[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
CHALLENGES FACING FIRST RESPONDERS IN BORDER COMMUNITIES
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY
COMMUNICATIONS, PREPAREDNESS,
AND RESPONSE
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 12, 2007
__________
Serial No. 110-56
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
48-930 WASHINGTON : 2009
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800
Fax: (202) 512�092104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402�0900012009
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California, PETER T. KING, New York
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts LAMAR SMITH, Texas
NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
JANE HARMAN, California MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon TOM DAVIS, Virginia
NITA M. LOWEY, New York DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
Columbia BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana
ZOE LOFGREN, California DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
Islands GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida
BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
HENRY CUELLAR, Texas DAVID DAVIS, Tennessee
CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania
YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York
AL GREEN, Texas
ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado
VACANCY
Jessica Herra-Flanigan, Staff Director & General Counsel
Rosaline Cohen, Chief Counsel
Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Robert O'Connor, Minority Staff Director
______
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS, PREPAREDNESS, AND RESPONSE
HENRY CUELLAR, Texas, Chairman
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
NITA M. LOWEY, New York MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana
Columbia DAVID DAVIS, Tennessee
DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin PETER T. KING, New York (Ex
Islands Officio)
BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina
BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex
Officio)
Craig Sharman, Director
Nichole Francis, Counsel
Brian Turbyfill, Clerk
Heather Hogg, Minority Senior Professional Staff Member
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Henry Cuellar, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Texas, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Emergency
Communications, Preparedness, and Response..................... 1
The Honorable Charles W. Dent, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Pennsylvania, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Emergency Communications, Preparedness, and Response........... 2
The Donna M. Christensen, a Delegate in Congress From the U.S.
Virgin Islands................................................. 35
The Honorable Bob Etheridge, a Representative in Congress From
the State of North Carolina.................................... 33
The Honorable Rick Larsen, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Washington............................................ 3
Witnesses
Mr. Bill Elfo, Sheriff, Whatcom County Sheriff's Office,
Washington State:
Oral Statement................................................. 12
Prepared Statement............................................. 15
Mr. Mike Kessler, Homeland Security Coordinator, The Confederated
Tribes of the Colville Reservation:
Oral Statement................................................. 18
Prepared Statement............................................. 19
Mr. Christopher H. Lombard, Communications/Special Operations,
Seattle Fire Department:
Oral Statement................................................. 21
Prepared Statement............................................. 24
Ms. Leesa Berens Morrison, Director, Arizona Department of
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 5
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
Chief Louis F. Sosa, Jr., Fire Chief, Laredo, Texas:
Oral Statement................................................. 9
Prepared Statement............................................. 11
Appendixes
A. Supplemental Testimony:
Hector Gonzalez, M.D........................................... 39
B. US-Mexico Border Public Safety and Public Health Response..... 43
C. Detailed Statement of Chief Sosa.............................. 45
D. For the Record:
Questions and Responses:
Responses from Mr. Bill Elfo............................... 49
Responses from Mr. Christopher Lombard..................... 51
Responses from Ms. Leesa Berens Morrison................... 56
CHALLENGES FACING FIRST RESPONDERS
IN BORDER COMMUNITIES
----------
Thursday, July 12, 2007
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Emergency Communications, Preparedness, and
Response,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:02 p.m., in
room 1539, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Henry Cuellar
[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Cuellar, Christensen, Etheridge,
and Dent.
Also Present: Representatives Reichart and Larsen of
Washington.
Mr. Cuellar. The Subcommittee on Emergency Communications,
Preparedness and Response will come to order.
The subcommittee is meeting today to receive testimony
regarding the unique challenges that first responders face in
the border communities, given their expanded responsibilities
in this post-9/11 world.
The Chair also would like to acknowledge that a member of
the committee who does not sit on the subcommittee, Mr.
Reichert, has asked to participate in today's hearing. In
addition, while he doesn't sit in the subcommittee or the full
committee, Mr. Larsen, the gentleman also from the State of
Washington may join us here today and will be introducing his
witness, the witness from his particular state. Consistent with
its rules and the practices of the committee, we are pleased to
honor their requests.
I now ask unanimous consent to allow Representatives Larsen
and Reichert to sit here to question the witnesses of today's
hearing.
Without objection, it is so ordered.
Again, good afternoon. First, on behalf of the members of
the subcommittee, let me welcome our panel of witnesses, who
work together to protect our citizens every day from any and
all threats they may face. We applaud you for your efforts. We
are glad that you are all here today; we look forward to
hearing from you today, the responders from both the northern
and the southern border regions to discuss challenges you face
in your communities and figure out ways to improve the
coordination of the emergency preparedness and response
efforts.
The United States shares nearly 6,000 miles of border with
Canada and the Republic of Mexico. The communities along these
borders vary in population and size and resources, and several
points along the borders are major points of entry to our
country.
You are uniquely positioned to address our preparedness
efforts in border communities and can provide Congress with the
insight needed to provide Federal policies. I am especially
interested in hearing the perspective from different folks. You
know, we have got folks from my hometown in Laredo; we have got
folks from the northern part of the country. And again, you
know, whether it is Arizona or the State of Washington, other
places, we have folks who are here.
Again, we are looking forward to our witnesses both from
the southern part of the United States and the northern part of
the United States, so they can share their unique experiences
and their best practices with us. We hope to gain an
understanding from our witnesses of the resources available to
their agencies, the existence of interstate and cross-border
mutual aid agreements and their emergency communications
capabilities.
It is unsettling that after the devastating Oklahoma City
bombing and the 9/11 attacks and Hurricanes Katrina and Rita,
there is still an outstanding need for improvement in emergency
communications. This is not a new vulnerability to us. Fire
fighters, police and other emergency responders can cannot
communicate during times of emergency.
It also greatly concerns us that our first responders are
not being given the tools necessary to protect the American
public.
Not only are our first responders called to duty in the
local communities, they also have a difficult task of taking
part in Federal activities that occur in these border regions.
This additional responsibility puts enormous strains on
personnel, equipment and greatly exhausts our critical
resources needed to adequately provide protection to the
American people.
I also look forward to examining the processes that are
needed to effectively share critical information along and
across the border. We have learned that oftentimes local law
enforcement personnel aren't receiving the information
necessary to actively deter threats; this is again a major
concern for the committee.
Let us agree to continue this dialogue as members of this
committee, and again we value the testimony that you are going
to give us. Together we must ensure that the American people
are protected from threats, especially the most vulnerable
areas of the country, the border. I also want to thank again
the witnesses for their testimony.
The Chair now recognizes the ranking member of the
subcommittee, the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Dent, for an
opening statement.
Mr. Dent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I just wanted to thank all of you for coming here
today.
As the Nation has debated border security and immigration
reform over the last several years, and especially recently, we
have touched on the impact that our unsecured borders have on
our border communities.
I have had the opportunity to visit Laredo, Texas, and had
the opportunity to do that last year with Mr. Cuellar and Chief
Sosa. While some communities have experienced a rise in violent
crime associated with border crossings, this may impact not
only law enforcement but also the public health system and
emergency medical services.
Across the country, communities rely on their local police,
fire fighters and EMS providers to protect them from threats
and respond to emergencies. After the terrorist attacks of
September 11, this country increasingly asked these individuals
to take on new responsibilities for homeland security. And
while these responsibilities certainly proved challenging to
the first responders across the country, those in border
communities may face even greater challenges on a daily basis.
For instance, during these hot summer months, many who
attempt to cross the southern border illegally may succumb to
extreme temperatures and require emergency attention. While
Federal officials often respond to these medical emergencies,
local EMS providers would also be called upon to assist.
Along the northern border, in addition to coordinating with
local and State authorities, the first responders must also
coordinate with Federal and Canadian officials to leverage
resources and avoid unnecessary duplication of effort and
comply with international treaties.
In port or seaside communities, first responders must
prepare for and respond to threats against our Nation's ports
and maritime trade. In these communities, first responders must
work with port officials, shipping industry and others to
ensure that they are prepared for a terrorist attack or other
disaster incident.
These are just a few of the additional challenges that
first responders in border communities now face.
Our witnesses today certainly represent both land borders
and seaport communities and come from a variety of backgrounds.
So I look forward to hearing your unique perspectives on the
various challenges that you face dealing with the increased
crime and violence along the borders and your coordination--
your ability to coordinate with Federal officials to protect
our border communities.
And again, Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for
putting on this hearing today and thank the witnesses for your
testimony. I look forward to receiving it.
Yield back.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you. I, of course, now welcome the panel
of witnesses. Let me go ahead and start with Mr. Larsen, if you
want to go ahead and introduce your witness.
STATEMENT OF HON. RICK LARSEN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS
FROM THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate the
chairman's and the ranking member's willingness to allow me to
sit in and introduce Sheriff Bill Elfo.
After I do the introduction, I will be headed upstairs to a
meeting until about 2:30. I would like to have an opportunity
to come back down and continue participating in the committee.
Sheriff Elfo, Bill Elfo, has served as sheriff of Whatcom
County in Washington State in my district since January of
2003. Sheriff Elfo previously served for over 6 years as the
Director of Public Safety for the border community of Blaine,
Washington. He has continuously served in law enforcement, for
over 33 years as a former prosecutor, and has also served as an
adjunct professor of criminal justice at several colleges and
universities. He holds a B.S. and M.S. in criminal justice, as
well as a Juris Doctorate. So, you know, he is clearly far
smarter than I am.
I think right now Sheriff Elfo is the current President of
the Washington State Sheriffs Association. He is a former
President of the Whatcom County Police Chiefs Association, a
member of the International Sheriffs Association, the
International Association of the Chiefs of Police, as well as a
variety of other organizations; and has served as Chair for the
Washington State Attorney General's Criminal Law and Sentencing
Committee of the Methamphetamine Task Force.
So the point I want to make is, he is extremely involved in
not just his job as a sheriff, but in all aspects of law
enforcement and the kind of coordination that we need to have
at our northern border, where you have not just a county
sheriff, but local police forces, you have Federal folks on our
side of the border, as well as everyone's equivalent on the
Canadian side of the border. So he can speak very well to the
challenges that we face at the northern border.
So, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for being willing to
allow Sheriff Elfo to come and talk about the unique challenges
that we have at the northern border, to be part of this
conversation as we move forward, especially for us as we move
forward to the 2010 Olympics in Vancouver, British Columbia, a
mere 30 to 40 miles across our border. But as we know, the
security shield for the Vancouver Olympics is not going to stop
at the border; it will continue down Washington State. So
coordination and communication is that much more important as
we move forward through the next 2 years.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you again for being with us.
Our other first witness, who we will get started with, is
Ms. Leesa Berens Morrison who is the Director of the Arizona
Department of Homeland Security. She is the first female
director for the department and was appointed in December of
2006. She previously served as the Director of the State
Department of Liquor Licenses and Control for 3 years and led
the Arizona Fraudulent Identification Task Force for Governor
Napolitano. And again we want to thank you for being here.
Our second witness is Luis Sosa, Chief of the Fire
Department located in my own hometown of Laredo. He has served
as chief for the last 6 years and has been with the fire
department since 1976. Again, Chief, thank you for being here
with us.
You met Mr. Bill Elfo. And, again, it is a pleasure having
you here, sir.
Our fourth witness is Mr. Mike Kessler, who has served as
the Commander of the Colville Confederated Tribes Police
Department. Mr. Kessler is responsible for overseeing the
tribal patrol officers and general operations of the entire
2,276 square mile Colville Indian Reservation in north central
Washington State. Thank you for being here with us.
Our fifth witness is Mr. Christopher Lombard, who leads the
communications and special operations efforts within the
Seattle, Washington, Fire Department. His current
responsibilities include the coordination and management and
maintenance of communications equipment, policies for special
operations teams, including Urban Search and Rescue and the
Metropolitan Medical response system.
Mr. Cuellar. And again, we want to welcome all of y'all.
Thank you for being here with us.
Without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be
inserted into the record. And I will ask each witness to
summarize his or her statements for 5 minutes, beginning with
Director Morrison.
STATEMENT OF LEESA MORRISON, DIRECTOR, ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY
Ms. Morrison. Thank you. Good afternoon, Chairman Cuellar,
Ranking Member Dent and committee members--Mr. Larsen. My name
is Leesa Berens Morrison and I serve as the Homeland Security
Director for the State of Arizona and as cochair of the
National Governors Association's Committee on Border Security.
Thank you for having me here to testify today.
I commend the committee for seeking solutions to the
challenges that our border-based first responders face. I would
also like to commend Chairman Cuellar for calling for the
creation of a border liaison at the Federal Department of
Homeland Security.
As I begin, I would be remiss if I did not point out
something that is very obvious. Arizona's southern border is
not just my State's border. It is the Nation's border to
another country and, in many ways, to the outside world.
The first responders of the border are men and women who
work every day to try to keep our citizens safe. They
understand that the new reality of a September 11 world means
that a broken border represents no less than a national
security crisis, and every day they operate with just that
sense of urgency. I believe our policymakers at the State and
Federal levels owe them the same sense of urgency.
I would like to discuss just two challenges this afternoon,
faced by first responders in border communities. The first is a
porous international border. The second is the absence of a
nationwide interoperable emergency communications system.
Because of our broken border, first responders working in
the region are in a constant state of emergency response,
making it even more challenging to operate when communications
among first responders is hindered. As a State that experiences
the majority of the Nation's illegal border crossings, Arizona
offers a real-world perspective on the implications that an
unsecured border has on emergency response. Every day we
address the repercussions of an open border, including border
violence, criminal activity, incarcerations, investigations and
autopsies, all of which place an undue and unsustainable
staffing and funding strain on our first responders.
While we wait for Federal action to secure the border and
alleviate these challenges, Arizona has taken temporary
measures to address this dire security gap. Governor Napolitano
released State emergency funds to pay for additional local law
enforcement patrols. We have applied State resources for
antigang squads and a fraudulent ID task force. We have
expanded the work of our fusion center, the Arizona
Counterterrorism Information Center, which now encompasses
members from local border counties.
However, it would be shortsighted to focus too much on
these measures, because they divert our first responders from
the regular duties within their communities. The real solution
to border crisis can only be found at the Federal level.
The second significant challenge facing first responders
along the border is a lack of a comprehensive, coordinated
system of interoperable communications. In Arizona, we don't
have to theorize about what our communication needs would be in
an emergency situation. Our first responders on the border
operate under these conditions every day.
With no comprehensive long-term Federal solution to the
communications vacuum in sight, States have applied Band-Aid
solutions that will work during emergency response. In Arizona,
we have spent our precious homeland security funding to develop
patching technologies, upgrade radio towers and purchase mobile
communication vans. But I reiterate, these temporary measures
are no substitute for comprehensive action at the Federal
level.
We need a long-term solution to the ongoing problem and
Federal dollars to implement the solution. The solution must
involve permanently installed infrastructure for real-time, on-
demand interoperability supported by 700 and/or 800 MHz trunks
and P25 compliant radios.
Arizona also encourages any Federal effort to provide
States with a distinct and separate funding stream for
interoperability funding efforts, such as the Department of
Commerce's Interoperability Grant Program. And since we know
that emergencies do not stop at international borders, I ask
that Congress take into consideration the additional need for
cross-border communications. We need to be able to communicate
with our neighbors to the south in the case of an emergency.
In summary, we will do all that we can do in Arizona to
address all of these challenges, but resources are scarce and
stretched way, way too thin. I would ask that Congress continue
to give attention to the unique challenges that border first
responders face every day, and apply funding and Federal
solutions to these challenges for the sake of homeland security
and the safety of our citizens.
I appreciate your time and your consideration, and I am
glad to answer any questions.
Mr. Cuellar. OK. Well, thank you for your testimony.
[The statement of Ms. Morrison follows:]
Prepared Statement of Leesa Berens Morrison
Chairman Cuellar, Ranking Member Dent and Committee Members.
My name is Leesa Berens Morrison and I serve as Homeland Security
Director for the State of Arizona and chair of the National Governors
Association's Border Security Committee, part of NGA's Governor's
Homeland Security Advisory Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to
testify before you today.
I commend you for calling this hearing on such an important and
timely subject, and for working to seek solutions to the challenges
faced by border-based first responders. I also would like to commend
Chairman Cuellar on calling for the creation of a Border Liaison at the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security to improve relationships and
communications on both sides of our border, as well as a comprehensive
study to determine the infrastructure, staffing and resources needed at
our borders. I applaud your commitment to improving border security,
and the Committee as a whole for taking the time to convene today.
As I begin my testimony, I would be remiss if I did not point out
something that, although obvious, is important to keep in mind.
Arizona's southern border is not just my state's border. It is our
nation's border to another country and, in many ways, to the outside
world. In our post-September 11 world, that means a broken and
malfunctioning border represents no less than a national security
crisis in the United States. The first responders at the border are men
and women who work every day to try to keep our citizens safe and
secure. They understand this reality and operate with that sense of
urgency. I believe our policy-makers at the state level and federal
level owe them the same sense of focus and urgency.
I would like to focus my remarks on two of the most troublesome
challenges faced by first responders in border communities. The first
is the porous, unsecured international border. As the state that
experiences the majority of the nation's illegal border crossings,
Arizona offers real-world perspective on the implications that an
unsecured border has on emergency response. The second challenge is a
nation that lacks a comprehensive, interoperable emergency
communications system, the absence of which makes it both dangerous and
difficult for first responders to protect and save lives. In Arizona we
do not have to theorize about what our communications needs would be in
an emergency situation--our first responders on the border operate
under these conditions every day.
The Challenges of a Porous Border
More than a million illegal crossers have been apprehended along
the 377-mile Arizona-Mexico border over the last two years. The
repercussions of so much illegal cross-border traffic include increased
border violence, criminal activity, incarcerations, investigations and
autopsies, all of which place an undue and unsustainable staffing and
funding burden on the first responders who work in this region. Through
no choice of our own, Arizona's first responders have also become, in
many ways, de-facto Border Patrol agents and immigration police. This
places an enormous strain on our first responders, not to mention the
overall security of our state.
As you consider the unique burdens on first responders in border
states, it is also critical to keep in mind that our southern border
is, for vast stretches, comprised of the desert. In many ways, the
crises our border-based first responders handle on a daily basis are
the result of the harsh environment in which they work. Firstly,
Arizona emergency responders along the border must be specially-trained
to work and function safely in very remote areas with extreme heat and
weather conditions, much like the special training provided to the
National Guard who reported to the southern border as part of Operation
Jumpstart. This alone represents a unique cost for first responders
that states like ours must bear.
But the much greater burden is that many of the emergencies we
respond to every day are immigration-related crises caused by the
extreme conditions in the desert. Each year first responders find
hundreds of bodies in the Arizonan desert. These were people attempting
to cross into the United States, but who succumbed to heat, dehydration
and other common problems associated with the conditions of our region.
In addition to being a tragic loss of life, each one of these deaths
also presents great cost of money and manpower to the State of Arizona
and to the Native American nations along the border. Recovery,
investigations, autopsies and burial costs all must be borne by our law
enforcement agencies and first responders.
For every one of the deaths that occur during attempted border
crossings, our first responders handle many more rescue operations.
Putting aside the problems with our broken border and outdated
immigration laws, first responders have an obligation to save lives,
and along the border they meet that obligation many times every day.
These life-saving emergency responses along our border every year
takes not only an economic toll on our border communities but it is
also an enormous drain on the emergency response system we have put in
place to deal with natural disasters and homeland security crises.
However, sitting by idly awaiting federal action to address the
cause of these strains--the open border--is not an option. To help fill
this dire security gap in our state, Arizona has:
Dissuaded illegal crossers through increased local law
enforcement patrols along the border, paid for with state
funding that was freed up when Governor Napolitano declared a
state of emergency in Arizona's border counties;
Decreased border-related crime through Arizona anti-
gang squads--Gang Intelligence and Immigration Team Enforcement
Missions (GIITEMs)--which include local law enforcement from
border communities;
Dismantled manufacturers and vendors of the fake IDs
that are used to facilitate violent human trafficking and other
crimes associated with illegal immigration, through the
Governor's Fraudulent ID Task Force, comprised of local and
state law enforcement;
Cracked down on border region auto theft through
Arizona's Stolen Vehicle Border Enforcement Strategy, through
which local and state law enforcement use high-tech cameras to
identify stolen vehicles as they travel southbound to the
Mexico border;
Formed intelligence-sharing partnerships with our
neighboring border states of California, New Mexico and Texas
and expanded the work of the Arizona Counter Terrorism
Information Center to encompass local law enforcement officers
from the border counties.
I am proud of the successes our border first responders, primarily
law enforcement, have had in addressing these additional challenges.
However, it would be shortsighted to focus too much on these temporary
measures because these efforts divert first responders from their
regular duties within their communities. The real solution to the
border crisis can only be found at the federal level. I am here today
to ask for your assistance so that our first responders can focus their
efforts on their primary duties in their local communities instead of
fulfilling, what we believe to be, a federal responsibility at our
borders.
Interoperability Challenges
A second significant challenge facing first responders along the
border is a lack of a comprehensive, coordinated system of
interoperable communications. Because of our broken border, first
responders working in the region are in a constant state of emergency
response, making it even more challenging to operate when
communications among first responders is hindered. And after our many
months and years in this situation, it is clear that the
interoperability of our emergency communications systems is still
inadequate.
With no comprehensive long-term federal solution to the
communications vacuum in sight, states have applied a ``band-aid''
approach that works only during emergency response. In Arizona, we have
spent precious homeland security funding to provide for
interoperability along the border and throughout the state on a short
term basis, including:
Building patching technologies, upgrading radio towers
and purchasing Mobile Communications Vans that allow Arizona
first responders to communicate with one another during
emergency response efforts. Just last year Arizona opened an
additional two regional communications hubs in Santa Cruz
County to further enhance border interoperability during
emergencies;
Developing a mutual aid agreement with Sonora to share
response equipment that provide secure radio communications
among law enforcement and response agencies working along the
border;
Creating a Collaborative Border Regional Alliance to
develop cooperative relationships among the disparate
communications service providers supporting the Arizona/Sonora
region;
Holding bi-national exercises involving hundreds of
Arizona and Mexican firefighters, medical responders and law
enforcement officers who work along the border to test cross-
border interoperability.
I can give you hundreds of examples of how these interim measures
have assisted our first responders' communications capabilities during
emergency responses along our border. But, I reiterate that these
temporary measures are no substitute for comprehensive action at the
federal level to upgrade our nation's public safety communications
systems and achieve fixed, permanently-installed infrastructure for
real-time, on-demand interoperability, supported by 700/800 MHz,
trunked and P25 compliant radios. We need a long-term solution to this
ongoing problem, and federal dollars to implement the solution. For all
of our safety, we owe our first responders the ability to communicate
with one another during all emergency response efforts, not just large-
scale events. And since emergencies do not stop at international
borders, I ask that Congress take into consideration the additional
need for cross-border communications.
Arizona also encourages any federal effort to provide states with a
distinct and separate funding stream for interoperability efforts, such
as the Department of Commerce's interoperability grant program.
Funding Shortfalls
The simple fact is that state and local response efforts depend to
a large degree on federal homeland security funding, and although these
funds have decreased over recent years the challenges to first
responders, especially in border communities have continued to grow.
First responders will always be the first people we turn to, whether
it's a terrorist attack or a national disaster. We trust these
firefighters, law enforcement officers and emergency medical personnel
to save our lives. In return, they trust us to ensure that they have
the resources they needs to keep us safe and our nation secure. And at
the border our first responders need specific cross-border pandemic
plans, unique critical infrastructure protection and bi-national
preparedness and training systems. I believe all of this should all be
given due consideration when federal homeland security funding
allotments are determined. We will continue to do all we can in Arizona
to address these challenges, but resources are scarce and stretched too
thin.
Closing
In closing, I ask that Congress continue to give attention to the
unique challenges that border first responders face every day, and to
apply the necessary funding and federal solutions to these challenges,
for the sake of homeland security and the safety of our citizens.
Since 9/11 first responders have been asked to do more for their
communities than ever before. In addition to their everyday heroic
efforts while walking beats, suppressing fires, conducting search and
rescue and hazardous materials response and providing emergency medical
care, first responders today are constantly on the lookout for
terrorist activity. And first responders working in border communities
bear the additional responsibilities that must be acknowledged and
addressed.
I appreciate your time and consideration, and am pleased to answer
any questions you have at this time.
Mr. Cuellar. At this time, we recognize Chief Sosa to
summarize his statement for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF LUIS F. SOSA, JR., FIRE CHIEF, LAREDO, TEXAS; BILL
ELFO, SHERIFF, WHATCOM COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, WASHINGTON
STATE
Chief Sosa. Chairman Cuellar, Ranking Member Dent and
members of the Subcommittee on Emergency Communication,
Preparedness and Response, on the border, because we are often
so isolated from any surrounding communities on the U.S. side,
we understand better than most that we are on our own to
address the threats not only to the people, property and
economy of Laredo, but increasingly the United States.
For instance, while my colleagues in New York City or the
District of Columbia may rely upon union assistance, joint
assistance programs with surrounding communities, in times of
challenge, in Laredo our nearest support is 2 hours away,
despite Nuevo Laredo, Mexico, a city of 600,000 population,
just across the river. And while the Federal agents manning the
border posts have other security responsibilities, Laredo bears
the burden with respect to protection of life, health and
property.
While the chairman is well aware of Los Dos Laredos, or the
two Laredos, and the role we play on the border, let's take a
moment to share some insights about my community with the
subcommittee. In outlining Laredo's role on the border, I am
also seeking to answer the questions that many of you may have.
Why should Federal resources be used to support services
that are typically provided by every local government?
Laredo is at the center of the primary trade route
connecting Canada, the United States and Mexico. We are the
gateway to Mexico's burgeoning industrial complex. The two
Laredos are actually one city divided only by one river.
Laredo became the first official port of entry on the U.S.
and Mexico border in 1851. In fact, the United States consulate
in Nuevo Laredo, Mexico, is America's oldest, continuously
active diplomatic post, established in 1872. Today, the Laredo
Customs District handles more trade than the land ports of
Southern California, Arizona, New Mexico and West Texas
combined.
The city of Laredo provides a unified approach of police,
fire and public health first responders to ensure safety,
security and public health disease control and preparedness. We
also provide training, planning and support for disease control
and prevention through our public health authority.
We support our Federal and State partners in responding to
public health and safety hazards, challenges such as primary
response for river rescue and recovery, as well as response to
bomb threats at our international bridges to conduct searches
for weapons of mass destruction.
Despite Laredo's providing these national defense services,
Laredo is not a direct beneficiary of any of the new DHS
programs because Federal funding of homeland security has been
limited to the U.S. census data.
Funding formulas must be changed to address threat levels
and services provided to the Nation by border communities.
Laredo is providing the services; it is time that the Nation
provides Laredo with a fair share of resources needed for these
efforts.
Federal funding for homeland security and public health
response initiatives must compensate local communities that are
providing protection to the Nation. The easiest way to
accomplish this goal is to create a border category in all
funding formulas.
There are also specific steps that the Congress can take to
address these challenges. The UASI should be changed to make
proximity to the border a threat criterion, and funding should
be available for people and equipment required to meet threats
to the Nation's health and safety. Laredo provides more public
health responders and public safety responders on the border
than the Federal Government, yet it is not eligible for any
direct funding.
The port security initiative must be modified to include
all major ports, not simply water ports. The city of Laredo is
the Nation's largest inland port on the U.S.-Mexico border, and
yet it is not eligible for port security funding. International
bridges should be included in the protected class of
infrastructure of national significance. Their loss would have
a major impact to the Nation's economy.
Creative border security initiatives, such as Laredo's
``River Vega'' project, that enhance national security by
clearing lines of sight and building river retaining walls with
the result being an integrated national security project should
be supported.
All other DHS and Department of Justice programs which fund
first responders, like the SAFER grant and the COPS grant, must
be fully funded; and the role a community plays in supporting
national security must be included in the funding criteria.
Laredo is the only southern border city strategically
positioned at the convergence of all land transportation
systems. While this location results in Laredo being our
Nation's largest inland port on the southern border, it also
means that Laredo's public safety and health programs are
heavily burdened with the flow of such commerce.
Laredo is the shipping and receiving dock for the urban
centers and seaports in your States. There are even statistics
on the amount of cargo that flows from or returns to your
States, like Washington, New York, Pennsylvania, the Carolinas
and beyond.
Laredo and other communities strive for healthy and safe
communities. Sometimes we are asked to bear too large a burden
in keeping our Nation healthy and safe. We look to this economy
to assist us obtain the resources we need to help us meet that
challenge.
Thank you.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Chief, for your testimony.
[The statement of Chief Sosa follows:]
Prepared Statement of Louis F. Sosa
INTRODUCTION
Chairman Cuellar, Ranking Member Dent and Members of the
Subcommittee on Emergency Communications, Preparedness, and Response--
Good morning. I am Luis F. Sosa, Jr. I have been proud to lead the
Laredo Fire Department, a three hundred and thirty--three (333)
uniformed personal department, since 2001. Like my father before me, my
professional career has been as a first responder on the border, having
joined the Department in 1976. .
LEADERSHIP OF CHAIRMAN CUELLAR
Before I begin my formal testimony, I would like to take a moment
on behalf of my fellow border first responders in Laredo to thank
Chairman Cuellar and this Committee for the focus you have brought to
the challenges we face. This past March, Chairman Cuellar sat down with
me, Laredo Police Chief Dovalina and Laredo Health Director Dr. Hector
Gonzales to craft a US-Mexico Border Public Safety and Public Health
Response paper. The conclusion of that paper, a copy of which is
attached to my testimony, is that there is a need for a Federal-Local
partnership.
ISOLATION & COOPERATIVE EFFORTS
On the border, because we are so often so isolated from any
surrounding communities on the U.S. side, we understand better than
most that we are on our own to address threats not only to the people,
property and economy of Laredo, but increasingly to the United States.
For instance, while my colleagues in New York City or the District of
Columbia may rely upon joint assistance programs with surrounding
communities in times of challenge, in Laredo, ``our nearest U.S.
support'' is over an hour's drive away, despite Nuevo Laredo, a city of
600,000 being just across the river. And while the Federal agents
manning the border posts have point responsibility for security, Laredo
bears the burden with respect to protection of life, health and
property.
LOS DOS LAREDOS AND THE ROLE WE PLAY ON THE BORDER
While the Chairman is well aware of ``La Dos Laredos,'' or ``The 2
Laredos'' and the role we play on the border, let me take a moment to
share some insights about my community with the Subcommittee. In
outlining Laredo's role on the border, I am also seeking to answer the
question that many of you may have--Why should federal resources be
used to support services that are typically provided by every local
government?
A. Largest and Oldest Southern Inland Port
Laredo is at the center of the primary trade route connecting
Canada, the United States and Mexico. We are the gateway to Mexico's
burgeoning industrial complex. The two Laredos are actually one city,
divided only by a river. Laredo became the first ``official'' Port of
Entry on the U.S./Mexico border in 1851. (In fact, the United States
Consulate in Nuevo Laredo, Mexico is America's oldest continuously
active diplomatic post, established in 1872.) Today, the Laredo Customs
District handles more trade than the land ports of Southern California,
Arizona, New Mexico and West Texas combined.
B. Services We Provide Laredo and Nation
The City of Laredo provides its local citizens and the nation a
comprehensive public safety and public health response to threats at
the border. Laredo provides:
A unified approach of police, fire and public health
first responders to ensure safety, security and public health
disease control and preparedness.
Training, planning and support for disease control and
prevention through its public health authority.
Support for our federal and state partners in
responding public health and safety hazards challenges such as
primary response for river rescue and recovery as well as
response to bomb threats at our international bridges to
conduct searches for weapons of mass destruction.
CHALLENGE
Despite Laredo providing these national defense services, Laredo is
not a direct beneficiary of any of the new DHS programs because federal
funding for homeland security has been limited to US census data.
Funding formulas must be changed to address threat levels and services
provided to the nation by border communities. Laredo is providing the
services. It is time that the nation provides Laredo with a fair share
of the resources needed for these efforts.
SOLUTIONS
Federal funding for homeland security and public health response
initiatives must compensate local communities that are providing
protection to the nation. The easiest way to accomplish this goal is to
create a border category in all funding formulas.
There are also specific steps that the Congress can take to address
these challenges:
UASI should be changed to make proximity to the border
a threat criterion and funding should be available for people
and equipment required to meet threats to the nation's health
and safety. Laredo provides more public health responders and
public safety responders on the border than the federal
government, yet it is not eligible for direct funding.
The Port Security initiative must be modified to
include all major ports, not simply water ports. The City of
Laredo is the nation's largest inland port on the U.S. Mexico
border, yet it is not eligible for port security funding.
International Bridges should be included in the
protected class of infrastructure of national significance.
Their losses would have a major impact on the nation's economy.
Creative border security initiatives such as Laredo's
``River Vega'' project that enhance national security by
clearing lines of sight and building river retaining walls with
the result being an integrated national security project should
be supported.
All other DHS and Department of Justice programs which
fund first responders (i.e. SAFER, COPS) must be fully funded
and the role a community plays in supporting national security
must be included in the funding criteria.
CONCLUSION
Laredo is the only southern border city strategically positioned at
the convergence of all land transportation systems. While this location
results in Laredo being our nation's largest inland port on the
southern border, it also means that Laredo's public safety and health
programs are heavily burdened with the flow of such commerce. Laredo is
the shipping and receiving dock for the urban centers and seaports in
your states. There are statistics of the amount of cargo that flows
from, or returns to, your states of Mississippi, Washington, New York,
Pennsylvania, Indiana, the Carolinas, Alabama and beyond. Laredo and
other border communities strive for healthy and safe communities.
Sometimes we are asked to bear too large a burden in keeping our nation
healthy and safe. We look to this committee assist us obtain the
resources we need to meet that challenge.
Thank you and I look forward to your questions.
Mr. Cuellar. At this time I now recognize Sheriff Bill Elfo
to summarize his statement for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF BILL ELFO, SHERIFF, WHATCOM COUNTY SHERIFF'S
OFFICE, WASHINGTON STATE
Mr. Elfo. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank
you for the invitation and opportunity to be here today to
discuss some of the unique challenges and successes of first
responders in northern border communities.
Whatcom County is located in the extreme northwest corner
of the United States, or the continental United States. It
encompasses 2,150 square miles and has a population of over
186,000. We share a 90-mile land border with Canada and 30
miles of Puget Sound coastline. We have 10,000-foot-high
mountains and a remote terrain that is often difficult to
access.
We are 30 miles south of Vancouver, British Columbia, site
of the 2010 Olympics. We include Point Roberts, which is unique
and presents special law enforcement and homeland security
challenges; not physically connected to the U.S. mainland, it
is surrounded on three sides by water and is accessible by land
only by driving 26 miles of busy Canadian highways and
processing through two Customs checkpoints in two countries.
Local responders are challenged to provide protection and
emergency response to key critical infrastructure related to
the border and commerce that includes refineries and butane and
propane storage facilities. Not only are these facilities
vulnerable to attacks that are capable of producing major local
devastation, but their destruction would cause international
consequences.
The northern border experiences serious problems with
narcotics, human and weapons smuggling; and it has been the
route for terrorists on two occasions to enter the United
States. Fortunately, good cooperation between homeland security
and local law enforcement exists, and we work together to
detect and capture hundreds of wanted criminals each year.
Border bounce-backs involve over 600 persons per month from
around the country, seeking admission to Canada, who are denied
entry because of criminal records, mental illness or indigency.
Many remain in our community and cause problems including
brutal murders.
It is essential that local State and Federal law
enforcement and other first responders continue to work
together to mitigate these unique challenges and protect our
community and Nation.
Local and State responders in Whatcom County include the
Whatcom County Sheriff's Office, which has county-wide
responsibilities plus 10 city, State and tribal first responder
agencies. All major components of the Department of Homeland
Security are present, as is the FBI, the DEA, the National
Parks Service and the U.S. border services which conduct
operations in Whatcom County. Fire protection and emergency
medical services are provided through 19 independent fire
agencies.
Since the 9/11 attacks, there has been a large infusion of
DHS agents into our community. Staffing assets at the Border
Patrol, Coast Guard, ICE and CBP have increased dramatically.
Particularly notable was the establishment of the CBP Air and
Marine unit at Bellingham Airport.
Cooperation and resource-sharing between local and Federal
law enforcement officials have been outstanding. The county has
been a good partner to Federal law enforcement as well.
In our local system, we prosecute and process over 80
percent of the cases that are initiated by Federal law
enforcement agencies. The county recently launched a data-
sharing project that allows local, State and Federal law
enforcement to share criminal data; and we have established a
highly skilled and equipped Sheriff's Special Response Team to
respond to situations requiring special weapons tactics and
equipment.
The Sheriff's Office has worked with DHS and others to
develop major functional exercises that will test interagency
response, communications and coordination. However, despite
these successes, many gaps and vulnerabilities continue to
exist. Much more needs to be done to improve response
capabilities, communications and information-sharing.
To meet these challenges, it is absolutely essential that
first responders are able to fully cooperate and communicate
with each other. At present, none of the agencies have
dependable communication systems that cover their entire area
of operations. Not all agencies can operate in a secure mode,
and there is really no common frequency to bring all agencies
together for true interoperability.
Terrain challenges and a lack of funding have precluded the
achievement of a workable countywide system. Treaties granting
Industry Canada approval of border area frequency licenses
further limit options.
It is essential that border area first responders at all
levels develop capabilities, including a joint operation center
large enough to accommodate everyone to work together in times
of need under protocols established by the National Incident
Management System. DHS is reviewing EOC capabilities in
connection with the 2010 Olympics, and this may provide an
opportunity to resolve that situation.
Federal assistance is needed to reach agreements with the
Canadian Government and eliminate bureaucratic and systematic
impediments that delay critical emergency responses to parts of
our county, particularly Point Roberts, and facilitate the
timely response of law enforcement.
We are also burdened with some new regulations; regulations
requiring passports to re-enter the United States at Point
Roberts have been an impediment. We have asked for the State
Department's help and it has not been forthcoming. We are now
engaged in the time-consuming, expensive process of acquiring
passports for our law enforcement personnel. We also need to
work toward better relations with Customs Canada on capturing
wanted criminals who try to enter Canada to flee American
justice.
The sheriffs of the State and other law enforcement
officials are concerned about the timeliness and adequacy of
information provided by Federal officials regarding threats in
our local communities. Improvements have been made, including
enhanced intelligence fusion centers, but much more needs to be
done. Problems encountered at the local county level can be
dealt with by local law enforcement agencies and other first
responders if adequate resources are provided for staffing,
training, equipment, interoperable communications and
exercises.
Leaders in local first response agencies are in the best
position to assess local needs and mount responses. No State or
Federal agency is as familiar with these issues as sheriffs and
other local emergency response officials. Consequently, they
are in the best position to prevent, respond and mitigate the
effects of border crime and threats.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you again for your testimony.
[The statement of Mr. Elfo follows:]
Prepared Statement of Bill Elfo
Bill Elfo has served as Sheriff of Whatcom County, Washington since
January of 2003. Sheriff Elfo previously served for over six years as
Director of Public Safety for the border community of Blaine,
Washington. Sheriff Elfo has continuously served in law enforcement for
over 33 years and is a former prosecutor, has served an adjunct
professor of criminal justice at several colleges and universities and
currently serves on the criminal justice advisory board for two
colleges.
Sheriff Elfo holds a BS and MS in Criminal Justice as well as a
Juris Doctorate. He is a graduate of the FBI Command College, the FBI
National Law Institute, the Southern Police Institute and many other
professional training programs. He holds Executive Level Certification
from the Washington State Criminal Justice Training Commission. Sheriff
Elfo is a member of the Washington State Bar, the Bar of the United
States District Court of the Western District of Washington and the
bars of several other state and federal courts.
Sheriff Elfo is the current president of the Washington State
Sheriff's Association and a former president of the Whatcom County
Police Chiefs Association. He is a member of the National Sheriff's
Association, the International Association of Chiefs of Police, the
Washington Association of Sheriffs and Police Chiefs and the Whatcom
County Police Chiefs Association.
He served as Chair of the Washington State Attorney General's
Criminal Law and Sentencing Committee of the Methamphetamine Task
Force. He has been invited to serve on the National Sheriffs'
Association, Sheriff's Mutual Aid Response Committee.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Homeland Security Committee:
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you and discuss
some of the unique challenges confronting first-responders in border
communities and to present some of the successes we have experienced in
dealing with them.
Whatcom County is located in the extreme northwest corner of
Washington State. It is over 2150 square miles in size and shares an
approximate 90-mile land border with Canada and has 35 miles of Puget
Sound coastline. Geographically diverse, the County includes 10,000
foot high mountains and remote terrain that are very difficult to
access. Whatcom County is located just 30 miles south of Vancouver,
British Columbia the site of the 2010 Winter Olympics. With over
186,000 residents it is home to Western Washington University, Whatcom
Community College and Bellingham Technical College.
Unique law enforcement and homeland security challenges are
presented by the 1500 resident County community of Point Roberts. Point
Roberts is not physically connected to the rest of the County or the
United States by land and is surrounded on three sides by water. By
land, it is only reachable by driving through 26 miles of busy Canadian
highways and processing through two Customs checkpoints.
Local responders are challenged to provide protection and emergency
responses to key critical infrastructure within the County. Not only is
this infrastructure vulnerable to attacks that can result in local
devastation, but if disrupted, could lead to major regional, national
and international consequences.
Two major oil refineries, a large aluminum smelter, two major dams
providing hydro-electricity, and propane/butane production and storage
facilities all are located within the County. Marine ports of entry,
petroleum pipelines, railways and an interstate highway facilitate
international commerce. Pipelines provide fuel to Sea-Tac airport south
of Seattle and to McChord Air Force Base.
The northern border has experienced serious problems with
narcotics, human and weapons smuggling. Terrorists have traversed it to
enter our Country. Abu Mezer, who planned the bombing of the New York
City subway system, entered the United States at the Blaine Washington
port of entry. Ahmed Ressam entered the country through Port Angeles,
Washington with explosives and a plan to attack Los Angeles
International Airport.
Fortunately, Customs and Border Protection officers and local law
enforcement work together to detect hundreds of wanted criminals
seeking to cross the international border. In additions to detecting
hundreds of cases involving weapons, drugs, kidnapping and stolen
property, Whatcom County processes on average, 150 wanted fugitives
from across the country every year. The cities of Blaine (population
4000) and Sumas (population 700) straddle the border and their police
departments are also involved in these efforts.
On average, over 600 persons a month seeking admission to Canada or
seeking entry to Canada to reach Alaska, are denied entry because of
criminal records, mental illness or indigency. Some remain in our
community and cause problems. A Colorado sex offender was denied entry
to Canada and returned to Bellingham where he brutally murdered a woman
in a city park. A criminal alien who had recently been denied entry to
Canada stabbed a young worker to death in a Bellingham shopping center.
It is essential that local, state and federal law enforcement and
other first responder agencies work together to mitigate these unique
challenges and protect our community and nation.
The municipalities of Blaine, Sumas, Lynden, Everson-Nooksack,
Ferndale and Bellingham operate their own police departments and the
Whatcom County Sheriff's Office has jurisdiction throughout the County.
Other local and state law enforcement agencies operating within the
County include the Washington State Patrol, the Western Washington
University Police Department, Lummi Nation Law and Order and the
Nooksack Tribal Police Department. Major components of the Department
of Homeland Security present in Whatcom County include Customs and
Border Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Coast Guard
and the Border Patrol. The FBI, DEA, National Park Service and the U.S.
Forest Service law enforcement components also maintain operations and
offices within the County.
Fire protection and emergency medical services are provided through
sixteen independent fire districts, the City of Bellingham and Lynden
Fire Departments, the Department of Natural Resources and a volunteer
fire agency operated by Seattle City Light at the Skagit River Project.
The Sheriff's Office Division of Emergency Management provides overall
emergency coordination and operates an emergency operations center.
Since the attacks of 9-11, there has been a large infusion of
agents of the Department of Homeland Security into our community.
Staffing and assets at the Border Patrol, Coast Guard, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement and Customs and Border Protection have increased
dramatically.
Particularly notable was the establishment of the Customs and
Border Protection Air and Marine Unit at the Bellingham International
Airport. Cooperation and resource sharing between local and federal law
enforcement officials have been outstanding. Air resources provided in
times of emergency have proven invaluable. The Border Patrol has agreed
to assign an agent to the regional drug task force and the Coast Guard
makes its vessels and crews available to assist on a variety of
missions.
The County continues to be a good partner and processes over 80% of
the criminal cases initiated by federal officers in our local criminal
justice system. The County recently launched a data-sharing project
that will allow all local, state, and federal participating agencies to
share data. A highly skilled and equipped Sheriff's Special Response
Team is able to provide special weapons and tactics when necessary.
The Sheriff's Office is also working closely with the Department of
Homeland Security, the State Military Department and other emergency
response agencies and has developed functional exercises designed to
test interagency response, communications and coordination.
Despite these successes, many gaps and vulnerabilities continue to
exist. Much more needs to be done to improve communications,
information sharing, response capabilities and relationships.
To meet these challenges, it is absolutely essential that local,
state and federal first-responders are able to fully cooperate and
communicate with each other. None of these agencies have a dependable
communications system that covers their entire area of operations.
Interoperability is a wish that is yet to be fulfilled.
Most federal agencies operate on VHF band. State and locals operate
on the VHF and UHF bands. There is no common frequency that brings all
the agencies together for true interoperability and the closest thing
we have is the Law Enforcement Radio Network (LERN) frequency. This
frequency is not on repeater channels and communications are generally
limited to line of sight. Some of the agencies have the ability to
operate in the secure mode, but not all. When rapid communications are
needed, they are not forthcoming.
Terrain challenges and a lack of funding have precluded the
achievement of a workable countywide system. In some areas,
communication capabilities are nonexistent. Treaties that grant
Industry Canada a review of border area frequency assignments and
licensing further limit options. The Sheriff's Office is currently
studying the feasibility of improving communications through satellite
and Internet technologies.
It is essential that border area first responders at all levels of
government develop capabilities to coordinate responses and resources
at major events influenced or affected by the international border. A
joint emergency operations center large enough to accommodate border
related activities should be constructed and maintained within our
border county to integrate activities in times of emergency under
protocols established by the National Incident Management System
(NIMS). Current facilities are undersized and under-equipped to meet
the challenges of large-scale events. The State emergency operations
center is located over 140 miles from the border and in the event of a
large-scale emergency requiring multiple agency coordination and a
unified command structure, it is unlikely that local personnel who are
critical to the success of the mission will be able to leave their
communities to reach a distant operations center. The Department of
Homeland Security is currently reviewing emergency operations needs in
advance of the 2010 Olympics. This should be viewed as an opportunity
to develop a joint emergency operations center.
Federal assistance is also needed to reach agreements with the
Canadian government and eliminate bureaucratic and systematic
impediments that delay critical emergency responses to parts of our
County and facilitate improved communications and information sharing.
As previously described, Point Roberts is not connected to the rest
of the United States by land. Nonetheless, the Whatcom County Sheriff's
Office is responsible for protecting and providing emergency services.
Prior agreements with the Province of British Columbia permitted the
Sheriff's Office to obtain provincial firearm permits for the limited
purpose of traveling to Point Roberts. A few years ago our federal
government negotiated a national policy replaced the workable local
policy.
Registered law enforcement officers can enter Canada to travel to
Point Roberts. However, the process now involves reporting to Customs
Canada, waiting for the deputy's name to be checked against a registry,
unloading all firearms, securing the firearm in a locked container in
the trunk of the police vehicle, driving through Canada, reporting to
the U.S. Port of Entry, removing the weapon from the container in the
trunk, reloading it and proceeding to the emergency. As you can
imagine, this system is unworkable and wastes valuable minutes when
they are most needed. Furthermore, there are no provisions that allow
our Special Response Team to respond to the Point with needed special
weapons and equipment.
As I was preparing this testimony, the Sheriff's Office was
confronted with an explosive device that had been shipped to a business
at Point Roberts through the mail. Emergency responders were delayed in
their response because of these policies. Eventually, a Coast Guard
vessel was secured to transport them on a boat.
The Sheriff's Office asked for the assistance of the State
Department in expediting and waiving fees for newly required passports
for trips to Point Roberts. Many of these trips are needed to support
our federal partners at the Ports of Entry. No assistance was
forthcoming and we are now engaged in the expensive and time-consuming
process of acquiring passports for our personnel.
It is not uncommon for wanted criminals to try and make their way
to Canada. In January 2006 two individuals who committed a brutal
murder in California were located during a joint Sheriff's Office--
Homeland Security Operation that resulted in a high-speed pursuit and
gunfire. After assaulting federal agents, the fugitives' vehicle was
stopped literally inches from the border. When information regarding
the pursuit was relayed to Customs Canada, their unarmed Customs
officers abandoned their posts and their union issued a press release
about unsafe working conditions.
A short time later, another fugitive wanted for murder was
suspected of being headed for the Whatcom County area. U.S. Marshals
notified Customs Canada. Canadian Customs officers promptly walked off
the job and issued a press release about the fugitive and unsafe
working conditions. These actions not only jeopardized operations
designed to apprehend the suspect, but endangered the lives of all law
enforcement officers who may have confronted them. Until issues such as
these can be resolved, local law enforcement is reluctant to share
criminal intelligence information with Customs Canada.
The Sheriffs of the State and other law enforcement officials are
concerned about the timeliness and adequacy of information provided by
federal officials about threats in their local communities.
Improvements have been implemented over the past year including an
enhanced intelligence fusion center. However, more needs to be done to
ensure that notifications to local law enforcement are timely and
relevant.
The problems encountered at the local county level can be dealt
with by local law enforcement agencies and other first responders if
adequate resources are provide for staffing, training, equipment
acquisition, interoperable communications, and exercises. Leaders in
local first-response agencies are in the best position to assess local
needs and mount responses. No state, regional or federal agency is as
familiar with these issues as sheriffs and local law enforcement
leaders. Consequently, they are in the best position to prevent,
respond and mitigate the effects of border crime.
Mr. Cuellar. I now recognize Commander Mike Kessler to
summarize his statement in 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MIKE KESSLER, HOMELAND SECURITY COORDINATOR, THE
CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE COLVILLE RESERVATION
Mr. Kessler. Good afternoon, Chairman Cuellar, Ranking
Member Dent, members of the subcommittee. My name is Mike
Kessler and I am testifying today on behalf of the Confederated
Tribes of Colville Reservation in my position as Commander with
the Tribal Police Department. I am also responsible for
homeland and border security issues.
A little bit of background on the Colville Tribe: Although
we are recognized as one tribe, right now there are 12 smaller
bands that come together to form that confederation. The
Colville Reservation encompasses approximately 2,275 square
miles. We have about 9,300 tribal members, half of which live
on or near the reservation.
Our reservation also encompasses two counties and two
homeland security regions. Due to that issue, we very rarely,
if at any time, get homeland security funds because they are
filtered through the State.
Among the issues that I would like to briefly highlight are
the recent float plane incidents that we have had on the
Colville Indian Reservation. We continue to have drug smuggling
come across the reservation--excuse me, come across the border.
Those float planes land on remote waterways, remote airstrips
within the reservation. The planes that we have contacted--we
seized one, arrested the pilot; that plane was carrying in
excess of 400 pounds of illegal narcotics, including marijuana
and Ecstasy.
For each plane that we sight or can make contact with, we
have gotten information that there are four or five that we
don't. These are both fixed-wing and rotor-wing type aircraft.
The issues that face us in this instance are mainly our
communications. The two aircraft that have been contacted--we
contacted one, Border Patrol contacted another within about 20
miles of the reservation borders--had radios that were able to
monitor local police and Border Patrol frequencies. They know
where we are at, they know what we are doing, they know when to
land, where to land; and that is causing an issue for us.
The other issue as far as resources is manpower. I have 18
patrol officers to cover 2,270 square miles. That puts about
three officers on at any given time on a 24/7 shift. With 2,275
square miles to cover, I can't have officers anywhere close to
one of these aircraft sightings at any given time; and they
take advantage of that fact. Like I said, they know where we
are at and what we are doing.
Because of the lack of funding and the lack of our access
to homeland security funding, our communications system is
lacking, if you will. We have no digitally capable radios at
this point. We can talk to our local county sheriff's
department, but if they decide to have an emergency and go--
they are digitally capable to go to their digital channels--we
are left out. We have no capability of doing that.
Forest Service, Border Patrol, all of those local agencies
again have P25-capable radios. We don't. We can't communicate
with them.
Among the homeland security responsibilities that the tribe
has undertaken are the three dams we have with immediate access
to the reservation. The reservation is surrounded on three
sides by water, the Columbia River to the east and to the south
and the Okanogan River to the west. On the Columbia, there are
two dams that border the reservation. Grand Coulee Dam is on
our southern border, Chief Joseph Dam is on our western border
and Wells Dam is within 10 miles of the reservation.
Grand Coulee Dam, the Lake Roosevelt Reservoir, the tribe
is one of only two agencies in the area that have the
capability of patrolling the waterways. The lack of funding for
that arena has led to a lack of those patrols, and therefore,
has reduced somewhat the protection to the dam. We are able to
respond but our response is slowed.
Having direct access to homeland security funding that is
not filtered by the State and by the counties would greatly
enhance the tribe's capability to provide protection to Grand
Coulee Dam, the citizens of the reservation and the citizens of
the surrounding counties.
Thank you.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you again for your testimony.
[The statement of Mr. Kessler follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mike Kessler
Good afternoon Chairman Cuellar, Ranking Member Dent, and members
of the Subcommittee. My name is Mike Kessler, and I am testifying today
on behalf of the Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation
(`Colville Tribe'' or ``Tribe''). I am the Commander of the Colville
Tribe's Police Department and also serve as the lead coordinator for
the Tribe's homeland and border security activities. I appreciate this
opportunity to testify on the unique challenges the Colville Tribe
faces as a tribal community along the northern border of the United
States. Specifically, I would like to address the Colville Tribe's
ongoing battle with cross-border smuggling, the resources and funding
challenges we face, and our experience working and coordinating with
government agencies.
I would first like to provide a brief background on the Colville
Tribe and its geographic location. Although now considered a single
Indian tribe, the Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation is,
as the name states, a confederation of 12 smaller aboriginal tribes and
bands from all across eastern Washington State. The Colville
Reservation encompasses approximately 2,275 square miles and is in
north-central Washington State. The Colville Tribe has nearly 9,300
enrolled members, making it one of the largest Indian tribes in the
Pacific Northwest. About half of the Tribe's members live on or near
the Colville Reservation.
The northern boundary of the present-day Colville Reservation is
approximately 70 miles long and within 30 miles of the U.S.-Canadian
border. The former North Half of the Colville Reservation, which was
opened to non-Indian settlement in the late 1800s, extends northward
from the existing boundary to the Canadian border. The Colville Tribe
and individual tribal members retain ownership of numerous tracts of
land in the North Half, the largest of which are either contiguous to
or within five miles of the Canadian border. The Tribe exercises law
enforcement and regulatory jurisdiction over these lands.
In addition to the Tribe's proximity to the Canadian border, a
portion of the Grand Coulee Dam--the largest hydroelectric power plant
in the United States and the third largest in the world--is on the
Colville Reservation. Chief Joseph Dam, another dam on the Columbia
River system, is also partially located on the Colville Reservation.
Yet another dam, the Wells Dam, is located less than 10 miles from the
southwestern boundary of the Colville Reservation.
The Colville Tribe's police force consists of 18 officers, three of
whom are on duty and respond to calls during any given eight-hour
shift. The Tribe's Natural Resources Department is able to provide
three additional officers to patrol the lakes and waterways of the
Colville Reservation, which include Lake Roosevelt, the reservoir of
the Grand Coulee Dam. These Natural Resources officers have also
assisted and continue to assist the National Park Service and the
Bureau of Reclamation (``BOR'') since those agencies heightened
security of the Grand Coulee Dam in the aftermath of the September 11
attacks. Collectively, a total of six law enforcement officers are
responsible for policing all 2,275 square miles of the Colville
Reservation and its accompanying lakes and waterways at any given time.
Cross-Border Smuggling
One of the most pressing issues the Colville Tribe faces is cross-
border smuggling activity from Canada. During the past year, numerous
sightings of unmarked fixed-winged aircraft have been reported on or
near the Colville Reservation. Most significantly, in March 2006, the
Colville Tribe's Natural Resources officers and officers of the Tribe's
police department seized an unmarked float plane from Canada that was
attempting to smuggle illegal drugs into the United States through the
Colville Reservation. After being alerted to the plane, the officers
were able to respond and disable the aircraft when it was attempting to
take off from the Columbia River near the Grand Coulee Dam. After a
long chase, the officers ultimately captured the pilot and handed over
to federal law enforcement authorities an estimated $2 million in
illegal drugs that had been deposited by the plane. The U.S. Border
Patrol honored the tribal officers who participated in that seizure.
In addition to that widely publicized incident, the Colville
Tribe's law enforcement officers have apprehended or participated in
the apprehension of several other individuals involved in cross-border
smuggling activity. Collectively, these efforts have resulted in the
seizure of millions of dollars in cash, marijuana, Ecstasy, cocaine,
methamphetamines, and other illegal substances.
The Colville Tribe continues to receive several reports each month
of unidentified aircraft on the Colville Reservation. For example, in
recent weeks one of the Tribe's police officers witnessed a small plane
taking off from a makeshift airstrip in the eastern portion of the
Colville Reservation. That plane, which had its identifying markings
painted over, was representative of the types of aircraft from Canada
that have been involved in smuggling activity.
Smugglers have found the Colville Reservation an attractive
thoroughfare for smuggling activity because of its remote location and
because at any given time, the Colville Tribe has only six law
enforcement officers (three police officers and three Natural Resources
Department officers) to patrol the entire 2,275 square-mile Colville
Reservation. The Tribe has reason to believe that smugglers exploit our
lack of resources by monitoring our radio frequencies and coordinating
their activities around our officers' movements.
Resources and Funding Challenges
The Colville Tribe faces several significant resource and funding
challenges in its effort to combat cross-border smuggling activity and
provide security to the areas near the dams on or near the Colville
Reservation. As the Subcommittee is aware, under current law, tribal
governments must apply through their respective states or local
governments for federal homeland security funding. In Washington State,
federal homeland security funds are funneled through regions that
correspond with county governments and their respective geographic
boundaries. The Colville Reservation includes portions of both Ferry
and Okanogan Counties. Those counties are included in different
regions, 7 and 9, respectively. Because the Colville Tribe's
governmental headquarters is in Region 9, however, the Tribe is allowed
to seek funding only from that region. This funding mechanism, coupled
with the fact that our neighboring counties are among the poorest in
Washington State and are therefore not inclined to pass along funding
to the Tribe, has effectively precluded the Colville Tribe from
receiving any federal homeland security funding.
The Tribe's funding challenges are most evident by the lack of on-
the-ground law enforcement personnel to patrol the Colville
Reservation. For example, funding for the Tribe's Natural Resources
Department officers--who were among the officers honored by the U.S.
Border Patrol for capturing the float plane near the Grand Coulee Dam
last year--has been omitted from the President's Budget Request for the
last several years. This continued omission comes despite the fact that
the Lake Roosevelt Management Agreement (``LRMA''), an agreement
between the Tribe, the Secretary of the Interior, and other agencies
within the Department of the Interior, requires the Bureau of Indian
Affairs (``BIA'') to identify funds for these activities in its budget.
Although the Tribe has been working with the BIA in an effort to get
the funds restored to that agency's base budget, the omission has
forced the Tribe to seek congressional assistance to get these funds
(identified as ``Lake Roosevelt Management-Enforcement'' in the BIA's
budget) restored through the appropriations process. As the
Subcommittee is surely aware, restoring funding that was not included
in the President's Budget Request has become an incredibly difficult
undertaking.
Communications is another area in which the Colville Tribe's lack
of resources is evident. The Colville Tribe does not have a digitally
capable radio system, and we currently own only four digitally capable
radios. The primary radio frequency used by the Tribe's law enforcement
personnel is shared with three other governmental agencies. This
sharing of a single frequency by outside agencies, one of which is more
than 150 miles from the Colville
Reservation, often results in interference or otherwise
unintelligible radio traffic. Although the Tribe possesses the capacity
to establish its own frequency, we estimate that doing so would require
an investment of approximately $2 million to cover the costs of radios,
repeaters, antennas, and associated structures to house the equipment.
Coordination with Governmental Agencies
Even with its resources and funding challenges, the Colville Tribe
has generally worked well with federal law enforcement agencies. Most
significantly, the Tribe has a positive and cooperative relationship
with the U.S. Border Patrol. Tribal personnel regularly attend
intelligence meetings with Border Patrol officials, and the two
entities share information on an ongoing basis. The Colville Tribe also
shares intelligence and participates in ongoing operations with the
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (``ICE'') agency to identify
and attempt to curtail airborne smuggling activity.
The Colville Tribe also coordinates with other federal agencies
within the Department of the Interior. As noted above, the Tribe and
the Secretary of the Interior are parties to the LRMA, which divides
Lake Roosevelt--the reservoir of the Grand Coulee Dam--into zones and
charges the various parties with responsibility to patrol a given zone.
Other parties to the LRMA include the BIA, the National Park Service,
the BOR, and the Spokane Tribe of Indians. The LRMA has been in effect
since 1990, and officers from the Tribe's Natural Resources Department
carry out the enforcement activities in the zone for which the Tribe is
responsible.
In addition to coordination with federal agencies, the Colville
Tribe has also worked with other organizations on interoperability and
border security issues. For example, the Tribe worked with the National
Native American Law Enforcement Association and the National Congress
of American Indians in the preparation of the Indian Country Border
Security and Tribal Interoperability Pilot Program. That pilot program
assessed border and homeland security preparedness for 40 Indian
tribes, including the Colville Tribe, that are geographically located
on or near the northern and southern borders of the United States.
The Colville Tribe also coordinates with local Canadian
governmental officials on border-crossing issues affecting our tribal
members. The aboriginal territory of two of the 12 bands of the
Colville Tribe--the Lakes and Okanogan bands, respectively--extends
northward into what is now British Columbia. Many Colville tribal
members who descend from those bands maintain close cultural ties north
of the border. The Tribe maintains a dialogue with local officials of
the Canada Border Services Agency and with entities in the Integrated
Border Enforcement Team (``IBET'') network on these and related issues.
Although the Colville Tribe is not formally part of the IBET network,
the Tribe participates in IBET indirectly for law enforcement purposes
through its relationships with the U.S. Border Patrol and ICE.
The Colville Tribe remains very concerned about the cross-border
smuggling activity and other vulnerabilities on the Colville
Reservation. In response to the smuggling events that began during the
last year, the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Washington was
quoted in a northwest newspaper as noting that, ``a person that will
smuggle guns, drugs, meth, Ecstasy and cash will also be the kind of
person who will smuggle a special interest alien or a terrorist.'' The
Colville Tribe echoes this concern and stands ready to work with the
Subcommittee to explore solutions to these and other problems affecting
border communities.
This concludes my statement. At this time, I would be happy to
answer any questions the Subcommittee may have.
Mr. Cuellar. At this time I would recognize Christopher
Lombard to summarize his statement in 5 minutes.
Mr. Lombard. Good afternoon, Chairman Cuellar, Ranking
Member Dent and the other members of the committee. Thank you
for the beautiful weather today. It is my understanding that
yesterday was more the Seattle Day. I should have come a day
earlier to take advantage of that.
My name is Chris Lombard. I am with the Seattle Fire
Department. I come before you today as one of our Nation's
first responders. My purpose is to share with you some of the
critical public safety issues, as my colleagues have. While
some of the issues are border specific, as you have been
hearing, some of the issues are irrespective of the borders.
They affect us all wherever we are.
In addition to my duties with the Seattle Fire Department,
I am also privileged to serve in several national public safety
communications roles. Not only do I help the fire department
through these roles, but I work with the region and the
responders throughout the Nation. Again, thank you for the
opportunity to discuss some of these issues that we in the fire
service have.
Three key areas I would like to discuss include some of the
successes that are helping us do our job, some of our concerns
regarding a few communications issues and some of the concerns
that we have regarding the safety of our Nation's ports. First,
the successes.
As you know, good information and a thorough knowledge base
can be powerful tools. Among the many there are three specific
resources that are making my job easier. Through the Memorial
Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, you sponsored a
resource known as the Responder Knowledge Base. The RKB
provides the means for us to quickly and easily find out
information pertaining to grants, equipment, testing
information, standards and more. They offer an easy-to-use Web
site that continues to grow in popularity for the valuable
information that provides. Again, it is a great Web site to
help me get all kinds of information.
Where the RKB provides information on the Web site, the
Interagency Board for Equipment Standardization and
Interoperability, the IAB, has a similar impact in connecting
people. I don't know of any other entity that brings together
such a diverse group--fire, police, law, EMS at all levels--to
share, exchange knowledge and have a solid core of experts.
Finally, the SAFECOM project has also been a valuable
source of information for all sorts of communications-related
issues. I would ask that you please continue your support of
this program as well.
Communications: Of the communications concerns we have, the
first and perhaps the most important we have is the issue of
operability. It is huge. This continues to be a buzz word--
interoperability continues to have almost a buzz word status,
but there continues to be this huge need for just being able to
talk to each other on a day-to-day basis. You have heard some
of it from my colleagues here on the panel.
An estimated, probably, 65 percent of the fire departments
don't have enough portable radios to outfit just the people
that are on duty to be able to talk amongst themselves. Again,
we are talking operability. There are agencies sending fire
fighters out the door today that can't talk to each other.
It is my understanding that as part of implementing some of
the 9/11 Commission's findings, you are considering legislation
that would provide almost $3.3 billion in additional grants. I
would ask you, please consider adding operability as a
component of this, as well as the interoperability.
Speaking of interoperability, we have had some great
advancements in the technology allowed to bridge and patch
different communications. But there continues to be a people-
person or a people-issue for interoperability. There are issues
of credentialing, standardization, training and certification
on a national level that we need help with.
Some of the issues that we are experiencing on the northern
border include 700 MHz and Nextel rebanding. It is a really
dynamic issue, and it concerns a lot of the treaty work that is
going on with Canada.
One of the things I want to emphasize that is happening in
this is, there is a lot of talk about partitioning portions off
for data, partitioning portions off for voice. We all do our
text messaging, BlackBerrys and things like that. But one of
the things I want to point out is, if I go into a fire and I am
having trouble, I am not going to whip out a BlackBerry and
type ``Please help me now.'' I need to have preserved voice
that is set aside because that is what we are going to go to.
We need help with dialogue with the State Department. If we
just knew where things were as far as these treaty
negotiations, that would help us impact and work on our job
better. Congressman Larsen mentioned the 2010 Olympics. One
thing I want to emphasize here is when the international media
comes, they fire up whatever equipment they have from their
hometowns, and this often knocks us off the air. If there were
some way that we could get help with dialogue again, with the
State Department, with Canada with us and with our respective
Customs departments, we might be able to minimize or mitigate
some of those problems.
Our Nation's ports: I mention our ports because this is a
huge international gateway, especially for Seattle. Seattle has
been dealing with some of the issues for the securing and
trying to prevent the problems, but when these problems do
happen, we have got to deal with the responses and the
recovery.
One of the big concerns that the fire service has on the
response side is that there are two significant issues,
overtime and backfill. Unfortunately, with the grants and
stuff, we are getting the opportunity to plan and stuff like
that. But we can't put companies out of service because we
leave two big areas unprotected. So I would ask consideration
for that.
The next one is recovery. After we put together these big
operations, port issues tend to take a lot of our resources and
dump them real quick. FEMA has got a program called the
Prepositioned Equipment Packages, or Packages On-Demand, that
makes a huge difference. This helps reconstitute us after an
event like that.
Again, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to
address you this afternoon. I would like to express our
continued appreciation for this committee and its dedication to
preparing us for present and future disasters both in the
border regions and throughout our country. We appreciate your
due consideration regarding these important Federal emergency
response programs and your continued support of America's fire
fighters, EMT and law enforcement.
Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Lombard follows:]
Prepared Statement of Christopher H. Lombard
Good morning, Chairman Cuellar, Ranking Member Dent, and members of
the subcommittee. My name is Christopher H. Lombard of the Seattle,
Washington, Fire Department. Today, I come before you as one of our
Nation's first-responders. My purpose today is to share insights with
you regarding critical public safety issues, especially those that
impact the border regions of our Country. I appreciate how very similar
our jobs are--in that we are all united in the effort to serve the
safety needs of citizens.
I feel privileged to have accumulated a wealth of practical
experience from the field and to have a diverse background in Geography
(resource allocation), communications, firefighting and Emergency
Medical Services (EMS). It is through these roles that I support many
of the communications efforts of the Seattle Fire Department and the
Seattle Urban Area. My background and experience have allowed me to
become involved in many national public safety related efforts.
Noteworthy among these are the following:
The InterAgency Board for Equipment Standardization
and Interoperability (IAB) \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ http://www.iab.gov
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
National standards development--Committee for the
National Fire Protection Association's Standard 1221(related to
Emergency Service Communications)
Communications policy guidance for national emergency-
response--SAFECOM \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ http://www.safecomprogram.gov/SAFECOM/
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
National incident response (FEMA--Urban Search and
Rescue teams and Metropolitan Medical Strike Teams).
I would like to express my sincere thanks to the committee members,
for the opportunity to discuss some of these issues that we, in the
fire service, have as a result of operating in, and near America's
border regions. I would like to discuss three key issue areas:
1. Successes
2. Communications Issues, and,
3. Our Nation's Ports.
SUCCESSES
The first responder communities, in cooperation with our state and
federal partners, have implemented several efforts that are having a
positive impact on the safety and effectiveness of our work. I would
like to thank you for your support of these very successful endeavors
that are truly making a change for the better. While some of these
successes are not necessarily border community specific, they have had
a positive impact on these border communities, as well.
1RESPONDER KNOWLEDGE BASE
The Responder Knowledge Base (RKB) \3\ is a web-based information
service for the emergency responder community funded by the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) and hosted by the National Memorial
Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT). RKB operates as a
public service, with no cost to users and no cost to information
contributors such as product manufacturers. Thousands of jurisdictions
and departments, as well as virtually all State Administrative
Agencies, now use the RKB on a regular basis to obtain grant guidance
and unbiased product information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ https://www.rkb.mipt.org/
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The RKB is unique in that, while supported by the government, it is
not an official government endeavor. This independence has allowed the
RKB to function almost like a `Consumer Reports' for the equipment we
use--first responders are able to describe firsthand experience with
equipment (pro and con), opinions can be expressed, brands can be
mentioned specifically, etc. Its users come from all disciplines (Fire,
EMS, Law Enforcement, Emergency Management, Utilities, Transportation,
Private Industry, etc.) and are in every state.
The RKB continues to gain acceptance, among first responders, as
`The First Place To Go' for finding out information pertaining to
available grants, information about the equipment we use (with the
ability to dialogue with other first responders about equipment pros
and cons--based on firsthand experience), relevant standards applicable
to that equipment, and more.
I know of no other single source of information that remains as
current, accurate and easy to navigate regarding the equipment we use
and need. The RKB is adamant about being directed by the needs of the
thousands of first responders who access it. It is my understanding
that the RKB itself is funded through a grant application processes.
Energies that could be focused toward greater `Information Exchange'
for first responders must be directed toward assuring continued funding
for the next year. I would request that the RKB be given your continued
support and that you consider funding this valuable resource in a more
permanent fashion.
The InterAgency Board for Equipment Standardization and
Interoperability (IAB)
The IAB is designed to establish and coordinate local, state, and
federal standardization, interoperability, compatibility, and responder
health and safety to prepare for, train and respond to, mitigate, and
recover from any incident by identifying requirements for an all-
hazards incident response with a special emphasis on Chemical,
Biological, Radiological, Nuclear or Explosive (CBRNE) issues.
The IAB's membership roster and their leadership successfully
`eliminates the middle man' by pairing current first responders with
federal representatives that have decision making authority. The IAB is
``working'' because key federal program managers have partnered with
first responders to tackle the tough issues that prevent first
responders from getting the job done. Simply put, the IAB has been able
to quickly and clearly communicate essential needs and translate those
needs into tangible equipment solutions, organized efforts, new
standards and more.
Like the RKB, the IAB is a source that many turn to for guidance on
best practices and I urge you consider continued support for this
worthwhile effort.
SAFECOM
SAFECOM is a communications program that provides research,
development, testing and evaluation, guidance, tools, and templates on
communications-related issues to local, tribal, state, and Federal
emergency response agencies working to improve emergency response
through more effective and efficient interoperable wireless
communications.
The SAFECOM program within the Department of Homeland is another
program serving many different disciplines (Fire, EMS, Law Enforcement,
etc.) and regions. We appreciate the work that SAFECOM has been able to
accomplish in bringing our nation's first responders closer toward
interoperability.
SAFECOM recognizes that many locales have expert knowledge about
what they need to improve their own respective communications.
SAFECOM's role is to help assure that these `improvement' efforts
around the United States are coordinated--hence gaining
interoperability. By starting with, and emphasizing the importance of
practitioner level support, and working from the `ground' up, SAFECOM
has been able to achieve first-responder `buy in' of the national
coordination efforts. They continue to involve all disciplines from all
levels of government. We appreciate what SAFECOM is doing to unify the
Nation's efforts towards interoperable communications amongst first
responders (fire, EMS and law enforcement) and their supporting
networks (federal response).
SAFECOM has distilled valuable lessons through the execution of
their grant guidance programs and sponsored projects. Many state and
local communities have benefited, and continue to benefit from SAFECOM
efforts as they strive to improve their communications systems.
I would ask you to continue your strong support for this necessary
and worthy effort.
COMUNICATIONS ISSUES
First responders are faced with many challenges in communications
that are starting to be resolved. We still have a ways to go on several
of these issues, including:
Operability versus interoperability
While interoperability has reached buzz-word status, there
continues to be an immense and oft overlooked need for improved, simple
operability. Before we can claim significant victories in the area of
interoperable communications, (international, cross-border or
otherwise) we continue to struggle with simple operability: our ability
to just talk amongst ourselves--e.g. fire fighter to fire fighter at
the same incident. Interoperability (``The ability of emergency
response officials to share information via voice and data signals on
demand, in real time, when needed, and as authorized \4\) does continue
to be a pressing need. But again, one of the largest challenges facing
first responders today is the lack of `Operability,' not
interoperability--the most basic ability to communicate within a single
jurisdiction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ http://www.safecomprogram.gov/SAFECOM/interoperability/
default.htm
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Earlier this year, Chief James B. Harmes, President of the
International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC), in his testimony
before the House's Subcommittee on Homeland Security for the Committee
on Appropriations, stated that an estimated 65 percent of fire
departments do not have enough portable radios to equip all emergency
responders on a shift. As a friend of mine, former Chief John Eversole
(retired from the Chicago Fire Department) would likely have affirmed,
``There are agencies sending fire fighters out the door today that
cannot afford to equip them with a radio to talk to other members of
their own fire fighting team.''
When considering both on-shift and off-shift fire and Emergency
Medical Service (EMS) personnel, it is estimated that the number having
access to radios drops to less than 25 percent. This is significant
because, when large incidents occur, agencies can call off-duty members
back to duty, but they cannot equip them. It is my understanding that
many law enforcement agencies are facing similar deficiencies. This
continues as an unacceptable reality, and should be addressed in order
to move forward.
It is my understanding that, as a part of implementing some of the
9/11 Commission's findings, Congress is considering legislation that
would provide additional grants, on the order of $3.3B, for
communications related equipment and efforts--These grants should
include provisions for simple operability (not only the purchase of
radios, but basic supporting infrastructure, local training, planning
and governance too) as well as interoperability.
As you institute new regulations for other, terrorism-focused
homeland security grant programs, please preserve the `all-hazards'
FIRE and SAFER Act grant programs--these are one of the ways in which
public safety is working toward addressing operability.
Interoperability is a people problem--not a technology problem
The United States has made great strides in recent years towards
developing the hardware needed to achieve communications
interoperability. Now we need to focus attention on those responders,
the people, who will make this hardware work most effectively. FEMA's
NIMS Integration Center (NIC) needs to increase its role in resolving
some of the roadblocks. Some of the essential `people' issues we need
them to address include:
National credentialing--At large incidents, local
agencies often call for specific assistance from other areas of
the country. It is important to know that those coming to
assist are who they say they are. The scene of an emergency is
not the time or place to confirm that incoming assistance is
both qualified and who they say they are.
Standardization (of qualifications)--when an entity
asks for, and receives assistance, there is an expectation that
the assistance they receive will be competent to accomplish the
required task(s)
Training--while the NIC is not expected to conduct the
training, a mechanism must be in place to assure
standardization of the training, as well as qualifications of
those who do conduct the training, of those who are trained,
and for the ongoing maintenance and updating of training
programs.
Certification--similar to credentialing, there should
be a central location responsible for certifying individuals
and tracking that certification.
Public safety access to the 700 MHz bandwidth
The first responder community applauds recently passed legislation
that will provide additional public safety frequency bandwidth in the
700MHz frequency range. Of all of the discussion about the `use-
options' for this new bandwidth, it is important to keep in mind that
there are treaties with Canada and Mexico that will be affected by any
change in 700 MHz allocation. Some of the aggressive timelines for the
various interoperability grants are at odds with these treaties--they
specify the purchase of equipment for frequency ranges that, depending
on the treaties, may not be available to us.
A significant concern of ours pertains to those portions of the
spectrum that are designated for voice versus those that are designated
for data. Treaty work with Canada, regarding the initial 700 MHz plans,
has already assured that portions of the voice communications will not
have cross-border interference. Because the State Department has had to
renegotiate our treaties, the 3--5 year planning process of public
safety agencies wanting to use these bands will also experience
setbacks.
The importance and prioritization of clear voice communications
cannot be overemphasized. This is important because it is
counterintuitive to the everyday user of communications devices.
Consider the communications devices each of you probably use every day.
Despite the popularity of text messaging, if I am having trouble in a
fire, or one of my friends in law enforcement is chasing someone, we
are not likely to break out a cell phone, two-way pager or other
messaging device and start pressing buttons! Preserving voice
communications, free from interference, is an important life-safety
concern.
This year, the Commerce Department, through National
Telecommunications Information Agency (NTIA), is in the process of
awarding the nearly $1 billion in communications grants to public
safety agencies, which you have generously made available. These grants
are to be used for the acquisition of equipment for the above described
700MHz frequency range. Unfortunately, because the frequency allocation
plans are in flux, and we do not know the current state of our treaties
with Canada concerning these frequencies, our ability to efficiently
spend these billion dollars in the allotted time is being directly
impacted. We feel strongly about our accountability both to you for
awarding the grants, and to our public for providing the funding.
In order to effectively implement this change in the amount and/or
location of public safety frequencies in the 700MHz bandwidth, we would
ask for assistance with better dialogue between the US State Department
and those public safety representatives responsible for supporting our
communications infrastructure (specifically pertaining to treaty
discussions with Canada and Mexico, as relates to the relevant
frequency ranges).
Also, if private industry is to build out a nationwide broadband
network for public safety use, it is critical to have a strong public
safety presence to protect the interests of public safety. There is a
large concern that rural areas will be left out of any private/public
partnerships for the construction of infrastructure. The National
Public Safety Telecommunications Council (NPSTC) recently released a
position paper, posted July 7, 2007, that further clarifies some of
public safety's concerns.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ http://www.npstc.org/positionPapers.jsp
Nextel re-banding effort
As with the 700 MHz issue, there are some aspects of Nextel re-
banding effort in which we, public safety, are unable to move forward
without knowing the status on existing treaty information--information
that the State Department should be able to help with. Unfortunately,
the dialogue with the State Department has not been what it should be.
One significant difference between the United States and Canada
relates to public access to specific types of information--
specifically, the frequencies and locations of radio transmitters. In
this effort, we are not asking Canada to change anything (e.g. radio
frequencies they use and transmitter locations). If (again, through
cooperative efforts with the State Department) those of us that need-
to-know were to have access to this information, we would be able to
plan accordingly in the modification of our 800MHz systems so as to not
interfere with their existing infrastructure. We are at an early enough
stage where it is possible to alter our systems to accommodate both the
Nextel re-banding effort and our neighbors to the north.
The 2010 Olympics in British Columbia, Canada
While the Olympics will be physically occurring in Canada, a
concern shared by many in our region (on both sides of the border)
pertains to the international media. Similar past experiences have
shown that when the international media convene at an event such as
this, they often utilize whatever communications infrastructure they
relied upon in their home country. A problem this presents relates to
our first responders depending upon those same frequencies state-side,
that the international media uses in their native countries. The
international media's broadcasting equipment tends to be magnitudes
more powerful than our public safety radio infrastructure and, as a
result, components of our systems can be rendered ineffective.
If possible, the establishment of a more formal partnership between
the United States, Canada, our respective Customs agencies, and our
respective first-responder communities, may be able to mitigate many of
these specific issues before they occur.
OUR NATION'S PORTS
Security and Protection
While attention and discussion is starting to be drawn toward the
security of our Nation's borders, our ports continue to be a proverbial
``open back door.''
To provide a practical example, the crew of a container ship
visiting Seattle has to send advance notice of its ``14'' crew members
several days before actually reaching the port. But those individuals
intent on harming us could fill two containers, of the estimated ``. .
.an 11 million containers entering the United States annually. . .''
\6\ with 20 individuals each, including most anything they can carry
(short of radiological goods), and with only 1000 US Customs and Border
Protection inspectors for more than 360 ports (ibid), they stand a good
chance of entering this country illegally and undetected.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ http://hutchison.senate.gov/speech515.html
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As with trying to prevent all fires by implementation of the fire
code, incidents still do, and will happen.
Response
As just one point of reference, the ports of the Greater Seattle/
Puget Sound Area, collectively, are among the largest ports in the
nation. Last year Seattle area ports hosted over 735,000 cruise line
passengers. We had over a thousand vessel call our ports. In 2005, we
moved $70.5 B worth of goods through the area.\7\ We have a robust
fishing industry, oil refineries, and a thriving private sector marine
community. The Navy also maintains a large presence with at least one
carrier task force, the Bangor Submarine Base, and the Bremerton Naval
Shipyard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ http://www.portseattle.org/seaport/statistics/
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Puget Sound waterways encompass over 1,000 square miles and
include over 1,000 miles of shoreline. Currently, there is only one
fire boat staffed 24 hours a day for this entire area. It is my
understanding that these `understaffing and inadequate resources'
issues are commonplace amongst our nation's ports. While some of these
capitol outlays (e.g. fireboats) are very expensive, often costing $12
M or more, they do last longer than other equipment (40+ years).
America's first responders need help acquiring the tools, training
and means to mitigate these incidents that are going to happen. When an
event occurs at any of our nation's ports, the first response of
employees, federal (U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Customs) or otherwise, is to
call 9-1-1, just as they did with other federal offices like the Murrah
building in Oklahoma City and the Pentagon. . . And, that brings the
discussion back to the nation's first responders--fire fighters, law
enforcement and EMS. For the high risk/low frequency events that happen
at our ports, we need help purchasing fire boats, port/marine
firefighting equipment, hazardous materials equipment and supporting
the associated training.
It will probably be asked why public safety has not purchased this
equipment with the grant funds already offered. As referenced in the
communications sections previously, it is a matter of prioritization--
we need to be able to communicate effectively before we can do anything
else.
Recovery
Daily, first responders are responding to emergencies in our ports
and, most of the time, they successfully mitigate the situations they
find. Occasionally, in doing so, they will lose much of their equipment
to severe contamination (e.g. chemical, biological, and radiological).
A case in point included many of the local agencies in our gulf states
(Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas) immediately
following Hurricane Katrina.
A successful effort started, by Congress a number of years ago,
developed emergency caches of first responder equipment to assist with
the rapid reconstitution of a local department's protective clothing,
the department's communications equipment, their breathing devices,
etc. As mentioned previously, regarding communications equipment, after
a large incident, public safety can quickly recall significant numbers
of off-duty members, but we do not have the equipment to outfit them
all. FEMA is now supporting this project--The Pre-positioned Equipment
Packages, Package on Demand (PEP POD). This program more than proved
its merit in both concept and value.
Unfortunately, it is starting to slip `under the radar,' and
succumbing to the old adage, ``out of sight, out of mind.'' Several of
the PODs were deployed during Katrina and have yet to be replaced. In
the remaining PODs, some of the equipment purchased over 5 years ago is
nearing its expiration dates and is in need of upgrading or
replacement. Field support staffs for the program have not received
necessary subsequent, or refresher training and some critical
certificates have expired.
This is another federal program that was making a huge difference
in recovery and had demonstrable successes! Many fire and EMS agencies
in Louisiana and Mississippi were able to get quickly back on their
feet. Again, the program is in jeopardy and I would hope that you
consider continued support.
Exercises
Public safety agencies need continued support for training and
exercises on a regional and international level which include backfill
and overtime. These types of events are beyond the budget/scope of any
single jurisdiction. Further, because it often results in large areas
of our respective districts being without coverage, the fire service is
hard-pressed to place multiple companies out of service for the
purposes of training and exercises.
CONCLUSION
Again, thank you for the opportunity to address you this afternoon.
On behalf of the nation's first responders, I would like to express our
continued appreciation to this committee for its dedication to
preparing America's first responders for present and future disasters,
both in border regions and throughout our country.
We appreciate your due consideration regarding these important
federal emergency response programs and your continued support of
America's fire fighters, EMTs and law enforcement officers.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you again for your testimony. I want to
thank all the witnesses for their testimony.
I remind each member that he or she will have 5 minutes to
question the panel. I will go ahead and recognize myself for my
questions.
To the folks that represent the border area on the southern
part, let me ask you this question: According to the report of
the Good Neighbors Environmental Board, the Independent Federal
Advisory Board, first responders from the United States are
sometimes called to respond to emergencies in Mexico. The
report states, however, that responders near the border are not
able to easily cross the border to respond to incidents because
of insurance liability, national sovereignty and command
issues. Furthermore, it states that the Customs and Border
Protection often makes it difficult for the first responders to
come back into the United States after they had just crossed to
respond to an incident in Mexico.
Have any of these problems affected your ability to respond
to emergencies along the border?
Chief Sosa. Yes. It is one of the biggest problems we have.
The reason is that we--the insurance for our fire fighters and
any first responders, it is only 15 miles into the Mexican
side.
But one of the biggest problems we have there is, on the
Mexican side there are a lot of hazards that pass through
Laredo. There are 10,000 trailers per day that pass through
Laredo, and half of them have hazardous materials. So you can
imagine if something happens on the Mexican side, it is very
hard to go in and do any kind of incident.
For example, if you have a chemical spill on that side, it
is very hard for us to go. And besides, Mexico doesn't have any
kind of resources or funding for this type of deal.
What we try to do is train the people from Mexico because
we have an $11 million training facility, but no moneys for
training people. But we do do some training for us and for
them, so--to help us in case there is a hazardous spill in
Mexico.
For example, every day--this is a constant thing that
happens every day in Mexico. They burn tires, and because we
have winds from the southeast, all that smoke from tires comes
into the Laredo side. We, over here, are very strict on
environmental protection, but on the Mexican side there isn't.
So you can imagine every day getting this smell of tires and
all this smoke, this hazardous smoke that comes into the Laredo
side. It is very important.
But like I said, we don't have any funding, we don't have
any equipment. We do have equipment for hazardous materials
because what happens is, in Laredo--1990, the NAFTA trade went
though, and 40 percent of the NAFTA trade passes through
Laredo. So it is important for us to learn about hazardous
materials.
Mr. Cuellar. OK. Anybody?
Ms. Morrison.
Ms. Morrison. Chairman Cuellar, in Arizona we have the same
and similar-type issues. What we have been able to do, using
State money and a very little bit of Federal money, is we are
performing binational exercises so that it does open the lines
of communication. Unfortunately, it is very difficult because
the Mexicans do not have the funding sources at all to be able
to actually participate at the level we would like them to and
have that communication across the border.
But your border issue question is very relevant, and it is
very difficult to go across the border, and especially in a
hazardous situation.
Mr. Cuellar. OK. One of the things that we see is, you see
big communities and then, of course, the small communities. And
sometimes I feel that the small communities, that many times
have few resources to combat crime, drug trafficking and
security issues, the smaller communities are very vulnerable
and often are overlooked in the big picture when it comes to
homeland security grants.
How can we, as Members of Congress, better help the smaller
communities along the border to respond to the emerging threats
that they have to deal with on a day-to-day basis? Open to, Mr.
Kessler, Mr. Elfo.
Mr. Elfo. I believe having some form of coordination, a
homeland security coordinator to coordinate with local border
agencies would be a help, a one-stop shop, somebody you could
take those issues to.
And the other would be to establish regional joint
emergency operation centers strategically along the border that
would interface with all the key players on the U.S. side and
those of our neighbors to the north or the south.
Mr. Cuellar. OK. Mr. Kessler.
Mr. Kessler. Mr. Cuellar, I believe that the Congress could
help by--I am not sure how to go about it, but make the funding
easier to access for the smaller communities. As I stated
earlier, at least with the tribe and, I know, some of the
smaller communities in the counties that I am familiar with,
the funding stops at the county. They use the funding for what
they feel is going to benefit the smaller community, and that
isn't always necessarily the case.
So making the funding easier to access by the smaller
community would be a great help.
Mr. Cuellar. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Morrison. Mr. Cuellar, Arizona receives Operation
Stonegarden funding, and I am sure, as you are well aware, it
is a limited amount that is split between Arizona, California,
New Mexico and Texas. Arizona this year received about $6.35
million. That is only useable for equipment and overtime for
the first responders on the border.
The problem from these local jurisdictions, smaller
jurisdictions--you are asking what can be done. It is very
difficult because these grants are predicated on a
reimbursement policy. So if you take a very small town that
doesn't have $70,000 in its budget to buy some type of armored
vehicle, they cannot purchase it because that is the process it
has to go through.
So it would be my recommendation that there be a procedure
that would allow them to get the money up front as opposed to
them having to pay for that and then wait for reimbursement.
And we try to get them reimbursed as fast as we can, but
sometimes the request takes months.
Chief Sosa. One of the biggest problems down in south Texas
is--like Laredo, Laredo is the biggest border city within 200
miles. We have to take care of the small counties. We, Laredo,
or the counties that we are under--the Council of Governments,
we got $240,000 from the Department of Homeland Security--
money, preparedness. $240,000. Now, you divide that within five
counties, this is all the money we got in that area, and the
reason is because of your census formulas.
We are a small city, 250,000. But yet we cover 600,000
people on the Mexican side and a lot more other small counties,
but we only got $240,000. So the formula part is not working
for us as a border city. We need to have a special priority or
do something better than doing the census because--I think
threat or risk would be a good factor.
Mr. Cuellar. OK. Thank you.
At this time I would recognize the ranking member, the
gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Dent, for questions.
Mr. Dent. Thank you all for your testimony. And I guess I
will start with Chief Sosa.
I visited Laredo last year with Chairman Cuellar and a few
other Members of Congress, and I was struck by some of the
stories I had been told about, really, the police department on
the other side of the border in Nuevo Laredo and how they fired
the whole police department. And it seemed that the interaction
between law enforcement on the Mexican and American sides
wasn't really what it ought to be because of corruption issues
on the other side of the border.
What is your relationship with your peers in the fire
service on the other side of the border? How much mutual aid?
How often are you called over there to an incident?
Chief Sosa. We have a binational agreement, but it is one-
sided, sir; and the reason it is one-sided is because Mexico
has no kind of resources or equipment.
What I try to do, I try to give my old equipment or hand-
me-downs to them or anybody in Mexico.
Mr. Dent. How often are you called, I guess more
specifically, to respond on the Mexican side in some kind of
mutual aid situation?
Chief Sosa. From the American side to the Mexican side? It
doesn't happen that often. The reason we don't do it as much as
we used to is because the chief from Nuevo Laredo told me to
stop coming because this way they can show the people from the
Mexican side that they need equipment and funding. So we have
stopped doing it.
But we still, when it gets to the point where it might be
hazardous to the city of Laredo, I call the chief and I tell
him, you know, we are coming. I don't care. Because both of
you, you know it is going to hurt us. If something happens on
the Mexican side, you know it is going to come to our side.
If it is health issues, like TB or any kind of a disease
that happens in Mexico, people walk--30,000 people walk--per
day walk the bridges in Laredo.
Mr. Dent. Those are generally commuters going back and
forth to work, right?
Chief Sosa. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dent. I would like to shift over to Mr. Lombard and to
Sheriff Elfo.
It has been mentioned that the Olympics are coming to
Vancouver in 2010. Could you just kind of give me a sense,
Sheriff, as to what preparations first responders in the border
region have begun to make for these games?
Mr. Elfo. Well, they have put a Federal official in charge
who is coordinating the response, and we are scrambling to get
funds to try to build an interoperable communications center
and a joint emergency--to achieve interoperability and full
communications throughout the county. As my colleague said, it
is not just an interoperability issue, it is an operability
issue.
And we are also trying to phase in a joint emergency
operation center that we could operate under the Incident
Command System and coordinate what we are doing not only with
our U.S. partners, but our Canadian partners as well. We
believe the impact will be significant with people traveling to
visit the Vancouver area for the Olympics, and we will have an
increase in the size of the population and border backups and a
lot of vulnerabilities during that time.
Mr. Dent. And I guess, to Mr. Lombard, you started to talk
about some of the challenges with the operability,
interoperability of communications. And I guess what really the
question is, how really is Washington, the State of
Washington's State plan being affected by the ongoing
negotiations with Canada to reassign the spectrum and the 800
MHz range to public safety agencies? You mentioned there were
going to be some problems at that time, you having access to
that range.
Mr. Lombard. Thank you. Our State plan is--for one, our
State plan is still in development right now, and what we are
doing is, we are taking some of the different regional plans
from the State and trying to put them together.
As far as some of the interoperable issues, what we are
trying to do is, there are some informal discussions and
meetings that occur between some of our communications folks
and their counterparts on the Canadian side. But again, those
are informal and we are trying to formalize those.
One of the big differences between the Canadian side and
ours has a lot to do with the freedom of information. For
example, their antenna site locations and the frequencies that
they broadcast on are restricted information. So, first, on
issues like the Nextel rebanding and stuff, there are things
that if we knew the information, it would be easy for us to
reaccommodate so that we are not putting the same tower, same
frequencies, you know, 100 yards across the border from each
other. If we had the ability to have that dialogue, then we
would be able to relocate that tower, say, in southern
Washington instead of right on the border.
As far as the Olympics, again it is kind of the same thing.
There are informal communications going on right now as far as
what are they trying to accommodate, what they are agreeing to.
But the missing key here is kind of where the State Department
is as far as negotiations and treaties. We just don't know.
Mr. Dent. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I see my time has
expired, and I will yield back.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Mr. Dent.
The Chair will now recognize other members for questions
they may wish to ask the witnesses. In accordance with our
committee rules and practice, I will recognize the members who
were present at the start of the hearing based on seniority on
the subcommittee, alternating between majority and minority.
Those members coming in later will be recognized in the order
of their arrival.
The Chair now recognizes for 5 minutes the gentleman from
North Carolina, Mr. Etheridge, for his questions.
Mr. Etheridge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And let me thank
each of you for being here. You know, the challenge of training
and multijurisdictional communications has got to be something
most of us don't think about. You know, we think about the
interoperability of communications within counties and cities
within the United States. We don't think about those that cross
the borders.
And we know that interoperable communications also have a
technological component. But at the same time--and we have
tried to help in this committee with funding and we have pushed
it to the extent we can, but there is also a human component,
and you have touched on that.
That human component is interoperability of individual
police, fire, Border Patrol, first responders, et cetera, and
border agents. And these are the brave men and women we depend
on every day to get the job done, and they really are on the
front line of protecting all of our communities and really our
country. So each of you have--this task is further complicated,
I guess, by having to deal with any entity across the border
where most communities don't have that.
So I would like to explore that a little further with you,
Chief Sosa. You touched on it a little bit about the problems
you have with all the traffic moving through Laredo. Most
people don't think of that when they think of the border issues
that you have shared with us today, with all of the hazardous
material, et cetera, between Laredo and Mexico.
Clearly, you talk about a partnership but we really need a
binational partnership with Mexico. I mean, it is much bigger
than just a city, Laredo with our sister city or even the
community. It is really a national working relationship, not
just with Mexico, similar to what we are doing with Canada and
others.
So my question is, to what extent do you both train with
your counterparts? You have touched on that a little bit. And
what subjects do you train on? And are there standard operating
procedures similar or close to what you use in an emergency,
say a bomb threat, Hazmat, a chemical spill? Will you do the
training so you know in advance what you can expect if you are
working together when you do have an emergency? And finally--
how do you communicate on a daily basis or when you have an
accident? And finally, how do you share intelligence, if you
do?
Chief Sosa. OK, sir, Mr. Etheridge.
Mr. Etheridge. Sheriff, I would like you to answer that one
too.
Chief Sosa. OK. One of the things--the city of Laredo has
been very supportive of public safety, and what the city has
done with no Federal funding was to build an $11 million
training facility. We train people in hazardous material, we
train them in fire fighting, in health issues, in swat. It is
called the Laredo International Fire and Law Enforcement
Training Facility. It is on the Web site, city of Laredo.
And the greatest thing, we can do it in Spanish. We do it
in Spanish. We have done people from Puerto Rico; we have done
people from Argentina, Guatemala, and especially Mexico.
Talking about sister city, the city of Laredo has 13 sister
cities. So you can imagine all these people coming to Laredo
and trying to get some kind of equipment from us. And it is
very hard to reject these people when they come in.
But one of the things that we try to do is do training.
There is no Federal funding for training for both sides. This
is something that is really needed on the borders because you
have to train the people on the other side, including law
enforcement, fire, health services; and we do it free. We do it
to the point just because we are there and because we need to.
For communications, it is very hard, sir. They don't have
any kind of communication. The city of Laredo got $1.4 million
from homeland security to put in some kind of communication.
The city of Laredo had to put in $8 million to just get it off
the ground because it was to the point that if a burglar in the
downtown city of Laredo was running towards the border, police
and the Border Patrol could not communicate. And it is still to
that point.
Or because it is a border city and it is close to Mexico,
your communication breaks down. There is no communication
between the river, but yet anybody can cross the river,
swimming, or running across the border. And this is very hard.
You can't communicate with people from Mexico. The only way you
can communicate is by phone right now.
Mr. Etheridge. Mr. Elfo?
Mr. Elfo. We have had several incidents that we have worked
with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and they pretty much
have jurisdiction along the entire border that we share in
multiple detachments. And when we do, we physically put a
person on the Canadian side, they put one on the U.S. side to
achieve interoperable communications.
We operate--actually we have had some major demonstrations.
We have worked in a unified command center. We have had the
Canadians working together. We have jointly made decisions.
We have a park that straddles the border, and there is no
Customs checkpoint in between. You can walk back and forth as
long as you stay in, and it has become a site of some pretty
significant demonstrations, and we have worked very well with
the RCMP.
As far as response from Canadian fire, we have actually had
their hazardous materials team come down and help us. We have
had a number of joint exercises where we have simulated attacks
on the border, chemical spills and the like; and we have worked
very hard together. But that doesn't alleviate the need for
people to have interoperable communications.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you very much. At this time I will
recognize for 5 minutes a gentlewoman from the Virgin Islands,
Mrs. Christensen.
Mrs. Christensen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, am sorry I was
late. As my colleagues said, you have a bit more challenges
than people who are not at the border, and my district being in
the U.S. Virgin Islands, some places less than 3 miles away
from the British Virgin Islands. We share some of those issues,
this is an interesting and important hearing to me.
In the absence of agreements, international legal
constructs that go beyond Federal agencies, has there been any
activity, any assistance coming from Homeland Security or any
other Federal agency to begin developing those constructs at
your levels.
Chief Sosa. Ma'am, I am glad you asked that question. The
City of Laredo, they do a couple of Federal functions that the
city doesn't get any funding for. For example, body recovery on
the river. We have, over this year, we are close to 67 body
recoveries and rescue on the river. The City of Laredo does it
now. We are talking about international waters.
Mrs. Christensen. Right.
Chief Sosa. There is no Coast Guard. Border patrol will not
do it, they will hover and tell us where it is, but the person
who will go get it is us, is us, the first responders, we will
get there. It is not as easy as launching a boat at a dock,
because there is no dock, there is a cliff. And you can not put
a launching put a launching pad because environmental won't let
you, the water commission won't let you, and also it takes a
lot of permits to do little small launch. So it is very hard to
do.
For example, the bridges we do bomb threats almost twice a
day, bomb threats on the bridges of Laredo, yet the first
responder, the fire department is the one who does the sweep.
Police has one bomb dog, they can not use that bomb dog because
his keen smell for bombs won't be there. So if you are having
two per day or 10 per week, they won't use it. Who do they use?
The first responder who does the sweep, the City of Laredo Fire
Department.
Mrs. Christensen. There is no reimbursement? I am assuming
these are Federal----
Chief Sosa. Yes, it is in the Federal Customs Border side.
We go half of the bridge does it, and Mexico does the other
half. When you are doing this, you stop commerce. Millions and
millions of dollars are lost because you are stopping for a
bomb threat. It takes at least 20 to 30 minutes to do the
sweep. Like I said, 40 percent goes through Laredo, all your
cars, all your broccolis, all your vegetables, your suburban,
everything is stopped in Laredo for that moment. So imagine the
threat there is if there is a bomb that might devastate the
bridges, but yet first responders go up there without any money
or equipment or resources.
Mrs. Christensen. Anyone else want to respond?
Mr. Lombard. Yes. One current effort the government is
doing to help, they are just starting now, we mentioned that
inoperability is quickly becoming a people issue. There are a
couple of efforts within DHS, particularly in SAFECOM and
FEMA's center. They are putting together, starting to develop
plans now on training communications unit leaders at the local
level. The idea or the concept is that we are going to give
people in the local areas the tools so that they can help
resolve their own problems, teach them who they should be
seeking out, the questions they should be asking, some of the
things they need to be considering so that it is irrespective
of the borders.
Mrs. Christensen. Are they helping to develop the kind of
agreements that you need to have in place so that you have that
legal foundation for operating one----
Mr. Lombard. Not yet, they are working on helping people
know what questions to ask.
Mrs. Christensen. Ms. Morrison.
Ms. Morrison. Representative Christensen, in Arizona, what
we have done is created a network called Se Quatro, it is
dealing with four regions from Nogales, Arizona into Nogales,
Sonora. The technicalities can wait, but the bottom line is our
first responders can radio a question to Nogales Sonora,
Nogales Arizona, then that question is radioed to Nogales
Sonora. There is a real-time response, but it is literally a
patchwork of radio communications across the border, that is
all we have right now.
We have been told in early 2008, the FCC will no longer
allow the Mexicans to utilize that wavelength, so we will no
longer have that type of communication across the border.
Mrs. Christensen. Go ahead.
Chief Sosa. Could I add one thing? When you do that, you
have to talk in Spanish, so if you are not a bilingual person,
there is no way of communicating. You have to realize you are
talking to a Third World country. That is the reason it is very
hard, because these people, the Third World country don't have
any resources or funding. They see the United States as the
cousin, but yet no funding goes through that area. For example,
in Laredo, 250,000 population in Laredo, but in Mexican side,
there is 600,000, almost more than half a million people there.
But yet there is no funding for them. When we do our census,
you only see city of Laredo you don't see both. I can't count
the formula, but the risk is there.
Mrs. Christensen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cuellar. To turn this around a little bit, we would
like to write down your questions. We have been asking you
questions, you have had an opportunity to put in testimony. If
you want to give us a question that you would like to ask us on
areas that you think we are ought to be focusing on, what would
that be and I will start off with Ms. Morrison.
Ms. Morrison. One pointed specific question at this point
which is becoming very real in the near future with the
inoperability grant that is being given to the States by the
Department of Commerce, they are following the pattern of
having 80 percent go to the locals, 20 percent to the States.
If we are really trying to come up with a nationwide
interoperability plan and a statewide interoperability plan
that will piggyback, then the question to the grant holders, so
to speak, is why wouldn't you want to give 100 percent of those
funds to the State? Let the State be responsible for doling out
that money as needed statewide. We know what our needs are and
that doesn't make the State the overseer of what is being
utilized locally.
Mr. Cuellar. OK, thank you.
Ms. Morrison. That was a great question, format.
Chief Sosa. Congressman, what if the City of Laredo decides
no more Federal function? What if they decide to say, you know
what, I am not going to do any more body recovery. You know
what, I am not going to take care of the bridges. I am not
going to do hazardous material because we don't have the
resources or funding.
Those are the questions that are asked every day by the
union of the City of Laredo and other border cities. Why should
we be doing Federal functions if we don't get the money? This
is one of the most important questions that they are asked
everyday, especially in the south border or for radios, how can
we communicate regionally or if I want to communicate with
California through Texas, how can we do it? Through Washington
how do we do it? It is very important to have some kind of
regional for border cities.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you.
Mr. Elfo. Mr. Chairman, we have a lot of Federal resources
in terms of law enforcement in our communities, but the Federal
Government doesn't provide the infrastructure to support them.
As I said, 80 to 85 percent of the cases are prosecuted in our
local courts. Our jail was designed for 148 inmates and we have
300 in there now.
If we are going to provide the enforcement, catch more
people we need the infrastructure to support it, it would take
a system wide approach. I know on the southern border in some
of the States, there is some reimbursement provided for the
cost of prosecuting persons apprehended by Federal law
enforcement and turned over to the State for prosecution. There
is no similar provisions for the northern border.
We handle 160 fugitives a year from all over the country
apprehended primarily by the Federal agencies, primarily. The
vast majority of drug smuggling cases that are smugglers
apprehended by Federal authorities, stolen cars, kidnappings,
you name it, we have it. We could use some help adding
prosecutors, courts and adding personnel in law enforcement to
be able to address that. That's what my question to you would
be.
Mr. Cuellar. All right, thank you. Mr. Kessler.
Mr. Kessler. Strictly from a tribal perspective,
traditionally tribes have not had good working relationship
with the States and the counties because the sovereign nation
aspect gets in the way sometimes. My question would be, why
can't tribes be recognized on the same level as the States and
have access to that funding without, and nothing against the
States, but without having to depend on them for the
disbursement of that fund?
Mr. Cuellar. Mr. Lombard.
Mr. Lombard. Mr. Chairman, my question will sound very
similar to Mr. Sosa's. The ports last year had over 3 quarters
of a million people go on cruises, we did over $70 billion
dollars in commerce coming in and out of our ports, second only
to Norfolk, we have one of the largest Navy presences, we have
a carrier task force, the home of the tried and sub fleet, we
have Bremerton naval shipyard.
My question would be with one fire both protecting the
area, what would you like us to protect first or what would you
like to us not protect?
Mr. Cuellar. All right. Thank you. I appreciate it. With
this type of format there is a structure where we ask you to
speak for 5 minutes, and we ask a couple of questions, but I
always want to get a two-way dialogue so I really appreciate
this.
I think this is all the questions, Ms. Christensen. So this
time, I want to thank all the witness for their valuable
testimony and to the members of their questions. The members of
the subcommittee may have additional questions for the
witnesses, and we ask you to respond to them as soon as
possible in writing to those questions. Having no further
business, this hearing is adjourned, thank you.
[Whereupon, at 3:17 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
Appendix A
----------
Supplemental Testimony
Of
Hector Gonzalez, M.D.
Director of Health
City of Laredo
1. INTRODUCTION
Good morning Chairman Cuellar and Members of the Subcommittee on
Emergency Communication, Preparedness and Response. My name is Doctor
Hector F. Gonzalez; I am the Director of Health for the City of Laredo.
My colleague Chief Luis Sosa, Chief of the City of Laredo Fire
Department is addressing you today in person to provide testimony on
our unique needs based issues as first responders and emergency care on
the border. I am submitting this addenda to the Chief's testimony. I
have every confidence that Chief Sosa can address any immediate
questions you may have on public health threats and our unified
response in Laredo, a Texas-Mexico Border City.
I have provided public health care for over thirty (30) years. In
contrast to private medicine, public health keeps our community disease
free and promotes wellness and prevention. We want to keep people well.
2. CHALLENGES ON THE BORDER
Nowhere are these activities more vibrant and yet challenging than
on the Texas-Mexico Border.
Infectious diseases and co-morbidities are critical.
Laredo has one of highest rates of Tuberculosis in Texas.
There is a critical lack of access to health care
(over 50% of our citizens are un/underinsured).
There is a critical lack of access to health care
professionals. We are a HRSA health professions shortage area
and we lack appropriate equipment for services and adequate
communication which all add to the challenges.
Yet our resiliency has assisted border communities like Laredo to
flourish despite the odds. From El Paso to Brownsville, Texas first
responder responsibility includes addressing infectious and all hazards
threats.
3. THE NEW FIRST RESPONDER PARADIGM
After September 11 , the first responder paradigm changed. This is
especially so after the anthrax attacks. No longer do we view first
responder and preparedness in the same way. Nowhere is this more
evident than in Laredo where the Chief of Police, Fire Chief and I work
intimately close to respond to all hazards: biological, chemical and
radiological. Yet Laredo has always worked in this manner, maximizing,
regionalizing and being innovative because we have always recognized
that it is our community but everyone's border to protect. Most
importantly however, resources have always been insufficient and
therefore we created our own response expertise. We respond to all
hazards to contain disease, prevent the spread and provide immediate
care of individuals affected as well to protect the public. For us, it
is routine to respond locally, regionally and internationally. We are
the state and federal responders, as there is no one else to respond,
and we recognized this a long time ago. On the border, issues may be
international in scope, but the response to the threat will always be
local! This is why we developed are own team of experts especially for
all an hazards and public health response.
4. LOCAL RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL THREATS
Let me share a few examples of interventions.
(1) Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)
During the world-wide Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)
threat, there were five (5) mainland Chinese nationals traveling
through Mexico City and entering the United States illegally through
the Freer, Texas border post. The Customs and Border Patrol called us
in Laredo to inform us that two of Chinese nationals had a fever.
(Please note, it was not a Laredo Border crossing but individuals in
Freer, Texas, an hour's drive.) We respond and conduct a rapid and
immediate thorough investigation, instituting quarantine and isolation
procedures for the prevention and protection of all. This effort
included a response to protect over 30 federal agents, 25 Mexican and
Central Americans (caught with the Chinese) as well the wellbeing of
all Laredoans. We also had to deal with federal and state health and
immigration authorities from both countries. The City of Laredo Health
Department (CLHD) made it our immediate responsibility to assure the
protection of all and the disease containment to prevent a potential
spread of a highly communicable disease that could have impacted the
nation. This was the responsibility of federal authorities but we are
the only ones able to respond. While we have a Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) quarantine station in El Paso that covers
New Mexico and Texas, they only have 3 persons. We work wonderfully in
partnership with them but in the end we provide all of the local
investigations and response, training and prevention efforts not only
for Laredo but for the region as we care for 4 other counties as well.
Both Chief Sosa and our staff are continuously responding to all
hazards including assuring the appropriate storage of Cobalt 60,
assuring the safety management of illegally discarded hazardous
materials and the safety of food and water supplies.
(2) TB
Finally I am sure all of you have heard about the quarantine and
isolation of the person with TB with XDR who traveled worldwide. The
whole nation is concerned and I understand there are hearings on this
matter. Well this is an everyday threat for us on the border. We don't
need any exotic or biological weaponized threat; there are everyday
communicable disease threats to the public that are equally lethal.
One of our cases in 2006 involved two family members (one in Laredo
and one in Nuevo Laredo Mexico). We immediately intervened
(internationally) since members lived on both sides of the US-Mexico
border to get all family members tested, confirmed, treated and
followed. When we finished the investigation, we had tested over 40
family members and 3 were positive. These were immediately confirmed,
treated and followed as active TB which needs treatment for at least 6
months with multiple medications. It is imperative to assure compliance
to avoid drug resistance which is a problem today and in some cases (as
in the case all of you have heard about) there is a rare extremely
multi-drug resistant strain. In our situation, the 3 cases were family
members in San Antonio (150 miles away) Dallas (over 400 miles away)
and in Chicago. If we did not have the surveillance detection system to
intervene quickly, test, confirm, treat and follow these cases, they
would have gone undetected putting hundreds if not thousands of people
at risk.
Yet we have faced a 30% reduction in funds over the last 2 years
affecting our public health response infrastructure. Today we do not
have adequate infection control response staff, equipment for services
with an isolation and response vehicle and appropriate communication
systems is still lacking. Our staff responds with limited resources and
equipment and in their own vehicles which are not appropriate for our
terrain and protection against potentially communicable diseases and
hazardous exposure. This is not an appropriate response. If our staff
fall and fail to protect and prevent not only is Laredo at risk but the
state and nation as well.
We ask that you consider providing adequate resources for services,
staff and equipment not based on formulas and standards that are used
for the rest of the nation. Our United States-Mexico Border and in
particular the Texas-Mexico Border, specially Laredo as the major
inland port of entry, must have adequate resources to respond based on
our unique response responsibilities to all threats. We must have the
appropriate staff, equipment, vehicles to respond as well the proper
tools to isolate and quarantine, after all what happens in Laredo
affects the entire nation. If we protect and respond appropriately in
Laredo, we protect the public's health and wellbeing of the country.
5. CONCLUSION
The US is under a constant threat of an intentional or
unintentional medical or biological attack. In Laredo we say: ``When
Nuevo Laredo, Mexico coughs, Laredo gets the cold.'' Disease does not
respect a border, a wall or even the most professional of custom and
border patrol agents.
When you think of the potential public health threats that can
cause epidemics, contaminate our water or food supply, there is no area
more vulnerable than the US-Mexico Border. In Laredo, we are proud to
provide a first line of defense for our community and the nation. We
just need help with the resources to meet these demands.
I want to thank you for allowing me to provide this written
testimony. I know Chief Sosa is providing immediate answers to any of
your questions but I will glad to answer any additional questions you
may have as well.
Appendix B
----------
US-Mexico Border Public Safety and Public Health Response
The Need for a Federal-Local Partnership
Background
The City of Laredo provides its local citizens and the nation a
comprehensive public safety and public health response to threats at
the border. Laredo provides:
A unified approach of police, fire and public health
first responders to ensure safety, security and public health
disease control and preparedness.
Training, planning and support for disease control and
prevention through its public health authority.
Support for our federal and state partners in
responding public health and safety hazards challenges.
Challenge
Despite Laredo providing these national defense services, Laredo is
not a direct beneficiary of any of the new DHS programs because federal
funding for homeland security has been limited to US census data.
Funding formulas must be changed to address threat levels and services
provided to the nation. Laredo is providing the services. It is time
that the nation provides Laredo with a fair share of the resources
needed for these efforts.
Solutions:
Federal funding for homeland security and public health response
initiatives must compensate local communities that are providing
protection to the nation. The easiest way to accomplish this goal is to
create a border category in all funding formulas.
There are also specific steps that the Congress can take to address
these challenges:
UASI should be changed to make proximity to the border
a threat criterion and funding should be available for people
and equipment required to meet threats to the nation's health
and safety. Laredo provides more public health responders and
public safety responders on the border than the federal
government, yet it is not eligible for direct funding.
The Port Security initiative must be modified to
include all major ports, not simply water ports. The City of
Laredo is the nation's largest inland port on the U.S. Mexico
border, yet it is not eligible for port security funding.
International Bridges should be included in the
protected class of infrastructure of national significance.
Their losses would have a major impact on the nation's economy.
Creative border security initiatives such as Laredo's
``River Vega'' project that enhance national security by
clearing lines of sight and building river retaining walls with
the result being an integrated national security project should
be supported.
All other DHS and Department of Justice programs which fund first
responders (i.e. SAFER, COPS) must be fully funded and the role a
community plays in supporting national security must be included in the
funding criteria.
Appendix C
----------
Detailed Statement of Chief Sosa
On The
Challenges Facing First Responders in Border Communities
BACKGROUND
Border Security and safety is an essential component of our
nation's homeland security. It is a duty that we gladly and proudly
accept each time we report for our shifts. Although our task is
challenging, we realize its importance, for we as first responders, are
the front line of defense for our Nation against intentional or
unintentional threats. A sobering reality is that the number of threats
in this post 9-11 world has increased along the US/Mexico border and so
has the number of incidents that can potentially escalate into major
emergencies.
The County of Webb, in which Laredo is located, is the 6th largest
county of the 254 counties in the State of Texas. It covers 3,360 sq.
miles or 2,139,217 acres. As the second fastest growing city in the
nation, Laredo has outgrown its boundaries. The City of Laredo, thru a
contractual agreement, provides emergency services to all of Webb
County. The County of Webb has 4 cities that the Laredo Fire Department
services: Mirando City, Bruni, Oilton, and Aguilares. The Laredo
metropolitan area posted the largest gain in population of any other
city along the Texas border. Laredo has an approximate population of
250,000 residents and its sister city, Nuevo Laredo, Mexico, has a
population of 600,000 residents.
While all local governments have security issues, border
communities have special challenges. Consider Laredo, Texas, the
largest land port in the United States for people and goods arriving
from Central and South America. Every day, 13,000 trucks bring parts
and supplies across the border, and 30,000 people cross its four
bridges, a process that takes one and one-half hours on a normal day.
Our frontier community is a booming one, having doubled its
population in the past 10 years, from 100,000 to more than 200,000.
Nuevo Laredo, our sister city across the border in Mexico, has a
population of 600,000. During a serious emergency, the closest support
from any U.S. locality, state government, or federal government agency
is 150 miles away. An existing binational aid agreement between Laredo
and Nuevo Laredo includes an understanding of hazardous-materials
responses, bomb threats and SWAT tactics among other public safety
disciplines. Historically, the aid provided has been to assist Nuevo
Laredo emergency agencies to properly mitigate threat in our sister
city. Also we experience an average of three or four bomb threats each
week at our international bridges.
CHALLENGES
In outlining Laredo's role on the border, it is important to answer
the question that many of you have: Why should federal resources be
used to support what are typical services provided by every local
government as well as other special services that may not be typical to
other jurisdictions? Listed below are two reasons why:
A. International
Largest and Oldest Southern Inland Port
Laredo is at the center of the primary trade route connecting
Canada, the United States and Mexico. We are the gateway to Mexico's
growing industrial complex. Los Dos Laredos (The Two Laredos) are
actually one city, divided only by a river. Laredo became the first
``official'' Port of Entry on the U.S./Mexico border in 1851. (In fact,
the United States Consulate in Nuevo Laredo, Mexico is America's oldest
continuously active diplomatic post, established in 1872.) Today, the
Laredo Customs District handles more trade than the ports of Southern
California, Arizona, New Mexico and West Texas combined.
Services We Provide Laredo and Nation
The City of Laredo provides its local citizens and the nation a
comprehensive public safety and public health response to threats at
the border. Laredo provides:
A unified approach of police, fire and public health
first responders to ensure safety, security and public health
disease control and preparedness.
Training, planning and support for disease control and
prevention through its public health authority.
Support for our federal and state partners in
responding public health and safety hazards challenges such as
primary response for river rescue and recovery as well as
response to bomb threats at our international bridges to
conduct searches for weapons of mass destruction.
Despite Laredo providing these national defense services, Laredo is
not a direct beneficiary of any of the new DHS programs because federal
funding for homeland security has been limited to US census data.
Funding formulas must be changed to address threat levels and services
provided to the nation by border communities. Laredo is providing the
services. It is time that the nation provides Laredo with a fair share
of the resources needed for these efforts. Additionally, we would like
to mention some of the other challenges we face along the border:
B. Domestic
The City of Laredo is a hub for emergency response with assets and
expertise to manage emergencies in a 150 mile radius. The City has
executed mutual aid agreements with several jurisdictions to offer aid
in the event they should be needed. Local resources could be quickly
exhausted should there be a need to respond to a major emergency. As a
Border community we face a wide variety of threats given our strategic
location and as such we must recognize that emergencies in our sister
city could lead to a potential emergency in ours.
Structure fires
With 60 million square feet of warehouse space to protect on our
side of the border, we must consider the vast amount of warehouse space
to the south. The limited means of our counterparts puts our community
at risk should a fire in their commercial/warehouse districts become
uncontrollable. An existing bi-national agreement with Nuevo Laredo
would require our fire department to render aid.
EMS
Laredo Fire Department Emergency Medical Services (EMS) responded
to close to 17,000 calls in 2006. Many of these were responses to our
international bridges to render aid to patients coming in from Nuevo
Laredo. The patients arrive to our bridges via personal vehicles or by
foot. Additionally, many attempts by foreign nationals to cross our
borders illegally generate a response by our EMS system to render aid
in the hostile terrain that surrounds our community. These patients
become dehydrated or suffer trauma while attempting to cross via rail
car or by vehicles transporting illegal aliens that are involved in
accidents.
1Mass casualty incidents
In addition to offering protection to our community from mass
casualty incidents, we consider other factors that increase the
potential for these types of incidents. A major corridor named IH35,
passes through our city and so does a tremendous amount of traffic.
This includes passenger buses as well multi-occupant vehicles. This
highway is also a major thoroughfare for the transportation of illegal
aliens. Many times while chased by law enforcement, these vehicles
become involved in accidents with as many as 50 people. Recently, the
fire department was called to assist a neighboring border county,
Zapata, when a passenger van transporting 50 aliens rolled over killing
one. This incident placed a significant burden on our resources as
several ambulances were dispatched to assist, render aid and transport
the injured back to local hospitals.
HAZ-MAT Incidents
Laredo is the main NAFTA corridor for the United States and
correspondingly in Texas for international trade. Laredo has four
International Bridges and is currently in the process of applying for a
Presidential Permit to build a fifth International Bridge. Laredo
carries 50% of all NAFTA related trade. It is further estimated that
fifty percent of the trade that crosses through Laredo is hazardous
material. The United States, Mexico, Central and South America's
economies depend on secure bridges (the artery through which life flows
for the business-trade sector). Terrorist actions or any disruptive
situations would be detrimental to local, state, national and
international economies. According to Laredo Development Foundation's
2001 data, Laredo is the number one inland port in the United States
with 2,772,537 annual tractor-trailer crossings and an additional
350,620 rail car crossings through our single railroad bridge. Almost
half of the cargo that travels through the Laredo Corridor by land and
rail carry Hazardous Materials. The Laredo Airport, a former U.S. Air
Force Base, had 226 million pounds of freight land in 2001.
The situation our community faces today is the increasing volume of
commercial traffic with hazardous cargo passing through our city via
road and rail. In addition, we are experiencing an expansion of
commercial warehousing that store the hazardous materials transported
by commercial traffic. This reflects an increase for calls our
department makes to hazmat incidents.
Of note are recent emergency calls that posed a threat to our
community and contained all of the necessary elements to escalate to a
major disaster.
A tractor-trailer overturned on Hwy 359 spilling a
significant amount of highly toxic sodium hydroxide. The
highway was closed for several hours. Prevailing winds
threatened to carry fumes towards the City.
A tractor-trailer was found to be leaking an unknown
chemical. The trailer contained several pallets of AG Oxycom,
an oxidizer corrosive that causes irritation of the respiratory
track when inhaled.
A train derailment caused several boxcars containing
petroleum alkalate and benzene 10% to burn exposing one boxcar
with tetrachchloroethylene. Residents in the immediate area
were evacuated. Wind conditions threatened to carry fumes
towards a populated area.
There is also the challenge of rail yards in the midst of a heavily
populated area of town. These boxcars transport a huge amount of cargo
throughout the day at the risk of derailment.
All these numbers translate into a single conclusion: Laredo's Fire
Department must be prepared to address a hazmat challenge due to the
volume of Hazmat cargo, commerce, and tourism present on both sides of
the border. Data compiled from the U.S. Department of Commerce
indicates that in 2004, the total share of U.S.-Mexico trade passing
through the port of Laredo was 58.9%. All other ports on the U.S.-
Mexico Border totaled only 41.1%. This commercial traffic has only
increased over the past decade as more commerce is utilizing the Port
of Laredo's strategic location. The significant increase has offered
many opportunities for the potential of a major hazardous material
incident that would affect the lives of many families on both sides of
the border as well as those that reside in the surrounding communities.
Additionally, Laredo has over 60 million square feet of warehouse space
and at least a quarter of that space contains hazardous materials and
is highly vulnerable to Terrorism and Bio-Chemical Terrorism.
River Rescue and body recoveries
The Laredo Fire Department is the primary responder to river
rescues and body recoveries along the Rio Grande. As the increase in
attempts to cross our border illegally so do the number of rescues and
recovery of drowning victims. We lack the equipment and training to
safely conduct these services on international waters.
Bomb Threat at bridges
911 Dispatch receives on average 3 bomb threats a week to our
international bridges alone. The Fire Department responds to these bomb
threats and conducts a search for any suspicious packages and explosive
devices without any protective equipment or ordinance training.
SOLUTIONS
Homeland security is about the integration of a nation, everyone
pledged to freedom's cause, everyone its protector, and everyone its
beneficiary. It's about the integration of our national efforts, not
one department or one organization, but everyone tasked with our
Nation's protection. To accomplish this task, federal funding for
homeland security and public health response initiatives must
compensate local communities that are providing protection to the
nation. The easiest way to accomplish this goal is to create a border
category in all funding formulas.
Additionally, we would like to respectfully submit the following
points:
(1) The City of Laredo has been a major contributor of
resources to create a regional mutual aid agreement. As the
largest source of assets and experience in our region, we are
looked to in the event of a significant emergency occurring in
any of the participating jurisdictions. Support and training
for regional preparedness is essential to our border
communities.
(2) Our City has invested heavily in the creation of a state of
the art Fire and Law Enforcement training facility. This
facility has trained first responders from around the globe.
Students have trained here from different parts of Mexico,
Central and South America, Europe and Canada. Another benefit
to first responders from around this region is the close
proximity and accessibility to world class training.
Standardized training for public safety officials on both sides
of our border is essential for a uniformed response to an
emergency that would affect communities on the US/Mexico
Border.
(3) We must be recognized as a hub for public safety and
homeland security for the region and for the front gate of our
nation. Although we are the largest community in the region
with public safety assets, it is important to remember that we
are the closest entity for emergency response in 150 miles.
(4) UASI should be changed to make proximity to the border a
threat criterion and funding should be available for people and
equipment required to meet threats to the nation's health and
safety. Laredo provides more public health responders and
public safety responders on the border than the federal
government, yet it is not eligible for direct funding.
(5) The Port Security initiative must be modified to include
all major ports, not simply water ports. The City of Laredo is
the nation's largest inland port on the U.S. Mexico border, yet
it is not eligible for port security funding.
(6) International Bridges should be included in the protected
class of infrastructure of national significance. Their losses
would have a major impact on the nation's economy.
(7) Creative border security initiatives such as Laredo's
``River Vega'' project that enhance national security by
clearing lines of sight and building river retaining walls with
the result being an integrated national security project should
be supported.
(8) All other DHS and Department of Justice programs which fund
first responders (i.e. SAFER, COPS) must be fully funded and
the role a community plays in supporting national security must
be included in the funding criteria.
CONCLUSIONS
Laredo is the only U.S./Mexico border city strategically positioned
at the convergence of all land transportation systems. While this
location results in Laredo being our nation's largest inland port on
the southern border, it also means that Laredo's public safety and
health programs are heavily burdened with the flow of such commerce.
Laredo is the shipping and receiving dock for the urban centers and
seaports in your states. There are even statistics of the amount of
cargo that flows from or returns to your states of Mississippi,
Washington, New York, Pennsylvania, Indiana, the Carolinas, Alabama and
beyond. Laredo and other border communities strive for healthy and safe
communities. Sometimes we are asked to bear too large a burden in
keeping our nation healthy and safe. We look to this committee assist
us obtain the resources we need to meet that challenge.
Every day, we work to make our border and America more secure.
Every day, the memories of September 11th inspire us to live our vision
of preserving our freedoms, protecting America, enjoying our liberties,
and securing the homeland.
Appendix D: For the Record
----------
Questions and Responses
Question from the Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security
Responses from Bill Elfo
Question 1.: Sheriff in your testimony you mention the need for a
joint operations center large enough to accommodate border related
activities. What is your current state of operations in this regard?
How could you be better by a joint operations center? How would such a
center assist in preparedness and response among all levels of
government?
Response: The Whatcom County Emergency Operations Center is located
within a local fire station. It is approximately 1400 square feet and
can accommodate up to fifty persons. While adequate for managing our
typical winter storms and flooding, it is grossly inadequate in terms
of accommodating and coordinating the number of essential local,
county, state, federal and private sector representatives needed to
manage major border-related emergencies and disasters. Experience and
exercises have consistently demonstrated that we can reasonably
anticipate the need for a multi-agency emergency operations center that
will accommodate up to 250 people.
The Whatcom County Sheriff's Office has primary responsibility for
providing emergency management services at and near our land border
with Canada. It maintains emergency management responsibilities for six
municipalities and the unincorporated area, encompassing 2116 of the
County's 2150 square miles, 62% of its population and all of its major
oil refineries. The City of Bellingham Office of Emergency Management
provides similar services within its city limits.
The United States Department of Homeland Security, through its many
component agencies, has a myriad of emergency management and disaster
responsibilities at and near the border, at the refineries and at
multiple federal facilities located throughout the County. In most
potential border-related events, jurisdictional authority and impacts
overlap.
Whatcom County, the City of Bellingham and the Department of
Homeland Security all envision the establishment of a multi-agency
coordination center designed to coordinate and plan for the response
and mitigation of activities impacting their spheres of responsibility.
All of these entities share services provided through support agencies
such as the Red Cross, the County Health Department, the County Medical
Examiner, the City Emergency Medical System and many others. In times
of disaster or emergency, all of these entities will need to coordinate
requests for outside assistance through the Washington State Military
Department.
It is absolutely essential that the three major jurisdictions
involved in emergency management operations closely coordinate
activities and decision-making. Creating three separate facilities will
be counter-productive. The establishment of a multi-agency coordination
center will bring all critical decision-makers to one location and
facilitate a transition into the most appropriate incident command
structure, accommodate specific needs, and avoid confusion and
competition for resources. It will also raise situational awareness,
ensure clarity in communications and serve as a model for other
communities.
Question 2: Sheriff Elfo in your testimony you state that since 9/
11 there has been a dramatic increase in the Federal law enforcement
presence in Whatcom County. Specifically, you state that most notable
increases you have seen have come from Customs and Border Protection,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the Coast Guard.
Are you comfortable with the amount of intelligence information
that is shared between these agencies and state and local law
enforcement officials?
Response: No. Aside from the agencies mentioned above, the United
States Border Patrol, FBI, DEA and a number of other federal law
enforcement agencies maintain operations in Whatcom County. The number
of federal agents assigned to Whatcom County far outnumber, local,
county and state law enforcement. The relationship that exists among
these agencies and their willingness to assist local law enforcement is
generally very good. Nonetheless, enhancements are needed in the area
of sharing information and intelligence.
If not, what can be done to enhance the flow of information?
Response: Border county law enforcement agencies need to closely
coordinate and collaborate in the sharing of information and
intelligence relating to crimes, threats and terrorism. With border
counties, it is essential that this information and intelligence
sharing include issues related to the international border. Nearly all
federal law enforcement operations in the county are border-centric and
it is essential to the success of investigations and safety that
efforts be coordinated.
In the State of Washington, regional intelligence groups were
created in various geographic regions. These intelligence groups take
an ``all crimes'' approach to criminal intelligence. Participating
agencies contribute personnel on either a full-time or part-time basis
and efforts are made to provide information to those agencies that are
unable to assign personnel on a regular basis.
The regional intelligence group responsible for servicing our
border county is centered in Everett, nearly 90 miles from the
international border. Most regular participants in the group are from
Snohomish County, which is located near the greater Seattle area. Crime
and intelligence information is generally centered on regional issues
related to the Seattle region and the surrounding naval facilities,
rather than those matters having a nexus with the border. The
activities and issues surrounding gangs, organized crime, criminal
enterprises and terrorist organizations in the Seattle area differ from
those occurring in our border community. Distance, priorities and
logistics do not support the Everett regional intelligence group with
the capacity to fully integrate border-related intelligence into its
operations.
A compelling need exists to integrate the activities of local,
county, state and federal enforcement in sharing information and
intelligence specific to border-activities. The City of Bellingham
Police Department maintains an intelligence unit. The Washington State
Patrol has assigned a trooper full-time to unit and the Whatcom County
Sheriff's Office regularly participates in the activities of the unit,
shares information and works cooperatively with joint investigations.
Funding should be provided to grow the nucleus of this group into a
countywide regional intelligence group to include participation from
key federal agencies and other local law enforcement. The Department of
Homeland Security should fund a full-time position to support this
operation as it does for existing regional intelligence groups.
The current formula and mechanisms for funding analyst positions
assigned to the intelligence groups impairs effectiveness and
efficiency. Current Department of Homeland Security regulations
preclude the hiring of commissioned law enforcement officers for these
positions and since funding for these positions are not sustainable,
agencies are forced to hire independent contractors to perform
intelligence functions. In most cases, these analysts do not know
communities as well as local law enforcement and there is a high rate
of turnover. As independent contractors, limits exist on the ability of
agencies to supervise their activities. Consideration should be given
to amending the regulations and reimburse intelligence groups for the
cost of assigning fully commissioned law enforcement officers to each
group. This reimbursement program could require a minimum three year
agency assignment and be rotated among participating agencies. will
increase support and appreciation for the intelligence function among
affected agencies.
It is absolutely essential that mechanisms be established to
improve the flow of information from the Washington Joint Analytical
Center, the Joint Terrorism Task Forces, the Regional Intelligence
Groups and local law enforcement. When critical information or
intelligence involving a local community is identified, a system must
be developed to ensure that it rapidly flows to designated staff at
potentially impacted police departments and sheriffs offices. Steps
must be taken to ensure operational capability exists 24 hours a day,
365 days a year.
Consideration should be given to establishing a joint terrorism
task force to serve border counties.
If so, it the same true for other northern border county law
enforcement entities in Washington?
Response: Sheriffs in the northern border counties of Clallam,
Okanogan and Stevens report that they do not receive adequate border-
related intelligence through the regional intelligence groups servicing
their areas. Sheriff Thayer of Stevens County indicated that similar
issues exist in Ferry and Pend Oreille counties. All counties maintain
good relations with Department of Homeland Security agencies but
generally receive relevant information through informal relationships
rather than an established system of dissemination. Like Whatcom
County, regional intelligence groups are generally distant from the
border and tend to focus attention to issues in the larger cities where
they are housed.
Question 3.: In your testimony you highlight an issue that is often
overlooked when discussing the challenges facing border communities.
You state that on average over 600 persons a month seeking into Canada
through County are denied because of mental illness or a criminal
record. How do these individuals impact public safety in your
community?
This phenomenon is commonly referred to as ``bounce-backs'' and
occurs when Customs Canada detect persons with criminal records, mental
illness or a lack of funds and subsequently deny them admission to
Canada. These persons are generally directed to return to the United
States and U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers are normally
notified. If currently wanted as fugitives or suspected of involvement
in criminal activity, the Sheriff's Office is normally summoned. On
average 150 wanted fugitives from around the nation are apprehended at
the border every year. Other cases involve a large array of crimes
ranging from kidnapping to possession of stolen These incidents
typically involve an investigation by the Sheriff's Office, detention
in the County Jail and involvement by the Prosecuting Attorney, Courts
and Public Defense.
Aside from the obvious impact of these individuals committing new
crimes in our community, their presence represents a drain on scarce
local law enforcement and mental health resources. A jail designed and
staffed to hold 148 inmates, now maintains an average daily population
of over 270. Prosecutors have enormous caseloads and our mental health
system is challenged to provide adequate service levels.
Question 4.: In your testimony you talk about the work between
local law enforcement and the Customs and Border Protection Officers to
detect criminals and other contraband crossing the international
border. How do you work together, share information and communicate?
Most communications and information sharing occurring between local
law enforcement and Customs and Border Protection are the result of
personal relationships and informal systems that have existed for
decades. A deputy sheriff assigned full-time to the Customs and Border
Protection Air and Marine Unit successfully coordinates information
sharing. Management personnel Customs and Border Protection and
Immigration and Customs Enforcement regularly attend meetings of the
County Police Chiefs and Sheriff Association resulting in the fostering
of an environment amenable to cooperation. The Sheriff's Office
provides Customs and Border Protection with a daily crime analysis
report. The County has established an integrated data system that will
eventually allow federal agencies to view and share data.
While many regions of the nation are focused on radio
interoperability, agencies in Whatcom County are in many areas, lacking
basic operability. Operability issues must be resolved before
interoperability can be achieved. Limited interoperable communications
are achieved through a patchwork of systems but are not dependable and
often are not available when they are most needed.
Terrain, infrastructure and agreements with the government of
Canada limit options. The County is exploring the feasibility of using
satellite technology to increase communications coverage. This platform
and technology has the capability of solving both operability and
interoperability issues.
Follow-up Questions and Responses
Questions from the Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security and the Honorable Henry Cuellar, Chairm, Subcommittee
on Emergency Communications, Preparedness, and Response
Responses from Christopher H. Lombard
Thak you so much for the opportunity to further dialogue with you,
following my testimony on July 12, 2007, before the Subcommittee on
Emergency Communications, Preparedness, and Response. I am happy to
answer your follow-up questions.
Question 1.: Chairman Thompson, you have asked the following: Mr.
Lombard, in regards to training you discuss in your testimony the need
for continued support on the regional and international level that
include backfill and overtime coverage for first responders. Currently,
does the need for backfill and overtime coverage affect your attendance
for training exercises? How does this affect the day to day operations?
Response: In a word, Yes! The need for backfill and overtime has a
significant and direct impact on our ability to attend all but the most
basic training exercises.
For the fire service, the issue of training essentially comes down
to one of resource allocation. Various national standards (e.g. NFPA
1710), and Standards of Care dictate our response times. The emergency
response times of the fire service, from dispatch to arrival on-scene,
are measured in minutes.
For a typical house fire, it only takes minutes before something
like a simple smoldering cigarette can become a raging inferno. Or, as
is the case in medical incidents like heart-attacks and strokes, we
have about six minutes to get oxygen flowing back to the brain (from
the onset of the condition) before permanent brain damage or death
occur. These physical time limits have profound impacts on the
uniformity of coverage and the in-service status of fire and EMS
resources.
When we do place resources out of service for training, the
resulting `coverage area' of surrounding units expands to fill in the
gaps. Too many units placed out of service and response times increase
allowing situations to reach extreme portions, jeopardizing safety of
both victims and responders. The bottom line of this reality directly
impacts our ability to provide on-duty training.
In an effort to provide the most accurate and up-to-date answers, I
contacted colleagues with some of the larger fire departments in the
nation: my own Seattle Fire Department, FDNY, Chicago Fire, LA County
Fire, LA City Fire, etc. All were able to confirm the same. In the fire
service we tend to go about as far as placing 6% of our total on-duty
units out of service for training purposes. Any more units out of
service could mean that someone dies because it takes too long to get
to their aid.
Fire/EMS training generally falls into three categories:
1. Required training (e.g. that which is legally required by
OSHA, State plans, etc.)
2. Essential training (e.g. that which assures an acceptable
level of service--NFPA, DHS, NIMS, etc.), and
3. Desired training (e.g. terrorism prevention, mutual aid
exercises/regional drills, etc.).
At best, the 6% `units-out-of-service' level referenced above
barely allows for the maintaining of our required training
requirements. Thankfully, the federal grants, especially those within
the Homeland Security Grant Programs, that have recently made available
(e.g. UASI, MMRS, etc.) are helping to improve the access to
`essential' levels of training. It has only been through these grants
that large regional training exercises have been able to occur.
Questions #2 and #3
Congressman Cuellar, you asked two excellent questions that strike
to the very heart of the philosophical way in which most of the United
States views incident management. In an effort to better answer your
questions, I offer a little background on the way we, in the United
States, have traditionally managed significant incidents. I am
referring to the `prevent' AND `prepare' mentalities or aspects.
We understandably invest a great many resources in trying to
prevent bad things from happening before incidents occur (i.e. crisis
management). That being said, with the exception of the military, we
allocate disproportionately fewer resources in preparation for actual
incident mitigation, (i.e. consequence management). As a result, and
because of the lack of appropriate pre-incident planning, we are often
forced to pay vastly more towards recovery, after the fact. These are
all facts that are realized all too well by the insurance industry and
their subsequent discounting for things like car alarms, living close
to a fire station/hydrant, burglar alarms, sprinkler systems, etc.
As a case in point, most every single county/parish in the United
States can claim at least one paid law enforcement officer, whether it
is a single paid sheriff or thousands of city, county/parish, state and
federal officers within a single county. If the idea of a bake sale,
car wash, or cook-off occurring somewhere in the nation to help replace
your local police car, or to buy bullets and guns for police sounds
strange, there is reason. But, for the nation's fire and EMS services,
the opposite is true. As an article in USA Today observed, ``. .
.almost three-fourths of the nation's 1.1 million firefighters are
volunteers, and two-thirds of all fire departments are volunteer. . .''
\1\ The Seattle area is not immune from this disproportion. Quite the
contrary, the situation is fairly consistent throughout the nation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 11/07/2005 (USA Today article by Rick Hampson--http://
www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-11-06-volunteer-firefighters_x.htm)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At the expense of stating the obvious, despite all of our efforts
at prevention, incidents do, and will continue to occur--human nature
and interaction with our environment dictates that we are always going
to have car crashes, house fires, hurricanes, earthquakes, tornados,
wildland fires, bombings, etc. Hence the importance of simultaneous
prevention AND preparation.
I will expound more on this later, but to relate this to your
questions on communications operability and preparation for the
Olympics, we the State and DHS are making great strides in prevention
efforts (crisis management) but doing relatively little about response/
recovery efforts (consequence management).
To answer to your first question, ``As illustrated by Hurricane
Katrina and 9/11, first responders oftentimes cannot effectively
communicate with one another. Secretary Chertoff has told this
Committee in the past that you cannot have interoperable communications
without operable communications. That said (do) all of the first
responders in the Seattle area have the basic level of equipment (to
be) operable,'' I offer the following.
As alluded to previously, there are differences between the
operability and interoperability communications for Seattle area police
and fire/EMS departments. First, relating to voice communications, the
region's fire/EMS agencies have marginal operability. Every day we
respond to several situations (e.g high rise buildings, ship holds,
hospital basements, etc.) where we do not have basic operability
between units and their respective field supervisors. Further, unlike
our police counterparts, we only have enough radios to outfit our on-
duty compliment. For large events and incidents, where we recall off-
duty members back into service, we end up having members go without
radios; compromising their safety and efficiency. Seattle is similar to
most of the fire service in that our equipment levels and operability
could be termed, ``only just.'' Portable radios are only part of the
equation.
For both police and fire/EMS, Seattle's supporting infrastructure
is approaching 15 years old--young in the national perspective, yet old
in system terms. Our provider, Motorola, has already given us an end-
of-life date starting in 2009, after which they will no longer support
or maintain our system. We have tried to plan for this eventuality
through the use of subscriber fees, but the fees have not been able to
keep up with recent estimates for replacement costs. As with the
portable radios, infrastructure components usually work during normal
operations, but when things are not normal. . .you get the picture. I
mention this not because we are seeking federal funding for the system
replacement, but because replacement will take most all of our local
resources. It is the expansion of the systems to achieve
interoperability with others (Federal entities, International entities,
etc.) that are beyond our current ability to fund.
If the current state of voice communications sounds bleak, then it
is even more so for data communications. For data, we are only starting
to work towards the operability you reference. Through our fire/life
safety inspection programs, many departments collect a vast amount of
information pertaining to data like building blueprints, special
occupants needs, special building and area hazards, emergency contact
information, sprinkler/alarm systems, water/hydrant supply information,
pertinent medical information for patients, and more. Regrettably, even
though this information is collected, few departments are able to do
much with these records or to get this information from the stations
and databases where it is stored, back out to the field where it is
needed (to mobile computers in the apparatus, in command vehicles,
etc.).
Many departments, ours included, do not have adequate resources to
build, manage and maintain our Information Technology (IT) support
systems (including: staffing, supporting data communications
infrastructure, hardware, etc.).
Your second question asked, ``Given the focus of your expertise and
the upcoming 2010 Winter Olympics, what is currently being done to
train and prepare the first responders in the region on communications
protocols? Are you fully staffed to address the communications needs in
the region? What equipment is already in place and are (the) public
safety agencies properly trained to handle the equipment? What
redundancies are build into the system if it (becomes) overloaded or
worst case, fails?''
Response: Again, you bring up several excellent questions and I
will try to answer them in the order you asked them.
The problems relating to preparation for the 2010 Olympics go far
beyond a request for funding related support. To date, in the whole of
the planning process for the 2010 Olympics (either at the state or the
federal levels), the lack of inclusion of the fire service, EMS,
hospitals and other agencies could be considered a major oversight.
And, it is not for a lack of having expertise to offer and wanting to
be involved on our parts.
Again, in an effort to provide you with the most accurate
information to your follow-up questions, I contacted several western
Washington Fire Chiefs. Most knew of the existence of a planning
process and were able to identify one or two of the agencies involved,
but none knew of any fire/EMS/hospital involvement. It was only through
my inquires, to provide the most accurate answers to your follow-up
questions, that I was even able to find out specifics relating to the
Olympic planning process.
These planning shortfalls are not unique to the State of
Washington, but are typical of most major incident planning throughout
the United States (again, as confirmed with interviews with members of
FDNY, the Chicago Fire Department, Seattle Fire Department, Los Angeles
City and County Fire Departments, etc.).
The region's fire/EMS services have staffing and well trained
planning and communications experts to offer toward the Olympics
effort, but we are finding it difficult to gain inclusion in the
process. Because of our communications expertise, we have access to all
manner of redundancies and back-ups, but they will likely not be
included--again, planners have demonstrated that they are unaware of
their existence.
Were the Olympics occurring in the United States, there would be
considerable funding and/or funding mechanisms available to offset the
costs associated with hosting such an event. Unfortunately, because the
venue is just outside of the US, little funding exists (save that which
is locally provided by either entities within the region or by the
state)--yet the expenses remain.
Pertaining to this specific elevated-risk event, there is good news
and bad news. The bad news is that our region is going to have to make
due with available resources. Fortunately, the good news is that the
issues you raise go beyond just the Olympics and, as such, we are
starting to address them in an effort to meet long-range regional
goals. Resolving some of our current day-to-day needs will coincidently
better position us to handle this, and other major events.
The recent DHS' Report to Congress on the 2010 Olympic and
Paralympic Winter Games, provided an impressive analysis and summary of
pre-planning for the security for the events (e.g. discussions
pertaining to Customs and Border Patrol (CBP). The DHS report
anticipates that, during the two Olympic events, an additional half-
million visitors will transit through the Western Washington area.
Further, the report mentions the impact this will have on the region's
enforcement assets and what the affected agencies are planning to do
about the increase.
Ironically, there was no mention pertaining to anything about
training, funding and/or pre-staging of any kind of response (fire,
EMS, hospital, etc.) assets. Despite the planned 500,000 additional
visitors, it can only be assumed that the folks among the local fire
department's (North Whatcom Fire & Rescue) 35 firefighter/EMTs and
supporting volunteers will try to operate--business as usual. By
comparison, the Seattle Fire Department has almost 1,200 personnel to
serve a city of just over a half-million.
For major events like the Olympics, the problem tends to be one of
getting information to those who will need it most, when they need it--
in this case, the operational personnel in the field. You may recall
elements from the testimony of my fellow panelists, Fire Chief Sosa
(Laredo, TX) and Sheriff Bill Elfo (Whatcom County, WA)--we are not
looking for everyone, in every agency, and at every level being able to
talk amongst each other, but it is essential that supervisory personnel
are able to inter-communicate.
What typically happens in preparation for an event such as the
Olympics is that a particular agency will be designated as the lead
agency. Because of funding limitations, the lead agency usually only
assigns an individual, or a couple of individuals to oversee the whole
event. They then establish a list of other agencies that they think
might have a vested interest or may have the potential to be involved
in any incidents. These other agencies, with vested interests, may
participate as best they can, on a voluntary basis.
The lead agency, often a law enforcement entity, will begin a
series of planning sessions on how the incident will be managed.
Regrettably, the communications components and contingencies are
focused on law enforcement needs.
Finally, a table-top `type' exercise for senior administrators may
occur and `the plan' will then be distributed. Ultimately, those who
need the information the most usually never get it. The problem is one
of completing the final component of the circuit.
Regarding your question about redundancies, we as a region have
discussed, but do not yet have much in the way of redundancies. Our
regional communications systems would most likely break down and fail
back to their current, localized sites/zones.
Regrettably, it is likely that not even Congress can resolve some
of the problems surrounding events like these. Many of the issues
surrounding the Olympics and events like it (not just near the borders,
but throughout the nation) are inherent to some of the differences
between the culture of the fire service and the culture of law
enforcement.
Appropriately, and by the nature of their work, the law enforcement
community tends to be less than `open' about the information they
share. Information exchange tends to be kept to a minimum (as needed,
when needed, only with those who are needed, and only that which is
needed). For obvious reasons, this is essentially the case to allow for
their investigations, criminal prosecution, etc. Unfortunately, this
does not lend itself well to the mitigation of major region-wide or
national incidents where prompt and open communications are essential
to success.
In somewhat of a generalization, interoperable communications for
police typically means ``police talking to police.'' (e.g. The city
police officer being able to talk to the county sheriff, talking to the
state patrol officer, taking to the federal agent/marshal, etc.)
Interoperable communications for the fire service means ``any first
responder who needs to, talking to any other first responder.'' (e.g.
The fire fighter talking to the police officer, the police officer
talking to the transportation coordinator, the EMS responder talking to
the hospital, etc.)--referencing SAFECOM's definition.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ http://www.safecomprogram.gov/SAFECOM/interoperability/
default.htm
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As a case in point, many fire/EMS agencies throughout the nation
have only limited and restricted access to the DHS mandated Tactical
Interoperable Communications Plans (TICPs), of which they are expected
to be a part. (e.g. ``I want you to call so-and-so, but I'm not going
to give you his number!?!'') Further, most fire/EMS agencies had only a
marginal role, if any, in the development of regional TICPs, defeating
the concept of Interoperability.
As we have learned through the national implementation of NIMS/ICS
and through actual events (e.g. Oklahoma City Bombing, 9-11, Oakland
Hills fire, etc.), the fire service tends to have more of the expertise
and open exchange of information necessary to manage large scale
operations (including the planning, logistics and communications
components). This is again because of our inherent openness regarding
communications and inclusion or other services. It is largely in part
to our traditional openness in communications, that has led the fire
service's operational model (the Incident Command System--ICS) to
become the national standard.
Here is where congress CAN make a difference.
What is working?
The 9-11 legislation changes allowing for
communications equipment outside of the 700MHz frequencies.
The allowance for using federal grants to purchase
`operability' equipment as well as interoperable equipment.
The very fact that you are showing an interest has
created dialogue opportunities locally, for fire/EMS--as with
the 2010 Olympics, we are finding out about on-going projects
and initiatives that we were not privy to before.
Additional ways Congress can help?
Offered here are some potential `policy changes,' using existing
funding/allocations, that have the potential to improve first
responders' communications operability and interoperability (versus
new/additional expenditures).
Assure that federal grants continue to address all-
hazards and include both aspects of public-safety (e.g. Instead
of being equally applicable to both law enforcement and fire/
EMS, the DHS-CEDAP grants are tending toward law enforcement
specific. The DHS-UASI grants too, are tending from `both
police/fire' toward `law enforcement,' etc.)
Consider legislating equal representation of
prevention (law enforcement) AND response management (fire/EMS)
agencies into pre-incident planning (e.g. The DHS/Washington
State 2010 Olympic Planning Committee has only a single listed
fire/EMS/hospital representative, out of the almost 100 listed.
This neglects the importance of preparation for consequences.).
Emphasize that Fire and EMS services need to be an
equal partner in DHS Special Events Working Groups--it almost
seems self-evident that this should be the case, but reality is
far from the case.
Continue to assist with the backlog and/or
prioritization of security clearance (Secret, Top Secret, etc.)
screening. Within the large backlog, there are a few
representatives from the fire and EMS communities. While there
are only a relative few requesting/needing clearances, they
speak for, and represent the majority of consequence
management. This lack of individuals with appropriate
clearances is often a reason given for excluding fire/EMS from
incident pre-planning.
For improved interoperable communications:
Consider requiring the State Department create
an office of first-responder/public-safety liaison or
inter-agency communications. The intent of such an
office being the ability for police/fire/EMS agencies
(in regions like San Diego--CA, Laredo--TX, Seattle--
WA, etc.) to fast-track international issues pertaining
to public safety and/or to quickly get status updates.
Support efforts by SAFECOM and the NIMS--IC to
develop and consolidate the range of necessary
training, credentialing, and certifications for the
people necessary to manage incident communications.
(ref: COML related projects)
For the 2010 Olympics:
Encourage mobilization of the FEMA
Propositioned Equipment Pod--Package on Demand (PEP-
POD) to a location nearer to the border. (As was done
in the Salt Lake City area during the 2002 Winter
Olympics.)
Engage the National Interagency Fire Center
(NIFC)/National Interagency Coordination Center (NICC)
in Boise, ID. They have planned and managed multi-
state, supra-regional incidents more often and far
larger than the Olympics are planned to be. In addition
to expertise and other resources, they offer one of the
largest communications equipment caches in the nation.
Engage the local FEMA Mobile Emergency
Response Support (MERS) unit, located in the Puget
Sound region, near FEMA's Region--X offices, in
incident pre-planning. They also have personnel and
equipment able to support most all aspects of large
incidents.
Questions from the Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security
Responses from Lessa Berens Morrison
Question 1.: Ms. Morrison, your testimony mentions bi-national
exercises involving hundreds of Arizona and Mexican firefighters,
medical responders and law enforcement officers who work along the
border to test cross-border interoperability.
What was the genesis of these exercises?
Have they been successful?
Are these exercises funded with local, state or
federal funds?
Response:
The State of Arizona has a strong historical working relationship
with the Mexican State of Sonora. Since 2003, the State of Arizona has
included Sonora in our statewide full-scale exercises. However, border
communities have participated in bi-national exercises prior to 2003.
The Mariposa Point of Entry (POE) exercise occurred for one week in
November, 2003. Mexican, U.S. federal, state, and local agencies
gathered to evaluate their ability to respond to, recover from and
mitigate against a Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) exercise. The
simulated explosion gave the State the ability to assess bi-national
intelligence sharing, interoperability of statewide communications
systems, interaction of local management activities utilizing emergency
plans and guidelines, and Arizona's Metropolitan Medical Response
System (MMRS).
In November 2004, Operation REACT (Readiness Exercise Assessing
Cyber Terrorism) simulated a terrorist attack on the lower Colorado
River flood control infrastructure and a simultaneous attack on a
Veterans' Administration hospital. In addition, the flood gates were
explosively opened (simulated) at Davis and Parker Dams creating a
surge of water flowing down the Colorado River consistent with
historical flooding.
Both exercises were very successful and involved the active
participation of U.S. and Mexican governmental agencies. Arizona's
strategic goals and objectives were met and key areas for future
development and improvement were identified.
While these two (2) exercises were funded with U.S. Homeland
Security Program Grant funds, other exercises have been conducted with
funding from local and state monies. Some of these border community
exercises were:
March 2004--First Responder hazardous materials
exercise Nogales, Sonora, Mexico at Maquiladora
Grupochamberlain;
December 2004--Union Pacific Rail Car hazardous
materials drill in Nogales, Arizona;
October 2005--Santa Cruz Emergency Management in
conjunction with Holy Cross Hospital in Nogales, Arizona
exercised a small pox incident;
July 2007--Pandemic Flu (H5N1) Full Scale Exercise in
Santa Cruz County, Arizona;
Questions from the Honorable Henry Cuellar, Chairman, Subcommittee on
Emergency communications, Preparedness, and Response
Responses from Lessa Berens Morrison
Question 2.: In many areas along the U.S.-Mexico border, federal
law enforcement has a significant presence in Southwest border
communities. In rural communities, Border patrol agents often far
outnumber the number of local police, county sheriffs, or state public
safety officers. In times of crisis, these federal personnel are often
pressed into service as first responders. For instance, during severe
flooding in El Paso, Texas last summer, Border Patrol agents and
military personnel rescued motorists from flooded vehicles and helped
shore up levees.
While this assistance is clearly invaluable, what
coordination challenges do these incidents present?
Are there ongoing efforts to help ensure that
coordination is facilitated in times of crisis, and if so what
are they?
To what degree are there set procedures for
coordination at the local, state, and federal level, and to
what degree is it up to individuals to forge relationships with
their counterparts at other levels of government?
Response: Border Patrol agents have been valuable assets in public
safety and criminal emergencies throughout their primary assigned areas
in Southern Arizona. A highway patrol officer and a border patrol
officer are often present on scenes to assist each other. The most
common scene is a critical vehicular collision. Coordinating the assets
during emergency operations is effectively done with proper incident
command.
The largest challenge continues to be the lack of immediate
interoperable communications, which plagues public safety agencies
regardless of assignment. Responding agencies cannot communicate via
the same radio system; therefore, relays with dispatchers are required
from agency to agency in order to patch through communications. This is
time consuming and in an emergency situation, seconds are vital.
Common efforts to ensure coordination include post-incident reviews
when lessons are learned about better coordination and response. An
example of pro-active coordination planning has been recent meetings to
forge plans with federal (Border Patrol), state, county and local
agencies to prepare for what to do in the event of border violence
spilling over into Arizona. The Border Patrol and other federal
agencies are also regular partners in various local/county law
enforcement management boards/groups that meet on a regular basis in
each county. Those groups exist to share information and review
incidents and plan for future coordinated efforts.
In regard to emergency management, if the incident occurs at the
local level it remains at the local level until all assets at that
level are utilized. Once that occurs, the local jurisdiction relies
upon county, followed by state, followed by federal assets. This
procedure is standard in local, county, state, and federal plans and
procedures. Many of the smaller jurisdictions on the Arizona/Mexico
border have built solid working relationships within their fire,
police, and emergency management communities on both sides of the
border, to include federal agencies located in the area. Some of the
border jurisdictions have ``sister city'' agreements in place which
assist in forging solid working relationships.
Question 3.: Ms. Morrison, as we all know, actionable and timely
intelligence and information is the first step in working to prevent
and respond to a threat or incident. In your testimony you mention the
partnerships your state has formed with California, New Mexico, and
Texas and the expansion of the Arizona Counter Terrorism Information
Center that includes local law enforcement from the border counties.
Can you please provide more details on the
partnerships with your surrounding border states?
And how do you include the local law enforcement in
the Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center--how are they
funded and how is participation coordinated?
Response: Our fusion center, the Arizona Counter Terrorism
Information Center (ACTIC) has intelligence analysts, law enforcement
detectives and public safety personnel assigned from federal, state,
city and county law enforcement and public safety agencies. These
individuals have formed both professional and personal relationships
with their counterparts in the other three southwest states and
elsewhere throughout the United States. Personnel from other
Intelligence Fusion Centers, the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), SW
Border HIDTA Intelligence Support Centers, state and federal Department
of Homeland Security and Rocky Mountain Information Network (part of
RISS) in California, Texas, and New Mexico, regularly contact ACTIC
personnel to provide timely and actionable information and
intelligence. This is done by electronic and telephonic means as well
as through various publications.
Additionally, the Border Governor's Conference attendees
established various subcommittees, including the Border Security Work
Table, which has representatives from all four of the Southwest Border
States and six of the bordering Mexico states. Information and
intelligence from these meetings and, as circumstances necessitate, is
funneled to the ACTIC.
The ACTIC has established a Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) program
that is comprised of 143 TLO's from 66 different law enforcement and
fire departments in Arizona. These TLO's coordinate with the ACTIC to
``push'' out information and intelligence to their communities, public
safety agencies, businesses, and governing bodies as well as to serve
as collectors of information and intelligence from these same entities
to provide to the ACTIC.
The ACTIC relies on several funding sources--federal, state, and
local. Agencies who send personnel to TLO training and who have
personnel assigned to the ACTIC make in-kind contributions for the
salary and benefits of those personnel. The specialized equipment
utilized by the TLO's is funded via a federal DHS grant, the Law
Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program (LETPP) and is coordinated by
a TLO Director, housed at the ACTIC. Without all of these funding
sources, the ACTIC would not be able to sustain its operation.