[Senate Hearing 106-662]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 106-662
U.S. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: FINDINGS ON
RUSSIA, CHINA, AND SUDAN; AND RELIGIOUS PERSECUTIONS IN THE WORLD
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MAY 16 AND SEPTEMBER 7, 2000
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
66-867 CC WASHINGTON : 2000
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri BARBARA BOXER, California
BILL FRIST, Tennessee ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island
Stephen E. Biegun, Staff Director
Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom: Findings on Russia,
China, and Sudan
May 16, 2000
Page
Abrams, Hon. Elliott, Member, U.S. Commission on International
Religious Freedom; and president, Ethics and Public Policy
Center, Washington, DC......................................... 22
Prepared statement........................................... 25
Al-Marayati, Laila, MD, Commissioner, U.S. Commission on
International Religious Freedom, dissent to testimony on
religious freedom in Sudan..................................... 55
Kazemzadeh, Dr. Firuz, Member, U.S. Commission on International
Religious Freedom; and secretary for External Affairs, National
Spiritual Assembly of the Baha'is of the United States, Alta
Loma, CA....................................................... 29
Prepared statement........................................... 33
Saperstein, Rabbi David, Chairman, U.S. Commission on
International Religious Freedom; and director, Religious Action
Center of Reform Judaism, Washington, DC....................... 16
Prepared statement........................................... 20
Seiple, Hon. Robert A., Ambassador at Large for International
Religious Freedom, Department of State, Washington, DC......... 3
Prepared statement........................................... 9
Response to additional question for the record from Senator
Gordon Smith............................................... 16
Shea, Nina, Member, U.S. Commission on International Religious
Freedom; and director, Center for Religious Freedom, Freedom
House, Washington, DC.......................................... 35
Prepared statement........................................... 38
Religious Persecution in the World
September 7, 2000
Feingold, Hon. Russell D., U.S. Senator from Wisconsin, prepared
statement...................................................... 58
Kazemzadeh, Dr. Firuz, Vice Chairman, U.S. Commission on
International Religious Freedom, and secretary of External
Affairs, National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha'is of the
United States, Alta Loma, CA; accompanied by: Hon. Michael K.
Young, Commission Member and dean, George Washington University
Law School, Washington, DC; and Hon. John Bolton, Commission
Member and senior vice president, American Enterprise Institute
for Public Policy, Washington, DC.............................. 71
Prepared statement of Dr. Firuz Kazemzadeh (includes
attachments)............................................... 76
Seiple, Hon. Robert A., Ambassador at Large for International
Religious Freedom, Department of State, Washington, DC......... 59
Prepared statement........................................... 62
United States Commission on International Religious Freedom,
responses to additional questions submitted for the record..... 89
(iii)
U.S. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: FINDINGS ON RUSSIA,
CHINA, AND SUDAN
----------
TUESDAY, MAY 16, 2000
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met at 10:04 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Sam Brownback, presiding.
Present: Senators Brownback and Sarbanes.
Senator Brownback. The hearing room will come to order.
Thank you all for joining us this morning on this Senate
Foreign Relations full committee hearing on ``U.S. Commission
on International Religious Freedom: Findings on Russia, China,
and Sudan,'' the title for this morning's hearing. I am
especially pleased that the International Religious Freedom
Commission that was created by the Congress has really taken
its task seriously and moved forward aggressively, and that is
what we are here to highlight today, what they are reporting
on, and what we can do to implement the findings of the
Commission.
There has been a stunning shift in foreign policy in the
last 3 years involving a recognition of religious liberty as a
respected human right, equal to the freedoms of press, speech,
and assembly. This was not true even a few years ago when
Members of Congress and foreign affairs intelligentsia were
reluctant to seriously entertain this topic. A dark cloud of
silence hung over the foreign affairs worlds which tended to
dismiss religious persecution as too complicated or an internal
issue, not to be meddled with, or a quirky expression of deeper
nationalistic identities, or something just simply too
amorphous to merit attention.
Of course, there were notable, courageous exceptions,
people who fought alone for years, like Sam Erickson or one of
the most tenacious advocates who will be testifying here today,
Nina Shea. But there were really very few.
Consequently, innocent leaders remained in jail without a
single letter being sent. Others were executed without one
protest, and illegal peaceful religious communities were lost
in the underground, forgotten by the West.
When I think of how precious my own faith is to me, I am
truly grieved by the suffering which results from embracing a
minority faith in a hostile country. I regularly get press
reports of what has happened to people in other countries who
simply try to practice their own faith. Last week I received a
report of what was happening in North Korea, about Christians
there being shot in public by firing squads simply for the
desire to practice their own faith in that country, and just
some horrifying stories that were taking place there. I wish
this were the exception, that this only happened rarely and in
only a few places around the world, but I am afraid it happens
quite frequently and in a number of places around the world.
I think of the countless people in closed countries like
China who may never hear a religious message that would comfort
their souls in troubled times or really give meaning to lives.
It may be fair to say that of all the rights a country might
steal from its people, religious freedom is the most intimate
one.
Then the light broke through the clouds in the form of the
International Religious Freedom Act of 1998. This act, for the
first time, began to insert religious liberty in the middle of
the foreign policy debate. In the last 3 years, I believe there
have been more conferences and articles on religious freedom
than the several previous decades combined. You can thank the
act for this. Also a number of activist groups have come
together to press this issue. They have popularized the notion
that religious freedom is a fundamental, universal, human
right, which transcends the restraints of jealous nations.
Therefore, I am honored to be chairing this hearing to see how
far we have come and how far we need to go.
The act created a Commission which is represented today by
five of its members. They will be discussing their first
report, issued on May 1, which concentrates on three countries:
the Sudan, Russia, and China.
Before we begin, let me first congratulate you, the
Commission, on taking a very practical approach to the complex
problems that were presented. I thought that the advocacy
recommendations for each country were extremely good and, if
implemented, will make a difference.
Regarding Sudan, I am grateful for the Commission's
courageous conclusions, which I would like to begin to help
implement. In particular, I have been pressing for direct,
nonlethal assistance to the opposition forces in southern
Sudan, which I note your report also recommends as well, after
some conditions.
I have worked on religious liberty issues in all three of
the countries, in the Sudan, Russia, and China, which will be
addressed today. Given this, I am especially interested in the
methods by which you intend to implement the recommendations
and the actions that you call for.
Just on a final opening note, I hope this is something that
we just start to see really coming to its own now, that we will
see a lot more focus on religious freedom, a lot more intensity
of the focus on religious freedom. I think it has been growing
substantially over the past 3 years. I hope that is not a
cyclical thing, but rather is something that we are on a
trajectory toward growth, that we recognize this most
fundamental of human rights, and that is to do with your own
soul as you see fit and as you choose.
The administration witness is the first panel, and that
will be Ambassador at Large for International Religious
Freedom, Ambassador Robert Seiple, who sits also on the
Commission. Welcome, Ambassador Seiple.
Following will be the second panel of four commissioners,
Rabbi Saperstein, Elliott Abrams, Firuz Kazemzadeh, and Nina
Shea, who also will address an individual country examined in
this report.
With that, Ambassador Seiple, I am very pleased to have you
here to report on the findings of the Commission. I have a few
questions after your testimony. Thank you for joining us.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT A. SEIPLE, AMBASSADOR AT LARGE FOR
INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Seiple. Thank you very much. Thanks again for
doing this today. Let me also say thank you for both your
leadership and your passion on this issue. We feel we are very
much in sync. It is nice to be able to work with folks like
yourself on terribly important issues.
Let me also mention your able assistant, Sharon Payt,
irrepressible Sharon, who has also guided us in this issue in
so many different ways and so many different places. You both
have been courageous in where you have visited, maybe more guts
than brains. I am not sure. But it is great leadership, and the
city takes note of that and I think this issue takes note of
that and we are very grateful.
Senator Brownback. Thank you and thanks for recognizing
Sharon Payt's work too. I would add my recognition as well. She
is uniquely qualified and does great work on the topic.
Ambassador Seiple. Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee, I am pleased to appear before you today to testify
on the report of the U.S. Commission on International Religious
Freedom. Let me begin by thanking the chairman and the
committee for their strong and continuing support in our work
of promoting religious freedom internationally. Each of us here
today shares a vision: a world in which every member of the
human family is permitted to seek God in his or her own way,
protected in that endeavor by the state, but also free from its
interference. We seek to safeguard the most fundamental and
precious of human longings, that of understanding who we are,
why we are on this Earth, and how we ought to order our lives.
If we are not free to seek the truth in such matters, then we
are not living a fully human life.
The religious freedom policy of the United States is, of
course, based in part on the American experience in which
religious liberty was and is the first freedom of the
Constitution. But the brilliance of the founders was that they
articulated truths that went beyond mere national borders.
Religious freedom is the first freedom of America not only
because it is the first of the rights guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights, but also because it is foundational for democracy
itself. The Founders knew that a government which fails to
honor religious freedom and freedom of conscience is a
government which does not recognize the priority of the
individual over the state and that the state exists to serve
society, not vice versa. This is why they put religious freedom
first, to acknowledge the sanctity of the human conscience and
the importance of structuring society so that human beings may
seek the truth unhindered by the state.
These are the universal values that all of us seek to
promote as part of U.S. religious freedom policy. It makes
sense from the standpoint of religion, from the standpoint of
all human rights, and from the standpoint of promoting
democracy. One of the key elements of our policy is the work of
the independent and bipartisan U.S. Commission on International
Religious Freedom. As the committee knows, the Commission was
established by the International Religious Freedom Act, passed
unanimously by both Houses of Congress, and signed by the
President in October 1998. As Ambassador at Large for
International Religious Freedom, I serve ex officio on that
Commission as a non-voting member. I have attended the great
majority of its meetings, have heard the views expressed by its
Commissioners, and have given my own views when appropriate. It
has been and continues to be a productive and professional
relationship, one that is, I believe, faithful to the spirit of
the act.
You have invited me to testify this morning on the
Commission's first annual report, not as a member of the
Commission, but as the principal adviser to the President and
to the Secretary of State on international religious freedom. I
am happy to do so. Let me begin with some comments on each of
the three countries on which the report focused, Sudan, China,
and Russia. Because I have recently testified before the
Congress on China and Russia, I will allocate a bit more time
today to Sudan. I will then conclude with a response to the
Commission's critique of the State Department's own Report on
International Religious Freedom.
Turning to Sudan, we agree with the report's assessment of
the state of religious freedom in that country. The long and
tragic civil war has created the context for unconscionable
depredations against innocent civilians by the Sudanese
Government or its agents. There have also been significant
human rights violations by those opposing the government,
although they are not equivalent. The causes of this war and
its horrors, of course, are not exclusively religious. There
are significant ethnic, political, and economic factors as
well. But we agree with the Commission's conclusion that
religion is a major factor in the crisis, evidenced by the
government's extremist interpretation of Islam, which it
imposes on all Sudanese Muslims, and its attempts to impose
Sahri'a law on the Christians and traditional religionists in
the south.
These policies form the context for slave raids by
government-sponsored militias into the south, resulting in the
enslavement of thousands of people, including women and
children. While such behavior is not overtly motivated by
religious differences, and has economic and ethnic roots, the
slave raids have a significant religious dimension. Their
victims are almost uniformly Christians and adherents of
indigenous religions. Some of the children captured and sold
into slavery have been forcibly converted to Islam.
The same can be said for the victims of government bombings
in the Nuba Mountains and the south, an outrageous and ongoing
use of lethal force against Christians, adherents of indigenous
religions, and, in this case, Muslims who do not accept the
government's interpretation of Islam. I was present at a
remarkable meeting in February between the Secretary and Bishop
Macram Max Gassis, the heroic Catholic bishop whose diocese
includes the Nuba Mountains. Everyone in the room was moved by
his description of the 14 children--his children, he called
them--who had been killed by aerial bombs just 1 week before.
He told the Secretary that the dead were students in a Catholic
school that includes children from Protestant and Muslim
families, families adhering to indigenous religions, as well as
Catholic families. And from an official of the Sudanese
Government came the reprehensible announcement that the school
was a legitimate military target.
So, Mr. Chairman, there is little disagreement that a
humanitarian crisis of stunning proportions is occurring in
Sudan and that religion plays a significant part. The real
issue is how to address the crisis and what the role of the
U.S. Government should be. The Commission has laid out a
detailed set of policy recommendations which are being studied
by the Department and which will, in due course, lead to a more
considered reply. As a preliminary matter, however, let me make
a few comments. A substantial part of the Commission's
recommendations involves what is characterized as a
comprehensive plan to bring pressure on the Government of Sudan
to change its behavior. It calls for an informational campaign,
unilateral economic pressures, and vigorous multilateral and
bilateral efforts to increase economic and other pressures on
the government.
We welcome these recommendations. Indeed, I would argue
that we are in many ways already implementing them. For
example, we agree that the United States should highlight
Sudan's continued crimes against humanity wherever and whenever
we can. I would note the Secretary's designation in October of
Sudan as a country of particular concern under the
International Religious Freedom Act for particularly severe
violations of religious freedom, a status it shares with the
worst abusers in history. We lobbied for comprehensive and
accurate resolutions on Sudan at the U.N. General Assembly last
November and at this April's U.N. Human Rights Commission in
Geneva.
I would also note that the United States has had in place
since November 1997 comprehensive sanctions on Sudan denying it
virtually every economic advantage except for the sale of food
and medicines and the humanitarian aid we provide to the
victims of government violence and neglect. We have worked
intensively during the past year to invigorate the peace
process led by the Inter Governmental Authority on Development,
a group of East African countries. These efforts have been led
by the President's and Secretary's Special Envoy for Sudan,
Ambassador Harry Johnston, whose mandate includes
reinvigorating the peace process, pressing for human rights
improvements, and ensuring the delivery of relief aid to
victims of the conflict. We invite the Commission to work with
us in finding ways to enhance and improve our implementation of
these common objectives.
Let me also respond briefly to some of the Commission's
other recommendations.
We agree that we should continue to do all that we can to
meet the humanitarian needs of the victims of war. The United
States provided in excess of $159 million in humanitarian
assistance in fiscal year 1999 and over $1 billion since 1990,
far more than any other donor.
We agree on the need to continue to provide food and other
assistance outside of Operation Lifeline Sudan, while still
supporting the critical role of OLS. In fiscal year 1999, USAID
provided $24 million in food aid and $4.6 million in other
emergency assistance through non-OLS NGO's.
The Commission's report recommends that we provide
nonlethal aid to the opposition within 12 months if progress is
not made by the Sudanese Government on critical human rights
issues. I would note that fiscal year 2000 Foreign Operations,
Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act
authorizes, but does not require, the President to provide food
assistance to opposition groups engaged in the protection of
civilian populations from attacks by Sudanese Government
forces. The administration has not made a decision to use the
authority under this act at this time, but will continue to
consult with Congress on this issue.
Let me now turn to China. Here again, I share the
Commission's analysis of the status of religious freedom. Like
Sudan, China was designated a country of particular concern for
particularly severe violations of religious freedom. I recently
testified on China before the Congressional Human Rights Caucus
and gave an extensive analysis of the religious persecution,
which continues to occur there, of Tibetan Buddhists, of
Catholic and Protestant Christians, and of the Uighur Muslims.
I need not repeat that testimony here, except to say that it
was entirely consistent with the assessment provided by the
Commission in their report.
Mr. Chairman, I know that people of good will can and do
disagree over where our shared analysis of Chinese human rights
abuses ought to take U.S. policy. Some believe that it should
prevent the establishment of permanent normal trade relations
[PNTR] or cause us to oppose Chinese entry into the World Trade
Organization. The Commission itself, while noting that the
great majority of its members are free traders, has recommended
that the granting of permanent normal trade relations be
conditioned on human rights improvements in China. I understand
and respect this point of view.
However, I must disagree with the Commission. I believe
that the setting of conditions on PNTR will not advance the
cause of religious freedom in China and will not improve the
circumstances of the religious adherents about whom we are all
deeply concerned. This is because conditionality, as proposed
by the Commission, and even a vote to reject PNTR, would
provide little more than the appearance of U.S. leverage
against the Chinese Government. It would not prevent Chinese
entry into the WTO, nor would it deprive China of the economic
benefits of WTO membership. What it would do is deprive the
United States of the full economic benefits of China's market-
opening commitments and severely restrict our ability to
influence the course of events in China. It would reduce the
role of American companies in bringing higher labor standards
to China and in forcing local companies to compete in improving
the lives of their workers.
However, with unconditional congressional approval of PNTR,
China will enter the WTO bound by the full range of economic
commitments contained in the U.S.-China bilateral trade
agreement. These commitments will move China in the direction
of openness, accountability, reform, and rule of law, all of
which will, over the long term, contribute to an improvement in
the conditions for religious freedom in China. Failure to
approve PNTR would deprive the United States of the ability to
hold China to all of these commitments. Given China's likely
entry into the WTO, it would also put us in conflict with WTO
rules, which require immediate and unconditional provision of
PNTR for all WTO members.
Despite my disagreement with the Commission on the issue of
conditionality, however, I want to repeat that we are one in
our common concern about abuses of religious freedom in China
and together remain committed to sustained U.S. Government
efforts to promote religious freedom.
Turning briefly to Russia, let me say that I share the
Commission's concern over the continuing fragility of Russia's
commitment to freedom of religion. As the committee knows, a
good religion law passed in 1990 has been replaced by the 1997
law which creates a troublesome hierarchy of distinctions among
religious groups. While the potential impact of the law has
been mitigated by Federal authorities and the Constitutional
Court, the opportunities for discrimination against particular
religions remain plentiful. And while the amendment to the law
signed by President Putin extended the re-registration
deadline, it also appears to harden the requirement that groups
not registered by the deadline be liquidated. We will, of
course, be watching this issue very closely, and I will
continue to express our concern to Russian authorities.
I do want to note the encouraging news that for the third
time in recent weeks, local courts have ruled that members of
the Jehovah's Witnesses have the right to choose civilian
service in lieu of military service. This is not only a welcome
sign of the proper operation of the Russian Constitution, which
explicitly provides for alternative civilian service, but it
also reflects a growing acceptance in Russia of religious-based
differences.
As a general matter, we agree with the Commission
recommendations for continued active monitoring of the
situation in Russia and will continue to seek in our reports to
give appropriate coverage to the various minority religions in
the country. Although we have hosted a number of Russian
religious leaders in visits to the United States--and I have
met with some of them myself--we agree that we can and should
do more. We will study with great interest the other
recommendations, including the promotion of exchanges between
Russian legal defenders and their counterparts here and the
encouragement of Russian authorities to extend the length of
visas for foreign religious workers wishing to remain in
Russia.
Let me conclude by offering a brief response to the
Commission's assessment of the first annual State Department
Report on International Religious Freedom, which was presented
to Congress last September. That report, as the committee
knows, covers 194 countries worldwide and includes an extensive
executive summary, which is mandated by the IRF Act. It is
compiled and edited by the same talented and professional
reports office that does the human rights report but my office,
the Office of International Religious Freedom, is responsible
for the final product. All of us are, of course, gratified by
the Commission's praise of the report and the judgment that it
marks, as the Commission puts it, ``a sea change'' in focusing
attention on religious freedom.
The Commission's analysis also makes valuable suggestions
for improving the report. They recommend, for example that we
improve the organization of material, prioritize better, and
identify more fully where there are gaps in our sources of
information. They call for more context and a fuller
articulation of our methodology in preparing the reports.
Importantly, the Commission recommends the scrupulous avoidance
of appearing to favor or disfavor any state or religious
tradition over another and the imputation of particular
extremist interpretations of religion to the religion itself.
Let me say that we welcome these and the other
recommendations and we will take them seriously. Our respective
staffs have worked closely together over the last several
months and will continue to do so. As the Commission is
sympathetically aware, our office is now in the process of
doubling its size from a staff of three to six religious
freedom action officers, plus an office director. In due
course, our goal is to have nine action officers, enough to
cover every region, and to pursue some of the many worthy
reconciliation projects that warrant our attention. We are
presently involved in such efforts in Kosovo, Lebanon, and
Indonesia, but we could do more--much, much more. I would also
note that, as the committee is well aware, our embassy
resources in the field are stretched quite thin. At some of the
posts, the Foreign Service officers who report on human rights
and religious freedom are also responsible for covering
political, economic, and security matters. Some of them even
have consular and administrative duties as well.
Notwithstanding their many responsibilities, I cannot
overemphasize the enormous contribution that these fine men and
women have made to the success of our report, sometimes at the
risk of their own safety.
With respect to the Commission's recommendations, the
ongoing consultations between our staffs have already led to
the implementation of some of them. We have, for example,
adopted some of their suggestions for the next report,
including a greater emphasis on organization and legal context.
We endorse the Commission's view that our report, while lifting
high the value of the religious quest itself and of freedom of
conscience, must not appear to favor or disfavor any religious
tradition, country, or region. The Commission knows that this
has always been and will remain one of my highest priorities.
We will redouble our efforts to ensure evenhandedness.
At the end of the day, Mr. Chairman, I conclude that the
Commission's report, notwithstanding the existence of certain
substantive disagreements, has been a positive one. It has
focused further international attention on the state of
religious freedom in three critical countries. It has made
clear recommendations, many of which can form the basis for
further policy discussion. And it is already contributing to
the State Department Report on International Religious Freedom.
On balance, I believe that the Commission is making a
substantial contribution to our common goal of promoting
religious freedom worldwide.
Those of us who are charged with implementing the
International Religious Freedom Act have had some modest but
invigorating victories: some religious prisoners freed, some
religious refugees assisted, a few bad laws altered or
repealed. But we must take the long view. None of us can claim,
nor should we expect, that the millions who suffer for their
religious beliefs will have been loosed from their torments 18
months after the passage of the International Religious Freedom
Act or because of the actions of my office or those of the
independent U.S. Commission. But, Mr. Chairman, I believe that
we have all made a start. Together, we have planted seeds,
seeds of hope and of future action. With God's help, those
seeds are taking root and will one day bear fruit.
I thank you and this committee and the members and staff of
the U.S. Commission for their commitment to the cause of
religious freedom and to the well-being of the human family of
which we are all a part. And I would be more than happy to take
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Seiple follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Robert A. Seiple
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I am pleased to appear
before you today to testify on the report of the U.S. Commission on
International Religious Freedom. Let me begin by thanking the Chairman
and the Committee for their strong and continuing support in our work
of promoting religious freedom internationally. Each of us here today
shares a vision: a world in which every member of the human family is
permitted to seek God in his or her own way--protected in that endeavor
by the state, but also free from its interference. We seek to safeguard
the most fundamental and precious of human longings--that of
understanding who we are, why we are on this earth, and how we ought to
order our lives. If we are not free to seek the truth in such matters,
then we are not living a fully human life.
The religious freedom policy of the United States is, of course,
based in part on the American experience, in which religious liberty
was and is the ``first freedom'' of the Constitution. But the
brilliance of the Founders was that they articulated truths that went
beyond mere national borders. Religious freedom is ``the first
freedom'' of America, not only because it is the first of the rights
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, but also because it is foundational
for democracy itself. The Founders knew that a government which fails
to honor religious freedom and freedom of conscience is a government
which does not recognize the priority of the individual over the state,
and that the state exists to serve society, not vice versa. This is why
they put religious freedom first--to acknowledge the sanctity of the
human conscience, and the importance of structuring society so that
human beings may seek the truth unhindered by the state.
These are the universal values that all of us seek to promote as
part of U.S. religious freedom policy. It makes sense from the
standpoint of religion, from the standpoint of all human rights, and
from the standpoint of promoting democracy. One of the key elements of
our policy is the work of the independent and bipartisan U.S.
Commission on International Religious Freedom. As the Committee knows,
the Commission was established by the International Religious Freedom
Act, passed unanimously by both Houses of Congress and signed by the
President in October of 1998. As Ambassador at Large for International
Religious Freedom, I serve ex officio on that Commission as a non-
voting member. I have attended the great majority of its meetings, have
heard the views expressed by its Commissioners, and have given my own
views when appropriate. It has been and continues to be a productive
and professional relationship--one that is, I believe, faithful to the
spirit of the Act.
You have invited me to testify this morning on the Commission's
first annual report--not as a member of the Commission, but as the
principal adviser to the President and to the Secretary of State on
international religious freedom. I am happy to do so. Let me begin with
some comments on each of the three countries on which the Report
focused--Sudan, China and Russia. Because I have recently testified
before the Congress on China and Russia, I will allocate a bit more
time today to Sudan. I will then conclude with a response to the
Commission's critique of the State Department's own Report on
International Religious Freedom.
SUDAN
Turning to Sudan, we agree with the report's assessment of the
state of religious freedom in that country. The long and tragic civil
war has created the context for unconscionable depredations against
innocent civilians by the Sudanese Government or its agents. There have
also been significant human rights violations by those opposing the
Government, although they are not equivalent. The causes of this war
and its horrors, of course, are not exclusively religious. There are
significant ethnic, political and economic factors as well. But we
agree with the Commission's conclusion that religion is a major factor
in the crisis, evidenced by the Government's extremist interpretation
of Islam, which it imposes on all Sudanese Muslims, and its attempts to
impose Shari'a law on the Christians and traditional religionists in
the south.
These policies form the context for slave raids by Government-
sponsored militias into the south, resulting in the enslavement of
thousands of people, including women and children. While such behavior
is not overtly motivated by religious differences, and has economic and
ethnic roots, the slave raids have a significant religious dimension.
Their victims are almost uniformly Christians and adherents of
indigenous religions. Some of the children captured and sold into
slavery have been forcibly converted to Islam.
The same can be said for the victims of Government bombings in the
Nuba Mountains and the south--an outrageous and ongoing use of lethal
force against Christians, adherents of indigenous religions, and, in
this case, Muslims who do not accept the government's interpretation of
Islam. I was present at a remarkable meeting in February between the
Secretary and Bishop Macram Max Gassis, the heroic Catholic Bishop
whose diocese includes the Nuba Mountains. Everyone in the room was
moved by his description of the 14 children--``his children,'' he
called them--who had been killed by aerial bombs just one week before.
He told the Secretary that the dead were students in a Catholic school
that includes children from Protestant and Muslim families, families
adhering to indigenous religions, as well as Catholic families. And
from an official of the Sudanese government came the reprehensible
announcement that the school was a legitimate military target.
And so, Mr. Chairman, there is little disagreement that a
humanitarian crisis of stunning proportions is occurring in Sudan, and
that religion plays a significant part. The real issue is how to
address the crisis, and what the role of the United States government
should be. The Commission has laid out a detailed set of policy
recommendations which are being studied by the Department, and which
will in due course lead to a more considered reply. As a preliminary
matter, however, let me make a few comments. A substantial part of the
Commission's recommendations involves what it characterizes as a
``comprehensive plan'' to bring pressure on the Government of Sudan to
change its behavior. It calls for an informational campaign, unilateral
economic pressures, and vigorous multilateral and bilateral efforts to
increase economic and other pressures on the Government.
We welcome these recommendations--indeed, I would argue that we are
in many ways already implementing them. For example, we agree that the
United States should highlight Sudan's continued crimes against
humanity wherever and whenever we can. I would note the Secretary's
designation in October of Sudan as a ``country of particular concern''
under the International Religious Freedom Act for ``particularly severe
violations'' of religious freedom--a status it shares with the worst
abusers in history. We lobbied for comprehensive and accurate
resolutions on Sudan at the UN General Assembly last November, and at
this April's UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva.
I would also note that the United States has had in place since
November 1997 comprehensive sanctions on Sudan, denying it virtually
every economic advantage except for the sale of food and medicines and
the humanitarian aid we provide to the victims of Government violence
and neglect. We have worked intensively during the past year to
invigorate the peace process led by the Inter Governmental Authority on
Development (IGAD), a group of East African countries. These efforts
have been led by the President's and Secretary's Special Envoy for
Sudan--Ambassador Harry Johnston--whose mandate includes reinvigorating
the peace process, pressing for human rights improvements, and ensuring
the delivery of relief aid to victims of the conflict. We invite the
Commission to work with us in finding ways to enhance and improve our
implementation of these common objectives.
Let me also respond briefly to some of the Commissions' other
recommendations:
We agree that we should continue to do all we can to meet
the humanitarian needs of the victims of the war. The U.S.
provided $159.1 million in humanitarian assistance in FY 1999,
and over $1 billion since 1990, far more than any other donor.
We agree on the need to continue to provide food and other
assistance outside of the Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS)
structure, while still supporting the critical role of OLS. In
FY 1999, USAID provided $24 million in food aid and $4.6
million in other emergency assistance through non-OLS NGOs.
The Commission's report recommends we provide non-lethal aid
to the opposition within 12 months if progress is not made by
the Sudanese government on critical human rights issues. I
would note that FY 2000 Foreign Operations, Export Financing,
and Related Programs Appropriations Act authorizes, but does
not require, the President to provide food assistance to
opposition groups engaged in the protection of civilian
populations from attacks by Sudanese government forces. The
administration has not made a decision to use the authority
under this act at this time, but will continue to consult with
Congress on this issue.
CHINA
Let me turn now to China. Here again, I share the Commission's
analysis of the status of religious freedom. Like Sudan, China was
designated a ``country of particular concern'' for particularly severe
violations of religious freedom. I recently testified on China before
the Congressional Human Rights Caucus, and gave an extensive analysis
of the religious persecution which continues to occur there--of Tibetan
Buddhists, of Catholic and Protestant Christians, and of Uighur
Muslims. I need not repeat that testimony here, except to say that it
was entirely consistent with the assessment provided by the Commission
in its report.
Mr. Chairman, I know that people of good will can, and do, disagree
over where our shared analysis of Chinese human rights abuses ought to
take U.S. policy. Some believe that it should prevent the establishment
of Permanent Normal Trade Relations, or cause us to oppose Chinese
entry into the World Trade Organization. The Commission itself--while
noting that the great majority of its members are free traders--has
recommended that the granting of Permanent Normal Trade Relations
(PNTR) be conditioned on human rights improvements in China. I
understand and respect this point of view.
However, I must disagree with the Commission. I believe that the
setting of conditions on PNTR will not advance the cause of religious
freedom in China, and will not improve the circumstances of the
religious adherents about whom we are all deeply concerned. This is
because conditionality as proposed by the Commission--and even a vote
to reject PNTR--would provide little more than the appearance of U.S.
leverage against the Chinese government. It would not prevent Chinese
entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO); nor would it deprive
China of the economic benefits of WTO membership. What it would do is
deprive the U.S. of the full economic benefits of China's market-
opening commitments, and severely restrict our ability to influence the
course of events in China. It would reduce the role of American
companies in bringing higher labor standards to China and in forcing
local companies to compete in improving the lives of their workers.
However, with unconditional Congressional approval of PNTR, China
will enter the WTO bound by the full range of economic commitments
contained in the U.S.-China bilateral trade agreement. These
commitments will move China in the direction of openness,
accountability, reform, and rule of law, all of which will over the
long-term contribute to an improvement in the conditions for religious
freedom in China. Failure to approve PNTR would deprive the U.S. of the
ability to hold China to all of these commitments. Given China's likely
entry into the WTO, it would also put us in conflict with WTO rules,
which require immediate and unconditional provision of PNTR for all WTO
members.
Despite my disagreement with the Commission on the issue of
conditionality, however, I want to repeat that we are one in our common
concern about abuses of religious freedom in China, and together remain
committed to sustained U.S. Government efforts to promote religious
freedom.
RUSSIA
Turning briefly to Russia, let me say that I share the Commission's
concern over the continuing fragility of Russia's commitment to freedom
of religion. As the Committee knows, a good religion law (passed in
1990) has been replaced by the 1997 law which creates a troublesome
hierarchy of distinctions among religious groups. While the potential
impact of the law has been mitigated by federal authorities and the
Constitutional Court, the opportunities for discrimination against
particular religions remain plentiful. And, while the amendment to the
law signed by President Putin extended the registration deadline, it
also appears to harden the requirement that groups not registered by
the deadline be ``liquidated.'' We will of course be watching this
issue very closely, and will continue to express our concern to Russian
authorities.
I do want to note the encouraging news reports that, for the third
time in recent weeks, local courts have ruled that members of the
Jehovah's Witnesses have the right to choose civilian service in lieu
of military service. This is not only a welcome sign of the proper
operation of the Russian Constitution--which explicitly provides for
alternative civilian service--but it also perhaps reflects a growing
acceptance in Russia of religious-based differences.
As a general matter, we agree with Commission recommendations for
continued active monitoring of the situation in Russia, and will
continue to seek in our reports to give appropriate coverage to the
various minority religions in the country. Although we have hosted a
number of Russian religious leaders in visits to the United States, and
I have met with some of them myself, we agree that we can and should do
more. We will study with great interest the other recommendations--
including the promotion of exchanges between Russian legal defenders
and their counterparts here, and the encouragement of Russian
authorities to extend the length of visas for foreign religious workers
wishing to remain in Russia.
the 1999 state department report on international religious freedom
Let me conclude by offering a brief response to the Commission's
assessment of the first annual State Department Report on International
Religious Freedom, which was presented to the Congress last September.
That report, as the Committee knows, covers 194 countries worldwide,
and includes an extensive Executive Summary which is mandated by the
IRF Act. It is compiled and edited by the same talented and
professional ``Reports Office'' that does the human rights report, but
my office--the Office of International Religious Freedom--is
responsible for the final product. All of us are, of course, gratified
by the Commission's praise of our report, and the judgment that it
marks--as the Commission puts it--``a sea change'' in focusing
attention on religious freedom.
The Commission's analysis also makes valuable suggestions for
improving the report. They recommend, for example, that we improve the
organization of material, prioritize better, and identify more fully
where there are gaps in our sources of information. They call for more
context and a fuller articulation of our methodology in preparing the
reports. Importantly, the Commission recommends the scrupulous
avoidance of appearing to favor or disfavor any state or religious
tradition over another, and the imputation of particular extremist
interpretations of religion to the religion itself.
Let me say that we welcome these and the other recommendations, and
we will take them seriously. Our respective staffs have worked closely
together over the last several months, and will continue to do so. As
the Commission is sympathetically aware, our office is now in the
process of doubling its size--from a staff of three to six religious
freedom action officers, plus an office director. In due course, our
goal is to have nine action officers--enough to cover every region, and
to pursue some of the many worthy reconciliation projects that warrant
our attention. We are presently involved in such efforts in Kosovo,
Lebanon and Indonesia, but we could do much, much more. I would also
note that, as the Committee is well aware, our Embassy resources in the
field are stretched quite thin. At some of our posts, the Foreign
Service officers who report on human rights and religious freedom are
also responsible for covering political, economic and security matters.
Some of them even have consular and administrative duties as well.
Notwithstanding their many responsibilities, I cannot overemphasize the
enormous contribution that these fine men and women have made to the
success of our report--sometime even at the risk of their own safety.
With respect to the Commission's recommendations, the ongoing
consultations between our staffs have already led to the implementation
of some of them. We have, for example, adopted some of their
suggestions for the next report, including a greater emphasis on
organization and legal context. We endorse the Commission's view that
our report--while lifting high the value of the religious quest itself,
and of freedom of conscience--must not appear to favor or disfavor any
religious tradition, country or region. The Commission knows that this
has always been, and will remain, one of my highest priorities, and we
will redouble our efforts to ensure evenhandedness.
At the end of the day, Mr. Chairman, I conclude that the
Commission's Report--notwithstanding the existence of certain
substantive disagreements--has been a positive one. It has focused
further international attention on the state of religious freedom in
three critical countries. It has made clear recommendations, many of
which can form the basis for further policy discussion. And it is
already contributing to the State Department Report on Religious
Freedom. On balance, I believe that the Commission is making a
substantial contribution to our common goal of promoting religious
freedom worldwide.
Those of us who are charged with implementing the International
Religious Freedom Act have had some modest but invigorating victories--
some religious prisoners freed, some religious refugees assisted, a few
bad laws altered or repealed. But we must take the long view: none of
us can claim, nor should we expect, that the millions who suffer for
their religious beliefs will have been loosed from their torments 18
months after the passage of the International Religious Freedom Act, or
because of the actions of my office or those of the independent U.S.
Commission. But, Mr. Chairman, I believe that we have made a start.
Together, we have planted seeds--seeds of hope and of future action.
With God's help, those seeds are taking root and will one day bear
fruit. I thank you and this Committee, and the members and staff of the
U.S. Commission, for their commitment to the cause of religious
freedom, and to the well-being of the human family of which we all are
a part.
I would be happy to take your questions.
Senator Brownback. Thank you, Ambassador Seiple, and thank
you for the excellent statement and thoughts and your work that
you are doing. I hope what you and your group has started
working on will continue to grow and infiltrate much of the
U.S. Government as well. My office will get a number of
complaints of people seeking religious asylum, and they are
complaints directed at the INS. I think more and more of those
we will try to send by your office for thoughts and reviews as
well for people seeking freedom.
Let me note a couple of questions to you, if I could, on
your statement on the Sudan. I appreciate your going into that
in length. I take it, from your comments, you are saying that
the administration is already providing direct, nonlethal
assistance to the people fighting against the government in the
Sudan. There is consideration of legislation here to provide
direct, nonlethal assistance to the aid of the people fighting
against the government in Sudan. I am not clear from you what
your or the administration's position is on that issue. Could
you clarify that for me?
Ambassador Seiple. What I was referring to was the aid
offered outside the OLS system. That percentage and that amount
of aid has increased over the last 18 months. I think we have
all been in agreement that the OLS system is somewhat flawed by
the ability of Khartoum to apply a veto, and there have been
times in 1998, for example, where the OLS system could not take
emergency aid into places that were under attack or where
food--in a sense to be cynical, but I think right--was being
used as a weapon of war. Now, that food is being distributed
through an NGO system. It is not being distributed through the
opposition forces. I think your question really refers to the
nonlethal aid to opposition forces as opposed to the NGO's.
What I was referring to is the non-OLS aid that goes through an
NGO system.
Senator Brownback. I understand, but if we were to pursue
legislation here on providing direct, nonlethal assistance to
people other than the government-controlled entities, not
through the OLS, does the administration have a position on
that legislation?
Ambassador Seiple. As you know, they have the enabling
legislation, as of the 1st of February, to make a determination
in that regard.
Senator Brownback. That is on food aid. This would be
nonlethal assistance, not direct food aid.
Ambassador Seiple. I was going to say both of those,
nonlethal and food aid, are currently being studied in the
State Department extensively. I know the folks who were
studying that proposal have been grateful for what the
Commission has provided by way of this being a part of a
comprehensive plan. I can only say at this time that it is
under study, with the assurance that they, obviously, would
like to be working closely with the Congress and the Commission
as determinations are made, but the determination has not yet
been made.
Senator Brownback. I would hope the administration would be
supportive of the legislation to provide that authority, not a
requirement, but authority to them to be able to provide that
nonlethal assistance to people fighting against the government
in Khartoum.
A second question that I would have for you would be--and I
appreciate your statements on both China and Russia, as well--
what other countries do you hope the Commission will look more
closely at in the upcoming months that you have particular
concerns about on religious freedom?
Ambassador Seiple. Well, there are a number of countries
that, might we say, would be on the bubble, not necessarily
because they are candidates for countries of particular
concern, candidates for sanctions, or candidates for
designation, but just countries where there are unique
situations taking place where we can perhaps make a difference
if we get to them in time.
We had a Commission meeting for most of the day yesterday
and looked at, I think, about 17 different countries. I think
the Commission will come out in favor of an additional four or
five countries to look at in depth, even as they continue to
monitor the three that they did this year. If they can do that
during the 4 years, each year maybe pick up an additional
country, as the body of expertise grows, I think that in a 4-
year period of time, the Commission has the ability to look at
as many as 20 or 25 countries.
If you look at our executive summary in the International
Religious Freedom report that we put out through the State
Department, there are probably 30 in that country category of
violators, all told. Now, the specifics of those countries, who
they are, they are countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, India,
Pakistan, Laos, North Korea, Iran, which was looked at before,
but began to be looked at specifically as an addition of the
three. These are the kinds of countries that have had
significant issues where lots of people this day are suffering
because of how they worship or who they worship. I think all of
them have a legitimate rationale behind them in terms of why
they should be looked at.
If I may just add one point, we look at 194 countries. The
Commission has decided, I think properly so, to look at a much
fewer number but to go deeper. I think the complementary aspect
of that works extremely well for all of us interested in this
issue.
Senator Brownback. As I mentioned in my opening statement,
I would hope that you would be looking closely at North Korea
as you mentioned in your statement. I have just been reading
more and more reports, and then I met directly with a lady last
year who had been able to escape the country, had been in a
prison camp there, and told just a horrifying story of watching
a person who would not deny their faith have molten iron poured
on them and killed because they would not walk away from their
faith. Just a horrifying statement. And you read ones like that
fairly frequently.
Ambassador Seiple. I read that same statement. Actually it
is now in the form of a booklet, written by the woman who got
out and has written as a Christian from her perspective of what
was happening to people of faith.
We are also this year getting additional reports from a
variety of sources, something we did not have on North Korea a
year ago. We knew things were bad instinctually, intuitively,
but in our reports we want to make sure that we can
substantiate them and they are not just anecdotal research.
There are a number of reports now lining up with this kind of
information that will ultimately have to be dealt with in the
accountability on the part of the North Koreans.
Senator Brownback. I hope that is also something that we
can do to draw public attention both in this country and abroad
about the level of persecution that takes place to a number of
people of faith around the world.
In January of this year, I traveled to Nepal and in
Kathmandu met with about 120 Tibetan refugees that had recently
walked across the Himalayas in winter to get to freedom. It was
one of the most striking examples to me of the desire for
freedom and the desire of the soul to worship as they see fit.
I talked individually with probably around 12 to 15 of them
about their story. There were children there 8 to 10 years of
age. There were older people that were there as well. And each
had just an amazing story. Some had been jailed and beaten in
jail and had been released and then later escaped. It was 2
weeks that they hiked. Many of them left just on an
instantaneous basis with plastic shoes and not much more than a
light jacket to do that incredible hike. You look at them just
in amazement of the level of persecution that drove them and of
the desire of the human spirit to be able to be free. It is
something that I hope we never give that light up ourselves as
we move forward and as the United States takes a lead role in
pressing this freedom for people throughout the world.
Ambassador Seiple. Well, that is our constituency, not so
much a legislative process or a bureaucratic process or an NGO
process. Our constituents are those who this day suffer for
their faith. You met with the ones who made the walk and are
still alive. The unfortunate statistic is there are an awful
lot of children who died on the Himalayas because they suffered
irreparably through that winter and never made it. That is
another one of the statistics of this whole issue, people who
are lying dead on the mountainsides.
Senator Brownback. And it is a fact that goes on yet today.
As you note, my interest in this and the interest of this
country and our heritage built upon it--one quick side story
before we go on. There is a wood etching in the Library of
Congress of John Ogilvie who was persecuted in Scotland for his
faith. The wood etching is of him being held back on a board,
strangled, and being disemboweled, killed for his faith some
300-400 years ago. He in the 1950's was canonized by the
Catholic Church and is now St. John Ogilvie and the current
Chaplain of the U.S. Senate is Lloyd John Ogilvie. John
Ogilvie's persecution was part of the Scottish migration that
came to the United States looking for freedom and also other
people came from Scotland for other reasons as well.
But part of our heritage has been people searching just to
be free, free for their faith, and it is something that we
should never forget, nor should we fail to look back and to try
to seek other countries and other people just yearning to be
free, yearning to have their souls for freedom.
It is a great job that you have and I am glad you are in
it, Ambassador. You do a wonderful job at it.
Ambassador Seiple. Thank you very much.
Senator Brownback. Thanks for joining us today.
[Following is in response to an additional question
submitted for the record:]
Response of Hon. Robert A. Seiple to a Question from Senator Gordon
Smith
Question. In your opinion, is the Belgian Government being
discriminatory in the current practice of issuing visas only to foreign
volunteer religious workers who are members of officially recognized
religions of that country?
Answer. We are concerned that the Government of Belgium may be
discriminating against non-recognized religious groups in its issuance
of visas. In April, the Belgian Consulate in Los Angeles refused to
grant visas to missionaries of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints. Similar visas had been processed for decades without incident.
At the request of the U.S. Government, the Government of Belgium agreed
to investigate the reasons for the refusals, and has informed us that
their visa procedures are currently under review by the Ministry of
Interior. Visas to missionaries from the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints are being issued under a temporary procedure which
will remain in place until October 1st of this year, when the
Government of Belgium plans to issue new visa procedures. We are
hopeful that the new procedures will allow these missionaries to freely
obtain visas.
Our Embassy has been, and will continue to be, in contact with the
Belgian Government in an effort to address our concerns regarding
religious freedom.
Senator Brownback. The next panel will be several of the
Commissioners on the religious liberty panel. They are Rabbi
David Saperstein, Chairman of the Commission and director of
the Religious Action Center for Reform Judaism out of
Washington, DC; the Honorable Elliott Abrams, president of the
Ethics and Public Policy Center, Washington, DC; Dr. Firuz
Kazemzadeh, secretary for external affairs, National Spiritual
Assembly of the Baha'is of the United States; and Ms. Nina
Shea, member of the U.S. Commission on International Religious
Freedom and director of the Center for Religious Freedom,
Freedom House, Washington, DC.
STATEMENT OF RABBI DAVID SAPERSTEIN, CHAIRMAN, U.S. COMMISSION
ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM; AND DIRECTOR, RELIGIOUS
ACTION CENTER OF REFORM JUDAISM, WASHINGTON, DC
Rabbi Saperstein. Good morning, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Brownback. Good morning, Rabbi.
Rabbi Saperstein. I want to express our appreciation on
behalf of the Commission for holding this hearing. And I want
to express our appreciation as well to you. It is difficult for
me to think, over my 25 years, of someone who has not only
spoken as eloquently on the issue of international religious
freedom as you, but also put themselves on the line in visits
across the globe, to areas of particular concern on behalf of
refugees, giving them, through your presence, the hope to go on
with their struggle. So, I want to express my appreciation for
your personal dedication, as well as for the committee's
interest in this report.
Let me also just say one other word and that is to
Ambassador Seiple. This was an extraordinary choice for
America's first Ambassador. He has done a remarkable job here,
and I think the integrity and vision that he brings to bear in
his work was reflected in his testimony this morning, as well
in his ongoing work. So, I am deeply grateful for his presence.
Today we report to you on a milestone event, the issuance
of the first annual report \1\ on the U.S. Commission on
International Religious Freedom, as foreseen under the
International Religious Freedom Act passed in 1998. The vision
of IRFA is this: The Founders of our Nation understood that the
words, ``We are endowed by our Creator with certain inalienable
rights,'' put freedom of religion at the center of those
fundamental rights. It is the first of the enumerated rights in
the first amendment. It is central to the human condition and
to what we have striven for during so many decades of the 200-
plus year history of this Nation: to ensure that the religious
life of the individual and of religious communities could
flourish without the government restraining or interfering with
that freedom; that this is part of the vision of human rights
that cuts across the global community; and that as such, it
ought to be at the heart of American foreign policy.
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\1\ The report, entitled ``Report of the United States Commission
on International Religious Freedom,'' May 1, 2000, along with ``Staff
Memorandum for the Chairman: Religious Freedom in Sudan, China, and
Russia,'' May 1, 2000, can be accessed at the Commission's Website:
www.uscirf.gov
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As we look around the world, however, we find this
fundamental liberty under serious attack in far too many
places. In Sudan, the Islamist extremist government is bombing
Christian churches, church-run schools, and hospitals. In
China, we see mass arrests of Falun Gong practitioners, the
harassment and arrest of leaders of the Muslim Uighur
community, the continued systematic infringement under
religious freedom of Tibetan Buddhists, and the harassment of
the underground Catholic and Protestant churches as well. In
Iran, Baha'is are sentenced to death just because they are
Baha'is. All these things testify that the work of the
Commission is urgent work, work of fundamental liberty and of
priority importance.
The IRFA process created the Ambassador at Large for
International Religious Freedom and mandated a State Department
report once a year. That report, which you have seen, marked a
significant change in the way business is done in the American
foreign policy establishment. Over an extended period of time,
there have been in most of the countries across the globe
Foreign Service officers, as well as staff in regional bureaus
here at the State Department, who because of this report, had
to focus on what to say about religious liberty, how to address
it, how to express it, how to define it, how to describe what
is happening on the ground in the countries that they are
charged to cover, and how to express what America's interests
are regarding this issue. More difficult decisions that had to
be made as part of this process required the attention and
involvement of high-ranking State Department officials. The
entire structure was caught up with addressing this issue, and
that alone marked an important structural change. As our
commissioners traveled to other countries this year, they met
with and worked with Foreign Service officers who are now
knowledgeable about issues of religious liberty, who are
involved in diplomatic efforts to combat religious persecution,
and who have made lasting contacts with leaders of the
religious communities and with NGO's, both foreign and
domestic, who are working in this field.
It is the role of this Commission on an ongoing basis and
summarized once a year in the annual report to make
recommendations to you, the Congress, to the President of the
United States, and to the Secretary of State on how to address
policy related to combating religious persecution and enhancing
religious freedom. Now, because of the delay in appointments of
members of the Commission and in congressional funding for its
work, we have only been fully staffed for 6 months and in
offices for about 4 months. As a result, we decided that while
engaging in ongoing monitoring of general U.S. policy on
religious freedom, while visiting a number of nations and while
making ongoing policy recommendations regarding emerging urgent
situations wherever they occurred--these recommendations that
we made throughout the year addressed urgent situations in
nearly a dozen countries--we would focus on three priority
countries. Two are nations designated by State in the IRFA
process as ``countries of particular concern,'' that is,
countries where there are systematic, egregious ongoing
manifestations of religious persecution. Those countries are
China and Sudan.
At the same time, we also selected another country, Russia,
which reflected a completely different dynamic. It is a country
that allows for much more religious freedom. There are not the
same manifestations of religious persecution, but there are
growing problems. But this is a country with which the United
States has close relations and the ability to make its voice
heard more effectively. So, we targeted Russia because there
are so many religious groups in that country, and in many ways
it is a litmus test for how the other Newly Independent States
that sprung up after the collapse of the Soviet empire will
address these issues.
The report we released on May 1 was a culmination of our
work since the Commission first met here. We have held day-long
hearings on Sudan in Washington and on China in Los Angeles.
Commissioner Elliott Abrams, from whom you will hear in a
moment, traveled to southern Sudan. Other commissioners have
visited a number of other countries. We reviewed the State
Department reports and met with human rights and church
experts, experts on economic sanctions and war crimes, others
with firsthand information about the situation of religious
freedom in these countries. We tried to visit China, but the
Chinese authorities have yet to respond to our requests for
visas. We held meetings at least twice a month--one in person
lasting 1 to 2 days, another by conference call. And, in the
run-up to May 1, in addition to the time we spent in our
meetings on the wording of the report, we spent an additional
25 hours in conference calls, going over every word in our
recommendations and text for the annual report.
To me, one of the most extraordinary results of this
process, of the work of this religiously and politically
diverse Commission, is that both throughout the year in the
recommendations we made and in the report, every recommendation
and action was approved either by unanimity or by consensus.
Bonded by a deep and profound commitment to addressing
religious persecution for all religious groups and furthering
religious freedom for all, these Commissioners' openness to
diverse views, new ideas, and different approaches, combined
with the respect we had for one another's expertise allowed us
to present this report with the same overwhelming support we
have manifested in our recommendations during the year. In the
entire report of approximately 50 recommendations, there is
only one dissent \2\ by one Commissioner from two of the Sudan
recommendations.
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\2\ ``Dissent to Testimony on Religious Freedom in Sudan,''
presented by Commissioner Laila Al-Marayati, MD, is on page 55.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lest there be any confusion, our formal report is the
document so named. There is a second document that is
distributed with it. It is the staff report for the chair,
drawing on our work during the year. It provides helpful
background, particularly for those not familiar with the
details of religious life in these countries. While I think you
will find it a compelling indictment of religious freedom
abuses in China and Sudan, we did not feel it necessary to
resolve some outstanding differences, nor to adopt it formally.
The annual report contains a host of recommendations on our
three countries, and my colleagues will address each one
briefly individually. Before I turn to them, just a few other
words.
We, as Ambassador Seiple indicated, issued a detailed
analysis of the annual report issued by the State Department
under Ambassador Seiple's aegis. We talked about prioritizing,
about setting information in better context, about referencing
relevant law, eliminating the potential for bias, referencing
international law that is incorporated into IRFA, and improving
the methodology for information gathering. We are very
heartened by the response of the Ambassador and State
Department officials. The details of our recommendations are
set out in the report.
Let me finally say a word about our plan for this coming
year.
First, we will continue to monitor and make recommendations
on our three priority countries.
Second, we intend to issue recommendations regarding how
State identifies so-called ``countries of particular concern''
before the Department's next report and next list of those
countries, which is due in early September.
Third, the Commission will continue to respond to instances
of religious persecution--as it has done throughout this first
year--wherever and whenever they occur. It will also begin the
process of analyzing and addressing U.S. policy regarding
religious freedom issues in greater detail in a larger number
of countries. I do not know exactly what the number is. We will
decide at our next meeting. I would imagine, in addition to the
three we have, there will be another four to six such countries
on which we will focus. They will be taken from either the list
of ``countries of particular concern'' or they will be taken
from the countries that are discussed in some detail in the
executive summary of Ambassador Seiple's report in which he
lists the countries that have more serious problems. We agree
with much of that list, and it is likely our countries will be
drawn from that.
However, that will not set the limit of in-depth study that
we will do, for we are also going to address one of the most
complicated and vexing themes in the work of religious freedom,
and that is the issue of the right of people to change one's
faith and the right to seek to persuade others to change their
faith. This issue will lead us to address religious freedom
issues in a large number of countries.
Finally, the Commission will make further recommendations
on the extent to which capital market sanctions and other
economic leverage should be included in the U.S. diplomatic
arsenal to promote religious freedom in other countries.
Mr. Chairman, let me thank you again for the opportunity to
speak with you and with the committee. With your permission, I
would ask that the May 1 report and the staff memorandum \3\
that accompanied it be included in the hearing record along
with my full testimony.
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\3\ See, reference to Internet access, footnote 1, on page 17.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senator Brownback. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of Rabbi Saperstein follows:]
Prepared Statement of Rabbi David Saperstein
Good morning Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee. I'm Rabbi
David Saperstein and I am honored to serve as Chair of the United
States Commission on International Religious Freedom. Let me begin by
thanking the Committee for holding this hearing.
Today we report to you on a milestone event: The issuance of the
first Annual Report of the U.S. Commission on International Religious
Freedom as foreseen under the International Religious Freedom Act, or
IRFA, passed in October 1998. The vision of the IRFA process is this:
The Founders of our country understood that the words, ``We are endowed
by our Creator with certain inalienable rights,'' put freedom of
religion at the center of those fundamental rights. It is the first of
the enumerated rights in the First Amendment. It is central to the
human condition and to what we have striven for during so many decades
of the 200-plus-year history of this country: to ensure that the
religious life of the individual and of religious communities could
flourish without the government restraining or interfering with that
freedom; that this is part of the vision of human rights that cuts
across the global community, and as such, it ought to be at the heart
of American foreign policy.
As we look around the world, however, we find this fundamental
liberty under serious threat. In Sudan, the Islamist extremist
government is bombing Christian churches, church-run schools, and
hospitals. In China we see mass arrests of Falun Gong practitioners,
the harassment and arrest of leaders of the Muslim Uighur community,
the continued systemic infringement of the Tibetan Buddhists' religious
freedom, and the arrests of leaders of the underground Catholic and
Protestant Churches. In Iran, Baha'is are sentenced to death just
because they are Baha'is. All these things testify that the work of
this Commission is urgent work, work of fundamental liberty and of
priority importance.
The IRFA process created an Ambassador at Large for International
Religious Freedom at the State Department and mandated a State
Department report once a year. That report, which you have seen, marked
a significant change in the way business is done in the American
foreign policy establishment. Over an extended period of time, there
were Foreign Service officers, in embassies across the world and in
regional bureaus here at the State Department, who were focused on what
to say about religious liberty, how to deal with it, how to express it,
how to define it, how to describe what is happening on the ground and
what America's interests are regarding this issue. More difficult
decisions required the attention and involvement of high-ranking State
Department officials. That alone marked an important structural change.
As our Commissioners traveled to other countries this year, they met
with and worked with Foreign Service officers who are now knowledgeable
about issues of religious liberty and involved in diplomatic efforts to
combat religious persecution. They have also made contacts with
religious communities and NGOs (both foreign and domestic).
It is the role of this Commission on an ongoing basis, and then
summarized once a year in an annual report May 1st, to make
recommendations to the President of the United States, the Secretary of
State, and the Congress of the United States on how to address policy
related to combating religious persecution and enhancing religious
freedom. Because of the delay in appointments of members of the
Commission and in Congressional funding for its work, we have only been
staffed and in offices for about four months and decided, as a result,
to focus on three priority countries. Two are nations designated by
State in the IRFA process as ``countries of particular concern.'' These
are countries in which there are systematic, egregious, ongoing
manifestations of religious persecution. Those countries are China and
Sudan.
At the same time, we also selected another country, Russia, which
reflected a completely different dynamic, a country that allows much
more religious freedom. There are not the same manifestations of
religious persecution, but there are growing problems. This is a
country with which the United States has close relations and the
ability to make its voice heard more effectively. So we targeted Russia
because there are so many religious groups in that country, and in many
ways it is a litmus test for all the other new independent states that
have sprung up after the collapse of the Soviet empire.
The report we released May 1 was the culmination of our work since
the Commission first met late last June. We've held day-long hearings
on Sudan here in Washington and on China in Los Angeles. Commissioner
Elliott Abrams traveled to southern Sudan and other Commissioners have
visited a number of other countries. We've reviewed the State
Department reports and met with human rights and church groups, experts
on economic sanctions and war-crimes, and others with first-hand
information about the situation of religious freedom in these
countries. We tried to visit China, but the Chinese authorities have
yet to respond to our requests for visas. We held meetings at least
twice a month, one in person, lasting one or two days, another by
conference call. In addition, in the runup to May 1, we spent at least
25 hours in conference calls going over every word in our
recommendations and text for the Annual Report.
To me one of the most extraordinary results of the work of this
religiously and politically diverse Commission is that both throughout
the year and in this report, every recommendation and action was
approved by consensus or unanimity. Bonded by a deep and profound
commitment to addressing religious persecution for all religious groups
and furthering religious freedom for all, these Commissioners' openness
to diverse views, new ideas, and different approaches, combined with
the respect we had for one another's expertise, allowed us to present
this report with the same overwhelming support as we have manifested in
our recommendations during the year. There is only one dissent by one
Commissioner from two of our Sudan recommendations.
Lest there be any confusion, our formal report is the document so
named. The second document is a staff report for the Chair, drawing on
our work during the year. It provides helpful background, particularly
for those not familiar with the details of religious life in these
countries. While I think you will find it a compelling indictment of
religious freedom abuses in China and Sudan, we did not feel it
necessary to resolve outstanding differences nor to adopt it formally.
The Annual Report contains a host of recommendations on our three
countries of primary focus, and my colleagues will address each one
individually. Before I turn to them, however, I would like to say a few
words about our review of the State Department's first Annual Report on
International Religious Freedom, issued last September.
The State Department and the Office of International Religious
Freedom deserve high praise for the high quality and timely publication
of the first Annual Report on International Religious Freedom. Equally
important was the impact of the Report in making religious freedom a
higher priority for the work of every U.S. embassy and consulate.
Even so, the Commission believes that the Report can be
strengthened by (a) prioritizing and evaluating information, (b)
placing information in context, (c) referencing relevant law, (d)
eliminating the potential for bias, (e) referencing international law
incorporated into IRFA, and (f) improving the methodology for
information-gathering. The Commission's comments in this regard also
apply to those sections of the Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices that touch on matters related to freedom of religion or
belief.
Specifically, the Reports should clearly identify the most
significant religious-freedom problems in each country. Gaps in
information should be identified, particularly where a foreign
government itself is responsible for the inadequacy of available
information. The facts and circumstances in the reports should be
summarized and evaluated in light of the standards set out in IRFA.
The Report should contain enough historical, religious, and
political context to present a more complete picture of religious
freedom in each country. State interference with other human rights
that are integral to religious exercise should be discussed. The Report
should identify each country's relevant constitutional, statutory, and
regulatory provisions affecting freedom of religion; explain the
relationship between the state and religion; and assess whether the
government and courts enforce the laws in a way that promotes religious
freedom.
To avoid bias, the Report should distinguish between religious
concepts and how a foreign government may interpret them; politically-
loaded terms such as ``cult,'' ``sect,'' ``orthodox,''
``fundamentalist,'' ``jihad,'' or ``Shariah'' should be used in defined
and appropriate ways. The consequences of state sponsorship of a
favored religion should be discussed.
Let me close by reviewing the Commission's work plan for the next
year. First, we will continue to monitor and make recommendations on
the three countries we focused on this year: China, Sudan, and Russia.
The conditions that make them worth our attention unfortunately won't
go away soon.
Second, we intend to issue recommendations regarding how the State
Department identifies so-called ``countries of particular concern''
before the Department's next report in September.
Third, the Commission will continue to respond to instances of
religious persecution whenever they occur. It will also begin the
process of analyzing and addressing U.S. policy regarding religious-
freedom issues in a larger number of countries. Countries that will
draw greater attention during the next phase of the Commission's work
are the seven designated by the State Department last October as
``countries of particular concern'' and the more than 25 countries
discussed in the Executive Summary of the State Department's Religion
Report of September 9, 1999.
Fourth, the Commission will also evaluate U.S. policy options that
could promote the right to change one's faith and the right to seek to
persuade others to change theirs.
Finally, the Commission will make further recommendations on the
extent to which capital-market sanctions and other economic leverage
should be included in the U.S. diplomatic arsenal to promote religious
freedom in other nations.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for this opportunity to speak to the
Committee. With your permission, I would ask that the Commission's May
1, 2000 Report and the Staff Memorandum that accompanied it be included
in the hearing record with my testimony.
Senator Brownback. Thank you very much and thanks for your
leadership on the Commission. I think it has done an
outstanding job. It is just getting going, but it has done a
wonderful job and is really fulfilling a mission that at least
this Member of the Senate believes it was commissioned to do.
Next we welcome Mr. Abrams for his testimony.
STATEMENT OF HON. ELLIOTT ABRAMS, MEMBER, U.S. COMMISSION ON
INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM; AND PRESIDENT, ETHICS AND
PUBLIC POLICY CENTER, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Abrams. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for the
invitation to be here today.
Let me describe the conditions that we found in China and
the recommendations we made with respect to China in just a few
minutes.
We found a sharp deterioration in religious freedom in
China in the past year. We found that violations of religious
freedom in China are egregious, ongoing, and systematic. Let me
describe why we reached that conclusion.
First, there is a continuing ban on religious belief for
large sectors of the population, the 60 million members of the
Communist Party, the 3 million members of the military, and all
citizens--and there are hundreds of millions--who are under the
age of 18. The state has reasserted its monopoly over the
spiritual education of minors so that participation by children
in any religious activity can be prevented.
Second, the reassertion of state control over authorized
religions. All religious groups have to register with the
Religious Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Civil Affairs, and
their activities are limited to a very narrow officially
sanctioned space, a cage really, in which people of faith are
allowed to exercise their religious beliefs. Many of the limits
imposed on registered churches are violations of accepted
international standards of free exercise of religion.
For example, if you register, there is official scrutiny of
your membership. There is a ceding of some control over
selection of clergy. Your financial records are open to the
government. There is restriction on contacts with other
religious institutions. There are limits on a variety of
activities such as youth activities or building projects. You
cannot evangelize. You must allow censorship of religious
materials and interference with your own religious doctrines.
There is particular interference with education. For example,
the state has decided in China to reduce the number of years of
seminary training of Catholic priests from the 5 or 6 that are
normal to 2 years.
There is ongoing harassment of unregistered churches. The
Communist authorities seem determined to eliminate all
religious activity that they do not directly control. In recent
months, for example, authorities have detained Catholic clergy
loyal to Vatican in an apparent attempt to force their
allegiance to the official church.
Last year, one priest, Father Yan Weiping, was detained in
May 1999 while performing mass and was found dead on a Beijing
street shortly after being released from detention.
There is continuing egregious violation of freedom of
religion in Tibet and in Xinjiang, where ethnic, political, and
economic factors complicate the relationship between the
atheist state and large communities of Tibetan Buddhists and
Uighur Muslims.
Amnesty International reported that authorities in the
Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region have closed mosques and
Koranic schools, halted the construction of unauthorized
mosques, prohibited the use of Arabic script, more tightly
controlled Islamic clergy, and required Muslims who were party
members or who worked for the government to abandon the
practice of Islam or lose their positions.
In Tibet, religious institutions are likewise tightly
controlled.
In an action denounced by the Dalai Lama, authorities of
the region and in Beijing approved the selection of a boy as
the reincarnation of the sixth Reting Lama. This is the latest
in a campaign to control the future leadership of Tibetan
Buddhism. In 1995, the Dalai Lama identified a young boy as the
reincarnate Panchen Lama. The Chinese immediately denounced the
Dalai Lama's choice, detained the boy and his family, and
pushed the acceptance of their own choice. Chinese authorities
continue to hold the Panchen Lama at an undisclosed location
and refuse all requests to visit him that are put forward by
official and unofficial foreign delegations.
Within the last year, about 1,000 monks and nuns have been
expelled from their monasteries, and that makes for about
11,000 expelled since 1996.
Finally, I think everyone is familiar with the campaign
against what the government is calling heretical cults. The
government has acknowledged having detained more than 35,000
adherents of the Falun Gong movements. In closed trials, Falun
Gong leaders received prison sentences of from 6 to 18 years,
and many who have told their stories to the media have been
severely punished.
So, with that in mind, we reached a unanimous conclusion
about permanent normal trade relations [PNTR] with China. We
were accused of politicizing this Commission. But we had, by
statute, to give a report on May 1. What we said in the report
was this.
``The Commission believes that in many countries, including
some of China's neighbors, free trade has been the basis for
rapid economic growth, which in turn has been central to the
development of a more open society and political system. This
belief has been a major factor for the annual decision, by
presidents and congressional majorities of both parties, to
grant MFN each year to China over the past two decades.
Moreover, a grant of PNTR and Chinese membership in the WTO
may, by locking China into a network of international
obligations, help advance the rule of law there in the economic
sector at first, but then more broadly over time.
``Nevertheless, given the sharp deterioration in freedom of
religion in China during the last year, the Commission believes
that an unconditional grant of PNTR at this moment may be taken
as a signal of American indifference to religious freedom. The
government of China attaches great symbolic importance to steps
such as the grant of PNTR, and presents them to the Chinese
people as proof of international acceptance and approval. A
grant of PNTR at this juncture could be seen by Chinese people
struggling for religious freedom as an abandonment of their
cause at a moment of great difficulty. The Commission therefore
believes that Congress should not approve PNTR until China
makes substantial improvements in respect for religious
freedom.''
Now, we have a list of things that we think would symbolize
or embody greater respect. These are not, each one, a
precondition. They are a group of standards by which to measure
progress. We did not propose a strict formula. Let me just
mention a few of them and then I will be done.
We would like China to agree to an ongoing dialog on
religious freedom with the U.S. Government.
China has signed in 1997 the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights. We would like China to agree to
ratify that covenant.
We would like China to grant unhindered access to religious
prisoners.
We would like them to disclose who are the prisoners of
conscience and where they are, and we would like them, of
course, to release all persons incarcerated for religious
belief.
We think the U.S. Congress should hold annual hearings on
human rights in China or adopt some mechanism for continuing
monitoring.
We think the Congress should invite the Dalai Lama, a great
symbol of religious freedom and religious tolerance, to address
a joint session.
We think the United States should continue to push and push
harder for the resolution to censor China at the U.N. Human
Rights Commission in Geneva.
We think the United States should lead a multilateral
campaign to seek the release of Chinese religious leaders who
are imprisoned or under house arrest.
We think the United States should continue to raise the
profile of conditions in Xinjiang for Uighur Muslims.
Finally, as long as these conditions are extant in China,
we think the United States should use its influence so that
China not be selected as the site for the next Olympic Games.
Again, that is not a list of preconditions. It is a list of
actions that might be taken to show that while PNTR is being
voted, the United States maintains its commitment to religious
freedom in China.
Thank you very much for the opportunity to speak.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Abrams follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Elliott Abrams
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
On behalf of the United States Commission on International
Religious Freedom, of which I have the honor to be a member, I wish to
thank the Committee for this invitation to testify about religious
freedom in China.
THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS
Over the last several months, the Commission has conducted research
and held hearings on limits to religious freedom in China. We found a
sharp deterioration in religious freedom in China in the past year.
Violation of religious freedom in China is egregious, ongoing, and
systematic. The Chinese Communist Party and government leaders have
promulgated new laws and policies aimed at eliminating religious
activity beyond their direct control.
This past year saw the continued prohibition of religious belief
for large sectors of the population; the ongoing harassment of
unregistered churches; the assertion of state control over authorized
religions; an increase in the number of sects branded ``heretical
cults;'' the continued use of notorious extra-judicial summary trials
and the sentencing to reeducation through labor camps for so-called
``crimes'' associated with religion; and credible reports of torture of
religious prisoners.
1. Continued ban on religious belief for large sectors of the
population
The right to freedom of belief is explicitly denied to the 60
million members of the Chinese Communist Party, the three million
members of the Chinese military and all citizens--and there are
hundreds of millions of them--under the age of 18. Several campaigns to
purge the Party and military of believers have been waged over the last
five years. The state has re-asserted its monopoly over the spiritual
education of minors, so that participation by children in any religious
activity can be prevented.
2. Assertion of state control of authorized religions
Regulations in the PRC now require that all religious groups
register with local units of the Religious Affairs Bureau (RAB) in the
Ministry of Civil Affairs and that they affiliate with an official
organ of one of the five authorized religions: Buddhists, Taoists,
Muslims, Protestants and Catholics. It is in this narrow officially
sanctioned space--within this cage--that people of faith may exercise
their religious beliefs.
While in theory registration requirements need not be onerous, and
in fact many congregations operate under RAB auspices with little
interference, serious restrictions on freedom of religious expression
have been reported in recent years. Many limits imposed on registered
churches are in violation of accepted international standards of free
exercise of religion.
Human Rights Watch reports that government oversight of these
authorized religious groups entails official scrutiny of membership;
ceding some control over selection of clergy, opening financial records
to government scrutiny; restricting contacts with other religious
institutions; accepting limits on some activities, such as youth or
social welfare programs, or building projects; eschewing evangelism;
allowing censorship of religious materials and interference with
doctrinal thought; and limiting religious activities to religious
sites.\1\ The state requires that political indoctrination be an
important component of religious training for recognized religious
groups. This often comes at the expense of religious education, as is
the case with a recent movement to ``reduce the number of years of
seminary training of Catholic priests from the normal five to six years
to two.'' \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Mickey Spiegel, ``China: Religion in the Service of the
State,'' testimony at the USCIRF Hearing on Religious Freedom in China,
March 16, 2000, Los Angeles, California.
\2\ Human Rights Watch Continuing Religious Repression in China,
1993.
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Authorities limit the building of mosques, monasteries, and
churches even for approved groups. They restrict the numbers of
students in Christian seminaries, Buddhist monasteries and Islamic
schools. They proscribe the teaching of certain doctrines and labeled
heretical practices such as exorcism and healing.
Chinese authorities remain deeply suspicious of the involvement of
``hostile foreign elements'' in Chinese congregations and severely
limit association between Chinese and foreign religious groups.
3. Ongoing harassment of unregistered churches
Chinese law now requires all religious groups register with local
RAB officials. In the past, in many areas, officials have allowed the
unregistered groups to operate without harassment, in others, officials
have been zealous to the point of abuse in their campaign to force the
registration of places of worship. Increasingly, Communist authorities
seem determined to eliminate all religious activity that they do not
directly control. Some religious groups, as a matter of conscience or
fearing official intervention, have resisted registration. Officials
have denied recognition to other groups. The Protestant house-church
movement and Catholics loyal to the Vatican are among those that have
resisted registration on principle or been denied permission to
register.
Human rights groups report Chinese authorities detained 40
Protestant worshipers in Wugang in October of 1998, at least 70
worshipers in Nanyang in November, and 48 Christians, including
Catholics, in Henan in January of 1999. Authorities detained, beat, and
fined an unknown number of underground Catholics in Baoding, Hebei in
the same month. In April of last year, Public Security personnel raided
a house church service in Henan. Twenty-five Christians were detained.
Seventy-one members of the Disciples Sect were detained in Changying in
April.\3\ Just last week, a reliable Hong Kong source reported that
Chinese police have detained 47 Protestants in Anhui province and
criminally charged six of their leaders for organizing an illegal sect
and illegal gatherings.\4\ Similarly, leaders of large Protestant
house-church networks who, in 1998, challenged the government to a
dialogue, have been targeted for arrest. Unauthorized Protestant places
of worship have also been destroyed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ State Department Annual Report, International Religious
Freedom, 1999.
\4\ Newsroom, ``China Detains 47 Members of Protestant Group,'' May
7, 2000.
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Some observers report a concerted effort to ``eliminate underground
bishops and bring them under the authority of the official Chinese
Catholic Patriotic Association.'' \5\ This organization is being
introduced into areas in which it never existed before. It is pressing
underground bishops for obedience, not just cooperation. Without even
consulting church leaders, diocese are being reorganized: Some recently
divided dioceses are being re-united, while others have simply been
abolished by the government. On January 6 of this year, the Chinese
Catholic Patriotic Association ordained five bishops without Vatican
approval.
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\5\ Rev. Drew Christiansen, S. J. ``Policy Responses to the Denial
and Restriction of Religious Liberty in the People's Republic of
China,'' testimony before the USCIRF Hearing on Religious Freedom in
China, March 16, 2000, Los Angeles, California.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In recent months authorities have detained Catholic clergy loyal to
the Vatican in an apparent attempt to force their allegiance to the
official church. One, the young Father Weiping, was detained in May of
1999 while performing mass. He was found dead on a Beijing Street
shortly after being released from detention.\6\ The Vatican reports
that five churches built without authorization had been razed. Thirteen
were destroyed in the Fuzhou diocese in Fujian.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ State Department Annual Report, International Religious
Freedom, 1999.
\7\ State Department Annual Report, International Religious
Freedom, 1999.
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4. Repression in Xinjiang and Tibet
Some of the most egregious violations of religious freedom occur in
Tibet and Xinjiang, where ethnic, political, and economic factors
complicate the relationship between the atheist state and large
communities of Tibetan Buddhists and Uighur Muslims. In these areas
Chinese controls on information are especially tight.
In these sensitive regions, authorities, seeking to eliminate ``a
very small number'' of separatist activists, infiltrate and attempt to
dominate religious institutions which they fear may breed opposition to
continued Chinese control. Religious freedoms are curtailed and in
response, resistance intensifies.
Amnesty International reports that authorities in the Xinjinag
Uighur Autonomous Region have closed mosques and Koranic schools,
halted the construction of unauthorized mosques, prohibited the use of
Arabic script, more tightly controlled Islamic clergy, and required
Muslims who are Party members or who work in government offices to
abandon the practice of Islam or lose their positions. The Chinese
press reported that ``rampant activities by splittists'' justified the
closure of 10 unauthorized mosques, and the arrest of mullahs who it
said had preached ``illegally'' outside their mosques. It further
related that public security personnel raided 56 mosques.
While allowing some Muslims to make a religious journey to Mecca,
authorities deny that experience to hundreds of Uighurs desiring to do
so.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Uighur witness testimony before the USCIRF Hearing on Religious
Freedom in China, March 16, 2000, Los Angeles, California.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In Tibet, where Chinese authorities fear growing Tibetan
nationalism and the political and organizational power of the
monasteries, religious institutions are likewise tightly controlled.
In an action denounced by the Dalai Lama, authorities of the Tibet
Autonomous Region and the RAB in Beijing approved the selection of a
boy as the reincarnation of the sixth Reting Lama. This is the latest
in a campaign to control the future leadership of Tibetan Buddhism. In
1995, the Dalai Lama identified a young boy, Gendun Choekyi Nyima, as
the reincarnate Panchen Lama. The Chinese immediately denounced the
Dalai Lama's choice, detained the boy and his family, and pushed the
acceptance of their choice, Gyaltsen Norbu. Chinese authorities
continue to hold the Panchen Lama at an undisclosed location and refuse
all requests to visit him put forward by official and unofficial
foreign delegations.
Each of Tibet's major monasteries is overseen by a ``Democratic
Management Committee,'' members of which are vetted by authorities for
their political reliability. The Committee regulates religious affairs,
finances (90% of which come from private donations), security, and
training. It enforces limits on the number of monks and nuns within
monasteries and conducts invasive ``patriotic'' education campaigns
that force monks and nuns to denounce the Dalai Lama and accept the
Chinese-selected Panchen Lama.
Authorities limit the religious festivals Tibetans are allowed to
observe, the rituals monks are allowed to perform, and the courses of
study monasteries are allowed to teach. In 1995, Chinese authorities
asserted that ``a sufficient number of monasteries, monks and nuns now
exist to satisfy the daily religious needs of the masses.'' Over 1,000
monks and nuns were expelled from their monasteries in 1999, and over
11,000 have been expelled since 1996. The Party Secretariat of the
Lhasa City Administration announced that it would not allow more
monasteries to be built and that monasteries constructed without
permission would be destroyed. Chinese cadres have taken up residence
in monasteries to oversee political education campaigns.
5. Increase in the number of sects branded ``heretical cults'' and
banned
Article 300 of the Criminal Law, as amended in 1997, and as
interpreted by the People's Supreme Court and the National People's
Congress, stipulates that central authorities have the right to
delegitimize any belief system they deem to be superstitious or a so-
called ``evil religious organization.'' Leaders of these so-called
cults are subject to ``resolute punishment.'' In the absence of a clear
definition of terms, Chinese authorities have wide latitude for using
the designation ``cult.'' Even private religious practice is forbidden
to members of groups declared by Chinese authorities to be ``evil
cults.'' The law has been used against numerous evangelical Protestant
groups including the China Evangelistic Fellowship in Henan
province.\9\ In November of 1999, six leaders of these groups in Henan
were charged with leading cults and sentenced to re-education through
labor.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ The conditions have been reported in detail by the State
Department, by human rights organizations, and in the Staff Memorandum
For The Chairman that accompanies the Commission's May 1 Report (the
latter two documents may be found on the Commission's Web site,
www.uscirf.gov).
\10\ Associated Press, ``Sect Followers Said Tried in Secret,''
December 30, 1999.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Falun Gong, a syncretic meditation and martial arts organization
whose spiritual teachings draw on Taoist and Buddhist belief systems,
has been the target of a virulent anti cult campaign. On April 25,
1999, 10,000 practitioners staged a peaceful demonstration outside the
residential compound for top Party officials in central Beijing. The
gathering was prompted by reports of police violence against fellow
practitioners in Tianjin and by an official ban on publishing Falun
Gong materials. In the months that followed, the group was declared an
``evil cult'' and by year's end the government acknowledged having
detained more than 35,000 adherents. Some detainees were tortured. Zhao
Jinhua was reportedly beaten and killed while in Shandong jail.\11\
Others have been held in mental institutions for ``re-education.'' \12\
In closed trials Falun Gong leaders received prison sentences of 6 to
18 years. Many of those who have told their stories to outside media
have been severely punished.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ AP 12/13/1999.
\12\ Lu Siqing, Director of the Information Center for Human Rights
and Democratic Movements, Hong Kong, Testimony before the USCIRF, Los
Angeles, California, March 16, 2000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The law has been used against a number of other religious groups.
In January of this year, Zhong Gong, a meditation and exercise sect
claiming 20 million practitioners, was added to the list. Also banned
are a sect with Buddhist origins, and Yi Guan Dao.
RECOMMENDATIONS
When Congress established this Commission it charged us with
monitoring religious freedom and making policy recommendations to the
legislative and executive branches of government that would promote
religious liberty. After careful consideration the nine Commissioners
unanimously decided upon the following recommendations as we move
forward in our relationship with the PRC.
First, given the deterioration of religious freedom in China over
the past year, the Commission unanimously recommends that Congress
grant permanent normal trade status to China only after China makes
substantial improvements in respect for freedom of religion as measured
by the following standards:
a. China agrees to establish high-level and ongoing dialogue
with the U.S. government on religious freedom matters;
b. China agrees to ratify the International Covenant On Civil
and Political Rights, which it signed in 1997;
c. China agrees to permit unhindered access to religious
prisoners by the Commission;
d. China discloses the condition and whereabouts of persons
imprisoned for reasons of religion or belief;
e. China releases from prison all persons incarcerated for
religious reasons.
Second, the Commission recommends that before granting PNTR to
China the U.S. Congress should:
a. Announce that it will hold annual hearings on human rights
in China, and
b. Invite the Dalai Lama to address a joint session of
Congress.
Third, as part of a sustained effort to improve religious freedom
in the People's Republic of China, the Commission further recommends
that until religious freedom significantly improves in China, the U.S.
government should:
a. Initiate a resolution to censure China at the annual
meeting of the UN Commission of Human Rights. This effort
should be led by the personal efforts of the President of the
United States;
b. Lead a multilateral campaign to seek the release of
Chinese religious leaders imprisoned or under house arrest;
c. Raise the profile of conditions in Xinjiang for Uighur
Muslims by addressing their religious-freedom and human rights
concerns in bilateral talks, by increasing the number of
educational exchange opportunities available to Uighurs, and by
increasing radio broadcasts in the Uighur language into
Xinjiang; and
d. Use its diplomatic influence with other governments to
ensure that China is not selected as a site for the
International Olympic Games.
I would like to take just a minute to elaborate on the Commission's
reasons for taking the position we have on PNTR. The Commission's nine
voting members come from both political parties and a diversity of
religions, and a number of them strongly support free trade. Yet the
Commissioners were unanimous in their report in asking that the
Congress not grant PNTR to China until substantial improvements are
made to advance religious freedom. The Commission's reasoning is stated
in our Report:
The Commission believes that in many countries, including
some of China's neighbors, free trade has been the basis for
rapid economic growth, which in turn has been central to the
development of a more open society and political system. This
belief has been a major factor for the annual decision, by
presidents and congressional majorities of both parties, to
grant ``most favored nation'' (MFN) trade relations with China
each year over the past two decades. Moreover, a grant of PNTR
and Chinese membership in the World Trade Organization may, by
locking China into a network of international obligations, help
advance the rule of law there in the economic sector at first,
but then more broadly over time.
Nevertheless, given the sharp deterioration in freedom of
religion in China during the last year, the Commission believes
that an unconditional grant of PNTR at this moment may be taken
as a signal of American indifference to religious freedom. The
government of China attaches great symbolic importance to steps
such as the grant of PNTR, and presents them to the Chinese
people as proof of international acceptance and approval. A
grant of PNTR at this juncture could be seen by Chinese people
struggling for religious freedom as an abandonment of their
cause at a moment of great difficulty. The Commission therefore
believes that Congress should not approve PNTR for China until
China makes substantial improvements in respect for religious
freedom.
The Commission does not suggest all the actions outlined above as
preconditions for PNTR, but as standards to measure progress. We did
not propose a strict formula, but Congress must weigh the evidence and
decide how much must be done before PNTR is granted.
The Commission concluded that these are significant yet ``do-able''
requests to make of China and of our own government. The Chinese
government could announce tomorrow that it intends to ratify the ICCPR,
commence high-level talks on religious freedom, invite the Commission
to visit incarcerated religious leaders, and release all elderly, ill
and under-age religious prisoners. If it did so, this Congress might
well conclude that such intentions demonstrated sufficient improvement
in respect for religious freedom to proceed with granting of PNTR.
Indeed, the vote on PNTR could take place as scheduled next week.
Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the members of the U.S. Commission on
International Religious Freedom, thank you for the privilege of
appearing before this Committee today.
Senator Brownback. Thank you, Mr. Abrams. I want to inquire
a little bit about what Rabbi Saperstein said about visas not
being granted for travel to China. So, I want to inquire some
further on that in a little bit.
Dr. Kazamzadeh. I hope I am saying that somewhere close to
right.
STATEMENT OF DR. FIRUZ KAZEMZADEH, MEMBER, U.S. COMMISSION ON
INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM; AND SECRETARY FOR EXTERNAL
AFFAIRS, NATIONAL SPIRITUAL ASSEMBLY OF THE BAHA'IS OF THE
UNITED STATES, ALTA LOMA, CA
Dr. Kazemzadeh. It is quite close, sir.
Senator Brownback. Very good. Thank you. Welcome. Glad to
have you here.
Dr. Kazemzadeh. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
On the 1st of May, the Commission presented to the Congress
its report that included a brief analysis of the state of
religious freedom in Russia and 10 recommendations. The
Commission noted that today Russia enjoys an incomparably
greater degree of religious freedom than she did under the
Soviet regime. The Russian Government, the reports says, ``has
taken positive steps to promote religious freedom.'' The
constitution of the Russian Federation guarantees freedom of
religion within a secular state and the Federal Government has
by and large adhered to these constitutional guarantees.
Regrettably, in 1997 the Duma passed the so-called Religion
Law that created a hierarchy of religious organizations and
effectively restricted the rights, powers, and privileges of
smaller, newer, and foreign religious communities. It also
established an onerous and intrusive registration process and
other mechanisms of state interference with the activities of
religious organizations.
On March 26, President Putin signed the little noticed
amendment to the 1997 Religion Law extending by 1 year the
deadline for the registration of religious organizations that
had not been able to register by December 31, 1999. This
positive measure was accompanied, however, by a negative one,
requiring that unregistered groups be liquidated after December
31, 2000. In addition, the Commission reports, ``in January
2000, President Putin signed an important directive specifying
that one of the measures necessary to protect Russian national
security is a `state policy to maintain the population's
spiritual and moral welfare and counter the adverse impact of
foreign religious organizations and missionaries.' ''
It is too early to say how this legislative amendment and
directive will be interpreted by regional and local authorities
who have been the most zealous in denying registration,
harassing, and liquidating unregistered religious communities,
including Roman Catholics, Mormons, Baptists, Seventh-Day-
Adventists, Jehovah's Witnesses, and even Orthodox Old
Believers. The liquidation of unregistered religious
communities after December 31 of this year would have
particularly grievous consequences for hundreds, if not
thousands, of small religious groups. The Commission has
therefore recommended that the U.S. Government continue, as a
major diplomatic priority, to make efforts to ensure that
legitimate religious groups that have not registered by January
1, 2001 are not liquidated.
Regional and local authorities have not only interfered in
practice with the religious freedoms of unregistered groups.
One-third of Russia's constituent regions have enacted
regulations that are plainly unconstitutional. Central
authorities have, however, in most cases failed to enforce
those aspects of Federal law that protect religious freedom
and, in many instances, have themselves been guilty of
violating both national and international human rights
standards.
In its report, the Commission observed that in Russia the
inadequacies of law are exacerbated by three widely shared
traditional attitudes.
First, many hold prejudices against ethnic and religious
minorities, including Muslims, Jews, and various Christian
groups other than the Russian Orthodox Church.
Second, among many Russians, longstanding nationalistic
resentment against foreign influences affects the treatment of
religious groups that are perceived to have strong foreign
ties, such as Roman Catholics, Protestants, and some Muslim
groups.
Third, is the related belief among some of the members of
the Russian Orthodox Church and the traditional religions of
Russia that they should be accorded special privileges and
protection in contrast to the smaller, newer, and foreign
religious groups.
The Commission, having had staff and offices for only 4
months, had neither time nor opportunity to investigate in
greater detail the religious situation in the Russian
Federation, a formidable task considering that country's size,
the heterogeneity of its population, and the number of
religious groups active within it. Given the persistent threat
to religious freedom in Russia and the recurring instances of
the violation of that freedom, particularly in regions loosely
supervised by the Federal Government, the Commission will
monitor and recommend that the U.S. Government continue to
monitor conditions of religious freedom in Russia.
The Commission is particularly concerned about local and
regional regulations enacted in violation of the Russian
constitution. Such regulations provide provincial authorities
with a convenient cover, giving the appearance of legitimacy to
unconstitutional acts. Instances of official harassment have
been reported from a number of localities in central Russia, in
Tatarstan, Siberia, and elsewhere.
Religious, cultural, and ethnic or racial prejudices
unfortunately exist in all societies. Russia has had a long
history of virulent anti-Semitism that has varied in intensity
from place to place and from time to time. Although Judaism has
been accorded the status of a traditional religion, popular
anti-Semitism has not disappeared and should be carefully
watched. Islam is another faith accorded the status of
traditional religion in Russia. Yet anti-Muslim feelings are
quite widespread there. The ferocity of the war in Chechnya has
undoubtedly been exacerbated by the religious element.
The Commission has noted that: ``While the conflict in the
Caucasus is primarily political and ethnic in nature, religion
appears to play a role on both sides of the conflict. Islam
forms the basis of Caucasian Muslim identity, and it is a
significant element of resistance to dominance by Moscow.
Russian authorities, meanwhile, have played upon deep-seated
and historic prejudices against Muslims to rally domestic
support for the war.''
The Commission has recommended that the State Department
make the humanitarian and human rights crisis in Chechnya a
high priority issue in its bilateral relations with Russia and
that Congress continue to include the Smith amendment in its
appropriations bills until it becomes clear that the Putin
administration will ensure that Russian laws do not
discriminate on the basis of religion.
Ultimately, religious freedom must be assured to the
peoples of the Russian Federation by its own citizens through
their own government. Tolerance, the acceptance of religious
diversity, freedom from ethnic and religious prejudice are not
easily achieved in any society, let alone in a society that has
freshly emerged from decades of officially sponsored
intolerance. Fortunately, Russian culture is not devoid of such
qualities. One has only to mention the names of Herzen,
Tolstoy, Solovyev, Chekhov, or Berdyaev to make the point.
The Commission has recommended, therefore, that: ``the U.S.
Government should actively promote religious tolerance in
Russia by providing support to willing non-governmental
organizations, journalists, and academic institutions engaged
in programs aimed at preventing intolerance and discrimination
and supporting international standards on freedom of religion
and belief. The U.S. Government should also promote religious
tolerance through appropriate activities such as exhibits,
conferences, and media and Internet broadcasting, particularly
in regions where numerous manifestations of intolerance have
occurred.''
Unfortunately, religious intolerance is not confined to
government or secular nationalist groups. Within Russia's
traditional religious communities that have lived for decades,
or even centuries, in relative isolation, there is much
suspicion and at times open antagonism toward the so-called
foreign religious and newer movements. A number of leaders of
major religious communities have supported or even promoted the
Religion Law of 1997, invoking the power or the state to
protect themselves from the intrusion of unfamiliar ideas.
To increase mutual understanding through personal contacts,
the Commission has recommended that: ``the U.S. Government
should promote contacts with leaders of the Russian Orthodox
Church and members of other religious communities who may
benefit from traveling to the United States and meeting with
American political and religious leaders.''
In spite of many defects, the Russian legal system provides
many opportunities to defend human rights and religious
freedom. In many instances, the courts have put a liberal
interpretation on the Religion Law of 1997 and have protected
individual believers and religious communities. Recognizing the
importance of effective legal advocacy, the Commission has
recommended that the U.S. Government support ``the activities
of Russian public interest organizations that defend the right
of freedom of religion or belief in Russian courts.''
Russia is a signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the various covenants that establish freedom of
religion or belief as a universal standard. It is therefore
appropriate for the United Nations Commission on Human Rights
to monitor the status of religious freedom in that country. Yet
the U.N.'s Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance stated
in his 2000 report to the UNCHR that his request for a site
visit has not been answered. The Commission, therefore, has
recommended that the U.S. Government ``encourage the Government
of Russia to agree to the request of the U.N. Special
Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance to visit Russia.''
The Commission believes that the implementation of these
recommendations would have a positive effect on religious
freedom in Russia.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Kazemzadeh follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Firuz Kazemzadeh
Mr. Chairman, honorable Members of the Committee:
My name is Firuz Kazemzadeh. I am Professor Emeritus of Russian
History at Yale University and a member of the United States Commission
on International Religious Freedom.
On the first of May the Commission presented to the Congress its
Report that included a brief analysis of the state of religious freedom
in Russia, and several recommendations. The Commission noted that today
Russia enjoys an incomparably greater degree of religious freedom than
she did under the Soviet regime. The Russian government, the Report
says, ``has taken some positive steps to promote religious freedom.''
The Constitution of the Russian Federation guarantees freedom of
religion within a secular state, and the federal government has by and
large adhered to these constitutional guarantees.
Regrettably, in 1997, the Duma passed the so-called Religion Law
that ``creates a hierarchy of religious organizations and effectively
restricts the rights, powers and privileges of smaller, newer, and
foreign religious communities. It also establishes an onerous and
intrusive registration process and other mechanism of state
interference with the activities of religious organizations.''
On March 26 President Putin signed the little noticed amendment to
the 1997 Religion Law, extending by one year the deadline for the
registration of religious organizations that had not been able to
register by December 31, 1999. This positive measure was accompanied,
however, by a negative one, requiring that unregistered groups be
``liquidated'' after December 31, 2000. ``In addition,'' the Commission
reports, ``in January 2000, President Putin signed an important
directive specifying that one of the measures necessary to protect
Russian national security is a `state policy to maintain the
population's spiritual and moral welfare and counter the adverse impact
of foreign religious organizations and missionaries.' ''
It is too early to say how this directive will be interpreted by
regional and local authorities who have been the most zealous in
denying registration, harassing, and liquidating unregistered religious
communities including Roman Catholics, Mormons, Baptists, Seventh-day-
Adventists, Jehovah's Witnesses, and even Orthodox Old Believers. The
liquidation of unregistered religious communities after December 31 of
this year would have particularly grievous consequences for hundreds if
not thousands of small religious groups. The Commission has therefore
recommended that the United States government continue, as a major
diplomatic priority, to make efforts to insure that legitimate
religious groups that have not registered by January 1, 2001 are not
liquidated.
Regional and local authorities have not only interfered in practice
with the religious freedoms of unregistered groups. One-third of
Russia's constituent regions have enacted regulations that are plainly
unconstitutional. Central authorities, however, have in most cases
failed to enforce federal law and in many instances have themselves
been guilty of violating both national and international human rights
standards.
In its Report the Commission observed that in Russia the
inadequacies of law are exacerbated by three widely shared traditional
attitudes:
First, many hold prejudices against ethnic and religious
minorities, including
. . . Muslims, Jews, and various Christian groups other than the
Russian Orthodox Church. Second, among many Russians, longstanding
nationalistic resentment against ``foreign influences'' affects the
treatment of religious groups that are perceived to have strong foreign
ties (such as Roman Catholics, Protestants, and some Muslim groups).
Third is the related belief among some that the Russian Orthodox Church
or the ``traditional'' religions of Russia should be accorded special
privileges and protection in contrast to smaller, newer, and
``foreign'' religious groups.
The Commission, having been in existence less than a year, had
neither time nor opportunity to investigate in greater detail the
religious situation in the Russian Federation, a formidable task
considering that country's size, the heterogeneity of its population,
and the number of religious groups active within it. Given the
persistent threat to religious freedom in Russia and the recurring
instances of violation of that freedom, particularly in regions loosely
supervised by the federal government, the Commission will monitor, and
recommends that the United States government continue to monitor
conditions of religious freedom in Russia.
The Commission is particularly concerned about local and regional
regulations enacted in violation of the Russian Constitution. Such
regulations provide provincial authorities with a convenient cover,
giving the appearance of legitimacy to unconstitutional acts. Instances
of official harassment have reported from a number of localities in
central Russia, in Tatarstan, Siberia, and elsewhere. This has prompted
the Commission to recommend that the United States government ``urge
the Russian government to monitor the actions of regional and local
officials that interfere with the right to freedom of religion or
belief and to take steps to bring local laws and regulations on
religious activities into conformity with the Russian Constitution and
the international human rights standards.''
Religious, cultural, and ethnic or racial prejudices unfortunately
exist in all societies, Russia has had a long history of virulent anti-
Semitism that has varied in intensity from place to place and from time
to time. Although Judaism has been accorded the status of a
``traditional religion,'' popular anti-Semitism has not disappeared and
should be carefully watched. Islam is another faith accorded the status
of ``traditional religion'' in Russia. Yet anti-Muslim feelings are
quite widespread there. The ferocity of the war in Chechnya has
undoubtedly been exacerbated by the religious element. The Commission
has noted that:
While the conflict in the Caucasus is primarily political and
ethnic in nature, religion appears to play a role on both sides
of the conflict. Islam forms the basis of Caucasian Muslim
identity, and it is a significant element of resistance to
domination by Moscow. Russian authorities, meanwhile, have
played upon deep-seated and historic prejudices against Muslims
to rally domestic support for the war, which in turn has fueled
anti-Muslim attitudes in Russia by making Islam and Muslims
synonymous with terrorism and extremism. These actions have
apparently had a direct impact on the religious freedom of
Muslims who are independent of the officially sanctioned Muslim
organizations.
The Commission has recommended that the State Department make the
humanitarian and human rights crisis in Chechnya a high priority issue
in its bilateral relations with Russia and that Congress continue to
include the ``Smith Amendment'' in its appropriations bills.
Ultimately religious freedom must be assured to the peoples of the
Russian Federation by its own citizens through their own government.
Tolerance, the acceptance of religious diversity, freedom from ethnic
and religious prejudice are not easily achieved in any society, let
alone in a society that has freshly emerged from decades of officially
sponsored intolerance. Fortunately Russian culture is not devoid of
such qualities. One has only to mention the names of Herzen, Tolstoy,
Solovyev, Chekhov, or Berdyaev to make the point. The Commission has
recommended that:
The United States government should actively promote
religious tolerance in Russia by providing support to willing
non-governmental organizations, journalists, and academic
institutions engaged in programs aimed at preventing
intolerance and discrimination and supporting international
standards on freedom of religion or belief. The United States
government should also promote religious tolerance through
appropriate activities such as exhibits, conferences, and media
and Internet broadcasting, particularly in regions where
numerous manifestations of intolerance have occurred.
Unfortunately religious intolerance is not confined to the
government or secular nationalist groups. Within Russia's traditional
religious communities, that have lived for decades or even centuries in
relative isolation, there is much suspicion of and at times open
antagonism toward so called foreign religions and newer movements. A
number of leaders of major religious communities have supported, or
even promoted, the Religion Law of 1997, invoking the power of the
state to protect themselves from the intrusion of unfamiliar ideas. To
increase mutual understanding through personal contacts and dialogue,
the Commission has recommended that:
The United States government should promote contacts with
leaders of the Russian Orthodox Church and members of other
religious communities in Russia who may benefit from traveling
to the United States and meeting with American political and
religious leaders. The U.S. government also should encourage
appropriate American religious leaders and seminarians in
traveling to Russia to discuss issues of tolerance and
religious freedom.
In spite of its many defects the Russian legal system provides many
opportunities to defend human rights and religious freedom. In many
instances the courts have put a liberal interpretation on the Religion
Law of 1997 and have protected individual believers and religious
communities from overzealous officials. Recognizing the importance of
effective legal advocacy for the protection of religious freedom in
Russia, the Commission has recommended that the United States
government support ``the activities of Russian public interest
organizations that defend the right to freedom of religion or belief in
Russian courts. The U.S. government should promote exchanges between
Russian judges, lawyers, and legal rights organizations with their
counterparts in the United States.''
Russia is a signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and the various covenants that establish freedom of religion or belief
as a universal standard. It is therefore appropriate for the United
Nations Commission on Human Rights to monitor the status of religious
freedom in that country. Yet the UN's Special Rapporteur for Religious
Intolerance stated in his 2000 report to the UNCHR that his request for
a site visit has not been answered. The Commission therefore has
recommended that the U.S. government ``encourage the government of
Russia to agree to the request of the UN Special Rapporteur on
Religious Intolerance to visit Russia.''
The Commission believes that the implementation of these
recommendations would have a positive effect on religious freedom in
the Russian Federation.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee.
Senator Brownback. Thank you very much. Thank you for the
testimony and your thoughts. I look forward to some questions.
Ms. Nina Shea, thank you very much for joining us.
STATEMENT OF NINA SHEA, MEMBER, U.S. COMMISSION ON
INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM; AND DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, FREEDOM HOUSE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Shea. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know you have
profoundly reflected on what to do about Sudan, having risked
your life to go there yourself, of course, your staff member,
Sharon Payt, having survived a bombing raid personally in the
Nuba Mountains last year. So, I am honored and humbled to be
here, and I thank you very much for inviting me on behalf of
the Commission to testify about Sudan.
Mr. Chairman, the U.S. Commission on International
Religious Freedom decided to focus on Sudan because we have
found that the Government of Sudan is the world's most violent
abuser of the right to freedom of religion and belief. The
civil war has raged in Sudan for 17 years, a war that ignited
when the regime in Khartoum attempted to impose Shari'a, or
Islamic law, on the non-Muslim south, and in which religion
continues to be a major factor.
Last January Commissioner Elliott Abrams traveled to Sudan
and interviewed a church leader who concluded that the
government would like to remove the church from Sudan, to
``blow out the candle,'' as he put it so poignantly. Moreover,
``this persecution is intensifying, making even worse the
security problems the church faces from the war itself,'' he
said. ``Islam is the crux,'' he said. The government wants all
the resources in its hands and wants to use them to create a
fully Islamic country.
As it prosecutes its side of the war, the Government of
Sudan is carrying out genocidal practices against its religious
and ethnic minorities. Such practices include aerial
bombardment, scorched earth campaigns, massacre, slavery--and
recently the Congressional Black Caucus gave estimates that
between 20,000 and 100,000 women and children are enslaved in
Sudan--forcible conversion and its most lethal tactic, what
Senator Frist has termed ``calculated starvation,'' which in
1998 alone brought 2.6 million to the brink of starvation and
100,000 did die. This calculated starvation is achieved by
using brutal means to drive entire communities off their land.
That is creating vast numbers of internal refugees who are
dependent on humanitarian relief for survival, while at the
same time barring international relief flights from delivering
aid. Estimated at 4.5 million, they number the largest
internally displaced population in the world. In fact, they
amount to, according to Mr. Holbrooke's figures, about a
quarter of the world's total of internal refugees.
As a direct result of the conflict, some 2 million persons
have been killed, mostly Christians and followers of
traditional beliefs in south and central Sudan. This is more
than Bosnia, Kosovo, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone combined.
That the Government of Sudan has not yet prevailed in the
war may be due to the fact that until last year it has been
financially strapped and in default to the IMF and other
international lenders. Last August, oil developed in south
Sudan by foreign companies in a joint venture partnership with
the Khartoum government came on stream and has begun to provide
windfall profits for the regime, as well as a critical source
of new international respectability. As Secretary of State
Albright acknowledged, the proceeds from the oil revenues will
be use to support the Sudanese military actions and human
tragedy in Sudan is likely to become worse.
There is ample evidence that this is already happening.
Since February, a Catholic primary school in the Nuba Mountains
has been bombed, Samaritan's Purse hospital near Juba, operated
by the family of Rev. Billy Graham, has been bombed five times,
a clinic at the Voice of the Martyrs, a clinic of Irish
Concerns, and other relief centers, churches and civilian
targets in south Sudan have all been bombed by the government
in one of the most relentless bombing raids of the war.
A few days after the Nuba Catholic school was bombed, its
founder, Bishop Macram Gassis, testified before the Commission.
I wish to share his words, and I quote. ``On February 7th and
8th, two Russian-built Antinov bombers targeted the heavily
populated areas around Kuada. The Catholic Church has set up
the only well-established school in the area with more than 360
students. Fourteen of these students were killed outright in
the raid and the number of wounded is yet to be fully
determined.'' Incidentally, the total killed there was 19 in
the end.
The Bishop said, ``Truly this is a slaughter of the
innocent and an unbridled attempt to destroy the Nubas' hope
and indeed their future by destroying their children. I have
tried time and again to tell the world that the National
Islamic Front regime in Khartoum has been and is conducting a
campaign of genocide aimed at exterminating the Christian,
African, and non-Arab populations of Sudan in order to
establish a uniform Arab Islamic fundamentalist free state in
the heart of Africa. This terrible heart-breaking incident is
yet another piece of evidence. If more were still needed, that
the war in Sudan is a religious--and I underline it is
religious--and ethnic war launched by Khartoum and aimed at the
destruction of my people. We cannot take back the 14 martyred
children under the trees in Kuada. There are many Rachels today
in the Nuba weeping for the children. What we can do is call
upon the international community to refuse to stand by idly
while the African and Christian peoples of the Sudan are
exterminated.''
Mr. Chairman, in addition to the conflict which the
Sudanese Government declares to be a jihad against both non-
Muslims and dissident Muslims, the regime is responsible for
other forms of religious persecution throughout the country.
These concern the Commission as well. Muslims who do not
subscribe to the government's extremist interpretation of Islam
are persecuted. They are forced to conform in their dress,
their prayers, their practices, and in their sermons to the
regime's strict interpretation of Islam. Other Muslims are
perceived as disloyal to the regime and thus are declared
apostate and targeted for death.
Christian schools were nationalized in 1992. Christian
churches and prayer centers continue to be demolished in the
north, and the government has not granted permission to build
or repair a church in the area controlled in over 30 years. The
regime suppresses Christian and African traditional religions
in a variety of ways.
The scope of the humanitarian tragedy of Sudan dwarfs all
those of other recent conflicts, and yet Sudan receives far
less international attention. Neither the international
community nor the United States has any plan to address the
mounting tragedy in Sudan. Although the United States has
imposed against Sudan trade and financial sanctions for
American companies and provides massive amounts of humanitarian
relief, these steps do not respond to the underlying
catastrophe in Sudan. Nor does current policy address the
question of whether the Sudanese Government's actions
constitute not only war crimes and crimes against humanity, but
actually amount to genocide.
Mr. Chairman, in its report, the Commission proposes a
comprehensive set of policy options to significantly strengthen
the United States' response to the crisis in Sudan. The
Commission's recommendations provide both disincentives and
incentives for the Sudanese Government to comport with
international standards of religious freedom and other basic
human rights. These include bringing world moral opprobrium to
bear upon the genocidal regime by raising the profile of the
atrocities in Sudan, by giving them greater priority, and
determining whether it is a genocide. They also include
providing nonlethal aid to opposition groups in order to
strengthen the defenses of the vulnerable civilian populations,
once certain conditions are met.
In addition, the Commission recommends increasing economic
pressure on the regime, especially by restricting foreign
companies involved in Khartoum's strategic oil industry from
raising money in U.S. capital markets. The Commission calls for
greater transparency and disclosure for foreign companies
engaged in Sudan's oil sector that are seeking to obtain
capital in the U.S. markets.
Mr. Chairman, you and other Members of Congress asked the
SEC for a 90-day cooling down period to review the filing of
PetroChina, before it had its IPO, in order to examine the
implications of it entering the market. But we are aware that
the SEC rejected that request. We believe that more
clarification and disclosure is needed about whether the
proceeds from that IPO will find their way to Sudan.
And also because of the extremely egregious, in fact
genocidal, nature of the religious persecution in Sudan, the
Commission urges that access to U.S. stock and bond markets be
restricted in this specific case, and that is to those foreign
companies engaged in business with a designated sanction entity
in Sudan, which is itself sanctioned. What I am talking about
is the Greater Nile Oil Project.
In undeveloped countries, such as Sudan, is the sanctioning
of investment rather than trade that will bring real pressure
upon the regime. Last year overall foreign activity in the U.S.
securities markets was twice the level of 1995, and we are
entering a new era in which Sudan is poised to obtain more
resources from American investors than from the IMF.
I would like to at this point acknowledge the tremendous
contribution of Roger Robinson of the Casey Institute who is
sitting behind me today and who has testified before the
Commission, for Mr. Robinson really pioneered this area by
drawing attention to the need for greater transparency in U.S.
capital markets.
Because the regime continues its genocidal practices, the
Commission's recommendations also set forth measures to
ameliorate the agony of the targeted populations in south and
central Sudan. These include ensuring food aid reaches starving
communities by channeling more aid outside the U.N. system,
supporting through peaceful means a military no-fly zone, and
strengthening an infrastructure to sustain civilian life.
The Commission's recommendations, for the most part, are
based on the same principles that proved so effective in ending
apartheid in South Africa during the 1980's; that is,
identifying the Sudanese Government as a pariah state and
intensifying its economic isolation. None of the Commission's
recommendations call for the involvement of U.S. troops or U.N.
peacekeeping forces. They do not risk involving the United
States in a dangerous quagmire of financial and military
obligations. They do require American resolve and leadership.
In the half century since the ratification of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, the world community has rarely invoked it or applied
its definitions. Typically when it has been used, it has been
used years after the fact, after the killing has stopped and
the mass graves have been exhumed, as was the case in Cambodia,
or when it has helped to justify a decision to intervene
militarily, such as in Bosnia and Kosovo. These past
occurrences of genocide fill the pages of our newspapers to
this day, and they continue to haunt our policy leaders. The
Commission's recommendations are intended to help while lives
remain to be saved and to do so through peaceful means.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my testimony. The further
details of the Commission's recommendations are included in the
report itself and in my written testimony.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Shea follows:]
Prepared Statement of Nina Shea
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
On behalf of the U.S. Commission on International Religious
Freedom, on which I serve, I wish to thank the Committee for inviting
me to testify before you today about religious freedom in Sudan.
Mr. Chairman, the U.S. Commission on International Religious
Freedom decided to focus on Sudan because we have found that the
government of Sudan is the world's most violent abuser of the right to
freedom of religion and belief. As it prosecutes its side of a 17-year-
old civil war--a war that ignited when the regime in Khartoum attempted
to impose Sharia, or Islamic law, on the non-Muslim south and in which
religion continues to be a major factor--the government of Sudan is
carrying out genocidal practices against its religious and ethnic
minorities. Such practices include aerial bombardment, scorched earth
campaigns, massacres, slavery, forcible conversion, and its most lethal
tactic, what Senator Frist has termed ``calculated starvation.'' (The
latter is achieved by creating through brutal means vast numbers of
internally displaced persons--estimated at 4.5 million they number the
largest internal refugee population in the world--who are dependent on
humanitarian relief for survival, while barring international relief
flights from delivering aid.) As a direct result of the conflict, some
two million persons have been killed, mostly Christians and followers
of traditional beliefs in south and central Sudan.
That the government of Sudan has not yet prevailed in the war may
be due to the fact that, until last year, it has been financially
strapped, and in default to the IMF and other international lenders.
Last August, oil developed in south Sudan by foreign companies in a
joint venture partnership with the Khartoum government came on stream,
and has begun to provide windfall profits for the regime, as well as a
critical source of new international respectability. The proceeds from
the oil revenues will be used to support the Sudanese military's
actions, and the human tragedy in Sudan is likely to become worse.
There is ample evidence that this is already happening: since February,
a Catholic primary school in the Nuba mountains, Samaritan's Purse
hospital, near Juba, operated by the family of Rev. Billy Graham, a
clinic of Voice of the Martyrs, a clinic of Irish Concern, and other
relief centers, churches and civilian targets in south Sudan have been
bombed by the government in one of the most relentless bombing raids of
the war.
In addition to the conflict, which the Sudanese government declares
to be a jihad (against both non-Muslims and dissident Muslims), the
regime is responsible for other forms of religious persecution
throughout the country. These concern the Commission as well. Muslims
who do not subscribe to the government's extremist interpretation of
Islam are persecuted. Christian schools were nationalized in 1992.
Christian churches and prayer centers continue to be demolished, and
the government has not granted permission to build or repair a church
in over 30 years. The regime suppresses Christian and African
traditional religions in a variety of ways.
Neither the international community nor the United States has any
plan to address the mounting tragedy in Sudan. Although the United
States has imposed against Sudan trade and financial sanctions for
American companies, and provides massive amounts of humanitarian
relief, these steps do not respond to the underlying catastrophe in
Sudan. Nor does current policy address the question of whether the
Sudanese government's actions constitute not only war crimes and crimes
against humanity, but actually amount to genocide.
Mr. Chairman, distinguished Senators, in its report, the Commission
proposes a comprehensive set of policy options to significantly
strengthen the United States' response to the crises in Sudan. The
Commission's recommendations emphasize the need for an intensive
diplomatic effort over the next 12 months to stop genocidal actions and
human rights abuses, providing both disincentives and incentives for
the Sudanese government to comply with international standards of
religious freedom and other basic human rights. These include bringing
world moral opprobrium to bear upon the genocidal regime and providing
non-lethal aid to opposition groups in order to strengthen the defenses
of the vulnerable civilian populations.
In addition, the Commission recommends increasing economic pressure
on the regime, especially by restricting foreign companies involved in
Khartoum's strategic oil industry from raising money in U.S. capital
markets. The Commission calls for greater transparency and disclosure
for foreign companies engaged in the development of the oil and gas
fields in Sudan that are seeking to obtain capital in U.S. markets, but
also, because of the extremely egregious, in fact genocidal, nature of
the religious persecution in Sudan, the Commission urges that access to
U.S. stock and bond markets be restricted in this specific case. In an
underdeveloped country such as Sudan, it is the sanctioning of
investment rather than trade that will bring real pressure upon the
regime. Last year, overall foreign activity in U.S. securities markets
was twice the level of 1995, and we are entering a new era in which
Sudan is poised to obtain more resources from American investors than
from the IMF.
Because the regime continues its genocidal practices, the
recommendations also set forth measures to ameliorate the agony of the
targeted population in south and central Sudan. These include ensuring
food aid reaches starving communities by channeling more aid outside
the United Nations' system, supporting through peaceful means a
``military no-fly zone,'' and strengthening an infrastructure to
sustain and stabilize civilian life.
The Commission's recommendations for the most part are based on the
same principle--intensifying the economic isolation of the Sudanese
government as a pariah state--that proved so effective in ending
apartheid in South Africa during the 1980s. None of the Commission's
recommendations calls for the involvement of U.S. troops or UN
peacekeeping forces. They do not risk involving the United States in a
dangerous quagmire of financial and military obligations. They do
require American resolve and leadership. In the half century since the
ratification of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, the world community has rarely invoked it or applied
its definitions. Typically, when it has been used, it has been years
after the fact, after the killing has stopped and the mass graves have
been exhumed, as was the case in Cambodia, or when it has helped to
justify a decision to intervene militarily, such as in Bosnia and
Kosovo. These past occurrences of genocide fill the pages of our
newspapers to this day and they continue to haunt our policy leaders.
The Commission's recommendations are intended to help in time to save
lives, and to do so through peaceful means.
In reaching these recommendations, the Commission made an on-site
visit to southern Sudan, conducted its own hearings and research, met
with religious and other non-governmental organizations (``NGOs''),
reviewed the public reports of the State Department and obtained
information from other agencies. The State Department has withheld
certain documents relating to the application of economic sanctions on
Sudan on grounds of executive privilege, and more importantly resisted
on the same grounds making available to the Commission embassy cables,
even though Commissioners and senior staff hold the requisite security
clearances.
A more detailed discussion of the Commission's concerns and
recommendations regarding Sudan follows:
1. THE HUMANITARIAN TRAGEDY
Since 1983, when the second phase of the civil war began, almost 2
million people have died in Sudan as a direct result of the war, most
of whom died from starvation.\1\ Another 4.5 million have been
displaced inside the country.\2\ This amounts to nearly a quarter of
all such internal refugees worldwide. There are 1.5 million internally
displaced persons (IDPs) in Khartoum alone. Many internal refugees live
in squalid conditions in what the government of Sudan euphemistically
calls ``peace camps.'' These refugee camps have only primitive
sanitation facilities, are largely dependent on food supplied by the
United Nations, and provide their inhabitants with virtually no means
of self-support. In some camps, the inmates are forced to convert to
Islam before they or their children can receive food and medicine.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ UN Special Rapporteur for Sudan, Situation of human rights in
the Sudan: Addendum, May 17, 1999, para. 42.
\2\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite the desperate needs of the Sudanese people, the government
of Sudan prohibits international relief missions from bringing food to
many who are seriously affected. Although Operation Lifeline Sudan
(OLS), the United Nations humanitarian relief mission for Sudan, sought
to provide food relief for the starving population, the government
continued its ``no flight'' ban on these famine areas and advised that
it would shoot down any UN or NGO plane attempting to make humanitarian
flights to the region. OLS and many NGOs agreed to the conditions
imposed by the government. Recently, the World Food Programme issued an
urgent notice that a serious famine is expected to strike Sudan this
year (2000) in the hard-hit regions of Bahr al-Ghazal and Darfur. The
government continues to veto food delivery flights in various areas.
There are several NGOs that step into the breach and deliver food and
other aid to areas covered by the flight ban imposed by the Sudanese
government. These ``non-OLS'' NGOs run the risk of being attacked and
shot down by the government's armed forces.
At the same time, attacks on civilians continue unabated. On
February 8, 2000, three weeks after the Sudanese government declared a
cease-fire, one of its planes dropped between three and six bombs on
the Comboni Primary School, a Catholic missionary school in the Nuba
Mountains. The bombs immediately killed 14 children and a 22-year-old
teacher. The survivors of the attack carried 18 wounded children, some
with limbs blown off, to a nearby German medical facility, one of many
such makeshift medical facilities operating in hazardous locations
throughout Sudan. A videotape recorded the aftermath of the
slaughter.\3\ Five of the wounded children later died of their
injuries.\4\ Bishop Macram (Max) Gassis, whose diocese includes the
Comboni School, testified before the U.S. Commission on International
Religious Freedom's hearing on Sudan just one week after the attack:
``Truly, this is a slaughter of innocents, an unbridled attempt to
destroy the Nubas' hope and indeed their future by destroying their
children.'' \5\ The Commission has documented several such cases during
the first quarter of this year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ When shown the videotape of the Comboni school bombing, a
Sudanese government official in Nairobi, Dirdieiy Ahmed, responded that
``the bombs landed where they were supposed to land. The bombs landed
into a military camp. The SPLA has pulled people into this military
camp.'' Godfrey Mutizwa, Reuters, ``Sudan school still in shock after
fatal air strike,'' February 11, 2000. Days later, Sudanese Foreign
Minister Mostaf Osman Ismail accused rebel forces of amassing troops in
the target area and stated, ``If there were civilian groups there, then
this was a regrettable matter and the Sudanese government hopes that
this will not happen again.'' Associated Press, ``Government says
rebels had troops in area where school was bombed,'' February 14, 2000.
A few weeks later, Justice Minister Mi Mohamed Osman Yassin, told U.S.
envoy Harry Johnston, who was then in Khartoum, that the bombing of the
school and the killing of the children was a ``mistake.'' Reuters,
``Report: Sudan tells U.S. Nuba Raid was `Mistake,' '' March 6, 2000.
But even as Mr. Yassin disavowed the motives behind the Comboni attack,
the Sudanese military was bombing the Samaritan's Purse hospital. Linda
Slobodian, ``No Excuses for Bombing,'' Calgary Sun, March 7, 2000. For
other examples of recent bombings of civilian targets, see Sudan
Appendix I below.
\4\ Gabriel Meyer, ``Sudan After the Bombs,'' National Catholic
Register, March 26-April 1, 2000. The Comboni Primary School is a
Catholic school, named after Daniel Comboni (1831-1881), the first
Roman Catholic Bishop of Khartoum.
\5\ USCIRF, Hearing on Sudan (Gassis testimony), 19. On February
15, 2000, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom held a
day-long hearing on Sudan. The hearing was designed to elicit evidence
for Commissioners on the situation in Sudan as it relates to religious
persecution. The Commission heard testimony from various witnesses,
including human rights activists, humanitarian relief workers,
religious leaders and others--Sudanese and non-Sudanese--with direct
knowledge of the situation in Sudan. Hearing testimonies, in addition
to numerous interviews with other experts by Commission staff, which
are included throughout this memorandum, have been instrumental in the
development of the Commission's findings and recommendations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
By any reasonable application of international law, the persons
responsible for these attacks on civilian populations and humanitarian
workers are guilty of ``committing crimes against humanity'' and should
be held accountable by all civilized governments of the world. The
Commission has concluded that by the nature of its actions, the
government of Sudan has engaged in genocidal activity, and includes
among its policy recommendations a request that the U.S. State
Department determine whether Khartoum has violated the 1948 Genocide
Convention.
The issue of slavery and slavery-like practices is a terrible
problem in Sudan. While the practices of inter-tribal raids, abductions
and ransoming have historical roots in Sudan, as the Secretary of State
stated before the UN Commission on Human Rights last March, the
government of Sudan itself is responsible for slavery. The most
flagrant example of the government's support for the practice of
slavery takes place along the 445 kilometer railroad track from
Babanusa (Western Kordofan) through Aweil to Wau (Bahr al-Ghazal), in
the form of raids on villages by government-backed murahalin
militiamen. The murahalin are mostly Arabic-speaking and Muslim Baggara
tribesman, who are traditional rivals of the indigenous Dinka tribes
that live near the railway in northern Bahr al-Ghazal. The government
arms (although it does not pay) the murahalin to protect the government
supply train which leads to the garrison town of Wau. Jemera Rone of
Human Rights Watch/Africa explains:
The muraheleen descend on civilian villages on horseback,
armed with the government's automatic weapons. The raids are
conducted where there is no SPLA presence; the objective is not
to kill enemy troops but to enslave ``enemy'' civilians and
weaken the Dinka, economically and socially. The Dinka are
outgunned and horseless; they cannot protect their women,
children, or cattle. Those who resist are killed.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ U.S. Congress, House Committee on International Relations,
Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights and
Subcommittee on Africa, Crises in Sudan and Northern Uganda, 105th
Cong., 2d Sess., 1998.
Thus, rather than limiting their work to protecting the train from
rebels, these armed militias terrorize and intimidate Dinka villagers.
The exact number of those abducted and enslaved is not known. The
Congressional Black Caucus estimates that tens of thousands of women
and children, mainly from Bahr al-Ghazal, have been abducted and raped,
remain in captivity, and are used as slaves.\7\ There are reports by
human rights groups that those enslaved are frequently abused and
mistreated, and that local law enforcement authorities regularly fail
to assist families of abducted individuals or to prosecute those
responsible.\8\ This led Human Rights Watch to conclude that ``the
government of Sudan is guilty not only of knowingly arming,
transporting and assisting the slave-raiding militia, it also is guilty
of not enforcing its own laws against kidnaping, assault, and forced
labor.'' \9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Congressional Record, 106th Cong., 146, H1753.
\8\ Human Rights Watch, Background Paper on Slavery and Slavery
Redemption in the Sudan, March 12, 1999.
\9\ Human Rights Watch, Background Paper on Slavery.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. persecution of christians and traditional believers
Since the NIF-backed coup of 1989, discrimination and serious
violations of religious freedom increased dramatically. Non-Muslims in
Sudan, both Christians and followers of traditional beliefs, in essence
have become second-class citizens subject to a wide range of
violations, including the misapplication of hudud, legal and social
discrimination, forcible conversions to Islam and religious coercion,
restrictions on religious institutions, harassment of religious
personnel, and persecution.
In spite of the government's rhetoric claiming that it respects the
rights of followers of the ``revealed religions,'' Christians of all
denominations and backgrounds in Sudan are subjected to repression,
discrimination, and persecution. These include restrictions on
operations of their churches and on church personnel, harassment, and
persecution. The government has not allowed the building or repair of
churches in Khartoum since 1969.\10\ According to Human Rights Watch,
between 30 and 50 Christian schools, centers and churches have been
demolished by government authorities in Khartoum state since 1989
ostensibly because they lacked the proper permits.\11\ According to
Bishop Macram Gassis, a total of 750 Christian schools have already
been confiscated by the government.\12\ The government rarely grants
building permits to Christian institutions, while permits for mosques
and other Islamic institutions are readily attainable.\13\ Numerous
churches and church properties have been bulldozed or confiscated on
the grounds of not fulfilling rigid requirements, or of any other
pretext supplied by Sudanese authorities. In June 1999, the government
served eviction notices on the Episcopal bishop and all other church
personnel of the Episcopal diocese in Omdurman, and ordered them to
vacate the headquarters, Afler ecumenical demonstrations, the
government returned the headquarters.\14\ Government authorities
confiscated the Catholic Club in Khartoum. In some areas, such as the
province of Damazin, Christian preaching has been outlawed
altogether.\15\ The government also intimidates and harasses Christian
leaders critical of the regime by charging them with both ordinary and
security-related crimes. For example, in 1998, a military court tried
Fr. Hilary Boma and Fr. Leno Sebit, chancellor of the Archdiocese of
Khartoum, along with 24 others for ``conspiracy and sabotage.'' The
government released Boma and Sebit in December 1999, following
international pressure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Boyle and Sheen, Freedom of Religion, 75; UN Special
Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance, Implementation of the Declaration,
November 11, 1996, para. 94.
\11\ Human Rights Watch, World Report 2000, 78.
\12\ USCIRF Hearing on Sudan (Gassis testimony), 21.
\13\ Human Rights Watch, World Report 2000, 78.
\14\ Abel Alier, interview with Commission staff, U.S. Commission
on International Religious Freedom, Washington, D.C., February 8, 2000.
\15\ USCIRF, Hearing on Sudan (Biro testimony), 29.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At the same time, Sudanese regimes, past and present, have made no
secret of the their designs to eventually integrate the southern
populations through a systematic program of Islamization. Differences
between the current military regime and previous governments, thus are
in degree rather than substance. The current government of Sudan, like
all those before it, does not recognize the legitimacy of traditional-
indigenous beliefs and views the south largely as a ``blank slate'' to
be converted to Islam.\16\ The regime has sought to eliminate
traditional-indigenous religions, particularly in the ``frontier
zones'' bordering the south such as the Nuba Mountains and the
Ingessana Hills.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ See Badal, ``Religion and Conflict,'' 263, 267.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There are reports of individuals being forcibly or otherwise
coercively converted to Islam. Forcible or coercive actions have
occurred among the Nuba of Southern Kordofan and the Gamk of the
Ingessana Hills in Southern Blue Nile, and elsewhere in the south such
as Bahr al-Ghazal. Much of this religious coercion takes place in so-
called ``peace villages''--a cynical euphemism employed by the
government officials to describe camps for the mostly non-Muslim
Sudanese who have been forcibly removed from their homes and villages
by government or government-backed militia forces. Nearly one-third of
the Nuba population have been forcibly removed from their homes and
villages and resettled in the peace villages.\17\ In addition to
government-backed militias, semi-official relief organizations are also
reported to be involved in religious coercion of non-Muslims. The Dawah
Islamiyya, for example, which operates in a number of refugee camps, is
reported to distribute food aid ``in a selective fashion, either to
Muslims or to those who agree to embrace Islam.'' \18\ Meanwhile, the
1991 Penal Code criminalized apostasy, and subsequent court rulings
have rendered it a capital offense. \19\ Conversion from another
religion to Islam, however, is not considered ``apostasy,'' but rather
is promoted as a matter of policy by the government of Sudan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ Lesch, Sudan, 163. See also Mark Bradbury, ``International
Responses to War in the Nuba Mountains,'' Review of African Political
Economy 25, no. 77 (September 1998): 463-474, 465. For a quantitative
account of forcible resettlement, see Millard Burr, Working Document
II: Quantifying Genocide in Southern Sudan and the Nuba Mountains,
1983-1998 (December 1998).
\18\ Bulad, ``Triple Genocide,'' 22.
\19\ UN Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance, Implementation
of the Declaration, November 11, 1996, para. 20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. PERSECUTION OF MUSLIMS
Muslims in Sudan are not immune to religious repression by the
regime. The government of Sudan violates the religious freedom rights
of Muslims in Sudan primarily in two ways. The first is through the
compulsory enforcement of Muslim religious observance as interpreted by
the government. The regime has thus sought to monopolize the discourse
on Islam to the exclusion of all other views. As many Muslim critics
point out, despite Quranic injunctions against ``compulsion in
religion'' (Quran 2:256), in many instances the government has made
otherwise personal religious observances, such as daily prayers and
fasting, compulsory. For example, government employees are required to
attend congregational prayers and women are not given the option of
whether or not they choose to wear the Islamic head scarf (hijab).\20\
At the same time, Friday sermons in the mosques must first be vetted by
a government commission. Imams who refuse to comply are prevented from
preaching. The regime pressures Muslim preachers to preach loyalty to
the regime and they may be replaced, harassed, or otherwise ill-treated
if they refuse to do so.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Beset by Contradictions,
23. See also Julie Flint, ``In the Name of Islam,'' Africa Report (May-
June 1995): 34-37, 37.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, the Sudanese government targets Muslim groups and ``sects''
who are seen as part of the military and political opposition to the
government. These include traditional sectarian movements such as the
Khatimiyya, Ansar, Ansar al-Sunnah, and Samaniyya, as well as Muslim
communities in the ``frontier zones'' (Nuba Mountains, Darfur, Red Sea,
and Ingessana) who are either suspected of collaborating with rebels of
the Sudanese People's Liberation Army or of practicing a form of Islam
that is not deemed to be ``pure.'' \21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ According to Abdelfattah Amor, the Special Rapporteur on
Religious Intolerance, it is the official policy of the Sudanese to
impose ``its truth regarding Islam on an erroneous local version of
Islam,'' UN Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance, Implementation
of the Declaration, November 11, 1996, para. 116.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The government of Sudan has particularly attacked the Khatimiyya
and the Ansar, which are linked to the banned Democratic Unionist Party
(DUP) and (until recently) Umma Party respectively. During the past few
years, the DUP and Umma have been the two largest Muslim opposition
movements.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ In addition to posing challenges to the political hegemony of
the Islamists, both the Khatimiyya and the Ansar are rooted in Sufism,
Islamic mysticism, and are philosophically in opposition to the NIF.
The NIF and its parent organization the Muslim Brotherhood are of the
Salafi orthodox trend that is hostile to both traditionalism and
mysticism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 1993 the government of Sudan secured a religious edict (fatwa)
declaring all those who oppose the regime to be ``apostates.''
Government forces were thereby granted license to attack Muslims of the
Nuba and other areas at will and the regime's forces have destroyed or
desecrated numerous mosques and Muslim institutions. Attacks on Muslims
in the Nuba Mountains, whether by government aerial bombardment or by
gangs acting on behalf of the regime, became so common that many Nuba
leaders believe that the regime has attacked more mosques than it has
churches.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ African Rights, Facing Genocide, 293; Burr, Quantifying
Genocide, 20-36.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. OIL AND CAPITAL MARKETS
The terrible situation in Sudan is likely to become worse. The
Sudanese government, which has been waging a campaign of death and
destruction against its own people, is now receiving windfall profits
from oil fields in south central Sudan. Sudan has proven oil reserves
of 262 million barrels and estimated reserves of more than eight
billion barrels. With the completion in mid-1999 of an oil pipeline
from south-central Sudan to the Red Sea, Sudan's daily crude output
rose dramatically from an estimated 12,000 barrels in 1998 to 150,000
barrels in 1999, and is expected to reach 250,000 barrels in 2000.\24\
Experts estimate that the Sudanese government will derive approximately
$300-400 million annually from the new pipeline.\25\ These oil profits
will provide the government with funds to increase its purchases of
military equipment, which will in turn be used to further its campaigns
against religious, racial, and ethnic minorities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ Energy Information Administration, ``Sudan,'' (November 1999),
(http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/sudan.html accessed April 29, 2000).
\25\ USCIRF, Hearing on Sudan (Reeves testimony), 104.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There is a critical linkage between oil and gas production and
human rights violations in Sudan. The government of Sudan destroyed a
number of villages surrounding the Bentiu oil fields in order to rid
them of human habitation. The proceeds from the oil revenues will, in
turn, continue to be used to support the Sudanese military's actions
against other regions of the country. The Harker investigation feared
that oil extraction may be contributing to the ``forced relocation'' of
civilian populations living near the oil fields and concluded that,
``[i]t is difficult to imagine a cease-fire while extraction continues.
. . .'' \26\ The State Department echoed that sentiment through
Secretary Albright's then-spokesman James Rubin, who noted that new oil
revenues ``provided a new source of hard currency for a regime that has
been responsible for massive human-rights abuses and sponsoring
terrorism outside Sudan,'' and added that the United States is ``very
concerned that investment in the Sudanese oil sector strengthens the
capacity of the Khartoum regime to maintain and intensify its brutal
war against its own people.'' \27\
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\26\ Harker, Human Security in Sudan, 16.
\27\ Jeff Sallot and Steven Chase, ``U.S. rebukes Ottawa on Sudan:
Axworthy backs down on threat to impose sanctions against Talisman for
fueling civil war,'' Globe and Mail, February 15, 2000.
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In this context, the Commission was alarmed by reports in late
1999, that the China National Petroleum Company (CNPC), a 40 percent
stakeholder in a joint venture to develop the Sudanese oil and gas
fields, was poised to obtain additional funds from the U.S. capital
markets on a huge scale. According to those reports, CNPC was planning
to make an initial public offering (IPO) of equity shares in the amount
of $10-12 billion. At that level, the IPO would have been one of the
largest ones ever made on the New York Stock Exchange.
In response, the Commission studied the applicability of the
President's economic sanctions and the disclosure requirements of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to such an IPO, in
consultation with the Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign
Assets Control (OFAC) and the SEC. In October 1999, the Commission
urged President Clinton and top White House officials to prevent the
IPO. The Commission also focused a substantial part of its February 14,
2000 hearing on Sudan on this sort of use of our capital markets.
In the face of the issues raised by the Commission and others, CNPC
restructured itself, placing its domestic operations in a wholly-owned
subsidiary, PetroChina Company Limited, and retaining its international
operations. On the basis of a registration statement filed by
PetroChina with the SEC, PetroChina and CNPC each offered and sold
PetroChina shares on the U.S. market in early April 2000. The
registration statement said that some of CNPC's proceeds might go into
retirement of its debt, but left unclear whether any of that debt was
incurred in developing the Sudan oil fields. OFAC, which administers
the Sudanese Sanctions Regulations, opined that these shares could be
purchased so long as there was no ``clear statement'' that CNPC would
use the proceeds to retire Sudan-related debt. As a result, millions of
those dollars from CNPC's sale of PetroChina shares may well end up
benefitting GNPOC. Also, this and other interpretations by OFAC have
clarified that a foreign-organized company may engage in revenue-
generating activities in both Sudan and the United States without
violating the sanctions regulations.
5. FINAL OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
During the last several months, the Commission met with, and heard
in its hearings from, foreign policy experts, humanitarian
organizations doing work in Sudan, Sudanese religious leaders, other
leaders from the beleaguered areas, legal experts on war crimes, and a
variety of experts on the use of sanctions. In this process, the
Commission learned that U.S. government attempts to enhance religious
freedom depended on the effectiveness of our policies in addressing the
broader conflict in that nation. And it was equally clear that efforts
to help end the civil war needed a new impetus.
Toward that end, the Commission has proposed a comprehensive 12-
month plan to significantly strengthen the United States' response to
this crisis. In addition, the Commission recommends increasing economic
pressure on Khartoum by tightening the current U.S. sanctions on the
Khartoum government and constricting the ability of foreign-organized
firms doing business with Sudan to raise money in U.S. capital markets.
The Commission met with President Clinton in October 1999 to brief him
on its work and to ask him to strengthen U.S. efforts to address the
urgent issues of Sudan and its violations of human rights and religious
freedom.
Recommendations on Sudan
The United States should continue to increase its
humanitarian aid to the people of Sudan and, in particular, increase
the percentage of that aid that flows outside the United Nations' food
program, and should engage in vigorous multilateral and bilateral
efforts to encourage other governments to follow suit.
The United States should begin a 12-month plan of
incentives and disincentives to pressure Sudan's government to improve
human rights. If there is not measurable improvement in religious
freedom in Sudan at the end of that period, the United States should be
prepared to provide non-lethal and humanitarian aid to appropriate
opposition groups. During the 12 months, the United States should:
(a) launch a vigorous campaign, led by the President, to
inform the world of Sudan's war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and genocidal activities;
(b) engage in vigorous multilateral and bilateral efforts to
increase economic and other pressure on the Sudanese
government;
(c) identify specific criteria to measure the Sudanese
government's actions and create linkages between Sudan's
actions and the United States' responses;
(d) include specific criteria for measuring whether
opposition groups have made identifiable efforts to adhere to
international human rights norms;
(e) if after 12 months Sudan has not made measurable progress
toward ending human rights violations and if opposition groups
have taken steps to improve their human rights record, provide
direct non-lethal aid to appropriate opposition groups; and
(f) be prepared to provide aid sooner if the situation
deteriorates markedly.
The Administration should increase its financial and
diplomatic support for the Intergovernmental Authority on Development
(IGAD) peace negotiations and persuade Egypt to participate.
The U.S. government should earmark additional humanitarian
aid for building public works (such as roads and bridges) and civil
government in southern Sudan.
The U.S. government should work toward a ``military no-fly
zone'' over Sudan using peaceful means.
The United States government should formally request an
investigation into whether Sudanese government forces have used
chemical weapons in violation of international law.
The Department of State should give Congress its opinion
on whether Sudan's government has committed and is committing
``genocide'' as defined by international law.
The United States government should prohibit any foreign
corporation from seeking to obtain capital in the U.S. market as long
as it is participating in Sudanese oil-field development.
The United States government should require any foreign
corporation that is engaged in the development of the oil and gas
fields in Sudan to disclose fully, before it may proceed with an IPO in
the United States, whether it intends to use the proceeds from the IPO
for the development of those oil and gas fields.
The United States government should require any company
that is engaged in both the development of the oil and gas fields in
Sudan and revenue-generating activities in the United States to submit
public reports from time to time on the nature and extent of both of
those activities.
OFAC should investigate: (a) how much of the debt that
China National Petroleum Company intends to retire arose from its
Sudanese activities; (b) what criteria CNPC will use to decide whether
to retire Sudan-related debt from the proceeds of its recent sale of
PetroChina shares in the U.S. capital market; (c) whether prior to the
sale CNPC earmarked any of the proceeds for use in retiring Sudan-
related debt; and (d) whether U.S. underwriters knew or should have
known of any such earmarking.
OFAC should call on the parties to the sale of PetroChina
stock to inform it if CNPC does retire Sudan-related debt and explain
how U.S. sanctions against Sudan relate to that debt retirement.
OFAC should inform the Commission and the Congress of the
results of its investigation, initiate appropriate enforcement action,
and adjust its interpretations of the regulations as appropriate.
The SEC should be especially careful to investigate the
adequacy and reliability of representations made in any filings related
to the recent sale by CNPC and PetroChina of PetroChina shares.
Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the U.S. Commission on International
Religious Freedom, I would like to thank you for inviting me to address
the Committee.
Senator Brownback. Thank you and I want to thank the
overall Commission, Mr. Chairman, as well. You have done an
excellent job I think in taking on a very big, very difficult
subject that has a lot of people's lives and souls at stake. It
just seems like you can go around the globe and point to
various places of where people are being persecuted, where they
are being killed for practicing their faith, just on a regular
and continuous basis. So, your work is leading the country and
leading the world on our recognizing and dealing with and
hopefully in the future greater assurance to people that they
will be able to practice their faith, whatever that might be,
however they might choose to practice that. So, thank you for
doing it.
I want to focus my initial questions on the Sudan, and I
have got several others as well.
I am delighted to have Senator Sarbanes joining us at this
time too.
The group recommends a number of specific action items on
the Sudan, which I am appreciative of, and I am delighted you
take a very practical focus on this of what can be done. You
note in one of your recommendations, Mr. Chairman or Ms. Shea,
whoever would decide to address this, recommendation 1.2,
comprehensive plan for the solution of the tragedy in Sudan,
calling for the Sudanese Government behavior--if it does not
improve in measurable ways, the U.S. Government should,
following a 12-month preparation period, provide nonlethal and
humanitarian aid to Sudanese opposition groups that have
developed procedures to comply with verifiable international
human rights standards.
Now, I take it from what you were saying earlier, that was
either a unanimous or a consensual agreement of everybody on
the Commission. Is that correct?
Rabbi Saperstein. That was one of the places there was a
single dissent.
Senator Brownback. There was a single dissent on this one.
Rabbi Saperstein. Right. Other than that, there was
consensus on the recommendation.
Senator Brownback. Good. I am hopeful that that is
something we can provide the administration with the authority
to do that as one of those preparatory steps that we send a
signal to the Sudanese Government. Look, if things do not
improve, the relationship with the United States is going to
change; it is going to materially change. And I am glad you put
that forward.
You also noted later in the report a creation of a military
no-fly zone, that the U.S. Government should advocate within
the international for a military no-fly zone over Sudan and for
taking steps to prevent civilians from being hurt by Sudanese
bombing attacks.
What was the Commission's thinking on that particular
recommendation, either Rabbi or Ms. Shea if you want to address
that because that is one that has been talked about some, and I
would like to hear the Commission's thinking on that.
Ms. Shea. Well, we came to that conclusion after our
hearing in which witness after witness really came forward and
said this is quite needed. We spoke with a number of other
church leaders from Sudan, human rights people from Sudan who
were just talking about the sort of haplessness with which the
civilian population was being bombed. There was absolutely
nothing to defend them, no bomb shelters. There was nothing.
So, we decided to make this recommendation and to do it
using peaceful means, and that is by providing civilian leaders
in targeted areas with communication and tracking equipment
that can help provide early warning of the military flights, by
making a bigger push within IGAD to call for a moratorium on
the military flights over Sudan, and then finally by appealing
to the Organization of African Unity and the U.N. Security
Council to call for a moratorium and internationally enforced
ban. Those internationally enforced measures would be up to
those bodies, of course, but it could range from economic
pressures, diplomatic pressures, that sort of thing.
Rabbi Saperstein. Let me add just a word to this. There is
a central theme of the Sudan section that is obvious to some
and not obvious to others, although we tried to say it as
explicitly as we could. It is impossible to disentangle
religious components of the civil strife from economic, ethnic,
political, military components of the strife that is going on
there. The only way to deal with religious freedom or the way
most effectively to deal with religious freedom is to deal with
some of the macro problems, in particular, the civil war and
the devastation that is wrought on civilian population centers.
So, we cast many of our recommendations much more broadly than
on the narrow issue of religious freedom because you simply
cannot deal with it outside the context of the broader issues.
However, in every one of the areas that we dealt with,
every one of the experts we met with, and every one of the
witnesses that testified we asked questions specifically about
religious freedom. As Nina Shea just pointed out, one of the
most common responses was anytime the bombing stops for a few
months, it is extraordinary to see how quickly the civilian
population gets their act together and begins to rebuild the
basic components of civil society there, within the economic
and functional limitations that are available. One of the first
things that happens is that churches reopen. Religious life
begins to resume. The traditional religionists are much freer
in terms of living their lives openly within the cultural and
religious norms of their traditions as well.
We tried to extrapolate from that constant insight that
witnesses gave us the recommendation that one of the best
things we can do until we end the civil war is to try and push
to protect more effectively for the civilian infrastructure.
So, there are actually several recommendations that go to it.
This is one. Another one is urging that in addition to food
relief, the international community begin to help rebuild some
of the infrastructure components in that area of the country,
all of it aimed at allowing normal civilian life to resume
because that is the sine qua non for the beginnings of
religious life to live itself out freely again.
Senator Brownback. That was certainly my experience in
being there in Yei, Sudan. You go around and off some of the
side streets and other places, people just dug basically holes
for when they hear planes coming over. Indeed, when they heard
our plane coming in, people started heading for the holes, but
they were just kind of craters in the ground that people would
dive into when they would hear the planes coming by. It just is
a real paralyzing thing for civil society.
I still remember one gentleman coming up to me and just
simply asking the question: ``What are we supposed to do?'' Are
we all supposed to convert? Is that what you are saying to us
by not providing any protection or support to people? Is that
what message you are trying to send us? I think of beleaguered
populations around the world with that simple question. What
are we supposed to do? It is one we should not make them
choose; that sort of question.
I think the no-fly zone is a very good suggestion for being
able to bring back a civil society. It is one that is going to
have to take place somehow.
I want to look at China for a minute. Mr. Abrams, in
particular on China, it has already been noted the dispute on
permanent normal trade relations and the recommendations you
have here.
First, either Mr. Abrams or the chairman, you were denied
visas to travel to China for examination on religious
persecution. Is that correct?
Rabbi Saperstein. I think more technically is we wrote
asking for permission to go and they never responded, rather
than that there was an outright denial. Despite our efforts to
followup on that, they simply refused to respond to our request
rather than our having received a formal denial.
Senator Brownback. Well, I would be happy to request from
our office as well the official permission that you would be
able to receive visas to travel to China. When I meet with
Chinese officials, they continue to tell me, well, we would be
happy to see people come into our country and to examine. So, I
think you should certainly be allowed to go and to travel to
China, and we will be happy to make that as a formal request as
well on behalf of the Commission.
Rabbi Saperstein. I think for any of the leaders of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee to make that request along
with you would have significant weight. So, we are deeply
appreciative of that.
Senator Brownback. Mr. Abrams, on human rights, we have
pursued diplomatic engagement, but it does seem as if the
reports continue to show a situation that is not substantially
improved. Why have we had so little apparent impact on China
given the focus that has been put on this? Even with that,
there have been crackdowns. I have noted the crackdown about
including repression of Christian worship outside of the
government-approved patriotic association churches, repression
of the Falun Gong. We have talked specifically about repression
of Tibetan Buddhists and of Muslim faiths in certain regions.
What is wrong with our approach that things have not
improved in these fundamental areas?
Mr. Abrams. I do not know that anyone has the answer to
that question. My own theory would be that as the regime loses
legitimacy because that legitimacy is based on a Marxist-
Leninist theory that hardly anybody in China believes anymore,
it becomes increasingly resistant to the propagation of
alternative theories of life, alternative belief systems,
whether those are new ones like Falun Gong or very old ones,
old even in the context of China, religions like Buddhism or
Christianity. So, they resist. They become more and more
hostile to these alternatives.
But our thought was there are things that can be done to
show the Chinese Government how strongly we feel about this.
One example is the U.N. Human Rights Commission resolution in
Geneva where I think our track record is not so good, and we
ought to learn the lesson that we need to start earlier and
push it at a far higher level if we are going to get the votes
together. We seem to be starting late in what is obviously a
hotly controversial matter for many governments.
But we came up with this list of things that the U.S.
Government might do and might try to get the Chinese to do
because we thought there are some more pragmatic suggestions
here that perhaps we have not tried.
Senator Brownback. I am hopeful we can try some other
approaches because it does not seem as if we have really had
the effect that we would want to have.
A final point I would make, I note that some staffers from
the Foreign Relations Committee met with an underground
Catholic bishop in Shanghai in January, and they were informing
me that he lives in utter squalor. He was monitored by a camera
across the hall from his apartment. Security forces visited him
before the staffers called on him. He is an elderly clergyman.
He is nearly 80 years old--to the point that when they visited
with him beforehand, he almost refused to meet with the
staffers. Then afterwards, he was interrogated about what he
had told them. You kind of wonder how an 80-year-old man
holding religious services in his home can be a threat to the
regime, how that could threaten. I just really wonder about how
that could be perceived as any sort of threat at all.
Mr. Abrams. Well, it strikes me that it does show how
illegitimate the regime feels itself to be in the eyes of the
Chinese people. If they interpret the religious practices of an
80-year-old as a potential threat to the regime, they must feel
remarkably fragile and weak in their hold on the hearts and
minds of the Chinese people.
Senator Brownback. Dr. Kazemzadeh, the final question and
then I will go to Senator Sarbanes. The Commission report notes
that the 1997 Religion Law requires an onerous and intrusive
registration process for religious organizations within Russia.
I note as well your concern that it is about Russia, but it is
also about its leadership role within the region to a number of
countries that is deeply troubling. Although groups now have
until December 31, 2000 to register, could you explain why so
many religious groups have not registered and some of the
difficulties that they are experiencing in doing so?
Dr. Kazemzadeh. There are several reasons. Some of these
religious groups have not even been properly informed. In
outlying areas of Russia, in isolation, they may not even have
known all the legal facts which were necessary.
In many instances, they could not obtain legal advice.
There have been cases where these groups have tried to register
without consulting a lawyer, and the papers that they would
present to the local authorities would be rejected on
procedural grounds. In some instances, these groups did not
have sufficient funds to hire lawyers.
In some instances, the local authorities simply gave them a
classical runaround--come tomorrow or the next day--and finally
the time expires and they are not registered.
So, there is a combination of factors working, and there
are literally thousands of such groups that still remain
unregistered.
Senator Brownback. I hope it is something that they can get
registered so that they can be able to practice.
Rabbi Saperstein. Let me just add to that that one of the
things that we most strongly have urged the President to do
directly is, in his meetings with Mr. Putin, to urge him to
suspend that deadline, or at least urge him to suspend the
mandatory requirement that the groups that have not registered
be liquidated.
That decree issued by Mr. Putin slipped by the media. It
was not really noted. It should have sent shock waves through
this country here. We think that the moment of leverage that we
have now, with this new President and our President meeting
together in the coming months, should be an opportunity which
is taken advantage of. That would at least give it some
breathing time to begin to work through some of the more
systemic problems that Dr. Kazemzadeh had indicated.
Senator Brownback. Very good.
Senator Sarbanes.
Senator Sarbanes. Mr. Chairman, is this an opportune time
to make an opening statement? I was not sure of what process
you follow.
Senator Brownback. Yes, if you would like to.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, first of all, I want to thank you
for holding this important hearing. I especially want to thank
the Commission members for coming and forming this very
important panel. I have known Rabbi Saperstein and Dr.
Kazemzadeh for many, many years, and I am really very pleased
that they have taken on this responsibility and that they could
be here with us today. Of course, Elliott Abrams was at one
time the Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian
Affairs. And Nina Shea has worked in this area for many, many
years now. I will refrain from identifying exactly how many.
I want to start off by saying that I think one of the most
significant acts enacted by the Congress in the last few years
was the International Religious Freedom Act which the President
signed into law in October 1998. This act does several
important things. It places the issue of international
religious freedom at the forefront of our country's human
rights policy. It allows the Commission to make policy
recommendations to the President and the Secretary of State in
an independent fashion. So, it in effect gives the Commission a
screening, as it were, so they can act independently. It serves
notice to countries around the world how deeply the United
States cares about the right of religious freedom, and that an
important component of our foreign relations with these
countries will be, in part, how they respect this right.
I have to say I am impressed with the work of Ambassador
Robert Seiple and, of course, with the work of the Commission,
chaired by Rabbi Saperstein.
I think the Department's 1999 Annual Report on Religious
Freedom was a thorough job in examining the situation of
religious freedom around the globe. The Commission's report, of
course, is focused on three countries of particular concern,
and it brought a very focused spotlight to the questions in
those countries and made a number of useful recommendations in
terms of U.S. foreign policy.
I ought to note that the Annual Report on International
Religious Freedom aptly notes that while religious liberty is
an essential component of our own Constitution, that the
International Religious Freedom Act does not attempt to impose
the American way on other nations. Rather, it draws on the
internationally accepted belief of inviolable dignity of the
human person and of universal rights that flow from that
belief. These rights are reflected in international covenants
which are, in turn, cited in the act as key standards on
religious freedom by which governments, including the U.S.
Government for that matter, must be judged. So, the basis for
this has an international underpinning, and I think it is
important to underscore that as we hold this hearing and
consider this report.
Of course, we are anxious that all countries should apply
these international standards of religious freedom so that
people can exercise freedom of religion without fear,
intimidation, persecution, or in some instances even death. So,
I think this is a very important hearing. I am glad it is being
held in such a timely fashion, and we are very appreciative to
the Commission for its very fine work.
Now, in that regard, I want to put one question to the
chairman of the Commission. It is obviously important that the
Commission's work continue in a sort of sustained and elevated
fashion. There is sometimes a tendency in the Congress to act
as follows: you get the first report in and you make the first
appropriation, and then everyone turns their attention
somewhere else. Thus, this very significant initiative that has
been launched can lose its momentum.
So, we ought to try to get on the record where are you in
your funding process. I guess it would be for the fiscal year
beginning next October 1. You are funded for this fiscal year
at a level of $3 million.
Rabbi Saperstein. Right. In the original legislation, there
had been an authorization, to the best of my recollection, for
the life of the Commission of $3 million a year. When the
correcting legislation was done over the summer here--because
when it was passed and appropriated, it did not have those
magic words ``and the Commission can spend it to further its
purposes.'' So, the money was at GSA but we could not access
it. So, there was correcting legislation that was issued. There
the multi-year authorization was dropped. So, we need to go
through the process every year. One possibility would be
somehow to put back the language from the original bill.
But in terms of this particular year, we have made a
request that is less than the $3 million, in part because we
have money left over from the first year, and in part because
we now have a better idea of what it will take to run our
operation, and we are trying to keep it as tight as possible.
The request was for $2.5 million this year.
A letter went from Senator Nichols and Senator Lieberman I
believe recently asking that it be part of the CJS
appropriations for this year. We have not heard definitely that
that issue has been resolved where this actually goes. That
would be the obvious place for it here. Beyond that, we are not
aware of problems with it other than we need to have focused
attention on it, and several of the offices represented here
have been helpful in trying to see that that moves along here.
But that is all I know at this point and our staff that is
charged with relations with the Hill is monitoring that
carefully and asking Senators if there is more that needs to be
done.
Whatever you can do to help facilitate that appropriation
would be invaluable to us. The concept that you bring to bear
here, that there needs to be a sustained, consistent level of
involvement, is for us the indispensable key to the success of
the Commission. This is not a 1-year project. It will take
several years. We are very gratified by the changes that have
been made in a year within the way the Government does its
work, and we talked about that earlier. But it is clear we have
a long way to go. So, your help in this would be deeply, deeply
appreciated.
Senator Sarbanes. Mr. Chairman, that is probably the single
most important contribution we can make to the work of the
Commission to ensure that they do not run into either an
authorization or an appropriation problem as they move forward
into the next fiscal year. Perhaps subsequently we can discuss
that and think of ways we might be of further assistance to
them in trying to move forward.
Rabbi Saperstein. Thank you, Senator Sarbanes.
Senator Sarbanes. What staffing level do you envision for
the Commission once you have sort of settled into a more
permanent pattern?
Rabbi Saperstein. We have staff of approximately 20 people.
There are several people that are focused on work with the
media in furthering the cause and attention to the cause that
we are charged to represent; two, perhaps three people, that
are focused on working closely with the Hill and the
administration here, and then a very strong research staff that
combines research on the law with what the facts are on the
ground, although that crosses over into Ambassador Seiple's
report as well.
We are also charged to analyze policy very seriously. Let
us take a look at policy. What has been tried? What has worked?
Why? What has not worked? Why? We want to set the context for
the policy recommendations that we are doing. So, we have a
strong research staff in that area as well and then obviously a
very small administrative staff together with the executive
director of our Commission, Steve McFarland, sitting behind me,
who oversees the whole thing. So, we are a little below 20 in
terms of the numbers that we have.
Some of these people come on a 1-year fellowship or
opportunities like that. We are doing things to try and keep
the costs as tight as possible, but that is about where we are,
a staff of about 20 people.
Senator Sarbanes. Now, how well is the religious community
in this country interacting with the Commission?
Rabbi Saperstein. There has been fairly strong interaction
with the religious community across the board. There have been
meetings with representatives of well over a dozen major
religious groupings, not just regarding the traditional kind of
Christian and Jewish community involvement in this, but
meetings with a number of groups with small numbers here in the
United States, but very much larger numbers in other areas
across the globe. So, there have been ongoing communications
with these groups, and we have in our plans an expansion of
some of those efforts in the coming year. We hope not only to
educate ourselves on what they are doing, but to talk with them
about ways they could be more effective in the struggle for
religious freedom across the globe as well. So, that is a very
crucial part of our work.
Senator Sarbanes. Now, does that include groups abroad that
are concerned with this issue, as well as in this country?
Rabbi Saperstein. It includes groups abroad. We have visits
where we have entertained probably a dozen delegations of
various religious groups from across the globe. As I am doing
the count in my head, I actually think quite a bit more than
that. We have also had a number of individuals who come
formally to our hearings representing religious groups in the
countries about which we are holding hearings. We have had
meetings, both formal and off-the-record, with leaders of
religious groups. In addition, we have had many more informal
meetings with foreign delegations who have come through and who
make repeated requests to us to get together so they can talk
about their problems.
These meetings have helped our work immeasurably. It has
brought to our attention the plight of some of the situations
you talked about earlier, Senator Brownback, which at the
beginning we might not have been fully aware of. It gives us
access to people who are on the ground in those areas and know
firsthand what is going on. Because of these meetings, we are
at the receiving end of the information that we then utilize to
develop our reports and recommendations.
With the American groups, we see them, in terms of our
role, as being charged to help make policy recommendations for
this country. They, of course, under the first amendment have
the right, and I would say on a religious basis the obligation,
to share their views on that as well. So, we want them to be
familiar.
So, there is an overlap between the domestic religious
groups and the international religious groups. There have been
quite extensive conversations. As I said, it has really been
invaluable to us. We have learned immensely from the visits of
religious groups from across the globe.
Senator Sarbanes. Is there any counterpart to your
Commission working in any other country?
Rabbi Saperstein. The United States is the first to begin
this. One of the gratifying aspects of this--and this has come
up in some conversations. I am really glad you asked this
question--has been the response of some of the other nations
across the world. Some of the affected nations respond in one
way and sometimes in a positive way, saying, we see what you
are doing. We do not want to be on your list. What can we do to
make things better? And on that level, the process has some
benefit.
But what has happened from some countries that are
committed to religious freedom is they have approached
Ambassador Seiple. They have approached the Commission and
asked, tell us about your work. We want to think about doing
something similar. So, let me give you one example.
Ambassador Seiple and I traveled to five or six countries
in Europe, to Rumania and Bosnia. We spoke at the Human Rights
Conference in Geneva, met with the Vatican. At the request and
invitation of the Government of The Netherlands, we flew to
meet with their top officials dealing with human rights
concerns. They were particularly interested in the way we were
working, wanted to find ways for us to work more closely
together. One of the things that they indicated there they are
going to do now is routinely take the country reports, both
from our report and Ambassador Seiple's, send it to their
staff, ask them to take a look into these matters and to work
with the American Embassies and the Foreign Service officers
there more cooperatively, and we are going to try to share
information back and forth.
This is exactly the kind of impact that we want now because
the EU countries are working more closely together as a common
whole. They hope to use that as a leverage to move the EU
community more broadly on this issue as well. So, we were very
gratified by those kinds of responses to the vision embodied in
the IRFA legislation.
Senator Sarbanes. Yes, I think that is very encouraging. As
I perceive it, the way the Commission is working, you
established this concept of international religious freedom as
sort of a prevailing principle, and to some extent, that takes
it out of the context of one particular religion fighting
another particular religion in a country where they often have
religious strife, and moves it to a different level. I think to
the extent you can encourage this kind of development that you
talked about in The Netherlands--and I guess maybe England
would be a prime possibility for something like that--it would
be very helpful in moving the whole process forward.
Well, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for holding the
hearing, and I want to express my very deep appreciation to the
members of the Commission who are here and their colleagues who
are not present. I had a chance to look through your report. I
confess I have not thoroughly studied it, but I am impressed
with the work, and we really encourage you on. Thank you.
Rabbi Saperstein. Thank you.
Senator Brownback. Thank you, Senator Sarbanes. Those were
excellent thoughts and questions put forward.
I too am very appreciative of your work and your trend-
setting that you are doing not only for this country, but for
the rest of the world. I look forward to the day hopefully in
the near future when all people, wherever they may be located,
can practice their faith in full freedom and without fear of
repression, reprisals, death, or whatever else. Unfortunately,
that day is not yet but let us keep vigilant till it is.
I may be talking with the chairman about doing a followup
hearing on this in a couple of months. So, Senator Sarbanes,
your point about losing momentum, we establish and launch and
then we go on somewhere else, was a good one. We may try to do
this sort of hearing again in 3 or 4 months to see how your
recommendations are proceeding.
Rabbi Saperstein. That is the kind of relationship we
really envision having with the Congress. So, we are very
heartened by that idea. Thank you.
Senator Brownback. Thank you very much. The hearing is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
----------
Dissent to Testimony on Religious Freedom in Sudan
Presented by Laila Al-Marayati, MD, Commissioner,
U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom
This statement is written in objection to segments of the testimony
delivered before this committee on May 16, 2000.
First, the testimony fails to acknowledge my previously written
dissent (as documented in the May 1 report) regarding the Commission's
recommendation for non-lethal aid to opposition groups. I am opposed to
such measures for the following reasons: (1) The Sudanese People's
Liberation Army (SPLA), which would be the major opposition group to
benefit from aid, is responsible for numerous human rights abuses in
southern Sudan. (2) The U.S. Government has not exerted enough effort
to date in bringing an end to the conflict through peaceful means and
intense negotiations. These measures should be exhausted before
considering aid to rebel forces. (3) By promoting one of the major
antagonists in the civil war, the U.S. Government would actually be
contributing to the prolongation of the conflict and the subsequent
suffering of millions of Sudanese. (4) The distinction between lethal
and non-lethal aid is artificial such that any U.S. assistance to rebel
groups may be perceived by the Sudanese government as an act of
aggression and a declaration of war which could have severe and violent
repercussions for Americans in Sudan and elsewhere.
Next, while the testimony often refers to the ``genocidal'' nature
of the Sudanese government's actions, it should be noted for the record
that the Commission has not unanimously agreed that the Government of
Sudan is deliberately carrying out a campaign of genocide. One of the
recommendations of our report is that the State Department determine if
indeed the situation in Sudan meets the criteria for such a definition
which would require a specific response based on international law.
RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION IN THE WORLD
----------
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 7, 2000
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:46 a.m. in room
SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Sam Brownback
presiding.
Present: Senators Brownback.
Senator Brownback. The hearing will come to order. Thank
you all for joining us. I apologize for being late. I had
another commitment where I was detained, so I apologize for
starting the hearing late. We have two votes scheduled for just
before 10 o'clock. Ambassador Seiple and those in attendance,
we should go as long as we can, take a break for those two
votes then continue the hearing after the votes.
It's my pleasure to chair this second hearing in the full
Senate Foreign Relations Committee to examine religious
persecution worldwide and in particular a new religious liberty
report issued by the State Department. I would like to thank
Senator Helms for scheduling this hearing. This follows up on
our first hearing held on May 16, which examined the
persecution report issued by the Commission on International
Religious Freedom that included the three countries of China,
Sudan, and Russia.
This morning our primary focus will be the religious
liberty report which covers countries worldwide. It was issued
September 5 by the State Department. We will examine some of
the issues included in that report issued on September 5.
Our first testimony will be from the Ambassador at Large
for International Religious Freedom, Robert Seiple, who
announced this year's selected list of countries of particular
concern regarding religious persecution.
This is also a good opportunity to acknowledge the imminent
departure of Ambassador Seiple, which I am sorry to say. He is
the first Ambassador at Large for International Religious
Freedom for America, the first of many, I would presume, and I
think he's set quite a distinguished record for this important
post.
This is both a substantive and symbolic achievement, which
has given hope to persecuted religious minorities worldwide.
Therefore, I thank you, Ambassador Seiple, for your excellent
efforts in enhancing religious freedom internationally. His
efforts have included obtaining the release of religious
prisoners in hostile countries, which is particularly near to
my heart. I hope he takes this chance to review his tenure and
note some lessons for posterity and for future incumbents to
this office.
Following Ambassador Seiple are three members of the
Religious Freedom Commission, including the new Vice Chairman,
Dr. Firuz Kazemzadeh, who is also the secretary for External
Affairs for the National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha'is of
the United States. Dr. Kazemzadeh will deliver the oral
presentation. The two following Commissioners will field
questions: Commissioner Michael Young, who is also the dean of
the George Washington Law School; and Commissioner John Bolton,
who is also the senior vice president of the American
Enterprise Institute.
I note that the State Department report only lists two
countries which have made notable improvements in the area of
religious liberty worldwide. I wanted to particularly point out
this positive aspect within the report. One of these countries
is Azerbaijan, the other country is Laos. I commend President
Aliyev of Azerbaijan, who has stuck by the promise he made to
the entire nation through public addresses last year that
Azerbaijan would uphold religious liberty and ``not go back to
the dark ages.''
I think it is also important that, while we view the
troubles in a number of countries, we also review the progress
of some nations and highlight and extol that as well. I am
hopeful that such progress will continue to be made throughout
that entire region and throughout the world.
Since the passage of the International Freedom Act 2 years
ago, increased focus has been given to religious persecution as
never before, from the grassroots to the Halls of Congress,
religious liberty has been inserted into the foreign policy
debate. This, in turn, has already helped expand freedoms for
embattled believers worldwide, as well as jump-start individual
campaigns of awareness over hellish situations such as that in
the Sudan.
In closing, I want to acknowledge the people who inspired
these reports and list in the first place. They are the simple
people of faith who stand against terrible odds in hostile
countries. Many are forced to wage individual battles for this
precious personal freedom. They stand with great courage
against terrible odds.
I am proud that we are having this hearing because it is
one more stone in the path to establishing religious freedom as
a universal right for all of these embattled believers
everywhere in the world, wherever they might be. Particularly
since our Nation is blessed with incredible freedom, I consider
this to be our reasonable duty.
Ambassador Seiple, I am delighted to have you here. I am
delighted to know you as a friend. I am pleased with the work
that you have done in helping to establish this as a
fundamental human right. With that, welcome to the committee
and the floor is yours.
[The following statement was submitted for the record.]
Prepared Statement of Senator Russell D. Feingold
Ambassador Seiple, I want to thank you for being here today, and
for all of your hard work over the last couple of years. I also want to
recognize the members of the U.S. Commission for International
Religious Freedom that are here to testify and to thank them for their
efforts.
I have consistently expressed my view that basic human rights are
at the core of our national identity and at the heart of our national
interests. Freedom of religion stands with other basic rights, like
freedom of expression and association, as one of the bedrock principles
of American democracy. These rights inform our national values and
shape our national character.
Basic human rights are also critical to our national interests
abroad. History has shown that unjust regimes tend to rot from within,
often disintegrating into chaos. The pursuit of basic human rights is
critical to our quest for a more stable world. It is only appropriate
that our commitment to the basic rights of men and women should guide
the U.S. abroad.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT A. SEIPLE, AMBASSADOR AT LARGE FOR
INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Seiple. Thank you very much. I appreciate the
nomenclature of friend and friendship and certainly appreciate
the leadership that you have shown on this issue and many other
issues of values in your tenure here in the Senate.
I would say in the beginning that we have a larger report,
testimony, that should be given to the record in the interest
of time and maybe a couple of votes. I will speak from a much
truncated version.
Senator Brownback. We will accept the entire report in the
record.
Ambassador Seiple. Again, I am honored to appear before you
on the occasion of the issuance of our annual report. As I
prepare to depart the position of Ambassador at Large after 2
years of service, I want to express to you again, Mr. Chairman,
my gratitude for the support that you and your staff, and in
particular Ms. Sharon Payt, have given to the Office of
International Religious Freedom and to the cause of religious
freedom around the world.
Mr. Chairman, I have two goals this morning. The first is
to formally present the second annual Report on International
Religious Freedom 2000 \1\, and to inform you of the
Secretary's decision with respect to countries of particular
concern under the International Religious Freedom Act. The
second is to give you my sense of where things stand with
respect to religious freedom worldwide.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The report can be accessed at the Department of State Website:
. It will also be available in print from the Committee
on Foreign Relations in November 2000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
During the course of the past 12 months, my office has
monitored carefully the status of religious freedom worldwide.
We have traveled to many of the countries in which religious
liberty is at risk. We have had access to the large and growing
volume of press and NGO reporting on religious freedom. Last,
but perhaps most importantly, we have reviewed the excellent
reporting from the U.S. missions abroad.
U.S. diplomatic reporting on religious freedom has always
been good, but it has become better under the tenure of
Secretary Albright, who made it a point of emphasis soon after
her arrival in the Department. Some folks read the New York
Times, the Wall Street Journal. We read the reports of a whole
host of really top-flight bright young people who manage the
Foreign Service posts around the world on behalf of people of
faith.
This year's report covers the period from July 1, 1999, to
June 30, 2000, contains 194 country chapters, an introduction,
and an executive summary. This year the executive summary
highlights improvements, as you mention, in religious freedom.
We have provided this section because it is prescribed by the
act, but also because we think it is terrifically important
that the United States encourage improvements. I am proud to
present the second annual report on International Religious
Freedom 2000, all 1,200 pages of it.
Now a word on designations under the act. Mr. Chairman, as
you know, the IRF Act has established a very high standard for
this designation. In order to be designated, the government of
a country must have engaged in or tolerated particularly severe
violations of religious freedom. As we apply the act's criteria
in deciding what action to take, we try to place them in the
context of diplomacy: Is diplomacy working? Are there trends in
one direction or another? Is a particular action likely to help
or to hinder our diplomatic efforts to improve the situation?
None of these is determinative, but all are important as we
decide how to proceed with any given country.
With respect to the Secretary's decisions this year, let me
first note that she has decided to redesignate the five
countries designated last year. They are Burma, Iran, Iraq,
Sudan, and China. In addition, she is renewing her
identification of Serbia and the Taliban of Afghanistan as
particularly severe violators. Neither constitutes a
``country'' as envisioned by the act.
During the course of the year my office reviewed the
records of all other countries which we believed might approach
the designation standard. After carefully reviewing these
records, I have concluded that no other countries reach that
standard. I reviewed this matter with the Secretary. She has
approved my recommendation, and of course I will be happy to
answer any questions that you have on any one country that
might come to mind.
Let me now give you a brief assessment of my office's work
and a few thoughts on the status of religious freedom. I
believe that we are implementing the terms of the IRF Act of
1998 in an effective way, faithful to the intent of the
Congress, the President, the Secretary of State. The Office of
International Religious Freedom is well integrated into the
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, thanks in part to
my friend Assistant Secretary Harold Koh.
The process of producing the annual report has itself
played a major role in integrating our office and the issue
into the mainstream of U.S. foreign policy. The report has
become a focal point for the discussion of religious freedom
and has dramatically increased public awareness of our mission.
Our mandate has also caused us to reach out to American
religious communities. I am very proud of our outreach programs
to the Muslim community. I consider this program a success and
my office intends to expand it to other American religious
communities.
My ex officio membership in the U.S. Commission on
International Religious Freedom has been a productive and
pleasant one. The Commission brings a separate set of eyes and
a sharp focus to our common task of promoting religious
freedom.
With the support of Assistant Secretary Koh, my office has
grown to a staff of five officers other than myself and we are
in the process of recruiting three more. Their workload is
heavy and growing, and it involves some of the most
invigorating work in the field of diplomacy. We are met almost
daily with a new challenge--a refugee family fleeing religious
persecution needing our help, a new draft law that restricts
minority religions, new arrests, deportations, or executions of
religious people.
We have had some small but important victories. Our office
has had the opportunity to improve the lives and fortunes of a
few families and individuals suffering for their religious
beliefs. These are the things, Mr. Chairman, that give us hope
and make us even more determined to persevere in the promotion
of religious freedom.
But in all candor, I must also tell you that we have made a
very modest beginning in attacking the root causes of religious
persecution and discrimination. The problem has no simple
solution. The annual report provides a measure of the problem
and shines a spotlight on it. On balance, it is a critical tool
in our goal of promoting religious freedom.
But to get to the root causes of persecution, we must go
beyond the spotlight, the designations, and the sanctions. We
must convince governments that religious belief is not
something to be feared, but a source of social and cultural
strength. We must build bridges between religions, attacking
the sources of fear and distrust that feed violence. We must
encourage believers of all stripes to summon the best in their
traditions.
Every world religion, Mr. Chairman, has some version of the
Golden Rule. For example, the monotheistic religions believe
that every human being, religious or not, believer or infidel,
is created in the image of the Creator. To defile another human
being, to destroy a person's dignity, to live without respect
for human life, these are attacks on the very nature of things
and on the divine source of that life.
Every religious tradition is plagued by men and women who
exploit and abuse the sacred, expropriating it as a divine
license for persecution and violence against others. In their
hands, religion becomes a mobilizing vehicle for nationalist or
ethnic actions. We have seen this outrage played out on stages
from Afghanistan to Serbia to Sudan.
But we must not view the actions of such impostors and
hypocrites as representative of any true religion. Religion can
be, ought to be, a source of conciliation and hope, of unity
and respect. The authors of our Constitution knew that
religious freedom touches upon the most fundamental and
universal attributes of humanity--the quest for ultimate
meaning and purpose that is shared by every human being. In
this, we are truly one human family.
So, Mr. Chairman, I am proud to have been the first
Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom. I am
satisfied that our office has done its job well, not only
complying with the law, but laying the groundwork for future
progress as well. When all is said and done, our work will be
judged not by the denunciations we make or the sanctions we
imposed, but by the people we help. As far as I am concerned,
that endeavor lies at the heart of what it means to believe.
Thank you for having me here today and I will be happy to
take any and all questions.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Seiple follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Robert A. Seiple
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I want to thank you for
holding this hearing. I am honored to appear before you on the occasion
of the issuance of our Annual Report.
As I prepare to depart the position of Ambassador at Large after
two years of service, I want to express to you, Mr. Chairman, my
gratitude for the support you and your staff--in particular Ms. Sharon
Payt--have given to the Office of International Religious Freedom, and
to the cause of religious freedom internationally.
Mr. Chairman, I have two goals this morning. The first is formally
to present the second Annual Report on International Religious Freedom,
and to inform you of the Secretary's decision with respect to countries
of particular concern under the International Religious Freedom Act.
The second is to give you a brief retrospective of the past two years,
and my sense of where things stand with respect to religious freedom
worldwide.
THE ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
During the course of the past twelve months, my office has
monitored carefully the status of religious freedom worldwide. We have
traveled to many of the countries in which religious liberty is at
risk, and I have testified before Congress on the problems faced by
religious minorities in Russia, China and Western Europe. We have
talked to dozens of government officials, religious leaders, human
rights groups and NGOs, as well as believers from many religious
traditions, both here and abroad. We have had access to the large and
growing volume of press and NGO reporting on religious freedom. Last,
but perhaps most importantly, we have reviewed the excellent reporting
from U.S. missions abroad.
U.S. diplomatic reporting on religious freedom has always been
good, but it has become better under the tenure of Secretary Albright,
who made it a point of emphasis soon after her arrival in the
Department. We have some of the best minds in the business out there,
Mr. Chairman, and their cables on religious freedom are the morning
fare of my office. Some people read the New York Times or the Wall
Street Journal. We read the reports of Embassy Moscow, Embassy Cairo,
or Embassy Tashkent, or the other bright minds of the Foreign Service
posted throughout the world.
These men and women report on religious freedom issues throughout
the year, and it is they who do the initial drafts of the country
chapters for the Annual Report. These drafts are then compiled and
edited, in close consultation with my staff and the country desks, by
the Office of Country Reports and Asylum Affairs in the Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor.
This year's report covers the period from July 1, 1999 through June
30, 2000. It contains 194 country chapters, an Introduction and an
Executive Summary. The Introduction contains a brief account of the
Act, and how the issue of religious freedom reached such prominence in
U.S. policy. It also discusses the contribution that religious freedom
makes to democratic governance, and vice versa.
The Executive Summary details various categories of abuses of
religious freedom and U.S. efforts to deal with those abuses. It also
contains a section that highlights certain improvements in religious
freedom. We have provided an improvements section because it is
prescribed by the Act, but also because we think it is terrifically
important that the United States encourage improvements. Some will
criticize this section because it appears to praise countries that have
horrific human rights records in areas other than religious freedom, or
because incremental improvements in the treatment of certain religions
are not replicated in others. I recognize this problem, but nonetheless
believe that we must use the report to acknowledge positive changes
whenever we can.
Finally, the annexes to the Report provide texts of relevant
international instruments, and a variety of information on U.S.
religious freedom policy and practice.
I am proud to present the second Annual Report on International
Religious Freedom.
COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN
Now a word on designations under the Act. As we sifted through the
enormous amount of information at our disposal, we began to identify
countries that needed closer examination in order to determine whether
they should be designated as ``countries of particular concern.'' Mr.
Chairman, as you know, the IRF Act has established a very high standard
for this designation, which entails consideration of economic sanctions
and requires some action by the United States government. In order to
be designated, the government of a country must have engaged in or
tolerated ``particularly severe violations'' of religious freedom. Such
violations are defined as ``systematic, ongoing, egregious violations
of religious freedom accompanied by flagrant denials of the right to
life, liberty and security of persons, such as torture, enforced and
arbitrary disappearances, or arbitrary prolonged detention.''
As we apply these criteria in deciding what action to take, we try
to place them in the context of diplomacy. Is diplomacy working? Are
there trends in one direction or another? Is a particular action likely
to help, or to hinder, our diplomatic efforts to improve the situation?
None of these is determinative, but all are important as we decide how
to proceed with any given country.
With respect to the Secretary's decisions this year, let me first
note that she has decided to redesignate the five countries designated
last year. They are Burma, China, Iran, Iraq, and Sudan. In addition,
she is renewing her identification of Serbia and the Taliban of
Afghanistan as ``particularly severe violators.'' Neither constitutes a
``country'' as envisioned by the Act.
During the course of the year, my office reviewed the records of
all other countries which we believed might approach the designation
standard. After carefully reviewing these records, I have concluded
that no other countries reach that standard. I have reviewed this
matter with the Secretary, and she has approved my recommendation. I
will be happy to answer any questions you have on this subject.
THE STATUS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
Let me now give you a brief assessment of my office's work, and a
few thoughts on the status of religious freedom.
I believe that we are implementing the terms of the IRF Act of 1998
in an effective way, faithful to the intent of the Congress, the
President and the Secretary of State. As you know, the Act gave my
office the mission of promoting religious freedom abroad. Carrying out
that mission has required us to integrate the office into the work of
the Department; to monitor religious persecution and discrimination on
a daily basis; to meet with NGOs, human rights groups and religious
groups here and abroad; and to advocate freedom of religion and
conscience with foreign governments.
The Office of International Religious Freedom is well integrated
into the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor--thanks in great
part to my friend, Assistant Secretary Harold Hongju Koh--and into the
Department as a whole. Within our bureau, I want to note in particular
the contributions of the Office of Country Reports and Asylum Affairs
and the Office of Bilateral Affairs. We work closely with our
colleagues in the regional bureaus, both to address problems and to
develop policy. We communicate frequently with our embassies and
consulates abroad. When we travel--and we have visited 26 countries,
some of them more than once--we meet with U.S. Ambassadors and mission
staff to discuss our policy and to hear their recommendations and their
concerns.
The process of producing the Annual Report has itself played a
major role in integrating our office, and the issue, into the
mainstream of U.S. foreign policy. The Report has become a focal point
for discussion of religious freedom--in conferences and journals for
example--and has dramatically increased public awareness of mission.
The Report also requires our embassies abroad to monitor religious
freedom year-round. It encourages their development of sources of
information among local communities of religious believers, NGOs, human
rights groups and government officials. And it taps the impressive
analytical skills of our officers, causing them to delve more
completely into religious beliefs and customs that may be alien to
them.
Our mandate has also caused us to reach out to American religious
communities. I am very proud of our outreach program to the Muslim
community. For a year and a half, we have met periodically with
American Muslim leaders to brief them on our efforts and to hear their
concerns. I consider this program a real success, and my office intends
to expand it to other American religious communities.
In conjunction with the Department's Bureau of Intelligence and
Research, we are sponsoring a series of conferences on religious
freedom and foreign policy, including segments that focus on the
teachings of particular religious traditions. We have found a
tremendous interest in this subject, and intend to continue and expand
our conferences. We also attend conferences as participants as
frequently as we can, contributing to the international dialogue on
religious freedom.
My ex officio membership in the U.S. Commission on International
Religious Freedom has been a productive one. The Commission brings a
separate set of eyes and a sharp focus to our common task of promoting
religious freedom. It has been a pleasure to work with the
Commissioners. I should also note that the working relationship between
the Commission's staff and my own is an excellent one that continues to
prove fruitful.
With the support of Assistant Secretary Koh, my office has grown to
a staff of five officers (other than myself), and we are in the process
of recruiting three more. Our existing staff comes from the foreign and
civil services; one is a military chaplain. Their workload is heavy and
growing, and it involves some of the most daunting, invigorating work
in the field of diplomacy. We are met almost daily with a new
challenge--a refugee family fleeing religious persecution and needing
our help; a new draft law that restricts minority religions; new
arrests, deportations or executions of religious people.
And we have had some small, but invigorating victories. I am proud
to tell you that our office has had the opportunity to improve the
lives and fortunes of a few families and individuals suffering for
their religious beliefs. These are the things, Mr. Chairman, that give
us hope, and make us even more determined to persevere in the promotion
of religious freedom.
But in all candor, I must also tell you that we have made oniy a
very modest beginning in attacking the root causes of religious
persecution and discrimination. The problem has no simple solution. The
Annual Report provides a measure of the problem, and shines a spotlight
on it. Evidence in the Report provides a starting point for diplomacy--
a basis for discussion. On balance, it is a critical tool and an
important step in our goal of promoting freedom of religion and
conscience.
It is, however, a step that must be followed with others. To get at
the root causes of persecution, we must go beyond the spotlight, the
designations and the sanctions. We must convince governments that
religious belief is not something to be feared, but can be a source of
social and cultural strength. And we must build bridges between and
among religions, attacking the sources of fear and distrust that feed
violence. We must encourage believers of all stripes to summon the best
in their traditions.
Every world religion, Mr. Chairman, has some version of the Golden
Rule For example, the monotheistic religions believe that every human
being--religious or not, believer or infidel--is created in the image
of the Creator. To defile another human being, to destroy a person's
dignity, to live without respect for human life--these are attacks on
the very nature of things, and on the divine source of that life.
Every religious tradition is plagued by men and women who exploit
and abuse the sacred, expropriating it as a divine license for
persecution and violence against others. In their hands religion
becomes a mobilizing vehicle for nationalist or ethnic passions. We
have seen this outrage played out on stages from Afghanistan to Serbia
to Sudan.
But we must not view the actions of such impostors and hypocrites
as representative of any true religion. Religion can be--ought to be--a
source of reconciliation and hope, of unity and respect. The authors of
our Constitution, and of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, understood that protecting freedom of religion and conscience
provided no warrant for hatred. Rather, they knew that religious
freedom protects an individual's right to pursue his or her quest for
ultimate meaning and purpose, a quest that is shared by so many. In
this, we are truly one human family.
And so, Mr. Chairman, I am proud to have been the first Ambassador
at Large for International Religious Freedom. I am satisfied that our
office has done its job well, not only complying with the law, but in
laying the groundwork for future progress as well. When all is said and
done, our work will be judged not by the denunciations we make or the
sanctions we impose, but by the people we help. And, as far as I am
concerned, that endeavor lies at the heart of what it means to believe.
Thank you for having me here today. I'll be happy to take your
questions.
Senator Brownback. Thank you very much, Ambassador Seiple.
I appreciate your statement and your highmindedness. I think
that is absolutely appropriate and the right track to take. I
hope following ambassadors in your position will take such a
view.
In January of this year, I traveled to Nepal and I met with
a number of Tibetan refugees that had walked over the Himalayas
in the winter to get to freedom. I personally interviewed
somewhere between 15 and 20 of these Tibetans. There was
probably about 150 to 200 people who had traversed over the
Himalayas over that month. They were at a station in Kathmandu,
Nepal, to build up some strength before going on to a more
permanent site.
Virtually all of them told some story of persecution within
Tibet, such as being jailed, or beaten. Only one lady had taken
a public means of transportation, but the rest had secretly
escaped to make it out. Many told of imprisonments, and
beatings that had taken place during that period.
Reportedly, religious freedom has declined substantially in
China lately. Could you give me your view of this from your
report and your personal experience of what is taking place in
China? In contrast, you also hear others say that religious
freedom, in some areas of China, has grown substantially.
Last December, I was in southern China, before going to
Nepal, and saw what seemed to be a great deal of religious
freedom. Please share your perspective on China.
Ambassador Seiple. Well, maybe I can begin with a question:
Why has religion grown, the interest in religion grown in
China? I think there are two reasons. I think the people of
China have been betrayed twice, one by a bankrupt Communist
ideology that absolutely has not delivered on any promises that
it has made; and then second with the opening on the economic
side, where more money was made available, more people came
above the poverty line, the people of China realized that this
in itself is not going to satisfy the deep longing of the
heart.
There are a lot of concerns in China, macro concerns, and
they are being played out in the lives of individual people who
are searching for some sort of meaning other than the meaning
that the government has established. The government, it is a 50
year old government. People talk about this is different, this
is Asia, this is a culture that we have to begin to understand.
The Communist government is the interloper here. The Asian
culture has gone back millennia, but the interloper, the
carpetbagger, if you will, is communism, and it has not worked.
It has not worked anyplace else. There is no reason to expect
it to work there.
But more than that, it has betrayed its promise to the
people. Lots of problems and the people are turning to faith.
The Falun Gong movement is an example. The house church growth
is an example. The situation that you mention in Tibet, where
people will risk life and limb and children, and many of them
have left dead children on the hillsides as they came out in
the course of the winter.
The Kermapa escapes--that is the language--escaped Tibet.
Now, this is his territory. This is his homeland. These are his
monasteries. What does it mean to have to escape all that?
Something dramatic and terrible is wrong right now.
I am not quite sure how it gets fixed. I think ultimately
it is going to take people from the inside, and these kinds of
changes are going to have to happen from the inside. During
that time period, I think it is our responsibility from the
outside to maintain faith with those people who this day are
suffering because of their faith.
Senator Brownback. I have traveled to the Sudan. I have met
with Sudanese refugees. They speak pointedly about, not being
forced into one religious mode they do not share. I have met
with individuals who have tried to flee out of the Sudan.
A gentleman started out with 30,000 refugees that were
moving from Sudan to try to get to Ethiopia. They were
intercepted by the military several times and at the end only
500 got out. He spoke to me about walking over dead bodies,
hiding under dead bodies, using the blood of his fellow
compatriots who were with him to look as if dead himself, to be
able to flee from that. It is a religious persecution of an
enormous scale that is taking place.
Why isn't more action being taken by our government when we
know what is happening there? The President recently traveled
to Africa a second time. Why aren't we seeing more statements
about this genocide that is so well documented? Why are we not
speaking out more?
Ambassador Seiple. Sudan is both simple and terribly
complicated. If it were easy, however, it would not have gone
on for 17 years with the killing of 2 million plus people, most
of them noncombatants. It also has been, unfortunately, a war
without heroes in the south, certainly in the north. So it has
been difficult sometimes to take sides and to know that the
issues are going to be resolved.
There have been in this 17-year period upwards of 20
different militia working throughout the south. It has been
said by other experts that more people probably have been
killed in the south by southerners than by the north, just to
give you a sense of the complications. This is no apology for
the Khartoum Government.
The Khartoum Government has engaged, as you know,
indiscriminately in bombing, systematic bombing, bombing of
churches, bombing of hospitals, bombing of refugee sites. They
have done that even while we have been in talks, in dialog with
the diplomats, our interlocutors in Khartoum.
There is a major gap between what was being told to us and
what is being done in the field. As long as that gap is there,
it is going to be difficult to resolve the issue. It has to be
named for what it is. It has to be seen for what it is, and the
entire world, not just the United States, because frankly we
have done about everything we can do in terms of sanctions,
including throwing Tomahawk missiles at Khartoum, on the
sanctions side.
But it is going to need a concerted effort from our allies
working with ourselves across the board. Now, a special envoy
has been appointed. Those discussions, the IGAD process, has
continued, has been renewed and been revitalized. We are going
to take steps forward. We are going to see steps taken
backward. It is not going to be easy.
Ultimately, at the end of the day there has got to be a way
to increase the gain or increase the pain to stop the conflict.
Quite frankly, when they brought oil on line and had a revenue
source, it made even that much more difficult to achieve.
Senator Brownback. I would ask the administration not to
open the embassy in Khartoum. I know people are considering
moving in, and it appears to be some sort of beginning of a
relationship. Even though the Government in Khartoum has much
blood on its hands. The President previously traveled to Africa
and says in Rwanda ``Never again,'' and yet we have 2 million
people killed in Sudan. We have U.N. planes that have been
bombed by the Khartoum Government. We have the bombing of
civilian hospitals. I have personally spoken to witnesses who
saw their hospitals and their schools having been bombed.
We could provide direct development assistance to the
south. We as a Government could do that. Also, we should speak
out more forcefully and certainly not open up the embassy in
Khartoum. We should protest their awful human rights abuses
based around ethnic and religious persecution. Millions of
people that have been killed and hundreds of thousands have
been purposely starved when food aid waits at the borders.
I think there is more that we can do in the Sudan, and
there are some steps that we must take to send the signal that
their ``charm offensive'' is not working. It is hard to
showcase murder as charming.
Ambassador Seiple. Well, we certainly are in agreement
there on the charm offensive. There is no one in greater
agreement in terms of all that you have just said than Susan
Rice, our Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs.
Again, we wish we had a silver bullet here. We wish we had
an answer. We wish we had something that would work yesterday.
I can assure you that it has engaged our building, our
Department. Folks are working day and night to try to figure
out how to proceed.
In terms of the issues that are opening up in Khartoum, of
course, as you alluded to, the embassy really never was closed.
It just was vacated after the situation with our two embassies
in August 1998. Since that time we have had people coming and
going. There is symbolism that is at play and there is reality
at play, and sometimes one is the other.
We will continue to work with you. We know your passion on
this issue. We know the passions on the Hill. We have got to
find solutions that will endure, that will see through the
symbolism, see through the charm offensives, and that
essentially stop the carnage that has been going on over 17
years.
Senator Brownback. I am going to put us into recess for a
period of time for me to do these two votes that have been
called. Then we will come back, I would hope, within 15
minutes, and start back up, then go to the second panel. We are
in recess.
[Whereupon, at 10:11 a.m., the committee was recessed, then
reconvened at 10:35 a.m.]
Senator Brownback. I call the hearing back to order. I
apologize about the time away for the votes.
Ambassador Seiple, one of the other areas of jurisdiction I
have is the Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Subcommittee.
I was curious in your report you did not--you cited a couple of
countries within that jurisdiction, Iraq and Iran, did not make
mention publicly, at least here, of countries of concern of
Saudi Arabia that you do hear a number of comments about, and
also some other countries in that region.
I would appreciate your oral thoughts and comments about
religious freedom, religious persecution in Saudi Arabia and in
some of the other Middle East countries in that region that
were not cited as countries of particular concern.
Ambassador Seiple. Well, we have major problems on the
human rights side in general, but also in terms of religious
freedom, in any number of those countries. Let me say that
there are some that are much more tolerant than others. Jordan
would fit into that characterization, although we have some
issues that we are working to resolve there, that have not
gotten resolved this past year.
We have other areas where we have seen some improvements in
methodology of dealing with them. Egypt was a case in point. We
have an El Kush I and an El Kush II and the differences in how
they treated those two crises is fairly remarkable.
There are no countries where I think you are going to see
linear progression. Saudi Arabia would be a case in point. They
work and they force us to work within some very narrow
confines. That is a kingdom. It is the guardian of two of the
three high holy sites for Islam. And they do not have a chip on
their shoulder about this, but they are absolutely dug in.
What we have been able to do in the last 2 years is to get
them to agree that non-Muslim worship can take place if it is
done discretely and privately, without interference of the
Mutawwa. Now, where we have had worship taking place
discretely, which is a function of numbers and noise and how
many people are there and so on, how long it goes on, we have
had them step forward and do the right thing.
In fact, this past year Prince Turki made the statement in
the Geneva Human Rights Commission that this was now a part of
their policy, and it was promulgated widely within Saudi
Arabia. That is very important because the Mutawwas sometimes
seem to operate without anyone holding them accountable. So we
have had fewer problems.
Now, again this is a situation where we wish things were
different. We have a long way to go. We are working these
issues at all levels with an ally. Saudi Arabia is certainly
that. But at the same time, we have been very, very clear in
the report: There is no religious freedom in Saudi Arabia.
Does it pass the bar for a country of particular concern?
Well, it is systematic and it is ongoing, there is a pattern,
there is an intentionality to it. But being egregious, in the
term that we use of persecution--kidnapings and killings and so
on in the period of our report this past year--no, that did not
happen, and so they were not designated.
Senator Brownback. But Afghanistan is not listed as a
country of particular concern.
Ambassador Seiple. The Taliban, which is not a government,
but they occupy 88, 90 percent of the land, has been
redesignated as a gross violator. That was done a year ago and
we have done that again this year. Primarily, a year ago that
was done on the basis of an intra-Muslim conflict between Sunni
and Shia, but a genocide of sorts up in the northern part, in
Sharif, the village up there where systematically the Taliban
went through and executed people.
So there are some terrible things that go on. You will see
if you read the Iraqi report some terrible listing, recounting
of abuses against the Shia in southern Iraq. We have had some
improvements in Iran and frankly, looking forward, I hope that
they continue, because we may see a major breakthrough there in
the years ahead.
We have to be careful how we play that. We can throw it off
course if our diplomacy is too visible, too overt. At the same
time, there are some positive things happening. My friend Firuz
Kazemzadeh can talk specifically about what they have done that
play in a positive way in favor of the Biha'is, which have been
very persecuted in Iran.
These are difficult countries. My office spends a great
deal of time working very hard to prove Sam Huntington wrong.
There does not have to be a clash of kingdoms, there does not
have to be a clash of civilizations. Islam is not monolithic.
You see various expressions of it, various expressions of
Sharia law throughout the Middle East. We do a disservice when
we superficially stereotype it. But we need to learn more about
it, because we do not know much. Speaking of the collective
``we,'' we do not know much about Islam in that part of the
world and the impact that it has had historically and could
have in the future, as we should. It is incumbent upon us to do
those teachings and learnings.
Senator Brownback. How about in Russia? The Commission
report had cited Sudan, China, and Russia, the International
Religious Freedom Commission. It expressed concern about some
of the changes that have taken place in Russia. What is your
viewpoint?
Ambassador Seiple. Let me say in general with the
Commission report, we have had Susan Rice speak to the sections
on Sudan with the Commission and there is a great deal of
parallelism in what the Commission has recommended in the
methodology of a way forward and what is being promulgated
inside the State Department as policy there. In China there has
been a major difference on PNTR. That was the major difference
in the Commission and our findings.
In Russia, I think we are again of one mind. We have got
some enormous macro events that have hit Russia, a relatively
new country coming out of the Soviet era. But there has been
political turmoil, there has been obviously the large economic
turmoil. In the middle of that chaos, you always worry about
scapegoating, anti-semitism. Although it has not been prevalent
in the period of this report, it lies underneath the surface.
There is something akin to a Putin watch. We do not know
all that we would like to know about this person. We now have
some of his works. We have a few of his actions. But it is
going to take a while to come to understand this person in
terms of his own dedication.
We are seeing some troubling issues relative to
missionaries, missionaries that are being forced out of Russia.
There are pockets of these. Russia is a big place and there are
thousands of Western missionaries in Russia. But still, there
is some troubling aspects to it. Of course, monitoring the 1997
law, which we felt at the time was a giant step backward in the
judicial system. There is uneven implementation of the
legislation, the fact that they do not control the hinterlands
in many respects, the Governors of some of these provinces.
You have all the potential for a chilling effect on the
people who want to worship because of how they believe or who
they believe, and can they do it under this particular system.
So this is not a bad report on Russia, but we would neglect
what could happen potentially in Russia at considerable peril.
So the Smith amendment, for instance, that we have to make
sure that the 1997 legislation does not do damage to minority
faiths, is good legislation that we probably need to continue.
I hope there comes a day when we can do the same with just the
IRF report and our office.
But until we know more about what is going to happen, the
registration process--what happens at the end of this year? A
lot of these churches and mosques and synagogues and the
Orthodox church itself, they are not going to be registered.
The bureaucracy does not allow the fast moving of that. Are
they going to be liquidated? Is the time going to be extended?
Is it going to be a license for people to discriminate against
people of faith? We are not sure.
So we are cautious, I think properly so, and we continue
our points of discussion with them on these issues.
Senator Brownback. I appreciate your service in the job,
your statements, and your comments here, and I hope you will be
available for future consultation. The only point of view that
I would dispute with you is on the Sudan, not that you listed
them as a country of particular concern. I think they deserve
that designation. But I believe we must do more. I think we
should not open the embassy. I think that the civilian bombing
must stop now.
The gentleman who took me to Sudan last year, says I could
not go in now because the bombing has increased that much on
civilian targets.
We want to provide direct development assistance to the
south. The President must include Sudan on his Africa list,
where he says: ``Never again.'' I think there are some obvious
steps the administration has not taken on the Sudan. I
appreciate your mentioning them as a country of particular
concern. I do not think our actions have stepped up to plate. I
know there is pressure to not get involved in Sudan, but this
is a brutalized population. It is ethnic and religious
persecution, and I think there is more that we could do.
Ambassador Seiple. Let me just say, as someone who was
kicked out of the north in 1988 as the head of World Vision and
having to work illegally in the South since 1988, there is
nothing I would like to see more than a resolution of the
conflict in a way that a solution is put together that endures.
I find it a very humbling place. Yes, there is probably
more we could do. We need all the help we can get. We are
grateful for yours. I say that on behalf of the State
Department. We have got to find a way that has an acceptable
end game and a solution to the conflict that will stand the
test of time.
So many things in Africa, unfortunately, have unraveled. We
have not gotten it either right or we were applying Band-Aids
to symptoms. This is as complicated and as humbling as it gets.
I said before, if it were easy it would not have taken us 17
years to get to this point. So we do indeed need your help on
this. I do not think there is a lot of disagreement on the
facts. It is just the methodology forward. At this point there
are maybe some differences, but we should not stop talking on
the subject.
Senator Brownback. God speed to you, Ambassador Seiple. You
have been a wonderful, wonderful person for the administration,
and I think you have left a record of integrity and honor.
Thank you very much.
Ambassador Seiple. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Brownback. I will call up our next panel, which
includes other members of the Commission. If you would please
come forward. I believe one will testify and the other two will
answer questions.
Dr. Kazemzadeh, welcome. Good to see you again. I
understand you will be providing testimony and the other two
Commissioners will be answering questions. Delighted to have
you here today.
STATEMENT OF FIRUZ KAZEMZADEH, VICE CHAIRMAN, U.S. COMMISSION
ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, AND SECRETARY OF EXTERNAL
AFFAIRS, NATIONAL SPIRITUAL ASSEMBLY OF THE BAHA'IS OF THE
UNITED STATES, ALTA LOMA, CA; ACCOMPANIED BY: HON. MICHAEL K.
YOUNG, COMMISSION MEMBER AND DEAN, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
LAW SCHOOL, WASHINGTON, DC; AND HON. JOHN BOLTON, COMMISSION
MEMBER AND SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE
FOR PUBLIC POLICY, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Kazemzadeh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My name is Firuz
Kazemzadeh and I am honored to serve as Vice Chairman of the
U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom. I wish to
thank the committee for inviting a representative of the
Commission to testify before you today on the annual report on
International Religious Freedom. I ask that my complete written
statement be made part of the hearing record.
Senator Brownback. Without objection.
I note that Senator Wellstone may be joining us later,
although he caught me on the floor and said he was carrying an
amendment about religious freedom in China associated with
PNTR. So, while he would love to be here at the hearing, he was
doing the work on the floor, so he could not join us. He may
join us later, though.
Dr. Kazemzadeh. I also want to thank the committee for
holding this hearing because it is through holding hearings
like this that the issue of international religious freedom can
become an integral part of this Nation's foreign policy agenda.
That, after all, is one of the guiding principles and purposes
behind the International Religious Freedom Act, the statutory
basis for the State Department's annual International Religious
Freedom report.
The annual report is important to keep religious freedom
high on the foreign policy agenda and an important tool to
promote religious freedom abroad. It brings to light the facts
on the ground and, perhaps just as significant, it describes
what the U.S. Government is doing to promote religious freedom
around the world.
The International Religious Freedom report is not only a
report to the world, but also to the Members of Congress. The
Commission urges Congress to take special note of what the
report says about U.S. policy toward violators of religious
freedom and activities designed to promote the protection of
religious freedom.
In the International Religious Freedom Act, Congress stated
that it was the policy of the United States to oppose
violations of religious freedom engaged in or tolerated by
governments of foreign countries and to promote religious
freedom, among other things, specific mandated actions
targeting violators. In other words, the law requires the U.S.
foreign policy to take into account the nature and severity of
religious freedom violations. This report therefore is a
yardstick with which to measure our progress in meeting the
goals of the statute.
I would like to take a moment to speak about Ambassador
Seiple. The Commission commends the hard work that Ambassador
Seiple and his staff have put into not only the annual
international religious freedom report, but also their
substantial efforts throughout the year to keep religious
freedom on the foreign policy agenda. Ambassador Seiple has
made a significant contribution to the work of the Commission,
on which he sat as an ex officio, nonvoting member, and we
value him as a colleague. We very much regret his departure.
The Commission will strongly urge the next President to
move quickly to fill the vacancy with a person as knowledgeable
and distinguished as Ambassador Seiple. It will also urge the
new Congress to impress upon the new President the importance
of doing so.
As the Commission noted in its own first annual report,
released in May, as important as the report itself is the
impact that its preparation has had on the State Department and
on our embassies. This year's report generally shows more
complete understanding of religious freedom issues and
extensive factfinding and verification. It reflects hard work
on the ground.
In other respects as well, this year's report is an
improvement over last year, and I note with pleasure that some
of the recommendations that the Commission made in its annual
report appear to have been adopted by the Department. Each
country report now has an introduction generally identifying
the most significant religious freedom problems in that
country.
There is a separate subsection detailing relevant law. Our
review of the Department's instruction cable sent to the
embassies earlier this year also shows that the Department
incorporated many of the Commission's suggestions in which
information it solicited from embassy officials. However,
problems remain. In some of the reports, the main thrust of
what is happening and why is lost in detail and through
omission of important context.
For example, the report focuses in a dozen or so pages
relating to Sudan mainly on the policies and practices of the
Sudanese Government with respect to religious freedom per se,
giving only a page to atrocities being committed as part of the
civil war, including for example aerial bombing of hospitals
and schools, abduction of women and children, and the burning
and looting of villages. There are, moreover, significant gaps.
For example, the report fails to describe the pivotal role
that oil extraction is having, especially in enhancing the
ability of the Government of Sudan to continue in its criminal
behavior. Similarly, it does not focus on the delivery of
humanitarian aid, for instance the longstanding refusal of the
Sudanese Government to allow humanitarian aid to reach some
regions. In short, the report fails to give the behavior of the
Government of Sudan the attention it deserves.
Another problem is that this year's report includes a
section in the executive summary entitled ``Improvements in
International Religious Freedom,'' which are also reported in
the individual country chapters. The Commission believes that
the reporting of such ``improvements'' must be carefully
handled in order to avoid misrepresentation of the conditions
of religious freedom.
Labeling what are positive developments--and such
developments deserve to be noted--labeling them as improvements
confounds positive steps with real and fundamental progress in
eliminating religious persecution. The mention of such positive
steps in the executive summary can overshadow an overall
negative situation. The executive summary should be the place
to report on fundamental lasting change in the protection of
religious freedom, as may be the case in Azerbaijan, but not
particular events that may be positive.
Several persecutors can make a positive gesture without
improving the overall conditions of religious freedom. On
occasion, they do it to deflect criticism and to mislead
foreign observers.
In the case of Sudan, for instance, the positive
developments highlighted in the executive summary are changes
of a shallow nature and not the type of developments that would
signal a change in the regime under which religious believers
suffer horribly. Another example is Laos, where the release of
religious prisoners, a welcome event, is characterized in the
executive summary as significant improvement. But the Laos
section noted ``the government's already poor record for
religious freedom deteriorated in some aspects.'' These
contradictory messages are found in the report's discussion of
Vietnam as well.
The Commission is pleased that the State Department has
listed for a second year Burma, China, Iran, Iraq, and Sudan as
``countries of particular concern,'' [CPC's] as well as the
Taliban regime of Afghanistan and the Government of Serbia.
This year's annual report affirms that the conditions in these
countries have not changed significantly. The Commission is
very disappointed, however, that the Secretary has not named
Laos, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, and Turkmenistan as CPC's.
On July 28, 2000, the Commission wrote to the Secretary of
State concluding that the governments of each of these four
countries have engaged in particularly severe violations of
religious freedom and thus meet the statutory threshold for
designation as CPC's. I have attached this letter to my written
statement for inclusion in the hearing record.
Senator Brownback. Without objection, it will be included
in the record.
Dr. Kazemzadeh. The Commission's conclusion was based on
the information that was available to us at that time. The
information contained in the 2000 annual report only confirms
that these countries should be designated as CPC's. The label
of ``CPC'' is important. It brings into the spotlight the
egregious violators. But the act of labeling is only one aspect
of the situation. The act requires policy responses and again
the International Religious Freedom report is a report on U.S.
action or actions to promote religious freedom and not only
report on facts and circumstances.
I would like to focus for a moment on actions taken in
response to CPC designations and then speak more broadly to
U.S. policy initiatives in certain countries that are of
concern to the Commission. Nowhere in the report did the State
Department mention the sanctions it may have imposed as a
result of a country's designation as a CPC. This is consistent
with State's previous practice. It has to our knowledge done
nothing to publicize the sanctions imposed under IRFA and at
times appears to go out of its way to avoid mentioning them.
In the cases of Sudan and China, the sanctions that the
State Department identified are inadequate and ineffective.
Regarding Sudan, the Department stated last October that in
order to satisfy the sanction requirement of IRFA the Secretary
of State also uses the voice and vote of the United States to
oppose any loan or other use of funds of international
financial institutions to or for Sudan pursuant to the
International Financial Institutions Act. More effective action
that the Commission has recommended included the closing of
U.S. capital markets to companies that participate in the
Sudanese oil fields and taking steps to end Sudan's ability to
control foreign food aid and use it as a weapon of war.
Regarding China, the Department stated that the Secretary
of State restricts exports of crime control and detection
instruments and equipment. It is difficult to believe that this
sanction sends a strong message to Beijing on religious
freedom.
I would also note that under IRFA the President must take
action or issue a waiver of the requirement to take such action
with regard to all countries the governments of which engage in
or tolerate violations of religious freedom and not only the
CPC's. These actions do not appear to be so recorded in the
annual report.
In general, the report shows that U.S. Embassy personnel in
a number of countries have been working to raise the issue of
religious freedom with their foreign counterparts. Embassy
personnel have also made inquiries and sought to monitor the
legal proceedings of some religious detainees. Ambassador
Seiple and his staff have traveled widely to reinforce the
message of the importance of religious freedom to the United
States.
The Commission applauds these actions. However, progress in
the promotion of religious freedom also requires that steps be
taken at the highest level of interaction between the United
States and foreign governments.
As a parenthetical point, I would like to note that in the
executive summary of this year's report actions taken by the
Commission itself are listed in the section on what the U.S.
Government has done with respect to a number of countries. This
practice should not be continued. The Commission is not
empowered to implement U.S. foreign policy, but to make policy
recommendations. Congress has required the Commission to report
on its activities separately from the State Department.
Including Commission actions in the annual report may blur the
distinction between it and the State Department in the minds of
the American public, NGO's, victim communities, and foreign
governments.
The report shows a number of countries where a
deterioration in the conditions of religious freedom has not
resulted in the adjustment of U.S. policy toward them. In the
case of China, the report bluntly states, and rightly so, that
the Chinese Government's attitude toward religious freedom has
deteriorated and the persecution of several religious
minorities has increased.
The report reflects the situation in almost excruciating
detail. Arrests of Falun Gong and Zhong Gong practitioners and
Christian worshippers in unregistered groups have accelerated
dramatically since June last year. At least eight Uigher
Muslims from Xinjiang Autonomous Region have been executed in
June and July on charges of splitting the country.
The receptivity of the Chinese Government to U.S. concerns
about religious freedom in China also appears to have
deteriorated. The Chinese Government has refused to reinstate
official bilateral dialog on human rights and religious
freedom. Government officials have refused to meet with U.S.
Embassy officials who intended to raise religious freedom
issues with them. The Department's Special Coordinator for
Tibet and a member of her staff were denied visas for travel to
Tibet.
It is distressing that the administration and the majority
of the House of Representatives are willing to overlook all of
this in pursuing their campaign for permanent normal trade
relation status for China.
Turkmenistan is another example of where the State
Department concludes that conditions of religious freedom have
worsened and yet the reported U.S. actions do not appear to
reflect any change in the U.S. policy. A promise by President
Niyazov to the State Department to allow minority religious
groups to register, thus legalizing their actions, has yet to
be realized.
A third example is France, where the report describes in
detail some disturbing recent events that threatened the
protection of religious freedom of minority religious groups.
In particular, the National Assembly in June of this year
passed a bill targeting the so-called ``sects'' for dissolution
and establishing a new crime of ``mental manipulation.'' It is
now pending in France's Senate.
The report also illustrates a number of instances where
U.S. policy does not appear to be in line with the gravity of
religious freedom problems in a particular country. The report
on Sudan does not display any coherent, concentrated plan on
the part of the U.S. Government for dealing with the atrocities
being committed there.
When the Commission studied that situation over the past
year, we were struck by the huge disparity between the scale of
atrocities being committed by the Government of Sudan and the
response of the President and the Secretary of State. Yes,
event by event the administration has expressed outrage and
disapproval, but we have not seen evidence of the sort of
concentrated and coherent policy that would have any hope of
success.
Consequently, in May of this year, as a key part of our
recommendations on Sudan, we laid out a specific 12-month plan
of action for the President, urging particularly that he
personally launch a vigorous campaign to inform the world of
Sudan's war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocidal
activities. In addition, the Commission has raised with the
State Department and the National Security Advisor the issues
of delivery of humanitarian aid in the face of continued
indifference by the Sudanese Government and oil extraction
enhancing the ability of the Sudanese Government to prosecute
the civil war.
The Commission has asked Mr. Berger to investigate reports
that the Commission received from credible sources, Anglican
and Catholic bishops in the Sudan, that the U.N.-provided
humanitarian aid for Sudan, including U.S. aid, is being
manipulated to force religious conversions among the country's
displaced and needy religious minorities. I have attached a
copy of the Commission's August 14, 2000, letter to the
National Security Advisor to my written statement for inclusion
in the hearing record.
Senator Brownback. It will be included in the record.
Dr. Kazemzadeh. With regard to North Korea, the report
notes that the United States does not have diplomatic relations
with that country. Nevertheless, the U.S. does have a policy
with respect to North Korea and one that is undergoing
significant changes, including the announcement of the lifting
of certain sanctions against the country.
We are not taking a position on the wisdom of these
actions. However, it is apparent from the report that human
rights and religious freedoms have not played a role in the
development of policy with respect to one of the world's worst
religious freedom violators.
With respect to Iran, again a country with which the United
States has no diplomatic relations and where there have been
significant developments in U.S. policy during the last year,
it is reported that the U.S. officials have raised religious
freedom issues and problems facing religious minorities in
international forums and in public statements at the highest
level. However, the United States can and should make clear to
Iran that respect for human rights and religious freedom is
among the necessary elements of improved ties between the two
countries.
The 2000 annual report states a sobering fact: Much of the
world's population lives in countries in which the right to
religious freedom is restricted or prohibited. As the richest
and most powerful nation on Earth, the United States can do
significantly more to vindicate this right abroad. As the
freest nation on Earth, it must do more.
On behalf of the U.S. Commission on International Religious
Freedom, thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for the invitation to
present the Commission's perspective.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Kazemzadeh follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Firuz Kazemzadeh
INTRODUCTION
Thank you and good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and members of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. My name is Firuz Kazemzadeh and I
am honored to serve as Vice-Chairman of the U.S. Commission on
International Religious Freedom. I wish to thank the Committee for
inviting a representative of the Commission to testify before you today
on the Annual Report on International Religious Freedom. I ask that my
complete written statement be made part of the hearing record.
I also want to thank the Committee for holding this hearing,
because it is through holding hearings like this that the issue of
international religious freedom can become an integral part of this
nation's foreign policy agenda. And that, after all, is one of the
guiding purposes and principles behind the International Religious
Freedom Act, the statutory basis for the State Department's Annual
International Religious Freedom Report.
IMPORTANCE OF THE ANNUAL INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT
The Annual International Religious Freedom Report is important to
keep religious freedom high on the foreign policy agenda and an
important tool to promote religious freedom abroad. It brings to light
the facts on the ground, and--perhaps just as significant--it describes
what the U.S. government is doing to promote religious freedom around
the world. The International Religious Freedom Report is not only a
report to the world, but also a report to the Members of Congress. The
Commission urges Congress to take special note of what the Report says
about U.S. policy toward violators of religious freedom and activities
designed to promote the protection of religious freedom. In the
International Religious Freedom Act, Congress stated that it was the
policy of the United States to oppose violations of religious freedom
engaged in or tolerated by governments of foreign countries and to
promote religious freedom, through, among other things, specific
mandated actions targeting violators. In other words, the law requires
that U.S. foreign policy take into account the nature and severity of
religious freedom violations, and be adjusted accordingly. This report
is the yardstick with which to measure our progress in meeting the
goals of the statute.
I would like to take a moment to speak about Ambassador Seiple. The
Commission commends the hard work that Ambassador Seiple and his staff
have put into the Annual International Religious Freedom Reports, but
also their substantial efforts throughout the year to keep religious
freedom on the foreign policy agenda. Ambassador Seiple has also made a
significant contribution to the work of the Commission, on which he has
sat as an ex-officio nonvoting member, and we value him as a colleague.
The Commission regrets his departure. The Ambassador at Large for
International Religious Freedom is a very important part of U.S. policy
initiatives to promote religious freedom abroad--the State Department
2000 Annual Report calls his office ``the fulcrum of the effort to
promote religious freedom.'' A prolonged vacancy in this crucial
position threatens U.S. progress in promoting religious freedom. The
Commission will strongly urge the next president to move quickly to
fill the vacancy with a person as knowledgeable and distinguished as
Ambassador Seiple. It will also urge the new Congress to impress upon
the new president the importance of doing so.
REPORTING ON THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
A few words on the Annual Report's reporting of the facts and
circumstances of religious freedom.
Although we have not had the time to review Tuesday's thousand-page
report in its entirety, it is apparent that the Department has done a
highly commendable job of telling the tragic story of religious freedom
around the globe. As the Commission noted in its own first annual
report released in May, as important as the report itself is the impact
that its preparation has had on the State Department and our embassies.
This year's report generally shows more complete understanding of
religious freedom issues and extensive fact-finding and verification.
It reflects hard work on the ground.
In other respects as well this year's report is an improvement over
last year, and I note with pleasure that some of the recommendations
that the Commission made in its annual report appear to have been
adopted by the Department. Each country report now has an introduction
generally identifying the most significant religious-freedom problems
in that country. There is a separate sub-section detailing relevant
law. Our review of the Department's instruction cable sent to the
embassies earlier this year also shows that the Department incorporated
many of the Commission's suggestions in what information it solicited
from embassy officials.
However, problems remain. In some of the reports, the main thrust
of what is happening, and why, is lost in detail and through omissions
of important context.
For example, the Report focuses, in its dozen or so pages relating
to Sudan, mainly on the policies and practices of the Sudanese
government with respect to religious freedom per se, giving only a page
to atrocities being committed as part of the civil war, including for
example, aerial bombing of hospitals and schools, abduction of women
and children, and the burning and looting of villages. There are,
moreover, significant gaps. For example, the Report fails to describe
the pivotal role that oil extraction is having--especially in enhancing
the ability of the government of Sudan to continue in its criminal
behavior. Similarly, it does not focus on the delivery of humanitarian
aid--for instance, the long-standing refusal of the Sudanese government
to allow humanitarian aid to reach some regions. In short, the Report
fails to give the behavior of the government of Sudan the attention it
deserves.
Another notable problem is that this year's report includes a
section in the executive summary entitled ``Improvements in
International Religious Freedom,'' which are also reported in the
individual country chapters. The Commission believes that the reporting
of such ``improvements'' must be carefully handled in order to avoid
misrepresentation of the conditions of religious freedom. Labeling what
are really positive developments--and such positive developments
deserve to be noted--as ``improvements'' confounds positive steps with
real and fundamental progress in eliminating religious persecution. The
mention of such positive steps in the executive summary can overshadow
an overall negative situation. The executive summary should be the
place to report on fundamental, lasting change in the protection of
religious freedom, as may be the case in Azerbaijan, but not particular
events that may be positive. Severe persecutors can make a positive
gesture without improving the overall conditions of religious freedom.
On occasion they do it to deflect criticism and mislead foreign
observers.
In the case of Sudan, for instance, the positive developments
highlighted in the executive summary are changes of a shallow nature,
and not the type of developments that would signal a change in the
regime under which religious believers suffer horribly. Another example
is Laos, where the release of religious prisoners--a welcome event--is
characterized in the executive summary as ``significant improvement.''
But the Laos section noted that ``the government's already poor record
for religious freedom deteriorated in some aspects.'' These
contradictory messages are found in the report's discussion of Vietnam
as well.
COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN
The Commission is pleased that the State Department has listed for
a second year Burma, China, Iran, Iraq, and Sudan as ``countries of
particular concern,'' (CPCs) as well as the Taliban regime in
Afghanistan and the government of Serbia--which, while not recognized
states, also remain ``particularly severe violators of religious
freedom.'' This year's Annual Report affirms that the conditions in
those countries have not changed sufficiently so as to warrant a change
in designation.
The Commission is very disappointed, however, that the Secretary
has not named Laos, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, and Turkmenistan as
CPCs. On July 28, 2000 the Commission wrote to the Secretary concluding
that the governments of each of these four countries have engaged in
particularly severe violations of religious freedom and thus meet the
statutory threshold for designation as CPCs.\1\ The Commission's
conclusion was based on the information that was available to us at
that time. The information contained in the 2000 Annual Report only
affirms that these countries should be designated as CPCs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ I have attached this letter to my written statement for
inclusion in the hearing record.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In Laos, during the last 12 months, increasing numbers of
Protestants, Baha'is and Catholics have been subjected to detention,
arrest and harassment, and over 50 persons have been reportedly
imprisoned for the peaceful practice of their faith.
In North Korea, notwithstanding the difficulty of obtaining
reliable information on conditions in the country, it is apparent that
religious freedom is non-existent. As this year's report states:
``Genuine religious freedom does not exist.'' The government has
imprisoned religious believers and apparently suppresses all organized
religious activity except that which serves the interests of the state.
Not identifying this repressive government as a CPC effectively rewards
it for suffocating free speech, press and travel so thoroughly that
information on religious persecution is limited.
In Saudi Arabia, the government brazenly denies religious freedom
and vigorously enforces its prohibition against all forms of public
religious expression other than that of Wahhabi Muslims. Numerous
Christians and Shi'a Muslims continue to be detained, imprisoned and
deported. As both the Department's 1999 and 2000 Annual Reports bluntly
summarize: ``Freedom of religion does not exist.'' How then can Saudi
Arabia not be deemed a country of particular concern?
In Turkmenistan, where the ruling regime is reminiscent of Stalins,
only the official Soviet-era Sunni Muslim Board and the Russian
Orthodox Church are recognized by the state as legal religious
communities. Members of unregistered communities--including Baha'is,
Christians, Hare Krishnas, and independent Muslims--have been
reportedly detained, imprisoned, deported, harassed, fined, and have
had their services disrupted, congregations dispersed, religious
literature confiscated, and places of worship destroyed. This year's
report notes a decline in the Turkmenistan government's overall respect
for religious freedom, and notes ``severe restrictions'' on minority
religious groups.
In addition to the four countries that the Commission recommended
be named as CPCs, the Commission advised the Secretary of State that
another four governments are close to earning the CPC label. India,
Pakistan, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam are among those countries that have
attracted the Commission's particular scrutiny, and they deserve the
Department's as well. Its own report bears this out.
REPORTING ON U.S. ACTIONS TO PROMOTE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
The label of CPC is important; it brings into the spotlight the
egregious violators. But the act of labeling is only one aspect of the
statute. IRFA requires policy responses and, again, the International
Religious Freedom Report is a report on U.S. actions to promote
religious freedom and not only a report on facts and circumstances.
I would like to focus for a moment on actions taken in response to
CPC designation, and then speak more broadly to U.S. policy initiatives
in certain countries that are of concern to the Commission.
U.S. ACTIONS IN RESPONSE TO CPC DESIGNATION
Nowhere in the report did the State Department mention the
sanctions it may have imposed as a result of a country's designation as
a ``country of particular concern.'' This is consistent with State's
previous practice: it has, to our knowledge, done nothing to publicize
the sanctions imposed under IRFA and at times appears to go out of its
way to avoid mentioning them. In the cases of Sudan and China, the
sanctions the Department of State identified are inadequate and
ineffective. Regarding Sudan, the Department stated last October that
``in order to satisfy the sanction requirements of the IRFA, the
Secretary of State also uses the voice and vote of the United States to
oppose any loan or other use of funds of international financial
institutions to or for Sudan pursuant to the International Financial
Institutions Act.'' More-effective actions that the Commission has
recommend include closing U.S. capital markets to companies that
participate in the Sudanese oil fields (the revenue from which helps to
fund the Sudanese government's war effort) and taking steps to end
Sudan's ability to control foreign food aid and use it as a weapon of
war. Regarding China, the Department stated that the Secretary of State
``restricts exports of crime control and detection instruments and
equipment.'' It is difficult to believe that this sanction sends a
strong message to Beijing on religious freedom.
I would also note that under IRFA, the President must take action
(or issue a waiver of the requirement to take such action) with regard
to all countries the government of which engages in or tolerates
violations of religious freedom, and not only CPCs. These actions do
not appear to be so recorded in the Annual Report.
U.S. ACTIONS TAKEN TO PROMOTE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
In general, the report shows that U.S. embassy personnel in a
number of countries have been working to raise the issue of religious
freedom with their foreign counterparts. Embassy personnel have also
made inquiries and sought to monitor the legal proceedings of some
religious detainees. Ambassador Seiple and his staff have traveled
widely to reinforce the message of the importance of religious freedom
to the United States.
The Commission applauds these actions. However, progress in the
promotion of religious freedom also requires that steps be taken at the
highest levels of interaction between the U.S. and foreign governments.
Religious prisoners and persecution must be prominently raised in
virtually every meeting between American diplomats and violator
governments.
As a parenthetical point, I would like to note that in the
executive summary of this year's report, actions taken by the
Commission itself are listed in the section on what the U.S. government
has done with respect to a number of countries. This practice should
not be continued. The Commission is not empowered by Congress to
implement U.S. foreign policy, but to make policy recommendations.
Congress has required the Commission to report on its activities
separately from the State Department. Including Commission actions in
the Annual Report may blur the distinction between it and the State
Department--in the minds of the American public, NGOs, victim
communities and foreign governments.
The report shows a number of countries where a deterioration in the
conditions of religious freedom have not resulted in an adjustment in
U.S. policy toward those countries.
In the case of China, the report bluntly states, and rightly so,
that the Chinese government's attitude toward religious freedom has
deteriorated and persecution of several religious minorities has
increased. The report reflects this situation in almost excruciating
detail. Arrests of Falun Gong and Zhong Gong practitioners and
Christians worshiping in unregistered groups have accelerated
dramatically since June of last year. At least eight Uigher Muslims
from the Xinjiang Autonomous Region were executed in June and July on
charges of ``splitting the country.'' The receptivity of the Chinese
government to U.S. concerns about religious freedom in China also
appears to have deteriorated. The Chinese government has refused to
reinstate official bilateral dialogue on human rights and religious
freedom. Government officials have refused to meet with U.S. embassy
officials who intended to raise religious freedom issues with them. The
Department's Special Coordinator for Tibet and a member of her staff
were denied visas for travel to Tibet. It is distressing that the
Administration and a majority of the House of Representatives is
willing to overlook all of this in pursuing its campaign for Permanent
Normal Trade Relations status for China.
Turkmenistan is another example of where the State Department
concludes that conditions of religious freedom have worsened, and yet
the reported U.S. actions do not appear to reflect any change in U.S.
policy. A promise by President Niyazov to the State Department to allow
minority religious groups to register, thus legalizing their
activities, has yet to be realized.
A third example is France, where the report describes in detail
some disturbing recent events that threaten the protection of religious
freedom of minority religious groups in that country. In particular,
the National Assembly in June of this year passed a bill targeting so-
called ``sects'' for dissolution and establishing a new crime of
``mental manipulation.'' It is now pending in France's Senate. However,
a comparison of this year's report on what the U.S. has done, in
comparison to last year's report on what the U.S. did, shows that
despite worsening conditions, the U.S. appears to have done less. This
deserves an explanation.
The report also illustrates a number of instances where U.S. policy
does not appear to be in line with the gravity of religious freedom
problems in a particular country.
The Report on Sudan does not display any coherent, concentrated
plan on the part of the U.S. government for dealing with the atrocities
being committed there. When the Commission studied that situation over
the past year, we were struck by the huge disparity between the scale
of atrocities being committed by the government of Sudan and the
response of the President and the Secretary of State. Yes, event-by-
event, the Administration has expressed outrage and disapproval. But we
have not seen evidence of the sort of concentrated and coherent policy
that would have any hope of success. Consequently, in May of this year,
as a key part of our recommendations on Sudan, we laid out a specific
12-month plan of action for the President--urging particularly that he
personally launch ``a vigorous campaign
. . . to inform the world of Sudan's war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and genocidal activities.'' In addition, the Commission has
raised with the State Department and the National Security Advisor the
issues of delivery of humanitarian aid in the face of continued
interference by the Sudanese government and oil extraction enhancing
the ability of the Sudanese government to prosecute the civil war. The
Commission has asked Mr. Berger to investigate reports that the
Commission received from credible sources--Anglican and Catholic
bishops in Sudan--that U.N.-provided humanitarian aid for Sudan,
including U.S. aid, is being manipulated to force religious conversions
among the country's displaced and needy religious minorities. I have
attached a copy of the Commission's August 14, 2000 letter to the
National Security Advisor to my written statement for inclusion in the
hearing record.
With regard to North Korea, the report notes that the U.S. does not
have diplomatic relations with that country. Nevertheless, the U.S.
does have a policy with respect to North Korea, and one that has
undergone significant change in the last year, including the
announcement of the lifting of certain sanctions against the country.
We are not taking a position on the wisdom of those actions. However,
it is apparent from the report that human rights and religious freedom
have not played a role in the development of policy with respect to one
of the world's worst religious freedom violators.
With respect to Iran, again a country with which the U.S. has no
diplomatic relations and where there have been significant developments
in U.S. policy during the last year, it is reported that U.S. officials
have raised religious freedom issues and problems facing religious
minorities in international forums and in public statements at the
highest levels. However, the United States can and should make clear to
Iran that respect for human rights and religious freedom is among the
necessary elements for improved ties between our two countries.
CONCLUSION
The 2000 Annual Report states a sobering fact: ``Much of the
world's population lives in countries in which the right to religious
freedom is restricted or prohibited.'' As the richest and most powerful
nation on Earth, the United States can do significantly more to
vindicate this right abroad. As the freest nation on Earth, it must do
more.
On behalf of the U.S. Commission on International Religious
Freedom, thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for the invitation to present
the Commission's perspective.
[Enclosures.]
U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom,
800 North Capitol Street,
Washington, DC, July 28, 2000.
The Honorable Madeleine K. Albright
Secretary of State,
U.S. Department of State,
Washington, DC.
Re: Recommendations for Presidential Designation of Severe Violators of
Religious Freedom
Dear Madam Secretary:
In its first year of operations, the U.S. Commission on
International Religious Freedom has investigated violations of
religious freedom engaged in or tolerated by governments of a number of
countries, using information from victims, religious groups and other
private organizations, the United States government, and others.
Although it continues to be denied access to embassy cable traffic, the
Commission has carefully reviewed the Department's Annual Report on
International Religious Freedom--1999 and its Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices--1999.
Based on this information, the Commission concludes that the
governments of Laos, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, and Turkmenistan have
engaged in particularly severe violations of religious freedom, and
therefore recommends that the President designate these four countries
as ``countries of particular concern'' (``CPCs''), for purposes of
Section 402(b) of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998
(``IRFA'') [22 U.S.C. Sec. 6442(b)].'' \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Commissioner John Bolton voted ``no'' on the vote to include
Saudi Arabia, and Commissioner Laila Al Marayati abstained.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In Laos, during the last 12 months, increasing numbers of
Protestants, Baha'is and Catholics have been subjected to detention,
arrest and harassment, and over 50 persons have been reportedly
imprisoned for the peaceful practice of their faith.
In North Korea, notwithstanding the difficulty of obtaining
reliable information on conditions in the country, it is apparent that
religious freedom is non-existent. The government has imprisoned
religious believers and suppresses all organized religious activity
except that which serves the interests of the state. Not to identify
this repressive government as a CPC would effectively reward it for
suffocating free speech, press and travel so thoroughly that
information on religious persecution is limited.
In Saudi Arabia, the government brazenly denies religious freedom
and vigorously enforces its prohibition against all forms of public
religious expression other than that of Wahabi Muslims. Numerous
Christians and Shi'a Muslims continue to be detained, imprisoned and
deported. As the Department's 1999 Annual Report bluntly summarized:
``Freedom of religion does not exist.''
In Turkmenistan, where the ruling regime is reminiscent of
Stalin's, only the official Soviet-era Sunni Muslim Board and the
Russian Orthodox Church are recognized by the state as legal religious
communities. Members of unregistered communities--including Baha'is,
Christians, Hare Krishnas, and Muslims operating independently of the
Sunni Muslim Board--have been reportedly detained, imprisoned,
deported, harassed, fined, and have had their services disrupted,
congregations dispersed, religious literature confiscated, and places
of worship destroyed.
The Commission further concludes that all of the seven governments
or entities named by the President last October as CPCs--Burma, China,
Iran, Iraq, Serbia, Sudan, and the Taliban in Afghanistan--continue to
engage in particularly severe violations of religious freedom, and
therefore should continue to be designated as CPCs.
The Commission also notes grave violations of religious freedom
engaged in or tolerated by the governments of India, Pakistan,
Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. The actions of the governments of these
countries may not meet the statutory threshold necessary for
designation as CPCs. Nevertheless, the Commission notes that under
IRFA, the President must take action (or issue a waiver of the
requirement to take such action) with regard to all countries the
government of which engages in or tolerates violations of religious
freedom (and not only CPCs) [Sec. 401(b)(1), 22 U.S.C. 6441(b)(1)].
Because of the seriousness of the violations in these four countries,
the Commission urges the Department to closely monitor religious
freedom in these countries during the upcoming year, and to respond
vigorously to further violations there (including CPC designation later
in the year, if appropriate).
In India, the central government appears unable (and possibly
unwilling) to control growing violence by self-proclaimed Hindu
nationalists targeting religious minorities, particularly Muslims and
Christians. Priests and missionaries have been murdered, nuns
assaulted, churches bombed, and converts intimidated in scores of
violent incidents over the past year.
In Pakistan, large numbers of Sunni Muslims, Ahmadis and Christians
have been harassed, detained, and imprisoned on account of their
religion under laws that prohibit blasphemy and essentially criminalize
adherence to the Almadi faith. In April of this year, the military
government abandoned its expressed intent to soften the blasphemy laws.
In Uzbekistan, scores of Muslims worshipping independently of the
state-controlled Muslim organization have been detained on account of
their religious piety. Several religious leaders--including Muslims,
Jehovah's Witnesses and Evangelical Christians--have apparently
disappeared under mysterious circumstances, died from mistreatment in
custody, or have received long prison terms.
In Vietnam, the law provides for the extensive regulation of
religious organizations by the state, and leaders and members of the
banned Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam, the ba Hao sect of Buddhism,
the Cao Dai religion, as well as Protestants and Catholics have been
detained without charge, imprisoned, heavily fined, harassed, or
subject to government surveillance.
The Commission is also deeply concerned about the violence between
members of different religious communities in Indonesia and Nigeria.
In Indonesia, current communal violence in the Malukus region has
reportedly claimed the lives of 4,000 Christians and Muslims since
January 1999, and there is evidence that the Indonesian government is
not controlling its armed forces, resulting in murder, forced mass
resettlement, and torture.
In Nigeria, disputes surrounding the actual and proposed enactment
of elements of Islamic law into the criminal codes of many states in
the northern part of the country have sparked a cycle of violence
between Muslims and Christians in many parts of the country.
The Commission recommends that the United States urge the
Indonesian and Nigerian governments to do all they can to prevent
further violence and bring the perpetrators of such violence to
justice.
Thank you, Madam Secretary, for considering the Commission's
recommendations.
Respectfully yours,
Elliott Abrams, Chairman.
Commissioner Michael Young, joined by Commissioner Nina Shea, states:
``Because I am convinced that the government of India tolerates
particularly severe violations of religious freedom, I dissent from the
Commission majority's decision not to recommend that the President
designate India a `countly of particular concern' under section 402 of
the International Religious Freedom Act (22 U.S.C. 6442(b)).
``Reliable reports from the media as well as religious and secular
human rights groups in India portray a marked and lethal increase in
violence against religious minorities in the past year. Christian
converts, missionaries and clerics have suffered over forty violent
assaults in the past year, including murder, rape, and church bombings.
Officials are slow to investigate and even slower to prosecute when the
alleged perpetrators are Hindu and the victim is not. This violence is
fomented, if not commissioned, by strident Hindu nationalist
organizations from which the Vajpayee Government refuses to distance
itself; indeed, its complacence has implicitly sent a message that
federal authorities will do little to stop attacks on non-Hindus or
interfere with state laws that intimidate Christian evangelism (e.g.,
among Dalits).
``IRFA dictates that the President `shall designate each country
the government of which has engaged in or tolerated [severe violations]
as a country of particular concern for religious freedom.'
Unfortunately, this certainly describes India during the past year, and
thus it should be so designated. Accordingly, I dissent from the
Commission's failure to request such a designation for India.''
U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom,
800 North Capitol Street,
Washington, DC, August 14, 2000
Mr. Samuel R. Berger
National Security Advisor,
The White House,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Berger:
As you know from your meeting with members of our Commission, the
situation in Sudan has been a central preoccupation of ours over the
last year. Recent reports have greatly increased our concern. Last week
various newspapers reported that the UN had suspended relief flights
into southern Sudan as a result of bombings conducted by the government
of Sudan. Last month we received reports from church leaders in Sudan
alleging that needed food aid is still not reaching the so-called ``no-
go'' regions and that the government has been using food aid to force
religious conversions. I am writing to (1) express our alarm over these
reports, (2) learn more about the relevant facts and current U.S.
policy, and (3) follow up on our May 1, 2000 recommendation that the
Administration strengthen the Sudan Sanctions Regulations.
We respectfully request that you respond to this letter before the
end of August, prior to the return of the Congress. Our sense of
urgency about Sudan is high. Not only have we received these reports
regarding the suspension of relief flights, starvation and disease in
the ``no-go'' regions, and forced conversions, but the government of
Sudan apparently is continuing to engage in the bombing of civilian
populations and aid centers and to consolidate its ability to do so
through the development of the oil fields in southern Sudan. The
overall situation seems only to be worsening.
First and foremost, we would like to know your assessment of, and
the Administration's plans for responding to, the UN suspension of
relief flights. How soon is the UN likely to resume flights? What are
the prospects for an increase in human suffering in the meantime? What
is the Administration doing or planning to do to assure that civilians
in southern Sudan will receive the humanitarian aid they need?
We have detailed below our concerns about the ``no-go'' regions,
forced conversions, and sanctions.
A. Food Aid
1. Availability in Non-OLS Areas of Sudan
The government of Sudan has long barred the UN's Operation Lifeline
Sudan (OLS) from providing humanitarian aid in some areas of the
country. Over the past several months, representatives of the
Administration have given assurances that U.S. aid to such areas would
be increasing. But church leaders on the ground in the Nuba Mountains
and other ``no-go'' zones report that their people are again dying from
starvation and disease and that U.S. humanitarian aid is not being
delivered to them.
This apparent discrepancy between stated policy and actual practice
may be explained by the following finding in the State Department's
Interagency Review of U.S. Civilian Humanitarian & Transition Programs
(January 2000), Annex 3, p. 4-5:
4) Lines of authority and accountability within the U.S. for
some key humanitarian issues related to Sudan remain unclear.
Some examples include:
a) The reform and revitalization of OLS
OLS's inability to effectively address issues related to access
to vulnerable groups has been cause for concern. Lack of access
was identified by USAID as a contributing factor to the 1988
[sic] famine. While a U.S. Action Plan called for aggressive
efforts at UN/OLS reform, it was unclear to those interviewed
for this Case Study how to make this happen. Should the State
Department or USAID be in the lead? Is it a UN reform question
or a regional, Sudan-specific one? What Agency and what level
of staff in that Agency have the authority to engage other
donors, the UN and the Sudanese government and rebel movements
on this question? \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The start of this passage may be found at
The authors of the Interagency Review in their next sentence
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
reached the disturbing conclusion that:
No steps have been taken on this important issue, even as
access issues again loom as a cause for concern in southern
Sudan.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Ibid.
At hearings on the United Nations and Africa before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee on July 12, 2000, more than six months
after the Interagency Review was issued, United Nations Ambassador
Richard Holbrooke acknowledged that he has ``never worked on Sudan at
all in the UN context.'' After no less than four Senators raised the
issue of the United Nations policy allowing the government of Sudan to
veto the delivery of OLS food aid, he then agreed to communicate this
concern to the United Nations Secretary General.
In identifying religion as a major factor in the conflict raging in
Sudan, the Commission stated in its May 1, 2000 report that the Sudan
government is committing atrocities at ``genocidal'' levels. A
principal weapon of the Sudan government has been mass, selective
starvation. As a result of Khartoum's banning of delivery flights of
international food aid to designated ``no-go'' areas, hundreds of
thousands of Sudanese civilians have already died of hunger and related
illnesses. These deaths could have been averted since U.S. aid was
available for Sudan. Senator Bill Frist, who has made several fact-
finding visits to Sudan, stated at the Senate hearings on July 12 that
he ``conclude(s) the United Nations has not even put up a struggle to
the restrictive terms that have been used to allow these so-called `no-
go' zones.''
We respectfully ask for an update on the efforts of the United
States to assure that humanitarian aid reaches the ``no-go'' areas,
including efforts to resolve the coordination issues highlighted by the
Interagency Review. We request your personal engagement to assure
appropriate and timely distribution of U.S. humanitarian aid within
Sudan, especially to the Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile region and other
``no go'' areas where thousands of lives are at risk.
2. Forced Conversions
The Commission has received reports from credible sources that UN-
provided humanitarian aid for Sudan, including U.S. aid, is being
manipulated to force religious conversions among the country's
displaced and needy religious minorities.
In mid-July, Sudan's Anglican Bishop Peter Munde of Yambio diocese
in southern Sudan and Catholic Bishop Macram Gassis of El Obeid diocese
in the Nuba Mountains and northern Bahr al Ghazal reported separately
to the Commission that, under the influence of the government of Sudan
some relief groups distribute UN aid with the precondition that those
receiving the aid convert to Islam. Such coercive practices would
directly violate fundamental principles of religious freedom.
Bishop Munde attested in a written statement to the Commission as
follows:
One of the tactics of the NIF government is to force
conversion by withholding food for those who will not convert
to Islam. My wife, nine children, and I were denied food for
four days because we are Christians. I have witnessed people
dying from hunger in towns where food is plentiful, especially
in Juba town in the south of Sudan. In Juba I have seen food
brought in, but after offloading, the food disappears. It is
sold at a higher price to people other than those for whom it
is intended, or it is withheld from those who will not convert
to Islam. . . .
According to the two church leaders a conversion-to-eat policy is
routinely enforced in the government-controlled camps outside Khartoum
where two million Christian and animist refugees are wholly dependent
on international aid. Although we do not know how many people are being
affected, both bishops reported that such coerced conversions are
``longstanding practices,'' ``common,'' and ``well-known'' throughout
government-controlled areas in Sudan. They said they have received many
reports of such practices from their priests and parishioners who had
escaped from the camps. ``If you want to eat, you must convert,''
reported Bishop Gassis about the relief practices in areas of his
diocese of El Obeid.
The bishops identified ``IARA'' (Islamic African Relief Agency) and
``Dawa Islamiya'' as NGOs that engage in such coercive practices.
We are deeply disturbed by these reports. We respectfully request
that you take urgent action to investigate and put a stop to any use of
U.S. humanitarian aid for coercing religious conversion, whether the
aid is delivered through the UN or NGOs outside the OLS system, and
that you inform us by the end of August of the steps you have taken or
plan to take. For your information, we have also brought these reports
to the attention of USAID.
B. Strengthening the Sudanese Sanctions Regulations
In our May 1 Report, the Commission made recommendations to the
President about the ongoing and severe violations of religious freedom
in Sudan. We were especially concerned that the accelerating
development of the oil fields in Sudan is increasing the ability of the
government of Sudan to wage what has become a genocidal war. We urged
the President, among other things, to strengthen the economic sanctions
against Sudan so as to further restrict the ability of companies that
are helping to develop those oil fields from raising capital on the
U.S. market. We respectfully request that you provide us with a
response to that recommendation.
The Commission's recommendations appear in the Report of the United
States Commission on International Religious Freedom, May 1, 2000, a
copy of which is enclosed. The relevant recommendations are
Recommendations 1.8 and 1.9, which provide as follows:
1.8 The United States should prohibit any foreign-organized
corporation from obtaining capital in the U.S. markets as long
as it is engaged in the development of the oil and gas fields
in Sudan, including exploration, extraction, piping or
refining.
1.9 In view of the linkage between oil and gas revenues and
the human rights violations of the government of Sudan, the
United States should mandate that any foreign-organized
corporation engaged in the development of the oil and gas
fields in Sudan must:
(a) in the event it intends to make an IPO in the United
States, disclose fully whether or not it intends to use the
proceeds of the IPO for development of those oil and gas fields
before it may proceed with the IPO; and
(b) in the event it is engaged in revenue-generating
activities in the United States, submit periodically for public
review reports on the nature, extent and duration of its
involvement in developing those oil and gas fields and its
revenue-generating activities in the United States.
C. Conclusion
Because of the urgency and severity of the situation in Sudan, we
ask that you respond to this letter by the end of August. I or our
Vice-Chairman, Dr. Firuz Kazemzadeh, would be pleased to respond to any
questions you or your staff may have. Thank you for your time and
attention.
Sincerely yours,
Elliott Abrams, Chairman.
Senator Brownback. Thank you very much, and I appreciate
your willingness to travel the world to areas of great concern.
I appreciate your willingness to be critical of, the
administration and its conclusions.
Dean Young, I would be curious if I could ask you about a
particular reference to China. News reports indicate reduced
religious liberties in China. My own personal experience has
actually been mixed in that regard. With the Tibetan refugees,
there is clearly a great deal of persecution. I spent a week in
the south adopting a daughter in December last year, and there
seemed to be a great deal of freedom in that region. This
merely a personal and linited experience.
You are an expert in this field. I would appreciate your
views on China's religious freedom and whether that has been
decreasing within the last couple of years.
Mr. Young. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate the opportunity
to be here as well and to talk just a little bit about China.
As you know, in our report the Commission did identify
China as a serious problem and recommended that we seek
substantial improvements in the human rights area, particularly
relating to religious freedom, and listed four or five areas
that might reflect that kind of improvement. That has been made
public in our report and in subsequent press releases.
I think we, if anything, feel more strongly about that in
the last few months than when we actually issued the report. As
our chairman said not so long ago, people told us not to expect
significant improvements in the near term as we engage with
China in deeper trade relations. They did not tell us to expect
a substantial deterioration, and that is in fact what we
believe we have seen.
There have been reports in a variety of areas. I refer you
to a press release that we issued on religious persecution in
China on September 4 of this year, in which we highlight the
extensive campaign against Falun Gong and Zhong Gong, and that
seems to have accelerated, not only in the past few months, but
even in the past few weeks and past few days. As many as 35,000
people may have been detained. Upwards of 27 to 30 reports,
credible reports of beatings that have resulted in death, over
5,000 people now detained in labor camps, many of those
receiving sentences that are at least as long as a decade, and
this is continuing and accelerating.
The Uigher Muslims, as it was also mentioned in Dr.
Kazemzadeh's testimony, is another indication of those
problems. We have seen even in the past few weeks an
acceleration of harassment of the house churches, as well as
attempts to further control the Catholic Church by ordaining
bishops and so forth.
The police have been particularly active in Tibet,
including ransacking and expelling monks from some of the
holiest shrines and so forth.
So I think it is certainly fair to say that one has seen in
the past decade a substantial increase in freedom in certain
kinds of areas in China. I think that is undeniable, I think
that is laudable, and I think much of our engagement with the
Chinese has had a positive effect in precisely that regard.
I think simultaneously, however, there has been substantial
decline in confidence in the ideology of the Communist party
and it has resulted in some resurgence of a variety of
different kinds of religions in China. Those seem to be viewed
increasingly as a threat to the Chinese and suppressed with a
vigor and force that, despite China's tremendous interest in
joining the WTO and engaging in broader trade relations,
despite that interest it has not deterred the Chinese in the
slightest from this expanded crackdown, even, as I say, in the
past few weeks, not to mention past few months and years.
Senator Brownback. How have the Chinese justified the
recent crackdown to the Commission? Has the Commission inquired
directly of the Chinese Government about this?
Mr. Young. We have sought from the Chinese Government the
opportunity to actually go to China and have not been granted
that permission yet. As was mentioned earlier, one of our staff
members has actually been denied a visa to go to Tibet. We have
been trying to engage the Chinese Government. We have sought
appointments with the Ambassador to talk about this at more
length and in more detail, and we have not had any satisfactory
official explanations. We have certainly talked to China
experts as well as to victims of this persecution, but have not
yet had the kinds of in-depth discussions with Chinese
officials to try and ascertain their views on this.
Senator Brownback. So they have just denied any sort of
discussion and have not engaged in any discussion at all?
Mr. Young. Yes, I think that is fair to say. I would not
say they denied it. In typical Chinese fashion, we are awaiting
a reply.
Senator Brownback. They have delayed it.
Mr. Young. Yes, they have delayed it.
Senator Brownback. Mr. Bolton, thank you for being here
with us as well today.
I might just open the floor up for you. Do you have a
couple of comments you would like to assert about the report,
or discuss what has occurred recently regarding religious
freedom?
Mr. Bolton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I just add
two points perhaps, one on China. I think it is significant
from the point of view of American interests in dealing with
China that the execution of the Muslim Uighers in Xinjiang
Province was announced by the PRC as having to do with their
efforts, at least in the PRC's view, to split Xinjiang away
from Beijing's rule.
This concern about ``split-ism,'' as the Chinese Government
calls it, is something, although not limited to religious
freedom, is something that gets the attention of people in
other parts of that region, in Taiwan for example, which is
also repeatedly criticized by Beijing for split-ist tendencies.
Now, the particular sin of the people on Taiwan is they keep
voting and, even worse than voting, they keep voting for
elected officials who do not agree with what Beijing believes
to be the correct political status of Taiwan.
That is not something within the Commission's jurisdiction,
but I can assure you that people on Taiwan are quite concerned
about the future of their own population, their own government,
their own status, many of whom are people of faith themselves--
Christians, Buddhists, Falun Gong, many different confessions.
They watch with particular care what Beijing is doing in its
equal opportunity repression of all religious faiths inside
China.
So that this question of the treatment of the Uigher
Muslims is not simply something that we object to as a matter
of the repression of their religious freedom, but it plays
directly into the calculations of leaders in other countries in
that region that have a direct bearing on American national
security.
Second, Mr. Chairman, if I could just say a brief word
about Korea and echo what Firuz Kazemzadeh said in his
statement, the Commission's full statement, about how
disappointed we are that North Korea has not been designated as
a country of particular concern. As I understand the position
of the State Department in interpreting the Religious Freedom
Act, their view is that they have to look on a year by year
basis for a deterioration in the conditions of religious
liberty within a country and then meet all the criteria that
Ambassador Seiple referred to before they can designate it as a
country of particular concern.
The problem arises where you have a country, like North
Korea, where the level of religious freedom is already at
absolute zero, so that if in the course of 365 days there is no
further deterioration in the condition of religious liberty
because it's not possible to get any worse, as I understand the
State Department view, that precludes them from adding North
Korea to their list.
Now, we have considered this question within the
Commission. As on many other things, we have a variety of
views. But it was our consensus, as expressed in the letter to
Secretary Albright that Firuz Kazemzadeh referred to that is
attached to the testimony, that North Korea, precisely because
its level of oppression of religious freedom is so intense,
that it should have been--the State Department should have
designated it as a country of particular concern.
We looked at the same statutory criteria and we were able
to come to the conclusion that it fit the description that
Congress intended when it wrote the Religious Freedom Act. I
would hope that the State Department would reconsider that
question, but I would just flag that as something the Congress
may want to take a look at. I cannot believe when you wrote the
act you did not intend to catch up countries like North Korea.
Indeed, precisely because of the change of policy toward North
Korea, as to which as a Commission obviously we take no
position--again, we are of different views on that--but
precisely when there is an opening in discussion with a country
like North Korea, that is precisely the time for the
administration to make very clear to the Government of North
Korea what our views on this subject are.
Senator Brownback. I certainly agree with that statement.
If we are going to engage with North Korea at this point in
time, we should be clear as to what we view as a fundamental
human rights standards, including religious persecution. North
Korea has a dismal record in this regard.
Could I ask you, Dr. Kazemzadeh, how can we help the
Commission to become more effective? Are you getting sufficient
information and support from the State Department?
Dr. Kazemzadeh. It took us some time to be able to read
cables from U.S. Embassies in various countries of concern. We
attribute this partly to the usual bureaucratic lack of
efficiency. But over time cooperation has increased and
undoubtedly Ambassador Seiple and his staff have played an
important role in persuading the other elements of the State
Department to let us see that cable traffic, which is really
important.
We have been also receiving information from other Federal
agencies, the Central Intelligence Agency, and I do not think
at this point we really have any complaints, and we are happy
to acknowledge that cooperation. As far as making the
Commission more effective, well, in the first year the
Commission labored under a handicap because it took months to
acquire a place of business, to gather a staff. Our first
annual report was produced under extremely unfavorable
conditions. We thought at times that our staff might not even
survive because of the amount of work that they had to do at
the last moment.
Those conditions obviously have now improved. There still
can be improvements made. We probably will need a little bit
more help. But on the whole, I think we are in good shape.
Senator Brownback. Good.
Dean Young, I limited your statement earlier. Do you have
other areas that you would like to put forth as a brief
statement for consideration?
Mr. Young. No. I think that we have largely covered it in
our written submission. I would just note that, in addition to
the countries we have mentioned as those that ought to be
considered as countries of particular concern, we also have
listed some others that we think bear watching and particular
scrutiny, including on that list was certainly India, as well
as Pakistan, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. Those are all countries
about which we have some concern.
I think that for the most part the State Department's
report reflects the nature of our concerns. But those are also
countries that I think bear particular consideration and
particular watching. India I think is one that has particular
potential for problems, and that is something that we will be
certainly watching closely on our side and hope that, in the
absence of improvements, that we will have a chance to come
back and talk with you and work together to devise ways in
which we may effectively and positively influence that.
Dr. Kazemzadeh. May I add to this?
Senator Brownback. Yes, please.
Dr. Kazemzadeh. We are also concerned with Uzbekistan and
Vietnam. Reports from these countries are distressing and the
Commission plans to look very carefully at both of these.
Senator Brownback. Very good.
If I could just say thanks to all of you. I have met with a
number of people since my service in the Senate has begun who
have been persecuted for their religious beliefs in their home
country. People who live in fear that their loved ones will be
killed because they have a different religious persuasion. Each
time I felt a dart in my side to think that millions suffer for
their faith worldwide.
I do not know if there is a more noble thing that we could
be involved in than this task of giving voice, support, effort,
and recognition to religious liberty.
We have a long ways to go. I think your report clearly
illustrates this. But we have started down the right path, and
each of you have contributed greatly toward this effort.
So keep up your excellent work. Godspeed to you. You are
really doing work that impacts millions and millions of people
across this planet.
The record will remain open for the requisite number of
days. The hearing is concluded.
[Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Questions Submitted for the Record
Responses from United States Commission on International Religious
Freedom to Additional Questions Submitted for the Record of September
7, 2000
Question. What, if any, cooperation have you had in gaining access
to information collected and/or produced by federal agencies? In
particular, could you speak to cable traffic made available about the
State Department? How can Congress help?
Answer. In most cases, federal agencies have been very responsive
to Commission inquiries for information related to international
religious freedom. In the case of the State Department's cable traffic,
in August 2000, the Commission was granted permission to review
redacted cables. Under this agreement, the Commission submits names of
countries and mutually agreed upon search criteria which the State
Department uses to locate relevant cables. State's Freedom of
Information Office then identifies portions of the cables that they
believe should be redacted because they deem it irrelevant to the
CIRF's work, it reveals the ``deliberative process'' of DOS authors, or
some similar reason. The Office of International Religious Freedom
reviews the recommended redactions to determine if they agree, and then
sends the cables to the country desk officer for a final decision. The
Freedom of Information Office redacts information based on the country
desk officer's instruction. Commission members and staff with security
clearances are then allowed to go to the State Department to read the
redacted cables. Under this agreement, the Commission is subject to
cost-sharing for redacted cable information.
Section 203(b) of the International Religious Freedom Act
(``IRFA'') (as amended by Section 1 of P.L. 106-55), 22 U.S.C.
Sec. 6432a, gives the Commission power to secure information from any
Federal department or agency that the Commission considers necessary to
carry out its statutory mission. Although pleased to have access to
information in State Department cable traffic, the Commission wishes
the Congress to clarify under what terms that information should be
shared. The Commission's reports to Congress might be materially
improved if it had access to the ``deliberative process'' of embassy
officers in persecuting countries.
Question. Does the Commission think the President should have taken
further actions against China, given its status as a ``country of
particular concern?''
Answer. In the case of China, the Commission believes that the
sanction the Secretary of State identified as meeting the requirements
of IRFA as a result of China's designation as a ``country of particular
concern'' (``CPC'') is inadequate and ineffective. The Department
stated that the Secretary of State ``restricts exports of crime control
and detection instruments and equipment.'' It is difficult to believe
that this sanction sends a strong message to Beijing on religious
freedom. In its letter of October 22, 1999, sent to Congress and
constituting its report to Congress pursuant to Section 404 of IRFA,
the Department also stated: ``As a matter of policy, the Department of
State, in conjunction with other U.S. agencies as appropriate, will
continue vigorously to pursue all other available means of altering
Chinese behavior with respect to religious freedom.'' Judging from the
Department's Annual Report on International Religious Freedom--2000, it
is not at all apparent that the State Department has vigorously pursued
``all . . . available means'' of altering Chinese behavior toward
religious freedom.
As confirmation of this view, in September 2000, in light of the
re-designation of China as a CPC, the Secretary decided ``to take no
further action with respect to [China] since the action taken last year
for [China] is still in effect.'' In other words, the State Department
took no further action against China despite a marked deterioration of
religious freedom and the marked failure of the Department's initial
response (i.e. the export restriction on crime control equipment). In
its first Annual Report of May 1, 2000, the Commission set forth a
number of policy recommendations to the President, the Secretary of
State, and Congress in order to respond to the systematic, ongoing, and
egregious violations of religious freedom engaged in by the Chinese
Government. In its second Annual Report, the Commission will again
consider appropriate policy responses with respect to religious freedom
in China.
Of particular concern to the Commission is the current ability of
the Chinese government to obtain capital on U.S. markets. In 1998, the
government sold bonds in large quantity to U.S. investors, without
having to disclose with specificity how it planned to use the proceeds.
It stated merely that it planned to use the money ``for general
governmental purposes, including infrastructure projects.'' Those
purposes, however, include oppressive regulation of domestic religious
activity and development of oil resources in Sudan. Recent press
reports indicate that China plans another large bond offering in the
near future. The Commission recently informed the President that, in
its view, he has authority under IRFA to bar U.S. institutional
investors from purchasing such bonds and asked him whether he agrees
and plans to exercise that authority. The Commission plans to take the
President's response into account when it formulates its
recommendations. Options include not only preventing such sales until
China makes substantial improvement in respect of religious freedom,
but also requiring greater disclosure and sufficient assurances to
guarantee that the proceeds are never used for religious persecution.
Also of concern is the current ability of Chinese corporations to
sell their securities to U.S. investors. The proceeds from these sales
could end up supporting the repressive policies of the government,
inasmuch as it controls the corporations. But, in addition, the money
might be used directly or indirectly to support development of the
oilfields in Sudan, where at least one Chinese corporation is heavily
involved. One option that the Commission is studying for dealing with
these risks is more specific disclosure about the use of proceeds in
SEC registration statements.
Question. A letter to Mr. Berger, released yesterday [September 6,
2000] by the Commission, inquires of recent reports of two Muslim
relief groups in Sudan forcing conversion to Islam for food. Has the
Administration responded to the Commission's inquiry?
Answer. The Commission has asked National Security Advisor Berger
to investigate reports that the Commission received from credible
sources--Anglican and Catholic bishops in Sudan--that humanitarian aid
for Sudan provided by the United Nations, including U.S. aid, is being
manipulated to force religious conversions among the country's
displaced and needy religious minorities. In response to our inquiry,
we were told by the USAID that they conducted some preliminary
investigations in Khartoum--talking to humanitarian groups on the
ground. USAID has asked for additional information from the Commission,
such as specific dates on which the alleged practices were said to have
taken place. They have also briefed the Commission on their food aid
distribution and verified that one of the non-governmental
organizations in question is no longer eligible to be a direct
recipient of USAID funds (as reported by the New York Times). The
Commission will continue to engage the appropriate federal agencies in
pursuit of a full investigation of these matters.
Question. The religious and sectarian violence in Indonesia has led
to the deaths of thousands of people. What is the Commission's
assessment of the situation and what actions should the U.S. Government
take to end the violence?
Answer. The Commission is gravely concerned about the current
communal violence in the Malukus region of Indonesia. There are reports
that at least 3,000 Muslims and Christians have been killed since the
outbreak of violence in January 1999. The situation worsens as the
killing continues and supplies of food and medicine reportedly dwindle
in the region. The Commission is particularly concerned because there
is evidence to suggest that the Indonesian government is tolerating
systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom such
as murder, forced mass resettlement, and torture. There appears to be
little question but that the targets and victims of such violence are
selected on the basis of their religion. Moreover, places of worship
have been primary targets for destruction.
On July 5, 2000, the Commission wrote to Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright with recommendations for a stronger U.S. Government
response to the Muslim-Christian violence wracking Indonesia's Maluku
Islands. The Commission recommended that the United States Government:
(1) use all diplomatic means at its disposal to encourage the
Indonesian government to stop the violence and to investigate and
prosecute those responsible; (2) provide whatever assistance is
necessary to help the Indonesian government in these efforts as well as
to alleviate the humanitarian situation; (3) monitor closely the
implementation of the state of civil emergency in the Malukus that
President Wahid declared on June 25, 2000; and (4) if the Indonesian
government is unable to control the violence, press for the deployment
of an international peacekeeping force, as was done in East Timor.
Further investigation has been stymied by the ban on travel to the
affected areas.
Question. Explain why you think India should be listed as a
``country of particular concern?''
Answer. On July 31, 2000, the Commission wrote to the Secretary of
State and concluded that ``the governments of Laos, North Korea, Saudi
Arabia, and Turkmenistan have engaged in particularly severe violations
of religious freedom, and therefore recommends that the President
designate these four countries as `countries of particular concern'
(`CPCs'), for purposes of Section 402(b) of the International Religious
Freedom Act of 1998 (`IRFA') [22 U.S.C. Sec. 6442(b)].'' In addition,
the Commission noted grave violations of religious freedom engaged in
or tolerated by the governments of India, Pakistan, Uzbekistan and
Vietnam, and urged the State Department to closely monitor religious
freedom in these countries during the upcoming year, and ``to respond
vigorously to further violations there (including CPC designation later
in the year, if appropriate).'' Experts and first-hand witnesses at the
Commission's public hearing on Capitol Hill on September 18, 2000,
confirmed a marked deterioration of religious freedom for religious
minorities in India.
In the July 31, 2000 letter, Commissioner Michael Young, joined by
Commissioner Nina Shea, stated: ``Because I am convinced that the
government of India tolerates particularly severe violations of
religious freedom, I dissent from the Commission majority's decision
not to recommend that the President designate India a `country of
particular concern' under section 402 of the International Religious
Freedom Act (22 U.S.C. 6442(b)).
``Reliable reports from the media as well as religious and secular
human rights groups in India portray a marked and lethal increase in
violence against religious minorities in the past year. Christian
converts, missionaries and clerics have suffered over forty violent
assaults in the past year, including murder, rape, and church bombings.
Officials are slow to investigate and even slower to prosecute when the
alleged perpetrators are Hindu and the victim is not. This violence is
fomented, if not commissioned, by strident Hindu nationalist
organizations from which the Vajpayee Government refuses to distance
itself; indeed, its complacence has implicitly sent a message that
federal authorities will do little to stop attacks on non-Hindus or
interfere with state laws that intimidate Christian evangelism (e.g.,
among Dalits).
``IRFA dictates that the President `shall designate each country
the government of which has engaged in or tolerated [severe violations]
as a country of particular concern for religious freedom.'
Unfortunately, this certainly describes India during the past year, and
thus it should be so designated. Accordingly, I dissent from the
Commission.''
Question. The United States has valuable relationships with nations
like Egypt and Saudi Arabia. And yet religious freedom is curtailed in
those nations to a very real extent. How do we factor in religious
freedom in determining what our overall relationship is with a
strategic friend? How do we conduct an alliance relationship with
nations with such visible blemishes? How should we conduct our
diplomacy with regard to issues other than religious freedom--and with
what linkages to the issue of religious freedom?
Answer. The role that religious freedom should play in the
formulation and implementation of U.S. policy with respect to any
foreign country should be based on the particular circumstances of that
country and its relations to the United States. Strategic allies should
understand that the U.S. Government, as well as the people of the
United States, take human rights and religious freedom seriously and
that these constitute a significant element in relations between the
U.S. and any foreign country, in particular friendly relations with an
ally. In this respect, the openness of a foreign government to scrutiny
of the factual situation and its religious freedom policies is
especially important. Linkages between religious freedom and other
policy objectives can be made both in the positive and negative sense
in that, under appropriate circumstances, benefits can be withheld or
inducements offered based on improvements in religious freedom. These
linkages should be seriously considered where improvements in the
protection of religious freedom are possible based on the leverage
available through the linkage. Finally, the U.S. should be particularly
cautious to avoid actions or policies in pursuit of a strategic
friendship where those actions or policies may tacitly acquiesce in or
inadvertently contribute to a foreign government's engagement in, or
toleration of, violations of religious freedom or conditions in society
that promote religious intolerance and persecution.
Question. The Commission put out a ``Statement on Religious
Persecution in China'' this past Monday [September 4, 2000]. What
dimensions of religious persecution in China should Senators be
thinking about in contemplating the conduct of a China policy after
annual debates about MFN/NTR disappear?
Answer. In the aforementioned statement, the Commission noted the
deteriorating conditions of religious freedom in China since June 2000,
including the brutal crackdown against the Falun Gong and Zhong Gong
spiritual movements, executions of Uighur Muslims, the rising detention
and harassment of Protestants and Roman Catholics who refuse to join
the state-controlled religious organizations, and the tightening
controls on Buddhists in Tibet. The Commission stated that ``the U.S.
government has a moral obligation to speak out and let the Chinese
government know that these abuses are unacceptable.''
In the context of the then-upcoming vote on Permanent Normal Trade
Relations (PNTR) with Vietnam, the Commission made a number of specific
recommendations, reiterating its first Annual Report. These
recommendations included that PNTR should be granted only after China
makes substantial improvement in respect for religious freedom. As
measurements for such improvement, China should:
(a) open a high-level and continuing dialogue with the U.S.
on religious freedom-issues;
(b) ratify the International Convention on Civil and
Political Rights, which it has signed;
(c) permit the U.S. Commission on International Religious
Freedom and international human rights organizations unhindered
access to religious leaders, including those imprisoned,
detained, or under house arrest;
(d) respond to inquiries regarding persons who are
imprisoned, detained, or under house arrest for reasons of
religion or belief or whose whereabouts are not known, although
they were last seen in the hands of Chinese authorities; and
(e) release from prison all religious prisoners.
Also, before granting PNTR, the U.S. Congress should:
(a) announce that it will hold annual hearings on human
rights and religious freedom in China; and
(b) extend an invitation to the Dalai Lama to address a Joint
Session of the Congress.
Further, the United States should use its diplomatic influence to
ensure that China is not selected as a site for the Olympic Games until
it makes significant improvement in human rights, including religious
freedom.
Now that PNTR has been granted, the Commission believes that these
policy goals and responses are still relevant to U.S. policy toward
China. Congress should pursue other available opportunities to
influence the behavior of the Chinese Government, for example through
holding public hearings, insisting upon effective action by the
Executive Branch under IRFA, and supporting the work of the new federal
commission on China and this Commission. It is the Government of China,
through its laws and policies, that engages in gross violations of
religious freedom. The Commission further believes that it is incumbent
on those in Congress who supported PNTR because they believed that
further engagement with China in trade and in the international
institutions concerned with trade would improve human rights in China
to pay close attention to the conditions of human rights and religious
freedom in China, and to speak out when necessary as part of that
engagement with the Chinese Government and people.
Also, beyond trade, another major aspect of our relationship with
China is the ready access that the Chinese Government and Chinese
corporations currently have to U.S. capital markets. As discussed
above, that access raises important policy questions that Congress
should address. For example, should not the Chinese Government, before
it can offer sovereign bonds, have to rule out the possibility that it
will use the proceeds for religious persecution or for enhancing the
ability of the Sudanese Government to make war against its Christian
and animist citizens in southern Sudan?
Question. What do you make of the persistent efforts of the Chinese
Government to root out spiritual groups--like the Falun Gong, the Zhang
Gong, and the China Fang-Cheng Church--under the so-called ``Evil Cult
Law?''
Answer. Over the past several years, Chinese officials have been
employing increasingly strict laws and regulations as instruments to
harass religious groups and maintain control over religious activities.
Officials responsible for enforcing the strict laws continue to be
guided by Communist Party policy directives on religion. Furthermore,
the Chinese legal system does not protect human rights from state
interference, nor does it provide effective remedies for those who
claim that their rights have been violated. Thus, this Commission finds
that even though the Chinese Government modified its means of state
control by moving to a system of regulation of religion according to
law, it has not improved the conditions of religious freedom in China--
quite the contrary.
The anti-cult provision of the Chinese Criminal Code has been used
against many groups. Action is largely directed at organizations with
national networks that have raised what authorities perceive to be
political challenges. Following a peaceful demonstration in Beijing by
Falun Gong practitioners in June 1999, the Civil Ministry declared
Falun Gong an illegal organization and charged it with endangering
social stability and propagating ``superstition.'' Security forces have
detained thousands of prisoners and continue to do so. On July 22,
1999, the Department of Public Security prohibited all Falun Gong
activities.
Several other qigong groups have been banned including Go Gong, Chi
Bei Gong and Benevolence Practice. In January of 2000, Zhong Gong, a
meditation and exercise group claiming 20 million practitioners, was
added to the list of banned organizations. Also outlawed under anti-
cult provisions of the law is a Buddhist group called Guan Ying School.
The anti-cult provision of the Criminal Code also has been used
against Christian groups apparently in a response to a bold move in the
summer of 1998 by leaders of 12 house church networks. Frustrated by
policies that render their evangelical and charismatic worship services
illegal, these leaders issued a communique calling on the leadership of
the Communist Party to open dialogue with the ``Chinese House Church.''
The communique demanded the unconditional release of Christians
imprisoned for practicing their religion, modification of regulations
that limit the activities of house churches, an end to government
harassment of house churches, and clarification of the definition of
the term ``cult.'' Religious leaders associated with the document have
been arrested. There is some evidence that the crackdown on Falun Gong
and Christian Fellowship involved not just local Religious Affairs
Bureau and Public Security Bureau personnel, but national security
forces as well, indicating a determination by central authorities to
deal forcefully with this broad network of churches.
Question. Should the detention on August 24th (and then the
expulsion on August 26th) of three Taiwan-born American citizens--Henry
Chu, Sandy Lin, and Patricia Lan--among 130 detainees of the China
Fang-Cheng Church be special cause for U.S. concern? When U.S.
missionaries, Christian missionaries in this case, are the targets of
persecution, does that increase the imperative for the U.S. Government
to respond? What should the response be?
Answer. The International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 states that
it shall be the policy of the United States to condemn violations of
religious freedom and to promote the fundamental right to freedom of
religion. Thus, incidents such as the detention (and subsequent
expulsion) of three U.S. citizens in August of this year on account of
their religious activities in China are definitely a cause of concern.
According to press reports, these three were arrested for participation
in a house church function of the China Feng-Cheng Church. The concern
over apparent violations of religious freedom such as this is
heightened when U.S. citizens are victims of such violations,
particularly when they are detained or imprisoned. In this way, U.S.
citizens who are lawfully present in a foreign country as religious
workers, or those simply engaged in personal religious activities,
should be treated no differently by the U.S. Government than U.S.
citizens present in a foreign country for other purposes and engaging
in other peaceful activities. On occasion, foreign religious workers or
other visitors may run afoul of domestic laws, policies, or practices,
the enforcement of which violates the home country's legal norms
regarding freedom of religion or its international human rights
commitments. In such cases, the U.S. government should urge (and use
appropriate pressures to try to ensure) that the home country act in
accordance with its international obligations.
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