[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE NEXT STEP IN AVIATION SECURITY--CARGO SECURITY: IS DHS IMPLEMENTING
THE
REQUIREMENTS OF THE 9/11 LAW EFFECTIVELY?
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 15, 2008
__________
Serial No. 110-126
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
__________
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44-653 PDF WASHINGTON : 2008
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Washington, DC 20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Loretta Sanchez, California Peter T. King, New York
Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts Lamar Smith, Texas
Norman D. Dicks, Washington Christopher Shays, Connecticut
Jane Harman, California Mark E. Souder, Indiana
Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon Tom Davis, Virginia
Nita M. Lowey, New York Daniel E. Lungren, California
Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Mike Rogers, Alabama
Columbia David G. Reichert, Washington
Zoe Lofgren, California Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas Charles W. Dent, Pennsylvania
Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin Ginny Brown-Waite, Florida
Islands Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida
Bob Etheridge, North Carolina David Davis, Tennessee
James R. Langevin, Rhode Island Paul C. Broun, Georgia
Henry Cuellar, Texas Candice S. Miller, Michigan
Christopher P. Carney, Pennsylvania
Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Al Green, Texas
Ed Perlmutter, Colorado
Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
I. Lanier Lavant, Staff Director
Rosaline Cohen, Chief Counsel
Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Robert O'Connor, Minority Staff Director
______
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas, Chairwoman
Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts Daniel E. Lungren, California
Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon Ginny Brown-Waite, Florida
Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida
Columbia Paul C. Broun, Georgia
Yvette D. Clarke, New York Peter T. King, New York (Ex
Ed Perlmutter, Colorado Officio)
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi (Ex
Officio)
Michael Beland, Director & Counsel
Natalie Nixon, Deputy Chief Clerk
Coley O'Brien, Minority Senior Counsel
(II)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on
Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection.......... 1
The Honorable Daniel E. Lungren, a Representative in Congress
From the State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee
on Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection....... 10
Witnesses
Panel I
Mr. John P. Sammon, Assistant Administrator, Transportation
Sector Network Management, Transportation Security
Administration, Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 13
Prepared Statement............................................. 14
Mr. James Tuttle, Director, Explosives Division, Directorate for
Science & Technology, Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 19
Prepared Statement............................................. 20
Ms. Cathleen A. Berrick, Director, Homeland Security and Justice
Issues, Government Accountability Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 29
Prepared Statement............................................. 31
Panel II
Captain Paul Onorato, President, Coalition of Airline Pilots
Associations:
Oral Statement................................................. 64
Prepared Statement............................................. 66
Mr. John M. Meenan, Executive Vice President and Chief Operating
Officer, Air Transport Association:
Oral Statement................................................. 68
Prepared Statement............................................. 69
Mr. Brandon Fried, Executive Director, Airforwarders Association:
Oral Statement................................................. 70
Prepared Statement............................................. 72
Ms. Cindy Allen, Chairman, Task Force on Security, National
Customs Brokers and Forwarders Association of America:
Oral Statement................................................. 77
Prepared Statement............................................. 78
For the Record
SOS Global Express:
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
Captain John Prater, President, Air Line Pilots Association,
International:
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
Mr. Peter Kant, Vice President, Global Government Affairs,
Rapiscan Systems, and Mr. H.B. Miller, Vice President, Smiths
Detection, Inc.:
Prepared Statement............................................. 10
THE NEXT STEP IN AVIATION SECURITY--CARGO SECURITY: IS DHS IMPLEMENTING
THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE 9/11 LAW
EFFECTIVELY?
----------
Tuesday, July 15, 2008
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure
Protection,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:15 p.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Sheila Jackson Lee
[Chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Jackson Lee, Markey, DeFazio,
Clarke, and Lungren.
Ms. Jackson Lee. The subcommittee will come to order.
It is my pleasure to acknowledge the Today Foundation that
has 16 students here. It is a leadership group from Dallas and
Tyler. Could you please stand up so we could see you and
welcome you? Congratulations. We are delighted to have you
here. Welcome.
The subcommittee is meeting today to receive testimony on
``The Next Step in Aviation Security--Cargo Security: Is DHS
Implementing the Requirements of the 9/11 Law Effectively?''
Our witnesses today will testify about TSA's progress in
meeting the 9/11 Act mandate to screen 100 percent of all air
cargo on passenger aircraft by 2010.
I am proud to convene today's hearing to evaluate the
progress made by TSA in carrying out section 1602 of the
implementing recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of
2007, which mandates that 100 percent of all air cargo aboard
passenger aircraft be screened by the year 2010.
On page 393, it is important to take note of the 9/11
Commission report that part of the descriptive instructions
given indicated that TSA also needs to intensify its effort to
identify, track and appropriately screen potentially dangerous
cargo in both the aviation and maritime sectors. This Congress
has taken up the challenge, and therefore this landmark piece
of legislation will make our citizens safer.
I am proud that under the leadership of Chairman Thompson
this committee worked to steer this provision through Congress
last year. As Chairwoman of this subcommittee, I am ready to
help ensure that it is implemented properly.
I want to take this opportunity to recognize the
significant efforts of Mr. Markey of Massachusetts in making
this screening requirement a reality. I look forward to
continuing to work with him on this important issue.
I am concerned with the implementation of this mandate and
the status of TSA's pilot program. In particular, I want to be
sure that the program will be narrowly tailored to ensure the
least amount of impact on small and medium-sized businesses and
that TSA will be providing stakeholders with the necessary
guidance and technologies in order to make implementation
successful.
This mandate was not designed to be heavy-handed. Instead,
it calls for a 3-year phased approach to screening 100 percent
of cargo carried on passenger planes and lays out clear and
specific benchmarks. It is with this framework in mind that the
subcommittee is evaluating whether progress has been made by
TSA in attempting to reach the benchmarks and for us to help
ensure that guidance is available to industry stakeholders who
will be impacted by the implementation of new TSA regulations.
Allow me to take this moment to thank the Department of
Homeland Security overall. We as the Homeland Security
Committee have the responsibility of oversight. But I do want
to acknowledge that there are hard-working members of this
Department who just a few years ago became a single department,
and out of that singleness they had to unify, speak the same
language and work on the same mission. So we know that they
have been working hard to secure the homeland.
We are grateful to the expanded law enforcement, to the
aviation and transit and maritime and others that address the
question of security. We have watched as there has been a new
attitude in making sure that America is safe, and we are
grateful to have gone since 2001 without a major incident on
our soil.
For some who are in this room, this may be a nuisance,
inspection of air cargo. As we look around the world, as we
watch the flare-ups, most recently in Afghanistan, the
difficulties in Pakistan, the challenges in the Mideast, we
recognize that although we may not be on borrowed time, that
the responsibility of this particular committee is a bottom
line, for if something were to occur the question would be what
were you doing?
So I express my appreciation to those who will be witnesses
today, that recognize we are part of a team. To the witnesses
from the Department, I want to be particularly clear: It is
vital that this subcommittee be informed of any difficulties
that have arisen in implementing this mandate. This is to
happen if we are to work in an oversight manner and to ensure
that we are all traveling the same journey. Unless we are made
aware of real or potential obstacles, we cannot help you obtain
the tools and/or the resources you lack and will not look
fondly on future shortcomings we could have helped to resolve.
This is not between the committee and staff members and
industry. This really is a higher goal, responding to the needs
of securing America, being effective and efficient, but
certainly doing our job. For that reason, I hope that you will
be clear and specific about any problems you are experiencing
or anticipating. I view the relationship between TSA and this
subcommittee as a partnership, and we are ready and willing to
provide you with the tools you need. But, again, you need to
make us aware of the facts.
This August will mark the anniversary of the enactment of
the 9/11 Act. As chair of the subcommittee, I think it is
appropriate to convene this hearing nearly a year after the
enactment of the 100 percent screening provision to assess the
progress made by TSA in implementing a critical component of
this legislation and nearly 7 years since 2001.
In accordance with the legislation phase-in approach, TSA
must screen 50 percent of all cargo transported by passenger
planes in the United States by February 2009 en route to
fulfilling the 100 percent requirement by 2010. Because the
implementation of this provision is complex and involves
numerous stakeholders, it is imperative for Members to inquire
about TSA's progress and whether TSA is on track to meet the
mandated 2010 deadline.
Specifically, I am hoping our witnesses today will address
the following issues. First, there seems to be a great deal of
concern regarding the status of TSA's pilot program. We must
ensure that as an integral part of this program proper and
timely guidance is provided to industry stakeholders to allow
them to comply with regulations. Particularly relevant to this
is the status of the interim final rule. The subcommittee must
know when this will be released.
Second, we are concerned that smaller companies with fewer
resources at their disposal will be unable to comply with the
program. TSA's existing pilot proposal requires that certified
screening facilities purchase equipment that can cost anywhere
from $150,000 to $500,000 per facility. Unfortunately, small
and medium-sized companies often are not able to invest in such
expensive equipment, especially if there is no assurance that
the equipment purchased will meet the requirements set by TSA
or prove to be effective for implementation of the program.
Third, we want to know how DHS is evaluating any innovative
technologies that can be applied to help fulfill this mandate.
Under the law, the Administrator of TSA may approve measures
beyond any X-ray equipment, explosive detection system,
explosive trace detection and canine teams to ensure that cargo
does not pose a threat to our Nation's aviation security.
I am interested in learning how DHS is thinking outside the
box about any strategic plan in place for evaluating
technologies that can potentially enhance security as it
pertains to this mandate. I will not rest until the
bureaucratic tape is cut and innovative effective technologies
can readily be deployed in order to make this task both readily
possible, but also efficient and effective and successful.
Finally, we are interested in hearing from industry
stakeholders who will be affected by TSA's imposed
implementation plan. While some of these witnesses are engaged
in the pilot program, others will discuss recommendations that
should be considered by TSA as it implements regulations and
works toward fulfilling the 100 percent mandate.
I look forward to the witnesses' testimony regarding this
important program, and stand ready for the subcommittee to
support your vital mission.
Once again, I would like to thank everyone for their
participation, and look forward to hearing from our witnesses.
At this time, without objection, I would like to enter
three statements into the record. The first is a statement
submitted by the SOS Global Express; the second is a statement
submitted by the Airline Pilots Association; the third and
final statement for the record is a letter from the Vice
President of Rapiscan and Smiths Detection Technology.
Hearing no objection, it is so ordered.
[The information referred to follows:]
Statement of SOS Global Express
transportation security administration air cargo on passenger aircraft
screening regulation
Issue One: Support for 100 Percent Screening
Section 1602 of the Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act of 2007 (the ``Act''), Public Law 110-53, requires that
100 percent of all cargo placed on passenger aircraft undergo security
screening by August 3, 2010. SOS Global Express, Inc. fully supports
the Act's screening requirement, which is essential to preserving the
security of passenger aircraft.
Section 1602 of the Act sets both a general standard and minimum
requirements. The general standard requires the Transportation Security
Administration (``TSA'') to ``provide a level of security commensurate
with the level of security for the screening of passenger checked
baggage . . . '' Pub. L. 110-53, 1602(a). The minimum standards
require TSA to implement a phased-in screening process whereby 50
percent of the subject cargo must be screened by February 3, 2009. The
final phase requires 100 percent screening by August 3, 2010. SOS
Global Express, Inc. fully supports the general standard and minimum
requirements.
Issue Two: The TSA's Pilot Screening Program (1) fails to adequately
ensure the safety of cargo shipped on passenger aircraft, (2)
shifts the regulatory cost to the private sector, and (3)
imposes severe hardship on thousands of companies that ship
cargo on passenger aircraft.
The Transportation Security Administration should reassess and
revise its plans for implementing the new Certified Cargo Screening
Program (CCSP). The Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act of 2007 (Act) requires that 100 percent of all cargo
placed on passenger aircraft undergo security screening by August 3,
2010. Screening is essential to preserving the security of passenger
aircraft. However, the CCSP falls far short of reaching the statutory
requirements while also imposing severe economic hardships on freight
forwarders.
The TSA is expected to issue an Interim Final Rule on the CCSP
during August 2008. The time to act is now. If the TSA is allowed to
move forward with the CCSP as it is currently planned, the TSA will
shift the regulatory and financial burden onto the air cargo industry.
The TSA will force an unfunded mandate on hard-working businesses that
might not survive the crush of an unfair and poorly implemented
regulation.
The air cargo industry is a vital part of our Nation's economy.
Freight forwarders, manufacturers, and third-party logistics companies
move about 7,500 tons every day of urgent deliveries on passenger
aircraft. These customers provide airlines with much-needed revenue.
Congress must not allow the air freight industry to be unnecessarily
destroyed by misguided Government regulators.
Solution: Open Airports
1. TSA must reassess the economic impact of the CCSP and not
entirely rely on the program for compliance with the Act.
2. TSA must require more screening at the airport and provide
financial and personnel support to avoid bottlenecks and delays
at the airport screening locations.
3. TSA must receive appropriate funding for the airport-level
screening process.
______
Statement of Captain John Prater
July 15, 2008
ALPA is the world's largest, most influential pilot union,
representing nearly 55,000 pilots who fly for 40 airlines in the United
States and Canada. ALPA was founded in 1931 and our motto since its
beginning is ``Schedule with Safety.'' ALPA has had a prominent role in
shaping aviation security for many decades. The Association demanded,
and ultimately achieved, legislation that created airline passenger
screening at the height of the so-called ``homesick Cuban'' hijacking
crisis in the early 1970's. Many of the aviation security improvements
that were made after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, were
first advocated by ALPA via congressional testimony given in September
and October 2001 which included installation of hardened cockpit doors,
upgrading airline security training, and the creation of the Federal
Flight Deck Officer (FFDO) program, among many others. We urged
Congress to address cargo security as well, and while progress has been
made since 2001, there is much work yet to be done in this arena and
for that reason, we applaud the subcommittee for holding this hearing.
The specific focus of the hearing is DHS's implementation of
Section 1602 of the ``Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act of 2007.'' The law requires the Secretary of Homeland
Security to establish a system to screen 100 percent of cargo
transported on passenger aircraft by August 2009. In our remarks, we
will first provide some background regarding cargo screening on
passenger and all-cargo aircraft, then look at the specific issue of
the adequacy of DHS's response to the 100 percent screening requirement
for passenger aircraft. Finally, we will address what we believe to be
the most neglected area of cargo security: the insufficiency of
security measures adopted for all-cargo operators.
background
In May 2003, TSA created three air cargo working groups within the
Aviation Security Advisory Committee. These working groups, which
included subject-matter experts from labor and industry, were chartered
to examine and recommend improved security protocols related to three
topics: shipper acceptance procedures, indirect air carriers, and
security of all-cargo airliners. In October 2003, the working groups
provided the TSA with 43 recommendations, which ultimately served as
the foundation for an Air Cargo Strategic Plan that former DHS
Secretary Thomas Ridge approved in January 2004.
In November 2004, the TSA published in the Federal Register (Docket
No. TSA-2004-19515) a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), Air Cargo
Security Requirements, which was based in large measure on the 43
recommendations made by three working groups. The NPRM was adopted as
the Final Rule on Air Cargo Security Requirements in May 2006. It
mandated a number of significant improvements to the security of the
air-cargo supply chain by requiring airports, domestic and foreign
airlines, and indirect air carriers to implement additional security
measures.
The air-cargo supply chain is a complex, multi-faceted mechanism
that begins when a shipper tenders goods for transport. It potentially
involves numerous intermediary organizations such as freight
forwarders, indirect air carriers (IACs), and other industry personnel
who accommodate the movement of goods. The process culminates when a
shipment is received by airline personnel, loaded on an airliner, and
delivered to its intended destination.
Because a cargo shipment is exposed to multiple security-related
circumstances from the time it is tendered until it is delivered, an
effective air-cargo protective system must focus on the entire supply
chain and discover opportunities for, and provide reasonable measures
to prevent or interrupt, malicious acts. Such a system must certify the
integrity of the goods that are offered and the reliability of the
shipper, properly educate and verify the trustworthiness of all
personnel who maintain access to shipments, and ensure a secure
operating environment. Because the movement of goods is often time-
critical, this process presents a daunting challenge to regulators and
industry alike, and complete success has not yet been achieved.
The Passenger Carrier Cargo Supply Chain
Since the events of September 11, 2001 the TSA has worked
diligently to strengthen the air cargo supply chain, primarily focusing
its efforts on cargo that is shipped on passenger aircraft. It has
spent a significant amount of time on the development of a Freight
Assessment System (FAS), the Known Shipper Management System (KSMS),
the Certified Shipper program and the Certified Cargo Screening Program
(CCSP). ALPA agrees with TSA that, based on the state of today's
screening technology and the need to facilitate the movement of goods,
an effective cargo screening program must be composed of a variety of
techniques to ensure that 100 percent of the cargo which is loaded on
commercial aircraft is secure.
The combination of systems that TSA proposes to accomplish this
goal is built upon a certain degree of trust, as responsibility for
ensuring its integrity is shared among the critical players who compose
the air cargo supply chain, including: Known Shippers (KS); Certified
Shippers (CS); Certified Cargo Screening Entities (CCSE); Indirect Air
Carriers (IACs); direct air carriers; other entities involved in the
movement of air cargo such as trucking companies, and the TSA. For the
proposed system to be effective, it requires the proper education,
strict management, supervision, enforcement and oversight of the
stakeholders by the governing authority. Consequently, serious
responsibility is assigned to the TSA to make certain that it has
sufficient personnel and resources in place to guarantee the integrity
of the entire process.
ALPA supports TSA's multi-faceted, air-cargo supply chain security
vision, to include the CCSP, but urges Congress and the TSA to be
mindful that without the proper resources and a comprehensive and
effective oversight and enforcement process, the system is vulnerable.
TSA must be afforded and dedicate the appropriate resources to
effectively fulfill its obligation in securing the air-cargo supply
chain.
screening 100 percent of cargo on passenger airlines
There has been considerable debate over the meaning of the terms
``inspection'' and ``screening'' when applied to goods shipped in the
air-cargo supply chain. Generally, inspection means to open and examine
the contents of a package. Screening signifies that some measure of
security control--not necessarily a physical inspection--has been
applied to a shipment.
The current screening/inspection system employs a layered approach,
using a combination of the Certified Cargo Screening Program, the
Certified Shipper program, the Known Shipper program, Government
inspections and enforcement, facility security requirements, vetting of
supply chain personnel, standard security programs for airlines and
indirect air carriers, random inspections by carriers, and the Freight
Assessment System (FAS). ALPA supports this layered approach to
securing goods which move in the air-cargo supply chain. The current
state of screening technology, labor resource constraints, and the dire
financial straits of the airline industry all argue against a 100
percent pre-flight inspection requirement. A very few passenger
airlines, due to their size, type of operation, types of cargo carried
and other variables, may be able to institute a 100 percent inspection
of cargo today. Most, however, cannot. To force such a requirement on
the carriers at a time of $145 per barrel of oil is simply unrealistic
and, in our view, unnecessary.
Given the fact that TSA proposes a layered approach in securing the
air-cargo supply chain, no need has been demonstrated to justify
inspecting 100 percent of goods offered for shipment. Until affordable
and efficient technology exists and is capable of inspecting all
commodities moved via air without disrupting the normal flow of
commerce, ALPA supports TSA's layered approach to cargo security based
upon a philosophy of 100 percent screening.
security measures for all-cargo operators
The post-9/11, revitalized focus on airline security revealed that
security regulations pertaining to air cargo operations were inadequate
and that the all-cargo airline industry was often exempted from
complying with the stricter policies that are mandated for passenger
airlines. As an example, all cargo airlines are not required to install
hardened flight deck doors, and all-cargo pilots were initially
excluded from participating in the FFDO program. Known Shipper (KS)
rules are not applied in the all-cargo supply chain. Additionally,
Common Strategy training is not required for flight crews of all-cargo
airliners. This imbalance in regulatory requirements affords all-cargo
operations only a fraction of the protections that are mandated for
passenger airlines.
Because of the differing levels that still exist between the
security of goods shipped on passenger air carriers versus those moved
in the all-cargo air supply chain, ALPA offers the following
recommendations:
Make Greater Use of Technology.--The air-cargo strategic plan must
continue to incorporate effective, strategically located screening and
inspection technology. This includes the technical means to detect
improvised explosive devices, and chemical, biological, and
radiological weapons or contaminants. ALPA urges the TSA to continue
research and development of equipment that will accomplish this task.
New technology must accommodate standardized industry practices
relative to the expeditious movement of goods.
Implement Risk-Based Assessment of Cargo.--A Government
Accountability Office (GAO) investigative report entitled Federal
Action Needed to Strengthen Domestic Air Cargo Security (October 2005),
plus risk assessments offered by air-cargo stakeholders and security
experts, suggest that the effectiveness of the Known Shipper (KS)
program is limited at best and that the program should not be relied
upon as the primary method of securing the passenger air-cargo supply
chain.
To supplement the protections offered by the KS program, the TSA is
developing a computerized Freight Assessment System (FAS) for assigning
risk metrics to cargo shipped on passenger airliners. The Aviation
Security Advisory Committee, through its Air Cargo Working Group, has
helped the TSA in this effort. The Working Group, composed of subject-
matter experts representing various disciplines associated with the
air-cargo supply chain, was chartered to assist the Government in
developing an information-based, threat-management system that
evaluates specific information about shippers and the goods they tender
so that a corresponding risk score can be computed which identifies
cargo considered to be of elevated risk. Any suspicious cargo that is
detected by this risk-assessment engine will be subjected to additional
inspection.
The KS program, coupled with an effective FAS, would significantly
enhance aviation safety and security. ALPA believes that these cargo
security initiatives should not be limited to use solely in the
passenger domain, but that they should be expanded to incorporate goods
transported by all-cargo airliners. We urge the TSA to expedite the
deployment of FAS and to continue its partnership with the now
disbanded Air Cargo Working Group.
Require a SIDA for All-Cargo Operations.--As a result of the Final
Rule on Air Cargo Security Requirements, Secure Identification Display
Area (SIDA) protocols have been implemented in some areas of all-cargo
operations that are conducted at airports supporting passenger airline
service. However, current regulations fail to require this important
safeguard at airports that serve only all-cargo operations. This lack
of SIDA standards dramatically reduces the security provided to air-
cargo operations conducted at these facilities.
SIDA requirements detail perimeter security protocols, clearly
define entry and exit procedures, dictate specific identification
display and ramp security procedures, and are predicated on a mandatory
10-year, fingerprint-based criminal history record check for all
employees who maintain unescorted-access privileges within the SIDA.
Consistent application of these standards throughout the all-cargo
domain would significantly enhance the protection of shipments, flight
crews, and parked all-cargo airliners, and would greatly improve the
background screening standards needed to properly identify and vet ramp
and warehouse personnel. ALPA proposes that any airport that serves
regularly scheduled, all-cargo operations that involve transport-
category airliners be required to maintain a full security plan and
designated SIDA for such operations. Further, ALPA recommends that the
TSA ensure, through strict compliance enforcement, that airports and
airlines adequately address the potential security vulnerabilities
posed by non-SIDA operations areas, including maintaining proper
staffing, selection, and training of persons who will be charged with
the responsibility of performing the requisite security functions.
Install Hardened Flight Deck Doors and Secondary Barriers on All-
Cargo Airliners.--A significant number of all-cargo airliners lack
bulkheads and flight deck doors, leaving them without partitions that
separate the flight deck from the airplane's interior. This lapse in
security is highlighted by the fact that all-cargo airliners frequently
carry additional, non-crew personnel, such as couriers and animal
handlers. To deter persons who possess malicious intent and impede
their ability to attack flight crew members, gain access to aircraft
controls, or otherwise execute a hostile takeover of an airliner,
physical barriers must be designed and installed to separate the all-
cargo airliner's flight deck from accessible passenger and cargo areas.
All-cargo flight decks must be clearly delineated and protected in the
same fashion as the flight decks of passenger airliners, including the
provision of reinforced flight deck doors, secondary flight deck
barriers, and training for crewmembers in appropriate flight deck
access procedures.
Vet Persons Who Have Unescorted Access to Cargo and All-Cargo
Airliners.--ALPA has consistently advocated a policy of ``One Level of
Safety and Security'' for passenger and all-cargo airline operations.
To best protect the integrity of the air-cargo supply chain, persons
with unescorted access to shipments destined to be transported on
passenger or all-cargo airliners (i.e., persons who receive, inspect,
transport, and load air cargo, and those who are granted the privilege
of unescorted access to all-cargo airliners) must be vetted using a
thorough threat matrix that measures significantly more than a
potential link to terrorism. All persons who are granted unescorted
access to cargo destined for shipment by air must be vetted by means of
a fingerprint-based criminal history records check (CHRC) and threat
matrix as are applied to applicants for unescorted SIDA access.
Vet Persons Transported on All-Cargo Airliners.--All-cargo flights
often transport couriers, animal handlers, and company employees, many
of whom are foreign nationals and who frequently sit immediately
outside the flight deck, unsupervised and possessing items normally not
allowed to be carried on passenger airliners. While the Final Rule on
Air Cargo Security Requirements specifies physical screening measures
for these non-crewmembers (i.e., supernumeraries) before boarding, it
fails to subject them to a security threat assessment (STA) background
investigation. As such, supernumeraries are allowed to board all-cargo
airliners with less screening than is required for persons traveling on
passenger airliners. This practice is particularly troubling in view of
the fact that many all-cargo airliners lack hardened flight deck doors,
Federal Air Marshals, flight attendants, and able-bodied passengers to
help protect the flight deck and crew from attack.
The Final Rule requires airlines to ensure that the direct
employers of these supernumeraries have completed background checks on
them and have maintained the records of same. Unfortunately, this
process has proven unsatisfactory. ALPA recommends that the practice of
allowing an airline and/or the direct employer to be responsible for
completing these investigations be eliminated. The TSA must assume
responsibility for ensuring the completion of fingerprint-based
criminal history records checks for supernumeraries flying on all-cargo
airliners. ALPA further recommends that all persons transported on all-
cargo airliners be subjected to the same pre-travel screening (i.e.,
checking them against current terrorist watch lists) as is applied to
persons carried on passenger airliners.
Provide Security Training for All-Cargo Flight Crew Members and
Staff.--Government-approved security training, equivalent to that
required in the passenger domain, must be mandated for flight crews and
ground personnel supporting all-cargo flight operations. Basic and
recurrent crew training must include instruction on the All-Cargo
Common Strategy and all-cargo flight crews should be provided access to
TSA-issued Security Directives (SDs) and Information Circulars (ICs)
that pertain to their role as In-Flight Security Coordinators (ISCs).
Additionally, security training for all-cargo flight crews and ground
personnel should include instruction in identifying, countering, and
mitigating threats presented by explosive devices; chemical,
biological, and radiological weapons; and other contaminants and
dangerous goods.
Expand TSA Compliance Enforcement.--ALPA encourages the TSA to
continue expanding its field inspection staff; to create a non-
punitive, voluntary self-disclosure program; and to develop and
distribute security training materials to educate cargo industry
employees and agents. The TSA's current Cargo Watch initiative stands
as a positive example in this regard. These efforts, coupled with
appropriate regulations, strict compliance enforcement, and enhanced
electronic communications capabilities will significantly enhance the
security of passenger and all-cargo operations. The TSA continues to
strengthen the requirements for businesses holding, or attempting to
acquire, Known Shipper and Indirect Air Carrier (IAC) status and
continues to bolster the security requirements relating to the
acceptance, processing, and movement of air cargo.
ALPA agrees that confirmation of background information supplied by
IACs and Known Shippers and strict enforcement of the pertinent
regulations these businesses must follow is paramount to the success of
cargo security efforts. All participants in the air-cargo system must
qualify to participate, and they must understand the regulations and
the critical need to comply with security mandates.
Address Security Deficiencies at Private Airports Serving All-Cargo
Operations.--Major all-cargo airlines use a number of privately owned
airports as sorting facilities. These airports support significant
cargo operations and a variety of transport-category airplane types,
including large, wide-body airliners. Unfortunately, these airports are
not held to the same Government-mandated security standard applied to
airports operating in the public domain and are not subject to the same
scrutiny in compliance efforts. As such, significant security
deficiencies exist at a number of these locations. ALPA urges
Government regulators to take notice of these vulnerabilities and to
respond with appropriate regulations and enforcement actions.
For security reasons, specific information related to this topic
will not be provided within the framework of this document. However,
ALPA is prepared to meet with appropriate Government and industry
representatives to provide them with more-detailed information and to
help in remediation efforts.
Conduct Vulnerability Assessments and Threat Mitigation.--The
success of any Government-sponsored efforts to assess vulnerabilities
within air-cargo supply chain operations hinges upon meaningful
consultation with associated industry subject matter experts (SMEs).
Because SMEs best understand the strengths and weaknesses of their
respective operational environments, they are well-positioned to
provide critical insight in any attempt to find vulnerabilities
contained therein and to establish effective and efficient
countermeasures to potential threat vectors.
To facilitate this process, Government representatives must engage
SMEs in meaningful, regular dialog that incorporates current
intelligence related to potential threats to the air-cargo supply
chain. ALPA urges all appropriate Government entities to identify
industry SMEs from critical disciplines within the air-cargo supply
chain, solicit their input regarding the strengths and vulnerabilities
within their respective operational environments, and share with them
current intelligence related to threats to cargo. This consultative
process is necessary for Government and industry partners to determine
and characterize threat scenarios and develop and implement appropriate
threat mitigation practices.
Improve Cargo Security Rule.--While ALPA did not agree with all of
the requirements of the Final Rule announced in May 2006, it signaled
great potential for significant improvement in the security of the air-
cargo supply chain. Unfortunately, implementation of several facets of
the Rule has not gone smoothly.
Confusion regarding the security threat assessment (STA)
requirements led to a number of delays in implementing them. This
uncertainty had an adverse effect on domestic and foreign airlines,
indirect air carriers (IACs), freight forwarders, and their employees
and agents. ALPA urges the TSA to clarify the rules relating to the STA
process.
The Final Rule provides that SIDA security measures must be
extended to secured areas and air operations areas that are regularly
used to load cargo on, or unload cargo from, an aircraft operated under
a full program or a full all-cargo program. It further requires that
each airport security program will specify the limits of the cargo
operations area to be included in a SIDA, subject to review and
approval by TSA.
ALPA has been disappointed to learn that at some airports where the
Final Rule requires that SIDA requirements be extended to cargo areas,
certain air operations areas used by all-cargo airliners have not been
made part of the SIDA. ALPA urges the TSA to apply a strict
interpretation and enforcement policy related to the SIDA requirements
specified in the Final Rule.
Use Known Shipper Concept for All-Cargo Operations.--Measures have
been taken via the Known Shipper (KS) program to minimize threats that
cargo shipments present to passenger airliners. However, the same
protective standards are not applied to goods shipped via all-cargo
airlines. Cargo and passenger airliners should be viewed equally in
terms of susceptibility to exposure to risks associated with improvised
explosive devices and chemical, biological, and radiological hazards.
The KS system must include an effective methodology for maintaining its
integrity, accuracy, and reliability. Any decisionmaking process
designed to evaluate a person or organization seeking inclusion in the
KS database should incorporate sufficient criteria, beyond a link to
terrorism that will indicate the character, reliability, and
susceptibility to compromise of the persons involved, or the potential
for disruption of the air transportation system for political or
economic purposes.
conclusion
The Transportation Security Administration, in conjunction with
industry stakeholders, has done significant work to improve the
security of the air-cargo supply chain, but there is much more to be
done. The costs associated with needed cargo security enhancements are
minimal when viewed in terms of the potential price to be paid for
failing to properly protect the air-cargo industry from viable threats.
Since the events of Sept. 11, 2001, cash-strapped and bankrupt
passenger airlines have added multiple layers of security enhancements
at their own expense, while many all-cargo airlines, which until very
recently enjoyed robust growth and sustained record profits, have
failed to keep pace in making such improvements. Protecting flight
crews, industry personnel, passengers, and airliners engaged in or
affected by air-cargo operations requires that Government and industry
stakeholders cooperate in achieving effective layers of security.
ALPA commends the TSA for a number of its cargo security efforts,
including increased field inspection staff and use of canine resources,
research on screening technology, research on the use of container
seals to certify the integrity of cargo shipments, and the continued
effort to develop and deploy the CCSP and Freight Assessment System
(FAS).
Thank you for the opportunity to provide this statement.
______
Letter From Peter Kant and H.B. Miller
July 15, 2008.
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson,
The Honorable Edward J. Markey,
U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC 20515.
Dear Chairman Thompson and Congressman Markey: We applaud your
efforts to focus more attention on the need to provide for
comprehensive inspection of air cargo carried by passenger aircraft.
Rapiscan Systems and Smiths Detection both manufacture, install,
and service an array of non-intrusive inspection systems for use in
airports. Our companies are the two providers of new inspection systems
for the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) advanced
technology (AT) checkpoint security program.
Rapiscan and Smiths also have systems on the TSA's approved list of
candidate technologies for inspection of air cargo on passenger
aircraft. As many freight forwarders note, there is also a need for
pallet inspection systems to screen larger air cargo. Rapiscan, Smiths
and other manufacturers have for over 10 years, provided these systems
to cargo companies and airlines in the United States and worldwide.
Under Pub. L. 110-53, Congress set a target date of February, 2009
for screening 50 percent of air cargo carried by passenger aircraft. We
note that the technology to meet this mandate is readily available and
urge our Government to continue its accelerated efforts to approve
inspection systems and provide air cargo operators with approved
inspection procedures so effective inspection can begin as soon as
possible.
As Congress conducts oversight of the implementation of the
passenger air cargo screening mandate, please let us know if we can
provide you and/or your staffs with more details regarding the current
availability and state of cargo inspection technologies. Thank you
again for your efforts to call attention to this important homeland
security issue.
Sincerely,
Peter Kant,
Vice President, Global Government Affairs, Rapiscan Systems,
H.B. Miller,
Vice President, Smiths Detection, Inc.
Ms. Jackson Lee. As I introduce the Ranking Member, the
distinguished gentleman from California, let me just indicate
to the audience that both of us serve on multiple committees,
including the Judiciary Committee, which I happen to be on the
Task Force for Antitrust Competition, which was holding a
simultaneous hearing. So to the Ranking Member and to the
audience, I was delayed because I was in another hearing, and I
thank the Ranking Member.
At this time, it is my pleasure to yield to the Ranking
Member for an opening statement.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman.
Well, I express my agreement with you over the need to
better secure our passenger air cargo system. As you noted, it
has been 7 years since 9/11. We have invested literally
billions of dollars to screen airline passengers, their baggage
and carry-on. After these enormous expenditures to secure our
airlines, it would be foolhardy to ignore the cargo that is
being transported on the same aircraft.
Sensible security requires stronger passenger air cargo
measures. The 100 percent screening requirement posed by the
majority, however, does raise a number of concerns which I feel
compelled to articulate.
First, I hope that the 100 percent screening solution does
not raise false security expectations; that is, the idea that
all threats to passenger air cargo can be eliminated by
instituting a, quote-unquote, 100 percent screening is
unrealistic. We should not forget that risks can be managed in
our vast homeland, but never totally eliminated, as much as we
would wish that to be the case.
Second, my concern about the 100 percent screening
requirement is that it abandons the risk-based homeland
security approach to terrorist threats which has been the
direction of this committee, been the direction of the
Congress, been the direction of DHS. It is one that I think has
worked very effectively.
Risk assessment allows DHS, and in this case TSA, to
effectively target its financial and intelligence resources for
the best security benefit. We don't have unlimited resources,
obviously. So, without that, we have to be smarter than the
terrorists and use our intelligence and layered security
measures to mitigate future risks.
While passenger air cargo security needs tightening, I hope
that by imposing a, quote-unquote, 100 percent screening
mandate we don't force a costly security overhaul which pushes
the passenger air cargo screening further down the supply chain
to indirect air carriers and freight forwarders, because many
of these important small business passenger air cargo
contributors have difficulty making the bottom line as it is
now.
What I am trying to say is we ought to be smarter than just
being led by slogans. We ought to make sure that the risk-based
approach continues here as it has everywhere else.
We have to see how many more inspectors this would require
if we are going to make this work. Hopefully the pilot program
will show us exactly what that is. We have to be concerned
about what the Small Business Committee of the House has
expressed to us, their concern about whether costs might make
it a noncompetitive aspect of the smaller operations versus the
large operations.
I just want to make sure that what we do is effective, that
we are being smarter than the other guys, and that we are
always guided by the risk-based assessment approach. I think if
we abandon that, we abandon something that has proven to be
very, very, very successful.
Last, I would just say, I am heartened by the fact that TSA
has indicated that they are going to have a multiple-layered
approach; that they are talking about new technology, that they
are talking about inspectors, that they are talking about
canine units. As Members of this subcommittee and committee
know and members of the audience know, I have always tried to
point out the fact that canine units apparently give us an
opportunity to be as agile as we possibly can, to be able to
move when the unexpected occurs, and in some cases can do a
better job than that required by equipment that causes capital
investment and changes in already existing physical locations.
So I hope that we can learn from what the approach is that TSA
has already embarked upon and which they intend to continue in
the future.
So I look very much forward to hearing from our witnesses.
I want to thank them for being here today. With that, Madam
Chairman, I would yield back the balance of my time.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Lungren, we thank you for your
comments and remarks. We hope we will find common ground on
such an important issue. Thank you for your opening statement.
It is my privilege to acknowledge the presence of the
distinguished gentleman from Oregon, Mr. DeFazio, who is
present here. Let me also make note of the fact that other
Members of the subcommittee are reminded that under the
committee rules opening statements may be submitted for the
record.
We begin by welcoming our first panel of witnesses. Our
first witness is Mr. John B. Sammon, who is the Assistant
Administrator for the Transportation Sector Network Management
Office at TSA. Mr. Sammon works to protect and secure our
Nation's intramodal transportation systems, including aviation,
rail, mass transit, maritime, cargo and pipelines. We are
looking forward to his testimony today, since the office he
directs has been tasked with implementing several mandates
enacted by the 9/11 Act, including the 100 percent screening of
air cargo aboard passenger airplanes.
I must note that the subcommittee requested that Mr. Ed
Kelly testify here today. Mr. Ed Kelly is TSA's chief architect
of air cargo policy, but the invitation was unfortunately
declined by TSA. Nevertheless, I welcome Mr. Sammon's
testimony. In your testimony, you might explain Mr. Kelly's
absence, Mr. Sammon. We welcome you.
Our second witness is Mr. James Tuttle, head of the
Explosives Division of the Department's Science and Technology
Directorate. Mr. Tuttle's division is responsible for the
Department's scientific research and technology, explosives
detection, blast mitigation and response to non-nuclear
explosives and other energetic threats, including shoulder-
fired missiles aimed at commercial aircraft.
Mr. Tuttle came to DHS with 21 years of experience in R&D
efforts. He has published numerous professional papers and
completed a Boeing Fellowship in Seattle where he helped
develop applications for reducing the radar signature of
military aircraft. Welcome, Mr. Tuttle.
Our third witness is Ms. Kathleen Berrick from the
Government Accountability Office. Ms. Berrick is a senior
executive with GAO's Homeland Security and Justice team. In
this position, she oversees GAO reviews of aviation and surface
transportation security matters and has developed a broad
knowledge of transportation security practices and related
Federal policies, as well as Federal and private sector roles
and responsibilities. She has leveraged this expertise to lead
numerous reviews of DHS and TSA initiatives, to strengthen the
security of the U.S. transportation system, and to navigate the
complex array of legislation passed and policies instituted in
the aftermath of the terrorist acts of September 11, 2001.
We welcome back Ms. Berrick, who routinely testifies before
this subcommittee and the full committee, and we are looking
forward to her assessment on the progress made by TSA regarding
the 100 percent screening mandate.
Without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be
inserted into the record. I now ask each witness to summarize
his or her statement for 5 minutes, beginning with Assistant
Administrator Sammon.
STATEMENT OF JOHN P. SAMMON, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR,
TRANSPORTATION SECTOR NETWORK MANAGEMENT, TRANSPORTATION
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Sammon. Good afternoon, Chairwoman Jackson Lee and
Ranking Member Lungren. And Chairwoman, Mr. Kelly is sitting
behind me right now, Ed Kelly, accompanied by Douglas Brittan,
who is his assistant in the air cargo area.
Ms. Jackson Lee. We certainly will welcome his answering
the questions. Thank you.
Mr. Sammon. Sure. Thank you. I am pleased to be here today
to discuss the progress that the Transportation Security
Administration is making toward fulfilling the air cargo
provisions of implementing the recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act.
We are committed to the goal of screening 50 percent of all
air cargo shipped from the United States on passenger aircraft
by February 2009 and 100 percent by August 2010. This goal has
been a TSA objective, and TSA worked closely with Congress to
reach these provisions in the 9/11 bill.
As you know, implementation of the 9/11's air cargo
provisions requiring 50 percent screening by February and 100
percent screening by August 2010 presents significant
challenges. The major challenge we face is that there is not
enough capacity at all the airports to do the screening that
needs to be done. This lack of capacity makes it impractical to
attempt to break down, screen and reassemble large consolidated
loads on airport property with any timeliness or efficiency.
Furthermore, the resulting congestion would pose a security
vulnerability and a threat target of its own.
TSA's answer to that challenge is to enable screening
further up the supply chain to TSA certified freight forwarders
and shippers in addition to airport facilities. TSA is then
creating a secure chain of custody from the screening location
to the airport.
Logistics planners at many fields use secure chain of
custody with great success and have done so for decades.
Screening cargo at the appropriate time and place in the supply
chain will keep commerce and freight flowing in a secure
manner. By reducing congestion potential at the airports, this
approach also provides the best opportunity for small
businesses to have continued access to air carrier screening
facilities at the airport.
Participation in TSA-certified screening programs is
voluntary. Participants become TSA-regulated parties and agree
to adhere to TSA security protocols for their operations. A
common security protocol will include standards for personnel
vetting, facility infrastructure security and physical
screening facilities, among the other requirements. TSA will
only certify facilities that have been inspected and validated
by TSA or TSA-authorized agents.
A key to this initiative is that the air carriers have the
ultimate responsibility to transport only certified, screened
cargo. TSA's regulatory programs, including ongoing
inspections, will enable cargo to be done by certified parties,
but unscreened cargo will not be allowed to fly after August
2010.
While it is the air carrier's responsibility to ensure that
cargo has been screened by a TSA-certified entity who actually
screens the freight in a particular location that will be
determined by market issues such as available capacity, labor
costs, real estate costs, and the ability to become TSA
security-certified, it is the air carrier's responsibility to
work with freight forwarders and cargo handlers to ensure
sufficient screening capacity exists in our markets. In the
end, if only 100 pounds have been screened, only 100 pounds can
fly in commercial aircraft.
To meet the first deadline in February, TSA is directing
its inspector, canine and technology resources to the 18
highest volume cargo airports. These airports handle nearly
two-thirds of passenger cargo.
In addition to our cargo volume focus, TSA's February plan
puts passengers first. As a consequence, TSA expects that all
cargo will be screened on aircraft carrying 80 percent of the
passengers. Let me repeat that. By February 2009, TSA expects
that all cargo will be screened on aircraft carrying 80 percent
of the passengers. Through a combination of focusing on high
cargo airports and high volume passenger flights, we expect to
meet the 50 percent requirement in the act.
TSA has measures in place today that assure the safety of
air cargo on passenger planes through a risk-based, layered
security approach. TSA is committed to a process that keeps air
cargo moving while meeting vital security screening
requirements. That is why we particularly appreciate the
assistance of Jim Tuttle in the Science and Technology Office's
R&D program, and we look forward to working with Cathy Berrick
to make this new screening process as airtight as possible.
Thank you. I will be happy to answer your questions later
on.
[The statement of Mr. Sammon follows:]
Prepared Statement of John P. Sammon
July 15, 2008
Good afternoon Chairwoman Jackson Lee, Ranking Member Lungren, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee. I am pleased to be here
today to discuss the progress the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) is making toward fulfilling the air cargo security
provisions of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission
Act of 2007 (9/11 Act), Pub. L. 110-53.
As you know, implementation of the 9/11 Act's air cargo
provisions--requiring the screening of 50 percent of cargo on passenger
aircraft by February 2009 and all such cargo by August 2010--presents
significant challenges. To meet these challenges, TSA is emphasizing
effective security management of the entire air cargo supply chain by
building upon our established programs: air cargo security regulations,
standard security programs, security directives, information sharing,
and increased use of TSA-certified explosives detection canine teams
and Transportation Security Inspectors (TSIs) for cargo. Key to the
success of our screening regime will be collaboration with
stakeholders--U.S.-based shippers, freight forwarders, and passenger
air carriers--through a program that will facilitate screening early in
the supply chain using currently approved screening methods and
stringent facility and personnel security standards.
TSA's strategy involves every component of the air cargo shipping
system--from the entity originating the freight to the freight
consolidators/forwarders, airports, and finally to air carriers who
transport the cargo--and the people involved in the process that have
access to cargo at every point in the supply chain. The program is
designed to harmonize with the international community, since a large
portion of air cargo moves on international flights.
TSA is committed to meeting the 9/11 Act's goals. And, when we meet
the 50 percent goal, the vast majority of flights, carrying more than
three-quarters of all passengers, will in fact be screened at the 100
percent level.
the 9/11 act: reinvention of air cargo security
Approximately 12 million pounds of cargo is transported daily on
passenger aircraft. To accommodate this considerable stream of
commerce, TSA currently has in place a multilayered, risk-based system
for securing cargo traveling on passenger aircraft. As required by
applicable security programs and regulations, aircraft operators and
foreign air carriers are now primarily responsible for screening a
percentage of cargo transported on passenger aircraft. In addition,
indirect air carriers (IACs) are required to screen or provide to TSA
for screening, all cargo that meets certain high-risk criteria.
Regardless of risk, TSA screens 100 percent of cargo at Category II-IV
airports.
Currently, required cargo screening is conducted by aircraft
operators and air carriers, using the following TSA-approved methods of
screening: physical search with manifest verification, X-ray,
explosives trace detection (ETD), explosives detection systems (EDS),
and decompression chamber. Cargo consolidations built by aircraft
operators and air carriers or accepted in that form from shippers and
IACs are subject to random screening by TSA-trained and certified
explosives detection canine teams. For unique cargo types that do not
lend themselves easily to these established screening methods, TSA
permits alternative screening methods to be employed, such as
verification of the description of the cargo and matching the identity
of the shipper with information contained in the shipping manifest.
Additional layers of security augment the required screening. For
example, with very few exceptions, cargo may only be accepted for
transport on passenger aircraft when there is an established business
relationship between the shipper and accepting IAC, aircraft operator,
or air carrier. Employees and authorized representatives of aircraft
operators, foreign air carriers, and IACs with unescorted access to
cargo must undergo a security threat assessment (STA), and the Security
Identification Display Area (SIDA) security requirements at regulated
airports have been expanded to include areas where cargo is loaded and
unloaded. TSA has timely processed and adjudicated 170,000 STAs for IAC
employees.
The 9/11 Act mandates significant changes to this regime. Section
1602 of the
9/11 Act amends TSA's primary screening authority, 49 U.S.C. 44901,
to require TSA to implement a cargo screening program that will, no
later than August 2010, achieve the screening of 100 percent of cargo
transported on passenger aircraft in a manner that results in a level
of security commensurate with that of checked baggage. The 9/11 Act
defines the term ``screening'' to mean ``a physical examination or non-
intrusive method of assessing whether cargo poses a threat to
transportation security'' and includes within that definition X-ray
systems, EDS, ETD, explosives detection canine teams certified by TSA,
and a physical search combined with manifest verification. The 9/11 Act
also provides TSA the flexibility to develop additional methods to
ensure that the cargo does not pose a threat to transportation
security, including a program to certify the security methods used by
shippers.
The requirements are easily stated, but the enormity of the task
cannot be overstated. Essentially, this legislation mandates the
reinvention of air cargo security.
considerable challenges
The 9/11 Act's mandate cannot be achieved by relying on the current
system, whereby aircraft operators and air carriers are almost
exclusively responsible for screening cargo. Currently, aircraft
operators alone do not have the capacity to screen the volume of cargo
that is now transported on passenger aircraft daily. Requiring
passenger aircraft operators to screen 100 percent of air cargo would
result in carrier delays, congestion at airport cargo facilities,
backlogs of unscreened cargo, and missed flights--in short, such a
requirement would significantly impede the flow of commerce. Likewise,
requiring screening of the current volume of cargo carried on passenger
aircraft at the airports by parties other than the aircraft operators
would be impractical, if not impossible, if only because of the lack of
space to accommodate such an operation.
Multiple Stakeholders
To fulfill the 9/11 Act's requirements, TSA must rely on the
wholehearted cooperation of industry. Success will only be achieved by
augmenting current screening resources with those of multiple
stakeholders and ensuring that screening is conducted at earlier stages
in the air cargo supply chain. As discussed more fully below, in
connection with the Certified Cargo Screening Program, TSA is working
with aircraft operators, IACs, and shippers to create, pilot, and
ultimately implement a program in which air cargo security is a
responsibility shared by the entire air cargo industry.
Technology
A critical challenge in meeting the requirements of the 9/11 Act is
the development of technology to accomplish the contemplated level of
screening, particularly given current practices for packing cargo for
transportation aboard passenger aircraft. Under current industry
practice, a large percentage of cargo that will be placed aboard
passenger aircraft, particularly wide-body aircraft, is tendered at the
airport in a consolidated state, i.e., it has already been packaged on
large pallets for transportation. Without the development of effective
technology for dealing with cargo tendered in this manner, screening
would require significant costly reengineering of existing packaging
and shipping processes.
The new requirements for screening cargo commensurate with
passenger baggage will have the biggest impact on cargo that is carried
on wide-body aircraft. For efficiency in operation, wide-body aircraft
utilize Unit Load Devices (ULDs) to transport the cargo in the lower
holds of the aircraft. These ULDs can hold up to 11,000 lbs. of cargo
comprised of literally hundreds of pieces/boxes. Some ULDs are hard-
sided (similar to baggage containers) where the pieces are hand-stacked
inside, while other are flat metal pallets on which the pieces are
stacked, contoured to the aircraft shape, then shrouded in plastic and
covered in heavy netting to prevent shifting in flight. The majority of
the wide-body flights are on international lanes. IACs control most of
the market (most shippers work through an IAC for many reasons, and do
not negotiate directly with carriers). As a result, a very high
percentage of ULDs are filled/built by the IAC, not at the air
carrier's facility. This is done not only for efficiency, but also
because it enables IACs to obtain better rates than when cargo is
tendered ``loose'' (because less handling by the carrier is required).
For international cargo, cutoff times for carriers to receive cargo
from IACs (or shippers) is approximately 4 hours prior to departure
time.
Without the development of technology to effectively screen cargo
built into large pallets and ULDs, screening cannot be executed
primarily at airports. If all cargo were to be screened only at
airports by air carriers, they would have to either: (a) Break down/
remove cargo from all ULDs previously built-up by IACs, screen the
cargo, and re-build the ULDs, or (b) require the IACs to tender the
cargo ``loose,'' and then the carrier would screen the cargo and
``build up'' all of the containers. Either scenario would be extremely
labor-intensive, be costly in time, and eliminate rate discounts for
industry.
meeting the challenges
TSA is well on its way to meeting the 50 percent screening
milestone and to having in place the critical regulatory pieces for
meeting the 100 percent goal. There are several interlocking pieces
that advance us toward the 50 percent goal in the short term and that
lay the groundwork for the complete implementation of the
9/11 Act's requirement for cargo screening.
Near-Term Elements: 100 Percent Screening for Vast Majority of
Passenger Flights
A key component of achieving the 9/11 Act's 50 percent milestone by
February 2009 is a 100 percent screening requirement for passenger
aircraft that comprise approximately 95 percent of all domestic
passenger flights and carry approximately 25 percent of all cargo that
is carried on passenger aircraft. This requirement, developed in
coordination with air carriers and other appropriate stakeholders, is
scheduled to go into effect in October 2008.
Most significantly, this requirement will cover flights that carry
more than three-quarters of all passengers. This means that when this
requirement becomes effective, the great majority of air passengers
will be protected by enhanced screening measures, even in advance of
full deployment of our air cargo strategy.
Near-Term Elements: Canine Program
Current TSA security directives and emergency amendments already
require that bulk cargo consolidations be made available by aircraft
operators and air carriers for screening by TSA-certified explosives
detection canine teams. As of July 1, 2008, TSA has trained 450 teams
that are deployed and operated by local law enforcement agencies at
airports. Standard operating procedures governing these teams require
that they devote at least 25 percent of their duty time in the air
cargo environment. Canine teams generally are concentrated at or near
airports where there are high volumes of passengers and cargo. Under
the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq
Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. L. 110-28, Congress
provided TSA with additional funding to expand the explosives detection
canine team program by 170 teams. Of these, half will be proprietary,
that is, comprised of TSA-owned dogs and TSA handlers, and devoted
exclusively to screening air cargo. The deployment of additional canine
resources ensures that a greater number of cargo consolidations that
are subject to screening will in fact be screened.
Near-Term Elements: Increased Cadre of Inspectors
At the beginning of fiscal year 2008, TSA employed 300 Cargo TSIs
exclusively dedicated to the oversight of air cargo. Since then, TSA
has trained and deployed an additional 130 air cargo TSIs, and another
20 will be added by the end of fiscal year 2008. Inspectors conducted
more than 37,000 compliance reviews in fiscal year 2007 and initiated
more than 2,500 formal investigations based on suspected non-compliance
with TSA requirements. Cargo inspectors operate under work plans to
ensure that all aircraft operators, air carriers, and IACs are
inspected regularly and that those that have had previous compliance
issues are inspected more frequently and thoroughly. Cargo inspectors
also conduct outreach to all regulated entities to ensure their ability
and willingness to comply with the IAC program's requirements prior to
their approval. Along with performing daily oversight of cargo
operators, inspectors also conduct covert testing of the air cargo
system and participate in ``cargo strike'' surge activities at our
Nation's largest cargo airports.
Near-Term Elements: Elimination of Alternative Screening Methods
In addition to increasing screening across the board, TSA is in the
process of reevaluating and eliminating many of the alternative
screening methods previously used for ensuring the security of certain
categories of cargo. TSA reported to Congress a comprehensive overview
of alternative screening of specific commodities, as required by
section 1602 of the 9/11 Act.
Looking Forward: The Certified Cargo Screening Program
TSA is diligently working with all of our partners across the air
cargo community to establish the linchpin of our air cargo screening
strategy--the Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP)--a voluntary
program under which TSA will certify cargo screening facilities to
screen cargo before it is tendered to aircraft operators for carriage
on passenger aircraft. As authorized by the 9/11 Act, we are currently
developing an Interim Final Rule (IFR) to implement the CCSP, which we
hope to publish by the end of this calendar year. This program, which
we anticipate deploying in fiscal year 2009, will establish full supply
chain security of air cargo and play a major role in overcoming the
hurdles inherent in a 100 percent screening requirement.
Like TSA's existing security programs, the CCSP will rely on layers
of security to provide the best possible protection for cargo on
passenger aircraft and the least disruption to commerce. Under the
CCSP, facilities upstream in the air cargo supply chain such as
shippers, manufacturers, warehousing entities, distributors, and third-
party logistics companies will be able to apply to TSA to be designated
as certified cargo screening facilities (CCSFs). IACs and aircraft
operators that screen cargo outside airport perimeters may also apply
to be certified to become CCSFs in order to screen cargo for transport
on passenger aircraft. CCSFs will be required to screen cargo using
TSA-approved methods and to implement chain of custody measures to
ensure the security of the cargo throughout the air cargo supply chain
prior to tendering it for transport on passenger aircraft. CCSF
employees and authorized representatives will be required to
successfully undergo TSA-conducted STAs. Before being certified, and
periodically thereafter, the CCSF will be required to undergo
examination by a TSA-approved validator, who will also need to undergo
a TSA-conducted STA. These facilities will also be subject to regular
and random inspections by TSA cargo inspectors to ensure their
adherence to CCSP requirements.
Once the program is implemented, CCFS-screened cargo will
contribute greatly toward meeting the 50 percent and 100 percent cargo
screening requirements of the 9/11 Act.
certified cargo screening pilot programs
As part of the process of establishing this regulatory program, TSA
is testing the concept of screening earlier in the supply chain by
conducting two pilot programs: (1) The CCSP (Phase One) pilot involving
shippers and other entities such as manufacturers, distributors and
third-party logistics companies, and (2) the Indirect Air Carrier (IAC)
technology pilot. The pilot program with shippers is being conducted at
the following major gateway airports: San Francisco, Chicago,
Philadelphia, Seattle, Los Angeles, Dallas-Fort Worth, Miami, Atlanta,
and New York/Newark. The pilot with IACs is running at these airports
and additionally at Dulles, Honolulu, Intercontinental Houston, Boston/
Logan, Detroit, Denver, San Juan and Orlando.
Over 65 percent of all cargo transported on passenger aircraft is
from these 18 pilot airports. Approximately 61 percent of cargo
transported on wide-body aircraft originates at just 6 of these
airports. By focusing its outreach in the pilots on the entities using
the airports with the highest volume of cargo transported on wide body
passenger aircraft, we have been able to maximize the impact of the
pilots.
The IAC technology pilot is evaluating the effectiveness of cargo
screening equipment recommended by TSA, such as Advanced Technology X-
ray (AT X-Ray), ETD machines, and EDS, by commodity class at each
participant's consolidation facility. Congressional appropriations
provided TSA with funds for the screening of air cargo. TSA is using
these funds to assist in the deployment of appropriate screening
technology for use in the IAC pilot program. In addition to testing the
equipment itself, the IAC pilot is also evaluating the volumes of cargo
the IAC community is able to screen and the use of chain of custody
procedures.
Industry has responded enthusiastically to TSA's call for
participation in the pilots. During the first 4 months of 2008, TSA
teams met with over 225 shippers, 550 IACs, and 100 air carriers in
these cities to explain the impact of the regulation as well as the
solution provided by the CCSP. To date, TSA is working with over 70 IAC
pilot locations as well as over 100 shipper locations that are
undergoing the validation process to become certified to screen as part
of the pilot. Fourteen major IACs are committed to participating in the
pilot and are in various stages of certification. The final steps in
the process will be their purchase of approved technology and
subsequent completion of the necessary training on use of that
equipment. In addition to the IACs who are formally participating in
the pilot, we have received applications from 47 IAC facilities in the
18 cities that wish to become certified and plan to purchase the
approved technology on their own.
We feel that this approach has many benefits, not the least of
which is that moving the screening of cargo for these larger IAC
operations away from the airports will allow the carriers to utilize
their capacity to screen cargo from smaller IACs and shippers who do
not have the volumes of cargo or the financial ability to invest in the
infrastructure needed to screen cargo themselves.
Looking Forward: Research and Development
To address the technological challenges, TSA is working
collaboratively with the DHS Science and Technology Directorate (S&T)
to identify technology gaps and to prioritize research and development
(R&D) requirements. Together, we are working to develop and qualify
technologies in the areas of automated break-bulk and bulk explosives
detection; trace explosives detection; alternative screening
technologies such as metal detection, non-linear junction device
detectors, and Improvised Explosives Device (IED) disruptor
technologies; blast mitigation technologies; stowaway detection
technologies; and supply chain integrity technologies. Our
collaboration includes the conduct of laboratory and field assessments
of AT X-ray and pallet-sized X-ray technologies in conjunction with
S&T's Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL).
TSA and S&T completed technology readiness evaluations of bulk air
cargo screening technologies last year, and research is continuing on
promising technologies under Cooperative Research Development
Agreements (CRDAs). Formal qualification testing of break-bulk (box/
piece) air cargo screening technologies is scheduled to commence this
Fall with a view toward adding successful technologies to an air cargo
screening technology Qualified Products List (QPL). In addition, TSA is
working with S&T to prioritize bulk (palletized/containerized) air
cargo screening technology requirements for future investments.
TSA has been conducting a Hardened Unit Loading Device (HULD) Pilot
Program for which interim test results were released in November 2007.
Based on these results, TSA has decided to put the HULDs on a QPL. The
final test results and report for the HULD Pilot Program are expected
to be completed and released by August 31, 2008.
Finally, TSA is also working closely with the S&T Cargo Pilot
Program, which assessed air cargo screening costs for three levels of
automation. S&T will submit a report to Congress on the results of the
pilot, after which TSA will report to Congress the cost estimates for
doing 100 percent screening of air cargo at various airports on all-
cargo and on passenger aircraft.
success is the only option
TSA's mission is to protect the security of the Nation's entire
transportation system. Our current risk-based, layered security
approach has served us well in fulfilling that mission. We anticipate
that the current program, along with the new CCSP, will enable us to
achieve the 100 percent air cargo screening requirement envisioned by
the 9/11 Act in a manner that does not disrupt the flow of commerce.
Thank you, again, for the opportunity to bring you up to date on
our progress with this important mandate. I will be happy to answer any
questions you may have.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, Mr. Sammon, for your testimony.
Mr. Tuttle, you are recognized for your testimony and you
may summarize it for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF JAMES TUTTLE, DIRECTOR, EXPLOSIVES DIVISION,
DIRECTORATE FOR SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Mr. Tuttle. Good afternoon, Chairwoman Jackson Lee, Ranking
Member Lungren, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee.
It is my honor to appear before you today to provide a brief
overview of how the Science and Technology Directorate is
assisting TSA in meeting the goal of screening 100 percent of
air cargo by 2010.
The Science and Technology Directorate is committed to
protecting the Nation against this threat. Our work with TSA
begins with a customer-led transportation security IPT,
Integrated Product Team, which addresses air cargo and
explosive detection. Through this process, we gather TSA input,
work together to identify their needs, define capability gaps,
prioritize technology development and allocate R&D resources.
Prior needs identified thus far include technologies for
screening break bulk, palletized, containerized air cargo for
explosives and weapons. A primary focus is on meeting the goal
of screening 100 percent of air cargo by 2010.
We are assisting TSA in meeting this goal in three ways:
The Air Cargo Explosive Detection Pilot Program, the Air Cargo
Research and Development Program, and the Science and
Technology support to TSA's Certified Cargo Screening Program.
I will now provide a brief overview of each program.
In 2005, Congress directed Science and Technology to work
with TSA to determine if significantly more levels of air cargo
could feasibly be screened for explosives, additional costs to
increase that screening and how effective existing baggage
screening technologies would be if they were used to screen air
cargo.
The Air Cargo Explosive Detection Pilot Program was
conducted at three airports: San Francisco International
Airport, Cincinnati-Northern Kentucky International Airport,
and Seattle-Tacoma International Airport. Pilot program
operations are now concluded and we are now analyzing the data
from those sites. This data will help define how to screen the
various commodities of air cargo, guide the development of
future screening technologies and inform concept operations.
Our second program area deals with explosives air cargo
research and development. Its overall goal is to perform
research, development and testing of secure systems to screen
all air cargo for a wide range of explosives threats while
minimizing operational costs and impact on the flow of people
and commerce through air transit.
The general approach is to use or adopt security
technologies that have been successfully employed at U.S.
airports for screening checked and carry-on baggage, mainly
focused on commercially available technologies that can be
modified and enhanced. The program is also involving research
and development in new and emerging technologies to screen air
cargo faster, more reliably and more effectively without human
operations intervention.
The third program area includes test and evaluation for
TSA's Certified Cargo Screening Program. Specifically, we have
been asked to evaluate the efficacy of independent cargo
screening facilities which are privately run and screening air
cargo for explosive threats. These facilities could receive
freight bulk air cargo, perform screening and assemble parcels
from multiple sites into pallets for ingestion in the airport.
The TSA Certified Cargo Screening Program must also address how
to screen the chain of custody between where air cargo is
screened and the final ingestion at airports. We plan to levy
present work in the areas of screening commerce and maritime
transportation, which could provide important technologies for
securing the supply chain.
In conclusion, the threat of explosives through air cargo
remains considerable. The key challenge is that current
technology is inadequate to screen diverse commodities reliably
and effectively. The Science and Technology Directorate is
committed to a balanced strategic approach to developing air
cargo screening technologies that will meet TSA requirements
efficiently and effectively.
Members of the committee, I thank you for the opportunity
to meet with you today. My written testimony provides
additional detail in each of these initiatives.
Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Tuttle follows:]
Prepared Statement of James Tuttle
July 15, 2008
introduction
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman and Members of the subcommittee for
this opportunity to share with you the work the Science and Technology
Directorate (S&T) performs to support the Transportation Security
Administration's (TSA) goal to screen 50 percent of air cargo to be
transported on passenger aircraft by February, 2009 and 100 percent by
August 2010.
S&T's Explosives Division develops the technical capabilities to
detect, interdict, and lessen the impacts of non-nuclear explosives
used in terrorist attacks against mass transit, civil aviation and
critical infrastructure. This includes checkpoint, baggage, air cargo,
and vehicle screening technologies; blast-resistant aircraft
construction; and detection of explosive threats from a distance
(standoff detection). Customer inputs and requirements from the TSA,
U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Coast Guard, and first responders are used to
define capability gaps, prioritize technology needs, and allocate
research.
There are three, interrelated ways that S&T assists, or plans to
assist, TSA in achieving the goal to screen 100 percent of air cargo by
August 2010. The first way is in the conduct of the multi-year, multi-
million dollar Air Cargo Explosives Detection Pilot Program (ACEDPP).
This program has been carried out in full partnership with TSA as well
as with the three local airport authorities and officials who have
participated.
The second way is in the conduct of the multi-year, multi-million
dollar Air Cargo Research and Development Program. This program is also
being conducted in close coordination with TSA. TSA prescribes the
requirements in a Capstone Integrated Product Team process, which
serves as the basis for the research program.
The third way, still in the planning stage, is S&T support to the
TSA Certified Cargo Screening Program. The Securing the Chain of
Custody section of this document addresses the activities that TSA
requests S&T to undertake in support of the Certified Cargo Screening
Program.
The sections that follow provide more detailed information on these
three ways S&T is assisting TSA in achieving the goal of screening 100
percent of air cargo by August 2010.
air cargo explosives detection pilot program (acedpp) summary and
lessons learned
Summary
In authorizing the ACEDPP, Congress recognized the potential threat
of an explosive device to be loaded onto a plane as cargo and
detonated, resulting in catastrophic loss of life and significant
damage to property and commerce. An additional vulnerability is related
to freighter aircraft, which typically have larger cargo doors and can
accept larger containers. With larger cargo containers, there is the
potential for an individual to stow away in the container and take
control of the plane during flight.
The ACEDPP is evaluating countermeasures to these vulnerabilities
by examining alternative approaches to, and assessing the impacts of,
substantially increasing air cargo screening levels for explosives and
for the detection of stowaways using existing screening methods (i.e.,
bulk explosives detection, trace detection, canine screening and
physical inspection) and TSA-qualified screening protocols. ACEDPP
results will assist S&T in defining the research agenda for future
cargo screening technology development to fill gaps that exist in
present systems.
The ACEDPP will provide critical information about the design,
operation and challenges of integrated cargo handling and screening
systems, and their associated costs. The program will also collect
important data about the frequency and nature of false alarms generated
during screening. Such information will guide the improvement of
existing screening technologies and the development of future
technologies, as well as inform the development of effective Concepts
of Operation (ConOps).
Key questions the ACEDPP addresses are:
Is it feasible to screen significantly more air cargo (i.e.,
at least six times more than pre-ACEDPP levels)? What resources
and ConOps are required to do so?
What are the costs associated with increased screening
levels, and how are these costs distributed over system and
operational elements?
To what degree does increased screening enhance security?
How effective are technologies and protocols developed for
screening passenger-checked baggage in detecting explosives in
air cargo?
The ACEDPP is unique in that it has taken a systems approach to
cargo screening. This approach integrates screening technologies with
cargo handling systems. It also incorporates ConOps that direct
specific cargo commodities to the most appropriate screening
technology, based on detection sensitivities, alarm rates and other
factors. ACEDPP data collection and analysis efforts are focused on
evaluating the efficacy, cost, and operational impacts of increased
cargo screening using high-fidelity/high-integrity, ground-truth
operational data.
The ACEDPP established pilot operations at three airports: San
Francisco International Airport (SFO), Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky
International Airport (CVG), and Seattle-Tacoma International Airport
(SEA). The objective of the pilot programs at SFO and CVG is to
evaluate screening of belly loaded cargo for explosives, while the SEA
pilot evaluated the use of canines and technology to screen bulk cargo
for explosives and stowaways.
The program has completed operations and data collection at each of
the three pilot sites. The current focus is on data analysis, computer
simulation, optimization modeling activities, and completion of the
final report. Three interim reports have been provided to Congress as
required by the statute establishing the ACEDPP. The fourth progress
report is in review and will be transmitted to Congress within the
month. The final report will include conclusions and recommendations
that will inform evolving cargo screening policies, screening protocols
and future technology development efforts. In its final report to
Congress, ACEDPP will include a cost-benefit analysis to compare the
high-volume/high-automation screening approach implemented at SFO-
United Air Lines, the moderate-volume/high-automation approach at SFO-
Northwest/Continental, and the moderate-volume/reduced-automation
approach at CVG-Delta.
As a follow-on activity to ACEDPP, S&T is assisting TSA in
accomplishing its air cargo screening through additional testing of
different equipment that TSA wanted to test at SFO. We shall be
gathering raw data and images for varied cargo from an L-3
Communications (L-3) MVT-HR unit we have on loan from L-3. S&T expects
to collect about 3 months of data that, again, will assist in better
understanding how the performance of X-ray based screening equipment
might be improved (either through indicated changes in hardware or in
improved algorithms). Data will be shared with L-3 and will also be
analyzed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. We expect to
continue this data collection at SFO with a Surescan unit in the Fall,
after we are through collecting other data with this unit at Tyndall
AFB. These data collection efforts take on more importance as TSA
evolves toward wishing to use AT technologies (in addition to CT-based
technologies) as part of its strategy for screening more air cargo.
S&T will also be collecting data from the AS&E X-ray back scatter
van, loaned to us by AS&E, at SFO. We shall determine its effectiveness
for stowaway detection as a complement to what we have already learned
at SEA from CO2 and heart-beat monitoring equipment under
the ACEDPP. The back scatter unit has been effective in connection with
war operations in theatre.
These data collection efforts have been in accordance with the
direct requests of the Chief Technical Office at TSA.
Lessons Learned
More than half of air cargo at some facilities (e.g.,
United/SFO) is currently screened by alternate methods due
solely to the way it is packaged. Eliminating these alternate
methods of screening will add substantially to the air carrier
screening load using traditional methods.
Screening high percentages of air cargo shipments for
explosives using existing baggage screening technologies is
feasible. However, breaking down and re-building Unit Loading
Device (ULD) shipments for piece-level screening is very labor
intensive. Moving the requirement for screening ULDs earlier in
the process to Indirect Air Carriers (IACs), manufacturers, or
Independent Cargo Screening Facilities (ICSFs) would be far
more efficient. Alternatively, ULDs could be screened by air
carriers using canines or another bulk screening method.
The use of heart beat monitors coupled with carbon dioxide
sensors for detecting stowaways in bulk cargo containers was
determined to be feasible. FEMA-certified search-and-rescue
canines also showed great promise as a means to detect
stowaways in freighter-bound bulk cargo.
The cost of technology-based screening is on the order of
$0.08-0.12 per pound and is dominated by cargo handling and
screening labor. Canine screening is much less expensive per
pound--less than $0.01 per pound for the ACEDPP pilot at SEA-
TAC airport.
Given that labor is the predominant factor in air cargo
screening costs, ongoing efforts by equipment vendors to reduce
false alarm rates would result in substantial future cost
savings.
Limited operational efficacy assessments for explosives
detection systems (EDS) machines were conducted at SFO using
simulated explosives, with very positive results. Some efficacy
data for explosives trace detection (ETD) and canine screening
have been reported elsewhere. There is still a need for system-
level efficacy testing and analysis.
Under the current screening regime, screening 100 percent of
air cargo would have significant impacts on air carriers. Many
business practices would need to be modified, such as
allocation of substantial warehouse space for screening
equipment, screening personnel and shipment staging, requiring
some shipments to be delivered earlier, and prioritizing
shipments for screening. The Certified Cargo Screening Program
(CCSP), being developed by TSA (and discussed more fully in
TSA's written statement), is being designed to mitigate this
impact.
Cargo screening can provide side benefits to air carriers,
such as yielding accurate weights and dimensions to maximize
revenues and help balance aircraft loads.
Important legacies of the ACEDPP include an optimization model that
permits TSA to undertake tradeoff analyses between performance and
comprehensive, inclusive costs. This verified and validated model,
using detailed cost information collected at three airports in the
process of undertaking the ACEDPP, reveals the costs of increased cargo
screening, by category of cost, and is being used by TSA now in
extrapolating the results of the ACEDPP to the top five air cargo
carrying airports and the top ten passenger carrying airports, as
required by Congress. Another legacy is the library of images from
airport X-ray based detection systems. These images can be accessed by
investigators to help determine what improvements in hardware and in
software would be necessary to improve future detection performance--
both in terms of the probability of detection and in lower false alarm
rates. Since labor costs have been shown in the ACEDPP to be about 50
percent of the total costs of screening air cargo and to be a
substantially greater fraction of costs than any other cost category,
reduction of labor costs through reduction of false alarm rates can
save substantial money. It has been estimated that each percent
reduction in false alarm rate leads to a $25 million/year saving in
screening costs. A final legacy is the beta-testing design of suitable
material handling facilities that can reliably track air cargo from
ingestion to plane delivery, route cargo to the appropriate screening
technology based upon the type of commodity involved, and reduce
potential injury to cargo handling personnel through ergonomically
designed lifting and movement systems.
air cargo research and development program
The overall goal of the Explosives Division's Air Cargo Research
and Development Program is to research, develop, and test security
systems (technologies and screener/operators) to screen all air cargo
for a wide range of explosive threats while minimizing operational
costs and the impact on the flow of people and commerce through the
mass air transit system.
The general approach is to use, or adapt, security technologies
that have been successfully employed at U.S. airports for screening
checked and carry-on baggage. To reduce costs, research has focused on
commercially available technologies that can be modified and enhanced
from other applications (e.g., military equipment). Given gaps in the
commercial technology base, the program also involves researching and
developing new and emerging technologies to screen air cargo faster,
more accurately, and with less reliance on the human operator.
Derived from the program's goal and approach are the following
research and development (R&D) objectives:
Aggressively pursue an innovative and forward-thinking R&D
program focused on automated detection of explosives.
Screen a wide range of cargo commodities without
significantly impacting cargo operations.
Develop technologies to screen break bulk, palletized, and
containerized configurations of cargo.
Apply technology to strengthen the security of the supply
chain to permit distributed screening over time and across
geography.
tsa certified cargo screening program
The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007
requires that the 50 percent screening of air cargo to be transported
by passenger aircraft by February 2009 and 100 percent by August 2010
be provided at a level of security commensurate to that of passenger
baggage. Current TSA-approved methods of air cargo screening include
physical search with manifest verification, X-ray, explosives trace
detection (ETD), explosives detection systems (EDS), decompression
chamber, and canine screening. TSA has concluded that screening
capacity at a single point in the supply chain, e.g. at the premises of
air carriers in air cargo-carrying airports, is insufficient to
accomplish this requirement. The large volume of air cargo (about 12
million pounds daily) that moves on passenger aircraft suggests that
carrier delays, cargo backlogs and transit time increases could all
occur unless the screening strategy distributes the requirement
spatially and by participant. TSA intends to satisfy the requirements,
in large part, by establishing a Certified Cargo Screening Program
(CCSP), which will create additional screening capacity in the air
cargo supply chain. TSA has already begun implementation of an Indirect
Air Carrier (IAC) Screening Technology Pilot, as part of the
development of the CCSP, and will issue an Interim Final Rule, as
provided by the 9/11 Act, to fully implement the program.
TSA will be describing these programs in its testimony today. The
S&T Directorate will continue to assist TSA in accomplishing its
objectives in whatever specific ways TSA may require for both the CCSP
and IAC aspects of its approach to air cargo screening.
However, an additional variation of the two approaches, above,
involves establishment of Independent Cargo Screening Facilities
(ICSFs). The ICSF is a ``fee-for-service'' business model variant that
would provide screening services for varied entities, including smaller
IACs and air carriers. ICSFs could be located near airports and could
provide screening services for those customers (shippers or others) who
do not wish to invest in security requirements and equipment to screen
freight themselves. Quite importantly, the ICSFs could also receive air
cargo in the form of individual break bulk parcels, screen them as such
(with technologies now suited only for break bulk sizes), and assemble
them into pallets for delivery to airport sites. The ACEDPP has
measured the times required to break down pallets for break bulk
screening in EDS equipment and then reassemble them for delivery to the
air carrier point of embarkation. The times are lengthy and could
threaten the orderly flow of commerce. In addition, the assembly of
pallets and ULDs is a complex science that challenges the ability of
screeners to reassemble pallets and ULDs expeditiously once the
screening is completed. TSA has received several expressions of
interest from entities who wish to explore the business opportunities
presented by ICSFs. TSA would like S&T to contact these parties and
design, establish and evaluate such a facility at one of the larger
airports. S&T could bring the comprehensive expertise and contacts it
has developed in conjunction with its ACEDPP and incorporate ``lessons
learned'' in the design of an effective ICSF. S&T would work closely
with the TSA Air Cargo team in developing an operating plan for this
business model and in selecting a suitable pilot site.
S&T and TSL are also providing significant support of the CCSP by
conducting the Multi-Technology Assessment (MTA) of Advanced Technology
(AT) X-ray and pallet-sized X-ray systems. S&T is adjusting testing
priorities to support the TSA CCSP initiative to get detection,
throughput, and false alarm data to help provide guidance on how
commercially available technologies can be used in the IAC Pilots.
In addition, S&T via the Independent Test and Evaluation (IT&E)
Program at the TSL, is establishing a bulk/high-density break bulk air
cargo qualification testing capability. This high visibility initiative
is helping to establish technical requirements for commercially
available cargo screening equipment. Most importantly, this effort will
commence qualification testing of existing break-bulk air cargo
screening equipment this Fall in direct support of the TSA CCSP.
The S&T Directorate welcomes the opportunity to participate with
TSA in the multiple ways that have been described in this paper and
specifically would like to work with the TSA Air Cargo Team in the
design and evaluation of the new ICSF concept.
securing the chain of custody
One of the challenges that must be addressed in carrying out TSA's
Certified Cargo Screening Program will be how to secure the chain of
custody between the points where air cargo is screened, e.g. at TSA-
certified shipper sites, the IACs or at ICSFs, and final ingestion at
the air carrier site at the airport. Fortunately, the S&T program
supporting Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) to secure commerce in
maritime transportation can provide important technologies to
accomplish such chain of custody. The following S&T projects may
provide results that TSA might draw upon to improve security in the
chain of custody.
M-Lock.--M-Lock is designed to ensure that truck cargo leaving air
cargo consolidation facilities completes its intended path to
designated airports throughout the United States with no tampering. The
M-Lock configuration of the Marine Asset Tag Tracking System (MATTS) is
a MATTS tag in a lock enclosure that can be used as a TSA Chain of
Custody tool for reliably tracking and monitoring air cargo from a
consolidation facility to an entry point at a U.S. airport. In
conjunction with TSA's Certified Shipper Program, M-Lock's will be
demonstrated in an operational scenario starting in Q4 of fiscal year
2008.
Air Cargo Composite Container.--This project, which kicked off in
fiscal year 2008, expands upon the composite materials developed in
association with the Hybrid Composite Container project. In order to
detect tampering or intrusion, security sensors will be embedded into
the walls of an air cargo Unit Load Device (ULD) fabricated using
composite materials. The project's success depends on ensuring
lightweight comparability to existing aluminum containers and
interoperability with existing aircraft loading infrastructure.
Secure Carton.--This Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR)
project will develop a shipping carton with embedded security sensors.
These sensors will detect tampering/opening of the carton once it has
been closed and secured. The carton will communicate to an RFID reader
any tamper event such as the insertion of threat material. This project
provides improved supply chain visibility, chain of custody, and
security closer to the point of manufacture, or stuffing, and is
scalable and applicable across various shipping modalities including
maritime and air cargo. The prototype development phase of this project
will end in fiscal year 2008 and testing will start in fiscal year
2009.
Secure Wrap.--This SBIR project, which kicked off in fiscal year
2008, is developing a more flexible and secure tamper-indicative
wrapping material. This wrap is suitable for palletized cargo shipped
through the international supply chain and across the various shipping
modalities (e.g. air, maritime, land). Secure wrapping material will
have the capability to detect tampering through the material and will
be deployable with minimal impact to current supply chain logistics and
processes.
CanScan.--This project will develop enhancements to existing
secondary non-intrusive inspection (NII) capabilities to detect or
identify terrorist contraband items (e.g., drugs, money, illegal
firearms) or humans. These system enhancements will provide increases
in penetration, resolution, and throughput when compared to existing
NII systems. Future Automatic Target Recognition (ATR) capability will
be integrated into the CanScan system. This project addresses the Cargo
Security Capstone IPT's highest capability gap to enhance cargo
screening and examination systems through advanced non-intrusive
inspection. The capabilities developed will screen air cargo in unit
load devices (ULD), on pallets, or break-bulk configurations. This
effort is planned to begin in fiscal year 2009.
Automatic Target Recognition (ATR).--The project will develop an
automated imagery detection capability for anomalous content (e.g.
persons, hidden compartments, contraband) for use in existing and
future Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) systems. This ATR capability is
applicable to scanning and imaging systems used by CBP and TSA by
applying an operator-assisted decision aid that provides target
discrimination. This project is planned to begin in fiscal year 2010.
Air Cargo Data Exchange System.--This project establishes a system
architecture and prototype implementation to ensure that security data
and tracking information from various tamper-evident devices are
communicated reliably and securely to TSA. This prototype
implementation will be interfaced to TSA's targeting capability. The
effort is planned to begin in fiscal year 2014.
customer output focused
Input from customers is key to defining capability gaps,
prioritizing technology needs, and effectively allocating research.
This input has been gathered through the DHS S&T Capstone Integrated
Product Team (IPT) and the Air Cargo Product IPT processes. The
Capstone IPT has identified capability gaps for technology development,
operations and oversight, and detection of stowaways. The explosives
detection IPT calls for technologies for screening break bulk,
palletized, and containerized air cargo for explosives and weapons.
One of the highest priorities of TSA is to develop requirements and
to qualify commercially available technologies to screen air cargo.
Congress directed that by February 2009, 50 percent of air cargo
transported on passenger aircraft be screened and to increase that
percentage to 100 percent of air cargo by August 2010. The Explosives
Air Cargo Program will work with TSA to assist TSA in meeting this
goal.
Goals for Air Cargo Explosives Detection R&D.--The short-, mid-,
and long-term research goals for effective air cargo screening of
explosive threats are identified below. These goals are based on the
program mission, the investment approach, operational objectives, and
customer input.
Short-Term Goals (0-2 years)
Development of cargo-optimized EDS systems for break bulk
cargo screening.
Continued industry outreach to pursue private sector
innovations and approaches.
Tools to assess operator performance and to regulate/oversee
screening effectiveness. Cargo screening is currently a
regulated function.
Evaluation of current capabilities and TSA approved
screening methods.
Detection of non-explosive components of air cargo threats.
Mid-Term Goals (3-5 years)
Development of advanced technologies to screen larger cargo
configurations without causing logistical burdens on the
industry.
Development of advanced technologies to screen dense and
exception cargo commodities.
Mitigation of insider threats by ensuring cargo integrity
throughout the supply chain.
Long-Term Goals (>5 years)
Next Generation ETD and EDS development to permit automated,
fast, accurate inspection of a wide range of commodities and
cargo configurations.
The specific fiscal year 2008 and fiscal year 2009 goals are:
Conduct testing of cargo-optimized technologies, based on
checked luggage equipment, for break bulk cargo screening.
Conduct testing of a metal detection technology to detect
the components of an Improvised Explosive Device (IED), such as
wires, batteries, and timers, rather than identification of the
explosive. This will be used for non-metallic cargo
commodities.
Complete development of a prototype technology that ruins
the electronics of an IED and renders it safe. This will be
used for non-electronic cargo commodities.
Conduct testing (Technology Readiness Evaluation) of
commercially available technologies to screen containerized
cargo made of low-density commodities (e.g., fresh flowers,
produce, and seafood).
Develop and pilot test a selection test to identify and hire
the best air cargo screeners.
Begin development and validation of standardized training
for all of the approved air cargo screening technologies.
Begin development and validation of a certification test to
assess the performance (i.e., operator proficiency) of air
cargo screeners.
These immediate activities will assist TSA in meeting the
requirements to screen 50 percent of air cargo transported on passenger
aircraft by February 2009 and to increase that percentage to 100
percent of air cargo by August 2010.
air cargo screening challenges
There are currently six approved methods for the screening of air
cargo: physical search with manifest verification, canines, X-ray,
decompression chamber, Explosives Trace Detection (ETD), and Explosive
Detection Systems (EDS). None of these methods were designed for cargo
inspection, and their use in the cargo environment has resulted in
limited performance in terms of detection, nuisance alarms, throughput,
operation/logistics, and costs. A dedicated near-, mid-, and long-term
R&D program is described to optimize current (checked baggage and
checkpoint) inspection technologies for cargo and to develop equipment
and systems to expeditiously and effectively screen cargo. Challenges
an R&D program must address are:
Commodities.--The greatest challenge in screening air cargo is the
tremendous range and configuration of commodities. Many of the common
cargo commodities (e.g., machine parts) are very dense and present
significant challenges for inspection technologies. In addition, many
commodities are exceptional, such as cargo that is live (e.g., tropical
fish) or requires great care and sensitivity (e.g., human remains)
(refer to Table 3). The time-sensitive nature of air cargo requires
fast screening and resolution. Further, there is wide seasonal,
temporal, and geographic fluctuation in commodities shipped by air.
Last, approximately 15 percent of the cargo is unique or unusual (e.g.,
race cars, marble statues) and can present tremendous screening
challenges.
Configurations and Packaging.--Another challenge in screening air
cargo is the wide range of packaging and configurations. Cargo can be
presented in individual boxes, on pallets, and in a wide range of
containers (i.e., Unit Load Devices or ULDs). In general, break bulk
cargo is considered to be individual boxes less than one cubic meter (3
ft 3 ft 3 ft). Containerized cargo includes shrink-wrapped pallets,
cookie sheets, and ULDs. These configurations are generally 4 ft 4ft
8 ft, but can also be much larger. Currently, there is no inspection
technology to inspect the larger cargo configurations automatically
(i.e., without operator intervention). In addition, cargo is packaged
in a diverse range of material including cardboard, metal, wood, and
plastics and a large range of weights that can exceed current equipment
capabilities.
Operational Constraints and Environment.--The context of air cargo
in the United States has a profound impact on its safe and expeditious
screening. Numerous and diverse stakeholders are involved with air
cargo: air carriers, logistics companies, indirect air carriers,
freight forwarders, shippers (both known and unknown), industry groups,
screening companies, and government agencies. Stakeholders have
competing views and demands that may be strenuous. The TSA's oversight
of cargo screening is from a regulatory perspective. Thus, TSA does not
directly screen air cargo, nor does it procure, deploy, maintain, or
operate cargo screening equipment. Key operational constraints to
screening air cargo include:
Diverse and Numerous Stakeholders;
Regulatory Oversight/Approach From Government;
Percentage of Cargo Screened;
Operational Need for Speed and Efficiency;
Economic Impact of Screening;
Alarm Resolution is Critical;
Insider Threats;
Theft;
Public Concern;
Political Interest.
There is strong pressure to inspect more cargo and to reduce the
current type and number of exemptions. In fiscal year 2006, Congress
directed DHS S&T to conduct three Air Cargo Explosive Detection Pilot
Programs (ACEDPP) to examine the feasibility of screening six times
more air cargo in a break bulk configuration. A final report to
Congress, with key findings regarding this challenge, will be presented
in January 2009.
The Technology Base.--The technologies that have been used, or
proposed, to screen air cargo were developed for checked or carry-on
baggage. As a result, each technology and approach has limitations in
terms of detection, throughput, sensitivity, automation, and
operational costs. Several screening methods and technologies exist for
the type of commodity and configuration that are acceptable for
screening low density commodities in small configurations. Performance
gets progressively worse as the density increases, the configuration
gets larger, and the packaging becomes more complex. The ultimate goal
of the Explosives Air Cargo Program is to provide effective and
acceptable technologies for all types of commodities and
configurations.
Additional Security Challenges.--Other challenges to screening air
cargo include the need for operational speed and efficiency. This is
particularly important given the corporate and national economic
benefits of air cargo commerce. Furthermore, a very low nuisance alarm
rate is required of any technology that will be operationally
acceptable, especially given the high costs and difficulty in opening
and resolving alarms in carefully packaged break bulk and containerized
configurations. In addition, the open nature of the air cargo system
has made it vulnerable to threats from insiders and to theft, which is
estimated at 3 percent annually and is accepted by the industry as a
``cost of doing business.'' Theft of cargo indicates that there are
vulnerabilities in the system that could be exploited to insert a
threat.
the opportunities: proposed systems approach for screening air cargo
The Explosives Air Cargo Program is also guided by a vision of an
integrated system of people, technologies, and procedures to
effectively and expeditiously screen air cargo. This vision is based on
the idea that any effective and optimized system for screening should
include at least the following seven components.
Tested and Qualified Products--by Commodity/Configuration
Detection, Identification, and Disruption
Site-Specific Customization
Distributed System
Protection and Inspection Approaches
Human Engineering
Rigorous Oversight and Audit for Quality Assurance
Candidate Technology List.--Working in collaboration with TSA, a
draft performance specification has been developed that presents the
detection and processing requirements for break bulk and containerized
air cargo screening technologies. This performance specification,
analogous to a Qualified Products List, will facilitate the selection
of suitable solutions for air cargo screening. To the extent
practicable, technologies should be automated to aid the human operator
in the interpretation of complex images and information. It is foreseen
that technologies for the proposed air cargo system will be approved or
qualified by configuration (i.e., break bulk or containerized) and by
eight major cargo commodities.
Explosive Detection, Device Identification, and Threat
Disruption.--For checkpoints and checked baggage the focus has been on
detection of explosive substances. Given the nature of air cargo, an
entire, intact explosive device is the threat that will almost
certainly be presented. This provides the opportunity to identify the
non-explosive components of the device (i.e., metals) in non-metallic
air cargo. There is also the opportunity to disable/disrupt the intact
device in non-electronic cargo to render it harmless to the aircraft.
The proposed systems approach to air cargo screening should be multi-
faceted and include explosives detection, as well as innovative
approaches for device identification, and threat disabling/disruption.
Site-Specific Customization.--Given the wide variation in the types
and configurations of air cargo by airport (e.g., Miami has a high
percentage of fresh flowers) it is likely that specific technologies
should be mapped onto the operational needs of each airport and/or
operation. For the State of Alaska, which relies on air cargo rather
than roadways, the customization and flexibility of the cargo screening
will be critical. Thus, it is foreseen that an effective cargo security
system will be a customized ``patchwork'' of technologies, procedures,
and human operators who are designed to optimize the detection and
minimize the operational costs of air cargo inspection at each site.
Distributed System.--The current air cargo system involves numerous
stakeholders (e.g., shippers, consolidators, handlers) who have
facilities and equipment off site from the airport. There is
opportunity to take advantage of the distributed nature of air cargo
over geography and time. To the extent that cargo can be effectively
screened by trusted entities and that the supply chain is secure, it
will be possible to design a system that is flexible and does not
create ``cargo checkpoints'' or bottlenecks at the airport. Improved
supply chain integrity will reduce thefts. The proposed systems
approach should include supply chain integrity to permit distributed
screening over time and geography.
Protection and Inspection.--Protection refers to hardening the
aircraft or its subsystems so that it has enhanced capability to
withstand the effects of an explosive device. To the extent that
protection approaches are viable and successful, terrorists are forced
to use larger threats to cause catastrophic damage. Larger threats are
easier to identify via inspection and thus the performance demands on
detection technologies can be better optimized. The proposed systems
approach should employ protection technologies to ensure a more robust
capability to mitigate explosive threats via air cargo.
Human Engineering.--Even with significantly automated technologies,
it will ultimately be the decision of a human operator whether or not a
cargo item represents a threat. The human operator is a necessary and
key component of an effective security system. Thus, there should be a
dedicated focus on human factors and the performance of individuals
screening cargo through R&D on selection, training, equipment
interfaces, standardization, development of procedures, and mitigations
of insider threats.
Oversight and Audit.--A significant challenge for a complex socio-
technical system with diverse people, entities, locations, procedures,
technologies is to maintain strict vigilance. The goal is to maintain
high and consistent levels of performance over time. Technologies and
interventions, such as Threat Image Projection, can be incorporated to
maintain vigilance, provide training to operators, and monitor
performance to determine person-machine effectiveness. The proposed air
cargo security system should be designed with oversight and quality
assurance as a key goal.
air cargo r&d strategic map
Given the challenges, opportunities, operational constraints, and
technology approaches, the Explosives Air Cargo Program has developed a
high-level strategic map to guide the sequencing and priority of R&D
based on the cargo configuration, commodity characteristics, and the
applicable technology approach.
The strategic R&D map indicates that technologies will be developed
individually for break bulks, palletized, and containerized cargo
configurations. These are in order of difficulty, but the ultimate goal
is one integrated technology solution that can screen all three
configuration types. Within each configuration, technologies will be
specialized for low density, high density, and exceptional commodities.
Six technology approaches will be developed, enhanced, and tested to
yield air cargo screening systems:
Trace Explosives Detection is based on chemistry and it
involves technologies that can identify minute particles or
vapors from explosives. In this area, the R&D focus is to get
the sample into the technology, to get more accurate analysis
(sensors), and to increase automation so there is less reliance
on a human operator.
Bulk Explosives Detection is based on physics and involves
electromagnetic energy and ionizing radiation (such as X-rays)
to penetrate cargo, collect data (e.g., mass and density), and
present an image. In this area the R&D focus is to increase
automation so there is less reliance on a human operator,
increase detection of explosives, reduce nuisance alarms,
increase speed and throughput, increase power to screen larger
and more dense cargo, increase reliability, and reduce annual
operational costs.
Device Component Detection is based on technologies that
detect or disrupt the non-explosive components of an IED. In
air cargo the threat is an intact IED that is a complete
circuit with a power source, initiator, explosive, and switch/
timer. In this R&D area the focus is to increase sensitivity
(e.g., find very small amounts of metal in produce), increase
throughput, ensure safety, increase speed and throughput, and
reduce reliance on a human operator.
This work is based on commercially available technologies or the
integration of mature components. A dedicated basic research
effort is not required since the effort involved leveraging
work conducted by other Government agencies (e.g., DoD, NASA)
through the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG).
Human Engineering is concerned with getting the best
performance from the human operator and to ensure that
technology is designed for ease-of-use (ergonomics). The R&D
focus is to select, train, and monitor the performance of human
operators who are screening air cargo. Another key R&D
challenge is to evaluate the automation of screening
technologies and determine the most effective way for humans to
interpret data and resolve alarms.
Canine Explosives Detection is concerned with the use of
dogs to screen air cargo for explosives and the scent of
threats. The challenge for R&D is to breed the best dogs,
increase training tools, develop better ways to get a scent
(sample) to the dogs, improve detection performance, increase
consistency of the dogs, and reduce operational costs.
Mitigation and Hardening is focused to develop bomb-
resistant systems to complement and back-up explosive detection
technologies. Existing inspection systems may not always find
explosives at weights that can, under some circumstances, cause
catastrophic failure. Selective use of hardening technology in
conjunction with inspection may result in a more practical and
cost-effective means of ensuring aircraft safety than
inspection alone.
In addition, as technologies mature, a concerted effort will be
undertaken to integrate and fuse the technologies to take full
advantage of their orthogonal capabilities. It is envisioned that the
``final'' fused solution will take advantage of multiple technology
layers in an integrated system of systems (technology, people, and
procedures).
conclusion
The threat of explosives to air cargo remains considerable. The key
challenge is that there exists a very limited current technology base.
There is currently no technology that can cost-effectively,
efficiently, accurately, and quickly screen the diverse range of cargo
commodities, configurations, and packaging.
The DHS S&T Explosives Division is committed to a balanced
strategic approach to developing air cargo screening technologies by
leveraging research and development in chemistry and physics-based
detection, IED component detection, human engineering, canine
olfaction, and explosives mitigation. Research and development in the
air cargo explosives detection area will ensure that technology
products are available to be deployed to ensure the safety and security
of the traveling public.
Members of the committee, I thank you for the opportunity to meet
with you today to discuss how the S&T Directorate is assisting TSA in
meeting the goal of screening 100 percent Air Cargo by 2010. As we move
ahead, I look forward to working with the committee to improve our
Nation's capabilities in the area of securing air cargo.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, Mr. Tuttle, for your testimony.
I now recognize Ms. Berrick to summarize her statement for
5 minutes. Welcome.
STATEMENT OF CATHLEEN A. BERRICK, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY
AND JUSTICE ISSUES, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Ms. Berrick. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, Ranking Member
Lungren, and Representative DeFazio for inviting me here to
discuss GAO's work assessing air cargo security and TSA's
efforts in implementing a system to screen 100 percent of cargo
transported on passenger aircraft.
As you are aware, in response to the implementing
recommendation of the 9/11 Commission Act, TSA is required to
implement a system to physically screen 50 percent of cargo
transported on passenger aircraft by February 2009 and 100
percent of such cargo by August 2010. To fulfill this
requirement, TSA is developing a voluntary program referred to
as the Certified Cargo Screening Program, or CCSP, which would
allow the screening of air cargo to take place at various
points throughout the supply chain. TSA has already taken a
number of important actions to implement this program,
including identifying cities and some facilities for
participation in the program's pilot and conducting outreach to
the air cargo industry. TSA has also identified a number of
technologies that it plans to approve for use under the
program. These activities are critical and will undoubtedly
assist the agency moving forward.
However, TSA will face a number of challenges as it
attempts to implement this new, fundamental shift in the way in
which air cargo is secured. More specifically, the CCSP is
still in the early stages and has not yet been fully defined.
For example, TSA is still in the process of conducting outreach
to identify participants for the program's pilot and has not
yet identified specific time frames for completing necessary
activities leading up to the February and August deadlines.
TSA has also not identified the number of certified
facilities needed to ensure the program's success. Without
specific plan activities tied to time frame, it may be
difficult for the agency, Congress and others to monitor TSA's
progress moving forward.
In addition to the need for sound planning for the upcoming
pilot, we identified five challenges that TSA will need to
address related to the CCSP and strengthening air cargo
security more generally.
First, TSA has identified some technologies that the agency
plans to allow certified facilities to use for screening cargo,
but has not yet completed its technology assessments. In
addition, although TSA plans to reimburse industry for some
equipment costs, air cargo stakeholders expressed concern
regarding the costs associated with purchasing and the
screening equipment needed to become a certified facility.
Second, TSA has taken steps to eliminate the majority of
exempted, domestic and outbound cargo that is not required to
be screened. However, the agency plans to continue to exempt
some types of this cargo from screening after the August 2010
deadline. Further, TSA has not yet completed its air cargo
vulnerability assessments, which could help to identify
potential security vulnerabilities associated with these
exemptions.
Third, TSA may face resource challenges in overseeing
participants in the CCSP. While TSA has increased its number of
inspectors dedicated to cargo and plans to request funding for
additional inspectors, it has not yet conducted an assessment
of its compliance resource needs under the program.
Fourth, while the CCSP is focused on domestic and outbound
air cargo, more work remains to strengthen the security of
cargo transported into the United States from foreign
countries. TSA has strengthened its efforts to secure inbound
air cargo through various means, including planning to increase
the amount of cargo physically screened. In addition, TSA has
begun working with foreign governments to help develop uniform
air cargo security standards and to mutually recognize each
others' standards, referred to as harmonization. However, the
agency has not yet finalized its strategy for securing this
cargo and continues to exempt certain types of cargo from
screening.
Finally, the air cargo industry is critical to the
successful implementation of the CCSP. Should these entities
not volunteer to participate in the program in the thousands as
TSA envisions, air carriers will ultimately be responsible for
ensuring that cargo is screened prior to its transport on
passenger aircraft, which could become an overwhelming
undertaking.
We will continue to review TSA's air cargo security efforts
and will report to this committee and the public on the results
of our work.
This conclude my opening statement. I look forward to your
questions.
[The statement of Ms. Berrick follows:]
Prepared Statement of Cathleen A. Berrick
July 15, 2008
gao highlights
Highlights of GAO-08-959T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection, Committee on
Homeland Security, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study
The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007
requires the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to implement
a system to physically screen 100 percent of cargo on passenger
aircraft by August 2010. To fulfill these requirements, the Department
of Homeland Security's (DHS) TSA is developing the Certified Cargo
Screening Program (CCSP), which would allow the screening of cargo to
occur prior to placement on an aircraft. This testimony addresses four
challenges TSA may face in developing a system to screen 100 percent of
cargo: (1) Deploying effective technologies; (2) changing TSA air cargo
screening exemptions; (3) allocating compliance inspection resources to
oversee CCSP participants; and (4) securing cargo transported from a
foreign nation to the United States. GAO's comments are based on GAO
products issued from October 2005 through February 2008, including
selected updates conducted in July 2008.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has made recommendations to DHS and TSA in prior reports to
increase the security and screening of air cargo, including completing
vulnerability assessments and developing a plan for analyzing
compliance inspections. TSA generally agreed with these recommendations
and plans to address them.
aviation security: transportation security administration may face
resource and other challenges in developing a system to screen all
cargo transported on passenger aircraft
What GAO Found
DHS has taken steps to develop and test technologies for screening
and securing air cargo; however, TSA has not completed assessments of
the technologies it plans to use as part of the CCSP. TSA has reported
that there are several challenges that must be overcome to effectively
implement any of these technologies, including the nature, type, and
size of cargo to be screened and the location of air cargo facilities.
In addition, the air cargo industry voiced concern about the costs
associated with purchasing the screening equipment. GAO will likely
review this issue in future work.
TSA plans to revise and eliminate screening exemptions for some
categories of air cargo, thereby reducing the percentage of cargo
transported on passenger aircraft that is subject to alternative
methods of screening. However, TSA plans to continue to exempt some
types of domestic and outbound cargo (cargo transported by air from the
United States to a foreign location) after August 2010. TSA based its
determination regarding the changing of exemptions on professional
judgment and the results of air cargo vulnerability assessments.
However, TSA has not completed all of its air cargo vulnerability
assessments, which would further inform its efforts.
TSA officials stated there may not be enough compliance inspectors
to oversee implementation of the CCSP and is anticipating requesting an
additional 150 inspectors for fiscal year 2010. They further stated
that they have not formally assessed the number of inspectors the
agency will need. Without such an assessment, TSA may not be able to
ensure that CCSP entities are meeting TSA requirements to screen and
secure cargo. To ensure that existing air cargo security requirements
are being implemented as required, TSA conducts audits, referred to as
compliance inspections, of air carriers that transport cargo. The
compliance inspections range from a comprehensive review of the
implementation of all security requirements to a review of at least one
security requirement by an air carrier or freight forwarder (which
consolidates cargo from many shippers and takes it to air carriers for
transport). GAO reported in October 2005 that TSA had conducted
compliance inspections on fewer than half of the estimated 10,000
freight forwarders Nation-wide and, of those, had found violations in
over 40 percent of them. GAO also reported that TSA had not analyzed
the results of compliance inspections to systematically target future
inspections.
GAO reported in April 2007 that more work remains for TSA to
strengthen the security of cargo transported from a foreign nation to
the United States, referred to as inbound air cargo. Although TSA is
developing a system to screen 100 percent of domestic and outbound
cargo, TSA officials stated that it does not plan to include inbound
cargo because it does not impose its security requirements on foreign
countries. TSA officials said that vulnerabilities to inbound air cargo
exist and that these vulnerabilities are in some cases similar to those
of domestic air cargo, but stated that each foreign country has its own
security procedures for flights coming into the United States.
Ms. Chairwoman and Members of the subcommittee, we appreciate the
opportunity to participate in today's hearing to discuss the security
of the air cargo transportation system. In response to the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, the Aviation and Transportation Security
Act was enacted in November 2001, which created the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) and required it to provide for the
screening of all passengers and property, including cargo, U.S. mail,
and carry-on and checked baggage that is transported onboard passenger
aircraft. Recognizing the need to strengthen the security of air cargo,
Congress enacted, and the President signed into law, the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, which requires TSA
to implement a system to physically screen 50 percent of cargo on
passenger aircraft by February 2009, and 100 percent of such cargo by
August 2010.\1\ To fulfill the requirements of the Act, TSA is
developing a program, referred to as the Certified Cargo Screening
Program (CCSP), which would allow the screening of air cargo to take
place at various points throughout the air cargo supply chain. Under
the CCSP, Certified Cargo Screening Facilities (CCSF), such as
shippers, manufacturing facilities, and freight forwarders that meet
security requirements established by TSA, will volunteer to screen
cargo prior to its loading onto an aircraft.\2\ Participation of the
air cargo industry is critical to the successful implementation of the
CCSP. According to TSA officials, air carriers will ultimately be
responsible for screening 100 percent of cargo transported on passenger
aircraft should air cargo industry entities not volunteer to become a
CCSF.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ See Pub. L. No. 110-53, 1602, 121 Stat. 266, 477-80 (2007)
(codified at 49 U.S.C. 44901(g) (mandating the screening of all cargo
transported on passenger aircraft and defining ``screening'' for
purposes of satisfying the mandate)).
\2\ A freight forwarder consolidates cargo from many shippers and
takes it to air carriers for transport.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
My testimony today focuses on the challenges TSA may face as it
works to develop a system to screen 100 percent of cargo transported on
passenger aircraft by August 2010. Our comments are based on GAO
reports and testimonies issued between October 2005 and February 2008
addressing the security of the air cargo transportation system,
including selected updates to this work conducted in July 2008. In
addition, this statement includes selected information collected during
our review of TSA's report on its air cargo screening exemptions as
mandated by the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act
of 2007.\3\ This review was completed in July 2008 and has yet to be
publicly issued. We will initiate a review of TSA's efforts to meet the
requirement to screen 100 percent of cargo transported on passenger
aircraft in the near future, at the request of the Chairman of the
House Committee on Homeland Security and Congressman Edward Markey.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ See Pub. L. No. 110-53, 1602(b), 121 Stat. 266, 479-80
(2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We conducted our work in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and
perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide
a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
summary
TSA has taken actions to strengthen the security of air cargo, but
may face four major challenges as it proceeds with its plans to
implement a system to screen 100 percent of cargo transported on
passenger aircraft by August 2010.\4\ These challenges are: (1)
Deploying effective technologies to screen and secure air cargo; (2)
determining whether to revise, maintain or eliminate existing TSA air
cargo screening exemptions; (3) allocating compliance inspection
resources to oversee CCSP participants; and (4) securing inbound
cargo.\5\ First, TSA has identified some technologies that the agency
plans to allow certified facilities to use for screening and securing
cargo, but has not yet completed assessments of these technologies. As
a result, TSA cannot be assured that the technologies it plans to
approve for use as part of the CCSP can effectively screen cargo. In
addition, the air cargo industry has expressed concern regarding the
costs associated with purchasing the screening equipment under the
CCSP. Second, although TSA has taken steps to eliminate the majority of
exempted domestic and outbound cargo that it has not required to be
screened, the agency currently plans to continue to exempt some types
of domestic and outbound cargo from screening after August 2010.\6\ TSA
determined whether to change its exemptions based on professional
judgment and, to some extent, the results of air cargo vulnerability
assessments. However, TSA has yet to complete its air cargo
vulnerability assessments, which could help to identify other potential
security vulnerabilities associated with the exemptions. In addition,
while TSA has plans to complete its vulnerability assessments, the
agency has not established a time frame for doing so. Third, the agency
has also begun analyzing the results of air cargo compliance
inspections and has hired additional compliance inspectors dedicated to
air cargo. TSA officials reported, however, that the agency will need
additional air cargo inspectors to oversee the efforts of the
potentially thousands of entities that may participate in the CCSP once
it is fully implemented. Finally, more work remains in order for TSA to
strengthen the security of inbound cargo. Specifically, the agency has
not yet finalized its strategy for securing inbound cargo or determined
how, if at all, inbound cargo will be screened as part of its proposed
CCSP.
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\4\ ``Screening'' as defined by the Implementing Recommendations of
the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 means a physical examination or
nonintrusive methods of assessing whether cargo poses a threat to
transportation security. See 49 U.S.C. 44901(g)(5). Such methods of
screening include X-ray systems, explosives detection systems (EDS),
explosives trace detection, explosives detection canine teams certified
by TSA, or a physical search together with manifest verification. While
additional methods may be approved to ensure that cargo does not pose a
threat to transportation security, these additional methods cannot
include solely performing a review of information about the contents of
cargo or verifying the identity of a shipper of the cargo if not
performed in conjunction with other authorized security methods,
including whether a shipper is registered in the known shipper
database.
\5\ Inbound air cargo is cargo that is transported into the United
States from abroad by either U.S. or foreign-operated air carriers.
\6\ Cargo transported by air within the United States is referred
to as domestic air cargo, and cargo transported by air from the United
States to a foreign location is referred to as outbound air cargo.
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background
Air cargo ranges in size from 1 pound to several tons, and in type
from perishables to machinery, and can include items such as electronic
equipment, automobile parts, clothing, medical supplies, other dry
goods, fresh cut flowers, fresh seafood, fresh produce, tropical fish,
and human remains. Cargo can be shipped in various forms, including
large containers known as unit loading devices that allow many packages
to be consolidated into one container that can be loaded onto an
aircraft, wooden crates, assembled pallets, or individually wrapped/
boxed pieces, known as break bulk cargo. Participants in the air cargo
shipping process include shippers, such as individuals and
manufacturers; indirect air carriers, also referred to as freight
forwarders; air cargo handling agents who process and load cargo onto
aircraft on behalf of air carriers; and air carriers that store, load,
and transport cargo. A shipper may also send freight by directly
packaging and delivering it to an air carrier's ticket counter or
sorting center where either the air carrier or a cargo handling agent
will sort and load cargo onto the aircraft.
According to TSA's Air Cargo Strategic Plan, issued in November
2003, the agency's mission for the air cargo program is to secure the
air cargo transportation system while not unduly impeding the flow of
commerce. TSA's responsibilities for securing air cargo include, among
other things, establishing security requirements governing domestic and
foreign passenger air carriers that transport cargo, and domestic
freight forwarders.\7\ TSA is also responsible for overseeing the
implementation of air cargo security requirements by air carriers and
freight forwarders through compliance inspections, and, in coordination
with the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Science and Technology
(S&T) Directorate, for conducting research and development of air cargo
security technologies. Air carriers are responsible for implementing
TSA security requirements, predominantly through a TSA-approved
security program that describes the security policies, procedures, and
systems the air carrier will implement and maintain to comply with TSA
security requirements. These requirements include measures related to
the acceptance, handling, and screening of cargo; training of employees
in security and cargo screening procedures; testing employee
proficiency in cargo screening; and access to cargo areas and aircraft.
If threat information or events indicate that additional security
measures are needed to secure the aviation sector, TSA may issue
revised or new security requirements in the form of security directives
or emergency amendments applicable to domestic or foreign air carriers.
Air carriers must implement the requirements set forth in the security
directives or emergency amendments in addition to those requirements
already imposed and enforced by TSA.
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\7\ TSA also establishes security requirements for domestic and
foreign all-cargo carriers that transport cargo to, from, and within
the United States.
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DHS's U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has primary
responsibility for preventing terrorists and implements of terrorism
from entering the United States. Specifically, CBP screens inbound air
cargo upon its arrival in the United States to ensure that cargo
entering the country complies with applicable laws and does not pose a
security risk. CBP's efforts include analyzing information on cargo
shipments to identify high-risk cargo arriving in the United States
that may contain terrorists or weapons of mass destruction, commonly
known as targeting, and physically screening this cargo upon its
arrival.\8\
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\8\ For the purpose of the statement, the term ``targeting'' refers
to the use of information obtained from the screening process to
identify high-risk air cargo shipments for inspection.
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Air carriers use several methods and technologies to screen cargo.
These currently include manual physical searches and the use of
approved technology, such as X-ray systems; explosives trace detection
systems; decompression chambers; explosive detection systems (EDS); and
certified explosives detection canine teams.\9\ Under TSA's security
requirements for domestic and inbound cargo, passenger air carriers are
currently required to randomly screen a specific percentage of
nonexempt cargo pieces listed on each airway bill. As of October 2006,
domestic freight forwarders are also required, under certain
conditions, to screen a certain percentage of cargo prior to its
consolidation. TSA does not regulate foreign freight forwarders, or
individuals or businesses that have their cargo shipped by air to the
United States.
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\9\ Explosives Trace Detection requires human operators to collect
samples of items to be screened with swabs, which are chemically
analyzed to identify any traces of explosive material. Decompression
chambers simulate the pressures acting on an aircraft by simulating
flight conditions, which cause explosives that are attached to
barometric fuses to detonate. An explosive detection system uses
computer-aided tomography X-rays to examine objects inside baggage and
identify the characteristic signatures of threat explosives. Certified
explosives detection canine teams have been evaluated by TSA and shown
to effectively detect explosive devices.
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dhs is in the early stages of testing technologies to screen and secure
air cargo
DHS has taken some steps to develop and test technologies for
screening and securing air cargo, but has not yet completed assessments
of the technologies TSA plans to approve for use as part of the CCSP.
According to TSA officials, there is no single technology capable of
efficiently and effectively screening all types of air cargo for the
full range of potential terrorist threats, including explosives and
weapons of mass destruction. We reported in October 2005, and again in
April 2007, that TSA, working with DHS's S&T Directorate, was
developing and pilot testing a number of technologies to screen and
secure air cargo with minimal impact on the flow of commerce. DHS
officials stated that once the Department determines which technologies
it will approve for use with domestic air cargo, it will consider the
use of these technologies for enhancing the security of inbound cargo
shipments. These pilot programs seek to enhance the security of cargo
by improving the effectiveness of air cargo screening through increased
detection rates and reduced false alarm rates, while addressing the two
primary threats to air cargo identified by TSA--hijackers on an all-
cargo aircraft and explosives on passenger aircraft. A description of
these pilot programs and their status is included in table 1.
TABLE 1.--TSA AND S&T'S PILOT PROGRAMS TO TEST TECHNOLOGIES TO SCREEN AND SECURE AIR CARGO WITH MINIMAL IMPACT
ON THE FLOW OF COMMERCE
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pilot Program Description Status
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Air cargo explosives detection pilot Tests the use of explosive Consistent with the Conference
program. detections systems, explosives Report accompanying the
trace detectors, standard X-ray Department of Homeland Security
machines, canine teams, Appropriations Act, 2006, DHS's
technologies that can locate a S&T is reporting on the initial
stowaway through detection of a results of the pilots every 6
heartbeat or increased carbon months after initiation of the
dioxide levels in cargo, and first pilot.* DHS last submitted
manual screening of air cargo. a report dated June 2007, and the
latest update is currently
undergoing DHS executive review.
In July 2008, TSA officials
provided an update that this
pilot is complete and that its
final report to Congress is due
July 2008.
Explosive detection system (EDS)....... Tests the use of computer-aided TSA planned to complete this pilot
tomography to compare the program in May 2008. In July
densities of objects to locate 2008, TSA officials provided an
explosives in air cargo and to update that the pilot will be
determine the long-term completed by the end of 2008.
feasibility of using EDS equipment
as a total screening process for
break bulk air cargo.
Air cargo security seals............... Explores the viability of potential Contract was awarded in June 2007
security countermeasures, such as and TSA planned to start
tamper-evident security seals, for evaluating various seals in the
use with certain classifications spring of 2008. However, in July
of exempt cargo. 2008, TSA officials provided an
update that the agency is not
conducting a pilot program in
this area.
Hardened unit loading devices.......... Tests the use of containers made of TSA is finalizing its pilot
blast-resistant materials that program to evaluate hardened unit
could withstand an explosion loading devices. In July 2008,
onboard an aircraft. TSA officials provided an update
that this pilot will be completed
by the end of August 2008.
Pulsed fast neuron analysis (PFNA)..... Identifies the chemical signatures In the research and development
of contraband, explosives and phase. However, in July 2008, TSA
other threat objects. officials provided an update that
the agency does not plan to
conduct a pilot program in this
area.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: GAO analysis of information provided by TSA.
* H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 109-241, at 53 (2005) (accompanying Pub. L. No. 109-90, 119 Stat. 2064 (2005)).
Although TSA is moving forward with its plans to implement a system
to screen 100 percent of cargo transported on passenger aircraft, the
agency has not completed all of its assessments of air cargo screening
technologies. According to TSA officials, the results of its technology
tests will need to be analyzed before the agency determines which
technologies will be certified for screening cargo, and whether it will
require air carriers and other CCSP participants to use such
technology. Although TSA has not completed all of its pilot programs or
set time frames for completing all of them, TSA is planning on allowing
CCSFs to use explosives trace detection, explosive detection system
(EDS), X-ray, and other technology under CCSP for screening cargo.
Without all of the results of its pilot programs or a time frame for
their completion, however, TSA cannot be assured that the technologies
the agency plans to approve for screening cargo as part of the CCSP are
effective. GAO will likely review this issue as part of our planned
review of TSA's efforts to meet the requirement to screen 100 percent
of cargo transported on passenger aircraft.
According to TSA officials, tamper-evident/resistant security seals
will be essential for ensuring that cargo screened under the CCSP has
not been tampered with during transport from the CCSF to the air
carrier. Officials noted that the agency recognizes that the weakest
link in the transportation of air cargo is the chain of custody to and
from the various entities that handle and screen cargo shipments prior
to its loading onto an aircraft. Officials stated that the agency has
taken steps to analyze the chain of custody of cargo under the CCSP,
and is drafting a security program that will address all entities
involved in the transportation and screening of cargo under the CCSP to
ensure that the chain of custody of the cargo is secure. However, as of
July 2008, TSA officials stated that the agency is not conducting a
pilot program to test tamper-evident/resistant security seals.
Therefore, the effectiveness of security seals to effectively prevent
cargo shipments from tampering is unknown. GAO will likely review this
issue as part of our planned review of TSA's efforts to meet the
requirement to screen 100 percent of cargo transported on passenger
aircraft.
In addition, we reported in April 2007 that several air carriers we
met with were using large X-ray machines at facilities abroad to screen
entire pallets of cargo transported on passenger aircraft. These
machines allow for cargo on pallets to undergo X-ray screening without
requiring the pallet to be broken down.\10\ We also noted that CBP uses
this technology to screen inbound air cargo once it enters the United
States. TSA officials recently stated that the agency planned to pilot
test large X-ray machines, identifying that large X-ray machines could
be used to screen certain types of cargo that are currently exempt from
TSA's screening requirements, as part of the agency's efforts to screen
100 percent of cargo transported on passenger aircraft. TSA officials
stated that the agency plans to evaluate this equipment beginning late
2008 as part of its CCSP pilot program and to complete the evaluation
at the conclusion of the CCSP pilot in August 2010.
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\10\ GAO, Aviation Security: Federal Efforts to Secure U.S.-Bound
Air Cargo Are in the Early Stages and Could Be Strengthened, GAO-07-660
(Washington, DC: April 2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, as part of the agency's plans to screen 100 percent of
cargo transported on passenger aircraft, TSA is taking steps to expand
the use of TSA-certified explosives detection canine teams to screen
cargo before it is placed onto passenger aircraft. In 2004, TSA
conducted a pilot program that determined that canine teams had an
acceptable rate of detecting explosives in an air cargo environment,
even when the teams were not specifically trained in this area. TSA is
in the process of adding 170 canine teams to support aviation security
efforts, of which 85 will be primarily used to screen air cargo.\11\
These teams are to be primarily located at the 20 airports that receive
approximately 65 percent of all air cargo transported within the United
States. TSA officials, however, could not identify whether the
additional 85 canine teams will meet the agency's increasing screening
needs as part of its efforts to screen 100 percent of such cargo, thus
raising questions regarding the future success of the CCSP.
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\11\ There are currently 370 TSA-certified explosives detection
canine teams that are cross-trained to work in multiple aviation
environments, including air cargo.
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According to TSA officials, the Federal Government and the air
cargo industry face several challenges that must be overcome to
effectively implement any of these technologies to screen or secure
cargo. These challenges include factors such as the nature, type and
size of cargo to be screened; environmental and climatic conditions
that could impact the functionality of screening equipment; low
screening throughput rates; staffing and training issues for
individuals who screen cargo; the location of air cargo facilities;
employee health and safety concerns, such as worker exposure to
radiation; and the cost and availability of screening technologies. As
TSA takes steps to implement the CCSP, it will be critical for the
agency to address these challenges to ensure the effectiveness of the
program.
As TSA proceeds from piloting to implementing the CCSP, the issue
of who purchases the technologies to support the program will have to
be resolved. Specifically, TSA officials stated that under the CCSP,
certified facilities and air carriers will be responsible for
purchasing equipment to screen cargo. Officials noted that many air
carriers already have screening equipment in place at their facilities
to support this screening, and stated that TSA will reimburse CCSFs for
the cost of the equipment, such as EDS, for up to $375,000 per facility
as long as these entities continue to meet security requirements
established by TSA. The CCSF, however, will be responsible for
maintaining the screening equipment and purchasing new equipment in the
future. In addition, CCSFs will be required to train their staff to
operate the equipment using TSA's training standards. Air cargo
industry stakeholders have already raised concerns regarding the cost
of purchasing and maintaining screening equipment to support the CCSP.
According to some industry estimates, the cost of purchasing air cargo
screening equipment will be much more than the $375,000 TSA plans to
reimburse each CCSP participant. In addition, the air cargo industry
has expressed concern regarding the costs associated with training
those individuals who will be operating the air cargo screening
equipment.
tsa plans to revise and eliminate screening exemptions for some
categories of air cargo, but has not completed air cargo vulnerability
assessments to inform its efforts
TSA plans to revise and eliminate current exemptions for some
categories of cargo, thereby reducing the percentage of cargo
transported on passenger aircraft that is subject to alternative
methods of screening.\12\ These changes will go into effect in early
2009. However, according to agency officials, TSA made these
determinations based on a limited number of vulnerability assessments,
as well as professional judgment.\13\ In February 2008, TSA issued a
report assessing existing screening exemptions for certain kinds of
cargo transported on passenger aircraft and evaluated the risk of
maintaining those exemptions. As part of its assessment, TSA officials
stated that they considered and determined the threat to and
vulnerability of the exempted cargo types. TSA officials also stated
they based their determinations on which screening exemptions to
revise, maintain or eliminate in part on results from air cargo
vulnerability assessments at Category X airports they completed in
accordance with law.\14\ TSA has completed assessments at 6 of the 27
Category X airports. Absent the completed assessments, which could help
to identify potential security vulnerabilities associated with the
exemptions, TSA does not have complete information with which to make
risk-based decisions regarding the security of air cargo. TSA officials
have acknowledged the importance of completing air cargo vulnerability
assessments and stated that they will complete them by the end of 2009.
Officials further stated that as the agency conducts additional air
cargo vulnerability assessments, they will assess the results to
determine whether existing screening exemptions should be revised,
maintained or eliminated.
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\12\ For certain types of cargo, TSA has authorized the use of TSA-
approved alternative methods for screening cargo transported on
passenger aircraft. Alternative methods can include verifying shipper
information and conducting a visual inspection of the cargo shipment.
\13\ TSA officials made these statements during our review of TSA's
report on its air cargo screening exemptions. We completed this review
in July 2008 and the results have yet to be publicly issued.
\14\ See Pub. L. No. 110-28, 121 Stat. 112, 140-41 (2007)
(providing that the $80 million appropriated for air cargo shall be
used to complete air cargo vulnerability assessments for all Category X
airports, among other purposes). TSA classifies the commercial airports
in the United States into one of five security risk categories (X, I,
II, III, and IV). In general, Category X airports have the largest
number of passenger boardings, and Category IV airports have the
smallest. Categories X, I, II, and III airports account for more than
90 percent of the Nation's air traffic.
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tsa has taken actions to strengthen air cargo compliance inspections,
but more resources may be needed to ensure ccsp participants are
meeting tsa screening requirements
To ensure that existing air cargo security requirements are being
implemented as required, TSA inspects air carriers and freight
forwarders that transport cargo. Under the CCSP, TSA will also have to
inspect other entities, such as shippers, who volunteer to participate
in the program. These compliance inspections range from an annual
comprehensive review of the implementation of all air cargo security
requirements to a more frequent review of at least one security
requirement by an air carrier or freight forwarder. In October 2005, we
reported that TSA had conducted compliance inspections on less than
half (49 percent) of the estimated 10,000 freight forwarder facilities
Nation-wide, and of those freight forwarders they had inspected, the
agency found violations in over 40 percent of them. We also reported
that TSA had not determined what constitutes an acceptable level of
performance related to compliance inspections, or compared air
carriers' and freight forwarders' performance against this standard;
analyzed the results of inspections to systematically target future
inspections on those entities that pose a higher security risk to the
domestic air cargo system; or assessed the effectiveness of its
enforcement actions taken against air carriers and freight forwarders
to ensure that they are complying with air cargo security requirements.
We recommended that TSA develop a plan for systematically analyzing
andusing the results of air cargo compliance inspections to target
future inspections and identify system-wide corrective actions. We also
recommended that TSA assess the effectiveness of enforcement actions in
ensuring air carrier and freight forwarder compliance with air cargo
security requirements. TSA officials stated that, since our report was
issued, the agency has increased the number of inspectors dedicated to
conducting domestic air cargo compliance inspections. Officials also
told us that TSA has begun analyzing compliance inspection results to
prioritize their inspections on those entities that have the highest
rates of non-compliance, as well as newly approved freight forwarders
and air carriers that have yet to be inspected. However, in recent
discussions with TSA officials regarding their plans to implement the
CCSP, they stated that there may not be enough compliance inspectors to
conduct compliance inspections of all the entities that could be a part
of the CCSP, which TSA officials told us could number in the thousands,
once the program is fully implemented by August 2010. As a result, TSA
is anticipating requesting an additional 150 cargo Transportation
Security Inspectors for fiscal year 2010 to supplement its existing
allocation of 450 Transportation Security Inspectors. However, TSA
officials stated that they have not formally assessed the number of
Transportation Security Inspectors the agency will need. Without such
an assessment, TSA may not be able to ensure that entities involved in
the CCSP are meeting TSA requirements to screen and secure cargo. GAO
will likely review this issue as part of our planned review of TSA's
efforts to meet the requirement to screen 100 percent of cargo
transported on passenger aircraft.
tsa has not identified a strategy for securing inbound air cargo
We reported in April 2007 that more work remains in order for TSA
to strengthen the security of inbound cargo. As previously stated, TSA
is currently taking steps to develop a system of screening 100 percent
of domestic and outbound cargo transported on passenger aircraft. TSA
does not, however, currently plan to include inbound cargo as part of
this system. TSA officials acknowledge that vulnerabilities to inbound
cargo exist, but stated that each foreign country has its own security
procedures for flights coming into the United States, and further
stated that TSA does not impose its security requirements on foreign
countries. According to TSA, it will continue to work with other
countries to encourage the adoption of uniform measures for screening
cargo flights bound for the United States as it enhances its
requirements for screening cargo originating in the United States. TSA
has begun working with foreign governments to develop uniform air cargo
security standards and to mutually recognize each other's security
standards, referred to as harmonization. We reported, however, that
duplicative air cargo security standards exist, which can impede the
flow of commerce, expose air cargo shipments to security risk, and
damage high-value items. For example, to meet TSA requirements,
passenger air carriers transporting cargo into the United States must
screen a certain percentage of non-exempt cargo shipments, even though
these shipments may have already been screened by a foreign government.
Air carrier representatives stated that meeting TSA screening
requirements is problematic in certain foreign countries because air
carriers are not permitted to rescreen cargo shipments that have
already been screened by foreign government employees and deemed
secure. These conflicts and duplication of effort could potentially be
avoided through harmonization.
According to TSA officials, pursuing harmonization would improve
the security of inbound cargo and assist TSA in performing its mission.
For example, officials stated that the harmonization of air cargo
security standards would provide a level of security to those entities
not currently regulated by the agency, such as foreign freight
forwarders and shippers. However, achieving harmonization with foreign
governments may be challenging because these efforts are voluntary and
some foreign countries do not share the United States' view regarding
air cargo security threats and risks. Additionally, foreign countries
may lack the resources or infrastructure needed to develop an air cargo
security program as comprehensive as that of the United States. In
April 2007, we recommended that TSA, in collaboration with foreign
governments and the United States air cargo industry, systematically
compile and analyze information on air cargo security practices used
abroad to identify those that may strengthen TSA's overall air cargo
security program. TSA agreed with this recommendation and, since the
issuance of our report, has reviewed the air cargo screening models of
two foreign countries. According to TSA officials, this review led to
the design of their proposed CCSP.
Opportunities exist for TSA to further strengthen its screening
efforts for inbound cargo in the following three key areas:
Conducting air cargo vulnerability assessments for inbound cargo.
As noted earlier, TSA is currently conducting air cargo vulnerability
assessments at Category X airports, but is not including inbound cargo
in these assessments. While TSA has plans to conduct vulnerability
assessments as part of its risk-based approach to securing inbound
cargo, the agency has not established a time frame for doing so. Such
assessments could provide information on the potential vulnerabilities
posed by the transport of inbound cargo. We reported in April 2007 that
TSA officials stated that they would conduct vulnerability assessments
of inbound cargo after they had assessed the vulnerability of domestic
cargo. Nevertheless, TSA officials acknowledged that vulnerabilities to
inbound cargo exist and that these vulnerabilities are in some cases
similar to those facing the domestic and outbound air cargo supply
chain.
Assessing the vulnerability posed by maintaining screening
exemptions for inbound air cargo. TSA has not assessed the potential
vulnerabilities posed by inbound air cargo screening exemptions. In
April 2007, we reported on the potential vulnerabilities associated
with inbound air cargo screening exemptions. Specifically, we reported
that screening exemptions could pose a risk to the inbound air cargo
supply chain because TSA has limited information on the background of
and security risks posed by foreign freight forwarders and shippers
whose cargo may fall into one of the exemption categories. We
recommended that TSA assess whether existing inbound air cargo
screening exemptions pose an unacceptable vulnerability to the air
cargo supply chain and if necessary, address these vulnerabilities. TSA
agreed with this recommendation and noted that the agency had recently
revised and eliminated domestic and outbound air cargo screening
exemptions. However, TSA has yet to address our recommendation for
assessing inbound air cargo screening exemptions.
Updating TSA's Air Cargo Strategic Plan to address inbound cargo.
As part of TSA's risk-based approach, TSA issued an Air Cargo Strategic
Plan in November 2003 that focused on securing the domestic air cargo
supply chain. However, in April 2007, we reported that this plan did
not include goals and objectives for securing inbound cargo, which
presents different security challenges than cargo transported
domestically. To ensure that a comprehensive strategy for securing
inbound cargo exists, we recommended that DHS develop a risk-based
strategy to address inbound cargo security that should define TSA's and
CBP's responsibilities for ensuring the security of inbound cargo. In
response to our recommendation, CBP issued its International Air Cargo
Security Strategic Plan in June 2007. While this plan identifies how
CBP will partner with TSA, it does not specifically address TSA's
responsibilities in securing inbound cargo. According to TSA officials,
the agency plans to revise its Air Cargo Strategic Plan in the fall of
2008, and will address TSA's strategy for securing cargo from
international last points of departure, as well as its collaborative
efforts with CBP to secure this cargo.
Ms. Chairwoman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to
answer any questions that you or other Members of the subcommittee may
have at this time.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank the witnesses for their
testimony and remind each Member that he or she will have 5
minutes to question the panel. I now recognize myself for
questions.
Let me address this to you, Mr. Sammon. You have hopefully
responded to my opening statement and at least laid out a
framework of what the challenges are.
Tell me about this problem of capacity, and have you
advised this subcommittee, myself as the Chairwoman, on this
seemingly growing or ongoing problem?
Mr. Sammon. We have had numerous briefings with the staff.
The issue, what we don't want to do is to simply pass a
regulation forcing the air carriers to screen all of the cargo
at the airport. Our problem is that much of the cargo that is
presented to the air carriers comes in the form of consolidated
loads, that there are large shipments that are put together to
go to particular places, and there are economic reasons and
materials handling reasons for this.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Sammon, I appreciate where you are
going with this, but in advising the staff, what is your
intention about the lack of capacity? Hear me out, because the
lack of capacity may be an issue in 2009, it may be an issue in
2010. You have to directly respond to the issue of capacity.
Are you going to ask the airports to inventory their space
and to look for what might be feasible? Have you concluded that
there is no on-site space? What is the option?
Mr. Sammon. What we are looking at, we feel at some
airports there may be plenty of capacity. However, at others,
there is insufficient capacity. Therefore, the capacity we want
to use for screening is at the locations where people are
assembling these loads and/or shipping the loads that are going
onto the passenger aircraft. In each market, it will vary. In
some markets, it may be more in the airport; in some it may be
more off.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So you are not looking necessarily for
space at the airport? Is that what you are saying?
Mr. Sammon. No, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So when you make the point there is not
capacity, what are you speaking of?
Mr. Sammon. What we are speaking of is that if we forced
all of the cargo screening to happen at all airports, we would
have a capacity issue, that not all airports, for instance JFK,
could handle all this.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Because the time is short, what is the
status of the interim rule?
Mr. Sammon. The interim rule is progressing now. We expect
that to be out by the end of the year.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Can Mr. Kelly give us an exact time frame?
Mr. Sammon. I believe he can give you the same answer. I
can ask him, if he could.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I would like to. Do you have an exact----
Mr. Kelly. As John said, it is going through the process
right now of being finalized, and it will move to DHS and OMB
probably in the next 2 or 3 months and then be issued.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, we are looking to February 2009. Is
that what you are expecting?
Mr. Kelly. We expect a final rule to be in place before
February.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Before February. Let me move quickly.
Thank you, Mr. Sammon. I may come back to you. As I said, my
time is short.
Let me go to Ms. Berrick. What is your assessment of the
progress that has been made by TSA, and, in particular, whether
or not they have what we would call a coherent vision, an
effective plan for first meeting the 50 percent and then
meeting the 100 percent of screening, air cargo screening?
Ms. Berrick. First of all, I think they have taken some
important steps in terms of planning. They have identified the
cities that have high volumes of cargo, identified the
locations, and have reached out to stakeholders there.
The area where I think they can strengthen is developing a
more specific plan leading up to the February and August
deadlines that are tied to time frames, and that would enable
TSA internally and also this committee to monitor their
progress in moving toward those deadlines. We haven't seen
those specific plans.
A couple of other areas where I think they can focus their
efforts--one is related to completing technology assessments.
As Mr. Tuttle mentioned, S&T has completed some assessments,
but there are still a number that are under way and may not be
completed for years.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me interrupt you for a moment. What is
your response to the TSA blocking whole categories of cargo,
exempting whole categories of cargo?
Ms. Berrick. We just looked at that and in fact have made
recommendations in the past that TSA should re-look these
exemptions. The 9/11 Act mandated TSA to re-look those
exemptions and GAO to look at their assessment. We found that
TSA generally did a good job in re-looking the exemptions of
air cargo. Based on their review, they made some modifications
to the exemptions. However, there are still some in place.
But the key point that we made related to the exemptions is
TSA hasn't yet completed vulnerability assessments of the air
cargo system at airports, and as they get more information in
from doing those assessments, it will inform their decisions
about the exemptions. Just during the course of our review,
they received new information from vulnerability assessments
that prompted them to modify one of the exemptions because they
thought it was a security vulnerability.
So we think it is important for TSA to complete these
assessments so they can really make informed decisions about
the exemptions.
Ms. Jackson Lee. My time has expired.
Mr. Lungren, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much.
Mr. Sammon, in January of this year, I went out to San
Francisco Airport, I think it was the United facility, and
looked at a, quote-unquote, pilot project that was then in
existence with respect to air cargo. Are you familiar with that
pilot program?
Mr. Sammon. Yes, sir.
Mr. Lungren. While I was there, I saw where pallets would
come in that had been sent by a particular shipper. They were
unpalletized, I guess is the language they used. They went
through the system for the check. If there was something that
indicated that one should be taken out for a physical
inspection, it was. As I recall, a photograph was taken of the
palletized cargo. Then the system was such that it was
repalletized in the same way, presuming that all the pieces
could go back in, there wasn't something that kept it out. It
seemed to work fairly well. I didn't know how expensive it was
or how unmanageable or manageable it was.
What were the results of that pilot project?
Mr. Sammon. Well, I think it was a good pilot project, and
Jim Tuttle may wish to comment on this also. But one thing we
did learn, if you looked at it from a materials handling
standpoint from that same facility and shed, because I spoke to
the personnel out there, and I said if you had taken all the
pallets here and had to run it through the system, what would
happen? He said there is no way we could handle it here.
So our idea is before the boxes are put onto the pallet, is
have that entity screen them, assemble the pallet under a
secure chain of custody to the airport. Because the one thing
we did learn, again from a materials handling and logistics
standpoint, trying to do all the cargo that came to that shed,
the United shed, would be extremely difficult and cause a lot
of congestion in that facility.
So, it was a worthwhile pilot to have for that one reason,
that we learned quite a bit in terms of the materials handling
impact, in terms of how much you could actually put through.
That was one of the primary lessons we saw from it.
Mr. Lungren. As you push it down the supply chain and you
have these certified entities, are you saying that if it is a
certified entity it would do a physical screening of each
parcel?
Mr. Sammon. It would do the screening of the freight before
they are assembled. That is the idea.
Mr. Lungren. How do you define a physical screening?
Mr. Sammon. They would either X-ray, physically open it,
ATD, canine, whatever, the measures that are mentioned in the
act. If we can pull that freight out of that United cargo shed,
we feel that the smaller businesses who bring single boxes in
and small shipments then we will have the opportunity to have
those shipments screened at that United shed, rather than being
filled up by all the cargo from the large freight forwarders.
Mr. Lungren. Is this a system that is similar to what they
have, what has been in place in England for some time?
Mr. Sammon. Yes. In England, they have a similar system
that they call them consignors. But they have certified to
screen the freight, they are certified by the British
authorities, and then the freight is brought to the airport
under a chain of custody. In fact, much of what we are doing is
modeled after the British system.
Mr. Lungren. Ms. Berrick, have you looked at this?
Ms. Berrick. We did look at cargo screening methods around
the world in Asia and Europe and did find that the United
Kingdom and also Ireland have a very similar system that TSA is
modeling off of. They have less volume of cargo than the United
States, but it has been shown to be effective in those
countries.
Mr. Lungren. Would you define that as a coherent vision or
a coherent approach to it, or is it an incoherent approach?
Ms. Berrick. I would categorize it as a coherent approach,
but, again, I would like to see more specific plans on how it
is going to be implemented, given the looming time frames
coming up in February and August.
Mr. Lungren. What would be the nature of the certification,
Mr. Sammon?
Mr. Sammon. The certification would consist of facility
security in terms of perimeter security, access control,
background checks on employees, security processes,
certification of the truck drivers who are going to deliver the
freight, seals through the process, that the shipments are
sealed, the trucks are sealed and, in terms of the whole chain
of custody, is certified by TSA from the facility to the
airport.
Mr. Lungren. Mr. Tuttle, in looking at a number of these
things that they are doing, what is the state of technology
with respect to that? Here is the question I have. I have seen
different pieces of technology that have come through the last
number of years, and yet in some cases I see where dogs do a
better job. When you are looking at things from this, I will
call it laboratory perspective, and I mean that with a positive
nature, that you are looking at these things to see how they
are working, what about the practical nature of it? When you
are looking at some of these various technology advances, do
you take into consideration what Mr. Sammon talked about in
terms of capacity? I will just simply say this: That is,
scalability of the equipment, so it can be located in small
units as well as larger units, where it may not require a major
capital investment by an airport in terms of modifying in a
very significant way the physical footprint that is already
there?
Mr. Tuttle. We worked very, very closely with TSA on these
issues. As far as the general state of technology, the biggest
problem, because the various commodities that flow through and
the size of the pallets and the explosives size you need to
look for, there is no technology that can screen a whole
pallet, period. There is nothing even close. So, you look at
it, you have to break it apart. So if you do break bulk, that
is very labor-intensive to do.
Now, there are a number of technologies that can do it, and
TSA has already outlined what those technologies are, the five
or six various technologies, but even they have problems with
various commodities. So you almost have to match up the
technology versus the commodity, and that is the data we have
actually been collecting and providing to them to help them
make a decision on how they are going to do it.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you.
Ms. Jackson Lee. The gentleman's time has expired.
I yield 5 minutes, recognizing the distinguished gentleman
from Oregon, Mr. DeFazio, for questioning.
Mr. DeFazio. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Mr. Sammon, how many certified sites do you expect there
will be?
Mr. Sammon. We can expect for the phase 1, we expect to
have the freight forwarders, probably about 60 to 80, and we
expect that perhaps several hundred shippers. The initial lift
will be, in terms of getting to the 50 percent, will be at the
airports and also on a limited number of high-volume freight
forwarders.
Mr. DeFazio. So there will be 60 to 80 places that would
have the equipment that will do the actual inspection on phase
1?
Mr. Sammon. Yes, sir. That is also where we are
concentrating our canine teams, our proprietary canine teams
also.
Mr. DeFazio. So several hundred shippers will funnel into
that?
Mr. Sammon. Yes, sir.
Mr. DeFazio. But you are not depending on the shipper to
certify the security or safety, there will be actual physical
inspection at those 60 to 80 places?
Mr. Sammon. Yes, sir, for the first phase.
Mr. DeFazio. You say here they will be random oversight,
unannounced inspections, those sorts of things. How many
inspectors do you think you are going to need to monitor those
60 to 80 places?
Mr. Sammon. Well, we will have about 450 in place, and as
we go to 100 percent cargo screening, we will focus that
inspection force more and more on those certified facilities.
Right now we have about 10,000 IACs, or the independent agents
who ship, and they do work with those folks in terms of their
paperwork and what kind of shipments they are presenting. But
what we want to do is see if we can focus on a limited number
of facilities where the screening is actually happening, real
screening taking place, what that does to the dynamic of the
inspection force.
Mr. DeFazio. Phase 1 is going to cover what percentage of
the cargo?
Mr. Sammon. Fifty percent.
Mr. DeFazio. So do we just double that number for phase 2,
or is it going to be more dispersed and require even more?
Mr. Sammon. Phase 2 will be a different dynamic. If you
think of phase 1 primarily happening at the airports and a
limited number of freight forwarders, in phase 2 we will expand
the number of freight forwarders and also expand the number of
shippers.
Mr. DeFazio. So how big?
Mr. Sammon. The shippers may expand to 15,000 shipper
locations.
Mr. DeFazio. Fifteen thousand shipper locations, that
actually do the physical screening?
Mr. Sammon. Yes, sir.
Mr. DeFazio. One thousand, five hundred?
Mr. Sammon. Fifteen thousand.
Mr. DeFazio. Fifteen thousand?
Mr. Sammon. Yes.
Mr. DeFazio. How many inspectors do you think you will need
to oversee that?
Mr. Sammon. We will have a larger force. Also we are
looking at third-party validators to certify and to check on
those.
Mr. DeFazio. What is a third-party validator?
Mr. Sammon. A third-party validator would be similar to the
process that they use----
Mr. DeFazio. That they use overseas? That is not too good?
Mr. Sammon. No, that the English do use. What we would do
is hire a party that has demonstrated their ability to do
certifications in other areas, particularly in logistics, and
hire them and their agents.
Mr. DeFazio. Fifteen thousand dispersed sites. Then how are
we going to secure--okay. I think we have a logistical problem
there. But then beyond that, there is 15,000 places feeding the
cargo into the airports.
Tell me about the security system for the chain of custody.
Let's assume that somehow we can monitor, certify and ensure
that those 15,000 are good. How are we going to secure the
freight after that point?
Mr. Sammon. Well, then if it is from one of those original
shipper sites, they could go directly to the airport with a
secure chain of custody, that is the electronic and paper flow,
in addition to the tamper evidence sealing system is in place.
Mr. DeFazio. Have you a tamper-proof tamper evidence
system, unlike the current very lame system we use on
containers in our ports now, that any kid can replicate by
going downtown to the local supply store?
Mr. Sammon. There are a number of tamper evidence systems,
and I think Mr. Tuttle also referred to the work that he is
doing in developing these in his testimony. Also in terms of
what we want to do with the chain of custody is work with Cathy
Berrick and GAO through this period to make sure that we are
covering all the bases as we go along, as opposed to waiting
until it is over and Cathy writing a report and saying there
are problems here, problems there.
We would like to work with GAO to make sure we keep this as
airtight as possible. We recognize the issues in terms of chain
of custody. We also recognize the problems if we let all this
freight pile up at the airport and attempt to screen it there.
You have got a challenge, and that is the biggest challenge we
see.
Mr. DeFazio. Ms. Berrick, is GAO aware of the magnitude we
are talking about here, the 15,000, and do you think that is
going to present a pretty substantial logistical challenge
here?
Ms. Berrick. I think you hit on two key points, which is
the TSA's inspections resources and being able to oversee this,
and the second is the chain of custody.
When we reported on this most recently at the end of 2005,
we looked at TSA's inspection program. There is a lot of
positive aspects to it. But the area we felt that could really
be strengthened was really the freight forwarders. Of the
10,000 freight forwarder locations, TSA at that time had
inspected about half, and at half of those there were security
deficiencies in terms of not meeting security requirements in
40 percent of those facilities.
So with this increased requirement in terms of overseeing
these 15,000 facilities, I think it will be very challenging.
TSA has increased, as Mr. Sammon mentioned, its inspections
work force. They recognize this challenge is coming. They said
that they plan on requesting additional funding for more
inspectors. But I agree, I think it will be a very difficult
challenge and something that TSA will need to assess, exactly
what is going to be the impact on the agency, which hasn't been
done yet.
The second point about the chain of custody I think is also
crucial. At one point TSA had said they were going to do a
pilot looking at the tamper-resistant seals. We heard recently
they weren't planning on doing that. So that is an area we will
be following up on as part of our work.
Mr. DeFazio. One very quick follow-up, Madam Chairwoman.
Mr. Sammon, of those 40 percent who didn't live up to snuff
that the GAO found, what were the consequences for those folks?
Mr. Sammon. There is a combination of administrative and
civil actions. I think it is about 20 percent civil actions,
fines, penalties, revocations, whatever.
Mr. DeFazio. Those fines, were they actually implemented?
Because I am familiar with the process. Sometimes we read in
the paper about a big fine, and then subsequently it kind of
goes away through the process.
Mr. Sammon. That is my understanding. Of that population of
10,000 IACs, of the number of IACs, there are 10,000 IAC
locations, there are about 5,000 roughly IACs; only about 350
have multiple locations. So you have a lot of single mom-and-
pop folks out there who are looking at regulations and things.
Those folks, we see them in the future. With 100 percent
physical screening, you are going to be paying less attention
to them, because it is going to actually be screened at the
airport or through a forwarder. So you focus your attention on
the 350 with the multiple locations and the places that have
real bricks-and-mortar security facilities in place.
Mr. DeFazio. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the gentleman for his questioning.
It is my pleasure to recognize the distinguished
gentlewoman from New York, Ms. Clarke, for 5 minutes for
questioning.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman. I want
to thank you on your vigilance with regard to this matter of
cargo security, and I want to thank our panelists for being
here this afternoon to do an examination and an assessment of
exactly where we are.
In fiscal year 2008, the President's budget request for air
cargo security was $55 million, well below the $73 million that
Congress felt was necessary to meet the 100 percent screening
mandate required by law. This year, the President recommended
deleting the cargo line item and placing the funding into a
broader package that would allow funding intended for cargo
security to be used for other uses. This gives the appearance
that the President is looking for ways to minimize the funding
for implementation of this mandate, despite the difficulty that
TSA is having in meeting deadlines with higher levels of
funding provided by Congress. I believe this demonstrates a
lack of seriousness or reneging, if you will, on the part of
the administration to provide genuine cargo security.
So, my question to you, Mr. Sammon, is you are the person
tasked with ensuring the 100 percent screening requirement is
met by the authorized deadlines, and knowing how much work
there is yet to complete, do you agree with the President's
budget recommendations, or do you feel it is important that
your program receive a dedicated funding stream at the higher
levels Congress is providing?
Mr. Sammon. Ma'am, I would have to check into that a little
bit more. My understanding as of Friday is that we asked for
$104 million for dedicated air cargo screening program,
including 170 canine teams, 450 inspectors and so on. So I will
double-check to see where that request stands. But I know we
had requested the $104 million.
Ms. Clarke. Madam Chairwoman, can we just follow-up to make
sure that that is indeed the case and there is dedicated
funding? That obviously is your preference, Mr. Sammon.
Mr. Sammon. Well, you would need that magnitude to support
the increased inspectors and canines.
Ms. Clarke. That is dedicated funding, so that this funding
cannot be utilized for other TSA purposes?
Mr. Sammon. That is my understanding.
Ms. Jackson Lee. If the gentlewoman would yield, we would
be happy to do that, provide that for her. We would ask, Mr.
Sammon, that you provide that for the committee in writing.
Mr. Sammon. We will do that.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman.
I represent a district in Brooklyn, New York, which is
located in very close proximity to New York's two major
airports. They are among our Nation's busiest in terms of
international flights, transporting many thousands of Americans
and foreign passengers each day. Yet the GAO says that TSA has
no plan to screen cargo coming in on flights from other
countries.
This seems like a major loophole in the plan. While I
understand that we cannot regulate what happens in other
countries, CBP and the Coast Guard, both DHS components, have
worked out ways to promote cargo screening at many foreign
seaports when the shipments are headed to the United States.
Can you explain why TSA is unable to do this?
Mr. Sammon. First of all, what we want to do, and I think
as we spoke earlier and that Ms. Berrick emphasized, as this
program is being developed and put in place, we want to have
the program put in place on a solid basis and foundation. It is
similar to a number of overseas programs. At that point I
think, when it's up and solid and running, then we can take
something that is in place, operating overseas and attempt to
get cooperation from other governments to put the same program
in place. But it is not fully--it is not up and functioning
yet, so it is hard to put a program in place overseas that is
not up and running here.
Ms. Clarke. So do you have a projected time by which you
will have finished this assessment and think about piloting
that in the United States? Is that ultimately the goal that we
set for ourselves?
Mr. Sammon. The goal is to be at 100 percent screening by
August 2010. I think, working with GAO and other folks on this
committee, that we can get to that point and know where what
resources are required and to be at the point. Then when I
think we have that fully functioning, we can take that much
more easily and transport it overseas.
But we are working right now with the folks in Australia,
throughout the European community, Great Britain and a number
of other locations, Canada, in terms of talking about
harmonizing the security procedures that they have with ours so
that we end up at the same place.
Ms. Clarke. My time is winding down. But have you looked at
Israel? Have you looked at the model they have?
Mr. Sammon. Yes, we have looked at Israel. Part of the
issue on Israel on many of these screening things with
passengers and whatever is they have one location and it is a
much smaller stream of cargo than we are facing in the United
States.
Ms. Clarke. But, Ms. Berrick, I see that you are chomping
at the bit. Madam Chairwoman, would you indulge me for just a
moment?
Ms. Jackson Lee. I continue to yield to the gentlelady.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you.
Ms. Berrick. With respect to GAO's work looking at cargo
coming into the United States from foreign countries, we did
report that TSA and CBP. They both play a role. We are doing
less to ensure the security of that cargo. Carriers coming into
the United States are required to inspect a certain percentage
of cargo, but it is a small percentage. TSA is planning to
increase that percentage.
We have also made some recommendations in this area,
including conducting vulnerability assessments. TSA, as Mr.
Sammon mentioned is also working to harmonize security
requirements with foreign countries, which we think is very
positive. But we think still more work remains in inbound air
cargo.
Ms. Clarke. While Israel may not have the scale we are
looking at, certainly there is maybe a way to build that to
scale or some of what they are doing to scale to suit the
United States in the various ports of entry that we have here
in terms of air travel.
I yield back. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman.
Ms. Jackson Lee. The gentlelady's time is expired.
It is a pleasure to yield again to another distinguished
gentleman who knows a little bit about this issue, and his
knowledge continues to grow and contribute to this committee as
well as the securing of America. We thank him for his service.
The distinguished gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Markey,
I yield to you questioning for 5 minutes.
Mr. Markey. Thank you, Madam Chair, very much; and welcome,
Mr. Sammon.
TSA's current plan to screen all the cargo carried on
passenger planes relies heavily on freight forwarders and other
private sector participants in the air cargo industry.
Specifically, under TSA's proposed certified cargo screening
program, shippers and other entities along the supply chain
would voluntarily agree, voluntarily agree to screen cargo
before it reaches the airport in exchange for some financial
support from TSA and presumably fees from customers wanting to
ship their goods on a passenger plane. What is TSA's fallback
plan if not enough private sector companies elect to
participate as so-called certified screeners?
Mr. Sammon. Yes. I think as I mentioned in my oral
testimony, in the end you have 100 pounds to screen, you have
100 pounds that flies. So it is everyone's interest to make
sure that their partners in the whole air cargo business, there
are a sufficient number of people who are screening the
freight. It is in the economic interest not only----
Mr. Markey. But what if they don't volunteer? What is your
plan?
Mr. Sammon. If they don't volunteer, it is ultimately the
air carrier's responsibility to make sure the cargo they
transport has been screened either by another entity or by the
airline themselves.
Mr. Markey. How are you going to ensure that that works,
that system?
Mr. Sammon. In the end, by August, if there is freight that
is not through our inspector, if there is freight that is not
screened, it won't fly.
Mr. Markey. Ms. Berrick, are you aware at GAO of TSA's
efforts to develop and test a fallback cargo screening plan and
does GAO believe that these efforts are sufficient to test its
feasibility?
Ms. Berrick. To our knowledge, the Plan B, if you will, is
the carriers at the airports having to do the screening. From
the work that we have done, the indication is that would be
very, very difficult because of capacity space limitations,
equipment and--so it would be difficult for them to have the
ability to do that.
Mr. Markey. So you don't think that TSA's Plan B really is
feasible?
Ms. Berrick. We are continuing to look at that and haven't
concluded other than we think it would be difficult for
carriers to do it at the airport.
Mr. Markey. Thank you.
Mr. Sammon, I am concerned about TSA's ability to monitor
compliance with the new cargo rules it is developing to comply
with the 100 percent screening mandate.
One year ago almost to the day, July 11, 2007, the
Department of Homeland Security's Inspector General issued this
report. It was a scathing, scalding indictment of TSA's current
air cargo security structure and contained disturbing findings.
On page 6, for example, TSA's process for overseeing the
screening of cargo by the airlines, quote, increases the
opportunities for the carriage of explosives, incendiaries and
other dangerous devices on passenger aircraft. That is only
with one entity, besides TSA doing the screening.
Now, under TSA's proposed certified shipper screening
program, TSA will be responsible for overseeing potentially
five additional entities who would be eligible to screen air
cargo under TSA's plan. According to your testimony, those
entities also would be eligible to screen air cargo shippers,
manufacturers, warehousing entities, distributors and third-
party logistics companies.
As the Department's Inspector General reported, TSA had
significant problems with overseeing airline compliance when
only a fraction of air cargo had to be screened. Now, not only
are an additional five types of entities eligible to screen
cargo, but 100 percent of the cargo must be screened. I am
concerned about whether TSA will be able to carry out this
oversight function effectively, given its past documented
difficulties.
Ms. Berrick, is that a legitimate concern?
Ms. Berrick. I think it is a legitimate concern, and it is
a key challenge that we identified in our statement today.
Back at the end of 2005, we looked at TSA's compliance
efforts for freight forwarders. At that time, as well as the
case today, there were 10,000 facilities where freight
forwarders were located. TSA had inspected about half of those,
and of 40 percent of those, half there were security
deficiencies. So, given the increased volume, I do think it
will be a challenge.
Mr. Markey. Mr. Sammon, on page 4 of your testimony, you
state that, quote, without the development of technology to
effectively screen cargo built into large pallets and ULDs,
screening cannot be executed primarily at airports. If the
technology to effectively screen pallets were available, would
you support having it screened at airports?
Mr. Sammon. In addition to the pallets, you have large
ULDs, which are called cookie sheets, which looks like a large
flat aluminum sheet which can hold up to 11,000 pounds, which
is larger than the size of this table, perhaps twice the size
of this table. The technology--if we are lucky, we can get
technology to screen 4 by 4 by 4 pallets. Getting to a cookie
sheet, which are delivered to many--by the aircraft I think is
way, way off in the future.
Mr. Markey. I have a letter here from two established,
well-known screening equipment vendors. In this letter, Smiths
and Rapid-Scan state that, ``Rapid-Scan, Smiths and other
manufacturers have for over 10 years provided pallet
inspections to screen larger air cargo to cargo companies and
airlines in the United States and worldwide.''
I think the TSA should focus its plans on screening cargo
at the airports or as close to the airport perimeter as
possible to reduce the possibility of tampering with the cargo
from the point of screening to the point of loading it onto the
aircraft. Southwest Airlines now screens 60 percent of the
cargo which goes on to its planes at the airport, and I know
that they are a profitable airline and one that is doing well.
But it seems to me that the models are already here to get most
of the cargo screened, Mr. Sammon, at the airport with
equipment that already exists.
Mr. Sammon. Most of the cargo that--Southwest has a fleet
of 737s. They are flying single box cargo, small--they are not
flying large cookie sheets, and it is a completely different
problem.
I think in Jim Tuttle's testimony he talked about the
issues. We are going to test pallet size, high-voltage X-rays
during the pilot phase of this, but they have not been approved
for purchase in the lab yet. We may find that they are good for
certain commodities.
Mr. Markey. When are you going to approve them? What is the
deadline you have established?
Mr. Sammon. They may never be approved. They may only be
approved for certain commodities.
Mr. Markey. What is your schedule for making a
determination as to whether or not the job can get done?
Mr. Sammon. They are working with the labs over the next
several labs, and we will see how the approval--I would
personally like to see the pallet-sized machines approved if
possible. But if they are not secure and we can't view into
particularly dense commodities, there is no point in having
those machines out there.
Mr. Markey. Again, referring back over to Ms. Clarke and,
obviously, other examples, the Israelis and others have focused
on this issue. I no longer believe that it is a technological
issue. I do believe it is a political issue, a question of
political will on the part of the Bush administration.
We are now 7 years since 9/11. That is an awful long time
to develop technology that could make sure that the successor
Mohamed Attas and others who boarded those planes in Boston
could not do so through the cargo hold using just cargo in
order to accomplish those goals.
Seven years is a long, long time. That is how long it took
President Kennedy in 1961 to 1969 to put a man on the moon and
to get him to come back. This does not seem as complicated a
task, and I hope that you know that we are going to be
monitoring your progress on this very closely.
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the gentleman.
I am going to give the opportunity for Members, if they
desire, to have a second round; and I yield to myself at this
time 5 minutes.
I just want to see if I can focus on the line of
questioning of Mr. Markey, Mr. Sammon, and that is that I am
just unclear--having listened to the eloquence of our Members
and their questioning and having listened to the astuteness of
your answers, I am unclear as to where we are and what we need
to have happen. So let me try to ask some very factual, direct
questions that you can answer as direct as you possibly can.
I believe we have an objection of 50 percent air cargo
screening by 2009; and my question to you is, what date will we
meet that 50 percent requirement under the law signed by the
President of the United States?
Mr. Sammon. We are confident that we will get to 50 percent
in February 2009.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me ask that question again. Will you
get 50 percent in February 2009?
Mr. Sammon. Yes, through the combination of focusing on the
high-volume cargo location airports. There are 18 airports that
represent 66 percent of the volume of freight. We are focusing
our canines, our technology, our inspector resources on those.
In addition to that, we are focusing on the aircraft that carry
80 percent of the passengers. Those two combinations, we expect
to get 50 percent of the cargo----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Do you consider that your pilot program?
Mr. Sammon. We consider it because we are testing
technology throughout this entire period, and technology will
develop. We are also going to be testing and retesting. The
chain of custody will all be considered a pilot program.
Ms. Jackson Lee. The pilot program is what you gauge will
be the work that is in place by 2009? Is that what you are
saying? You consider that a pilot?
Mr. Sammon. The pilot program and through technology will
continue through August 2010.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Right. But is the pilot program part of
meeting the 2009 50 percent goal?
Mr. Sammon. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So you don't include the 15,000 sites?
That is not what you are going to get your hands around
immediately?
Mr. Sammon. No, the 15,000 sites will not be part of the
initial phase.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Will 15,000 sites be part of the
completion?
Mr. Sammon. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me ask the question. Will you be 100
percent by the time instituted in the 9/11 Act?
Mr. Sammon. Yes, our goal is to be at 100 percent by
August, 2010.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Your recollection that you have asked for
$104 million, do you have a recollection that the
administration has asked for that or the Department? Is that
all you need? Is $104 million--inasmuch as the gentlelady from
New York showed a gap in the amount of money that the
administration asked for and the Congress?
Mr. Sammon. I would have to double-check. I know that what
I was referring to was a request I had in on Friday to what we
had requested for air cargo, and it was $104 million. I will
double-check on where that has gone from that standpoint.
Ms. Jackson Lee. You had mentioned sometime that you were
going to increase the number of transportation security
inspectors solely for air cargo screening in the upcoming
months. How many inspectors do you have? What kind of training
do they have or are engaged in and what are their
responsibilities?
Mr. Sammon. The air cargo inspectors--we have, I believe,
about 430 on board. We were going to hire 150. I think we have
hired 130 of the 150. We still have another 20 to hire.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Is that added to the 400 or a total of
400?
Mr. Sammon. Originally, we were at 300; and we added--we
are adding 150 more.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So it is 450?
Mr. Sammon. Yes, that is correct.
Ms. Jackson Lee. You are up to 100 and what?
Mr. Sammon. We are up to 430. So we expect to be at 450 by
the end of the year.
Ms. Jackson Lee. What is your goal for air cargo
inspectors?
Mr. Sammon. Right now, we are going to go 450 and see over
the next several months how that works by looking at 100
percent actual inspection. On certain high-volume locations, we
think that those inspector resources may be sufficient. We may
come back to you and say we need additional inspector
resources. We may come back and say we need additional canines.
One thing we are doing, of the 170 canines, we split them
into two groups. One is the traditional supply to the airport.
The other half--the other 85 are proprietary canine teams that
we can take anywhere in--we can take them to freight forwarder
facilitators, and we think we can get a lot more productivity
out of those canines than the ones just at the airport.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So the $104 million, is that going to
cover these additional inspectors?
Mr. Sammon. Yes, ma'am, and the canines.
Ms. Jackson Lee. You mentioned the word ``third-party''
validators. Who are you utilizing in the third-party
validators?
Mr. Sammon. We have not chosen any third-party validators
yet. That program is finalizing in the fall. Again, the third-
party validators are not a necessary component of the first
stage to get to 50 percent.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So you don't believe you need those to get
to 50 percent. Are you using in-house?
Mr. Sammon. We will use our own inspectors, yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Tuttle, you have mentioned a program
that deals with the air cargo explosive detection pilot program
and its use of canines and technology to screen both cargo for
explosive and stowaways. Has S&T or TSA conducted additional
tests on the effectiveness of canines as a detection method?
And let me have a post-script to that question. I am
concerned that we may be closing our eyes to the technology
proposed by small and minority and women-owned businesses, and
I would like to have in writing what your particular effort is
in assessing technologies presented by less than
multinationals.
In particular, we understand that a review was given or
rejected of freight scan, a technology by a small company; and
I would like to know the process that was gone through to
assess the viability or whatever the present status is.
My inquiry is based upon the fact--what chance does
efficient, effective technologies that come through smaller
companies have in participating in this program?
Mr. Tuttle. Well, actually, we get more of our innovative
ideas from smaller companies, to tell you the truth. I see a
lot of the bigger companies are already set on their solution,
and they are just trying to validate it through some of our
testing. We might do a transportation lab. So I do not know if
we really did reject that, if S&T did; and if we did, I will
get an answer back of why for that.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I would appreciate it if you would review
that for me and provide a response back.
But can you answer me about your additional tests on the
effectiveness of canines as a detection method?
Mr. Tuttle. Yes, we had three different pilots conducted.
One of them was San Francisco. The one that was focused on
canines was at Seattle-Tacoma; and, actually, the canines were
relatively effective as being used as an explosive detection.
The major focus of that effort was actually stowaways, but they
were pretty effective for explosive detection.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Okay. Do you feel that you have the
technology--are you keeping up or is the technology keeping up
with the pace and requirements of the 9/11 Act? Do you feel
that we will have a broad enough technology, a span of
technology that will meet the goals of 50 percent screening and
then 100 percent screening? Are you keeping pace with that?
Mr. Tuttle. Well, we are improving the technologies,
whether it be handheld trace detectors, whether it be training
aids that we give to TSA to train their canines, whether it be
screening tests, those type of things.
But, basically, what that means is you have to break the
pallet down if you are going to do it at the airport or you can
do it in parcel size before it gets built up. The major problem
with this technology is, if you want to do everything at the
airport, you are going to have to break it up. There is a
number of different technologies, in fact, one in which we
tested in your district down in Houston, that shows promise.
But we have a long way to go on that.
I understand this was done 5 years ago. You think, gee, you
send a man to the moon in 7 years. Why can't we? But a lot of
money hasn't been focused on looking at a whole palletized
solution.
Ms. Jackson Lee. The only thing I can say, Mr. Tuttle, is
we better get busy. Maybe we are not focusing because we think
it will go away. Obviously, you are involved in technology. I
imagine you are straightforward and certainly want to find the
vast amount of technology. But the word should go out that
there is a seriousness here, and we better find the technology
and look at a number of opportunities to look at other examples
like Israel and other places to get creative.
Let me just conclude by asking Ms. Berrick her assessment
of in your review of what you have heard that would give you
confidence that they will meet the 50 percent deadline and 100
percent deadline, since you have been reviewing, you have been
critiquing and you have been assessing some of the pilot work
that TSA has done.
Ms. Berrick. I would say the elements have all been thought
through and are there. But, again, what we haven't seen are
specifically how it will be implemented. The devil is in the
details. There is a lot of details associated with these
different items that we have been talking about today.
We haven't seen the level of specifics that we would
anticipate seeing for something that is moving forward into a
pilot phase of this magnitude. So I would say I think that is
the first key point, a plan with specifics and time frames.
The other two key areas, one is inspections. Of the 450
inspectors dedicated to cargo, some of those inspection
resources are also dedicated to other TSA activities. So it is
important that TSA determine what their needs are going to be,
resource needs will be for inspections.
I think the other key issue which you have talked about as
well, which is technology, a lot of these technology pilots we
have been reporting for 5 years are in process, but we haven't
seen a whole lot of progress, with the exception of the
completion of this recent pilot.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Specific and defined staff people that are
actually doing the air cargo work. Are you concerned about
whether the release of the rule and its impact?
Ms. Berrick. I think it is important that TSA, as they have
been doing, reach out to the cargo industry and make sure they
fully consider the input that they are getting before moving
forward with the rule. So I think stakeholder outreach is
extremely key in making sure the rule is successful.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank you.
Mr. Lungren.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
I very much enjoy being back in Congress and being back
with my friend, Mr. Markey, who always enlightens me. We seem
to run on parallel tracks. He has an Achilles repaired, I have
a hip replaced. He breaks his wrist, and I fall off my bike
last week and injure my wrist. So I guess I will affectionately
call my friend, Mr. Markey, lefty over there from now on, since
he can use his left hand and not his right hand.
Mr. Markey. But he went to Notre Dame, and I went to Boston
College. He is a Republican, and I am a Democrat. So----
Mr. Lungren. That is true. Just to show you, on that same
line, the gentleman from Massachusetts said to Mr. Sammon, you
have had 7\1/2\ years to do this. That is a long time. Let me
just put it another way. It has been 7\1/2\ years since we had
that attack. Is that not true?
Mr. Sammon. That is true.
Mr. Lungren. Have we had an attack on another airliner in
the United States since then?
Mr. Sammon. No, sir.
Mr. Lungren. Is that by accident?
Mr. Sammon. No.
Mr. Lungren. Has a lot of work gone into that?
Mr. Sammon. There was a lot of work, starting with
intelligence and border security in terms of who comes, who
flies, who doesn't fly, the kinds of people allowed to travel
around the country.
In terms of the layers, well, we think that the 100 percent
screening and actual screening is a good idea. We think that
cargo has been--is more difficult than dropping a bag for a
specific airline off and that lots of work has been going in
from the Department and from TSA to ensure and protect this
country. So there has been lots of work and resources.
Mr. Lungren. Correct me if I am wrong, but I have one of
the air forwarders in my district. I went and visited them
about a year ago to find out how they work. I presume they are
like a lot of other air forwarders, that a lot of the cargo
they get, even though it is given to them as air forwarding, it
never gets on an airplane.
Mr. Sammon. The chance--and if you look at the time-
sensitive business and if you looked at people presenting
business to air forwarders, you have many more times a chance
it will end up going over the road, a time-definite market.
Mr. Lungren. They instructed me that if someone
specifically asks that their piece of cargo, whether it is a
small piece or pallet or whatever, go on a particular passenger
airline, it is not accepted. Is that the practice in the
industry?
Mr. Sammon. It has to be 100 percent screened. It will be--
if it is from a known--if they know who it is coming from. But
if they want to be flight-specific, it has to be screened
today. So you can't walk up and say I would--if you go to an
airport and drop off a package for a specific flight, they--it
has to be screened. Otherwise, it won't be accepted.
Mr. Lungren. And to go on a passenger airliner, does it
have to be one of the secured companies?
Mr. Sammon. It has to come from what is a known shipper. So
you have a known business relationship, yes.
Mr. Lungren. If it is a non-known shipper, can it go on a
passenger----
Mr. Sammon. No, it cannot. A number of the passenger
companies also have all-cargo divisions. So you may ship
something and think, well, it is going to go to this
destination. I will give it to--hopefully, it will go on this
carrier. They may end up on their own cargo plane, as opposed
to a passenger plane.
Mr. Lungren. I was just wondering about that. Because it
seems to me that is part of the layered approach to defending
against a terrorist attack, is it not?
Mr. Sammon. Yes, it is. You have shipping, cargo, you have
less control over what is going to happen to it than you do,
say, dropping a bag off at the airport.
Mr. Lungren. As a matter of fact, when I went and I talked
with them, they showed me how, if they receive a piece of cargo
or--they don't physically. The people that are doing it are
sitting at a desk at a computer terminal. They know where it is
supposed to go, and they go and look up in their computer
system with logarithms to figure out in terms of price, in
terms of when it has to reach there and so forth. It can be on
rail, it can be on truck, it can be on airplane, and it might
be a different one on a different particular day, depending on
the circumstances; is that correct?
Mr. Sammon. Yes, sir. A day, a week makes a big difference
in terms of the availability of capacity and delivery dates.
You may have--over a weekend, you have 3 or 4 days to make up
for a Monday delivery. Say if you are shipping on Thursday, it
may not have to go on an airplane for a Monday delivery.
Mr. Lungren. The reason I am asking this is I was being
briefed by the folks in my district who happen to have their
headquarters there the way they operate, and I wanted to know
from your perspective did that appear to be the way the
industry operates as opposed to just the way this particular
air forwarder operates?
Mr. Sammon. That is typical of the industry. I mean, an air
forwarder handles all kinds of freight. Their purpose is, if
you are a shipper or manufacturer, they can provide you with
multiple modes of transportation, provide you with the best
combination of price and service that meets your logistical
needs. That is the niche they provide, and that is what
business they are in.
Mr. Lungren. I just happen to think that is an example of
where their interest in the way they operate happens to
dovetail with our interest in protecting against a
vulnerability in the cargo arena that could otherwise be looked
at as a vulnerability by a terrorist or someone who would want
to have an explosive device on a passenger airliner.
Mr. Sammon. Yes, I agree. Introducing it to a freight
forwarder, you have much less certainty and control over how it
is going to be delivered than dropping a bag at the airport.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, and I yield back the
balance of my time.
Ms. Jackson Lee. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. DeFazio is recognized for 5 minutes in the second
round.
Mr. DeFazio. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
I guess I want to return to the overseas screening issues.
I don't remember the specific wording of the provision, but our
mandate did not extend to cargo carried on American-owned or
operated aircraft returning to the United States?
Mr. Sammon. No.
Mr. DeFazio. It was just domestic?
Mr. Sammon. It is cargo being shipped from the United
States domestically or international.
Mr. DeFazio. Okay. So we didn't mandate that.
Mr. Sammon. No.
Mr. DeFazio. But if one were to look at this objectively,
wouldn't we think there might be as high or perhaps, in my
opinion, a higher threat with cargo that originates overseas?
Mr. Sammon. I wouldn't disagree with you, sir.
What we want to do is make sure from a practical standpoint
that we have this program here nailed down, working so we can
work with those other governments to have the same kinds of
requirements in place over there so that we have the same kind
of inbound. Yes, sir. But we need to have the program working
here first. It is kind of hard to suggest they should do
something that we don't have up and running yet.
Mr. DeFazio. No. But what percentage are you requiring to
be screened now? Is that a public number?
Mr. Sammon. I cannot reveal that now.
Mr. DeFazio. But it is--so we are requiring a percentage
overseas to be physically screened?
Mr. Sammon. It depends. Different countries have different
what are called model security programs. We accept their
security program or not, and there are various aspects of it in
terms of how they treat that cargo. That is how that works.
Mr. DeFazio. Right. Well, I have a high level of concern
about overseas since, you know, I think it was 2 years ago this
summer we had the very well-developed plot for onboard
explosives in Great Britain.
Mr. Sammon. Yes.
Mr. DeFazio. We certainly had Pan Am 103, which was checked
baggage with a barometric device that was set to go off the
second time the plane reached altitude, having flown on a
smaller plane from Crete to Frankfurt and then loaded onto the
larger plane. So we know those devices have been made, can be
made. I think that, you know--I guess I really feel that the
overseas area is a high-risk area, given recent activities.
Okay. Mr. Markey has just shown me an air cargo--shall
establish 100 percent of cargo transport and passenger by an
air carrier or foreign air carrier in air transportation or
intrastate air transportation. It says, in air transportation
or intrastate. I don't see that there is a provision that
restricts that to domestic.
Mr. Sammon. Well, our interpretation is that you asked for
it to be commensurate with the baggage security, which takes us
back to ATSA, which takes us back to originating shipments in
the United States. That is our interpretation.
Mr. DeFazio. Right. I guess I was not aware of that
recollection, and I wouldn't necessarily agree with that
interpretation. I think that is something that we are going to
need to revisit in our specifics.
Again, I believe there is a higher threat level overseas,
and I am not saying--to say, well, after we get our act
together over here with a lower threat level, then we will
begin to work with foreign partners, which can take years to
implement some measures over there. Ms. Berrick, have you
looked at this particular issue overseas?
Ms. Berrick. We have, and we understand TSA's
interpretation of the law. This is one area that we are going
to be looking into, the interpretation, compare that to the
requirements of the 9/11 Act as a part of work we are doing for
this committee that we are getting ready to kick off.
In terms of security for cargo coming into the United
States, we have also reported that we think there is
vulnerabilities associated with that. Although we can't give a
specific percentage, a small percentage of cargo we can say
publicly coming into the United States is screened.
Also, there is a set of exemptions of cargo that does not
have to be screened that is coming into the United States. And
although TSA reassessed exemptions for domestic cargo, they
haven't yet done that for cargo coming into the United States.
So we think that more can be done to strengthen security in
that area.
Mr. DeFazio. What about that, Mr. Sammon? Why haven't you
reassessed--if you have reassessed where there is a lower
threat level in the United States and restricted, why would you
maintain those exemptions overseas and not reassess?
Mr. Sammon. We are looking at those continuously. Again,
one--if you look at the liquids ban, we were able to convince a
number of the European countries that they should institute the
same ban because of our leadership in terms of the knowledge of
the threat. So if you have something in place that we know is--
works, that is superior, we can convince other people to do
things. I think until we are there, it is a hard--you are
pushing uphill a bit. We are looking continuously at the
international programs and where they stand, what exemptions
are proper or not.
Mr. DeFazio. Well, I am afraid that reminds me of your
ultimate parent agency; and I was intimately involved in
creating the TSA. But, you know, for many years, 22 years, I
have served on the Aviation Committee for many years. We would
always refer to the tombstone mentality at the FAA, which was,
unfortunately, after the fact. I think in this area in terms of
what I, you know, personally would think are the threats
overseas that are known, we should exert a little more
preemptive leadership in this area. I would hope to minimally
review that list and secondarily to begin to press for, you
know, a higher percentage of screening overseas and then,
third, to move toward 100 percent overseas as quickly as
practical.
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Ms. Jackson Lee. The gentleman's time has expired. I thank
the distinguished gentleman.
I would be happy to yield to the distinguished gentlelady
from New York. If she would yield to me for just a moment, as
Mr. DeFazio's probative questions--Mr. DeFazio, if I might,
either we need to receive a clarification as GAO is reviewing
this interpretation of the law from your perspective, and I
would ask that that be accelerated, particularly that narrow
point of the inspection of foreign cargo. I think many Members
of Congress believe that that was included in the mandate. If
it is not included in the mandate, I think it is important for
this committee to consider an immediate or at least forthcoming
legislative fix that will help clarify it for the Department of
Homeland Security.
I think that if you--in essence, we are starting our
inspection midway down the trunk, and so we don't catch it at
the top. The interpretation would seem quite contrary to, I
think, the intentions of the Congress. I will look forward to
this committee getting that determination, and I would ask Mr.
Sammon to clarify or to give us the genesis of his
interpretation as well.
I thank the gentlelady for yielding. I yield to the
gentlelady for her 5 minutes.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman.
Ms. Berrick, I wanted to ask, in the past, this committee
has had concerns about the known shipper program and the lack
of standards that exist before a company is given this
designation. Have the vulnerabilities regarding known shipper
been addressed by TSA?
Ms. Berrick. That is an area we are going to be looking at.
I know that TSA in the past 2 years have taken action to
strengthen the known shipper program. They issued a rule that
requires a database to maintain known shippers. They have
better visibility over who the known shippers are. We will
continue to look at that.
If I could make one point about TSA's coordination with
international partners, it has been very positive in a number
of regards related to trying to harmonize security requirements
with other countries. That is a very difficult thing to do; and
TSA has made progress along those areas, which we think is very
positive.
Ms. Clarke. So, given the progress that you have observed,
is the timetable for synchronization one that you think will be
in the immediate future, foreseeable future?
Ms. Berrick. They already have made some concrete progress.
For example, they will allow--TSA will allow carriers to apply
to TSA to amend their security programs to account for security
measures they are already doing in their host country. That is
a very, very positive step because----
Ms. Clarke. Do you see that being a standard protocol going
forward?
Ms. Berrick. I think TSA has implemented that as a standard
procedure moving forward.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you very much.
After the attacks of 9/11, Congress, the President and,
quite frankly, the public at large all determined that the role
of screening passengers and securing airports should be the
domain of Government. It should not be overseen by airlines and
other private entities. Mr. Sammon, why is TSA--or why is it
that TSA has now sort of thrust so much of the cost and
responsibility for the very sensitive air security operations
back on the private sector?
Mr. Sammon. Right now, the air screening that is taking
place is taking place in the private sector. TSA does not have
the resources to take or the logistical capability to take
packages inside an airport and run them through TSA screening
facilities without great disruption of the supply chain.
So what we are trying to do is maintain--the reason air
cargo flies--cargo flies in passenger jets is that there are
specific time and economic advantages to it. If we disrupt
those, then the cargo may--can go in either all-cargo airplanes
or by other means. So what we are trying to do is work and
design the security system around the supply chain so we do the
least amount of disturbance to it, yet provide the amount of
security that is necessary for the flying public.
Ms. Clarke. It just seems like sort of a Catch-22. Because
we put so much faith in the private sector that--to sort of be
the security guard, that should there be a breach in that, the
accountability to Government is very low. So, you know, I don't
know how much of that you have given consideration to, but I
think that, while we are concerned about the disruption of
commerce through cargo and the fact that passenger flights are
an efficient way of getting that done, one disruption due to an
oversight in cargo could mean a very significant problem. What
would we then say to the public when they ask ``Where was
Government?''
Mr. Sammon. I think still, in terms of what we are looking
at and the threat streams we are looking at, what our resources
are focused on in terms of the airport, in terms of behavior
detection and a whole series of initiatives, we think that the
appropriate place right now for cargo screening is what we are
recommending in this program.
Ms. Clarke. So each airline has a standard that you believe
is adequate and have full faith in?
Mr. Sammon. Through the certified screening program, the
standards will be clarified and specified. There are currently
screening standards. The screening protocols for the airlines
and their agents will be--are being clarified, known what they
are----
Ms. Clarke. So you are not quite there yet?
Mr. Sammon. Is being rolled out right now, yes, ma'am. We
are right in the middle of doing this.
Ms. Clarke. So you are in the middle. You are not right
there yet?
Mr. Sammon. No, no. As I said, we will be there in August
2010.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman.
Ms. Jackson Lee. The gentlelady's time is expired.
I recognize the gentleman from Boston, Massachusetts, Mr.
Markey, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Markey. I thank the gentlelady, a graduate of Boston
University Law School, for the recognition.
I would just begin by saying that it is really a wonderful
thing that there has been no successful additional attack on
the United States since 9/11. I think that is the one thing
that Mr. Lungren and I do agree upon. That is absolutely
something that we should all really thank goodness for.
But, at the same time, the GAO and the Inspector General
say that cargo is vulnerable, and we have a responsibility to
make sure that we eliminate that vulnerability so that there is
not a repetition, and that is what this hearing is about.
Ms. Berrick, as you referenced in one of your responses, in
April 2007, GAO completed a report on the security of so-called
inbound air cargo. That is cargo that is transported from
overseas into our country. According to TSA, approximately 200
U.S. and foreign air carriers currently transport cargo into
the United States from foreign countries. During 2005, 4
billion--with a B--billion pounds of cargo was transported from
overseas into our country aboard passenger planes.
In your testimony, you stated that TSA, quote, has not yet
finalized its strategy for securing such inbound cargo or
determined how, if at all, inbound cargo will be screened. The
100 percent cargo screening mandate in the 9/11 Commission law
applies to domestic and foreign air carriers. In your opinion,
is TSA on track or meeting the statutory deadline to implement
a system for screening all inbound cargo coming into our
country on foreign carriers?
Ms. Berrick. Related generally to the security of inbound
air cargo, we did report that TSA can make progress in this
area.
You mentioned one key point we made, which was the lack of
a strategy for how they are going to approach this area of
cargo security. TSA has told us they plan to update their air
cargo strategy for both domestic and inbound air cargo.
Another key area we talked about was the need for TSA to
conduct vulnerability assessments of inbound air cargo
security. We are going to be looking, as a part of our work, to
see to what extent the 9/11 mandate applies to cargo coming
into the United States from foreign locations. So we will be
reviewing that in more detail.
We do know the TSA has some plans to increase the
percentage of cargo, the screening of cargo coming into the
United States. So they are taking some steps to strengthen
security in this area, but we think more work needs to be done.
Mr. Markey. Mr. Sammon, do you agree with GAO's assessment
that TSA is falling behind in meeting the law's requirement
that all inbound cargo on passenger planes also be screened?
What are you doing at TSA to ensure that you are going to meet
the statutory deadline for screening all the cargo coming into
our country from overseas?
Mr. Sammon. Again, I would repeat that what we are doing is
focusing on the cargo that originates in the United States. It
is our interpretation of the law and its reference to the
baggage screening requirements, referring to ATSA, that we are
talking about shipments originating in the United States. So
what we are doing is, first of all, focusing on shipments
originating, and then when we have a secure system, a proven
system in place that we can work with the foreign governments--
--
Mr. Markey. Can I read this to you, Mr. Sammon? Because I
would be interested in your interpretation as the author of
this provision. It says here on--and this is at the beginning
of the section on screening of cargo.
It says, air cargo on passenger aircraft, not later than 3
years after the date of enactment of the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, the
Secretary of Homeland Security shall establish a system to
screen 100 percent of cargo transported on passenger aircraft
operated by an air carrier or foreign air carrier in air
transportation or intrastate air transportation to ensure the
security of all such passenger aircraft carrying cargo.
So where in that is there a differentiation made between
foreign and domestic air carrier?
Mr. Sammon. First of all, we do--our program recognizes
outbound cargo as both domestic carriers and foreign carriers.
Second, it is the reference to provide a level of security
commensurate with the level of security for the screening of
passenger checked baggage which refers to a level of security
that we provide under ATSA which is for the outbound shipment
of bags and cargo.
Mr. Markey. I don't know what you're--this system applies
to foreign air carriers.
Mr. Sammon. We apply--our system also applies to foreign
air carriers. What we are talking about with this program
applies not only to domestic carriers but foreign carriers. But
it is the shipments that originate in the United States that we
can screen.
Mr. Markey. Back to you, Ms. Berrick. What do you think
about this interpretation and what vulnerability does it
create?
Ms. Berrick. The interpretation is an area that we feel we
need to look at as a part of our work, but we have not yet
completed that effort yet. But we will, and we will speed that
up at the request of the committee.
Mr. Markey. If Mr. Sammon's interpretation is correct, does
that create problems at the other end in terms of the security
of the screening for cargo on passenger planes?
Ms. Berrick. Yes. We have made recommendations in saying
security for inbound air cargo can be improved in a number of
areas. Again, TSA is taking some action to strengthen security
in that area, but we think more can be done.
Mr. Markey. Yeah. Well, again, I disagree with you, Mr.
Sammon, on your interpretation; and I would hope that you would
work toward closing the gap and doing so quickly because I
think it leaves an aperture that could be exploited.
Mr. Sammon. Our intent is to address the international
inbound--and I think we should probably respond with a written
legal opinion back to the committee that would address where we
are coming from.
Mr. Markey. That would be very helpful. Thank you.
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman's
time has expired.
There being no further questions for our first panel, I
want to thank the witnesses for appearing before the
subcommittee today for this very important hearing.
To the witnesses of which I have asked for answers, Ms.
Berrick, Mr. Tuttle, with respect to the technology and the
analysis of the opportunities for small women-owned and
minority-owned businesses, I appreciate direct and expeditious
answers.
To Mr. Sammon, on a number of issues that we asked,
particularly focusing on your affirmation of meeting the
deadline, the amount of funding that you have asked for--and I
might add that we will seek a clarification through a number of
sources of how we are going to ensure the full inspection of
all cargo. But for those inquiries we have made, we appreciate
a quick response.
The Members of the subcommittee may have additional
questions for you as well. We ask that you respond to them
expeditiously in writing.
You are now dismissed, and we now welcome our second panel
to the witness table. As the clerk is preparing to clear, we
will hold this hearing in recess for votes for Members. But we
appreciate it if the clerk will have the table and witnesses
ready upon our return.
[Recess.]
Ms. Jackson Lee. The meeting is now reconvened.
I welcome our second panel of witnesses. Our first witness
is Captain Paul Onorato, President of the Coalition of Airline
Pilots Association. Captain Onorato is a Southwest Airlines
captain based at Baltimore-Washington International Thurgood
Marshall Airport. He began his career with Southwest Airlines
in May, 1997, and has previously served as CAPA's Vice
President. He has been active in the Southwest Airlines Pilots
Association serving as Chairman of its Governmental Affairs
Office Committee, and has 7 years of experience working on
legislative and regulatory issues of concern to the five member
associations of CAPA and the Southwest Airlines Pilots
Association.
Our second witness is Mr. John M. Meenan, Executive Vice
President and Chief Operating Officer of the Air Transport
Association. Mr. Meenan is responsible for all aspects of ATA
operations, with a particular focus on technical, safety,
security, environmental, economic and legal policy issues
impacting the airlines industry.
Mr. Meenan joined ATA as an Assistant General Counsel in
1985 following 9 years with the United States Secret Service.
He has acted as the industry representative on numerous
Department of Transportation and Federal Aviation
Administration committees and working groups and has been a
frequent member of the U.S. delegations to various
international bodies, including the International Civil
Aviation Organization and the International Labor Organization.
Our third witness is Mr. Brandon Fried who was appointed to
serve as the Executive Director of the Airforwarders
Association in November 2005. Mr. Fried has more than 25 years
of experience in the air freight industry. He started his
career as a sales representative in Los Angeles and then moved
to Washington, DC, where he founded, owned and operated the
Washington office of Atcom Worldwide, a global freight
forwarder specializing in time definite air cargo
transportation.
Our fourth witness is Ms. Cindy Allen, who is testifying
today on behalf of the National Customs Brokers and Forwarders
Association of America. With over 20 years of experience as
both a freight forwarder and customs broker, Ms. Allen chairs
the NCBFAA task force, which is currently focusing on
governmental security programs. She is currently Vice President
of Corporate International Customs and Director of Import and
Export Compliance at Argis Air Express.
Without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be
inserted into the record. I now ask each witness to summarize
his or her statement for 5 minutes, beginning with Captain
Onorato. Captain, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN PAUL ONORATO, PRESIDENT, COALITION OF
AIRLINE PILOTS ASSOCIATIONS
Mr. Onorato. Thank you. Chairman Jackson Lee, Ranking
Member Lungren and Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for
the opportunity to provide testimony before you this afternoon.
I am Captain Paul Onorato, President of the Coalition of
Airline Pilots Association, a trade association of 23,000
passenger and cargo pilots which represents issues of concern
to the Allied Pilots Association of American Airlines, the
Independent Pilots Association of United Parcel Service, the
National Pilots Association of Airtran Airways, the Southwest
Airlines Pilots Association, and the Teamsters Local 1224 of
ABX Air. CAPA commends Chairwoman Jackson Lee and Ranking
Member Lungren for their foresight in holding hearings to
tackle this very tough issue.
Let us begin with some background on CAPA's interest and
extensive involvement in aviation cargo security. For the past
7 years, aviation cargo security has been one of CAPA's highest
priorities and has been addressed in each of CAPA's annual
aviation security report cards. The grades received in the
report card are shared by the industry, Congress and the
administration, and are designed to rate aviation security as
the pilot sees it, from the curb to the cockpit.
CAPA has always held the position that air cargo carried
aboard passenger and cargo aircraft should be physically
inspected as it arrives at the airport commensurate with
checked baggage screening. Cargo security is an unresolved
problem reaching back to the Aviation Transportation Security
Act of November 2001.
Congress clearly wanted all articles placed on commercial
aircraft to be inspected. Passenger baggage security was
quickly addressed through the implementation of the 100 percent
baggage inspection program. Unfortunately, the TSA allowed the
cargo industry to define the scope of cargo inspections and
allowed for all passenger cargo to be screened under the Known
Shipper Program. The Known Shipper Program is a database-driven
program which failed to verify the actual contents of any cargo
box or package being placed on passenger aircraft.
TSA continued to tweak the Known Shipper Program with
additional database enhancements, such as the Freight
Assessment System. These two programs still failed to
physically inspect the contents of the cargo carried aboard
commercial aircraft. CAPA's pilots worked closely with several
Members of Congress to address the air cargo security issue,
notably Congressman Ed Markey and his staff, whose leadership
on this issue has been indispensable.
The result of this collaboration was the recent enactment
of the 9/11 Act, which requires 10 percent screening of
passenger air cargo. This brings us directly to today's issue
of: Is DHS implementing the requirements of the 9/11 law
effectively?
In order to comply with the February 2009 50 percent
screening mandate, TSA is apparently working on three
initiatives: The Certified Cargo Screening Program, the
Indirect Air Carrier Screening Technology Pilot, and the
Narrow-Body Aircraft Screening Amendment. Unfortunately, with
the demise of the Air Cargo Working Group, it is now very
difficult for organizations like CAPA to obtain detailed
information on the progress of these programs.
Airline industry representatives insist that to meet the
August 2010 100 percent screening requirements, it will be
nearly impossible for the typical legacy passenger carrier to
screen all cargo at their in-house cargo build-up facilities.
To that end, TSA is developing the Voluntary Certified Cargo
Screening Program to enable vetted, audited and certified
supply chain facilities to screen cargo earlier in the supply
chain.
Within this program, TSA is extending the right to screen
cargo beyond the air carrier's certified cargo screening
facilities. These facilities could be a third-party entity
certified by the TSA to screen cargo prior to delivery to the
air carrier. CAPA has voiced concerns related to the cargo
screening facility concept and is specifically concerned about
facility security standards, personnel training, regulatory
oversight of the facilities, and the reliability of the chain
of custody between the cargo screening facility and the
transporting aircraft. TSA has commented that tamper-evident
technology will be used.
It is important to highlight the positive advances which
can be made in cargo security when an individual company
decides to commit their talent and resources to solve problems
and mitigate potential security threats. Currently, Southwest
Airlines, my employer, one of CAPA's parent airlines,
voluntarily doubled the mandated TSA screening percentage
system-wide for their narrow-bodied cargo.
Southwest Airlines is physically screening air cargo as it
arrivals at the airport commensurate with baggage screening and
has invested millions of the company's money in the newest
explosives detection technology. They are to be highly
commended for stepping up to enhanced security for the
traveling public ahead of the mandates.
TSA's plan for implementing the air cargo screening
requirement in the 9/11 Act should be consistent with the
screening policies and procedures already in place at carriers
such as Southwest Airlines. As TSA continues its work to
implement the screening requirements for the cargo carried on
passenger planes, I encourage Congress to turn its attention to
the security of freight transported on all cargo carriers, an
issue I know Congressman Markey has raised in the past.
Our volunteer pilots regularly attend national working
groups and continually strive to be honest brokers in all we
do. Since
9/11, CAPA has stood ready and willing to interface with
legislators, regulators and industry to improve our Nation's
aviation security. We appreciate the trust placed in us by
Congress and such organizations as DHS, TSA, FAA and GAO, as
well as our members, airlines and airports. We look forward to
continuing our joint efforts to secure our Nation's air travel.
[The statement of Mr. Onorato follows:]
Prepared Statement of Paul Onorato
July 15, 2008
Chairwoman Jackson Lee, Ranking Member Lungren, Members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to provide testimony before
you this afternoon on ``The Next Step in Aviation Security--Cargo
Security. I am Captain Paul Onorato, President of the Coalition of
Airline Pilots Associations (CAPA).
The Coalition of Airline Pilots Associations, a trade association
of more than 23,000 professional passenger and cargo pilots represents
the legislative and regulatory issues of concern to the Allied Pilots
Association of American Airlines; the Independent Pilots Association of
United Parcel Service; the National Pilots Association of Air Tran
Airways; the Southwest Airlines Pilots Association and the Teamsters
Local 1224 of ABX Air. CAPA commends Chairwoman Jackson Lee and Ranking
Member Lungren for their foresight in holding hearings to tackle this
very tough issue.
Let us begin with some background on CAPA's interest and extensive
involvement in aviation cargo security. For the past 7 years aviation
cargo security has been one of CAPA's highest priorities and has been
addressed in each of CAPA's annual Aviation Security Report Cards. The
``grades'' received in the report card are shared by the industry,
Congress and the administration and are designed to rate aviation
security as the pilot sees it from the ``curb to the cockpit.'' CAPA
has always held the position that Air Cargo carried aboard passenger
and cargo aircraft should be physically inspected as it arrives at the
airport, commensurate with checked baggage screening.
Cargo security is an unresolved problem reaching back to the
Aviation Transportation Security Act (ATSA) of November 2001. Congress
clearly wanted ALL articles placed on a commercial aircraft to be
inspected. Passenger baggage security was quickly addressed through
implementation of the 100 percent baggage inspection program.
Unfortunately, the TSA allowed the cargo industry to define the scope
of cargo inspections and allowed for all passenger cargo to be screened
under the Known Shipper Program. The Known Shipper Program is a data-
based driven program which failed to verify the actual contents of any
cargo box or package being placed on passenger aircraft. TSA continued
to ``tweak'' the Known Shipper Program with additional database
enhancements such as the Freight Assessment System. These two programs
still failed to physically inspect the contents of the cargo loaded
aboard commercial aircraft.
CAPA has participated in the TSA's Air Cargo Working Groups and the
Department of Homeland Security's Aviation Security Advisory
Committee's Air Cargo Working Group. Both the ASAC charter and the
cargo working group's charter were recently terminated. Unfortunately,
there is currently no TSA stakeholder cargo working group available in
which to discuss critical cargo security plans, programs and
developments.
CAPA's pilots worked closely with several Members of Congress to
address the Air Cargo Security issue, notably Congressman Ed Markey and
his staff, whose leadership on this issue has been indispensable. The
result of this collaboration was the recent enactment of Public Law
110-53, ``the 9/11 Act'', which requires the 100 percent screening of
passenger air cargo. This brings us directly to today's issue of ``Is
DHS Implementing the Requirements of the 9/11 Law Effectively?''
In order to comply with the February 2009 50 percent screening
mandate TSA is apparently working on three initiatives: the Certified
Cargo Screening Program; the Indirect Air Carrier Screening Technology
Pilot; and the Narrow Body Aircraft Screening Amendment. Unfortunately,
with the demise of the Air Cargo Working Group it is now very difficult
for organizations like CAPA to obtain detailed information on the
progress of these programs.
Airline industry representatives insist that to meet the August
2010 100 percent screening requirements it will be nearly impossible
for the typical legacy passenger carrier to screen all cargo at their
in-house cargo buildup facilities. To that end, TSA is developing the
voluntary Certified Cargo Screening Program to enable vetted, audited,
and certified supply chain facilities to screen cargo earlier in the
supply chain. Within this program, TSA is extending the right to screen
cargo beyond the air carrier to Certified Cargo Screening Facilities.
These facilities could be a third-party entity certified by the TSA to
screen cargo prior to delivery to the air carrier. CAPA has voiced
several concerns related to the Cargo Screening Facility concept and is
specifically concerned about facility security standards, personnel
training, regulatory oversight of the facilities, and the reliability
of the chain of custody between the Cargo Screening Facility and the
transporting aircraft. TSA has commented that ``tamper evident
technology'' will be used. However, CAPA is currently unaware of any of
the details regarding this technology.
It is important to highlight the positive advances which can be
made in cargo security when an individual company decides to commit
their talent and resources to solve problems and mitigate potential
security threats. Currently, Southwest Airlines, my employer and one of
CAPA's Association's parent passenger airlines, voluntarily doubles the
mandated TSA cargo screening percentages system-wide for their narrow-
body cargo. Narrow-body aircraft account for about 96 percent of total
domestic passenger flights and over 25 percent of total passenger air
cargo by weight. Southwest Airlines is physically screening air cargo
as it arrives at the airport, commensurate with baggage screening, and
has invested millions of the company's money in the newest explosive
detection technology. They are to be highly commended for stepping up
to enhance security for the traveling public ahead of the mandates.
TSA's plan for implementing the air cargo screening requirements in
the 9/11 Act should be consistent with the screening policies and
procedures already in place at carriers such as Southwest Airlines. As
TSA continues its work to implement the screening requirements for
cargo carried on passenger planes, I encourage Congress to turn its
attention to the security of freight transported on all-cargo
carriers--an issue I know Congressman Markey has raised in the past.
None of the current laws or regulatory agencies are addressing the
issue of security within the all-cargo operations. As a Nation we've
been most fortunate our enemies have not exploited the all-cargo
security loopholes such as: nonstandard and frequently minimal
perimeter and ramp security found at many cargo airports and the lack
of flight-deck doors or hardened cockpit doors on all-cargo aircraft.
Congress must monitor the progress of the 9/11 law to ensure the intent
of the law is achieved.
Our volunteer pilot members regularly attend numerous national
working groups and continually strive to be ``honest brokers'' in all
we do. Since 9/11 CAPA has stood ready and willing to interface with
legislators, regulators, industry and other associations to improve our
Nation's aviation security. We appreciate the stakeholder trust placed
in us by Congress and such organizations as DHS, TSA, FAA, and GAO as
well as our member's airlines and airports. We look forward to
continuing our joint efforts to secure our Nation's air travel.
Ms. Jackson Lee. We thank you for your testimony, Captain.
Mr. Meenan, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF JOHN M. MEENAN, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT AND CHIEF
OPERATING OFFICER, AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION
Mr. Meenan. Chairwoman Jackson Lee, thank you very much. On
behalf of our member airlines, please accept our thanks for the
opportunity to appear before the subcommittee today to discuss
both our commitment to meeting the screening requirements of
the 9/11 Commission Act and to outline a few concerns which we
believe must be addressed quickly.
First, as to our commitment, our members are well along in
developing their individual compliance plans to meet the
February 2009 deadline for screening 50 percent of all cargo
shipments on passenger aircraft. These plans vary from carrier
to carrier, depending on the nature and scope of their
particular cargo operation. They involve things like equipment
acquisition, development of appropriate procedures, in some
cases contractual arrangements with other cargo handling
partners, and, to a limited extent, they may also involve the
termination of cargo services at certain locations where
business benefits do not outweigh the security expenses.
These compliance plans, however, are dependent on key
assumptions about equipment and processes which we are awaiting
the Transportation Security Administration approval for. For
example, TSA needs to provide a qualified products list
specifying exactly what equipment is approved for TSA
screening. We are also expecting clear and detailed guidance on
the use of X-ray equipment to screen shipper-built cargo skids.
Even more importantly, we are awaiting approval for a batch
explosives trace protection processing procedure.
These approvals we have been assured are in process, but at
this point we have been waiting for them for some time and we
are becoming increasingly concerned that if we don't see them
soon, it is going to make meeting those deadlines and
commitments very difficult.
It bears noting that because of the intense focus on
baggage and passenger screening, budgetary limitations and
other Office of Science and Technology priorities, the
Department of Homeland Security research and development of
cargo equipment has been, in our view, lacking. To date, with
the exception of canine screening, we have no certified method
to effectively and efficiently screen air cargo. We would urge
this subcommittee to focus its attention and to try to focus
OST's attention on doing more in that area very quickly.
Another area of extremely serious concern relates to TSA's
announced plans to require 100 percent screening of cargo
aboard narrow-body aircraft by October 2008 as opposed to the
50 percent screening requirement established by law in 2009.
Rather than mandating yet another unnecessary program which
would pose significant new challenges to the industry, we
believe that the 50 percent 9/11 Act compliance date is the
appropriate date to shoot for, and while we would agree that
certainly carriers should have the option of going with the 100
percent narrow-body screening the TSA is interested in, that
should not be a mandate imposed on everyone.
Looking out further to the legislatively mandated 100-
percent-screening deadline in August 2010, we know to a
certainty that success is dependent upon TSA's full
implementation of a robust certified cargo screening program.
Under the program, large volume shippers and freight
forwarders would be certified, as you have heard, to screen
cargo which would then be transported directly to the airlines.
We believe that this program could significantly advance
compliance with the coming February 2009 deadline, and it is
essential to meeting the 2010 full screening deadline. We are,
however, concerned that the pace of the program again is
lagging.
Finally, I would be remiss in not bringing to the
subcommittee's attention the devastated economic condition that
the airline industry finds itself in. As a direct result of the
current fuel price situation, we are seeing substantial
reductions in the size of the industry. Roughly 100 communities
have already been advised that they will no longer have
scheduled air service, close to 30,000 jobs have been
eliminated, and hundreds of aircraft are parked or being
parked. Going forward, unless fuel prices moderate, things will
get worse.
While not directly relevant to today's discussion, we are
actively pursuing measures to address the unhealthy oil
speculation, while also focusing on supply and demand issues
for fuel. We would ask that the subcommittee work with us going
forward to assure that the Government plays its full and proper
role in providing aviation security and that we all understand
the limits under which industry revenues and resources can be
applied.
Thank you, and I would be happy to respond to questions.
[The statement of Mr. Meenan follows:]
Statement of John M. Meenan
July 15, 2008
On behalf of our member airlines, please accept our thanks for the
opportunity to appear before the subcommittee today to discuss both our
commitment to meeting the cargo screening requirements of the
``Implementing Recommendations of the
9/11 Commission Act of 2007'' and to outline a few concerns, which must
be addressed quickly in order to facilitate our meeting that
commitment.
First, as to our commitment, our member airlines are well along in
developing their individual compliance plans, enabling them to meet the
February 2009 deadline for screening 50 percent of all cargo shipments
aboard passenger aircraft. These plans vary from carrier to carrier
depending on the nature and scope of each particular cargo operation.
These plans involve equipment acquisition, development of appropriate
procedures and, in some cases, contractual arrangements with cargo
handling partners. To a limited extent, they may also involve a
termination of cargo services at certain locations where the business
benefits do not outweigh the security expenses.
These compliance plans are, however, dependent on key assumptions
about equipment and processes for which we are awaiting Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) approvals. For example, we need the TSA
to provide a ``Qualified Products List'' specifying exactly what
equipment--already purchased or currently available for purchase--is
approved by the TSA for screening cargo. Because there is no certified
technology to efficiently screen cargo, airlines remain hesitant to
purchase technology absent a qualified list and the specific
operational protocols, which help determine the number of units
necessary. We are also expecting clear and detailed guidance on the use
of X-ray equipment to screen shipper-built cargo skids. Even more
importantly, we are awaiting approval of ``batch'' Explosive Trace
Detection Screening procedures. These approvals, we have been assured,
are ``in process'' and just about to be provided. This promise, while
welcome, has been outstanding for some time and we are increasingly
concerned that we do not yet have final, actionable commitments from
the TSA. Obviously, as we move closer to the February compliance date,
our ability to expeditiously implement any unanticipated TSA
initiatives becomes more problematic.
It bears noting that because of the intense focus on baggage and
passenger screening, budgetary limitations and ``other'' Office of
Science and Technology priorities at the Department of Homeland
Security, research and development of cargo screening technology has
been a low priority. To date, with the exception of canine screening,
we have no certified method to effectively and efficiently screen
cargo. We would urge that the subcommittee focus on advancing this as a
much higher priority issue. Perhaps consideration should be given to
the creation of a TSA grant program to serve as an incentive for
manufacturers to develop cargo screening technology.
Another area of extremely serious concern relates to TSA's
announced plan to require 100 percent screening of cargo aboard narrow-
body passenger aircraft by October 2008, as opposed to 50 percent of
cargo aboard all passenger flights as required by law. Rather than
mandating yet another new and unnecessary program, which would pose
significant operational challenges to airlines operating mixed wide-
and narrow-body fleets, we have indicated repeatedly that airlines must
be allowed to comply with the 9/11 Act's 50 percent mandate established
by Congress. With TSA approval of the technology and procedures that we
are currently anticipating--which, as noted previously, we need as soon
as possible--our airlines are preparing to meet the requirements of the
law. They should not be expected to significantly exceed those
requirements. One hundred percent narrow-body cargo screening certainly
has a role as a compliance option, but there is no reason for yet
another unnecessary mandate. As a practical matter, this initiative
would force mixed-fleet operators to create a bifurcated cargo
acceptance and screening processes that would pose significant
operational challenges and inefficiencies.
Looking out further to the legislatively mandated 100 percent cargo
screening deadline of August 2010, we know to a certainty that success
is dependent on TSA's full implementation of a robust Certified Cargo
Screening Program (CCSP). Under this program, large-volume shippers and
freight forwarders would be certified to screen cargo, which would then
be transported directly to the airline. In view of the fact that
approximately 80 percent of air cargo is shipped by just 20 percent of
our cargo customers, there is clearly great value in this type of
screening program, which has been demonstrated to be effective in other
countries. We believe that this program could significantly advance
compliance with the coming February 2009 deadline and that it is
essential to meeting the August 2010 full-screening deadline. We are,
however, concerned with the pace of program development and would
encourage the subcommittee to favorably consider any request that TSA
might put forward to significantly accelerate this initiative.
Finally, I would be remiss in not bringing the subcommittee's
attention to the devastated economic condition of the airline industry.
As a direct result of the current fuel price situation, we are seeing a
substantial reduction in the size of the industry. Roughly 100
communities have already been advised that they will no longer have
scheduled air service, close to 30,000 jobs have been eliminated and
hundreds of aircraft are being removed from service. Going forward,
unless fuel prices moderate, things will get worse. While not relevant
to today's discussion, we are actively pursuing measures to address
unhealthy oil speculation while also managing supply and demand issues.
We would ask that the subcommittee work with us going forward to assure
that the Government plays its proper role in providing aviation
security and that we all understand the limits of industry resources.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, Mr. Meenan, for your testimony.
Mr. Fried, you are recognized for 5 minutes for your
testimony.
STATEMENT OF BRANDON FRIED, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, AIRFORWARDERS
ASSOCIATION
Mr. Fried. Chairman Jackson Lee, Ranking Member Lungren,
Members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
appear today to discuss the challenges the air forwarding
industry faces in complying with the air cargo screening
mandates of the 9/11 law. I ask that my full statement be
entered into the record.
My name is Brandon Fried, and I am the Executive Director
of the Airforwarders Association. The forwarding industry is
committed to security and looks forward to continued dialog
with this committee and TSA. Today I wanted to discuss one of
the tools to ensure all cargo is screened, the Certified Cargo
Screening Program, or CCSP.
Products such as automobiles, assembly line parts, high-
tech electronics, pharmaceuticals and vital consumer goods are
transported in the cargo holds of passenger planes on virtually
every flight. In some cases our members help save lives by
assisting medical companies and hospitals ship urgently needed
heart valves, blood samples and human organs across the country
to waiting doctors and patients.
Because just-in-time air cargo is critical to so many
segments of the American economy, we believe in solutions that
provide for both the physical security as well as the economic
security of our Nation.
I want to thank the committee for its work in defining
screening through a variety of methods. There is no one
solution to air cargo security, and many tools are required to
handle the variance in size, type and contents of cargo moving
daily throughout our Nation and around the globe.
The Airforwarders Association strongly transports the CCSP.
The program is a key part of the risk-based, multi-layered
approach to air cargo security this association has always
endorsed. It balances the need for increased security while
also meeting the needs of the shipping public.
The Airforwarders Association has several members
participating in the CCSP pilot program. We applaud TSA for
working with industry closely to create a model program that
will actually work in the forwarding environment.
While these members are seeing progress with certification
and implementation, concerns remain. An initial list of
technology provided by TSA is now available. However,
purchasing equipment has been delayed due to the lack of final
approval. Also the amount and timing of reimbursement funding
promised to participants continues to change. It is imperative
that the pilot program is successful and executed following the
good faith agreements already existing in order to continue
expansion of the program.
Another concern is that much of the technology certified
currently is geared toward passenger baggage applications, with
no certified equipment to screen pallets and consolidations.
Forwarders move pallets that contain up to 300 different
packages. While we have been told the methodology or the
technology exists according to vendors, TSA Science and
Technology has not certified the equipment, and we urge them to
move forward on these devices.
Also, there is no mechanism to protect forwarders'
investments if that equipment is later found to be
unsatisfactory by TSA. Given the costs involved, many of our
members have decided that this is an impediment to
participation. We urge TSA to work with forwarders to ease
concerns on this issue.
We should not lose sight of the fact that progress is being
made on a daily basis by TSA. Initial facility audits have
begun, as have initial certification inspections at some
members' facilities. Forwarders are submitting security plans,
and there is a great deal of dialog with the participants on
the ground. Some participants in the pilot program believe they
will be able to meet the screening goals by the fall of 2008.
That said, the Airforwarders Association is troubled by the
potential impact of treating CCSP as an unfunded mandate for
all forwarders not participating in the pilot.
If there is not ample participation further down the supply
chain, we face a very real threat to both economic and airport
security. Airports do not have the real estate to screen all
cargo with existing resources, and airlines do not have the
financial or human resources to efficiently expedite screening
of all just-in-time cargo at the airport.
Forwarders participating in the CCSP must purchase
technology costing from $150,000 to $500,000 per facility per
machine, a price tag that cannot be met by many forwarders. As
a result, they will face delays at the airports, causing them
to miss flights and lose revenue, and this lost revenue in the
current economic environment could push forwarders out of
business. The consolidation of the market is bad for
forwarders, manufacturers, and the American consumer.
A survey of our membership has shown that our concerns are
well-founded. Of the 60 percent of surveyed members who have
less than 10 offices, nearly all stated that without funds they
would choose not to participate. The remaining members surveyed
indicated that only a few offices would be outfitted with
equipment. We urge Congress to provide funding to ensure that
the jobs of hundreds of thousands of workers in the air freight
industry are not lost and the American economy does not face
serious harm to the delays in good and products being
delivered.
The Airforwarders Association supports grants to fund CCSP,
as well as additional funding, a reallocation of TSA's budget,
to provide funding for equipment and personnel devoted to cargo
screening.
In conclusion, we believe that a great deal of progress has
been made. Our shared goal of creating a safe and efficient air
cargo regime can be achieved, provided Congress fulfills its
commitment to homeland security by fully funding these
programs.
Thank you for hearing my testimony today. I look forward to
any questions you may have.
[The statement of Mr. Fried follows:]
Prepared Statement of Brandon Fried
July 15, 2008
introduction
Chairman Jackson-Lee, Ranking Member Lungren and Members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before the House
Committee on Homeland Security to discuss the development,
implementation and challenges the forwarding industry faces in
complying with the air cargo screening mandates of the 9/11 law. I ask
that my full statement be entered into the record.
Today, I want to discuss one of the tools developed by TSA to
ensure all cargo is screened by August 2010--the Certified Cargo
Screener Program, or CCSP. As the executive director of the
Airforwarders Association, I assure you that the forwarding industry is
committed to safety and looks forward to continued dialog with this
committee and TSA to ensure this program is implemented in a timely
fashion and provides a maximum degree of security with a minimum amount
of supply chain disruption.
The Airforwarders Association strongly supports The Certified Cargo
Screener Program. The task of screening all the cargo that boards
passenger planes is an immense challenge, and spreading security
responsibilities throughout the supply chain is an effective way of
engaging all industry to achieve safety for the traveling public. That
said, the cost of participating in this unfunded, voluntary program for
forwarders is cost-prohibitive for nearly half of the forwarding
industry based on our best approximation. With equipment costs that
range from $150,000 to $500,000 per facility, we anticipate seeing more
members opting not to participate in the program due to cost or
business models that do not utilize facilities at gateway cities. If
this happens it will put enormous pressure on the airlines and airports
to screen potentially as much as 40 percent of the cargo put on
passenger planes in the United States. Not only does this create a
bottleneck that is extremely detrimental to our economy and ability to
export goods, it also risks a new security concern due to the sheer
amount of cargo awaiting inspection in airport cargo facilities.
I urge Congress to provide funding for CCSP, particularly for the
benefit of small to mid-sized forwarders, in future appropriations
bills. Additionally, I urge TSA to fulfill its commitment to the
current participants in the pilot program by completing the list of
approved technology and the other critical needs of the program in a
timely fashion.
background
My name is Brandon Fried and I am the executive director of the
Airforwarders Association. It is a pleasure to address this
distinguished panel today on the important issue of air cargo security.
I was appointed to serve as the Executive Director of the
Airforwarders Association in November 2005 and have over 25 years as a
forwarder myself. In my position as Executive Director, I represent the
Association on all security matters and currently serve on the Aviation
Security Advisory Committee (ASAC) working group in counsel to the
Transportation Security Administration.
The Airforwarders Association is an alliance of Indirect Air
Carriers, Cargo Airlines, and affiliated businesses located throughout
the United States that play a vital role in ensuring the continuous
movement of global commerce. There are over 4,000 registered indirect
air carriers who are responsible for the planning, oversight and
transporting of companies' goods and products--anything from flowers
and seafood to pallets of humanitarian supplies. The parameters of this
job include steps such as pick-up of goods, customs clearance,
transportation, warehousing, regulatory compliance and delivery, we
work from one end of the supply chain to the other.
discussion
Many of you on the panel today may ask, ``Who uses airfreight that
flies on passenger planes?'' The answer is, ``All of us do!'' In
addition to medical companies and hospitals shipping urgently needed
heart valves, blood samples and human organs across the country within
hours, those firms depending upon ``just in time'' inventory strategies
do as well. These include companies such as Hewlett Packard, Boeing,
General Electric, 3M and IBM.
Products such as automobile assembly line parts, high-tech
electronics, pharmaceuticals and vital consumer goods are transported
in the cargo holds of passenger planes on virtually every flight.
During the cold winter, our families enjoy fresh vegetables flown from
the warm west coast and South America on passenger flights. As we
speak, thousands of pounds of seafood are in flight to be served
tonight in restaurants in places like Albuquerque, Minneapolis, Omaha
and St. Louis. In some cases our members help save lives by assisting
medical companies and hospitals ship urgently needed heart valves,
blood samples and human organs across the country to waiting doctors
and patients.
Because air cargo is critical to so many segments of the American
economy, we believe in formulating solutions that provide for both the
physical security of the public as well as the economic security of our
Nation. The Airforwarders Association has been and remains a vocal
advocate for continuing the risk-based, multi-layered approach to air
cargo security that has protected our Nation's planes and protected our
Nation's economy as it enables the critical and efficient flow of
commerce. I applaud the committee for its work in crafting the
``Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendation Act of 2007'' to
focus on screening air cargo through a variety of methods. There is no
one solution to air cargo security and a variety of tools, as approved
in the legislation and certified by TSA, is absolutely critical to
handle the variance in size, type, and contents of cargo moving daily
throughout our Nation and around the globe.
Certified Cargo Screener Program (CCSP): An Introduction
As such, the Airforwarders Association is supportive of a voluntary
program, like the Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP), which
spreads security throughout the supply chain. The Program is a key part
of the risk-based, multi-layered approach to air cargo security this
association has always endorsed. It balances the need for increased
security while also meeting the needs of the shipping public. The
Airforwarders Association, along with other key stakeholders have been
working closely with TSA to identify possible participants, potential
pitfalls and problems with the parameters of the program, and
technology available to meet the screening needs of the supply chain
process.
The 9/11 bill specifically recognized programs such as this, as
well as other non-intrusive measures approved by TSA, as an important
part of the screening mandate. These provisions are critical to meet
the mandate as established by Congress to reach 100 percent screening
by August 2010. Engaging the supply chain while utilizing technology
like tamper-proof seals to ensure the integrity of the cargo is an
excellent way to achieve full screening of cargo that does not place
the entire financial burden on one entity or part of the supply chain.
Certified Cargo Screener Program (CCSP): Challenge of an Unfunded
Mandate
However, if there is not ample participation further down the
supply chain by shippers and forwarders alike at certified screening
facilities, we face a very real threat to both economic and airport
security. Airports do not have the real estate to screen all cargo, or
even 50 percent of the total tonnage, moving on passenger planes with
existing resources and airlines do not have the financial or human
resources to efficiently expedite screening all ``just in time'' cargo
at the airport. In our conversations with the Airports Council
International (ACI), airport managers are very concerned about the
ability of existing facilities to meet such a high level of cargo
demand. If screening occurs at the airport, with no additional funds
for airlines or airports, and without funding to encourage additional
forwarders to participate in CCSP, the massive influx of cargo that
must be screened at the airport is likely to create bottlenecks and
delays in the supply chain. This will have a devastating effect on
delicate cargo like medical supplies or perishable foods.
We are extremely concerned about the lack of Government funding for
the 100 percent screening mandate. Forwarders participating in CCSP
must purchase technology for which the cost may range from $150,000 to
$500,000 per facility--a price tag that cannot be met by most small and
medium-size forwarders. As a result, they will face delays at the
airport for cargo screening, causing them to miss flights and lose
revenue. This lost revenue, in the current economic environment with
high fuel surcharges and razor-thin profit margins, could force
forwarders out of business. This consolidation of the market is bad for
forwarders, manufacturers and the American consumer.
The variance in size among the forwarding community is part of what
makes this vital industry continue to thrive. Forwarders develop
specific business models based on the type of cargo niche they carve
out for their business needs, be it several small offices to handle
trade show and convention material movement, or many large facilities
at gateway cities to handle tons of flowers imported from Latin America
or American manufactured goods being exported to our trading partners.
Just as a wide variety of goods are shipped via airfreight, there are,
and should remain, a wide variety of forwarders in the industry to
compete for that business.
A survey of our membership and our alliance partner, the National
Customs Brokers and Forwarders Association of America, who will testify
in a moment, has shown that that our concerns are well-founded. More
than half of the members surveyed would qualify as ``small to mid-
sized'', as they have no more than 5 permanent offices that accept
cargo for passenger planes. Of the 60 percent of surveyed members that
are ``small to mid-sized'', without additional funds, nearly 100
percent would not choose to participate as a CCSF. The remaining
members surveyed indicated that only a few offices would be outfitted
with equipment to participate as a CCSF.
While CCSP is a voluntary program, the competitive advantage it
gives to companies that have the financial ability to purchase
screening equipment makes it a very costly to ``opt out'' for other
companies. Not only do non-participants lose the ability to ensure
their cargo moves as quickly as their competitors, but they also will
have to expend substantial funds to pay for screening. Smaller
businesses in our industry provide professional, well-paying jobs with
health and retirement savings benefits to thousands of hard-working
Americans--if the market is altered in such a way that the ``haves''
are the only companies that can guarantee efficient shipping, the
``have nots'' may quickly become so financially disadvantaged they will
be forced out of business.
Certified Cargo Screener Program (CCSP): The Funding Solutions
We believe the best way to ensure the market stays competitive for
all players is to provide funding for all forwarders to be able to
participate in CCSP if they so choose. Based on our membership, I
expect that to include a number of forwarders who would participate at
one to two of their facilities. That said, while we believe it is in
the best interest to establish substantial screening responsibilities
throughout the supply chain, there are a number of business models that
simply do not permit forwarders to screen at any point prior to the
airport. It is imperative that the screening at the airport conducted
by the airlines and is done in an efficient and expedient manner. We
also believe that funding should be available to the airlines to
achieve that goal.
Secondary and tertiary airports that serve many residents in
districts of Members of this subcommittee are already suffering from
cutbacks in airline service. Without the revenue and profit generated
by cargo at these airports due to the high cost associated with airline
screening of cargo in say, Eugene, Oregon or even Jackson, Mississippi,
carriers may cease accepting cargo at those airports and further
jeopardize airline service for those cities.
We urge Congress to provide funding to ensure the jobs of hundreds
of thousands of employees in the airfreight industry are not lost and
the American economy does not face serious harm due to delays in goods
and products being delivered. The Airforwarders Association supports
small business grants to fund CCSP as well as additional funding or
reallocation of TSA's budget to provide funding for equipment and
personnel devoted to cargo screening. We are also eagerly awaiting the
demonstration of the newly proposed Independent Screening Facility
pilot program or ``car wash'', where third parties will have an off-
site, stand-alone facility dedicated to screening cargo for a fee. We
believe this is another tool that will alleviate bottlenecks at the
airport.
Certified Cargo Screener Program (CCSP): Progression of the Pilot
Program
Now, I would like to move to a discussion of the current status of
the CCSP pilot program. The Airforwarders Association has several
members participating in the CCSP pilot program launched by TSA. We
have attached a statement for the record from one such member. These
companies are currently facing a degree of uncertainty in terms of
moving forward with the program. That said, we applaud TSA for working
with industry closely to create a model program that will actually work
in the forwarding environment, which is critical to a successful pilot
and full-scale deployment.
While an initial list of technology approved by TSA has been made
available, purchasing equipment has been delayed due to the lack of
final approval. Also, there is concern that the amount of reimbursement
funding promised to the participants continues to change as does when
that funding will be available to participants. It is imperative that
the pilot program is successful in order to continue the expansion of
the program, and to that end, other forwarders will listen carefully to
the experiences of participants.
With regard to technology, we remain concerned that much of the
technology listed as acceptable is geared toward passenger baggage
applications with little, if any, approved to screen built pallets and
consolidations. Since the mandate dictates screening at the piece
level, packing and unpacking pallets not only slows the supply chain,
but creates new risks in terms of tampering or theft. Forwarders move
pallets that can contain up to 300 different packages--without a
machine certified to move these pallets quickly to utilize in the pilot
program, the results of throughput times are likely to be much higher
than the speed of a pallet screening device.
Also, there is no mechanism in place that protects forwarders
investments in currently approved screening technology if that
equipment is later found to be unsatisfactory or phased out by TSA.
Given the cost involved in the initial purchase, many of our members
have cited this uncertainty as an impediment to participation. While
the SAFETY Act may provide some degree of protection, we urge TSA to
work with forwarders to ease concerns over this particular issue.
The good news from our members is that progress is being made on a
daily basis by TSA. Initial facility audits have begun as have initial
certification inspections by TSA at some member's facilities.
Forwarders are submitting security plans and technology preferences to
TSA and there is a great deal of dialog with the participants ``on the
ground''. Smaller participants in the pilot program believe they will
be able to meet screening goals by the fall of 2008. The Airforwarders
Association will continue to provide regular updates on progress to
this committee at your request.
In conclusion, we believe that a great deal of progress has been
made by TSA in meeting the mandate to screen 100 percent of passenger
plane cargo. The deployment of the CCSP pilot program is advancing on a
daily basis and through the efforts of airlines such as Southwest,
freight forwarders and many shippers, I believe that our goal of
creating a secure, safe and efficient air cargo security regime can be
achieved, provided Congress fulfills its commitment to homeland
security by fully funding these programs.
Thank you for hearing my testimony today on this important issue
and I look forward to answering any questions you may have.
Falcon Global Distribution, Inc./Falcon Global Edge, Inc.
CCSP Participation Highlights
july 9, 2008
(Winter 2008) Falcon personnel obtain first CCSP notional
documents and learns of pending BAA for ``technology pilot''.
(February 7, 2008): Orientation session with TSA personnel
assigned to West Coast target cities and senior TSA management
(on-site Union City).
(February 14, 2008): Falcon submits application to BAA.
(February, 2008): Falcon Global Distribution, Inc. is
approved as an IAC and is subsequently approved for
participation in the ``technology pilot''.
(February 13, 2008): Falcon submits initial technology
proposal, leaning toward installation and operation of AT X-
ray.
(Late February, 2008): Falcon Global Distribution, Inc.
becomes an IAC in conjunction with application to BAA.
(April 29, 2008): Falcon personnel meet L3 representatives
at L3 facility to view AT X-ray machines.
(May 8, 2008): Meeting on-site Union City with
representatives from TSA's Science & Technology group, together
with other third-party vendors to TSA (Deloitte and Safe Skies)
who will be conducting a ``process audit'' of the facility to
aid in determining the best type of screening technology to be
used in the facility.
Initial determination at above meeting that ETD might be
better suited to Falcon's facility due to primary inventory
product type (electronics), among other factors.
(May 15, 2008): Falcon submits revised technology proposal,
with emphasis shifted from AT X-ray to ETD.
(May 15, 2008): Falcon submits CCSF application.
(June 2, 2008): Falcon undergoes initial facility audit at
Union City.
(June 27, 2008): Falcon submits initial Facility Security
Plan to TSA.
(July 9, 2008): Falcon undergoes certification inspection by
TSA. The facility is to be certified for physical cargo
screening, in anticipation of later reliance on either ETD or
ATX-ray as primary screening method.
Comments
The process is moving at a very slow pace but does appear to be
going forward. It is readily apparent that TSA is relying on industry
to ``step up'' and make this program work, even by inventing the
necessary processes (i.e. training and testing) with minimal TSA
guidance. This is a positive in that TSA is letting industry (and
particular facilities) dictate practical steps to fulfill the
legislative mandate, based on the particular types of products that
reside in, and will be shipped from that facility. It is a negative
because I believe many companies are: (1) Waiting for TSA to issue firm
guidance; and (2) taking TSA's lack of firm guidance as an indication
that the CCSP is not viable--or won't be following a change of
administrations.
TSA has not yet released a revised ``approved list'' of
screening technologies, which we were told was to be released
June 27, 2008.
Though TSA has not released an ``approved'' training/testing
program (a draft version, constructed by TSA field personnel,
is in circulation as a model), nor guidance on ``approved''
types of Tamper Evident Technology or the exact specifications
for the ``screened'' indicator sticker, we are moving forward
with constructing a training and testing regimen to obtain
certification. Our TSA contact is aiming to submit the final
certification application to TSA HQ end of the week of 7/14/08.
Allowing for an approval process of 2-4 weeks, Falcon could
have screened cargo (utilizing only physical search screening
methodology) in the stream of commerce by middle to end of
August.
If the process audit can be performed in a timely manner,
and the approved list of technology published, Falcon hopes
that an OTA can be executed and equipment ordered so that
training and testing on that equipment can be completed by mid-
October.
Once the technology is installed and personnel adequately
trained, Falcon will screen 100 percent of its passenger air
cargo shipments immediately. At present rate, I hope that 100
percent of the passenger air cargo originating from Falcon's
facility can be screened by end of November, 2008.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, Mr. Fried.
Now, Ms. Allen, you are recognized and yielded to for 5
minutes.
STATEMENT OF CINDY ALLEN, CHAIRMAN, TASK FORCE ON SECURITY,
NATIONAL CUSTOMS BROKERS AND FORWARDERS ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA
Ms. Allen. Thank you, Chairwoman Jackson Lee.
On behalf of National Customs Brokers and Forwarders
Association of America, I am pleased to have this opportunity
to testify before you today on air cargo security as chairwoman
of the Security Task Force for NCBFAA. First let me say a
little bit about our industry.
While our membership includes several large and direct air
carriers, or IACs, who are household names, our largest segment
of membership are medium-small independently owned businesses.
We book space aboard aircraft, both passenger and exclusively
all air cargo aircraft, and we also assist in the movement of
goods toward the airport.
We need to say at the start that we strongly support TSA's
Certified Cargo Screening Program and want to do our part in
ensuring its success. We believe that it meets this committee's
and Congress' intent in addressing the obligations required by
the 9/11 law mandating 100 percent security of cargo destined
for passenger aircraft.
This program recognizes that indirect air carriers are
force multipliers in the twin tasks of establishing security
and moving goods by air. Yet our commitment to the TSA in
support of the CCSP program does not mean that we are
completely happy with how the agency is implementing its
obligations under the law.
Initial deployment of the program is being conducted as a
pilot. In order to meet Congress' requirement of reaching 50
percent physical examination at the individual carton level or
piece level by next February, the agency has sought to entice
the largest IACs to the pilot, to the exclusion of small and
medium-sized businesses.
The TSA has determined that those large companies are
needed in the pilot to meet the 50 percent Federal requirement.
To incentivize their participation, TSA will subsidize those
companies and underwrite a major portion of their overhead.
Small companies, all of whom have been excluded from the pilot,
will receive no such benefit.
There appears to be no funding within the TSA for like
treatment for the small and medium-sized businesses that will
follow these large, mostly international corporations into the
program. We therefore start with a basic inequity.
Our sole option is to join the queue at the airport and
wait our turn for examination. This not only reduces our
ability to put cargo on aircraft expeditiously, but adds one
more cost to each shipment for both the small IAC and for our
customers, the small and medium-sized exporters who are at the
heart of our economy today.
Smaller participants in the TSA program will also see our
ability to compete on a one-to-one basis diminish even further
at the hands of a Government pilot program. This creates a huge
competitive disadvantage in an industry where two of the key
differentiating factors of service between companies are time
in transit and overall costs.
In her letter of May 1, 2008, to TSA Administrator Kip
Hawley, House Small Business Committee Chairwoman Velazquez
said that the TSA should restructure the program in a manner
that does not place small businesses at a disadvantage.
The Association recognizes, however, that there needs to be
creativity to this solution, creativity that reduces its cost
overall. We recommend what we refer to as the car wash
solution: Establish one or several centralized locations in a
specific geographic area where the community's IACs can take
their cargo for screening. Some will favor a co-op approach.
Others may prefer to establish their own and provide services
to the community on a fee basis. The concept can work if given
the opportunity, and we understand the TSA is exploring this
option.
In all events, however, the costs must be low enough to
enable small and medium-sized companies to compete against
those who have a built in advantage by virtue of the TSA pilot
and funding. IACs who are regulated by the TSA are required to
establish and maintain stringent security programs that are
regularly vetted by the TSA. We can become viable partners in
funneling the freight to the airports, ensuring these secure
funnels do not become bottlenecks that have the ability to
strangle cargo flow and negatively impact the economic
viability of small exporters, effectively limiting their
ability to timely compete with goods source abroad.
Chairwoman Jackson Lee, we think your committee is the
starting point for achieving a balance for this program, and we
look forward to working you with you in search of the
solutions.
Thank you.
[The statement of Ms. Allen follows:]
Prepared Statement of Cindy Allen
July 15, 2008
Chairwoman Jackson Lee and Ranking Member Lungren, on behalf of the
National Customs Brokers and Forwarders Association of America
(NCBFAA), I am pleased to have this opportunity to testify before you
today on air cargo security. I am Cindy Allen of Argents Air Express,
Ltd., of Romulus, Michigan and chairwoman of the Security Task Force
for NCBFAA. NCBFAA is the national organization representing customs
brokers, ocean transportation intermediaries and Indirect Air Carriers
(IAC). Very simply, an IAC is designated by a shipper to facilitate the
movement of his goods by air.
We are directly regulated by the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA), together with the air carriers, while our
customers, the shippers, are not. We operate under a security plan the
details of which cannot be shared with our customers because the
program is considered Sensitive Security Information, or SSI. The air
carriers to whom we tender cargo are also regulated by the TSA with
their plan, the details of which they are not allowed to share with us.
Thus, we are a very important cog in the transportation supply chain
and positioned to have a highly positive role in our Nation's fight
against terrorism in the skies, through multiple, interdependent layers
of security.
First, let me say a little about the industry. We are very closely
aligned with our colleagues from the Air Forwarders Association, whose
members tend toward domestic shipping while ours tend toward
international transportation. While we have several large members who
are household names, our largest segment of membership are medium and
small, independently owned businesses. While we book space aboard
aircraft--both passenger aircraft and exclusively all cargo aircraft--
we also assist in the movement of goods toward the airport: either by
trucks owned by the IAC or contracting with independent cartage
companies; picking up cargo at the shipper's location or receiving it
at ours; and, either palletizing merchandise in our own facilities and/
or moving merchandise directly to the airport to be built on airline
pallets or placed in containers by the airline. If a member contracts
with a trucking company to arrange transportation, that company is
regulated under our own security program as what is called an
``authorized representative.'' As such, our IAC members are responsible
for the conduct of those companies and are liable for their actions,
including potential civil and/or criminal violations in their conduct.
We need to say, at the start, that we strongly support TSA's
Certified Cargo Screening Program and want to do our part in ensuring
its success. We believe that it meets this committee's and Congress'
intent in addressing the obligations required by the 9/11 law mandating
100 percent screening of cargo destined for passenger aircraft--50
percent required by February 2009, and the remaining 50 percent
required by August 2010. The screening must be completed at the piece
level, meaning that pallets of cargo must be taken apart and their
individual cartons screened.
The program recognizes that Indirect Air Carriers are force-
multipliers in the twin tasks of establishing security and moving goods
by air. Air cargo is selected as a transportation mode for essentially
one reason--urgency. ``Just-in-time'' delivery has created the business
imperative of moving merchandise more quickly to the point of sale,
rather than absorbing the expense of inventory and of positioning
additional quantities of goods in warehouses. There are several
commodities which are not suitable for other means of transportation,
such as perishable food, flowers, medicine and medical response items.
These are among the diverse mix of products handled daily by IACs and
airlines. Collectively, we also move valuable or sensitive cargo for
many Government agencies such as Defense, Treasury and State that
require urgent shipment and delivery. And, everyone knows now that they
can remedy last-minute contingencies that can occur in business through
a next-day delivery.
To create a security system that establishes one funnel and a
likely bottle-neck at the airports--whereby carriers are required to
physically examine and then process packages under limiting
conditions--undermines the viability of air cargo delivery. The
Certified Cargo Screening Program draws upon regulated entities--
Indirect Air Carriers--to share this responsibility. An IAC must have
its personnel thoroughly vetted by the TSA through their Security
Threat Assessment program. This program mandates that all individuals
with unescorted access to air cargo must be screened through a number
of databases maintained by the Federal Government. An IAC's facilities
must pass muster by meeting fixed physical security standards, which
are constantly probed and tested by one of 450 cargo inspectors that
the TSA has in the field every day. Finally, each participating air
forwarder must meet chain-of-custody standards in delivering screened
merchandise to the air carrier. All of these activities take place
under regulations promulgated and enforced by the Transportation
Security Administration. It is a sensible way to manage security for
the huge volumes of air cargo that inundate airports every day.
Yet our commitment to TSA and support of the Certified Cargo
Screening Program does not mean that we are completely happy with how
the agency is implementing its obligations under the law. Initial
deployment of the program is being conducted as a pilot, performed in a
number of U.S. cities by a limited number of Indirect Air Carriers. In
order to meet Congress' requirement of reaching 50 percent physical
examination at the individual carton or piece level by next February,
the agency has sought to entice the largest IACs to the pilot, to the
exclusion of small and medium-sized businesses who presumably have to
be incorporated into the program in time to meet the goal of achieving
100 percent examination. While we understand TSA's responsibility to
reach the screening percentages prescribed by the statute, this creates
a number of problems for our industry.
To start with, the Certified Cargo Screening Program involves large
capital outlays for screening equipment, costs which are well beyond
the means of most businesses. Equipment that is used for screening of
air cargo must be far more substantial than that required for screening
passenger baggage. The size and complexity of packaging and palletizing
requires greater sophistication and capacity--and hence far greater
cost. We estimate that outlays will require between $150,000 to
$500,000 or more per facility.
It is unrealistic to assume that a typical IAC can afford this
equipment for use in his own company, just as we understand it may be
difficult for some of the larger participating companies to do so. We
clearly understand that all or most of the cost for screening equipment
in the pilot program will be underwritten by TSA, with the equipment
provided to those companies on a permanent basis, without clear
restrictions on their ability to utilize that equipment in their favor
in the commercial marketplace. Also of great concern is that with the
deadlines rapidly approaching, TSA has not and does not foresee
developing a list of eligible products from which to choose, but rather
will provide a ``Candidate Technology List''. Further, we have no
guarantees from the agency that should they identify another threat
which cannot be detected by existing equipment, we will not be obliged
to purchase an entirely new set of equipment at additional cost. You
can understand why we approach this cautiously.
There appears to be no funding within TSA for like treatment for
the small and medium-sized businesses that will follow these large
corporations into the program. We therefore start with a basic
inequity. The TSA has determined that these large companies are needed
in the pilot to meet the 50 percent Federal requirement. To incentivize
their participation, TSA will subsidize those companies and underwrite
a major portion of their overhead. Small companies, all of whom have
been excluded from the pilot, will receive no such benefit. Their sole
option is to join the queue at the airport and await their turn for
examination. This not only reduces their ability to put cargo on
aircraft expeditiously but adds one more cost to each shipment for both
the IAC and their customers--the small and medium-sized exporters who
are at the heart of our economy. Smaller participants in the TSA
program will see their ability to compete on a one-to-one basis
diminish even further. This creates a huge competitive disadvantage in
an industry where two of the key differentiators of service between
companies are time-in-transit and cost.
NCBFAA surveyed its membership and received over 70 responses from
its individual IAC companies. Asked how many offices IACs would equip
with the necessary screening equipment and assume other operations
costs, 58.3 percent said that they would not do so. Another 31 percent
said that they would only equip a very few offices. This may have the
undesired effect of shifting the points where air cargo is tendered to
mirror the locations where cargo is screened. This is important as it
would certainly increase the traffic and infrastructure demands of
those already burdened major freight hubs, would affect the
profitability of those airlines servicing small locations, and perhaps
eventually limit passenger flight availability in those small markets.
In her letter of May 1, 2008 to TSA Administrator Kip Hawley, House
Small Business Committee Chairwoman Nydia Velazquez said that ``the net
effect of this plan could place small firms who cannot reach the volume
levels required of pilot participants on an unlevel playing field,''
concluding that ``TSA should restructure the program in a manner which
does not place small businesses at a disadvantage.''
In approaching a solution, instead of looking backward at the
present pilot, NCBFAA is inclined to look ahead to the time when small
and medium-sized companies will be incorporated into the Certified
Cargo Screening Program and are part of the final 50 percent necessary
to achieve the 9/11 law's 100 percent mandate. First, TSA needs to
provide the requisite funding to enable that participation. Presently,
there is no funding projected, nor available for this purpose. We
strongly urge the Congress to look ahead to the fiscal year 2010
budget--which will begin to take shape this fall--and authorize and
appropriate funding for this purpose.
The Association recognizes however that there needs to be
creativity to this solution, creativity that reduces its cost. We
recommend what we refer to as the ``car wash'' solution: establish one
or several centralized locations in a specific geographic area where
the community's IACs can take their cargo for screening. Some will
favor a co-op approach. Others, such as warehousemen or individual
IACs, may prefer to establish their own and provide services to the
community on a fee basis. This procedure has been effective and
efficiently used in similar circumstances for other governmental,
security-related requirements in the CBP Carrier Initiative and C-TPAT
programs. Additionally, we have experienced comparable results from
Centralized Examination Sites (CES) Nation-wide for over 15 years. The
concept can work if given an opportunity and we understand that TSA is
exploring this option. In all events, however, the cost must be low
enough to enable small and medium-sized companies to compete against
those who have a built-in advantage by virtue of the TSA pilot.
Chairwoman Jackson Lee and Ranking Member Lungren, NCBFAA Indirect
Air Carriers respect the 9/11 law. You have met, over time, with a
large community of our members from the Houston area and know their
commitment to the Nation's security. We support Congress' mandate and
we support the Transportation Security Administration's Certified Cargo
Screening Program. Adjustments however need to be made to ensure that
goods flow freely yet securely through the airports and aboard
passenger aircraft, while permitting those within our industry to
compete for business. We think that your committee is the starting
point for achieving this balance and we look forward to working with
you in search of solutions.
Thank you for your kind attention to our views.
Attachment 1.--Letter From Hon. Nydia M. Velazquez
May 1, 2008.
The Honorable Edmund S. Hawley,
Administrator, Transportation Security Administration, East Building,
601 South 12th Street, Arlington, VA 22202-4220.
Dear Administrator Hawley: Small businesses play a critical role in
ensuring the security of our Nation. As such, I would like to get more
information regarding the Transportation Security Administration's
(TSA) development of the Certified Cargo Screening Program. TSA is
required by the Implementing the 9/11 Act (Pub. L. 110-161) to screen
50 percent of all cargo placed on passenger aircraft by February 2009
and 100 percent of such cargo by August 2010. Phase One Deployment of
the program has begun with a pilot in three metropolitan areas.
The committee is concerned that small firms are not eligible to
participate in the pilot program. I understand that TSA has selected
participants using a volume benchmark with a minimum level that permits
only the largest of air forwarding companies (known as ``indirect air
carriers '') to participate. The pilot program appears to place small
businesses at a competitive disadvantage because TSA is giving away or
providing at a reduced cost the required screening equipment to
participants. The committee has been informed that the screening
equipment would remain the pilot participant's permanent property,
while later participants in the Certified Cargo Screening Program would
be required to spend hundreds of thousands of dollars to purchase their
own equipment. The net effect of this plan could place small firms who
cannot reach the volume levels required of pilot participants on an
unlevel playing field. They would either need to purchase their own
equipment or meet fees expected of air carriers conducting screening at
the airport--a cost not faced by the large companies participating in
the pilot.
Small firms play an important role is securing our Nation. I urge
you to structure the pilot program in a manner which does not place
small businesses at a disadvantage.
Sincerely,
Nydia Velazquez,
Chairwoman, Committee on Small Business.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank you for your testimony and
the insight that you have given.
Let me also make it very clear that we hope that all of you
will be engaged with our staff, whatever your perspective may
be. If we are to meet the timelines set by the legislation,
mandated by law, signed by the President of the United States,
still good law, then it will be important for us to have the
insight that many of you have offered here today. So I know
that some may have found their way to half of the staff. It is
important that everyone meets with all of our staff members on
both the majority and minority side. This legislation and
mandate is not partisan. It is solution-based, and the only way
we can have solutions is if we are hearing from both
perspectives.
With that in mind, I pose this question to Mr. Meenan and
Mr. Fried in particular for you to comment on the plan that TSA
has recently shared with us today and whether or not you think
that plan is feasible, whether it is on track to meet the
requirement specifically, the 50 percent screening of air cargo
by February 2009, and what about the requirement to screen 100
percent of air cargo by August 2010. Do you think it is
challenging?
Let me also acknowledge, Mr. Meenan, your comments. I agree
with you about the plight and difficulty of the airline
industry. Many of us have met with our hometown airlines. We
are cognizant and we recognize these are very steep challenges.
You might also comment on the relationship, if you will,
the funding relationship which in the pilot seems to be
discretionary with the sharing of funds.
You heard us pose the question of the issue of asking how
much TSA is asking to implement their plan, and I think it is
unclear. We in Congress are prepared to make the hard
decisions, and it is a hard decision because money is finite
and therefore has to be prioritized. But we are pressuring TSA,
as I indicated on the record, as my colleague asked the
question--what is the amount of resources that legitimately are
needed to get the task done?
So I have added to my question, but I want you to focus on
what your assessment was on what we heard today, and the
feasibility of meeting the deadlines of February 2009 and then
the deadline of 2010.
Mr. Meenan.
Mr. Meenan. Thank you, Chairwoman Jackson Lee. It is a
complicated question. I think our testimony attempts to outline
the steps we believe need to be taken.
We obviously from the perspective of what the carriers are
planning to do themselves, we need the approved equipment
lists, we need the procedures, we need to know what is going to
be expected of us to do the kind of screenings that the
airlines will perform themselves.
We also clearly recognize, and we think to get to the 50
percent goal, that is important, those components are very
important as part of that. Obviously, the faster we can advance
the CCSP program, the better off we are in terms of being able
to add still more cargo to the pile of screened cargo, if you
will. But at this point, we really don't know how well advanced
that is.
We have heard the same testimony you heard. We heard the
same kind of reports. But there has been no independent
validation of all of that at this point. Clearly, the more
resources that the TSA has to apply to this, the better off we
all will be in the long run.
I think one of the things that we believe is seriously
lacking is attention to the security equipment development
process, the pipeline, if you will, through the Office of
Science and Technology.
What we believe has happened there is there has been so
much attention focused on passenger screening and that side of
the equation, baggage screening, that a decision at some level
has either consciously or unconsciously been made simply to let
air cargo sort of float out there and somebody else will pick
up that responsibility. Right now that looks like it is going
to substantially fall on the shoulders of the airlines, and to
an extent to the freight forwarders, although they will have an
opportunity not to participate if they choose not to.
At the end of the day, what this is all about is keeping
our Nation's economy running as effectively as possible. What
we want to see is as much of that screening done up the supply
chain as it possibly can be done, with the necessary assurances
that it is done properly.
But the bottom bottom-line is we will simply not be able to
carry cargo, and that is going to be a very damaging thing not
just to the interests of the airline industry and its employees
and the employees in the various districts around the country,
but to all of the jobs that depend on that cargo moving freely
and smoothly through the system. We think better screening
technology is the place to start.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Fried.
Mr. Fried. Thank you, Chairwoman Jackson Lee.
I would say I have been in this business for 27 years now
and I spend a lot of time at airports, specifically at freight
forwarding facilities and at airlines, and I would say that
this is a good program. The Certified Cargo Screening Program
is an effective method of screening cargo because it is going
to push the security task into the supply chain getting
shippers involved. That is smart, because at the airports,
unfortunately, we have a real estate challenge. As Mr. Sammon
said earlier, we have to start breaking down pallets and unit
load devices on the piece level and start looking at every
single piece. Even with technology, there will be some issues
in finding the space to do it. Also, of course, as my colleague
has just talked about, the airlines probably couldn't afford to
complete the screening in a timely and efficient manner in
order for us to make flights.
That said, I would say the Certified Cargo Screening
Program has got to be successful, and the way it can be
successful is making sure that shippers understand what the
program entails. It is a question of communication. It is a
question of the TSA making sure that freight forwarders
understand what it is about, and it is making sure that the TSA
engages the shipping public, the people that give us the boxes.
As far as the freight forwarders are concerned, in order
for them to participate as certified cargo screening
facilities, they will have to buy technology. As discussed
earlier, it is expensive, and without Government assistance to
purchase this technology, most of our members will not be able
to afford to do so.
So my thought is that we will make the screening deadline
of 50 percent by February 2009 and we will do it through a
number of ways, the TSA will do it through a number of ways, of
course, the freight forwarding community assisting along the
way.
We think by that time we will have the CCSP pilot up and
running, and they have involved a number of large freight
shippers who move a lot of cargo through the gateways, such as
JFK, Chicago, Los Angeles and Miami. These large forwarders
handle I think approximately 200 pallets a year. So they do a
lot of the shipping. In addition to that, you will have some
CCSP shippers involved, the big customers, if you will, the big
shippers. I also think that those forwarders who can pay for
the equipment will start coming on-line as well.
But I think for us to get in and meet the 100 percent
deadline, it is going to take financial assistance from
Congress in the form of many different tools. It could be
grants, it could be tax credits, it could be a number of
methods that I will leave up to more sophisticated financial
people to decide for the time being.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me ask, just to follow up very quickly
on your point, are you getting sufficient guidance from TSA as
we speak?
Mr. Fried. We remain very active with TSA. We go over to
meet with them frequently here in Washington and we are active
in our rapport with Mr. Sammon and Mr. Kelly and his staff. The
issue right now is there are a lot of unanswered questions
regarding the CCSP, and we are waiting for this information.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So your answer is, the term of art is, you
are very active. Are you getting the kind of guidance that
moves this program forward from TSA as we speak?
Mr. Fried. We are getting limited guidance at this time.
Ms. Jackson Lee. With respect to the crafting of the
interim rule, has there been a meeting of stakeholders, or is
there a format for there to be input as this rule is being
crafted?
Mr. Fried. Yes. As a matter of fact, we are expecting the
Indirect Air Carrier Standard Security Program rewrite, which
should--we have been told to expect it within a few weeks, and
there will be a comment period thereafter, as there was a
comment period for the Indirect Air Carrier Standard Security
Program we are working under to this day.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, you have certainly made yourself
clear with respect to the resources that are needed. I think
this committee made itself clear. We will look into that.
Ms. Allen, you have a smaller community, small to medium-
sized businesses. What is the greatest obstacle for those that
you represent in complying with and meeting the requirements of
this program?
Ms. Allen. Right now I would say funding is the largest
issue for us and our inability to even participate in the pilot
program so that we can avail ourselves of the information of
the program, understand what the details of the pilot program
are, and decide if that is really something that our membership
would be interested in.
We are concerned about our ability to compete with the
larger forwarders who have been accepted into this program. We
feel that right now they are going to have a competitive
disadvantage. They already have an advantage by size and by
volume of freight when they tender cargo to the aircraft, so we
feel that this is another layer that they are going to be able
to use to make sure that their freight gets loaded first on the
airlines. Our members are going to be at the bottom of the
pile, because we cannot screen our own freight. So we feel it
extremely important that we have an opportunity to address that
through a co-op or through other cargo security models.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Certainly you would, I assume, respond
affirmatively to suggest that the safety of the goods that you
are forwarding are equally important as those of the large
companies as well. Have you had any engagement or raised these
points directly with TSA?
Ms. Allen. We have. We have also aligned ourselves with the
Airforwarders Association and in association with Mr. Fried
have talked to the TSA on several occasions about some of our
concerns.
Ms. Jackson Lee. What has been the response?
Ms. Allen. Their response is they feel that the program as
it is now will meet the 50 percent deadline as set by Congress,
and they will address the 100 percent after they meet the 50.
We feel it is extremely important that they include our
members in that second half of the screening program where
essentially the rest of the cargo is coming to the airport, and
it is going to be extremely important that our members are even
engaged with the TSA through both the NCBFAA and the
Airforwarders Association to ensure that the voice of the small
and medium-sized forwarders who make up most of the companies
that tender freight to the carriers are heard.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Is that moving forward?
Ms. Allen. In a limited way, yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, let me make a commitment that we are
going to look into it. I frankly believe we are going to review
the legislation again, and I think there are some elements of
the legislation, including this whole issue of foreign cargo,
that have to be clarified. I certainly think it should be
clarified on how we address the range of the industry, which
includes, as I understand it, your representation of small and
medium forwarders.
What would you determine to be the average size in terms of
the cargo that you all are transporting, the companies that you
represent?
Ms. Allen. Mostly small package freight. Our freight does
not get tendered to the airlines in a palletized format. We are
smaller companies, picking up one, two, maybe one pallet of
cargo that gets tendered to a company that then either
palletizes it or directly to the airline to palletize it there.
We do have some palletized cargo, but certainly not the cookie
sheets that was testified as to earlier. We simply don't have
that volume of freight for the majority of our members.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I assume your small and medium-sized
companies, however, use large, medium and small airports?
Ms. Allen. Absolutely.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And you use the major carriers?
Ms. Allen. Absolutely.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So, in essence, if we were to use our
imagination, even your small and medium-sized companies could
be transporting a package that might do harm?
Ms. Allen. Absolutely. We fully participate in the supply
chain. We pick up cargo from the shippers, we transport it to
our warehouses, we break it down, rebuild it, repackage it and
tender it to the airlines, just as the larger forwarders do.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much.
Captain, let me just comment and make note of the fact that
I understand that Southwest Airlines screens 100 percent of its
air cargo. Is that accurate?
Mr. Onorato. Currently Southwest Airlines screens 60
percent of the cargo loaded on their narrow-bodied aircraft,
which is ahead of the mandate at this point. When asked, they
stated they could screen 100 percent by September of this year.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, how are they doing that? What has
been the commitment that they have had to make to get that
done?
Mr. Onorato. They have just committed to following the
program as it is dictated by the 9/11 Act, and they have
purchased the trace detection technology and they use that to
screen the package as it arrives at the airport and before they
place it on the aircraft.
Ms. Jackson Lee. You were here and listening to the
testimony that talked about this issue of capacity. How does
Southwest Airlines address the question of capacity, when we
have heard that it may be a stumbling block as we move forward?
Mr. Onorato. I think because it is a narrow-body operation,
as is 96 percent of the flights in the country, you are getting
smaller pieces of cargo delivered to the aircraft. So it is
easier to piecemeal screen each package, whether it be physical
screening, some type of technology application or with a canine
inspection.
The palletized and larger bulk cargo seems to be the
sticking point that I have noted at this hearing today, and we,
as Congressman Markey has also stated, have seen demonstrations
of technology that could screen larger bulk cargo and
palletized cargo. So there seems to be a stalling point here
where we can't develop this technology or purchase this
technology and get it to the airports to screen the pallets and
the bulk cargo as it arrives.
Ms. Jackson Lee. What you are saying is that Southwest
Airlines as it arrives has an operation that screens?
Mr. Onorato. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Is this trafficking that is going on both
passenger flights, I assume?
Mr. Onorato. It is in all passenger operations, so all the
cargo transported on Southwest, yes, ma'am, is on a narrow-body
passenger aircraft.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So can you give us a sense of the kind of
limitations that you have? You obviously are carrying
passengers and cargo and luggage. So you have isolated space
for cargo?
Mr. Onorato. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Are you able to timely get that cargo
screened and on time on airlines?
Mr. Onorato. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And they made the investment how long ago?
Mr. Onorato. As soon as the 9/11 Commission, since August
of last year.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Can you recollect the number of airports
that Southwest Airlines flies into across the Nation?
Mr. Onorato. We serve 63 different airports across the
country.
Ms. Jackson Lee. They range in size from small, medium and
large?
Mr. Onorato. From Los Angeles to Lubbock, Texas.
Ms. Jackson Lee. First of all, let me state for the record,
let me compliment Southwest Airlines. It may be a model that is
worth viewing a little bit more closely than TSA might have
viewed it. I also want to make note of the fact, as I have
spoken to just air cargo pilots, it is a small population I
assume that we have not paid much attention to, and I can
assure you they are enthusiastic about the idea of air cargo
screening.
They fly the Nation's airlines, or fly at least the
Nation's flight fleet for their cargo companies, to a certain
extent unnoted and unnoticed, and they fly huge amounts of
cargo, and prior to this legislation, unscreened. So the fact
that Southwest Airlines has given us an example it seems that
we can find a ready way to make this system work.
My question would be, do you have an assessment of the
kinds of challenges that you are facing, if you will, by--
Southwest Airlines is facing through this process that you
have?
Mr. Onorato. I believe that they are moving rather quickly
ahead of the mandate to screen 100 percent of their cargo, so
it has strictly been an example of their commitment to the
project to adhere to the 9/11 Act as it has been written and to
screen the cargo, to enhance the security for their passengers
and their crews and their fleet. So they have made that
commitment, and they seem to be ahead of the curve as far as
adhering to the law.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Absolutely they are. Southwest Airlines is
financing it themselves?
Mr. Onorato. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Are you prepared to answer on the record,
do you think that adopting first 50 percent and then 100
percent screening of all air cargo is the way the United States
and this Government should go?
Mr. Onorato. Yes, ma'am. Absolutely. CAPA and our 23,000
pilots have always espoused that cargo security is very
important, and the curb-to-cockpit view of aviation security,
our pilots want the cargo as well as the passengers, their
checked bags and the baggage that is loaded underneath, to be
100 percent screened, so that we can assure the safety of the
traveling public.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Some would argue, Captain, that we have
spent so much money on aviation that we have left other modes
of transportation to their own devices. How would you respond
to that?
Mr. Onorato. I think it is only natural that we focus on
aviation because our enemies seem to focus on aviation as well.
They are certainly going to spread more terror and get more
visibility by attacking aviation, and the impact it can have on
the transportation sector and the Gross National Product of our
country. So it has an economic impact as well as a terror
impact.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well said. What would be your answer--you
heard Mr. Meenan, I think, make a very important point about
the difficulties of the market, the economy, particularly with
our airlines. Is there some suggestion evidenced by what
Southwest Airlines has done that can be helpful to moving the
other airlines closer to accomplishing these goals?
Mr. Onorato. Certainly better management of their schedule
and efficiency and their funding and their commitment to
security, as Southwest Airlines has done. I think this is the
industry, this is the atmosphere we are in, and these are the
commitments that we have to make, and Southwest has set that
example.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank you for that. Would you believe
that this is a point as well that the Government needs to step
in to ensure that we complete our task timely?
Mr. Onorato. Yes, ma'am. Absolutely. We talked about
funding earlier and the possible shortfalls. If there needs to
be more funding, then so be it. The technology needs to be
accelerated to the shipping areas so that the palletized and
bulk cargo loaded on the larger aircraft can be properly
screened as well.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Captain.
Mr. Meenan, you wanted to respond. Would you respond to
this question as to what improvements can be made?
Specifically, you highlighted the difficulty in the technology,
the progress of the technology and the focus on passenger
screening technology. I am troubled by that as well.
What suggestions do you offer to expedite, if you will, the
reviewing of the technology, and do you think it is possible
for us to have the necessary sophisticated technology by 2009
and 2010? Mr. Meenan?
Mr. Meenan. I believe that it is challenging to have that
technology, but the fact is we have been slow-rolling the
investment in R&D there. We could do things like offer
incentives to manufacturers to bring forward some of the
products that I believe you have been receiving correspondence
from some of the vendors out there.
There are lots of things that the Government could do to
incentivise the production of newer technology, but right now,
as I say, the focus has been more on passenger and baggage.
Getting back to Southwest Airlines, which is a member of
our association, I just want it to be clear for the record that
the other carriers are very much looking at the same kinds of
uses of trace technology that Southwest is using.
It is important to note, however, that the Southwest cargo
business is significantly different than a lot of the cargo
businesses conducted by other carriers in our membership at
this point. Many of them operate both narrow-body and wide-body
fleets. They don't necessarily know when the cargo is arriving,
what kind of airplane it is going to end up being transported
on. There are many variations. We have a member right now who
operates narrow-body, heavy cargo fleets--narrow-body heavy
cargo fleets that actually accepts palletized cargo.
So there are lots of variables that make it somewhat easier
at this point for the one carrier who operates the way
Southwest does than it is for the others. But they are all
following in that direction right now.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So let me try to be clear. What you are
suggesting is there is disparate aircraft on a number of your
members' airlines, if you will, and it makes it difficult to
get a uniform approach?
Mr. Meenan. That is correct. Right now we have carriers
that operate in some cases an all-cargo aircraft, as well as
their passenger fleet. We have other carriers who operate
narrow-body aircraft along with wide-body aircraft, which
creates a great variation in terms of how you receive cargo.
You don't necessarily know when the cargo comes in the door
what kind of aircraft it is going to be carried on.
The TSA at this point has not made clear what the
procedures are. For example, Southwest is using trace
technology at this point that, at least as we understand it,
they have an arrangement with TSA that has not been extended to
the rest of the industry at this point. We are waiting, as I
said in my testimony, for the release of what is the approved
technology, what are the approved procedures. We are told those
are in the pipeline, but they have not yet actually been
produced by TSA.
So there are lots of unanswered questions at this point
that make it perhaps more challenging for a carrier operating
one of these more diverse cargo operations than it would be for
Southwest. That is not to detract in any way, but I just wanted
to be clear that there are reasons that one carrier may be
ahead of others at this point in time.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I wouldn't suspect that you are trying to
detract from the great work that Southwest Airlines has done.
Mr. Meenan. We love Southwest Airlines.
Ms. Jackson Lee. They are a good role model for others.
Many of us have hometown airlines which we promote and have
great respect for, such as the hometown airline of Houston,
Texas. But we are trying to look at ways of being helpful.
What I heard in your comments is that the guidance from TSA
has not come as fluidly as you would like. Is that my
understanding?
Mr. Meenan. We have been told that those decisions are in
the pipeline. We are anticipating their release very soon. But,
as I said earlier----
Ms. Jackson Lee. What does ``very soon'' to you mean?
Mr. Meenan. We would like them tomorrow. I am not sure that
we are going to get them tomorrow.
Ms. Jackson Lee. You surmise that ``very soon'' in TSA
language means when?
Mr. Meenan. It could be later this summer. We really don't
know at this point. But that will greatly facilitate
decisionmaking by carriers as to what kind of equipment they
should acquire, how they should go about employing that
equipment and so forth.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Do you have resources overseas to include
goods coming in from overseas on your carriers?
Mr. Onorato. The carriers do have some procedures that they
follow within their own security programs overseas, yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. But are you utilizing the requirements of
the 9/11 Act to ensure that there is a screening process on
cargo coming in from overseas?
Mr. Onorato. Right now, we are complying with the
guidelines we have received from TSA as to how those security
procedures are to be----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Which you interpret to mean what?
Mr. Onorato. There are security procedures in place for
cargo that comes into the United States from overseas, but they
are not necessarily--as we heard earlier today, they may not be
consistent with what I believe some of the members expect as a
result of the 9/11 Act.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Fried, same question regarding foreign
cargo.
Mr. Fried. Well, most of our members have an international
presence, so that the Airforwarders Association focuses
primarily on domestic U.S. forwarders. I would say that----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Most of them have--I am sorry. I did not
hear you. Is your microphone on?
Mr. Fried. My apologies. Most of our members have an
international presence. They have international offices.
Although we represent primarily domestic voters, we are
becoming more international in scope.
I would say that, yes, there is a good deal of cargo coming
in from overseas and entering the United States ports; and our
members abide by the local rules and regulations of those
countries in tendering cargo.
Ms. Jackson Lee. But do you believe that the reach of the
9/11 Act, as interpreted by your members, reaches for the
foreign cargo that you may be bringing into the United States?
Mr. Fried. I would say, up to now, that has not been
specifically addressed by TSA. Our emphasis with TSA up to now
has been primarily on cargo transiting within the United States
and exiting the United States.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, I think, as we have heard by the
earlier testimony, it is certainly an issue that we need to
clarify.
Mr. Fried. I would agree. Cargo has to be safe for
everyone.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Ms. Allen, I didn't know if I heard this
from you, are you engaged with TSA, your organization
separately, or are you working with some of the collaborative
organizations there?
Ms. Allen. In both venues, ma'am.
If I could speak to the inbound cargo issue for a moment.
We are a national customs brokers and freight forwarders
association; and I can answer, when we look at inbound and
outbound cargo, generally we see that as two different shops.
Our freight forwarders handle the domestic and outbound cargo,
and our customs brokerage members and even those entities that
have both customs brokers and freight forwarders do handle the
inbound cargo on the customs brokerage side with Customs and
Border Protection and do certainly cooperate with them in their
screening methods on the inbound cargo.
So I can say that we view that as two separate issues at
this time; and, yes, we do have involvement with the TSA
directly.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I think there is a distinction between a
package coming and it being an American Airline aircraft who is
loaded with foreign cargo versus the individual packages that
may be the business of small to medium-sized companies; and I
think we need to look at that separately in how we distinguish
and work with your set of issues, as well as the large
companies' issues that actually--I assume that your companies
don't have aircraft?
Ms. Allen. That would be correct.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Right. I assume that between Mr. Meenan
and Mr. Fried you are representing companies with aircraft?
Mr. Fried. Primarily my members are what we call non-asset-
based. We primarily do not have aircraft. We have, I believe,
one member that does operate a fleet. But we have over 200
members now.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Meenan.
Mr. Meenan. Our members all have aircraft, fewer aircraft,
but they have aircraft.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So you have nothing to share with Mr.
Fried or Ms. Allen.
Mr. Meenan. I am tempted to say he can have them.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank the witnesses.
I am going to pose a question, and I would appreciate it if
you all would submit it in writing. Because I think it warrants
a more thoughtful answer than what you might be able to do in a
the short period of time that we have.
I would like to have answered, as TSA moves forward through
the process of 2009 and 2010 with screening plans for air cargo
facility, what should they keep in mind? What should be the
additional aspects of their work? What additional assistance
should they have in implementing the certified cargo screening
program that would be helpful to each of you?--probably
excluding the Captain. But we would welcome the thoughts of
Southwest Airlines; and we would certainly welcome an emphasis
of small to medium-sized companies, Ms. Allen, if you would.
I would also appreciate if Mr. Meenan and Mr. Fried would
answer the question of capacity on the airport or off the
airport grounds as we try to define how effective and efficient
we can move the cargo without inhibiting commerce as well as
the traveling public.
Let me express my appreciation for all of the witnesses. It
has been a long hearing, but I think it has been an important
oversight hearing that allows us to answer the questions that
we still, I believe, have unanswered.
I want to thank Captain Onorato for his testimony on behalf
of Southwest Airlines. I also want to express an appreciation
for Mr. Meenan and Mr. Fried and Ms. Allen.
As well, I think it is important to note that we are going
to continue to have oversight on this issue. Because we are a
work in progress, and it is very important to note on the
record that we are less than 6 months out or about 6 months out
of February, 2009, which makes this an urgent matter, and that
is why we held this hearing.
So I want to thank the witnesses again for their valuable
testimony, and I want to thank the Members of this committee
for their questions. The Members of the subcommittee may have
additional questions for the witnesses. We ask that you respond
to them expeditiously in writing. I have offered my question on
the record.
Hearing no further business, the subcommittee now stands
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:58 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]