The background of the page features a large, faint, circular seal. The seal contains an eagle with spread wings, a shield on its chest, and a banner in its beak. The words "INSPECTOR GENERAL" are written in an arc at the top, and "OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION" is written in an arc at the bottom. There is also Arabic text within the seal.

**CHALLENGES IN OBTAINING RELIABLE  
AND USEFUL DATA ON IRAQI  
SECURITY FORCES CONTINUE**

**SIGIR-09-002  
OCTOBER 21, 2008**



# SIGIR

Special Inspector General for IRAQ Reconstruction

## Summary of Report: SIGIR-09-002

### Why SIGIR Did This Study

Under Section 9204 of the Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2008, Public Law 110-252, the Secretary of Defense is required to submit a quarterly report to the Congress presenting a comprehensive set of performance indicators and measures of progress toward military and political stability in Iraq. Two indicators in the Department of Defense's (DoD) reporting are the number of Iraq Security Forces (ISF) assigned and the number trained. The number of ISF assigned is derived from payroll data from the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Ministry of Interior (MoI). The number of personnel trained represents those who complete specific basic-level training, as reported by Coalition training teams.

This is a follow-up to a report SIGIR issued in April 2008 (SIGIR-08-015) that identified limitations in the reported data on Iraqi security forces. The objectives for this current report include updating and expanding on prior data to include (1) assessing the process for compiling data on ISF assigned and trained, including the accuracy and usefulness of data subsequently used for U.S. reporting, and its comparability over reporting periods; (2) the status of and challenges to improving data accuracy and reliability by developing automated human resource and payroll systems to be used by the MoD and MoI.

### What SIGIR Recommends

This report does not contain recommendations.

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq generally concurred with the conclusions and lessons learned. Others also provided comments which were incorporated in this report, as appropriate.

For more information, contact SIGIR Public Affairs at (703) 428-1100 or [PublicAffairs@sigir.mil](mailto:PublicAffairs@sigir.mil)

October 21, 2008

## Challenges in Obtaining Reliable and Useful Data on Iraqi Security Forces Continue

### What SIGIR Found

The data on ISF assigned and trained continue to contain inaccuracies, and comparability among reports is difficult because of changing metrics and definitions. Inaccuracies in the data persist because Iraq's payroll systems contain improper documentation and reporting of personnel actions by Iraqi officials and unauthorized employees. They also contain inconsistent information as a result of corrupt and irregular practices. In addition, the usefulness of data on Iraqi police assigned and trained continues to be limited because not all police assigned to the force have been trained. Furthermore, not all those trained—both police and military—are available for duty: some of those reported as assigned have completed their obligations, some are on leave or absent without leave, and others have been injured, or killed. Because reporting metrics and definitions have changed, meaningful trend analysis remains difficult.

U.S. and Iraqi-funded efforts are continuing to automate human resource and payroll systems and improve the ability of the MoD and MoI to better manage their personnel. Although the systems offer some capabilities, they are still incomplete and not fully implemented. According to DoD officials, problems with data entry, staff training and proficiency, and supporting infrastructure are hindering full implementation of the MoD's Human Resource Information Management System (HRIMS) and the MoI's e-Ministry system. In addition, poor requirements definition and unsatisfactory contractor performance have delayed development of the HRIMS system, which cost approximately \$21.2 million in U.S.-appropriated monies from the Iraq Security Forces Fund. The Government of Iraq is funding the MoI's e-Ministry system at an estimated cost of \$27.8 million.

### Lesson Learned

While this report does not provide any recommendations, it does identify another in a continuing series of lessons learned from SIGIR's work examining reconstruction contracting in Iraq. Neither the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan nor the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq included specific or measurable deliverables in the statement of work for the HRIMS contract. As a result, even though officials were not satisfied with the contractor's performance, they could not terminate the contract for cause because they could not cite the contractor for a failure to meet contract requirements. If the U.S. government is to hold contractors responsible for poor performance, it must clearly specify in the contract what it expects in "deliverables" and contract performance.



## SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION


October 21, 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR U.S. AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
JOINT SECRETARIAT  
OSD POLICY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY  
COMMANDING GENERAL, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND  
COMMANDING GENERAL, MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE – IRAQ  
COMMANDING GENERAL, MULTI-NATIONAL SECURITY  
TRANSITION COMMAND – IRAQ  
DIRECTOR, IRAQ TRANSITION ASSISTANCE OFFICE

SUBJECT: Challenges in Obtaining Reliable and Useful Data on Iraqi Security Forces  
Continue (SIGIR-09-002)

We are providing this report for your information and use. It contains a review of the data provided on the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in the September 2008 Department of Defense report *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*. This audit was conducted as Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) project 8024. It was performed under the authority of Public Law 108-106, as amended, which also incorporates the duties and responsibilities of inspectors general under the Inspector General Act of 1978. It is a follow-up to SIGIR's April 2008 interim report in which SIGIR reported on the reliability and usefulness of the number of ISF personnel and the methodology for determining the number reported.

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the SIGIR staff. For additional information on this report, please contact Glenn Furbish at (703-428-1058/[glenn.furbish@sigir.mil](mailto:glenn.furbish@sigir.mil)).

  
Stuart W. Bowen, Jr.  
Inspector General

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# Challenges in Obtaining Reliable and Useful Data on Iraqi Security Forces Continue

SIGIR-09-002

October 21, 2008

## Executive Summary

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### Introduction

Under Section 9204 of the Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2008, Public Law 110-252,<sup>1</sup> the Secretary of Defense is required to submit a quarterly report to the Congress presenting a comprehensive set of performance indicators and measures of progress toward military and political stability in Iraq. Two indicators in the Department of Defense's (DoD) September 2008 report, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, are the number of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) assigned and the number trained. The number of ISF assigned is derived from payroll data from the Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Ministry of Interior (MoI). The number of personnel trained represents those who complete specific basic-level training, as reported by Coalition training teams.

In April 2008, SIGIR issued an interim report on the reliability and usefulness of the reported number of ISF personnel and the methodology used to determine and review those numbers.<sup>2</sup> SIGIR concluded that although DoD was making efforts to improve the reliability of the information, there was a need for caution regarding its accuracy and usefulness. In addition, SIGIR reported that DoD made efforts to assess data reliability, but it will have less visibility over the data as the Government of Iraq (GOI) assumes more control over the training of its forces. Last, SIGIR reported on efforts to automate human resource and payroll systems to improve data accuracy and reliability within the MoD. This report provides additional information about these topics:

- the process for compiling data on ISF assigned and trained, including the accuracy and usefulness of data subsequently used for U.S. reporting, and its comparability over reporting periods
- the status of and challenges to improving data accuracy and reliability by developing automated human resource and payroll systems to be used by the MoD and MoI.

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<sup>1</sup> Legislation mandating the quarterly reports includes Section 9010 of P.L. 109-148, Section 9010 of P.L. 109-289, Section 1308 of P.L. 110-28, Section 1224 of P.L. 110-181, Section 609 of P.L. 110-161, and Section 9204 of P.L. 110-252.

<sup>2</sup> Interim Analysis of Iraqi Security Forces Information Provided by the Department of Defense Report, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq* (SIGIR-08-015, April 25, 2008.)

## Results

The data on Iraqi forces assigned and trained continues to contain inaccuracies, and comparability among DoD's quarterly reports is difficult because of changing metrics and definitions. Inaccuracies in the data persist because Iraq's payroll systems contain improper documentation and reporting of personnel actions by Iraqi officials and unauthorized employees. They also contain inconsistent information as a result of corrupt and irregular practices. In addition, the usefulness of data on Iraqi police assigned and trained continues to be limited because not all police assigned to the force have been trained. Furthermore, not all those trained—both police and military—are available for duty: some of those reported as assigned have completed their obligation, some are on leave or are absent without leave, and others have been injured or killed. Because reporting metrics and definitions have changed, meaningful trend analysis remains difficult.

U.S. and Iraqi-funded efforts are continuing to automate human resource and payroll systems and improve the ability of the MoD and MoI to better manage their personnel. Although the systems offer some capabilities, they are still incomplete and not fully implemented. According to DoD officials, problems with data entry, staff training and proficiency, and supporting infrastructure are hindering full implementation of the MoD's Human Resource Information Management System (HRIMS) and the MoI's e-Ministry system. In addition, poor requirements definition and unsatisfactory contractor performance have delayed development of the HRIMS system, which cost almost \$21.2 million in U.S.-appropriated monies from the Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF). The GOI is funding MoI's e-Ministry system at an estimated cost of \$27.8 million. However, resistance to accountability and identification of individuals may affect accurate data entry and reduce e-Ministry's ability to provide reliable information when completed.

## Lessons Learned

Neither the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan nor the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) included specific or measurable deliverables in the statement of work of the HRIMS contract. As a result, even though officials were not satisfied with the contractor's performance, they could not terminate the contract for cause because they could not cite the contractor for a failure to meet contract requirements. If the U.S. government is to hold contractors responsible for poor performance, it must clearly specify in the contract what it expects in "deliverables" and contract performance.

## Management Comments and Audit Response

MNSTC-I generally concurred with the report's conclusions and lessons learned. MNSTC-I also provided specific comments on statements made in this report, which SIGIR incorporated, as appropriate. MNSTC-I's comments are in Appendix F. In addition, U.S. Central Command, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Policy) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Strategic Plans and Policy) provided technical comments that SIGIR addressed in the report, as appropriate.

# Introduction

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## Background

Since 2005, the Congress has appropriated \$18.04 billion to the Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF) for the development of Iraq's security forces (ISF), which include the Iraqi Police Service, the National Police, and the Directorate of Border Enforcement under the Ministry of Interior (MoI); the Ground Forces (Army), the Navy, the Air Force, and Support Forces under the Ministry of Defense (MoD); the Special Operations Forces under the Counter-Terrorism Bureau; as well as headquarters personnel in these ministries. Several assessments have concluded that to counter internal security threats, the ISF requirements—military, police, and special operations forces—should increase up to between 601,000 and 646,000 personnel by 2010. As of August 15, 2008, the authorized force structure is 622,119 personnel, with 591,695 assigned to the force.

National Security Presidential Directive No. 36, "United States Government Operations in Iraq," assigned responsibility for organizing, equipping, and training Iraqi security forces to the Commanding General, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). CENTCOM's subordinate command, the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), leads this effort. The MNF-I's major subordinate commands—the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) and the Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) – play integral roles in the development and training of the ISF. MNSTC-I assists the Iraqi government in developing, organizing, training, equipping, and sustaining the ISF. MNC-I is responsible for tactical command and control of MNF-I operations and works with Iraq's military at the division, brigade, and battalion levels, as well as with police forces at the provincial, district, and station levels. Appendix B shows the U.S. command relationships related to the ISF.

In 2005, the Congress emphasized the need for a more comprehensive set of performance indicators and measures of stability and security in Iraq, and directed the Secretary of Defense to submit quarterly reports.<sup>3</sup> These reports, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, focus on Iraq's progress toward political, economic, and military stability. Along with other indicators of ISF development—the number of assigned and trained forces—are shown in Section 2 of the report, *Iraqi Security Forces Training and Performance*. The 13<sup>th</sup> quarterly progress report, issued in September 2008, included information on the number of ISF assigned and trained, by ministry and component, as shown in table 1. SIGIR discusses these numbers in greater detail in this report.

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<sup>3</sup> Legislation mandating the quarterly reports includes Section 9010 of P.L. 109-148, Section 9010 of P.L. 109-289, Section 1308 of P.L. 110-28, Section 1224 of P.L. 110-181, Section 609 of P.L. 110-161, and Section 9204 of P.L. 110-252.

**Table 1—Assigned and Trained Iraqi Security Forces as of August 15, 2008**

Component	Assigned	Trained
<b>Ministry of Interior</b>		
Police	299,170	192,028
National Police	39,739	50,184
Border Enforcement	43,073	34,370
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>381,982</b>	<b>276,582</b>
<b>Ministry of Defense</b>		
Army	180,296	224,970
Support Forces	22,069	21,144
Air Force	1,887	2,246
Navy	1,872	1,494
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>206,124</b>	<b>249,854</b>
<b>Counterterrorism Bureau</b>		
Special Operations	3,589	4,564
<b>Total</b>	<b>591,695</b>	<b>531,000</b>

Source: *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, September 2008.

## Process of Developing DoD's *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq* Reports

DoD's process for developing its quarterly report *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq* involves reviews by many entities inside and outside DoD. The process begins with the Office of the Secretary of Defense's (OSD) request for information from MNF-I. MNF-I asks its sub-commands, MNSTC-I and MNC-I, for ISF data. MNSTC-I reports on the number of ISF personnel assigned and trained for both Iraq's ministries of Defense and Interior, and MNC-I provides input such as the operational readiness of the ISF. To obtain personnel data on the ISF, MNSTC-I relies primarily on the Iraqi government with assistance from the U.S. advisory and training teams, which work directly with Iraqi personnel in both the MoD and MoI. Recognizing potential limitations, DoD officials noted that this is the best available ISF data. Once the information on the ISF assigned and trained is updated and incorporated into Section 2 of the draft *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, the report is sent through the chain of command, where it undergoes numerous revisions and drafts, with input and review from various government organizations, before being submitted to the Secretary of Defense for final review and eventual delivery to Congress. Organizations providing input and/or review are listed in Appendix C.

## Objectives

SIGIR issued an interim report in April 2008 including its assessment of the reliability and usefulness of the number of ISF authorized, assigned, and trained, as reflected in DoD's reports, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq* and the methodology for determining and reviewing those numbers.<sup>4</sup> In addition, SIGIR also reported on efforts to automate human resource and payroll systems to improve data accuracy and reliability within the MoD. This report supplements that prior interim report by providing additional information about these topics:

- the process for compiling data on ISF assigned and trained, including the accuracy and usefulness of data subsequently used for U.S. reporting, and its comparability over reporting periods
- the status of and challenges to improving data accuracy and reliability by developing automated human resource and payroll systems to be used by the MoD and MoI.

For a discussion of the audit scope and methodology, see Appendix A. For a description of the command relationships in establishing, training, and equipping the ISF, see appendix B. For a list of organizations providing input and review of the *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq* quarterly reports, see Appendix C. For definitions of acronyms used, see Appendix D. For a list of the audit team members, see Appendix E. For MNSTC-I's management comments from, see Appendix F.

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<sup>4</sup> Interim Analysis of Iraqi Security Forces Information Provided by the Department of Defense Report, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq* (SIGIR-08-015, April 25, 2008.)

## Accuracy of Iraqi Security Forces Data Remains a Challenge

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As we previously reported, the data on the number of ISF assigned and trained contain limitations, and comparability among reports is difficult because of changing metrics and definitions. Our current report shows that the “assigned” data continue to contain inaccuracies because of improper documentation and reporting of personnel actions by Iraqi officials, unauthorized employees, and corrupt and irregular practices that affect the accuracy and consistency of MoD and MoI payroll data. These factors can result in overpayments, duplicate payments, “ghost soldiers,” and non-payments. MNSTC-I officials explained that these factors can be attributed to the MoI and MoD personnel learning new processes for assigning and distributing personnel. In addition, data on ISF police assigned and trained continues to offer limited usefulness because not all police assigned to the force have been trained. Furthermore, not all those trained—both police and military—are available for duty: some have completed their obligations, some are on leave or absent without leave, while others have been injured, or killed. Because reporting metrics and definitions have changed over time, meaningful trend analysis also remains difficult. Table 2 summarizes the sources of ISF data from which MNSTC-I officials obtain information to include in the *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq* reports.

**Table 2—Sources of ISF Personnel Statistics**

<b>Component</b>	<b>Assigned</b>	<b>Trained</b>
<b>Ministry of Interior Forces</b>		
Police National Police Border Enforcement	Payroll data from Mol Human Resources	Civilian Police Assistance Training Team
<b>Ministry of Defense Forces</b>		
Army Support Forces Air Force Navy	Payroll data from MoD Director General Program & Budget; the Iraqi Joint Headquarters Personnel Directorate consolidates this data for MNSTC-I	Coalition Army Advisory Training Team; Coalition Air Force Training Team; Maritime Strategic Training Team
<b>Counterterrorism Bureau Forces</b>		
Special Operations	Iraqi National Counterterrorism Force Transition Team	Iraqi National Counterterrorism Force Transition Team

Source: MNSTC-I.

## **Improper Documentation and Reporting of Personnel Actions Affect Data Accuracy**

One cause of report inaccuracies, according to a MoD payroll manual, is missing and questionable supporting documents related to assignments, commencements, and transfer orders, as well as uncertainties about the accuracy of some data reported. When a new recruit is sent to basic training, his background information is reportedly vetted by the MoD Director General Personnel. An assignment order is then created that provides information on his reporting unit and service capacity. If the background check is approved, the recruit is assigned an 8-digit pay number (or employee number) for his term of service. Once he arrives at his assigned unit, a commencement order is sent to the MoD Joint Headquarters and Payroll section where his information is entered into the payroll system. If the battalion commander transfers the service member to another unit, transfer orders must also be reported in order to track the service member and ensure that his pay gets to his location.

Late submission of documentation affects a service member's pay and also causes the MoD payroll and personnel databases to include and report inaccurate data due to the pay lag that gives a false sense of personnel manpower for that month. For example, according to data provided by MNSTC-I officials, the Iraqi Army's 7<sup>th</sup> Division had 11,478 personnel on the payroll roster for the week ending on August 15, 2008. However, only 7,556 personnel, or 66 percent of those, were present for duty. The 3,922 personnel not present were absent for various reasons, such as being on leave, in training, absent without leave, injured, or killed. DoD's September 2008 quarterly report also shows that the present for duty rate for 14 Iraqi Army

Divisions range from 55 percent to 130 percent.<sup>5</sup> The bottom range is slightly lower since we issued our interim report (focusing on data presented in DoD's March 2008 quarterly report), which shows that the present for duty rate ranged from 68 percent to 125 percent.

Table 3 shows that a number of Iraqi Army personnel on the payroll were not available for duty from January through August 2008. According to MNSTC-I officials, one reason for the discrepancy between those assigned and present for duty is that the MoD Director General Programs and Budget reports on the number of personnel assigned and on the payroll, while the Joint Headquarters Personnel Directorate reports on those present for duty. In addition, the Prime Minister's recent directive to fill the Army divisions to 105 percent of authorization in order to maintain combat power also account for the discrepancy as MoD leave policy allows for 21 days on and 7 days off. Until the data is reconciled, the number of personnel assigned may be either overstated or underreported because it does not reflect conditions on the ground.

In commenting on a draft of the report, CENTCOM officials noted that approximately 54,000 Sons of Iraq (SoI) were merged into the Government of Iraq (GOI) and directed to report to Iraqi Army units on October 1, 2008. According to CENTCOM accounting for the SoI transfer to permanent billets within the MoD, MoI, other ministries and civilian agencies, may compound current problems with personnel accounting.

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<sup>5</sup> In DoD's September 2008 quarterly report, the present for duty for the 17<sup>th</sup> division is reported at 0 percent because its personnel are currently accounted for in the 6<sup>th</sup> division.

**Table 3—Iraqi Army Personnel Assigned and Present for Duty from January through August 2008**

Month	Assigned	Present For Duty	Difference
January	160,248	114,009	46,239
February	160,020	114,522	45,498
March	165,437	118,620	46,817
April	172,235	127,364	44,871
May	169,392	127,478	41,914
June	174,268	125,243	49,025
July	180,296	131,575	48,721
August	183,756	134,448	49,308

Source: MNSTC-I.

Note: Iraqi Army personnel represent all divisions and headquarters.

## Corrupt and Irregular Practices May Affect Data Reliability

DoD's June 2008 quarterly report states that eliminating corruption in the MoD is progressing slowly as Coalition forces continue to assist the Iraqis in building an effective military justice reporting and management system. It also states that the MoD and Joint Headquarters Inspector General is maturing and has trained military inspectors from all branches of the ISF, who are now present in most Iraqi divisions. While these are positive steps, the MoD payroll manual lists fraud at the unit level as a common payroll issue that can affect data reliability. MNSTC-I officials noted that although fraud has decreased in recent months, some units still report an inaccurate status of their soldiers. By neglecting to report the status of those who have been killed or have left the force, Iraqi officials are able to partially or wholly retain monthly stipends of these "ghost soldiers." As we previously reported in April, this practice can occur in order to provide medical care and financial compensation to the families of those wounded or killed. MNSTC-I officials also noted that the cash payment system provides opportunities for potential corrupt practices, as salaries are delivered monthly in convoys from Baghdad to the units.<sup>6</sup> Officials explained that ISF personnel prefer cash payments because they do not want to risk having personal data compromised by banks.

Reducing corruption and improving professionalism in the MoI also remains a challenge, despite the fact that the MoI Directorate of Internal Affairs closed 2,523 cases in the first quarter of 2008, terminated 377 employees, and disciplined 297 others. In December 2007, the MoI began an effort to clear the rolls of ghost employees and to pick up personnel who were on contract, but not officially hired. The Ministry distributed a personnel accountability reconciliation form and asked each subordinate element to return the form for each individual, along with copies of the individual's hiring orders and the payroll roster. The MoI's effort to reconcile police payrolls resulted in the removal of 2,500 ghost employees from rosters in December 2007. MoI officials

<sup>6</sup> At the end of each month, unit pay committees travel to Baghdad to obtain and cash the salary checks for the unit. Payday commences on the 23<sup>th</sup> of each month, when service members pick up and sign for their monthly salaries at their units.

hope that the e-Ministry automated personnel and payroll system (see below) will further decrease corruption.

## **Unauthorized Hires Affect Reported Data**

Under the MoD, some Iraqi Army commanders recruit members outside the authorized recruitment process, according to both MNC-I officials and the MoD payroll manual. These unauthorized recruits, or “street hires,” do not have orders, nor do they undergo MoD’s mandatory background checks. They do not attend basic training and do not receive their initial issue of organizational clothing and individual equipment. Until the MoD receives back-dated assignment orders from the Divisions, these individuals are not captured in the MoD personnel and payroll database and are not paid. They could serve for weeks or even months before the MoD recognizes and validates their legitimacy. As a result, the number of Iraq’s defense forces reported by the MoD and MNSTC-I may be lower than the actual number of personnel serving on the force.

Under the MoI, the number of assigned police personnel is higher than authorized for some Iraqi provinces. For example, Al Anbar province is authorized 28,000 police, yet the data show 29,552 as assigned or on the payroll rosters as July 2008 (see table 4). The provinces of Babil, Dhi Qar, and Najaf also report higher numbers of police on the payroll than are authorized. According to MNSTC-I officials, the Provincial Directors of Police (formerly known as provincial chiefs of police) often hire more personnel than the MoI has authorized because they are more beholden to the Governor and local pressures than to MoI officials. Consequently, the Provincial Directors of Police hire additional personnel based on perceived needs of the province, rather than the MoI hiring authorizations.

Because of the rapid expansion of the police force, the MoI recently increased its authorization level for some provinces to better reflect the additional personnel needs. Specifically, as table 4 shows, the MoI added 45,323 police personnel to its authorization level from February to July 2008. In addition, eight of the 18 provinces had higher personnel on the payroll than authorized in February. By July, the authorization level increased for some of the provinces, but four provinces still show assigned personnel above the authorized level.

**Table 4—MoI Police Authorized and Assigned**

Province	February 2008			July 2008		
	Number Authorized	Number Assigned	Percent Assigned*	Number Authorized	Number Assigned	Percent Assigned*
Al Anbar	24,000	24,376	102%	28,000	29,552	106%
Babil	11,836	10,609	90%	9,702	9,770	101%
Baghdad	39,393	34,205	87%	42,800	42,488	99%
Bashrah	16,654	15,679	94%	16,654	14,885	89%
Dahuk	2,833	3,369	119%	4,000 <sup>a</sup>	3,437	86%
Dhi Qar	12,383	16,841	135%	16,086	16,448	102%
Diyala	19,361	17,128	88%	21,000	18,136	86%
Irbil	4,344	15,977	368%	16,000 <sup>a</sup>	12,488	78%
Karbala	13,000	11,041	85%	20,000	12,934	65%
Maysan	10,542	12,721	121%	13,500	11,453	85%
Muthanna	6,838	7,890	115%	9,838	9,652	98%
Najaf	14,048	13,973	99%	14,048	14,997	107%
Ninawah	24,387	19,120	71%	27,500	25,384	92%
Qadishiyah	8,854	11,117	126%	11,854	11,156	94%
Salah al Din	15,650	15,534	99%	18,000	16,507	92%
Sulaymaniyah	25,473	17,230	68%	25,473 <sup>a</sup>	18,031	71%
Tamim	11,939	8,452	71%	12,500	8,602	69%
Wasit	10,315	10,560	102%	10,218	8,991	88%
Traffic Police	16,151	14,048	87%	16,151	14,259	88%
<b>Total</b>	<b>288,001</b>	<b>279,870</b>	<b>97%</b>	<b>333,324</b>	<b>299,170</b>	<b>90%</b>

Source: MNSTC-I.

**Notes:**

<sup>a</sup> Figures are best estimates; they are neither vetted nor tracked through the MoI.

\* Numbers are rounded to the nearest percent.

Contributing to the rapid expansion of the police above the MoI authorized level is Coalition Provisional Authority Order 71, issued in April 2004, giving the chiefs of police responsibility for overseeing civil law enforcement activities. According to DoD's December 2007 quarterly report, CPA Order 71 diluted the MoI's control over the police by giving the provincial governments the power to approve the hiring and firing of provincial chiefs of police. CPA 71, in effect, made provincial chiefs of police subject to local pressures without regard to MoI funding constraints. As a result, DoD's December 2007 report concluded that ~~the~~ process does not allow synchronization of required resources and growth projections; it creates confusion in effectively manning the force, undermines attempts to build a requirements-based force structure, and subsequently creates difficulties in properly training, equipping, and budgeting for police salaries." In commenting on a draft of this report, CENTCOM officials noted that CPA

71 applies only to non-Provincial Iraqi Control provinces and will become obsolete when the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1790 expires on December 31, 2008.

## **Assigned and Trained Metrics Offer Limited Usefulness**

As we previously reported, the usefulness of ~~–trained~~” and ~~–assigned~~” metrics is limited because not all trained personnel are present for duty and not all assigned personnel have been trained. For example, MNSTC-I reported that 192,028 police had been trained as of August 15, 2008. This metric represents personnel who have received a MoI-approved training course and are accounted for at the 18 training centers.<sup>7</sup> However, not all of those trained are available for duty, and some are no longer on the force because, among other things, they have completed their obligation, are absent without leave, are wounded or have been killed. As a result, MNSTC-I does not know how many of the 192,028 police reported as trained are currently on the force.

At the same time, MNSTC-I reports 299,170 police as assigned and on the payroll as of August 15, 2008, or 107,142 more than the 192,028 reportedly trained. A contributing factor to untrained personnel on the payroll is the rapid expansion of the police force in order to counter violence in the country. This rapid expansion outpaced and exceeded training capacity and resulted in a training backlog. MNSTC-I officials stated they are working with the MoI to expand training capacity and reduce the backlog. Until new police recruits complete MoI-approved training courses, they are not captured in MNSTC-I reported data on trained personnel, but they are included in the assigned data. This further distorts efforts to determine personnel trained and on duty, which represents a better metric of ISF capability than ~~–assigned~~” or ~~–trained~~.”

## **Changing Metrics and Definitions Complicate Comparability**

In our interim report, we discussed how changing metrics and definitions affect comparability of data over time. This report includes additional factors affecting comparability and the continuing difficulty in tracking changes to the ISF. Early quarterly reports focused on ISF personnel who received initial training and basic equipment. The ~~–trained and equipped~~” metric served as a key indicator of progress in developing the ISF. According to MNSTC-I, these early reports focused on training forces to meet requirements at the time, which were 137,418 for defense forces and 188,260 for police forces. However, as a result of a deteriorating security situation and changes in force structure defined by the GOI, MNSTC-I increased force requirements and modified its reporting metrics. The data on forces ~~–trained and equipped~~” was replaced by ~~–trained~~” and ~~–assigned~~” as measures of progress in developing Iraq’s security forces. The ~~–assigned~~” metric potentially provides a somewhat better measure of force structure. However, because it was not used in past reports, SIGIR cannot track forces ~~–on the payroll~~” over time.

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<sup>7</sup> MoI-sanctioned courses include the three-year police college, nine-month and six-month courses, Officer Candidate School and Officer Transition Integration Program for officers; Basic Recruit Training (BRT), BRT Lite, Department of Border Enforcement BRT, Facilities Protection Service BRT, Emergency Response Unit BRT, the Baghdad Provincial Directorate of Police 200-hour course, and the Transition Integration Program for shurta (policemen).

In addition to new and/or changing metrics, MNSTC-I has also modified its definition of some metrics. In a 2006 memorandum, the MNSTC-I Commander stated that ISF personnel recruited, trained, and equipped by MNSTC-I to the authorized levels were to be included in the reporting process. Forces hired above those authorized and those not trained by the Coalition were to be excluded. According to MNSTC-I, once these authorized goals were achieved, additional trained forces were counted as sustainment training and not included in the quarterly reports. As a result, the reported Iraq security force structure during this time was understated.

In January 2008, MNSTC-I modified the definitions of reporting categories. Increases in MoD personnel under the Prime Minister over-manning initiative—those above authorization—were to be included in the reporting process. In addition, ISF personnel ~~—trained~~ were to be considered those who had completed basic combat training (for MoD forces) or MoI-sanctioned initial entry training courses (for MoI forces). In the June 2008 report, MNSTC-I redefined Iraqi Army personnel who were hired under the Prime Minister’s over-manning initiative as ~~—assigned~~ rather than ~~—authorized~~. This was done to make ISF reporting consistent with standard military personnel accounting practices of the United States and other countries, according to MNSTC-I. As a result of redefinition, 29,504 Iraqi Army personnel were shifted from ~~—authorized~~ to ~~—assigned~~ in the March to June 2008 reports.

# **Automated Human Resource and Payroll Systems Remain Unfinished**

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Efforts have been under way for some time to automate the human resource and payroll systems to provide the MoD and the MoI with better tools to manage its personnel—one under a contract awarded and paid for by the United States for a system benefiting the MoD and one awarded and paid for by the GOI for the MoI. Although both systems now offer some capabilities, both the MoD's Human Resource Information Management System (HRIMS) and the MoI's e-Ministry system are still incomplete and not fully implemented. MNSTC-I officials stated that problems with data entry, staff training and technical proficiency, and supporting infrastructure are hindering full implementation of both systems. In addition, contracting officials also cite poor requirements definition and poor performance by Torres, Advanced Enterprise Solutions (Torres), the government contractor, as major factors delaying implementation of the HRIMS system, which costs approximately \$21.2 million in U.S.-appropriated monies from the ISFF.<sup>8</sup> The MoI system, procured by the GOI at an estimated cost of \$27.8 million, has also experienced delays in implementation. In addition, resistance to accountability and identification of individuals may affect accurate data entry and reduce e-Ministry's ability to provide reliable information when completed.

## **MoD Human Resources Information Management System to Improve Personnel Accountability Not Yet Fully Functional**

The MoD has made progress in implementing the HRIMS system, though the system is not yet fully functional. In August 2006, MNSTC-I (through the Joint Contract Command-Iraq/Afghanistan) contracted for one year with Torres to develop a personnel and payroll system database to assist the MoD in its personnel accountability functions. The entire system cost approximately \$21.2 million in U.S.-appropriated monies from the ISFF. HRIMS combines five different personnel, payroll, and biometrics databases<sup>9</sup> and is expected to serve as the primary system to manage MoD's manpower accountability and pay. With the integration of these databases, MNSTC-I officials expect that HRIMS will increase transparency in the payroll process, retain flexibility to change, create reports and queries, reduce corruption, and minimize the number of ghost soldiers. The HRIMS network, with the type of personnel information that the database captures, is shown in Figure 1.

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<sup>8</sup> The cost of the HRIMS includes \$11.8 million paid to Torres to date (with final invoices under review.) The cost also includes initial user needs assessments, Oracle software and renewal applications, hardware and other equipment, and additional training and maintenance support.

<sup>9</sup> Storage Area Network Solution (SANS) is a biometrics personnel identification data storage for integrated use with HRIMS. Biometrics data collected from individuals include fingerprints, iris scan, voice print, photograph, and biographical data. SANS was also developed by Torres under a separate contract at a cost of \$850,278.

**Figure 1—HRIMS Network**



Source: SIGIR analysis of Torres and MNSTC-I data.

Although HRIMS can provide some personnel accountability functions, it is not yet fully functional. As of September 2008, HRIMS could perform personnel accountability functions such as strength accounting, manpower tracking, personnel reports, promotions, and pay data. However, according to MNSTC-I officials, four tasks must be completed for the system to be fully functional. First, the MoD must validate over 437,000 incomplete entries currently in the system and input all assigned personnel (the MoD currently has complete data on approximately 135,000 assigned personnel). Second, HRIMS must be established at all planned remote sites. Third, MoD staff must be trained in the operation and maintenance of the system. Finally, a query capacity must be expanded and built to produce personnel and payroll reports. Because the HRIMS is under the control of the MoD Chief Information Officer (CIO), the pace at which these tasks are completed now depends on MoD personnel. To assist the MoD CIO, MNSTC-I contracted with three experts to provide system administration and user training.

MNSTC-I officials stated that implementation of HRIMS has been difficult because of the system's complexity and Torres' unsatisfactory performance. While HRIMS is accessible through the Iraqi Defense Network (IDN), 31 Very Small Aperture Terminals (VSATs, or satellite equipment) have also been installed across Iraq allowing connectivity to HRIMS in areas without IDN connectivity. Other hardware and software installed include eight Dell 2900 database servers and Oracle 11i E-Business Suite, Oracle 10g, and Linux operating systems. To be fully functional, the IDN infrastructure and VSAT network (and equipment) need to be accessible from additional sites in Iraq. In addition, end users also need to be trained to use the system.

Both contracting officials and the MoD CIO expressed dissatisfaction with Torres, and stated that the company had failed to meet its contractual obligations. Contracting officials notified Torres in December 31, 2007, that it had failed to complete the installation and verify the functionality of the VSAT equipment, ensure IDN connectivity, perform on-site training, provide help desk support, and prepare a plan to transition the HRIMS program to the MoD. A follow-up letter stated that only one of 31 VSAT sites was functional as of January 2008 and asked Torres to submit a proposal for corrective actions. A February 2008 demonstration of the HRIMS' capability also failed, but Torres stated that the MoD did not provide it with the required data to allow for a successful demonstration. According to contracting officials, Torres was required to train 460 personnel; however, only 217 were trained.

Although contracting officials issued letters of concern to Torres, they did not terminate the contract for cause because the contract's statement of work did not contain specific or measurable deliverables. While not satisfied with Torres' performance, at the end of the one-year performance period in August 2007, contracting officials extended the contract for another six months to accelerate the implementation and training of HRIMS and made the contract performance-based with specific deliverables. However, contract files show Torres' continued poor management and performance.

Because MoD personnel had not been fully trained and the system was not yet fully functional, the MoD CIO asked MNSTC-I to provide technical assistance for six months to assist him in implementing HRIMS. MNSTC-I contracted with three technical experts at a cost of almost \$1.0 million in ISFF funds to train MoD personnel to use and maintain the HRIMS system. The contract was awarded to Innovative Management & Technology Approaches (IMTAS) for a six-month period with two renewal options at additional cost. IMTAS began work on September 1, 2008.

## **MoI e-Ministry to Link Human Resource and Payroll Actions Not Yet Complete**

Similar to the MoD's HRIMS, the MoI's e-Ministry system is intended to link human resource and payroll actions and provide accountability for MoI personnel.<sup>10</sup> The MoI conceived, planned, and funded the automated e-Ministry system, which aims to provide organization-wide, high-level administrative and accountability management tools. The system is expected to incorporate financial, logistics, and human resources management modules that enable users to better manage financial processes, plan and execute transportation and distribution operations, and automate personnel processes from recruitment to retirement. When completed, it is intended to link human resource, payroll, and training management and allow the ministry to better track employee hiring rolls for accuracy and pay. e-Ministry is the result of a MoI Human Resource committee plan to reform ministerial human resources systems.

Implementation is planned to occur in three phases at an estimated cost of \$27.8 million. In Phase I, the MoI purchased software licenses for MoI Headquarters personnel and entered 2,000 records at a cost of \$3.8 million. In Phase II, the MoI plans to extend the system's capability to

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<sup>10</sup> The MoI contracted with INTRACOM Jordan and Specialized Information Technology to develop and integrate the e-Ministry software.

Iraqi police stations and purchase 88,000 additional licenses at an estimated cost of \$12 million. Phase III plans are to extend the system to the remaining provinces at a cost of \$12 million. Starting dates for phases II and III have not yet been determined.

The e-Ministry project began in December 2005 and has experienced numerous delays. MoI officials had projected that e-Ministry would be completed by September 2008. However, this is unlikely given that Phase I was just recently completed. The MoI had planned for Phase I to be done by August 2006, but by May 2008, initial data entry had not been completed. In addition, several other tasks remained incomplete as of May 2008, including training (both trainers and end-users), module testing, and data migration. In December 2007, the MoI halted e-Ministry implementation until completion of off-site training in Amman, Jordan. Training was conducted in April 2008, and MoI officials plan to continue the e-Ministry rollout. However, Iraqi resistance to accountability and positive identification of individuals may result in inaccurate data entry. The DoD's September 2007 quarterly report states that —~~th~~ heightened sensitivity of personal information in the environment of severe intimidation and threats to which MoI employees are subject will . . . likely hamper implementation of the system.”

## **Lessons Learned**

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Neither the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan nor the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq included specific or measurable deliverables in the HRIMS contract's statement of work. As a result, even though officials were not satisfied with the contractor's performance, they could not terminate the contract for cause because they could not cite the contractor for a failure to meet contract requirements. If the U.S. government is to hold contractors responsible for poor performance, it must clearly specify in the contract what it expects in "deliverables" and contract performance.

## **Management Comments and Audit Response**

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MNSTC-I generally concurred with the report's conclusions and lessons learned. MNSTC-I also provided specific comments on statements made in this report, which SIGIR incorporated, as appropriate. MNSTC-I's concurrence letter is presented in Appendix F. In addition, CENTCOM, OSD (Policy), and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Strategic Plans and Policy) also provided technical comments that SIGIR addressed in the report, as appropriate.

## Appendix A—Scope and Methodology

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This assignment was conducted as SIGIR project 8024, and supplements SIGIR’s interim report on the subject in April 2008. The objectives of this report are to provide additional information on (1) the process for compiling data on ISF assigned and trained, including the accuracy and usefulness of data subsequently used for U.S. reporting, and its comparability over reporting periods, and (2) the status of and challenges to improving data accuracy and reliability by developing automated human resource and payroll systems to be used by the MoD and MoI.

To provide additional information on the process used to compile the numbers of ISF reported as assigned and trained, we interviewed officials at MNSTC-I and MNC-I in Baghdad, Iraq, and obtained information on personnel and payroll data to determine the soundness of the reporting data. We also reviewed and analyzed DoD’s September 2008 *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq* report and compared it with previous reports. To obtain information on the status of and challenges to developing automated personnel and payroll systems to improve data reliability, we interviewed officials at MNSTC-I as well as the Chief Information Officer at Iraq’s Ministry of Defense on the development and implementation of the HRIMS. We supplemented our audit by reviewing prior reports by SIGIR, the Government Accountability Office, the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq (the Jones Report), and others. We also obtained information and held discussions with officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Policy).

This audit was performed under the authority of Public Law 108-106, as amended, which also incorporates the duties and responsibilities of inspectors general under the Inspector General Act of 1978. We performed our work in Arlington, Virginia, and Baghdad, Iraq. We conducted this audit from May through October 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our results based on our audit objectives. Based on those objectives, we believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our results.

### Use of Computer-Processed Data

We did not rely on data from computer-based systems to conduct our audit. Rather, we focused on published reports, DoD-provided data, and discussions with responsible officials.

### Internal Controls

Iraq’s ministries of Defense and Interior provided the data on assigned and trained Iraqi Security Forces that was presented in DoD’s September 2008 quarterly report. We did not assess the overall system of Iraqi management controls related to this data. However, we reviewed the reports and compared the information with prior reports to identify anomalies. We also obtained information on the extent to which DoD reviews the information for accuracy and consistency and its views on data reliability. These steps provided reasonable confidence in our conclusions.

## **Related Reports by SIGIR and Others**

*Interim Analysis of Iraqi Security Force Information Provided by the Department of Defense Report, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq* (SIGIR-08-015, April 25, 2008.)

*Efforts to Implement a Financial Management Information System in Iraq* (SIGIR-08-007, January 25, 2008.)

*Operation Iraqi Freedom: DOD Assessment of Iraqi Security Forces' Units as Independent Not Clear Because ISF Support Capabilities Are Not Fully Developed* (GAO-08-143R, November 30, 2007.)

*The Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq*, September 6, 2007.

*Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Government Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks* (GAO-07-1195, September 4, 2007.)

*Stand Up and Be Counted: The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces*, House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations, June 27, 2007.


*Stabilizing Iraq: Factors Impeding the Development of Capable Iraqi Security Forces* (GAO-07-612T, March 13, 2007.)

*Iraqi Security Forces: Weapons Provided by the U.S. Department of Defense Using the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund* (SIGIR-06-033, October 28, 2006.)

*Iraqi Security Forces: Review of Plans to Implement Logistics Capabilities* (SIGIR-06-032, October 28, 2006.)

## Appendix B—Command Relationships in Establishing, Training, and Equipping Iraqi Security Forces

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*Source: Department of Defense and U.S. Government Accountability Office.*

## Appendix C—Organizations Providing Input and Review of Quarterly Reports

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Organizations providing input and/or review of the *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq* reports include:

- Secretary of Defense
- Defense Security Cooperation Agency
- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Undersecretary of Defense (Policy)
- Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller)
- OSD (Public Affairs)
- OSD (Legislative Affairs)
- DoD Office of General Counsel
- Joint Staff
- U.S. Central Command
- Multi-National Force – Iraq
  - Multi-National Coalition – Iraq
  - Multi-National Security Transition Command - Iraq
- Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
- OSD (Policy)/International Security Affairs/Middle East –Iraq
- Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Middle East)
- Key General and Flag Officers
- Department of State
- Department of Justice
- Department of the Treasury
- Office of Management and Budget
- National Security Council
- Intelligence Community
- Defense Security Cooperation Agency
- Task Force to Improve Business and Stability Operations

*Source: Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Policy).*

## Appendix D—Acronyms

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CENTCOM	U.S. Central Command
DoD	Department of Defense
GAO	Government Accountability Office
GOI	Government of Iraq
HRIMS	Human Resources Information Management System
IDN	Iraqi Defense Network
IMTAS	Innovative Management & Technology Approaches
ISF	Iraqi Security Forces
ISFF	Iraq Security Forces Fund
JCC-I/A	Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan
MNC-I	Multi-National Corps-Iraq
MNF-I	Multi-National Force-Iraq
MNSTC-I	Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq
MoD	Ministry of Defense
Mol	Ministry of Interior
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
SANS	Storage Area Network Solution
SIGIR	Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
SIT	Specialized Information Technology
Sol	Sons of Iraq
VSATs	Very Small Aperture Terminals

## **Appendix E—Audit Team Members**

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This report was prepared, and the audit work conducted, under the direction of David R. Warren, Assistant Inspector General for Audit, Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. Staff members who contributed to the report include:

Tinh Nguyen

Charles Thompson

# Appendix F—Management Comments

## Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq

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REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF:

MULTI-NATIONAL SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND-IRAQ  
BAGHDAD, IRAQ  
APO AE 09348

MNSTC-I-AUD


12 Oct 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction

SUBJECT: Challenges in Obtaining Reliable and Useful Data on Iraqi Security Forces  
Continue

1. This memorandum provides the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) response to the subject report.
2. MNSTC-I generally concurs with the conclusions and lessons learned contained in the report. See the enclosure for our comments.
3. We appreciate your assessment of the subject project. Thank you for the opportunity to provide written comments for incorporation in the final report.
4. If you have any question please contact LTC Patrick Dailey at DSN 318-852-1359 or email [patrick.dailey@iraq.centcom.mil](mailto:patrick.dailey@iraq.centcom.mil).

Encl

  
RANDY A. BUHIDAR  
COL, USA  
Chief of Staff

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<b>Congressional Affairs</b>	<p>Hillel Weinberg  Assistant Inspector General for Congressional Affairs  Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General  for Iraq Reconstruction  400 Army Navy Drive  Arlington, VA 22202-4704  Phone: 703-428-1059  Email: <a href="mailto:hillel.weinberg@sigir.mil">hillel.weinberg@sigir.mil</a></p>
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