Text of letter from NASA Advisory Council to Administrator Goldin
Text of letter from Advisory Committee on the International Space Station to the NASA Advisory Council
Text of letter from Cost Assessment
and Validation Task Force on the International Space Station to
NASA Advisory Council and dvisory Committee on the International
Space Station
Figure 2-1. Fiscal Years 1998 and 1999 Budgets
Figure 2-2 Fiscal Year Budget by Components
Figure 2-3. Components Budget by Fiscal Year
Figure 3-1. Overrun Trend
Figure 3-2. Staffing Projections
Figure 3-3. Fiscal Year 1998 Civil Service Staffing Levels
Figure 3-4. Schedule Milestone Trends
Figure 3-5. CAV Task Force Schedule Assessment
Figure 3-6. Impact of Schedule Stretchout
Figure 3-7. Assessment of Reserves
Figure 3-8. CAV Task Force Budget Recommendations
Figure 3-9. CAV Funding Assessment
Table 3-1. Estimates of Schedule Slippage
Table 3-2. Estimates of Cost Growth
Table 3-3. CAV Task Force Budget Recommendations
The Cost Assessment and Validation (CAV) Task Force was established
for independent review and assessment of cost, schedule and partnership
performance on the International Space Station (ISS) Program.
The CAV Task Force has made the following key findings:
1.1 Background
The International Space Station emanates from
a 1993 NASA cost reduction-based redesign of the Space Station
Freedom. NASA committed to build the new design within a $2.1
billion annual funding constraint and at a total cost to completion
of $17.4 billion. Now, nearly five years later, hardware manufacturing
for many of the first U.S.-developed flight elements has been
completed. The program is well into the test and integration phase,
preparing for the start of deployment later this year.
Progress on the ISS Program has been achieved
by overcoming a variety of challenges. In 1997, cost growth
and delivery delays, both in the U.S. and abroad, made considerable
news. In May 1997, the ISS First Element Launch (FEL) was deferred
by seven months from November 1997 to June 1998. In September
1997, after coordination with the International
Partners on out-year ISS assembly flights, a new manifest
was released that reflected a slip of over a year in completion
of ISS assembly. These events and others have raised questions
regarding the total cost and schedule for ISS development and
operations.
In September 1997, the NASA Administrator asked Dr. Brad Parkinson
to establish a Cost Assessment and Validation Task Force, reporting
through the Advisory Committee on the International Space Station
(ACISS) to the NASA Advisory Council, for independent review and
assessment of cost, schedule and partnership performance on the
ISS Program. The letter of request is in Appendix A. The objective
of the Task Force, chaired by Mr. Jay Chabrow, was to provide
advice and recommendations for improvement of the ISS business
structure and cost management practices and to determine the total
cost over the life of the Program. The Task Force Terms of Reference
are in Appendix B.
On October 6, 1997, the Senate-House Conference Committee submitted
Conference Report 105-297. This report specified certain NASA
reporting requirements to Congress as a precondition to the March
1998 Congressional release of $851,300,000 in FY 1998 ISS funding.
The following items were required of NASA by Congress:
NASA requested the CAV Task Force to perform this independent
assessment, either verifying NASA's data or explaining reasons
for lack of verification. The letter making that request is in
Appendix C, and the Task Force's assessment is in Appendix D.
Six additional experts made up the Task Force. Their biographies
are in Appendix E. The members were selected to obtain a diversity
of expertise in program management, cost estimation and formulation,
technology development, and cost and schedule risk assessment,
so that all aspects of the ISS Program could be analyzed and assessed.
Task Force members have backgrounds in industry, the federal government,
and the military and have experience in large-scale aerospace
and other technology development programs.
1.2 CAV Task Force Organization and Process
Three members of the CAV Task Force, who were serving as technical
consultants on the ACISS, attended detailed budget reviews at
each of the Prime contractor's production sites in October, 1997.
The official kick-off meeting of the Cost Assessment and Validation
Task Force was on November 6, 1997
Since the team's initial meeting, members of the CAV Task Force have met almost weekly. The team was given open access to every facet of NASA's ISS Program. Fact-finding trips were made for meetings with ISS Program management, line support organization personnel, and the Program's Prime Contractor. The CAV Task Force met with representatives of the European Space Agency (ESA) and the Russian Space Agency (RSA) at their production sites to gain first-hand knowledge of their performance. Representatives of Alenia Aerospazio, Turin, Italy, who are responsible for the delivery of several U.S. and European elements also briefed the CAV Task Force on their progress.
The Task Force's fact-finding focused on major aspects of past
performance trends, current performance, and estimated projections
by the ISS Program. The main thrust was to identify and evaluate
major risk elements that would likely contribute
to further cost growth and schedule slip. Pertinent information
was gathered through summary and detailed status briefings, special
topics briefings, site visits, and personal interviews with ISS
program and line management and support personnel, and in conversations
with other government oversight organizations. The compiled information
was reviewed to assess the major impediments which could affect
timely completion of the ISS.
1.3 Findings
1.3.1 Development
The ISS Program has been diligent and resourceful in managing
the unique challenges of this complex venture given the significant
complexity and uncertainty of international involvement and the
difficult task of staying within annual and total funding caps
established prior to final Program content definition. The Program
has not incurred any extraordinary technical or programmatic "show
stoppers" to date. Although cost and schedule growth have
occurred, the magnitude of such growth has not been unusual, even
when compared with other developmental programs of lesser complexity.
The $2.1 billion annual funding limitation has resulted in spread-out
procurements, deferred and untimely work, and inadequate contingency
planning, all of which have induced schedule delays and have increased
cost. NASA's cost and schedule plans have been optimistic from
the beginning of the Program and continue to be so today. Budget
and reserve levels have been, and continue to be, inadequate for
a program of this size, complexity, and development uncertainty
despite NASA's past contentions that the total funding level is
adequate. It could alternatively be stated that the Program has
more content than it has funds available to achieve.
In the Task Force's opinion, Program de-staffing goals do not
adequately account for: work yet to be accomplished, mitigation
of current and potential cost and schedule risks, and the retention
of an appropriate skill mix through completion of development.
The Task Force analyzed ISS de-staffing plans for several prior
years and found they were not achieved for reasons similar to
those noted above. Current development de-staffing plans require
Prime contractor off-loads at a greater rate than all previous
plans. Past trends clearly indicate that this is not a realistic
assumption. Therefore, the Task Force believes that attempting
to adhere to the current de-staffing plans is unreasonable and
will introduce additional cost and schedule risks that could otherwise
be avoided.
Management challenges will remain large and diverse considering
the significant on-orbit assembly tasks; the size and breadth
of the integration required; the splintered delegation of systems
integration functions; and the required coordination responsibilities
among NASA, its Prime contractor and International Partners. ISS
Program management, primarily due to past annual funding constraints,
has not fully developed and implemented cost and schedule risk
mitigation plans to minimize or eliminate larger schedule stretchouts
or increased costs.
Major Development Risk Elements
There are a significant number of cost and schedule growth risks
in a program of this magnitude that have direct implications to
the total development cost of the Program and to the schedule
for completion of assembly. The following list represents the
major development risk elements the Task Force identified in the
ISS program.
This phase of the ISS Program requires simultaneous
integration of launch operations, on-orbit assembly operations,
engineering support, and logistics and maintenance support with
mission operations over an extended period of time. The
full assembly sequence for ISS will span a period in excess of
five and one-half years, involving over 93 flights of multiple
booster types to assemble and check out, on orbit, hardware from
around the world. The overall complexity and scope of this effort
is beyond the current experience base of NASA and the International
Partners and, as such, contain cost and schedule
uncertainties and risks. The resource estimates, in terms
of schedule and budget, for this undertaking are optimistic.
The Crew Return Vehicle (CRV) is a new, crewed, vehicle development
program which is required in early 2003 to support the autonomous,
safe return of up to seven crew members. The CRV development and
deployment is on the ISS Assembly Complete critical path. The
X-38 is a NASA in-house program to develop some technology for
the CRV vehicle. The X-38 Program is 10 months behind schedule.
Currently, there is no integrated plan or acquisition strategy
that would provide a seamless transition from the current X-38
Program to support CRV development and production requirements
and schedule. Further, NASA's CRV budget and schedule allow only
$5 million of expenditures in FY 1999, a production award in FY
2000, and only three and one-half years to operational need. In
the CAV Task Force's opinion, current CRV Program plans will not
support operational readiness requirements to meet the assembly
sequence need date.
Multi-Element Integrated Testing (MEIT) is a rigorous integration
and testing program intended to successfully demonstrate systems
interface compatibility and end-to-end hardware and software functionality.
Major flight hardware is scheduled to undergo MEIT just prior
to launch; however, hardware and software production activities
have very little remaining schedule reserve between now and launch
to address unanticipated problems. Resolution of problems or issues
identified during MEIT will likely result in launch delays. The
highly integrated and interdependent nature of the MEIT hardware
and software need dates and the phasing of MEIT activity also
introduce a high potential for multiple ISS launch schedule impacts.
Additionally, the schedule impact of incorporating MEIT for the
Phase III portion of the assembly sequence is not yet reflected
in the Program plan or budget.
The Laboratory is currently several months behind schedule, with
a significant amount of qualification and integrated testing remaining
to be performed. Software development and testing are also major
concerns. Considering past trends there is a high probability
of additional schedule erosion of several weeks or more.
Schedule slippage is affecting training readiness. In addition
to oral and written language complexities, there are also issues
with respect to detailed approaches to training that are cultural
or philosophical in nature and are yet to be fully resolved.
Software testing and integration are traditionally the areas of
space system development subject to the greatest schedule problems.
The ISS has a significant amount of software that has to be integrated
across multiple domestic and international suppliers. While many
software deliveries already have little schedule margin remaining,
late flight hardware deliveries will place further pressure on
software schedules due to hardware problems likely to be discovered
during late stages of testing. Typically, late hardware problems
are circumvented by software workarounds, thus increasing the
time and effort required for software integration and testing.
To contain near-term spending to within
the funding profile during peak development, decisions were made
to reduce contracting for parts and spares necessary to support
the current schedule. Various program activities were hardware-limited
during the development and test phases. Not procuring adequate
spares during the initial production run of some components may
lead to quality and consistency issues as well as increased cost.
1.3. 2 International
Sixteen countries on four continents are engaged in building hardware
and software for the ISS. Each country has its own governmental
limitations. Partner countries have adjusted, and will continue
to adjust, their level of financial involvement and schedule commitments,
ultimately affecting U.S. costs and schedules. Further, modifications
to the assembly sequence, ground operations, and on-orbit operations
all require integration and various levels of coordination and
joint approval. The U.S. developmental effort cannot be isolated
from these occurrences and their associated impacts: the Program
has experienced cost growth and schedule slippage associated with
this broad level of international involvement.
This has been especially true in the case of Russia. The anticipated
one billion dollar cost savings to the U.S. to be accrued from
Russian provision of the Functional Cargo Block (FGB in its Russian
language acronym) and an Assured Crew Return Vehicle capability,
was a faulty assumption as far back as 1994. The continuing economic
situation in Russia has also negated most of the $1.5 billion
in schedule savings to be achieved through their involvement.
Russian schedule slippage, due largely to failure of the Russian
government to deliver promised funding, translates directly to
the most recent Service Module schedule slips. With continuing
funding shortfalls carrying into 1998, the absence of any hard
indicators that adequate Russian funding will be provided soon,
and the recent cabinet shake-up in Moscow, it is likely RSA elements
will experience further delays.
The CAV Task Force notes that a diminished level of Russian participation
could significantly alter the current ISS assembly sequence and
final design. Proceeding forward with full knowledge of the past,
present, and to some extent, the future economic environment in
Russia without implementing adequate contingency capabilities
to address likely shortfalls is tantamount to accepting a level
of risk that could drive U.S. costs significantly higher. NASA
contingency plans extending beyond the development of the Interim
Control Module are not reflected in the current budget. The Task
Force believes the level of exposure to increased cost from Russian
delays justifies the funding of additional contingency activities.
Major International Risk Elements
The most significant cost and schedule growth risks identified
relative to International Partner contributions are as follows:
Inadequate funding will likely cause the Service Module schedule
to slip a minimum of four months in addition to the eight months
already acknowledged and incorporated into the Revision C baseline
assembly sequence. Service Module subsystem deliveries are being
affected, and this could result in a day-for-day slip until adequate
funding is supplied. Approximately $45 million dollars in FY 1997
Russian funding are still outstanding, and there are no hard indicators
that adequate Russian funding will be provided any time soon for
FY 1998 and beyond.
Current RSA plans reflect a late 1999 Mir deorbit. This plan,
which calls for deorbit a year later than NASA had desired, foreshadows
a Russian logistics impact to the current ISS assembly sequence.
Russia's demonstrated Progress spacecraft production capacity
and its recent launch rate capability do not support the view
by RSA that it can meet its collective ISS and Mir requirements.
1.3.3 Operations
In the operations timeframe, the ISS Program management believes
it will be able to meet its $1.3 billion annual operations funding
limit. The Task Force believes this level of funding is inadequate
to support the total scope of the technical and operational requirements.
Major Operations Risk Element
The CAV Task Force anticipates that upgrades due to normal wear and tear, obsolescence, and degradation will be required, and additional funding will be necessary to support these needs. This issue is addressed in section 4.3, but it is not quantified. It is noted as an item of significance and one that merits additional in-depth consideration.
1.4 Conclusions
Given the above considerations, the Task Force concludes that
the Program has inadequate funding to cover normal developmental
program growth, ISS cost and schedule risks, and necessary risk
mitigation activities. The ISS will also likely experience a delay
of one to three years in the completion of assembly.
Relative to budget formulation, the Program will likely need
the full level of funding requested in the FY 1999 budget submission
to Congress. The Program should plan for the development schedule
to extend an additional two years with additional funding requirements
of between $130 million and $250 million annually, including the
period beyond Assembly Complete. The specific annual CAV Task
Force funding recommendations are provided in Table 3-3. This
level of funding and schedule extension results in a total assessed
cost of approximately $24.7 billion from the 1994 ISS redesign
through ISS Assembly Complete.
This level of funding should be sufficient to address threats
that are reasonably likely to occur, with several noted exceptions:
it does not cover catastrophic launch vehicle or payload failures,
the withdrawal of an International Partner, or the development
of a U.S. propulsion capability which the Task Force believes
should be factored into an overall Russian contingency strategy.
1.5 Recommendations
1) The present program plan should be revised
so that it is achievable within the financial resources available.
Realistic major milestone dates should be established as the basis
for development of the program plan and internally defined target
dates should be used for execution. If necessary, program content
should be eliminated or deferred to fit within funding constraints.
2) Develop and implement a comprehensive cost and schedule risk
evaluation and mitigation strategy associated with the delivery
of Russian contributions, particularly for the uncertainties associated
with propulsion and logistics capability and the Service Module
delivery.
3) Develop and implement Phase III MEIT to mitigate on-orbit systems
assembly and integration uncertainties.
4) Consider merging the NASA X-38 and the CRV development programs, accelerating the start of the CRV to FY 1999, and increasing the budget by $120 million. The CRV schedule urgency coupled with relatively high levels of technical and budgetary uncertainty support the need to have a seamless transition of experience and learning from the NASA
X-38 Program to the CRV Program.
5) Establish a specific organization and management structure with responsibility for Systems Engineering & Integration (SE&I) efforts, including sustaining engineering. The structure should include both government and contractor personnel from all participants and should be given clear management responsibility, authority and budget to carry out an integrated SE&I plan. NASA should also clearly delineate and document the systems integration responsibilities for which each party is accountable and currently performing.
6) Establish a competitive environment for support contracts,
such as sustaining engineering, in order to reduce overall program
costs.
7) Maintain the current level of research funding. Develop plans
to maximize science utilization on-orbit during schedule stretchout.
8) Institute a system for determination of earned value performance
measurement for the Non-Prime scope of effort. Non-Prime activities
account for 65 percent of the total staffing in 1998 and are growing
as a percentage of work performed. Implementing such a system
would greatly increase the accuracy of status reporting and of
Non-Prime cost and schedule projections.
9) Verify the appropriateness of a flat funding profile for the
operations timeframe of the ISS, specifically assessing how obsolescence-induced
upgrades will be planned and implemented.