

**ASSESSING AND ADDRESSING THE THREAT:  
DEFINING THE ROLE OF A NATIONAL COMMISSION  
ON THE PREVENTION OF VIOLENT RADICALIZATION  
AND HOMEGROWN TERRORISM**

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**HEARING**

BEFORE THE

**SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,  
INFORMATION SHARING, AND  
TERRORISM RISK ASSESSMENT**

OF THE

**COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

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# ASSESSING AND ADDRESSING THE THREAT: DEFINING THE ROLE OF A NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE PREVENTION OF VIOLENT RADICALIZATION AND HOME- GROWN TERRORISM

Thursday, June 14, 2007

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY,  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, INFORMATION SHARING,  
AND TERRORISM RISK ASSESSMENT,  
*Washington, DC.*

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:10 a.m., in Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Jane Harman [chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.

Present: Representatives Harman, Dicks, Perlmutter, Reichert, Shays and Dent.

Ms. HARMAN. The hearing will come to order. Almost 6 years after 9/11 and after countless Intelligence briefings on the Hill, I am very unhappy to report that I still don't know what makes a terrorist. And not just any kind of terrorist, mind you, but terrorists who are either American citizens or legal residents who are here actively planning to murder their neighbors, who could be you or me or our relatives and friends and, by the way, as many of us as possible.

I ask, why does an American citizen like Russell Defreitas allegedly conspire with an al-Qa'ida inspired cell of international terrorists to destroy JFK Airport and kill thousands of people by blowing up fuel storage tanks and pipelines? Why would a U.S. citizen and two U.S. residents conduct reconnaissance of Fort Dix in New Jersey and plot to kill, quote, as many American soldiers as possible, unquote, with mortars, rocket-propelled grenades and guns all, quote, in the name of Allah, unquote? And why did Adam Gadahn, a Jewish kid from southern California, go from being an alienated American teenager to an al-Qa'ida sympathizer to the mouthpiece for Osama bin Laden preaching hate and violence across the airwaves.

I don't have the answers. I don't believe my colleagues have the answers. And the American people don't either.

What I do know, however, is that I am chilled by what Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller, the former director of Britain's MI5, has said about the consequences of failing to get the answers and failing to act in time based on those answers. Last November, Dame Eliza revealed that, in the United Kingdom alone, police and others

within our organization, quote, are working to contend with some 200 groupings or networks totaling 1,600 identified individuals who are actively engaged in plotting or facilitating terrorist acts here—here means Britain—and overseas. You heard me right. Some 200 terrorist plots involving more than 1,600 British citizens planning to kill other British citizens, or if we had not foiled the liquid bomb plot last summer, planning to kill up to 4,000, mostly American, citizens traveling to the U.S. on U.S. planes.

I am worried. We must learn from the UK experience and fix what needs fixing in this country before we find ourselves under the same threats as Britain is. An important step toward doing that, I believe, is to consider establishing a national commission on the prevention of radicalization and homegrown terrorism. While we potentially face similar problems as Britain, I am mindful of the fact that we are not the United Kingdom. And what we face may be different and less menacing. That is all the more reason for us to conduct an expedited but thorough study of what is happening in our country so we can find an American response to our American indigenous threat.

The commission, we want to discuss with our witnesses today, could be modeled after the National Commission on Terrorism, which I served on in the late 1990s, from 1999 to 2000, and which I believe produced a very important report predicting a major terrorist attack on U.S. soil. One of our witnesses, Brian Jenkins, was also involved in that effort. And I should say to our audience and our witnesses that, on 9/10/2001, the commission's chairman, L. Paul Bremer, Jerry Bremer, and I had lunch near the Capitol wondering why no one was paying attention to our recommendations.

A commission focused on radicalization and homegrown terrorism could get us up to speed quickly on the threat and help us assess whether a legislative strategy is needed to address it. The commission could also bring together the best minds in the Nation from as many diverse backgrounds and experiences as possible. It could create a common strategy that not only shapes the action we take here but also carves out a role for other stakeholders at the Federal, State and local levels. And I might add, we should probably assess what the private sector could be doing as well. I am eager to hear from the witnesses about the value of this approach, what issues it should address and what recommendations it should make.

And let me commend the ranking member, Mr. Reichert, who we also call Sheriff Reichert, for being one of the early advocates for this approach. But let me be absolutely clear, when we talk about radicalization and homegrown terror, we are not talking about—I want to underscore this—people from one particular ethnic, political or religious group. On the contrary, we are talking about anyone who might be engaged in ideologically based violence, whether by a U.S. Bronze Star honoree named Timothy McVeigh; or in Belgium, a female Catholic convert to Islam who traveled to Iraq and blew herself up; or in the UK, third generation Britons of Pakistani decent who, 2 years ago, killed scores of their fellow citizens on buses and trains. I am sure everyone on this subcommittee would agree that while taking on radical extremists who mean us harm, it would be wrong, it is wrong, to lump an entire community to-

gether for increased scrutiny simply because of their ethnic, religious or national background. And it would be equally wrong, let me stress this, to pretend that there is no problem and hope for the best.

The time for action is now. We will consider marking up legislation next week. What our witnesses share with us today will help us finalize our work and help save lives now and in the future.

Welcome, again, to you all. And I now yield to the ranking member, Mr. Reichert, for an opening statement.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JANE HARMAN, CHAIR, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, INFORMATION SHARING, AND TERRORISM RISK ASSESSMENT

- Almost six years after 9/11, and after countless intelligence briefings on the Hill, I am very unhappy to report that I still don't know "what makes a terrorist".
- And not just any kind of terrorist, mind you, but terrorists who are either American citizens or legal residents who are actively planning to murder their neighbors—who could be you or me or our relatives and friends.
- I ask: why does an American citizen like Russell Defreitas conspire with an al-Qa'ida-inspired cell of international terrorists to destroy JFK airport and kill thousands of people by blowing up fuel storage tanks and pipelines?
- Why would a U.S. Citizen and two U.S. residents conduct reconnaissance of Fort Dix in New Jersey and plot to kill "as many American soldiers as possible" with mortars, rocket-propelled grenades, and guns—all "in the name of Allah"?
- And why did Adam Gadahn, a Jewish kid from Southern California, go from being an alienated American teenager, to an al-Qa'ida sympathizer, to the mouthpiece for Osama bin Laden, preaching hate and violence across the airwaves?
- I don't have the answers, my colleagues don't have the answers, and the American people don't either.
- What I do know, however, is that I am chilled by what Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller, the former Director of MI5, has had to say about the consequences of failing to get those answers—and failing to act based on them.
- Last November, Dame Eliza revealed that in the United Kingdom alone, police and others within her organization "are working to contend with some 200 groupings or networks, totaling over 1,600 identified individuals . . . who are actively engaged in plotting, or facilitating, terrorist acts here and overseas."
- You heard me right. Some 200 terrorist plots involving more than 1600 British citizens planning to kill other British citizens!
- I'm worried that it could happen here, too.
- We must learn from the UK experience and fix what needs fixing in this country before we find ourselves in precisely the same situation.
- An important first step toward doing that, I believe, is establishing a National Commission on the Prevention of Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism.
- While we potentially face similar problems, I am mindful of the fact that we are not the United Kingdom and we may face a different, less menacing, kind of homegrown threat.
- That is all the more reason for us to conduct an expedited but thorough study of what is happening in our country so we can find an American response to our indigenous threat.
- The Commission we are exploring is modeled after the National Commission on Terrorism that I served on during the late nineties.
- One of our witnesses, Brian Jenkins, was also involved in that effort.
- A Commission focused on violent radicalization and homegrown terrorism could get us up to speed quickly on the threat and help us assess whether a legislative strategy is needed to address it.
- The Commission could bring together the best minds in the nation—from as many diverse backgrounds and experiences as possible.
- Such a Commission could create a common strategy that not only shapes Congressional action but also carves out a role for other stakeholders at the Federal, State, and local levels.
- I am eager to hear from the witnesses about the value of this National Commission approach, what issues it should address; and what recommendations it should make.
- But let me be absolutely clear: when we talk about "radicalization" and "homegrown" terrorists, we're not talking about people from any particular ethnic, political, or religious group.

- On the contrary, we're talking about ideologically-based violence, whether by a white, U.S. Bronze Star honoree named Timothy McVeigh; or
- in Belgium, a female Catholic convert to Islam who traveled to Iraq and blew herself up; or
- in the UK, third generation Britons of Pakistani descent who two years ago killed scores of their fellow citizens on buses and trains.
- I am sure everyone on this Subcommittee would agree that while taking on radical extremists who mean us harm, it would be wrong to lump an entire community together for increased scrutiny simply because of their ethnic, religious or national background.
- And it would be equally wrong to pretend the problem does not exist and hope for the best.
- The time for action is now. We will mark up legislation next week.
- What our witnesses share with us today will help us finalize our work and help save lives now and in the future.
- Welcome again to you all.

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Madam Chair. And I want to thank you for holding this hearing and for your leadership on this issue. And just for the information of the audience and the panel present today, you have a committee with varying backgrounds and experience.

And the Chair referred to me as the sheriff. My experience comes from local law enforcement for the past 33 years. This is my second term here in Congress. The last 8 years of my tenure in the sheriff's office in Seattle was as the elected sheriff there. And the rest of the committee comes, as I say, with a background in a variety of degrees and a lot experience in Homeland Security efforts, Intelligence efforts and Department of Defense. So you have a committee here that is really interested and willing to work with you to help make this commission a successful event.

And I want to thank you three for being here this morning, taking time out of your busy schedule to give us your insights and to answer some of the questions that we have to pose to you today. This subcommittee has focused intently on the issue of radicalization, as you know, and how it affects our security. Unfortunately, since that time, as we have been moving through this, we have seen radicalization and individuals involved in radicalism in plots against us, most recently against the John F. Kennedy Airport.

JFK plotters aimed to cause greater destruction than in the September 11th attacks, by destroying the airport, killing several thousand people and destroying parts of Queens. One of the United States citizens involved in the plot indicated that JFK was targeted because it is a symbol that would put the whole country in mourning saying, it is like you can kill the man twice. This is what we are dealing with.

And, unfortunately, the scope of the potential problem is huge. Radicalized cells can form in prisons, get together on the Internet, meet and follow charismatic leaders or any combination of the three. They can also decide to become a lone wolf to avoid detection. This example is especially noteworthy after the lone wolf shooting at the Jewish Federation in Seattle last summer.

Radicalization is a complex phenomena. It is essential that we understand the phenomena, especially on how these cells form and how they grow. In March of this year, I introduced H.R. 1605, The Prevent Act, which would establish a national commission on the prevention of radicalization. And unlike most commissions, like the



9/11 Commission, like the WMD Commission and the U.S.S. Cole Commission, which were formed after a major failure occurred, this commission would focus on mitigating problems leading to radicalization before a major attack occurs.

I have been involved in all sorts of commissions over my career and conferences and committees. And most of the time what happens, we get together, we talk, we write down some reports, and nothing is ever done. This needs to be a commission, an effort, some energy put toward where we actually have some meaningful findings, things that we can do, some action items that we can apply, so that we can prevent attacks from occurring within the United States. And, again, I thank all of you for being here.

I thank you, Madam Chair, again, for your leadership. And this truly is a committee that has worked in a bipartisan way to protect our Nation and its people. Thank you very much.

I yield.

Ms. HARMAN. I thank the ranking member and now welcome our witnesses. Let me note also that other members of the subcommittee under subcommittee rules can enter opening statements in the record if they so choose.

All of the witnesses on this panel are very well known to me. And I commend them for not only the excellent testimony they have submitted for today's hearing but for the work they do in their day jobs on these issues.

Our first witness, Brian Jenkins, is the senior advisor to the RAND Corporation and is one of the world's leading authorities on terrorism. He is a repeater. He testified at our recent Los Angeles hearing on the same subject. And I would also say, he is the godfather. He founded the RAND Corporation's terrorism research program in 1972. That is not a typo, 1972. Has written frequently on terrorism. And has served as an advisor to the Federal Government and the private sector on terrorism-related issues. In 1996, he was appointed by President Clinton to the White House Commission on Aviation, Safety and Security. He also served as an advisor to the National Commission on Terrorism, the one on which I served, and is a member of the U.S. Comptroller General's advisory board.

Our second witness, Mr. Salam Al-Marayati, is the executive director of the Muslim Public Affairs Council, MPAC, which is an organization that, among other things, plays a major role with the FBI regional office in Los Angeles. MPAC is a public service agency aimed at disseminating accurate information about Islam to the American public. The MPAC national office in Washington, D.C., serves as the primary interface between the Muslim American community and U.S. Government officials. MPAC has worked with the Departments of State, Treasury and Homeland Security, and the White House to offer guidance on issues that affect the United States and the Muslim community.

Our third witness, Mr. Frank Cilluffo, is the associate vice president for Homeland Security at the George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute. That is a mouthful. Mr. Cilluffo leads the university's homeland security efforts on policy, research, education and training. He directs the multidisciplinary Homeland Security Policy Institute, a think tank that advances homeland security issues. The institute's recent policy and research

agenda has spanned domestic terrorism, radicalization, disaster management, emergency preparedness, pandemic influenza planning, biodefense, intelligence and information sharing. And if that is not enough of a nightmare, I am sure we will hear from him today about how we need to do even more. I would add, about Mr. Cilluffo, when I became, with the former House Member Saxby Chambliss, the—I guess we were the co-chairs of—I am not sure how it was defined, but anyway of our House focus on terrorism following 9/11. We called a small panel together to advise us on what we should do, and Mr. Cilluffo was one of the people we turned to.

Without objection, the witness's full statements will be inserted in the record. I would now ask each of you to summarize your statement for 5 minutes. There is a little clock that will be blinking at you if you violate my edict.

And let us start first with Mr. Jenkins.

**STATEMENT OF BRIAN JENKINS, SENIOR ADVISOR, RAND CORPORATION**

Mr. JENKINS. Madam Chair, members of the committee, I want to thank you for providing me with another opportunity to address radicalization and recruitment to terrorism in the United States. In my April 5th testimony, I address the ways terrorists recruit and what we might do to improve it. Today I would like to focus my remarks on the specific proposal; that is, the creation of a national commission on the prevention of violent radicalization and home-grown terrorism.

As a historian and based upon personal experience, I believe that advisory commissions can be useful instruments for addressing difficult issues and providing new approaches. In the past, national commissions have helped the country navigate crises, define and address problems of domestic violence and prepare for the growing challenge of terrorism. To go all the way back to the wave of assassinations and riots in the 1960s, the Eisenhower Commission on Violence in America, in 1968, thoughtfully reviewed America's propensity for violence. It warned of a divided society.

In 1983, the Long Commission convened to review the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut. It went beyond that, and it alerted the Pentagon and the public that terrorism had become another form of armed conflict for which our armed forces had to be prepared.

Several commissions were convened in the 1990s to examine new dangers offered by terrorism. One after another they issued sober findings. The Deutch Commission warned of the weapons of mass destruction. The Bremer Commission warned of a large-scale terrorist attack in the United States. In many respects, that commission's report and the problems it identified proved prophetic. Its concerns were echoed by the Gilmore Commission. All three commissions agreed that the United States had to prepare for terrorist catastrophe.

After the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon in 2001, of course, the 9/11 Commission was able to build upon this earlier work and the issues that the earlier commissions had identified to produce a national plan for improving our capabilities to combat terrorism. The 9/11 attacks were carried out by

19 terrorists who were radicalized and recruited abroad. But as the threat has evolved since, today we worry more about individuals in the United States who may respond to the continuing, and I should say, increasingly sophisticated incitement to violence emanating from al-Qa'ida and its allies. And that is the challenge that the proposed commission would have to consider.

In doing so, it would be required to address a broad range of questions: What do we know about radicalization and recruitment to terrorism in the United States? We talk about self-radicalization, but our actual cases show evidence of proselytizers, inciters, incubators, people who facilitate travel abroad for training for terrorism; hardly "self." What could be done about this infrastructure that supports radicalization and recruitment? Should we see recruitment as a societal problem calling for community intervention or a matter of purely personal choice? And if the former, what is the role of the communities where recruiting is occurring, and how would the affected communities frame the problem? What role, if any, would they propose? What is the role of the Internet? What lessons might we learn from the efforts of other nations? What are possible strategies for reducing recruitment to terrorism in this country? And finally, what is the appropriate role of Federal and local government?

Tasking an advisory commission with assembling all we know and developing a framework for understanding radicalization and homegrown terrorism, therefore, in my view, is a good idea. Inevitably, it will lead to the identification of some specific threats and vulnerabilities and possible ways to fix them. Some of these will address issues of enhancing our local intelligence capabilities, updating legal mechanisms to deal with Internet-era technology. Those certainly should be done. Some will inevitably touch upon more sensitive areas. And here we do have to be cautious. Proposals that get us into the area of social engineering have to be very carefully analyzed for their intended and unintended consequences. Whatever we do to improve national security must be accomplished without degrading our enduring values or our inherent national strengths. Thank you.

[The statement of Mr. Jenkins follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BRIAN MICHAEL JENKINGS<sup>1</sup>

DEFINING THE ROLE OF A NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE PREVENTION OF VIOLENT  
RADICATION AND HOMEGROWN TERRORISM<sup>2</sup>

Madame Chairperson and members of the Subcommittee, I want to thank you for providing me with another opportunity to address the issue of radicalization and recruitment to terrorism in the United States. Since my earlier testimony, authorities have uncovered two more terrorist conspiracies, and although these plots were nowhere near operational and probably would not have produced the death and destruction the conspirators fantasized about, they nevertheless indicate a mindset of

<sup>1</sup>The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are the author's alone and should not be interpreted as representing those of RAND or any of the sponsors of its research. This product is part of the RAND Corporation testimony series. RAND testimonies record testimony presented by RAND associates to federal, state, or local legislative committees; government-appointed commissions and panels; and private review and oversight bodies. The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.

those who seriously wanted to cause devastation. Had they been allowed to acquire the capability and not been intercepted, they probably would have used it.

In my April 5 testimony, I addressed the ways terrorists recruit, what we know about radicalization and recruitment in the United States, how we might impede it, and guiding principles for any actions we might consider.<sup>3</sup>

Today I want to focus my remarks on the specific proposal before us—the creation of a National Commission on the Prevention of Violent Radicalization and Home-grown Terrorism.

As a policy analyst, and based upon my own personal experience, I believe that advisory commissions can be useful instruments for addressing knotty issues and providing fresh perspectives.<sup>4</sup> Commissions can bring together individuals inside and outside of government to combine experience, expertise, and political savvy. Commissions can conduct impartial inquiries, level hard criticism when warranted, help government officials and the public understand events, provide forums for diverse views, and alert the country to new threats.

Commissions are not permanent government bodies. They have no authority beyond their powers of persuasion, which I think is good. Required to produce a public report, commissions come to see the American people as their primary constituency, the national interest as their sole guide, which enables them to rise above partisan politics and transcend bureaucratic agendas. Often they can say things that cannot comfortably be said by officials, including themselves as individuals in their current or former positions. Even when their recommendations are ignored by legislators or decisionmakers, commissions offer a nonpartisan dissenting voice.

Commissions, however, have their limitations:

The oft-heard criticism that creating a commission enables political leadership to duck hard decisions may be deserved, but clamor for immediate action can lead to hasty decisions and drive-by legislation. A conscientious decision to buy time for more thoughtful recommendations (and a better decisionmaking climate) can be wise leadership.

Finding the right balance between a roadmap to a perfect world and pragmatic suggestions that have some chance of implementation is never easy. Bipartisanship can sometimes lead to milky compromises. Courtesy among commission members can permit the inclusion of sometimes-eccentric recommendations.

The presumption that something has gone wrong, a sense of urgency underscored by a commission's own limited life span, can drive commissions into making too many recommendations, many of them exhortations to do better without direction. The first option—not altering course and therefore not doing more harm—should always be considered seriously. Often, it is not.

Commission members may choose to be gadflies; frankly, sometimes they can become cranks. Nevertheless, in the recent past, national commissions have helped the country navigate crises, define and address problems of domestic political violence, and prepare for the increasing challenge of terrorism<sup>5</sup>:

<sup>2</sup>This testimony is available for free download at <http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT285>.

<sup>3</sup>Brian Michael Jenkins, "Building an Army of Believers: Jihadist Radicalization and Recruitment: Testimony Before the Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment, United States House of Representatives," April 5, 2007.

<sup>4</sup>I served as an advisor to the Long Commission in 1983, briefed the Inman Panel, was a member of the Committee on the Embassy of the Future, advised the Pan Am 103 Commission, served as a member of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security 1996–97 and as an advisor to the National Commission on Terrorism 1999–2000, was a technical reviewer for the Gilmore Commission Report, and testified before and assisted the staff of the 9/11 Commission.

<sup>5</sup>Commissions that have addressed domestic political violence and international terrorism include the following:

- 1967—National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (Kerner Commission)
- 1968—National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (Eisenhower Commission)
- 1970—President's Commission on Campus Unrest (Scranton Commission)
- 1983—DoD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983 (Long Commission)
- 1984—Advisory Panel on Overseas Security (Inman Panel)
- 1989—President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism (McLaughlin Commission)
- 1995—Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence Community (Aspin Commission)
- 1996—President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection
- 1996—White House Commission on Aviation and Security (Gore Commission)
- 1996—Task Force on the Khobar Towers Bombing (Downing Commission)
- 1998—U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (Hart-Rudman Commission)

- In the wake of assassinations and riots, the 1968 Commission on Violence in America thoughtfully reviewed America's propensity for violent politics and put the contemporary outburst in historical context but warned of a divided society.
- In 1983, the Long Commission, convened to review the terrorist bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut, alerted the Pentagon and the public that terrorism had become another form of armed conflict for which our armed forces must be prepared. Further commissions were convened to review events and distill lessons learned from the terrorist bombings of Khobar Towers in 1996, the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, and the USS Cole in 2000.
- At the same time, the Inman Panel, responding to terrorist attacks on U.S. diplomats and diplomatic facilities, laid out an ambitious program to increase the security of our diplomatic establishment.
- In 1989, the Pan Am 103 Commission devised another ambitious program to improve U.S. efforts to combat terrorism and increase security for commercial aviation.
- The crash of TWA flight 800, although it turned out not to have been caused by terrorist sabotage as initially suspected, provided the basis for the Gore Commission to make specific recommendations to improve aviation safety and security.
- Several national commissions were convened in the 1990s to examine the new dangers. One after another, they issued sober findings. In 1999, the Deutch Commission warned of the diversion of weapons of mass destruction from Russia, possession of weapons of mass destruction by unfriendly states, clandestine delivery of a nuclear weapon, and terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction in the United States. The following year, the Bremer Commission warned of large-scale terrorism in the United States, including chemical, biological, and radiological attacks. The Gilmore Panel warned of attacks in the United States with weapons of mass destruction, terrorist attacks on U.S. agriculture, and cyberterrorism. All three commissions agreed that the United States had to prepare for catastrophe. They also warned that national panic in the face of such threats could imperil civil liberties. The Hart-Rudman Commission recommended the creation of a cabinet-level Agency of Homeland Security.
- Following the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the 9/11 Commission identified failures and built upon earlier work to provide a comprehensive blueprint for improving national capabilities to prevent the recurrence of such attacks.

The 9/11 attacks were carried out by 19 terrorists who were radicalized and recruited abroad to attack the United States. Such attacks remain a possibility, but the terrorist threat has evolved. Today we worry more about individuals already in the United States, legally or illegally, who may respond to the continuing and increasingly sophisticated incitement to violence emanating from al-Qa'ida, radicalize themselves, and plot terrorist attacks. In examining homegrown terrorism, the proposed commission would come closer to the Kerner and Eisenhower Commissions of the late 1960s than to the later commissions, which focused on threats from abroad.

Any commission convened to address radicalization and recruitment in the United States will inevitably touch upon broader sensitive issues:

- Protecting religious freedom while protecting society against incitement and violence wrapped in asserted religious imperatives.
- The tenets of religious faith versus the responsibilities of citizenship.
- Protecting free speech but not incitement to violence when it can be expected to result in criminal action.
- Whether new communications technologies—e.g., the Internet—warrant further monitoring and regulation.
- Our ability to control our borders, regulate immigration, and reduce illegal immigration.

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1998—U.S. Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Deutch Commission)

1998—Accountability Review Board on the Bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, on August 7, 1998 (The Crowe Commission)

1999—National Commission on Terrorism (Bremer Commission)

1999—Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (Gilmore Commission)

2000—DoD USS Cole Commission (Crouch-Gehman Commission)

2002—National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission)

2004—Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the U.S. Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (Robb Commission)

- Whether the assimilation of immigrants—America’s great strength—is still working.
- The role and rules of domestic intelligence collection.
- The still fluid and always difficult determination of when and how authorities should and may intervene to thwart terrorist plots.

One of the major challenges will be to correctly frame the issue, avoiding unsupported assumptions that lead to inappropriate strategies. Is homegrown terrorism an immigration and assimilation problem? Is this a problem for the Muslim community? (And what do we mean by “the Muslim community”?) Do we need to mobilize the “moderate Muslims”? And if so, how do we do that? Or is recruitment to violence a matter of individual choice and chance encounter?

To conduct a thorough inquiry, the proposed commission would have to consider a broad range of questions:

- What do we currently know about radicalization and recruitment to terrorism in the United States? What do we need to know?
- How would we assess this threat? Is the danger exaggerated? Radicalization and recruitment are occurring here, but there is no evidence of a significant cohort of recruits. Yet how confident are we that we know what is going on? Is this a slow building effort by our terrorist foes?
- We speak of self-radicalization, but actual cases show evidence of proselytizers, inciters, incubators, trips abroad for training, volunteers for violence seeking mission approval from perceived figures of authority—not entirely “self.” What do we know about this infrastructure for radicalization?
- Is radicalization here a product of an externally financed missionary campaign that is pushing an extreme version of faith, self-isolation, intolerance, and militancy?
- Should radicalization and recruitment be framed as an immigration and assimilation problem? What about extremist enterprises that recruit native-born Americans to violence? Does it make sense to lump together the self-radicalization that led to the Oklahoma City bombing with the self-radicalization that has produced violent jihadists?
- Assimilation of immigrants, accomplished with little federal intervention, is a historic strength of America. Along with the “huddled masses yearning to breathe free,” we have in the past occasionally imported their violent quarrels. Is the problem significantly worse than previously? Have circumstances changed to deepen the pools of unassimilating, alienated immigrants or sons of immigrants? Has a violence-exalting narrative combined with effective exploitation of modern communications, and perhaps anger at policies that can easily be portrayed as an assault on faith or community, interrupted the normal multigeneration integration of immigrant communities?
- Is recruitment to terrorism a societal problem calling for community intervention or a matter of purely individual choice? If it is the former, then what is the role of the communities where recruiting is occurring? And if it is the latter, do affected communities have no greater role than any other citizens (and less basis for complaint when authorities focus on suspected recruiting venues)?
- What are the views of affected communities? How would they frame the problem? What role, if any, would they propose? Does inevitable and understandable public concern about terrorism and the resulting heightened scrutiny of certain communities reinforce community efforts to discourage young men (and women) from pursuing dangerous and destructive paths or only provoke suspicion and antagonism? Do affected communities see a need for assistance, and if so, what kind of assistance?
- What role does the Internet play in radicalization and recruitment to violence, along with practical instruction in its application? Does this role pose a sufficient threat to require consideration of some measure of regulation? What are other nations that face this challenge doing? What might be learned from their efforts?
- What are possible policies and strategies for reducing recruitment to terrorism, explicitly considering the possibility that the potential adverse consequences of any government intervention beyond current local community and intelligence efforts outweigh likely payoffs?
- If useful interventions can be identified, what is the appropriate role of the federal government versus that of local government?

You can detect a difference between my view on the creation of a national commission to examine radicalization and homegrown terrorism and my cautionary views regarding government intervention to prevent such threats. Let me make this explicit.

Tasking a national commission with assembling all we know and developing a framework for understanding radicalization and homegrown terrorism is a good idea. Inevitably, such an inquiry will lead to the identification of some specific, perhaps new, threats and vulnerabilities, and possible ways to fix them. But here I become more cautious, even skeptical.

Judging by the terrorist conspiracies uncovered since 9/11, violent radicalization has yielded very few recruits. Indeed, the level of terrorist activities in the United States was much higher in the 1970s than it is today. Fashioning national strategies to deal with handfuls of diverse misfits may be counterproductive. Therefore, as I concluded my April 5, 2007 testimony with some basic principles, let me conclude here by underscoring some principles to guide the proposed commission's work:

- Improving national security must be accomplished without degrading our enduring values.
- Updating legal mechanisms to deal with Internet-era technology should be done, but more ambitious and more sensitive proposals for social engineering should be extensively analyzed for their intended and unintended, positive and negative consequences.
- The criterion for any proposed measure should be a very high level of confidence that it will be effective, that the risks of adverse consequences will be very small, and that it will include mechanisms to prevent and remedy the abuse if things go wrong.

Finally, efforts should be primarily local, albeit with federal assistance.

#### **SOME FURTHER THOUGHTS ON A PROPOSED COMMISSION**

##### **ON THE PREVENTION OF VIOLENT**

##### **RADICALIZATION AND HOMEGROWN TERRORISM**

**Brian Michael Jenkins**

**June 22, 2007**

The proposed commission can build on strength. Although we know that radicalization and recruitment to terrorism are taking place in the United States, these efforts thus far do not appear to have produced a significant cohort of terrorist operatives. Since 9/11, we have suffered no further terrorist attacks. We may credit good intelligence, possibly discouragement by the community, and the paucity of terrorist volunteers. Polling indicates that the vast majority of our immigrant population rejects violence. All this is good news. But the bad news is that our terrorist foes remain determined, their communications are becoming more sophisticated, and a greater number of young people may endorse terrorist violence. The challenge will be to reduce the appeal of those foes without eroding our inherent strengths.

Any inquiry into measures to combat radicalization and recruitment to terrorism in the United States inevitably will confront the fact that the structure and strategy to address these elements as a component of our global efforts against terrorism are inadequate.

In the first months after 9/11, we understandably focused our attention on disrupting any further large-scale terrorist attacks in the pipeline and on degrading the terrorists' operational capabilities. The United States then invaded Iraq, which has continued to command our resources and demand our attention. As a result, efforts aimed at preventing radicalization and recruitment to terrorism were consigned to the sidelines and remain scattered and uncoordinated. The Pentagon's Office of Strategic Information was strangled at birth. Military psychological operations remain tactical—in essence, playing cards with wanted posters. The State Department, although the lead agency for public diplomacy, has few resources and little authority over other parts of government. Nearly six years after 9/11, we have created no Political Warfare Executive, no new version of the United States Information Agency, to counter increasingly sophisticated terrorist propaganda.

How we ultimately approach the issue here will affect perceptions abroad. Successful ideas developed to address the issue of homegrown terrorism will also find application elsewhere.

Europe, especially the United Kingdom, France, Spain, Germany, and the Netherlands, has been intensively examining the issue of radicalization and recruitment. Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Malaysia, and Singapore have launched programs to reduce incitement, inoculate targeted communities, offer those who have been recruited a way back, and rehabilitate terrorist prisoners. We can learn from these experiences.

Radicalization and recruitment to terrorism have also been examined by analysts in the intelligence community, by local law enforcement (with some informative research done by the New York Police Department), and by people in the research community. If the information was assembled in one place, we would probably find that we know a great deal about the dynamics of recruitment.

Our encounters are primarily with individuals who have been arrested or detained. These include a number of hardcore terrorists, committed to the depths of their souls, who may color our overall view. Not surprisingly, we hear less from those who have been radicalized and decide to leave, although these may be the most informative and credible sources of information. Khaled al-Berry's *La Terre est Plus Belle que le Paradis*, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross' *My Year Inside Radical Islam: A Memoir*, and Ed Husain's *The Islamist: Why I Joined Radical Islam in Britain, What I Saw Inside, and Why I Left* could help us identify the decision points and weaknesses in the radicalization process.

At the same time, these testimonials must be interpreted with care. While entirely sincere, they may reflect the denunciatory zeal of the "ex."

There is debate within the broader community of faith, where the terrorists' extreme and exotic interpretations are being challenged. *In the Footsteps of the Prophet: Lessons From the Life of Muhammad*, by Tariq Ramadan, is a recent example. This is not a matter of mobilizing the so-called moderates against the extremists. Our role is not to endorse any religious scholars, which would in any case destroy their credibility, but instead to endorse the kind of debate that is consistent with individual liberty.

We are looking at intent here. Therefore, I want to repeat a point made in response to a question. Those arrested on terrorism-related charges in the United States have manifest intent—they had simply not yet acquired the capability to carry out any attack.

The Hamburg Cell, whose members ultimately led the 9/11 attacks, had intent. Until they went to Afghanistan, they had no capability. That was provided by al-Qa'ida.

The Leeds Cell responsible for the 2005 bombings in London had intent. They acquired capability, probably when one of their members traveled to Pakistan.

To move outside of al-Qa'ida's realm, Timothy McVeigh and his co-conspirators responsible for the 1995 bombing in Oklahoma City had intent. McVeigh, a former soldier, acquired the capability himself.

Intent is the constant. Capability is the variable. A determined group will continue to seek capability, reaching out for assistance or until its members are recruited for a specific terrorist operation by those with capability.

We must, however, move very cautiously in criminalizing intent. As a country that guarantees individual liberty, we have not developed a large corpus of law dealing with intent. Free speech is constitutionally guaranteed, although not unlimited. Radicalization alone—the acquisition of extreme or outlandish beliefs—is no crime. It is only when radicalization turns to commitment to carry out acts of violence or to recruiting, assisting, or inciting others to do so that we enter the domain of law enforcement. We may never be able to draw a sharp line defining exactly where that occurs, which is why oversight is vital. The ultimate auditors, of course, are judge and jury.

A final comment: The proposed commission's work might be divided into two phases. Phase one would examine radicalization and recruitment to homegrown terrorism, assess the threat, and identify its vulnerabilities. Phase two would recommend specific measures, identifying those requiring federal legislation and describing the benefits and risks of each.

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Jenkins, for posing some very provocative questions and for the expertise you bring. Should we proceed with this idea, you are hereby enlisted.

Mr. ALMARAYATI.

**STATEMENT OF SALAM AL-MARAYATI, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,  
MUSLIM PUBLIC AFFAIRS COUNCIL**

Mr. AL-MARAYATI. Thank you very much, Madam Chairperson, and the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment, for inviting the Muslim Public Affairs Council to provide a voice for the mainstream Muslim American community on Homeland Security. We believe that the commission



is a very good idea that can address a number of very important issues, specifically identifying the relationship between the Muslim American community and the U.S. Government. We believe that increased engagement with and the role of the mainstream Muslim American community should be understood within the broader strategy of protecting our country. The Muslim American community is an underutilized asset. We can partner with it and understand legitimate, authentic and credible leadership as a key to countering extremism and radicalization.

Preventing alienation of this group is also a key to effective policy making. Counter-extremism, in many ways, is tantamount to countering ghettoization, seen right now in European Muslim communities. And let me just add to this that the Muslim American story is a story of success. And we are dealing today with a very serious problem. But we should not dismiss many of the great contributions of Muslim Americans in business, academia, science and the arts. We should not dismiss the Muslim American contributions in our armed forces and in law enforcement today.

America offers equal opportunity to citizenship, an open society, an alliance with civil society and a process for integration into pluralism. No other country today offers those opportunities for any of its minorities. America needs Muslims, and Muslims need America.

We have a saying in our organization, home is not where our grandparents are buried; home is where our grandchildren are going to be raised. And for an effective counterterrorism strategy, the community should be involved as it is considering this a priority in protecting our home from any enemy. Therefore, community-based policing, similar to neighborhood watch groups, are effective in increasing crime. The Muslim Public Affairs Council in 2004 offered the national grassroots campaign to fight terrorism that is built on three major components: one, to amplify Islam's message against terrorism, to fight bad theology with good theology, to counter the theology of death with the theology of life; number two, to build partnerships between law enforcement and local Muslim communities, as Muslim Public Affairs Council has developed an important dialogue with the FBI and other law enforcement agencies on this very important issue; and number three, to offer guidelines to Muslim institutions so that they can demonstrate their transparency and accountability to the American public. And we do this not for political reasons but for Islamic reasons based on the Quranic principle found in sura 5, verse 32, that basically says the killing of an innocent human being is equal to the killing of all of humanity, and the saving of an innocent life is equal to the saving of all of humanity. We are here to save lives, Christian life, Jewish life, Muslim life, atheist life. And we counter the ideology of death with the ideology of life.

But the ideology of life needs to have the platform and the arena and needs the assistance of government in raising its profile. Therefore, in doing so, I believe the American public can at least begin to appreciate that Muslim Americans are part of the solution, not part of the problem. In the FBI headquarters down the street, there is a quote that says, the most effective weapon against crime is cooperation; the efforts of all law enforcement with the support and understanding of the American people. The U.S. Government

therefore needs to publicize the partnership it has developed with the Muslim American community and not just publicize the arrests of fringe elements that are not necessarily part of the mainstream Muslim American community. Muslim Americans want to be treated as partners, not suspects.

Let me just end by touching upon three important elements that we believe should be addressed by the commission. Number one is the credibility of leadership. The term moderate has lost its impact and meaning. It is now interpreted by the Muslim American community as the one who has left Islam and condemns the religion wholesale with this following logic, that the only good Muslim is an ex-Muslim. The commission needs to include Muslims who are self-critical, but not self-hating. The term moderate should describe those who believe in the change of the status quo and perhaps are anti-establishment, but in advancing towards change renounce violence as an instrument of change and support civic engagement, human and interfaith relations and an understanding of Islam that is inclusive, not exclusive.

Muslim youth need our support. In the several campuses throughout the United States, there are Hillel and Christian chaplaincy that support Jewish and Christian students respectively, but there is no similar support system for Muslim American students. Universities can also consider establishing a center for Muslim American studies that looks into the development and integration of Muslim Americans. And, finally, on the issue of Muslim youth, we need Federal programs that train adults, as well as youth, on the difference between free speech and incitement to violence.

Lastly, Islamophobia is a root cause of radicalization, and we need more of our government and political leaders to speak out against anti-Islamic rhetoric, not for the sake of civil liberties necessarily but for the sake of keeping the Muslim American community engaged in all important policies. Thank you.

[The statement of Mr. Al-Marayati follows:]

#### PREPARED STATEMENT OF SALAM AL-MARAYATI

Thank you, Congressman Bennie Thompson, Congresswoman Jane Harman, and members of the House Homeland Security Committee's Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment for inviting me to testify on "Assessing and Addressing the Threat: Defining the Role of a National Commission on the Prevention of Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism." On behalf of the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC), I am honored to offer analysis and recommendations that we believe can be helpful and constructive in increasing the understanding and role of the mainstream Muslim American community within the broader strategy of protecting the country. While one of the most underutilized assets, understanding and partnering with the Muslim American community and its legitimate, authentic and credible leadership is the key to countering extremism and radicalization.

One major aspect of any effective counterterrorism strategy is community-based policing, similar to neighborhood watch groups that have been effective in dealing with various crimes throughout the United States. To this end, MPAC launched the National Grassroots Campaign to Fight Terrorism in 2004 (<http://www.mpac.org/ngcft/>). This program was based on three critical components: (1) amplifying Islam's message against terrorism; (2) developing partnerships between law enforcement and local Muslim communities; and (3) offering guidelines to Muslim institutions to demonstrate transparency and accountability in the post 9/11 era. This program is based on the Quranic instruction: "*Whosoever killed a human being—unless it be in punishment for murder or for spreading corruption on earth—it shall be as if he had killed all humankind; whereas, if anyone saves a life, it shall be as though he had saved the lives of all humankind.*" [5:32]

Down the street from this House Office Building is the FBI Headquarters, and in the interior is etched an important quote underscoring the need for partnership: "The most effective weapon against crime is cooperation . . . the efforts of all law enforcement agencies with the support and understanding of the American people."

Hence, the role of community-based organizations like MPAC is critical to bridging the governmental and non-governmental agencies in any policy initiative. To do so, there must be an environment of mutual trust and respect. Muslim Americans want to be treated as partners in making America safe and secure, not suspects. Treating them as suspects by advocating for policies that single out and hence isolate the entire community undermines and impedes efforts for homeland security.

### **Engagement**

Direct engagement with the Muslim American community is now a clear strategy of several federal agencies. It is the time to look more closely at the human and intellectual resources Muslim Americans can offer in the various areas of interest. Lately, hearings on radicalization have focused on campuses, the internet and prisons. For each of these problem areas, there are solutions found within the Muslim American community.

Muslim Americans want to be part of the solution and do away with the stigma of being part of the problem. On the issue of universities, Muslim organizations and individuals work with students in counseling and guidance towards problem-solving. On the issue of the internet, there are several internet sites that provide thoughtful analyses on current affairs and counter extremist rhetoric. On the issue of prisons, Muslim chaplains are a critical part of the answer to self-styled leaders that wear the cloak of Islam. Here I'd like to focus on Muslim Youth and the key factors in supporting rather than isolating our youth. In order to scratch beyond the surface to begin understanding and preventing radicalization from taking root in the United States amongst our youth, we must identify and explore the critical issues of identity, the government's responsibility to partner with credible leadership, the effects of Islamophobia, and the application of counterproductive language.

### **Muslim Youth**

MPAC recently issued a special report on Muslim youth entitled "The Impact of 9/11 on Muslim American Young People: Forming National and Religious Identity in the Age of Terrorism and Islamophobia" (<http://www.mpac.org/article.php?id=512>). The recommendations in this report identify important steps that universities, government, media professionals and Muslim American institutions can take to begin their collective contribution to supporting and protecting our youth. In regards to the government's role, the recommendations include but are not limited to creating an Inter-Agency Muslim American Youth Advisory Board of leaders and young professionals, eliminating conflation of every criminal activity by Muslims as terrorism, more vocally speaking out against anti-Muslim hate speech, and inviting young Muslim American professionals and youth to trans-Atlantic dialogues that aim to create space for Western Muslim Youth to compare their experiences and build friendships and alliances. Furthermore, our federal law enforcement agencies should publicize the important and productive relationship they hold with Muslim American organizations and their leadership in order to demonstrate to the American public that mainstream Muslims are working alongside the government to protect their communities and their country. As we discuss the potential threat of homegrown terrorism and radicalization, universities also play a critical role in fostering inclusion.

For this reason, we recommend that universities institutionalize a Muslim chaplain position for every campus in the United States. While every campus has a Hillel support system or a Christian chaplaincy, Muslim students have no comparable support. Hence, MPAC is calling for a collaborative effort emanating from the leadership of every college campus to institute a Muslim religious advisor funded, staffed and certified by the university to ensure the applicability of the chaplain's contributions are germane to each campus. In tandem, universities should dedicate resources to the creation of centers for Muslim American studies that can foster better understanding of the Muslim landscape, including much needed academic research. This research, when coupled with direct engagement, should facilitate further integration of Muslim Americans into American pluralism.

### **Credibility of Leadership**

The word moderate has been politicized in the discourse on counter-extremism to the extent that it has lost its impact. Moderate has become associated with the individuals who have left Islam and condemn the religion wholesale. Government partnering with credible leadership within the Muslim American community is a key component in effective engagement. The Commission needs Muslims who are

self-critical without being self-hating. A major problem in the policy-making circles is the absence of Muslim Americans who represent the mainstream community with a track record in enhancing civic engagement, interfaith and human relations.

Campus life should represent the best of America in offering opportunities for critical thinking, free speech and civil discourse. Hence, discussions with federal agencies on the distinctions between free speech and incitement to violence are crucial to the development of healthy debate in universities. Federal programs in promoting dialogue and countering hate speech could be very instructive and beneficial to Muslim and non-Muslim student groups.

#### **Islamophobia**

Those involved in counterterrorism policy-making should understand that the more negative the image of Islam is in public discourse, the more fertile the soil will be for radicalization of Muslim youth throughout America. Young people react to perceived threats upon their identity by amplifying the most noticeable anti-social elements as symbols of their independence and chosen identity.

MPAC offers the Muslim American identity as the model for healthy integration into American pluralism. We reject the "clash of civilizations" theory as we see no friction between the founding principles of America and the values of Islam. As we have repeatedly stated, "Home is not where our grandparents are buried, but home is where our grandchildren will be raised." Hence, America is home, and defending it against all who seek to harm her is our priority. Defending the Muslim American community against those who scapegoat and stereotype Islam and Muslims is a priority in effective civic engagement and securing our nation.

#### **Terminology**

While radicals use Islam to justify terrorism, we cannot afford to lend Islamic legitimacy to extremist groups. Hence, using "Islamic" before terms like fascism, terrorism, violent radicalism is counterproductive. MPAC appreciates the initiative of the Committee on Homeland Security to make distinctions between Islam and its exploitation by extremists.

In conclusion, to the mainstream Muslim American community, Islam is the antidote to violent radicalization. The empowerment of the mainstream Muslim American community is the most effective but underutilized resource in creating effective counter-terrorism strategies. MPAC is optimistic and is ready to foster cooperation and mutual understanding between our government and the Muslim American community.

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you very much.

I watched your neighbor to your left, Mr. Cilluffo, nodding through your testimony, Mr. Al-Marayati, and I bet we are going to hear some reinforcement right now.

Mr. CILLUFFO.

#### **STATEMENT OF FRANK J. CILLUFFO, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY POLICY INSTITUTE, THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY.**

Mr. CILLUFFO. Madam Chair, Congressman Reichert, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. And sitting next to my friend, Brian, and Mr. Al-Marayati, I do have to say they covered much of the waterfront. And I applaud the efforts of both and have worked with Brian for a number of years.

But prevention of radicalization and homegrown terrorism is one of the most pressing issues of our time. And you should be commended for your strong leadership in examining and, more importantly, in acting on these matters. As director of the Homeland Security Policy Institute at GW, much of my time and energy over the last 18-months has been directed towards the study of radicalization. In particular, the processes by which people become radicalized. In prisons, over the Internet, here at home and also abroad. Unfortunately, recent events such as the Fort Dix case, the Toronto 18 and the JFK plot remind us that there is no basis for

complacency. The up side is that the domestic plots we have seen thus far have demonstrated intent but not much in terms of capability. We would be foolish however to ignore the real possibility that both intent and capability may indeed marry up in the future.

Testifying before the subcommittee last September, I presented the key findings and recommendations of a report on prisoner radicalization produced jointly by HSPI and the University of Virginia's CIAG. Our study recommended that Congress establish a commission to investigate the issue in order to better understand the nature of the threat and the baseline of activity and effectively assess current prevention and response efforts and recalibrate them accordingly. Radicalization, wherever it is occurring and through whatever venues, is only one subset of the battle of ideas. And effective response strategies and tactics need to extend beyond our borders. In fact, it is a bit of a misnomer to speak of home-grown terrorism. We live in a largely borderless world, and the threats that we face are transnational. Activity in cyberspace reinforces that point.

In a second joint study, we looked at Internet-facilitated radicalization and found that Internet chat rooms are now supplementing and replacing mosques, community centers and coffee shops as venues for recruitment and radicalization by terrorist groups such as al-Qa'ida. A copy of our report has been submitted for the record. By incorporating and manipulating local, political and economic grievances, some of which are legitimate, extremists have woven an effective tale of an imaginary clash of civilizations between the West and Islam. The extremist's compelling call to action, based partly on myths and falsehoods, begs for the development of an effective counternarrative, one that unpacks, forcefully refutes and powerfully responds to the extremist's own. The West is not at war with Islam, and terrorism is, in fact, un-Islamic.

The real challenge for us here is to offer a dream of sorts and provide real opportunities for a better tomorrow to those who feel alienated and marginalized and who might otherwise be seduced by the extremist ideology. The U.S. needs to catch up in the cyber battle of words and ideas, to deconstruct the al-Qa'ida brand campaign and turn it into nothing more than a passing fad. To succeed, of course, this means much more than slick marketing and framing of the message. Our words must match our actions.

The bottom line is that radicalization is not a well understood phenomenon. Greater study of the life cycle of a terrorist, when one goes from sympathizer to activist to indiscriminate violence, is needed in part to identify trigger points and possible points of intervention.

With all this as background, your proposal to establish a commission is a necessary step to meet and defeat existing and potential threats to the United States. Your legislation will go a long way towards pulling together what is known in this field, identifying gaps and seams in our knowledge and chart a more clearer course ahead. That foundational research may then be used to better inform and shape policies. The importance of tapping knowledge and experience of both the public sector at all levels of the government and private and nongovernmental sectors needs to be emphasized. And while there is no one-size-fits-all approach to the challenge at

hand, there still is a substantial value in looking beyond our borders to the work done and lessons learned or at least observed by other countries.

In fact, HSPI has inaugurated an ambassador roundtable to do just that. And your legislation clearly recognizes all of this. It is important to note, though, that the role of government is limited in this context. The solution for this problem lie primarily at the grassroots level in local communities where trusted incredible leaders can have real impact with their fellow citizens. That is not to say that government at all levels don't have a contribution to make. Cultivated mutual respect and understanding between officials and communities founded on a solid education about Muslim cultures an Islam is crucial.

Let me emphasize that radicalization is not unique to Islam, nor is it a new phenomenon. Historically, extremist beliefs have been used to subvert the ideals of every major religion in the world, and Islam is one of those several. And they actually do run directly counter to the basic tenets of Islam, and most polls overseas would demonstrate that.

Let me just get to two quick points. I know I am over the time. But I do think it is important that we appreciate the sensitivities and the perceptions of those who feel that they, their religion and entire community are being targeted as a result of the extremist action of a fringe element. And I think you should really run with the protections you have there in terms of civil liberties and recognize that balance, and I applaud that. And I also think there are two points in particular that could be enhanced in the legislation. The first is, it is not comprehensive of all the disciplines that need to be addressed. Behavioral science needs to have a front row seat at the table, as do social networking experts. This is largely a networking phenomena, so people in the IT sector who can do that. And I would also suggest that, since terrorists don't adhere to artificial timelines, and 18 months is an awful long way to go before you come up with a complete report, that you should have interim reporting requirements and draft that into the legislation itself.

In closing, thank you for your leadership. HSPI stands ready to help however we can, and I thank you for the opportunity to be here with friends and colleagues.

[The statement of Mr. Cillufo follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF FRANK J. CILLUFFO

Chairwoman Harman, Ranking Member Reichert, and distinguished Members of the Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. The prevention of radicalization and homegrown terrorism is surely one of the most pressing issues of our time, and your leadership in examining these matters—and, more importantly, in *acting* on them—is to be heartily commended.

As Director of the Homeland Security Policy Institute (HSPI) at The George Washington University, much of my time and energy over the last eighteen months has been directed towards studying the phenomenon of radicalization in various contexts: in prisons, over the Internet, here at home in the United States, and also abroad. Sadly, recent events have only reinforced the importance of this task and driven home the sense of urgency that should accompany both examination of and action against radicalization. The Fort Dix case and the JFK airport plot revealed just days ago, serve as only the latest reminders that there is no basis for complacency. The threat is real and plainly, our shores will not act as a failsafe against it. Yet it is something of a misnomer to speak of “homegrown terrorism” for the

term is suggestive of watertight compartments that do not in fact exist. To the contrary, we live in a borderless world and the threats that we face are similarly transnational. That said, the United States remains in some respects reasonably well situated. Other countries are currently experiencing a more full-blown manifestation of certain dimensions of the problem such as the United Kingdom. In a sense therefore, we have an opportunity to get ahead of the curve and deal proactively with these elements before they have the chance to flourish more vigorously in this country. Fortunately, the domestic plots that we have seen in the U.S. to date have evidenced intent but not much in the way of capability—but we would be foolish to think that the two cannot or will not come together in future.

Testifying before this Subcommittee in September 2006,<sup>1</sup> I presented the key findings and recommendations of a special report produced jointly by HSPI and the University of Virginia's Critical Incident Analysis Group (CIAG), and entitled *Out of the Shadows: Getting Ahead of Prisoner Radicalization*.<sup>2</sup> That report was informed by a dedicated volunteer task force of subject matter experts in law enforcement, intelligence, behavioral science, and religion (including imams, chaplains, and scholars). The study reached the fundamental conclusion that Congress should establish a commission to investigate in depth the matter of prisoner radicalization by conducting an objective risk assessment in order to better understand the nature of the threat, and calibrate and formulate our prevention and response efforts accordingly. We emphasized the complexity of the problem and the associated need to take a multidisciplinary approach to analysis, and further urged that the commission seek to balance the practice of religious freedom while preventing the spread of radical ideology. A number of the priority issues we recommended be addressed by the commission were specific and targeted to the prison setting, such as the need for more data and greater study of prisons outside the jurisdiction of the Federal Bureau of Prisons. Others were more wide-ranging, including for example the identification of broader areas of dialogue with the Muslim community to better facilitate cultural understanding, mutual respect, and trust. Prisoner radicalization is of course but one subset of the battle of ideas, and the former cannot be divorced from the larger context in which it is embedded. Effective response requires strategies and tactics that extend not only beyond bars but beyond borders. A commission with a broader mandate than that described above is therefore to be welcomed.

Like the nation's prison system, cyberspace constitutes another understudied but fertile ground for radicalization in the United States. With the twin aims of redressing the dearth of research in this area and offering powerful prescriptions for action, HSPI and CIAG jointly undertook a study of Internet-facilitated radicalization titled *NETworked Radicalization: A Counter-Strategy*, a copy of which is submitted along with this statement.<sup>3</sup> That report, supported by a task force of highly regarded subject matter experts from a range of disciplines, found that Internet chat rooms are now supplementing and replacing mosques, community centers and coffee shops as venues for recruitment and radicalization by terrorist groups like al-Qa'ida. The real time, two-way dialogue of chat rooms has enabled extremist ideas to be shared, take root, be reaffirmed and spread exponentially. By incorporating and manipulating local political grievances—some of which are legitimate—extremists have woven an effective tale of an imaginary “clash of civilizations.” The extremists’ compelling “call to action” based partly on myths and falsehoods begs for the development of an effective counter-narrative that forcefully refutes and responds to the extremists’ own. One wonders how it is that the nation that gave rise to Silicon Valley and the Internet itself, came to be outplayed in this realm. In part the answer lies in the fact that we have not channeled our collective talents and energies into that end. Irrespective of the reason, it is clear that the U.S. needs to catch up in this cyber-battle of words and ideas. However, unless elements of the counter-narrative emanate from within the Muslim community and are conveyed by voices that are trusted and credible within those communities, the opportunity to achieve impact will be limited at best.

As in the case of prisoner radicalization, the challenge in cyberspace should be appreciated in larger context. Granted, where appropriate we should seek to deny or disrupt extremist access to and extremist efforts through the Internet via legal and technical means and covert action. At the same time however, it is crucial that

<sup>1</sup> Frank J. Cilluffo, “The Homeland Security Implications of Radicalization,” testimony before the Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment Subcommittee of the U.S. House of Representatives’ Committee on Homeland Security, delivered on September 20, 2006.

<sup>2</sup> Frank Cilluffo, Gregory Saathoff, *et al.*, September 19, 2006.

<sup>3</sup> Frank Cilluffo, Gregory Saathoff, *et al.*, May 3, 2007. See also Frank J. Cilluffo, “The Internet: A Portal to Violent Islamist Extremism,” testimony before the U.S. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, delivered on May 3, 2007.

we bear in mind wider and deeper goals and themes such as the need to offer an alternative to those who feel alienated and marginalized. Another example is the importance of intelligence work to inform counterterrorism. These underlying or foundational elements merit special consideration as they are critical components of our efforts concerning radicalization writ large. By way of illustration, our report therefore offers a cluster of recommendations intended to foster intra—and cross-cultural dialogue and understanding to strengthen the ties that bind together communities at the local, national and international levels. Likewise, we emphasize that the need for additional behavioral science research into the process of radicalization both online and offline, must be recognized and addressed.

Radicalization is not a well understood phenomenon, hence greater study of the life cycle of a terrorist—specifically, the process by which an individual becomes motivated to listen to radical ideas, read about them, self-enlist or respond to terrorist recruiting efforts, and ultimately, undertake terrorist activity—is needed in part to identify trigger points and possible points of intervention. Against this background, your proposal to establish a National Commission on the Prevention of Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism is a necessary step to meet and defeat existing and potential threats to the United States. The stated primary purposes of the Commission—(1) to “[e]xamine and report upon the facts and causes of radicalization and homegrown terrorism in the United States. . .”; and (2) “to [b]uild upon and bring together the work of other entities. . .,” both domestic and foreign<sup>4</sup>—are suggestive of both a sorely needed initiative and a well thought out methodology. Rigorous scrutiny of radicalization undertaken by academics and practitioners alike, as mandated by this legislation, should go a long way towards pulling together what is known in this area, identifying the gaps in our knowledge, and moving forward. In turn, that foundational research may then be used to better inform and shape policies, which should prove to be all the more effective as a result of this evidence-based tailoring. To date, some work has been done, but not under a broad rubric or with the active engagement of the federal agencies necessary. To the extent that solid work on these critical areas has already been done, it should not be discarded or ignored. Collaborative endeavors undertaken by HSPI and CIAG, and projects undertaken by other similar entities such as the Center of Excellence for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) based at the University of Maryland, offer a starting point for more in-depth investigation and analysis by the Commission and its staff.

The importance of drawing upon knowledge and experience that may reside in both the public sector, at all levels of government, and the private and nongovernmental sectors must be emphasized—as must the value of looking beyond our borders to the work done and lessons learned (or at least observed) by other countries. While there is no one size fits all approach to the challenges under study, since each country setting derives its experience and response from a different set of political, economic, social and cultural circumstances and history, there remains substantial value in carefully examining whether certain elements may be relevant to the U.S. context. Put differently, in a borderless world such as ours, we would be acting at our peril if we failed to take into account “foreign government studies of, reviews of, and experiences with radicalization and homegrown terrorism,” as required by the legislation.<sup>5</sup> This is an area where HSPI has been particularly active. Our Ambassador Roundtable Series on International Collaboration to Combat Terrorism and Insurgencies, co-sponsored by the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies, builds upon and institutionalizes efforts to engage ambassadors, heads of state and cabinet level officials in an ongoing dialogue on counterterrorism efforts of multiple nations. This coming Monday, in fact, HSPI will be hosting the United Kingdom’s Home Secretary, Dr. John Reid, who leads the UK’s effort to protect the public from terrorist attack. His address will speak to the future of terrorism, the “battle of ideas,” international law, and recent developments in the U.K. Secretary Reid will offer insights on radicalization and potential methods to counter it.

Yet the role of government whether foreign or domestic is perforce limited in this context, as the solution sets for the problem under discussion must emanate principally from the grassroots, from local communities, their leaders and the citizens that reside there. Governments at the federal, state, local and tribal levels certainly have a contribution to make however, and there is also a measure of interplay between the public and private sectors that is and will continue to be crucial to combating radicalization at home and elsewhere. For instance, law enforcement at the local level should develop new relationships and deepen existing ones within Muslim communities as local figures are best placed to identify radicalization at its earliest

<sup>4</sup>Manager’s Amendment to H.R. 1955 Offered by Ms. Harman of California, Section 899C(b).

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, sec. 899C(b)(2)(C).



stages. Cultivated mutual respect and understanding between officials and communities, founded on a solid education about Muslim cultures and Islam, is critical. Notably, in the Fort Dix case, the mosque attended by three of the plotters quickly called an “emergency town hall meeting” to invite law enforcement, other officials, and members of the public “to ask anything they want about the mosque or about Islam, and to publicize a ringing denunciation of terrorism and violence of any sort. . . .”<sup>6</sup>

Let me emphasize that radicalization is not unique to Islam nor is it a new phenomenon. Historically, extremist beliefs have been used to subvert the ideals of every major religion in the world and Islam is only one of several that terrorists may invoke to justify acts of violence (though such acts run counter to the very tenets of Islam). In cyberspace, extremist organizations of all stripes, adhering to any number of radical belief systems, are present and have used the Internet to radicalize and recruit others. Likewise, in addition to radical Muslim influence, U.S. prisons have borne the imprint of right-wing extremist groups and cults known to participate in criminal activity. Unfortunately, there exists a certain symbiosis between the two and some radical right-wing groups have found common ideological cause with extremists identifying themselves as Muslim. Moving forward, it is imperative that due care be accorded to the sensitivities and perceptions of those who may feel that they, their religion and entire community are being targeted as a result of the egregious and extremist action of but a few. Section 899F of the legislation, which speaks to the protection of civil rights and liberties while preventing ideologically-based violence and homegrown terrorism, recognizes the delicate balance that is required here.

Turning to the more specific aspects of your proposal, in particular the nature of the composition of the Commission and the proposed qualifications of its members, it is suggested that two members each shall be appointed by various officers of government and that in these instances those two members “shall not be members of the same political party.”<sup>7</sup> Without wading too far into comment on this particular clause, it bears reiterating that homeland security is a national endeavor that should be pursued collectively and collaboratively with vigor and determination, drawing on the tremendous reservoir of talent, imagination and energy that exists in this country. If ever there was an issue or challenge that should be considered and acted upon in nonpartisan fashion, this is it. The stakes are simply too high for any other approach. Section 899C(e) is also reflective of this understanding as the section calls for Commission members to be “selected solely on the basis of their professional qualifications, achievements, public stature, expertise, and relevant experience in the areas of sociology, terrorism, religion, counterterrorism, cultural anthropology, sociology, juvenile justice, education, and corrections.” At the risk of offering an overly “micro-level” comment, I would suggest adding to the foregoing passage the phrase “including but not limited to,” so that the clause would read in relevant part as follows: “. . . in the areas including but not limited to sociology,” et cetera. This is more than mere word-smithing as there may be other disciplines that could provide trenchant insights into the matters at hand and yet those disciplines may not be referenced in the list cited above. The behavioral sciences constitute one such example.

Continuing on at the structural level of analysis, the Amendment requires the Commission to issue within 18 months of its first meeting “a report of its findings and conclusions, and any recommendations for immediate and long-term countermeasures to homegrown terrorism and ideologically based violence and measures that can be taken to prevent violent radicalization and homegrown terrorism from developing and spreading within the United States.”<sup>8</sup> However, terrorists do not adhere to artificial timelines. Given the seriousness of the Commission’s endeavors and the potential consequences that could result should an incident materialize in the U.S., it may in fact be desirable to embed a greater sense of urgency by imposing one or more interim reporting requirements that would set in motion the sharing of key ideas with relevant partners at an earlier stage of the process. Those parties should be in a position to feed the Commission’s preliminary thoughts into key channels that could have real impact—as they identify areas of missing information/data and matters of concern—and potentially change outcomes. Even if this concept is not accepted, the requirement to issue recommendations should be firm and broad, and should be highlighted more so than is the case at present, as the ulti-

<sup>6</sup>Chris Newmarker, “Mosque where Fort Dix suspects struggles with suspicion in wake of plot,” *International Herald Tribune*, May 15, 2007, <http://www.ihl.com/articles/ap/2007/05/15/americas/NA-GEN-US-Fort-Dix-Plot-Mosque.php>.

<sup>7</sup>Manager’s Amendment, *supra* note 4 at sec. 899C(c).

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*, sec. 899C(r)(1).

mate objective of the legislation is to solve a remarkably complex problem and the way to achieve that end is through action. Further study, reflection and planning are all crucial tasks, but it must be remembered that they are in essence merely precursors to our fundamental aim, which is to act effectively so as to defeat the challenge posed.

Although I have focused my remarks on the Commission itself, H.R. 1955 also establishes a grant program to prevent radicalization and homegrown terrorism in the United States.<sup>9</sup> The text accords eligibility to any State to apply, and funds granted may be awarded by States to "agencies and organizations, including but not limited to, social services agencies, community-based groups, educational institutions and non-governmental organizations. . .".<sup>10</sup> Conceptually, this passage cuts two ways. On the one hand, it reflects an appreciation of the fact that an array of entities and actors must be involved in prevention efforts. On the other hand, the possibility of taint or "blowback" (in the lay sense of the term) inheres in this grant proposal as the credibility of the programs and messages being delivered by private and non-governmental entities may be impugned or challenged simply due to the fact they are funded by the government. By noting this conundrum, it is not to suggest that the grant program should be abandoned altogether. To the contrary, it could enable a range of productive initiatives that could yield real impact and that might otherwise never get off the ground for lack of funding. That said, our expectations of what may be achieved through this particular mechanism should be realistic and should discount from the get-go the fact that government is but one player of many in this area and it is neither the most crucial nor without drawbacks even in terms of limited involvement. Further and more importantly however, there is an issue of sequencing: it may in fact be best for the Commission to complete its work first so as to better inform the proposed grant program.

In light of the most recent developments with the Fort Dix and JFK airport plots, it is my sincere hope that quick action is taken to establish this Commission, so that this critical work can get underway. Thank you again for according me the privilege of testifying before you on this issue of fundamental national importance. The work of the Subcommittee and its staff in driving this matter forward is a genuine public service. Should it be possible to assist your efforts in any way in days ahead, HSPI stands ready to do so. I would now be pleased to try to answer any questions that you may have.

Ms. HARMAN. I thank all of the witnesses. Each of you has just made an additional contribution to this focus that we have had on-going for some time. I am hopeful that all of your testimony will be carefully digested by us and by staff and that the legislation we look at next week will include many good new suggestions that you have just made.

Each member will now have 5 minutes to question the panel. And I will first recognize myself for questions. My first question is about language, names. And let me say why I raise this. If we launch a commission and its name is something that offends many of the people we are trying to reach for, that would be a mistake. On the other hand, if we try to come up with some warm and fuzzy name that is not clear about what we are studying, I think that could be a disservice. So let me ask all three of you—obviously, I recognize that Mr. Al-Marayati has a lot to contribute to the answer, but all three of you do—about three terms: radicalization, each of you used it; homegrown terrorism; and ideologically based violence. What about these names? And I am not sure in what order, but does any of these names give you heartburn in terms of a description of what we are trying to look at with this new commission? I would appreciate an answer from all of you, starting with Mr. Al-Marayati.

Mr. AL-MARAYATI. Thank you very much. I think that is a very important question, Congressperson Harman. And I don't have a

<sup>9</sup>Section 899C(a).

<sup>10</sup>Section 899C(e).

problem; I don't think we have a problem with any of these terms. These are real issues that no one should be in denial of their manifestations. I think we have two problems in general in terms of terminology. The first is a selective application of terminology. And I think you covered that very well in your introductory remarks, that we are not talking about one particular religion. And indeed homegrown terrorism did not begin just a few years ago, but with Timothy McVeigh, with Puerto Rican terrorists, with so many other examples of terrorism in the past.

The other issue is affording religious legitimacy to extremists by using terms like Islamic fascism, Islamic radicalism, Islamic terrorism. Number one, that is an inaccurate description; as I believe we agree, the essence of Islam is against terrorism. There is no room for terrorism in the front. Number two, when we give in to extremists and let them use jihad or jihadi to describe themselves, we are giving them religious legitimacy and taking it away from the Muslim mainstream.

Ms. HARMAN. You'll note, I did not use that term.

Mr. AL-MARAYATI. Exactly. I just wanted to underscore and emphasize that point.

Mr. DICKS. Will the gentlelady yield for just one minute?

Ms. HARMAN. Yes.

Mr. DICKS. What terms would you use?

Mr. AL-MARAYATI. The terms that were used without religious labels; radicalization, terrorism, extremism, ideologically based violence. And I believe that that is a constructive way of establishing the dialogue with the Muslim American community on this issue. And you will find more constructive discussions on the issue.

Mr. DICKS. Thank you for yielding.

Ms. HARMAN. You are welcome.

Reclaiming my time, Mr. Jenkins, Mr. Cilluffo would you comment on terminology please.

Mr. JENKINS. Just two quick comments. I do think the term radicalization needs the adjective violent in front of it, because that will keep us out of some trouble in terms of conveying a wrong message that we are in any way attacking people's ideas here. Homegrown is a perfectly good term, however in the actual conduct of the commission's work, I think they would have to realize that, in today's world, we do live in a global society. And so many of the issues that come into play here, when we look at what we call homegrown radicalization, it involves Internet, which in fact is a global network. It may involve recruiters from abroad. It may involve going abroad for training.

Ms. HARMAN. Let me just interrupt you there. I take that point. And Mr. Cilluffo made it in his testimony. But a premise would be that there is something unique about the American experience. And we better understand that because there are many more Americans here who could be radicalized than there are, let's just start with Americans. Americans abroad, is that correct?

Mr. JENKINS. Absolutely. That is why I would leave homegrown in the title of the commission. But as I said, the commission ranges more broadly in terms of how that feeds into homegrown terrorism.

Ms. HARMAN. I appreciate that much.

Mr. CILLUFFO.

Mr. CILLUFFO. Madam Chair, I do think words really do matter. And how we use those words are critical in determining our success, and this is not an academic exercise. I have no qualms with any of the terms you have identified. I would note, however, that, and this is not a political statement, but I don't use the term GWOT, for example, when looking at these issues overseas.

Ms. HARMAN. GWOT is Global War on Terrorism?

Mr. CILLUFFO. Global War on Terrorism. To some extent, that empowers the adversaries we are looking at. I do use, I call it, and this is quite the bumper sticker made for TV, but it is a transnational insurgency underpinned by a global jihadi salafist movement. Now I do use the term jihadi, but in each case, I will identify that it is being misconstrued by a small set of individuals. And if you couple salafist with the jihad, that is in large part what we are seeing, so I am not taking that in isolation. But I very much agree with my colleague's points. Let's not make them any more religiously codified than they should be. They are not warriors.

Ms. HARMAN. I thank you for your answer. My time has expired.

The Chair now recognizes the ranking member for 5 minutes.

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate your question. I think, in my past line of work, again, I'll mention, the use of words really does affect people. It touches their heart in so many different ways. As a homicide detective for 13 years, in the beginning of my early career investigating murder cases, the term closure was used for families who had lost a loved one who was murdered. And we learned very quickly as we moved through some very important cases that there is never any closure, and it was deeply offensive to the families. They got answers to questions about their loved one's death, but they never got closure.

So I appreciate the question from The Chair and your answers from the panel. It is also that important that people who are members and active participants of this commission, and certainly there are recommendations made in the legislation, do any of the three of you have any other thoughts besides, I know the behavioral science person recommended, any other thoughts on who should be participating in this commission?

Mr. JENKINS. I think that the commission would be well served to have, in addition to behavioral scientists, to have either as members or certainly as advisors or witnesses that would assist its work those involved in intelligence issues, particularly at the local police level, because those are the people who directly interface with the various communities involved. I would, at some peril, suggest the inclusion of a lawyer, a constitutional lawyer. We are going to be touching upon, any commission, any commission that addresses this is going to touch upon extremely sensitive issues, issues involving free speech, religion, immigration and, therefore, would do well to have the kind of guidance that could be provided by a Federal judge or someone who is well versed in these matters.

I would agree with Frank Cilluffo that our behavioral scientists should definitely include someone in the area of both individual motivations as well as social networks. So we have legal. We have behavioral. We have intelligence. Those, I think, would be essential components.

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you.

Mr. Al-Marayati.

Mr. AL-MARAYATI. Yes, in addition to what my colleagues have stated, I think what we need are experts for the community in terms of community-based policing to understand how to detect and how to intervene in cases, such as Mr. Gadahn, that Congresswoman Harman stated. In that particular situation, could there have been intervention in the mosque with that individual? Because here is the dilemma, I can just be very frank with you, about how Muslim Americans are feeling about the situation. If they intervene, they are afraid that law enforcement and those in the media are going to exploit the situation and say that they are associating themselves with terrorists, not just in mosques but also on the Internet. People are afraid to go into these extremist Web sites because they don't want a law enforcement agent knocking on their door the next day asking them questions and misconstruing it as association with terrorists. So experts that can help in determining how to intervene in these situations would be very helpful.

Number two, experts on Islamic ideologies of human rights and human decency I think are important to make these important distinctions and to explain it to the American public in a way that satisfies our first amendment, the establishment clause, and separation of church and state so that the American public, as was stated earlier, gets a greater level of confidence that we are providing some answers, not just talking about the problems.

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you.

Mr. CILLUFFO. I would just add, Congressman Reichert, that I agree very much that community policing is at the heart of this matter. It is not going to be decided here inside the Beltway. And it can't only be in a counterterrorism environment, because that creates a defensive posture to begin with. It has got to be part of a larger community police effort. I also agree very much with Brian, the Intelligence Community, not only intelligence-led policing but people who have had experience in understanding the opportunities and the limitations of intelligence from a national security standpoint.

I also think those with experience in organized crime. To some extent, we have been uniting our adversaries when we need to start disaggregating. And I think that the role that we played in Cosa Nostra, it was in large part because they started losing confidence in one another. And trust is the key to everything. Trust is the key to the good guys. Trust is the key to the bad guys. You start eroding some of their trust; maybe it starts falling apart. So I would highlight those.

The other area I would highlight and accentuate is the international component. We have a lot to learn. And hopefully, we don't learn it and have the same scar tissue that some of our friends overseas have. And I would like to see that somehow find its way into its findings.

And then, finally, of course, to have resonance, we need Islamic scholars. The solution sets in part are going to come from within, within the Muslim community. And to have resonance, that is who we need to look toward.

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you for your answers.

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Ms. HARMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Dicks from Washington for 5 minutes.

Mr. DICKS. Thank you. I want to give each of you a chance to talk about this subject. And first of all, I appreciate your testimony here today. And I want to compliment the chairman and the ranking member. We have gone around the country and looked at a few different situations. How big an issue is this? Stepping back from a commission, the big commissions authorized by Congress before, if the administration doesn't want to cooperate, that can be a problem. So I hope we can get cooperation. But how big a problem is this? We know we have got a terrible problem internationally. There is no question about that. And we know we have these specific examples. But just from your experience, the American people want to know how major a concern is this?

Mr. JENKINS. Let me start with that. And at the risk of sounding Rumsfeldian, you don't know what you don't know. Where we have looked at this issue, where local law enforcement and Federal authorities have examined it, we have in almost every case have been surprised to find out that there was more going on than we previously had imagined. The concerns, for example, about recruiting in prisons, these were not discovered until we actually began to look at the issue. And once we looked at the issue, we discovered there were things going on here. When there were increased intelligence activities as a consequence of 9/11, we discovered that in fact there was more activity going on than we previously had imagined. I don't want to exaggerate this. The country was not filled with sleeper cells, but certainly there was ample evidence of active radicalization and recruiting going on in the country.

Now, thus far, based upon the conspiracy and clusters that we have uncovered since 9/11, there does not seem to be a significant cohort of terrorist operatives in the country. But there is active recruiting, and there is the development of intent. And I want to make a point here about intent. The Hamburg cell had intent but no capabilities until they showed up in Afghanistan. The Leeds cell that carried out the bombings in London had no capability. They may have acquired some in a training camp somewhere. To move out of that realm of terrorism and to go back to Timothy McVeigh, Timothy McVeigh had intent and developed his own capability. Intent is the constant here. Capability is the variable. So when we look at these various conspiracies, the only difference between a handful of hotheads fantasizing about violence and somebody actually doing something that is going to result in dreadful carnage is the acquisition of this capability. There are lots of bunches of guys around the country that are fantasizing about violence. It only needs one of them, one individual in one of those clusters to have some capability, and we could confront what some of our allies have confronted on their soil.

Mr. DICKS. Would the other members want to comment on this?

Mr. AL-MARAYATI. Yeah. From the community standpoint, we don't see a movement for radicalization. We don't see similar expressions of extremism like we have seen in Europe. And probably the reasons that we discussed earlier, in terms of the level of integration here in America, American Muslims tend to be higher in

terms of education than the average, higher in terms of income than the average and definitely much better than those in Europe. If there are cells at this time, and if there is just one cell or one individual, that is one too much. So we are not looking at it in terms of whether there is a widespread movement for radicalization or not.

However, we can identify the problem. And if we identify the problem in an effective, precise way, then that will help us towards a solution. If we identify the problem in a simplistic way, in a sweeping way, we believe that will exacerbate the situation. And the further you push young Muslims especially to the margins of society, then the more likelihood that they could be recruited by these extremist recruiters. So we should not even allow that situation to happen, and therefore, the prevention of those social ailments in our society should be of utmost concern; therefore we should not impose the cloud of suspicion on young Muslim Americans today.

Mr. DICKS. Can we finish this?

Ms. HARMAN. Yes.

Mr. DICKS. Thank you.

Mr. CILLUFFO. I appreciate the question, and it is very difficult. I often say, since the end of the Cold War, forecasting has made astrology look respectable, and I don't have a crystal ball. We simply don't know. But the question we do have to ask is, how much is too much? And I would agree with my colleague that one is too much. And the last thing we want is to have hearings where us or anyone else are before you all after an incident occurs, and there is going to be the knee-jerk attempt to take much more Draconian measures, which are going to further push the issue to making it a bigger set of challenges.

I might note, though, that the UK asked those same questions prior 7/7. And for anyone who is interested, I am hosting Home Secretary John Reid on Monday for a speech and other things, but if you are interested. What they noticed in the 7/7 activities, which was quite alarming, is the speed and the pace of radicalization. We are talking months. We are not talking years. We are not talking many months. It was very rapid. So I think that we don't want the cures to be worse than the disease. We want to get out in front of this issue. And I can't quantify or qualitatively give you a concrete answer. But as Brian said, in all of our reports, the more we uncovered, the more we found. And clearly, the messages are being targeted at a Western demographic and a young demographic.

Mr. DICKS. Thank you.

Ms. HARMAN. The gentleman's time has expired. Before yielding to Mr. Perlmutter, I just note that the British experience is somewhat different. There is a huge British Pakistani population that travels home for a month a year for family reunification purposes. Tens of thousands of people go to Pakistan each year. So there is an opportunity there for bad things to happen that I don't see a parallel for in America, which is another reason to study radicalization from the American perspective.

The Chair now yields 5 minutes to Mr. Perlmutter of Colorado.

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Thanks, Madam Chair.

And thank you for bringing your bill forward and convening this panel. We met in Torrance, what, 2 months ago, 3 months ago, and I was hoping that the prison experience and Mr. Gadahn were aberrations. And since then, we have had the pizza-Fort Dix experience; we have had Toronto; and just recently, JFK. And so it is becoming more prevalent and, quite frankly, a little more frightening. But, Mr. Cilluffo, you asked or you used a couple words that sort of resonated with me. You said these guys are not warriors; they are a bunch of thugs, I think you said.

Mr. CILLUFFO. It is New York speak.

Mr. PERLMUTTER. No, I appreciate that. You also talked about the Cosa Nostra, the gangster kind of element to this. Gangsters may be more focused on economic, making money and that kind of power. This is more ideologically driven. But between that comment and Mr. Jenkins' comment about intent is the constant and capability is the variable; if you were both commission members, what would you be focusing on based on your use of Cosa Nostra and thugs, but also taking into account his statement about intent, constant, capability as a variable, if you please?

Mr. CILLUFFO. That is a complex question. And I am not sure I have a quick answer for that. But clearly it is the convergence of bad guys and good stuff, and the good stuff being technology, capability, training, execution. And that training can occur anywhere. So what I meant by Cosa Nostra is also that terrorism is a team sport. We haven't found a single profile. In fact, quite the contrary. The one thing we do know is that social bonds matter. And it is often friends, family. And those are very difficult to use conventional instruments to be able to respond to. But what I do think, in terms of organized crime, this is where we have worked on some of the Federal, State, local interactivities, and I firmly believe that this isn't going to come from the beltway. It is not going to come from overseas intelligence. This is largely going to have to come from communities that are going to see when something is awry. So I do think we have got to focus on intent. But I also think that there is a lot of intent. The question is, when do the two marry up with capability. And there we have got a problem.

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Mr. Jenkins, if my complex question made any sense to you?

Mr. JENKINS. It is a complex question. I am not quite sure I have got it framed right. Let me just put up here a note agreeing with the other witnesses. In looking at this, I would say, let's begin with the fact that, right now, we have a success story. We have a success story in terms of our ability as a Nation to assimilate immigrants, to provide them with futures in this country. And therefore, we do not confront the same problems that many of our European allies do. Second, we have a success story thus far in being able to identify and uncover some of these conspiracies that we have discovered. Not all of them have turned out to be significant in terms of capability. But as I said, certainly intent was there.

So one of the things I would be focusing on or advise the commission, rather, to focus on, is, how can we enhance that success? How can we improve our local intelligence capabilities? How can we improve the relationships between police activities at the local level? I emphasize at the local level, and the various communities and



avoid doing things that are going to have counterproductive effects, and that is by isolating, alienating, stigmatizing and angering that same potential reservoir of recruits that the terrorist ideology is going after. So how can we take advantage of our inherent strengths in this country, add some capability and ensure that we are not going to spoil that? That is especially important, by the way, if, heaven forbid, an incident should occur. Having good intelligence and knowing what is going on and having good relations is going to prevent the country from propelling itself into a series of measures that in fact will imperil all of our civil liberties.

Mr. AL-MARAYATI. Could I just add?

Ms. HARMAN. Yes.

Mr. AL-MARAYATI. We mentioned intent and capability. Also, I think the overriding factor is our capability to intervene, as my colleague has stated. And if we look at the model that was stated before, it simplifies its activists to violent radicalization. The intervention point is in the early stages when there are sympathizers. The mechanism for intervening is ideological intervention. And just to share with you internally what is happening in the Muslim American community, there is a training of religious leaders to intervene in a healthy, constructive way to make sure that sympathy is addressed within the Islamic context, that you cannot sympathize with murder, you cannot sympathize with wholesale violence; and number two, that these individuals who are being trained need to be empowered and need to be given the resources to make sure that we prevent the further stages of radicalization.

Ms. HARMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

I would just like the record to be clear that we are talking about sympathy with violent action, not sympathy with any particular religion or religious tenets.

Mr. AL-MARAYATI. Exactly. Exactly.

Ms. HARMAN. The Chair now yields 5 minutes of questions to Mr. Shays of Connecticut.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. I think there are two inconvenient truths in the world—the one that Al Gore talks about and the other that the 9/11 Commission talks about. I think it is an incredible statement and shows, as the Commission says, we are not confronting terrorism as if it is some ethereal being; we are confronting radical Islamist terrorists.

One, I want to know if you agree with that, each of you. Secondly, I want you to tell me what you think our country's strategy is to deal with this threat, if you think it exists. The Cold War threat was contain, react and mutually assure destruction. So I would like you to tell me, one, if you agree with what the 9/11 Commission said and; secondly, what you think our strategy is to deal with that threat.

Mr. JENKINS. First of all, I think the threat is real. There is no question about it. Second, in terms of the radicalization—

Mr. SHAYS. "The threat is real" is not what I asked.

Mr. JENKINS. Yes.

Mr. SHAYS. Do you agree that we are confronting as a—there are a lot of real threats. They highlight this as a major concern of the United States.

Mr. JENKINS. It is the principal threat that we face in this country right now—

Mr. SHAYS. Okay.

Mr. JENKINS. —and I suspect that we will face for decades.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

Mr. JENKINS. We are talking about a phenomenon that cannot be dealt with by driving tanks across the desert and reaching Baghdad.

Mr. SHAYS. So what is our strategy to deal with that?

Mr. JENKINS. I am critical of us here. I think that we, understandably, right after 9/11 focused our efforts on the degrading the operational capabilities of our terrorist folks. We had to do that because we did not know if another 9/11 was in the pipeline at that moment, but what we have not done and what is far behind is our understanding of and our strategy for dealing with the frontal end of it.

Mr. SHAYS. So what is the strategy?

Mr. JENKINS. We do not have a strategy.

Mr. SHAYS. What should the strategy be?

Mr. JENKINS. The strategy should be intervening in the radicalization and recruitment process before they reach the stage of terrorist operatives. At that point, unless we can interrupt that radicalization and recruiting process, we are condemned to a strategy of stepping on cockroaches one at time. We are going to be doing it forever.

Mr. AL-MARAYATI. Can I take a—

Mr. SHAYS. All three of you, sure.

Mr. AL-MARAYATI. Ambassador Edward Jarugian, in the late 1980s or early 1990s, said we need to have a dual track approach. Now, the one is to bring culprits to justice. So intelligence, incarceration, prosecution, conviction of criminals is one important track, and then the second track is to deal with the root causes and the social factors that lead to what Mr. Jenkins has aptly identified as the radicalization process.

So our strategies should be a dual-track approach. I agree with the 9/11 Commission that it is a Muslim task, and if it is a Muslim task, then there are internal issues within the Muslim community, and there are national and international issues that deal with relations between these Muslim communities and their governments and their law enforcement, and we can get into more specifics later. I just disagree with the nomenclature and the terminology because we do not want to give more religious legitimacy to the terrorists than they are already trying to obtain.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

Mr. CILLUFFO. Mr. Shays, I would actually agree with both of my colleagues here, but let me put it a little differently. Clearly, it is the greatest threat facing the United States today, and others can exploit asymmetric means as well to take the United States on, which they cannot do tank for tank/plane for plane in the traditional war on a conventional battlefield.

Let me say that I think the time has come to recognize we have got to stop only attacking the structure and start attacking their strategy. This is a battle of ideas. There is only one side on the battlefield right now, and it is not us, and our diplomacy efforts should

not be about projecting American values; it should be about debunking and unpacking their narrative to demonstrably show how it is misusing and distorting a religion.

I would also add that, when looking at our overseas function, my simple philosophy in 2 seconds—because I know my time is going to get cut off—but we have got to isolate the military and operational planners from the organization, organizations from one another, that from a movement and that from society at large. Every step of the way, there are different instruments of state craft that have to be brought to bear. Heretofore, the emphasis has been on the kill and capture, and that is where Congress is spending the money as well.

So I think we need to look to how we can marshal other instruments of state craft. I am not suggesting that the military component is not important; it is part of it, but we need to get other instruments to the fore.

Ms. HARMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Dent of Pennsylvania for 5 minutes of questions.

Mr. DENT. Thank you, Madam Chair.

On the issue that you were just talking about of radicalization and religious arguments, how would you recommend that we deal with these religious arguments? I guess, you know, maybe these Islamic extremists have been motivated by religious arguments.

Is it incumbent upon moderate Islamic clerics to help deradicalize? How do you think the Commission should address that specific question? I thought maybe either one of the two of you.

Mr. CILLUFFO. I do think we need to—when I give public speeches on these sorts of issues, I always ask the audience, who is often an informed one—and I am not going to ask for an answer here because I know I am in the seat of taking questions—but how many people actually can tell me how many statements Osama bin Ladin has made? How many people have actually read them? You would be surprised at how few hands I will ever see raised.

Before we can come up with a counternarrative, we have to understand what the narrative is. Why is it having resonance? Why is it sticking? That is where, I think—stage one, let us understand—forget the bad pun—what makes them tick. Then we have got to identify what a compelling counternarrative is, and that is going to have to, to a large extent, be driven, or be at least communicated from within the Muslim community. The Koran is arguably the most important instrument we have to show how it is being distorted by others—Islamic scholars, cultural experts—and we need to provide an opportunity for others to have a better tomorrow. That is all part of it. I do not think we have done that, and in fact—

Mr. DENT. So, with this type of commission, you think it would be wise to engage the modern Islamic community to help debunk these—

Mr. CILLUFFO. Unequivocally.

Mr. DENT. Whatever term. Understood.

Mr. AL-MARAYATI. Yes. I think we should empower Muslim religious authorities who are speaking about the ideology of Islam that

looks at Jews and Christians as people of the book, not as infidels, but looks to human beings, other human beings—as the Koran stated, “We have created you with human dignity. The children of Adam are created and bestowed with human dignity.” It talks about the role of Muslims and Islam within the modern era, not as something that we have to replicate from the 15th century or from the 10th century or from before then but looking at modern issues of human rights, of democracy, of co-existence, of something that is very different from when Islamic civilization was at the top. In other words, we live as Muslim minorities here, and the Muslim world is a very different Muslim world than it was 1,000 years ago.

Let me just add to that, and I think my colleague was alluding to this, that there have been polls done of Muslim mainstream communities about violence. Those who supported violence use political arguments. Those who oppose violence use religious arguments, and so we have to be aware of that narrative in order for the counternarrative to be effective.

Mr. DENT. That is well said.

My next question is to you. Is it Mr. Cilluffo?

Mr. CILLUFFO. Correct.

Mr. DENT. You have, I think, been quite a bit involved with prison radicalization. What do you think the Commission should do with respect to our penal system and to the radical Islamic movement that is currently going on in many prisons?

Mr. CILLUFFO. You know, that is a long answer, but let me suggest that part of the solution, there again, is getting Muslim chaplains who can actually use the faith that prisoners, themselves, have been distorting, and prisons have always been incubators for radical ideas, I mean whether you are looking at Adolf Hitler, writing *Mein Kampf*, whether you are looking at Joseph Stalin, filling the ranks of the Bolshevik Revolution, and I can give many other examples. It has always been an incubator for radical ideas. You have got a captive and a captured audience with a lot of time on their hands, but I think a lot of the emphasis heretofore has been on the Federal Bureau of Prisons. That is a very small percentage of our prison population.

Mr. DENT. I agree.

Mr. CILLUFFO. 82 percent State and county prisons and jails.

California, Madam Chair, has done a phenomenal job. We used them as a case study. L.A. County and LAPD, those are the models we should be looking at, and I can go ad nauseam.

Mr. DENT. My time is about up, but for maybe a later round of questioning here, when should we intervene with this radicalization process? How should we go about that?

My time is up. I do not know if you want to take that into the next round.

Ms. HARMAN. If I might point out to Mr. Dent, that question was asked in a slightly different form a little bit earlier, so we are going to go to one more question each. That seems, to me, to be about the right period of time, and if you would like to ask that question at that point, you should feel free to, but we do have a fairly full record.

I will just point out to Mr. Cilluffo that the cell that was arrested in Torrance, the site of our prior hearing where Mr. Jenkins testi-

fied, was radicalized in Folsom State Prison. So, while I would like to give California a lot of credit, there is still a lot of work to do.

We will go to a partial second round now and ask those members who wish to ask one additional question starting with Mr. Reichert.

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Madam Chair. I will make mine quick.

We talked about keeping it simple, and we have had a lot of discussion about community, working together, education, community-oriented policing. I just wanted to ask the panel if any one of you are aware of a program called Cops and Culture. The National Crime Prevention Council of the King County Sheriff's Office, when I was the sheriff, implemented that program in King County along with the Seattle Police Department, and I think it might be a tool that could be used in this effort.

Goahead.

Mr. JENKINS. Absolutely. There are three ways local police are going to be able to address this.

One is through routine criminal investigations that then take other directions. That was the case in Torrance. The second is through community policing, the relationships with the community so that communities are comfortable in a relationship with the police and provide information, and the third is through dedicated intelligence efforts, that is, a portion of police resources with Federal assistance, specifically focusing on areas of concern.

Mr. AL-MARAYATI. Another point to underscore to reinforce your theory, Congressman Reichert, is where we have seen plots occur in terms of violence against the United States in the name of Islam, we have also seen the that there are Muslims who are key in unfoiling those plots, and the U.K. terror plot would not have been stopped had it not been for a responsible Muslim British citizen's stepping forward to the authorities and letting them know about this plot. So the key in community policing is the partnership and the cooperation and the comfort level with the community so that they can share information with our law enforcement without the fear of reprisal, without the fear of stigmatization.

Mr. REICHERT. Specific to this program, it really gets into educating the local law enforcement agencies about the cultures and about the ethnic groups that they are serving.

Mr. AL-MARAYATI. Exactly.

Mr. CILLUFFO. Congressman Reichert, I think that is an excellent program, and there are others that we need to be building upon because it all comes down to trust. It is all trust—

Mr. REICHERT. Yes.

Mr. CILLUFFO. —and it is individuals. These are human beings, and you need people who can feel comfortable talking to another individual, and that is all based and contingent upon trust, and it is going to have to come from the bottom up. My Latin teacher, if he is still around on this earth, in the 4th grade would probably kill me because I will butcher the words, but there is a term, "Audiator et altera pars," which basically means "let the other side be heard," and I think we need to be listening, not only doing, but I would also add that law enforcement at the local level, I do not think, has the analytical capacity right now or the breadth or the

depth, and there is still this belief that Washington is going to come down with that silver bullet when and where something will occur.

You know what? We have never done indication or warning intelligence well, but I think we have got to get down to brass tacks, requirement setting. What do I need? What do I have? How can I provide that information and ask the questions from both the Federal and the State and local? But community policing is even more important in that equation.

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Ms. HARMAN. I thank the gentleman.

I might suggest that that Latin proverb apply to Congress.

The Chair now yields to Mr. Dicks for one additional question.

Mr. DICKS. You know, you mentioned Mein Kampf and Stalin. There is a history in the United States of radicalization. This is not the first episode of this. I mean—so I think we need to take that into account as we look at this. This is very important phenomena, and I guess the prison issue—Mr. Cilluffo, if you would like to go on a little bit further about this prison aspect of this—what is good, what is bad. I mean, you know, one thing about a commission is that it kind of forestalls doing things. My view is, you know, I do not want to wait for a commission. I mean, we ought to have a commission—I would support that—but I think there are things we can be doing now, especially on this prison issue, where we can make some progress forward.

So, would you like to comment on that?

Mr. CILLUFFO. Thank you, Congressman Dicks.

We did look at white supremacy. We did look at other gang activity of every stripe and ilk, and we came to conclude that the activity is the activity. The *modus operandi* is the *modus operandi*. Some were converting to Islam—which conversion is, arguably, a very good thing. The problem is you have got those who can manipulate that, and they have little to no knowledge coming in about the faith so they can easily be co-opted by a charismatic leader, which was the case in California. When I was talking about the best practices in California, I was actually talking post new Folsom because then they actually started providing the Joint Regional Intelligence Center, JRIC. It was part of that intelligence stream. The Bureau of Prisons was being looped into the whole process. Until then, they were treated, to a large extent, in isolation. So we have got a lot to do in terms of the prison systems, and a lot of that is information, but first and foremost, it is a priority setting issue.

If you are in charge of a prison and you are worried about gang activity and getting stabbed on a daily basis, it is very difficult—and we are already overcrowded and overpopulated, and they have got more than their handful of challenges. To throw yet another set of issues onto an already full list is difficult, so part of that is raising awareness, and what I would like to see is a confederation of not only the FBOP, the Federal Bureau of Prisons, but I would like to see that much better looped into the State prisons and county jails where much of the activity is occurring.

Mr. AL-MARAYATI. I think one of the issues in terms of Muslim chaplains is looking at the rate of bringing Muslim chaplains into

the prison system. To my understanding, it has been frozen. There have been no additional Muslim chaplains added since the case of Captain James Yee in Guantanamo, number 1.

Number 2, we have seen in various studies that religion, whether it is Judaism, Christianity or Islam, in the prison system is a positive force for prisoners so that they do not return to crime after they leave the prison system. So, just in general, I think we need to look at how religion plays a constructive role in the prison system.

Mr. CILLUFFO. Could I build on that, Madam Chair, just for one second? Because it is the integration into society where you have those points where we were talking about intervention. That is absolutely critical. Many convert for protection. We called it priz-lam. We had a couple of imams who referred to it as "jailhouse Islam," and they get better food. So part of it is really going to be at that exit, at that facilitation. That is where we have to actually spend more resources in general in the prison system, and I would note that most major prisons are not in urban areas. So, in many cases, you are not going to have a very large Muslim community to begin with, so it is hard to get to the prisons.

Mr. JENKINS. Can I make one comment here quickly?

Stepping out of the issue of prisons specifically, we have had examples in our history of domestic radicalization to violence and to terrorist activity in this country. The difference now, however, since previously, say, in the 1960s or in the 1970s, is that the means of communication have developed, and we are now facing a foe that has been very sophisticated in using the most modern means of communications to convey a message to create a community, a sense of belonging to something. We have to deal with that threat, but other radical groups will learn from the use of these techniques and will adopt them to their own means, so we are dealing with something—we dealt with this historically, but we are dealing with something new today.

Mr. DICKS. Thank you.

Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Perlmutter for one question.

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Thanks, Madam Chair. You said that in such a way that maybe—can I put like four questions into one question like I did the last time?

Ms. HARMAN. [Shakes head.]

Mr. PERLMUTTER. The question I have—and Mr. Jenkins, you were sort of hitting on it—is there is a different way to communicate that is much broader and that may be more potent. Is there an age group that is particularly susceptible to this?

Mr. JENKINS. It is the same age group—yes, there is, and it is the same age group that is susceptible to being recruited into gangs. It is the same age group that is susceptible to being recruited into a lot of things. We are talking about primarily young men in their teens on up into their early 20's. These are young men who are going through, in many cases, just because of the age, identity crises, looking to define themselves. Because of their age, again, they have lots of energy, lots of hormones. That is the age bracket that commits crime in this country. That is the age bracket that goes into gangs. It is what young men do, and unfortunately, if you have a narrative, a narrative that exalts violence, that at-

tempts to project that violence as a personal obligation, that justifies it, that offers the tantalizing prospect of clandestinity, identity, all of those are very appealing to that specific age group.

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Thank you.

Mr. AL-MARAYATI. If I could just pick up on the issue of identity then—and this connects with Mr. Dent's question—in terms of intervention, this is where we are intervening now, and we need to be more proactive and provide more resources in developing a healthy Muslim-American identity that America is home, that we counter gutterization within the Muslim-American community whether it is psychological gutterization or any other form of gutterization. In doing so, we will prevent this form of antisocial behavior of this group, and antisocial behavior could be manifested in drugs, in promiscuous sex or in joining groups with violent ideologies. So the root cause here is an identity crisis that we have to address.

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Perlmutter.

Mr. Shays, one question.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.

First off, this is an excellent panel. I really wish we were going to spend more time because there is more that we could learn.

I think it is instructive that none of us really could state what our strategy is. Yet, we could state what the Cold War strategy is. That, to me, is—what we need first is a huge national dialogue about what we are confronting. In the short run, it has got to be protect, prevent, preempt, and sometimes act unilaterally, and you may call that getting the cockroaches, but it has got to be that, and then we fill it in with other things that we did during the Cold War with Sputnik, education and so on to compete economically with Russia.

What I just want to say—and I want your reaction—is I find it repugnant, having just finished reading. Elie Wiesel's "The Night" last night, that I would have to speak to or deal with people who are so sick that they would literally wrap themselves in a weapon and blow up themselves in front of children, and somehow dealing with that is striking me as incomprehensible, and it may be a disconnect that we have, but it is somehow like we have to kind of negotiate and deal with—I just react to it.

Mr. AL-MARAYATI. I agree, Mr. Shays. This is a sickness. It is a psychosis. It is something that the average human being, the normal human being, can not comprehend, and we have to address it objectively and effectively. There is an ideology of suicide culture that is taking on a cloak of religion, and I think what we are all seeing here is that we have to understand the development, the metamorphosis of this suicide culture. We really have not invested enough in the ideological battle against this suicide culture.

So we should do that, and also, we have to listen to the mainstream. We are not listening enough to the mainstream Muslim communities. Our policies have isolated the mainstream Muslim-American communities who, like you and I, cannot explain why there is a suicide culture in the name of their religion right now, and we should also speak out more against Islamaphobes like Pat Robertson, who said yesterday that Islam is not a religion but a



move for worldwide domination. When they hear that message from a religious leader, they view that as a message that is closely associated with the U.S. Government, as a friend of the U.S. Government. So we need to also address how to deal with our own extremists here in America who are fermenting anti-Islamic rhetoric and how they exacerbate the situation.

Mr. CILLUFFO. Mr. Shays, could I just add to that?

I certainly would hope no one at this table would suggest negotiating with people who would actually take those steps. That is very different—again, getting back to my isolate, military and operations plans, organizations, it is that second ripple effect that I am most concerned about. Those who are potentially teetering on the edge who can go one way or the other. In dealing with the military and operational planners, we are going to have to use the heavy instruments of government—covert action, law enforcement, military, string them up, string them along. I do not know.

It is a case—by—case basis, but it is that next tier of folks that is the group we are potentially losing, and we wrote a major report on the narrative and counternarrative, so obviously, I agree with everyone here, but it is also worth noting that it is not what you say; it is what people hear, and we have to understand what they are hearing.

Mr. JENKINS. I want to underscore that.

Once they strap on a bomb and become a weapon, that is, obviously, not the point for having discussions about identity and radicalization. They are a weapon and must be dealt with as such.

The point of intervention is to try to do things that are going to reduce the reservoir of those who will be caught up in this narrative, which is essentially an ideology of death. This is an ideology that exalts death. It connects the individual with some glorious utopian pass which may or may not have existed and promises them earthly pleasures in some future life, leaving the now which is nothing and, therefore, enables an individual to simply turn himself into a weapon, and he thinks of himself as nothing more than a weapon. We have to be able to intervene to ensure that there is not going to be a large reservoir of those who can be recruited to that.

Mr. CILLUFFO. Could I just add one point?

Because it is that reaffirmation, that moral equivalency that people then will be emboldened to actually act. That is that reservoir we have to keep flipped on the other side.

Mr. AL-MARAYATI. And also there is the terrorist, and there are audiences, and terrorists try to influence audiences, and we should embrace and engage the audiences. The terrorist is not somebody we need to—you are right. We are not here to understand or to develop an agreement with a terrorist. They should be handled swiftly and with justice.

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you. The good news is that I need to leave now, but Mr. Dicks will take over the chair, and if our members have additional questions, we can go until noon, assuming the witnesses can stay.

I just want to observe that this is one of the best panels we have ever had and that what you have just said will directly influence a legislative proposal, which we are working on now, to set up a

national commission but, not only that, perhaps some other legislative initiatives which I believe this committee on a unanimous basis—that will be a miracle in this Congress—but on a unanimous basis will embrace, and for once, you know, Congress is accused of more heat than light. We might actually shed some light on a very serious set of problems.

So I just, personally, want to thank our witnesses and our members for an enormously productive hour and a half.

Mr. DICKS. [Presiding.] Mr. Dent.

Mr. DENT. Thank you, Madam Chair. I concur with your remarks. I am sorry I did not get here for the beginning of it.

The media, the Internet and religion, I think we can all agree, play a role in radicalization and, hopefully, a role in the prevention of the mitigation of radicalization.

Given our first amendment, how do we, as a government and as a society, effectively combat all of these radicalizing forces that you gentlemen have so eloquently discussed here today?

Mr. JENKINS. Two things with regard to that.

First of all, combating what is taking place on the Internet or in other communications media does not necessarily mean controlling or restricting. It means that is simply the new terrain of battle. That is where we are going to fight. It means having counternarratives. It means taking advantage of those same communications channels. Indeed, the irony of this is that this Nation, which invented the Internet, which is so creative in exploiting communications for commercial and political purposes, has been so flatfooted in engaging those same means of communications to deal with this problem. So we can engage it without necessarily impinging upon the first amendment. In some areas, however, I think that we do look at appropriate controls.

For example, I mean it is interesting that they are now talking about putting controls on the Internet to reduce fraud on sales through eBay. We control the Internet to deal with issues of child pornography and other things. So the fact that it is simply this thing called the “Internet” does not mean that we cannot appropriately update our laws and concerns to deal with specific problems.

Mr. DENT. As you answer these questions, could you also just address, you know, the role of the government in terms of on the Internet, and who is going to put up these religious arguments? Is that the government’s role? Whose role is that?

Mr. AL-MARAYATI. It is the Muslim-American community’s role to put up these arguments, and I think what we need to discuss in terms of cooperation between these communities and the government is where the community does not feel stigmatized, but they enter extremist Internet chat zones to argue against extremism or to intervene with a potential radical or sympathizer of radical ideology in the community or in the mosque so we do not shut these individuals from our communities and then they become ripe for the pickings of extremist recruiters.

So I do not see a problem in the first amendment here. If the government were promoting Islam in any way, that is the problem, and that is not what we seek. I think what we are talking about is understanding the Muslim world and the Muslim western com-

munities in a more nuanced way with a little bit more precision, more accuracy so that that will help us sociopolitically and empower us in the tools against extremism.

Mr. CILLUFFO. Let me pick up on a couple of those points, and this is something we have written a lot on, so I will try to be brief, not my strong suit again.

When we are looking at who the solution sets are, we cannot look at this, Mr. Shays, I think, as a grand strategy. We actually have to look at it from a decentralized perspective, which is very difficult for government to do, and government only has a small role in this overly complex set of issues. Shutting Web sites down, it is like Whackamo. Hit it here. It is just going to pop up somewhere else. Quite honestly, the Web sites are not even the issue. We need to get into the chat rooms. It is the chat rooms that are replacing the smoke-filled bars of the LaCarre novels where espionage used to occur. That is where people—that is where it goes from the cyberworld to the physical world. That is where they actually start connecting. We have got to be in there in a hand-to-hand kind of way, demonstrably showing how people are misusing the Internet.

The other thing is that I agree with Brian. Greater transparency is also the solution here. We have got the ideas on our side. Let us use them and make sure we are doing that directly, and there is a program—and I am not suggesting that all of their programs are very good—but the Saudis have a program called the “Tranquility Program” where they are actually going into the Internet chat rooms, and they are bringing in Islamic scholars to refute how they are being misused. We have got to start thinking about that.

Then on the counternarrative, we all hear about terrorists and their martyrs. Well, it is about time that some of our martyrs be remembered, and we have got to remind the terrorists—and they are trying to create this clash of civilizations of the West versus Islam—who is being killed by terrorist bombs, largely Muslims. So how can they, in their own defense, make these sorts of cases? We have got to remind people of that. In Beslan, there are hundreds of kids being killed. I could not think of a more powerful, motivating attack to abhor terrorism. We need to start reminding people and showing the graphic visuals.

As to the bombing in Jordan, at the wedding, which actually was al-Zarqawi's is undoing, I think, in the long run, that had negative consequences. Obviously, it was a horrendous attack, but we have got to start packaging that. Casa Blanca. I could go on and on and on and on. They are packaging it very effectively. We have not, and I think that is part of this counternarrative.

Mr. DICKS. Just following up on that, does the government play a role in this? I mean is this the State Department? Are they supposed to be involved in this ideological struggle on the Internet or in the chat rooms? I mean, is that the way to do it or does it have to be dealt with all outside of government?

Mr. JENKINS. No, it does not.

You know, during the Cold War, we had something called the “United States Information Agency.” It was an institution that was set up to basically conduct the war of ideas with our adversaries in the Soviet Union. That does not mean that the government, itself—that some government official was the author of every mes-

sage, but it was a way of facilitating messages to get to audiences. The government has been involved in the sponsorship of things like radio for Europe and other communications mechanisms.

The problem we have now is that we do not have in this country any institution which brings together these various components of what we are trying to do in the State Department, the Defense Department and elsewhere in terms of communications. We do not have a single point to focus our efforts; we do not have a strategy, and therefore, we are still grappling with this particular issue, but we have done this during World War II. We have done this during the Cold War. It is a matter of learning some new lessons and, perhaps, remembering some old ones and creating mechanisms that can facilitate this ideological combat.

Mr. AL-MARAYATI. And I do not know of a single instance where there has been a meeting of all of these components, in a single setting, to develop a strategy. So I think the government can help in at least hosting these discussions that are needed with all of these components now looked upon in a central manner.

Number 2, I think the government needs to start publicizing. As Mr. Cilluffo said, we need to look at the heroes on our side—on America's side—and those people who have been on the front lines, battling this extremist ideology, they need to be empowered, and therefore, publicizing the relationship between, for example, the Justice Department or the State Department with these Muslim-American individuals and Muslim-American institutions is critical.

Lastly, there are exercises of government that have impeded the progress of the ideological battle, and we need to look more closely at that.

Mr. DICKS. Well, not to be partisan here, but Abu Ghraib is an example, I would think, that hurt America's reputation and image in the world, and it helps the other side, you know, from my perspective.

Mr. AL-MARAYATI. Exactly.

Mr. CILLUFFO. Mr. Chairman, it is not to suggest that government has a role. I do not necessarily agree that it is the same role with our counter concealment deception programs and ideological programs vis-a-vis the Soviet Union just because I think we have got so many other actors in the nonstate/onstate kind of environment that it is different, but what we really do need to be doing is enabling and empowering and packaging—how many people in this room can tell me that they know that a number of Muslim associations in the United States issued statements denouncing terrorism shortly after 9/11? Very few people.

Well, there have been thousands of such groups, but no one hears them, so we need to make sure that someone is packaging that, not just in the United States but overseas as well, and I would say—there was a 60 Minutes episode not too long ago that I thought was very powerful. Hassam Batu is one of the primary al-Qa'ida recruiters for the 7/7 bombers, termed, but he came out denouncing terrorism, saying he got duped by al-Qa'ida. That individual is going to have a much greater impact and resonance on a potential recruit than I would or anyone else would. I just look

at my own children when I try to explain things. If I use the Disney Channel, they get it and PBS, but the point being—

Mr. DICKS. Thank you.

Mr. CILLUFFO. —we need people who have credibility with the constituencies we are trying to work with, and the government has a role. We have a covert action role we have to play in the shadows. I am not sure we are doing that very effectively, and we also have a role in empowering others, but that is not going to be the solution.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Shays.

Mr. SHAYS. Abu Ghraib was talked about in this country for months and months and months and months. It was an outrage, and we should have made it clear it was an outrage. It was talked on Al Jazeera for months and months and months and years. Yet, when there were 50 people found in a torture chamber outside of Baghdad with, you know, drill holes, tortured for months, it was not even a front page story in this country, and it certainly was not covered overseas, and when I read Al Jazeera in English and see it covered there, it is an outrage, describing what American soldiers do, and I know for a fact they were giving candy to kids being lured out, and then they are getting blown up. It is an outrage how Al Jazeera covers what we are doing there. I will just make another comment and your comment to that.

I am not impressed with most of the denunciations by the Muslim community against terrorism, because they always have a “but,” and the “but” is “but, you know, we have problems in Israel with Palestinians,” “but we have this but the western world needs to do this.” There is no “but” to terrorism, and I would like to see some of these denunciations without the word “but” and then an explanation.

Mr. AL-MARAYATI. I do not think there was a “but” in the reference to Mr. Cilluffo’s—

Mr. SHAYS. That is, you know, the extreme example.

Mr. AL-MARAYATI. I think that is actually the rule, Mr. Shays, not the exception.

Mr. SHAYS. Well, you know what? Then I would like that documented to me.

Mr. AL-MARAYATI. Sure, we can provide you with all of the documentation.

Mr. SHAYS. Not a paragraph that follows if there is not a “but” but a paragraph that says, “but the western world needs to get with it.”

Mr. AL-MARAYATI. I do not think anybody is adding the “but.” I think, maybe, you or your staff needs to look more closely not to add the “but.”

Mr. SHAYS. You know what? I did look closely because I followed it, and it was my committee that followed it after September 11th, and we heard a few, but there were more “buts” than there were not, and I stand on that.

Mr. AL-MARAYATI. Let us look at that together, and we will clarify that for you in terms of the important denunciations of terrorism as just an absolute, number 1.

Number 2, in terms of media, I agree with you wholeheartedly. I think there should be a panel in terms of how the media—the

international media and the domestic media here—plays a role in exacerbating tensions between the United States and the Muslim world, and we can have a whole panel on that discussion as well.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Dent, are you all done? Okay.

Mr. Perlmutter.

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Just a comment. I assume we are winding this down—

Mr. DICKS. Yes, we are.

Mr. PERLMUTTER. —but I would hope that each and every one of you, if you were asked, would be a commission member or advise this commission that we are putting together because it is important. Things seem to be speeding up here. You know, it is a very, you know, vulnerable or open age, that group, and that group moves fast. I have three in that age category, and they are reading everything, watching everything, and they move quickly, and so I just thank you all for your time and for your expertise.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Dent.

Mr. DENT. Mr. Chairman, I just want to follow up with what Mr. Perlmutter just said.

As this Commission moves forward, I hope these three gentlemen have some role in it. This has been an enormously helpful hearing for me.

I yield back.

Mr. DICKS. Let me ask you just one final question.

On the question of the Internet, you suggested that Congress is looking at various restrictions. I mean, are you suggesting, you know, a restriction on violent context when you take radicalization to violence, that that would be limited?

Mr. JENKINS. You know, that has to be defined, and I think that is something we want to look at very carefully, so I do not want to jump ahead to the conclusion before we look at what are the reasonable possibilities, but to provide, for example, direct instruction, not only incitement, but specific instruction of “this is how you make bombs, and this is how you should place the bomb”—even in any other media, incitement is not protected by free speech when there is an anticipation that it is going to lead to criminal action. So to provide incitement and instruction with a reasonable expectation that somebody is going to use it, yes, we do have to look at that. How we can address that, I am not sure. That would be a hell of a challenge for the Commission, but certainly, it is not off the table.

Mr. DICKS. Any other comments on that?

Go ahead.

Mr. CILLUFFO. I would very much agree with Brian. Sure, we also need, for intelligence exploitation, to do it anyway. It is the chat rooms, though, where there is the interactivity, the real-time, two-way communication between individuals and the reaffirmation of ABERN attitudes, and to some extent, we are even seeing the perceived creation of a virtual umah where they do not have anyone who is denouncing some of what they are doing, so they actually start reaffirming one another, and there is something—we talked about child predators. On the Net in particular, there could be six people, but they start emboldening one another because they start believing that what they actually do is acceptable. It is not it. It

is really not. One of the things we looked at, which we could not come to any conclusion on in our report, is whether or not the media has a role to play here in terms of exposing like ABC or NBC—I forget which one it is—in exposing child predators, but that would be crossing the line, Brian just said, between incitement activity where that may be against the law to do that, but I am not suggesting we do not shut them down. If we can, of course, we do. Realistically speaking, we are not going to get to everything.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Al-Marayati.

Mr. AL-MARAYATI. Yes. Let me just segue then to the larger question of the government's role of how it can help.

Number 1, I agree that there needs to be ideological independence of these indigenous Muslim-American groups that are fighting the extremist ideology, and to associate government with that would tarnish their credibility in the community, so I agree with that.

Where cooperation comes in then is, for example, the Federal funding of programs that teach young students—all students—on our campuses the difference between incitement to violence and free speech. It can come also in the financing of programs for partnership between law enforcement and local communities. It can also come in the form of ad council advertisements, talking about how to detect criminal activity/terrorism and what to do or it can also be a positive ad council advertisement talking about the process of pluralism—I mean, the greatness of pluralism and the process of integration, especially that of young Muslim-Americans into our great society. So these are some of the recommendations that we have in our Muslim-American youth report that we hope you can take a look at.

Mr. JENKINS. Can I just make one final point?

Mr. DICKS. Yes, go ahead.

Mr. JENKINS. We have probably paid more attention and spent more money—I am not saying it is not a noble cause—in a government-sponsored effort to reduce smoking, to reduce drunk driving, problems to be sure, problems that kill Americans every day, but we have made it a national effort with government sponsorship to go after those issues, and we have done so without violating the Constitution. We certainly can do that much here.

Mr. DICKS. I think this has been an outstanding hearing, and the committee will stand adjourned.

We, again, thank the witnesses for a good job done.

[Whereupon, at 12:00 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

#### FOR THE RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BENNIE G. THOMPSON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI, AND CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

- Than you, Madame Chair, for turning our attention today to the issues of radicalization and homegrown terrorism, and how a national commission addressing them could make this nation safer.
- As the London train bombings in 2005 and the terror arrests of 12 Canadians in Toronto last summer made clear, the threat of homegrown terrorism is real.
- Indeed, the recent arrests of U.S. citizens who were plotting attacks against the Fort Dix military base in New Jersey and JFK airport in New York remind us that the threat in this country is equally great.

- Alsmot six years after 9/11, it is high time that we start to understand how radicalization can lead to terrorism and what we should do about it.
- I commend Ms. Harman for her efforts in sponsoring the Homegrown Terrorism Prevention Act of 2007, and I believe that the creation of a national commission to study this problem and to recommend a legislative plan of action is the right step.
- Such Commissions have had a major impact before.
- The Gilmore Commission, for example, made 164 recommendations regarding responses to terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction.
- All of those 164 recommendations have been adopted—in whole or in part—by the Federal Government.
- Moreover, the National Commission on Terrorism, on which Chairwoman Harman served in the late nineties, was a valuable resource for American counter-terrorism efforts both before and after the 9/11 attacks.
- And the work of the 9/11 Commission itself set in motion the creation of this Committee and the daily work we do to help secure the homeland.
- I believe that the creation of a national commission on radicalization and homegrown terrorism will continue this tradition and help define our approach to these pressing problems.
- Welcome again to you all. I look forward to your testimony.

