[Senate Hearing 110-554]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-554
PAKISTAN'S FUTURE: BUILDING DEMOCRACY
OR FUELING EXTREMISM?
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 25, 2007
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BILL NELSON, Florida JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire
BARACK OBAMA, Illinois GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
JIM WEBB, Virginia DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
Antony J. Blinken, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Ahmed, Dr. Samina, South Asia Project Director, International
Crisis Group, Islamabad, Pakistan.............................. 54
Prepared statement........................................... 55
Burns, Hon. R. Nicholas, Under Secretary for Political Affairs,
Department of State, Washington, DC............................ 6
Prepared statement........................................... 12
Cohen, Dr. Stephen P., Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, The
Brookings Institution, Washington, DC.......................... 50
Prepared statement........................................... 52
Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator From Massachusetts............. 1
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator From Indiana................ 5
Schaffer, Hon. Teresita C., Director, South Asia Program, Center
for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC........ 46
Prepared statement........................................... 48
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses to Questions for the Record Submitted to Under
Secretary Nicholas Burns by Chairman Biden..................... 59
(iii)
PAKISTAN'S FUTURE: BUILDING DEMOCRACY
OR FUELING EXTREMISM?
----------
WEDNESDAY, JULY 25, 2007
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:33 p.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John F.
Kerry, presiding.
Present: Senators Kerry, Feingold, Menendez, Cardin, Casey,
Webb, Lugar, Hagel, and Isakson.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
Senator Kerry. Good afternoon. The hearing will come to
order.
Thank you, Secretary Burns, for being here with us today.
We really appreciate it. And we look forward to this, what I
consider to be an important hearing.
Ambassador Burns has had a long and distinguished career as
a Foreign Service Officer. He served as our Permanent
Representative to NATO, Ambassador to Greece, and State
Department spokesman, as well as on the National Security
Council staff. He currently serves as the Under Secretary of
State for Political Affairs, which makes him the third-ranking
official at the State Department, with oversight responsibility
for U.S. policy throughout the world.
I might add, he comes with special credentials, because
he's from Massachusetts. He's a graduate of Boston College, and
he's a lifelong Red Sox fan. And that means he knows how to
persevere through great adversity, ladies and gentlemen.
[Laughter.]
Secretary Burns, this is clearly a pivotal moment in
Pakistan, and I wanted to have this hearing today because,
while we are spending hundreds of billions of dollars in Iraq,
and, while there is such significant focus on Iran--and we are
appropriately focused on Iran, but to the exclusion of other
concerns, in some people's judgment--places of enormous
importance have, in our judgment, not received some of the
focus that, perhaps, they should.
Our intelligence agencies have just issued a dire warning
about the threat posed by al-Qaeda in the tribal areas of
Pakistan. The Taliban is using Pakistani territory as a base
for attacks in Afghanistan. There has been a major increase in
extremist violence, following the attack on the Red Mosque, and
the political turmoil surrounding the ouster and reinstatement
of Chief Justice Chaudhry has put President Musharraf in a
precarious position, with new elections scheduled for the fall.
So, obviously, all of these issues, we look forward to hearing
your views on them, and the administration's strategy for
Pakistan, going forward.
But I want to say just a few words about this. People I
have talked with and met with privately in the past months
indicate to me that events in Afghanistan are going a lot less
well than we would like. And that has not necessarily received
the public attention that it ought to. And it is related--
directly related, intimately related--what is happening in
Pakistan, and, most notably, to what is not happening in
Pakistan.
This relationship is one of the most important, I want to
underscore, that we have, strategically and substantively,
anywhere in the world right now, and it is also one of the most
complex. We need to make it clear to Pakistan--and I want to
emphasize, here today, when I say ``Pakistan,'' I don't just
mean the Musharraf government. Pakistan, to America, cannot
just mean Musharraf, it must mean Pakistanis and the country,
and the country's aspirations. And we need to make it clear to
Pakistan, to both the government and the people, that we are
committed to sustaining and building this relationship over the
long term in a manner that serves both of our countries'
interests.
We appreciate the very significant contributions and
sacrifices that Pakistanis have made in the fight against al
Qaeda and Islamic extremists. At the same time, it is clear
that our current strategy in Pakistan has not been working as
well as it should, or must, particularly when it comes to our
core objectives of fighting terrorism and promoting democracy.
We understand that it's a delicate balance between moving
Pakistan in a more positive direction and not causing a major
rupture in the relationship--not encouraging the worst
outcomes--that we hope to avoid.
So, I hope we'll come away from today's hearing with a
better understanding of the administration's views, and
particularly its plans, and how we can all work to build an
effective long-term strategy.
Clearly, the most pressing and direct national security
concern that we face in Pakistan is the resurgence of al-Qaeda
in the tribal regions bordering Afghanistan. We were all deeply
troubled by the recent National Intelligence Estimate, entitled
``The Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland,'' which made clear
that, while we've been distracted and bogged down in Iraq, al-
Qaeda has grown stronger than at any time since 9/11. I would
remind the President, who took pains yesterday to point out in
South Carolina the importance of dealing with al-Qaeda, that
this is our own National Intelligence Estimate; these are our
own intelligence personnel, who are warning us of al-Qaeda's
strength, not in Iraq, but in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Al-Qaeda has grown stronger. The NIE brings home to all of
us, in the starkest possible terms, that al-Qaeda has--and I
quote the NIE--``regenerated key elements of its homeland
attack capability, including a safe haven in the Pakistan
federally administered tribal areas, operational lieutenants,
and its top leadership.'' Osama bin Laden and top al-Qaeda
leaders are likely still hiding out somewhere in the region,
and none of us here need to be reminded of the nightmare
scenario of the potential of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal falling
into the wrong hands.
We also know that the Taliban is using the tribal areas as
a base for launching attacks against coalition forces in
Afghanistan. And our generals tell us that Taliban leaders have
maintained a headquarters in Quetta. It is clear that we can't
succeed in the vital mission of stabilizing Afghanistan if the
enemies of the coalition and the Karzai government enjoy a safe
haven right across the border.
General Eikenberry, the former commanding general in
Afghanistan, summed it up simply: Al-Qaeda and Taliban
leadership presence inside Pakistan must be satisfactorily
addressed if we are to prevail in Afghanistan and if we are to
defeat the global threat posed by international terrorism. I
don't think anybody could put it more directly or succinctly or
accurately.
I might add that one of the reasons, I am told by some
experts, that we've lost a little foothold with respect to the
Taliban is because of the lack of success in Iraq, coupled with
the lack of success in Afghanistan, which is coupled to the
lack of delivery on the civil side, which has disillusioned
Pashtun from believing, somehow, that the outcome will be what
they thought it would be at the outset. And when the outcome is
in doubt, people play their own games and align themselves
differently.
So, the lack of focus has cost us, very significantly,
folks, and that's part of what we want to deal with here today.
The central front in the fight against terrorism is right
where it always has been, along the Afghanistan-Pakistan
border. We simply cannot allow history to repeat itself, and
many of us here are concerned that there may not be the
implementation of an effective strategy, if there is a defined,
effective strategy, in order to counter this threat.
Our intelligence community has linked the resurgence of al-
Qaeda and the Taliban in this area directly to an agreement
that President Musharraf struck with tribal leaders in
Waziristan. I was in Pakistan at that period of time, and I
remember commenting then to President Musharraf and to the
press, publicly, that the treaty raised serious questions about
whether or not it was an appeasement and abdication of our
responsibilities. The administration has now finally
acknowledged that the treaty has not worked for Pakistan, and
it has not worked for the United States.
After the attack on the Red Mosque, the Taliban declared
the deal was dead, and we've even seen increased presence of
Pakistani troops in the tribal areas since then. Yet, still we
hear that President Musharraf is actually trying to revive that
agreement. And I would say, today, as firmly as I can, that
going back to a failed strategy is not the answer. The
administration has also made it clear that they haven't ruled
out U.S. military operations in the area. We must be prepared
to use force, if necessary, to protect our interests, but
sending United States ground troops into Pakistani territory
obviously raises many difficult issues for us, as well as it
does for Pakistan.
We also have a 5-year, $750 million plan for winning over
the local population in the area. But real concerns have been
raised about whether that money can actually be put to good
use. We'll be interested to hear your views, Mr. Secretary,
about the strategy for dealing with this threat, both in the
short term and the long term.
We also need to consider the role of U.S. aid in advancing
our interests. Since 9/11, we've given Pakistan roughly $10
billion in aid, and, likely, billions more in covert
assistance. Roughly 75 percent of this aid has gone to
reimbursement of counterterrorism expenses and other security
assistance. We clearly have a right to expect more in return
for the investment of $10 billion, a massive amount of aid in
the fight against terrorism. At the same time, less than 10
percent of our aid goes to development and humanitarian
assistance. And I think we have to give strong consideration to
whether targeting more of that assistance to projects that help
the Pakistani people understand the stakes of this fight and
the benefits of this fight may, in fact, make a difference, or
not.
One area we should pay particular attention to is funding
for education, which the bipartisan 9/11 Commission emphasized
was key to promoting moderation. This is especially important,
given that more than half of Pakistan's population is under 15
years of age. Again, when I was in Pakistan, I had the
privilege of visiting the northern territories, near the
Himalayas, where the earthquake had taken place, and we did a
remarkable job in providing disaster relief. I think all
countries who took part in that should be very proud of their
efforts. But one thing that struck me when I was in the high
country, I met hundreds of kids who were in school, all of them
for the very first time in their lives. That was the first time
that they had come out of the mountains and actually been
organized in a way that could educate them.
So, these are enormous tasks and challenges, and I think
they deserve to be on the table as we consider the longer term
strategy.
Finally, we've reached a critical period for the future of
democracy in Pakistan. It's clear that reinforcing our strong
commitment to democracy, human rights, and respect for rule of
law is in the best interests of all Pakistanis and of the
United States. President Musharraf's term is set to expire this
fall, and, under Pakistani law, the national and provincial
assemblies must conduct new Presidential elections by October,
with new legislative elections to follow. The Pakistani Supreme
Court may have to rule on whether President Musharraf can stay
on in his role as chief of the military and whether he can
legally be reelected by a lame-duck Parliament. These are big
issues for any country.
Now that Chief Justice Chaudhry has been reinstated to the
court, there appears to be a strong possibility that it will
rule against President Musharraf on these questions. So, we
need to be prepared for that eventuality and the possibility
that President Musharraf might leave office, or be forced out
of office.
In fact, although he may be hedging on this now, President
Musharraf has said in the past, and he said it to me personally
in my visit with him, that he will live up to his promise, and
that he will relinquish his military role. And Khurshid Kasuri,
the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, said, during this recent
visit, that President Musharraf was still planning to do so. We
must make it clear that we expect President Musharraf to live
up to that promise, that it's an important one, in terms of our
relationship with Pakistan, and with him, personally.
It's also critically important that the upcoming elections
are free and fair, and we should work to ensure that they are
conducted transparently and legitimately. This sends an
important message of support to the people of Pakistan, who are
increasingly insistent on restoring true democratic rule and
will help to undermine extremists, in the long run. That is
part of a strategy against terror.
We must also continue to raise our strong concerns over the
unexplained disappearance of some 400 people, the arrest of
hundreds of political activists from opposition parties, and
the recent crackdown on the media.
Finally, we must also consider Pakistan's relationship with
India, especially when it comes to Kashmir, the security of
Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, and the current status of our
efforts to ensure that the proliferation disaster we
experienced with A.Q. Khan, that that network can never be
repeated.
With these comments, I turn to Senator Lugar.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
As you've mentioned, the United States relationship with
Pakistan is one of the most critical in the world today, and
also one of the most complex. I'm especially pleased that we
will be able to gain the insights of Nick Burns, who has played
such an important role in our diplomacy in the region, and to
hear from a distinguished panel of experts.
While Pakistan was a long-time and important friend of the
United States, the September 2001 terrorist attack led us to
intensify our engagement to ensure a strong and productive
relationship. Voices in Congress now have been calling for a
review of this policy. The common refrain is that American aid
should be conditioned on improved performance in the war on
terror and progress toward democracy and away from military
rule.
Recent events in Pakistan have once again thrown our
relationship into high relief. President Musharraf's decision,
last spring, to suspend the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
aroused considerable controversy, especially among those
already unhappy that he has declined to relinquish his role as
military chief. The court decision, last week, which reinstated
the Chief Justice, while auguring well for judicial
independence, nonetheless puts President Musharraf in a
difficult political position. His decision, earlier in June, to
order a commando assault against Islamic militants illegally
occupying an Islamabad mosque provoked a violent reaction among
some Islamists.
Setbacks in the security situation, especially in the areas
along the Afghan border, have been detrimental to both United
States and Pakistani interests. The collapse of the cease-fire
in the federally administered tribal areas could presage more
fighting for the Pakistani military, which lost hundreds of
soldiers in the unforgiving terrain prior to this truce. A new
United States intelligence report says al-Qaeda has
reconstituted itself in the tribal areas, stronger than at any
time in a year. In addition, Taliban fighters, bent on
destabilizing Afghanistan, move between the tribal areas and
Afghan villages. There has been considerable discussion about
the appropriate United States response to this al-Qaeda and
Taliban activity inside Pakistan, and I hope Under Secretary
Burns will be able to clarify the administration's position.
Moreover, Pakistan's army is designed, trained, and
equipped to fight India and Kashmir, and to deter India with
nuclear weapons. This requires a dramatically different
capability from that needed in the tribal areas, which is why
the United States is rushing to supply the military with more
money and weapons. The United States is said to be planning to
provide $750 million over the next 5 years in these troubled
areas to help win over the general populace and persuade them
to end their support for al-Qaeda and Taliban militants. But
there are obvious dangers in distributing so much money in a
hostile region, where oversight is virtually impossible, even
by the Pakistani Central Government, much less by the United
States. After all, the tribal chiefs have, for years,
accommodated the very groups that America seeks to drive out.
This committee and the Congress would like to know what
safeguards and monitoring mechanisms the administration would
employ to ensure that such funds are effective. I believe it's
fair to ask whether it was wise to try to use development aid
as a counterinsurgency tool in this remote hinterland; and, if
it is, can we do it in a way that maximizes our chances of
success?
Mr. Secretary, I know, from your experience with this
committee, that you have given these important questions great
thought already. Many in Congress who have supported the
administration's policies in South Asia for nearly 5 years are
now asking whether it is time for a course correction, and we
look forward to hearing your analysis and your recommendations
today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Kerry. Thank you, Senator Lugar.
Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, I have no statement, and look
forward to the Secretary's comments.
Thank you.
Senator Kerry. Thank you very much.
Secretary Burns, thanks, again, for being here, and we look
forward to your testimony.
STATEMENT OF HON. R. NICHOLAS BURNS, UNDER SECRETARY FOR
POLITICAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Secretary Burns. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Senator
Lugar, members of the committee, it's a pleasure to be here.
And I think you're right, Mr. Chairman, to have called this
hearing. I agree with you--I listened carefully to your opening
statements--that there is no more important challenge for our
country than the battle in Afghanistan and Pakistan and on the
border area, the battle that we have, and they have, with al-
Qaeda and with the Taliban. And I hope that, by the end of this
hearing, you will become convinced that we are focused on this.
We have 27,000 American troops in Afghanistan. We have the
fifth-largest aid program in the world in Pakistan. We've
brought all of the efforts and will of our government to bear,
diplomacy and militarily, on this crisis area for many years,
since 2001.
I'm here today to underscore that we need to have a
successful American engagement with Pakistan, because that
speaks to our vital national security interests.
Pakistan, right now, is one of our closest partners,
globally. It is, without any question, our indispensable--our
most indispensable partner in the fight against al-Qaeda and
the other Islamic terrorist groups in South Asia. It is also,
without any question, the most important country affecting our
efforts in Afghanistan, given the degree of involvement of the
terrorist groups crossing back and forth over that eastern
border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. It's also, of course,
one of the leading Muslim countries in the world, and it's--it
is situated in an area that is now of vital importance to the
United States: South Asia. I don't think we would have said
that 20 years ago, or 30 years ago, but, of course, we say it
now.
At the same time that we debate American policy, as you
note very correctly, Pakistan is facing tremendous internal
challenges. And these challenges are its own to manage, but we
have a clear interest in the outcome of the struggle within
Pakistan itself; and its future stability and prosperity, and
whether or not it can become a fully fledged democracy, will be
important indicators of whether or not the American policy in
the region can succeed. So, we hope that Pakistan will become a
more democratic country. We hope that the government will lead
the country, and, as you say, all Pakistanis, to that place.
And we're committed to remaining a close partner to the
Government of Pakistan, but also the people of Pakistan, as we
proceed.
We have a rather unusual history with that country. And I
know you all are well aware of that history over the last half-
century. It's been tumultuous. We had very close cooperation
after Pakistan's independence in the 1950s, through CENTO and
SEATO. But, then we gave way to a period of inaction, in the
1960s. There was President Nixon's famous tilt toward Pakistan,
and then, of course, some of his successors tilted away. We had
a very close period of partnership against the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan in the 1980s, but then we parted ways over
Pakistan's unwelcome development of its nuclear weapons
program.
Post-9/11, Musharraf threw in his lot with us, and we are,
together with him, and, we believe, with the Pakistani people,
the great majority of them, in wanting their country to be
peaceful and stable, and wanting their country to resist al-
Qaeda and the Taliban. And, as I said before, I think the
single greatest change to our strategic interests, perhaps even
globally, has been the newfound realization that what happens
in South Asia--in Afghanistan, with Pakistan, with our new
strategic relationship with India--is now of singular
importance to us and of vital importance to our most important
national interests.
And so, we see Pakistan through this historical prism, but
we also see it through the strategic prism of what's important
to the United States as we try to fight these radical terrorist
groups and stabilize Afghanistan, and then take advantage of
the more positive opportunities with India and the other
countries.
I wanted to say this, and just reflect a bit on the
history, because I think the Pakistani people--average
Pakistanis--many of them say, ``Well, the United States has
been very inconsistent in its engagement with our country over
many decades. Are you going to be consistent?'' And I think the
answer is that there's nothing more important, at this time,
than that we Americans be consistently engaged and committed to
try to do the right thing with Pakistan and help that country
to become more stable. And so, I hope that Pakistanis will see
the United States as a reliable friend and a reliable partner.
I hope they'll understand, as well, and the government will
understand, that, as a good friend, we need to speak frankly
from time to time with them and about them. We're going to
disagree with Pakistan, as we have in the last several weeks,
sometimes, about how to prosecute the war against al-Qaeda and
the Taliban. We will disagree, perhaps, about the right way to
build a democratic state. But there's no question that we
Americans have a stake there, and it needs to be a long-term
stake, and we need to sustain this over the period of the next
decade, or more.
Now, obviously, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman--and Senator
Lugar did, as well--by far, our most important interest is to
work with the Pakistanis to get right this question of the best
strategy and the best set of tactics to fight global terrorism
and extremism. President Musharraf, I think, as you know, has
been the victim of several terrorist attacks on his own life.
He has lost 600,000--600 soldiers--excuse me--since 9/11 on the
border with Afghanistan in the northwest frontier province,
fighting the terrorist groups. We don't question the will of
President Musharraf. But there's a legitimate question about
what kind of policies should be pursued by the Pakistani
government and our Government in order to be successful.
They have killed or captured more al-Qaeda than anybody
else--Pakistan has--over the last 6 years. They have arrested
hundreds of terrorist suspects. They have turned over to the
United States senior al-Qaeda figures, such as Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed and Ramzi bin al-Shibh, and Abu Zubaida. They've
stationed, now, 100,000 troops on the Pakistan-Afghan border,
and that was a very lightly defended border, as you all know,
unfortunately, before 9/11. And, as I said, a number of those
troops, 600, have lost their lives in battles against the
terrorists groups.
So, I think, as Americans, we should give the Pakistani
Government and people their due. They've been committed. They
have made a great effort to try to fight the terrorist groups,
but not always with the kind of success that we would expect,
or desire, to see.
Now, this month, after their efforts to find a peaceful
resolution through this Waziristan agreement clearly failed,
the Pakistani Government has moved in a different direction.
They've moved to confront the terrorist groups. They did that,
certainly, in the Red Mosque incident in Islamabad, but they've
also done it on the border.
We have to have a perspective on this fight. We know that
it's going to be long and extremely challenging. We know the
tribal areas of the mountainous border regions with Afghanistan
have never been within the effective control of any central
government. We know that the regions of north and south
Waziristan have become safe havens for terrorism and extremist
activity. And we know--and, in part, Mr. Chairman, you quoted
the unclassified portion of the National Intelligence
Estimate--that al-Qaeda has found a refuge inside Pakistan, as
has the Taliban. And so, we hope that the Pakistani Government
can now strengthen and elevate its efforts to fight these
groups.
In the tribal area, just in the last several weeks, the
dominant story has been the increase in fighting between the
insurgent groups and the Pakistani military. And the Pakistani
military has recently brought in a group number of additional
troops, just over the last several weeks, to deal with that
threat, and they have just recently captured some major Taliban
figures, such as Mullah Obaidullah.
Now, it's also expanded its political efforts to try to
work to boost the capacity of the local tribes to resist and
expel extremists. They've had some successes. They've been
limited. There has been a success in leading to the expulsion
of al-Qaeda-affiliated Uzbek terrorists in and around south
Waziristan. But, from--these initiatives apart, I think we need
to see a more sustained and effective effort by the Pakistani
Government to defeat the terrorist forces on its soil.
Our assistance to Pakistan is twofold. We have a great deal
of military assistance that has been going into the country
since 9/11, and that will continue, with the support of the
Congress and the agreement of the Congress, in the next several
years. But we are also paying attention, Mr. Chairman, to what
you suggested, and that is the life of the Pakistanis
themselves, particularly the poor Pakistanis. We have a large
program to try to build schools, to try to help change
curriculum, and try to give kids an opportunity, not just to go
to the madrassahs, but to go to other schools that will teach
tolerance and reason, and teach peace. And we also have a
large-scale program underway--you mentioned it--to help
Pakistanis, particularly in the Kashmir region, to overcome the
vestiges of the earthquake. So, there's a lot that's happening
on the economic and humanitarian and reconstruction side of the
country, building roads in the tribal areas, that is very
important for the future. But there's no question that we also
have to be concerned about helping the Pakistani military to be
equipped appropriately and to be trained appropriately to fight
a different kind of war than they had been anticipating over
several decades. And Senator Lugar made that point. Their
battle in the future is not with India. They should have a
peaceful relationship with India, through the composite dialog
and through the improvement that we've seen between the Indian
and Pakistani governments over the last several years. Their
battle has to be with al-Qaeda and the Taliban and the other
terrorist groups.
So, we would like Pakistan to do more here in this effort
against the terrorist groups, and we'd like them to try to
think through--and I know they are--the appropriate strategy.
Now, you referred to this North Waziristan agreement. It
was designed to empower local tribes to fight al-Qaeda, and to
do so in a way that the Pakistani military wouldn't have to
intervene and inadvertently kill Pakistani civilians. But,
apart from that successful expulsion of Uzbek terrorists, that
agreement did not work. And, as you said, Mr. Chairman--we have
said so publicly in the last couple of weeks--it didn't work
well for the Pakistanis, and it certainly didn't work well for
American interests there. So, we've now seen this resurgence of
the military going in, and we applaud that and encourage them
to be robust in fighting the terrorist group.
But, beyond that, I think that--I know that the Pakistani
Government recognizes that it cannot defeat terrorism in the
northwest frontier province by military means alone. There does
have to be a political dialog in the tribal areas with the
people who are influential in those areas. There must be an
effort to help rebuild the tribal areas, to provide it the kind
of infrastructure that's lacking access to education. And
that's behind the administration's request for $750 million
over 5 years to do that, to underwrite social and economic,
humanitarian and infrastructure development in tribal areas.
And so, it has to be a combination of a military strategy, but
also an economic and political strategy, to win the battle for
hearts and minds. Just as we Americans can't win the battle
against terrorists by military means alone anywhere in the
world, the Pakistanis cannot do that in their own country
either. That's an important point that they tell us, that the
Pakistani Government and people outside the government tell us.
And I think we are--we would all be mindful to build our
strategy based on that--based on that principle.
But there is more that that Pakistani Government itself can
do to fight terrorism. We're particularly concerned about
terrorist groups who exploit charitable donations. Their tactic
is to re-form themselves, once they're identified, under new
names, and they continue their work in financing extremism. We
think the government needs to pay attention to that.
We urge the Government of Pakistan to work with us to
accelerate joint efforts to prevent the financing of these band
terrorist organizations. And we urge Pakistan to pass an
antimoney-laundering bill that meets international standards,
and to establish a financial intelligence unit within the state
bank of Pakistan.
But, beyond those steps, and beyond a more assertive
military strategy, the Government of Pakistan wants to pay
attention to the--its ability to help poor people resist the
lure of terrorism, and, instead, turn their lives in more
productive directions.
So, that lies behind the two major programs that we've put
in front of the Congress. We are asking for support, for this
$750 million over the next 5 years. This is President
Musharraf's personal request to our Government, to underwrite
the humanitarian development of the tribal areas. And we think
that has the prospect of being effective over the long term. We
may not see immediate benefits. But, as a long-term measure, it
is the right thing to do in the way to fight--to root out the
roots of terrorism.
Second, we're trying to jumpstart the reconstruction
opportunity zones that President Bush and President Musharraf
and President Karzai have all talked about. When President Bush
visited both Afghanistan and Pakistan, in March 2006, President
Musharraf said, ``One of the problems in the border regions, on
both sides of the border, in the Pashtun areas, is that people
don't have access to jobs. And so, would it be possible for the
United States to bring into the United States, on a duty-free
basis, goods produced by local people on both sides of that
border, and, in fact, in enterprises that might straddle the
border between Afghanistan and Pakistan?'' And we've put this
concept of a reconstruction opportunity zone before the
Congress, in staff briefings in February, and now we're going
to ask for congressional support for this type of tariff
reduction. It's a complicated proposal, and it deserves a lot
of study. And I know that the Congress will ask lots of
questions. And you should. But we think this initiative on
trade, along with the initiative to help to try to bring some
economic support to the tribal areas, is an effective long-term
strategy.
I'm happy to answer questions on any of this, Mr. Chairman.
I would just say two more things before I close.
You mentioned--and were right to mention--the fact that, by
the end of January 2008, Pakistanis will go to the polls, both
for a Presidential election and a parliamentary election.
President Musharraf has said, many times, that he's pledged to
hold free and fair elections in accordance with Pakistan's
Constitution and within international standards. We have a
partnership with the Pakistanis, and so, it gives us the
opportunity to comment and to say that we would like to support
the long-term objective of the Pakistani people to achieve a
more--a fuller democracy and a better-functioning democracy,
and to see democratic rights bestowed on all the people of
Pakistan. And so, we've tried to be helpful. We're providing
some technical assistance, as we do in many countries around
the world in this situation, to the Pakistanis, to help them
organize their elections. We're working with NGOs to do that,
and with international organizations. But we believe the
Pakistani people should be free to elect their own leaders. And
we hope this is done in a way that would withstand
international scrutiny. And we hope that there'll be a
sustainable democracy, and a free press, and the right to free
assembly. And I think we're beginning to see an independent
judiciary assert itself, with the actions of the Supreme Court,
just over the last week, in restoring to his position the Chief
Justice.
And so, it is a dynamic time for Pakistani democracy. And,
of course, we'll have to balance the interests that we have in
that country, in terms of our public comments--we don't want to
seem to be as--at least our Government--as intrusive. But we do
have a point of view, and we don't shy away from voicing that
point of view.
We believe the Pakistani Government can do more to help
build this kind of evolution toward a full democracy, and that
it's in its best interests to do that.
And we'll all see the credibility of these elections. What
will the result be? Will people be able to go to the polls
freely and without fear of intimidation? Will they be able to
go to election, free of government manipulation? Will political
parties be able to organize and to contest the election? These
are elementary standards in our country and in any country. And
so, we assert them as interests.
Finally, I would say--and my last point would say, Mr.
Chairman--is that we are interested in education. We have a
major program to help rebuild schools and, as I said, to be
involved in curriculum development. And so, we're trying to pay
attention, in a comprehensive way, to all the different
interests that the United States has.
I think you raise, quite rightly, the fact that we have to
pay attention to the regional element of stability. We have
been very, very active in promoting, mainly through private
dialog, this nascent good beginning of better relations between
India and Pakistan. My two counterparts, the Foreign
Secretaries of both India and Pakistan, have a composite
dialog, and they meet frequently, and they discuss the Kashmir
issue, they discuss the Siachen Glacier issue, Sir Creek, and
the other disputes that have been so difficult between the two
countries for so many years, and we are optimistic that
President Musharraf and Prime Minister Singh are dedicated to
improve the relations between the two countries.
And one of the largest strategic moves that I think
President Clinton made, and now President Bush is making, as
well, is to assert a bigger relationship with India, a
strategic partnership. And, of course, we have this very close
relationship with Pakistan. So, this is an opportunity for our
country to be part of the development of a more stable
relationship between the two biggest powers, and to see South
Asia be a more peaceful region in relations among the great
powers there in the future. And I--we're paying attention to
that, and we're very much involved in it. And Secretary Rice,
in particular, in her discussions with the Prime Minister of
India and the President of Pakistan, has been very keen to make
sure that the United States plays mainly a behind-the-scenes
role, but a role that can be productive.
So, forgive me for going on a little bit longer than I had
anticipated. I have submitted testimony in written record,
which is longer, still. And I'd be happy to answer any
questions you have.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Burns follows:]
Prepared Statement of Under Secretary of State R. Nicholas Burns
Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to appear before the
Foreign Relations Committee. I am here today to underscore that
successful American engagement with Pakistan serves our vital national
security interests. Pakistan, one of our closest partners globally, has
been indispensable in our world-wide struggle against radical Islamic
terrorist groups. As Afghanistan's most influential neighbor, Pakistan
plays a pivotal role in the prosecution of our war effort. Pakistan is
also, of course, a leading Muslim country, whose future will be
decisive in the search for stability in South Asia--a region of vastly
increased importance to the United States.
At the same time, Pakistan faces enormous internal challenges.
While these challenges are its own to manage, we have a clear interest
in its future stability, prosperity, and success. We hope the country
will become more democratic, and are committed to remaining a close
partner as Pakistan makes a full transition to democracy. Our national
interests as well as the interests of 160 million Pakistanis depend on
it.
As this committee knows well, the history of America's relations
with Pakistan during the last half-century has been especially
tumultuous. We had early close cooperation in the 1950s after
Pakistan's independence through SEATO and CENTO, but that gave way to
disillusionment in the 1960s. President Nixon engineered a famous
``tilt'' toward Pakistan, and then his successors tilted away. We
partnered closely to defeat the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s,
but then parted ways over unwelcome advances in Pakistan's nuclear
weapons program. Our post-9/11 cooperation takes place against this
historical backdrop, as President Musharraf chose in 2001 to cast his
country's lot with ours in the fight against terrorist groups.
Indeed, September 11th brought the South Asia region to singular
importance in our foreign policy for the very first time, and redefined
our relationships there. The last six years have reinforced the
dramatically changed nature of the global threats we face and the
importance of our cooperation with Pakistan to counter them. South
Asia, as a whole, has become central to our security, especially as we
help Afghanistan to develop its fragile democracy and nurture
institutions of governance in their infancy. Pakistan is critical to
these efforts. For Pakistan's own development, we have pledged and
delivered significant economic and military assistance, which I will
address in greater detail. And yet we know that despite this clear
indication of our commitment to their country, many Pakistanis believe
we will again pull back-just as we did numerous times in the past. For
this reason, I can think of nothing more important to this relationship
at this moment than continued American attention, commitment, and
engagement with the government of Pakistan, as well as with the people
of Pakistan. Pakistanis should be assured that we will be a good and
reliable friend. But, as a good friend, we will speak frankly and
sometimes disagree on vital issues such as the best way to defeat
terrorist groups, and the right way to build a democratic state. Our
continued partnership will build Pakistan's confidence that indeed we
share its interests. We seek for Pakistan nothing less than the
fulfillment of the great promise that its founder, Mohammad Ali Jinnah,
envisioned. We Americans should work to help Pakistanis build durable
foundations for sustainable democracy, a moderate society, and an open
economy that offers prosperity and opportunity for its citizens.
pakistan as a counter-terror partner
Mr. Chairman, you and the members of the committee know how
important Pakistan has been to our ongoing mission in Afghanistan.
While the threat of the Taliban remains, this group of violent
extremists no longer subordinates an entire country to its bizarre and
cruel policies. Without Pakistani support and cooperation for our
current military operations, we would face severe difficulties in
supplying, reinforcing, and protecting our troops and those of our
allies who are defending the democratically elected Afghan government.
Countering terrorism and violent extremist ideology is a priority
in our agenda with Pakistan. Terrorism threatens Pakistani security,
too: President Musharraf himself has been the victim of several
assassination attempts. And Pakistan does a great deal on this front,
having killed or captured more al-Qaida operatives than any other
country in the world. Since 2001, the Pakistani government has arrested
hundreds of terrorist suspects, turning over to the U.S. such senior
al-Qaida figures as Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Ramzi bin al Shibh, and Abu
Zubaida. Pakistan has stationed 100,000 troops on the rough terrain of
the Afghanistan border, and more than 600 members of Pakistan's
security forces have sacrificed their lives in support of anti-terror
efforts. This month, after all decisively against extremists in
Islamabad's Red Mosque.
Despite these achievements, we know this fight will be long and
extremely challenging. We know that the tribal areas of the mountainous
border regions inside Pakistan have never been within the effective
control of any central government. We know that the regions of North
and South Waziristan have become safehavens for violent extremist and
terrorist activity. Recent reports of al-Qaida's activity there
underscore the need for Pakistan to continue its efforts, and elevate
its efforts, to fight this enemy. In the Tribal Areas we have already
seen an increase in violence at the hands of groups who stand in the
way of security and peace. To quell the renewed violence in these
areas, the Pakistani government has brought in additional troops,
strengthened border posts and controls, and helped kill or capture
major Taliban figures such as Mullah Obaidullah. It has also expanded
its political efforts by working to boost the capacity and will of
local tribes to resist and expel extremists in their midst, achieving
some successes such as the expulsion of al-Qaida-affiliated Uzbeks in
and around South Waziristan.
These initiatives apart, we would like to see a more sustained and
effective effort by the Pakistani government to defeat terrorist forces
on its soil. Al-Qaida remains a potent force inside Pakistan, as is the
Taliban. Defeating these enemies is essential to our effort to defeat
terrorism in South Asia and around the world.
strengthening pakistan's counter-terror capacity
Our assistance to Pakistan has significantly strengthened
Pakistan's capability to combat extremist forces. Assistance comes in
two forms: security assistance, which enhances Pakistan's ability to
fight terrorist actors, and bilateral assistance in areas such as
governance and economic reform, focused on creating an environment
inhospitable to terrorists and violent extremists.
Our military and border security assistance has allowed Pakistan to
establish a permanent presence in previously unpatrolled sections of
the rugged Pakistan-Afghan border for the first time. We have provided
equipment such as helicopters and radios to make these forces more
effective, and we have also provided training. We work closely with the
Department of Defense, with our Pakistani counterparts, and with
Congress to keep these border forces appropriately equipped and
properly trained to conduct counter-terror operations effectively.
Mr. Chairman, counter-terror operations in the border areas of the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas take place in a uniquely ungoverned
environment. In recent days there has been increased attention on more
aggressive actions, which we welcome, on the part of the Pakistani
government to deal with these problems, and we would frankly like
Pakistan to do even more here. The committee members will all be aware
that President Musharraf has tried a number of methods to enlist
counter-terror cooperation from local tribal groups, most notably with
the North Waziristan Agreement. That agreement was designed to empower
local tribes to fight al-Qaida directly, in order to reduce incidents
of Pakistani Army forces fighting against their fellow citizens
inadvertently. Apart from the successful expulsion of Uzbek terrorists,
the tribes proved too often unable or unwilling to control the al-Qaida
elements within their territories. This agreement has not worked well
for the Pakistani government, nor has it worked well for us. As a
result, the Pakistani government has recently reinserted its forces
into the tribal areas. We would like to see the top al-Qaida and
Taliban leaders, who we believe intentionally use Pakistan as a
safehaven, brought to justice. Long term denial of these areas to
terrorists will require local cooperation, and Pakistan will have to
find a more effective and successful way to do so.
We want to see Pakistan use all tools at its disposal to choke the
flow of funds to terrorist groups. We are particularly concerned about
terrorist groups exploiting charitable donations, and by their tactic
of re-forming under new names to evade international prohibitions on
donations to terrorist organizations. We urge the government of
Pakistan to work with us to accelerate our joint efforts to prevent
financing of banned terrorist organizations. We urge Pakistan to pass
an Anti-Money Laundering bill that meets international standards, and
to establish a Financial Intelligence Unit within the State Bank of
Pakistan.
the long-term: development to counter terrorism
Beyond these specific counter-terror efforts, we seek to diminish
the effectiveness of terrorists in the Tribal Areas and elsewhere by
changing the economic opportunities available to the desperately poor
and chronically ungoverned. President Musharraf shares with the USG a
recognition that we cannot counter terrorism and other forms of violent
extremism by military means alone; we must create an environment
inhospitable to future terrorism. To this end, we have a major program
of economic assistance to Pakistan, our fifth-largest aid program
worldwide. This year, we worked with Congress to provide $843 million
for economic and security assistance to Pakistan, including expanded
efforts in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). We tailor
our development assistance in Pakistan to build sustainable growth,
improve living standards, and promote good governance, responsible
citizenship, and foreign investment.
During President Bush's visit to Islamabad in March 2006, President
Musharraf asked for a substantial U.S. effort to help implement the
FATA Sustainable Development Plan. In February, we briefed the Congress
on our multi-year plan to assist Musharraf's effort. We plan to seek
$150 million per year for five years--a total of $750 million from FY
2007 to FY 2011. These funds will be used to assist the government of
Pakistan to improve livelihoods and employment, improve access to
health and education, improve infrastructure and roads, and assist the
government to improve communications with the people of the Tribal
Areas on the programs planned and delivered. We believe this initiative
will help eliminate extremist safe havens on the Afghan border and
reduce the appeal of extremist ideology.
The Tribal Areas are some of the poorest regions in all of
Pakistan. Domestic extremists inside Pakistan rely heavily on a large
population of young men lacking access to a modern education and to
quality employment. Economic and educational reform can play a
significant role in Pakistan's domestic anti-extremist efforts. We
believe this Pakistani strategy, supported by the U.S. and other
international donors, has the potential to make these areas less
hospitable over the long term to al-Qaida, the Taliban, and other
extremist groups, while improving the quality of life for citizens
there. We also intend to support the local security force, the Frontier
Corps, by developing its capacity to extend the rule of law throughout
the Tribal Areas. Our funding will be used to boost the capacity of the
local governmental agencies to implement these funds over a 5-year
period.
Mr. Chairman, President Bush has also announced his intention to
jumpstart the creation of Reconstruction Opportunity Zones as a
critical part of our broader counterterrorism strategy, designed to
connect isolated regions to the global economy and create greater
employment opportunities in territories prone to extremism. Through
these zones, located in the border regions of Pakistan and Afghanistan,
we hope to encourage investment and economic development by granting
duty-free entry to the United States for certain goods produced on both
sides of the border. We hope that new investment will, in turn, create
employment alternatives for working-age young men who may otherwise be
drawn into terrorism, narcotics trafficking, or other illicit
activities. We expect the zones to be a focal point for interconnected
efforts by the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan as well as the
international donor community to build better roads and other
infrastructure improvements, and to remove bureaucratic barriers to
investment and export. We want to work with Congress to pass the
legislation necessary to create this trade preference program so that
we can utilize this important economic tool in our fight against
terrorism.
progress on counter-proliferation
Mr. Chairman, in the last three years we have seen some progress by
Pakistan in disabling the A.Q. Khan proliferation network and taking
steps to deny its reconstitution. A.Q. Khan did enormous damage to
international efforts to restrain the spread of nuclear technology. The
government of Pakistan has direct responsibility to help us undo that
damage and ensure it does not happen again. During President Bush's
visit to Pakistan in 2006, President Musharraf committed that Pakistan
would take a leading role in international efforts to prevent the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems,
and related technology and expertise. We welcome the action Pakistan
has taken to bring its export controls in line with international
standards, including the recent establishment of a Strategic Export
Control Division within its Ministry of Foreign Affairs to centralize
licensing and enforcement. Pakistan continues its cooperation with the
United States under the Export Control and Related Border Security
(EXBS) program. We welcome Pakistan's participation in the Container
Security Initiative and the Secure Freight Initiative, under which the
United States and Pakistan worked together to install screening and
radiation detection equipment to scan U.S.-bound cargo. We are also
pleased that, in early June, Pakistan joined the Global Initiative to
Combat Nuclear Terrorism. We remain engaged with Pakistan on this full
range of nonproliferation and counter-proliferation issues, as they
remain vital to U.S. and global interests and key to ensuring a shadow
proliferation network does not arise again in Pakistan. Additionally,
the U.S. Department of Energy is working with their counterparts in
Pakistan on radiation source security and is in the process of
finalizing an agreement to install radiation detection equipment at
Pakistani ports and border crossings. We hope Pakistan will continue to
take steps to join additional international nonproliferation programs
and regimes so it can finally move beyond the stigma of the A.Q. Khan
era.
supporting democratic transition
Before the end of January 2008, Pakistanis will go to the polls-
both for president and parliament. President Musharraf has pledged to
hold free and fair elections in accordance with Pakistan's Constitution
and with international standards. Our partnership with the Pakistanis
gives us an opportunity to support the long-term objective of
Pakistan's transformation to a modern, democratic state, and a moderate
voice in the Islamic world.
To support Pakistan's electoral process, we are providing technical
advice and assistance. We believe that Pakistani citizens must be able
to freely and fairly choose their own leaders, and chart their own
course through a civilian-led democratic government, in accordance with
the Pakistani Constitution, as President Musharraf has promised. But we
in the U.S. also know that democracy means more than just holding
elections. It means building the foundations of sustainable democracy:
a free and vibrant press, the right to free assembly, an independent
legislature and judiciary, active civil society organizations, and
broadly participative and internally democratic political parties. The
Pakistani government will need to do more to help build such a system
of government. Our governance and democracy assistance programs aim to
strengthen institutions such as a free media, a responsive legislature
and issue-based political parties and support nongovernmental
organizations, with an eye to bolstering Pakistan's civil institutions
and long-term political stability. Department of Justice programs in
Pakistan, supported by the State Department, work to ensure an
accessible, viable, secure justice system. These efforts also work
toward ensuring that Pakistan has the legislative tools necessary to
meet international conventions.
Throughout the world, the United States backs democratic
institutions with training, assistance and political support. We plan
to intensify these efforts in Pakistan in the months and years ahead.
The credibility of Pakistan's elections will rest on the ability of
Pakistani political parties to campaign and seek votes openly; the
ability of Pakistani voters to vote on election day for the political
parties and candidates of their choice, in an election free of
government manipulation; the ability of political parties to adjudicate
post-election disputes in a timely fashion; an election commission that
is viewed by political parties as independent and impartial; and the
ability of those political parties who emerge with a majority of the
votes to form a democratic government reflecting the will of Pakistan's
electorate.
supporting opportunity for all
Nothing determines individual, and therefore societal, success more
than access to education. We have thus made education a core focus of
our economic assistance. We are supporting the Pakistani government's
efforts to upgrade public education, placing emphasis on improving the
quality and affordability of Pakistan's public schools. USAID is
helping increase school enrollment by constructing and furnishing
sixty-five primary, middle, and high schools in five agencies within
the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. These efforts will allow
impoverished parents to give their children educational opportunities
beyond religiously oriented madrassahs.
We are pleased that the increased resources to Pakistan's education
sector have already shown encouraging results. National school
enrollments have increased 5.7% from 2000 to 2005. In the Punjab,
Pakistan's largest province, provision of free textbooks and stipends
paid to female students have increased enrollment by more than two
million students since 2001, many of them female. In the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas, enrollments have increased 38% since 2000
with female enrollment accounting for 27% of the total. National female
literacy rates increased from 32% in 1998 to 40% in 2005.
Pakistan has undertaken a comprehensive reform of its school
curriculum, which aims to remove teaching material encouraging violent
extremism, and to modernize school curricula in areas such as English-
language, science, history, and mathematics. In addition, in
recognition of the critical role that international study and higher
education play in developing the next generation of Pakistani teachers
and leaders, we have partnered with Pakistan to make available over the
next few years 500 Fulbright Commission scholarships for graduate
degree study in the United States. This represents the largest U.S.
government dollar contribution to any Fulbright program in the world,
and helps Pakistan strengthen its human capital base to support its
university system and build an innovation society. Programs for youth
and their teachers have also been quite successful. To date, 157
Pakistani high school students have spent an academic year with U.S.
host families under the YES (Youth Exchange Study) program. Fifty-five
more students are expected for the upcoming academic year.
The State Department's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs
is also funding teacher training programs in Pakistan, including in the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas, as well as bringing Pakistani
teachers to the U.S. for additional training. This summer, for example,
for the fourth consecutive year, teachers from across Pakistan have
studied educational methodologies at Plymouth State College in New
Hampshire. Since 2004, the teachers returning from Plymouth State have
trained 10,000 more of their colleagues.
We are also working closely with our Pakistani and non-governmental
partners on women's rights and legal protection for ethnic and
religious minorities, and combating forced child labor and human
trafficking. The State Department's Office of Democracy, Human Rights,
and Labor plans to provide $150,000 to the Mukhtaran Mai Welfare
Organization for gender-based violence training for its resource center
workers, and will also offer capacity building and strategic planning
technical assistance.
Women's health is a particular challenge in Pakistan, but we
believe the rate of maternal mortality can be lowered significantly
with properly trained rural health providers. The U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) provides such training. In December
2006 President Musharraf signed the Women's Protection Act amending the
Hudood Ordinance, marking a significant step toward improving the legal
rights of women in Pakistan by allowing criminal courts (rather than
religious courts) to try rape cases. The Act marks the first time in
nearly three decades that a Pakistani government has modified
discriminatory laws that have stood virtually untouched since the time
of General Zia-ul-Haq.
getting our message across accurately
Mr. Chairman, as you can imagine, we face an active and often
hostile press in Pakistan. Our public diplomacy programs in Pakistan
disseminate our message to the widest possible audience and expose
influential people and institutions to U.S. policies, views, and
values. Despite considerable security constraints, our outreach
programs include long-established and respected exchange programs such
as the Fulbright, Humphrey, and International and Voluntary Visitor
programs, as well as innovative use of print and electronic media, the
internet, five new Lincoln Corners centers, a visiting speakers
program, and an enhanced public speaking engagement program for mission
personnel to further share our policies and values with the Pakistani
public. Pakistan is one of 19 pilot countries that will receive
significant new funding from the $40 million allocated to public
diplomacy as part of the Global War on Terror FY 2007 supplemental.
But it is our concrete assistance to average Pakistanis that has
been the best form of public diplomacy. I was impressed and moved by
the Pakistani reaction to U.S. earthquake assistance in 2005, where the
immediate and overwhelming support of the U.S. military, USAID disaster
relief and reconstruction assistance, and the donations of private
Americans saved many lives. The U.S. government provided nearly $280
million in emergency and reconstruction assistance in the response to
the earthquake in FY 2006. This year, the Pakistani government will
direct $50 million in local currency to earthquake reconstruction
expenses from the local currency generated by the $200 million we
provided in budget support. Nothing could have been more effective in
demonstrating American values and disseminating a message of friendship
between our peoples. Indeed, we have data which illustrates the impact
of this visible aid: public opinion surveys in Pakistan carried out
right after the earthquake and subsequent American relief efforts
showed favorability ratings of the U.S. doubling, from 23% to 46%.
working toward regional peace and stability
Mr. Chairman, it is very much in our interest to see Pakistan's
relations with neighboring states improve. We continue to work with the
Pakistani and Afghan governments to strengthen stability along the
twists and furrows of their 1500-mile-long border. The joint statement
issued by President Musharraf and President Karzai in Ankara this
spring demonstrates some hope that cooperation between the two
countries might improve. But tensions remain, and the two governments
need to make a greater and more sustained effort to work effectively
together. U.S. and NATO policies must continue to foster expanded
Pakistan-Afghanistan bilateral dialogue, stronger economic and trade
ties, and deeper cooperation between Pakistani and Afghan border
security forces. With U.S. assistance, Pakistan is working to secure
its border with Afghanistan to prevent the smuggling of arms,
terrorists, and illegal drugs which are fueling the Taliban insurgency.
The difficulties of this terrain cannot be overstated but we will
continue to work with Pakistan to place it under control.
On the eastern border, we have been pleased to see renewed
commitment to Indo-Pakistan reconciliation. Pakistan and India opened
the fourth round of the Composite Dialogue this past March, a process
originally launched in 2004. The Dialogue addresses their long-standing
differences, not only over the Kashmir issue, but over other issues
such as the Siachen Glacier and Sir Creek. They have also opened a
direct channel to discuss counterterrorism, which we think is extremely
useful. We have been encouraged by the success of confidence-building
measures such as bus and rail links that restore old connections
severed at partition, allowing ordinary people to visit relations and
friends. We will continue to support both countries to improve their
relations. Secretary Rice and I have made a long-term improvement in
relations between India and Pakistan, and especially resolution of the
Kashmir dispute, a very high priority in our frequent high-level
discussions with both countries.
When she became Secretary of State two and one-half years ago,
Secretary Rice also promoted the creation of new economic and
technological links between South and Central Asia as a major American
priority. Pakistan and South Asia in general offer dynamic new markets
for energy from the landlocked nations of Central Asia. The largest
country in the region, India, has seen 8-9% economic growth in recent
years, accompanied by a rapid increase in energy consumption. It is now
the third-largest energy consumer in the world. Through infrastructure
projects such as roads and hydroelectric power in Turkmenistan,
Afghanistan, and Pakistan, we envision helping to tie these countries
closer together so they can provide a long-term and oil and gas bridge
from the Central Asian north down to South Asia. As economic
relationships develop to knit the countries of this broader region into
new areas of interdependence, we believe changed calculations of
national interests will offer dividends of peace and stability for all.
Pakistan is attempting to expand its sources of energy, and like
India, is looking at Iran as a source. We have made it abundantly clear
to both the Pakistani and Indian governments that a proposed pipeline
project with Iran is a bad idea, given Iran's refusal to comply with
its international nonproliferation obligations. We will continue to
urge Pakistan to pursue other sources for its growing energy needs.
our people in pakistan
Our embassy in Islamabad is currently led by one of our most
experienced and accomplished diplomats. Anne Patterson, who was
recently confirmed by the Senate, has already led the mission through
the Red Mosque standoff and its fallout, as well as the recent post-
cyclone flooding.
Embassy Islamabad and our consulates in Karachi, Lahore, and
Peshawar are dangerous and difficult posts, designated as unaccompanied
for families and loved ones, but our fine men and women serve with
distinction to advance key U.S. interests and to construct our
important strategic relationship with Pakistan.
closing statement
Mr. Chairman, in closing let me reiterate that the partnership
between Pakistan and the United States is successful and improving.
Both of our peoples have spilled blood in our common struggle to defeat
the terrorist enemy. Much remains to be done, however. We must continue
to focus on bringing top al-Qaida and Taliban leaders to justice. We
must continue the momentum engendered by Pakistan's recent success in
capturing or killing several Taliban leaders. And we must continue our
joint focus on moderating the extremism that emanates from Pakistan,
which our long-term development assistance targets.
We applaud the efforts of Pakistan, ask for its continued support
to defeat the extremists, and commit our support in return. In this
year of momentous transition for Pakistan, we are determined to ensure
that the substantial resources the American people provide to Pakistan
are utilized efficiently, effectively, and to support what all of us
want: Pakistan's transformation into a more stable, open, and secure
nation where its people can, in the future, live peacefully.
We look forward to working with Congress toward this goal.
Thank you, and I would be happy to take any of your questions.
Senator Kerry. Thank you very much, Secretary.
Your full statement will be placed in the record as if read
in full, and we appreciate that. And we're glad you did go on.
I think it's important to do so.
Given the number of Senators, what we'll do is have a 7-
minute round, and then, hopefully, we can come back a second
time, if people want to do that.
Mr. Secretary, in your testimony, you separated--and I want
to separate, for the purpose of this early discussion--the,
sort of, democracy and some of the issues, on one side, and
then the effort to fight terror, on the other. And you
certainly made the effort to deal with the increase in
terrorism and al-Qaeda paramount. And I think we would agree
with that.
That said, as I listened to your testimony, and I listened
to the talk of dealing with the charities and the financing,
and dealing with the money-laundering and financial
accountability, and then, of course, the economic side that you
talked about, the sort of humanitarian investment, and I don't
see, in any of that, a clear or comprehensive analysis with
respect to how you're going to deal with al-Qaeda and with the
increased influence of the Taliban, and the movement of weapons
and people between Afghanistan and Pakistan. You did say, in
your testimony, that--I think you agree--that there are areas
which clearly are under Taliban, and or, al-Qaeda control. You
agree with that, correct? There are areas in the territories,
as well as in the border region, including in Waziristan, where
it's almost a no-man's land.
Secretary Burns. Mr. Chairman, I think I remember saying
that al-Qaeda has certainly found a refuge, as have many
members--many leaders of the Taliban--inside the Pakistan part
of that border. I think I also mentioned that one of the cruel
historical facts of that area is that it's been----
Senator Kerry. Is that they've----
Ambassador Burns [continuing]. Ungoverned----
Senator Kerry [continuing]. Never been fully under control.
Ambassador Burns [continuing]. Or----
Senator Kerry. I understand.
Ambassador Burns [continuing]. All of Pakistan----
Senator Kerry. I understand. But let me come to where we're
in a critical struggle against an individual without ideology
who is determined to blow people up, kill them. And we all
understand the threat of al-Qaeda. I don't have to go through
that repetition here. But I don't hear from you the strategy
that suggests anything that's going to really alter that in any
fundamental way. And I think the question that a lot of
Americans and other people ask, is: How is it that you can have
a relationship with a country, and you give them $10 billion,
and they're ostensibly a democracy, and you hear these words,
but here are these folks who are criminal, No. 1, to the
world--again, ostensibly--and they live, sort of, with impunity
in this area, continuing to plot against the United States and
other countries?
Now, recently, Frances Townsend, the White House
Coordinator for Homeland Security, was quoted as saying, ``All
options are on the table when it comes to intervening in
Pakistan.'' Can you share with the committee, are those really
thoughts that, sort of, go to the far end of what I'm saying
about how you deal with this? If there is no capacity to
effectively find them, capture them, ``take them out,'' what is
the option that we're looking at, realistically?
Secretary Burns. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would answer your question by saying the following. We
have to have an effective strategy to defeat al-Qaeda in that
region, based on three factors:
First of all, there has to be an effective effort by the
Pakistani military to deal with the threat inside Pakistan.
And, I think, in my written testimony, and I tried to capture
in this in my oral comments, they've done some good things. We
know there's a commitment there. But it has not been as
effective as it should, and we are asking the Pakistani
Government to do more.
Second----
Senator Kerry. So, that's exclusively a Pakistani effort?
Secretary Burns. Well, I was just going to answer in three
parts. I mean, that's----
Senator Kerry. Right.
Ambassador Burns [continuing]. The first thing that has to
happen.
Second, we have a responsibility, with the Afghan
authorities, on the Afghan side of the border. Most of the
American forces, as you know, in Afghanistan are stationed in
the east, along the border, and then, we have four principal
NATO-country forces in the south. We have the British, we have
the Dutch, we have the Canadians, and we have other forces in
the south. That's the force--that NATO force--that needs to
deal with the Taliban as it comes across the border, as it
finds refuges inside of Afghanistan.
And, third--and what we have been lacking and need to see
an improvement on--we need to see effective cooperation between
Afghanistan and Pakistan. You know, President Bush has tried
very, very hard, on a personal level, to bring President Karzai
and Musharraf together. That's been at the command level. You
mentioned General Eikenberry. He was involved in a tripartite
effort, as his successors are, on a regular basis, to try to
bring the three militaries--United States, Pakistan, and
Afghan--together.
Senator Kerry. Well, it's my information that that was a
dreadful meeting, had a dreadful outcome, that the relationship
between President Karzai and President Musharraf is strained,
at best, and that there isn't really a high level of
cooperation.
Secretary Burns. There have been many meetings. Sometimes
the United States is present at the meetings, sometimes
Pakistan and Afghan leaders, including the two Presidents, meet
together, and they must continue, because they are fated to
live next door to each other, and they confront the same
challenge on both sides of that one border.
I would then just say, finally, Senator Kerry, that--you
asked about Fran Townsend's remarks--as we've reflected on
this--and, I think, to be fair to her and what she said the
other day--we understand that Pakistan is sovereign in its own
country. We understand that Pakistani forces are in the battle.
And it is always the preference to work with Pakistan on this
issue of counterterrorism. Fran said, the other day, and quite
correctly, that, given the primacy of the fight against al-
Qaeda and Osama bin Laden, if we have, in the future, certainty
of knowledge, then, of course, the United States would always
have the option of taking action on its own, but we prefer to
work with the Pakistani forces, and we, in most situations,
nearly every situation, do work with them.
Senator Kerry. Well, do you have any confidence, at this
point, that President Musharraf is, in fact, prepared to change
his strategy with respect to what the forces will be used for,
and how, in those territories what their engagement will be
now? Because last time, as you said, they went in there, it was
sufficiently tough for them, and negative, that they decided to
come out. And that's what prompted the agreement, in the first
place. Is there any indication that that would be any different
today?
Secretary Burns. Well, there's every indication. It's hard
to predict the future. And it's really difficult to say how
successful the Pakistani forces will be. But, just in the last
several weeks----
Senator Kerry. Was there something that's happened that's
changed what that outcome might be?
Secretary Burns. Well, I think so. I think it's--I think
it's been apparent, over the last few weeks, that the
Waziristan agreement, to let the tribal leaders taken on al-
Qaeda and the Taliban, did not succeed. And so, we've seen a
reintroduction of Pakistani military forces. And there's been a
tremendous amount of military activity, and lots of fighting,
by--on the part of the Pakistani military, against these
forces, just in the last few weeks. And you've seen lots of
terrorist bombs, suicide bombings, as well, particularly since
the Red Mosque incident. So, we've definitely seen a change of
tactics by the Pakistani Government, and we want to be
supportive of them. But, as I said before, the Pakistanis,
quite rightly, are also focused on the longer term battle for
the hearts and minds of the people who live in the tribal
regions; thus, the need for us to work with them on the
economic and humanitarian support within the tribal areas
itself.
Senator Kerry. Well, that certainly is a long-term task,
but I'm not sure it's particularly encouraging or instructive
with respect to what happens to those known enclaves and safe
harbors that exist today. I mean--well, I'll come back. My
round is a minute over, and I don't want to abuse it, so I'll
come back afterward on that.
Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
In this hearing, and in others that the committee has
conducted on Pakistan, we've always touched upon democracy.
You've mentioned, specifically, elections are going to occur
for President of the country, and the legislature, within the
next 6 months, more or less. Now----
Secretary Burns. Yes, sir.
Senator Lugar [continuing]. Sketch out your judgment about
what we would call a speedy return to democracy--in other
words, a reintroduction that would allow for much greater
participation; potentially, political parties. If such free and
open elections were held in Pakistan in the coming months, who
would likely win? What would this mean for U.S. strategic
interests? And how does this greater political participation
meld together with, clearly, the militants who are involved in
Pakistan, attempting to destabilize the country, if not the
democratic process?
Secretary Burns. Thank you, Senator Lugar.
We do have an interest--a real interest in the fate of
Pakistani democracy. Now, obviously the country has gone
through a very unusual period over the last 7 or 8 years, where
there's a lack of a full democracy. But the country, the
government, has also been fighting this extraordinary rise in
terrorism against the people of Pakistan and the government
itself. So, as the government has tried--the Government of
Pakistan--has tried to balance both a professed open commitment
to want to return to democracy, but a priority, I guess it
would say, in dealing with the terrorist threat, we have tried
to encourage it to continue on that democratic path and not to
let it founder.
It's hard for me--and I think it probably would be naive of
me to try to predict--and unwarranted of me--to predict
election results, except to say these are important elections,
because Pakistan has a very lively set of political parties and
a very rich political history and some quite dynamic
politicians. And our hope would be that the political parties
that are democratic and that are patriotic and that do not
support terrorism, of course, would be free to contest these
elections. And it shouldn't be, I think, for the United States
to favor anybody in those elections, or to predict who might
win, but we should certainly support that process. And we're
trying to, as I said, through our technical training, but, more
importantly, through our voice, in saying that, even in a
difficult terrain--place like Pakistan, where this huge battle
is underway between extremists forces and the government,
countries can still practice democracy and at least find their
way back to a full democracy. And so, that would be, I think,
the way I would summarize our views and what we're trying to
do, as an outsider, commenting on what are really their
internal affairs.
Senator Lugar. Could one of the results of this election
and the new officials be some sort of difference in the safe-
haven situation for al-Qaeda, but, likewise, A.Q. Khan? We've
talked a lot about al-Qaeda, but some would say that, as a
matter of fact, out of Pakistan has come the intelligence,
sometimes materials, perhaps even guidance, for weapons-of-
mass-destruction systems in other countries. We know, from our
experience in Libya, specifically, a great deal of testimony
about the A.Q. Khan network. Yet, for the moment, in the
current situation in Pakistan, he [A.Q. Khan] is out of reach,
out of touch, certainly with us. This is of great consequence
in our foreign relations and in our nonproliferation situation
around the world. Do you have any comment about potential
events in that realm?
Secretary Burns. Well, I would just agree with you, Senator
Lugar, that A.Q. Khan and his network did enormous damage to
our global efforts in the international community to try to
restrain nuclear proliferation. And we trust, and we will
expect, that the Pakistan Government will continue to make sure
that that network can never arise again, or any similar network
can arise again. And the Pakistani Government knows full well
the determination that we have to make sure that doesn't happen
again.
So, I would agree with the thrust of your question, and you
can be sure that, for many years, we've been impressing--we've
been pressing that point on the Pakistani authorities. It's
really their obligation--he apparently is under some form of
house arrest there--sort of, their obligation to make sure that
he or his associates or acolytes are never again in a position
to trade, on the black market, a nuclear technology, the way
that that network did in such an insidious way.
Senator Lugar. Does this have any relationship to democracy
in Pakistan, and to much more of a free flow of ideas and
debate, or would, regardless of who is elected, all of the
group want to protect A.Q. Khan? In other words, I'm trying to
develop at least--is there some scenario in which things change
from the rigidity that we observe?
Secretary Burns. That's a--I guess I would say, Senator,
that, you know, as we look ahead, we would expect that any
responsible Pakistani politician would have to stand--we would
want them to stand with us in two ways: First and foremost,
against al-Qaeda and the Taliban; and, second, against those
who would proliferate Pakistan's nuclear technology. Those are
vital national interests that extend to our global foreign
policy, and we have not been shy about making that point, not
just to the government, but to some of the politicians in
Pakistan who are outside the government, at the present time.
Senator Lugar. In other hearings on Pakistan, we have heard
testimony about the lack of public schools, and, therefore, the
reliance upon the madrassahs. As you say, we would like to try
to help that situation. As a practical matter, given the size
of the country, really, how can we help the Pakistanis organize
a public school system so that there could be development
through education for the children of the country?
Secretary Burns. Well, it's a major priority for us. We
are--as you know, we, with the agreement of the Congress, have
committed a great deal of money to try to support the Ministry
of Education--and I've met with the Minister of Education in
Islamabad--to try to build public schools; No. 1, to give kids
access--as Senator Kerry said, kids who haven't had it--to
schools; and, No. 2, to the right kind of schools, not to
those--at least some of the madrassahs who--that have been so
much the source of intolerance in Pakistani society. And so,
we're funding that, both school construction--we're encouraging
curriculum change, and we're trying to help the Pakistani
Ministry of Education free up some money to do those very
things. But, as you say, it's an enormous challenge. It's a
poor country, 160 million people, and a country that doesn't
have as much--of a strong central government with a pervasive
influence throughout the country as, say, you find in many
other countries. So, it's a big challenge, but we're on to it,
and we're working very hard, and we appreciate the support of
the Congress in committing the funds necessary to achieve that
purpose.
Senator Lugar. Thank you.
Senator Kerry. Thank you, Senator Lugar.
Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And, Under Secretary Burns, thank you for coming before the
committee today to discuss Pakistan. As we were reminded in the
recently declassified National Intelligence Estimate, Pakistan
is, of course, vital to our fight against al-Qaeda.
Mr. Chairman, I have a full statement I'd like to put in
the record, if I could.
Senator Kerry. Without objection.
Senator Feingold. Thank you.
The latest NIE only reinforces my--and many of my
colleagues'--belief that this administration has failed to
focus on the true threats to our national security, and in
particular, the threat posed by al-Qaeda. If Pakistan is our
ally in this fight, why have we not yet gotten at the root of
the problem which so directly impacts our national security?
Why--while al-Qaeda has strengthened its safe haven, we have
watched political and religious upheaval grow across Pakistan.
We need to support the tenets of democracy and the rule of law
in Pakistan just as much as we support security and
counterterrorism initiatives. If we're to truly protect our own
national interests, we must commit ourselves to eliminating
corruption and poor governance, endemic poverty, and the
historic marginalization that has allowed terrorists and other
threats to fester.
But I do thank you, again, appreciate your thoughts. And
let me ask a couple of questions.
It seems that, in the post-9/11 era, anti-American
sentiment in Pakistan has grown significantly as has religious
extremism, which recently led to the Lal Mosque crisis. The
increased rate of attacks by suicide bombers across the country
is also notable. To what do you attribute these developments,
and what steps are being taken to address them?
Secretary Burns. Senator, thank you.
First of all, let me just say that I would just
respectfully, and very respectfully, disagree that somehow the
United States Government has not been focused on the fight
against al-Qaeda. We have been focused, and we've made a major
effort, both in security assistance with the Pakistani
military, to the economic assistance that Congress has been
good enough to fund, but also in Afghanistan. We've recently,
this year, increased our troop presence to 27,000 soldiers.
When I first started going to Afghanistan, in 2002, we had less
than half that number of American troops in Afghanistan. We've
built up, over the last couple of years, because we do
understand that our national security interests are on the line
there, in both countries--Pakistan and Afghanistan. So, I think
we've made the effort.
The question is: Can we sustain an effective effort among
three countries--Afghanistan, the United States, and Pakistan?
And we bring in, of course, 25 NATO allies into that mix, and
lots of other countries in the international force. So, it's a
complicated effort. I would say that we can do a better job in
trying to elicit a stronger performance from the Pakistani
military inside their border. I said to Senator Kerry, in
response to one of his questions, that we need, obviously, to
improve the cooperation, or see an improvement, between
Afghanistan and Pakistan itself. And I think most of us would
say that NATO has done very well to go in, to be present, to
fight. The Canadians have lost more people there than any
conflict since the Korean war. But we haven't had a seamless
effort between the NATO military effort and the international
civilian effort in Afghanistan.
So, we would never claim that this is a perfect situation.
We can do better. But I think we've made a major effort, and we
are committed to it.
I wanted to say that, because I believe that very strongly,
personally.
Senator Feingold. Well, I recognize the increased effort
with regard to Afghanistan. I think it needs to be recognized,
in the record, that it came pretty late, after what I consider
to be almost an obsessive emphasis on Iraq, to the point where,
when I was in Afghanistan, I even had our troops saying,
``Where did our resources go, here in Afghanistan?'' But I know
that you sincerely want to have the proper emphasis on
Afghanistan and Pakistan, so I'd ask you to respond to the
other part of my question, that had to do with Pakistan itself,
and the----
Secretary Burns. Right.
Senator Feingold [continuing]. Anti-American issue.
Secretary Burns. On--to answer that question, Senator, I
would just say that there--you know, as you know, there's a
battle underway between these extremist forces inside Pakistan
and the government. And I think that battle will extend to the
other democratic political parties, let's face, for the future
of Pakistan. And so, we need to be present to give the right
type of assistance, and we need to be committed, over the long
term, to help them.
Anti-Americanism? I think there are a lot of reasons for
it. It's certainly very much present in Pakistan. What's
interesting is that, when our military went in to the
mountainous areas, after the earthquake, and delivered, in
record time, humanitarian assistance, we saw, in the public
opinion polls, nearly a doubling of the American approval
rating, because people began to see the United States not just
as a foreign military force operating close to Pakistan inside
the Afghan border, but as a military that could help them in a
time of great trouble.
And so, obviously we need to do what's right, continue to
assist the antiterrorism effort, but we need to also assist the
people, through education, through humanitarian development.
That's why we're asking the Congress for this commitment of
$750 million over 5 years for the tribal areas. That's nearly
all money to be spent to improve people's lives, and it's
through that kind of commitment, I think, that you'll gradually
see--probably not overnight, but gradually--an improvement in
how people see our country in that--in a very difficult
environment.
Senator Feingold. I think that's a fair point. And I'd--
same thing with Indonesia, where we saw the numbers go up after
the----
Secretary Burns. Right.
Senator Feingold [continuing]. Tsunami. But, you know,
obviously we can't wait for disasters for this to happen. And
the problem is, is that when it isn't something like a
disaster, it's a little--it's a lot more complex, the way that
we're perceived, and what we're doing is perceived; plus, it's
harder to persuade the American people to put the resources in,
to have them believe that it will have the bang for the buck,
in terms of better relations. But I do agree with the general
sentiment, very much.
A recent article in The New Yorker magazine referenced the
``economic empire'' run by Pakistan's military, including
findings in a recently published book by Ayesha Siddiqa, which
estimated that Pakistan's military controls business assets of
more than $20 billion, with interests ranging from cement and
dredging to the manufacture of cornflakes and the baking of
bread. Can you comment on what positions the administration has
taken, publicly and privately with the Pakistanis with regard
to these commercial ventures? And how do they impact the
military's professionalism in Pakistan? And are we taking any
steps to, you know, press the military in Pakistan to
relinquish these advancements, as was done in Indonesia? I
personally pressed the Indonesians on this with regard to
their, sort of, involvement--their military's involvement in
business ventures. What's going on with regard to Pakistan?
Secretary Burns. Well, Senator, I can tell you this, our
focus with the Pakistani military is on their fighting and
counterterrorism capability. I don't know, personally, to what
degree we've addressed this issue, which you often see in
developing countries, of state organizations, including
militaries, being involved in commercial enterprises. I can get
back to you. I think it's a fair question, and I'll be happy to
provide a written answer.
[The information referred to above follows:]
Secretary Burns. We have seen media and other academic reports that
Pakistan's military is involved in numerous business ventures. We
believe a nation's military forces should focus attention on security
affairs, especially countering the threat of terrorism and violent
extremism. Our International Military Education and Training (IMET)
program in Pakistan is one very effective way in which we help to
inculcate professional military values and behavior in the Pakistani
security forces. Renewed in October 2001, Pakistan's IMET program has
increased opportunities for military-to-military professional contact,
improved interoperability/technical capabilities, and enhanced respect
for civilian rule. IMET courses focus on professionalism and expose
Pakistani personnel to U.S. values, military doctrine, and management
as well as human rights and the law of war.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, sir.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Feingold follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Russ Feingold
Under Secretary Burns--thank for coming before this committee today
to discuss Pakistan. As we were reminded in the recently declassified
National Intelligence Estimate, Pakistan is vital to our fight against
al Qaeda.
In the few minutes I have, I would like to express my concerns
about the ability of al Qaeda to continue to thrive in Pakistan. It has
been almost six years since al Qaeda attacked the United States, and I
am deeply disturbed that the National Intelligence Estimate indicates
that al Qaeda has strengthened its capabilities. Mr. Burns, as you
know, Pakistan has received $3.4 billion in direct U.S. assistance
between fiscal years 2002 and 2006, which includes nearly $1.5 billion
in security-related aid. Pakistan also has received nearly $5 billion
in reimbursements for its support of U.S.-led counterterrorism
operations since 2001--and yet al Qaeda has reconstituted its strength
in the protected safe havens of Pakistan's border region. I can only
ask what so many Americans are asking--why have we failed to reduce the
al Qaeda threat? What are we doing wrong? And what are we doing about
it?
The latest NIE only reinforces my--and many of my colleagues'--
belief that this administration has failed to focus on the true threats
to our national security, and in particular the threat posed by al
Qaeda. If Pakistan is our ally in this fight, why have we not yet
gotten at the root of his problem which so directly impacts our
national security.
I understand the porous borders and weak governing structure of the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas are a challenge to the government
of Pakistan and to counterterrorism operations in general. But, I would
hope that six years and billions of dollars invested would have led to
greater improvement in regional security and stability and, at the very
least, a significant decrease in al Qaeda's capacity.
Adding to my concerns about a strengthened al Qaeda is the fragile
political state in which we find Pakistan right now. As part of our
efforts to combat extremism and terrorism, we should be stressing, not
sacrificing, our support for strong democratic principles and I am
concerned that we may have abandoned that effort long ago in Pakistan.
Promoting democracy overseas helps, not hinders, efforts to promote
greater security. While al Qaeda has strengthened in its safe haven, we
have watched political and religious upheaval grow across Pakistan. We
need to support the tenets of democracy and rule of law in Pakistan
just as much as we support security and counter-terrorism initiatives.
If we are to truly protect our own national interests, we must commit
ourselves to eliminating corruption, poor governance, endemic poverty,
and the historic marginalization that has allowed terrorist and other
threats to fester.
Thank you again for your testimony today, Under Secretary Burns. I
look forward to hearing your thoughts and insight on how we can best
work with Pakistan to effectively address al Qaeda while encouraging
efforts to make it a fully functioning democracy.
Senator Kerry. Thank you, Senator Feingold.
Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Welcome, Secretary Burns.
What is your assessment of Pakistan's relationship with
Iran?
Secretary Burns. My judgment, Senator, is that they don't
have an extremely close relationship, but they have a
relationship: Diplomatic and economic. And one of the issues
that's arisen, quite recently, is this prospective natural-gas
pipeline that will unit Iran with India and Pakistan. And we've
made it very clear to the Indian Government, as well as the
Pakistani Government, that, given the fact that Iran is, in
effect, an outlaw state, in terms of its nuclear weapons
program, we would hope, very much, that that gas pipeline deal
would not be consummated.
And so, Pakistan seems to have the type of relationship
that lots of the neighboring countries have with Iran, and have
had for a long time, that lots of our European allies have
had--diplomatic, commercial. But our whole approach--with the
Pakistanis, with the Europeans, with the Indians--is to say
Iran is not a country that can be trusted, and we would prefer
to see that relationship cut down quite dramatically.
Senator Hagel. Have we worked with, or through, Pakistan,
in any way, regarding Iran?
Secretary Burns. We have certainly been in touch with the
Pakistani Government about what we're trying to do to limit
Iran--to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear weapons power.
We've also talked to the Pakistanis--we have a strategic dialog
with Pakistan--and, in the last meeting that I held with
Foreign Secretary Riaz Khan, we had a long conversation about
Iran, both about the regional dimension of Iran's funding of
terrorist groups in the Middle East, but also about the nuclear
program. And we've had the same type of discussion, by the way,
with India, just last week, when the India Foreign Secretary
was here.
Senator Hagel. Well, in light of our second engagement with
Iran, as of yesterday, I would ask you: Do we consult with
Pakistan on those kinds of diplomatic initiatives?
Secretary Burns. We're beginning to. I think, for a while
there after 9/11, our relationship pretty much was focused on
the counterterrorism struggle and on Afghanistan, but Secretary
Negroponte--my colleague John Negroponte, the Deputy
Secretary--was in Islamabad, and had some broader-range
consultations. I did, as well, during my last two visits to
Islamabad. And we are inviting the Pakistanis into that kind of
a regional dialogue, yes.
Senator Hagel. You mentioned, as has been mentioned here
this afternoon, the impending Presidential and parliamentary
elections in Pakistan. And if my information is correct, the
Presidential election is slated for October----
Secretary Burns. Yes, two elections----
Senator Hagel [continuing]. Parliamentary----
Ambassador Burns [continuing]. Between now and January,
Presidential and parliamentary.
Senator Hagel. If that's the case, then we are about 3
months away, from the end of October. What preparations are you
aware of that are ongoing for a Presidential election in
Pakistan? Are they proceeding, printing ballots, like a normal
democratic election? Ninety days away is not a long time, as
you know.
Secretary Burns. That's right. It's my understanding that
they are proceeding toward elections. I said, in my prepared
testimony, that President Musharraf has pledged, rather
consistently, to uphold both Pakistani constitutional standards
and to meet normal international standards. And we would expect
that that would happen. We hope very much that that will
happen.
Senator Hagel. Is there, for example, a slate of
Presidential candidates 90 days out?
Secretary Burns. Well, there are certainly a number of
politicians and political parties who want to contest the
elections. And----
Senator Hagel. Can you name two or three primary
candidates----
Secretary Burns. Well, I----
Senator Hagel [continuing]. For president?
Secretary Burns. You know, the People's Party, of course,
is in--this is the party of Benazir Bhutto. She is not in
Pakistan, as you know; she lives outside of Pakistan. But her
party is there. The party of Nawaz Sharif is there. There are a
number of--four or five major political parties in Pakistan
itself. Now, we'll have to watch and see how these elections
are conducted and the degree to which these parties can
mobilize their supporters and----
Senator Hagel. Is their presence required--like, Ms.
Bhutto, would she have to physically be in Pakistan to stand
for election?
Secretary Burns. I don't believe that their presence is
mandatory. It's their choice, obviously, and they'll--as to
whether or not they would seek to be present for the elections.
Senator Hagel. Is there active campaigning going on in
Pakistan today?
Secretary Burns. I believe there is campaigning going on,
yes. I will not--I would not want to assert that the
environment is, say, the environment you'd find in the United
States of America, with all the debates that you--we see on the
television, with the Republican and Democratic candidates, and
so on. It's not that kind of environment. It's an environment
where obviously there have been limitations on the democratic
rights of some of the political parties and of individuals. And
what I tried to say in my testimony today, what we have tried
to say consistently, is that we believe it's a standard that
should be met, and the United States, of course, should always
voice support for such standards.
Senator Hagel. What kind of limitations on candidates and
campaigns, as you have just noted?
Secretary Burns. I'm not actually the best person to answer
that question right now. I don't have immediate knowledge. I
couldn't tell you specific immediate limitations that are being
imposed right now. But I can certainly take that question and
give you a written answer.
[The information referred to above follows:]
Secretary Burns. According to the Election Commission of Pakistan,
and Pakistani citizen not less than 25 years old (in the case of
National and Provincial Assemblies) or not less than 30 years old (in
the case of the Senate) or not less than 45 years old (in the case of
the President), who is of good moral character, with a good education,
who has not defamed the armed forces or judiciary, and has not
defaulted on debts or utility fees may contest for parliamentary
elections. In addition to these qualification, candidates for President
must also be Muslim and qualified to be elected as a Member of the
National Assembly.
President Musharraf amended the Political Parties Act in August
2000 to bar any person from a third term as minister. This would make
two leaders of prominent opposition parties, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz
Sharif, ineligible for appointment to the post even if their parties
were to gain a majority of the seats in parliament.
The Political Parties Act was further amended in August 2001 to bar
anyone with a court conviction from holding party office. The amendment
created obstacles to the political futures of both Bhutto and Sharif
since both have been convicted of corruption.
Under Pakistani law, the Tribal Areas are excluded from the
legislative regime in force throughout the rest of Pakistan. Instead,
the Tribal Areas are governed primarily through the 1901 Frontier
Crimes Regulation, a procedural law distinct from the criminal and
civil codes operative elsewhere in Pakistan, which states that no
political party can legally campaign or operate an office there.
Therefore, political parties are not allowed to operate within the
Tribal Areas.
Senator Hagel. Well, it just--it seems to me, if you have a
presidential election in a large country like Pakistan, 90 days
away, there would be some kind of activity that would be
indicative of preparation for a new administration.
Secretary Burns. Yes, and I said, Senator Hagel, that the
United States--our Government is supplying technical advice and
assistance to help support the organization of the elections,
and we're working with some other international organizations
and with NGOs. So, we'll continue that. So, we're front and
center in arguing that there should be democratic elections. I
just can't give you some of the specific granularity, myself,
that you are looking for.
Senator Hagel. Well, you see, your last point--and I know
you can't control this, but, when you just said--you're arguing
strenuously that there should be elections. Does that imply
that there is some question whether there will be elections?
Secretary Burns. Oh, I think there's--I don't think there's
any question about the fact that there will be elections. The
question will be: Will these elections, the day after--and
this--we have this question with any election in a foreign
country like this--be democratic? Will it meet a free-and-fair
standard? And so, we're working to support that eventuality.
But, obviously, given the environment of the last 7 or 8 years,
with the original coup in Pakistan, with the departure of at
least two of the prominent political party leaders--Nawaz
Sharif and Benazir Bhutto--there has been a question about what
road the Pakistani Government and people would take, under what
conditions would elections be contested, sure. And we've spoken
out about that, and will continue to do that.
Senator Hagel. Do you believe there will be Presidential
elections----
Secretary Burns. We----
Senator Hagel [continuing]. By October?
Ambassador Burns [continuing]. Hope very much there'll be
a--we have every understanding that there will be, yes.
Senator Hagel. You--but do you believe there will be? Do
you----
Secretary Burns. I think----
Senator Hagel. Can you tell this committee that you believe
there will be elections held by October?
Secretary Burns. It would be my judgment that you will see
Presidential and parliamentary elections. We certainly hope so.
Senator Hagel. But----
Secretary Burns. And we see no reason why that--the
government would change and decide not to hold those elections.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Senator Kerry. Thank you, Senator Hagel.
Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, you said, in your statement, that Pakistan
is the most indispensable partner that we have. It's also one
of the largest recipients of U.S. aid. And, in that respect, it
has received more than $3 billion over the last 5 years in
direct assistance, and about another $6 billion in coalition
support funds. And so, I look at what we have--at the record,
after $10 billion of support, in money and years, and I look at
the 2007 failed-states index that lists Pakistan among the 15
most unstable countries in the world. I look at the State
Department's Country Report on Human Rights practices in 2006,
that again determined that the Pakistani Government's record on
human rights remained poor, that Pakistan remains a safe haven
for the Taliban. And, as we all know, the recent National
Intelligence Estimate verified that al-Qaeda is operating in a
safe zone along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, at September
11th strength. And then, we look at that National Intelligence
Estimate that tells us that, in fact, al-Qaeda is the single
greatest threat to American security. And so, I listen to you
say, $10 billion later, greater anti-American sentiment, and a
Musharraf government that either turns a blind eye or acts more
in containment than in trying to put al-Qaeda out of business,
to the one entity that is the No. 1 threat to our country as
they train in that border line between Afghanistan and
Pakistan. I don't think that that's sustainable anymore. I
don't think that's sustainable anymore.
And I want to talk with you, specifically, in that context,
as you comment on that, you know, since October 2001 we have
been providing Pakistan with large sums of money as
reimbursement for Pakistan's fight against terrorism. According
to the Congressional Research Service, this money, which is
distributed from the coalition support funds, has provided
Pakistan with an average of $80 million a month, on top of the
direct assistance that they receive from the United States--
that's about $6 billion, to date. I've heard estimates that
this money may account for more than a quarter of Pakistan's
defense budget. And despite this vast quantity of money, there
is virtually no oversight or transparency in the disbursements
of these funds.
So, my question is: Could you provide details on the
oversight that currently exists? How how are we, as a
government, ensuring that this money, being given to the
Pakistani Government, is being used for legitimate purposes?
I'm alarmed, as I already heard the questions from my colleague
Senator Feingold about all of these private enterprises by the
Pakistani military. We're giving them $80 million a month.
We've given them nearly $6 billion over this period of time. I
mean, what are our receipts to show that this work that we are
funding is within the lines of what we meant for it to happen?
Secretary Burns. Thank you very much.
This effort, since September 11, 2001, has been
extraordinarily expensive. I don't disagree with you at all.
This effort to try to work with the Pakistanis, have them work
with us effectively in the fight against al-Qaeda and the
Taliban, militarily, but also the money that we've spent to try
to help them economically, it's an expensive proposition. And
you're--you have, obviously, an obvious right to ask the
question, ``So, what are we getting in return for it?''
We have a country that is, without any question, the most
indispensable country in the fight against al-Qaeda, by virtue
of the fact of where it's located and where al-Qaeda is
located, and by the opportunity to do something about that.
Now, what I've tried to indicate in my testimony today is
that we don't question President Musharraf's commitment. I
mean, this is the guy who has nearly been killed several times
by terrorist forces. He has 100,000 troops on the border, and
he's lost 600 troops in the fight against al-Qaeda alone. So,
the commitment is there. The question is: Can we work with the
Pakistani Government to help them fashion a more effective
strategy? And I would say to you, quite honestly, there needs
to be a stronger and more effective effort in the fight against
al-Qaeda.
Is there transparency and oversight? In terms of the
military assistance that we give to any country, including
Pakistan, we do spend--the Pentagon spends a lot of time in
end-use certification and in oversight, and employ a lot of
people to do that. And I'm--be happy to get you the necessary
information to answer that question, from the Pentagon.
[The information referred to above follows:]
Secretary Burns. We are committed to ensuring that monetary
assistance the USG gives Pakistan is used for the purpose for which it
was intended. All assistance funds are subject to standard USG controls
and audit requirements. Monies used for grants, projects, and
procurements are subject to U.S. Agency for International Development
audit requirements. Funds used under NADR and INCLE programs are also
subject to the standard controls and end use agreements, and are
monitored accordingly. Money obligated under the Strategic Objective
agreements negotiated with the Government of Pakistan is provided to
the Government of Pakistan, and results are measured through a variety
of measures, rather than by tracing funds. In the case of all DRL
programs in Pakistan, monies pass through U.S. partner grantees and
non-governemental organizations who submit regular quarterly and
financial reports. We maintain clear, established controls and
financial records for this portion of our assistance program.
Secretary Burns. In terms of the economic, educational,
humanitarian programs that we're running, with the support of
the Congress, of course we have oversight and transparency
through USAID and through our Embassy in Islamabad, and we work
hard to achieve that.
Senator Menendez. Well, Mr. Secretary the difficulty is, I
think the average American would look and say, $10 billion
later, and we have a reconstituted al-Qaeda, at September 11th
strength, we have President Musharraf looking--I think we'll
hear other testimony, later today, of those who will say that
he's basically looking at--with a blind eye, to some degree,
that what we're doing here is containment, versus putting these
entities out of business. And yet, we are told, by the National
Intelligence Estimate, this is the single most significant
threat to us. So, I can't understand how $6 billion directly in
military funding creates a reconstituted al-Qaeda, with very
little effective action, at the end of the day, and rising
anti-Americanism, $10 billion later. It's just very difficult
to understand. And now the administration comes and asks for
more money into tribal areas. I mean, at the end of the day,
you have to give us a plan here that works. It's not just about
working with Musharraf, which I'm all for, but results matter.
And a reconstituted al-Qaeda and a Taliban that is growing in
strength is not, in my mind, a plan that works.
Secretary Burns. Well, Senator, I'd say to you that we
don't have an option here about whether or not to work with
President Musharraf. He is a friend of the United States. His
government is a partner with our country. They collaborate on
military strategy with us. And if the option is walking away
from that government and not spending the money, I don't think
that's an appropriate----
Senator Menendez. Our option is to make----
Ambassador Burns [continuing]. Policy----
Senator Menendez [continuing]. It more----
Ambassador Burns [continuing]. When al-Qaeda is the
greatest threat to our country.
Senator Menendez. Our option is to make it more effective,
and you----
Secretary Burns. And that's been the----
Senator Menendez [continuing]. Can't keep coming----
Ambassador Burns [continuing]. Thrust of my testimony----
Senator Menendez [continuing]. To the Congress and ask for
billions more, to achieve the same results. That's my point.
Secretary Burns. It's--and that's a fair point. And I would
just say, Senator, if I could just respond, very quickly to
your good question, we're trying very hard to work with the
Pakistanis to fashion an improvement in the strategic and
tactics, because we would acknowledge that, at--if al-Qaeda has
reconstituted itself, or found a refuge, if the Taliban are in
Pakistan in greater numbers, we're not satisfied with that
situation. We have to have it--see it change. But working with
the Pakistanis and continuing to commit to a close military and
economic relationship is the way to do it. I fear that, if we
walked away or didn't pay attention to the nonmilitary side of
the fight against terrorism, it wouldn't work for us, long
term.
Senator Menendez. I'm not----
Secretary Burns. It wouldn't be a successful policy.
Senator Menendez. I don't want to overstay my time. I'm not
suggesting that, Mr. Secretary. But pouring more money down,
for the same results, is also not acceptable. It's not a blank
check for a failed policy. It's a check that ultimately has to
lead to a different success. I'll look forward to the responses
on the coalition support funds and how those were distributed.
Thank you.
Senator Kerry. Thank you, Senator Menendez. Thank you.
Senator Isakson.
Senator Isakson. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. Two
days in a row. It's been a pleasure to see you. I'm sorry I
missed some of your remarks following up on the response and
the question of Senator Menendez.
I am correct that Musharraf's effort now on the border with
Afghanistan in the tribal areas is the most significant,
militarily, since all this began, September 2001. Is that
correct?
Secretary Burns. Whether it's the most significant in
number of troops, I don't know, but, I think, in intensity, it
is. We've never seen----
Senator Isakson. Yeah.
Ambassador Burns [continuing]. I think, the intensity of
exchange that we've seen over the last several weeks. So, they
are taking on the militant groups.
Senator Isakson. That's my perception. And, second, and
this is my perception--I could be wrong, and I'm sure you'll
correct me--but the real problem with that area, historically,
has been, in the history of this war with terror, or war on
terror, they hop back and forth, depending on where the
pressure is coming from. ``They,'' being the bad buys, whether
they be Taliban or whether they be al-Qaeda. If we do have the
most significant intensity of pressure from the Pakistani side,
are we putting the proportionate pressure on the Afghan side to
narrow the gap?
Secretary Burns. Yeah. Yes, we are, Senator. In fact, you
know, there was a lot of talk, at the turn of this year, that
the Taliban would launch a spring offensive. And, as Secretary
Gates put it, we launched the offensive before they could. NATO
launched a major military offensive, as you remember, in
February and March. We have taken--the NATO forces have taken
the battle in the east and in the south and in Kandahar,
Oruzman, and Helmand provinces, to the Taliban. They've done
very well. But the Taliban's strong, and they continue to come
across the border. And we can expect that's going to continue.
So, you're very right to assert you need to have an
effective strategy from both sides of the border. We've often
not had that. And we're trying to arrive at a situation where
a--where that happens.
Senator Isakson. And that effectiveness requires the word
``coordination''----
Secretary Burns. Yes, it does.
Senator Isakson [continuing]. In my judgment. Are we
getting any indication that that coordination is, in fact,
taking place, with the Pakistani military?
Secretary Burns. Well, I can say one thing for sure. In my
visits to Afghanistan, I've always gone out and seen the U.S.
military in action, and they're doing a first-rate job, our
people. We are not satisfied at the degree of cooperation and
coordination between the Pakistani and Afghan governments. I,
in an earlier question by Senator Kerry, referred to President
Bush's personal efforts to bring the two leaders together, but
also to see this tripartite military cooperation among the
United States, Pakistan, and Afghanistan--we can--I think it's
fair to say we all believe that that can be improved, and we
need to keep our eyes focused on that.
Senator Isakson. With regard--Senator Lugar may have asked
this, I believe--I heard A.Q. Khan come up, so he may have
asked this. If he did, I apologize. But I understand we, and
other countries' investigators, have little or no investigatory
access to that network or any remnants. Is that correct?
Secretary Burns. That's also my understanding, that we have
not had personal access to him, to A.Q. Khan. But we obviously
have told the Pakistani Government that it is its
responsibility to sequester A.Q. Khan, his network, to
dismantle it, and to make sure that it, or a similar
organization, is not created again in Pakistan. It did enormous
damage. And to Pakistan's reputation, it did enormous damage.
Senator Isakson. I think you just answered my followup
question, but, just to be sure, I'll ask it. Do you have reason
to believe that the remnants of that network of nuclear
proliferation still exist?
Secretary Burns. That's a very good question. I cannot
assert that no part of that network exists, but it's my
understanding, based on our conversations with the Pakistanis,
that the network has been fundamentally dismantled. But, to say
that there are no elements in Pakistan, I'm not sure I could
say that. And I--if you'd like, I could take that question and
try to get you a more detailed answer, maybe in a classified
basis.
Senator Isakson. It's probably the most concerning thing to
me, in terms of weapons-of-mass-destruction capabilities
getting into bad people's hands relatively easily, if you have
that type of network existing.
I guess my last point would be--you had mentioned President
Musharraf wanted $750 million in aid, and that was for the
economic and educational programs in the border area, is that
right?
Secretary Burns. Yes. When President Bush visited, in March
2006, President Musharraf said that he felt that, in the long-
term battle to deprive al-Qaeda and Taliban of sanctuaries in
the tribal areas, that the Pakistani Government needed help in
trying to help convince young people not to join these
organizations. So, job creation activities, infrastructure,
health programs, educational programs, he thought, over the
long term--and he didn't predict short-term progress--would be
essential.
Senator Isakson. I want----
Secretary Burns. And so, we are prepared--you know, we've
come to the Congress with a proposal for that.
Senator Isakson. I want to just comment. I had the
opportunity, post-9/11, to go into Ethiopia and Egypt, with
NGOs and State Department representatives, to make sure that
United States aid for educational and economic purposes was, in
fact, being distributed to make the right influences. For
example, we learned that, in Egypt, they weren't letting young
girls go to school, or the money to be used for schools where
young women could go, and things of that nature. So, I think
it's very important in that. I am a supporter of that, because
you can win hearts and minds. It's difficult if the Taliban has
an equal license. But I'm assuming we're going to continue to
dissipate that. But it's very important that we make sure, when
it goes into education, that we know the education it is going
into, and it is, in fact, the liberating type of enriched
knowledge that we'd like folks to have.
I would--because I would point out, Mr. Chairman, Ethiopia
was our big friend, here recently, in Africa, really--and 10
years ago, that would not have been the case. But the--that
effort in Ethiopia has paid off, I think, big time, for the
United States and our relationship, and hopefully it would be a
part, in concert with the military cooperation with American
forces and Pakistani forces, to clean that area up, or begin to
turn the corner in that border area.
Secretary Burns. I very much agree. In fact, both--in
Afghanistan, we do a lot of education work, and Pakistan. We
pay attention to the curriculum and what's being taught. And in
Pakistan, of course, we have welcomed to the State Department
Mukhtar Mai, who's been a campaigner for women's rights in
Pakistan. In fact, we're helping to fund NGOs in Pakistan that
stand up for women's rights in the country.
Could I just say--I want to make sure I was fully
understood on your question about illicit A.Q. Khan-type
networks. I meant, of course, to say that these would be
private. I don't--I didn't mean to assert that the government
would have anything to do with them. But I can't be sure----
Senator Isakson. I did not take that----
Ambassador Burns [continuing]. I cannot be sure that there
are no private groups in Pakistan trying to reconstitute that
type of capability.
Senator Isakson. That's the way I understood your answer.
Secretary Burns. Thank you.
Senator Isakson. Thank you, sir.
Senator Kerry. Thank you, Senator Isakson.
Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Secretary Burns, once again I thank you very much for
your service and what you're doing for our country. You're
making a very important contribution, and we thank you for
that.
And you made a very convincing point about the importance
of Pakistan in our fight against al-Qaeda, and the importance
of Pakistan in that region, and our relationship with Musharraf
government. And--but let me just make an observation.
Historically, when we support governments that are moving in
the wrong direction on democratic reform, or who are not
protecting the rights of the people in their own country, and
the human rights records deteriorate, that, over the long term,
that's not in our interest. And I'm just concerned whether the
current government in Pakistan is facilitating or is an
impediment to democratic reform, and to protecting the human
rights of its citizens. And I want to get your observations of
whether it's moving in the right direction or wrong direction.
We all talk about these elections. And obviously that's the
immediate concern. But it seems to me that--you look at what
happened with the--what he tried it with--the government tried
to do with the courts, look at what's happening in many other
areas--that the country is moving in the wrong direction. And
what impact does that have on the--beyond just today, with the
relationship between us and Pakistan?
Secretary Burns. Well, I think, Senator, it's a fair
question. It's been a major concern in our foreign policy over
40-50 years, have dealt, throughout the cold war, with this
same issue, in many parts of the world.
I think that there are two recent indications that the
Pakistanis may be heading in a better direction, if they can be
sustained. The first is the Supreme Court decision to reinstate
the Chief Justice. Now, the Government of Pakistan, the
President and Prime Minister, have both said that they will
abide by it. We have said, publicly, we think this is a
positive development, because it's a triumph for the rule of
law, and that we do want to see a strong, independent judiciary
in Pakistan. So, we'll have to see how this plays out. But we
would hope that that court decision would be respected and that
this would be something that the government and judiciary would
then have to deal with together to learn to exist together.
Second would be the elections. And, while I don't have a
crystal ball, and I cannot now say that the election is going
to meet all standards that we would want it to meet, but we
hope it will and we're arguing for that, and we're voicing that
sentiment, and we're putting our money behind helping to
organize the elections, you know, in technical assistance to
the election process itself.
And I think those are two issues that are guideposts, and
we need to watch them, but we also need to encourage the people
of Pakistan and the Government of Pakistan to follow a positive
evolution, both in terms of the law, as well as in terms of
politics.
Senator Cardin. Well, I agree with you on the elections.
That's coming up soon. I think it is a critical time for
Pakistan. And I encourage you to be as aggressive as you can,
and be as honest in your assessment as to whether it's a free
and open, fair election process that's used. We need to be
pretty direct about that, and not be influenced by any other
factor than whether it's a free and fair election.
I want to get to the Pakistan-India relationship for one
moment. We've been talking about that for many, many, many
years. You talked about that there is conversation taking place
between the two countries and their leaders, and that there is,
at times, some progress that is being made. How would you judge
progress? What are we looking for? What are we trying to
achieve in improving the relationship between those two
countries?
Secretary Burns. I think we have to judge it against the
standard of 1998 and 2001. You remember, there were times when
it seemed that India and Pakistan, both during the Clinton
administration and during the early years of this Bush
administration, were on the brink of a conflict. They're
nuclear-armed. Nothing could be worse for the people of the two
countries, and for the world.
Since then, I think you've begun to see--and what I would
look for is an element of trust beginning to develop between
the highest-level leaders on both sides, President Musharraf,
Prime Minister Singh, their Foreign Ministers, and their
Foreign Secretaries. And they've formed this composite dialog.
It's an Indo-Pak dialog of the Foreign Secretaries. And they do
get together very consistently, they work through their
bilateral differences. They work on the very difficult issue of
Kashmir. And they're also trying to break down the barriers
that have separated the peoples in the border regions for a
long, long time--by the bus routes, that have been enabled
relatives to visit each other for the first time in many years,
for instance. So, there's a little bit of hope.
We've been encouraged by it. It doesn't mean that they've
arrived at a state of full understanding or partnership or
friendship. I think they're not there yet. But we've been
encouraged by this, and we are, along with some other
countries, very much supporting it in our private discussions
with both sides. Secretary Rice has done that. I've done it, at
my level, with my counterparts who are involved in this dialog.
And it's in our interest, because, I would say, if you're
looking at the future of American foreign policy, we now have
vital interests in South Asia that we did not have before. We
need to have full strategic relations with both Pakistan and
India. And we don't need to have a relationship with Pakistan,
``hyphen,'' India, as we did for so long, and balance
everything minutely. We can have a relationship with India,
which is going to look very different, and be different, than
the relationship with Pakistan, but both of them will be
important.
Their ability to resolve their bilateral differences will
help us, and help them, to create much more stability and peace
in the region. So, I think the stakes are very high, and the
progress is good. But they need to go a lot farther to
consummate this process.
Senator Cardin. How important it is--is it for the United
States to be actively involved in trying to get progress
between those two countries, as--I take it, it's going to be
difficult for the two countries, on their own, to make the type
of progress that many of us would like to see. How important is
it for the United States? And you mentioned some other
countries. What other countries are important in trying to make
progress in this area?
Secretary Burns. Well, I think it's certainly in our
interest to say to both countries, ``If we can be helpful,
please let us be helpful''--and I think there have been ways
when we have been helpful--and to assert that this is a very
critical stage for them, and, if they get this relationship
right between each other, it will unlock a lot of very positive
developments for both of them and--as well as for us.
I also would say this, that these are proud countries, and
the issue of Kashmir is especially sensitive. And so, we've
been very careful not to assert ourself as a mediator. I don't
think they--they don't want that. I think they want private
encouragement. We have a certain credibility in India, as well
as in Pakistan, and we should--and we can use that influence
quietly, but we don't need to be--and I don't think either side
wants us to be--a formal mediator in this process.
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Kerry. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Casey.
Senator Casey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
calling this hearing.
Senator Kerry. Let me just remind everybody, we do have a
panel of three, to follow this, so we want to try to get
through there.
Thanks.
Senator Casey. Thank you very much.
And, Secretary Burns, thank you for your service, in
particularly difficult times, in difficult and sensitive
matters that you have to deal with.
I wanted to ask a couple of questions about the A.Q. Khan
network. We--which we, I guess, charitably refer to as a
proliferation network, which is pretty scary to even
contemplate. First of all, just a couple of basic questions. It
operated out of Islamabad, is that correct?
Secretary Burns. It operated out of Pakistan, yes. I think,
various parts of Pakistan.
Senator Casey. Various parts of the country.
Secretary Burns. As far as I understand, yes.
Senator Casey. And isn't it true, it sold sensitive nuclear
technology to Iran?
Secretary Burns. Well, there is, I think, a great deal of
evidence that it sold technology to a great number of states
and actors, yes, on the black market.
Senator Casey. But Iran would be one of them? Are you
confident in that assertion, or----
Secretary Burns. I would be, yes.
Senator Casey. How about North Korea? The same?
Secretary Burns. Well, I think there's a lot of evidence to
indicate that there was a relationship there, as well, yes. I'm
being a little bit hesitant, for one reason. I was not working
on this issue during the time that the A.Q. Khan network was
unveiled. And so, I don't have a perfect recollection of how it
was taken down and of all of its tributaries. So, I would be
very happy to give you a written answer to these questions, but
obviously, yes, the A.Q. Khan network was involved with both of
those countries, and with others, as well.
[The information provided to the committee in response to
Senator Casey's question is classified.]
Senator Casey. And with others. And I just think it's
important, for the record, to establish that. And I guess
there's no--and you've been asked, by a couple of members of
this committee, about where we are now with regard to that. Is
it your understanding, right now--you used the word, before, I
think, in reference to--I think it was Senator Isakson's
question--that it's your understanding now that A.Q. Khan is
``dismantled.'' Is that the word--I think that's the word you
used. That's our understanding--our Government's understanding?
Secretary Burns. When his--when the network was revealed,
made known to us, we demanded that the network be completely
dismantled. We, of course, follow up regularly with the
Pakistani Government to ensure that that remains the case. I'm
not aware that we've had substantial access to him, and I am
aware that he currently lives in Pakistan, under some form of
house arrest, a general--I've used that general term, but I'm
not aware of the specifics of his existence and his
relationship to the law enforcement authorities there.
Senator Casey. And you said, before, I believe, that you
insisted, or you told--or, I mean, our Government has indicated
to the Pakistani Government that it's their responsibility to
fully shut him down and shut the network down. When we demand
that--and I'd like to ask you about how we enforce that, or how
we, as you said, follow up on it--what's the basis for their
continuing refusal--Pakistan's refusal to give the United
States, or any international investigators, access to the
network? What do they say? In other words, when we demand some
kind of access or we pursue that.
Secretary Burns. First, you're quite right that we have
made it a point to tell the Pakistani Government it's their
responsibility to have fully dismantled the network, and to
keep it dismantled, and any similar network. Their
responsibility. They have asserted to us that they accept that
responsibility, and that, therefore, as I understand it, we
haven't had the type of personal, consistent access that
otherwise might have been--would have been of interest to us.
But, again, I don't have all the details of everything
we've done, and some of it may be better conveyed to you in
classified form, as well.
Senator Casey. Well, I'd appreciate that. And I'm sure the
record--the committee would, in the record, would be--it would
be helpful for the record.
I guess part of what I'm asking is, to use an old phrase--I
think it President Reagan used--how do we ``trust, but
verify,'' here? And what are the mechanics of that, or the
steps that we have to walk through to get that done?
Secretary Burns. Well, we have to have the type of
relationship with Pakistan that there has to be transparency in
this issue, in our private discussions with them, and a degree
of access, in terms of our being able to ask questions and get
answers that are credible, because there is nothing more
important than containing nuclear fissile material or nuclear
technology that can help other countries, irresponsible
countries, develop nuclear arsenals. So, I can assure you that
we take this very seriously. We're actively involved in it.
But, again, I'd like--I think most of this should be done, in
terms of conveying information to you, on a classified basis.
Senator Casey. And the last question on this pertains to
timing. If you know--and if you don't know, if you're able to
supplement the record--when was the last time our Government
had an engagement or a conversation or a discussion about this,
even if it's--obviously, if it's classified, you can't talk
about it, but are you aware of any engagement recently--say, in
the last 6 months?
Secretary Burns. I will get you an answer on that--to that
question.
Thank you.
[The information provided to the committee in response to
Senator Casey's question is classified.]
Senator Casey. All right.
I don't have much time left. I want to keep within the
chairman's rules, and the rules of the committee.
I guess, one final question I have--and it--we don't have
enough time, but I want--I was looking at page four of your
testimony, and I was just underlining the following references.
And I'm reading--I'm just reading portions of sentences. But we
say--or, you're saying, on page four, we would, quote,
``frankly, like Pakistan to do even more.'' At one point, you
say, ``Pakistan will have to find a more effective and
successful way to do more on the borders.'' The next paragraph,
``We want to see''--further in that second paragraph on page
four, ``We urge.'' And then, ``We urge,'' again.
Now, I realize that we don't have the capacity or the
authority to run two countries, so to speak. But how do--how is
that going to work, going forward? When we--we know that
there's a major problem with al-Qaeda, which we knew before the
NIE, and we know it's even more pronounced now. When we say
``we urge,'' ``we hope,'' ``we want,'' ``we expect,'' how do
we--what kind of leverage do we have to go beyond that, so that
we can actually have an assurance that they are doing
everything possible to prevent the further spread of any kind
of influence that al-Qaeda has? I know it's a long--it's a
difficult question to answer, but I'd like you to speak to it,
because I think a lot of people who read the record of this, or
watch this, want to know what we're doing that's definitive.
Secretary Burns. It's a very fair question. I--you know, we
have to--we do know that President Musharraf has the same
interests that we do, and that is to defeat the terrorist
groups on his own soil. They've attacked him, personally.
They've tried to kill him. They've killed a lot of his
soldiers. They represent the greatest threat to the internal
security of Pakistan itself.
It was interesting to see----
Senator Kerry. Is that al-Qaeda? Or is that radical
internal----
Secretary Burns. Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and there are a few
other radical terrorist organizations inside Pakistan that
present a threat to the Pakistani government.
Senator Kerry. But the ones who made attempts on his life.
Secretary Burns. Excuse me?
Senator Kerry. Do you have a specificity with respect to
the attempts on his life?
Secretary Burns. I don't have, available to me right now, a
list of all the organizations that have tried to kill him, but
we know that there have been attempts to do so.
Senator Kerry. It's fair to say there are a bunch of
organizations, outside of al-Qaeda, that have an interest in
doing that, have been trying to, for some time.
Secretary Burns. It's fair to say that there are other
groups, beyond al-Qaeda, yes, exactly, that have tried to do
that.
And, just to try to answer your question, we don't doubt
President Musharraf's commitment. And we don't doubt the
commitment of his army and of many of the other leaders in the
government. But there's no question that we have to devise a
more effective strategy, because al-Qaeda is present, and the
Taliban is present, as well. And so, it's our No. 1 goal in
Pakistan and with the Pakistanis.
I think--I was just going to say, I--it was interesting to
see the reaction of a lot of average Pakistanis after the Red
Mosque incident in Islamabad. In general, as I understand it,
from reporting from our Embassy, the public reaction was very
supportive of President Musharraf. Most Pakistanis don't want
to see their country torn apart, they don't want to see suicide
bombers kill innocent people. And so, I think we have that
degree of connectivity with the Pakistani people, as well a the
Government of Pakistan, on this fight against extremist groups,
whether it's al-Qaeda or some of the other indigenous groups in
Pakistan.
[Additional information submitted by Secretary Burns
follows:]
Secretary Burns. Al-Qaeda and Pakistani extremists have been
involved in past assassination attempts against Musharraf. Although the
total number of such attempts is unclear, they include two attempts in
December 2003, a poorly planned and executed rocket attack in October
2006, and a badly planned and executed machine gun attack on
Musharraf's aircraft in July 2007. For more specific details, the State
Department can brief interested Senators and staff in a classified
setting.
Senator Kerry. Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Secretary Burns, I'd like to tell you how much I
appreciate not only the quality of your testimony, but the care
that you've put into your answers. These are--this is a
volatile issue, and I think you've been very responsible, in
terms of how you've attempted to answer these questions.
I also want to tell you I'm going to talk really fast,
because I only have 7 minutes, and you're at the bottom of the
food chain, in terms of your interrogators, here.
I couldn't help but react a little bit when Senator Hagel
asked you about the relationship between Pakistan and Iran,
because, when he was asking you that question, I actually was
thinking about the relationship between Pakistan and China, and
the fact that, if it had not been for certain elements in
China, Pakistan would not have a nuclear capability at all. And
I was among a number of people who were writing and warning
about that as it occurred. And the end result is what we're
dealing with right now. Quite frankly, there are few situations
around the world that have the volatility and the potential for
miscalculation as the issues in Pakistan, which is, again, why
I appreciate the care in which you have answered your
questions.
There's been a lot of discussion over the past week or so
about the possibility that the United States might enter into
these areas along the border to conduct counterterrorism
activities. And I think the best thing that we can do right
now, in terms of examining the potential ramifications of that
is, first, if you could explain to us, in short phrases, the
nature--the political nature of these federally administrated
tribal areas so that we can understand that, for the record,
the issues of sovereignty between the Pakistani Government in
these areas.
Secretary Burns. Thank you, Senator.
These areas have largely--well, have been not governed by
central authority since the creation of Pakistan.
Senator Webb. So, when we are--when we're discussing, for
instance, elections and these sorts of things, how are they
going to impact this area?
Secretary Burns. I would have to--actually, I would have to
get you a written answer on that.
[Secretary Burns's response to Senator Webb's question
follows:]
Secretary Burns. Presidential and parliamentary elections in
Pakistan this year and early next year are not expected to
fundamentally affect the political nature of the Fedderally
Administered Tribal Areas (``the Tribal Areas''). Under Pakistani law,
the Tribal Areas are excluded from the legislative regime in force
throughout the rest of Pakisan, and no political party can legally
campaign or operate an office there. Instead, the Tribal Areas are
governed primarily through the 1901 Frontier Crimes Regulation, a
procedural law distinct from the criminal and civil codes operative
elsewhere in Pakistan. Therefore, political parties are not allowed to
operate within the Tribal Areas. However, many secular political
parties complained that this rule was no longer valid since religious-
based political parties have openly campaigned in the Tribal Areas. The
long-term objective of the Pakistani government is to bring the Tribal
Areas into the mainstream body politic of the Pakistani state. The USG
supports the Pakistani government's comprehensive sustainable
development plan for the Tribal Areas which seeks to bring economic and
social development as well as effective governance to this remote
corner of Paki9stan. We encourage Congress to support USG plans to
contribute $750 million over five years to this plan to help render the
Tribal Areas inhospitable to terrorists and extremist ideology.
Senator Webb. Well, I think it's fair to say that that part
of Pakistan are does not have a representative government, at
this time. Is that fair to say?
Secretary Burns. That's fair to say. There are tribal
leaders----
Senator Webb. Right.
Ambassador Burns [continuing]. That have authority in the--
in these areas. And the Pakistani Government has a relationship
with them. The army does move into the tribal areas. The
Pakistani Government obviously extends assistance--health,
education, job creation--to these----
Senator Webb. Right. But, in terms of--when we're
discussing elections and a movement toward democracy and these
sorts of things, these are--these are, in terms of governmental
structure, not really considered to be a part of that process.
Is that fair, to say that?
Secretary Burns. It is fair to say, in terms of the
political administration----
Senator Webb. Right.
Ambassador Burns [continuing]. Of the----
Senator Webb. The elections that we're talking about, and
these sorts of things.
Secretary Burns. But I do want to make sure that I'm
entirely accurate in giving that answer, so I'm going to give
you a written answer to that.
[See Secretary Burns's response above.]
Senator Webb. OK. But I think it's fair to assume that, in
terms of normal issues of sovereignty, this is a gray area. And
that creates a situation, for us, the United States, in terms
of how to deal with international terrorist activities that are
in this area. It's not the traditional situation of--for
instance, the--parallel to what we had in Afghanistan, when we
had a government that was allowing international terrorism, and
all the trainee aspects, et cetera, to occur within its area of
sovereignty.
Secretary Burns. I think, Senator, it's not--in my own
view, it's not so much a question of complications over
sovereignty as it is over effectiveness of organization. I say
that, because, you know, President Musharraf did agree to this
Waziristan agreement, where he gave the tribal leaders the
right to go ahead and organization opposition to al-Qaeda and
others. That didn't work out. And so, now you have--the federal
troops have moved back in to the area, because that was the
only solution left to the government. So, I think the hardest
strategic question is: How do you organize a military effort,
combining with the tribal leaders, by the way, and the
Pakistani forces, to be effective? Because I think one point
that the Pakistani Government makes over and over to us is that
it can't just be about the application of military force. You
also have to have an economic strategy----
Senator Webb. I understand all that. And you've said it
very clearly during your testimony, that--the situation that
I'm trying to get some understanding on here is the dilemma, in
terms of international law and the ripple effect, actually on
the other side, that this might have in Pakistan. On the one
hand, I think our position has been, in international law, that
if you either cannot--as in the case, let's say, of Hezbollah--
or will not, as in the case of Afghanistan, control
international terrorism inside your borders, then we have the
right, under the United Nations Charter, to defend ourselves.
But then you have a situation, as in Pakistan, where you have
an enormously volatile central government that is administering
an area where it is attempting--and I want to give them credit
for that, they are attempting to control this process--but that
if we were to go in, that we would have the potential of
causing a ripple effect throughout the country that could truly
destabilize the central government.
Secretary Burns. Yeah. And here's how we look at it. And,
you know--as you know, my colleague Fran Townsend spoke to this
the other day on the Sunday shows--we want to respect the
sovereignty of the Pakistani Government. And it is sovereign
throughout all parts of the country, in terms of
international--its international legal character. It's
sovereign. And we want to work with the Pakistanis. But, I
think, you know, she was asked--and other people have been
asked--the question, Are there any scenarios under which the
United States might take its own action? And, when we're
dealing with Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda, we could foresee--we
can foresee such scenarios. But it's always going to be our
preference to work with Pakistan, and to prefer that as a
course of action.
Senator Webb. And you would agree with the potential that--
or the idea that this has the potential, if we were to do it
wrong, by, you know, perhaps, showing that we are not
respecting the central government's sovereignty, that we have
the potential here of destabilizing a government that is,
perhaps, the most volatile in--and, potentially, destabilized
country that we have any relationships with.
Secretary Burns. It's a very important consideration,
you're right, that we obviously have thought of, and will
continue to think of, because we--you know, we have put--we
have--we've put our support behind the Pakistani Government. We
are friends. We're partners with them. And we want to be
respectful of them, and we don't want to complicate their
internal politics needlessly. So, obviously, this is a
consideration for us, in this whole set of options that you've
drawn for us.
Senator Webb. Well, and I would say, again--my time is up--
but that--with respect to the sovereignty issues in this
particular country, I know of no more complicated area, in
terms of the use of military force, potentially, for the United
States.
Thank you.
Secretary Burns. Thank you.
Senator Kerry. Thank you, Senator Webb.
There is no question of the level of that complication,
which is partly, sort of, the quandary that we find ourselves
in.
Secretary Burns, just a couple of last questions before we
shift to the next panel.
To what does this administration attribute the rise of the
radicalism within Pakistan?
Secretary Burns. That's an enormously complicated question,
but I'll try to give you a good answer.
Pakistan has been roiled by political divisions and
tensions over the last 35 or 40 years, and very much divided--
badly divided--inside the country by those various tensions.
And that has been its first source of conflict and instability.
A second has been the rise of some of the radical--some of
the radical Islamists indigenous groups, as well as the
presence of al-Qaeda and the Taliban as a factor in parts of
Pakistan's political life. And they've been enormously
complicated.
Third have been the issues that have grown out of the fact
that there was a military coup and a military government took
over the country. And the normal political process was denied,
at least at the start of that period.
So, you put all of that together, and you have some of the
sources of instability and conflict that have been present in
Pakistani political life.
Senator Kerry. I agree with the historical component, but
it's never produced the kind of intensity, in the suicide
bombing and the sort of fragility, that exists today, would you
say?
Secretary Burns. Well, I do--I think that Pakistan is
undergoing a period of particularly intense division and
instability right now, and we know that al-Qaeda and the
Taliban and some of the other groups are, at least in part,
responsible for that type of division.
Senator Kerry. So, given that--and I agree with that--are
we just in a box that is, not just uncomfortable, but
impossible to really maneuver in, in the following sense?
President Musharraf, I would wager, is more interested in
holding onto power, and survival, than he is in taking a risk
for us. I also believe he's probably more interested in doing
those things than in taking on al-Qaeda and Taliban, if not
taking them on allows him to survive. And I suspect that's been
his judgment, to a certain point in time. That may be changing
now, I don't know. And you might shed some light on that. But,
whatever he does, if he does take them on, or any of those
other elements, in a hard fashion, he goes counter to the
democratic interests that the administration has expressed, and
the world supports, and also encourages people to see him as
acting on our behalf, which then emboldens the very elements
that he's, sort of, trying to deal with. So, you get this
circular relationship that obviously increases the complexity.
Is there a breakpoint here, where you kind of make the cut
that the way you survive is, in fact, by full-fledged taking
them on, without then becoming, sort of, the tool of the United
States? And, if not, are we just stuck, that al-Qaeda sits
there with its refuge, safe haven, because the accommodation
that exists between them is the easier way to survive and
thread the needle, in terms of his own interests--and the
army's interest, I might add?
Secretary Burns. Yeah. Well, I do think it's an enormously
complicated landscape, but I don't think, necessarily, we're in
a box, strategically. We need a strong friend and partner to
fight al-Qaeda and the other terrorist groups. We have that
person, in President Musharraf; first point.
My second point would be that obviously what we would like
to see is the positive evolution of his government and the
country toward a fuller democracy, because we believe that's
not just the right thing for the people, but the right way to
help stabilize the country over the long term.
Third, part of our challenge is to combat the Taliban in
Afghanistan. We need the Pakistanis to help us do that, through
actions on their side of the border. We can contain the Taliban
threat to the Karzai government. We have sufficient military
force--we and the allies--NATO allies--in the country to do
that, but we need to then--we need to do that in concert with
Pakistani efforts on that side of the border.
And that leads me back to your question. We need a strong
partner, who's willing to take military action on this priority
issue. And we have it. And we just hope it----
Senator Kerry. Do you have only with respect to the
Taliban----
Secretary Burns. Excuse me?
Senator Kerry [continuing]. Do you have that partnership,
in terms of taking them on, only with respect to the Taliban,
because of the Afghanistan connection, but not with respect to
al-Qaeda, because of the internals?
Secretary Burns. We need the partnership to combat both,
and I think you----
Senator Kerry. But do you believe----
Ambassador Burns [continuing]. Have that----
Senator Kerry [continuing]. You have it, with respect to
al-Qaeda?
Secretary Burns. We have the commitment.
Senator Kerry. Do you have the cooperation?
Secretary Burns. We need to see effective--more effective
action.
Senator Kerry. Well, I would agree with that, and I
appreciate your saying that.
Let me--we need to move on to the next panel. I think you
have answered a number of tough questions, as carefully as
possible, in some respects. It's tough to do in the open
session, and we all understand that. But I think it's been very
helpful, and, I hope, helps to clarify, for some people, just
how complicated this is.
So, we thank you, and we look forward to continuing to work
with you on this issue in the days ahead.
Thank you.
If I could ask----
Secretary Burns. Thank you.
Senator Kerry [continuing]. If we could keep everybody,
sort of, quiet in place, and we can move right on to the second
panel, if possible.
Thank you, Secretary.
Secretary Burns. Thank you. Thank you very much.
Senator Kerry. Please, sit. Thank you so much for your
patience. We have a terrific panel of experts here, and I
appreciate your patience. You've had a chance to really listen,
which is helpful. So, I welcome the Honorable Teresita
Schaffer, director of the South Asia Program, Center for
Strategic and International Studies; Dr. Samina Ahmed, South
Asia project director, International Crisis Group; and Dr.
Stephen Cohen, senior fellow of foreign policy studies at the
Brookings Institution.
I don't want to cut off something you have to say--your
full texts are going to be put in the record, as if in full. If
there's a way to summarize, somewhere in the vicinity of 5 or 6
minutes, I think it would be helpful, and then we can have some
discussion and go further from there.
Dr. Schaffer, please.
STATEMENT OF HON. TERESITA C. SCHAFFER, DIRECTOR, SOUTH ASIA
PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES,
WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Schaffer. I'll do my best, Senator.
And, first of all, thank you very much for inviting me here
to testify today.
My prepared statement describes the three big challenges
that I see Pakistan facing today, and they've all been
discussed at length. The one point that I think--there's two
points that I think need to be underlined, however.
First, there is a distinction to be made between the
challenge from, basically, lawbreakers who were in the Red
Mosque in Islamabad, who were flouting governmental authority,
and the extremist challenge in the northwest frontier province,
which is, fundamentally, backwash from the Afghanistan
conflict.
The second point has to do with the elections. Obviously,
the upcoming elections hang over all of the other challenges
that President Musharraf is facing. The problem is, first of
all, that there are two elections. There's an indirect election
for President. The President is elected by the national and
provincial assemblies. And there is a popular election for the
assemblies. Both are coming up. Both the sequence of them and
the question of whether President Musharraf can run in uniform
are legally complex and controversial. My reading is that the
government has a stronger case for its argument to have the
Presidential election first than it does for Musharraf running
in uniform. But, particularly following the Supreme Court
ruling reinstating the Chief Justice, it's evident that both of
these issues are going to be challenged in the courts. So,
Musharraf, I think, to his unhappiness and surprise, is facing
a much more uncertain election picture than he was before.
Let me move to my policy recommendations, and focus on
them, rather than on going back through, analyzing the
situation.
I have three basic recommendations:
The first is that the United States seize the opportunity
that the Supreme Court has handed to it, and come out strongly
in favor of the rule of law, a free and fair election, and
moving toward a truly democratic government. This would
include, in my book, supporting a court ruling, should there be
one, that Musharraf should resign from the army if he wishes to
run for President. That's the bit that's going to be
controversial, and that the administration hasn't reached that
point yet.
Why am I arguing for this? Not just because it is in line
with U.S. values, but it also reflects a hard-nosed judgment
about the relationship between the Pakistan Army and the
militants who threaten the progressive modern Islamic character
of the state. In the past, when the Pakistani state has cracked
down on extremist militants, the army has often pulled its
punches, making sure that militant groups remained alive and
available to work with them across Pakistan's tense borders in
the future. I think that extremism cannot be kept half-
contained in this fashion. As long as the army remains in
charge of policy, without a serious political supervision, I
think it's unlikely to treat the extremists as the enemy they
have become. Hence, my belief that we have to move back to a
government that's elected in a truly democratic process.
My second recommendation has to do with the tribal areas. I
strongly oppose the idea of U.S. military intervention. I
think--can think of no quicker way of turning all of Pakistan
against the antiterrorism goals that are so important to the
United States, and turning the Pakistan Army into a hostile
force. To use the military terminology, I don't think it would
be a permissive environment.
Support for Pakistan's operations in the frontier is
another story. There, we should be generous and creative.
As far as economic support for integrating the tribal areas
into Pakistan is concerned, I'm in favor of being willing to
spend generously, and I'm even in favor of taking the risk that
some of that money would go astray, and that is a very
significant risk. I think we need to focus on jobs for the
youth of the frontier. I think we need to focus on links to the
Pakistani economy. The idea of free access to the U.S. market
for goods produced there is fine, but, right at the moment,
there aren't any. That is looking way into the future.
And, finally, this kind of integration effort normally
depends on working with existing structures for social
management and administration. At least in parts of the
frontier, and in the most troublesome ones, those structures
really don't exist anymore. The tribal chiefs are, by and
large, gone from the south Waziristan area, where there was so
much talk of a deal. So, I think this is--was, in any case,
going to be the work of a generation. I think it's gotten
harder.
My final recommendation has to do with aid to Pakistan. I
think we need to keep economic assistance generous, carefully
programmed--meaning, not just cash--and largely immune from the
ups and downs of our relationship with Pakistan. This needs to
become the embodiment of a long-term commitment, which we need
to make to Pakistan in light of the continuing interests we
will have there.
As far as military aid is concerned, I think we should try
to focus, as much as possible, on equipment that is relevant to
the fight against terrorism, and I think that military
equipment for general upgrading of defense capabilities should
be conditioned on how well Pakistan is doing in these other
policy goals.
My final recommendation, I think we need to broaden and
deepen the antiterrorism consensus in Pakistan. You asked very
pointed questions about the rise of radicalism in Pakistan, and
the rise of anti-Americanism. I served in Pakistan 30 years
ago, I can tell you it's a different country now.
Lots of things have gone into this, movements that have
swept through the Muslim world, the tremendous sense of
injustice that pervades a lot of Muslim societies, but I think
the ``I'' word is there, too: Iraq. This has certainly
exacerbated public perceptions of the United States, and the
sense that the United States is a country that attacks Muslims.
The United States can't turn this around single-handedly.
We can't ``sell'' what we don't ``do.'' But one thing we can
start doing is to listen more carefully to what Pakistanis,
around the country, say about their hopes for a better future.
I think there are a lot of people out there who want
enlightened moderation. That should inform the rest of our
policy.
I was pleased that Secretary Burns put so much of his
testimony in terms of our relationship with Pakistan, and not
just our relationship with Musharraf. It's a subtle
distinction, but a vitally important one.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Schaffer follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador Teresita C. Schaffer
pakistan: today's crisis and u.s. policy
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for inviting me
to appear before you. Pakistan today is going through the most severe
crisis it has faced in the past eight years. Its future matters
profoundly to the United States and to the region, so it is a good time
to take stock of U.S. policy.
I would like to sketch out briefly the multiple crises Pakistan now
faces. I conclude that the United States needs to put its weight behind
a return to civilian rule through free and fair elections, a separation
between the offices of President and Army chief, and reducing the
army's role in domestic politics, while ensuring that the army's
essential role in national security is properly institutionalized.
Generous economic aid and properly targeted and conditioned military
aid are part of this. The U.S. should not intervene in the tribal
areas. And the United States urgently needs to try to strengthen and
broaden the anti-terrorism consensus within Pakistan.
Three short-term dramas are playing out in Pakistan. The first is a
challenge to the basic authority of the government to keep order, best
exemplified by the kidnapping and other lawless activities carried out
by the Red Mosque leadership and their students. Musharraf's decision
to respond was welcomed by all but the most hard-line supporters of the
militants, and briefly strengthened his position. Once the death toll
became known, however, it was followed by a rash of suicide bombings,
not just near the Afghan border but as far away as Karachi, leaving
another 200 or so people dead. The extremist threat to Pakistan's
government and society is still with us.
The second drama is the spillover from the conflict in Afghanistan.
The demise of the agreement between the Pakistan government and the
tribal leaders in Waziristan is the latest development on this front,
although from my perspective that agreement never really went into
operation, so its death should not be front-page news. This relates to
the speculation about whether the United States will or should
intervene militarily in the tribal areas to prevent Al-Qaeda from using
them as a sanctuary.
The third drama stems from Musharraf's decision to suspend the
Chief Justice last March, which the Supreme Court has now overturned.
The decision and the government's response, including the May riots in
Karachi that left 40 people dead, shattered Musharraf's legitimacy and
his popular support. It appears to have awakened considerable popular
resentment against the army, and concern within the army.
The Supreme Court's ruling last week was a serious embarrassment to
Musharraf. It also interferes with Musharraf's strategy of seeking
reelection later this year, with the presidential election preceding
the legislative elections, and with Musharraf retaining his post as
Army chief. The legal provisions governing both the sequence of the
elections and Musharraf's dual positions are complex and confusing, but
it is clear that both will be challenged in the courts. Musharraf can
no longer be confident that the courts will support him.
The United States needs Pakistan as a committed partner in the
struggle against terrorism and insurgency, especially in the Pakistan/
Afghanistan border region. It needs a Pakistan government that can keep
order and has legitimacy, one that will not allow Pakistan to be used
as a platform for insurgency or irredentism in either Afghanistan or
its nuclear-armed neighbor India.
My recommendations for U.S. policy focus on three things: support
for Pakistan's return to elected, civilian government; dealing with
Pakistan's frontier area; and military and economic aid.
Pakistan's political future matters profoundly to the future peace
and governability of the region. The Supreme Court ruling has given
us--and Pakistan--an opportunity to stand up for the rule of law. This
is the only way to set Pakistan on the course toward ``enlightened
moderation'' that many Pakistanis believe is their country's
birthright. The United States has welcomed the Supreme Court decision.
Accordingly, we need to make clear as events proceed that we expect the
coming elections to be fully free and fair, with Musharraf choosing
between the offices of president or army chief.
This may seem like an odd time for the United States to be taking a
strong stand for moving back to a freely elected government and
democratic institutions. This policy, however, is not just a reflection
of American values. It also reflects a hard-nosed judgment about the
relationship between the Pakistan army and the militants who threaten
to destroy the progressive, modern Islamic character of the state that
underpins real policy cooperation with the United States. In the past,
when the Pakistani state has cracked down on extremist militants, the
army has often pulled its punches, making sure that militant groups
remained alive and available to work with them across Pakistan's tense
borders in the future. That policy, I believe, is doomed to failure.
Extremism cannot be kept half-contained in this fashion. It poses a
mortal danger to Pakistan's domestic well-being. As long as the army
remains in charge of policy, it is unlikely to treat the extremists as
the enemy they are, and will not be able to end the domestic threat
they pose. Doing this requires a committed political government, with
full legitimacy. The army will of course play a critical role enforcing
the government's policies and defending Pakistan. But this role needs
to be anchored in a set of institutions in which elected political
power is firmly in charge, and fully accountable.
Musharraf may be in trouble, but he is the leader in Pakistan
today, so making this shift of emphasis without undermining his ability
to make decisions will be tricky. Since he has said he wants to hold
elections on time, and does not want to move toward a state of
emergency, the policy I propose is in line with his stated goals. But
it also recognizes that Pakistan's best shot at dealing with the danger
of violent extremism comes from moving back to a government that enjoys
full legitimacy.
Regarding the problem of the tribal areas, I strongly oppose direct
U.S. military intervention. I can think of no quicker way of turning
all of Pakistan against the anti-terrorism goals that are so important
to the United States, and turning the Pakistan army into a hostile
force. Support for Pakistan's operations in the frontier area is
another story: there we should be generous and creative.
But bringing the tribal areas under control is the work of a
generation, and will require political and economic as well as military
means. We do not understand the tribal society, its complex web of
relationships with Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the fragile economy
there, well enough to leave it in better shape than we found it. I
support a major development program, despite the substantial risk that
some of the money would go astray. Without jobs for the youth of the
tribal areas, I don't see how one can begin the long task of bringing
them into the government net. But let us be clear that this will not
bear fruit for several years.
My final recommendation deals with assistance programs in Pakistan.
I have long believed that we need to use our economic assistance to
build a long term relationship with Pakistan. We should increase it
relative to military assistance, and should hold it largely immune to
the political ups and downs of the relationship. We should be
programming our economic aid rather than giving it in cash or quasi-
cash form, and we should be using our assistance to build up Pakistan's
investment in its own people, in education and health.
Military assistance is also an important expression of our long-
term commitment to the people of Pakistan, but here it is important to
draw some distinctions we have not drawn in the past. Military sales
should focus in the first instance on equipment that will help Pakistan
with its vital counter-terrorism goals. Military sales that relate more
to general defense upgrading should take a back seat, and should be
contingent on Pakistan's effective performance in countering militant
extremists, both along the Afghan border and elsewhere. If we continue
to find that Pakistan's army is hedging its bets in Afghanistan and
providing support for the Taliban, or for domestic militant groups, we
should put this type of military sales on hold.
My other recommendation is more general. The administration has
tended to speak of Musharraf whenever it is asked about policy toward
Pakistan. I think we need to shift our emphasis to the whole of
Pakistan. Obviously, leaders are important, especially in troubled
countries at troubled times. But the sustainability of Pakistan's
political system and its ability to grow new leaders are absolutely
critical to the goal of combating terrorism that has been at the top of
our list for the past six years. This means that we need the Pakistani
political system--or as many parts of it as possible--to buy into the
goal of eliminating extremist influence in Pakistan. Especially since
the invasion of Iraq, this has become a very tough job in a country
where public opinion now regards the United States as a country that
``attacks Muslims.'' Hence my final recommendation. We need to listen
to what Pakistanis are saying about their hopes for a better future for
their country. If, as I suspect, there is widespread but amorphous
sentiment for ``enlightened moderation,'' we need to help strengthen
and deepen that, and to show by our actions that this is where we want
to go, together with Pakistan.
Senator Kerry. Well, I couldn't agree with you more on
that. I tried to emphasize it in my own comments.
Dr. Cohen.
STATEMENT OF DR. STEPHEN P. COHEN, SENIOR FELLOW, FOREIGN
POLICY STUDIES, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, WASHINGTON, DC
Senator Kerry. Can you push your mike a little closer.
Dr. Cohen. Thank you.
Senator Kerry. You're lit. Pull it close to you, too.
Dr. Cohen. I'm a Cub fan, and I know the meaning of hope,
even more than a Red Sox fan, but I don't think that hope is
the appropriate term to use in dealing with policy. I worked
for George Schultz for a couple of years, and he told us, one
day, ``Hope is not a policy.'' And I think that we need to be
more specific, more concrete, with our relationship with
Pakistan.
But I think that we have, actually, three problems we're
dealing with--two short term and one long term:
The short-term problems are the Taliban and al-Qaeda. And
clearly, they do present--al-Qaeda, in particular, presents an
immediate threat to the United States. Taliban presents a
threat--an indirect threat, in that it harbored al-Qaeda in
Afghanistan.
But we have a long-term threat, in the case of Pakistan.
Pakistan has been the most allied of allied countries, and so
forth. It's been a close country to the United States for many
years. But Pakistanis, especially the military, say that we
have used Pakistan like a tissue paper--I think it's a stronger
word, they say a condom--and thrown it away time and time
again. So, there's deep distrust in Pakistan with regard to the
American relationship, especially among the military. And our
billions of dollars have not bought loyalty, they've bought
cooperation, to some degree.
I think that part of the problem is that we're not clear
exactly what our priorities are. This may well be a
bureaucratic problem, it may be differences in the
administration, it may be Congress versus the administration.
I'm not quite sure. But clearly, we want to--we want the
Pakistanis to help us round up al-Qaeda. We want them to stop
supporting the Taliban, or tolerating the Taliban. We want
Pakistan to reform itself, to become a democracy. We want
Pakistan to clean up the madrassahs. We want Pakistan to be a
democracy. And we want Pakistan to stop abusing human rights
and have good relations with India. From a Pakistani point of
view, they look at this list, and they say, ``Well, what is
their real priority? What do we really have to do? What can we
do?'' They're not always the same thing that we're concerned
about. So, I think that part of our problem in dealing with
Pakistan, especially in recent years, is that we lack a
fundamental understanding with the Pakistanis as to what is
most important, what is least important. And I don't--until
that--until that difference is resolved, I think that we're
just going to continue to spin our wheels. In fact, the
questions here reflected a wide range of interests in Pakistan.
The answers were interesting, but I don't think that we can
meet all of the--I don't think we can meet all of the demands
I've heard here today.
Let me say a word about the military, because I think that
is really the key of--to Pakistan. Musharraf is a product of
the military. His most important constituent is the military.
He responds to challenges from the United States, from China,
from the Saudis, from the Pakistani people. He also--but he
really responds to challenges from the military. And I think
he's concerned about his position as army commander in chief.
And that's one reason he does not want to take off his uniform.
He wants to hold the triple position of leader of a political
party, President of Pakistan, and commander of the army. And I
think that's constitutionally unsustainable. And, in the long
run, it's unsustainable for Pakistan. Pakistan is a country
that's been walking on one strong leg, which is the army. It
needs to grow another leg, which is a civilian side. So, I
think, in terms of our policies, we've got to urge Pakistan to
move toward a more balanced civil/military relations.
Now, elections may not be the immediate answer to this.
Elections are important, but it's always the second election;
that's really crucial. And I don't think there's quite yet a
political consensus between the military and leading civilian
elements in Pakistan to have a free and fair election. There
may be an election, but I think it's going to be a rigged
election.
From my perspective, that would not necessarily be a bad
thing, if it led to a more free election after that, and,
ultimately, completely free elections. So, I think we should
see Pakistan's democratization as a crucial long-term interest
of ours, but something we're not going to achieve overnight. We
can't force Musharraf or the military to institute overnight.
Finally, let me add that I agree, just about, with all of
Ambassador Schaffer's recommendations. We prepared our
testimony separately, but we come up to the many of the same
points.
I think that our military assistance should be made
conditional on good performance in the case of al-Qaeda and
Taliban. In the case of Taliban, the army has an--Pakistan Army
has an interest in looking the other way, at least, because
they see the Taliban as one of the few instruments they have in
their position in Afghanistan. It's a strategic asset for them.
It's not simply--it's not--I think that there should definitely
be no military intervention in Pakistan. I think it would just
simply blow the lid off the place and destroy our relationship
with that country.
We should urge the Pakistanis, both civilians and--both
civil and military side--to develop a normal civil/military
relationship. The models we've had in Latin America, Southeast
Asia, other countries, are appropriate for Pakistan; sort of, a
phased withdrawal of the armed forces from politics.
And, finally, we need a dialog with India and China
regarding the future of Pakistan. The Chinese are vitally
interested in Pakistan. I think that the stimulating--the key
event that forced the Pakistanis to move against Lal Masjid was
the fact that Chinese were being killed, and one Chinese--a
couple of Chinese had been kidnapped by the ladies of Lal
Masjid. And I think Musharraf responded to that pressure faster
than anything else.
So, I think the Chinese have a concern about Pakistan
becoming a truly radical state. The Indians, of course, have a
vital interest in that. And I think there's an opportunity for
the United States to be--to, in a sense, (a) assist Pakistan
and India to a strategic reconfiguration of South Asia--that
is, get the Pakistan Army back on the frontier, where it used
to be in the old days, with the British-Indian Army; get the
Indian Army--India military doing global things, in a sense,
not fighting each other. But that's a long-term goal that I
think we should take a step down that road.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Cohen follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Stephen P. Cohen
Senator Kerry, members of the Committee, I am honored to again be
asked to share my expertise with you. Writing about Pakistan since the
mid 1960s, and visiting it regularly since 1977, I am the author of two
books on Pakistan: ``The Pakistan Army'' (1985) and ``The Idea of
Pakistan'' (2004), and dealt with Pakistan during my two years as a
member of Secretary Schultz's Policy Planning Staff in the Department
of State.
A short paper summarizing my understanding of Pakistan and its
future is appended, as is an op ed piece that recently appeared in the
Washington Post. I ask permission to attach these to my testimony. I
have divided my remarks into six observations about the present
situation in Pakistan followed by seven policy recommendations.
Pakistan used to be an important state because of its assets, but
it is now just as important because of its problems. Pakistan was once
truly a moderate Muslim country, the radical Islamists were marginal
and it had a democratic tradition even when the military ruled. In
recent years virtually all segments of Pakistani opinion have turned
anti-American. President Musharraf has not moved towards restoring real
democracy, Pakistan has been the worst proliferator of advanced nuclear
and missile technology, and the country continues to harbor-partially
involuntarily-extremists and terrorists whose dedicated mission is to
attack the United States and Pakistan's neighbors.
Recent events show that while Pakistanis may be at times incapable
of operating a democracy, they want one. The Supreme Court's reversal
of the suspension of the Chief Justice, the restraint of moderate
politicians, the courageous actions of the Pakistani press and
electronic media, and the outpouring of support for democracy among
Pakistani professionals and elites are all convincing evidence that the
US was wrong to tolerate Musharraf's contempt for democracy. One more
or less free election will not fix the problem, however, and building a
workable democracy will take time.
Musharraf is personally moderate but is strategically indecisive
and is in political decline. He has led Pakistan by exiling the leading
political opposition, co-opting some of the most corrupt elements of
Pakistani society and aligning with the Islamists. His survival
strategy was to meet external pressure from the US, China, and India
with minimal concessions. However, in the last year or so he has
systematically alienated most segments of Pakistani society and
infuriated his friends, both at home and abroad.
Musharraf will stay on only if he allies with the centrist
political forces in Pakistan. If he continues to stumble, mass protests
will make his rule impossible. Severe riots in Lahore and other Punjabi
cities will likely turn the army against him. If he accommodates the
centrist opposition parties he should be able to stay on, albeit
without his uniform. While Musharraf has a low opinion of civilian
leaders, especially exiled former prime ministers Benazir Bhutto and
Nawaz Sharif, other generals understand that their dilemma is that they
cannot alone govern a complex society such as Pakistan. The time has
come to move Pakistan towards a workable civil-military balance.
We do not have to worry overmuch about Musharraf's successor, or a
civil-military coalition. However, unless real reform is taken now, the
government that follows that may be cause for worry. In theory
Musharraf is capable of initiating such reform, but in practice he has
been reluctant to do it.
A final observation is that Pakistan's domestic politics remain
shaped by its security and foreign policy concerns. To the east there
is a continuing threat from India, whose army has now adopted a policy
that amounts to attacking in force across the border in retaliation for
the next terrorist incident. Fortunately, this may not be the Indian
government's policy. Continuing hostility with India ensures that the
Pakistan army will indefinitely remain at the center of Pakistani
politics. Looking west, the army remains concerned about India's
encircling influence in Afghanistan, and there are strong tribal ties
between Pakistani and Afghan Pushtuns. This means that American policy
has to deal with both sides of the border if it wants to stabilize
Afghanistan.
With these observations in mind, I would make the following
recommendations.
Washington cannot again abandon Pakistan, but it needs to change
the nature of the relationship with a state whose collapse
would be devastating to American interests. The Bush
administration was correct in lifting the many sanctions that
were imposed on Pakistan, but it was lax in holding the
Pakistani government to a high standard of governance, and to
President Musharraf's own stated goals and objectives.
The United States needs to make it absolutely clear to the
Pakistani leadership what our highest priorities are, and be
prepared to withdraw or reduce our assistance if there is no
effective cooperation from Islamabad. The US has provided
between ten and twenty-five billion dollars to Pakistan. Yet we
ask Pakistan to a) round up al Qaeda terrorists, b) suppress
the Taliban, c) stop future proliferation, d) move towards
democracy, e) clamp down on radical madrassas, f) normalize
relations with India, g) work with Afghanistan, and h) maintain
civil liberties and a free press. Pakistanis look at this wish
list and offer us what they think would be minimally
acceptable. The various United States agencies and department
must work out amongst themselves what is desirable and what is
essential, and what Pakistan can deliver. Our lack of expertise
on Pakistan hampers us in this regard. Pakistanis know how to
deal with Americans better than we know how to deal with them.
Our contacts with Pakistan must be broadened. We made a strategic
mistake in basing our entire Pakistan policy on President
Musharraf. He, like his military predecessors, knows how to
work the American "account." We hurt ourselves by cutting off
out contacts with Pakistani civil society, with leading
politicians, and with a timid public diplomacy. One bright
light has been an expanded Fulbright program, which is
educating a new generation of Pakistiani academics. Such
contacts and programs need to be greatly expanded, even at the
cost of some military assistance. They represent an enduring
contribution to Pakistan's growth as modern, moderate state.
While the U.S. should not do anything to undercut President
Musharraf's position, it should do everything we can to ensure
that he broadens his base. In 1985, I wrote that the army
needed a strategy of strategic retreat from politics, but that
this could only take place as civilian leaders and institutions
developed competence. This remains true. While we should push
for elections, they are meaningless unless there are
politicians who can govern. Pakistani politics is mostly issue-
free: it is about patronage and money. Our officials, scholars
and NGOs should concentrate on strengthening civilian
competence, and if the opportunity arises, help broker an
understanding between the army and centrist political forces in
Pakistan. We need to invest in the long-term stability of
Pakistan.
Any American military operations in Pakistan against the Taliban
should be conducted jointly with the Pakistan army. The
sovereignty issue runs as deep in Pakistan as it does in the
United States and most other countries. We should not risk
further alienation by unilateral military action. These are in
any case difficult, and the removal of a few terrorist leaders,
no matter how satisfying, is less important than preventing the
radicalization of thousands, if not tens of thousands, of
educated and professionally adept Pakistanis. The issue is not
just whether unilateral American military action would lead to
Musharraf's departure, but whether it would alienate virtually
all Pakistanis--it would do both.
In the case of the Taliban, which is openly tolerated by Pakistan
and based in urban centers such as Quetta, our aid should be
conditional. Pakistan uses the Taliban to balance supposed
Indian dominance (via the Northern Alliance) in Afghanistan. We
are not ``losing'' Afghanistan, although progress could be
better. We would be better off attempting to limit the presence
of all outside powers and their proxies in Afghanistan. This
applies to Russia, China, India, and Iran, as well as Pakistan.
With the U.S.-India nuclear agreement completed, Washington should
talk to New Delhi (and Beijing) about how to normalize
Pakistani politics. A successful settlement on Kashmir with
Musharraf or another leader would go a long way toward reducing
the military pressure on Pakistan, allowing it to concentrate
more resources on counterinsurgency in the Northwest Frontier
Province and Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Binding the
tribal areas to Pakistan proper will take years, and is bound
to be disruptive and a major undertaking. Pakistan cannot take
it on while preparing to fight a full scale war against India.
Some in India will be tempted to ``bleed'' Pakistan the way
Islamabad bled India for years via its surrogates, but that
would be shortsighted, and increases the risk of still another
India-Pakistan war. Washington, with its good ties to both
countries, ought to propose a new strategic deal whereby the
issues of the past are settled, enabling both countries to deal
with the problems of the future.
Senator Kerry. That was very helpful, thank you.
Dr. Ahmed.
STATEMENT OF DR. SAMINA AHMED, SOUTH ASIA PROJECT DIRECTOR,
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, ISLAMABAD, PAKISTAN
Dr. Ahmed. Thank you, sir. And thank you for inviting me to
testify.
When we start discussing these issues, we--you know, and I
thought the title of this testimony--the hearing itself--was
important. What does actually serve the interests of the United
States and the interests of the Pakistani people?
Senator Kerry. We'll check it out. Keep talking.
Dr. Ahmed. OK.
I don't think it's counterproductive to say that, ``Well,
this serves the interests of the United States, and that is in
the interest of the Pakistani people.'' What is important right
now is to see where the battle lines are, as somebody said,
earlier on--and I think it was Secretary Burns--that it's a
fight between moderation and the forces of extremism.
The real battle lines, if you're in Pakistan and you
understand what is happening on the ground, are the divisions
between civil and the military. This is--that is really the
reason why this is a crucial year. It's the forces of
moderation and democracy versus authoritarianism.
We also have to look at the alliance relationship there.
General Musharraf's government, while it is aligned to the
United States in fighting terror, while it pledges to support
the United States against the Taliban and al-Qaeda, is in a
coalition government with one Islamist party, called JUIF,
which is pro-Taliban, and that province where this party is
dominant, Balochistan, is where forces right across the border
that are being attacked, where Quetta was mentioned, where you
actually have----
Senator Kerry. All right, ladies and gentlemen, let me just
ask everybody--we have to--we are forced to adjourn the
hearing. We need to evacuate the building.\1\ If I could just
ask everybody to do so calmly and quietly.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ On July 25, 2007, the Dirksen Senate Office Building was
evacuated due to smoke caused by an electrical system malfunction. The
committee did not reconvene the hearing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
[Whereupon, at 4:47 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Prepared Statement of Dr. Samina Ahmed
I want to thank the subcommittee chairman Senator John. F. Kerry
and ranking minority member Norm Coleman, for holding this important
hearing and inviting me to testify on behalf of the International
Crisis Group on U.S. policy choices towards Pakistan that would protect
American interests and advance the goals of the Pakistani people.
The Crisis Group has been in Pakistan since December 2001, and has
published reports directly relevant to the issues under this
committee's review. Assessing conditions in Pakistan and U.S. policy
choices, we have repeatedly stressed that military rule does not serve
American interests in reducing Islamist threats in and from Pakistan to
the United States, creating stability in Afghanistan and ensuring peace
in South Asia. Short-term gains after September 11 have been undermined
by the long-term risks of a military that is only a grudging ally in
the fight against extremism. A transition to an elected civilian
government in Pakistan would reduce the influence of Islamist parties
in politics, help advance counter-terrorism cooperation, and offer a
deeper and wider relationship with the people of Pakistan.
As presidential and national elections fast approach in Pakistan,
President and Army Chief General Pervez Musharraf faces the most
serious challenge to eight years of military rule. For the first time
since the October 1999 coup, Musharraf's authoritarian rule appears
shaky. Public opposition has gathered momentum following the general's
abortive bid to remove the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
Pakistan.
We are concerned that President Musharraf appears to have no
intention of leaving power voluntarily or holding free and fair
elections. However, given an increasingly assertive opposition, it will
be impossible for the president and his military backers to maintain
the status quo. Western friends of Pakistan, most influentially the
United States, should not be or be seen as propping up President
Musharraf against a overwhelming popular demand that Pakistan return to
democratic government by holding a free, fair and democratic election
in 2007.
The worst scenario in Pakistan is the imposition of rule by
emergency decree and the use of force to suppress the expected massive
opposition. This would immediately produce chaos and violence and
ultimately increase the role of Islamist groups and, if Washington
supports the move or even tacitly accepts it, further increase anti-
U.S. sentiment. The best scenario is Pakistan's transition to
democratic rule through free and fair elections that would marginalize
extremist forces and reduce growing tensions in society. This could
occur if the military feels it is in its interests to pull back from
direct rule, as it has in the past.
The United States should urge a peaceful transition by strongly and
publicly urging Musharraf and his military against subverting the
electoral process or any measures to stifle constitutionally guaranteed
freedoms of speech, association, assembly and movement. It should urge
President Musharraf and his military to allow a return to democracy
through free and fair elections, including the return of exiled
political leaders.
musharraf's choices
As President and Army Chief General Pervez Musharraf completes his
five-year term and the National Assembly, which will elect the new
President, also ends its term of office this year; hence two crucial
elections are due.
When he took over power in October 1999, Musharraf dissolved the
parliament through a military coup and sent the democratically elected
prime minister into exile. After having been elected president through
a rigged referendum in April 2002-the referendum was itself an
unconstitutional device-Musharraf oversaw deeply flawed national
elections later that year. National and international observers cited
numerous violations and direct fraud. The resulting parliament, packed
with his supporters, including the Islamist parties, gave Musharraf a
vote of confidence and allowed him to retain his army post. Musharraf's
presidency ends in October. The national parliament completes its five-
year life in November. The electoral timetable and Musharraf's decision
to retain or give up the post of army chief will, to a considerable
extent, determine if the military intends to opt for a potentially
risky and likely short-lived regime survival strategy or a democratic
transition.
Musharraf could opt for one of three choices:
1. Presidential Before Parliamentary Polls
In Pakistan's parliamentary democracy, the directly elected
parliament elects the prime minister, the head of government who
represents the majority in the national legislature. Pakistan's
president, the head of state, who symbolizes the federation, is not
directly chosen by popular vote but by an Electoral College consisting
of the bicameral national legislature and the four Provincial
Assemblies.
Musharraf has, however, expressed his intention to obtain another
five-year presidential term by using the present lame duck assemblies
as his Electoral College, rather than the intent of the constitution,
as the opposition insists, the successor assemblies scheduled to be
elected this year. He is also intent on retaining the position of army
chief, thus maintaining his personal and the military's institutional
dominance for another five years.
Holding the presidential before the parliamentary polls would
deprive the electoral exercise of legitimacy and could well provoke
civil unrest countrywide. The president's plan has evoked opposition
from across the political spectrum, including the moderate political
parties, the independent media and civil society organizations.
Opposition leaders insist that this would amount to pre-rigging the
national polls and they will take this issue to the Supreme Court. No
moderate opposition party can afford to support Musharraf's re-election
by the present assemblies without gravely undermining their own party's
legitimacy.
The opposition also strongly opposes Musharraf's intention to
retain the position of army chief. Since the 1973 constitution
disallows anyone serving in an office of public profit from standing
for an elected post for a two-year period, his opposition has vowed to
also take this issue to the Supreme Court.
2. Power Sharing Arrangements
Pakistan's two major national-level moderate parties, Benazir
Bhutto's center-left Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and Nawaz Sharif's
center-right Muslim League (PML-N), that had dominated the democratic
decade of the 1990s, in government and opposition, had signed a Charter
of Democracy on 15 May 2006 to respect democratic norms and
functioning, to uphold the rule of law, and to depoliticize the
military. Their political competition, including a tendency to seek
military support, had created opportunities for the military to
repeatedly intervene and disrupt the democratic process in the 1990s.
The dangers of this democratic process being derailed, if either
party chose to once again work with and through the military, even if
the end goal were the restoration of democracy, cannot be ruled out.
For the past few months, Musharraf has held talks though intermediaries
with Bhutto's PPP. Musharraf cannot rely on his party, the Pakistan
Muslim League (Quaid-i-Azam), which lacks popular support and is
internally divided. If the PPP, which has the largest support base in
Pakistan, were to support his presidential bid, he could retain power
for another five years but with far more legitimacy than he has now.
Bhutto has insisted that any talks with Musharraf were primarily
motivated by the desire for an orderly transition from military to
democratic rule. However, there is as yet no sign of any agreement on
such a political transition since the PPP insists that Musharraf must
seek re-election from the new assemblies and must also give up the post
of army chief. President Musharraf rejects both preconditions. The
prospects of an accord with PPP are in any case fast fading in the
aftermath of Musharraf's abortive attempt to dismiss the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court of Pakistan and attacks on PPP workers by the
military and its political allies. Bhutto now says that she will return
to Pakistan and will not enter into any power-sharing agreement with a
military usurper. Sharif's party also refuses to accept Musharraf as
president, with or without his army post.
Judicial Crisis.--The higher judiciary of Pakistan has a long
history of legitimizing military rule and interventions. After
Musharraf's coup, the Supreme Court validated the intervention and the
present judges of the Supreme Court even swore allegiance to
Musharraf's political order, in violation of their duty of uphold the
constitution. However, by refusing to accept military dictates, the
present holder of the office of Chief Justice, Iftikhar Mohammad
Chaudhry has restored the faith of the Pakistani people in that
superior judiciary.
Fearing that this independent-minded judge might rule in accordance
with the spirit and content of the constitution and anticipating legal
challenges to his plans to seek re-election as president-in-uniform by
the sitting assemblies, Musharraf charged the Chief Justice with
misconduct and attempted to force him to resign on 9 March. When he
refused, the Chief Justice was subjected to pressure and threatened by
Musharraf's military and civilian intelligence agencies. Chaudhry's
dismissal and subsequent manhandling sparked widespread public outrage
and protests by the bar associations, a cause that was supported by
large numbers of sitting judges. In a desperate attempt to quell public
protests which accompanied the Chief Justice's public appearances,
Musharraf's coalition partner in the Sindh government, the Muttahida
Quami Movement used indiscriminate force against the opposition,
killing more than 40 political party workers in Karachi, mainly from
the PPP but also from the PML-N and the Awami National Party, a
moderate Pashtun party, on 12 May.
The government's efforts to forcibly suppress public protests and
silence the media have only fuelled public anger. Over time, this
increasingly vocal opposition, spearheaded by the bar associations,
supported by the moderate parties and all segments of civil society,
including human rights groups and the media, is channeling public
resentment to military rule, and has transformed into a larger
political battle for the restoration of democracy and rule of law,
unifying all moderate pro-democracy forces.
On 20 July, a full bench of the Supreme Court ruled against
Musharraf's suspension of the Chief Justice, certifying it ``illegal.''
The presidential reference to dismiss the Chief Justice was also
invalidated. Pro-democracy advocates have termed this a victory for
democracy, the judiciary and civil society. They have vowed to continue
the movement to its logical conclusion-- the restoration of democracy.
With expectations also high that the judiciary would now rule against
any extra-constitutional steps, including Musharraf's bid to retain his
dual offices of president and army chief and to hold the presidential
polls before general elections, the military ruler's options are fast
shrinking.
3. Imposing Emergency
While Musharraf should step down as army chief and his military
should opt for a democratic transition, with free and fair elections as
the essential first step, they might still, despite denials, in a
desperate last attempt to retain power, impose emergency rule, which
would suspend fundamental freedoms and restore absolute military rule.
National elections would also be postponed for another year.
Should Musharraf opt to disrupt the electoral process and to re-
impose absolute rule, the military might not have any choice but to
bring troops into the streets to suppress the expected massive
opposition. This would immediately produce chaos and violence and
ultimately expand the influence of radical Islamists, and if the
international community--particularly Washington--supports the military
government's move, this will cause even further anti-Western sentiment
among pro-democratic Pakistanis.
The government could attempt to justify the imposition of emergency
to the U.S. Government on the grounds of national security, following
an upsurge in militancy after the bloody end to the stand off at Lal
Masjid (Red Mosque), a jihadi madrasa complex in the federal capital in
July. But the military government was itself responsible for this
crisis, failing, as in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA),
to enforce the law against the madrasa's jihadi managers and students
when the crisis began in January 2007, choosing instead to appease them
for six months. The militants used this time to muster forces,
stockpile arms and fortify themselves. In FATA too, where bloody
attacks by Islamist radicals are claiming a steadily rising death toll,
Musharraf's deeply flawed peace deals, ceding the region's control to
the militants, are responsible for the crisis. The militants--Pakistani
and Afghan Talibs and their Al-Qaeda allies are understandably
emboldened.
implications of a rigged election
The Pakistani people have demonstrated their desire for a
democratic transition through public protests and demonstrations. It is
in Washington's interests to support that demand since a rigged or
stalled election would not only destabilize Pakistan but also bear
serious consequences for regional and international security.
In Balochistan, where the military's attempts to forcibly crush
Baloch demands for democratic functioning have triggered a province-
wide insurgency, the support base of the Baloch secular, moderate
regional parties has increased considerably, and hence their likelihood
of winning a free and fair election. But if Musharraf were to rig the
polls, he would have little choice but to fall back on the Islamist
alliance, the Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA), particularly its largest
party, the pro-Taliban Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Fazlur Rehman-JUI-F) to
marginalize the staunchly anti-military, and anti-Taliban, Baloch. In
Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) too, the military would have little
choice but to give the MMA free rein to manipulate the electoral
process if it is to retain the mullahs' support--not just in
Balochistan but also in the national parliament. This support is
particularly important since Musharraf will have to once again obtain
parliamentary assent for his dual positions of president and army
chief.
At the national level, the president will also need the Islamist
MMA's support to counter the opposition of the moderate PPP, PML-N and
other pro-democracy parties. In the past, the Islamist parties failed
to gain more than 5 to 8 percent of the popular vote. In the 1990
elections, the PPP and PML-N alliances won almost 73.5 percent of
votes. In the 1993 elections, the two parties gained 90 percent of
votes; and in the 1997 elections, their combined vote was 68 percent.
Even in the 2002 rigged elections, with military patronage, the
Islamist parties collectively only managed to garner 11 percent of the
popular vote, as compared to PPP's 25.1 percent.
Should the JUI-F, the largest MMA component party, and the
Taliban's main mentor and political supporter, retain power, courtesy
military patronage, in Balochistan and NWFP, bordering on Afghanistan's
restive southern and eastern provinces, the implications for regional
stability are clear. With the MMA's support, the Taliban and other
insurgents will continue to use command and control centers and bases
within Pakistan to plan and conduct cross-border attacks against
Western and Afghan troops, destabilizing Afghanistan's state-building
enterprise. Within Pakistan's Pashtun-majority regions, particularly in
FATA, the JUI-F's militant allies, the beneficiaries of Musharraf's
ill-conceived peace deals, will continue to flourish, using the
political space created by the military's marginalization of the
moderate parties to extend their reach to NWFP's settled areas and
beyond.
At the national stage, a rigged or stalled election will likely
reinforce public perceptions that regime change cannot take place
through the ballot box. Since a rigged or stalled election will fuel
public opposition, the military will try to further weaken the
mainstream moderate parties, leaving the political field open to the
Islamist forces.
the right option
The right option is a free, fair and democratic election for the
national parliament followed by their selection of the next President
upon taking office. Ironically, Musharraf's attempts at pre-election
rigging, including his onslaught on judicial independence, have helped
to create a democratic opening. With the pro-democracy movement gaining
momentum, domestic pressures are building on the military to return to
the barracks. With the Chief Justice reinstalled, this movement has
gained further impetus. Musharraf can no longer be sure that a
judiciary, more confident of its own independence, which is also under
intense public scrutiny, will act favorably on constitutional issues of
particular sensitivity, including his re-election from the current
parliament or retention of the dual offices of president-cum-army
chief.
While a reinvigorated opposition will challenge unconstitutional
moves and closely monitor election irregularities, the military high
command too must be closely watching the fast changing political
environment. Since the high command will also factor in the external
costs and benefits of retaining power or opting for a democratic
transition, signals from key international supporters, particularly the
United States, will influence the course the military takes.
us policy: the way forward
The Musharraf government is sensitive to external costs of its
domestic actions. The United States has a particularly crucial role in
ensuring that Pakistan moves towards a peaceful transition to
democracy. Should Washington signal now that it supports a democratic
transition, using its considerable leverage, it could nudge the
military back to the barracks. Musharraf and his military have
certainly benefited enormously from U.S. diplomatic and financial
support in return for pledges to crack down on Al-Qaeda and the
Taliban. But, despite more than $10 billion in assistance, the military
government has failed to keep its side of the bargain. Al-Qaeda, as the
latest U.S. National Intelligence Assessment reveals, is operating out
of Pakistani safe havens. The Taliban operating command and control
centers in Quetta, Peshawar and FATA, using Pakistani territory for
refuge, fundraising, recruitment and recuperation, are once more
resurgent.
Despite these concerns, Washington still appears unwilling to
pressure Musharraf beyond a point, and seems to be hedging its bets on
democracy, not openly criticizing Musharraf on his re-election bid even
by the sitting Parliament, or his decision to retain the position of
army chief, partly because of an unfounded fear that more pressure
could destabilize a valuable ally. There is also concern that elected
civilian government might not be able to pressure or persuade the
military to cooperate in countering religious extremism in Pakistan and
its neighborhood.
The military high command, however, is far more likely to abandon
its alliance relationship with the Islamist parties, take action
against their militant domestic and foreign allies, and allow a
peaceful and orderly transition, through free and fair elections if the
United States matches its rhetoric with action, including clearly
defined benchmarks and conditionalities on continued military
assistance. Congress could certainly play a constructive role if it
were to condition diplomatic and military assistance not just on action
against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban but also on a free, fair and
democratic election.
By supporting a democratic transition, the United States would
directly benefit since elected civilian governments will have the
legitimacy and popular support to counter domestic extremism and to
pursue friendly relations with Pakistan's neighbors. By retaining
security and democracy conditionalities after elections, the United
States would also send the right signals to the military high command
to refrain from undermining the transition or hindering an elected
civilian government's efforts to reform domestic security and foreign
policy.
Civilian governments are far more likely to reorient Pakistan's
internal and foreign policies in a more peaceful direction. Both
mainstream parties--Bhutto's PPP and Sharif's PML--have stated their
desire to do so. Moreover, U.S. support for a military government is
largely responsible for growing anti-U.S. sentiment among pro-democracy
Pakistanis. By rethinking its policy directions towards Pakistan, the
United States can forge a far more productive partnership with the
Pakistani people. The United States should also plan on supporting a
democratic transition by rethinking the current ratio of military to
economic assistance, which inordinately favors the military. By putting
together a package of expanded economic assistance and market access,
it could help ensure a democracy dividend, win the goodwill of the
Pakistani people and help stabilize a fragile and valuable ally.
The United States must stay engaged with Pakistan, but engaged the
right way. American support for the military government is not in the
interest of Pakistan or the United States. Supporting a deeply
unpopular regime is no way to help fight terrorism and neutralize
religious extremism. Pakistan's two national level parties are
pragmatic centrist forces whose political interests dictate that
Islamist extremism is contained within the country and the region. The
choice before the United States in Pakistan's election year, with time
fast running out, is stark. It can support a return to genuine
democracy and civilian rule, which offers the added bonus of containing
extremism, or the U.S. can sit on the sidelines as Pakistan slides into
political chaos, creating an environment in which militancy and
radicalism will continue to thrive.
__________
Responses to Questions for the Record Submitted to Under Secretary
Nicholas Burns by Chairman Biden
Question. Do you agree with the opinion expressed by Gen. James
Jones at a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on September 21,
2006, that in the view of many U.S. military officers the Taliban
central headquarters is located in or near the Pakistani city of
Quetta?
Answer. Since the days of the Soviet-Afghan war, Quetta has been
home to hundreds of thousands of Afghan nationals. When the U.S. drove
the Taliban from power in Afghanistan in 2001, many of the Taliban's
fighters and leaders escaped into loosely governed tribal areas of
Pakistan as well as parts of the Northwest Frontier Province and
Baluchistan. The concentration of these fighters and their arms in
sprawling urban centers like Quetta now poses an extremely difficult
security problem for Pakistani police and armed forces.
American officials speak regularly and at high levels with
Pakistani officials and security forces about our concern that Taliban
leaders operate out of Quetta and other parts of Pakistan, and
Pakistani security force actions against suspected Taliban targets both
in and around Quetta have helped disrupt the Taliban's operations in
Afghanistan. In March 2007, Pakistani authorities captured Mullah
Obaidullah, a key Taliban leader with strong ties to Mullah Omar, in
Quetta. Obaidullah remains in jail. Actions like these have resulted in
a series of bomb attacks by militants against Pakistani military and
civilian targets in Quetta and elsewhere in tribal areas of Pakistan.
We will continue pressing Pakistani authorities to deny the use of
Pakistani territory by the Taliban.
Question. Do you believe that the Government of Pakistan has made
satisfactory efforts to dismantle the terrorist groups Lashkar-e Taiba
and Jaish-e Muhammad? Are you satisfied with the lack of meaningful
punishment given to the leaders of these groups: Hafiz Saeed and
Maulana Azhar?
Answer. The Pakistani Government has taken steps to decrease
militancy in Kashmir by Lashkar-e Taiba, Jaish-e Muhammad, and other
terrorist groups, but problems remain. U.S. officials routinely raise
our concerns with Pakistani officials about reports that these groups
continue to operate in Pakistani Kashmir. We will continue to press
Pakistani officials to take actions that will prevent the use of
Pakistani territory by terrorist groups. We will also continue to
support India and Pakistan's Composite Dialogue peace process, which
includes a mechanism for sharing information related to terrorist
groups and to attacks in India and Pakistan.
Indian officials have recently commented that infiltration into
Indian Kashmir by Pakistan-based militants has decreased since 2005.
There are disturbing reports, however, that terrorist groups in Kashmir
are training militants who then move to the Federally Administered
Tribal Areas to join groups that are attacking U.S., Pakistani, and
Afghan forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan. India and Pakistan have also
begun a specific dialogue aimed at cooperating more effectively to
combat these groups. President Musharraf and Prime Minister Singh
committed their governments to regularly sharing information about
terrorist groups through ``Anti-Terror Mechanism'' meetings. Indian and
Pakistani intelligence and defense officials have met twice for Anti-
Terror meetings this year and have developed closer working
relationships with one another.
We will continue to urge the Pakistani Government to take effective
actions to capture and bring to justice Maulana Masood Azhar, founder
of Jaish-e Muhammad, and Hafiz Saeed, founder of Jama'at ud-Dawa and
Lashkar-e Taiba. American officials speak with Pakistani officials
about our concerns through appropriate channels.
Question. Do you believe there can be genuinely free and fair
elections in Pakistan so long as the leaders of the two largest
political parties remain barred from returning to the country?
Do you consider Pakistan's 2002 elections to have been free and
fair? If not, which specific metric referred to in Ambassador
Patterson's reply was not met in these elections?
Answer. Political party leaders Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto
remain outside of Pakistan due to pending legal and political matters
with the Pakistani authorities. Ms. Bhutto's party, the Pakistan
Peoples' Party, has announced her intention to return to Pakistan by
October 18 to participate in parliamentary elections in January. Her
participation in the elections, and that of her party, Pakistan's
largest, would be another step toward ensuring free and fair elections.
We understand that Mr. Sharif's difficulties are related to an
agreement between his representatives and representatives from Pakistan
and Saudi Arabia granting him exile status in Saudi Arabia and relief
from pending charges in Pakistan. His abortive effort to return to
Pakistan on September 10 resulted in his deportation to Saudi Arabia.
As the Department of State's 2006 Human Rights report notes,
international and domestic observers found the elections of 2002
flawed, identifying serious problems regarding the independence of the
Election Commission of Pakistan, restrictions on political parties and
their candidates, misuse of state resources, unbalanced coverage in the
state media and deficiencies in compiling the voter rolls and providing
identification cards. We have been working with the Government of
Pakistan to provide technical assistance, to encourage a resolution of
these problems. We continue to urge that the coming elections be free
and fair. Indeed, during their meeting in Islamabad in March 2006,
President Bush and President Musharraf agreed that the United States
would support Pakistan as it builds strong and transparent democratic
institutions and conducts free and fair elections to ensure sustainable
democracy. President Musharraf reiterated his commitment to a free and
fair electoral process to Secretary Rice in June 2006. Events in
Pakistan over the past year related to the judicial crisis, as well as
questions regarding whether or not President Musharraf will continue
occupying the positions of both president and Chief of Army Staff as he
runs for re-election, have heightened international concerns about the
upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections. For this reason, we
are urging the Government of Pakistan to hold elections that will be
free, fair, and transparent.
In light of recent government actions detaining opposition party
members, our Embassy has taken a strong stand, noting our concern
publicly.
Question. The testimony presented before our committee on July 25
outlined a policy that appears to differ very little from that pursued
by the administration for the past five years. Given the radical
changes underway in Pakistan--massive pro-democracy street protests, Al
Qaeda and the Taliban both resurgent, a looming constitutional crisis
over President Musharraf's post-election role--many believe it is long
past time for a shift in policy.
(a.) Is the Administration's policy for the next 18 months a
continuation of past practices? If not, which specific changes
represent the most significant policy shift?
(b.) Does the Administration believe that conditions in
Pakistan are markedly different than they were in 2002? If so,
how has this urgency been translated into policy?
Answer. Conditions in Pakistan are markedly different than they
were in 2002. In some ways they are significantly improved; a rapidly
growing economy (8.5% GDP growth in 2005), and strengthened state
institutions. In other ways, particularly regarding security in some
parts of Pakistan, the situation is markedly worse. U.S. policy has
evolved as the situation on the ground has changed. U.S. policy for the
next 18 months and beyond will seek to encourage further improvements
while, at the same time, working with the Government of Pakistan to
address areas of concern, especially the lack of security in the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas.
We have, in public and in private, urged the Government of Pakistan
to carry out free, fair transparent elections in accordance with the
Constitution of Pakistan. We have provided technical assistance to
strengthen the democratic process, and continue to work closely with
Pakistani officials, as well as NGOs, toward more effective democracy.
In July, after the findings of the National Intelligence Estimate
were released publicly, senior Administration officials commented
publicly--my own testimony included--that Pakistan's past policies for
the Tribal Areas had not worked in the way intended. The Government of
Pakistan has now renewed its efforts in the Tribal Areas, and we will
continue to encourage a more effective policy to weaken al Qaeda and
the Taliban and build the foundation for greater stability and peace
there.
We will work with the Government of Pakistan to expand the benefits
of growth, to continue support for reform of Pakistan's historically
weak education system, to build hospitals and train healthcare
professionals and to strengthen democratic institutions by calling for
free, fair and transparent elections. We will also work in close
coordination with the Government of Pakistan to address abysmal social
conditions and declining security in the Federally Administered Tribal
Areas. This is a situation that fosters extremism and has been
exploited by Al Qaeda and the Taliban to fuel their resurgence, a
threat that has global implications. The United States has committed
$750 million over five years in support of the Government of Pakistan's
ten-year, $2 billion program to develop and secure this region.
Question. More than half a decade after 9/11, Al Qaeda continues to
enjoy safe haven on Pakistani soil, the Taliban has regenerated and
operates from Pakistani soil, and the latest National Intelligence
Estimate deems the threat to the U.S. homeland from Al Qaeda to be
greater than at any time since 2001.
(a.) Given that the White House acknowledges that President
Musharraf's plan for a separate peace with pro-Taliban forces
in the FATA has not worked, is there a new strategy in place to
deny Al Qaeda safe haven in Waziristan and other parts of
Pakistan? If so, what does this new strategy consist of?
(b.) What are the metrics for success used by the
Administration in evaluating Pakistan's efforts to root out Al
Qaeda and the Taliban from Pakistan's territory? By these
metrics, has the past five years produced satisfactory success?
(c.) What specific actions, if any, is the Administration
undertaking to produce significant better human intelligence in
the FATA, in hopes of targeting Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-
Zawahiri and other Al Qaeda leaders?
Answer. The decision by the Government of Pakistan to sign a peace
agreement with tribal elders in North Waziristan was designed to give
elders greater responsibility in the tribal agency, based upon the
assumption that empowering residents would deliver better cooperation
and avoid pitting the Pakistani military against Pakistani citizens.
The decision to withdraw Pakistani military forces was, in hindsight, a
mistake. We objected to this decision at the time. The agreement
undermined Pakistan's domestic security and diminished the perception
of Pakistan as a leader in the War on Terrorism despite their efforts
to date. Tribal councils and tribal elders proved unable or unwilling
to restrict the movement and activities of terrorist and extremist
groups. This created a situation in the FATA that posed a danger to
Pakistan, to Afghanistan, and to U.S. forces in Afghanistan.
Following events at the ``Red Mosque'' in July, The Pakistani
Government quickly moved to reassert Government of Pakistan control in
the tribal areas. The Pakistani Army has reestablished a measure of
military control but the danger persists. In consultation with the
United States, President Musharraf has also reached the conclusion that
a purely military solution to problems in the FATA is impossible. Long-
term control of the FATA will require reestablishing Pakistani
Government presence and addressing the abysmal social and economic
conditions that exacerbate alienation in the FATA and in other
impoverished regions of Pakistan, such as Balochistan and the Northwest
Frontier Province, as well as establishing a security force capable of
facing down extremist elements. To this end, the Government of Pakistan
has initiated a ten-year, $2 billion effort to develop and secure this
region. The United States has committed $750 million over five years in
support of the development aspects of this program. Since the beginning
of July the Government of Pakistan has shifted an additional 20,000 to
30,000 troops into the border region and is working closely with the
U.S. to increase the capability of their Frontier Corps and Frontier
Constabulary.
Over the past six years no country (other than the U.S.) has done
more to fight Al Qaeda and the Taliban than Pakistan. Pakistan has
captured or killed hundreds of Al Qaeda and Taliban terrorists and lost
over a thousand troops--several hundred in the past months alone--in
pursuit of terrorists. These metrics offer compelling evidence of
Pakistan's invaluable efforts in the War on Terror. As important,
however, the continuation of terrorist incidents and overall insecurity
underscores that the job is far from done. The diminution of the
Taliban's ability to conduct cross-border operations in Afghanistan and
the arrest of Al Qaeda operatives and the disruption of their
capability to conduct international terrorist operations will be the
clearest measure of success.
We would be pleased to provide more information regarding section
(c) of your question on a classified basis.
Question. Of the $750 million proposed for the Federally
Administered Tribal Agencies, how much will be devoted to security and
how much will be devoted to development?
Answer. The U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Agency for
International Development have prepared a five-year, $750 million
development strategy for the Federally Administered Tribal Areas that
supports the Government of Pakistan's ten-year, $2 billion Federally
Administered Tribal Areas Sustainable Development Plan. The $750
million over five years will be devoted entirely to development.
The Sustainable Development Plan strengthens and expands ongoing
U.S. efforts to help Pakistan improve infrastructure, education,
health, and economic growth in these areas-with the goal of rendering
the area less hospitable to propaganda and recruiting by al Qaeda,
Taliban, and terrorist networks. The Plan seeks to:
Improve economic and social conditions in FATA communities;
Extend the legitimacy and writ of the Government of Pakistan in
FATA;
Support sustainable permanent change; and
Change the options available to residents, thus making terrorism
undesirable.
The strategy supports short and medium term service delivery such
as equipping health clinics with essential drugs and training
healthcare workers in their appropriate usage. The strategy also
focuses on developing the Pakistani government's capabilities-at
various levels of governance-to deliver essential services with speed
and effectiveness in this remote and unsettled area. Long-term success
depends upon community participation and building the capacity of
government agencies to deal effectively with them, and this Plan
addresses this challenge in a comprehensive way.
Question. The Administration portrays its proposed Reconstruction
Opportunity Zones as a notable part of its plan for the FATA. Is the
ROZ program intended to be a central component of a new policy towards
Pakistan, or merely a small-scale program limited to the FATA, with
relatively little impact on the overall US-Pakistan relationship and
the effort to combat extremism?
Answer. The Reconstruction Opportunity Zone initiative is a
critical tool designed to complement existing and planned economic
development activities by the United States and other donors. Areas
eligible for such zones would include not only the FATA, but also all
of Afghanistan and the entire Pakistani border region.
By extending duty-free treatment to certain goods produced within
designated territories within these areas, Reconstruction Opportunity
Zones can help stimulate private sector economic growth and sustainable
development. The resulting employment and income opportunities would
provide a vital means to address the poverty and desperation which
provide fertile ground for terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and other
illicit activities.
The Reconstruction Opportunity Zone program is designed to
complement current, planned, and completed regional aid and development
programs. For FY 2007 alone, USAID has budgeted $44 million for FATA
development, and President Bush has pledged to support the Pakistan-led
FATA Sustainable Development Plan with $750 million over five years.
The industrial and commercial activity resulting from the ROZ program
will build upon and sustain these and other U.S.-funded infrastructure
projects and capacity-building efforts by attracting jobs for newly-
acquired skills, commerce for travel across recently-built roads, and
sustainable, private sector-led investment and organic income growth to
bolster the impact of official development assistance. Reconstruction
Opportunity Zones also will encourage the formalizing of economic
activity and economic cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan
while helping connect these isolated areas gradually to the regional
and global economy.
The Reconstruction Opportunity Zone initiative can also be a focal
point for supporting initiatives of the governments of Afghanistan and
Pakistan as well as the international donor community, including
infrastructure improvements, removal of administrative barriers to
investment and exports, and other initiatives facilitating cross-border
economic cooperation. We are actively working to involve the
international community--including the G8, the European Union, and a
number of international financial institutions and non-governmental
organizations--to broaden, coordinate, and multiply the impact of our
own trade and economic development activities. Taken together, this
comprehensive approach to sustainable development can give local
populations a greater stake in the security and stability of the region
while undermining sympathy and support for violent extremism.
We hope to earn the support of Congress for this important program.
Question. On June 13, in an interview on CNN, you said there is
``irrefutable evidence'' that the Taliban arms were ``coming from the
government of Iran.'' This statement followed a considerably less
definitive one from the Secretary of Defense, who stated a belief that
arms were being transferred with the knowledge of the government, but
who stated, ``I haven't seen any intelligence specifically to this
effect.'' On July 17, the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan echoed the
Secretary of Defense's position: ``We believe that the quantity and
quality of these munitions are such that the Iranian government must
know about it,'' he told reporters. ``Beyond that we really can't go.''
a. What specific pieces of "irrefutable evidence" were you
referring to on June 13?
Answer a. My views, and those of our government, are informed by a
body of information which has been approved for public release by the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
Since at least 2006, Iran has arranged frequent shipments of small
arms and associated ammunition, rocket propelled grenades, mortar
rounds, 107mm rockets, and plastic explosives to the Taliban in
Afghanistan. Iran's primary instrument for providing arms to the
Taliban is the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF),
an element of the Iranian government responsible for cultivating and
supporting terrorist and Islamic military groups abroad. Specific
evidence of IRGC-QF arms shipments to the Taliban includes the
following:
In March 2007, a raid on a Taliban compound in Helmand Province,
Afghanistan netted an Iranian manufactured .50 caliber anti-
material sniper rifle, with a probable 205 manufacture date.
In April and May 2007, convoys were intercepted and seized in
southern Afghanistan. These convoys were carrying Iranian
weapons, believed to be en route to Taliban forces. The two
shipments included: plastic explosives, small arms ammunition,
several rocket- propelled (RPG) anti-tank grenades, mortar
rounds, artillery rockets, and rocket fuses.
Analysis of interdicted weaponry, ordnance and explosively-formed
projectiles recovered in Afghanistan indicate that the Taliban
has had access to Iranian weaponry produced as recently as 2006
and 2007.
On September 6, 2007, Afghan forces interdicted a convoy in Farah
Province in western Afghanistan, according to press reports.
The press reports noted that the confiscated weapons included
explosively formed projectiles (EFPs), which are similar to
Iranian-manufactured EFPs provided by the Qods Force to Iraqi
militants.
Our intelligence experts believe Iran is providing arms to the
Taliban in a bid to raise the cost for the United States and NATO of
our presence in Afghanistan, to inflict casualties on U.S. and NATO
forces, and to cause reaction at home in the countries contributing
those forces.
Question b. Do you agree with the analysis of Taliban-Iranian arms
links presented in the National Intelligence Estimate on Afghanistan of
April 1, 2007 (NIE 2007-03)?
Answer b. I am not an intelligence officer, and I think there has
to be a clear line between those responsible for intelligence
predictions and those in the policy community. That said, I have full
confidence in our intelligence community. I think that our analysts are
objective and have every confidence in their analytical judgments
regarding this issue.
Question c. Did you base your ``irrefutable evidence'' statement
primarily on this NIE? If not, please provide the unclassified titles
and reference numbers for any classified items of intelligence which
formed the primary basis for your statement.
Answer c. My statement was based on information referenced above
that the Office of the Director of National Intelligence has approved
for public release.