[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE CHALLENGE OF PROTECTING MASS GATHERINGS IN A POST-9/11 WORLD
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 9, 2008
__________
Serial No. 110-124
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Loretta Sanchez, California Peter T. King, New York
Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts Lamar Smith, Texas
Norman D. Dicks, Washington Christopher Shays, Connecticut
Jane Harman, California Mark E. Souder, Indiana
Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon Tom Davis, Virginia
Nita M. Lowey, New York Daniel E. Lungren, California
Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Mike Rogers, Alabama
Columbia David G. Reichert, Washington
Zoe Lofgren, California Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas Charles W. Dent, Pennsylvania
Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin Ginny Brown-Waite, Florida
Islands Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida
Bob Etheridge, North Carolina David Davis, Tennessee
James R. Langevin, Rhode Island Paul C. Broun, Georgia
Henry Cuellar, Texas Candice S. Miller, Michigan
Christopher P. Carney, Pennsylvania
Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Al Green, Texas
Ed Perlmutter, Colorado
Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
I. Lanier Lavant, Staff Director
Rosaline Cohen, Chief Counsel
Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Robert O'Connor, Minority Staff Director
(II)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 2
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas:
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
Witnesses
Panel I
Colonel Robert B. Stephan, USAF (Ret.), Assistant Secretary,
Infrastructure Protection, National Protection and Programs
Directorate, Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
Vice Admiral Roger T. Rufe, Jr., USCG (Ret.), Director, Office of
Operations Coordination and Planning, Department of Homeland
Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 13
Prepared Statement............................................. 15
Panel II
Dr. Thomas H. Blackwell, MD, Medical Director, Center for
Prehospital Medicine, Carolinas Medical Center, Charlotte,
North Carolina:
Oral Statement................................................. 45
Prepared Statement............................................. 47
Sergeant Scott McCartney, Program Manager/Exercise Planner, Large
Stadium Initiative, Governor's Office of Homeland Security,
Sacramento, California, and Sergeant, Sacramento County
Sheriff's Department:
Oral Statement................................................. 51
Prepared Statement............................................. 52
Mr. Douglas Reynolds, Director of Security, Mall of America,
Bloomington, Minnesota:
Oral Statement................................................. 58
Prepared Statement............................................. 61
Appendix
Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson for Robert B. Stephan. 75
Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson for Roger T. Rufe, Jr. 80
Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson for Thomas H.
Blackwell...................................................... 81
Questions From Hon. James R. Langevin for Thomas H. Blackwell.... 83
Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson for Scott McCartney... 84
Questions From Hon. James R. Langevin for Scott McCartney........ 84
Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson for Douglas Reynolds.. 84
Questions From Hon. James R. Langevin for Douglas Reynolds....... 86
THE CHALLENGE OF PROTECTING MASS GATHERINGS IN A POST-9/11 WORLD
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Wednesday, July 9, 2008
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in Room
311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Bennie G. Thompson
[Chairman of the committee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Thompson, Harman, Lowey, Jackson
Lee, Christensen, Etheridge, Cuellar, Carney, Clarke, Green,
Perlmutter, Pascrell, King, Shays, Lungren and Dent.
Chairman Thompson. We are going to call the hearing to
order.
We will ask Mr. Shays to sit in for Ranking Member King who
is--well, speak of the angel. He is here.
The Committee on Homeland Security will come to order. The
committee is meeting today to receive testimony on the
challenge of protecting mass gatherings in a post-9/11 world.
Good morning. I would like to thank our witnesses for
appearing before us today.
When Americans think of mass gathering events, the Super
Bowl, the national conventions and the Pope's recent visit come
to mind. How the Department of Homeland Security manages and
coordinates these high-profile national security events is
certainly worthy of discussion, but that is a discussion for
another day. Today, we will turn our attention to the
challenges of securing mass gatherings that are not considered
national special security events, that do not have the Federal
Government coming in to run security and are held in
communities that do not have huge amounts of resources for
security.
Think of State fairs, collegiate sporting events and even
large shopping complexes during the holiday season. Mass
gatherings, whether they have national security event rating or
not, could be particularly tempting targets for Al Qaeda and
other terrorist organizations with the goal of killing or
injuring the most people, destroying the most infrastructure
and having the greatest impact possible with the least amount
of effort.
As you all know, I made it a priority to look at mass
gatherings of all types. In fact, last year I directed
committee staff to explore a variety of venues to see how mass
gatherings are being handled. At these venues, committee staff
observed members of the public and private sectors working to
ensure the health, safety and security of all involved. They
found that support personnel at these venues are doing the best
they can with what they have, especially when they do not have
the benefit of substantial Federal support.
This exploration culminated in a report that the majority
staff of the committee released in May entitled, ``Public
Health, Safety and Security for Mass Gatherings.'' The report
concluded that while local and State official efforts are
laudable, the Federal Government needs to partner with them in
three particular areas: countering biological threats,
collaborating and planning, and partnering across sectors.
Among the report's recommendations were that the Department
of Homeland Security help these localities in hosting these
mass gatherings now by strengthening public health and other
critical infrastructures, establishing comprehensive biological
surveillance systems and ensuring that intelligence about
biological threats is made actionable for decisionmakers on the
scene.
It is remarkable how State and local and private sector
partners have worked together to develop solutions on their
own, given the absence of dedicated Federal resources. Fighting
a common fight, they have established trusted relationships
with other very different entities and that trust serves as the
basis for sharing information and resources that would not
otherwise occur. The Department of Homeland Security could
stand to learn a lesson about information sharing here.
The Department of Homeland Security should also take note
that the districts that the Members of this committee represent
are diverse. Some, like mine, are largely rural, while others,
like the one represented by the gentlelady from New York, Ms.
Clarke, are decidedly urban. However, when it comes to mass
gatherings, we all share the same goal, ensuring that our
communities are prepared for and can respond to the challenges
of protecting mass gatherings. To that end, I look forward to
this morning's testimony.
[The statement of Chairman Thompson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman Bennie G. Thompson
Good morning. I'd like to thank our witnesses for appearing before
us today.
When Americans think of ``mass gatherings''--events like the Super
Bowl, the National Conventions, and the Pope's recent visit come to
mind. How the Department of Homeland Security manages and coordinates
these high-profile National Security Events is certainly worthy of
discussion but that is a discussion for another day. Today, we turn our
attention to the challenges of securing mass gatherings that: are not
considered ``National Special Security Events''; do not have the
Federal Government coming in to run security; and are held in
communities that do not have huge amounts of resources for security.
Think of State Fairs, collegiate sporting events, and even large
shopping complexes during the holiday season.
Mass gatherings, whether they have National Security event rating
or not, could be particularly tempting targets for Al Qaeda and other
terrorist organizations with the goals of: killing and injuring the
most people; destroying the most infrastructure; and having the
greatest impact possible with the least amount of effort.
As you all know, I have made it a priority to look at mass
gatherings of all types. In fact, last year, I directed committee staff
to explore a variety of venues to see how mass gatherings are being
handled. At these venues, committee staff observed members of the
public and private sectors working to ensure the health, safety, and
security of all involved. They found that support personnel at these
venues are doing the best they can with what they have, especially when
they do not have the benefit of substantial Federal support. This
exploration culminated in a report that the majority staff of the
committee released in May entitled ``Public Health, Safety, and
Security for Mass Gatherings.'' The report concluded that while local
and State officials' efforts are laudable, the Federal Government needs
to partner with them in three particular areas: Countering biological
threats; collaborative planning; and partnering across sectors.
Among the report's recommendations were that the Department of
Homeland Security help the localities hosting these mass gatherings now
by: Strengthening public health and other critical infrastructures;
establishing comprehensive biological surveillance systems; and
ensuring that intelligence about biological threats is made actionable
for decisionmakers on the scene. It is remarkable how State, local, and
private sector partners have worked together to develop solutions on
their own, given the absence of dedicated Federal resources. Fighting a
common fight, they have established trusted relationships with other
very different entities and that trust serves as the basis for sharing
information and resources that would not otherwise occur.
The Department of Homeland Security could stand to learn a lesson
about information sharing here. The Department of Homeland Security
should also take note that the districts that the Members of this
committee represent are diverse. Some (like mine) are largely rural
while others (like the one represented by the Gentlelady from New York,
Ms. Clarke) are decidedly urban. However, when it comes to mass
gatherings, we all share the same goal: ensuring that our communities
are prepared for--and can respond to--the challenges of protecting mass
gatherings. To that end, I look forward to the testimony this morning.
Chairman Thompson. The Chair now recognizes the Ranking
Member of the full committee, the gentleman from New York, Mr.
King, for an opening statement.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding
this hearing.
Obviously, mass gatherings are a matter of great concern
always but certainly since September 11; and I want to commend
the Department for what it has done through the NIPP to try to
address this, because this is primarily a local and State and
private matter. But, on the other hand, it does need
cooperation and assistance from the Department of Homeland
Security; and I think that the NIPP goes a long way toward
addressing that. But, again, this is a matter of great concern.
I know certainly in New York we have had--for instance, in
2004, we had the U.S. Tennis Open, we had the Republican
National Convention, and we had the Yankees all playing in the
same night. There is any number of events like that, such as
New Year's Eve, such as when the U.N. General Assembly is held.
Often there is a Federal and local component. You may have the
U.N. General Assembly and you have the Yankees or the Mets
playing at the same time.
So this is something, obviously, that is of great
importance in a post-9/11 era. It, to me, shows the absolute
necessity of having cooperation at all levels, with a
significant input from the Federal Government, with the concept
being that the locals know better than anyone. Certainly the
Federal Government can provide whatever intelligence or perhaps
coordination is needed, but it is primarily a local
responsibility.
Also the importance of layered defenses. Because there is
no silver bullet that is going to provide the type of blanket
coverage that we may like. For instance, a key component I know
in New York has been the Securing the Cities program which has
been pushed very much by the Department which basically is
intended to protect the city from radioactive devices being
brought in as a first line of defense.
So, all in all, Mr. Chairman, I think this hearing is
vital. It is important. This whole issue is important.
I think the Department has taken very significant first
steps. I commend them for what they have done. Obviously, more
needs to be done. More needs to be done at all levels, and we
have to continue to work toward that.
Mr. Chairman, no opening statement by me would be complete
without my once again stating what I believe is an absolute
necessity of us having an authorization bill this year and
having hearings on it and going forward both for the purposes
of the Department of Homeland Security, for the Committee on
Homeland Security, and also so we can establish a benchmark
that I think has to be set by this committee if we are going to
be a successful committee.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my
time.
Chairman Thompson. Other Members of the committee are
reminded that, under committee rules, opening statements may be
submitted for the record.
[The statement of Hon. Jackson Lee follows:]
Prepared Statement of Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee
July 9, 2008
Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for convening this
important hearing that examines the challenge of protecting mass
gatherings across the United States. Each year, millions of Americans
attend sporting and theatrical events, visit resorts, and frequent
shopping venues. In many ways, these places allow people to gather as
they desire in order to participate in activities that bring them joy
and entertainment.
Unfortunately, these locations are also a potential target for
terrorists. On several occasions, Al Qaeda's leadership has asserted
that causing economic damage to our country is among its chief
objectives. In November 2004, for example, Osama bin Laden asserted
that, ``[w]e are continuing this policy in bleeding America to the
point of bankruptcy.'' When the economic consequences of an attack on a
mass gathering event are combined with the spectacle that video
coverage of it worldwide would cause, it is clear that we need to
ensure that these events are secure and that effective response
measures are in place.
I am grateful, therefore, that Chairman Thompson has provided this
necessary forum to speak on this vital issue and for us to discuss the
best way forward to making sure that the American people can go about
their way of life while knowing that their security is the top
priority.
As Chairwoman of the Transportation Security and Infrastructure
Protection Subcommittee, I am quite familiar with many of the issues
that will be covered in today's hearing. I believe that my
subcommittee's robust oversight over DHS' infrastructure protection
efforts has played a major role in helping to make the Department's
efforts more effective.
The DHS effort to secure mass gathering events is coordinated by
the Commercial Facilities Sector (``CFS''), one of among 18 critical
infrastructure sectors in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan
(``NIPP''). Under this regime, the Department coordinates security
efforts for assets and stakeholders within each of the 18 sectors, many
in the private sector. Each sector has a ``Sector Specific Agency''
(``SSA'') that is responsible for leading the sector's efforts in NIPP
compliance and, therefore, must liaise with the private sector, State
and local governments, and the relevant departments and agencies of the
Federal Government. In the case of the CFS, the SSA is DHS. To be sure,
this is a large task. Not only is DHS a new department with a well-
documented track record of ineffective management, but the CFS, unlike
most of the other 17 sectors, is not a traditionally regulated sector.
In the case of the Energy Sector, for example, the SSA is the
Department of Energy which has a long history of coordinating and
regulating the sector's various stakeholders. Although such
coordination and regulation has not, hitherto, been based upon
security, preexisting partnerships can be leveraged for security-
related activities.
Not only is DHS the SSA for the CFS, but it does not have a long
history working and cooperating with the sector. Therefore, DHS must
work harder. Accordingly, I know that my subcommittee will continue to
provide DHS and the sector with the resources it needs to execute its
vital mission.
I must state clearly, however, that I commend Assistant Secretary
Robert B. Stephan's leadership at DHS and the work he has done to
develop the NIPP and to coordinate the relevant departments and
agencies. I do believe his authority to coordinate NIPP-related
functions must be legislatively strengthened to ensure better
implementation of the NIPP--something that has been greatly lacking.
With regard to the CFS specifically, Chairman Thompson and I have
directed committee staff to assist us in examining the activities of
this very important--and visible--sector. I applaud the organizational
work that DHS has done to enable it to do more security-related work in
the sector. By forming eight subsectors and convening regular meetings,
Assistant Secretary Stephan has taken important steps to solidify a
sector that was not preexisting prior to September 11, 2001. With that
said, several steps are necessary to move from organizational progress
to robust implementation of security and response-related measures and
I have many concerns.
First, my subcommittee held a hearing on March 12, addressing the
security efforts currently underway in the United States in preparation
for the Vancouver Olympics in 2010. During that hearing, several
experts testified that Congress should consider creating a lead at DHS
for non-National Special Security Events.
Second, DHS needs to develop clear metrics for the implementation
of security and response-related measures in the CFS as soon as
possible. These metrics need to address exercises, resources
allocation, and contingency planning efforts. I look forward to working
with the Department to learn what it needs to make the metrics
development process work as well as to help it acquire the necessary
information from industry to feed those metrics. One response that I
will not tolerate from the Department, however, is that the Paperwork
Reduction Act prohibits the Department from acquiring information about
security from the private sector. If the Department needs assistance to
develop these surveys, then my subcommittee is eager and ready to
assist.
Third, I also encourage the Department to utilize the authorities
that Congress has already allocated. For example, Assistant Secretary
Stephan has effectively begun to use the convening power provided by
the Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council (CIPAC). I
hope, however, that the CIPAC will seek to incorporate members that do
not merely represent an association, but include individual asset
owners and operators so that it is clear that these entities are
acquiring the necessary knowledge to implement security and response-
related procedures.
Fourth, I hope that the Department leverages its voluntary private
sector preparedness certification program that was a part of the
``Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.''
This program can be used to encourage companies to meet voluntary
standards using a market-based approach. I look forward to hearing from
Assistant Secretary Stephan about how this program has been introduced
to the CFS.
Fifth, I am very interested in the exercises taking place in the
CFS and how post-exercise reports are utilized: I would like a full
description of these exercises, their participants, and their
frequency.
On all of these topics, I am eager to hear from the Department
about the tools and resources it needs to effectively secure the CFS.
Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for holding this important hearing
today. I look forward to continuing to work aggressively on these
issues.
Chairman Thompson. I welcome our first panel of witnesses.
Our first witness is well-known to the committee.
Lieutenant Colonel Robert Stephan is Assistant Secretary for
Infrastructure Protection at the Department of Homeland
Security. He is responsible for the Department's efforts to
secure different aspects of the Nation's infrastructure,
including our commercial facilities where many mass gatherings
occur and for which risk management assessment is a must.
Our second witness is Vice Admiral Roger Rufe, Director of
Operations Coordination and Planning at the Department of
Homeland Security. His responsibilities include integrating
component agency operations across the Department, coordinating
with other Federal and non-Federal agencies and ensuring that
the National Operations Center, which monitors many mass
gatherings, functions efficiently and effectively.
We thank both witnesses for their service to the Nation and
for being here today.
Without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be
inserted into the record.
I now ask each witness to summarize his statement in 5
minutes, beginning with Assistant Secretary Stephan.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT B. STEPHAN, USAF (RET.), ASSISTANT
SECRETARY, INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, NATIONAL PROTECTION AND
PROGRAMS DIRECTORATE, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Colonel Stephan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
King and distinguished Members of the committee. I appreciate
the opportunity to speak to you today and address DHS's efforts
to enhance the security of mass gathering venues.
Places of mass gathering actually comprise a very diverse
group of commercial facilities and assets, typically privately
owned and operated, which may include sports venues, amusement
parks, concert halls, retail malls, office buildings,
residential apartment buildings, hotels or resorts, a very
diverse landscape of things that we have to worry about as
potential target sets. These facilities make up the Commercial
Facilities Sector under the National Infrastructure Protection
Plan, or the NIPP, and generally follow a model of open access
to enable operations and hence represent an inherent security
challenge.
Maintaining a balance between open access and security is a
primary concern to both the Department and stakeholders at the
State, local and private sector level within this sector. To
address this complex dichotomy, DHS plays a key role in terms
of information sharing, threat awareness, risk assessments,
exercises and training, best practices, facilitating public-
private sector interactions, sometimes at the local level, and
incident management. These activities are frequently augmented
by specific Federal support to select special events at
commercial venues.
It is necessary to frame the context of this discussion
around a central point: Mass gatherings are overwhelmingly and
predominantly owned and operated by the private sector. Hence,
the Department must leverage partnerships and relationships
with the sector as well as State and local government officials
to achieve success. This engagement supports a balanced
approach that fairly addresses public and private sector
concerns and, more importantly, ensures that risks are
appropriately and reasonably mitigated.
Within this engagement, most security and emergency
response planning across localized venues is principally the
responsibility of the private sector and State and local
officials at the venue level, with the role of the Federal
Government to augment and facilitate this process in many
significant ways as appropriate.
To facilitate and catalyze strong interaction among various
private sector, local and State authorities, the Department has
developed a series of initiatives that involve face-to-face
venue-level engagements. These interactions serve a variety of
purposes. Our protective security advisors are in place in
communities throughout the Nation to assist with local to
protect local efforts to protect assets and provide a Federal
resource to communities, businesses and State and local law
enforcement and emergency managers.
Over the life of the program, our folks in the field have
provided support to over 400 mass gatherings and special
events. We have also supported selective security assessments
and planning, as examples, for the papal visit to Washington,
DC, New York City, the Super Bowl and Rose Bowl earlier this
year.
DHS has also provided similar support to sporting
organizations and events, including 30 outreach activities to
NASCAR venues, supporting mass evacuation and emergency
response planning, providing situational awareness, exercise
planning, and observation and participation in various security
summits.
DHS also sponsors the buffer zone protection plan program
grant initiative. As of May, 2008, we have reviewed 863 buffer
zone plans for the commercial facilities sector, awarding grant
funds to State and local jurisdictions exceeding $50 million.
Sir, as an important and troubling side note, the House
markup of the 2009 DHS budget includes effectively an
elimination of this program. This is a very important error I
think that needs to be corrected, because this is one of the
most unique programs in our inventory that specifically drives
me and my staff down to a local level of collaborative planning
and focusing money on targeted capabilities, gaps within State
and local law enforcement jurisdictions that surround these
particular commercial venues. That money has effectively been
zero-ized in our 2009 budget. We would like your support to
correct that wrong as the bill moves through Congress.
To augment our boots-on-the-ground efforts in coordination
with our private sector partners we have created a suite of
planning and informational resources that assist commercial
facility owners and operators in enhancing their security
posture. The various publications, vulnerability and risk
assessment methodologies, reports that highlight common
vulnerabilities within the commercial facility sectors,
recommended approaches to reduce or manage risk and to
effectively deal with various aspects of various threat vectors
have all been provided in my written testimony. I will not
elaborate on them there, other than to reemphasize the fact
that we have done quite a bit of work across a wide range of
activities, including information sharing exercises,
vulnerability assessment, on-site collaborative security
planning. The Department continues to move forward in this
area.
In terms of concluding my opening remarks, I would like to
take a moment to thank the committee for bringing this very
important topic to the floor of discussion.
As many of you recall, 3 years ago the Department was
severely chastised by our own Inspector General's office and by
the media for focusing on special events that happened to take
place in local venues across the country. One that specifically
comes to mind is the Mule Day Parade in Tennessee. We were
specifically criticized for tracking and putting that event in
our national asset database. That is unfortunate because,
setting aside the importance of the mules temporarily, there
are 150,000 to 200,000 people that gather in rural Tennessee
one place, one time, 1 weekend every year. That to me is
150,000 to 200,000 potential targets that involve the loss of
human lives.
So I am glad to see that this committee considers and
acknowledges the importance of these particular mass
gatherings. Because they make up the fabric of America, and we
are here to secure that piece of America that often goes
overlooked.
Thank you, sir; and I look forward to your questions.
[The statement of Colonel Stephan follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert B. Stephan
July 9, 2008
Thank you, Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King, and all of the
distinguished Members of the committee. I appreciate the opportunity to
speak to you about the Department of Homeland Security's efforts to
enhance the security of mass gathering venues. Today also serves as an
opportunity to initiate a dialog to address the issues identified in
the majority staff report, ``Public Health, Safety and Security for
Mass Gatherings.''
``Places of mass gathering'' actually comprise a very diverse group
of commercial assets and facilities, typically privately owned and
operated, which may include sports venues, amusement parks, concert
halls, retail malls, office buildings, residential apartment buildings,
and hotels and resorts. These facilities, which make up the Commercial
Facilities Sector under the National Infrastructure Protection Plan
(NIPP) framework, may be generally characterized by one of four common
traits: business activities, personal commercial transactions,
recreational pastimes, and accommodations. The Commercial Facilities
Sector's requirement of open access, which is necessary to successfully
conduct operations associated with these types of facilities,
represents an inherent security challenge.
Maintaining a balance between open access and security is a primary
concern to both the Department and the stakeholders of the Commercial
Facilities Sector. As is consistent throughout the private sector,
business activities are driven by profitability. Owners and operators
strive to ensure that patrons enjoy easy access to facilities; however,
there is also an increasingly clear understanding within the sector
that today's risk environment dictates a degree of security not
previously seen in this very visible sector. To address this complex
dichotomy between business operations and effective security solutions,
DHS plays a key role in terms of information sharing, threat awareness,
risk assessment processes and tools, exercises and training, best
practices, facilitating public/private sector interactions, and
national incident management activities. These activities are augmented
by specific Federal support to select special events at commercial
venues.
Reviewing the Department's efforts in this Sector, I think it is
necessary to frame the context of this discussion around a central
point: Much like the bulk of the Nation's CIKR, this sector is
overwhelmingly and predominantly owned and operated by the private
sector. Hence, the Department must leverage partnerships and
relationships with the sector and State and local government entities
to achieve success. This engagement supports a balanced approach that
fairly addresses both public sector and private sector concerns and,
more importantly, ensures that risks are appropriately and reasonably
mitigated.
The partnership framework for those relationships is laid out in
the NIPP. As you know, the NIPP is an outcome of Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7), which identified 17 Critical
Infrastructure and Key Resource sectors and tasked the Department with
developing a plan to enhance protection and security found in and
around the Nation's critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR).
In addition, HSPD-7 designated the Department as the Sector Specific
Agency (SSA) for a number of the 17 (now 18) CIKR sectors, including
the Commercial Facilities Sector. Subsequently, DHS, in conjunction
with 17 executive branch signatory departments and agencies, developed
the NIPP, along with the associated Sector Specific Plans (SSP). DHS,
as the SSA for the Commercial Facilities Sector, spearheaded the
development of the Sector's SSP, which was released in May of last
year.
The NIPP provides guidance on addressing both terrorist threats and
all-hazard incidents using the Sector Partnership Model through which
coordinated planning and program implementation may take place. The
Commercial Facilities SSP, much like the other SSPs, molds the NIPP's
guidance to effectively address the diverse, complex, and unique
environments and relationships found within the Sector. Moreover, the
Sector Coordinating Model serves as an avenue through which the sector
can inform the Department of requirements for tools, information, and
training.
Reviewing the wide range of products and services that DHS has
developed in collaboration with the Commercial Facilities Sector, I
once again emphasize the importance of strong partnerships between and
among DHS, the private sector, and State and local government
officials. Ultimately, security and emergency response planning is the
primary responsibility of the private sector and State and local
officials at the venue level. The role of the Federal Government is to
augment and facilitate this planning process as appropriate. Incident
response typically highlights this division of roles; in the event of a
terrorist attack or natural disaster, local law enforcement and
emergency services providers will be the first on the scene,
immediately coordinating and collaborating with the private sector. The
more informed both parties are of facility and community capabilities
and gaps, the better the planning process and overall joint response
will be.
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS AND SITE SECURITY PLANNING
To facilitate strong interaction among DHS, the private sector, and
local authorities, the Department has developed a series of programs
and initiatives that involve face-to-face, venue-level engagements. The
interactions serve a variety of purposes, including leveraging security
specialist subject matter expertise to identify vulnerabilities and
security gaps, recommending strategies to close security gaps,
facilitating communications, initiating and maintaining relationships
between the private sector and local authorities, and providing
training and situational awareness.
As you are no doubt aware, the Department's infrastructure
protection work is not performed only in Washington, DC; rather, it
takes place across the country via the Protective Security Advisor
(PSA) cadre. PSAs are in place in communities throughout the Nation to
assist with local efforts to protect critical assets, providing a
Federal resource to communities and businesses. During natural
disasters and contingency events, PSAs work in State and local
Emergency Operations Centers. PSAs also provide real-time information
on facility significance and protective measures to facility owners and
operators, as well as State and local representatives.
Typically, PSAs are engaged to support the planning and execution
of National Special Security Events (NSSEs), led by the U.S. Secret
Service, as well as non-NSSEs, led by the Department's Office of
Operations Coordination and Planning under the direction of my
colleague Vice Admiral Roger Rufe. These programs are designed to
provide an objective framework through which Federal, State and local
entities can identify special events occurring within their
jurisdiction; request Federal support and training; and, after careful
evaluation and assessment, receive Federal operational support as
appropriate. I'll defer to VADM Rufe for a more in depth discussion of
the NSSE program, although I will briefly describe contributions from
personnel within the Office of Infrastructure Protection. These
personnel administer a variety of training courses for the relevant
public and private sector personnel; conduct site assistance visits and
buffer zone plans for the venue and adjacent infrastructure; provide
situational awareness and intelligence briefings; and provide
geospatial products of area CIKR. Over the life of the program, PSAs
and other security specialists from my office have provided support to
over 400 mass gathering and special events, and 156 Special Event
Assessment Rating (SEAR) Levels 1, 2, and 3 Special Events. Most
recently, we have supported security assessments and planning for the
Papal Visit to Washington, DC, and New York City, Super Bowl XLII, and
the Rose Bowl.
As part of their steady-state activities, PSAs work with State and
local law enforcement and the private sector in identifying critical
infrastructure assets, identifying vulnerabilities, recommending and
implementing protective actions/measures, and providing risk mitigation
training designed to teach terrorism prevention, detection, and
awareness to facility owners/operators and State and local law
enforcement entities.
DHS has provided similar support to sporting organizations and
events, such as the National Football League, Major League Baseball,
National Basketball Association, National Collegiate Athletic
Association, as well as sporting and mass gathering venue managers
associations in general. For example, specific to race events, PSAs
work closely with NASCAR--having conducted over 30 outreach efforts to
NASCAR venues, including mass evacuation and emergency response
planning, providing situational awareness in the run up to and
throughout events, exercise planning and observation, participating in
NASCAR Security Summits, and conducting security surveys.
In addition to the PSA program, the Buffer Zone Protection Program
(BZPP) grant initiative, one of the Department's most successful, long-
running programs, is administered by my office in conjunction with
FEMA. This program is designed to provide local law enforcement and
emergency responders and other public sector entities with the
resources necessary to enhance security and responsiveness ``outside
the fence'' at CIKR sites, including those in the Commercial Facilities
Sector. Local entities are able to purchase equipment and training
resources for the purpose of increasing preparedness, thereby
complicating a terrorist's plans to attack from the vicinity adjacent
to CIKR sites, ultimately buying down risk on a local and regional
level. As of May 2008, the amount of BZPP grant funds awarded to the
commercial facilities sector has exceeded $50 million.
The Site Assistance Visit (SAV) program is another long-running DHS
program that has had a measurable impact on the Commercial Facilities
Sector, particularly those sites that would be considered places of
mass gathering. SAVs identify vulnerabilities, leading to a dialog
between DHS and the facility owners/operators and local authorities
concerning means of mitigating identified vulnerabilities. As of May
2008, there have been 246 SAVs performed at various commercial
facilities across the Nation. We are also in the process of adding a
cybersecurity analysis component to the SAV program, which will further
enhance this program's value to our private sector partners.
PLANNING DOCUMENTS AND TOOLS FOR PRIVATE SECTOR USE
To augment our boots-on-the-ground efforts, in coordination with
our private sector partners, DHS has created a suite of planning and
informational resources that assist owners and operators of the
Nation's CIKR in enhancing security around their facilities. One of
these products, the Protective Measures Guide for U.S. Sports League,
released in January 2008, has been specifically designed for use by
participating representatives of the Sports Leagues and Public Assembly
Sector Coordinating Subcouncil (an organization formed under the NIPP
framework). Private sector participants included Major League Baseball,
Major League Soccer, NASCAR, the National Basketball Association, the
National Football League, the National Hockey League, and the United
States Tennis Association. The guide provides an overview of protective
measures that can be implemented to assist sports teams and owners/
operators of sporting event facilities in planning and managing
security at their facilities. DHS plans to develop additional
protective measures guides for the remaining six Commercial Facilities
subsectors over the next 2 years, with guides for the Retail, Lodging,
and Outdoor Events (Amusement Parks/Fairs) subsectors to be released in
fiscal year 2009.
The Department has also developed Common Vulnerability (CV),
Potential Indicators of Threat (PI), and Protective Measures (PM)
Reports based on data gathered from Site Assistance Visits and the
Buffer Zone Protection Program, for use by local law enforcement and
asset owners and operators to support their efforts in securing CIKR
assets. The CV, PI, and PM reports have been updated and conveniently
integrated into a single document for 17 facility types within the
Commercial Facilities Sector. They have been distributed widely,
including via the Commercial Facilities Sector Coordinating Council and
its eight Subcouncils, in addition to the Homeland Security Information
Network--Commercial Facilities Sector (HSIN-CFS) portal.
FEMA has also created the Risk Management Series, designed
specifically for commercial facilities, which includes a large suite of
man-made disaster publications directed at strengthening the building
inventory to reduce the potential impact from the forces that might be
anticipated in a terrorist assault. The objective of the series is to
reduce physical damage to structural and nonstructural components of
buildings and related infrastructure, and to reduce resultant
casualties from impact by conventional bombs, chemical, biological, and
radiological (CBR) agents; earthquakes; floods; and high winds.
One publication in the FEMA Risk Management Series, Methodology for
Preparing Threat Assessments for Commercial Buildings (FEMA 452), is
designed to assist commercial facility owners/operators in assessing
the vulnerabilities, threat, and risks associated with their
facilities. FEMA 452 has been used to assess hundreds of buildings
within the Commercial Facilities Sector. Currently, the number of
people trained in FEMA has increased to 775; it is estimated that an
additional 15 training sessions will be offered by September 2009.
In terms of self-assessment tools available to the Commercial
Facilities Sector, DHS is currently redeploying the Vulnerability
Identification Self-Assessment Tool (ViSAT), to be designated the
Risk--Self-Assessment Tool (R-SAT). R-SAT's building block, ViSAT, is a
Web-based self-assessment tool developed by DHS and provided free of
charge to CIKR asset owners/operators. The goal of this program is to
raise the level of security at CIKR facilities across the Nation and to
assist in establishing a common baseline of security from which all
assets in certain sectors or subsectors can identify weaknesses and
establish protection plans. Modules have currently been deployed for
stadiums, arenas, convention centers, performing arts centers, and
speedways. Approximately 1,000 commercial facilities have access to
ViSAT, and DHS has provided a grant to the International Association of
Assembly Managers, a co-chair of the Public Assembly Subcouncil, to
promote and provide training for this tool.
INFORMATION SHARING
The Department's Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis
Center (HITRAC) conducts all-source intelligence research and analysis
to assess the potential threat to critical infrastructure and key
resources across the Nation, as well as develop lessons learned
products derived from attacks on commercial venues abroad. HITRAC's
goal is to provide owners and operators of CIKR with strategically
relevant and actionable information on threats they face, primarily
from terrorists. HITRAC conducts outreach to both private and public
sector partners through classified and unclassified threat briefings to
members of private sector coordinating councils; Government
coordinating councils; State and local officials; and individual
companies. In the last 10 months alone, DHS HITRAC has released more
than seven products specific to places of mass gathering, including
bulletins related to Super Bowl XLII, the recent Papal visit to
Washington, DC, and New York City, and threats to popular sports and
entertainment venues.
Among other means, DHS disseminates these bulletins by the Homeland
Security Information Network (HSIN), the Department's primary platform
used to facilitate the information-sharing necessary for coordination,
planning, mitigation, and response by the Government and the private
sector regarding threats to sectors identified by DHS. HSIN is an
internet-based platform that enables secure, encrypted Sensitive But
Unclassified/For Official Use Only (SBU/FOUO) level communications
between DHS and vetted private sector members, both within the
Commercial Facilities Sector and across other sectors identified by
DHS. The Commercial Facilities Sector maintains an independent site on
the HSIN portal, which was designed and implemented in collaboration
with its Government Coordinating Council and Sector Coordinating
Council, and presently has 131 registered GCC and SCC organizational
users.
The next generation of HSIN for the Commercial Facilities Sector,
based on requirements developed by the sector itself, will include
additional features enhancing the value and utility of the platform.
Updates will include a virtual incident coordination center acting as a
``one-stop-shop'' for incident operations information sharing and
improved Sector content management capabilities.
TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES
We are also firm believers that in addition to providing on-site
assessments, self-assessment tools, and disseminating threat and
intelligence information, providing training to the private sector is a
critical component of enhancing security capabilities. DHS engages the
private sector through a number of different educational opportunities,
including conferences and seminars, and takes advantage of association
and trade conferences, working with our partners in the Commercial
Facilities Sector. DHS has made presentations, facilitated table-top
exercises, or exhibited educational materials at 12 major sporting
events related seminars or conferences since 2005. Audiences have
included sport-specific conferences as well as facility manager
conferences.
The Private Sector Counterterrorism Awareness Course is designed to
improve the knowledge of private sector security professionals by
providing exposure to key elements of soft target awareness,
surveillance detection, and improvised explosive device (IED)
recognition. The workshop training materials enhance and reinforce
participants' knowledge, skills, and abilities related to preventing,
protecting against, responding to, and recovering from terrorist
threats and incidents. The workshop outlines specific counterterrorism
awareness and prevention actions that reduce vulnerability and mitigate
the risk of domestic terrorist attacks. DHS has provided this training
to 336 Commercial Facilities Sector representatives.
The Soft Target Awareness Course is available to property/facility
managers, supervisors, first-line managers and their security and
safety staff, and entry level employees. Participants receive an
introduction to terrorism; learn to recognize and prevent terrorist
activities (basic surveillance detection methods); learn the basics of
prevention, response, and recovery; and then discuss with other
attendees issues specific to their sector of business. DHS has provided
this training to 1,935 Commercial Facilities Sector representatives.
The Surveillance Detection Course is intended for commercial
infrastructure operators and security staff. This course is designed to
provide attendees with a foundation for identifying locations conducive
to observing facility operations and/or personnel, employing the
fundamentals of surveillance detection, and observing and reporting
suspicious individuals and activity around facilities. DHS has provided
this training to 509 Commercial Facilities Sector representatives.
The Protective Measures Course is the Department's newest training
available to Commercial Facilities Sector personnel in the public/
private sector and is designed to provide students with the knowledge
to identify vulnerabilities and select appropriate Protective Measures
for their unique facility. The course focuses on providing information
pertaining to common vulnerabilities, available Protective Measures,
and strategies for selecting appropriate Protective Measures.
DHS is also developing an Active Shooter Training Guide to enhance
CIKR employee preparation for active shooter events. An active shooter
event is generally defined as a situation where an armed person has
used deadly force against other persons and continues to do so while
having access to additional victims. The final product will be a desk
reference guide addressing how employees, managers, training staff, and
human resources staff, at their respective levels, can mitigate and
appropriately react in the event of an active shooter. This material is
slated to be distributed to the commercial facilities sector partners
prior to the 2008/2009 holiday shopping season.
The Bomb-Making Materials Awareness Program (BMAP) is designed to
increase private sector and citizen awareness of activity associated
with bomb making, including the manufacture of homemade explosives for
use in the construction of IEDs. The program reaches out to businesses
that manufacture and sell many of the materials that bomb makers will
attempt to acquire, instructing retail employees not only which
materials they need to be aware of but also how to better identify
``suspicious behavior.'' The awareness tools, which include cards and
posters, are industry-specific and can be kept at the point of sale for
easy reference. DHS has provided this training to 28 Commercial
Facilities Sector representatives.
DHS also has developed a number of courses and training tracks for
Commercial Facilities Sector association training venues, such as the
International Association of Assembly Managers (IAAM) Academy for Venue
Safety and Security (AVSS). This training includes security planning
and life safety management for the public assembly venue industry. The
core educational tracks are Risk Management, Emergency Planning,
Security Operations, and Training. These tracks familiarize students
with the many types of emergencies that can occur at public assembly
facilities, and they offer techniques for planning, implementing, and
ensuring the safety of patrons, staff, and facilities. Later this
month, we will visit the Academy to discuss Evacuation Planning at
Events/Venues of Mass Gathering.
Going beyond private sector association activities, DHS is reaching
out to academia for research and education focused on the Commercial
Facilities Sector through the University of Southern Mississippi's
Center for Spectator Sports Security Management Advisory Board. The
Center was established through a grant awarded by DHS. The Center is
the first of its kind in the United States, building capabilities among
those responsible for sports events and security management through
research, education, and outreach efforts. Research conducted at the
Center for SSSM has already paid off, identifying gaps in the education
and training of current sport event management professionals. DHS works
closely with the Center, participating with the Advisory Board in an
information-sharing capacity.
NASCAR MASS EVACUATION PLANNING GUIDE FOR MAJOR EVENTS
Last, as you know, earlier this year, DHS released the NASCAR Mass
Evacuation Planning Guide for Major Events, which was developed through
a DHS/NASCAR coordinated effort and provides guidance on utilizing a
mass evacuation plan template for NASCAR-sanctioned facilities. The
template was designed to assist NASCAR venues in developing site-
specific evacuation procedures for responding to potential incidents in
an all-hazards environment. The guide was rolled out to the sector in
January 2008 at the annual NASCAR Security Summit. The development of
this guide was an extensively collaborative effort. Meetings with
NASCAR security officials between December 2006 and January 2008 hinged
upon on-site visits to four NASCAR tracks--Lowe's Motor Speedway,
Talladega Superspeedway, Infineon Raceway, and the Milwaukee Mile.
Our intent was to develop a flexible guide that each NASCAR venue
type could utilize as a baseline for developing an individualized plan
suited to the unique characteristics and jurisdictions that exist from
track to track. This requires a collaborative planning process with the
active participation of both private and public sector stakeholders at
the local level. This process also ensures that the plan is developed
to the resources available to support plan implementation.
Our long-term objective is to develop similar evacuation guides for
other venues within the Sports Leagues Subsector and, eventually, for
the entire Commercial Facilities Sector. A working group comprised of
Federal agencies, stadium associations, universities, and private
sector partners is currently making adaptations to the NASCAR guide for
use at collegiate and professional sports stadiums. This guidance will
be deliverable by January 1, 2009.
PUBLIC HEALTH, SAFETY AND SECURITY FOR MASS GATHERINGS
Concluding my discussion of our progress and accomplishments in
evacuation planning, I would like to take a moment to thank the
committee for the commentary and constructive criticism provided within
the report on Public Health, Safety and Security for Mass Gatherings.
The report highlights the complexity of the Commercial Facilities
Sector, and the Sports Leagues Subsector in particular, to wit: there
are 42 NASCAR events annually, 32 NFL teams, 30 NBA teams, 30 MLB
teams, 30 NHL teams, 14 MLS teams, 116 Division 1 college football
teams that compete weekly from late August through early January of
each year, among a host of other sporting events that occur each and
every week of the year at the professional, amateur, and recreational
level.
From State to State, jurisdictional boundaries vary, law
enforcement and emergency services capabilities vary, legal authorities
vary, and even the characteristics of the numerous sports venues
themselves vary significantly. The one constant is that the individual
facility owner or operator, and the corresponding State and local
officials know the unique circumstances facing the specific asset, and
are, therefore, best positioned to serve as primary lead in
coordination of security and emergency response planning at the venue
level. DHS' role in Commercial Facility Sector events is to augment and
facilitate planning and operational support where necessary and
appropriate, with the specific facility developing the individual plan
side-by-side with local and State authorities. As I previously
outlined, DHS facilitates this coordination through a variety of
engagements. These programs have been made readily available to the
private sector and will be provided on a continual basis to ensure that
DHS thoroughly engages with the multitude of facilities of this type
throughout the Nation--also ensuring that the parties with the unique
knowledge are enabled and contributing to the planning process. The
feedback we have received from our partners has validated our efforts,
and we will continue to solicit feedback on our activities and refocus
where and as necessary.
We are committed to continued engagement with the Commercial
Facilities community not only by sharing our expertise, but also by
enabling frank, two-way discussions focused on the overarching goals of
enhancing their security efforts and protecting the general public.
Thank you for your attention, and I would be happy to answer any
questions you may have at this time.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. I am sure the
people in Tennessee appreciate that shout-out for Mule Day.
Vice Admiral Rufe for 5 minutes, please.
STATEMENT OF ROGER T. RUFE, JR., USCG (RET.), DIRECTOR, OFFICE
OF OPERATIONS COORDINATION AND PLANNING, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Admiral Rufe. Good morning Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
King and Members of the committee. I am Roger Rufe, Director of
the Office of Operations Coordination and Planning at the
Department of Homeland Security. I am pleased to appear today
alongside Assistant Secretary Stephan and the other
distinguished witnesses. Thank you for inviting me to discuss
how the Office of Operations Coordination and Planning conducts
plannings for mass gatherings and other special events.
It is important to recognize that, as Assistant Secretary
Stephan just acknowledged, that the vast majority of planning
that must be done for special events is the responsibility of
State, local and tribal entities. As such, as it is in almost
all cases, Federal support to a special event or a mass
gathering not on Federal property comes only after a request is
received from the special event planners for support and is
deemed to require Federal coordination.
A special event is defined as a function that draws a large
public crowd to the host city or venue. It may also be a
significant political function or world event hosted on U.S.
soil. It can be free or a ticketed event. It may be local or
have regional importance.
The Special Event Working Group, known as the SEWG, or
SEWG, is a group of representatives of various Federal entities
who are involved in planning and coordinating Federal
activities for a special event. The SEWG facilitates a unified
interagency planning and coordination effort for all special
events. In addition, the SEWG identifies events that may
require a coordinated Federal response and collectively
coordinates Federal assets to bridge any capability gaps
identified by State and local partners that have not already
been addressed by exhausting local mutual assistance
agreements.
Within this process, the mission of OPS is to act on behalf
of the Secretary to fulfill his Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 5 responsibilities to integrate DHS and interagency
planning and coordinate operations for designated special
events.
The membership of the SEWG consists of representatives
designated by their respective Federal departments, agencies
and components. Presently, there are upwards of 50 Federal
entities with representatives assigned to the SEWG. I submitted
a list of these member agencies along with my written statement
today.
DHS has developed a method for assigning a relative risk
level to the multitude of special events Nation-wide brought to
our attention by State, local and tribal entities. This is
important as the Federal Government cannot support every
special event occurring across the 56 States and territories of
the United States. It is important to understand that entry of
a request to be evaluated for a designated risk level is
completely voluntary. Except in rare cases, DHS does not
evaluate events for risk level unless the event is nominated by
an appropriate State, local or tribal entity.
The first step in this evaluation process is a Special
Event Data Call. This automated system allows special event
planners from across the country to enter information regarding
upcoming events into a database. The most recent data call,
which covers calendar year 2008, had over 4,000 events entered
primarily by State and local planners.
Once the data call is closed, the events are run through
the risk methodology program, which analyzes response criteria
captured by the questionnaire and then assesses stages of
threat, consequences and vulnerabilities for each event. This
results in a preliminary Special Event Assessment Rating, or
SEAR, level for an event, categorized as SEAR levels 1 through
5.
The preliminary ratings are passed to the SEWG co-chairs by
OPS for further consideration. The SEWG co-chairs are made up
of FEMA, OPS, our risk management folks at DHS, the FBI and the
Secret Service.
These co-chairs treat the preliminary SEAR rating output as
a starting point to identify the final SEAR level. The co-
chairs analyze the initial ranking to account for any special
circumstances, such as whether there has been a request for
assistance from planners and whether a current threat has been
identified for the event.
The Federal Government coordination and non-SSE special
events is concentrated on those events designated as SEAR Level
1 or 2. These events are ones for which either direct or
extensive Federal interagency security and incident management
preparedness is required and some level of predeployment of
Federal assets is required. For every SEAR Level 1 or 2 special
event, a Federal coordinator is appointed by the Secretary to
serve as the Secretary's representative and has responsibility
for coordinating Federal assets for an event. An Integrated
Federal Support Plan is also developed.
For these events, SEWG's interagency threat committee also
generates a Joint Special Event Threat Assessment. These
assessments are crafted by interagency Intelligence Community
professionals and are distributed to Federal partners as well
as to State and local fusion centers in need of the
information. The focus is upon intelligence, threat, risk
information and identifies critical infrastructure and key
resources in proximity to large events.
Regardless of the SEAR level designation assigned, the
Federal Government can remain involved with a special event.
DHS will maintain awareness of all known special events through
monitoring by a national operations center. In addition, State
and local planners may request support for their events from
the Federal Government and agencies located near the event.
I am pleased to report to you today this progress that DHS
has made with the interagency community and how we deal with
these special event requirements each year. I would be happy to
answer any of your questions.
[The statement of Admiral Rufe follows:]
Prepared Statement of Roger T. Rufe, Jr.
July 9, 2008
Good morning, Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King and Members of
the committee. I am Roger Rufe, Director of the Office of Operations
Coordination and Planning at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
I am pleased to appear today alongside Assistant Secretary Stephan and
the other distinguished witnesses. Thank you for inviting me to discuss
how the Office of Operations Coordination and Planning (OPS) conducts
planning for Mass Gatherings and other Special Events. I welcome this
opportunity to discuss the Special Events Working Group and how their
planning effort facilitates the ability of the Secretary of DHS
(Secretary) to execute his incident management responsibilities in
accordance with Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 (HSPD-5).
The Secretary's role in this arena is that of his overall
responsibility for the execution of the key missions of DHS: preventing
terrorist attacks; reducing the country's vulnerability to terrorism;
minimizing damage and assisting in recovery from terrorist attacks that
do occur in the United States. It is important to recognize, though,
that the vast majority of Special Events are the responsibility of
State, local and tribal entities. As such, in almost all cases, Federal
support to a Special Event or a Mass Gathering not on Federal property,
comes only after a request is received from the Special Event planners
for support and is deemed to require Federal coordination.
SPECIAL EVENT WORKING GROUP (SEWG)
The Special Event Working Group (SEWG) is a group of
representatives of various Federal entities who may be involved in
planning for or coordinating Federal activities for a special event. To
paraphrase, a special event is defined as a function that draws a large
public crowd to the host city or venue in combination with political
importance and local, regional or international significance. The SEWG
was formed in April 2004, to validate a methodology for identifying and
categorizing special events (other than those designated as National
Special Security Events (NSSE)), and coordinating Federal support to
those events.\1\
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\1\ National Special Security Events are significant domestic or
international events, occurrences, contests, activities, or meetings,
which, by virtue of their profile or status, represent a significant
target, and therefore warrant additional preparation, planning, and
mitigation efforts. The designation process for NSSEs is established by
NSPD-46/HSPD-15, Annex II and HSPD-7.
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The mission and purpose of the SEWG is to support a unified
interagency planning and coordination effort for Special Events and to
ensure coordination of Federal support to the designated event. The
SEWG identifies events that may require a coordinated Federal response
and collectively coordinates Federal assets to bridge any capability
gaps identified by State and local partners that have not already been
addressed by exhausting local mutual assistance agreements. Within this
process, the mission of OPS is to act on behalf of the Secretary and
his HSPD-5 responsibilities to integrate DHS and interagency planning
and coordinate operations for designated Special Events in order to
prevent, protect, respond to and recover from terrorist threats/
attacks.
The SEWG consists of several elements: (1) The five Co-chairs of
the SEWG who consist of senior or executive level (GS-15/SES) managers
from OPS, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the United States Secret Service (USSS)
and DHS Office of Risk Management & Analysis (RMA); (2) the SEWG
General Membership itself; and (3) the DHS programmatic, coordination
and administrative staff dedicated to SEWG which is housed in OPS.
The membership of the SEWG consists of representatives designated
by their respective Federal Departments, Agencies and/or Components.
These representatives are traditional Federal agencies with missions
that are related to Special Events planning, coordination, and
execution, and span the four pillars of the National Response
Framework: Prevention, Protection, Response and Recovery. Presently,
there are upwards of 50 Federal Departments/Agencies and their
Components with representatives assigned to the SEWG (see the attached
exhibit No. 1).
PRIORITIZING SPECIAL EVENTS
DHS, including the Office of Risk Management and Analysis (RMA) and
the Office of Intergovernmental Programs (IGP) has developed a method
for assigning a relative risk level to the multitude of special events
Nation-wide brought to our attention by State, local and tribal
entities. This is important as the Federal Government cannot possibly
support every ``Special Event'' occurring across the 56 States and
territories of the United States. It is important to understand that a
request to be evaluated for a designated risk level is completely
voluntary. Except in exceedingly rare cases, DHS does not evaluate
events for their appropriate risk level unless the event was nominated
by an appropriate State, local, or tribal entity. On numerous
occasions, DHS's Office of Intelligence and Analysis has reviewed and
provided substantive input into a State and local produced threat
assessments.
The first step in this evaluation process is the Special Event Data
Call. This automated system, allows Special Event planners from States,
cities and localities to enter information regarding upcoming special
events into a database. The most recent Data Call which covers Calendar
Year 2008 had over 4,000 events entered primarily by State and/or local
Planners. This list is the crucial starting point and is the only
method that provides DHS and the SEWG with situational awareness.
In order to ensure the Special Event Data Call properly conducts a
preliminary assessment of events, the DHS SEWG has developed a
questionnaire for individuals at the State and local level who are
users of the system and entering their special event data. Once the
data call is closed, the events are run through the risk methodology
program,which analyzes response criteria captured by the questionnaire
and assesses stages of threat, consequences and vulnerabilities for the
event. This results in preliminary Special Event Assessment Rating
(SEAR) level results, which are categorized as SEAR Levels 1-5. The
preliminary ratings are passed to the SEWG co-chairs by OPS for further
consideration. The SEWG, OPS, RMA, and IGP work with their respective
subject matter experts to ensure the methodology fits the needs for the
users at the Federal, State and local levels.
The SEWG co-chairs treat the preliminary SEAR rating output as a
starting point to identify the final SEAR level. The co-chairs analyze
the initial ranking to account for any special circumstances, such as
whether there have been requests for assistance from planners and
whether a current threat has been identified.
SEAR LEVEL 1 & 2 EVENTS
The Federal Government involvement in non-NSSE special events is
concentrated on those events designated as SEAR Level 1 or 2.
An event is considered to be a SEAR Level 1 when it is an event of
significant national and/or international importance that may require
extensive Federal interagency security and incident management
preparedness. Pre-deployment of Federal assets as well as consultation,
technical advice and support to specific functional areas in which the
State and local agencies may lack expertise or key resources may also
be warranted. In order to ensure unified Federal support to the local
authorities and appropriate national situational awareness, a Federal
Coordinator (FC) will be designated, and an Integrated Federal Support
Plan (IFSP) will be developed.
A SEAR Level 2 event is a significant event with national and/or
international importance that may require direct national-level Federal
support and situational awareness. The magnitude and significance of
these events calls for close coordination between Federal, State, and
local authorities and may warrant limited pre-deployment of USG assets
as well as consultation, technical advice and support to specific
functional areas in which the State and local agencies may lack
expertise or key resources. In order to ensure unified Federal support
to the local authorities and appropriate national situational
awareness, a Federal Coordinator (FC) will be designated and an
Integrated Federal Support Plan (IFSP) will be developed.
On the other hand, SEAR Level 3, 4 and 5 events do not have a FC
identified nor an IFSP generated, however, State and local officials
may still solicit resources from Federal agencies at the agencies'
expense.
Regardless of the SEAR Level designation assigned, the Federal
Government can remain involved with the special event. DHS will
maintain awareness of all special events through reporting produced by
the National Operations Center (NOC). In addition, State and local
planners may request support for their events from the Federal
Departments and Agencies located near the event.
I would like to note that the SEAR levels themselves are an
excellent illustration of the cooperation and coordination accomplished
in the SEWG. The SEAR level system is the evolution of various Special
Event ratings previously used in the Federal Government. Until 2006,
DHS used Special Event Homeland Security (SEHS) as the DHS standard.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation used Special Event Rating Level
(SERL) as their standard. Often levels were different from one
organization to another. Through interagency cooperation fostered by
the SEWG, it was agreed that the SERL/SEHS terminology would be
eliminated, and the common term SEAR would be utilized by Federal
planners for all rated events. For the first time, the interagency
community had one term and one method to describe and categorize
Special Events.
A Federal Coordinator (FC) is assigned for every SEAR Level 1 or 2
special event. The FC is nominated by a SEWG member agency, approved
and appointed by the Secretary, and has responsibility for coordinating
Federal Assets for an approved SEAR Level 1 or 2 Event. He or she
serves as the Secretary's representative locally and is selected from
the ranks of the trained Principal Federal Official cadre if available
or another experienced senior or executive Federal manager. Whenever
possible, the FC is selected from the local area of the event being
supported.
Responsibilities of the FC include:
Engaging Federal, State and local officials; consult State
and local authorities on their event plans;
Coordinating the field information required for the
completion of the Integrated Federal Support Plan;
Coordinating Integrated Federal Support Plan (IFSP) input
from interagency HQS elements through OPS Special Events Staff;
Assessing, evaluating and de-conflicting requests for
Federal assistance;
Coordinating requests for assistance and identified
capability gaps with DHS, HQ and/or Field Elements and other
Federal Departments/Agencies.
For every SEAR Level 1 and 2 event, an IFSP is also prepared. The
IFSP is a collaborative effort of the SEWG and is designed to:
Inform the Secretary and FC of all the Federal activities
and support in preparation for and execution of a Special
Event;
Facilitate the FC's ability to initially participate within
the Unified Coordination Group in case of an incident to
support the Secretary's incident management responsibilities;
Educate Federal interagency partners on Federal resource
application.
Additionally, there are special threat products produced for each
SEAR Level 1 and 2 event. The SEWG has a robust interagency threat
committee which works to generate Joint Special Event Threat
Assessments (JSETA). These assessments are crafted by interagency
intelligence community professionals who belong to the SEWG threat
committee and are specific to Level 1 and Level 2 events. JSETA are
distributed to the interagency community for situational awareness as
well as to the State and local fusion centers in need of the
information. They focus upon intelligence, threat and risk information,
and identify critical infrastructure and key resources in proximity to
large events.
CONCLUSION
I am very pleased to report on the progress DHS and the interagency
community has made in how we support Federal, State, and local events.
The SEWG, in conjunction with the SEWG Threat/Risk Assessments,
Methodology, Airspace Security committees, continue to work together to
ensure that appropriate events are covered from a Federal perspective.
The SEWG also ensures that there are no gaps in local plans and/or
duplication of Federal efforts to support those plans. The SEWG does
not interfere or limit any member agency's ability to conduct its core
mission, if appropriate, regardless of the SEAR level of the event. The
success of DHS in supporting Special Event Planners is due to the
cooperation and coordination found in the SEWG, with the ultimate goal
of rendering appropriate Federal support for mass gatherings and
Special Events.
I hope that this testimony leaves you with an understanding for the
efforts that DHS, OPS Coordination and Planning and the SEWG have made
to improve planning and Special Event coordination. Thank you for the
opportunity to report to the committee on our ongoing efforts. I
request that you place this testimony and the list of SEWG member
agencies in the permanent record and would be pleased to answer any
questions at this time.
EXHIBIT 1.--2008 SPECIAL EVENTS WORKING GROUP MEMBERSHIP
The interagency Special Event Work Group has members from the
following organizations:
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
Office of Grants and Training (G&T)
Office of National Capital Region Coordination (NCRC)
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
United States Coast Guard (USCG)
United States Secret Service (USSS)
Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A)
Office of Operations Coordination (OPS)
Incident Management Division (IMD)
National Operations Center (NOC)
National Preparedness and Programs Directorate (NPPD)
Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP)
Office of Intergovernmental Programs (IGP)
Risk Management & Analysis (RMA)
Cyber Security & Communications (CSC)
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO)
Office of Private Sector Coordination
Office of Science and Technology (S&T)
Office of Health Affairs (OHA)
Office of General Counsel (OGC)
Office of Public Affairs (OPA)
Department of Justice (DOJ)
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives (ATF)
Counterterrorism Division/DOJ HQS
Criminal Division/DOJ HQS
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
Terrorist Screening Center (TSC)
U.S. Marshals Service (USMS)
Department of Agriculture (USDA)
Department of Commerce (DOC)
Department of Defense (DOD)
U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM)
Joint Task Force--Civil Support (JTF CS)
National Guard Bureau (NGB)
Joint Staff
NORAD
Office of Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)
Department of Energy (DOE)
Department of Health and Human Service (HHS)
Department of the Interior (DOI)
Department of State (DOS)
Department of Transportation (DOT)
Department of Treasury (TREAS)
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
Homeland Security Council (HSC)
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)
National Security Agency (NSA)
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
I will start our questions for our first panel.
Assistant Secretary Stephan, before I ask my first
question, I want to just share with you my disappointment in
the chemical security bill progress that we worked with your
staff and this committee staff on for more than 9 months. At
the beginning of that process, another committee had a hearing;
and a day before the hearing, we received a letter saying you
were against the bill. We had worked in good faith with you on
that.
I have since sent the Secretary a letter asking for a
clarification on how we worked for 9 months on getting a
chemical facility bill through this body. This committee passed
it. When another committee takes it up, you are against it.
So I just wanted to let you know that some of us are real
concerned that if there was opposition to a bill, the way we
work it out--and this committee does a good job at it--is we
work it out before we go public. That was a real concern on my
part, and I just wanted to make sure that you understood the
disappointment we had. Because we spent time in my office and
committee staff on trying to work the bill out.
Colonel Stephan. Sir, may I respond to your point?
Chairman Thompson. Sure.
Colonel Stephan. I just would like to remind you that we
did, in fact, provide several objections to the bill during a
previous testimony that I delivered personally to your
committee Chairmanship and to several of the subcommittee
meetings chaired by Chairwoman Jackson Lee. We have also worked
with your staff to voice our objections over time as the bill
seemed to get larger and larger and larger and more complex
over time, and I believe we did a fairly good job at bringing
you and your staff and Ms. Jackson Lee up to speed in terms of
our specific objections. Not many of those objections, however,
were noted in the final version of the bill.
Chairman Thompson. Well, thank you. We are both on the
record now. So we have a record.
Admiral Rufe, one of the things we are told by State and
locals is that, every time an event occurs, they have to make
an application, whether it is an event that--let's take the
mule event. If it happens every year, there is some concern as
to whether or not the laborious process of repeating the
submission of the data can somehow be streamlined. Have you all
looked at that?
Admiral Rufe. Yes, sir. We have a questionnaire that we
have developed over time. In fact, we just met yesterday with a
focus group to look at it again. We try to improve that over
time to make sure it meets the needs of the State and local
folks so that we are not asking for information that is not
useful.
I understand the concern that we would be asking for the
same thing for a similar event each year. But, over time, the
State and local capacity to be able to handle those events may
change, may get better or may degrade. The event itself may
grow or shrink. The participation could grow or shrink.
Certainly the threat from year to year may change. So while an
event may rate at one level one year, it may change the next
year depending upon the response to the questionnaire by the
State and locals who are submitting the information.
Chairman Thompson. So is your testimony that you plan to at
some point re-look at the information requested?
Admiral Rufe. Yes, sir. Actually, we do that every year.
The process starts right about now for next year, in fact. We
hope to have it complete by December 1.
The initial step in the process is to meet with
representatives of about five to eight States who represent a
focus group for us to look at what we did the previous year to
make sure the questionnaire is meeting their needs as well as
our needs and then changing it as we need to, and we will do
that each year depending upon feedback that we get from our
partners.
Chairman Thompson. Colonel Stephan, you know, most of us
live in communities where there are a number of gatherings of
all sorts, from State fairs to what have you. They do make
attractive targets. To what extent have you communicated with
State and locals what you have to offer in support of their
security concerns?
Colonel Stephan. Sir, I principally do that through my
protective security advisors. I have 78 of them deployed now
throughout the country, some in rural areas, some in major
urban areas in the United States. We have a request for 10
additional positions in our 2009 budget which I hope that you
all support.
Those are my eyes and ears forward. They are my boots on
the ground. They have developed, over the 3 years of the
program's life span to date, very extensive collaborative
relationships with State homeland security advisors, local
officials, municipal officials, emergency managers and, most
importantly of all, private sector owners and operators, to
include commercial venue owners and operators where lots of
these mass gatherings take place. Principally through that
forward arm, they facilitate a more detailed level planning for
events that don't necessarily pop up on Admiral Rufe's radar
screen through his process.
I think top-down through that process as well as bottom-up
through my protective security advisors, I think we are doing a
fairly good job now of providing more blanket coverage
situational awareness training exercise involvement doing site-
specific vulnerability assessments and just helping out our
State and local partners in many ways.
Chairman Thompson. I yield to the gentleman from New York
for 5 minutes.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Colonel, Admiral, I want to thank you for your testimony.
Secretary Stephan, one of the things we have learned over
the last several years--and Congressman Lungren made this clear
during the whole port security debate about the importance of
layers of defense and levels of cooperation in trying to stop
the enemy from getting here.
As you look back over the last several years with what you
have tried to do with mass gatherings, what has struck you as
being the most successful part of your program? As we look to a
new administration, what do you feel has to be done over the
next several years to strengthen our position? I am not asking
you to give away any weaknesses. What particular areas would
you recommend the next administration focus on when it comes to
mass gatherings?
Colonel Stephan. Sir, some of the most important progress
we have achieved again lies in the area of the massive boots-
on-the-ground interaction we have now at these local venue
levels. But I think we have also set up a framework with the
leadership at the State and local level as well as within the
private sector venue owner and operator community.
We have provided them risk assessment and vulnerability
assessment methodologies. We focus, based upon risk, on
actually conducting physical and cyber on-site assessments of
these different facilities. We have provided them massive
amounts of training to both security guys at the venues
themselves as well as within State and local law enforcement
jurisdictions that have responsibility in some way, shape or
form for securities venues. We have attempted to target grant
money specifically to capabilities gaps that have been
identified in collaborative security plans.
So I think the planning framework, the training framework,
the exercise framework is there. The challenge for the
remainder of this administration and the next administration is
to try to figure out how to stretch the dollars, the Federal
grant dollars, and to support to the extent that you can so you
can make sure that no important things fall through the cracks.
As Admiral Rufe pointed out, it is impossible for us to be
everywhere, nor is it really our responsibility as the Federal
Government to be everywhere. But we do need to continue the
pace of the interaction providing the framework, the tools, the
methodologies, the planning templates for security and mass
evacuation and so on and so forth that we have established. So
we just need to push that kind of activity further, further,
further down the bean trail and hopefully at some point in time
the trainer concept will kick in; and for every dollar I spend,
State and local officials and the private sector, most
importantly, will be spending $10, $100 or $1,000 based upon
the models and templates we have provided them.
Mr. King. Do you find that local officials are cooperative?
For instance, is there a difference between doing a New Year's
Eve event in Manhattan and doing a Mule Day event in Tennessee?
Do you feel that your Department is able to cope with different
part of the country and adapt to different situations?
Colonel Stephan. Certainly. One thing I have learned is
every jurisdiction is different from every other jurisdiction
across the country, and I think the places where we have
probably the most challenge is where a certain number of scarce
resources are distributed across different law enforcement and
emergency management jurisdictions. Getting everybody to
acknowledge that they need to be part of a collective plan
instead of all individually trying to own a shiny new fire
truck and a swat team capability and sexy night vision goggle
equipment--not everybody needs all of that. We need to have a
collaborative plan, multijurisdictional in nature for these
specific areas we can carve out and define across the United
States and have people support their part of the plan. We
train, organize and equip to do that. I think that is one of
the most significant challenges we face.
Mr. King. Thank you.
Admiral Rufe, the DHS information network that you have
that provides intelligence and information, how do you screen
who is going to get that? What are the precautions that are
taken? Who is going to receive that? At what level are they
getting it?
Admiral Rufe. Yes, sir. In fact, I was going to add to what
you just asked Assistant Secretary Stephan. One of the
improvements I think we have made in this area is in that
information-sharing piece. For each one of these SEAR Level 1
and 2 events, we do a Joint Special Event Threat Assessment,
which is done by the intelligence professionals in the
interagency; and that is shared, obviously, with the people who
need to have it at the local events for which the threat
assessment is made.
In addition to that, I think a great step forward has been
our State and local fusion centers. Because any actionable
intelligence that is going to affect the local community is
pushed forward as soon as we have it to the State and local
fusion centers to ensure it gets distributed adequately to
anybody who needs to have access to it.
Mr. King. Thank you. Thank you for your testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
I yield 5 minutes to the gentlelady from the Virgin
Islands, Mrs. Christensen.
Mrs. Christensen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and thank you
for holding this hearing. It is an important issue. Thank you
for the report which really sets a good stage for us to begin
to do some more work on this issue.
Welcome to our two panelists. As a physician, I am going to
ask you some health-related questions.
First, I am extremely concerned about the ability of
States, territories, tribes and localities to deal with mass
casualties, which could certainly occur if a mass gathering
were to be hit with a disaster or an act of terrorism. How has
the infrastructure protection, Colonel Stephan, taken the
requirements for med surge into account and especially given
the inability of most hospitals to take on any more patients,
given that they are stressed to the max as it is? Actually,
both of you could answer.
Colonel Stephan. Yes, ma'am. I will do my best, although I
will have to defer to a FEMA representative in our Office of
Health Affairs as they kind of own this responsibility within
the Department.
Mrs. Christensen. That is going to get me to my next
question.
Colonel Stephan. For example, we have worked very
specifically with the NASCAR community over the past 18 months
to develop a mass evacuation guidelines template for them. We
have worked with the NASCAR leadership, security and emergency
preparedness folks, looking at three or four different size and
complexities of various NASCAR venues around the country. We
work with them hand-in-hand and with a represented sampling of
local officials, emergency managers and health community
experts to build a planning guide, which I have actually
brought with me to leave with the committee if you are
interested.
This includes important medical and public health
considerations, to include: What is the capacity? Have you
thought about, if you don't have the capacity locally, where
are you going to take your patients in prioritized sequence?
Those kind of questions are asked in the template.
Now it is the responsibility for the NASCAR leadership to
take this template to the two dozen or so major venues around
the United States of America and push out this guidance and
let's work with them to help build those plans to the extent
that we have the resources to do that.
Mrs. Christensen. You made a comment about the need to
provide the buffer funding.
Colonel Stephan. Yes, ma'am.
Mrs. Christensen. Do you think that we need to pay at least
the same amount of attention to building up the health and
infrastructure in communities around our country so that they
would be better prepared?
Colonel Stephan. I think as a general answer I would say,
yes, we have to focus on the resiliency and the capacity of the
medical and public health care community, especially with
respect to very specialized types of threat factors, such as
burn victims and so on and so forth, given certain types of
threat scenarios where we probably do not still have sufficient
capacity across the country.
Mrs. Christensen. Admiral, did you want to answer the
question?
Admiral Rufe. The only thing I would add, ma'am, is that
the national response framework which was recently published is
the framework for our response to any event. Any event
involving--whether it is a hurricane or a natural disaster or a
terrorist attack, you always have to be concerned with the idea
of a mass casualties. Within that national response framework
there is a natural disaster medical system that HHS is
primarily responsible for supporting. It does provide teams
that can come into different areas to support the State and
local folks and their needs for specialized training or for
just augmented medical help.
Mrs. Christensen. Right. In the Virgin Islands we have
taken advantage of some of the DEMAT and other teams.
But to go back to Colonel Stephan, you mentioned the Office
of Health Affairs; and I am always interested in how they are
being utilized within the Department. So how have you worked
with the Office of Health Affairs to address the health
concerns? Have their policy and programmatic input been
incorporated into the product?
Colonel Stephan. I think the principal distinction between
Dr. Runge's job and mine is he is responsible for coalescing or
coordinating the medical and public health aspects of the
Department's approach to incident management to steady state
policy development, and so on and so forth.
Where we have an overlap is in the medical and public
health sectors, as defined in HSPD-7 as well as the food and
agricultural sectors as defined in HSPD-7. We have a cross-
fertilization especially in the research and development and
modelling and simulation and analysis world with not only Dr.
Runge's office but also Admiral Cohen's office, the Science and
Technology Directorate, where I serve as a source of
requirements from the field from those three sectors: medical,
public health, food and agriculture.
We use an annual reporting process to determine what
modeling simulation analysis, research and development and raw
science requirements come up from the field. We risk them or we
risk categorize them and push them both to Dr. Runge for his
shop as well as to Admiral Rufe for final action to stay
engaged in the process as we research and develop things.
Mrs. Christensen. They do provide input into the planning
and the process that you oversee in terms of identifying the
needs and the vulnerabilities and implementing the actions and
measures? They have provided input that is used?
Colonel Stephan. Yes, ma'am.
A specific example is we collaborated very closely with Dr.
Runge's shop to develop the Pandemic Influenza Guide across the
critical infrastructure sectors to include commercial venues.
That is a document that has been finalized, writ large across
the sectors, and we are in the process of either distributing
or finalizing documents that are sector-specific. I, again,
have a copy of this guidance document for you.
Mrs. Christensen. Thank you.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
I now recognize the gentleman from Connecticut for 5
minutes, Mr. Shays.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and thank you to our
witnesses for being here.
I would like to have you give me a sense of how you sort
out what right the public has to know if their life is
potentially in danger. We had this challenge before September
11. I chaired the National Security Subcommittee in 1998, and I
focused on terrorism. That was the focus of our Committee on
Government Reform. When I talked about a Department of Homeland
Security, people said, what are we, Great Britain? It was just
like foreign to them. But we all knew that the Twin Towers was
a target. We all knew it. In 1999, 1998, 1997, it had been a
target in 1993, and we knew it still was a target. They failed
to get it the first time. It was still a target.
When September 11 happened, I had constituents who said:
How come you didn't tell me? So I am going to quickly give you
an example, a real-life example.
A number of years ago, we were given a very real briefing
that there was a suspected--in December a suspected terrorist
effort to hijack planes coming from Europe, Great Britain and
Europe. We were told there were six cities that were potential
targets for a dirty bomb. So I will just ask you rhetorically.
Hearing that, would you have your daughter go to Europe, your
son, daughter go to Europe during that time? No. Would you have
them go to the celebration, the New Year's celebration in New
York? No. You are not go going to do that. You are going to
tell your friends not to do it. That is exactly what I did.
Then I said it publicly, and the shit--excuse me--things hit
the fan.
What I want to know is, where do you draw the line? If you
know for a fact that five cities are a target and you believe a
dirty bomb is what you are concerned about and you are using
technology to determine if there is radioactive material, why
doesn't the public have a right to know if you sure would tell
your own family?
I want both of you to answer.
Colonel Stephan. Sir, I will take a shot first, if you
don't mind.
I think that every one of these scenarios is actually an
individual case study, although there are certain principles
that I believe the Secretary, the Intelligence Community, and
all the way up to the President kind of walk through in order
to gauge the response or the final decision that is made.
Some things would be: How specific, how credible, how
imminent is the threat? How mature and how advanced is the
plot? What is the opportunity to apprehend more of the network
if, by waiting, you could do that? If you waited 1 hour or 2
days, could you bag more of the network or not? What is that
all about? Will public release have a deterrent effect? That
is, if the cat is out of the bag, are they now going to execute
their plot or are they going to move it elsewhere?
A final principle would be: Will public release, in fact,
cause more mass panic and hence potentially self-generate
casualties than the terrorist attack itself or self-generated
consequences than the terrorist attack itself?
I think the senior administration decisionmakers, to
include our Secretary and the FBI Director and others up to the
President, have to walk through very carefully a series of
principled questions before they can get to your answer.
Mr. Shays. Colonel, I think that was a very thoughtful
answer. Thank you.
Admiral.
Admiral Rufe. Yes, sir.
I don't think I can improve very much on what the Assistant
Secretary just said. I would only add that I am sure that the
Secretary--if we had very actionable, specific intelligence
that was targeted at a specific community, and going through
the criteria that Bob has discussed here, the Secretary would
certainly lean forward in terms of talking to the Governor,
talking to the mayor, talking to the local folks who are, after
all, responsible for their citizens' safety to make sure that
that was a decision that they did together, rather than in
isolation.
Mr. Shays. Now, in this case, they actually stopped 11
planes and they never flew from Europe. So we knew our
intelligence was pretty accurate. Eleven planes never flew from
Great Britain because of suspected terrorists.
So you have gone through that process with me. Give me an
example of where the public would have a right to know.
Admiral Rufe. I will just say that if we knew for sure that
there was an attack that was imminent, that there was no
opportunity to interrupt it or there was a high degree of
uncertainty that we could interrupt it and that folks' lives
were in danger, I would say that would be a case where we
would--I would expect--I can't make that decision myself, but I
would expect the Secretary and the President would be very
forthcoming in terms of getting that information to the people
who needed to have it.
Colonel Stephan. Sir, I would also add to that. The more
specific the targeting information is--for example, if we could
drill down to an individual facility--the easier the decision
becomes. If it is a sector-wide threat or a widespread
geographic area of the United States, the decision becomes more
complex and complicated.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. I think your answers were very
thoughtful. Thank you.
Mrs. Christensen [presiding]. Thank you.
The Chairwoman now recognizes Mr. Pascrell for 5 minutes.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you.
Secretary Stephan, I am concerned about a couple of things
here, and that is--and thank you for both of your answers to
the gentleman from Connecticut--the sharing of information when
there are potential events. It would seem to me one of the
biggest criticisms in the first 2 or 3 years that we kept on
hearing all over the country was locals being the last resort
for information.
How do you put a list together? You have all of these
events. You have an inventory of events out there; and, as you
said, you can't cover all of them. So you are really depending
upon local responders and local enforcement folks to do what
they usually do at these events.
Since 9/11, there has not only been a high alert from the
Federal Government but also by local enforcement. You want them
to have the resources. You want them to have the training. The
training would seem that is very--you know, we have a role. The
Federal Government has a role in making sure--but what is your
specific relationship with the local governments in putting the
list together and then making sure that they are involved in
prevention, detention, and response?
Colonel Stephan. Sir, I am going to answer your question,
but I want to defer the part about how the list comes together
to my colleague, Admiral Rufe.
For known events on more of a major scale, specific threat
assessments or risk profiles are put together by the Intel
Community--that spans DHS, the FBI, the CIA and others--and we
put together documents that are shipped out to the localities
where the venue or the mass gathering is taking place.
Mr. Pascrell. But do you use local input in the first
phase? That is my question.
Colonel Stephan. To the extent that there have been
incidents or suspicious activities reports over time that have
been generated not related to the event or specific to the
event----
Mr. Pascrell. Is the network set up to do that right now?
Colonel Stephan. Yes, sir. I believe it is.
Mr. Pascrell. So, in other words, you are saying that local
folks on the ground, particularly law enforcement in this case,
have the wherewithal, have been taught the strategy and are
trained to provide this information to you? Is what you are
saying?
Colonel Stephan. Sir, I am saying, generally speaking, the
answer to your question is yes. The fusion center, as Admiral
Rufe pointed out----
Mr. Pascrell. We will get to that in a sec.
Colonel Stephan [continuing]. Are going to put an
immeasurable capability enhancement in place once those things
get fully set up. Importantly, prior to the events taking place
in many cases as well as during the events themselves, I have
my protective security advisors actually manning the fusion
centers, the State emergency OPS centers, the local OPS
centers, basically provide the incident command and control for
the venue. Though the means of that person, I am extracting
information from the national headquarters in the intel
community and I am feeding locally produced information through
that guy back up to my headquarters.
Mr. Pascrell. So you are getting information from--if I can
use the term--``below'' as well?
Colonel Stephan. Yes, sir. Through my deployed network of
boots-on-the-ground.
Mr. Pascrell. That was not happening before 9/11?
Colonel Stephan. I didn't have this capability 3 years ago.
Mr. Pascrell. This was not happening. This is a very
important ingredient to protecting people.
Colonel Stephan. I agree.
Mr. Pascrell. Now let me ask you this question: What are
you preparing in terms of this information to the transition
team of the next administration?
Colonel Stephan. In terms of----
Mr. Pascrell. Well, what are you readying--what are you
providing? GAO has done a report on what is being transferred,
what is being prepared for whoever becomes the President of the
United States.
Colonel Stephan. Sure.
Mr. Pascrell. I can only assume--and I am not going to
assume it--what are you preparing? What is your agency, which
plays a very critical role in protecting America----
Colonel Stephan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Pascrell. Are you preparing a transitional carry-off,
hand-off to the next administration?
Colonel Stephan. Yes, sir, I am. Every single one of the
divisions that works for me is either a GS-15 or a senior
executive service member that is career in nature. They will be
in place. They know their programs.
Mr. Pascrell. I am sorry.
Colonel Stephan. They know their programs. They know their
people. Transition briefings have been or are being assembled,
up-to-date, sector-by-sector checklists of what the status of
the sector are, where we are going. In fact, Congress will
receive a status of the 18 critical infrastructure sectors
series of reports the first week in November.
Mr. Pascrell. We have been asking about this to many of the
agencies that have come before the committee or subcommittees
about their obligation. By the way, it is a legal
responsibility that we do this. I just want to know, is your
agency up to snuff right now?
Colonel Stephan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Pascrell. You are on time? You are on target?
Colonel Stephan. Sir, we are on time. We are on target. The
only person that gets decapitated in this process is,
unfortunately, me.
Mr. Pascrell. Why?
Colonel Stephan. Everybody below me--because I am a
political appointee, sir.
Mr. Pascrell. Some political appointees will be here next
year, correct?
Colonel Stephan. Sir, some may; some may not. I don't want
to forecast the future.
Mr. Pascrell. I have seen some folks come before us that I
would recommend. I don't care what your political persuasion
is. I could care less. You do your job in protecting our
families and our neighborhoods. The rest is all baloney.
Colonel Stephan. Sir, that is a great approach.
Mr. Pascrell. Yeah. Well, that is me. I know I speak for
myself.
Let me ask this question--can I ask one more question,
Madam Chair?
Mrs. Christensen. If it is very short, very brief.
Mr. Pascrell. I will try to be short.
Admiral, the National Operation Center, a very key
ingredient to what we are talking about today, you folks pay
attention to mass gatherings. But what exactly do you do in the
process? How do you do that?
Admiral Rufe. Well the National Operation Center is the
Secretary's and is the Nation's, actually, primary situational
awareness and incident management node. It supports the
Secretary during the steady state times every day, 24/7, 365
days of the year.
They monitor--the watch monitors all manner of things going
on during the course of the day, including the special events.
So if the mule event that was described before, we are aware of
that. We know the date is happening. We have contact
information. Importantly, everybody who has a special event
knows the National Operational Center is the way to contact the
Federal Government should there be a need either just prior to
the event or during the event for any kind of Federal support.
Mrs. Christensen. I am going to have to----
Mr. Pascrell. Just one follow-up.
Mrs. Christensen. No, I can't because I have too many other
people.
Mr. Pascrell. I am not going to ask a question.
Mrs. Christensen. You are already 2--almost 3 minutes over
time, and we have a lot of other people to ask questions.
Mr. Pascrell. I want to go back to the point I made with
what Mr. Stephan said before.
Mrs. Christensen. Maybe someone will yield you some time
during their questions, but I have to give the other Members an
opportunity to ask their questions.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Lungren for 5 minutes.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much.
As maybe the only Member here who has ridden a mule on Mule
Day in Bishop, California, I hope you are aware of that Mule
Day as you are of the one in Tennessee.
I want to thank both of you gentlemen for your public
service. I happen to think, both in the military service that
you engaged but also now, you have made a real contribution to
our country; and I appreciate the work product that you have
put out and the status that we are at now versus where we were
before the two of you took your positions.
Second, you are talking about transition. We are going to
bring new people in no matter who wins the next election, and I
hope you will have some lexicon for them of the acronyms that
you have. Because I counted 24 in your two testimonies: DHS,
SSA, NIPP, HSPD, CIKR, SSP, PSA, NSSE, SEAR, BZPP, SAV, CV, PI,
PM, HSIN-CFS, whatever that is. I suppose if you had human
relations there, it would be his and hers. But I don't know how
to pronounce it. CBR, ViSAT, R-SAT, HITRAC, BMAP, SEWG, RMA,
IGP, SBU/FOUO.
We sometimes talk about our kids texting, and we can't
understand what they are saying. I don't think they have
anything on you two. So I appreciate the work that you have
done.
Let me just ask you this. The Federal Government can't do
everything, can't be everywhere, can't be all things to all
people; and I think we have to state that right up front. There
seems to be a tendency in this town that nothing is important
unless it is Federal. Whether it is the Supreme Court or
whether it is the Congress or whether it is the President, if
it is not the FBI investigating, it is not an important crime,
which is just totally wrong since about 98 percent of all the
violent crime is taken care of by local and State government.
That being the case, it seems to me very important that we
don't make your structures so heavy on the top that we don't
have that conductivity that is necessary, the interoperability,
the exchange of information on the ground floor where things
really happen.
The Chairman mentioned that we have a diversity of mass
gatherings all the way from Mule Days to the Super Bowl and
everything in between. So it seems to me it is important to set
up the structures that you have talked about to make sure they
are functioning.
But, to me, the overriding factor where the Federal
Government can contribute, where local and State cannot do, is
in the area of intelligence. What I mean by that is, you can be
the gatherers of information from the bottom up, but,
obviously, the Federal Government, through DHS, has a capacity
for intelligence gathering around the world on its own with our
intelligence agencies and foreign intelligence organizations as
well. That is why I hope the Senate is going to complete the
work on FISA today so that we will have a capability of getting
that information in very real ways.
My question to you, Secretary Stephan, is this. To what
extent is the intelligence received and analyzed by our various
elements of the Federal Government broken down and given out to
the people on the ground, the boots on the ground, local and
State governments in a comprehensive and understandable way so
that they can make it work from an operational standpoint?
To me, we can do all--everything else that you have talked
about, but if we fail there we basically failed in the true
Federal responsibility. How do you do that now? Where are
there--if there are any holes in that, that you need to improve
on, that we need to improve on?
Colonel Stephan. Sir, for my part of the information
sharing puzzle, I try to focus on getting products together and
disseminating them to the private sector; and then, through the
operations center and other avenues within DHS, the State and
local piece comes into play. I will defer that part to Admiral
Rufe.
But we focus on building the products collaboratively with
the private sector. So we have gotten these folks--now almost
between 900 and 1,000 of them--security clearances so they can
help in actual product development, be part of the process up
front, help us craft a document that is not just written by
just the intel folks. Because the intel folks again will have
their own speak, and we need at the end of the day the products
that are used in the field to be understood by the private
sector folks.
So we build in now some things up front, a very important
part of the process where the private sector can come in
through our sector coordinating council process and the cleared
members. We have made tremendous progress with the FBI and
Intelligence Community to declassify or downgrade from Secret
and above to FOUO.
We probably have still some work to do in terms of
shortening that timeline so that we can get it more quickly in
the hands of the private sector. But when I joined the
Department in 2003, that was taking a week or more. Now it
happens in the course of hours or a day or so, depending on
what situation we are talking about. We have made tremendous
progress there, but it needs to be a lot--just even a lot
quicker than that.
We also need to expand the platform through which
information is exchanged with the private sector. We released a
new contract or awarded a new contract with the HSIN network
about 2 months ago, working collaboratively with Admiral Rufe
and his staff. He has the lead for this project.
The first priority of that advance-generation HSIN network
is the private sector portals that are a piece of the overall
puzzle. We are leading that first to get the information to the
private sector at kind of the head of the line, if you will. So
I think there will be tremendous strides made within the next 2
to 12 months.
We are going to cover down on about nine items of general
functionality across the 18 critical infrastructure sectors
within the first 60 days of the program in its advanced phase.
In the course of the next year, we will develop additional
capabilities and functionalities sector by sector using their
inputs.
So we have got products that are built at the top. They are
integrated by using overseas intelligence, domestically
produced intelligence, sometimes from the State and local
community, sometimes from private sector folks. We have got
more of them cleared in now to help shape the products.
We are pushing strategic and tactical level intel out to
the field. We surge during special events to provide advanced
capability. We are maturing and expanding the platform to get
information out; and, ultimately, that is going to allow us to
migrate a capability user potential from 7 to 10,000 to
multiple tens of thousands, I believe, over the next year or
so. So I think that is what this is all about.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you.
Admiral Rufe. Well, the only thing I would add for the
National Operations Center that Mr. Pascrell asked about a few
minutes ago, within the National Operations Center is an
intelligence watch and warning branch that is our connectivity
on a 24-hour basis with the Intelligence Community, CIA and all
the other members of the Intelligence Community that brings in
actionable daily intelligence. Anything that is hot, we get
immediately. We disseminate that through that watch and warning
branch to the State and local fusion centers any information
that is of relevance or importance to them. So I think that
system is working better, working well.
In addition to that, we have 10 different police
departments that have put officers in the National Operations
Center from around the country. So, for instance, Miami/Dade,
Las Vegas Police Department, Chicago, Metropolitan Police
Department all have officers in our operations center that see
the same intelligence every day that I do.
Mrs. Christensen. Thank you.
Admiral Rufe. They don't distinguish. They get the same
access that I do.
Mrs. Christensen. The Chairwoman recognizes Mr. Carney for
5 minutes.
Mr. Carney. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
This is for both of you. I represent an area that has kind
of a unique event. I have the Little League World Series in my
area. You know, in central Pennsylvania we don't have a lot of
the resources available, but yet the world comes to central
Pennsylvania. It is not just Little League players from around
the country; it is from around the world too.
How much work do you do with organs of security of other
countries, of the visiting countries, in preparation for
something like this?
Admiral Rufe. Well, certainly part of what we do when we
give our data call out to the State and locals to find out what
events we are looking at, we ask them what capacity that is
being brought to bear that they can address as part of what is
being prepared for this event. That enables us to determine how
much additional capacity they need.
In terms of what foreign support is given, I have to get
back to you on that, because I don't know that, for instance,
for the Little League World Series, that the nations that send
their teams over here provide any particular intelligence or
security support to those teams, but I can answer that for the
record if you would like.
Mr. Carney. Sure. Well, I would like to see that. For
example, you know, we had a team from Saudi Arabia before, you
know, Latin America, various Asian nations represented as well.
You can imagine a showcase like the Little League World Series,
with what it is, it is as American as it gets. That is
Rockwell's America right there. What a target. So, you know,
working with other security organs of the visiting countries I
think is something I would really like to see what you do.
Colonel Stephan. Sir, we have protective security advisors
on the ground. What they will do is they will plug in, if the
State Homeland Security office is working the overall security
protocols, they will plug in to whatever structure the State
sets up. If the State passes it down to a more local level of
responsibility, my folks would plug in to that type of event at
that level.
We don't do specific, direct outreach to foreign
governments or foreign enterprises, but through the planning
mechanisms and security collaborative framework that the State
or the local guys set up to manage the venue.
Mr. Carney. Well, let me ask this then: Is there a way for
foreign governments to reach out to you and say, ``This is what
we are doing''? Is there some sort of international outreach?
Colonel Stephan. Again, I would--since that particular
event would be hosted in the principle security and emergency
preparedness planning responsibilities either reside at the
State or local level. It would be to reinforce them as they do
their----
Mr. Carney. Sure. I guess I didn't phrase the question well
then. From just the general DHS perspective, do we have the
opportunity or is there a way for foreign governments to keep
us apprised?
Admiral Rufe. Sure. I mean, I don't think there is any
formal mechanism where we reach out to ask them. For instance,
as Bob indicated, the event planners are the ones who are
responsible to alert us to what are the particular
peculiarities of the event and who is coming to support them,
what the capacity is available locally and what the shortfalls
are. That is usually the process in which we get that
information.
Certainly if someone wanted to reach out to us, they could.
If we saw a need, we would probably do it ourselves. Although,
in your particular case, I don't know whether we have.
Mr. Carney. Sure.
Colonel Stephan. For the bigger events such as the national
special security events that are really led by the Secret
Service, those types of formal mechanisms do exist.
Mr. Carney. Okay. Yeah, I mean, the Little League World
Series certainly is not the Super Bowl or NASCAR, but it does
get a lot of play, over a long period of time, frankly, and a
lot of the games are televised. So it is one of the things we
would need, I think, to pay close attention to. But I really
want to understand how everybody works together, from our
Nation to those of the visiting countries as well.
Thank you, ma'am. No further questions.
Mrs. Christensen. Thank you.
Mr. Dent, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Dent. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
To follow up on Congressman Carney's question about these
non-national special security events--he mentioned central
Pennsylvania, Little League World Series--a few miles from
there is Penn State, 110,000 people, six or seven Saturdays
every fall, similar situations in other States, for college
football games.
What can local municipalities and private organizations do
better to utilize Homeland Security dollars to prepare for
these types of non-national special security events? Anyone
want to take a shot at that?
Colonel Stephan. In my opinion, as I stated earlier, I
think a better cross-jurisdictional collaboration in terms of
pulling resources together. In some places that just naturally
occurs, but a lot of it is personality-driven and operating-
environment-driven, jurisdictional-authorities-driven.
But I think one of the big things that I see across the
country, many different States, many different local types of
jurisdictions, the successful or the not-so-successful approach
is based upon the relationships and the pre-event planning that
takes place across jurisdictional boundaries to integrate a lot
of different resources, authorities and capacities together to
solve a common problem.
Admiral Rufe. Grant funding doesn't fall in my area of
expertise, but I know within the Department they are always
reviewing their grant guidance on the various Homeland Security
grants that go to State and locals. If you have something
specific you would like to suggest in terms of a change to
grant guidance, I would be happy to bring that back.
Mr. Dent. I guess my follow-up question would be, what kind
of cooperation have you received from the NFL or Major League
Baseball regarding the preparation for games that might not
rise to a level of a national special security event? What kind
of involvement does the Department have in planning for these
types of events?
Colonel Stephan. Sir, our relationship with them is through
our Commercial Facilities Sector Coordinating Council. We have
a sports league sub-council; that includes hockey, baseball,
tennis, soccer, football, baseball, basketball. We have worked
with them to develop a protective measures guide that we have
recently published, actually in January of this year. That
gives a template for, based upon different threat scenarios,
what are physical protection, cyber protection, insider-threat-
type protection issues you should look at, and how the private-
sector owners and operators need to be connected with State and
local law enforcement emergency managers at the local, State
and Federal level. That is put together jointly with the sports
leagues and now distributed widely across all the cities where
these venues are housed. So that is one example.
Another example is providing them at Government expense,
actually, standardized vulnerability assessment methodologies
that are Web-based, user-friendly tools where the facility can
do a self-assessment. We provide IED-specific training to
security cadres, both on the law enforcement side as well as
the private-sector venue owner and operator side, prior to the
events, where we get with the Homeland Security advisors to
understand the schedule. We push focus training to those
particular jurisdictions based upon an annual event schedule.
Mr. Dent. Thank you.
At this time, I would be happy to yield the balance of my
time to my friend, Mr. Pascrell from New Jersey, if he would
like it.
Mr. Pascrell. How much time is left?
Mr. Dent. One minute, 48.
Mr. Pascrell. I wasn't kidding before when I said the
American people deserve to have a solid transition during the
time of transferring of powers regardless of if it is a
Democratic or Republican President. American people need to not
have extended anxiety over, are we are going to the next
chapter? There should be one chapter here. We should be all on
the same page when it comes to defending the Nation. That was
my point, and I meant what I said.
I think we should, Mr. Chairman, go on record, I think we
should go on record some time in stating this as a principle,
that we believe there should be a continuity. If it need be, to
have some people, even in political appointments--I have met
some great political appointments from the Bush administration.
I didn't find too many redeeming qualities in any other area,
but in Homeland Security I thought there were some great folks
that really loved this country and are seeing beyond the
politics. We should insist upon that, that that is very
important in securing the homeland.
That is my point. Thank you.
Admiral Rufe. I will just respond to that by saying that
the Secretary has made it very, very clear to all of us that
that is one of his main priorities, to make sure that he turns
over a Department that is fully functional, operational and is
in great shape for the next administration, no matter who it
is.
He has taken steps, I think, in terms of putting, as Bob
said, people in place at the non-political level, at senior
levels in non-political positions, to make sure that we have in
place--if the new administration decides to take all the
politicals out, to make sure there are career civil servants in
place at senior levels to make sure there is continuity across
the Department.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you.
Chairman Thompson [presiding]. Thank you.
I think Mr. Pascrell is correct. As you know, we have had a
hearing and some follow-up already on transition. So, this is a
priority, as is the entire transition to the next
administration, for the Department.
We now yield 5 minutes to the gentlelady from New York,
Mrs. Lowey.
Mrs. Lowey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this
important hearing.
Mr. Secretary, Admiral, in April, Pope Benedict visited the
United States, including stops in New York City and Yonkers.
This was a wonderful opportunity for my community, but it came
at great expense to the city of Yonkers. It paid over $400,000
for security. Unfortunately, no Federal funds helped cover the
cost, and Yonkers was told it could reallocate previous DHS
grants in the absence of new money.
Now, this is a recurring issue in New York--Washington, DC,
I would say, as well--as the New York Police Department
provides security for non-head-of-state diplomats attending
United Nations meetings. To date, the New York Police
Department is owed $40 million for security expenses. I am not
sure of the amount of money, Ms. Norton isn't here, but I
believe Washington, DC, faces similar expenses with
Presidential inaugurations.
I would like to ask you whether the Federal Government
should help offset the cost to local governments for the most
high-profile national special security events.
Colonel Stephan. I believe that there are sources of
funding available in terms of some existing Homeland Security
grant programs that can be leveraged to provide enhanced
security for exactly these types of special events,
specifically the UASI program and the State Homeland Security
Grant Program. Again, these moneys can be leveraged to support
surge requirements.
Mrs. Lowey. Well, I would be happy to follow up with that,
because Yonkers is out $400,000, and it is not a local football
game. Having the Pope come is a national event. I was told that
it could reallocate previous DHS grants.
What I was also told is, the way those grants are set up,
that money is already obligated. So what I would like to do,
and I would be happy to follow up with you, is to see whether
there is any way they could apply directly. Because Yonkers was
not given a positive response.
Colonel Stephan. We can reach out to your staff through our
legislative affairs folks and get them in contact with the FEMA
grant shop that really has responsibility for the grant
guidance and the rules of the road, in terms of what can and
can't be used.
Mrs. Lowey. So you are saying there may be a possibility,
although we were told there wasn't, and I thank you.
Colonel Stephan. No, I think what I am saying is your
information is accurate, that previously allocated grant
moneys, moneys that the States were pushed in either 2008, 2007
or earlier, I believe can be used in some way, shape or form to
cover down on some of these expenses, depending on what they
might be.
Mrs. Lowey. Well, I would like to follow up, because the
issue is, if they are already obligated, we are looking for
moneys for an event that are clearly national events. So we
will follow up with you.
When calculating the fiscal year 2008 Homeland Security
Grant Program's awards, FEMA uses threat vulnerability and
consequence criteria to calculate the relative risk of a
terrorist attack on an urban area. While FEMA has not publicly
released all variables that comprise the risk score, it does
not appear as though mass gatherings are included.
Now, another question that I would like to follow up on: Is
there any coordination between your offices and the FEMA grants
directorate in determining how mass gatherings should impact
grant allocations? If not, should mass gatherings be included
in grant determinations?
Because it is not a surprise that New York and Washington,
DC, for example, have these mass events. These are very, very
difficult for a community to deal with and to absorb.
Colonel Stephan. Ma'am, in terms of the overall risk
calculator of the Department, I own the input that feeds the
FEMA folks the infrastructure component across all the risk
engines of the Department. That is based upon a tabulation of a
Tier 1 and Tier 2 set of established criteria, sector by
sector.
Inside the Commercial Facilities Sector, we have various
categories of commercial venues that would be the sites where
mass gatherings would generally take place. They could be
colosseums, arenas, stadiums, amphitheaters, performing art
centers, so on and so forth. Based upon criteria specific to
each category of commercial facility, we do a risk ranking
based on, principally from my shop, potential consequences and
vulnerabilities. I feed that part of the algorithm that FEMA
controls with respect to the infrastructure target set. There
is very close collaboration between my staff and the FEMA staff
that owns that overall algorithm.
Mrs. Lowey. Well, thank you very much.
I see my time is up, so I will save the other question on
interoperability, because I am always interested in knowing who
is talking to who and whether their equipment is interoperable.
But I will save that, Mr. Chairman.
We will follow up with you. I thank you very much for your
response.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. I am sure that the
city of Yonkers appreciates your persistence.
Mrs. Lowey. Well, I am sure they do. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. We now recognize the gentleman from
Colorado, who I am sure has an interest in mass gatherings
going forward, Mr. Perlmutter, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Perlmutter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yes, I do; we have
the two conventions coming up.
The first question I have is, listening to you two today
and just reading some of the materials, that there is a real
focus on law enforcement, at least in the materials. How do you
think the coordination has gone at either convention or
generally with firefighters and paramedics and hospitals who
might have to also respond to a mass casualty kind of a
situation?
Admiral Rufe. Well, as you know, both conventions are
NSSEs, national special security events. So that is under the
guidance of the Secret Service, and they have that down very
well, in my opinion. You would have to really speak to them
directly to get their sense as to what the interaction is. But
they have a principal Federal official designated from the
Secret Service in each one of those places to be their guy.
That person is, I am sure, working very closely not just with
law enforcement, with the State and local responders from the
fire and medical community as well.
Mr. Perlmutter. I think they are. We have been working on
the thing for about a year now, so I feel like there has been
decent coordination.
Let's move to the next level. Let's say it is either one of
these conventions or it is some other big gathering, and it
isn't a situation where there is intent to do harm but there is
an intent to disrupt and just bring it to a halt, whatever the
situation is. How do the Federal officials, how does the
Federal coordination play a role in that?
So, I mean, let's just say there is lots of vandalism,
rioting, whatever it might be. Is there a Federal role? Do you
just say, ``Police, that is your problem. We are not getting
involved.''?
Admiral Rufe. It is pretty much a State and local problem.
But, obviously, if they are overwhelmed--and, in fact, this has
happened before in a natural disaster. Katrina is a good
example of that, where the local law enforcement was not able
to keep up with that level of unrest, and we had to bring in
Federal support to do that.
So I think when they do their planning for these big events
like the conventions, obviously there have been disruptions at
conventions in the past, a long time ago, most recently it is a
long time ago, and that is part of the planning. Principally it
is the responsibility of the State and the locals to handle
that sort of criminal or disruptive activity. But the Secret
Service certainly plays a role in that and would bring in extra
Federal support, if needed.
Colonel Stephan. The key to making that successful is the
joint operation centers that have law enforcement and emergency
manager people from across jurisdictions of government and
across disciplines are all sitting together in an incident
command post, and everybody would know or have the same
situational awareness, know what was happening, know what
capabilities were being exhausted and where additional
authorities, resources and capacities need to be brought into
the fight. You do that through the nodes that are then
connected up to the regional and the national level, such as
the NOC.
Mr. Perlmutter. I am sorry Sheriff Reichert isn't here now,
but the WTO up in Seattle, I assume that would be an NSSE, that
would be a special event.
Admiral Rufe. No, I don't think it has been. I am not sure
where that came at this year. It is not at NSSE.
Mr. Perlmutter. Okay.
Admiral Rufe. It would be categorized as one of the SEAR-
level events. I am not sure where that would fall.
Mr. Perlmutter. But there was one where people were there
to make trouble. So, in that instance, there would still be an
incident command post and everybody trying to work in a
coordinated fashion. I mean, was there Federal involvement in
that?
Admiral Rufe. An example of that is World Bank-IMF meetings
here in the District of Columbia, which are sometimes the
subject of considerable protest, and the chance for disruption
is there. That, this year, is a Level 3 event. So that does not
qualify at the higher level for Federal support.
But, certainly, if there is additional Federal support
needed for any of these lower-level events, it is provided on a
case-by-case basis.
Mr. Perlmutter. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
Admiral, maybe you can help clear us up. If you take the
highest level where Secret Service is in charge--is there a
formula for Federal participation at that level? Or how is that
derived?
Admiral Rufe. There is not, no, sir, Mr. Chairman. There is
not a strict formula. There are some guidelines, however. For
NSSEs, that is within the purview of the Secret Service, as we
said. They look at each event individually and decide what
level of support is needed.
You may have noticed that, just recently, that the
Democratic Presidential candidate is going to do his acceptance
speech now at the Mile High Stadium, which is going to change,
obviously, the requirements for protection for that event. So
the Secret Service looks at those things as they move along and
makes adjustments, as necessary, for those events.
On the SEAR 1, SEAR 2 and SEAR 3 events, there are some
general guidelines. For example, for a SEAR 1 event, the FAA
always puts in a temporary flight restriction in the area. That
does not necessarily hold true for a SEAR 2 event. They might
put in a TFR, but they might not. So it varies depending upon
the type of event you have. In some cases, you will have a
waterfront activity where the Coast Guard would play a pretty
big role. In another case, it might be pretty far inland; there
wouldn't be a Coast Guard role.
So there is no real set formula for the amount of Federal
assets that are used. It is based on what capacity is available
locally and with mutual aid agreements and then what the holes
and the gaps are that need to be filled by the Federal
Government.
Chairman Thompson. Well, I guess the point I am trying to
figure out is, how do we derive what is a State or local
financial burden versus the Federal burden? Is that some
formula that is worked out in advance? Or how is this done?
Admiral Rufe. No, sir, there is no formula for that. The
formula is that when each one of these events, these 4,000
events is entered into the data call each year, the State and
local officials who are putting the information in respond to
the questionnaire, and among the questions that they have to
answer is, ``Is the State and local capacity sufficient to
cover the requirement?'' Oftentimes they answer yes. In that
case, there really isn't a need for Federal assistance.
Now, whether the State and local capacity that is utilized
is available for reimbursement from the Federal Government is
another question. That is where the grants from DHS would play
a role.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
I now recognize the gentleman from North Carolina for 5
minutes.
Mr. Etheridge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Since we are on that topic, let me stay with it for a
moment. Because there a lot of large mass gatherings that
really, sort of, fall under the radar screen and don't get
national notice. I can think of one in North Carolina where we
will have the State fair and we will have 850,000 people in the
course of a week, and on most any day there will be about
150,000 people moving through it.
I didn't realize how many Mule Days they have, since North
Carolina has one in Benson. It is a large event. Roughly 60,000
people will show up for that event. Just for a parade, they are
going to have somewhere in the neighborhood of 20,000 people.
I share those numbers for a reason: Because you don't hear
about it here in Washington. It is the local folks who do all
the planning, all the training, ensure that it is safe, it is
enjoyable for the people who come and attend.
With that said, I think the Federal Government does help
and does spend a lot of time in preparing for emergencies,
developing best practices for securing large events and
protecting the public from terrorism. But it isn't clear that
the guidance is being applied at the local level.
Let me tell you why I ask this question. Committee staff
has heard that the Federal, State, territorial, tribes, local
and private-sector personnel that plan events are often
separated from other activities, such as training, standard-
setting, and the identification and communications of the
lessons learned.
Both of you are retired officers, and you know from your
experience in the armed and uniformed services that it is
critical to bring planning together with those activities. So
my question is, what is being done and what can be done that we
aren't doing to better integrate these efforts?
Colonel Stephan. Sir, I think to the extent that the
special events are identified through either Admiral Rufe's
process or from my protective security advisors that are my
eyes and ears forward, my boots-on-the-ground forward, that
when we have time and we know that something is coming, it is
deliberately planned----
Mr. Etheridge. How much time do you need?
Colonel Stephan. Sir, it depends on the size and scope of
the event, the complexity of the event. But for something that
recurs on an annual basis, like a State fair, I will have my
protective security advisor working with the State homeland
security advisor to figure out a plan that does involve
actually building the security plan, figuring out what Federal
requirements might be needed, helping facilitate cross-
jurisdictional collaboration and coordination, trying to tie a
grant-funded State and local exercise program to the event.
For the Vice Presidential and Presidential debates coming
up, we are doing this very thing to bring bombing prevention,
IED prevention and awareness training, soft target awareness
training to those communities specifically, and to make sure
that all of these folks are connected to the national
information-sharing network all around the various venues.
So I think we are making progress, again, principally
because now I have a cadre of people deployed across the
country that have been taken up under the wings of the State
and local officials that they support every day.
Admiral Rufe. The only thing I would add would be, sir,
that for the SEAR 1 and SEAR 2 events, we appoint a Federal
coordinator that is the Secretary's representative for the
event. Generally, it is somebody from the local area. We try to
get somebody who has some local knowledge from one of the
Federal agencies that is in the area. They are tasked with
putting together, with our support, an integrated Federal
support plan. As its name indicates, it is a support plan to
support the State and locals. It is supposed to be integrated
completely with the planning that is being done at the State
and local level.
Mr. Etheridge. The best practices?
Admiral Rufe. Absolutely.
Mr. Etheridge. Assistant Secretary Stephan, let me follow
that up, because I understand that the Department has been
working with State and local governments and with the private
sector to develop the planning guidance.
I guess my question, how would you assess the Department's
efficiency in providing material that these non-Federal actors
can actually use in the field?
I guess the second part would be, what are you doing to
improve that effort? Because I think that is a critical piece,
because there is more out there in the private sector, really,
than in the public sector.
Colonel Stephan. Absolutely, sir. In this particular
sector, commercial facilities, there is just such a wide
diversity in the number of actors involved, it is a difficult
problem set.
But we try to conquer that challenge two ways. One is to
enroll and engage the stakeholders in the development of the
guidelines documents, so that they are understood and
translatable down to the local level. So the people that are
going to have to use them are actually involved part and parcel
in terms of the process that guides their development.
The second part that we really need to work on is to get
more guidance and guidelines pushed out the door to the various
sub elements of this sector. We have hit the sports leagues. We
are working on stadiums and arenas. We have a shopping mall,
giant retail piece about to go out this fall, early next year.
I just need more time. In fact, I am not going to have more
time. The next administration will have to pick up this ball,
understand where we have been able to reach out and touch
folks, and continue to push the products and the guidelines
out, hopefully using the template of bringing in the
stakeholders from the very beginning of the process.
Mr. Etheridge. Very quickly, scale of 1 to 10, 10 being the
best, what would you rate?
Colonel Stephan. Sir, I hate those kind of questions.
Mr. Etheridge. I knew you would.
Colonel Stephan. You know, it is a 10 in terms of the
places where we had the guidance out right now, 9 or 10. In
places where we don't have the guidance, it is at the 1 or a 2
level. I mean, it is different depending on which piece of this
sector you are talking about.
Mr. Etheridge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
Colonel, can you provide the committee with a listing of
where you had the guidance out versus where you don't have the
guidance out?
Colonel Stephan. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy to do
that.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you. I think that will help us.
We will now yield to the gentlelady from New York for 5
minutes, Ms. Clarke.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen. This has been a very informative and
interesting hearing, especially coming from a place like New
York City, where it seems, every time I leave my house, I am
involved in a mass gathering.
There are a number of facilities and environments across
the United States that routinely handle mass gatherings that I
believe would likely be classified as SEAR 1 or 2. For example,
in New York we have Madison Square Garden, which is an
extremely popular venue for high-profile events that is right
in the heart of the city. Certainly, being in the heart of the
city, it is also in the middle of a commercial hub. So you have
not only the people who gather in the venue, but you have, I
would estimate, maybe hundreds of thousands of people that are
just moving about either in the subway system, Amtrak is right
there, and you have this massive shopping area. So potentially
hundreds of thousands of people are there.
With these types of environments, how do you offer support
and resources? Is it only in the direct run-up to a specific
event? Or do you work with them on a continuing basis if there
are facilities that commonly hold mass gatherings, such as
stadiums and similar venues?
Colonel Stephan. Ma'am, I think we actually approach it
from both angles. We do lots of what I refer to as steady-state
activities, collaborative planning, trying to target the
various grant programs to fix gaps that have been identified
through collaborative security planning efforts, so on and so
forth.
Then during particular special events, depending, again, on
the risk factor, surge, additional Federal support as required.
For example, in New York City, the U.S. Coast Guard is very
active in working as a team with local law enforcement
officials, in terms of the waterways around Manhattan island;
the TSA folks, in terms of no-fly zones during certain periods
to cover certain special events; TSA, also, in terms of helping
beef up with additional bomb dogs and things like that, in
terms of the subway system up there.
So I think the answer to your question is actually both
approaches, trying to work them together.
Ms. Clarke. Is that a consistent, in your estimation, a
consistent operation?
In other words, New York is always going to be dynamic like
that. One of the issues that I think the citizenry of the city
has is the fact that we get comfortable, because this is the
way we live. We want to be comfortable in the fact that the
individuals who are entrusted with our safety are not as
relaxed about the environment we reside in but are always in a
state of readiness.
For instance, what is the protocol in place for these types
of environments that creates and maintains the state of
readiness for the deployment of emergency response? Is that
something that your offices would monitor, or is it something
that has to be requested from the ground up?
Colonel Stephan. Ma'am, I think we have consistency in
terms of the guidance and protective guidelines, vulnerability
assessment methodologies, training, exercise programs, across
my mission area, from city to city or from rural area to rural
area. The guidelines are there, but they are flexible enough to
allow themselves to be tailored to the specific operational
risk environments where they have to be applied.
I think where you are going to find a variance, however, is
there is a tremendous difference in resources city by city
across America. A New York City and a Wichita, those are apples
and oranges. New York City is on a heightened alert posture
almost every day of the year, whereas other communities around
the United States of course do not feel, necessarily, that
sense of urgency with respect to the homeland security mission
set.
So you will find different levels of focus, different
levels of resources being applied. But in the plans that we
push out and the guidance documents we push out, we try to
maintain consistency, yet approach that allows flexible
tailoring of things to the local landscapes.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you very much, gentlemen.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
We now recognize the gentlelady from Texas for 5 minutes,
Ms. Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me
thank you very much for what I think is a very important
hearing that allows us to discuss the best way to go forward in
ensuring the safety of the American people.
Secretary Stephan, let me thank you also for your concerted
leadership. Of course, as we have been quite tough in our
questioning on a number of occasions, we do appreciate the fact
that both you and the Admiral are consistent in your commitment
and dedication, and I truly appreciate it.
As you well know, I chair the Subcommittee on
Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection, so I am
quite familiar with the many issues we have been discussing
today.
We recently had a hearing, and I wanted to ensure that a
number of the issues of that hearing could be framed in the
hearing today. I think that it is clearly important for a
country that loves to come together at big events, that we
focus our attention on how we can be more effective. The
hearing I speak of was held on March 12. So I am going to ask a
series of questions back to back, and then I will yield to you,
Mr. Secretary, if I can.
During our hearing, several experts testified that Congress
should consider creating a lead at the Department of Homeland
Security for non-national special security events. I would like
to get an assessment of the progress being made there.
In addition, I think it is important that DHS develops
clear metrics for the implementation of security and response-
related measures in the CFS, the Commercial Facilities Sector.
I would like to get your assessment of how far along the
Department is. The metrics need to address exercises, resource
allocation and contingency planning efforts.
Additionally, I think that it is important that the CIPAC
will seek to incorporate members that do not merely represent
an association. This, of course, is encouraging the Department
to utilize the authority that Congress has already allocated,
such as the Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory
Council. But I would like to see how you incorporate individual
asset owners. So go outside of the boundaries of Government and
see whether or not they can participate as well and give us
extra insight.
I also hope that the Department leverages its Voluntary
Private-Sector Preparedness Certification Program. This program
can be used to encourage companies to meet voluntary standards.
I would like to hear from you how that program is proceeding
and how this program has been introduced to the Critical
Facilities Sector.
Then I am interested in something that I have discussed
with you for a period of time, and that is exercises. I think
we have had some long-standing discussions on exercises. I have
listened to the Congresswoman from New York, Mrs. Lowey, about
the unexpected visit--or, let's say, the visit by the Pope. I
just think that these exercises are important, and I am
interested in a full description of these exercises. Probably
some of that may be in writing, but, anyhow, if you could give
just a quick assessment, their participants and their
frequency.
Again, let me make my request of utilizing the area in the
Southwest region, in this instance a city like Houston, for an
opportunity, but I believe we should spread those opportunities
and have some method of doing so.
I think there are about 5 points there, and I know that--if
you give a snippet on each, you will be able to write some of
the answers presented in writing.
Colonel Stephan. Yes, ma'am, you are going to have my staff
busy for quite a while over the next couple of weeks, but we
are going to get back to you to answer all these questions very
fully.
In terms of exercises, we have integrated really more than
an observer capacity for the first time. All of the elements of
the critical infrastructure sectors that wanted to be engaged,
starting back in TOPOFF 4, full players, full members of the
exercise design control simulation cell, as well as players
during the exercise event itself. We carried that forward a
couple of months ago, in May, when we had another national-
level exercise. For the first time, I opened up our National
Infrastructure Coordinating Center to seat members of the
private sector in the hub of the nerve center of my operation.
I think you will receive a favorable report, if you query
the folks that were involved, that they now have a special
exercise working group of the private-sector coordinating
councils across the board.
Ms. Jackson Lee. If I could just get you to answer the
point about ensuring that we have a person, a lead at DHS for
non-national special security events.
Colonel Stephan. I am proud to announce that that
individual is seated to my left. Admiral Rufe is the lead.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Excellent. I only have a short time, if
you want to finish your last sentence.
Colonel Stephan. The individual asset owners and operators,
ma'am, their equities, their interests and concerns are
incorporated really by my deployed cadre of 78 protected
security advisors that have solid and growing, ever-maturing,
professional relationships with the owners and operators in
their geographic areas of responsibility.
The private-sector voluntary standards program, in
accordance with the statutory requirements, has been briefed to
the sector coordinating council membership writ large. FEMA has
the lead for that program within DHS. The status we are at now
is mining what constitutes preparedness standards, figuring out
what kind of standards are out there, defining what the
accrediting body will be, and pushing out a contract to bring
those folks in.
We are going to roll in through the sector coordinating
council structure, under the national infrastructure protection
plan, the private sector input across the 18 sectors into that
process. That will move out over the course of the next year. I
will have the FEMA folks put together a more comprehensive
status briefing.
The metrics piece, specifically for this sector but all the
sectors really, will come to you in the sector annual reports.
I just received each of those on July 1. I am aggregating them
into a national-level cross-sector risk report that will be
coming to the Congress of the United States the first week in
November per statute. That contains a detailed metrics piece
sector by sector for you.
I believe I have covered five of five.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I think you have, but we will pursue it
further in further discussions.
Colonel Stephan. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
In the event, Ms. Jackson Lee, there is something that you
asked or wanted to ask and we did not, we will gladly provide
our witnesses with anything you provide us in terms of
questions for their response.
We want to thank our first panel of witnesses. You have
been very thorough in your answers, and we appreciate, again,
your service to this country. Thank you very much.
We will now call our second panel of witnesses.
We would like to welcome our second panel of witnesses. I
appreciate your patience and, obviously, your service to the
country.
Our first witness, Dr. Thomas Blackwell, is a medical
director for the Center for Prehospital Medicine at the
Carolinas Medical Center in Charlotte, North Carolina. He is
also the medical director for MEDIC, the Mecklenburg EMS
agency, Lowe's Motor Speedway, and the Bank of America Stadium,
all in Charlotte, North Carolina.
Dr. Blackwell, we want to thank you, especially for making
the time to testify today. We know that you have deployed your
mobile hospital to the State of Indiana to provide support as
part of the response to the recent floods there. We appreciate
your dedication to providing emergency medical care throughout
the Nation.
Our second witness is Sergeant Scott McCartney. Sergeant
McCartney is the program manager and lead exercise planner for
the Large Stadium Initiative for the State of California. He is
also a member of the Critical Incident Negotiation Team for the
Sacramento County sheriff's office.
Welcome.
Our third witness, Mr. Doug Reynolds, is the director of
security for the Mall of America in Bloomington, Minnesota. We
commend his service in this capacity, as well as his previous
21 years of service as a member of Army National Guard.
Speaking of the Mall of America, my wife appreciates the
security.
We thank our witnesses for their service to the States and
to the Nation and for being here today.
Without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be
inserted into the record.
I now ask each witness to summarize his statement for 5
minutes, beginning with Dr. Blackwell.
STATEMENT OF THOMAS H. BLACKWELL, MD, MEDICAL DIRECTOR, CENTER
FOR PREHOSPITAL MEDICINE, CAROLINAS MEDICAL CENTER, CHARLOTTE,
NORTH CAROLINA
Dr. Blackwell. Chairman Thompson, distinguished Members of
the Committee on Homeland Security, good morning. Thank you for
inviting me to testify this morning.
My name is Dr. Tom Blackwell. I am an emergency physician
at Carolinas Medical Center's Level 1 trauma center in
Charlotte, North Carolina. I also serve as a clinical associate
professor of emergency medicine at the University of North
Carolina-Chapel Hill.
My other positions do include the medical director for the
Mecklenburg Emergency Medical Services Agency, the 911 medical
provider for Charlotte, and the medical director for Lowe's
Motor Speedway, the Wachovia Championship PGA, and Bank of
America Stadium, home to the Carolina Panthers.
I have had the opportunity to read the committee's report
on public health, safety and security for mass gatherings, and
applaud the efforts at better understanding the issues we face
with preparedness and with response. It was a pleasure to spend
time with Dr. Asha George, Scott Springer, and other staff
members during their several visits to Charlotte.
Before I begin, I would like to iterate that planning and
preparedness for any mass gathering event goes hand-in-hand
with any mass casualty planning resulting from a disaster.
Thus, my comments this morning will apply to both of these
situations.
As you think about mass gathering medical support, there
are four primary criteria that I believe must be acknowledged
and addressed: No. 1, the coordination between State and local
authority, including the Federal and tribal governments when
those are applicable; No. 2, the participation of all law
enforcement, fire services, EMS, public health and hospitals
and emergency management agencies; No. 3, the comprehensive
preparedness, planning and training; and No. 4, the procurement
or availability of assets or resources required to save lives,
ease suffering and successfully mitigate the medical
consequences.
In Charlotte, we have addressed many of the issues in the
report and have created solutions that will preserve human life
and infrastructure, all of which have direct implications for
mass gathering events and disaster management. First is the
development of the Advanced Local Emergency Response Team, or
ALERT, which is a multi-agency team of law enforcement, fire
and medical staff trained to respond to a weapon of mass
destruction. No. 2 is the design, development and
implementation of the state-of-art mobile hospital.
Our ALERT multidisciplinary program has been training and
preparing since 1998, way before the events of 9/11. It also
includes a medical online surveillance tool that was integrated
into a State-wide detection system. This system is able to
track disease or potential disease spread and provides
epidemiologic feedback to the region or the area affected.
Now, while this is an important public health component,
the real issue facing communities in mass gathering venues
today is the acquisition of appropriate resources required to
manage patient care, especially given to current state of
health care delivery in the United States.
The 2006 Institute of Medicine report entitled ``The Future
of Emergency Care in the United States Health System'' outlined
the degree of emergency department overcrowding and hospital
closings. Since many hospitals across this Nation operate at
surge capacity on a daily basis, it is extremely difficult to
successfully handle any incident that results in mass
casualties.
So to support the ALERT initiative and the overcrowded
state of our health care system we developed and constructed a
mobile hospital that was different in design from the
traditional tent systems that have been used in the past. This
unit is designed to quickly move to the site of a disaster, can
be deployed in under 20 minutes, and supports the provision of
comprehensive medical and surgical care for traumatic injuries,
infectious disease, and general emergency and ambulatory care.
It incorporates a two-bed operating room, four-bed
intensive care unit, and an eight-bed emergency department in
an expandable 53-foot tractor trailer. When more beds are
needed, a shelter system can be deployed from the trailer that
can support an additional 250 beds.
In the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, MED-1 was
dispatched to Waveland and Bay St. Louis, Mississippi. Within
an hour after set-up, we began seeing patients. Within 24
hours, we had conducted our first surgical procedure,
transferred our first pregnancy who was soon to deliver in Gulf
Port, and saw our first traumatic injury.
This case involved a 12-year-old boy who was riding an all-
terrain vehicle when he was struck by a car. Due to the head
injury, the child had stopped breathing on their arrival at our
facility. We resuscitated and stabilized the child and quickly
transferred him by Coast Guard helicopter to the trauma center
in Jackson. It is my pleasure, Mr. Chair, to report to you that
this child eventually survived, walking out of the trauma
center in Jackson with no permanent nor long-term disability.
During the 7-week deployment, we saw more than 7,500
patients, sometimes going up to 350 a day. Six months later,
MED-1 was called to assist in the excessive surge capacity
conditions in New Orleans, during the first Mardi Gras
celebration following the hurricanes. During the 2 weeks of
deployment, 575 patients were treated.
At this very moment, Carolina's MED-1 is on its third
deployment in Columbus, Indiana, providing emergency department
services in the wake of the severe flooding that destroyed
Columbus Regional Hospital on June 6.
We are confident that the MED-1 asset, due to these
deployments and our lessons learned, would be a useful resource
for any mass gathering event and for tornados, earthquake and
floods that have plagued our country. The time is now, Mr.
Chair, to seek unique solutions that support a combination of
health care needs and mass gathering special events.
Finally, I would like to comment on two additional
important issues that we have concerns, and that is sustainment
and mutual aid.
It is important to realize that while many of our assets
and programs are grant-funded, sustainment dollars are equally
significant to keep those initiatives operational and
functional.
Last, I would encourage Congress to entertain methods to
expedite the process for requesting and authorizing mutual aid,
using the Emergency Management Assistance Compact, or EMAC.
When devastated communities and populations need emergency
care, deployment strategy should be as streamlined as possible
so as to facilitate that response.
I thank you again, Mr. Chair and committee Members, for
your time. I am pleased to answer questions that you may have.
[The statement of Dr. Blackwell follows:]
Prepared Statement of Thomas H. Blackwell
July 9, 2008
INTRODUCTION
Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King, distinguished Members of
the committee and guests, thank you for the opportunity to appear
before you today. My name is Dr. Tom Blackwell and I am an emergency
physician at Carolinas Medical Center, a designated Level 1 trauma
center in Charlotte, North Carolina. I also serve as Medical Director
for the Mecklenburg Emergency Medical Services Agency, which is the 9-
1-1 EMS provider for the city of Charlotte and Mecklenburg County.
Additionally, I am a Clinical Associate Professor of Emergency Medicine
at the University of North Carolina--Chapel Hill School of Medicine and
the University of North Carolina--Charlotte.
Carolinas Medical Center, is the flagship hospital of Carolinas
HealthCare System and is a State-designated Academic Medical Center
Teaching Hospital. Carolinas HealthCare System is the largest
healthcare system in the Carolinas and the third-largest public
healthcare system nationally.
I have dedicated the last 10 years of my career to improving our
community's and this Nation's ability to address surge capacity medical
needs and to respond to incidents resulting from natural and man-made
disasters. Today, I would like to share with you my experience in
developing our local capacity to respond to a mass casualty event in
our region. I would like to emphasize that when you prepare for mass
casualty incidents at mass gatherings, the same preparation applies
with mass casualties resulting from a natural disaster; thus my
comments this morning will apply to both situations.
In our region, we have addressed many of the issues in the
committee's Report Public Health, Safety and Security for Mass
Gatherings and have created solutions that will preserve human life and
infrastructure. Since 1998, I have been integrally involved in two
comprehensive medical management initiatives in Charlotte, both of
which have direct implications for mass gathering events and disaster
management.
1. The development of the Advanced Local Emergency Response Team,
or ALERT which is a multi-agency team of law enforcement, fire,
and medical staff trained to respond to a weapon of mass
destruction.
2. The design, development, and implementation of a state-of-the-
art mobile hospital.
Put simply, I am the doctor in the field at ground zero who will be
there when any incident unfolds. As such, I believe that I am able to
provide to you a unique perspective from the ground up as to how we
address patient care issues.
DEVELOPMENT OF ALERT
Charlotte is the second-largest banking center in the country and
is the only city in the world that has two nuclear power plants within
25 miles from the center of our uptown district. It hosts the NFL
Carolina Panthers and the NBA Charlotte Bobcats. The Lowe's Motor
Speedway, home to several prominent NASCAR events, sits just outside of
Charlotte in Cabarrus County, North Carolina. In addition, Charlotte
hosts a number of other annual mass gathering events such as the
Central Intercollegiate Athletic Association (CIAA) Basketball
Tournament and the Wachovia Championship Golf Tournament. The
Charlotte-Douglas International Airport is the tenth largest airport
and the largest hub for USAirways. Charlotte has the sixth-most Fortune
500 companies and is home to many international businesses.
Our wake-up call came in February 1998, when a man entered the
Mecklenburg County Court House in uptown Charlotte carrying a bomb. The
Court House is a mass gathering at 9 and 2 every day when district
court convenes. This man told deputies that he had a second device that
could be remotely detonated in the trunk of his car several blocks
away. A rapid search of his home revealed ingredients for constructing
a bomb, in addition to potential chemicals and biological agents on-
site. While the incident was successfully resolved, the emergency
response revealed several issues that we, as a community, needed to
address. Collaborative agreements were fostered between emergency
management, law enforcement agencies, the fire department, EMS, public
health, and hospitals. The result of our labor was the formation of the
Advanced Local Emergency Response Team (ALERT) to ensure preparedness
for urban terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, as well as natural
disasters (such as hurricanes and floods). The team makeup is comprised
of local law enforcement, fire, and emergency medical staff, and
incorporates resources to effectively and efficiently respond to any
terrorist incident or natural disaster.
ALERT has been training for terrorism and mass casualty responses
including tactical operations involving bombs, biological, and chemical
agents detection/disposal, decontamination, triage and scene treatment,
hospital response, and incident command. ALERT exemplifies the kind of
``culture of collaboration'' among various private and public entities
that the committee's Report Public Health, Safety and Security for Mass
Gatherings so appropriately recognized is essential to protecting our
citizens and preserving the community's infrastructure.
Two areas that are most critical in medical response and readiness
are real-time detection and surge capacity. Real-time detection is a
prerequisite to containing disease outbreak, particularly in a mass
gathering environment. Our ALERT program includes a medical on-line
surveillance tool that was integrated into a State-wide detection
system. This system is able to track disease or potential disease
spread, and provides epidemiologic feedback to the region or area
affected. Another critical issue facing communities and mass gathering
venues today is surge capacity--ensuring the availability of
appropriate and adequate resources required to manage an enormous
influx of ill or injured patients. In the 2006 Institute of Medicine
Report entitled ``The Future of Emergency Care in United States Health
System,'' one of the three reports ``Hospital-Based Emergency Care: At
the Breaking Point'' focused on surge capacity. The report outlined the
degree of emergency department overcrowding and hospital closings.
This, along with the fact that many hospitals across this Nation
operate at surge capacity on a daily basis, makes it extremely
difficult to successfully handle any incident that results in mass
casualties, particularly from mass gatherings where tens of thousands
of people could be affected.
DEVELOPMENT OF MOBILE HOSPITAL
Learning from the anthrax attacks, our deliberations surrounding
the ALERT initiative, and the overcrowded state of our hospitals, we
set out to design and construct a mobile hospital that was different in
design from the traditional tent systems that have been used in the
past. Initiated in 2002, we wanted to build a medical facility that
could quickly move to the site of a disaster, be rapidly deployed on
arrival, and be able to provide comprehensive medical and surgical care
so as preserve hospital resources for the most critical patients. Amid
the growing concern of biological threats, including infectious disease
outbreaks which raises the issues of isolation, containment, and
quarantine, it was essential that the mobile hospital serve patients
that could not and should not be transferred to local hospitals.
Transferring patients who may have an infectious disease could
contaminate and jeopardize the integrity of a hospital's infrastructure
for indefinite periods of time. Our design incorporated a 2-bed
operating room, 4-bed intensive care unit, and an 8-bed emergency
department in an expandable 53-ft. trailer. While 14-beds are helpful,
a mass casualty incident or pandemic outbreak could result in hundreds
or even thousands of patients. Thus, to plan and accommodate the
expected large number of patients, we developed a shelter system that
could be deployed from the trailer that can support an additional 250
beds.
The Department of Homeland Security was incredibly supportive of
our approach and plan. We applied for a grant and received funding from
the Department to build the prototype hospital. In April 2004, we
unveiled the Carolinas MED-1 mobile emergency department. The MED-1
unit is owned and operated by Carolinas Medical Center, and includes
emergency physicians, trauma and orthopaedic surgeons,
anesthesiologists, nurses, and paramedics as the healthcare team.
Additional support personnel includes drivers, clinical engineers, and
security staff provided by the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department.
After much training, planning, and operational exercises, the MED-
1's first deployment came in the immediate aftermath of Hurricane
Katrina. MED-1's emergency response unit and team was dispatched to
Mississippi to provide care to the survivors of the hurricane under an
Emergency Management Assistance Compact between the States of
Mississippi and North Carolina. Mr. Chairman, it was our great fortune
to serve the communities of Waveland and Bay St. Louis, and to support
Hancock Medical Center which was incapacitated by the storm.
Carolinas MED-1 set-up in a K-Mart shopping center parking lot,
located approximately 1 mile from Hancock Medical Center. Approximately
150 refugee families were living in make-shift structures on hot
asphalt, all without any significant medical care. Within an hour of
our arrival, we began seeing patients. On day 2, we conducted our first
surgical operation, transferred our first pregnancy who was soon to
deliver, and saw our first traumatic injury. The trauma involved a 12-
year-old boy who was riding an all terrain vehicle when he was struck
by a car. The local EMS provider noted that the child had stopped
breathing as they arrived at MED-1. Our team was able to resuscitate
and stabilize the child, provide head injury therapeutics, and complete
a full diagnostic evaluation including labs and X-rays. He was
transferred by Coast Guard helicopter to the Level 1 trauma center in
Jackson, Mississippi. It is my great pleasure, Mr. Chairman to let you
know that this boy eventually walked out of the hospital intact and
with no permanent nor long-term problems. Epidemiologists would comment
on the cost-benefit ratio of a MED-1 unit. In my opinion, that 12-year-
old's life was worth the cost of 1,000 MED-1s.
During the 7 weeks of deployment in Mississippi, we saw more then
7,500 patients. The MED-1 staff along with the hundreds of physicians,
nurses, EMTs and paramedics, and other allied health personnel from
across North Carolina will forever have a bond with the people of
Waveland and Bay St. Louis. Our prototype, again funded and supported
by the Department of Homeland Security, was a true success story from
the devastation invoked by Hurricane Katrina.
Six months later, Carolinas MED-1 was called back into service to
serve as a stand-alone emergency department to assist in the excessive
surge capacity conditions present in New Orleans during the first Mardi
Gras celebration following the Hurricane Katrina and Rita. The unit
quickly became the primary receiving facility for the city of New
Orleans EMS and other services in the surrounding parishes. During the
2 weeks of deployment, 575 patients were treated. Dr. Jullette Saussy,
the Director of Emergency Medical Services for New Orleans has been
working for the last 2 years to obtain funding for a full-time MED-1
for her city.
Presently, Carolinas MED-1 is deployed to Columbus, Indiana to
provide emergency department services in the wake of the severe
flooding that destroyed Columbus Regional Hospital. Our first patient
to arrive was in respiratory failure. A breathing tube was required and
inserted, he was placed on a ventilator, antibiotics were immediately
administered, and he was transferred by helicopter to Methodist
Hospital in Indianapolis. Today, MED-1 and the Columbus Regional
Hospital staff is seeing approximately 60-70 patients a day.
Overall, each of our deployments has been a tremendous success. We
developed MED-1 to meet a critical need in Charlotte and elsewhere, and
developed a company to produce more MED-1's to meet local preparedness
needs in other parts of the country. Los Angeles County procured its
second MED-1 and is in the process of building a program similar to the
one in North Carolina. Several County Supervisors have expressed a
great desire to deploy the unit to mass gatherings within the County
such as the Tournament of Roses Parade, Rose Bowl, and the Los Angeles
Marathon. Plans are also being developed to use MED-1 to provide
routine outpatient medical care to the people of Los Angeles County.
Frequent use will translate to quality training for the medical staff,
thus ensuring proficiency when a true disaster occurs.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on my experience with ALERT and MED-1, as you think about
mass gathering medical support, I have several specific recommendations
for your consideration.
Recommendation No. 1: Coordination between Federal, State, and local
authorities is essential both before and after a terrorist
attack or natural disaster.
Mass casualty incidents don't recognize county or State lines, and
our responses shouldn't either. We designed MED-1 to be set up in just
20 minutes. After Hurricane Katrina, MED-1 began providing patient care
services shortly after arrival at the K-Mart parking lot. However, it
took 4 days from the time Hurricane Katrina hit for MED-1 to actually
be deployed. At the time, extensive conversations were conducted
between the Federal Government, Mississippi, North Carolina, and
Carolinas Medical Center. Each time we deploy, there is a great deal of
paperwork and contracting that has to occur between the public and
private entities before we are able to move MED-1 toward the patients
that need the care. We must consider ways to simplify the process by
which MED-1 and other critical assets get deployed to minimize time
delays. That means ensuring coordination between the various entities
ahead of time to the greatest extent possible.
More specifically, the Emergency Management Assistance Compact,
(EMAC) is a congressionally ratified organization that provides form
and structure to interstate mutual aid thus allowing a disaster-
impacted State to request and receive assistance from other member
States quickly and efficiently. Based on my experience deploying MED-1
several times out of State, we need for all States to amend their EMAC
legislation so that the same immunity that applies to State employees
will also apply to all employees that work with the responding State to
provide the help that is needed. MED-1 and the employees who agree to
be part of an emergency response often deploy with or as a part of a
State's emergency response assets. An amendment to the EMAC model State
laws that are enacted in each State would save valuable time that is
now being spent on drafting and executing contracts between the
hospitals and the responding State so that the hospital employees will
be covered by the immunity given to the State.
Recommendation No. 2: All law enforcement, fire services, emergency
medical services, public health and hospitals, and local
emergency management agencies must participate in disaster
planning and response.
ALERT's success is due in large part to the participation of all
relevant private and government entities. This participation is
reflected in four key elements: ALERT's operational guidelines are
established collaboratively; ALERT members plan, prepare, and respond
as one unit; ALERT's equipment is standardized and has been approved by
all member agencies; and ALERT personnel wear a standardized team
uniform with nametags for personal recognition and familiarization,
thus fostering cohesion and nourishing ALERT's team concept. The
relationships fostered through our joint preparedness activities
ensures our cohesive and comprehensive response to any incident.
Recommendation No. 3: Developing comprehensive all-hazards preparedness
plans and consistent training on those plans.
Medical preparedness planning includes an understanding of who is
going to do what and how regarding evacuation, containment, medical
care, triage, transport, and recovery. To ensure that preparedness
plans are complete and to identify and fill gaps in the plans, it is
critical to test and evaluate the plans through ongoing and sustained
training and adjust where necessary. It is a never-ending, fluid
process and we are always learning from our training and experiences
with both ALERT and MED-1.
Recommendation No. 4: Procurement or availability of assets and
resources required to save lives, ease suffering, and
successfully mitigate the medical consequences of a terrorist
attack or natural disaster.
Local medical needs include ongoing financial support for
equipment, personnel, and training. Just maintaining MED-1 on an annual
basis and having it ready to go costs over $800,000. Ensuring adequate
response and recovery in the event of a mass casualty incident at a
mass gathering costs money. Critical assets like real-time detection of
a biological release should be made available at all mass gathering
venues. It is not plausible to think that any public hospital or local
government agency will have the resources on hand to provide the funds
necessary for full preparedness. While many of the assets and programs
we do have are grant funded, sustainment dollars are equally
significant to keep these initiatives operational and functional.
Last, I would like to emphasize that the time is now to seek
solutions that support healthcare needs at special events and mass
gatherings. As a Nation, our preparedness for terrorist attacks also
serves to ensure our preparedness for the more common occurrence of
various types of natural disasters which are plaguing the United States
more and more each year.
I thank you again, Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee for
your time, and I will be pleased to answer any questions you may have.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
We now will hear testimony from Sergeant McCartney. If you
would, summarize your statement in 5 minutes, please.
STATEMENT OF SCOTT MCCARTNEY, PROGRAM MANAGER/EXERCISE PLANNER,
LARGE STADIUM INITIATIVE, GOVERNOR'S OFFICE OF HOMELAND
SECURITY, SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA, AND SERGEANT, SACRAMENTO
COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT
Sergeant McCartney. Chairman Thompson and Members of the
committee, on behalf of Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger and
Director Matthew Bettenhausen of the California Office of
Homeland Security, I would like to thank you for opportunity to
appear before you this morning regarding California's Large
Stadium Initiative and the challenges protecting mass
gatherings in a post-9/11 world.
My name is Sergeant Scott McCartney, and I work for the
Sacramento County Sheriff's Department. I am assigned there to
the Governor's Office of Homeland Security as the program
manager of the Large Stadium Initiative.
I would like to take just a moment to acknowledge Chairman
Thompson, his staff and the Members of the committee for
recognizing the importance to preparing States' stadiums and
venues to be more aware of homeland security challenges.
In 2004, California recognized the need to develop a
comprehensive approach to the safety and protection of the
people and economy relating to mass gatherings of California
and began the California Office of Homeland Security Large
Stadium Initiative.
Originally, the Large Stadium Initiative was focused on
specific stadium priorities and specific events that rose to
high-profile status. The program has since evolved into a
multi-event, multi-venue program utilizing an all-hazards
approach to public safety.
LSI assists mass gatherings with strategies for enhancing
prevention, response and recovery capabilities; establishing a
high level of security practices in stadiums, regardless of the
building's size or type; integrating private partners into
NIMS, an ICS structure, in understanding local, State and
Federal systems; and provides customized training in venue
roles and responsibilities, lessons learned, mass care in
sheltering, and crisis communication.
LSI provides stakeholders in California a stair-step
approach to enhancing homeland security preparedness using best
practices, infrastructure security plans through automatic
critical asset management systems, shared discoveries, and
discussion-based exercises such as seminars, workshops and
tabletops.
LSI was the focus of California's Golden Guardian 2007
full-scale exercise, and events were held in all three regions
of California. The venues and public safety agencies that
participate in the LSI program are integrated into the State-
wide exercise planning cycles to allow them to fully assess
their strengths and identify any areas of improvement during
annual Golden Guardian exercise.
LSI partnered with other professional and collegiate venues
around the State, as well. The Large Stadium Initiative program
highlights target capabilities in the area of prevention,
preparedness, response and recovery. LSI works with venues and
first responders to raise awareness regarding criminal and
terrorist activities, against spectators or venues during mass
gatherings.
LSI has partnered with OHS Special Projects Division and
the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office to develop a
comprehensive preventative strategy for building a surge
capacity to detect and interdict radiological and nuclear
threats at mass gatherings in California. LSI prepares venues
and stadiums for critical infrastructure protection, which
enables them to identify, assess, prioritize and design
protective measures to increase the security and safety of
venues.
The LSI program also collaborates and coordinates with
emergency public safety and security responders, venue
operators and security partners and to reduce the impact of
natural, manmade and any other all-hazard incidents by
discussing and exercising their safety and security plans from
mass care in evacuations.
The LSI program is designed to assist mass gathering venues
with information on structural damage assessments, restoration
of lifelines, and continuity of business and economic recovery.
To return a mass gathering facility to a full operation,
which is vital to the economic sustainment and growth of the
community, LSI is evolving to meet the needs of mass gathering
venues of non-national significance. Future program goals of
the program: major sports television networks, chaplain and
community services, major award ceremonies and convention
gatherings.
I would like to highlight how LSI assists colleges and
universities in creating the implementing policies and
procedures for their stadiums. These venues augment security
with student services and still require assistance from first
responders. Funding can be an issue regarding training and
equipment needs for these venues.
As a result of the program, we see relationships develop
between universities and first responders and the increase in
strategic planning, crisis communication and memorandums of
understanding. The areas of improvement noted during the LSI
university series include communication process, development of
evacuation plans for different buildings, safety and security
equipment resources for normal operations, including consistent
training and exercising, identification of mass casualty
incidents, incident command and unified command training,
recovery and remediation.
California and the Large Stadium Initiative is committed to
keeping all mass gatherings, both national and non-national
significance, protected by partnering with local, State and
Federal entities in a post-9/11 world. LSI is developing new,
state-of-the-art ideas to design strategies to better prepare
all stakeholders and spectators in venue safety and security
during mass gathering venues for natural and man-made disasters
and all other hazards incidents.
Again, thank you for this opportunity today, and I would be
happy to answer any questions.
[The statement of Sergeant McCartney follows:]
Prepared Statement of Scott McCartney
July 9, 2008
Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King, and Members of the
committee, on behalf of Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, Director Matt
Bettenhausen and the California Office of Homeland Security, I would
like to thank you and the committee on Homeland Security for the
opportunity to appear before you this morning regarding the California
Large Stadium Initiative and the ``Challenges of Protecting Mass
Gatherings in a Post 9/11 World''.
My name is Scott McCartney and I am a Sergeant with the Sacramento
County Sheriff's Department, California. I am assigned as a Law
Enforcement Subject Matter Expert to the Office of Homeland Security as
the Program Manager of the California Large Stadium Initiative--LSI. It
is an honor for me to share with the committee the many accomplishments
and strides California is making on the Large Stadium Initiative and
mass gathering venues for the State of California and the Nation.
I would like to take just a moment to acknowledge Chairman
Thompson, his staff and the Members of the committee on Homeland
Security for recognizing the importance of large-scale mass gatherings
and the commitment to better preparing States, stadiums and venues to
be more aware of Homeland Security challenges and to increase their
capabilities for the prevention, preparation, response and recovery to
mass gatherings that encompass the true American sprit of freedom.
large stadium initiative
The tragic events of September 11, 2001 demonstrated the need to
develop programs to deal with terrorism prevention, response and
recovery at mass gathering venues. Large public venues, such as sports
stadiums, present unique security and disaster response challenges.
Through the Large Stadium Initiative, California is able to work with
our public and private partners to tailor exercises to their specific
needs to ensure the greatest possible protection for the public at
these venues.
California recognized the need to develop a comprehensive approach
to the safety and protection of the people and economy relating to mass
gatherings of California; and in 2004, the California Office of
Homeland Security began the Large Stadium Initiative (LSI). Originally,
the LSI program was focused on specific stadium properties and specific
events that rose to a high profile status. The program has since
evolved into a multi-event, multi-venue program utilizing an all
hazards approach to public safety.
The LSI program explores commonalities of large stadium/venue
Homeland Security preparedness issues and assists in developing
strategies for enhancing prevention, preparedness, response, and
recovery capabilities as set forth by Presidential Directive No. 8.
The Large Stadium Initiative is based on the premise that a
majority of stadiums are not owned by municipal or State governments,
and therefore security varies from facility to facility. Managers rely
on a combination of private security companies, local police/sheriff,
State, Federal partners and their own employees to protect their
facilities.
At a single facility, security strengths and weaknesses, the
quality of supervisory personnel and operational practices can vary
from event to event. Consequently, instituting a high level of security
practices in stadiums across the Nation regardless of the stadium size
or event type is a critical step in establishing a solid infrastructure
protection standard for the stadium or mass gathering industry.
With this in mind, the Large Stadium Initiative partners are
provided with customized training and exercises which focus on venue
roles and responsibilities, lessons learned and mass-care and shelter
issues from previous disasters and crisis communication during
incidents of both national and non-national significances. California
is committed to keeping all large-scale mass gatherings protected in a
post-9/11 world through the Large Stadium Initiative.
In working with the owners and operators of facilities in
California and other States, OHS-LSI has developed plans, policies and
procedures that follow the DHS/Homeland Security Exercise and
Evaluation Program (HSEEP) guidelines for Prevention, Protection,
Response and Recovery to assist local, State and Federal partners who
help secure these large-scale mass gathering venues. At each venue, we
assess with preventative measures used not only for criminal acts of
terrorism, but hazard prevention based on the facility, disaster
preparation and prevention of criminal activities not associated with
terrorism. We look at the physical plant of the facilities and make
recommendations on protective measures that can be employed to deter
criminal acts or provide for the greater safety of the spectators.
LSI in conjunction with our Critical Infrastructure Protection
Program (CIPP) and Automated Critical Asset Management System (ACAMS)
assesses response plans within each facility and make sure those plans
work together with the response plans for the public agencies that will
respond to an event within the facility. I facilitate meetings between
venue operators and public safety personnel to build relationships and
resolve discrepancies in the plans.
California provides training in the form of Seminars and Workshops
following the (HSEEP) guidelines to assess policies and procedures, and
identify strengths and areas for improvement. Table top exercises are
developed for these facilities and venues and their first response
partners, in order to assess their capabilities. The exercises are
designed to highlight first responders, private security and venue
facilities on their preparedness, response, recovery and recovery
procedures for mitigating and managing a terrorist attack or disaster
or other incident, which may occur at their venue during events.
I also work with venue operators to develop comprehensive recovery
plans so they can move toward the return of their facility to normal
operations as soon as possible. These recovery plans not only deal with
the physical plant (structure, stadium or venue), but with a marketing
plan to inform and reassure the public regarding the safety and
availability of the facility for use. This is an important step in the
economic recovery of the affected area or region.
LSI ACCOMPLISHMENTS
The goal of the State of California Office of Homeland Security
Exercise Division is to conduct a series of exercises for Large Stadium
and Mass Gathering sites, which includes a seminar, workshop and table
top exercises during a calendar year in support of the Large Stadium
Initiative (CA-LSI).
CA-LSI assists large-scale mass gathering stadiums/venues and sites
with:
Developing strategies for enhancing prevention, response and
recovery capabilities;
Establishing a high level of security practices in stadiums
across the country regardless of the building size or event
type;
Integrating private partners into SEMS/NIMS/ICS structure
and understanding local, State and Federal systems.
CA-LSI partnered with large-scale and mass gathering venues and
provided customized training:
Venue roles and responsibilities;
Lessons Learned;
Mass Care and Shelter issues from previous disasters;
Crisis Communication during incidents of national or non-
national significance.
CA-LSI provides stakeholders in California a stair-stepped approach
to enhancing Homeland Security preparedness using:
Best Practices;
Exemplars;
Infrastructure Security Plans;
Shared Discoveries;
Exercises.
CA-LSI was the focus of California's Golden Guardian 2007 Full-
Scale Exercise with events in the Southern, Inland and Costal Regions
of California, specifically the Honda Center and Angel's Stadium in
Anaheim, University of the Pacific (UOP) Spanos Center in Stockton and
the H.P. Pavilion in San Jose.
Past CA-LSI accomplishments have been with:
Arco Arena in Sacramento involving Professional Basketball;
Staples Center in LA involving Professional Basketball;
Monster Park in San Francisco involving Professional
Football;
PacBell Park in San Francisco involving Professional
Baseball;
Dodger Stadium in LA involving Professional Baseball;
AAA Club Speedway in Fontana and Infineon Raceway in Sonoma
involving Professional Motor Sports;
University of California at Davis involving Collegiate
Athletics.
The California Large Stadium Initiative has worked since 2004 to
assist these partners and venues with the latest and most progressive
practices and technologies of Homeland Security. Our goal is to better
prepare them to respond and recover from terrorist attack, natural
disaster and all other hazards or incidents while spectators are
visiting facilities to view sports or other large-scale events. The LSI
program works with the venues to match their approach to their specific
or desired focus of their event with first responders.
LSI SEMINARS
LSI Seminars are designed for specific audiences at local, State
and privately owned mass gathering venues. The seminar focuses on
shared, new and innovative equipment, local, State and Federal
resources. The seminars are informal discussions, designed to orient
participants to authorities, strategies, new or updated plans,
policies, procedures, protocols, resources, concepts, and/or ideas
(e.g., a seminar to review a new Evacuation Standard Operating
Procedure). Seminars provide a good starting point for jurisdictions
that are developing or making major changes to their plans and
procedures.
LSI WORKSHOPS
The LSI workshop is designed to build specific products, such as a
draft plan or policy (e.g., a Mass Evacuation Plan Workshop is used to
develop a Multi-year Training and Exercise Plan). The workshop, a type
of discussion-based exercise and represents the second tier of
exercises in the building-block approach. Although similar to seminars,
workshops differ in two important aspects: increased participant
interaction, and a focus on achieving or building a product (e.g.,
plans, policies). A workshop is typically used to: test new ideas,
processes, or procedures; train groups in coordinated activities; and
obtain consensus.
LSI TABLE TOP EXERCISES
A table top exercise (TTX) involves key personnel discussing
simulated scenarios in an informal setting. TTXs can be used to assess
plans, policies, and procedures or to assess types of systems needed to
guide the prevention of, response to, or recovery from a defined
incident. TTXs are intended to stimulate discussion of various issues
regarding a hypothetical situation. During a TTX, senior staff, elected
or appointed officials, or other key personnel meet in an informal
setting to discuss simulated situations. TTXs are typically aimed at
facilitating understanding of concepts, identifying strengths and
shortfalls, and/or achieving a change in attitude. Participants are
encouraged to discuss issues in depth and develop decisions through
slow-paced problem-solving rather than the rapid, spontaneous
decisionmaking that occurs under actual or simulated emergency
conditions. TTXs can be breakout (i.e., groups split into functional
areas) or plenary (i.e., one large group).
OHS APPROACH FOR LSI
Prevention
LSI is working with the venues and local first responders on
information gathering and recognition indicators and warnings for the
ability to see gathered data, potential trends, indications, and/or
warning of criminal and/or terrorist activities (including planning and
surveillance) against U.S. citizens and critical infrastructure of the
stadium or venues during large-scale mass gatherings.
LSI, in partnership with members of the Special Projects Division
of The California Office of Homeland Security, is currently working
with all directorates inside of OHS to partner or leverage
opportunities on a State-wide collaborative effort to develop a
comprehensive, preventive strategy to detect and interdict radiological
and nuclear threats within California's borders. The purpose is to give
State and local response entities, the tools and resources necessary to
interdict and resolve radiological and nuclear terrorist threats.
California has convened a group of key State, Federal and local
stakeholders to develop this program which is being developed in close
partnership with the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO). In
addition to everyday monitoring and detection efforts on our land and
waterways, one capability CA is looking to develop is a surge capacity
for radiological nuclear detection resources that could be deployed
throughout the State as needed for large-scale events and mass
gatherings.
Protection
Under this priority, LSI works with venues and stadiums on critical
infrastructure protection which enables public and private entities to
identify, assess, prioritize, and design protective measures to
increase the security and safety of the venues. Some of the protective
measures could involve hardening of the facilities, adjusting
schedules, installing enhanced fire protection or security systems and
the training of the facility staff in security and hazard mitigation.
Response
The LSI program collaborates with emergency public safety and
security responders, venue operations and security partners to reduce
the impact and consequences of an incident either terrorist, natural or
an all-hazards-type event by discussing and exercising their safety and
security plans for mass care and evacuations. The process works to
build continuity among venues and first responders to assist in
providing security support to other response operations and properties
and sustaining operations from response to recovery. This inclusive
program requires the coordination among officials from law enforcement,
fire, and emergency medical services (EMS).
Recovery
This part of the LSI program is designed to assist large-scale mass
gathering venues with information on structural damage assessments,
restoration of lifelines and continuity of business and economic and
community recovery to return the large-scale mass gathering facilities
to full operation. It is important to note here the significance both
to the venue recovery and employee's recovery after an incident. The
return of patrons to these venues is vital to the economic sustainment
and growth of the community and Nation. By discussing plans and
procedures both as a private partner and local community, we show the
importance of establishing the recovery process for venues and patrons
to return to the venue with minimal delay or concern.
FUTURE GOALS OF LSI
California LSI is working with the following organizations,
stadiums and mass gathering venues to introduce them to the LSI program
and series to them in the hopes of developing a standardization of
preparedness, response and recovery to large-scale mass gathering sites
in California and the Nation.
College and University Stadiums
Major Awards Ceremonies and Conventions Gatherings (The
Oscars, The Tonis)
Major Sports Television Networks
Chaplin and Community Services
COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY STADIUMS
I see many ways to expand into the collegiate level mass
gatherings. Most college or university venues are private or publicly
owned and operated, which can pose problems with funding and training
of venue security. Many of these venues require the assistance of local
law enforcement, fire and emergency management services, which can
place a strain on the finances and staffing of the locals. Frequently,
the collegiate venues use student services to augment security and to
help with the basic needs of the venue. This is a good way to involve
students and staff, but with that type of service, training becomes one
of the biggest concerns.
Training and equipment for these venues can strain the resources of
the colleges and universities that operate them. While training can be
provided by local agencies, funding is often a problem. Many of the
universities have working police officers, which is beneficial in the
development of plans and procedures; however, those universities who do
not employ their own law enforcement professionals must create plans
and procedures without first responder expertise.
The LSI program works with these colleges and universities to help
them through the plan development process and networking with locals to
help solves problems or close issues while planning for events on their
campuses. One of the major strengths I see from working with these
universities is the relationships they developed with their local first
responders. They also work on strategic planning and crisis
communication plans with local first responders and have memorandums of
understanding (MOU) for response and assistance at the venue regarding
incidents.
I have also seen some areas for improvement during my visits to
campuses. The development of evacuation plans and training of those
plans needs to occur more often. Facility staff and management need to
ensure information sharing between departments on campus; and messaging
internally in facilities with staff, families and students for family
reunification is very important.
In working with some of the colleges and universities in
California, I have been given many examples of what they need to
overcome some of the areas discussed above. Here are some of the
concerns and questions facing college campuses with large-scale mass
gatherings:
Communication process--lines of responsibility during an
incident;
Development of evacuation plans for different buildings;
Consistent training and exercising should be a priority;
Safety and security equipment resources for normal
operations;
Communication between various campus groups during events or
about events;
Identification of mass casualty incidents during an event;
Incident Command and Unified Command training;
Recovery and remediation needed to restore patrons' faith.
MAJOR SPORT TELEVISION NETWORKS
Create a seminar or workshop, as a part of the LSI program, for the
major sport networks to raise situational awareness of safety and
security issues at venues among media personnel. This exercise series
would provide reporters an opportunity to learn about crisis
communication and how their roles could change once an incident occurs.
The seminar's intent is to raise awareness within the sports-casting
community about how to react to a catastrophic incident, how to
transition from a sportscaster role into more of a newscaster role or
even function as a Public Information Officer (PIO) or Joint
Information Officer (JIC) within the Incident Command Structure (ICS)
structure during and incident. Perhaps teach the staff of the networks
how to integrate with the venue security and operational staff to
increase the overall understanding of incident response and crisis
communication.
CHAPLIN AND COMMUNITY SERVICES
The LSI program would assist mass gathering venues and community
first responders to create a network or system of chaplains or
community volunteers for each venue, whether it is a professional sport
stadium, public gathering venue or collegiate facility to respond to
the emotional and reunification needs of the people, both spectators
and first responders, involved in an incident. Within this network a
phone list (call down system) would be developed to go into effect in
the event of an incident. One person would initiate the phone tree to
bring in local law and fire chaplains to assist with recovery,
reunification and other volunteer functions as needed. A number would
be provided to the venue Incident Commander to activate this network of
agency and community chaplains. Eventually there would be a Nation-wide
database of chaplains who could be brought into a facility in a time of
need. These chaplains could be recruited through local first responder
agencies as well as through local, State and national volunteer
organizations.
MAJOR AWARDS CEREMONIES AND CONVENTION GATHERINGS
The LSI program would utilize the same exercise series: seminar,
workshop and table top exercise with these mass gathering sites to
increase awareness among the venue security and first responder
communities regarding major awards and convention gatherings. The
exercise process would develop strategies and procedures to meet
protection, response and recovery goals during these events. It would
also work with event staff to better understand the need for evacuation
and sheltering plans and protocols during the planning process. With
the cooperation of site security and local first responders, the venues
would be better prepared for a terrorist attack or an all hazard and/or
natural incident.
BEYOND THE LSI PROGRAM IN CALIFORNIA
The LSI Program is one of many pieces of California's effort to
protect its citizens from hazards and improve our ability to respond to
and recover from them. Each year, California hosts a series of
Functional and Full Scale Exercises that are designed to assess the
ability of California to respond to and recover from any incident. The
venues and public safety agencies that participate in the LSI program
are integrated into the State-wide exercise planning cycles to allow
them to fully assess their strengths and identify areas for improvement
during the annual Golden Guardian Exercise.
In closing, California and the Large Stadium Initiative is
committed to keeping all large-scale mass gatherings both of national
significance and non-national significance protected by collaborating
with local, State and Federal partners in a post-9/11 world. The CA-LSI
program is working with and developing new state-of-the-art ideas to
design strategies, following DHS/OHS and HSEEP guidelines for safety
and security at mass gathering sites, to better prepare all the
stakeholders in spectator and venues safety and security during mass
gathering large-scale venues, natural disasters, and all hazard
incidents.
Again, thank you for this opportunity to be here today. I will be
happy to take your questions.
OHSTED: Office of Homeland Security Training and Exercise Division
LARGE STADIUM INITIATIVE
The State of California Office of Homeland Security Exercise Branch
(OHSEB) conducts a series of exercises for Large Stadiums and Mass
Gathering sites, which includes--a seminar, workshop, and tabletop
exercises (TTXs)--during a calendar year in support of the California
Large Stadium Initiative (CA-LSI).
OBJECTIVES
The CA-LSI program explores commonalities of large stadium/venue
Homeland Security preparedness issues and assists in developing
strategies for enhancing prevention, response, and recovery
capabilities in an open, stress-free environment.
The Large Stadium Initiative is based on the premise a majority of
stadiums are owned by municipal or State governments, and therefore
security varies from facility to facility. Managers rely on a
combination of private security companies, local police, and their own
employees to protect their facilities. Even at a single facility,
security weaknesses, strengths, the quality of supervisory personnel
and operational practices can vary from event to event. Consequently, a
critical step in establishing a solid infrastructure protection
standard for the stadium industry is to establish a high level of
security practices in stadiums across the country regardless of the
size of building or the type of event.
With this in mind, the Large Stadium Initiative partners are
provided with customized training which focuses on venue roles and
responsibilities, lessons learned and mass-care and shelter issues from
previous disasters and crisis communication during incidents of
national significance.
MISSION STATEMENT
Provide to large stadium owners and stakeholders in California a
stair-stepped approach to enhancing Homeland Security preparedness by
using Best Practices, Exemplars, the Infrastructure Security Plans,
Shared Discoveries, and Exercises.
GOAL
The State of California Office of Homeland Security Exercise Branch
conducts a series of exercises for Large Stadiums and Mass Gathering
sites, which includes: a seminar, workshop and table top exercises
during a calendar year in support of the California Large Stadium
Initiative (CA-LSI).
ACCOMPLISHMENTS
CA-LSI assists large stadiums/venues:
Developing strategies for enhancing prevention, response and
recovery capabilities;
Establishing a high level of security practices in stadiums
across the country regardless of building size or event type.
CA-LSI partners are provided with customized training:
Venue roles and responsibilities;
Lessons Learned;
Mass Care and Shelter issues from previous disasters;
Crisis Communication during incidents of national
significance.
CA-LSI provides stakeholders in California a stair-stepped approach to
enhancing Homeland Security preparedness using:
Best Practices;
Exemplars;
Infrastructure Security Plans;
Shared Discoveries;
Exercises.
CA-LSI is a focus of California's Golden Guardian 2007 Full-Scale
Exercise with events in the Southern, Inland and Coastal
Regions.
FUTURE PLANS
Racetracks and Speedways.
Professional Outdoor Sporting Venues.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you, Sergeant.
We will now hear from Mr. Reynolds for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS REYNOLDS, DIRECTOR OF SECURITY, MALL OF
AMERICA, BLOOMINGTON, MINNESOTA
Mr. Reynolds. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Members of the
committee. My name is Doug Reynolds. I am the director of
security for Mall of America, located in Bloomington,
Minnesota. It is an honor to be here today to acquaint you with
the security program of Mall of America and to share our
challenges for the future.
For those of you who have never visited Mall of America, it
is important to understand this is much more than another
shopping center in fly-over country. In fact, Mall of America
is the Nation's largest retail and entertainment complex. It is
two to three times as large as the typical, super-regional
shopping malls found on either coast. Our building is 4.2
million square feet, large enough to fit seven Yankee stadiums.
It includes a 7-acre indoor amusement park. It is home to more
than 520 stores and 50 restaurants. It is open to the public.
Mall of America is one of the top tourist destinations in
the United States. In fact, we have more than 42 million visits
every year, which is more than the combined populations of
North Dakota, South Dakota, Iowa, Montana, Wyoming and all of
Canada.
On any given day, there are well over 100,000 people----
[Laughter.]
Mr. Reynolds. Yeah, pretty big.
On any given day, there are well over 100,000 people in
Mall of America, making it the third-largest city in the State
of Minnesota. Those numbers increase dramatically during
holiday and summer seasons. Mall of America employs more than
13,000 people and has an annual economic impact of nearly $2
billion for the State of Minnesota.
Mall of America hosts more than 350 events every year. Each
event is free and open to the public, which can pose some
unique security challenges. These events may attract from a few
dozen to more than 50,000 participants. Given the sheer number
of visitors to the Mall of America and our status as a symbol
of consumerism and capitalism, security remains a top priority
for us.
Unlike a typical shopping mall, our security department has
approximately 100 people, and we run our operation 24 hours a
day, every day of the year. We work closely with the local
police department, as well as other local, State and Federal
authorities, for the protection of our regular visitors,
celebrities and VIPs.
We have been able to institute many programs, procedures
and policies that help ensure the safety of our guests,
employees and facilities. Some of the programs that are unique
to the Mall of America include extensive ongoing training. Our
security officers go through 240 hours of initial training and
50 hours of recertification training every year, including such
things as effective communication, first aid, defensive
tactics, verbal judo, crisis intervention, terrorism awareness,
and rapid response.
That is more training than many municipal police
departments require.
We also have two highly trained canine explosion detection
units that patrol public and non-public areas of the Mall. In
addition to that, we cross-train with canine units from the
adjacent 11 counties to maintain our proficiency.
We have recently implemented two separate ion detection
systems that can be used to detect explosive residue as well as
chemical agents. The stationery unit is used to check all
delivery vehicles that enter our secure loading docks, and the
portable unit can be used throughout the Mall.
Most importantly, we have created our own counterterrorism
unit. We call it the risk assessment and mitigation unit. It
specializes in behavior profiling. Our RAM unit, or Risk
Assessment and Mitigation unit, is based on a technique that
has been perfected over the years in Israel. In fact, leaders
of our unit received training in Israel at our expense to help
us develop a special program.
These officers look for intent, rather than means. The
objective is to focus on suspicious indicators in three
categories: people, vehicles and unattended items like
backpacks, shopping bags, suitcases. Our unit has eight full-
time equivalent positions and is staffed every day of the year.
External connections have also helped us strengthen our
security program due to strong support from other agencies. We
have been able to establish a strong working relationship with
our local contact with the Department of Homeland Security,
Glenn Sanders. He has been helpful with sharing relevant
information, providing access to needed resources and just as a
voice of reason or a sounding board to make sure our decisions
are on track with the big picture.
In 2007, I was granted a seat on the Joint Terrorism Task
Force Executive Board through the FBI. This was made possible
when they activated my security clearance. This has proven to
be an invaluable asset to Mall of America and our security
program. However, I would like to note that it took more than 7
years for us to forge these relationships and to gain this
limited access. We had to be persistent, diligent, methodical
in order to gain access; and this really is just the beginning.
As a testament to our effectiveness, we are frequently
asked to share our expertise and knowledge with other large
venues and groups across the globe. Whenever time and resources
permit, we are more than happy to share with others.
For example, we have worked with the Canary Wharf financial
and retail complex in London, the world-famous Mayo Clinic and
a Canadian retail development company, helping each structure a
strong security program.
With growing concerns over biological, chemical, explosive
and firearm threats, we are taking steps to remain effective
leaders in the private industry. However, in order to continue
to succeed, we need timely, relevant information from proper
agencies, insight into new trends or issues and additional.
Access to training opportunities for our officers is critical
to the continued success of our programs.
Although we are a private entity, we are also a national
icon. If a major terrorist incident were to occur at Mall of
America, the ramifications to the retail industry and other
malls throughout the country would be devastating. Our goal is
to prevent that from ever happening.
Mr. Chairman, Members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify and for your continued leadership on the
issue of security in public venues.
Chairman Thompson. I thank all our witnesses on this panel
for their excellent testimony and your excellent testimony. I
will leave it at that.
[The statement of Mr. Reynolds follows:]
Prepared Statement of Douglas Reynolds
Honorable Chair and Members of the committee, this testimony is
submitted on behalf of Mall of America, the Nation's largest retail and
entertainment complex located in Bloomington, Minn. It is an honor to
be asked to acquaint this committee with the security program in place
at Mall of America; and to share our challenges for the future.
SUMMARY STATEMENT
As a major tourist attraction--and a national symbol of consumerism
and capitalism--Mall of America (MOA) faces security challenges and
opportunities that are unique within the industry. Mall of America
remains committed to working closely with local, State and Federal
agencies to ensure the safety and security of our guests, employees and
facilities. We are also committed to sharing our expertise with other
entities, and continued growth and vigilance of our security program.
TESTIMONY FOR NON-NATIONAL SPECIAL SECURITY EVENTS HEARING
For those Members of the committee who have never visited Mall of
America, it is important to understand that MOA is much more than
another shopping center in fly-over country located somewhere in the
Midwest. In fact, Mall of America is the Nation's largest retail and
entertainment complex.
MOA is two to three times as large as the typical super-regional
shopping malls found on either coast. Our building is 4.5 million
square feet, which is large enough to fit seven Yankee Stadiums, 32
Boeing 747's or 258 Statues of Liberty. MOA also includes a 7-acre
indoor amusement park; a 1.2-million-gallon aquarium; is home to more
than 520 stores and 50 restaurants; and is open to and easily accessed
by the public.
Mall of America is one of the top tourist destinations in the
United States. We have more than 42 million visits every year--which is
more than the combined populations of North Dakota, South Dakota, Iowa,
Montana, Wyoming and all of Canada. In fact, on any given day there are
well over 100,000 people in Mall of America, making it the third-
largest city in the State of Minnesota. Those numbers increase
dramatically during holiday and summer seasons.
Mall of America employs more than 13,000 people and has an annual
economic impact of nearly $2 billion on the State of Minnesota. We host
more than 350 events every year. Each event is free and open to the
public which can pose unique security challenges. These events may
attract from a few dozen to more than 50,000 participants.
Given the sheer number of visitors to Mall of America--and our
status as a symbol of consumerism and capitalism--security remains a
top priority for us.
Unlike a typical shopping mall, our security department has
approximately 100 officers, and we run our operation 24 hours a day,
every day of the year. We work closely with the Bloomington Police
Department as well as other local, county, State and Federal
authorities for the protection of our regular visitors, celebrities and
VIP's.
We have been able to institute many security programs, procedures
and policies over the years that help ensure the safety of our guests,
employees and facilities. Some of the programs that are unique to MOA
include:
Parental Escort Policy. We have been a leader in the Nation
by instituting a policy that helps redirect responsibility for
kids back onto parents. This policy has been a model throughout
the Nation and requires children under the age of 16 be
accompanied by parents or adults age 21 or older on Friday and
Saturday evenings. In fact, we receive calls from other malls,
businesses and reporters almost every week to learn about our
program.
Extensive on-going training. Our security officers go
through 240 hours of initial training and 50 hours of
recertification training every year (including effective
communications, first aid, verbal judo, crisis intervention,
terrorism awareness and rapid response). That is more training
than some municipal police departments require.
We have two highly trained canine explosive protection units
that patrol public and non-public areas of the mall. We also
cross-train with canine units from the 11-county metro area.
We have recently implemented two separate Ion Detection
Systems (one stationary and one portable) that can be used to
detect for explosive residue as well as chemical agents. The
stationary unit is used to check all delivery vehicles that
enter our secured loading docks, and the portable unit can be
used throughout the mall.
Most importantly, we have created our own counter-terrorism
unit--our RAM Unit--that specializes in behavior profiling. Our
RAM Unit is based on a technique that has been perfected over
the years in Israel. In fact, leaders of our unit received
training in Israel--at our expense--to help us develop this
special program. These officers look for intent rather than
means. The objective is to focus on suspicious indicators in
three categories: people, vehicles and unattended items like
backpacks or shopping bags. Our unit has 8 Full Time Equivalent
positions and is staffed every day of the year.
External connections have also helped us strengthen our security
program due to strong support from other agencies.
We have been able to establish a strong working relationship
with our local contact with the Department of Homeland
Security, Glen Sanders. He has been helpful with sharing
relevant information, providing access to needed resources and
just as a voice of reason or sounding board to make sure our
decisions are on track with the big picture.
In 2007 I was granted a seat on the Joint Terrorism Task
Force Executive Board through the FBI. This was made possible
when they activated my security clearance. This has proven to
be an invaluable asset to Mall of America and our security
program.
However, I would like to note that it took more than 7 years for us
to forge these strategic partnerships with the Joint Terrorism Task
Force and the Department of Homeland Security, and to gain this limited
access. Over the years we had to be persistent, diligent and methodical
in order to gain access. And this really is just the beginning.
A good example of some of the challenges we face is that of the
MJAC. Mall of America was the No. 1 source of actionable intelligence
in the State of Minnesota to the Minnesota Joint Analysis Center,
supplying more intelligence than any other single entity.
Unfortunately, we were pulled off of this system of information
sharing. It is actions such as this that make our job of securing a top
national tourist destination much more difficult and challenging.
As a testament to our effectiveness, we are frequently asked to
share our expertise and knowledge with other large venues and groups
across the globe. Whenever time and resources permit, we are more than
happy to share with others. For example, we have worked with the Canary
Wharf financial and retail complex in London, the world-famous Mayo
Clinic and a Canadian retail development company; helping each
structure a strong security program.
The success of Mall of America's security program has been the
subject of many news stories and reports including in The New York
Times, Boston Globe, Inside Edition, Nightline, The Today Show, Good
Morning America, The Travel Channel, Fox National News, CNN, Wall
Street Journal and The Washington Post.
With growing concerns over biological, chemical, explosive and
shooting threats we are taking steps to remain effective leaders in the
private industry. However, in order to continue to succeed, we need
timely, relevant information from proper agencies, insight into new
trends or issues. Additional access to training opportunities for our
officers would be quite helpful.
In short, here's what we need to remain successful:
Access to real time, relevant information;
Additional training opportunities;
Resources to strengthen our security program.
Although we are a private entity--we are also a national icon. If a
major terrorist incident were to occur at Mall of America, the
ramifications to the retail industry and other malls throughout the
country would be quite severe. Our goal is to work hard to prevent that
from ever happening.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee, thank you for this
opportunity to testify and for your continued leadership on the issue
of security in public venues.
Chairman Thompson. Dr. Blackwell, first of all, let me
thank you for the help you have given in the past in addressing
natural disasters not just in the State of North Carolina but
my home State of Mississippi as well, as well as Indiana.
But I am interested in your notion of sustainability for
your own local unit and how you see the Federal Government
helping with that. Also the notion of mutual aid you talked
about and how we can somehow put that in some structure that
people can just plug into, rather than people coming together
just because they have good will.
Dr. Blackwell. First, Mr. Chair, let me say that I can
think of no better place to initiate our project than Waveland
and Bay St. Louis. The people there were grateful, they were a
pleasure to help, and it was a great experience that will long
live with all of us for the rest of our lives.
As far as sustainment goes, these programs are expensive.
When a MED-1 unit is sitting on the ground not deploying, there
is a cost for that. When MED-1 goes out to a venue to provide
mass gathering support, to provide medical care in any mass
gathering venue or strategic event, there is a cost for that.
For those two costs, our hospital is absorbing those costs
right now.
Carolinas Medical Center is a Level 1 trauma center, sees
the need for that, supports the initiative but is providing the
funds for the sustainment dollars. When there is a deployment,
obviously, the Federal Government steps in, be it HHS or FEMA
or whatever. With our three deployments, we have been under a
Federal contract. So the Federal Government does step up. But
to get that unit prepared and ready to go and on the ready,
there is a cost for that readiness; and no one is picking up
the tab for that. So sustainment dollars, again, are equally
important through the Department of Homeland Security to
support these initiatives to keep them functional and
operational.
Regarding getting out the door, it was a real chore for us.
It took 4 days before we could deploy before moving to the Gulf
Coast. We were ready to deploy. Our units were packed. We were
staged. We had units from physicians, nurses and allied health
personnel, 22 vehicles, 100 staff ready to deploy to the Gulf
Coast; and it took 4 days before the agreements could be
mustered to get us out the door.
Attorneys from both sides were settling contracts. They
were disputing contracts, and we were ready to go see patients.
They needed help in the Gulf Coast. We wanted to go. We were
ready to go. But we had to wait until those contracts were
signed.
There is a process in place called the Emergency Management
Assistance Compact, the EMAC agreement. All 50 States are part
of that today. But to get a streamlined approach to this, I
would encourage Congress to really take a critical look at that
EMAC agreement and see if there are ways--when people need
help, they need help. Attorneys don't need to be arguing over
contracts for that.
Chairman Thompson. Well, and as you know we held some
oversight hearings on some of those issues. We have heard
stories of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police offering help;
and, after about 4 days, they just called Continental Airlines
from Canada, flew to Houston, rented vehicles, and drove into
Louisiana. There were a number of stories.
I think it is incumbent on all of us to fix the mutual aid
situation so it is seamless. Now we put some language in the
reorganization of FEMA to cut down on a lot of red tape in
times of natural disasters. Our national response plan
basically provided for a seamless approach to that process. But
we do have to fix it, and your comments won't fall on deaf ears
because we know what you are trying to do.
Mr. Reynolds, you talked about a 7-year effort to get into
the JTTF program. With 100,000 people on any given day in
operation, that is, in my mind, a significant venue of a
gathering. What was their reluctance to include the Mall of
America into this Joint Terrorism Task Force?
Mr. Reynolds. Mr. Thompson, I am not 100 percent certain of
where that reluctance came from. I do know that when a new ASAC
arrived for the area, we gave him a tour of our facility, and
he understood what we were doing, saw it as cutting edge and
said, I will get you access to the JTTF Executive Board. I had
replied, with all due respect, I have heard that before, and it
hasn't happened. However, he was true to his word, and he did
speed the process up and get it through.
I know in the past when we had inquired about access--and I
had an active Top Secret SCI clearance from the military they
said, yes, I understand that is a military clearance. It is not
any good to, you know, the JTTF board. I found it frustrating,
especially when it was the same paperwork I filled out to get
the access that he ended up giving me, eventually.
Chairman Thompson. So, since your inclusion, you feel that
you are a full partner in the effort?
Mr. Reynolds. Absolutely. We had talked about--we have
people out there looking for what we call suspicious
indicators. We need real-time intelligence to tell our people
what it is, what the trends are, what the bad things are they
should be looking for. I do feel we are a great contributor. In
2007, we were the No. 1 source of actionable intelligence for
the Minnesota Joint Analysis Center; and that is a private
entity.
Chairman Thompson. I guess one of the other questions is,
Admiral Rufe talked about having to submit paperwork annually
for every event. Now, as a private entity, are you required to
submit any paperwork showing how many people come into the Mall
every day? Or are you exempt from that?
Mr. Reynolds. That is one of the benefits of sitting on the
JTTF board. We share that information with others, what events
we have coming up, that type of thing. We have had assessments
done by many different agencies that come in and look at our
facility. Are we required to submit that paperwork? No.
Chairman Thompson. But they are aware of what is going on?
Mr. Reynolds. Correct. That is one of the great things,
again, about being on that board, is just being able to
exchange information openly with people, build those contacts.
Chairman Thompson. Okay. Yield to the gentleman from
California for 5 minutes.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to echo your words of compliment to the three
that are testifying here. I would hope that more members of the
public would have a chance to be exposed to this kind of
testimony to realize how much work has gone into protecting our
Nation on this level since 9/11; and I think we are far better
prepared than we were before 9/11, although we still have much
to do.
Mr. Reynolds I want to congratulate you. Without feigning
an accent, you managed to sound like a Texan in the beginning
of your testimony. Everything is the biggest and the best and
the largest. I haven't heard that since I sat down with my
colleagues from Texas.
Mr. Reynolds. Thanks y'all.
Mr. Lungren. I appreciate that.
Dr. Blackwell, one of the concerns I have is, in terms of
responding to a particular incident, the surge that we need to
do that, there has always been the question of adequate medical
personnel, and particularly nurses. I just know in my State we
have a lot of nurses well-trained who are retired now--and I am
not talking about 80, 90 years of age. I am talking about
retired, raising families, doing other things. But certainly
still sharp, still capable. Is there any kind of program you
have in your State or can you visualize a program in which we
could create a reserve of nurses as something like a military
reserve so that, when we did need that, that they would have
adequate training to sort of keep their skills high in order to
be able to assist when the surge is necessary?
Dr. Blackwell. Yes, sir. There is a program that exists
today. It is the Medical Reserve Corps. It is active in all 50
States that I know of. It is very active in North Carolina. We
have a central repository of data where any healthcare
provider--I agree with you. Nurses--I have run two plane crash
disasters in Charlotte; and I can tell you, the nurses are the
ones who made it happen. They are the ones that really get the
emergency department operational and get patients cared for.
The physicians do their work, but the nurses orchestrate it.
It is the same on our MED-1 unit. We are always looking for
nursing staff. Seventy percent of our staff are nurses on our
MED-1 hospital.
But there is a medical reserve component that private
citizens can sign up for, and it is a repository for their
credentials to ensure that they have active license with the
State Board of Nursing or the State Medical Boards, whatever,
depending on who is signing up. We do have that physician----
Mr. Lungren. Is there a specific program which allows them
to have training dedicated to the Medical Reserve Corps to
bring them up? Or is it a repository of information which tries
to coordinate, as opposed to a specific program that we need to
focus on these folks who aren't going to be working during the
year but need to bring their credentials and their training up
to snuff?
Dr. Blackwell. There is not a centralized training that I
am aware of. That is up to each individual State to put that in
place. Our State office of EMS does for our State, and we do
have those programs in place. But that is State-dependent. I
don't believe that there are Federal programs out there.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you.
Sergeant, again thank you for the work that you are doing
and how much you have advanced this effort in our home State of
California.
Let me ask you particularly about the college setting. A
lot of college campuses, if they have their own facility, they
rely on volunteers or they rely oftentimes on a core of retired
folks who are ushers. I mean, my alma mater, Notre Dame, they
have got some great ushers, but they were there when I was in
college. They do a great job in terms of getting people to
their seats----
Football, we play a little bit there. We are going to even
play more this year. In fact, we have got some nice trips to
Mississippi. But, anyway----
They do a very, very good job of creating an environment of
welcome and showing people to their seats. But, in many cases,
they would not be the most physically fit individuals to assist
in a disaster where you may need some additional hands. How do
you deal with that in terms of working with the colleges and
universities?
Sergeant McCartney. Congressman, I appreciate the question.
The important thing to remember, too, with colleges and
universities that I enjoy or that the Office of Homeland
Security enjoys in the LSI program is we go in and work with
first responders, the venues, the school, the administrators,
the staff and try to help them better understand programs or
games or facilities, basketball, baseball, football,
graduation. Six thousand people show up to a graduation at a
facility in UOP, as you know, in Stockton, and with that many
people they don't have--you know, there is an evacuation plan
that has to go into effect.
So the training of staff, the training of students is a
huge component of that because they use students to augment
security at these venues.
Mr. Lungren. That is a question that I would run into. You
have a large number of students usually at these venues----
Sergeant McCartney. Right.
Mr. Lungren [presiding]. Many of them sober--and capable of
working out. I am just not aware of a program which tries to
enlist the student body at large, not to be ushers, not to be
official volunteers but to be able to respond if there were an
emergency so that they would know their particular assembly
points in the stadium to assist. Is that kind of thinking going
on? Are you doing that sort of thing?
Sergeant McCartney. Yes. Through the Large Stadium
Initiative, what we do when we go to those schools is we talk
about that exactly. During their evacuation plans, one of the
things is they can set up an evacuation plan on paper. But if
they don't train to that and if they don't exercise to that,
then it does nobody any good.
One of the other things we noticed is that what if all the
lights go out in the basketball arena? It is pitch black. You
can't see anything. So flashlights was a big proponent, because
they didn't have flashlights.
So through the LSI program, through the first responders
and the local operational areas in California and the different
regions throughout California, we are able to help with some
funds through grants or other funds through the after-action
reporting and the improvement planning to get them to those
things, flashlights, basic necessity.
But, again, if this building right now was to--lights to go
out, minus the light from outside, it would be very dark in
here; and flashlights for those that are doing security and
those trying to evacuate people is very important. So we rely
on the schools and the first responders really to help in the
training; and through the facilitation of the program, we kind
of develop policies, procedures and new evacuation plans to
assist these universities.
Mr. Lungren. May I ask one more?
Chairman Thompson. Sure.
Mr. Lungren. Mr. Reynolds, I am going to be attending a
convention up in your neck of the woods later this summer. I
expect that my wife and I and others may visit your mall. I
presume you are making special efforts for that while you are
up there. What kind of pressure does that put on the mall when
you are going to have a national convention in the area where
you probably would expect more than the 100,000 a day?
Mr. Reynolds. Certainly we will adjust our staffing levels.
We are already training up for that. The RNC crew has put me on
the Crisis Management subcommittee, which helps, again, develop
what the big picture is, gets us involved in that, who we can
report to if we see different incidents, what we should be
watching for, that type of thing.
Mr. Lungren. Have you noticed a ramp-up in terms of the
participation you get from DHS and the Federal establishment
with respect to that versus your everyday large operation and
relationship to the Federal Government?
Mr. Reynolds. Two weeks ago, I was invited to or just
completed some training with the FBI directly relevant to the
RNC coming up. Prior to that--there is a lot with the local law
enforcement. The Capitol Police have been out to visit us. I
had a chance to visit with them yesterday as well.
Yes, there are a lot of entities that are regularly calling
and stop out for tours, visits, want to know what our plan is,
anticipate their people will be coming out to our area and want
to know what kind of facilities we have and what kind of
security arrangements we have.
Mr. Lungren. Well, I look forward to seeing you there.
Mr. Reynolds. We look forward to seeing your billfold, sir.
Chairman Thompson. We are sure you will invest in the
economy.
We will now recognize the gentlelady from the Virgin
Islands for 5 minutes, Mrs. Christensen.
Mrs. Christensen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just have a
few questions.
Dr. Blackwell, on MED-1, you have deployed it at several
places. I have operated under the tents, the ones that you blow
up after Hurricane Hugo. We were able to do surgery, deliveries
and do regular medical emergencies there. So one question would
be, how is MED-1 better than the tents? A couple of ways that
you could tell us that they are better. Do you feel that MED-1
units should be used either in whole or in part at mass
gatherings? Do you think they have a role there? Also, I don't
know how many there are. Is yours the only one in the country?
Dr. Blackwell. No, ma'am. Los Angeles County just bought
the first one after ours.
Mrs. Christensen. How many do you think we should have?
What would be--the last question on that would be, what would
be the optimum number that we should have to be able to have
enough to be deployed?
Dr. Blackwell. Yes, ma'am. I have got a bit of an interest
in MED-1 just because our charge--we received grant funding
from the Department of Homeland Security to build this as a
prototype. Our charge was to build something different than a
tent, and that is something that was aesthetically pleasing.
You as a physician know that a tent looks like a tent, smells
like a tent and leaks like a tent.
Mrs. Christensen. It was not aesthetically pleasing. We did
what we had to do.
Dr. Blackwell. Yes, ma'am. It was probably very functional
at the time. What we did is create an environment that would be
pleasing to patients, No. 1, that anybody that has just
suffered a disaster----
When we rolled into Mississippi, there were 150 refugee
families living on hot asphalt 7 days after the storm with no
health care; and so many of these had chronic conditions, as
you can imagine. When we rolled in and set up, they were in an
emergency department. It looked like a hospital. It was clean
like a hospital, and it wasn't a tent.
No. 1 for the patients, No. 2 for the healthcare providers,
physicians, nurses, allied help that don't work in those
austere environments. We want them to feel comfortable, that
they are not worried about leakage coming down. But, literally,
after 30 seconds after you are in this, we think that you
forget that you are in a tractor trailer. It looks like a
hospital.
So we think we have accomplished our mission on what
Homeland Security asked us to do and that was create something
different and prototype it and see if it is something that can
be used.
Which brings us to the next, should it be used in a mass
gathering venue? I think absolutely. It will raise the level of
care.
Most mass--not most but many mass gathering venues,
depending on the level of care they are providing, might just
be Band-Aid stations or first aid--Boy Scout first-aid-type
procedures. What we do at Lowe's Motor Speedway and Bank of
America, we try very hard to keep people on-site. We don't want
to separate them from their family or friends because that is a
repatriation issue. So we provide a higher level of care.
But using a MED-1 does several things. It raises the level
of care for patrons that are visiting those. It prepares you
for a mass gathering event, should a terrorist incident
actually occur; and it provides training for your staff that
when the river does rise or when the terrorist incident does
occur, your staff is ramped up and trained on that unit.
Do I think they need to be across the United States? Yes,
ma'am. We have proven it. We think it is what is needed today.
I would say start in every FEMA region across the United States
and expand it from there.
Mrs. Christensen. That is what I was thinking, to the
regions.
Sergeant McCartney, could you speak to the impact of
handling numerous events that are happening at one time across
the State or a big city? Earlier--I think you were here--the
New York folks particularly talked about having a number of
things happening on any given one day in New York City. Can you
speak to that at all?
Sergeant McCartney. Yes, ma'am. One of the things that
California does and through the Large Stadium Initiative--and I
have to say, the first responders in all the communities in
California and I am sure across the United States are the real
doers of all these mass gathering events. What they do
especially is they work together in a unified and ICS
structure. That is how they manage those big mass gathering
events or multiple events within a community.
One of the ways we recognize that and one of the ways we
help with that in the Office of Homeland Security is the fact
that we do a State-wide exercise where we bring all three
regions together at the same time in different parts of the
State and say, this just occurred. They, through mutual aid,
through operational areas, work through up to the State and to
the Federal, depending on the needs, to manage that type of
event.
Last year, in 2007, we did use a large stadium mass
gathering event which happened in the coastal region on the Bay
Area, San Jose. It happened in the inland region in the
Stockton--middle of the country--middle of the State, I should
say, and then in the southern region down in the Anaheim area
where all three areas were impacted by mass gathering events
during a day. Each local first responder had to come in using
unified command ICS structure and how they work through a
problem, along with emergency medical systems, fire, private
partners and dealt with the catastrophic events. So, through
the training and exercising, it really works that way.
Mrs. Christensen. May I ask just a real quick question, Mr.
Chairman?
To Mr. Reynolds, in the training that you listed--this is
just a real brief question--you listed ``verbal judo''. What is
that?
Mr. Reynolds. Yes, ma'am. It is sometimes known as tactical
communication, also. A gentleman named Dr. George Thompson
wrote a textbook on it. It is used a lot within law
enforcement. You are probably familiar with it.
Sergeant McCartney. Very familiar with it.
Mr. Reynolds. There is a version for teachers, also. It is
a way of talking to people and de-escalating situations. There
was a time in our past when we thought that the way to handle
things was to increase numbers and, you know, force on force
and that type of thing. That wasn't the solution. The solution
was to de-escalate it and to prevent it from getting worse.
Given the option of talking to somebody into leaving and going
hands-on with them, I would rather use my brain every time.
Mrs. Christensen. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
I have a couple other questions that I would like to throw
out.
Mr. Reynolds, one of the challenges in any kind of
potential situation is the ability for people to communicate
with each other. Since you are in a private setting, are you
allowed to have the ability to communicate with local law
enforcement on their radio frequencies?
Mr. Reynolds. That is an excellent question.
There are a couple different ways to look at that. We do
have one of the police base radios and one of their handheld
radios within our dispatch center. Yes, we are. We have direct
ring-down lines to the local police department that, we pick it
up, it goes straight to their dispatch. We have unlisted phone
numbers to their dispatch area. We have a great communication
center with the local police department.
Chairman Thompson. So with real-time communication though,
it is like a relay system or something like that?
Mr. Reynolds. Absolutely. We pick it up. Their dispatch
knows it is us on the other end. We know it is them. It is a
direct call line to them.
Chairman Thompson. Was that difficult to work out, to get
the ability to have a radio?
Mr. Reynolds. No. I started working for Mall of America in
1996, and we have had it ever since I started, before I
started. We have continued to make improvements on that along
the way.
Chairman Thompson. Sergeant McCartney, while you are
working with the LSI initiative, have you seen that
interoperability challenge?
Sergeant McCartney. It is certain challenges in certain
areas, depending on interoperability in the local area. But for
the most part in California that has been the huge component of
getting ourselves better prepared. Law enforcement, fire, EMS,
private partners, especially private partners in college
stadiums which have mostly law enforcement first responder
assistance during those venues.
Some colleges in California have police departments that
are actually the police for that university. Some other
colleges don't. So in some of the stadiums in some of the other
areas they used first responders to assist in that. In either/
or, with first responders being there or the private police or
the police department from the university, they can work
together. Quite frankly, they are retired from the police
department in the city is usually how they build the police
department in the university. So they do work together to make
sure that if there is a problem anywhere on one of those sites
that local first responders can talk to each other and talk to
them to get the best resources in to take care of the problem.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
Mr. Lungren.
Mr. Lungren. Following up on that, Mr. Chairman. We haven't
solved the interoperability problem Nation-wide. We haven't
solved it here with the Capitol Police, as a matter of fact. We
are working on that in another committee. But as I understand
it looking at the technology, we don't have automatically
compatible systems. There are patches.
Sergeant McCartney. Correct.
Mr. Lungren. I have seen the vehicles that can come in. As
long as you have someone who really knows what they are doing,
they can patch one through to the other and it almost is
instantaneous.
Sergeant McCartney. Right.
Mr. Lungren. I presume that is part of the efforts that you
have ongoing?
Sergeant McCartney. Yes, Congressman. What we do in the
Sacramento area--I can speak to that in California as much as
Los Angeles area in the southern region and the Bay Area. There
are multiple communication vans or vehicles that are out
traveling through local areas in California. Through those
vehicles, just like the Congressman stated, a gentleman or
woman who is very knowledgeable in that activity can go in
there and I can bring--the three of us could have three
different radios from three different places, walk into this
facility, hand them our radios. They get them back and the
three of us are now best friends because we can all talk.
I am sure in the Carolinas and I am sure in Minnesota it is
the same as far as that type of response when it comes to those
type of vehicles and the knowledge those people have.
Mr. Lungren. I just want to make sure that as we are moving
forward to the interoperability solution, which we are not at,
even this many years after 9/11, we don't forget what I call
the interim fix, which I call these mobile patch units. I just
want to make sure that if something comes up in the mean time
where we decide that there is an interoperability problem
immediately that we make sure that those kinds of fixes can be
made and funds can be directed to that. I was just asking those
of you as experts whether that makes sense. I mean, is that
technology out there? Are you using it now? Should we make sure
that that is available as we look to the ultimate solution, the
better solution where I think we are going to get but it is
going to be a number of years?
Sergeant McCartney. I think it is very important very
quickly to go off of what was talked about in the first panel,
mutual aid. It is very important to have that connectability
with those other departments. Because during mutual aid, as we
all know, we are bringing in resources from faraway places to
assist us. Fires in California have been astronomical, and we
require help from other States. So it is nice when we can bring
those people over and we have that opportunity to communicate
so we can handle those catastrophic events in California at
least.
Mr. Lungren. I was just thinking, Mr. Chairman, you
mentioned the Canadian Mounted Police coming down and
assisting.
Chairman Thompson. Right.
Mr. Lungren. We wouldn't necessarily have them on the same
frequency as some of the others. But I know if we have one of
those vehicles, I know it is a possibility. It is kind of the
flexibility and agility that we need to build into the system,
as opposed to rigidity.
Chairman Thompson. If the gentleman would yield. One of the
problems with that is how do we plan for the agility? Because
everybody wants their own piece of equipment. If we have to buy
mobile command centers for everybody who has a unit to deploy,
then we won't have many other resources to push toward the
problem.
One of the other problems associated with this, too, is our
vendors have been very strategic in going out and convincing
some less sophisticated departments that all they need to do is
buy a new system. Well, that new system is fine for that unit.
If it is a police system but they can't communicate with the
fire, you all have stovepiped that communication.
So you are absolutely correct. The temporary piece is how
can we patch everyone in with these units. Ultimately, from a
technology standpoint we just have to be able to move it even
further. But that has been one of our real, real problems.
I yield back.
Mr. Lungren. The other thing is, I have been reading Dwight
Eisenhower's memoirs from World War II called Crusade in
Europe; and it is amazing as you pick up insights into
leadership and so forth.
One of the things that he points out, and Stephen Ambrose
writing about World War II did, the success of the American
Armed Forces was attributable to many things but one of them
was the creativity of the average GI, the sergeant. They give
example after example where they did things that weren't
planned, but they responded.
I guess if I could just ask one question, my last question
would be this: How do we ensure that in all the planning that
you do that we still allow for that creativity, that we still
allow for someone to figure out the answer to a question that
you didn't really fully map out beforehand? In other words, are
we assured that within these plans--all the planning and
cooperation that we have, that there is enough left there that
someone with a spark of creativity can respond to a situation
as opposed to--well, you know, I got the Director from DHS
which came out to the Office of Homeland Security down to us,
and we figured out this thing at the Mall of America, and that
is the way we are going to do it. Is there a way to ensure that
that maintains itself, that possibility of creative response to
an unanticipated problem?
Dr. Blackwell. Congressman, on the medical side of things,
you raise a great issue. Where would we be if we didn't have
that? I would simply say, every deployment that we go on, we
learn something else. The key to our success is after-action
planning. We debrief on the mission. We spend a lot of time
around the table and say, what did we do right? What did we do
wrong? How can we make it better?
We learned lots of lessons after Katrina, we learned a lot
of lessons after Mardi Gras, and we utilized those lessons in
improving our system. The radio communication you just
mentioned, we realized we were dealing with multiple ambulance
services coming in, bringing us patients and we had no way to
communicate with them. Now we have UHF, VHF, 800 megahertz
radios, and a ham radio and a communications officer that
travels with us and that mixing box that makes all that happen.
We have learned those lessons, and we have gotten creative
every time we deploy. That is what is so vital in all this, and
that is why I think using our asset for mass gathering venues--
every time you deploy that, you are going to learn something
else and make your program better.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you.
Sergeant McCartney. I think also, in law enforcement, it is
very much the same way as it is in medical and fire as far as
creativity. The first-line folks, the folks that are doing the
job every day have valuable information when it comes to how to
solve problems and do certain things. Leadership, yes,
definitely is a process of that. But I think it is the
leaders--and I can speak for the Sacramento County Sheriff's
Department in the sense that we allow those people to make
those creative decisions. We test those things. We exercise;
and again we also, through after-action reporting and learning,
we learn new things. When we learn new things, we develop new
programs, policies, procedures.
As you know, we have the air show that comes to Sacramento.
I am the traffic commander for that entire event.
Mr. Lungren. You have improved.
Sergeant McCartney. We have improved over the last 2 years.
Mr. Lungren. I appreciate that. It is not too far from
where I live. The lines are shorter.
Sergeant McCartney. We do a lot of creative thinking,
planning and using our first-line responders to help us make
those decisions and work with us to find better ways to fix
whatever the problem may be.
Mr. Reynolds. Whether you are doing a real scenario or a
real situation or a training exercise, again, one of the keys
is to quickly have after-action reports after it. So often when
people are done with these, they see the situation as being
done and they want to leave. You have to gather them quickly,
put pride aside, and if you had some shortfalls, you have got
to point those out and, again, put pride aside at all levels,
like you were discussing. It can't just be the command level.
It has got to be the person on the ground, getting the boots
muddy, who has got to be able to give you input and what they
saw going right and what they saw going wrong or else you are
not going to make a difference, you are not going to improve.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you, gentlemen, very much for your
excellent presentations to the committee and again for the
service all of you do for our country. We appreciate it.
I think I speak for the entire committee. Our commitment is
to do all we can to make sure that the planning, the equipment,
and the resources at the Federal level get pushed down in
concert with working with State and locals and the private
sector to see that mass gatherings are as safe as any other
venue in this country. Thank you again.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:41 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson of Mississippi for Colonel
Robert B. Stephan, USAF (Ret.), Assistant Secretary, Infrastructure
Protection, National Protection and Programs Directorate, Department of
Homeland Security
Question 1. What are the challenges unique to those mass gathering
events that are not considered National Special Security Events (non-
NSSEs)?
Answer. Similar to challenges for an NSSE, specific challenges for
non-NSSEs vary from one event to another. There is no direct Federal
funding mechanism for non-NSSE mass gathering events. When local event
sponsors/planners do not have the necessary resources to overcome
specialized equipment and manpower (security and emergency response)
challenges, they must first exhaust the mutual assistance agreements
they share with their neighboring localities. If these agreements are
implemented and the event planners still face the challenge of
additional resource shortfalls, they may choose to request Federal
support as needed to fill a particular gap they have identified, such
as adequate maritime security or airspace security coverage. Other
examples could be a need for specialized radiological detection
equipment or bio sensors beyond their local and neighboring resources
and capabilities. In such cases, many individual Federal agencies and
departments that comprise the SEWG may be able to supplement local gaps
and shortfalls if it is in keeping with their core mission areas and
responsibilities. Direct requests from the localities is one way to
determine the level of Federal assistance that may be required; the
application of SEAR levels to all special events is another (automated)
way to determine the likely level of Federal assistance that may be
required.
Question 2. What additional resources do you think are necessary to
help secure the venues that host mass gatherings that are not
considered National Special Security Events (non-NSSEs), from whom, and
why? What additional contributions are you/Infrastructure Protection
prepared to make to improve security at these venues?
Answer. While the responsibility for securing non-NSSE events
resides primarily with the local authorities, local planners can
request Federal support from the Federal agencies in their area,
regardless of the SEAR level of the event. These authorities are
responsible for developing their own Special Event Plans.
The coordination conducted on behalf of the SEWG does not provide
for Federal operational oversight of member organizations, nor does the
Federal Coordinator have operational oversight of Federal organizations
during an event. As your question implies, the Office of Infrastructure
Protection (OIP), other DHS Components and SEWG member agencies are in
a position to support local planners, if their core mission calls for
such support.
Question 3. How can the Department of Homeland Security, State,
territorial, tribal, and local governments, and the private sector work
together better to ensure public health, safety, and security for mass
gatherings that are not considered National Special Security Events
(non-NSSEs)?
Answer. The continued participation and engagement of each State
Homeland Security Advisor and their S/L/T/T planners in the annual DHS
special event data call is of vital importance to strengthening the
Federal-State working relationship that can solve resource and
capability gaps and therefore better ensure the public health, safety,
and security for mass gatherings of all levels.
The information from this annual special event data call allows the
Department to ensure that all of the entered events are accurately
assessed, rated and communicated to the Federal community for overall
situational awareness and, when warranted, signal the need for direct
Federal support to occur. The State Homeland Security Advisors, OPS and
the SEWG are open to suggestions and feedback from our partner data
call users to ensure a consistent, reliable and trouble free entry of
events experience by all of the data call system users. In addition to
the data call itself, OPS works closely with the DHS Office of
Intergovernmental Programs to craft special event program messages to
the Homeland Security Advisors during the year and to communicate
whenever necessary via written correspondence and by hosting joint
tele-conference calls with the States.
Question 4. How do the Operations Coordination Division, Office of
Infrastructure Protection, Office of Risk Management Analysis, Office
of Intelligence and Analysis, and the Grants Program Directorate (now
sitting in FEMA) interact? Short of Secretary Chertoff, who is
responsible for coordinating the activities of these various entities
that all have something to do with mass gatherings?
Answer. The Federal Government coordination mechanism for non-NSSE
Special Events is the Special Event Working Group. While concentrating
on SEAR level 1-2 events, the SEWG, which consists of over 50 Federal
Departments, Agencies and DHS components, is also a mechanism for
coordinating and interaction on all non-NSSE Special Events. The
agencies noted above are all members of the SEWG.
Question 5. We have observed and heard from Federal, State,
territorial, tribal, local, and private sector personnel that planning
efforts are often disconnected from other activities (such as training,
exercises, standard setting, and the identification and communication
of lessons learned), even within the Department of Homeland Security.
What is being done, will be done, and/or can be done to better
integrate these efforts?
Answer. Following Hurricane Katrina, the President and Congress
directed DHS to conduct a Nation-wide plan review. The results of that
review, which were provided to Congress, included a series of
recommendations to address how planning should be more closely
synchronized with other elements of the preparedness cycle (e.g.
training, equipping, evaluating, assessing, and corrective actions).
Since then, Federal, State, tribal and local governments have made
significant progress in modernizing emergency planning and ensuring it
serves as the foundation for preparedness activities. The National
Response Framework clearly identifies the value of planning in Chapter
IV. The President issued Annex I (National Planning) HSPD-8 in December
2007.
The Integrated Planning System (IPS) will formally establish a
standard and comprehensive approach to national planning that will
facilitate the integration of planning efforts across multiple levels
of government and link planning to other preparedness activities.
Efforts directed by IPS will provide planning guidance to Federal
departments and agencies at the national and regional level and examine
possible approaches for a long-term evolution to a national planning
system. IPS will also translate policies, strategies, and planning
guidance into a family of strategic, operational, and tactical plans,
fostering integration and synchronization with State, local, and tribal
officials, to include linkages with Comprehensive Preparedness Guide
efforts.
The newly updated FEMA Comprehensive Preparedness Guide, CPG 101 (A
guide for all-hazard emergency operations planning for State,
territorial, tribal and local governments), provide guidance about
emergency operations planning to State, local, territorial, and tribal
governments. The Guide provides emergency managers and other emergency
services personnel with recommendations on how to address the entire
planning process, from forming a planning team, through writing and
maintaining the plan, to executing the plan. It also encourages
emergency managers to follow a process that addresses all of the
hazards that threaten their jurisdiction through a suite of plans
connected to a single, integrated emergency operations plan (EOP).
Additionally, CPG 101 incorporates concepts that come from disaster
research and day-to-day experience. The Guide is part of a larger
series of emergency planning related CPGs published by FEMA. Follow-on
guides will provide detailed information about planning considerations
for different response functions and hazards.
The 2006 Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act (PKEMRA)
mandated the transfer of certain DHS preparedness functions to FEMA. As
part of this transition FEMA created the National Preparedness
Directorate (NPD) with a mission of unifying DHS' preparedness,
mitigation, response, and recovery missions. Since 2007, NPD has
overseen the coordination and development of the capabilities and tools
necessary to prepare for terrorist incidents and natural disasters. NPD
is working closely with the disaster operations directorate on
implementation of the IPS and planning integration and synchronization
with State, territorial, local and tribal governments.
The IPS and CPG documents are driving the development of planning
curricula at the Emergency Management Institute (EMI), as well as
planning instruction for Federal planners. EMI operates within the
National Integration Center (NIC), which develops, manages, and
coordinates all homeland security training, external education,
exercise, and lessons learned programs.
The FEMA National Exercise Division (NED) supports an all-hazard,
capabilities-based approach to exercises. Exercises are designed and
facilitated to address identified needs and underdeveloped capabilities
at the Federal, State, local, and tribal level of government. Each
exercise is targeted to a jurisdictions needs or to exercise previously
untested/under-tested capabilities, including those capabilities that
address hazards specific to a mass gathering event.
Through the Regional Exercise Support Program (RESP), the NED has
delivered or scheduled 72 exercises for State and local communities in
fiscal year 2008. Of those exercises, the following exercises represent
a sample of exercises with scenarios related to supporting planning
relative to a mass gathering event:
Loudoun Speedway (NASCAR).--Facilitated in Loudoun, New
Hampshire, this Table Top Exercise (TTX) occurred in March
2008. The exercise validated command and control plans for a
small town (a population less than 5,000) that has a NASCAR
track, which can become overwhelmed on NASCAR weekends. The
town depends heavily on State/mutual aid and, because New
Hampshire is a strong commonwealth, the State cannot become
involved in an emergency event unless requested by local
officials.
Martinsville Speedway (NASCAR).--Facilitated in
Martinsville, Virginia, this TTX occurred in May 2008 and was
the third in a series of building block exercises supported by
NED. This exercise is a good example of how to use the building
block approach, through workshops and seminars, to develop
plans and then validated plans in the TTX. The State and local
officials have indicated that they will request a full-scale
exercise through RESP in fiscal year 2009.
Olympic Trials Preparation.--Facilitated in Portland,
Oregon, this Functional Exercise was held in June 2008 to
validate plans and procedures related to the pending Olympic
Trials in Oregon.
Baltimore Ravens Stadium (M&T Bank Stadium).--This Full
Scale Exercise will be facilitated in Baltimore, Maryland, on
August, 2008. The exercise will test evacuation, security, and
decontamination plans and procedures. The exercise will utilize
approximately 1,000 volunteers for a scenario involving a
``dirty bomb'' inside the stadium.
Presidential Candidate Debate at Hofstra University.--This
exercise, scheduled for September, 2008 in New York, will
support the local emergency preparedness community with their
preparations for the actual debate, scheduled for October 2008.
Question 6. Committee staff members have visited a number of venues
that feature mass gatherings that are not declared National Special
Security Events (non-NSSEs), and have witnessed the presence of FEMA,
ICE, and other organizations from the Department of Homeland Security.
Please provide a list of all organizations from the Department of
Homeland Security that provide support at mass gatherings that are not
National Special Security Events (non-NSSEs). What is the Department of
Homeland Security doing to institutionalize such support at these types
of gatherings?
Answer. Some DHS organizations that have participated in past SEAR
Level 1 & 2 special events include the Immigration Customs Enforcement
Agency, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Office of Health
Affairs, the United States Coast Guard, The United States Secret
Service and the Transportation and Security Administration among
others. Local planners are always able to solicit Federal support from
the local Federal agencies represented in their area, if the local
planners feel such support is needed, regardless of the SEAR level of
the event.
DHS OPS continues to support special events and mass gatherings
through interagency coordination efforts. Formalized procedures for the
Special Events Working Group are in development. The formal procedures,
when completed, will develop processes for SEAR Level 1 & 2 special
event support to include air space security procedures, joint threat
assessments, joint risk assessments, Federal Coordinator designations,
Integrated Federal Support Plans and other inherently Federal roles
that cover the spectrum of prevention, protection, response and
recovery activities. A copy of a list of all members of the SEWG is
attached for your information.*
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* See Exhibit 1, Prepared Statement of Vice Admiral Roger T. Rufe,
Jr., page 18.
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Question 7. How have you involved high-level decisionmakers at the
Federal, State, territorial, tribal, and local levels personally in
planning efforts? What are you doing to improve the processes by which
this should occur?
Answer. From a Federal perspective, the SEWG (for non-NSSE events)
is the established planning process. All high level decisionmakers in
the Federal organizations represented on the SEWG endorse these
planning efforts.
DHS OPS and the SEWG have made considerable efforts to identify
special events through the annual special event data call and through
continued outreach to the Homeland Security Advisors of each State.
During the annual mass teleconference between DHS OPS and the State
Homeland Security Advisors there is an open forum to discuss any
feedback to improve the data call program. Outside of this call, the
HSAs remain in regular contact with the DHS Office of Intergovernmental
Programs, a key working partner and member of the SEWG.
The data call process enables any event considered important enough
to Federal, State, territorial, tribal, and local planners to be easily
entered electronically for ultimate evaluation by the SEWG co-chairs
and member organizations. Electronic submission and tabulation
eliminates the introduction of favoritism based upon any pre-existing
relationships between local high level decisionmakers and DHS program
administrators.
On-going relationships at the local level between local event
planners and local Federal field offices enable specific requests for
assistance to be made to specific Federal organizations at any time in
keeping with core mission responsibilities in the communities they
serve.
Question 8. Mr. Thompson has said that the Department of Homeland
Security must provide additional guidance to the public and private
sector about what to do when the National Threat Level changes. What
are you doing to get guidance out about what mass gathering venues
should do when the National Threat Level changes--especially at mass
gatherings that are not National Special Security Events (non-NSSEs)?
Answer. DHS, in conjunction with the FBI and other affected Federal
agencies, uses a coordinated notification process when the national
threat level changes. This process involves notification to appropriate
Federal, State, territorial, tribal, and local officials, and if
appropriate, the American public. The guidance is often in the form of
a national advisory or sector-specific area, so it may not be specific
or applicable to all individual special event venues in every locality
Nation-wide.
The listing of current and upcoming special events is monitored by
the National Operations Center (NOC) at DHS. Should a change to the
National Threat Level occur and specifically and disproportionally
affect a particular State or city, the NOC may contact the State's
Homeland Security Advisor regarding the event and provide? establish
mutual? [sic] situational awareness. In addition to the Homeland
Security Advisor of the affected State/s or areas, other agencies, such
as the FBI, may engage and collaborate further with local high level
decisionmakers. Any ultimate determinations about whether an event
should be canceled or not is made at the local level in tandem with
event organizers. Local/city managers would engage pre-determined local
communication mechanisms to announce any changes to the local public
and/or event attendees.
Question 9. We applaud the Department's willingness to work with
the non-Federal Government and private sector to develop planning
guidance. However, we question the efficiency of the Department's
processes to do so. For example, evacuation planning guidance has been
returned by the private sector to the Department six times. What can be
done to make these processes more efficient?
Answer. To say that the document was returned to the Department six
times is misleading and does not properly illustrate the level of
Federal and private-sector collaboration that was involved in the
development of the product. The document was developed over a 1-year
period between the 2007 and 2008 National Association for Stock Car
Auto Racing (NASCAR) Security Summits.
From the outset of the project, the release date for the final
document was set for the January 2008 NASCAR Security Summit. The
development process included an initial scoping meeting with the NASCAR
Security Director. Two additional teleconferences were held to finalize
an initial draft. NASCAR had the opportunity to review this draft
document before and after the inaugural ``dry run'' visit to Lowes
Motor Speedway in Concord, NC, during the Coca Cola 600. The initial
draft was intended to be a foundation document of common evacuation
practices.
After the Coca Cola 600, DHS, NASCAR track officials, and local
first responders attended a validation meeting to ensure that the
document correctly captured the NASCAR racing environment and
recommended realistic processes for evacuating a NASCAR facility. It
was also suggested during this session that DHS refine the initial
draft to reflect lessons learned and prepare for the three unique track
type visits. DHS provided drafts before and after each visit to the
unique track types of Talladega, AL (large track), Infineon, CA (road
course), and Milwaukee Mile, WI (small track). The draft document was
shared before each visit to ensure that all attendees (i.e., DHS
personnel, NASCAR track personnel, State and local first responders,
and other Federal partners) had a similar foundation for the 2-day
sessions at each track. These sessions were carefully planned to ensure
that the document captured the uniqueness of each track type. The
document was reviewed after the visits to the three unique track types
to ensure that it reflected the wide span of NASCAR facility types and
was ready to be presented at the January 2008 NASCAR Security Summit.
We will continue to engage with the sectors and stakeholders to
identify ways to improve the process.
Question 10. How has Infrastructure Protection worked with the
Office of Health Affairs to address the health concerns that could
arise from mass gatherings? How--if at all--has policy and programmatic
input from the Office of Health Affairs been incorporated into your
products--including guidance to commercial facilities and other venues
where mass gatherings occur?
Answer. The Office of Infrastructure Protection is the Commercial
Facilities (CF) Sector-Specific Agency. We have worked with the Office
of Health Affairs, and through that Office, with the Department of HHS,
which has the lead for health care and public health under HSPD-7 and
the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, to address health concerns
that could arise from mass gatherings--most notably in its work in
accordance with the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza:
Implementation Plan. This important work has been accomplished through
a series of briefings, workshops, and conferences with the CF
stakeholders representing each of its eight sub-sectors. Information
provided through these venues is representative of intradepartmental
and interagency coordination and collaboration to support CF Continuity
of Operations and Continuity of Business planning. Examples include
identification of essential functions and personnel, targeted layered
containment strategies, supply chain management issues, infection
control information, etc.
Question 11. We are extremely concerned about the ability of our
States, territories, tribes, and localities to respond to mass
casualties--which could certainly occur if a mass gathering were to be
hit with a disaster or an act of terrorism. How has Infrastructure
Protection taken the requirements for medical surge into account--
especially considering the inability of most hospitals to take on many
more patients, as they are at top capacity on a daily basis right now?
Answer. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is committed to
ensuring that the Federal response, whether it is a medical,
environmental, or law enforcement response, is well-coordinated with
State and local officials to ensure a seamless and integrated response.
The role of the Federal Government is to supplement the State and local
efforts, and to provide assistance when it is needed.
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has the primary
responsibility for building and enhancing medical surge capacity. DHS
Office of Health Affairs (OHA) works closely with HHS, which in turn
works with State and local jurisdictions to assist in developing inter-
State and multi-State agreements to provide supplies, hospital beds,
medical professionals during a catastrophic event. Also, HHS has
response assets such as the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS)
which partners with the Department of Defense and the Department of
Veteran's Affairs for the care and transport of disaster patients. DHS
constitutes the fourth partner in the NDMS consortium. These
partnerships are important to ensure medical surge capacity.
The Office of Infrastructure Protection works with the OHA through
active participation on the Government Coordinating Councils (GCC) for
the Health and Public Health and Emergency Services Sectors, organized
under the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) framework.
Both offices work with private sector representatives through those
sectors' Sector Coordinating Councils (SCC). This partnership framework
supports coordination and collaboration with the HHS Office of the
Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) and the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to address the issues
that affect our Nation's ability to effectively prepare for and respond
to a mass casualty event.
Question 12. During the hearing, Mr. Etheridge asked Assistant
Secretary Stephan about how the Department of Homeland Security has
been working with State and local governments and with the private
sector to develop planning guidance for mass gathering events. The
Assistant Secretary responded that some guidance and guidelines had
been developed and ``pushed out the door.'' Chairman Thompson
subsequently asked Assistant Secretary Stephan if he could provide the
committee with lists of where the guidance has gone out versus where
the guidance is not yet out. Please provide those lists here, along
with any necessary qualifying information.
Answer. Guidance documents currently provided to the Commercial
Facilities (CF) Sector are shared with our various critical
infrastructure partners at the Sector Coordinating Council (SCC) level.
Some guidance is shared with the entire SCC (e.g., the Pandemic
Preparedness Guidance), which then shares it with members of its sub-
sectors, be it one or more associations or a single group of security
chiefs with assets at one or more locations. Guidance developed in
close collaboration with private-sector partners (e.g., the Protective
Measures Guide for U.S. Sports Leagues) is shared only with the
participating sub-sector's chairperson, who then distributes the
document to the sub-sector's membership. Some guidance (e.g., the
Infrastructure Protection Report Series Papers) is shared with all
Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources stakeholders at the Federal,
State, local, territorial, tribal, and private-sector levels during the
execution of Infrastructure Protection outreach initiatives, private
sector security training and awareness programs, and vulnerability
assessments. Last, guidance developed for a specific organization
(e.g., the NASCAR Mass Evacuation Planning Guide) is shared with the
specific organization, which, in turn, shares the guidance within its
membership. Current guidance documents provided to the CF Sector that
pertains to events of mass gathering are:
NASCAR Mass Evacuation Planning Guide;
Protective Measures Guide (Sports Leagues Sub-Sector);
Bomb-Making Material Awareness Program;
Commercial Facilities Pandemic Preparedness Guideline;
Infrastructure Protection Report Series Papers for:
Racetracks (Horse and Dog);
Stadiums and Arenas;
Large Public Outdoor Gatherings (i.e., parades, fairs,
festivals, rallies, flea markets, demonstrations, concerts,
and celebrations);
Convention Centers;
Motor Race Tracks;
Performance Venues (i.e., theaters, movie theaters,
concert halls, auditoriums, amphitheaters, and community
playhouses);
Hotels;
Casinos;
Office Buildings;
Shopping Malls;
Apartments.
Future guidance developed for the CF Sector will be shared as
described above. Guidance documents in development that pertain to
events of mass gathering are Mass Evacuation Planning Guide for
Stadiums, and Protective Measures Guide (Retail, Outdoor Events, and
Lodging Sub-Sectors).
Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson of Mississippi for Vice
Admiral Roger T. Rufe, Jr., USCG (Ret.), Director, Office of Operations
Coordination and Planning, Department of Homeland Security
Question 1. Does the Operations Coordination Division of the
Department of Homeland Security provide the same level of monitoring
for all events receiving a Special Events Assessment Rating? Please
explain.
Answer. The Special Event Assessment Rating (SEAR) is broken up
into 5 levels. These levels are a starting point for further
coordination and monitoring by the DHS and the Special Event Working
Group (SEWG) member agencies. All events, level 1-5, are monitored by
the DHS National Operations Center (NOC) for Situational Awareness.
DHS OPS and the SEWG further coordinate the Federal support and
monitoring of events that are identified as SEAR Level 1-2. Special
events designated SEAR Level 1-2 signify events which involve close
monitoring by the National Operations Center due to their scale,
complexity and the large degree of Federal resources, support and
manpower allocated, including the appointment a Federal Coordinator by
the DHS Secretary and the issuance of an Integrated Federal Support
Plan document. SEAR Level 3-5 special events are monitored by the NOC
as well for situational awareness purposes, but due to their minimal or
non-usage of Federal resources, they fall below the threshold of the
appointment of a Federal Coordinator and they do not require an
Integrated Federal Support Plan.
Question 2. In your opinion, why do States not apply for Special
Event Assessment Ratings for many of the mass gathering events that
occur throughout the year? Is the application process prohibitive?
Answer. ``Applying for a SEAR rating'' mischaracterizes the process
for obtaining a SEAR rating. The only way a special event is given a
SEAR rating is through participation in the DHS coordinated Special
Event Working Group (SEWG) data call, which is conducted each year in
the fall.
Prior to the opening of the yearly special event data call a mass
State Homeland Security Advisors (HSA) tele-conference is convened with
assistance and coordination provided by the DHS Office of
Intergovernmental Programs. The purpose of the mass HSA tele-conference
is to notice the upcoming DHS special event data call for the new year,
welcome and encourage participation of every State in the process,
engage active discussion as to any difficulties that are occurring,
provision of on the spot technical support to system questions and last
to open a yearly forum for any suggested improvements for system users.
The special event data call that quickly follows is open to all State/
local/territorial/tribal (S/L/T/T) Planners. Further participation
within the State is coordinated directly through the State Homeland
Security Advisors that participated on the teleconference kick-off
call. Each HSA can encourage participation locally but there is no
penalty for non-participation. Reasons for non-participation may
include no forthcoming Federal funds to assist local special event
planners and no anticipated need for Federal resource allocation to the
special events in question.
The DHS/SEWG purpose for the data call is two-fold. First, the list
compiled from the data call enables DHS and the Inter-Agency SEWG
members to monitor activities and events around the Nation for
situational awareness. Second, the iconic nature of SEAR Level 1-2
local events often requires considerable Federal support and
coordination. All Federal support for these Level 1 & 2 events
generally comes from the SEWG members' operating budgets, and not State
and local budgets. DHS and the SEWG have no leverage to compel S/L/T/T
Planners to participate in the data call, yet many S/L/T/T participate
and users entered approximately 4,000 events for 2008.
The data call itself is not a prohibitive process. A focus group of
past S/L/T/T users is convened by DHS prior to the mass Homeland
Security Advisors teleconference and the special events data call to
discuss changes and their suggestions and comments. The Homeland
Security Advisors are briefed in detail before the data call and asked
to identify S/L/T/T personnel responsible for entering the events into
the system. The entry of data itself is quite easy, using a web-based
secure application, which includes helpful drop-down guidance boxes for
individual assistance with many of the questions and also provides some
examples of entries for new uses. This year, users who enter events in
the data call will see the entire list of special events, as an added
user benefit and situational awareness. If an event reaches the
criteria warranting a Federal Coordinator or an Integrated Federal
Support Plan (SEAR Level 1-2), the local elected official is notified
by the Secretary.
Question 3. Do you believe that each mass gathering venue or event
should have an emergency action plan? Do you believe that an emergency
action plan should be required of each mass gathering venue or event
that applies for a Special Event Assessment Rating? Why or why not?
Answer. Yes, the benefit of an emergency action plan to a special
event planner is immeasurable. However, the lack of a plan or an
insufficient plan may be an indication that a special event, usually an
S/L/T/T event by definition, may require some type of Federal
assistance or guidance. Accurate event data are crucial to the DHS data
call process and enables the SEWG and DHS to identify and/or fill any
gaps, if appropriate.
Many localities are achieving a common national standard by
adopting the Incident Command System as part of their training and
procedures on their own schedule. It is not the intent of the SEWG to
dissuade event planners from access to the system based on whether or
not they have achieved emergency action plans for all of their mass
gatherings. The data call system does question each locality as to
whether their event security and resources are met by their local
existing capabilities. The capabilities question is one of many that
help to determine an events SEAR Level; however, the SEWG, a Federal
interagency mechanism, does not have the authority to actually mandate
submission of emergency action plans or require them for events
occurring in a local domain.
Question 4. Who is the individual responsible at the Department of
Homeland Security for events designated as Non-National Security
Special Events?
Answer. The Secretary of DHS has delegated programmatic,
administrative and operational coordination of Special Events to Roger
T. Rufe, Jr., Director of Operations Coordination and Planning (OPS).
The interagency Special Event Working Group (SEWG) is the coordination
body for non-NSSEs, and the OPS Future Plans/Special Events Branch
coordinates this entity.
Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson of Mississippi for Dr.
Thomas H. Blackwell, MD, Medical Director, Center for Prehospital
Medicine, Carolinas Medical Center, Charlotte, North Carolina
Question 1. How do you (as head of emergency medical services, as
Director for Medical Services at Lowe's Motor Speedway in North
Carolina, and Director for Medical Services for the Carolina Panthers
games) gather and analyze health data for unusual trends at mass
gatherings? If you do not do so, are you aware of anyone who does? How
would you recommend this be done or done better?
Answer. A patient care report is generated for every patient
encountered at each mass gathering venue covered. The reports are
similar regardless of the type of mass gathering event. Reports are
analyzed and specific data is entered into a secure database to track
the number of patients encountered, types of injuries or illnesses,
medical supplies used, and number of patients transported for further
care. While this is a retrospective review of the activity and as such
would not provide real-time information during an incident, our mass
gathering venues are such that direct interoperable communications is
maintained. Physicians and nurses staffing the Emergency Care Centers
on-site would immediately be apprised of multiple patient encounters
where similar signs or symptoms presented during a finite period of
time.
I am unaware of how other stadiums, arenas, or race tracks conduct
their medical or public health activities.
To improve our system, an electronic patient care reporting system
that supports real-time downloading of patient information could
expedite a system of epidemiologic surveillance. Perhaps the best
scenario would be to activate Fusion Centers that include pubic health,
hospitals, and emergency medical service staff so that intelligence-
sharing of potential threats is enhanced. If a biological or chemical
incident did indeed occur, this advanced knowledge would lessen the
time for definitive diagnoses and treatment algorithms.
Question 2. What types of mobile hospitals do you think would be of
most use at disasters involving large numbers of people--whether they
occur at mass gatherings, or otherwise? What are your recommendations
in this regard?
Answer. When Carolinas Medical Center received the Homeland
Security Grant to design, construct, and deploy a mobile hospital, we
set out to create a facility that is different from previous
structures, specifically tents, which are often used as medical
shelters at mass gathering events. Patients and healthcare workers
alike should not have to endure the nuances of tents that leak, mildew,
smell, and have size restrictions. The MED-1 design incorporates an
esthetically-pleasing therapeutic environment such that one forgets
that the infrastructure is a trailer shortly after entering. Just as
important, the set-up time from site arrival until commencing patient
care is approximately 20 minutes. Patients inflicted by a disaster
should not have to wait hours or days for a medical shelter or
structure to be erected.
Using MED-1 mobile hospitals at mass gathering events would
accomplish several objectives.
1. The equipment would be used on a regular basis keeping it
operational and functional (important for medical devices).
2. Staff would be afforded the training opportunity to refresh
their knowledge and skills on the set-up, equipment, patient
care, and movement processes associated with a mobile facility.
Thus, retention and recall, along with core competencies are
maximized when a disaster does occur.
3. The mobile hospital would continue to store current medical
supplies and pharmaceuticals so that when an unexpected
incident occurs, the unit is always in a state of readiness to
respond.
Question 3. You have deployed the MED-1 mobile hospital three times
following natural disasters. Do you feel that the MED-1 unit could be
used for mass gathering events and if so, should more of these units be
available for use or deployment across the country?
Answer. Absolutely. A MED-1 unit could be deployed to any mass
gathering venue to provide routine medical care before, during, and
after the event. Should a disaster occur, the asset is deployed and
staffed, ready to begin triage and treatment of patients, and would
serve to immediately augment the local healthcare delivery system to
prevent excessive hospital surge and to preserve resources for more
critical patients.
Question 4. We understand that MED-1 has been deployed in support
of Hurricane Katrina to the State of Mississippi, and that the hospital
is currently deployed to Indiana to help provide emergency medical
services after the floods. How have your experiences responding to
disasters with this mobile hospital helped you provide support at mass
gatherings, and vice versa?
Answer. The three MED-1 deployments have provided valuable feedback
and information to improve our system of response and care delivery.
Following each deployment, After-Action Reports and debriefing sessions
serve to identify gaps in our system and targeted areas for
improvement. The third design version of the MED-1 unit is currently
under construction and incorporates each of the identified improvements
in infrastructure that were noted from these deployments. All design
modifications serve to address patients in any mass casualty incident
regardless of a mass gathering or natural disaster.
Question 5. What sorts of detectors for weapons of mass destruction
and agents of terrorism do you believe are necessary to be used at mass
gatherings for which the U.S. Secret Service, the FBI, and/or other
Federal agencies do not bring in their own detectors?
Answer.
Chemical
Current and periodic training for staff in recognizing clinical
signs and symptoms of chemical nerve agents, vesicants, pulmonary
agents, blood agents, and riot-control agents would be the best
preparation for recognizing a chemical agent release.
Biological
The Biowatch air samplers would likely assist in determining what
particular agent was released if multiple patients presented
simultaneously. Again, the key for any biological event will be the
syndromic surveillance and advanced intelligence activities. The SMART
Tickets (Litmus paper) for biological detection have high false
positive rates and would not be useful unless they show a negative
reaction.
Radiological
While the thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD) film badge and
dosimeters records the quantity of radiation to which one is exposed, a
Geiger-Muller tubes would be useful for surveying a scene to determine
if it is safe to enter.
Question 6. What issues do you have with hand-held detectors for
weapons of mass destruction and agents of terrorism--especially those
being used by emergency medical services and other first responders in
the mass gathering context?
Answer. As outlined above, the actual detectors that are available
today are not particularly practical for first responder use, if
biological detectors are setup in advance of an event and can provide
direct, real-time information at the time of an agent release, this
assists in planning for those mass casualties that would likely present
days to weeks later. Public information would be important under such a
scenario. Chemical agent detectors are very time-consuming to use and
do not measure all of the specific chemicals that could be used. The
radiological detectors are easy to use and easily deployable.
Question 7. What challenges have you faced in deploying your mobile
hospital?
Answer. The main challenges we have faced are two-fold: (1)
Sustainment funding to ensure readiness and (2) rapid deployment when
the need arises.
Sustainment
Simply having a MED-1 mobile hospital does not translate to a unit
being capable of responding. Supplies, pharmaceuticals, clinical
engineering and preventative maintenance, generator maintenance,
tractor and trailer maintenance, etc. are all required to keep the
resource active. Maintenance staff, administrative oversight, and
training are all cost-generating areas.
Deployment
When disasters strike and patients are suffering, all means and
processes for medical assets to respond must be simplified and
streamlined. The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC)
agreement is in place to afford such processes; however, inordinate
time periods plague this system. The three deployments have all been
associated with contract negotiations between States, resulting in
prolonged delays in our response.
Questions From Honorable James R. Langevin of Rhode Island for Dr.
Thomas H. Blackwell, MD, Medical Director, Center for Prehospital
Medicine, Carolinas Medical Center, Charlotte, North Carolina
Question. Your job is to provide prehospital medicine, and it is
clear that you are expert at doing so in a variety of environments. As
the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity,
and Science and Technology, I am particularly interested in emerging
biological threats. Can you talk about how you would treat patients
that have been attacked with a biological agent, such as weaponized
anthrax, at a mass gathering occurring at either of the stadiums for
which you serve as medical director? Do you feel that you have the
right assets at your disposal to be able to adequately treat numerous
patients--especially if you were told that there would be no
evacuation, and that people would have to shelter in place? What would
you need to deliver the adequate prehospital care in this context?
Answer. A specific pharmaceutical cache is required to provide the
antibiotics or other countermeasures indicated for the specific
biologic attack. Most large cities engaged in Federal preparedness
programs have prepackaged pharmaceuticals in strategic locations. These
can be mobilized quickly and efficiently if the training component has
been satisfied. If anthrax were disseminated, stockpiles of antibiotics
(doxycycline or ciprofloxicin) would be required for initial treatment
of exposed patients. If chemical nerve agents were released, the nerve
agent antidotes (atropine and 2-pralidoxime chloride) would be
required. Each of the pharmaceutical resources are stockpiled at our
hospital facility.
The stockpiles of these agents are not sufficient to treat a
population that would be present at our larger mass gathering events,
e.g. Lowes Motor Speedway or Bank of America Stadium. A mechanism of
triage would be required to identify those individuals who have the
highest likelihood of survival and to provide comfort care to those
noted to be moribund. To achieve the numbers of pharmaceuticals
required, the Strategic National Stockpile of pharmaceuticals would
need to be requested. The issue now becomes one of time. The request
procedures, approval processes, mobilization, transportation, delivery,
inventory, and distribution all are time-prohibitive to be completely
effective unless the stockpile were within a few hours of the event. In
such instances where prolonged times were inherent, there would need to
be a facility for the sheltering in place that supports emergency
medical care. The MED-1 mobile hospital provides such a platform. In
the basic form, there are 14 beds capable of providing acute care.
Expanding the awning system that extends from MED-1 unit to a full-
scale general medical-surgical hospital will support up to 250 beds.
Having this capability prevents surge capacity and keeps isolated/
quarantine patients off-site while providing the acute and ambulatory
and surgical care required during such conditions.
Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson of Mississippi for Sergeant
Scott McCartney, Program Manager/Exercise Planner, Large Stadium
Initiative, Governor's Office of Homeland Security, Sacramento,
California, and Sergeant, Sacramento County Sheriff's Department
Question 1. What lessons have you learned as part of your work with
large stadiums in California that could be applied to securing mass
gatherings nationally?
Answer. Response was not provided at the time of publication.
Question 2. How are you utilizing information from the State Fusion
Center to support your activities with the Large Stadium Initiative in
California?
Answer. Response was not provided at the time of publication.
Question 3. What partnerships have you seen (via the Large Stadium
Initiative and other activities) that you think should be utilized at
all venues?
Answer. Response was not provided at the time of publication.
Question 4. How have you seen information shared with trusted non-
Federal and even non-governmental (private sector)?
Answer. Response was not provided at the time of publication.
Question 5. How have you seen State assets stretched to support
mass gatherings? If so, how?
Answer. Response was not provided at the time of publication.
Question 6. Would you speak to the impact of handling numerous
events--including mass gatherings--in a State simultaneously?
Answer. Response was not provided at the time of publication.
Questions From Honorable James R. Langevin of Rhode Island for Sergeant
Scott McCartney, Program Manager/Exercise Planner, Large Stadium
Initiative, Governor's Office of Homeland Security, Sacramento,
California, and Sergeant, Sacramento County Sheriff's Department
Question. You've done a great deal of work with large stadiums in
California. To what extent have you addressed the biological threat to
such venues? Have you exercised any biological scenarios? If you have
not addressed this threat, can you talk about how you would?
Answer. Response was not provided at the time of publication.
Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson of Mississippi for Douglas
Reynolds, Director of Security, Mall of America, Bloomington, Minnesota
Question 1. How are you utilizing information from the State Fusion
Center to support your activities at the Mall of America in Minnesota?
Answer. Unfortunately there is no State Fusion Center in Minnesota.
If the action directly pertains to Mall of America (such as a mall
shooting) then the Minnesota Joint Analysis Center (MN JAC) contacts me
directly. If the information is not determined to impact me directly
then it is filtered through the Bloomington Police Department. The
filtered information may be trends in terrorism that the sender does
not see as being relevant to MOA. However, we use these trends to
develop a list of possible methodologies and create associated
suspicious indicators. It is difficult to generate suspicious
indicators for our Risk Assessment and Mitigation (RAM) Team without
adequate intelligence. Our RAM Team, which utilizes behavior profiling
and other techniques to detect potential terrorist incidents, was the
number one source of actionable intelligence in Minnesota for 2007. Due
to changes in the past year, we can no longer submit information
directly to the MN JAC. All of our reports now go through local law
enforcement which delays or stops the report from reaching the
necessary recipients. A cleaner line of communication (directly to the
Minnesota JAC) would help Mall of America and the United States
greatly.
Question 2. What partnerships have you seen (via the activities you
participate in) that you think should be utilized at all venues?
Answer. We have many strong partnerships, most of which could be
utilized by other mass gathering venues. These partnerships include
local/Bloomington Police, Federal Air Marshalls, Airport Police,
various Metro Area Police Departments, local County Sheriff (mostly for
intelligence), 55th Civil Support Team, numerous K-9 units (Federal
Protective Service, A.T.F., and the FBI (for peroxides to train our in-
house K-9 teams), Minnesota ARNG (Military Intelligence, Joint
Operations Center, etc.), Metropolitan Emergency Manager's Association,
Bloomington Fire Department, HSAS, Imulik Juchtam with International
Consultants on Targeted Security (ICTS) for behavior profile training,
and the International Association of Bomb Technician's and
Investigators.
Question 3. How have you seen information shared with trusted non-
Federal and even non-governmental (private sector)?
Answer. We are an active member of the Joint Terrorism Task Force
(I am on the Executive Board), Tripwire (HSAS), the Security Management
Daily publication (ASIS), ICEFISHX (MN JAC) which shares Law
Enforcement Sensitive Information through local law enforcement.
Information from private-to-private entity is created by developing
strong relationships before the incident occurs. In emergency
management it is well known that a crisis is no time to exchange
business cards. Develop the contacts before the need whenever possible.
There is a tool that is used by the Federal Air Marshall's called the
Tactical Information Sharing System (TISS). This allows for a
searchable platform to determine if others in your area/industry are
seeing the same trends as you are. It is used to validate, or mitigate
concerns and show patterns. It can provide invaluable intelligence for
both the end users and those echelons above that are developing
national or global trends. Those that enter and retrieve data would be
credentialed into the program. The private sector could benefit from a
process similar to TISS and the cost would be minimal.
Question 4. Do you think that Federal, State, territorial, tribal,
and local governmental support to private sector entities that host
mass gatherings can be improved? If so, how?
Answer. Yes. It took Mall of America Security 7 years (2008) to
gain access to classified information. Prior to that we had to hope for
someone to forward information to us, but that was sporadic and spotty.
For example, MN JAC would share information with Bloomington PD who in
turn might share it with Mall of America. The private sector needs
direct access to searchable intelligence. AII money should be
controlled by the private sector that it is designed to protect instead
of at the determination of law enforcement, for example:
Money for the private sector could help cover over time and
temporary security positions needed during heightened alert
levels. Currently the money is given to law enforcement and
they determine when they need to provide overtime coverage. The
person in charge of the venue should be making that
determination.
Federal intelligence programs should have open seats for the
private sector to be represented.
Federal training should be open to credentialed critical
private sector groups. The private sector can pay for their own
lodging and travel expenses. This would be utilizing seats that
often go unfilled at government conducted training. This
provides common language, an understanding of acceptable
standards, and forms critical relationships prior to an
incident.
Federal grants could be used for equipment such as CBRN
(monitoring & response), rescue equipment, K-9's, CCTV and
digital recording. These are all assets that protect the public
and may aid in the recovery of evidence or the prosecution of
those with harmful intentions.
Question 5. What could the Department of Homeland Security do
better to help secure the public from terrorist attacks in facilities
such as yours?
Answer. Information sharing is the key to our success.
We would like access to verify ID's (for nationals and non-
nationals) and to verify that license plates are associated
with the correct vehicle and not stolen.
Access to a TISS-type system for same or similar incidents;
a searchable database of suspicious or terrorist activity.
Access to International Alien Query (IAQ) information. IAQ
is currently available to law enforcement only. The IAQ is used
to check an international traveler's status in the United
States and determine if they are properly registered to be in
the United States.
Ability to share ideas that are effective such as our RAM
program. MOA has created several programs that we are quite
proud of. I would like to share these programs with others in
the industry and walk them through the hurdles we had to
overcome.
Assign Reconnaissance & Surveillance (R&S) Teams (aka:
Intelligence and Information Teams) during major events to
assist with identifying suspects; and be alert for pre-event;
surveillance and rehearsal.
Training and intelligence sharing.
Mall of America will train other private entities or groups
to be familiar with our RAM program. The training would be free
or minimal--I would simply ask for them to pay for their
travel, lodging, and meals.
Question 6. Minneapolis/St. Paul is hosting the Republican National
Convention this September, with a mass influx of people coming into the
Twin Cities for over a week. How is the Mall of America preparing from
a security standpoint, and how can the Federal Government be of
assistance?
Answer. I know this event has already occurred. I apologize again
for my late response and will send the answer I had written prior to
the RNC.
There are a number of areas that the Federal Government could be of
assistance including:
CCTV--Mall of America has a very developed camera system. We
could use additional people to assist with monitoring these
cameras during peak RNC times. Although we will always have at
least two people assigned, it is difficult to actively monitor
hundreds of cameras with a small group of people. If more
people are assigned to our CCTV area it can turn from mostly
reactive to a more proactive approach.
Access to police operation's and communication centers for
real time information and answers about our assets. This will
allow a better understanding of how we can assist law
enforcement. We have our own K-9 department, limited chemical
monitoring unit, and more. These assets may not be properly
utilized if the responding officers don't know they exist. This
is more likely as law enforcement officers from throughout
Minnesota are drawn together.
Detection (radiological) equipment provided by the
Department of Energy. This was provided the day before the RNC
and provided another tool to use should a threat arise.
Access to Federal training programs.
Assigning R&S personnel to Mall of America--we would supply
an office and communication center they could use as their base
of operations.
K-9 teams--we could use an additional four teams on site.
Funding for MOA Security staff overtime.
MOA owned chemical agent detector.
Training with FBI, Bloomington Police Department and the
ATF. We conducted many training exercises that ranged from
reactions to protestors to WMD incidents. We were treated as
equals by those we trained with and the level of respect
appreciated.
Ways that we prepared for the Republican National Convention
included:
Restricted time-off for security staff.
Purchased chemical detection equipment and trained staff for
proper use.
Conducted regular protest awareness briefs.
Held regular protest intelligence meetings.
Conducted in-house training to deal with the most likely
scenarios that might occur during the RNC.
Questions From Honorable James R. Langevin of Rhode Island for Douglas
Reynolds, Director of Security, Mall of America, Bloomington, Minnesota
Question. As as director of security at the Mall of America, you
must be aware that there are numerous planning scenarios in which a
biological agent such as Yersinia pestis--plague, is released at a
popular mall. Please describe the steps you have taken to protect the
Mall of America from biological threats such as this one?
Answer. There are a number of actions we have taken:
There is restricted access to our ventilation systems
including required security escorts to those areas that house
our primary ventilation systems.
We have a strong partnership with the 55th CST and done have
done many studies and much training with them as well as the
local fire and law enforcement agencies for WMD incidents.
Our RAM offers routinely train on rehearsal, surveillance,
and execution techniques associated with this threat.
CCTV and door alarms are monitored 24/7--including primary
ventilation access areas.
We rely on intelligence and information-sharing--biological
threats are generally slow to develop and recognize.
In rapid incidents (i.e. Anthrax) we rely on recognizing an
incident, isolating the area, and alerting the Bloomington
Police Department as well as the State Duty Officer.
We have stopped chasing the means, and look at intent
instead--this is a specialty area of our RAM officers. Too
often the U.S. counter-measures focus solely on the means (look
for the weapon). The weapon can change and be almost anything;
I hope that lesson was learned on 09/11/01 by most Americans.
Although the means may change, it is hard to conceal intent.
That is why we focus on intent. This is not to say we ignore
means, it is just not viewed as the sole indicator.
We utilize intelligence to track trends and techniques.
For biological threats we rely heavily on other circles or
aspects of a broader security plan to not let the suspect get
this far.
Again, I thank you for this great honor and to be associated with
your efforts to enhance the security of this great Nation.