[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
US-VISIT EXIT: CLOSING GAPS IN OUR SECURITY
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER, MARITIME, AND GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 28, 2007
__________
Serial No. 110-54
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California, PETER T. KING, New York
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts LAMAR SMITH, Texas
NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
JANE HARMAN, California MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon TOM DAVIS, Virginia
NITA M. LOWEY, New York DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
Columbia BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana
ZOE LOFGREN, California DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
Islands GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida
BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
HENRY CUELLAR, Texas DAVID DAVIS, Tennessee
CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania
YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York
AL GREEN, Texas
ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado
VACANCY
Jessica Herrera-Flanigan, Staff Director & General Counsel
Rosaline Cohen, Chief Counsel
Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Robert O'Connor, Minority Staff Director
______
SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER, MARITIME, AND GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California, Chairwoman
JANE HARMAN, California MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
ZOE LOFGREN, California BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
HENRY CUELLAR, Texas GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
AL GREEN, Texas PETER T. KING, New York (Ex
BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Alison Rosso, Director
Denise Krepp, Counsel
Carla Zamudio-Dolan, Clerk
Mandy Bowers, Minority Senior Professional Staff Member
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Loretta Sanchez, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on
Border, Maritime, and Global 0Counterterrorism:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 2
The Honorable Mark E. Souder, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Indiana, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism.................. 21
The Honorable Gus M. Bilirakis, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Florida........................................... 3
The Honorable Henry Cuellar, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Texas............................................. 29
The Honorable Al Green, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Texas................................................. 24
For the Record
Prepared Statements:
The Honorable Mark E. Souder................................... 4
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson............................... 4
Mr. Randolph C. Hite joint with Mr. Richard Stana, Director,
Homeland Security and Justice Issues......................... 14
Mr. Robert Jacksta joint with Mr. Robert A. Mocny.............. 9
Witnesses
Panel I
Mr. Randolph C. Hite, Director, Architecture and Systems Issues,
Information Technology, Government Accountability Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 13
Mr. Robert M. Jacksta, Executive Director, Travel Security and
Facilitation, Office of Field Operations, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection:
Oral Statement................................................. 7
Mr. Robert A. Mocny, Director, US-VISIT Program, U.S. Department
of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 5
Panel II
Mr. James C. May, President and Chief Executive Officer, Air
Transport Association:
Oral Statement................................................. 35
Prepared Statement............................................. 37
Ms. Ana Sotorrio, Associate Director, Governmental Affairs,
Miami-Dade Aviation Department:
Oral Statement................................................. 40
Prepared Statement............................................. 41
Appendix
Additional Questions and Responses:
Responses from Mr. Robert A. Mocny............................. 49
Responses submitted by Ms. Ana Sotorrio........................ 53
US-VISIT EXIT: CLOSING GAPS IN OUR SECURITY
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Thursday, June 28, 2007
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Border, Maritime,
and Global Counterterrorism,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:05 p.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Loretta Sanchez
[chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Sanchez, Cuellar, Green, Souder
and Bilirakis.
Ms. Sanchez. The subcommittee will come to order.
The subcommittee is meeting today to receive testimony on
the US-VISIT Exit: Closing Gaps in Our Security.
In the interest of time, because I hear we are going to
have votes called in about a half hour, what we will do is go
quickly through our opening statements and give time for you
all to give your opening statements. I think right about that
time they will be calling the vote, and that is probably why we
don't see too many members here right now. And then we will
come back to take questions.
Thank you, first of all, to our witnesses for being here
today for US-VISIT Exit: Closing Gaps in Our Security. The U.S.
Visit and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology, or what we
call US-VISIT program, was created in 2003 to meet multiple
congressional mandates, actually, which date all the way back
to 1996, that required an automated entry-exit data system to
track foreign nationals entering the United States and to
detect individuals who were overstaying their visas.
The 9/11 Commission stated that completing this biometric-
based entry-exit system was an essential investment in our
national security; and this point was illustrated by the fact
that seven terrorists that committed crimes between 1993 and
2001, including four of the 9/11 terrorists, were actually
illegal in the United States because they were overstaying
their visas. Unfortunately, 4 years after the creation of US-
VISIT, the exit component has not been implemented.
As I understand it, the Department of Homeland Security is
starting to talk about implementing the US-VISIT Exit component
for air travel. However, Congress has yet to see detailed plans
for this rollout, and there are significant concerns about the
degree or consultation between the Department and the airlines
in designing this component of US-VISIT.
I would urge the Department to review the recent Committee
on Homeland Security majority staff report entitled, America's
Unfinished Welcome Mat, US-VISIT A Decade Later. The report
highlights the legislative mandates and the ongoing challenges
of US-VISIT and what it has faced in implementing a biometric
exit-entry system.
In addition, many reports by the Government Accountability
Office, or the GAO, make recommendations for improving the
operation and the implementation of US-VISIT's biometric entry-
exit system at air, sea and land ports.
We need to ensure that the exit component is implemented in
an efficient manner that complies with the recommendations in
these reports and that minimizes the negative impact on
international travel and on our commerce. So I am looking
forward to having this discussion. I think it is an incredibly
important one, especially as America grapples with who is
coming in and out of our country and how do we take care of
this big issue in particular of people overstaying their visas.
So I thank you for being here. I am looking forward to your
testimony. I want to thank our ranking member right now, Mr.
Bilirakis, for being here; and I will give him time for his
opening statement.
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Loretta Sanchez, Chairwoman,
Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, Global Counterrorism
Good Afternoon.
Thank you to our witnesses for being here today for this
Subcommittee hearings on ``US-VISIT Exit: Closing Gaps in our
Security''
The United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology
or US-VISIT program was created in 2003 to meet the multiple
Congressional mandates dating back to 1996 that required an automated
entry-exit data system to track foreign nationals entering the United
States and to detect individuals that over stay their visas.
The 9/11 Commission stated that ``completing a biometrics-based
entry-exit system is an essential investment in our national
security.''
This point is illustrated by the fact that seven terrorists that
committed crimes between 1993 and 2001, including four of the 9/11
terrorists, were illegally in the United States after overstaying their
visas.
Unfortunately, four years after the creation of US-VISIT, the exit
component has not been implemented.
I understand that the Department of Homeland Security is starting
to talk about implementing the US-VISIT exit component for air travel.
However, Congress has yet to see detailed plans for this roll out,
and there are significant concerns about the degree of consultation
between the Department and the airlines in designing this critical exit
component.
I would urge the Department to review the recent Committee on
Homeland Security, Majority staff report, ``America's Unfinished
Welcome Mat: US-VISIT a Decade Later''
This report highlights the legislative mandates and ongoing
challenges US-VISIT has faced in implementing a biometric entry-exit
system.
In addition, this report and many reports by the Government
Accountability Office make recommendations for improving the operation
and implementation of US-VISIT's biometric entry-exit system at air,
sea, and land ports.
We need to ensure that the exit components is implemented in an
efficient manner that complies with the recommendations in these
reports, and minimizes the negative impact on international travel and
commerce.
I am looking forward to an interesting discussion about the future
of US-VISIT's exit component.
I'd like to thank Ranking Member Souder for his interest in this
critical security program, and I look forward to working with him on
this important issue.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate it very
much.
I would like to read actually Ranking Member Souder's
statement.
The ability to reliably screen, identify and track foreign
nationals in the United States is essential for border
security. I have been a supporter of the US-VISIT program from
the beginning. I voted for six different laws that address the
national entry-exit system because I think that it is critical
for the integrity of our immigration and border management
system to have this capability.
The primary focus of the hearing is the Department's
inability to implement an exit system for the US-VISIT program.
There are clear security vulnerabilities in not knowing who has
overstayed their visa, and the consequences are stark.
Terrorists have exploited this security vulnerability to remain
in the United States to carry out and plan attacks, including
two of the coconspirators in the first World Trade
Center attack, one of the figures from the New York subway bomb
plot and four of the 9/11 terrorists. Without a land exit
system in place, we are giving terrorists a 6,000mile
loophole.
I am extremely concerned that there is no exit system in
place a year and a half after the legal mandate, and there
doesn't appear to be any plan in place to get there.
I would like to commend the US-VISIT program office for the
tremendous job of standing up the biometric entry system in
accordance with the statutory guidelines and requirements. The
previous administration ignored the program from 1996 to 2000.
After 9/11, the speed at which the entry program was
established shows the capability of the United States when
resources and political will are dedicated to a problem. I want
to see the same desire for an exit system.
The bottom line is that the Department's inability to
implement US-VISIT Exit as well as other border security
programs such as the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative is
prophetic of management and implementation problems that would
befall any amnesty or guest worker program currently being
debated in the Senate. I understand it did not get cloture. If
the Federal Government cannot gain operational control over the
border and implement a functional border management system, it
is doubtful that a massive amnesty program could be developed
that wouldn't overload the agencies and throw the system into
chaos.
I look forward to the testimony today and hearing about the
status and plans for US-VISIT. I would like to thank the
witnesses for being here and express my appreciation to the
Chair for holding this hearing.
I yield back; and I do have an opening statement a little
later when we get to the questions, if that is okay, Madam
Chair. Thank you.
Ms. Sanchez. Great. I thank the gentleman from--Florida?
Mr. Bilirakis. Florida, correct.
Ms. Sanchez. The gentleman from Florida.
Other members of the subcommittee are reminded that, under
the committee rules, opening statements may be submitted for
the record.
[The information follows:]
For the Record
Prepared Opening Statement of the Honorable Mark Souder, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global Terrorism
The ability to reliably screen, identify, and track foreign
nationals in the United States is essential for border security. I have
been a supporter of the US-VISIT program from the beginning. I voted
for all of the six different laws that address the national entry/exit
system because I think that it is critical for the integrity of our
immigration and border management system to have this capability.
The primary focus of the hearing is the Department's inability to
implement an exit system for the US-VISIT program. There are clear
security vulnerabilities in not knowing who has overstayed their visa
and the consequences are stark. Terrorists recognize have exploited
this security vulnerability to remain in the U.S. to carry out and plan
attacks, including 2 of the conspirators in the first World Trade
Center attack, one of the figures from the New York subway bomb plot,
and 4 of the 9/11 terrorists. Without a land exit system in place, we
are giving terrorists a 6,000 mile loophole.
I am extremely concerned that there is no exit system in place 1 1/
2 years after the legal mandate. And there doesn't appear to be any
plan in place to get there.
I would like to commend the US-VISIT Program Office for the
tremendous job of standing up the biometric entry system in accordance
with the statutory requirements. The previous Administration ignored
the program from 1996 to 2000. After 9/11, the speed at which the entry
program was established shows the capability of the United States when
resources and political will are dedicated to a problem. I want to see
the same desire for an exit system.
The bottom line is that the Department's inability to implement US-
VISIT exit, as well as other border security programs, such as the
Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, is prophetic of management and
implementation problems that would befall any amnesty or guest worker
program currently being debated in the Senate.
If the Federal government cannot gain operational control over the
border and implement a functioning border management system, it is
doubtful that a massive amnesty program could be developed that
wouldn't overload the agencies and through the system into chaos.
I look forward to the testimony today and hearing about the status
and plans for US VISIT. I would like to thank the witnesses for being
here and express my appreciation to the Chair for holding this hearing.
I yield back.
Prepared of Statement of the Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, Chairman
Committee on Homeland Security
Since 1996, Congress has called for a system to track the
entry and exit of visitors to our country.
After 9/11, we required this system, now known as US-
VISIT, to collect biometric information because of the security
enhancements biometrics offer.
However, after 10 years, $1.7 billion in taxpayer dollars,
and a 9/11 Commission recommendation to complete the system ``as
quickly as possible,'' the Department has completed only the entry
portion of the US-VISIT program.
Some people are optimistic when they see a glass that is
half full.
I wish I could be one of those people today, but the track
record for US-VISIT exit leaves me very skeptical.
Regarding the admittedly difficult task of implementing an
exit system at land ports of entry, it seems the Department has decided
to punt to the next Administration.
Regarding an exit system at airports, however, the
Department has indicated that it plans to undertake a new initiative
over the next year-and-a-half.
This is a promising step, but I hope the Department has
learned from previous failed efforts toward implementing exit programs.
Unfortunately, we have seen very little detail about the
Department' new biometric exit strategy for airports.
All we have is a so-called ``strategic plan'' that tells
us the new exit procedure will be incorporated into the airline
``check-in process.''
But what does this mean? Is the Department really
implementing a plan that it has not even tested?
I am concerned about a plan that would delegate our
federal security screening responsibilities to the air carriers or fail
to adequately engage Congress and key stakeholders.
The US-VISIT report released by the Committee today
outlines some of our ongoing concerns.
Hopefully today's hearing will speak to these concerns and
offer insight into the proposed new plan for US-VISIT air exit.
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
US-VISIT:
America's Unfinished Welcome Mat
June 28, 2007 (WASHINGTON)--Today, the Majority Staff of the
Committee on Homeland Security, headed Rep. Bennie G. Thompson (D-MS),
Chairman of the Committee on Homeland Security, and Rep. Loretta
Sanchez (D-CA), Chairwoman of the Subcommittee on Border, Maritime and
Global Counterterrorism, released a report on the state of the US-VISIT
program. The report analyzes the current path of US-VISIT while giving
recommendations to secure our borders.
Chairman Thompson issued the following statement regarding the
report:
While we understand tracking the entry and exit of foreign
nationals is no small task, the Department must take concrete steps
towards deploying US-VISIT's exit capabilities before making any
drastic changes to the system. Each day the Department delays
implementation of a biometric entry and exit system, the nation's
vulnerability to terrorist attack grows.
Chairwoman Sanchez added the following:
Unfortunately four years after the creation of the US-VISIT, the
exit component has not been implemented. Today's report signals the
need for DHS to work with Congress to efficiently implement the exit
component of US-VISIT to improve our nation's security, while
minimizing the negative impact on international travel and commerce.
Ms. Sanchez. I welcome our first panel of witnesses.
Our first witness is Robert Mocny, who is the Director of
the US-VISIT program. In that capacity, he is responsible for
the day-to-day operations of US-VISIT, including managing the
development and the deployment of the program.
Our second witness is Mr. Robert Jacksta, Executive
Director for Travel Security and Facilitation at the Customs
and Border Protection's Office of Field Operations. Do you say
that each and every time? In that capacity, he is responsible
for implementing passenger programs that combat international
terrorism and smuggling, specifically those related to
processing passengers entering and exiting the United States.
And our third witness is Mr. Randy Hite, Director of
Information Technology Architecture and Systems Issues at the
Government Accountability Office, where he is responsible for
GAO's work on information technology issues across the
government concerning architecture and systems acquisition
development, operations and maintenance.
Welcome to all of you; and, without objection, the
witnesses' full statements will be inserted into the record.
I now ask each witness to summarize his statement for 5
minutes, beginning with Mr. Mocny.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT A. MOCNY, DIRECTOR, US-VISIT PROGRAM, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Mocny. Thank you, Madam Chairman Sanchez and Ranking
Member Bilirakis. I appreciate the invitation to be with you
today to talk to you about how US-VISIT is, in fact, improving
our Nation's security.
Let me also say how pleased I am to be joined by my
colleague, Bob Jacksta, Customs and Border Protection, or CBP,
with whom we work on a daily basis to protect our Nation's
borders.
I am also pleased to be here with Mr.Randy Hite of the
Government Accountability Office. Randy has been focused on the
US-VISIT program since 2001, actually before US-VISIT became
the US-VISIT program; and he has offered his constructive
recommendations to improve how we do our business.
Biometric control is a priority for securing our Nation's
borders. You have said so. The 9/11 Commission has said so. The
Secretary of Homeland security has said so. We at the
Department of Homeland Security are working every day to meet
this mandate and make our Nation more secure.
Today, biometrics provide DHS with an additional tool to
match biographic records that might otherwise go unmatched.
Merging biographic and biotechnology information holds the
greatest promise to close the matching gap and ultimately close
the door on those persons who seek to exploit holes in our
immigration system.
Biometrics are a critical component to achieving broad
success in an exit control system. During the last 3 years, DHS
has conducted significant planning and testing, looking at
possible solutions for integrating US-VISIT biometric exit
requirements into the international air departure process.
US-VISIT conducted biotechnology exit pilots at 12 airports
and 2 seaports, some starting as early as January, 2004, when
US-VISIT was first launched. By the time we completed our
testing of biotechnology exit technology and procedures in May
of 2007, we had learned an important lesson, the technology
works and works well, but the procedures did not.
Travel compliance with the pilots was low. Unlike entry,
with no infrastructure in which to embed exit procedures,
travellers had to change their behavior independently.
Our final evaluation of the pilot determined that, to
achieve 100 percent compliance, biometric exit procedures need
to be incorporated into what travellers are already doing, into
the current processes for international travel.
Based on the pilots and other potential options, DHS had
determined that US-VISIT air records should be incorporated
into the airline check-in process. This option will minimize
the impact on legitimate travellers and dramatically improve
compliance.
We know that DHS's proposed solution requires significant
outreach and partnership with the airline industry, and the
Department has begun that outreach.
In order to minimize the carrier impacts, DHS proposes
providing a single interface to air carriers for meeting U.S.
Government passenger data requirements. This will ensure that
airlines would not be sending multiple or duplicative data sets
to DHS for the same person.
DHS is also considering technical and financial assistance
for air carriers to assist with the initial implementation.
In deploying biometric exit procedures, US-VISIT will
prioritize the departure airports based on volume and
destinations of travellers departing the United States. Since
more than 91 percent of all travellers from countries of
interest arrive in the United States by air, an effective
biometric exit process is essential to assessing risk and
enhancing the integrity of our immigration and border
management system.
DHS plans to publish a notice of proposed rulemaking
outlining the Department's approach to implementing biometric
air exit procedures by the end of this calendar year, with the
final rule published by June of 2008 and final execution by
December of 2008.
The same basic protocols will apply to the cruise lines as
well. As you know, the land border ports pose unique challenges
of their own.
DHS continues to research options and cost estimates that
will meet our goals without a negative impact on the economy
and the environment or travellers' safety.
In the short term, exit procedures at land ports cannot be
based on biometric solutions. The scope and complexity are
simply too great. While we continue our search for solutions,
DHS will instead seek to match records using biographic
information in instances where no current collection exists
today.
A comprehensive long-term traveller exit strategy for the
United States is a exceedingly complex and costly challenge. It
is a challenge subject to change due to fluctuating terrorist
threat levels, evolving supporting policies and developing
technologies. In order to meet this challenge, DHS must seek
new technologies and modernize facilities, establish new levels
of inter and intragovernmental cooperation and identify and
commit significant investments.
DHS is relying on the dedicated women and men of US-VISIT
and their proven track record of success to get the job done;
and although the challenge of creating a biometric exit system
is complex, we are prepared to meet this head on. I hope you
will continue to support our efforts.
Thank you, and I will be glad to take your questions.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT M. JACKSTA, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, TRAVEL
SECURITY AND FACILITATION, OFFICE OF FIELD OPERATIONS, U.S.
CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION
Mr. Jacksta. Good afternoon, Chairman Sanchez. Good
afternoon, members. I am pleased to be here today to let you
know what the Department of Homeland Security is doing as well
as Customs and Border Protection is doing at our ports of entry
to protect the United States.
I would like to begin by recognizing the very good close
working relationship that we have had with US-VISIT over the
years. We have been able to implement US-VISIT at our ports of
entry, and it is a very valuable tool to our officers today.
As you know, CBP has an enormous challenge. We share more
than 7,000 miles of border with Canada and Mexico and operate
325 ports of entry. Each day, CBP officers inspect more than
1.1 million travellers arriving at our ports of entry; and we
examine the documents, their baggage and their vehicles. Last
year alone, CBP welcomed over 422 million travellers through
their official ports of entry. During fiscal year 2006, CBP
processed a record 87 million passengers arriving from abroad
by air. However, in this largely compliant group of travellers
CBP denied entry to more than 209,000 inadmissible visitors and
seized 646,000 pounds of illegal narcotics.
To address this challenge, CBP has implemented a Smart
Border Strategy to provide security and enforce U.S. laws both
at and between ports of entry as well as extending our security
zones beyond our own borders. A key component of this strategy
at our borders is to use advanced electronic information and an
automated risk management system that identifies and targets
high-risk travellers well before arrival in the United States.
Advance information regulations were initially implemented
under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 and
the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Reform Act of 2002. On
April 7, 2005, the IAFIS final rule was published in the
Federal Register, requiring manifest information from all
commercial air and sea carriers arriving into or departing from
the United States. This manifest information includes a name,
date of birth, document type, document number and gender of all
arriving and departing passengers and crew. The Advance
Passenger Information System has become a critical tool in
securing our Nation's borders and increasing the facilitation
of legitimate air and sea travellers.
CBP is continually evaluating the data and by working with
the airlines and vessel industry has achieved improved advance
information compliance. The current inbound and outbound IAFIS
transmission compliance rate is over 99 percent. The arrival
and departure information system within DHS is a system that
can be used to match non-U.S. citizen arrival records with
departure records. The current non-U.S. citizen match rate is
93-percent, and the current Visa Waiver Program match rate is
close to 96-percent.
To further our security and after extensive consultation
with the U.S. and international airline partners, DHS has also
published a pre-departure notice of proposed rulemaking on July
14, 2006. This proposed rule offered two options for carriers
to transport passenger data to DHS in a manner sufficient to
allow DHS to screen all international travellers prior to their
departure. Specifically, air carriers can transmit complete
manifests prior to departure or they can transmit passenger
data as individual realtime transactions as each traveller
checks in.
When the rule is finalized and implemented, the United
States government will take on the watchlist screening
responsibilities for all travellers arriving into or departing
from the United States aboard a commercial aircraft or vessel.
In addition to receiving advance passenger information, CBP
also uses technology to screen travellers and goods at our
ports of entry for weapons of mass destruction. CBP officers
also screen travellers at selected foreign airport locations
throughout our immigration advisory program.
Finally, CBP has developed a training program for air
carrier personnel and their security screenings on fraudulent
document detection and imposter recognition through our carrier
liaison program.
Madam Chairman, members of the committee, I appreciate this
opportunity to testify before you. I can assure you CBP will
remain vigilant in the war against terrorism both at our
Nation's ports of entry and we will continue to add appropriate
additional layers of security overseas.
At this time, I would be happy to answer any questions you
may have today.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Mocny and Mr. Jacksta follows:]
Prepared Joint Statement for the Record
Robert A. Mocny and Robert Jacksta
Madam Chairman Sanchez, Ranking Member Souder, Members of the
Subcommittee--Good Morning. Thank you for the opportunity to appear
before you to discuss US-VISIT's role in addressing the border security
needs of our Nation.
Introduction
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) plans to modernize and
improve our immigration and border management system through
integration, collaboration, and cooperation among all parts of the
immigration and border management community. This community includes
important stakeholders in the private sector, such as air and sea
carriers. As a component of that overall vision, the Secretary of
Homeland Security, Congress, and the 9/11 Commission have all
identified exit control as a priority in order to secure our Nation's
borders. In this testimony we will provide an overview of how we plan
to implement biometric exit strategies through a phased approach at our
air, sea, and land ports. The data obtained through biometric exit will
allow DHS and the Department of State (DOS), as well as other federal
agencies, to determine whether a foreign traveler has left the country
and, if so, when; and whether such an individual is deserving of future
benefits, such as visa renewal or re-admittance to the United States.
Presently, DHS captures biometric information on entry through the
United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-
VISIT) Program. This includes the verification of biometrics of
travelers with visas, who are fingerprinted abroad by the Department of
State as part of the BioVisa Program. The use of biometric
identifiers--specifically digital fingerprints and photographs--has
made travel safer and more secure. DHS and DOS can now identify persons
attempting to enter the United States using fraudulent identities and
screen individuals to determine whether they constitute a risk to
national security. These biometrics are used to lock the identity of an
individual during his or her first encounter with the U.S. Government,
to verify the identity of the individual upon subsequent encounters,
and to run appropriate watch list checks on the individual if he or she
is seeking immigration benefits or admission to the United States.
There are considerable law enforcement and intelligence benefits
from being able to accurately document the entry and exit of foreign
nationals and to conduct trend analysis on arrivals and departures. In
addition, accurately identifying individuals who stay in the United
States beyond their authorized period of admission (``overstays'') will
allow DHS to focus resources to address known (or confirmed) overstays
and permit DHS and DOS to place greater emphasis on properly
adjudicating travel and immigration benefits.
Development of biometric exit is under way. However, a significant
challenge facing the deployment of biometric exit is that our air, sea,
and land ports lack the infrastructure to conduct exit control. Unlike
entry, there are currently no fixed inspection booths or other
facilities to process international travelers as they leave the United
States. Thus, DHS is left in the position of having to negotiate with
air and sea port authorities for the space and/or for facilities needed
to implement biometric exit. There are difficulties in creating the
infrastructure, architecture, and operational processes for biometric
exit screening. These difficulties not only impact space and equipment
issues, but also impact the departure process of travelers.
Despite these challenges, DHS is committed to deploying biometric
exit capabilities at our ports. To achieve the benefits noted and to
better secure our border, DHS proposes an incremental deployment into
the three departure environments--air, sea, and land--with an initial
focus on air and the corresponding development of data analysis needed
to produce highly reliable, actionable information.
Current Exit Process
DHS has come a long way in the exit process in a short period of
time. Previously, the legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) relied solely on a paper-based system of Form I-94 documents to
record a non-immigrant's entry and exit. Travelers manually completed
Form I-94 prior to entry inspection and received a stub from the form,
which would then be returned to the traveler for collection by the air
carriers upon departure from the U.S. This non-automated system was
deficient in a number of areas, including lack of timeliness, lost
documents, poor data integrity, and carrier non-participation. These
issues precluded legacy INS from having an accurate picture of who was
still in the United States, and who had departed (without having their
exit recorded). Consequently, scarce interior enforcement resources
were sometimes used to investigate individuals who had already
departed.
To address these issues, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
implemented the Automated Passenger Information System (APIS) to
collect manifest data on arrival and departure in an automated manner.
APIS not only improved the timeliness of the information, but also
increased the number of departure records collected. Additionally,
recent work with the carriers has increased compliance rates, which in
turn has led to a subsequent, positive impact on matching exit to entry
records.
Over the next six to twelve months, DHS anticipates that APIS
reporting will continue to improve. CBP will continue to work with
carriers to improve performance. US-VISIT will look to make
improvements to matching algorithms as well.
A number of factors exist that prevent DHS from making a 100
percent match of entry and exit records, regardless of the technology
used. These include: (1) the individual legally entered the U.S. prior
to the full implementation of the Arrival and Departure Information
System (ADIS) (the system was initially implemented in October 2002,
with additional classes of admission in January 2004); (2) the quality
of the data collected at departure was not sufficient to match against
the arrival record or vice versa; (3) a traveler exited using a
different document (i.e., dual nationals); and (4) an arrival record
was not captured at the time the person entered the United States (for
example, illegal entry, or the traveler arrived by land and departed by
air or vice-versa).
However, DHS believes that there is still substantial room to
improve entry and exit matching. Biometrics is one key means to achieve
this goal.
The Potential for Biometrics at Exit
US-VISIT tracks and records entry and exit records to determine
those who have overstayed their authorized period of admission.
Individuals identified by entry/exit analysis who have overstayed the
terms of their admission, or who are wanted or otherwise encountered by
law enforcement, may be apprehended. This analysis of records has been
conducted with both biographic information--such as name, date of
birth, document numbers, etc.--and with biometric (fingerprint)
information collected during visa applications or entry.
Based on US-VISIT analysis of biographic and biometric overstay
information, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has made
308 arrests between September 2004 and May 2007 (when biometric exit
testing ended).
US-VISIT merges biographic and biometric data to achieve accurate
matches of exit records to entry records. Information is drawn from
APIS manifests, departure Form I-94 documents, and from the locations
where biometric exit pilots were operated (from January 2004 to May
2007). This work is done through ADIS and validated by US-VISIT's Data
Integrity Group (DIG). For the month of April, ADIS was able to achieve
a match rate of 93.1 % of all non-U.S. Citizens, based upon APIS
biographic information and biometric information from the 14 pilot
locations.
Additionally, work done through IDENT, the Automated Biometric
Identification System, improves the matching efforts of ADIS and
includes conducting ``recurrent checks'' against all enrolled
fingerprints In other words, as new derogatory information is received
(e.g., where a person for whom no information that would exclude
eligibility for admission existed at the time he or she entered the
United States later becomes the subject of a criminal arrest warrant),
those prints are checked against the entire population of fingerprints
on file. Files that are matched are then used by other DHS components
and DOS to determine eligibility for subsequent immigration benefits,
such as re-admittance into the U.S. or visa renewals.
Based upon the pilots, DHS plans to move forward with a full
deployment of biometric exit to maximize the benefits biometrics can
bring to entry-exit matching. In turn, this improved matching will
bring many benefits to the immigration and border management
enterprise. Under the initial phases of the implementation of our
biometric exit program, data will be used for the following purposes:
Overstay information will be analyzed by US-VISIT and
forwarded to ICE for further follow-up and interior
enforcement;
Exit information will be used on an individual basis
during subsequent applications for admission to the United
States, visa issuance and renewal, or other immigration
benefits; and
Exit information will be analyzed in the aggregate to
identify weak areas in our immigration and border management
system where overstay is prevalent. This will require the
development of new analytic capabilities within DHS and DOS.
While biographic information is being used to address these goals,
it tends to be less accurate than biometric data and may not be
automated, thus requiring more time and resources.
Biometric exit collection is key to assisting DHS and DOS in
``closing the door'' on those individuals that seek to exploit our
immigration and border management enterprise. Comprehensive trend
analysis will allow DHS and DOS to identify specific visa-issuing
posts, visa categories, Visa Waiver Program (VWP) countries, or other
criteria that may be common to an unacceptably high overstay rate.
Subsequent visa applicants and travelers from those same posts,
categories, and countries will then receive increased scrutiny.
Exit in the Air Environment
DHS has done significant planning and testing over the past three
years looking at possible solutions for integrating US-VISIT biometric
exit requirements into the international air departure process,
considering deployment at airline ticket counters, TSA checkpoints,
airline boarding gates, and in airport terminals. For more than two
years, US-VISIT has run biometric exit pilots at 14 air and sea
locations, involving the use of automated kiosks, and sometimes mobile
devices, in port terminals. While the pilots demonstrated that the
technology works, they also revealed low compliance by travelers. Given
the analysis of the pilots and other potential options, DHS has
determined that US-VISIT air exit should be incorporated into the
airline check-in process.
Such deployment integrates into the current international departure
process and minimizes the impact on legitimate travelers. It
facilitates a consistent procedure regardless of the traveler's
departure location and incorporates biometric exit requirements with
existing data submission requirements from CBP and future requirements
of TSA.
DHS's proposed solution requires significant outreach and
partnership with the airline industry and we have begun that outreach
with U.S. air carriers. DHS proposes to minimize carrier impacts by
providing a single interface to air carriers with respect to U.S.
Government passenger data requirements. With strong support through the
DHS Screening Coordination Office, DHS has taken significant steps to
integrate CBP's pre-departure APIS with TSA's plans for Secure Flight.
US-VISIT has been brought into these discussions to ensure alignment of
policies, operations, and investments among all three programs. Once
operational, APIS pre-departure, biometric exit, and Secure Flight will
utilize the same network interface between DHS and air carriers, as
well as the same messaging formats.
Over the next year, DHS will take a number of steps toward full
implementation of biometric exit in the air environment. DHS will
refine the project plan and deployment options, as well as ensure
technical alignment with the pre-departure APIS and Secure Flight, as
proposed. DHS will engage in a more detailed conversation with the
airline industry and make a subsequent public announcement on the
Department's exit strategy.
DHS is considering acquisition strategies and how best to support
air carriers in their role. This could include financial and technical
assistance for the initial implementation, such as grants for equipment
or the reuse of existing 1-print readers as US-VISIT and the Department
of State deploy 10-Print readers to ports of entry and consular posts.
US-VISIT will also consider issuing a Request for Information (RFI) for
additional scanning devices that would combine the collection of
biometrics with a full page passport scanner. These options will be
refined as DHS works with air carriers in assessing the costs of both
initial deployment and continued operations and maintenance, as well as
deploying air exit at pilot locations.
In developing the deployment schedule, US-VISIT will prioritize the
departure airports based on volume and destinations of travelers
departing the United States. A critical focus of counterterrorism
efforts is recording the arrival of travelers from Countries of
Interest (COIs), which is conducted by the National Counter Terrorism
Center (NCTC), DHS, FBI, and DOS. Over 91 percent of all COI travelers
arrive in the United States via air. Knowing which travelers from COIs
complied with the terms of their admission, including whether they have
overstayed their authorized period of admission, is essential to
assessing risk and to enhancing the integrity of our immigration and
border management system.
Additionally, it is expected that deployment of US-VISIT air exit
will cover the vast majority of VWP travelers. These are travelers from
mostly western European countries that enter the United States for
business or pleasure without a visa for a period of 90 days or less.
DHS is currently working to publish in FY 2007 the regulatory framework
needed to support the new exit strategy.
Exit in the Sea Environment
The long-term exit solution will be deployed to commercial seaports
to provide an integrated biometric exit capture for cruise line
passengers. Biometrics will be captured and processed in a manner
aligned with the protocol developed for air exit and allowing for
optimal efficiency in traveler processing. However, the scope for
biometric exit at sea will be considerably smaller than for air. US-
VISIT biometric collection at entry is currently operational at 17
seaports. The biometric exit solution will be deployed to all seaport
locations where cruise ships depart. Seaport deployment will occur
after the air environment, so that lessons learned can be applied.
Exit in the Land Environment
The land ports have their own unique set of challenges.
Implementing biometric confirmation of the departure of travelers via
land ports of entry will be significantly more complicated and costly
than for air and sea. The main reason for this is that there are
significant space, infrastructure, and connectivity deficiencies at the
land ports for exit.
Because of the immense scope and complexity of the land border,
biometric exit information cannot be practically based on biometric
validation in the short term. Instead, DHS will initially seek to match
records using biographic information in instances where no current
collection exists today.
In an effort to address biographic exit data collection capability
along the land borders, US-VISIT will work with the DHS Secure Border
Initiative (SBI) effort to meet the challenge of border security. DHS
has not yet determined a timeframe or cost estimates for initiation of
land exit, but continues to research possible options. No matter the
course of action, DHS will move in a deliberative manner on exit at the
land ports to avoid negative repercussions on the economy, the
environment, and traveler safety that could easily occur from
precipitous action.
US-VISIT Program
DHS will rely on the proven track record of the US-VISIT Program,
and its history of working with multiple federal agencies and private
sector stakeholders to implement the envisioned exit solution.
DHS created the US-VISIT Program in July 2003 to meet statutory
requirements and, more broadly, to achieve the following program goals:
To enhance the security of our citizens and visitors;
To facilitate legitimate travel and trade;
To ensure the integrity of our immigration system;
and* To protect the privacy of our visitors.
The addition of biometrics, coupled with the integration of
databases, has contributed to improved decision-making and information
sharing across the immigration and border management community. In each
of the incremental improvements that have been successfully deployed to
date, all of the four goals listed above have been met.
DHS met its first statutory requirement by integrating existing
arrival and departure biographic information on December 31, 2003.
Subsequently, DHS:
deployed US-VISIT biometric entry procedures at
airports and seaports on January 5, 2004, for those individuals
applying for admission with nonimmigrant visas;
expanded biometric entry procedures to include those
individuals applying for admission under the Visa Waiver
Program (VWP) on September 30, 2004;
supported the deployment of the DOS BioVisa Program,
completed in October 2004;
deployed biometric entry to the 50 busiest land ports
before the legislative deadline of December 31, 2004;
deployed biometric entry capabilities to the remaining
104 land border ports of entry before the Congressionally
mandated deadline of December 31, 2005;
deployed technology for biometrically enabled e-
Passports to the 33 airports that cover 97 percent of all
travel from VWP countries as of November 2006;
tested radio frequency identification (RFID) at five
test sites along the Northern and Southern land borders to
capture entry/exit information, trigger updated watchlist
checks, and provide the results of this information to the CBP
officer at entry; and
tested the collected biometrics during exit for
travelers departing the U.S., from January 4, 2004 to May 5,
2007, at as many as 14 pilot locations.
One of the major initiatives that US-VISIT is presently
implementing is the development of interoperability between the DHS
biometric database--IDENT--and the FBI's fingerprint database, the
Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS). This
exchange of information allows DOS consular officers and DHS border and
immigration officers to have access to an additional number of FBI
wants and warrants when making visa-issuing and admissibility decisions
and when taking law enforcement actions. Likewise, the FBI and State
and local law enforcement officials have the ability to query Category
One visa refusals (e.g., generally one involving a permanent ground of
inadmissibility) and all expedited removals. DHS and DOJ are working to
increase the amount of data they exchange, thus improving the accuracy
and usefulness of information available to border security officials
and to State and local law enforcement. One of the benefits of US-
VISIT's transition to ten-print enrollment is that it facilitates more
efficient IAFIS and IDENT interoperability through the use of a common
biometric template.
Conclusion
A comprehensive long-term traveler exit strategy for the United
States is an exceedingly complex and costly challenge and is subject to
constant change due to factors such as fluctuating terrorist threat
levels, evolving supporting policies, and developing technologies. DHS
must meet this challenge by using new technologies and modernized
facilities, establishing new levels of inter- and intra-governmental
cooperation, and identifying and committing significant investment.
Thank you for this opportunity to testify. We look forward to
answering any questions you may have.
Ms. Sanchez. Mr. Hite for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF RANDOLPH C. HITE, DIRECTOR, ARCHITECTURE AND
SYSTEMS ISSUES, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, GOVERNMENT
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Hite. Thank you very much.
Let me begin by commending the subcommittee for holding
this hearing on that side of US-VISIT that can best be
described as an enigma, namely US-VISIT Exit.
As your opening remarks indicated, US-VISIT is supposed to
be two-sided, meaning it is to have both an entry and an exit
capability. The good news is that entry is operating at almost
300 ports of entry as well as over 200 visa-issuing posts, and
these capabilities have prevented illegal visitors from coming
to our country and have arguably deterred others from trying.
The bad news is that the other side of US-VISIT, namely exit,
is not operating anywhere.
The question thus becomes, why is that the case with US-
VISIT Exit? And what are the prospects for this changing
anytime soon?
My written statement addresses this question, and I will
summarize it by first quoting the Spanish philosopher who said,
those who ignore the history are doomed to repeat it.
As our previous reports chronicled, the history of US-VISIT
Exit shows a pattern of inadequate definition, planning and
justification around the solution to be pursued and how it is
to be pursued. As a result, 4 years of activity and $250
million in allocated funding has yet to produce an operational
exit capability.
As of today, I have not seen evidence that this has changed
in any significant way; and, in fact, everything seems to be
pointing to DHS ignoring and thus repeating its history on the
US-VISIT Exit. In particular, the latest US-VISIT expenditure
plan calls for investing $27 million on an unspecified air and
sea biometric exit solution and suggests that this is just the
beginning.
However, similar to the past, it has yet to produce either
the plans or the analyses that adequately define and justify
exactly what it intends to do and deliver by when, much less
how it intends to deliver it. Rather, DHS is repeating history
by making generous statements about fully implementing
undefined biometric exit capabilities at airports even in 2008
or 2009, depending on what planning document you look at,
engaging with airlines in some yet-to-be-defined manner, but,
nevertheless, saying it will issue a proposed Federal
regulation requiring airline participation by the end of this
year and replicating at seaports whatever this airport exit
capability turns out to be.
To quote the Major League Baseball icon, Yogi Berra, this
is like deja vu all over again.
As we have stated many times, successfully delivering a
costeffective US-VISIT Exit capability depends in large
part on having adequate plans and justifications governing the
solution to be required and deployed. Without it, the chances
of success are not good.
In closing, I believe it was Ben Franklin who said, the
definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over
again and expecting different results.
In my view, it is not reasonable for the Department to
continue taking the same undefined and unjustified approach to
US-VISIT Exit and expect that the outcome will be any different
than it is today, namely no operational exit capability despite
4 years and $250 million. Accordingly, I would urge the
Department to approach its latest attempt in delivering long-
overdue exit capabilities in the kind of rigorous and
disciplined fashion that our prior recommendations embody.
Until it does, the prospects of a cost-effective operational of
biometrically enabled exit capability would be diminished,
which in turn holds consequences for DHS's ability to perform
its border security and immigration enforcement missions
effectively and efficiently.
For example, the absence of an exit capability means that
important data are not available to DHS's immigration and
customs enforcement organization in targeting its limited
resources to identify and remove foreign nationals who have
overstayed their visas.
With that concluding thought, I would be happy to answer
any questions you have.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Hite.
[The statement of Mr. Hite follows:]
Prepared Joint Statement
of
Randolph C. Hite, Director, Information Technology Architecture and
Systems Issues
with
Richard M. Stana, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues
Madam Chairwoman and Members of the Subcommittee,
We appreciate the opportunity to participate in the subcommittee's
hearing focusing on the exit side of the United States Visitor and
Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT). As you know, US-VISIT
is a multibillion dollar program of the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) that is to, among other things, enhance the security of our
citizens and visitors and ensure the integrity of the U.S. immigration
system. To achieve these goals, US-VISIT is to record certain
travelers' \1\ entry and exit to and from the United States at over 300
ports of entry (POEs), verify their identity, and determine their
compliance with the terms of their admission and stay.
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\1\ US-VISIT applies to foreign travelers that enter the United
States under a nonimmigrant visa or are traveling from a country that
has a visa waiver agreement with the United States under the Visa
Waiver Program. The Visa Waiver Program enables foreign nationals of
certain countries to travel to the United States for tourism or
business for stays of 90 days or less without obtaining a visa.
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Since fiscal year 2002, we have produced eight reports that have
identified fundamental challenges that DHS continues to face in
defining and justifying the program's future direction and delivering
program capabilities and benefits on time and within cost.\2\ Our
testimony today draws on the above cited reports as well as our ongoing
work for the House Committee on Homeland Security on the definition and
completion of US-VISIT's strategic solution. All the work on which this
testimony is based was performed in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.
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\2\ See, for example, GAO, Homeland Security: Risks Facing Key
Border and Transportation Security Program Need to Be Addressed, GAO-
03-1083 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 19, 2003); GAO, Border Security: US-
VISIT Program Faces Strategic, Operational, and Technological
Challenges at Land Ports of Entry, GAO-07-248 (Washington, D.C.:
December 6, 2006); and GAO, Homeland Security: Planned Expenditures for
U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Program Need to Be Adequately Defined
and Justified, GAO-07278 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 14, 2007).
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In summary, DHS has invested about $1.3 billion over 4 years and
delivered basically one-half of US-VISIT, meaning that biometrically
enabled entry capabilities are operating at almost 300 air, sea, and
land POEs, but comparable exit capabilities are not. Moreover, the
prospects for this changing are essentially as uncertain today as they
were 4 years ago, despite the fact that the department's funding plans
have provided about one-quarter of a billion dollars to exit-related
efforts. During this time, we have continued to cite weaknesses in how
DHS was managing US-VISIT in general, and the program's exit capability
in particular, and have made numerous recommendations aimed at better
ensuring that the program delivered clearly defined and adequately
justified capabilities and benefits on time and within budget. Today,
as DHS embarks on yet another attempt to deliver long-overdue exit
capabilities, these recommendations still apply. Unless the department
implements them, it runs the serious risk of repeating the mistakes it
made on prior exit efforts and producing similar results. Accordingly,
we urge the department to approach its latest attempt at deploying
mission critical exit capabilities in the kind of rigorous and
disciplined fashion that we have recommended. If it does not, the
prospects for having an operational exit capability will be diminished,
which in turn will limit the department's ability to effectively and
efficiently perform its border security and immigration enforcement
missions.
Background
US-VISIT is a governmentwide program intended to enhance the
security of U.S. citizens and visitors, facilitate legitimate travel
and trade, ensure the integrity of the U.S. immigration system, and
protect the privacy of our visitors. To achieve its goals, US-VISIT is
to collect, maintain, and share information on certain foreign
nationals who enter and exit the United States; detect fraudulent
travel documents, verify traveler identity, and determine traveler
admissibility through the use of biometrics; facilitate information
sharing and coordination within the immigration and border management
community; and identify foreign nationals who (1) have overstayed or
violated the terms of their admission; (2) may be eligible to receive,
extend, or adjust their immigration status; or (3) should be
apprehended or detained by law enforcement officials. The scope of the
program includes the pre-entry, entry, status, and exit of hundreds of
millions of foreign national travelers who enter and leave the United
States at over 300 air, sea, and land POEs.
The US-VISIT program office is responsible for managing the
acquisition, deployment, operation, and sustainment of US-VISIT systems
in support of such DHS agencies as Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). As of March 31, 2007,
the program director reports to the Under Secretary for the National
Protection and Programs Directorate.
In 2003, DHS planned to deliver US-VISIT capability in 4
increments: Increment 1 (air and sea entry and exit), Increment 2 (land
entry and exit), Increment 3 (land entry and exit), and Increment 4,
which was to define, design, build, and implement a more strategic
program capability. Since then the scope of the first three increments
has changed. The current scope is Increment 1 (air and sea entry),
Increment 2 (air, sea, and land entry), and Increment 3 (land entry).
Increment 4 is still intended to define, design, build, and implement a
more strategic program capability, which program officials stated will
consist of a series of incremental releases or mission capability
enhancements that will support business outcomes. In Increments 1
through 3, the program has built interfaces among existing (``legacy'')
systems, enhanced the capabilities of these systems, and deployed these
capabilities to air, sea, and land POEs. These first three increments
have been largely pursued through existing system contracts and task
orders. Increment 4 strategic system enhancements are being pursued
through a systems integration contract awarded to Accenture and its
partners in May 2004.
Through fiscal year 2007, about $1.7 billion has been appropriated
for US-VISIT. According to the Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations Act, 2007,\3\ DHS may not obligate $200 million of the
$362.494 million appropriated for US-VISIT in fiscal year 2007 until
DHS provides the Senate and House Committees with a plan for
expenditure that meets several criteria. The department has requested
$462 million in fiscal year 2008 for the program. As of January 31,
2007, program officials stated that about $1.3 billion has been
obligated for US-VISIT activities.
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\3\ Pub. L. No. 109-295, 120 Stat. 1355, 1357-58 (Oct. 4, 2006).
US-VISIT Entry Is Operating at Most POEs
A biometrically enabled US-VISIT entry capability is operating at
most POEs. On January 5, 2004, the program office deployed and began
operating most aspects of its planned biometric entry capability at 115
airports and 14 seaports for certain foreign nationals, including those
from visa waiver countries.\4\ As of December 2006, the program office
also deployed and began operating this entry capability in the
secondary inspection areas of 154 of 170 land POEs. According to
program officials, 14 of the remaining 16 POEs have no operational need
to deploy US-VISIT because visitors subject to US-VISIT are, by
regulation, not authorized to enter into the United States at these
locations. The other two POEs do not have the necessary transmission
lines to operate US-VISIT, and thus they process visitors manually.
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\4\ On September 30, 2004, US-VISIT expanded biometric entry
procedures to include individuals from visa waiver countries applying
for admission.
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According to DHS, these entry capabilities have produced results.
For example, as of June 15, 2007, it had more than 7,600 biometric hits
in primary entry resulting in more than 1,500 people having adverse
actions, such as denial of entry, taken against them. Further, about
14,000 leads were referred to ICE's immigration enforcement unit,
resulting in 315 arrests.\5\ Another potential consequence is the
deterrent effect of having an operational entry capability. Although
deterrence is difficult to demonstrate, officials have cited it as a
byproduct of having a publicized capability at the border to screen
entry on the basis of identity verification and matching against watch
lists of known and suspected terrorists.
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\5\ We did not verify this information.
Despite Expending Considerable Time and Resources, US-VISIT Exit Is
Not Operational
Over the last few years, DHS has devoted considerable time and
resources towards establishing an operational exit capability at air,
sea, and land POEs. For example, between 2003 and 2006, DHS reports
allocating about $250 million \6\ for exit-related efforts.
Notwithstanding this considerable investment of time and resources, DHS
still does not have an operational exit capability. Our prior reports
have raised a number of concerns about DHS's management of US-VISIT's
exit efforts.
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\6\ As reported in the fiscal year 2005, revised 2006, and 2007
expenditure plans. The fiscal year 2007 plan reported that of this
amount, $53.1 million is still available as prior year carryover.
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As we and others have reported,\7\ the absence of a biometric exit
capability raises questions about what meaningful US-VISIT data are
available to DHS components, such as ICE. Without this exit capability,
DHS cannot ensure the integrity of the immigration system by
identifying and removing those people who have overstayed their
original period of admission--a stated goal of US-VISIT. Further, ICE's
efforts to ensure the integrity of the immigration system could be
degraded if it continues to spend its limited resources on
investigating potential visa violators who have already left the
country.
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\7\ GAO-07-248 and Department of Homeland Security, Inspector
General, Review of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Compliance
Enforcement Unit, OIG-05-50 (September 2005).
Air and Sea Exit Efforts Have Not Been Managed Well
Between January 2004 and May 2007, the program office conducted
various exit pilots at one air and one sea POE without fully deploying
a biometric exit capability. Throughout this period, we have reported
on the limitations in how these pilot activities were planned, defined,
and justified. For example, we reported in September 2003,\8\ prior to
the pilots being deployed, that DHS had not economically justified the
initial US-VISIT increment (which was to include an exit capability at
air and sea POEs) on the basis of benefits, costs, and risks. As a
result, we recommended that DHS determine whether proposed incremental
capabilities would produce value commensurate with program costs and
risks. We later reported in May 2004 \9\ that DHS had not deployed a
biometric exit capability to the 80 air and 14 sea POEs as part of
Increment 1 deployment in December 2003, as it had originally intended.
Instead, as we mention above, the pilot exit capability was deployed to
only one air and one sea POE on January 5, 2004.
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\8\ GAO-03-1083.
\9\ GAO, Homeland Security, First Phase of Visitor and Immigration
Status Program Operating, but Improvements Needed, GAO-04-586
(Washington, D.C.: May 11, 2004).
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In February 2005, we reported \10\ that the program office had not
adequately planned for evaluating its exit pilot at air and sea POEs
because the pilot's evaluation scope and time line were compressed, and
thus would not provide the program office with sufficient information
to adequately assess the pilots and permit the selection of the best
exit solution for deployment. Accordingly, we recommended that the
program office reassess its plans for deploying an exit capability to
ensure that the scope of the pilot provided an adequate evaluation of
alternatives.
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\10\ GAO, Homeland Security, Some Progress Made, but Many
Challenges Remain on U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator
Technology Program, GAO-05-202 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 23, 2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A year later in February 2006, we reported \11\ that the program
office had extended the pilot from 5 to 11 POEs (nine airports and two
seaports) and the time frame by an additional 7 months. Notwithstanding
the expanded scope and time frame, the exit pilots were not
sufficiently evaluated. In particular, on average only about 24 percent
of those travelers subject to US-VISIT actually complied with the exit
processing steps. The evaluation report attributed this, in part, to
the fact that compliance during the pilot was voluntary, and that to
achieve the desired compliance rate, the exit solution would need an
enforcement mechanism, such as not allowing persons to reenter the
United States if they do not comply with the exit process. Despite this
limitation, as of February 2006, program officials had not conducted
any formal evaluation of enforcement mechanisms or their possible
effect on compliance or cost, and according to the then Acting Program
Director, no such evaluation Would be done. Nonetheless, DHS continued
to operate the exit pilots.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ GAO, Homeland Security, Recommendations to Improve Management
of Key Border Security Program Need to Be Implemented, GAO-06-296
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 14, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In February 2006, we also reported that while DHS had analyzed the
cost, benefits, and risks for its air and sea exit capability, the
analyses did not demonstrate that the program was producing or would
produce mission value commensurate with expected costs and benefits,
and the costs upon which the analyses were based were not reliable. A
year later, we reported \12\ that DHS had not adequately defined and
justified its past investment in its air and sea exit pilots and its
land exit demonstration projects, and still did not have either an
operational exit capability or a viable exit solution to deploy. We
further noted that exit-related program documentation did not
adequately define what work was to be done or what these efforts would
accomplish, did not describe measurable outcomes from the pilot or
demonstration efforts, and did not indicate the related cost, schedule,
and capability commitments that would be met. We recommended that
planned expenditures be limited for exit pilots and demonstration
projects until such investments were economically justified and until
each investment had a well-defined evaluation plan. In its comments on
our report, DHS agreed with our recommendation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ GAO-07-278.
Land Exit Efforts Have Not Produced a Viable Solution
In January 2004, DHS committed to delivering a biometric exit
capability by December 2005; however, we reported \13\ that program
officials concluded in January 2005 that a biometric land exit
capability could not be implemented without having a major impact on
land POE facilities. According to these officials, the only proven
technology available to biometrically verify individuals upon exit at
land POEs would necessitate mirroring the entry processes,which the
program reported was ``an infeasible alternative for numerous reasons,
including but not limited to, the additional staffing demands, new
infrastructure requirements, and potential trade and commerce
impacts.''\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ GAO-07-248.
\14\ US-VISIT, Increment 2C Operational Alternatives Assessment--
FINAL (Rosslyn, Va.: Jan. 31, 2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In light of these constraints, the program office tested radio
frequency identification (RFID) technology \15\ as a means of recording
visitors as they exit at land POEs. However, this technology was not
biometrics-based. Moreover, testing and analysis at five land POEs at
the northern and southern borders identified numerous performance and
reliability problems, such as the failure of RFID readers to detect a
majority of travelers' tags during testing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ RFID technology can be used to electronically identify and
gather information contained on a tag--in this case, a unique
identifying number embedded in a tag on a visitor's arrival/departure
form--which an electronic reader at the POE is to detect.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to program officials, no technology or device currently
exists to biometrically verify persons exiting the country that would
not have a major impact on land POE facilities. They added that
technological advances over the next 5 to 10 years will make it
possible to biometrically verify persons exiting the country without
major changes to facility infrastructure and without requiring those
exiting to stop and/or exit their vehicles.
In November 2006, during the course of our work on, among other
things, the justification for ongoing land exit demonstration projects,
DHS terminated these projects. In our view, the decision was warranted
because DHS had not adequately defined and justified its investment in
its pilots and demonstration projects. As noted earlier, we recommended
in February 2007, that planned expenditures be limited for exit pilots
and demonstration projects until such investments are economically
justified and until each investment has a well-defined evaluation plan.
DHS agreed with our recommendation.
Lack of Definition and Justification of Future US-VISIT Exit
Capabilities Risks Repeating Past Mistakes
According to relevant federal guidance,\16\ the decision to invest
in a system or system component should be based on a clear definition
of what capabilities, involving what stakeholders, will be delivered
according to what schedule and at what cost. Moreover, such investment
decisions should be based on reasonable assurance that a proposed
program will produce mission value commensurate with expected costs and
risks. As noted earlier, DHS funding plans have collectively allocated
about $250 million to a number of exit efforts through 2006, but
without having adequately defined or economically justified them. Now,
in 2007, it risks repeating these same mistakes as it embarks on yet
another attempt to implement a means by which to biometrically track
certain foreign nationals exiting the United States, first at airports,
and then at seaports, with land exit capabilities being deferred to an
unspecified future time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ See, for example, OMB Circular No. A-11, Preparation,
Submission, and Execution of the Budget (June 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Based on the department's latest available documentation, it
intends to spend $27.3 million ($7.3 million in fiscal year 2007
funding and $20 million in fiscal year 2006 carryover funding) on air
and sea exit capabilities. However, it has not produced either the
plans or the analyses that adequately define and justify how it intends
to invest these funds. Rather, it has only generally described near-
term deployment plans for biometric exit capabilities at air and sea
POEs, and acknowledged that a near-term biometric solution for land
POEs is not possible.
More specifically, the US-VISIT fiscal year 2007 expenditure plan
states that DHS will begin the process of planning and designing an air
and sea exit solution during fiscal year 2007, focusing initially on
air exit and then emulating these technology and operational
experiences in completing the sea exit solution. According to this
plan, air exit efforts will begin during the third quarter of fiscal
year 2007, which ends in 2 days. However, US-VISIT program officials
told us as recently as three weeks ago that this deadline will not be
met.
Moreover, no exit program plans are available that define what will
be done, by what entities, and at what cost to define, acquire,
deliver, deploy, and operate this capability, including plans
describing expected system capabilities, defining measurable outcomes
(benefits and results), identifying key stakeholder (e.g., airlines)
roles/responsibilities and buy-in, and coordinating and aligning with
related programs. Further, there is no analysis available comparing the
life cycle costs of the air exit solution to its expected benefits and
risks. The only additional information available to date is what the
department characterized as a high-level schedule for air exit that we
obtained on June 11, 2007. This schedule shows that business
requirements and a concept of operations are to be completed by
September 3, 2007; a cost-benefit analysis is to be completed by
October 1, 2007; testing is to be completed by October 1, 2008; and the
exit solution is to be fully deployed in 2 years (June 2009). However,
the schedule does not include the underlying details supporting the
timelines for such areas of activity as system design, system
development, and system testing. According to program officials, more
detailed schedules exist but were not provided to us because the
schedules had not yet been approved by DHS.
Further, while the expenditure plan states that DHS plans to
integrate the air exit solution with the commercial airlines' existing
check-in processes and to integrate US-VISIT's efforts with CBP's pre-
departure Advance Passenger Information System and the Transportation
Security Administration's (TSA's) Secure Flight,\17\ the program office
did not provide any documentation that describes what has been done
with regard to these plans or what is planned relative to engaging with
and obtaining buy-in from the airlines. Nevertheless, DHS plans to
issue a proposed regulation requiring airlines to participate in this
effort by December 17, 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ The Advanced Passenger Information System captures arrival and
departure manifest information provided by air and sea carriers. Secure
Flight is a program being developed by TSA for domestic flights to
prescreen passengers or match passenger information against terrorist
watch lists to identify individuals who should undergo additional
security scrutiny.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With regard to land exit, the future is even more unclear.
According to the fiscal year 2007 expenditure plan, the department has
concluded that a biometric land exit capability is not practical in the
short term because of the costly expansion of existing exit capacity,
including physical infrastructure, land acquisition, and staffing. As a
result, DHS states an intention to begin matching entry and exit
records using biographic information in instances where no current
collection exists today, such as in the case of individuals who do not
submit their Form I-94 upon departure. According to DHS, it has also
initiated discussions with its Canadian counterparts about the
potential for them to collect biographical exit data at entry into
Canada. Such a solution could include data sharing between the two
countries and would require significant discussions on specific data
elements and the means of collection and sharing, including technical,
policy, and legal issues associated with this approach. However, DHS
has yet to provide us with any documentation that specifies what data
elements would be collected or what technical, policy, and legal issues
would need to be addressed. Further, according to DHS, it has not yet
determined a time frame or any cost estimates for the initiation of
such a non-biometric land exit solution.
-------------------------------
In closing, we would like to emphasize the mission importance of a
cost effective, biometrically enabled exit capability, and that
delivering such a capability requires effective planning and
justification, and rigorous and disciplined system acquisition
management. To date, these activities have not occurred for DHS's exit
efforts. If this does not change, there is no reason to expect that
DHS's newly launched efforts to deliver an air and sea exit solution
will produce results different from its past efforts--namely, no
operational exit solution despite many years and hundreds of millions
of dollars of investment. More importantly, the continued absence of an
exit capability will hinder DHS's ability to effectively and
efficiently perform its border security and immigration enforcement
mission. Hence, it is important that DHS approach its latest attempt to
deploy its exit capabilities in the kind of rigorous and disciplined
fashion that we have previously recommended.
Madam Chairwoman, this concludes our statement. We would be happy
to answer any questions that you or members of the subcommittee may
have at this time.
Ms. Sanchez. I actually am going to give myself a couple of
minutes to ask a little series of questions and then turn it
over to Mr. Bilirakis for his 5 minutes.
You just mentioned $27 million on an unspecified plan. Can
you go into more detail on what that is about?
Mr. Hite. The $27 million that I was referring to was cited
in the fiscal year 2007 US-VISIT expenditure plan. $20 million
of that is a carryover from prior years; $7.3 of it is fiscal
year 2007 money. The expenditure plan allocates the $7.3 to
broad categories of activity like project management and
contractor services. The $20 million is not allocated to
anything specifically in that plan.
Ms. Sanchez. And what you are saying is, this is money that
has sort of been put in a pile that they are going to use on
the exit part of US-VISIT but you were not able to figure out
any detailed plan of what that plan for exit was?
Mr. Hite. Exactly. Based on the documentation that has been
made available to us, either the expenditure plan or other
documentation that we have been provided.
Ms. Sanchez. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Mocny, do you have a plan?
Mr. Mocny. We do have a plan. At the time that we put that
document together, the plans were still in formulation, but we
do now have a very detailed set of actions that have to occur
between now and December, 2008, in order for us to successfully
implement that. So when that information is just making its way
up this year to Congress, at the time we put that together, it
was not as defined as it is now.
Ms. Sanchez. Is it a written plan?
Mr. Mocny. We have a written plan, various iterations of
the written plan. The way we work over at US-VISIT, we are very
project focused, so we put together a business plan of what we
think needs to happen. We put those down in a document. We
ended up with a Gant chart of activities that have to be
clicked off as we do that.
I think what was recognized earlier was the implementation
of entry was done successfully on time and on budget, and we
would make that same approach to exit as well. The same people
and the same processes would be in place to do that. It is
deciding what that is that we want to implement. Now we have
decided what we want to implement for exit. Now we would follow
our established plans.
Ms. Sanchez. And you are sending this packet, I am
assuming, because what you have just told me is sort of in
different pieces. It is not really in a binder all together.
This is the plan, et cetera. You are sending those pieces over
to Congress when? When do I get my hands on these little
documents?
Mr. Mocny. We have submitted to you I believe this morning.
In response to Chairman Thompson's request in his letter,
he asked some very specific questions about what we are going
to do. And whereas it won't be a great deal of detail within
the response to those letters, it is indicating that we do have
a plan and that we have activities that we know what we have to
do in order for us to be successful by--
Ms. Sanchez. You just said it is not in great detail, what
you are going to submit because of Mr. Thompson's letter. Do
you have a plan? Or don't you have a plan?
Mr. Mocny. We have a plan. We do.
Ms. Sanchez. You have a plan. And it is a written plan?
Mr. Mocny. It is a written plan.
Ms. Sanchez. It is a plan that, if I picked it up, it would
be 38 pages or 458 pages, and it would have objectives, a
timeline, money, and what you are trying to do. What if you
fall behind schedule? A real plan?
Mr. Mocny. Yes, it does. But I want you to understand that
we also have to do an NPRM. We have to work with the airlines.
And so where we have a plan to--and, as we said, make this part
of the check-in process, we now have to have the conversation
with the airlines to work out--
Ms. Sanchez. Have you had that conversation with the
airlines?
Mr. Mocny. We have begun the conversation.
Ms. Sanchez. When did you begin the conversation?
Mr. Mocny. We have had actual conversations over the course
of the last couple of months. But we have to do that formally
through the NPRM process.
Ms. Sanchez. You have had informal conversations with the
airlines?
Mr. Mocny. The airline community, specific airlines but
also with ATA, the Air Transport Association, but also the
International Air Transport Association as well.
Ms. Sanchez. Over the last 2 months is when you began
these?
Mr. Mocny. Approximately.
Ms. Sanchez. When did you put the plan together?
Mr. Mocny. The plan has been evolving over the course of
the last several months.
Ms. Sanchez. But it relies on--at least the piece at the
airports relies on--the airlines.
Mr. Mocny. That is correct.
Ms. Sanchez. So you started talking to the airlines within
the last 2 months, but you started making this plan without the
airlines several months before?
Mr. Mocny. We put parts of the plan together based on the
pilots that we ran. We understood that it had to be part of the
travellers' experience, that we looked at several options, and
we understand that the check--in process can offer us the most
optimum set of locations where the airlines can take the
biometric and give it to us. So we base a lot of our plan on
our own experience that we have been writing for the last 3
years and, in that course, working with the airlines as well.
The airlines had to participate as far as the pilots were
concerned. They had to direct individuals to find these kiosks.
The airports had to provide signage. So whereas in some cases
that worked very well, other cases it did not. We took those 3
years' worth of experience and then put that together in a plan
and outlined a plan that will evolve, and--as plans do. It will
get more detailed as we move further along the way, as we work
with the airlines, as we engage them and listen to them, as to
what their business model is for the check-in process. So that
plan becomes more and more detailed.
Again, the formal process is with the NPRM process. We get
their comments. We kind of ratchet that into the whole project
plan. That changes some of the elements that we have to do. At
the end of the day, though, we have to implement something with
the airlines.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you.
Mr. Souder for 5 minutes or whatever you want to say,
questions you want to ask.
Mr. Souder. Thank you.
I apologize for missing the opening statements. I had a few
questions regarding the land border, and I am not sure who best
answers this.
If I say--which we encourage millions of people to do and
millions of people do do it and I am not criticizing this. If I
say I am from Juarez and I am going to El Paso for dinner, do
we have any plans to see whether you went to El Paso for dinner
and stayed for 20 years somewhere in Indiana? Have you looked
at that question?
What exactly are you doing with--this is not a visa
overstay. These are short--term passes that happens every day
along the border, what seems to be, as we do our fencing, as we
do different types of things along the border, an increasing
occurrence.
Mr. Jacksta. Sir, when people arrive at our ports of entry,
first of all, they go through one of our primary officer
booths. We do normally a name query of that individual. We also
check the vehicle to see if there is anything in it. During
that process, the officer will ask the individual questions
about what their intentions are for coming into the United
States, how long they expect to stay.
On the southern border, there is the border crossing card
that allows those individuals from Mexico to arrive, to come
across to stay up to 30 days and to basically stay within a
25mile zone, except for Arizona, which is 75. But the
officer has a responsibility to ask the individual questions.
Based on that discussion between the officer and the
individuals, the decision, the determination is made on whether
further question is needed or whether there is an acceptance at
face value that the person is telling the truth and they are
going to a legitimate restaurant, that they are going to be
going--returning back to Mexico when they complete their
dinner.
So it is a process that is in place. However, once that
individual does go through our process and gets into the city
of El Paso, there is no mechanism to validate whether that
person has actually left the United States.
Mr. Souder. And there is no mechanism to see if they have
gone to another part of the United States?
Mr. Jacksta. That is correct.
Mr. Souder. And are you looking at a mechanism?
Mr. Jacksta. Well, there is obviously--what we do along the
various land border, southern border area, we do have specific
stops where we have our border patrol agents who will stop
vehicles and ask individuals for identification and determine
if someone has basically misused their--the use of the card. We
have the capabilities to work to make sure that individuals
that receive an I-94 card do return. If they don't return, they
show up on our list as individuals who have not reported for
returning; and we determine what type of action to take based
on risk management.
Mr. Souder. Do you check this with law enforcement around
the United States?
Mr. Jacksta. The ICE, the Immigration Customs Enforcement
officers are responsible--
Mr. Souder. I take back the question. I really want to
focus on the border. Do you see this as becoming part of the
US-VISIT program, that you have an exit for this type of--I am
going to dinner and I stayed for 20 years?
Mr. Jacksta. I think that that is exactly what we were
looking for to do down the road, recognizing that there are a
lot of technology issues.
Mr. Souder. Down the road like a year, 3 years?
Mr. Jacksta. I would say a couple of years.
Mr. Mocny. If I can, again, we have looked at and we have
tested various technology that might assist us in preventing
and uncovering what you have talked about; and, frankly, the
technology says that we are not ready yet. But I think within a
couple of years, as Bob suggests, we would have the ability
probably for biographic checks. It is the challenge of
biometrics. It is the challenge of taking a physical piece.
Mr. Souder. It is biometrics. Without biometrics, you are
going to have all kinds of profiling and potential
discrimination. Biometrics are real and nondiscriminatory.
Let me ask this question. We have just gone through a
debate--I am sure it is not going to end with the vote in the
Senate today--about potentially giving millions of work
permits. I presume that somebody from the administration has
asked you to draw up a plan to implement how you would handle
the exit part of the work permits and the entrance part of the
work permits. Do you have any documents? Do you have any
question that anybody has asked you to develop that plan? Or
was this just a pie-in-the-sky thing that a few people
developed but haven't even talked to the people who would have
to implement it?
Because, clearly, that falls directly on your shoulders,
that it could not possibly work for the employers in my
district to have work permits without a biometric indicator.
Because the whole problem here is, if you don't have a
biometric indicator, you are going to discriminate against the
many refugees and legitimate Hispanic citizens in the United
States because you don't know who really it is. And if you
don't have a plan, we are setting up tremendous problems of
identification.
Mr. Jacksta. I can tell you that I know that the Department
is looking at exactly what would be the enforcement plan, what
would be the protocols, what type of cards would be utilized to
try to address those concerns.
I am not a participant of that actual work group, but I
know that is important to us to make sure if we move forward
with any kind of trusted work program that there is the
capabilities to make sure it is enforceable at our ports of
entry.
Mr. Souder. So the answer is, is those who are running the
program really haven't been included in this yet?
Mr. Mocny. Our initial focus is on the air and the sea,
notwithstanding the challenges and the need----
Mr. Souder. Notwithstanding the fact that we are debating
in Congress a millions-of-people program. You are focused on a
few, while we supposedly were having a realistic debate about
millions. I mean, that is the frustration some of us have. And
you have to do air and sea. It is just that incrementally
Congress needs to be matched up with what you are actually
capable of delivering.
I thank the gentlelady for the extra minute.
Ms. Sanchez. You are quite welcome, Mr. Souder.
I now recognize Mr. Green from Texas for 5 minutes.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Madam Chair; and I thank the ranking
member as well.
This is indeed a necessary hearing, and I thank the
witnesses for making themselves available. I know that you have
tough jobs. This is an enormous task that you have undertaken.
So let us move quickly and talk about some of these very
serious issues.
Mr. Hite is with a reputable agency. I assume GAO is a
reputable agency, as you view agencies here on the Hill. He has
made some statements that might be considered indictments by
some. While I would not call them indictments, Mr.Hite, out of
respect for you and the agency, I will say that there are some
very serious charges; and the question to each of you, Mr.
Jacksta and Mr. Mocny, is do you agree with all that he has
said? Mr. Mocny.
Mr. Mocny. Mr. Hite has been with the program for----
Mr. Green. If you would, let me just ask this of you.
Because I have little time; and many times when a person has
finished, I don't know if they have said yes or no. Do you
agree--I think that is something you can say yes to--or
disagree with what he said?
Mr. Mocny. I agree with the recommendations he has provided
to us.
Mr. Green. Do you agree with his assessment?
Mr. Mocny. I may not have used those same quotations that
he used.
Mr. Green. Would you agree with his assessment: 4 years,
$250 million, no plan. Do you agree with his assessment?
Mr. Mocny. Yes. From the information we have provided to
GAO, I would agree that he would be able to make those
statements because we have not provided the detail to him for
him to evaluate the plan that we do have.
Mr. Green. Mr. Jacksta, do you agree with his assessment?
Mr. Jacksta. Yes.
Mr. Green. Now if you agree with his assessment, then the
question becomes, how can we be assured that--because he talked
in some detail about this being deja vu all over again. How can
we be assured that this next generation of plans will be
something that will give us much more than the previous
generations? Meaning that we will have something that we can
perfect and have a system that works.
Mr. Mocny. I will use a quote: Your past is prologue. I
think when we apply ourselves here and we have a plan and we
have the backing of the Department in order to execute that
plan, then we will execute that plan.
So when you look at what we did for entry, we have to have
that same--we will have that same backing of the Department in
going forward. So, therefore, I can commit to you that we will
have a plan. There is a lot ahead to do. We have to work with
the airlines. We have to be funded.
Mr. Green. Given you are saying you have the plan, you just
don't have it with you today, the question becomes what
timeline do you have within the plan that you have that you
don't have with you? What is the timeline within that plan for
implementation?
Mr. Mocny. Working with the airlines, we will have a
biometric exit solution in place by December of 2008. That is
the plan. In order to get to that plan, we have to do a series
of things like publish interim reg--interim rules, we have to
get some comments from the airlines industry, we have to
publish final rules. But December, 2008, is when we are
committing to having biometric exit stood up.
Mr. Green. Now does this mean that you will have the
genesis of the program or that you will have all of your
regulations in place such that the program will function
properly?
Mr. Mocny. Again, the plan calls for a final rule to be
issued in June of 2008.
Mr. Green. The final rule?
Mr. Mocny. Final proposed rule which would lay out what the
airlines have to do, what DHS has to do. So after we go through
an interim proposed rule, which is a comment period, we then
take those comments from the airlines and from anybody who
wants to comment on those proposed rules----
Mr. Green. So in 2008 we won't have a final plan. We will
have the beginning of the final plan?
Mr. Mocny. In June of 2008, we will have the final plan;
and then we have execution from June until December, 2008, with
the--so you have complete exit control on biometrics. You have
the air and the seaports of entry.
Mr. Green. In December of 2008 we will have the final plan
in place?
Mr. Mocny. No, June of 2008.
Mr. Green. June of 2008, and then we take----
Mr. Mocny. Six months.
Mr. Green. --six months to examine the final plan?
Mr. Mocny. Correct, and have it executed. So deploy after
starting--in June, we will then begin deploying the solutions
so that by December of 2008 we should have the exit, the
biometric exit, in place at the airports and the seaports where
we would have them put in place. And some of the ones I
mentioned within my opening testimony.
Mr. Green. Thank you for the time, Madam Chair. I see that
I have exceeded my time. Thank you very much.
Ms. Sanchez. You are quite welcome, Mr. Green.
Mr. Bilirakis, thank you for having been here from the
start and for taking your turn. Five minutes.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you. Thanks so much, and I would like
to submit my opening statement for the record, Madam Chair to
save time. It is in our best interest of time.
Ms. Sanchez. So ordered.
Mr. Bilirakis. Mr. Mocny, do you believe that establishing
a fully functional exit and entry system, especially at land
borders, is a prerequisite to amnesty or a temporary guest
worker program?
Mr. Mocny. I couldn't comment on whether or not we should
have it in place. I think it is going to be important for us to
be able to tell whether people leave or not, but whether we can
commit to an exit process in place of land borders, ports of
entry as part of the temporary worker program, that is
currently not something I could comment on.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay. Anybody else want to take a shot at
that?
Okay, can we enforce time limitations--again referring to
this--on such guest workers or other visa holders in the
absence of such a system? For the panel again.
Mr. Mocny. You can't enforce what you don't know. So if we
don't have an exit process in place, whether that be biographic
or biometric, you wouldn't know if in fact the person left
other than the I-94 that we might collect.
But I do want you to understand that we are not abandoning
that whole process. It is just a matter of what we can do in
the time frame of what we are talking about. So we could have a
biometric biographic system in place potentially by working
with Canada as if we are working with Mexico. It is not that we
are abandoning the land border. It is simply something we can't
sit here and testify today that this is the absolute solution
for, whether it be biographic or biometric at this point.
Mr. Bilirakis. Anyone else?
Mr. Jacksta. I just wanted to point out the challenges that
we place at the land border. I mean, I think it has to be
recognized that the land border is an extremely difficult place
for us to implement outbound compliance.
Clearly, as we move forward with any type of program, we
need to develop and look at the technologies that would be
available. There might be opportunities for RFID, radio
frequency cards. There might be the capabilities for
biometrics. There might be capabilities for other methods
working with the foreign governments, as Bob mentioned,
Canadians and Mexicans.
So there are opportunities to build on. But, clearly,
biometrics would be the most secure mechanism to ensure that
people who came into the United States leave the United States.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay. Next question. I mentioned in my
opening remarks which were submitted for the record about the
Mona Pass initiative in which the Coast Guard is using mobile
technology to collect biometric information on apprehended
migrants and comparing that information to the US-VISIT
identification database to determine their identity. Would you
briefly explain, Mr. Mocny, this effort, and the results to
date and the potential for expanding the use of mobile
biometrics collection as part of an exit solution?
Mr. Mocny. Thank you. The Mona Pass, the project that you
referred to with the Coast Guard, I think represents where we
have applied new technologies that have come to a maturity
stage where we can use those.
Simply put, what we are doing with the biometric devices is
providing to the Coast Guard who operate within the Mona Pass,
which is in the location in between Puerto Rico and the
Dominican Republic where people taking these yolas, which are
basically very rickety boats to try to get into America, to try
to get into Puerto Rico--in the past, the Coast Guard would
intercept a boatload of these individuals, knowing that they
had seen these people before, maybe the week before, the month
before, but they had no basis because these people carried no
identification or false identification. Working with the Coast
Guard and using biometric mobile devices that they procured and
working with our database, we now in fact in realtime, using
satellite communications, can identify people from these boats
to the point where they had one prosecution last year and they
are up to 60-some prosecutions so far this year where the Coast
Guard has indicated that the normal flow of traffic in between
the Mona Pass is down 50 percent.
It is a clear indication of when you apply technology that
is matured that you could have a significant appositive effect
on illegal migration and where this is not only the turn effect
but a huge prosecution effect working with the U.S. attorney in
the area.
But this is something that we think has a lot of merit and
a lot of application to other areas. Mobile technology will
afford us the ability to capture biometrics and process and
identify individuals in areas where we just can't do it today.
Whether that actually applies into a car and land border is to
be determined. But the idea of using mobile technology and
applying that to the various locations we believe will have a
very positive effect, and it has in the Mona Pass.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay. Thank you very much. Appreciate it
very much.
I yield back, Madam Chair.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you to the gentleman from Florida.
Gentlemen, the report on the House Homeland Security
appropriations bill provides $45 million in funding for TSA to
implement the new document checker program to ensure that
government employees and not airline employees are comparing
passenger ID to passenger boarding. In other words, when you
are at the airport and you are getting to security, you have
someone checking to see whether your boarding pass matches
whatever ID you are handing them, that traditionally has been
an airline employee. Now they have decided they would prefer to
have TSA employees do that.
So at a time when we are actually doing something that
simple, look at the person, see if the photo looks like them,
check that name against this name, we are taking that away from
the airline. Why would you be putting the VISIT Exit program in
the laps of the airlines at the checkout or at the check-in
process?
Mr. Mocny. For two reasons, and this is part of the
thinking that went into coming up with the check-in process,
which the airlines in effect do that today. The airlines
collect the I-94 departure card, the card that the foreign
national gets when they arrive in the U.S. So they hand the I-
94 which says this is Bob Mocny and now I am leaving the
country. They are collected by the airline employees, and then
they are turned over to Bob's people at the end of the day
where they are then matched and sent to a location to be
matched against the entry documents. The departure card is
matched against the arrival card.
That occurs today, and one of the things that we are asking
the airlines to do is to take another data point which is a
finger scan of that individual. And the reason why we have set
the check-in process, we have to make it known to travellers.
Again, one of the things we learned within the pilots is if
there wasn't kind of uniformity to where one checks out then
one can often get confused; and where the TSA sounds
attractive, it is a choke point, it is a DHS point.
Not all TSA locations fit well into that particular
airport. There are locations where they fit quite well, and
there is a lot of extra space. There is airports where TSA is
shoehorned into a particular area there. So if it can't be at
all TSA points, it kind of can't be at any TSA points. Because
if they are at this airport, it is at TSA; if it is at another
point, it is behind TSA; and a third airport it is before TSA.
Where do I go to check out?
Ms. Sanchez. I am not saying for TSA to do it. I am saying,
if TSA doesn't think the airlines can do a good job at doing
that little piece, then why would you think they would be able
to do all this other stuff? Why would an employee behind the
counter not look at the documents, for example?
Mr. Mocny. I don't work with TSA. But understanding these
were contractor people that the airports would hire, perhaps it
was the airports who would hire, it wasn't the check-in people
that would do it themselves--I think one of the reasons that we
again believe that this is a rather simple thing to do is what
we are asking the airlines to do is what we have been doing for
the last 4 years. It is tried and true. It is simply as part of
the process where they validate the passport with which they
have to do by regulations, they have to touch a passport for
anybody going, you know, to a foreign location.
So by touching the passport and validating that that is the
person who that is, they can simply take the finger scan of the
individual as well. It is tried and true. We have been doing it
at 3,000 points of inspection for the past 4 years. It is
relatively easy. It is very quick. It is very fast and
efficient.
So we are trying to find the best fit, not--you know, not
just for DHS and for the airlines but also for keeping in mind
the traveller has to be able to have some certainty as to where
I check out. So it is a simple process for the airlines to do.
It is simply asking for a finger scan of the individual.
Ms. Sanchez. Mr. Souder, do you have any questions?
Mr. Souder. I would like to ask Mr. Hite a question.
Ms. Sanchez. Go ahead.
Mr. Souder. I am sorry I missed your testimony, but I take
it that you have some skepticism, given the subtleties here,
which in and of themselves are interesting, despite spending
considerable time and resources, US-VISIT is not operational.
Air and sea exit efforts have not been managed well, land exit
efforts have not produced a viable solution, lack of
definition, justification, risk of repeating past mistakes. So
I think those are pretty strong statements.
Now, in the discussion, first on air, just briefly, it
seems to me that when a person checks in at the airport that we
would immediately have some kind of a computer system. We have
had this question about the land border and the TB person.
Isn't there a central check-in place where you just put your
finger down and it would immediately trigger whether the
person--not just at the airlines--the question of the backup,
why isn't there a U.S. Government backup system that catches
when somebody moves in or out? Is that technologically not
possible, what I am asking? Or is it just--what kind of
investment are we looking at?
It seemed to me that, for example, our national targeting
center should have known immediately the person who had TB was
crossing the border crossing. The technology moves immediately
through the air. It is not like it takes 3 days to float your
check anymore.
Mr. Hite. Yes, sir I appreciate the question. I submit it
is probably a better question to pose to the Department, as
opposed to GAO.
Mr. Souder. What I am wondering is, is do you think that
they feasibly could do something like that? Or have you seen
anything like that?
Mr. Hite. I have not seen anything like that. Based on my
knowledge and experience, I don't think it would be
technologically challenging. It may be operationally
challenging. I am not an expert on airport and airline
operations.
Mr. Souder. You have suggested some doubt, and you heard
today that they are hoping to have this airport procedure
operational in December, 2008. Do you think that is realistic?
Mr. Hite. I haven't seen anything to give me any confidence
to show that that is realistic. Throwing out dates like that
are nice to have as goals. Having meaningful dates that you
intend to meet are generated by virtue of the fact that you
thought through them systematically, what is it going to take
to get us there? And you build those kind of schedules on a
bottom-up basis. And therefore you have some confidence that
you can in fact meet that.
There are too many unknowns that haven't been answered yet,
in my view, to even have any confidence as to an end date on
this thing, the least of which is gaining the airlines'
cooperation on this proposed solution. So I don't think they
are at the point yet where they could give you a good hard date
that they would actually--I think if I was in their situation--
would want to be held accountable to.
Mr. Souder. Wouldn't you say, similar, that for the DHS or
the Senate or anybody in the House to say that a land border
entry/exit strategy would be in place in 3 to 5 years is a tad
optimistic goal as opposed to a realistic implementation
strategy?
Mr. Hite. All I can say is based on everything that I have
seen, I haven't seen anything that would give me the basis for
that. It certainly can be a stated goal, but there is a
difference between a goal and a schedule that has been defined
in a rigorous and disciplined fashion.
Mr. Souder. Thank you. I appreciate that. And in all
fairness to US-VISIT and to DHS, part of the problem is one of
the variables here is the United States Congress. And they
state their goals, but they may not have adequate money with
which to implement their goals. And if we are going to be
realistic about what is the difference between a goal and an
implementation strategy, we have to make sure there is adequate
money for the technology. And we have to make sure there is
adequate money for the development of these procedures, for the
hiring of people to implement it. And we have been a tad
inconsistent on our side, and then saying why isn't it being
done? But to do that the administration has to actually come
forward with realistic numbers and say, look, this isn't a
couple of billion dollars. We are looking at systems that are
incredible amounts of money. And probably that can't be done in
a very short period. It is going to take a little bit.
I yield back.
Mr. Cuellar. [Presiding.] Thank you, Mr. Souder.
At this time I will recognize the gentleman from Texas, Mr.
Green.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I would thank the
Ranking Member for his last comments. I do think that we need a
greater degree of cooperation from the administration in terms
of what is realistic and with the numbers. And I compliment you
and I thank you.
Just quickly, if we use biometric detection at the counter
with the airline employee--is that what we were talking about,
at check in?
Mr. Mocny. We are looking at the check-in process. And so
unless that happens at the counter--they are moving to kiosks
as well. And so we want to look at how we might implement a
finger scanner at the kiosk.
Mr. Green. At the point you are using the biometric
detection, I assume that the visitor will receive some sort of
document at this point if this proves to be the person, the
correct person.
Mr. Mocny. That is what we used for the pilot. There was a
receipt that was printed out. But what we would like to be able
do is work with the airlines to incorporate that into the
boarding pass process. So the boarding pass would in fact be a
receipt that says this person now has had their document
checked as appropriate and has a finger scan.
Mr. Green. What if that person does not immediately, if we
were at an airport, board a plane? The person then has the
freedom to move about through the airport before boarding the
plane?
Mr. Mocny. That is correct.
Mr. Green. What then prevents the person--and I am sure you
have the answer, I just don't see it--what prevents a person
from giving this document to another person, who has some
fraudulent ID, and then boarding the plane, if you have already
now had your biometric detection and you have given the person
freedom of mobility?
Mr. Mocny. We have asked ourselves that question. In fact,
during the pilots, we actually tested the ability to validate
someone who had already gone through the finger-scan process.
So there is technology that would allow a secondary scan to
take place at the boarding gate. There is other technology that
would allow us to vet the name of the people. When they close
out the final record, the Departure Control System, there is a
list of people who actually boarded the plane. We can vet that
name with the fingerprints and the names taken at the time that
they were finger-scanned at the counter, at the kiosk. But even
those are the details that we want to work with the airlines to
find the best that fits into--the best model that fits into
their business model as well.
Mr. Green. Your paradigm creates a certain amount of
dubiety, it creates a certain amount of consternation, because
the question becomes why perform what is the best check at the
check-in, and then some secondary or tertiary that is not the
best? Why not perform the best check at the point where the
person is about to board the plane, as opposed to at the point
of checking in?
Mr. Mocny. Again, you raise all very good and valid points.
We have got these three basic areas where we see people: at the
check-in, at the TSA, and at the boarding gate. The airlines
have been very successful in getting DHS away from the boarding
gate when TSA was doing secondary checks and messing up their
boarding process, and delaying planes and stuff.
Mr. Green. I understand, but we have a country to protect.
And I respect the opinions of the airlines, but the best place
to check the person for boarding a plane is at the point where
the person is about to board the plane. That premise is almost
undeniable. Would you agree?
Mr. Mocny. I wouldn't disagree, other than when you say
``the best''; it is an issue of there are--we have to factor
in, in anything that we do, the economic effect that we have on
what the industry does. And in fact, yes, we have to protect
America, but we also have to respect the fact that we have an
airline industry that moves millions and millions----
Mr. Green. Won't you have the same problem at the check-in
that you will have at the boarding point? How does it differ at
the boarding point as opposed to the point of checking in? How
does it differ in terms of time?
Mr. Mocny. We ask people to show up for check-in at least 2
hours, 2-1/2 hours before they go international. Generally at
the boarding gate you have a half an hour, as few as----
Mr. Green. But the biometric read is something that takes
less than 5 seconds. You do the biometric read, you have your
boarding pass, you enter.
Mr. Mocny. Right.
Mr. Green. Okay. I have been to Singapore, where they use
these biometrics. In fact, I believe the Chairlady was--were
you on that codel to Singapore? Okay. They do this. And they
have people who walk through and they scan and it happens
almost instantaneously. And it is a very, very expedited
process. Very much so. I am really appealing to you to consider
the best point of detection at the port of entry to the plane
or to the ship or to wherever it is the person is going to--
whatever vehicle the person will traverse. It just seems to me
that giving the person a license to roam freely, after having
gone through detection, gives a person also the license to
fraudulently board, or give someone else the opportunity to
fraudulently board an aircraft.
Mr. Mocny. And I appreciate that. And we will take all
those issues into consideration. I think, as we say, the check-
in process, we want to hear from the airlines what is the
check-in process of the future? How do you take the individual
from outside the airport to getting on board the plane? And so
we want to understand all those different steps along the way.
And whatever is the best for the security of the U.S. and works
with the airlines and works for the travelers so they are not
confused, we want to implement those programs.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Sanchez. [Presiding.] Thank you, Mr. Green. And I will
recognize Mr. Cuellar for 5 minutes.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Madam Chair. Three sets of
questions.
First question has to do with the deadlines. I think, Mr.
Hite, you mentioned about having realistic--and this applies to
all three of you. But you have the agency that has a particular
idea of what certain timetables should be. Then you have
Congress that has a certain idea of what the timetables should
be, a date line as to when we ought to implement a particular
project, or in this case talk about US-VISIT Exit. How should
we try to work closer together to try to come up with something
more realistic? Because I mean anybody could say do it by
January 5th of 2008 no matter what. Whether that is realistic
or not, you know, that might be questionable. But how do we
work out something where we could try to get more realistic
dates, taking everything into consideration? But then at the
same time--I mean I know you got to look at, well, how do we
implement this--but at the same time we get the outside
pressures saying we got to provide something for the security
of the Nation.
What is your thought process on how we ought to come up
with a more realistic timetable when we are working on
legislation? Whoever wants to go first.
Mr. Mocny. I think by having the back and forth that we
have been having, and by asking for reports that basically say
understand the complexity of what you have to do, Congress says
you have to do X by--and sometimes not by a certain date. We
have never been given a date certain to do exit. When we were
given a date certain to do entry, December 31st, 2003, 2004,
2005, we met or beat every one of those dates. Those were often
seen as perhaps not realistic, but we applied ourselves, and we
applied resources, and we were able to get those dates met. So
I think, then, now having--and with entry I want to say it was
easy. That is using the term a little bit loosely. Exit, we
don't have the infrastructure. That is part of the issue. You
don't have booths, manned, staffed booths that Bob has. So with
exit we have to create that infrastructure or utilize the
infrastructure that is out there.
So by having us look across the board and saying here is
the challenge, and here is what we don't have, here is what we
think we need to do, coming back to the Congress and submitting
a realistic plan. I think we suggested that with the land
border. I think we are here basically committing, saying it is
not possible in our minds to come up with a biometric solution
for the land border at this point. But should we study that and
look at what is possible and when is that possible?
So I think we have enough information and enough experience
in our history to say this is possible, this is not possible.
And that is why we are pretty confident saying biometric exit
at the land border is not possible within 2 years. Biometric
exit within the airports within 2 years we believe is possible,
and the cruise lines. We have that history.
So by having a dialogue, or whether it is reports sent up,
or having your able staff up here working with us, then we are
able to craft the appropriate legislation and the appropriate
appropriations to be able to fund this. Because that is the key
to any of this, as Congressman Souder mentioned, is the funding
behind what we have to do. And so I would simply say continue
the dialogue. And sometimes if it is in the form of a formal
report, which we are happy to do, that we kind of outline what
our plans are.
Mr. Cuellar. So this type of oversight hearing, or informal
meetings with staff, or whatever, those type of communications
would be very helpful?
Mr. Mocny. They have been very helpful to us for the past 4
years, absolutely.
Mr. Cuellar. Good. Because I can give you examples of
passport issues. As you know, we saw what happened. And then of
course there is US-VISIT Exit also. And then not even getting
into the land portion. I don't want to go into that. You know
how I feel about that. But yeah, we just need to continue
having this type of dialogue. Because I mean, I am not the type
to say just set up a timetable, so once we get to it, it wasn't
realistic, and then we have to delay it again for another
period of time. So we appreciate it if you could just continue
working with the committee to help us on this type of a
timetable.
Mr. Mocny. Absolutely.
Mr. Cuellar. I got about 50 seconds. Mr. Jacksta or Mr.
Hite, any thoughts on that? How do we establish that
communication to make sure we get realistic timetables?
Mr. Hite. Yes, sir. What I would offer is on any program,
what you are trying to do is to introduce a certain capability.
And that capability is functions, and it is how well you
execute functions by a certain time at a certain cost to
produce a certain benefit. All four of those legs on that table
need to be balanced against one another. Because if you give me
less time, I can give you less capability and less benefit. And
maybe I will get it done cheaper. But it all depends upon what
you want. And that is why there needs to be agreement around
what is the outcome we are trying to achieve. If the outcome is
the important thing, which I think it is, it drives capability,
it drives timelines, it drives cost. And then you can make an
informed judgment as to whether or not that outcome is worth
the cost. I would approach it that way.
Mr. Cuellar. You are right. The result is what we are
interested in. You know, what sort of inputs we put in, and we
determine that. But my time is up.
Mr. Jacksta. Can I just answer? You asked----
Mr. Cuellar. Yes.
Mr. Jacksta. --a question. I just want to say we are
working on this. One of the things that is extremely important
for us is to have this dialogue and to be here. Although at
times it can be painful, it is good to have a discussion about
what some of the issues may be. And we have had a number of
discussions with your staffs about what we are trying to do on
this. We have had a number of discussions with the carriers. We
have had a number of discussions with the stakeholders on the
land border.
This is a complex issue that we make every effort to hear
about what we can do to make it work for both of us, because it
is a mutual concern. We all want to have security. We want to
all have facilitation. How we get there is built on those
discussions that take place. And so I know why we were so
successful with the entry part of it was we did those
discussions, we did have the outreach efforts. And we will
continue to do that.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Sanchez. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Hite, before we let you go, your report is pretty sad,
actually. And throughout the report you continue to state
pretty much that there doesn't seem to be a cost-benefit
analysis really going on, that there is no justification for
the money spent, that the end product never gets there, or, you
know, going back to your whole idea of what are you spending
your money on and the whole accountability issue.
Is that because the Department wasn't forthcoming with
enough information for you to determine whether they had made
plans, hit milestones, or is it because they don't seem to have
plans to be able to hit milestones? That they are sort of just
groping in the dark?
Mr. Hite. The short answer is yes, I think it is a
combination of both of those. We have seen an absence of
definition, frankly, with entry as well, but primarily with
exit as to what are you going to deliver. What capability? What
kind of functionality? How well is it to perform? By when? At
what cost? And to achieve what outcomes? And how are you going
to measure whether or not you are achieving those outcomes? And
before you proceed, is it worth it? Is the solution that you
are proposing to give these capabilities, is it worth the
investment? Or is there another solution that is more cost
beneficial?
These are all principles that are applied to any new
program that you are developing. Frankly, it is a principle you
apply to any investment an individual is going to make in their
home, or any individual who is a business owner is going to
make. You invest in something to provide value, so you need to
know what that value is going to be. And you need to be able to
know how much it is going to cost you over the intended life
cycle and when it is going to get done. And so what we found--
and the testimony that you described was sad--has been a
pattern of that over the course of US-VISIT. We have said it is
difficult to hold the Department accountable for US-VISIT
because it has never really been clear what US-VISIT is or what
US-VISIT will be when it grows up.
So, again, the answer is it has been a combination of the
two, the lack of definition, and then what we--in sharing with
us what definition does in fact exist, and what we have seen,
limitations in that.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Hite.
Going back to Mr. Mocny just for the last question, we
talked earlier about how you have a plan, you have a plan, the
Chairman sent you a letter and he sent, you know, various
questions. And now you say you have a plan that is in writing.
It is certainly not in a binder all together. It seems to be
pieces from what I could get out of your testimony earlier to
me. I have your response back to the Chairman here. It is sad
also, by the way, this response.
So my question to you--I assume you read the GAO report
that Mr. Hite and the GAO put out?
Mr. Mocny. Is this the GAO report on the US-VISIT spend
plan? I am not sure I have.
Mr. Hite. I believe you are referring to our testimony?
Ms. Sanchez. Prospects for Biometric US-VISIT Exit
Capability Remain Unclear.
Mr. Hite. Today's testimony.
Mr. Mocny. I have not seen the report, no.
Ms. Sanchez. You have not seen the report. I would ask you
to take a look at page 10 when you go back. You don't need to
now. But one of the things that Mr. Hite and his group says is
that no exit program plans are available that define what will
be done, by what entities, and at what cost to define, acquire,
deliver, deploy, and operate this capability, including plans
describing the expected system capabilities, defining
measurable outcomes, identifying key stakeholders, roles,
responsibilities. The list goes on and on, life-cycle costs, et
cetera, et cetera.
I think I agree with Mr. Hite. I think this is the kind of
plan that we want to see on this committee. So his description
of what he thinks would be a good plan sits squarely on page
10. I hope you will go back and read the report, and that when
we get your plan that it answers to that. Thank you, gentlemen,
for testifying before us today.
And I welcome the second panel of witnesses. Our first is
Mr. James May, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Air
Transport Association. Prior to joining ATA, Mr. May served as
Executive Vice President of the National Association of
Broadcasters. He has held a variety of other senior positions
in public affairs and government relations. Welcome, Mr. May.
And our second witness will be Ms. Ana Sotorrio, Associate
Director for Governmental Affairs for the Miami-Dade Aviation
Department, operator of the Miami International Airport and
four general aviation airports. And she directs the
department's legislative and regulatory affairs at the local,
State, and Federal levels. She also serves as the chair of the
Airports Council International-North America Facilitation
Group.
So, without objection, the witnesses' full statements will
be inserted into the record. And I will now ask each witness to
summarize his or her statement for 5 minutes. Tell us what you
think is most important.
Ms. Sanchez. We will begin with Mr. May, please.
STATEMENT OF JAMES C. MAY, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER, AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION
Mr. May. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, and thank you,
Ranking Member Souder. We appreciate the opportunity to be here
today. As you know, Congress' mandate for the Federal
Government to collect information on visitors departing from
the United States isn't new. In 1996, Congress first directed
the government, I would point out, to develop an automated
entry and exit control system to collect biographical
information on visitors arriving in and departing from the
United States.
As you might not know, today is not ATA's first appearance
on this subject. In January of 2004, following yet another
congressional mandate for the Federal Government to collect the
information, including at that point biometrics on arriving and
departing visitors, I complimented DHS and the US-VISIT program
on the US-VISIT Entry program. Those compliments I think are
well deserved. As they have in many other contexts, DHS and the
airlines, worked together to implement that entry program in a
collaborative, systemic process. And without a doubt, the
government's successful operation of entry at 115 different
airports is due to that collaboration.
Now, in 2004, after having had limited involvement with the
exit pilot programs, I urged the continuation of this
partnership. Airlines were looking forward to working with DHS
on exit. DHS, however, chose not to consult further with ATA or
the airlines, and not to even share the results of the exit
pilot programs. Now, despite their assurances, there was no
government-industry partnership from the conclusion of those
pilot programs in December of 05 through December of 06. Then
in January of this year there was sort of a rapprochement, if
you will, and we were told again, sure, we are going to work
with you. Unfortunately, we learned in March that DHS had made
a unilateral decision, and that was that airlines, not the
government, would collect biometrics at check-in counters. They
explained the decision fit the DHS business plan.
I think it is unfortunate for a couple of reasons. Number
one, in addition to noting their sort of unexplained failure to
continue consulting with us, there are two principal issues.
First, you and the Congress have made it abundantly clear six
times since 1996 that you want the Federal Government to
implement this program. They do it with the entry program. They
do it with all sorts of border control activities. It is a law
enforcement function, and it ought to be the government that
executes this plan. After all, DHS and its counterparts are the
relevant agency. Further, I think the exit process should
mirror the entry process. Now, our second objection relates to
our business plan.
Years ago the airline industry adopted a business model
that focuses on moving passengers away from the ticket counter
and in unnecessary procedures. The goal was and is today to
facilitate passengers processing, making check-in processes as
efficient and seamless as possible. Today, due to considerable
investment by airlines and obvious time savings, over 30
percent of all of our passengers check in electronically. And
that number is growing every day.
Kiosks are just an interim step in the process. Kiosks are
an interim step in the process, and are going to disappear from
airports, as passengers check in via cell phones, PDAs and home
computers.
Now I am showing you what amounts to--it is hard to see
from this distance--a bar code on my Treo. I can receive that
electronically. I can let it get scanned at the check-in point,
the security checkpoint, I can let it get scanned again at the
gate. And, boom, I am taken care of. That is the kind of
technology that we are working on. We are exploring ways that
allow passengers like each of you and all of your colleagues,
as you are crossing the 14th Street Bridge and you are racing
to catch that plane because you want to get back to the
district for the weekend, to check in via cell phone or your
Treo.
And if, as DHS proposes, passengers are required to forget
all this wonderful new technology, go to the ticket counter,
and at that point the airlines themselves are required to
collect biometrics during the check-in process, then this whole
efficient, seamless off-airport passenger check-in is going to
disappear. And I promise you, for any of you who have been to
the check-in counters, Dulles Airport, National Airport, I am
sure Miami-Dade, the lines can be long and very, very
cumbersome.
In closing, let me make one final salient point. We have
invested millions of dollars reconfiguring our systems to
comply with the program you heard about earlier, Advanced
Passenger Information, APIS, and on passport reconciliation
requirements to collect biographical data on passengers. We are
committed, in working with DHS, to spending millions more on
implementing what is called AQQ and Secure Flight, two more
programs.
Finally, we are preparing to invest even more on wireless
technologies, as I have just demonstrated to you, to collect--
to supplement all of the biographical information that we are
currently collecting and sharing with DHS and its many
agencies. So we don't oppose the US-VISIT program. We want to
collaborate and continue to collaborate with DHS as possible.
But we want it to be done in a way that makes sense for all of
us. And quite frankly, the easiest, simplest place to have it
be the government that does it and have a one-stop shopping
center is to do it at the checkpoint. Thank you.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. May.
[The statement of Mr. May follows:]
Prepared Statement of James C. May
Madam Chairwoman and members of the subcommittee, thank you for
providing me the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the
US-VISIT/Exit Program.
This is the second decade of the congressional mandate to the
executive branch to develop a system to record the entry and exit of
foreign visitors. Congress has repeatedly signified in half-a-dozen
laws since 1996 that this system was to be a governmental
responsibility. Indeed, until only a few months ago, the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) had acted accordingly. The indications of that
have been unmistakable. US-VISIT/Entry, which was implemented in early
2004, is an entirely governmental program. Moreover, the recently
concluded US-VISIT/Exit Pilot Program was also exclusively
governmental.
DHS and the airlines closely collaborated in developing both the
US-VISIT/Entry Program and the US-VISIT/Exit Pilot Program. We
repeatedly offered to work with DHS to develop a permanent US-VISIT/
Exit Program and were assured that we would have the opportunity to
continue our collaboration with DHS. We looked forward to that. Those
pledges, however, have not been fulfilled. DHS recently informed us
that it had decided, regrettably without prior consultation, to require
airlines to collect the biometric information for US-VISIT/Exit.
This is very bad news for airline customers and it will get worse
for them in the future. Airlines are increasingly offering their
customers the opportunity to check in before they get to the airport,
through online and other communications technology. Customers
appreciate the ease of pre-airport check in and, consequently, airlines
are working to minimize airport-based transactions. This is 21st
century customer service--more precisely, customer-demanded service.
DHS, in contrast, envisions a system of continued airline physical
interaction with every customer at the airport. This is not where the
airline industry is headed, and the gulf between the capabilities of
emerging technology and the retarding effect of DHS policy will only
widen over time. The industry should not be forced to abandon its
broadening efforts to harness technology that promises to ease the air
traveler's experience.
In January 2004, I testified before the then-Subcommittee on
Infrastructure and Border Security just as US-VISIT/Exit was beginning
to be tested at 12 airports-of-entry around the United States. I said
at that time, and reiterate today, that the Air Transport Association
(ATA) members support the Department of Homeland Security in its
efforts to create and implement US-VISIT.
I also said then, and reiterate today, that airlines should not be
involved in the collection of biometric data for the exit element of
the program. That position is faithful to a decade-long congressional
design that the government be responsible for both exit and entry
information collection, and it will assure airlines the freedom to
develop even more innovative ways to improve passenger check in.
Legislative History of the Entry/Exit Information Collection System
The entry/exit information collection system has always been a
federal responsibility, dating back to when Congress first assigned the
task to the Attorney General in the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (Public Law No. 104-208)
(``IIRIRA''). Section 110 of IIRIRA directed the Attorney General to
develop an automated entry and exit control system to collect the
records of arrival and departure from every non-U.S. citizen entering
and leaving the United States. This automated system would match the
arrival records with the departure records, enabling the Attorney
General to identify visa overstays. In addition, the automated system
was expected to report on the number of departure records collected by
country of nationality, the number of departure records matched to
arrival records by country of nationality and classification as an
immigrant or nonimmigrant, and the number of travelers who arrived as
nonimmigrants, or under the Visa Waiver Program, who failed to depart
the country at the end of the authorized period of stay.
In June 2000, Congress amended Section 110 of IIRIRA in the
Immigration and Naturalization Service Data Management Improvement Act
(Public Law No. 106-215) (``DMIA''), which set forth specific dates and
other requirements for the Attorney General to follow in introducing an
automated entry/exit system. In addition, DMIA mandated the
establishment of a task force comprised of both government and private-
sector groups to evaluate how the Attorney General could effectively
carry out Section 110 of IIRIRA and how the United States could improve
the flow of traffic at its ports of entry through enhancing or
modifying information technology systems. ATA was appointed to this
task force by the Attorney General.
In October 2000, the Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act (Public Law
No. 106-396) was enacted. It directed the Attorney General to develop
and implement an entry/exit control system for Visa Waiver Program
travelers.
Following the events of 9/11, Congress enacted the USA PATRIOT Act
(Public Law No. 107-56) in October 2001. Sections 414 and 415 of the
Act specifically addressed visa integrity and security, and the
participation by the Office of Homeland Security in the entry/exit
development and implementation process. In addition, the PATRIOT Act
added two considerations: the ``utilization of biometric technology''
and ``the development of tamper-resistant documents readable at ports
of entry'' to the entry/exit process.
Finally, in 2002, Congress enacted the Enhanced Border Security and
Visa Reform Act (Public Law No. 107-173), which reiterated the
requirements of the PATRIOT Act for an entry/exit process and directed
the Attorney General to fund the development and implementation of the
program.
Each of these acts unmistakably contemplated that the executive
branch would be responsible for exit duties. None specified that the
airline industry was to be brought into that process. Given the urgency
with which Congress has approached the issue of entry and exit
information collection, most recently expressed in section 7208 of the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Protection Act of 2004 (Public Law
No. 108-458), that is a very telling omission. DHS--quite simply--does
not have a congressional mandate to force airlines to assume a function
that Congress for over a decade has intended federal border control
authorities to perform.
US-VISIT
Following the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, the
responsibilities of the Attorney General to develop and implement an
entry/exit program transferred to DHS and the Undersecretary for the
Office of Border and Transportation Security, Asa Hutchinson. Under his
leadership, the US-VISIT Program Office began development and
deployment of Entry.
US-VISIT Entry: In my January 2004 testimony, I complimented DHS,
the US-VISIT Program Office and the Bureau of Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) for working together and cooperatively with the
airline industry to implement Entry. Their attention to careful
planning, in full consultation with all interested parties was first
rate.
My January 2004 testimony also emphasized the need for DHS to
adhere to the planned schedule for deploying US-VISIT at the northern
and southern land borders. Though DHS has implemented Entry for those
border crossers who are sent to secondary, deploying an Exit strategy
has been postponed for the foreseeable future. While we are pleased to
work with DHS and our national security leaders to participate in these
programs, until US-VISIT--both Entry and Exit--is deployed nationwide
at all border crossings, the system will not be optimally effective in
enhancing our national security.
The inability of DHS to fully deploy US-VISIT at our land borders
raises an important overall question. Why insist on the collection of
biometrics at all, if DHS will never truly be able to cross reference
who is entering and leaving the United States through this program?
Airlines are already required by law to transmit biographical passport
information to DHS for every arriving and departing international
passenger. If these records are accurately matched--which I believe DHS
is doing today--doesn't this satisfy the need to know who is
overstaying their visas?
US-VISIT Exit: As with the entry process, we appreciated the open
communications we had with DHS in the development and deployment of the
Exit Pilot. Unfortunately, the Exit Pilot was never developed with the
same rigor as was used to develop and deploy Entry. Rather than rely on
a mandatory process analogous to Entry, DHS designed the Exit Pilot as
a voluntary program, assuming departing foreign visitors would know
that they were expected to either locate on their own randomly placed
airport kiosks and ``checkout'' or have US-VISIT employees collect the
biometrics using a handheld device at departure gates as passengers
were trying to board a departing flight.
After almost two years of testing at twelve airports, DHS was
supposed to share its Exit Pilot Report with the airline industry. We
understand that such a report was sent to the Secretary of DHS in
December of 2005.
We are still waiting to see that report.
After almost a year of silence, ATA was contacted in December 2006
and told that DHS was ready to begin discussions with the industry to
jump-start the US-VISIT/Exit process. In January of this year, ATA was
invited to participate in an industry wide meeting hosted by US-VISIT,
CBP and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to discuss how
DHS could work in partnership to develop an Exit solution that would
meet the legislative mandates but fit within the industry's evolving
business processes. The assurances of cooperation we received at the
January meeting were emphasized several more times in subsequent
meetings.
After specifically being told that DHS/US-VISIT would be seeking
our input, we learned that DHS had made a unilateral decision to force
the airlines to collect a biometric within our check-in process. In
addition, DHS advised the industry that it planned to issue a Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) to offload its responsibility for this
program to the airline industry. In choosing that course, DHS has
disregarded the two-year-long Exit Pilot Program by selecting an option
that it has never tested.
DHS says that this unilateral decision was made because it best
fits into a ``business plan.'' Who's business plan? What criteria were
used to make this decision? Was Congress consulted prior to the
decision being made? Why wasn't the industry consulted?
Moreover, DHS claims that it has been consulting with the airline
industry and that they are working with us to develop an Exit strategy.
Regrettably, this is not the case. Perhaps had that occurred, we would
not be here today.
Airline Industry Passenger Service Concerns
In addition to its unexplained departure from clear, unbroken
legislative policy, DHS' decision will impose new burdens on airlines
and their customers at airports, at a time when carriers are working
hard to simplify, and thereby ease, passenger check-in processes. The
check-in process of today is not static; it is evolving and
increasingly migrating away from the airport setting.
Today, approximately 30 percent of passengers check in online and
that proportion is growing. Because of its popularity and efficiency,
airlines are implementing procedures and spending significant revenue
to expand their off-airport check-in capabilities to include the use of
PDAs and cell phones.
Injecting an at-airport physical process, which the DHS decision
will do, into this customer-driven, electronic environment will be a
costly step backward for both passengers and airlines. This will create
lengthier lines at airline check-in counters and kiosks, which will
mean delays for customers, irrespective of their citizenship.
DHS says that collection of the biometrics at check in will only
add one or two seconds to the check-in process. This calculation does
not track the experience of collecting biometrics during the Entry
process, which takes between 10 to 15 seconds when it is being
preformed by a trained CBP officer. Outbound air travelers, of course,
will not possess that expertise.
Finally, and perhaps more importantly, the U.S. government will be
abdicating its role in the immigration/security process and, thereby,
jeopardizing the integrity of that process.
Possible Alternative
DHS' decision to forgo employing either of the methods that it
tested in the Exit Pilot Program complicates the situation.
Nevertheless, a solution is readily available to DHS. Some point in the
security screening at the airport of a departing foreign visitor offers
the most logical location for collection of biometric information. The
Transportation Security Administration has been responsible for
screening for over five years; the agency has complete control over it.
TSA has presumably examined the most efficient ways to adjust that
process. Adding biometric information collection to that process can be
accomplished seamlessly. Indeed, TSA's plan to assume control of
identification document and ticket verification at airport security
check points would facilitate the speedy processing of passengers
subject to the US-VISIT/Exit Program.
ATA's support for an Exit solution designed in conjunction with TSA
security screening dates back to our appointment on the Data Management
Improvement Task Force. In the December 2002 DMIA Task Force Annual
Report to Congress, the Airport Subcommittee Report specifically states
that ``the passenger exit process, which will be a new component of
U.S. international travel, must be given consideration specific to its
operational impact on aviation and existing facilities.'' That
observation is as pertinent today as it was four and a half years ago.
Conclusion
ATA and its member airlines support a US-VISIT exit strategy that
will enhance the U.S. immigration process, while at the same time not
jeopardizing airline business developments intended to improve the
travel experience for passengers.
Ms. Sanchez. And now Ms. Sotorrio.
STATEMENT OF ANA SOTORRIO, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, GOVERNMENT
AFFAIRS, MIAMI-DADE AVIATION DEPARTMENT
Ms. Sotorrio. Thank you, Chairwoman Sanchez, and Ranking
Member Souder, for the opportunity to testify today on this
important subject. I am appearing today not only in my capacity
as Associate Director of Government Affairs for Miami-Dade
Aviation Department, operator of Miami International Airport,
but also as Chair of the Airports Council International-North
America Facilitation Working Group.
ACI-NA represents the local, regional, and State governing
bodies that own and operate commercial service airports. The
association's member airports enplane more than 95 percent of
the domestic, and virtually all the international airline
passenger and cargo traffic in North America.
The ACI-NA Facilitation Working Group addresses issues
related to international passenger inspection and facilitation
programs and regulations, interfacing with various Homeland
Security agencies. ACI-NA recognizes the need for an accurate
biometric exit system, and fully supports its implementation at
air, sea, and land points of departure.
In order to be effective, the system must be integrated
into the traveler's normal departure process and implemented in
full consultation with industry stakeholders. The system must
also take into account existing infrastructure and passenger
flows at each airport. For about 2 years, the US-VISIT
conducted a pilot program, which mainly focused on kiosks to
collect biometric information of departing international
visitors at 12 airports and two seaports, including the port of
Miami. In the pilot airports, kiosks were placed in a secure
area after the screening checkpoint. The expectation was that
the passenger would use the kiosk and then proceed to their
departure gate and board their flight. There was good
communication between US-VISIT and the industry during the
phase of the pilot.
While officials from the US-VISIT program did provide some
notice of the termination of the pilots to the airports
involved, little information on the program has been shared.
US-VISIT has stated that the technology for collecting the
biometrics was successful, but that the compliance rates were
lower than expected. ACI-NA is disappointed that there was no
formal debriefing or sharing of information during the pilot or
on the final report prepared by the US-VISIT Office in December
2005 on the effectiveness of the pilot program. With such
limited data, we are unable to fully evaluate the pilot program
or make recommendations for improvement.
ACI-NA has heard from numerous airport officials that they
were not surprised at the reported low compliance rate, as
travelers had to seek out the kiosks because they were not
integrated into the existing passenger flow. It is clear that
any successful future program must be incorporated at a
location through which passengers must proceed.
Again, there has been little collaboration with the airport
community on the DHS current plan to place the exit process at
airline check-in counters. This proposal is strongly opposed by
the airlines. Most importantly, ACI-NA is concerned the
inherently governmental function of Immigration and Border
Patrol is to be abdicated to private industry.
The collection of entry or exit information from passengers
has always been a Federal responsibility, and no compelling
reason has been provided for change. US-VISIT must engage in
thorough and meaningful consultations with airports and
airlines to determine the most efficient method and location
for collection of a traveler's biometric as they exit the
country. Such a collaborative process is necessary, as the exit
program presents potential problems in accommodating both
equipment and staff into airports, where unfunded Federal
mandates have already claimed premium space.
Unfortunately, unlike airports in most other parts of the
world, U.S. airports were not designed or built to accommodate
passenger departure controls.
We would also stress that customer service must be
considered in designing an effective US-VISIT Exit program.
Numerous organizations have recently documented the important
economic contribution of international travel for both the
aviation industry and the U.S. economy as a whole.
International airline passengers, like domestic travelers, are
already experiencing record delays and inconveniences, and we
should ensure that any new system does not further complicate
the travel process.
ACI-NA and our member airports look forward to working with
DHS and its agencies, including the US-VISIT program office, as
well as industry partners, to ensure that the exit elements of
US-VISIT actually enhance both U.S. security and travel.
We appreciate the subcommittee's interests in this
important issue, and look forward to working with you to
accomplish our mutual goals. Thank you.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you so much for your testimony.
[The statement of Ms. Sotorrio follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ana Sotorro
Chairwoman Sanchez, Ranking Member Souder, thank you for the
opportunity to testify today on this important subject. I am appearing
today not only in my capacity as Associate Director, Government Affairs
for Miami-Dade Aviation Department, operator of Miami International
Airport, but also as Chair of the Airports Council International--North
America (ACI-NA) Facilitation Working Group. ACI-NA represents the
local, regional, and state governing bodies that own and operate
commercial service airports. The association's member airports enplane
more than 95 percent of the domestic and virtually all the
international airline passenger and cargo traffic in North America.
Nearly 400 aviation-related businesses are also members of ACI-NA. The
ACI-NA Facilitation Working Group addresses issues related to
international passenger inspection and facilitation programs and
regulations, interfacing with various agencies at the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) including U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(CBP), the US-VISIT Program Office and the TSA's Office of Screening
Coordination.
ACI-NA recognizes the need for an accurate biometric exit system
and fully supports its implementation at air, sea and land points of
departure. In order to be effective the system must be integrated into
the traveler's normal departure process and implemented in full
consultation with industry stakeholders. The system must also take into
account existing infrastructure and passenger flows at each airport.
Additionally, this is an important governmental function and it should
be appropriately funded to ensure its success.
For about two years, US-VISIT conducted a pilot program which
mainly focused on kiosks to collect biometric information of departing
international visitors at twelve airports and two seaports. Kiosks were
placed in the pilot airports in the secure area after the TSA passenger
security checkpoint. The expectation was that the passenger would use
the kiosk and then proceed to their departure gate and board their
flight.
There was good communication between US-VISIT and the industry
during the roll-out phase of the pilot. While officials from the US-
VISIT Program did provide some notice of the termination of the pilots
to the airports involved, little information on the success or failure
of the program has been shared with the industry. US-VISIT has stated
that the technology for collecting the biometrics was successful, but
that the compliance rates were lower than expected. ACI-NA is
disappointed that there was no formal debriefing or sharing of
information during the pilot or on the final report prepared by the
USVISIT office in December 2005 on the effectiveness of the pilot
program. With such limited data, the airport community is unable to
fully evaluate the pilot program or make recommendations for
improvement.
In preparation for this hearing, ACI-NA contacted member airports
to obtain information in response to the effectiveness of the pilot
program. Numerous airport officials stated they were not surprised at
the reported low compliance rate as departing travelers had to seek out
the kiosks because they were not integrated into the existing passenger
process. It is clear that any successful future program must ensure
that the process in incorporated at a location through which passengers
must proceed.
ACI-NA has learned that DHS currently plans on implementing the
full exit system in 2008 and that the collection of biometric
information is to take place at airline check-in counters at airports.
Again, there has been little collaboration with the airport community
regarding this decision. Further, we understand that such a system is
strongly opposed by the airline industry. Most importantly, ACI-NA is
concerned the inherently governmental function of immigration and
border control is to be abdicated to private industry. There are
significant legal and liability issues that would arise if individuals
employed by private entities were required to respond if a traveler
that submits their biometric information is found to be in violation of
their visa or is wanted for other offenses. Private companies have no
law enforcement authority and this critical homeland security function
should not be imposed on them.
The collection of entry or exit information from passengers has
always been a federal responsibility and DHS has not provided any
compelling reason or direction from Congress for change. We urge
Congress to direct DHS and the US-VISIT office to engage in thorough
and meaningful consultations with airports and airlines to ensure that
the exit process is not outsourced to private industry, which does not
have the resources or the law enforcement powers to effectively
implement the program. Further, US-VISIT must work closely with
industry partners to determine the most efficient method and location
for collection of a traveler's biometrics as they exit the country.
Such a collaborative process is necessary as the exit program presents
potential problems in accommodating both equipment and staff into
airports where previously there may not have been governmental
requirements or personnel. Space to accommodate a full exit program is
already at a premium at many airports. Additionally, unlike airports in
most other parts of the world, U.S. airports were not designed or built
to accommodate passenger departure controls.
While our primary concern is for the security of airline passengers
and others at the airport, it is important to stress that customer
service should also be considered in designing an effective US-Visit
Exit program. Numerous organizations have recently documented the
important economic contribution of international travel for both the
aviation industry and the U.S. economy as a whole. International
airline passengers, like domestic travelers, are already experiencing
record delays and inconvenience and we should ensure that any new
system does not further complicate the travel process.
ACI-NA and our member airports look forward to working with DHS and
its agencies, including the US-VISIT Program Office as well as industry
partners to ensure that the exit elements of US-VISIT actually enhance
both U.S. security and travel. We appreciate the Subcommittee's
interest in this important issue and look forward to working with you
to accomplish our mutual goals.
Ms. Sanchez. And I now recognize myself for some questions.
Can you both describe the difference between what the
airlines experienced in terms of partnership and coordination
with the Department on the US-VISIT Exit component and what you
think should have happened?
Ms. Sotorrio. Sure, I will take a crack at it. What we
would have liked to have seen is a true partnership, where we
could have worked collaboratively with not just US-VISIT, but
also with the airlines in identifying and developing the
optimal solution. There was that type of communication, I
think, early on, but somehow that was not followed through
after the conclusion of the pilots. And so, you know, therefore
at this point we find ourselves with very little data upon
which to base any recommendations.
Mr. May. Ditto. And beyond that, look, we ran a couple of--
DHS ran some pilot projects. As my colleague here has said,
they then didn't share with us the results of those pilot
projects. They sort of came to the conclusion, because it,
quote-unquote, fit their business plan, that they wanted to
unilaterally establish that this should be done by carriers at
our check-in counters. Well, that, as I have testified, runs
very counter to our business plan.
There was never a pilot done to see what the dynamics of
that process would be like. And it was almost a unilateral sort
of fait accompli that that was going to be the way it worked.
We have worked with DHS and TSA on countless programs. We
are working with them on APIS. We are working with them on AQQ
and Secure Flight. The reality is, and I think the committee
already understands this, if the goal is to collect information
on who is in and who is out of the country, a lot of that
information is already being collected via the APIS program.
The biometric is going to refine that process a little bit.
And the other thing you need to know is this isn't a ``go/
no-go'' program. This is just a collection effort. It doesn't
say, and it sort of reflects back on the Congressman's
questions on the other side, is how do you know it is the right
person? We really don't know the answer to that. We know that
we are collecting biometric information. And the comparisons
are not being done prior to these individuals departing on
whatever flight they are going to depart on. So I think there
are lots and lots of issues that need to be discussed,
resolved, costs.
But at the end of the day it is a law enforcement function.
That is what this Congress has told DHS on six different
occasions. The 9/11 Commission agrees.
And, secondly, it can't interfere with the business plans.
We have got great plans to facilitate people through the
process far more efficiently. This runs directly counter to
that. And if somebody had come to us and said, ``Gee, what do
you think about doing it at the counter?'' that is exactly what
we would have said at that point as well.
So we think doing it at the checkpoint is the best place to
do it. The reason they are changing out those people who are
checking documents has a basis in security concern. And we
think that if you have got qualified, trained people there,
that is the best place to have the process.
Ms. Sanchez. Mr. May, I have a letter. Mr. Thompson, the
Chairman, sent a letter asking various questions about, in
particular, the exit----
Mr. May. I saw his letter.
Ms. Sanchez. --piece of US-VISIT, and the Department's
answer back to how have you all been talking basically, how did
you--actually, how did you inform the stakeholders? Their
answer back was that they had been in contact with industry
stakeholders regarding the development of a new process for
collecting biometric exit data. And in addition to informal
conversations, DHS officials formally discussed the vision of a
biometric exit system with groups of airline industry
representatives at four detailed level meetings this year. Are
you aware of those?
Mr. May. I am not personally aware of all of them. I
wouldn't have personally attended. I am sure my staff have. I
can verify for you that we have had, you know, very formal
meetings with DHS on this subject, as we have on a lot of other
subjects. But the one that counts most is when we had a meeting
with them and were informed that they had made a business
decision, and this was going to be the plan.
Ms. Sanchez. When did they inform you or inform the
stakeholders of that?
Mr. May. If memory serves, sometime in February or March of
this year, where they made a unilateral decision. And we have
had such a wonderful cooperating relationship with them over
the years, it just sort of was out of character a little bit
more than anything else. And I want to maintain that
relationship. From a security standpoint, we think US-VISIT
Exit is very important. We have got to find a way to help get
that done, as we have with all the other programs.
Ms. Sanchez. The Department is considering different ways
to support air carriers in the implementation of the US-VISIT
Exit program. Some of the things they mentioned are financial
or technical assistance. What type of support could you use
from the Department? What is most needed and useful to
airlines?
Mr. May. What airlines most need is for the DHS to accept
and understand, as Congress has directed, that this is a
governmental function, it is a law enforcement function, it is
an immigration function, and ought to be conducted by qualified
officers of the Department, not by counter personnel or
personnel employed by the airlines.
Ms. Sanchez. Ms. Sotorrio, would it affect your airport?
Ms. Sotorrio. What? I am sorry?
Ms. Sanchez. Would--how they plan on collecting it, how is
it going to affect your functions?
Ms. Sotorrio. Well, for example, Mr. May suggested that the
process should occur at the checkpoints. You know, we are not
closed to that idea. I mean we would be open to exploring that
idea. But we would certainly have concern, because many
airports, including mine, already have very tight footprints
for those checkpoints. They are very congested places. And
quite frankly, I am not sure where you would put that process
in a checkpoint.
So you know, perhaps there is a way to make it work. I am
not saying it can't work. But there certainly hasn't been
enough analysis done to say that that--you know, with any kind
of definity--that that really can work.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you. Mr. Souder for 5 minutes.
Mr. Souder. Thank you. I am wrestling with a couple of
questions on this. I fundamentally don't see the bright line
distinction on law enforcement and the other. But I think you
have also made a compelling case about why there needs to be
consultation. Because the question is to me the law enforcement
function, is if you have somebody you need to detain or hold,
that clearly becomes law enforcement function. But for
clearance, I don't see that. It partly becomes an efficiency
question in the airport where that is going to occur, because
some airports have tremendously jammed Homeland Security areas,
others have it at the gate, and some others have it at some of
the ticket entry points.
I thought your point, Mr. May, was tremendous about
watching how I behaved. I still tend to like more of the hard
tickets, versus my son, who I think if he ever uses another
hard ticket will feel he has failed technologically. And the
kiosks took a little while to check in, but now you do it on
your home computer. And this cell phone change is huge.
Clearly, I doubt if that really hit anybody.
What I am wondering is how much of this is over cost?
Because even if the law enforcement function does go, to the
degree it is called a law enforcement function, to the airline
desk, either the gate--I thought Mr. Green made a tremendous
point whether it is at the gate or whether at the check-in
desk--to some of this is just a technological question. Because
the little reader that goes through and scans, clearly where we
are headed is to have a biometric indicator on that. And so if
you have your systems networked like computers should be
networked, where it is scanned, or even multiple times, it can
happen when you check in, it can happen at the Homeland
Security place, and at the gate for that matter, to make sure
that you aren't having changes.
I have a heavy manufacturing area that does a lot of
defense electronics. And I have looked at the models that are
being developed, some under DHS. I happen to have the three
largest companies that make driver's licenses, for example. The
biggest does 37 States plus Singapore. And Eye Scan
International. But a total of 46 or 47 out of the 50 States
licenses are done in my home area. And they have all kind of
flexibility. It is just a question of what we are willing to
pay for and put in them.
There is a company that is working with Homeland Security,
but right now with CIA, DIA and certain key installations,
where you just take your badge. I mean it is like a movie. You
take your badge and you go through and you might have to put
your finger on it. But we are not there yet.
Mr. May. Right.
Mr. Souder. And the question is how do we get there and who
is going to pay for it? But I don't necessarily accept the
assumption that this can't be done at the check-in or any given
place. It really is a question of how easy the technology is
and how fast the technology is. Do you disagree with that,
either of you, or in common?
Mr. May. Listen, we are always interested in the bottom
line, so I could never with a straight face tell you that money
doesn't enter into the issue. I would also quickly point out to
you, we are investing millions of dollars right now on TSA,
DHS-compliant programs that many of which are tied very closely
to this.
My driver's license, as I am sure your driver's license
does, has a magnetic swipe on the back. That contains biometric
information, fingerprint, photo. It is on there. If we are
using that same kind of technology that gets scanned at the TSA
checkpoint--and, again, for the sake of argument at the gate,
as you board the plane, in lieu of that paper or even
electronically printed out boarding pass--we have accomplished
a lot to get people to do that. I think many of these
technologies and tasks are going to be merged in the future.
But it seems to make sense to me--and I understand my
colleague from ACI's perspective, because I travel through a
lot of those airports--it seems to me that if we have got a
reasonably well-trained person who is going to stop you in
line, take a look at your identification and your ticket or
your boarding pass, compare those, that at the same time, if
you are a foreign national and are so required, you put two
fingers in a reader, which is right there that is collecting
that information, and it is a seamless process. And we know,
and I think the GAO witness talked about the fact that what
needs to happen is to have it be a collection point, if you
will, where you can run those folks through.
Gates have been one alternative. But as you know, you could
have literally hundreds of gates in an airport, some of the
larger airports. And that would require reading equipment at
many, many, many locations beyond that which it can be done at
the TSA checkpoint. I would like to have that all be
centralized and coordinated.
But, again, I think it points out the importance of working
with ACI and ATA and others to establish the real business
imperatives from our side as well.
Mr. Souder. If I can make this last comment. I mean RFID
technology, for example Wal-Mart is now--one of the things
working in the narcotics area, they are splitting up--they are
able to tell whether, when they have these loads of
pseudophedrine or things moving in their trucks, whether it has
been broken into and whether certain pills are missing.
Mr. May. We are using that same technology to check
security for cargo and RFID to track baggage.
Mr. Souder. We are near breakthroughs and quantity
breakthroughs that will change this whole field. Because we
cannot have work permits, we cannot deal with visa overstays. I
know a number of States have used--started to use fingerprints,
but they don't have any scanners that are affordable. You have
to have scanners, like they are starting to do for stolen Visa
cards and everything else at different places. We are going to
see this technology just mushroom.
I believe we are on the edge of getting a scanner that can
do biometric at 7--to $10. When it is 7--to $10 it doesn't
matter how many--I mean it matters a little, but it is peanuts
when you are talking the gates where you are at. Because you
need to have it in the police car when they pick up somebody.
You need to have it--one new challenge I had on work permits,
and I never thought of, were the direct marketing people are
very concerned that in employment, how is this going to affect
Mary Kay, how is this going to affect Discovery Toys, Amway?
Every time you have a party and there are some people there who
want to be a salesperson, you are going to have to scan them to
see that they are legal. Well, you are not going to have big
machines that cost thousands of dollars. You are going to have
to have something at 7-to-10 that can check into a system.
We are getting near that. We don't have it. And then it is
going to take us a while to implement and get all the IDs. And
the question is how do we get through this interim period
without totally disrupting air traffic, and yet keeping America
safe?
I believe we have an interim challenge and then we have a
longer term; and you certainly should be at the table on this
to figure out these variations.
Mr. May. We agree. I would simply note for you that having
the hardware to accomplish those tasks at a very low price
doesn't always cover the fact that the impact on software for
our system is critically important. Because these are our
systems that you are talking about. And then we have to find
ways to connect and transmit that information back to DHS, TSA,
whoever the agency may be.
Mr. Souder. And that is where we may get into what is law
enforcement and what is not law enforcement.
Mr. May. Right.
Mr. Souder. Thank you.
Ms. Sanchez. Were you both in here when we had the three
gentlemen beforehand? What is your understanding of what would
happen in the proposed system that they were talking about?
What is your understanding of what would be the responsibility
of an air carrier?
Mr. May. If I interpreted correctly of what they intend for
their plan, I have no reason at this stage of the game,
although I would like to have reason, that it is any different
than the announcement they made earlier to us earlier this year
that it would be a plan executed at the check-in counters of
airlines and run by airline personnel.
I would like to think that that is not a final plan. I have
seen some documentation from DHS that leaves open that
question. And I think we ought to have, you know, more
discussions on that point.
You know, this may be heretic, but I think the Congress
ought to ask, given the huge advances in technology that we are
on the cusp of, given the fact we are collecting huge amounts
of biometric data right now, given the fact you are going to
have even more demands from an immigration perspective on land
borders, et cetera, you know, it may be that instituting a
modest delay on some of these collection efforts for biometric
and, instead, relying more heavily on biographic might not be a
bad practical solution to some of the issues that have been
raised here.
Ms. Sanchez. Ms. Sotorrio, do you have any comment on that?
And more importantly, if you--just give us an indication of
every time we make a change, I am assuming--I mean I go through
a lot of airports. I haven't been through yours in a bit. But
every time we make a change everything has to be redone at the
airport; different lines, different corridors. Who pays for all
that?
Ms. Sotorrio. Well, thank you. Yes. Unfortunately, many of
these costs fall on the airport operator. And of course,
ultimately our bills are mostly paid by the airlines. And the
airlines, I think, are in the business to make a buck. So if
you, you know, take that all the way down, it is the ultimate
consumer, so the passenger is really paying for these
improvements.
We in Miami are in the midst of a 6.2 billion, with a B,
capital development program. So there is an awful lot of
construction taking place. And we are constantly having to
shift airlines, relocate ticket counters, you know, do a whole
series of moves in order to accommodate the construction. So
that is something also to keep in mind. It is not just when
you, you know, start a new process, but also initiating these
new processes in the middle of an environment that is very
dynamic and constantly in flux as well.
Ms. Sanchez. I can certainly appreciate that. In the last 7
years I think they have been constructing Dulles, or
reconstructing it, and that is only a $3 billion capital
project, so I can imagine you are going to have twice as many
headaches.
Anyway, thank you both for being before us and for your
valuable testimony, and also the members for their questions.
And the members of the subcommittee may have additional
questions, some of them. It has been a very busy week. So I
apologize for not having the entire membership here. But we
will ask you, if they have questions, to respond in writing. We
hope that will be quick so we can continue our oversight.
And, hearing no further business, the subcommittee stands
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 2:52 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX: Additional Questions and Responses
----------
Questions from Hon. Loretta Sanchez
Responses from Robert A. Mocny
Question 1.: With respect to the newly proposed biometric air exit
procedures please describe the Department's consultations with the Air
Transport Association both before and after the announcement was made
in May 2007 to incorporate US-VISIT exit into the check-in process.
Response: As stated in our written testimony, ATA and its member
carriers worked very closely with US-VISIT during the development and
deployment of the entry process in 2003 and 2004. In addition, there
was excellent communication during the development and implementation
of the exit pilot in 2004 and 2005. US-VISIT worked very closely with
ATA and its members to determine which airports should participate in
the pilot, holding regular conference calls with the industry. All of
our major international carriers were interested in having the pilot at
one of their hub airports and US-VISIT agreed to this plan. As a
result, among the final twelve airports chosen, 7 of those were hub
airports for our major carriers: Alaska Airlines/ Seattle-Tacoma
International Airport; American Airlines/ Dallas/Fort Worth
International Airport; Continental Airlines/ Newark Liberty
International Airport; Delta Air Lines/ Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta
International Airport; Northwest Airlines/ Detroit Metropolitan Wayne
County Airport; United Airlines/ Chicago O'Hare International Airport
and Denver International Airport; and US Airways/ Philadelphia
International Airport.
In 2005 we were told by US-VISIT that it would be sharing the
results of the exit pilot with us once it had been shared with the
Department of Homeland Security. We understand that this report was
sent to the Secretary of DHS in December of 2005. We are still waiting
to see it.
We did not formally hear from US-VISIT again on exit until December
of 2006 when were told that DHS was ready to enter into discussions
with the industry on an exit strategy. In January 2007, ATA was invited
to participate in an industry-wide meeting hosted by US-VISIT, Customs
and Border Protection (CBP), and the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) to discuss how DHS could work in partnership to
develop an exit solution that would meet the legislative mandates but
fit within the industry's evolving business processes. The assurance
that we ``won't do anything without stakeholder input'' that ATA
received at the January meeting was reiterated in subsequent meetings.
On May 22, 2007, at the request of DHS, ATA hosted a meeting of the
ATA carriers. DHS was represented by personnel from the Secretary's
office, US-VISIT staff, CBP and TSA. At that meeting, DHS formally
announced to us its unilateral decision to force the airlines to
collect a biometric during our check-in process. In addition, DHS
advised the industry that it planned to issue a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRM) directing the airlines to collect the biometric.
Needless to say, we were dismayed to learn that this decision had been
made despite being specifically told that DHS/US-VISIT would be seeking
our input.
DHS asserts that it has been consulting with the industry.
Unilaterally making a decision to offload its responsibility for this
program on the airline industry is not ``consultation''--especially
after repeated promises and discussions about including the industry in
its decision-making process.
Since the May 22nd meeting, ATA has had several meetings with
various DHS officials who continue to officially reiterate that the
decision has been made and that it is not negotiable.
Question 2.: Assuming the Department moves forward with its
proposed biometric air exit plan, what would be the best way to engage
and use the resources of the Air Transport Association in the
implementation of the new biometric collection?
Response: ATA and its member airlines are adamantly opposed to
collecting a biometric on behalf of the United States Government to
satisfy the legislative requirements of the exit program. The entry/
exit information collection system has always been, and remains a
responsibility of the federal government.
As we committed in our initial meeting on exit in January 2007, ATA
would be happy to engage in a discussion of where and how the
government could develop and deploy an exit solution. We are willing to
work with US-VISIT representatives to ensure better compliance should
it choose to mandate an approach using the kiosks that were previously
tested. In addition, we would be happy to work with them to develop
better and more efficient procedures for collection of the biometric at
the TSA checkpoints--as we have recommended previously.
Question 3.: What type of technical and financial burdens would the
collection of biometrics at the check-in counter place on the air
carriers?
Response: Since we only just learned of this proposal in May, ATA
and our member carriers have not conducted a detailed analysis of the
technical and financial burdens resulting from the collection of a
biometric during the check-in process. As we indicated during the
hearing, carriers are working hard to simplify the passenger check-in
process. Today, approximately 30 percent of passengers check in online
and that percentage is growing. Airlines are implementing other
procedures and spending significant revenue to expand their off-airport
check-in capabilities to include the use of PDAs and cell phones. The
current DHS proposal to have the air carriers collect a biometric
assumes a static check-in process that is not a reality now and will be
less and less so in the future. Introducing a manual, airport-centric
process into the evolving electronic check-in environment will decrease
efficiency and result in a costly step backward for both passengers and
air carriers.
In order for us to properly calculate the technical and financial
burdens that this proposal would place on air carriers, there are
hundreds of variables that must be considered including:
The number of domestic kiosks that would have to be
retrofitted to accommodate fingerprint scanners--one US carrier
alone estimates that they have over 1,100 units
The cost of breakage and repair spares
The cost of replacement contracts with vendor
The cost and length of time to retrofit all the
kiosks--carriers would have to dedicate programming time and
staff to a project this large
The cost of reprogramming legacy check-in systems to
accommodate fingerprint scanning capability
The cost of data transmission pipelines to the USG.
Question 4.: What process or combination of processes would you
recommend the Department deploy to meet the statutory requirement of
collecting biometrics upon a traveler's exit from the United States?
Response: ATA and its members believe that there is a readily
available solution that DHS should consider. Since US airports do not
have outbound immigration control procedures similar to most foreign
countries, we believe that the most realistic solution is for DHS
representatives to collect the biometric information of departing
foreign visitors at some point during screening at the TSA security
checkpoint. The TSA has been responsible for screening airline
passengers for over five years. Adding a biometric information
collection to that process can be accomplished seamlessly. The TSA
security checkpoint is common to all airports in the United States and
offers the most logical solution.
Question 5.: At the hearing, you stated that you have seen some
documentation from the Department of Homeland Security indicated that
the proposed plan announced in May 2007 is not final. Please describe
the documentation you reviewed that would lead you to believe that the
proposed air exit process is still open to negotiation.
Response: Despite the declaration by DHS that it has made a
unilateral decision to force the airlines to collect the biometric at
check-in, ATA continues to be told by various DHS/US-VISIT staff that
they want to ``work with the airlines'' to develop the most viable and
sensible exit solution. This has led us to believe that the door is
still open--albeit, very slightly, for some negotiation. ATA sincerely
hopes this is the case. As stated before, we would be more than willing
to work collaboratively with the government to determine where it can
deploy an exit solution.
Questions From Hon. Bennie G. Thompson
Responses From Robert A. Mocny
Question 1.: To what extent were the results from the Department's
initial biometric air exit pilot kiosks shared with the air industry,
including the Air Transport Association and Airports Council
International? If the results were not shared, why not?
Response: The Department did not provide formal documentation of
the results of the Exit Evaluation to our airline industry partners
because the final evaluation report was being reviewed by the
Department in order to best determine next steps for the Exit program.
After analysis was completed, the Department announced its plans to
move forward with full deployment of biometric exit on March 20, 2007.
Question 2.: With respect to the newly proposed biometric air exit
procedures, please describe the Department's consultations with the air
industry both before and after the announcement was made in May 2007 to
incorporate US-VISIT exit into the check-in process.
What type of recourse or fall-back procedures does the Department
intend to provide a traveler that is having difficulty providing his or
her biometrics to the air carriers?
Response: US-VISIT and the Department of Homeland Security have
been in contact with industry stakeholders on developing a new process
for collecting biometrics during exit. Department officials discussed
the progress of a biometric exit system with representatives from the
airline industry at four separate meetings in 2007.
The first two meetings occurred on January 25 and 29,2007, at the
Transportation Security Administration and included airline and airport
representatives. Another meeting occurred on February 21,2007, followed
by a meeting between Deputy Secretary Michael Jackson and airline
industry representatives. At each meeting, Department officials
discussed the challenges of implementing an effective biometric exit
system for air travelers and possible solutions.
Concerning recourse procedures, the determination as to how a
traveler having difficulty providing his or her biometric information
will be made during the course of further development of the system and
in consultation with the carriers. In addition, all of the aspects of
the US-VISIT'S biometric exit system will be determined only after
consultation with stake holders and the general public through notice
and comment making.
Question: How much and what type of training does the Department
plan on providing the air carriers to assist them in their collection
of a traveler's biometrics?
Response: The determination as to the type and duration of training
to be provided to carriers will be made during the course of further
development of the system and in consultation with the carriers through
the federal rule-making process. US-VISIT intends to employ an easy-to-
use biometric collection system that will require minimal assistance
from the carriers' agents.
Question 3.: The Department's plan for implementing US-VISIT exit
for air travel through the check-in process is quite different from the
pilot projects that were conducted. Are you planning to conduct pilot
projects based on the new model? If not, how can you ensure that the
implementation of this new plan at the top ten airports will not create
major problems?
Response: We do not intend to conduct additional pilots. However,
at this stage all plans for the exit system are tentative. The policies
and procedures implementing the system will be determined through
notice-and-comment rulemaking, giving the public ample opportunity to
comment. Additionally, we intend to conduct operational testing of the
collection system with at least one stakeholder partner.
Question 4.: I am concerned about the security implications of
shifting the US-VISIT component to private companies and about the
impact of this new responsibility on the welfare of the airlines. How
do you justify tasking private companies with a critically important
border security function?
Response: Airline companies are our security partners and are
already tasked with critically important security functions. Today,
airlines are required to submit electronic manifest records to U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP), both for arriving and departing
international flights. If the biometric exit solution requires direct
carrier participation to submit biometric exit data, then carriers
could build upon existing sharing arrangements with the Department of
Homeland Security. However, it should be noted the Department of
Homeland Security has not determined that any such requirements will be
placed on airlines. This determination will only be made with the input
of the public, through notice-and-comment rulemaking.
Question 5.: What statutory authority authorizes the Department to
require the air carriers to collect a foreign national's
Response: Any changes that the Department is going to make to the
US-VISIT program will be proposed in a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(NPRM). In publishing the NPRM DHS will clearly outline all of the
authorities authorizing the new policies in the NPRM.
Question 6.: According to your US-VISIT implementation strategy,
when do you expect the biometric air exit component to be fully
implemented and able to verify the departure of at least 97% of foreign
nationals who exit through United States airports? Would additional
funding help expedite this timeline?
Response: The Department of Homeland Security has set a goal of
using biographic information to achieve an entry-exit match rate of 97
percent within 12 months.
In the meantime, US-VISIT will publish a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking to provide the public with an opportunity to comment on the
new exit requirements that the Department is proposing. Biometric exit
will further enhance the Department's ability to match alien entry and
exit records. The Department expects to complete deployment of
biometric exit to air and sea ports by the end of December 2008. At
this time, we do not believe that the for deployment could be expedited
with additional funding.
Question 7.: During the hearing, you mentioned the existence of a
``written plan'' that more thoroughly describes the new biometric air
exit process. What is contained in this more detailed plan and when
will it be available for the Subcommittee to review?
Response: The Department is currently drafting a proposed rule on
biometric exit. US-VISIT is willing to provide in-person briefings to
Committee members and staff to fully explain our planning phases. US-
VISIT is in the process of developing the Biometric Exit project and
has created several documents at various stages of the project
lifecycle that are often collectively referred to as ``the project
plan.'' Many of the project plan documents are updated or modified as
the project progresses through its lifecycle. These documents are by
their nature, temporary and indicate only anticipated steps in the
program development. They should not be interpreted as representing
final decisions on implementation. The proposed rule will serve as the
formal explanation of the overall exit program, including air exit, and
we look forward to discussing it with you once it is published. An
updated Exit High Level Schedule will be submitted to the Committee
under separate correspondence in response to a letter from Chairwoman
Sanchez.
Question 8.: I was concerned when US-VISIT was moved to the
National Protection and Programs Directorate. How are you maintaining
close collaboration and communication with the operational and
technical needs of Customs and Border Protection and Immigration and
Customs Enforcement?
Response: Coordination between U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) and US-VISIT has existed since the latter's creation in 2003, and
the Department expects the current level of management controls and
communication to continue. For example, CBP is a member of the
Integrated Project Team, which helps govern US-VISIT.
U.S. Immigration and Enforcement has assigned a special agent from
its Office of Investigations to coordinate with US-VISIT on improving
interior enforcement.
Question 9: On June 5,2007, Congressional Quarterly reported that
``DHS says it is authorized to store US VISIT-related fingerprints for
70-75 years after collection.'' What is the purported legal authority
mentioned in the article and what are the justifications for
maintaining this type of information for so long?
Response: The System of Records Notice for the Automated Biometric
Identification System (IDENT) states:
``Records that are stored in an individual's file will be purged
according to the retention and disposition guidelines that relate to
the individual's file
``Testing and training data will be purged when the data is no
longer required. Electronic records for which the statute of
limitations has expired for all criminal violations or that are older
than 75 years will be purged. Fingerprint cards, created for the
purpose of entering records in the database, will be destroyed after
data entry. Work Measurement Reports and Statistical Reports will be
maintained within the guidelines set forth in and NCI-85-78-112
respectively.''
IDENT is a Department of Homeland Security (DHS)-wide system for
storing and processing biometric and limited biographic information for
DHS national security, law enforcement, immigration, intelligence, and
other DHS mission-related functions, and for providing associated
testing, training, management reporting, planning and analysis, and
other administrative uses. IDENT was originally developed in 1994 as a
collection and processing system for the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS). Today, IDENT is the primary DHS-wide system for the
biometric identification and verification of individuals encountered in
DHS mission-related processes. The retention period for IDENT is
consistent with the needs of the immigration and border management
enterprise, particularly ICE, and CBP.
Records will be retained until the statute of limitations has
expired for all criminal violations or when the records are older than
75 years. The retention period has been approved by the National
Archives and Records Administration.
Questions from Hon. Loretta Sanchez
Responses submitted by Ana Sotorrio
Question 1.: With respect to the newly proposed biometric exit
procedures, please describe the Department's consultations with
Airports Council International both before and after the announcement
was made in May 2007 to incorporate US-VISIT exit into the check-in
process.
ACI-NA Response: There was no consultation with ACI-NA about how
the Department of Homeland Security or Program Office should proceed
following the implementation of the US-VISIT Exit pilots which were
effective May 6, 2007. ACI-NA learned earlier this year in various
industry meetings that DHS/US-VISIT had decided to implement the exit
process by having airlines capture the biometric data when departing
international visitors check-in at the airport. Additionally, there was
no consultation with ACI-NA about whether collecting from passengers
while they are checking in is the most effective, efficient or
appropriate approach.
US-VISIT staff has recently contacted ACI-NA to discuss the future
of the passenger check-in process with a view to implementing US-VISIT
Exit in the airport check-in area. We expect to hold this meeting in
the near future.
Question 2.: Assuming the Department moves forward with its
proposed biometric air exit plan, what would be the best way to engage
and use the resources of Airports Council lnternational in the
implementation of the new biometric collection?
ACI-NA Response: ACI-NA can continue to provide DHS/US-VISIT with
background about U.S. airport concerns and views about airport customer
service, facility, financial, technical and operational conditions and
issues. ACI-NA also can continue to provide its U.S. airport members
with information and the proposed schedule from DHS/US-VISIT for
implementing US-VISIT Exit. As it has done in the past, ACI-NA can
facilitate communication and collaboration between DHS/US-VISIT and
U.S. airports in a timely manner. However, it is also necessary for
DHS/US-VISIT to consult with individual airports, given their different
facilities and passenger characteristics and the proprietary rights of
airports to manage their facilities.
Question 3.: What type of technical and financial burdens would the
collection of biometrics at the in counter place on the airports?
Most of the technical and financial burdens of including US-VISIT
Exit into the check-in process would fall on U.S. and foreign airlines
since they have their own check-in systems at most U.S. airports.
However, U.S. airports which have CUTE (Common Use Terminal
Equipment) systems used by all the airlines serving those airports will
confront similar issues. Collecting biometrics will require equipment
to be added to check-in counters kiosks and to be integrated into the
CUTE system and will require modifications to computer programs so that
the data can be forwarded to the U.S. Government. Each of these
requirements will present technical challenges and financial issues.
Capturing biometrics will increase the amount of time it takes for
departing international visitors to check in and thus could lead to
longer waits for all air passengers. The resulting congestion from the
check-in process might result in the need for an expanded check-in area
which would require additional financial resources.
Question 4.: What process or combination of processes would you
recommend the Department employ to meet the statutory requirement of
collecting biometrics upon a traveler's exit from the United States?
ACI-NA does not have recommendations regarding the specific process
or combination of processes for US-VISIT Exit. However, it does urge
that US-VISIT Exit be integrated into the passenger's normal departure
process, be implemented in full consultation with industry stakeholders
including airports and be funded and performed by the US Government.
ACI-NA also recommends that DHS and/or GAO conduct a comprehensive
study to analyze all the options, costs and benefits available for
implementing US-VISIT Exit.
While ACI-NA supports the goals of biometric entry-exit system, we
question the value of imposing US-VISIT Exit on departing air
passengers, while there is no similar requirement on travelers
departing by sea or land. DHS has suggested that implementing US-VISIT
at the land borders without serious economic impacts probably will not
be feasible for 5--10 years. Therefore, we believe that it is important
for the U.S. Government to evaluate whether its security and
immigration objectives can be effectively met through the more easily
collected biographic information included in the U.S. Customs and
Border Protection's Advanced Passenger Information System (APIS).
Question 5.: In your testimony, you indicate that the new US-VISIT
air exit process could create liability issues for the private sector
employees that are required to collect a traveler's biometrics. Please
describe these potential liability issues.
It is likely that some passengers will challenge in court the
authority of airline personnel to capture their biometrics,
particularly fingerprints, to deny them access to flights based on that
data and to summon law enforcement officials to handle the situation.
ACI-NA is also concerned about potential liability issues related to
ensuring the accuracy of the biometrics collected, as well as
maintaining, transmitting, and protecting the data.