[House Hearing, 106 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
U.N. INSPECTIONS OF IRAQ'S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROGRAMS: HAS
SADDAM WON?
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 26, 2000
__________
Serial No. 106-190
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/
international--relations
______
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For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
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COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman
WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa TOM LANTOS, California
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DAN BURTON, Indiana Samoa
ELTON GALLEGLY, California DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
DANA ROHRABACHER, California CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California PAT DANNER, Missouri
PETER T. KING, New York EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio BRAD SHERMAN, California
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
Carolina STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey
MATT SALMON, Arizona JIM DAVIS, Florida
AMO HOUGHTON, New York EARL POMEROY, North Dakota
TOM CAMPBELL, California WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
KEVIN BRADY, Texas BARBARA LEE, California
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania
GEORGE RADANOVICH, California [VACANCY]
JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana
THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado
Richard J. Garon, Chief of Staff
Kathleen Bertelsen Moazed, Democratic Chief of Staff
Stephen G. Rademaker, Chief Counsel
Shennel A. Nagia, Staff Associate
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
WITNESSES
Ambassador Richard Butler, Diplomat in Residence, Council on
Foreign Relations, Executive Chairman of the United Nations
Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM)............................ 3
The Honorable Stephen J. Solarz, Former Representative in
Congress....................................................... 10
APPENDIX
Members' prepared statements:
The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman, a Representative in Congress
from New York, and Chairman, Committee on International
Relations...................................................... 33
Witness prepared statements:
The Honorable Stephen J. Solarz.................................. 34
U.N. INSPECTIONS OF IRAQ'S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROGRAMS: HAS
SADDAM WON?
----------
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, 2000
House of Representatives,
Committee on International Relations,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10 a.m. in Room
2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Chairman Gilman. The Committee on International Relations
meets today to receive testimony from two very distinguished
witnesses about the serious problems our nation continues to
face in dealing with Iraq. I understand Mr. Solarz is tied up
in traffic but is on his way, and he should be here shortly.
Upon the conclusion of this morning's hearing, our
Committee will move directly to mark up a bill that a number of
my colleagues and I introduced yesterday regarding the
possibility of a unilateral declaration of statehood by the
Palestinians. That bill, the Peace Through Negotiations Act of
2000, is intended to underscore our very strong conviction that
such a unilateral declaration would undermine the Middle East
peace process and threaten U.S. national interests in the
region.
But before we go to that issue, we are going to hear about
another serious threat to U.S. interests in the Middle East,
and that is the threat posed by Saddam Hussein and his
continued efforts to thwart international inspections of his
weapons-of-mass-destruction programs. The gravity of the threat
posed by Saddam and the inadequacy of our nation's response to
that threat has been highlighted by three articles that
appeared recently in The Washington Post.
The first article appeared on August 30th, and in that
article it was reported that in late-August our nation joined
with Russia and France and the U.N. Security Council to block
the new U.N. weapons inspection agency for Iraq, UNMOVIC--I
hope I have the correct pronunciation of that--from declaring
it was ready to begin inspections inside Iraq. The story quotes
an unnamed U.N. diplomat as stating: ``The United States and
Russia agreed that it was not appropriate to give the
impression that UNMOVIC was ready to get back into Iraq. They
cautioned that this might create a climate of confrontation at
an inappropriate time.''
If this story is true, the effort to avoid confronting
Saddam over his weapons-of-mass-destruction programs has to be
a low point in U.S. diplomacy toward Iraq. Turning off the
U.N.'s new weapons inspectors at the very moment they were
ready to begin their work can only demoralize the inspectors
and embolden Saddam Hussein.
Indeed, the very next day, on September 1st, The Washington
Post reported: ``The United States is prepared to deploy
Patriot missile-defense batteries to Israel because of growing
fears of a possible attack by Iraq.'' Clearly, the
Administration has reason to believe that Saddam was thinking
about climbing out of the box in which they claimed to have put
him in.
In the third article, on September 18th, The Washington
Post reported that Secretary of Defense William Cohen had
warned Saddam Hussein against renewed aggression after Iraq
publicly accused Kuwait of siphoning oil from Iraqi oil fields
and flew an Iraqi fighter jet across Saudi Arabian air space
for the first time in a decade.
These actions by Saddam are reminiscent of his actions
leading up to the Gulf War in 1990, and Secretary Cohen was
right to issue his warning. The question for us today,
therefore, is, why has Saddam chosen this moment to resort to
some of his old habits?
Here to help us make sense on these developments are two
very distinguished observers of events in Iraq. Ambassador
Richard Butler has direct experience dealing with Saddam
Hussein as the executive director of the predecessor
organization to UNMOVIC, the U.N. Special Commission on Iraq,
or UNSCOM, from 1997 to 1999. Prior to that, he was a career
diplomat in the Australian Foreign Service, where he served as
Australia's ambassador to the United Nations, ambassador for
disarmament, and ambassador to Thailand, among other posts.
Ambassador Butler is now with the Council on Foreign
Relations in New York, and we are especially eager to hear his
assessment of where Iraq stands today on matters of
disarmament, and what the actions taken by the Security Council
last month with regard to UNMOVIC mean for the likely success
of that organization.
Joining Ambassador Butler will be one of our former
colleagues and a friend to all of us on the Committee, Mr.
Solarz. He served nine terms in the House as a Democrat
representing the State of New York and at various times Chaired
our Subcommittees on Asia and Pacific and on Africa. Since
leaving the Congress he has remained deeply engaged in foreign-
policy issues, taking a special interest in the subject of
Iraq, and I am pleased that he will be with us again.
We will hear first from Ambassador Butler, but before
recognizing him, permit me to turn to our Ranking Democratic
Member, the gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Gejdenson, for any
opening remarks.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gilman is available in the
appendix.]
Mr. Gejdenson. Mr. Chairman, thank you. It should not be a
surprise that Saddam Hussein is making his quadrennial
appearances to coincide with America's elections, hoping that
the diversion of our political process may give him an
opportunity for additional mischief. I think if he thinks that
is the case, he is making a terrible mistake because while I
think we will not be initiating a new policy at this stage in
our presidential term, it is clear the United States will not
allow Saddam Hussein to make any militarily aggressive actions
in the region.
For the future, it is a more complicated situation. I
think, one, we have to have a policy based in reality and it is
highly unlikely, from my perspective, that people who spend
their days in the hotels of London and France are going to lead
a revolution to overthrow Saddam militarily. It is also clear
that the West will not provide the military force to replace
Saddam at this time, just as the Bush Administration decided at
the end of the Gulf War not to try to remove him militarily.
I think also we have to understand that particularly the
French and the Russians, sitting on a tremendous debt that the
Iraqis owe them, tens of billions of dollars, have an
additional incentive for engagement with Iraq. Iraq's Arab
neighbors, even though I think most of them understand that
Saddam manipulates the food supplies for his own political
benefit, find themselves in a difficult situation as Iraqi
children and others are affected by his policies, which he
blames on the embargo. It is my understanding that Iraq has
somewhere in the range of $10 billion in its humanitarian
account that it could spend for food, but we know the games
that he is up to.
And I think for us in the United States, what we have to do
is, one, figure out a policy that we can get broad
international support for, that we cannot lose sight of the
fact that this is an individual who would still like to have
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and the missiles to
deliver them to neighbors and others around the world. And so
it is not a simple task, but it is one that is going to take
coordination with our allies and a sustained effort, and I
thank the Chairman for holding this important hearing and look
forward to hearing from both of our panelists.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Gejdenson. Any other
Members seeking recognition? If not, Mr. Butler, Ambassador
Butler, please proceed.
STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR RICHARD BUTLER, DIPLOMAT IN RESIDENCE,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN OF THE UNITED
NATIONS SPECIAL COMMISSION ON IRAQ [UNSCOM]
Ambassador Butler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am honored
and grateful to you for inviting me to be here today to address
what you and Mr. Gejdenson have just recognized as a serious
and continuing problem.
In my opening remarks I would propose to deal relatively
briefly with three. The first of those is, what is the present
situation, and how did we get there; the second is, what are
its visible consequences; and, thirdly, what we might do to
correct this situation.
First, the present situation and how did we get there. On
the present situation, the simplest way of putting it is this:
Saddam Hussein is still there. He remains determined to retain
and develop a weapons-of-mass- destruction capability. He has
been without the presence in his country of United Nations or
international weapons inspectors, and the effort to disarm him
of the weapons he created in the past has ended. That has been
the situation for 2 years, and all of the evidence at our
disposal, although that evidence, because of the absence of
international presence in Iraq, is somewhat inadequate, all of
the evidence suggests strongly that he is back in the business
of making, reacquiring, weapons-of-mass-destruction capability.
That, in a nutshell, is the present situation, and it goes
without saying, it is a deeply disturbing, if not threatening,
situation. Now, how on earth did we get there, when so much
effort, so much time, so much money, was devoted over the last
10 years toward achieving exactly the opposite result?
Now, the answer to that question, Mr. Chairman, is
necessarily a complicated and detailed one, but I am sure all
of those present have a good degree of familiarity with it, so
let me get to what I consider to be the two central elements in
answers to the question, how did we get into this dreadful
situation?
First, it is this: As pressure grew in 1998 toward some
kind of end to the situation of recurrent crises with Iraq and,
indeed, some end to the sanctions that have delivered
considerable harm not to the regime, but to ordinary Iraqis, I
took, with the approval of the security council, I took to
Baghdad, in June 1998, a final list of remaining disarmament
requirements, the materials and information that we needed in
the missile, chemical, and biological area in order to be in a
position to say to the security council that we had gotten the
best possible account of Iraq's existing weapons-of-mass-
destruction capability.
Note, Mr. Chairman, I am not saying that I would have been
able to say to the council with absolute certainty that Iraq is
disarmed, but that I hoped to be able to say to the council,
the security council, that we had the fullest, most complete,
best-possible account of the missiles, chemical and biological
weapons for which I was responsible that it was possible to put
together.
I made very clear in Baghdad, sitting across the table from
Saddam's assistants, in particular, Tarik Aziz, the deputy
prime minister of Iraq, I made clear to him that my short list
was a list of the necessary conditions for being in a position
to so report to the security council that we had an accurate
account of Iraq's past weapons. I drew a distinction between
the necessary conditions and the sufficient conditions. If the
former were to become the latter, it would only be as a
consequence of Iraq yielding to us the materials and weapons
that were on my list. The quality of their answers and
cooperation would be everything, and that was well understood.
Tarik Aziz told me in June that Iraq would cooperate in
seeking to bring that list of materials to proper account, and
he said to me, come back to Baghdad 6 weeks from now, and we
will render that final account. I did so, having in the interim
put to work all of the resources of UNSCOM in every field of
weaponry, with intensive inspections, visits, and inquiries of
Iraqi officials. But it became clear very quickly in the 6
weeks that was to be set aside for this work that Iraq was once
again refusing to give us the materials and weapons we
required, even on this relatively shortened list. And when I
got to Baghdad, as requested by Aziz in August 1998, to try to
bring that list to final account, he made clear to me that he
was well aware that Iraq had refused to give us the materials
we required, had refused to cooperate.
Chairman Gilman. Who was that?
Ambassador Butler. Tarik Aziz. He made clear that he was
well aware of that, and he said instead not only would he not
give us those materials, but that our disarmament work was
ended. And he placed a demand upon me to return to the security
council and declare Iraq disarmed, irrespective of the fact
that he had failed--that Iraq had failed to give us the
required materials.
I refused to comply with his request. I said, I will not do
what you ask me because I cannot because you have failed to
give me the weapons and materials required. And he then
declared UNSCOM's work over and shut down any further attempt
by the international community to disarm Iraq and, possibly
even more importantly, shut down our monitoring of ongoing
Iraqi manufacturing activities in the field of weapons of mass
destruction. Now, that was Iraq's decision, and that produced
the situation that we have faced for the subsequent 2 years.
But the second point I want to make under this heading of
how did we get to where we are arises through my posing the
question, why did Iraq do this? What made it think that it
could get away with this? What was its thinking leading to this
pattern of behavior? And the answer there is distressingly
simple. Iraq felt that it could get away with this because it
knew that it would have support from amongst certain permanent
members of the security council, in particular, Russia, and to
some extent, France and China. And it knew that under
circumstances where the security council was divided on
implementing its own laws with respect to Iraq, that it would
be able to get away with the position that it had adopted.
That should not, however, mask, Mr. Chairman, its
functional motivation in rejecting the list that I had given
it, and that motivation was driven by the fact that the list
was right. If we had actually gotten the materials that were on
that list, we would have effectively rendered final account of
Iraq's existing weapons-of-mass-destruction systems. And it was
because Iraq wanted to retain those systems that it refused to
comply with the request I put to it to yield remaining
materials in the missiles, chemical and biological weapons
area.
So, to sum this up, 2 years without further disarmament
work, no monitoring of ongoing efforts to create new weapons,
decisions taken by Iraq because of their functional wish to
retain weapons capability, and able to be taken by Iraq because
they knew they had support from amongst permanent members of
the security council.
Now, my second heading: What are the consequences of this?
I will mention quickly four things. One, in the interim period
Iraq has clearly embarked again on the business of making more
weapons of mass destruction. We cannot know exactly the orders
of magnitude involved because we are not there. That is the
inner logic of inspections and monitoring: You cannot know
exactly what you cannot see.
But evidence available to the United States Government, to
others, evidence which I have seen, although I am sure not all
of that available, evidence available strongly suggests this:
Iraq is back in the business of seeking to extend the range of
its missiles beyond the legal limit of the 150-kilometer range.
Secondly, Iraq has recalled its nuclear-weapons design
team. And I remind the Committee that when the work of that
team was stopped in 1991, they were 6 months away from
producing a nuclear explosive device. They know how to make an
atomic bomb. The only thing they have lacked in the past is the
required, special, fissionable material. And today that raises
the question of where they may be able to acquire that
material, including from black-market sources. So they are back
in the business of extending their missiles. They have recalled
their nuclear-weapons design team.
They have, thirdly, rebuilt their chemical-warfare
factories, and the same is true of their biological-warfare
factories. They are simply back in business.
Secondly, the sanctions that were applied to Iraq in the
first instance to seek to oblige their compliance with the
council's decision that they should withdraw from Kuwait, but
then more importantly, in 1991 those sanctions were tied
specifically after they were expelled from Kuwait; those
sanctions were tied specifically to the meeting of disarmament
and monitoring requirements. Those sanctions are crumbling.
Those sanctions are not doing their intended job.
It follows from the first point I have made. Iraq is back
in the business of making the prohibited weapons, even though
sanctions legally remain. But we see evidence all around that
those sanctions are not doing their job. They are crumbling and
being challenged daily, including by permanent members of the
security council and, quite literally, largely through a black
market, but not exclusively, partly through siphoning off food
and medicines made available to Iraq under U.N. sanctions.
The Iraqi regime is now literally awash with money, and
this is facilitating their work on weapons of mass destruction.
The sanctions instrument is no longer effective. Its only
consequence today is not to do any harm to the regime or its
weapons intentions; its only consequence today is to continue
to do insupportable harm to innocent, ordinary Iraqis.
My third point is that this unhappy passage of events
within the security council is causing its authority to
crumble.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Butler, Ambassador Butler, I regret
that we have to recess. We are being called to the floor. We
have just a few minutes, and we will return very quickly. The
Committee stands in recess.
[Whereupon, at 10:25 a.m., the Committee recessed, and
reconvened at 10:41 a.m. the same day.]
Chairman Gilman. The Committee will come to order. I
apologize for the interruption. Ambassador Butler, please
proceed.
Ambassador Butler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was dealing
with the second part of my presentation to the Committee, that
is, the consequences of the present circumstances. I mentioned
that Iraq is back in business of making weapons of mass
destruction and seeking to extend their holdings of those
weapons. I had said that sanctions are not doing the job that
they were supposed to be doing, that they are, in fact,
crumbling. In the discussion period I am sure there will be
more on that subject, so I might just leave that subject in the
interest of time and move on.
I had said that the third consequence is the destruction of
the authority of the security council. This is a very serious
matter. It is easy to find cynics or skeptics about the
security council on a whole range of subjects. It is very easy
to list the widely regarded failures of the security council
over the last decade of the post-Cold War period in Africa, in
the Balkans, and so on.
But all that aside, there is something very deeply
important about the security council, which is that it is the
supreme, international body charged with the maintenance and
security, and under the charter of the U.N. its decisions are
binding in international law. This is a very carefully crafted
structure, crafted in San Francisco, after the defeat of Hitler
and his allies, very carefully put together. And when it works
properly, it has great value to the world, but it relies
essentially on the preservation of its own authority. That
authority has been challenged root and branch by the dictator
of Iraq, and the council seems to be not meeting that
challenge. I think that has profound consequences in a whole
range of fields, and it should be deeply disturbing.
Finally, the force of the consequences I want to highlight
is the implementation of Saddam's behavior for the credibility
and security of the weapons-of-mass-destruction
nonproliferation-treaty regimes. Now, this Administration and
its predecessor, in fact, all United States Administrations I
can recall in the nuclear age, for example, have said that they
place great reliance on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty,
which in some ways is the jewel in the crown treaties on the
nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. But there is
also now the modern Chemical Weapons Convention. There is a
Missile Technology Control Regime, the Biological Weapons
Convention. I could go on.
This tapestry of treaties, at root, relies upon the ability
of members of the treaties to believe that violations will be
detected, and where necessary, the terms of the treaty will be
enforced. And interestingly, Mr. Chairman, in virtually all
cases under these treaties what is the enforcement mechanism?
Who is the policeman on the block here? The answer is the same
body, the security council.
If the security council fails in this instance from that
very, very serious challenge waged by Saddam, then I contend,
and I think there is evidence already for this phenomenon, I
contend that the credibility of the treaties themselves will be
severely challenged in other parts of the world. And I do not
think that is in the interest of this country or any country
concerned to ensure to future generations that we do not live
in a world awash with weapons of mass destruction or, indeed, a
world in which terrorists can have ready access or any access
to weapons of mass destruction.
Now, Mr. Chairman, I will turn quickly to my last heading,
which is, what to do about it. I am going to speak on the two
things in very practical terms. As will be evident from my
remarks, the problem lies, first and foremost, in the security
council. It seems to me that sound, future policy by the United
States would give priority attention to action by it to bring
about a new consensus within the security council amongst
permanent members with respect to the problems posed by Saddam
Hussein, the maintenance of the authority of the council as the
key body in this field, and with respect to the maintenance of
the credibility of the treaties on nonproliferation.
This must mean, first and foremost, that the Administration
must make clear to Russia that its newly embarked-upon policy,
redolent of the Cold War period of client statism, its newly
embarked-upon policy of giving support and comfort to regimes
such as the Saddam regime, is simply not acceptable, not
acceptable to the United States as a nation and not acceptable
as behavior fitting to a permanent member of the security
council.
This is a tough call, but I believe deeply it is one that
must be made. The Administration has said there are red lines
with respect to Saddam Hussein. Madeleine Albright, Secretary
Albright, said recently the United States would the not use
force to bring about a restoration under UNMOVIC of arms-
control inspection and monitoring. Now, she said, however,
there are red lines which may change position. If Iraq
reinvaded Kuwait or made a move on a neighbor, if Iraq
threatened the Kurds, or if Iraq was seen to be developing
serious weapons of mass destruction, could I say, as an aside,
I wonder how we are going to know that without inspections? Are
they going to send us a telegram saying we are developing
weapons of mass destruction?
But leaving that aside, there are three stated United
States red lines. Mr. Chairman, where is the fourth red line?
Where is the red line that says we will not tolerate from
permanent members of the security council a departure from
their responsibility to enforce their own law to maintain
nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and instead to
pursue what they consider to be their narrow and national
interests, whether, as you pointed out, it is based on the
money they think Iraq owes them or some notion of wanting to
twist the United States' tail, now that it is the sole
superpower, or whatever reasoning? It seems to me this should
be another red line, that it should be made clear to permanent
members of the security council that there is a duty that all
share to see that the law is obeyed. I do not think that task
has been adequately pursued, and that is my first
recommendation.
Now, secondly, with respect to sanctions, as I said
earlier, they clearly do not work or get the job done in their
present form. Let us be clear, Mr. Chairman, as we discuss
sanctions, who is responsible for them. There is a lot of talk
of goodwill, well-intentioned people that say the security
council is responsible for them, that we in the West are
somehow using sanctions as our own weapons of mass destruction
against the ordinary Iraqi people.
I reject that contention because it ignores the functional
responsibility that is held for sanctions, and that is held by
none other than Saddam Hussein. He has always had the ability
to see sanctions relieved by simply handing over the weapons as
the law required. Had that been done, it would have been my
duty to say immediately to the security council it is over, and
the council is pledged under its own law to then remove
sanctions.
So let us be clear about whose responsibility it is. And
when it gets down to the actual impact of sanctions on ordinary
Iraqis, let us be clear, too, that a portion of that impact
derives from Saddam's own manipulation of the food and
medicines that are supplied to Iraq. In the one part of Iraq
where his rule does not prevail, but which is provided with
food and medicine under the oil-for-food arrangements, namely,
in the Kurdish North, their standard of nourishment, their
standard of infant mortality, et cetera, their overall living
conditions are very considerably better than in the parts of
Iraq where Saddam is fully in control, and that tells its own
story. But having made those points about the real reason for
sanctions having the impact that they do on ordinary Iraqis,
let me say that I do believe that the sanction instrument,
because it is not doing its job, needs to be reviewed.
Mr. Chairman, this is not a commercial, but let me say, I
have written a book on my experience in dealing with Iraq, and
it is called The Greatest Threat, and that refers to the
weapons involved. But the subheading is Iraq: Weapons of Mass
Destruction and the Crisis of Global Security.
Now, Mr. Chairman, I do not know what else to call it but a
crisis. One of the main instruments of the security council is
sanctions. That is the main, nonmilitary instrument to bring
about compliance with the law. It is not working. The security
council's ability to enforce the law under Article 42 of the
charter by military means is clearly out of the question, given
the state of affairs in the security council. I do not know
what to call that, Mr. Chairman, other than a crisis in the
collective management of global security.
But with respect to the sanctions part of that, I believe,
and this is my second recommendation, and last, I believe the
United States should raise with the security council the
question of how to adjust sanctions on Iraq to ensure that they
target the leadership and that they continue to present the
importation of military goods into Iraq and relieve, as it
were, as far as possible, ordinary Iraqis from, the domestic
civil sector, from the impact of sanctions. It should not be
beyond our wit to design targeted sanctions of that kind.
I do not suggest that that is a panacea because, sadly, I
believe it is entirely possible that if the Russians got what
they want tomorrow and that sanctions were removed in toto,
taken away completely, that the idea that you would see an
immediate increase in the welfare of ordinary Iraqis would be
fulfilled. I strongly doubt that that would occur. I think
Saddam would say our first task now is to rebuild the nation,
meaning the military. And that is why I say a correct approach
to get out of this crisis of security management and make
sanctions do whatever job they can better would be to insist
that they remain targeted on the importation of military goods.
Now, in my final remark, let me say something that is not
widely understood. In such a new sanctions regime it would be
crucial that a part of the package would be that Iraq would
have to accept the restoration of monitoring on its weapons-
related industries. And what is not widely known today, Mr.
Chairman, is that the present circumstances are worse than
dreadful because not only is Iraq defying the law and
preventing the monitoring system that we had built over 8 years
from doing its job, but under this present situation of stand-
off Iraq is not even accepting the regular inspections that it
is supposed to have under the treaties of which it is a
partner, namely, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty or the
Chemical Weapons Convention, which it has not ratified but
which does provide for an inspection of chemical-related
facilities.
So I say that as a footnote because actually it
demonstrates that the circumstances we face are even, as I
said, worse than dreadful, in that the regular inspections, let
alone the special ones, are now not taking place in Iraq.
So there are my two proposals, Mr. Chairman, one within the
hard-edged context of relations amongst the permanent members
of the security council where I believe the United States must
stand up and demand correct behavior, and the other, a new look
at sanctions to ensure that they do their real job. The sharp
end of the stick there must be to prevent importation of
military-related goods. And there are my two proposals. I thank
you for your attention.
Chairman Gilman. Well, thank you, Ambassador Butler, for
your very eloquent analysis of what we are faced with, and it
certainly is a crisis.
We are now pleased to recognize and to welcome back to our
Committee a former Congressman, Steve Solarz, who served nine
terms in the House and represented the State of New York and at
various times Chaired our Subcommittees on Asia and Pacific and
on Africa. And since leaving the Congress he has remained
deeply engaged in foreign-policy issues, taking a special
interest in the subject of Iraq. It is a pleasure to welcome
you back, Mr. Solarz. Please proceed.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE STEPHEN J. SOLARZ, FORMER
REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS
Mr. Solarz. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is good
to be back before this Committee, although I must say, if I had
my druthers, I would probably prefer to be on the other side of
the witness table. Nevertheless, it is good to be with you and
some of my old friends on the Committee.
I also consider it an honor to be asked to testify together
with Ambassador Butler whose book on his experiences dealing
with the effort to eliminate weapons of mass destruction in
Iraq I have read and which I heartily commend to you. It is an
extremely persuasive indictment of the mendacity and duplicity
of Iraq in attempting to cover up its weapons-of-mass-
destruction program, of the shamelessness of several members of
the security council that appear more interested in getting
sanctions lifted against Iraq so they can continue to do
business with it than they are in forcing Iraq to disgorge its
weapons of mass destruction, and of the Fecklessness of the
U.N. bureaucracy, which is clearly more interested in avoiding
controversy than in seeking the implementation of relevant,
security-council resolutions against Iraq.
Mr. Chairman, before I go any further, let me just say for
the record so there should be no misunderstanding, as I think
you know, I have been engaged by the government of Turkey,
together with some of my other former colleagues, to represent
its interests here in Washington, and I want to say that my
testimony today reflects purely my own views about the
situation in Iraq and what we ought to do about it, and I have
neither vetted my testimony with any officials of the Turkish
government, nor did I have any intention of doing so. I speak
today solely for myself.
Ambassador Butler has explained at length how we got where
we are. I want to focus my testimony on what we should do about
it. I think that the continued existence of an unrepented and
unreconstructed Baathist regime in Iraq, which is presumptively
reconstituting its inventory of weapons of mass destruction,
poses two fundamental questions for American policy. First, to
what extent does this constitute an unacceptable threat to
vital American interests; and secondly, what should we do about
it?
The answer to the first question, I think, is very clear.
The butcher of Baghdad, who remains in power 10 years after
Desert Storm, long after George Bush and Margaret Thatcher are
out of power, and Francois Mitterrand and Hafiz Al-Assad are
dead, is clearly biding his time, waiting for an opportune
moment to wreak vengeance against those who were responsible
for thwarting his hegemonic ambitions in the past and who are
presumably prepared to thwart them in the future.
Indeed, as we meet, threats are emanating almost daily from
Baghdad against Kuwait and other countries in the region,
strikingly reminiscent of the threats which the Mesopotamian
megalomaniac was hurling a decade ago before the invasion of
Kuwait. We must not forget that this is a man who has gone to
war twice in the last decade, first against Iran and then
against Kuwait, and who has used weapons of mass destruction
not only against his enemies, but against his own people as
well.
To believe under these circumstances that Saddam Hussein
does not pose a very serious threat to vital American
interests, it seems to me, would be the height of naivety. The
more difficult question is, what realistically can be done
about it?
Recognizing the extent to which Saddam does pose a serious
threat to the United States, both the Congress and the
executive branch of our government have embraced the Iraq
Liberation Act, which was passed to a large extent due to your
leadership, Mr. Chairman, and which is based on the notion that
the best way to protect our interests vis-a-vis Iraq is to work
for the destabilization and eventual overthrow of the regime.
The Iraq Liberation Act, as you know, calls for the
disbursement of up to $97 million in excess military equipment
to the Iraqi opposition, and it is premised on the
incontestable proposition that a peaceful transition from a
malign dictatorship to a benign democracy in a country like
Iraq is a political oxymoron. And it was also based on the
assumption that to wait for a military coup in a country whose
military is riddled by several secret services, where you have
a leader who does not hesitate to tortue and execute anyone he
even suspects of conspiring against him is to put our faith in
miracles.
Yet 2 years after the passage of this historic legislation
not a single bullet has been transferred to the Iraqi
opposition. It is true, to be sure, that we have provided fax
machines and computers to the Iraqi National Congress, but I
would suggest that the transfer of office equipment, no matter
how sophisticated it may be, is unlikely to either discomfort
or depose Mr. Hussein. I think it is fairly clear that, despite
his rhetorical embrace of the Iraq Liberation Act, President
Clinton appears to have no intention of utilizing the authority
contained in this legislation to provide the arms and military
training to those Iraqis who are willing to lay their lives on
the line for the freedom of their country.
Much will depend on the willingness of the next
Administration to implement this legislation, but it will also
depend, and I think it is very important for us to recognize
this, on the cooperation of those countries which are
contiguous to Iraq, such as Turkey, Jordan, and Kuwait, to
provide the sanctuaries and to facilitate the flow of arms
without which the Iraq Liberation Act would be a dead letter
and without which the prospect for an effective, indigenous
opposition to the Baathist regime in Baghdad will remain an
illusion rather than a reality.
Right now, the truth is that none of the countries
territorially contiguous to Iraq are prepared to provide the
kind of cooperation the implementation of the ILA would
require. In the absence of a convincing demonstration by the
United States that we are determined to bring Saddam down and
that we will, if necessary, be prepared to use American
military power, including ground forces, if necessary, to
achieve this objective, I do not think that we can
realistically expect the cooperation of the contiguous
countries because they have little faith in the ability of the
Iraqi opposition on their own to achieve this objective, and
they do not want to put themselves in a position where they are
further exposed to the wrath of Saddam Hussein without being
reasonably confident that this effort will succeed in bringing
him down.
I should also add that if there is going to be any hope in
securing the cooperation of the contiguous countries, it will
be essential first to induce the Iraqi opposition to reaffirm
its commitment to a unified [albeit federal] Iraq, and to make
it clear that as a matter of functional policy the United
States would oppose the establishment of a separate Kurdish
state in northern Iraq or a separate Shia state in southern
Iraq.
I think we need to recognize, Mr. Chairman and Members of
the Committee, that right now, by virtue of the fact that we
have a declared policy of attempting to bring down the regime
in Iraq but lack a concrete policy with any credible prospect
of achieving that objective, that we are paying a very heavy
price in terms of our credibility in the region. Credibility,
after all, is the coin in which great powers conduct their
affairs, and our ability to persuade other countries,
particularly in the Middle East, to act in ways that promote
our values and protect our interests depends on the extent to
which they have faith in the credibility of our commitments and
the seriousness of our threats.
When we declare as a matter of policy that we want to bring
the regime in Baghdad down but do not do anything to
practically achieve that objective, I think we inevitably
diminish our credibility and will end up paying a very heavy
price for it.
Now, the Administration has argued that were we to provide
military assistance to the Iraqi opposition, that we would
simply be inviting ``another Bay of Pigs'' for which we would
be held morally responsible. And I can only say, Mr. Chairman,
that if this were the criteria which we had used in the 1980's
before deciding whether to provide assistance to the Mujahadin
in Afghanistan or the Contras in Nicaragua or the noncommunist
resistance in Cambodia or UNITA in Angola, we never would have
helped any of those indigenous movements either.
I believe we ought to be prepared to provide air cover and
air support for an indigenous Iraqi opposition, and I think we
also, if necessary, ought to be prepared to use our own ground
forces because, unless we are prepared to do that, we are never
going to get the cooperation which will enable us to help the
indigenous Iraqi opposition. But even if we were not prepared
to provide that kind of assistance, the moral responsibility
for whatever casualties might result from an opposition to
which we provided military assistance rests with the men and
women who are willing on their own initiative to take up arms
for the freedom of their own country.
Now, our current policy, which is apparently based on the
belief that even if Saddam does reconstitute his weapons of
mass destruction, we can keep him in his box, as the secretary
of state has said, because of the threat of retaliation if he
uses his weapons of mass destruction or even conventional
military power alone, seems to me based on a number of very
dubious assumptions. For one thing, it is very clear the
existing sanctions regime is utterly unraveling. Russia and
France and now India are talking about resuming flights to
Iraq.
It is obvious from Ambassador Butler's testimony that
Saddam is reconstituting his weapons. We know Saddam is capable
of massive miscalculations, and I think to rest on the
assumption that he will continue to be deterred in the future
is to put our faith in wishful thinking.
So I think Saddam does pose a serious threat to vital
American interests. Some of you may recall that 3 years ago
Secretary of Defense Cohen appeared on national television and
held up a five-pound bag of sugar and said, if this was filled
with anthrax, it could kill half the people in Washington, DC.
I think this is a threat which the American people can
understand and to which, with forceful presidential leadership,
they can respond.
I realize that from a political point of view it would be
almost impossible right now to muster the support in the
Congress and the country that would be needed for the
reintroduction of American military power in the Persian Gulf
for the purpose of bringing Saddam down in collaboration with
the Iraqi resistance and whatever members of the coalition were
willing to join with us in a renewed effort to eliminate this
threat to the peace and stability of the region.
But I am convinced that if and when we obtain hard
evidence, and I assume that sooner or later we will, that
Saddam is reconstituting his weapons of mass destruction, which
there is every reason to believe he is doing, that at that
point if the president went to the Congress and the country,
showed them the evidence that we have, that it would be
possible to muster the political support which would be
necessary for such an endeavor.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I think that both the Congress and
the next Administration will have to confront some very hard
realities. If, in fact, we believe, as I do, that the only way
to stop the Iraqi regime from rebuilding its weapons of mass
destruction is to remove the regime that is producing them,
because it is obvious they have no intention of permitting U.N.
inspectors back in under circumstances where they can really do
their job, then in order to achieve that objective, we have to
understand that it cannot be done on the cheap.
The Iraq Liberation Act, which I strongly support and which
I commend you for adopting, can only be effectively implemented
with the cooperation of other countries in the region, and that
cooperation can only be obtained if we are prepared to put our
military where our mouth is. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Solarz is available in the
appendix.]
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Solarz, and thank you,
Ambassador Butler, for your extensive analysis of this very
critical issue.
Let us proceed now with some of the questions. Ambassador
Butler, do you believe that Saddam has used the nearly 2 years
that the U.N. weapons inspectors have been out of Iraq to begin
reconstituting the weapons of mass destruction, and which of
those weapons programs should we be especially concerned about?
Ambassador Butler. Mr. Chairman, I do believe that he has
used this 2 years to that effect. In thinking about this, I
must say I am reminded of the classic test that is put when
someone is alleged to have committed a crime such as murder:
Did the person have the motive, the means, and the opportunity?
Well, Mr. Chairman, the motives of Saddam Hussein have always
been abundantly plain, and they have not changed.
May I say, I strongly support for this reason the moves
that are now afoot to have him indicted as a person who has
committed crimes against humanity?
Secondly, the means. The means are well established. They
know very well how to make an atomic bomb. They know very well
how to make their missiles breach the limit and fly longer. In
the last technical conversation I had in Baghdad it was about
precisely that. I asked the minister in charge of missiles to
stop illegal work that they were then commencing to create
virtually new Scuds, and he said, we will not.
And there is evidence that they have been about that
business in these 2 years, and the United States Administration
has itself put into the public arena that it has observed from
the sky the reconstruction of Iraq's chemical and biological
weapons plants. You cannot know exactly what is happening
inside those buildings unless you can be on the ground. Again,
that is the logic of inspections.
So, the third condition, motive, means, and now
opportunity, has been deliciously filled for him by 2 years'
freedom from inspection or monitoring and finally, given his
track record of use of these weapons, there is a saying that
says Saddam has never had a weapon that he did not use,
including on his own people. I deeply believe, Mr. Chairman,
the answer to your question is yes, and it would be utter folly
for us to assume anything else.
Chairman Gilman. Ambassador Butler, you recall that in 1998
there were suspicions here in the Congress that the
Administration was urging UNSCOM to proceed cautiously in
dealing with Iraq and was counseling you to avoid
confrontations with Saddam over his obstruction of UNSCOM
inspections. Were those suspicions well founded, and were you
being restrained at all by our own nation?
Ambassador Butler. No. They were not well founded, and I
was not so restrained. As Executive Chairman of the commission,
it was my responsibility to determine what objects should be
inspected when and by what teams and using what methods. I
occasionally sought counsel from a number of members of the
security council.
Bear in mind, I worked for the council, not for Kofi Annan,
not for the secretary general of the U.N. I was the head of a
suborgan of the security council, a unique position, so I
sought counsel from a number of members of the security council
on an informal basis as I did my work, and very often I found
their advice and views helpful.
Sometimes I profoundly disagreed with them, including with
views put forward by the United States. But I want to say this
on the record: At no stage did I ever feel that the United
States' representatives crossed the line that they should not
have crossed between having the right to put their views to me
and, on the other hand, accepting my unique responsibility for
making the operational decisions, and those are the facts.
Chairman Gilman. Do you see any parallels between your
experiences with the Administration in 1998 and what the press
tells us the Administration is now doing to UNMOVIC?
Ambassador Butler. Mr. Chairman, that question lacks a
little bit of specificity. When you say ``what the press tells
us,'' there have been various press reports, but I mean that
respectfully. We could talk at great length about this.
Chairman Gilman. Well, the contention is that they are
holding back UNMOVIC's movements forward.
Ambassador Butler. I have been concerned about a number of
aspects of UNMOVIC. First, it has been given the right mandate,
that is, to--UNMOVIC has the right mandate. It has been told to
bring to final account the weapons of the past and to construct
a new, comprehensive monitoring system.
By the way, Mr. Chairman, that bringing to account the
weapons of the past is exactly the same list as the one I gave
to Iraq in June 1998. It is still there. Now, but that is where
the similarities between UNMOVIC and the operation I led end.
It has the same mandate, but nothing else is the same. It has a
different political responsibility. The head of UNMOVIC works
for the secretary general. I did not. I worked under the
security council. He has less independence. He is not able to
recruit staff in an independent way as I did. He is much more
subject to continual riding of shotgun on him, political
direction, by members of the security council, and in that
context I call attention to this.
Again, something that has been overlooked, and I want to
put it on the record: On the 14th of April, last year--sorry--
14th of April 2000, the Russian ambassador wrote a letter to
the security council saying, we may have agreed to UNMOVIC
getting under way, but we tell you--this is in writing--look it
up--we tell you that we will not approve of any arms-control or
monitoring arrangements of which Iraq does not approve. That
sounded to me awfully like a Russian letter putting the fox in
charge of the chicken coop. That is not the way we operated
under UNSCOM.
So I have grave doubts that if Iraq changes its present
position and lets UNMOVIC into Iraq, that it will be permitted
to do anything like a satisfactory job. That is not to say a
disrespectful word to Dr. Hans Bleeks or his staff. I think
they are professionals. They would want to do a good job, but
whether Iraq and some of the members of the security council
will allow them to do so is another matter.
Finally, there was a report--this gets to the core of your
question, Mr. Chairman--there was a report that Dr. Bleeks, the
head of the new organization, had drafted a report to the
security council saying that he was ready to commence
inspections but that within a small private meeting of the
commission of advisers he had been asked to amend that and slow
it down and that the United States representative present that
day had not objected to that position as advanced by Russia,
France, and China.
I was not present during that meeting, and I do not know if
those media reports on that are a fair representation of what
happened. You will have to ask the Administration about that,
but that is what I think you were referring to. But I do know
this, that last Friday, when the security council, in full
session, took Dr. Bleek's report that indicated in this
modified version that he was more or less ready to start, there
was a resounding silence. Where was the council saying good and
turning to Iraq and saying, ``He is ready. Are you?'' Not a
word. And I think that is a matter of grave concern.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Butler is available in the
appendix.]
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Ambassador Butler. One more
question of you: To the best of your knowledge, is Saddam
developing viral agents that would be weapons capable?
Ambassador Butler. Viral agents? You said V-I-R-A-L?
Chairman Gilman. Yes.
Ambassador Butler. I do not know that degree of detail
today. I will rest on what I said earlier. What we have known
of the past and we know of is motive means an opportunity. It
would be folly to assume that he is not doing just that.
Chairman Gilman. And, Mr. Solarz, has the Clinton
Administration been serious about its professed policy toward
Iraq of regime change?
Mr. Solarz. No. I do not think it has, but let me say that
I am not convinced that the Congress has been fully serious
either, in the sense that it did adopt the Iraq Liberation Act,
for which I applaud the Congress and particularly those on this
Committee, like yourself, Mr. Chairman, who supported it. But I
do not think there has been a real appreciation on the part of
the Congress and those who support the Iraq Liberation Act,
that this cannot possibly be achieved without the cooperation
of countries like Kuwait, Turkey, and Jordan, who are very
dubious about the ability of the Iraqi opposition to achieve
this on their own and who will only be willing to cooperate if
the United States makes it clear that we are serious about this
and we are in it all the way, and that we will do whatever
needs to be done to succeed, including the use of American
military power and even of American ground forces, if that is
necessary. And if we are not prepared to do that, then I think
there is little hope of----
Chairman Gilman. And if that is demonstrated, do you think
that those countries, Kuwait, Jordan, Turkey, would agree to
support this policy?
Mr. Solarz. I certainly think at least one of them would,
Kuwait. I would hope the others would also. I would put it this
way. I think that a demonstration of our resolve is an
absolutely necessary condition for securing their cooperation.
I think there is a reasonably good chance they would cooperate,
but without that demonstration of resolve, there is no hope
whatsoever.
Chairman Gilman. Well, I want to thank both of our
panelists for focusing attention on this critical issue. Mr.
Gejdenson.
Mr. Gejdenson. Thank you. Mr. Solarz, there is nobody in
this town or any other town that I respect more for their
knowledge and ability to articulate a message. There is no one
whose knowledge of foreign policy that I have greater respect
for.
Mr. Solarz. I am getting nervous now.
Mr. Gejdenson. No, no, no, but I think here, you know, we
have parted company. I do not know any country on this planet
that has demonstrated the resolve against Saddam Hussein that
we have. In the Security Council our closest friends and allies
abandon us regularly on this. You know, when you say there are
countries in the region who would join us in military action,
virtually every country in the region's major papers, often
assumed to be arms of the government, have editorials attacking
us for sustaining the present embargo. About the only place we
do get some support is for an indictment, which is a noble
cause.
You know, it seems to me that the hope that people who
spend their days in the lobbies of the hotels in London and
France are going to lead a revolutionary effort in Iraq just
absolutely argues against everything we have seen in history,
and the last time we encouraged people to rise up, the Bush
Administration let Saddam Hussein slaughter them. So the
history here is not good. The indication from the people in the
region is they do not want to do anything. Our Security Council
members, two of them, now have sent planes into Iraq--never
mind about supporting armed resistance.
I come to the conclusion that Americans do not want to see
their boys in there with airplanes and tanks knocking out Iraqi
ground forces moving in on armed resistance. We are back to the
Contras here.
Mr. Solarz. Mr. Gejdenson, let me say at the outset that my
affection and respect for you, which is enormous, is in no way
diminished by our disagreement on this issue. But we do have a
genuine disagreement on this issue, and let me tell you why.
First of all, with respect to the attitude of the countries
in the region, there is no doubt in my mind that without
exception they would all be delighted if Saddam were to vanish
tomorrow. They recognize that he is a serious threat. In a way,
he is more of a threat to them than he is to us simply because
they are in his neighborhood. But at the same time they do not
want to poke a stick into a hornet's nest unless they are
convinced that by doing so they are going to kill the hornets.
Mr. Gejdenson. What do you base your assumption on? They
are not happy with the embargo, and a lot of us are not happy
with the embargo. I think the assessment is right. It is
hurting the people. It is not hurting Saddam. But in every
confrontation we basically have to drag them along kicking and
screaming, and we have to do all of the work. Where is your
sense that they want to engage this?
Mr. Solarz. Well, I have met with the leaders of those
countries. I have been there, and it is very clear to me that
they view Saddam as a very, very serious threat. The problem
they have is that given what appears to them to be our
unwillingness to commit the kind of military power that would
be needed to bring the regime down, they fear that the current
policy achieves nothing in terms of eliminating the regime----
Mr. Gejdenson. Not to interrupt you, but, you know, none of
them believe that Mr. Chalabi and his friends could ever be
capable enough to remove Saddam Hussein, not one of them. I
talked to every intelligence person in the region, virtually. I
have talked to every head of state in the region, virtually.
They all tell me that these guys are not on the level as far as
a military threat, and I think you have to agree, we are not
going to use our force to stop Saddam's tanks, just like George
Bush did not.
And let me just ask you one more. I hate to cut you off,
but you are so smart, I have to be on top of every one of your
statements, or I will get in trouble with you. The Turks do not
want an independent Kurdish state. They are not going to do
anything that takes Saddam Hussein's boot off the back of the
Kurds because then they have got a Kurdish problem.
Mr. Solarz. As I made clear in my testimony, I agree with
you that none of the countries in the region think that the
Iraqi National Congress, on its own, even with American arms,
can overthrow Saddam Hussein, which is precisely why they are
unwilling to cooperate in an effort to provide military
assistance and sanctuaries to the Iraqi opposition. But if they
believe that the United States was prepared to commit its
military power to the achievement of this objective--let me
just finish--then I think there is a good chance they would be
willing to cooperate.
Now, you say, isn't it obvious that we are not prepared to,
in effect, reengage in a military effort to bring down the
regime in Baghdad? And my answer to you is, as I said in my
testimony, at the moment you are absolutely right. If the
president were to get on national television tomorrow and make
a speech saying that he is reintroducing American ground forces
into the region, and we are soon going to commence an effort to
overthrow the regime there, and there might be American
casualties, it would be met with apathy at best and incredulity
at worst.
But I also believe that the American people are unprepared
to accept the existence of weapons of mass destruction in the
hands of someone like Saddam Hussein. That is why Secretary
Cohen said on national television, holding up a five-pound bag
of sugar, that this could kill half the people in Washington,
DC, if it was filled with anthrax.
And at the point at which we acquire unimpeachable and
unmistakable evidence that, in fact, Saddam is rebuilding his
weapons of mass destruction, and I think it is only a matter of
time before we do so, under those circumstances I think the
American people and the Congress would be prepared to support,
particularly if some other countries were willing to join us,
and I think a number would, an effort to eliminate that threat
by bringing down the regime. The alternative, Mr. Gejdenson, is
to accept an Iraq which has a growing arsenal of weapons of
mass destruction, where, based on Saddam's previous track
record, it is only a matter of time before he uses them again.
Mr. Gejdenson. Well, Mr. Solarz, I tell you--again, I go
back to my fundamentals here--we can barely keep peace-keeping
troops in Kosovo. We have a situation where all of our allies
seem to be abandoning us in any serious confrontation with
Saddam Hussein. There is no regional power that I have spoken
to that thinks that the resistance has any ability without a
massive, American military force. When we had a massive,
American military force, international force, on the ground,
the Bush Administration chose not to remove Saddam Hussein.
When you add all of these things up, this is, you know, more
hope and prayers than substance, you are basing your assessment
on.
Mr. Solarz. If I can make one other point here, Mr.
Gejdenson. The Administration itself has said that the
acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by Saddam is a red
line and that we would retaliate militarily, although they have
not said for what purpose and against what targets. As
Ambassador Butler has pointed out, chemical and biological
weapons can be made in facilities half the size of this hearing
room. It is almost, by definition, impossible to eliminate them
by surgical air strikes.
So I would suggest that if, in fact, the acquisition of
weapons of mass destruction by Saddam Hussein is a red line, if
we believe, as I do, that it poses an unacceptable threat to
vital American interests and to our friends in the region, then
we need to recognize that the only way to prevent the
acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by Saddam is to
eliminate the regime which he heads. And in order to eliminate
the regime which he heads, I agree with you, the use of
American military power would be necessary.
Now, you point out, quite rightly, that it is difficult to
sustain support for a much more limited and benign military
presence in Kosovo. But the difference between Kosovo and Iraq
is that even in a worst-case scenario Mr. Milosevic does not
threaten the United States or our allies with weapons of mass
destruction. Saddam Hussein does, and I think the American
people can recognize that distinction and respond to it.
Mr. Gejdenson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Gilman. The gentleman's time has expired. Thank
you, Mr. Gejdenson. Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Yes. I would remind Mr. Gejdenson, when he
said we are back to the Contras, that the Contras won, and the
fact is that the Sandinistas were defeated, and you have
democratic elections in Nicaragua, and, quite frankly, had
there not been so much opposition to the strategy of the
Contras by certain American elements, we would have probably
won a lot sooner in Nicaragua. And the Sandinistas have still
continued to lose every election whenever there is a free
election in Nicaragua because they were never popular. Saddam
Hussein is not popular.
I remember all of the experts telling us, when I was in the
Reagan White House, the Mujahadin do not have a chance to
defeat the Russians, and guess what? The Russians left. The
people of Iraq----
Mr. Gejdenson. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. Rohrabacher. I certainly will.
Mr. Gejdenson. The Contras did not win the war. The
Sandinistas lost the election, but on a better note, we might
have been better off if the Russians stayed in Afghanistan and
the Mujahadin----
Mr. Rohrabacher. One moment, Steve, reclaiming my time. I
think this body lost a great asset when Steven Solarz left this
Committee and left the House of Representatives, and he has my
great respect. I do not believe that we can muster public
support behind any type of ground effort against Saddam
Hussein. I just do not believe that is possible. But I do have
more faith that the people of Iraq and others through other
means could get rid of Saddam Hussein. And I am going to ask
the question, unless you get to that, but I have to put a
couple of things on the record here as well.
Mr. Butler, you are saying that the sanctions do not work
except to hurt the people of Iraq. Is that right?
Ambassador Butler. Uh-huh.
Mr. Rohrabacher. There have been a lot of people asking me
to oppose the sanctions because of that, and my reaction has
been that that is the only real leverage we have except
American military action. What is the other formula?
Ambassador Butler. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. Let me, Mr.
Chairman, reiterate and perhaps expand in a very brief way what
I said about sanctions. Sanctions were imposed upon Iraq as the
means of bringing about its compliance with the security
council's demand that it leave Kuwait, that it get out of
Kuwait.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Right.
Ambassador Butler. When it refused to obey that command and
was obviously unmoved by the sanctions introduced to back it
up, a force was put together, and it was militarily removed
from Kuwait. So there was the first instance where sanctions
did not quite do their job.
Secondly, when Iraq was removed from Kuwait, the sanctions
were then maintained and, in fact, extended and connected to
disarmament performance. I am making the simple and obvious
point that as Saddam has been able to evade his obligations to
be disarmed and to be monitored that he does not make weapons
of mass destruction in the future, the sanctions in that sense
have not done their job in bringing about compliance with the
disarmament law.
Mr. Rohrabacher. What is the other side of the coin, then?
What is your solution, because obviously----
Ambassador Butler. Okay. Sanctions are now also crumbling
because of Iraq's success in the black market and now because
Iraq has been supported in its avoidance of sanctions in
pulling down the edifice of sanctions by no less than Russia
and France and possibly two dozen other countries whose
businessmen are filling the hotels of Baghdad right now.
I welcome the opportunity to reiterate what I propose to be
a solution to this. It is what I called my fourth red line.
Steven Solarz was talking about direct military action. I think
that is one possible approach, but I had actually mentioned
this fourth red line, which is to go to the Russians and make
clear to them that it is not acceptable to the United States
for it to behave in the way that it is toward Saddam.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. Now, Mr. Butler, I have to believe
that our Administration has done that.
Ambassador Butler. Oh, do you?
Mr. Rohrabacher. I have to believe that our Administration
has gone to the Russians and said, we do not accept what you
are doing in Iraq. Steve, let me ask----
Ambassador Butler. Sorry. Could I just----
Mr. Rohrabacher. I only have 5 minutes, and I have got to
give Steve the last word on this.
Ambassador Butler. Okay.
Mr. Rohrabacher. But let me just say, it seems to me in the
very beginning, at the very first briefing I had on this, on
Saddam Hussein and the war that we were about to conduct with
Iraq--I remember that briefing--it was in the secret room there
in the Capitol that we all get briefed in--I remember going to
Dick Cheney and Colin Powell and telling them, do not start
this unless you are committed to finishing it, and finishing it
means Saddam Hussein is dead, dead. Kill Saddam Hussein. I told
them that, and very emphatically, I think that is what we still
have to do, frankly, to get this over with. Steve, you have got
the last word.
Mr. Solarz. Just very briefly, Mr. Rohrabacher, you
mentioned both Afghanistan and Nicaragua as examples of where
we helped indigenous freedom movements achieve their
objectives. We have to keep in mind that in the case of
Afghanistan we could not have done what we did without the
cooperation of Pakistan and in the case of Nicaragua we could
not have success without the help of Honduras. If we are going
to help the Iraqi opposition, we need the help of a contiguous
country that is willing to assist in the effort in terms of
avoiding sanctuaries and facilitating the flow of equipment.
And in order to get that help, we have to be prepared to make a
commitment which apparently you feel we are not prepared to
make.
I can only say that if, at the end of the day, it is the
conclusion of you and your colleagues and of the next president
that we are not prepared to use American military power in
combination with the Iraqi resistance to overthrow the regime,
then it would be better in terms of preserving American
credibility to abandon that objective and to rely on
containment alone, because we pay a very heavy price in the
erosion of our credibility when we establish a national
objective and then do nothing to effectively implement it.
Mr. Rohrabacher. One last thought, and that is the people
of Iraq are not our enemy. Saddam Hussein is a brutal dictator.
They know how monstrous he is, and, of course, we would applaud
anyone within that society, whether the Iraqi military or
whatever, of getting rid of this problem for both our peoples.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. Mr. Ackerman.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. We miss
you, Steve, and I think that your testimony today is ample
reason why. I would just like to point out to my colleagues who
might not have been here during much of Chairman Solarz's
tenure that he had so many accomplishments in the arena of
international relations.
He is probably the person most singularly responsible for
the downfall of Ferdinand Marcos and so many other things.
Certainly, when the final chapter might be written about the
history of the Persian Gulf War, I think all historians will
acknowledge that it was the leadership of Steve Solarz, who in
a nonpartisan way went to the White House and told President
Bush that there would be, although a minority, certainly enough
of us Democrats who would be willing to act in a nonpartisan
fashion should he choose to avoid the constitutional crisis of
intervening absent bringing the matter to the House of
Representatives and was able to convince the president of the
United States that if he did that, that we would act in a
nonpartisan way.
And certainly those who were either in the House or watched
it on television, it certainly was one of the finest several
days in the history of this Congress, listening to the debate
that had nothing to do with the petty politics that overtakes
us today as to who scores more points for or against an
Administration, but a genuine intellectual debate on foreign-
policy matters as to what was in the best interests of the
United States. And we certainly miss that kind of thing.
I have a question, Steve, listening to your remarks and
reading some of your testimony. You seem to be rather hawkish
on going back, if I could use that term for someone who started
out as an absolute dove.
Mr. Solarz. When it comes to Iraq, I am not a hawk; I am a
vulture.
Mr. Ackerman. And your appetite is vociferous.
First, let me ask this question, piggy-backing on something
that our colleague from California said. Was it a mistake not
to stay the extra couple of weeks after the president so
capably put together the international coalition? And I know
the argument that those who were fearful that the coalition
might fall apart was out there, but was it not a tragic mistake
not to continue on until the regime was brought to its knees?
Mr. Solarz. First, thank you for your very kind comments. I
am really quite touched, and I mean that sincerely, Mr.
Ackerman. It is certainly tempting, in retrospect, with the
benefit of hindsight, to say that we should have stayed the
course and gone to Baghdad, and I suspect if we had, we would
have been greeted as liberators, not fought as potential
occupiers. But let me say that I think the real mistake was not
in refraining from marching to Baghdad because that would have
utterly unraveled the coalition. The real mistake was, when the
Infitada or the uprising arose in Iraq in the immediate
aftermath of Desert Storm, in not using our air power to ground
Saddam's attack helicopters and to eliminate his armor and
artillery. We stood by and did nothing while Saddam's
Republican Guard and regular military formations slaughtered
the Iraqi people who rose up against him. And I have no doubt
that if we had been willing to use our air power to ground his
attack helicopters and destroy his armor and artillery, the
balance of power would have shifted against the regime, and the
opposition would have prevailed.
I remember several years ago I was on a panel at the
centennial of Stanford University with former Secretary of
State Schultz discussing the Gulf War, and Secretary Schultz
made, I thought, a brilliant point. He said, at the end of the
war General Schwartzcoff agreed to let the Iraqis use their
helicopters presumably for the purpose of communicating with
their units in the field. And when it became clear they were
using the helicopters to kill the Iraqi opposition, and
Schwartzcoff was asked about this, he said, well, he was
snookered by the Iraqis who deceived him. And Secretary Schultz
said, I never understood why he simply did not unsnooker
himself. We won, they lost, and we could easily have said that
we had not given them permission to use these helicopters to
suppress an indigenous uprising.
Mr. Ackerman. The concern that existed then, that we would
lose the coalition, and accepting that as a legitimate concern,
seems to fly in the face of the suggestion that we used both
air power and commit to using ground forces, if necessary,
absent putting together a coalition today. It seems to me that
forming a coalition today would be a lot more difficult absent
Saddam invading yet again one of its neighbors.
How do we reconcile that? If we take a unilateral action--I
know that you recall in 1981 the Israelis did that and were
condemned by the United Nations and us as well. Luckily, they
did that; otherwise, we might not have been so lucky in the
last war.
Mr. Solarz. Well, I shudder to think what would have
happened if the Israelis had not destroyed the Osirak reactor.
You put your finger on a very serious problem. There is no
question that it would be very difficult to reassemble the
coalition.
In fact, I would go so far as to say that it would be
impossible to reassemble the exact coalition which existed
then, but I do not think it would be impossible to put together
perhaps a lesser coalition of countries that would share our
view that the possession of weapons of mass destruction by
Saddam Hussein is unacceptable and in violation of very
important security council resolutions. Keep in mind----
Mr. Ackerman. Let me just follow up on that, if I can, on
the foreign-policy issue. If we were to do that, does it not
set a precedent that maybe should be set, I do not know, that
we can, with coalition partners or absent them, based on pre-
emptive rationale, move in against any country that is
developing weapons of mass destruction without them taking an
aggressive act against some neighbor?
Mr. Solarz. It is quite true that Iraq is not the only
country that has weapons of mass destruction, but it is true
that it is the only country since the end of the Second World
War that we know for a fact has used those weapons not just
once, but twice, not just against its enemies, but its own
people. By twice, I mean in two separate contexts.
Mr. Ackerman. The two-strikes-and-you are-out policy.
Mr. Solarz. Right. You know, people here recall the use of
chemical weapons by Iraq against the City of Halabga in
northern Iraq as part of Operation Anfal. What most of them do
not remember is that Saddam used chemical weapons on numerous
occasions in northern Iraq against his own people, and I think
this is what distinguishes Iraq from other countries.
It is always preferable in situations like this to have the
imprimatur of a security-council resolution, but under
circumstances where it is not obtainable, if we believe that
vital American interests are at stake, I believe we should be
prepared to act without it, particularly if there are other
countries that are willing to join with us, and in this case I
think there would be some other countries. I think the U.K, for
example, would be willing to participate. I think Kuwait would
be willing to participate. I suspect, with vigorous American
diplomacy, we could get a number of other countries to join
with us as well.
Chairman Gilman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Bereuter.
Ambassador Bereuter. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
heard your testimony. I appreciate it very much, gentleman. I
was not here for all the question period, but I do have a
question. I will start with our distinguished former colleague,
Mr. Solarz, and ask you to comment, too, Mr. Butler, if you
wish.
When the Clinton Administration launched Operation Desert
Fox in the end of 1998, it claimed that the loss of U.N.
weapons inspectors would be more than offset by a degradation
which would be inflicted on the Iraqis' weapons capabilities, a
degradation by our air strikes. Few would have imagined that it
would be 2 years before the U.N. would be ready to resume
inspection. In retrospect, Mr. Solarz, do you think it was a
mistake for the Administration to have launched Operation
Desert Fox, given the outcome?
Mr. Solarz. I think it was a mistake, Mr. Bereuter, for the
United States not to respond to the eviction of the U.N.
inspectors by taking the position that unless they were
immediately permitted to return under circumstances where they
could go where they wanted and look at what they wanted to look
at, that we would endeavor to take sustained military action,
not simply for the purpose of punishing the regime, but for the
purpose bringing it down.
I think that afforded us a pretext or a justification which
would have enabled us to have responded in a much more robust
and vigorous fashion not for the purpose of simply making a
point, but for the purpose of solving the problem, which in
this case, I think, clearly requires bringing down the regime,
which obviously is not prepared to agree to any kind of
inspections which will obligate it to divulge or disgorge its
weapons of mass destruction.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you. Ambassador Butler, would you care
to comment on whether, retrospectively, this is a good idea?
What would you say about the degradation of the weapons systems
that has taken place and how important is that vis-a-vis the
progress you say has been made on moving ahead with missile
extension and weapons development?
Ambassador Butler. In November 1998, when Iraq cut off our
work, it was about to be bombed, and you will recall that
President Clinton called that off at the last hour. Iraq then
solemnly promised to resume full cooperation, and I was given
the job of reporting to the council after an elapsing period of
time whether or not that had happened. A month later, I
reported the truth, which is not only had that not happened,
but they had imposed new restrictions on us. As a consequence
of that report, the United States and the United Kingdom
decided to take military action that became Desert Fox. Desert
Fox, it was then said, would degrade Iraq's weapons-of-mass-
destruction capability. Two years later, I do not believe it
had that effect.
What has happened is that inspection and monitoring has
been cut off. I said then, Mr. Bereuter, that the reason, if
there was a justification for bombing Iraq at that time, it was
because they had cut off the inspection and monitoring. It
followed logically that what must happen at the end of that
bombing, if it is to have been successful, is that that
inspection and monitoring is the first thing that must be
restored. That has not happened.
Mr. Bereuter. Ambassador, thank you. One of your former
subordinates in UNSCOM, Scott Ritter, has argued that UNSCOM's
efforts were misguided, and more importantly, that
``basically,'' a quote, ``we need not worry about Saddam's
weapons program because he has been qualitatively disarmed for
a very long time.'' What do you make of Mr. Ritter's claims?
Ambassador Butler. I find them deeply sad. They are utterly
without truth or foundation. The notion of qualitative
disarmament in this context is meaningless. What I find sad
about it is that a man who was once a very able inspector has,
for reasons that are beyond my ability to discern, decided to
enter into this kind of justification of the present
circumstances that I find sad and wrong.
Mr. Bereuter. Well, he certainly has not been qualitatively
disarmed for the long term, has he?
Ambassador Butler. The concept has no meaning, but the
answer, quite simply, is absolutely not.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you, gentlemen, very much for your
testimony on this important issue. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
holding the hearing.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Sherman.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would first like to
comment on the sanctions because so much of the world seems
fooled by Saddam. He has taken tens of millions of people
hostage. He kills them through starvation and the deprivation
of medical care, and then he garners sympathy not only for
those he kills, but for himself. I think the record of this
hearing needs to report that Iraq is exporting food, both food
that it grows itself and food that it acquires through the U.N.
program, that it has exported medicine, and the branding of
that medicine indicates that it has now been re-exported.
And one can only shudder to think of how little of its oil
revenue Iraq would devote to food and medicine if Saddam was
able without legal restriction to devote all of his oil revenue
to the production of weapons. This is a man who may need no one
in his country except his own military and his own political
supporters. In the absence of the current regime of control
over the revenues of Iraqi oil exports, the Iraqi people would
be suffering an awful lot more than they are today.
I would like to pick up on Mr. Solarz's approach that we
should be providing more than fax machines to the Iraqi
opposition. And I agree with him in part because it is critical
to our national security that we stop Saddam from developing
weapons of mass destruction, but, Ambassador Butler, if Saddam,
perhaps in fear of a level of action that far exceeds what we
are doing now, somehow Mr. Solarz was directing our activities
instead of those with a lot less willingness to take action, if
he agreed to reinstitute that the inspection regime, could that
regime provide assurance to the American people that Saddam was
not developing weapons of mass destruction, at least nuclear
weapons?
Put another way, is there anything other than the fall of
Saddam that can allow people of the United States to feel that
there is not going to be a maniac in Baghdad with nuclear
weapons in 15 years?
Ambassador Butler. Well, taking your second question first,
I think the answer is that the Iraqi people have suffered too
much under him, and the world has been too gravely threatened
for it to be tolerated much longer. I do not know whether
Steven Solarz's suggestion is the only way to do this, but my
direct answer to your question is that it would be better for
all concerned for Saddam to be no longer in charge of the
government of Iraq.
Mr. Bereuter. Clearly, that would be better, but if under
duress Saddam were to consent to the reinstitution of an
inspections regime----
Ambassador Butler. I would like to come to that, yes.
Mr. Bereuter. Okay. Go ahead.
Ambassador Butler. You asked specifically with respect to
nuclear weapons. I think we have to be very honest with
ourselves about what arms control and monitoring can and may
not achieve. If you have got an utterly determined criminal,
which I think is probably a fair description of Saddam, at the
head of a government who is utterly determined to break the
law, then it is hard to be completely assured that they will
not be able to do so.
What arms-control monitoring does is tells you that that is
what is happening. On the whole, it can do that. If you ask of
it to prevent a criminal or insane personality from behaving
according to their own decisions, then you are asking too much
of it. But the chances are exceedingly good that with an
adequate monitoring system in Iraq, that we would have notice
that such behavior was taking place. We would then be in a
position to take action to prevent it from going further.
And finally, absent such inspection now, we are in the
worst possible situation. Every day that passes means that
clandestine behavior can take place and, I strongly suspect,
has been taking place.
Chairman Gilman. The gentleman's time has expired. Mr.
Sanford.
Mr. Sanford. I thank the Chairman. I have come to the
conclusion that the no-fly zone over Iraq is just a total waste
of money. Do you all agree? I would ask whoever wants----
Mr. Solarz. I am sorry. Would you repeat the question?
Mr. Sanford. I have come to the conclusion that the no-fly
zone over Iraq is a total waste of U.S. taxpayer money. Do you
agree or disagree?
Mr. Solarz. No. I do not agree because were we to eliminate
the no-fly zone, I think it would be an open invitation for
Saddam to re-establish his military control over the rest of
the country.
Mr. Sanford. You are saying he does not militarily control
the country now?
Mr. Solarz. Well, he does not militarily control northern
Iraq, and that provides a certain measure of freedom, as it
were, and safety for a substantial number of Iraqis who live in
northern Iraq.
Mr. Sanford. Are you saying that there is not repression in
northern Iraq?
Mr. Solarz. Pardon?
Mr. Sanford. There is not repression in northern Iraq?
Mr. Solarz. Well, Iraq, in effect, the regime is not
present in northern Iraq to some extent because of the no-fly
zone, and I think that if we were to eliminate the no-fly zone,
it would be an open invitation to Saddam to send his forces
into the north and, in effect, resubdue the entire Kurdish
population.
Mr. Sanford. Then let us take that logic, then, and apply
it to the southern no-fly zone, too. Then you would say that
the no-fly zone over southern Iraq is a waste of money?
Mr. Solarz. No. I would not say it is a waste of money
there because I also think that it constitutes some deterrent
against Saddam threatening his neighbors. Keep in mind, just
within the past week or so an Iraqi plane not only violated the
no-fly zone; it overflew Kuwait and, I think, even Saudi air
space, and we did absolutely nothing.
Mr. Sanford. Wait. Let us back up here, though. If you
actually look at the 1999 numbers, there were 600--that is one
breach--there were 16 breaches in 1999 that were in the no-fly
zone. And so, in essence, about two times a day he is going out
there with aircraft and breaching the no-fly zone in current
form. And that is, it just seems to me basically press-release
foreign policy, wherein you have two breaches a day. We do not
fly every day, as you know, over there. Boys in F-16's will
leave Turkey tomorrow morning or the morning after--I do not
know which morning they are going to get up, but, you know, a
couple of days a week, go up over the mountains of Iraq,
refuel, and go down, for instance, in the northern no-fly zone,
but it is not a regular event.
Mr. Solarz. In my view, the problem is not that we are
doing too much; it is that we are doing too little, and I think
one has to view----
Mr. Sanford. So then I am just taking the logic that you
have been using throughout the hearing, which is for more, so
in its present policy it would be a waste of money.
Mr. Solarz. Well, I think that we have to distinguish
between whether we want to bring down the regime or whether we
simply want to contain it. I have argued, of course, that
containment is a very dubious proposition with someone like
Saddam.
Mr. Sanford. Which is why I thought you would not naturally
agree with the idea that the no-fly zone is a waste of money
because that is basically what you have been arguing.
Mr. Solarz. Right. But I will tell you what would concern
me, and there is a good deal of technical merit to your line of
argument, and I have to confess, it is one I had not considered
before, and I will reflect on it. But I will tell you
instinctively what concerns me about it, and that is that if,
in effect, we end up with a policy of containment, which is
more or less what in practice we have now, doing something like
eliminating the no-fly zone inevitably will diminish
credibility----
Mr. Sanford. Let us not even call it that, though. Let us
call it the sometimes no-fly zone except for two times a day
when we breach it.
Mr. Solarz. It would be seen as a victory by Saddam. It
would be seen as a further diminution of American resolve, and
given his capacity for miscalculation----
Mr. Sanford. But the very logic that you have been using
has been if we are going to do something, let us really do it
because if we say we are going to do something and really do
not do it, then we really hurt our standing around the world
and particularly in that region of the world.
Mr. Solarz. Well, that has been the logic of my argument.
That is with respect to the stated objectives of the Iraq
Liberation Act, which calls for the destabilization and removal
of the regime. The stated purpose of the no-fly zone is not to
bring down Saddam, but, in effect, to deter him from the
extension of his military power.
Mr. Sanford. And, again, I would just say, and I just want
to say for the record, it strikes me, because we had an
undersecretary from the Administration testify a couple of
months back, and I said, what exactly is the policy? They said,
well, basically as long as Saddam is around, we are going to be
around. And I said, that is very unsettling for me because in
my home state of South Carolina Strom is 2 years out, basically
a year and a half out, from making a hundred. If this guy has
that kind of longevity, you are looking at a billion, one,
billion, two, a year over another 50 years essentially, and $50
billion of taxpayer expense on something that I think we would
both agree has very, very limited----
Chairman Gilman. The gentleman's time has expired. Ms. Lee.
Ms. Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me thank our two
witnesses for your very insightful and thorough presentation. A
couple of questions I would just like to ask with regard to the
whole issue of delinking military and economic sanctions as we
look at a reexamination of our policy.
We held hearings, I believe, earlier this year looking at
what the impact of economic sanctions has been with regard to
food and medicine, especially with regard to children, and the
numbers are staggering. The humanitarian concerns, of course,
are equally as important as our national-security concerns, and
they should be. And somehow there are many of us who believe
that strengthening military sanctions would make sense at the
same time that we delink the economic sanctions from the
military sanctions.
What is your take on that, and how in our re-examination of
our policy toward Iraq should we view economic sanctions and
its impact on the people and what it is or is not doing?
Mr. Solarz. It is a very good question and a very
thoughtful one, and let me say that I do not believe we should
wage war on children or on sick or elderly people. But in the
case of Iraq my impression is that the main reason that there
may be some who are suffering as a consequence of the sanctions
has far more to do with Saddam Hussein than it does with the
sanctions. For example, as, I think, has already been pointed
out, Saddam has several billion dollars available for the
purchase of food and medicines which he is not using for that
purpose.
In northern Iraq, which, in effect, is not under Saddam's
control, in spite of the sanctions the children are not dying,
and people are getting the medicines they need. There is a
system for the distribution of food and medical supplies. The
problem with eliminating the sanctions, in my view, is that
given the nature of Saddam's regime, which clearly does not
care a whit for the welfare or well-being of its own people, is
that it would in no way, in my view, result in the sudden
availability of food and medical supplies which the country is
not able to now obtain because it can obtain them if it wants
to. Saddam will use the resources he is able to get once the
sanctions are lifted primarily for rebuilding his conventional
military power and expediting the reconstitution of his weapons
of mass destruction, and it would be a further indication that
the resolve of the international community to contain Iraq had
eroded further.
So I suppose my answer to your question is that I have
absolutely no faith whatsoever that the lifting of sanctions
would help those who are suffering in Iraq, and the main reason
is that the explanation for their suffering, to the extent that
they are suffering, has everything to do with Saddam and his
regime, which already has available resources--they are now
pumping more oil than they did before the Gulf War--and not the
sanctions themselves.
Ms. Lee. No. I agree, but also I am wondering, though, has
the imposition of sanctions taken this to another level in
terms of the pain and suffering of the Iraqi people, especially
children? We know that, you know, Saddam Hussein has done what
he has done and will continue to until he is gone, but are we
participating in a process that is creating more pain than
would be the case had we not imposed the sanctions?
Mr. Solarz. This is the impression which the Iraqi regime
has assiduously attempted to create, and I must say, with
considerable success, abetted in particular by those countries
that are interested in profiting economically from the lifting
of sanctions, not to sell food to Iraq, but to sell arms and
other things that he can use for aggressive purposes.
No. I think people are suffering because Saddam is not
interested in feeding them or taking care of their health. He
is interested in establishing his hegemony over the entire
region. He has tried to do that twice now in a decade, first
against Iran, then against Kuwait.
You know, finally, let me just say that, in answer to your
very thoughtful question, all Saddam would have to do to get
the sanctions lifted is to agree to let the inspectors back in
and go where they want and need to go to determine if he is
complying with his obligation not to build weapons of mass
destruction, but he refuses to do so.
Why does he refuse to do so? It is obvious. Because he
believes for his political and strategic and military purposes,
he needs chemical and biological and perhaps nuclear weapons as
well. And let me just say here in conclusion, if I might, that
Mr. Sherman, who I see is not here now, said that what would
happen if he had nuclear weapons in 15 years.
The fact of the matter is, and I think Mr. Butler would
agree with this, that if Saddam succeeded in obtaining fissile
material on the black market, which is certainly a possibility,
given what is happening in Russia, he has the know-how and the
technical means to make nuclear weapons now, not 15 years from
now.
And lastly, with respect to how much faith we should have
in the efficacy of inspections, if he could be persuaded to let
the inspectors back in, it is important to remember that before
the Gulf War the International Atomic Energy Agency had
inspectors in Iraq monitoring Iraq's nuclear program, and it
turned out after the Gulf War was over that Saddam had not one,
but three separate nuclear-weapons programs, of which the IAE
inspectors were utterly oblivious.
So I have absolutely no faith, even if inspectors were
permitted back in, that they could succeed in doing the job,
and I come back to the view that if we really believe that the
acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by Saddam Hussein
poses an unacceptable threat to us and our friends in the
region, the only way to solve the problem is to remove the
regime that is intent on making them.
Ms. Lee. Thank you very much.
Chairman Gilman. The gentlelady's time has expired. Mr.
Lantos.
Mr. Lantos. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know we need to move
on to a markup. I want to express my admiration for Ambassador
Butler and my distinguished former colleague, Congressman
Solarz, for their steadfast leadership on this issue, and I
yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Lantos. Any other comments
to be made? If not--Mr. Crowley. I am sorry.
Mr. Crowley. I am sorry that I missed your testimony, but
in going through your statement, Mr. Solarz, is it my
understanding that you believe--first, let me preface it by
saying that there has been a movement afoot here amongst many
Members to pull back on the sanctions, and myself and
Congressman Sweeney, in a bipartisan effort, have reached out
to our colleagues to ask them to keep those sanctions imposed.
My question to you is, is it your belief that the sanctions
alone are not working and that more needs to be done?
Mr. Solarz. I think it is obvious on the face of it that
the sanctions alone are not working. The main purpose of the
sanctions, the primary justification, was to induce and
pressure Iraq into complying with relevant U.N. resolutions,
originally not just those requiring it to give up its weapons
of mass destruction, but also to pay reparations to Kuwait and
other countries that suffered and to disclose what happened to
several hundred Kuwaitis who were missing, who were presumably
kidnaped by the Iraqis when they departed from Kuwait. He has
not complied with any of those resolutions, so if that is the
purpose of the sanctions, the sanctions, at least so far, are
obviously not doing the job.
The problem with lifting them is that not only would they
not induce him to suddenly begin to comply, since he would feel
he has been vindicated, but it would give him the additional,
unfettered use of resources that he will use not to feed his
starving people or to buy medicines to give to those who need
them, because he has several billion dollars to do it how. He
will use that money to rebuild his military power, and that
would pose a very serious threat to our interests and our
friends in the region.
Mr. Crowley. And just for the record, and if someone else
has already done this, neither yourself nor Ambassador Butler
are in favor of lifting the sanctions. Is that correct?
Mr. Solarz. That is correct.
Ambassador Butler. That is correct.
Mr. Crowley. Thank you.
Chairman Gilman. The gentleman's time has expired. Just a
2-minute closing statement by either of our panelists.
Ambassador Butler.
Ambassador Butler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am very
grateful to have been included in this exchange. I think it has
been extremely useful. I will make, in conclusion, four very
quick, summary points. What I think has been elucidated here
today is that the problem remains the same. It is the existence
of Saddam Hussein at the head of the government of Iraq.
Secondly, the prime victims of him is actually the Iraqi
people through his manipulation of sanctions and now the
demonstration that he has given that even if sanctions were to
be suddenly alleviated tomorrow, that he would not make the
benefits of that available to ordinary Iraqis.
Thirdly, the threat that he poses through reacquiring
weapons of mass destruction is growing each day.
And, finally, the solution to that problem, I think, lies
through the security council and through the United States
insisting to its Russian colleagues that it is simply no longer
prepared to tolerate its breaking of consensus on the
implementation of the council's own laws with respect to Iraq
and instead preferring to return to a Cold War situation where
Russia is, in fact, patronizing a rogue state, a person who
should be indicted for having committed crimes against
humanity, a person who is threatening by his own actions the
stability of this world, especially through a breakdown of the
treaties on the nonproliferation of weapons of mass
destruction.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Mr. Solarz.
Mr. Solarz. Mr. Chairman, I basically said what I have to
say. I will only conclude by indicating that I wish that we
could solve the problem simply by telling the Russians that
their attitude toward Iraq is unacceptable, but I fear that
even were we to do that, and I assume we are, that I doubt it
would solve the problem. The Russians do a lot of things we
find unacceptable in Chechnya and elsewhere, and we make our
views known, but they then go about doing what they think is in
their interest.
I think we need to recognize that much more will be needed
than vigorous diplomatic representations in Moscow. And what I
ask you and my former colleagues on the Committee and the new
Members of the Committee who came after I left is to ask
yourself some very hard questions about what we really need to
do to deal with this problem.
I fear that if we continue along the path we have been
pursuing, that the time will come--I do not know if it is next
year or the year after or 5 years from now--when Saddam, armed
with weapons of mass destruction, renews his aggression against
other countries in the region under circumstances where it will
be much more difficult and dangerous to deal with him than it
would be if we took resolute action now.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you very much, Ambassador Butler,
Mr. Solarz, for your very precise analysis of this crisis, and
we appreciate your taking the time to be with us.
[Whereupon, at 12:21 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Material Submitted for the Hearing Record
Prepared Statement of The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman, a
Representative in Congress from New York, and Chairman, Committee on
International Relations
The Committee on International Relations meets today to receive
testimony from two very distinguished witnesses about the serious
problems our nation continues to face in dealing with Iraq.
Upon the conclusion of this morning's hearing, we will move
directly to mark up a bill that I and a number of my colleagues
introduced yesterday regarding the possibility of a unilateral
declaration of statehood by the Palestinians. That bill, the ``Peace
Through Negotiations Act of 2000,'' is intended to underscore our very
strong conviction that such a unilateral declaration would undermine
the Middle East peace process and threaten U.S. national interests in
the region.
But before we get to that issue, however, we are going to hear
about another serious threat to U.S. interests in the Middle East, the
threat posed by Saddam Hussein and his continued efforts to thwart
international inspections of his weapons of mass destruction programs.
The gravity of the threat posed by Saddam, and the inadequacy of
our nation's response to that threat, has been highlighted by three
articles that appeared in the Washington Post within the past month.
The first article appeared on August 30th. In that story, it was
reported that in late August the United States joined with Russia and
France in the U.N. Security Council to block the new U.N. weapons
inspection agency for Iraq--UNMOVIC--from declaring it was ready to
begin inspections inside Iraq. The story quotes an unnamed U.N.
diplomat as saying ``The U.S. and Russia agreed that it was not
appropriate to give the impression that [UNMOVIC] was ready to go back
into Iraq. . . . They cautioned that this might create a climate of
confrontation at an inappropriate time.''
If this story is true, the effort to avoid confronting Saddam. over
his weapons of mass destruction programs has to be a low point in U.S.
diplomacy toward Iraq. Turning off the U.N.'s new weapons inspectors at
the very moment they were ready to begin their work can only have
demoralized the inspectors and emboldened Saddam Hussein.
Indeed, the very next day, on September 1st, the Washington Post
reported that the United States was preparing to deploy Patriot missile
defense batteries to Israel because of growing fears of a possible
attack by Iraq. Clearly, the Clinton Administration had reason to
believe that Saddam was thinking about climbing out of the box in which
they claim to have put him.
In the third article, on September 18th, the Washington Post
reported that Secretary of Defense William Cohen had warned Saddam
Hussein against renewed aggression after Iraq publicly accused Kuwait
of siphoning oil from Iraqi oilfields and flew an Iraqi fighter jet
across Saudi Arabian airspace for the first time in a decade. These
actions by Saddam are reminiscent of his actions leading up to the Gulf
War in 1990, and Secretary Cohen was right to issue his warning. The
question for us, however, is why Saddam has chosen this moment to
resort to his old habits.
Here to help us make sense of these developments are two very
distinguished observers of events in Iraq.
Ambassador Richard Butler has direct experience dealing with Saddam
Hussein as Executive Director of the predecessor organization to
UNMOVIC--the U.N. Special Commission on Iraq, or UNSCOM.--from 1997 to
1999. Prior to that he was a career diplomat in the Australian Foreign
Service, where he served as Australia's ambassador to the United
Nations, ambassador for disarmament, and ambassador to Thailand, among
other posts. He is now with the Council on Foreign Relations in New
York. I am especially eager to hear his assessment of where Iraq stands
today on matters of disarmament, and what the actions taken by the
Security Council last month with regard to UNMOVIC mean for the likely
success of that organization.
Joining Ambassador Butler is one of our former colleagues, and a
friend to all of us here on the Committee, Steve Solarz. Steve served
nine terms in the House of Representatives as a Democrat representing
the great state of New York, and at various times he chaired our
subcommittees on Asia and the Pacific and on Africa. Since leaving the
Congress he has remained deeply engaged in foreign policy issues, and
he has taken a special interest in the subject of Iraq. It is a
pleasure to see you again here in our hearing room, and I hope you can
give us some suggestions about what more we in the Congress should do
about Iraq.
We will hear first from Ambassador Butler, but before recognizing
him, I will turn to our Ranking Democratic Member, Mr. Gejdenson, for
any opening remarks he may have. Mr. Gejdenson?
__________
Prepared Statement of The Honorable Stephen J. Solarz, Former
Representative in Congress
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before your
Committee. I commend you for holding this hearing and for your own
prodigious and productive efforts to focus attention on the continuing
threat to vital American interests posed by an unrepentant and
unreconstructed Baathist regime in Iraq.
It has been almost a decade since the United States and its
coalition allies liberated Kuwait from the clutches of the Mesopotamian
megalomaniac who continues to rule the roost in Baghdad. Since the
triumph of coalition forces in 1991, George Bush and Margaret Thatcher
are out of power, and Francois Mitterand and Hafiz Al-Assad are no
longer among the living. But Saddam Hussein, despite all expectations
to the contrary, remains in power, biding his time, waiting for an
opportune moment to strike once again in his effort to wreak vengeance
against those who opposed his efforts to dominate the region in the
past and who constitute a continuing obstacle to the fulfillment of his
hegemonic ambitions in the future.
As we meet here in this historic hearing room, the ``Butcher of
Baghdad'' is once again rattling his cage. Dire threats, almost
identical to those he issued a decade ago, are emanating daily from
Baghdad. At the same time, the sanctions regime is demonstrably
unraveling, Iraq is pumping more oil than it did a decade ago, and with
UN inspectors having been barred from Iraq for almost two years, it
must be prudently assumed that Saddam is well on the way to
reconstituting his arsenal of chemical and biological weapons. If he
has been able to obtain fissile material on the black market it is even
possible that he is in the process of producing nuclear weapons, since
the knowledge of how to make these weapons of mass destruction, and the
means by which to do so, were not destroyed during the Gulf War.
Recognizing the threat still posed by Iraq our government, in both
its legislative and executive branches, has called for the replacement
of the Baathist bullies in Baghdad by a broadly based democratic
government that would be willing to renounce aggression against its
neighbors, respect the human rights of its own people, and fulfill its
international obligations.
The instrument for the achievement of this objective has been the
Iraq Liberation Act, which was enacted by the Congress and signed into
law by the President in the fall of 1998. It calls, as you know Mr.
Chairman, for the transfer of up to $97 million in excess military
equipment to the Iraqi opposition, as part of an effort to destabilize
and overthrow the existing Iraqi regime. It is premised on the
incontestable proposition that a peaceful transition from a malign
dictatorship to a benign democracy is, in an Iraqi context, a political
oxymoron, and that to wait for a coup in a military riddled by several
secret services under a leader who doesn't hesitate to torture and
execute those he suspects might be plotting against him is to put our
faith in miracles.
Yet two years after the passage of this landmark legislation, for
which you deserve much of the credit, Mr. Chairman, not a single bullet
has been given to the Iraqi opposition. We have, as I understand it,
offered them computers and fax machines, but Saddam is unlikely to be
cowed, let alone deposed, by the transfer of office equipment, no
matter how technologically advanced it might be. Despite the rhetorical
embrace of the Iraq Liberation Act by President Clinton when he signed
the bill in the fall of 1998 it appears that he has no intention of
utilizing the authority contained in the act to provide arms and
military training to those Iraqis who are willing to lay their lives on
the line for the freedom of their country.
Much will depend on the willingness of the next Administration to
adopt a more robust policy toward Iraq and to pay more than lip service
to the ILA. Yet even if the new Administration is willing to actively
implement the ILA, its ability to do so will depend on the cooperation
of those countries, such as Turkey, Jordan, and Kuwait, which are
geographically contiguous to Iraq. Without a willingness by those
countries to provide sanctuaries and facilitate the supply of arms, the
prospect of an effective indigenous resistance will remain an illusion
rather than a reality.
Right now, the truth is that without exception these countries are
skeptical about the viability of such a strategy and will not be
willing to provide the necessary cooperation it requires in the absence
of a convincing demonstration by the United States that it is
determined to bring Saddam down and will, if necessary, be prepared to
use American military power, including ground forces should they be
required, in support of an armed Iraqi opposition. These countries,
which rightly or wrongly believe that the Iraqi opposition cannot bring
down the Baathist regime on their own, do not want to expose themselves
to the further wrath of an enraged Saddam unless they are convinced
that by doing so they can be confident he will no longer be in a
position to retaliate against them. To calm their fears about what
might happen to Iraq should Saddam fall, it will also be necessary to
persuade the opposition to reaffirm its commitment to the preservation
of a unified (albeit federal) Iraq and to make unmistakably clear our
own determined opposition to the creation of a separate Kurdish state
in the North or an independent Shia state in the South.
Our failure to develop a realistic strategy for the overthrow of
Saddam has put us in a position where we have a publicly proclaimed
policy--regime change in Iraq--but no credible means or method of
achieving it. This yawning gap between our stated policy and our actual
policy is exacting a heavy price in our credibility and will continue,
to our eventual regret and inevitable disadvantage, to erode our
credibility in the future.
This is not a matter to be lightly dismissed. Credibility is the
coin in which great powers conduct their affairs. Our ability to
influence others to act in ways that protect our interests and promote
our values, particularly in the Middle East, depends on their
perception that the United States has the ability and resolve to meet
its commitments and carry out its threats. To the extent that Saddam
remains in power, and continues to defy the relevant resolutions of the
UN on weapons of mass destruction and other matters, it underscores the
irrelevancy of our rhetoric and the futility of our policy. We will
almost certainly end up paying a heavy price for it.
In defense of its refusal to provide the Iraqi opposition with the
arms called for in the Iraq Liberation Act, the Administration says it
does not want to be responsible for ``another Bay of Pigs.'' Neither,
it contends, does it want to be held morally accountable for the loss
of life such a policy would inevitably entail. The clear implication of
the Administration's position is that the Iraqi opposition cannot
succeed on its own and that by providing it with arms we would be
setting the stage either for the reintroduction of American armed
forces or the ignominious defeat of an Iraqi opposition we had failed
to back up with a use of military power we're not prepared to
contemplate.
Leaving aside the extent to which we should be prepared to use
American military power in support of the Iraqi opposition, both as a
way of securing the support of contiguous countries and of assuring the
success of such an endeavor, I can only say that if this had been our
approach in the 1980's we never would have provided assistance to the
Mujahadin in Afghanistan, the non-communist resistance in Cambodia, the
Contras in Nicaragua, or UNITA in Angola. In none of these cases were
we prepared to commit American military forces, either in the air or on
the ground, but that didn't stop us from providing assistance to men
and women who were fighting for freedom in a cause we clearly believed
was in our own national interest. If there were casualties on the part
of those who were the beneficiaries of our assistance we didn't feel
then, and we shouldn't feel now, that we were morally culpable for not
having committed our own military forces to the battles they were
waging on their own.
The next Administration, and the Congress, recognizing these
realities, will have to decide whether we should continue to pursue a
policy of containment plus regime change in Iraq or whether we should
switch to a policy of containment alone. A policy of pure containment
would have the virtue of enabling us to avoid the erosion in our
credibility which has been the inescapable consequence of our failure
to do what needs to be done to bring about a change in the Iraqi
regime.
The problem with a policy of containment alone is that it
implicitly concedes the ability of Saddam to reconstitute his weapons
of mass destruction, assumes that sanctions will remain in place
indefinitely, and is premised on the belief that Saddam will continue
to ``remain in his box,'' as the Secretary of State has put it, because
of the threat of American military retaliation if he should once again
invade his neighbors or use his weapons of mass destruction.
To say that this is a policy based on a foundation of shifting
sands would be to endow it with a solidity it manifestly lacks. There
can be little doubt that Saddam is already rebuilding his depleted
stocks of chemical and biological weapons and is trying to obtain the
fissile material he needs for nuclear weapons as well. Why else would
he exclude UN weapons inspectors from Iraq when all he would have to do
to get the sanctions lifted is to let them back to do their job, if he
has nothing to hide from their determined eyes? Furthermore, the
willingness of the international community to maintain sanctions
indefinitely, and of Saddam to refrain from renewed acts of aggression,
including the use of weapons of mass destruction, are assumptions of a
highly dubious nature.
The sanctions regime has already been greatly weakened. Saddam is
now earning more money from the export of oil than he did before the
Gulf War. And there is every reason to believe, as the recent French
and Russian flights to Baghdad suggest, that it will continue to erode
to the point of utter ineffectuality. As for the willingness of Saddam
to stay ```in his box'', and to refrain from using his weapons of mass
destruction, I can only say, based on his prior record, that this would
be an exceedingly imprudent assumption to make. He has, after all,
already used weapons of mass destruction against not only his enemies
but also his own people. In the last two decades he has gone to war
twice, once against Iran and once against Kuwait. And he also launched
a full-scale assault against the Iraqi opposition in Northern Iraq, in
spite of the fact that the Administration had provided assurances to
the leaders of the Iraqi National Congress that we would defend them
against such an attack. Our failure to defend the Iraqi opposition, as
we said we would, has unquestionably diminished our credibility. But it
also tells us something about the continuing deterrent value of our
containment policy.
So we need as a nation to make a choice: should we try to change
the regime in Baghdad or should we merely try to contain it.
I believe we should try to change it. But if we are going to
succeed in our effort to do so we not only need to arm and train the
Iraqi opposition, as called for by the Iraq Liberation Act, we also
need to be prepared to back them up with American military power,
including the use of ground forces if necessary, if we are going to
rebuild the coalition that enabled us to defeat Saddam a decade ago.
I would not preclude the possibility that a well armed Iraqi
opposition backed up by American air power, particularly if it can
induce defections from Saddam's regular Army units, can succeed in
bringing down the regime, without having to use American ground forces
to do so. Indeed, had we been willing to use our airpower to ground
Saddam's attack helicopters and to destroy his armor and artillery when
the uprising erupted in the immediate aftermath of Desert Storm, I have
no doubt that the Iraqi ``intifadah'' would have succeeded in sweeping
the Baathist regime into the dust bin of history. But unless we're
prepared to ``put our military where our mouth is,'' there will be
little hope of securing the cooperation of the countries without whose
active assistance an indigenous insurrection has little chance of
success.
If we're not prepared to pay the price in blood and treasure such a
strategy would require (a price, I believe, that will ultimately cost
us a lot less than a failed policy of containment), we should change
our declared policy and cease calling for the overthrow of the regime
and concentrate instead on trying to contain it. I have the gravest
doubts that such a policy will work. But it would at least enable us to
avoid the continuing loss of credibility which results from a manifest
failure to bring about a change in a regime to whose destruction we are
publicly committed as a matter of fundamental American policy.
Should the next Administration conclude that leaving Saddam in
power would pose an unacceptable threat to our most vital interests, as
I hope it will, it will have to convince the Congress and the country
that the removal of this threat may well require the renewed use of
American military power, in conjunction with at least some of our
former coalition allies, if we are going to finally succeed in
eliminating the primary source of instability in the Persian Gulf and
Middle East: the Baathist regime in Baghdad.
This cannot, I fully recognize, be done in a vacuum. Under current
circumstances, an ``out of the blue'' presidential call for such a
policy would probably be met by apathy at best and incredulity at
worst. But if the next President is prepared to adopt a much more
robust approach to bringing about a regime change in Iraq, along the
lines I have outlined, it shouldn't be hard to find a justification for
doing so.
The most likely, and probably the most convincing justification (in
the absence of another Iraqi invasion of Kuwait or a move by Saddam to
reassert his military control of Northern Iraq) would be clear evidence
that Iraq is, indeed, reconstituting its weapons of mass destruction.
It was, after all, only three years ago, that Secretary of Defense
Cohen held up a five pound bag of sugar on national television and said
that ``this amount of anthrax spread over . . . Washington could
destroy half the population'' of our Capital city.
The Administration, to be sure, has said that were it to come into
the possession of such evidence it would respond militarily to such a
development. But for what purpose and against what targets it has
declined to spell out. Since weapons of mass destruction, and the
facilities that produce them can easily be hidden and disguised, it is
highly unlikely that we would be any more successful in destroying them
with a renewed but limited air campaign than we were during the much
more extensive air campaign associated with Desert Storm. It must be
understood that the only way to eliminate weapons of mass destruction
from the Iraqi inventory, in the absence of the kind of intrusive
inspections Saddam has no intention of permitting, is to remove the
regime that is producing them.
What Secretary Cohen said about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction
was true then and remains true today. This is a threat the American
people can understand and, with forceful presidential leadership, I
have no doubt that they would be prepared to support a renewed effort,
including the use of American military power, to eliminate it.
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