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THE IRREGULAR WARFARE ROADMAP

HEARING

BEFORE THE

TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND
CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE

OF THE

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THE IRREGULAR WARFARE ROADMAP

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
SUBCOMMITTEE,

Washington, DC, Wednesday, September 27, 2006.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:30 p.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jim Saxton (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JIM SAXTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW JERSEY, CHAIRMAN, TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. SAXTON. The stenographer is ready, so if we could all take our seats. The Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities meets today to discuss the Department of Defense Irregular Warfare Roadmap. The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, marked the engagement of the United States in a very different form of warfare than has been the focus of strategic military planning during the Cold War. The global war on terror is defined by its long-term and irregular nature, and it requires an approach that does not solely focus on conventional capabilities or direct action missions to kill or capture terrorists and their supporters.

Recognizing the irregular nature of the global war on terror, the Department of Defense is taking measures to adapt to this new threat environment and to focus on building and improving our military irregular warfare capability by expanding Special Operations Forces, shifting conventional forces toward irregular warfare and significantly developing an Irregular Warfare Roadmap.

The roadmap will guide the implementation of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review recommendations as well as provide an important tool for the department to continue refinement of its approach to the global war on terror.

At the end of the hearing, we should walk away with a good understanding of where the Department of Defense is developing the Irregular Warfare Roadmap, what impacts the roadmap will have on policy, planning and research decisions and what operational activities and issues can be expected in the conduct of the irregular warfare campaign.

As a committee, we must remain focused on the strategic objectives of this war, and irregular warfare will prove to be a deciding factor in the global war on terror.

Today we have a great panel: Mr. Mancuso, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations in Combating Terror-

ism, Office of the Assistant Secretary For Defense of Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict; Vice Admiral Eric Olson, U.S. Navy, Deputy Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command; and Brigadier General O.G. Mannon, U.S. Air Force, Deputy Director, Special Operations, Joint Staff.

We look forward to your testimony as we represent the key—as you represent the key players in the development of the Irregular Warfare Roadmap as well as those who will be most closely involved in the roadmap’s implementation.

Before I proceed, let me yield to the ranking member for—Mr. Smith is the ranking member today.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Saxton can be found in the Appendix on page 27.]

**STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
WASHINGTON, TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS
AND CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE**

Mr. SMITH. Sitting in for Mr. Meehan who had a family situation to deal with today, so I appreciate the opportunity, and I thank the Chairman and join him in welcoming our witnesses and look forward to their testimony.

Particularly I want to thank the Chairman for having the hearing on this incredibly important subject. It is titled irregular warfare, but at this point, it is pretty much regular warfare for us. It is what we are doing now in Iraq and Afghanistan and elsewhere and learning how to deal with all that entails is critical to our victory in the war on terror. And as with all warfare, it is always different than the last one. It is just a matter of how it is different.

So learning those differences I think is critically important, and it is worth saying that, at this point, we still have work to do, without question. We have not had the success we would even have liked in Iraq or even Afghanistan and elsewhere, so we need to continue to learn lessons and move forward and get better at it to understand the dynamics of the irregular warfare that we face.

And with that said, I am very confident that we can figure it out as a Nation. We have met many new challenges, things we didn’t expect. That is the normal way of life, unfortunately. Things come that you didn’t expect. It is a matter of how quickly you change and adapt to them in order to deal with the new challenges, and that is what the military and our country faces right now in dealing with the brand of warfare that we face.

It is going to be a very long war. We need to figure out the new dynamics, adapt and do our best to contend with them. I am confident that we will.

I will look forward to hearing from our witnesses and asking questions as well to learn how we are doing and how we can do better. I have a longer statement for the record which I will submit, and I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SAXTON. Without objection. Thank you very much, Mr. Smith.

Admiral, the floor is yours sir.

STATEMENT OF VICE ADM. ERIC T. OLSON, DEPUTY COMMANDER, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND, U.S. NAVY

Admiral OLSON. Sir, I have submitted a statement for the record. With your permission, I will not read that but instead make a few separate comments regarding irregular warfare. I think it is important that we understand what irregular warfare is, in part at least, and what it is not.

So I will focus my opening remarks on that.

Chairman Saxton, Congressman Smith and distinguished members, I am pleased to be here before you today. I am pleased to join my colleagues, General Mannon and Mr. Mancuso, in doing so.

Irregular warfare is a relatively new term. It is without doctrinal history in the Department of Defense lexicon. The working definition of irregular warfare, which we will discuss today, was approved by the Deputy Secretary of Defense during the development of the Irregular Warfare Roadmap, which is still a work in progress.

The key words in the working definition of irregular warfare are that irregular warfare is a form of warfare. It is not a list of units that conduct irregular warfare. It is not a list of capabilities for irregular warfare. It is not a list of weapons systems for irregular warfare.

Instead, it is more an approach. It is a set of activities. It is what we do with the capability and with the units and the systems, not those things themselves.

Irregular warfare does include aspects of insurgency and counter insurgency, guerrilla warfare, unconventional warfare asymmetrical warfare and much more. There can be irregular warfare activities conducted in a regular or a major warfare campaign. Irregular warfare activities may include direct action and indirect action approaches.

But irregular warfare is certainly not just about a range of military actions or military options. One tends to think about irregular warfare as something other than direct force-on-force confrontation between uniformed armies extending to other less kinetic actions by the Department of Defense, and that is true.

But it is also important to know that irregular warfare activities include many of those activities that are squarely in the domain of other agencies of our government and in the domain of coalition forces and coalition nations in a global campaign.

Irregular warfare is clearly bigger than the Department of Defense, and although the Department of Defense (DOD) does have a key role in leading and conducting many irregular warfare activities, it is certainly not confined to DOD. And even within the Department of Defense, irregular warfare is much bigger than the United States Special Operations Command, although United States Special Operations Command has a history and a culture and a maturity of thought and actions that make Special Operations Command uniquely suited to leading Defense Department efforts in many of the areas of irregular warfare.

The nine core activities of Special Operations Forces have significant overlap with the activities of an irregular warfare campaign, those being: counter proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; combating terrorism; direct-action special reconnaissance; uncon-

ventional warfare; foreign internal defense; civil affairs; psychological operations; and informational operations; and synchronizing Department of Defense activities for the global war on terror. But irregular warfare activities, of course, include activities beyond the range of Special Operations activities.

And just to be clear, the Irregular Warfare Roadmap that we are addressing today is not a campaign plan or a guiding document for the global war on terror. It does not lay out the Department of Defense's total approach to irregular warfare. It is one of eight roadmaps under development, some of which have been approved and some not yet, that will serve as implementing documents to follow through on decisions made during the Quadrennial Defense Review. And the real purpose of the irregular warfare is to provide resourcing guidance to the services and the Special Operations Command within the Department of Defense as we go forward to implement the QDR decisions.

It represents a sub set of the universe of irregular warfare activity and, again, remains a work in progress.

Sir, that concludes my opening remarks.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Olson can be found in the Appendix on page 37.]

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you very much. Secretary Mancuso can we get your remarks next please? Thanks and thank you for being.

STATEMENT OF MARIO MANCUSO, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND COMBATING TERRORISM, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

Secretary MANCUSO. Thank you. It is my pleasure, sir.

Chairman Saxton, Congressman Smith and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for inviting us here today to present you with an update on where the Department of Defense is regarding irregular warfare.

As the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) stated, the United States is involved in a long war. This war is irregular in its nature, and our enemies are not traditional conventional military forces but rather dispersed global terrorist networks that exploit Islam to advance radical political ends.

Three factors have intensified the danger of this irregular war challenge: the rise of virulent extremist ideologies; the absence of effective governance in many areas of the world; and the potential of these enemies to acquire weapons of mass destruction.

Irregular warfare is a form of warfare and has a long history. Unlike traditional warfare, which focuses on defeating an adversary's military forces, the focus of irregular warfare is on the legitimacy of the relevant political authority.

Irregular warfare favors indirect approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other elements of national power to erode an adversary's power, influence and will.

Irregular warfare will likely be the dominant force of conflict our Nation faces over the next two decades. The global war on terror and irregular war in the most fundamental sense will require the U.S. military to adopt nontraditional and indirect approaches.

And while we must maintain our ability to deal with traditional threats, our Armed Forces must rebalance to adjust to this changing national security environment. Our experience thus far on the war on terrorism underscores the need to reorient our military forces to be able to project power through indirect approaches on a global scale and for an indefinite period.

The future security environment will challenge traditional U.S. advantages. The U.S. and its partners are likely to face state and non-state adversaries that employ irregular warfare as their primary form of warfare. Strategic policy and operational and other factors may preclude and constrain our Armed Forces from conducting conventional military campaigns against them. This problem will be exacerbated by nuclear-armed hostile states with sophisticated anti-access capabilities that may preclude direct military options.

These situations will require or favor an-all-of-government effort, including an irregular military approach using indirect and often nontraditional methods and means to achieve U.S. strategic objectives.

Moreover, even when the use of direct conventional military confrontation is feasible, the U.S. Government may seek the use of indirect approaches instead. The offensive use of irregular warfare will likely become an increasingly attractive strategic option and preferred form of warfare for the United States to meet its challenges and achieve its objectives.

Our Armed Forces will therefore require sufficient capability and capacity to wage protracted irregular warfare on a regional and global scale and for an indefinite period. The U.S. has a long history of waging irregular warfare. But our experience has been on limited engagements for limited periods of time, normally in association with conventional military operations.

What differentiates irregular warfare from more conventional warfare is its emphasis on the use of irregular forces generally and the other indirect nonconventional methods and means to subvert, attrite and exhaust an adversary or render him irrelevant to the host population rather than on defeating him through direct means on the battlefield.

Unlike conventional warfare, irregular warfare is an armed political struggle for control or influence over and the support of an indigenous population.

The President's recently released National Strategy for Combating Terrorism provides the vision for defeating terrorism and winning this kind of war. The war on terrorism is both a battle of arms and a battle of ideas.

This war will require us to meet and fight our terrorist enemies in the irregular warfare battle space while promoting freedom and human dignity as alternatives to the terrorist ideology of oppression and totalitarian rule.

The strategy will require the application and integration of all elements of national power and influence. The military must be resourced to rebalance the force to permit victory in this type of war. Specifically, we must improve the capability of our general purpose forces to conduct counterinsurgency operations and to part-

ner with and train foreign forces to defeat insurgencies and terrorist organizations.

Our Special Operations Forces must also rebalance to devote a greater degree of effort to counterterrorism operations, defeating terrorist networks and combating the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation.

The National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism describes the approach the Department of Defense will take to fulfill its role within the larger national strategy for combating terrorism and provides the Secretary of Defense's strategic framework for the application of the military instrument of national power in the global war on terror.

This plan established six military strategic objectives to permit development of the Defense Department's campaign plan for the global war on terror. The six objectives are and remain: denying terrorists the resources they need to operate and survive; enabling partner nations to counter terrorist threats; denying weapons of mass destruction technology to our enemies and increasing our capacity for consequence management; defeating terrorist organizations and networks; countering state and non-state support for terrorism in coordination with other U.S. Government agencies and partner nations; and countering ideological support for terrorism.

As noted in the 2005 QDR, the Department of Defense must rebalance its forces to support the National Military Strategic Plan.

The Department of Defense has established an aggressive time line for implementing the approximately 30 tasks over the next year in order to improve our ability to conduct irregular warfare, known as the Irregular Warfare Roadmap, as Admiral Olson mentioned. The focus of this roadmap is enhancing irregular warfare capabilities and capacities throughout the entire Department. A companion effort entitled, Building Partnership Capacity Roadmap, addresses interagency and multinational initiatives related to irregular warfare.

Both of these roadmaps are complemented by the Department of Defense directive 3000.05 which directs the Department to improve its capabilities to conduct stability operations.

The Irregular Warfare Execution Roadmap has begun to provide senior leadership with a mechanism to advance high-priority issues for decision through the fiscal year 2008 to 2013 Defense program.

The roadmap will transform the department through the implementation of five major initiatives: one, changing the way we manage people necessary to support irregular warfare; two, rebalancing our general purpose forces to better support irregular warfare; three, increasing our Special Operations Forces capabilities and capacity to support irregular warfare; four, increasing our capacity to conduct counter network operations; and five, redesigning our joint and service education and training programs to conduct irregular warfare.

The assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and low intensity conflict is fully committed to supporting the Irregular Warfare Roadmap and identifying and addressing capability and capacity shortfalls related to irregular warfare in coordination with U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and the Joint Staff.

In addition, we are identifying and requesting assistance to address legal authorities related to irregular warfare specifically section 2067 and section 1208 of Title 10 which provides the legal authority for U.S. military personnel to train and equip foreign forces supporting the war on terrorism.

Throughout our history, U.S. Military Forces, Active Duty, Reserves and National Guard, have adapted to engage new threats to our Nation.

The 2005 QDR identified the capability and capacity shortfalls that must be addressed to meet the full range of challenges to the United States, irregular, conventional, disruptive and catastrophic.

The Irregular Warfare Roadmap in particular represents a concerted effort to transform how we manage and train our forces and to rebalance our general purpose forces and Special Operations Forces to meet the irregular warfare challenge.

Chairman Saxton, Congressman Smith, distinguished members, thank you again for your interest in and support of our irregular warfare initiatives. I am honored to appear before you today, before this distinguished committee, and at the appropriate time, I would be happy and delighted to answer your questions. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Mancuso can be found in the Appendix on page 28.]

Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Secretary thank you, very much.

General, the floor is yours sir.

STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. OTIS G. MANNON, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, SPECIAL OPERATIONS, J-3, JOINT STAFF, U.S. AIR FORCE

General MANNON. Good afternoon, and thank you, Chairman Saxton. Chairman Saxton, Congressman Smith, distinguished Committee members. Thank you for inviting us here today to present you with additional information concerning the Irregular Warfare Roadmap.

For most of the 20th century, we knew who our enemies were and where they lived. They had armies, navies and air forces to attack with recognized capitals and populations to put at risk. However, in the 21st century, as we have already alluded to, we face a different enemy, an enemy defined by a complex network of ideologically driven extremists who will attempt to engage us not only far away from our shores but at home as well.

Future efforts in the long war on terror include many operations characterized by irregular warfare, operations in which the enemy is not a regular military force of a nation-state. As we are all aware, we are engaged in a global conflict, and our efforts confronting the enemy must also be global in nature. These operations will occur on multiple fronts and cannot be limited to primarily military activities.

The Department of Defense's 2006 QDR describes the Department's efforts to shift emphasis from a focus on major conventional combat operations to multiple irregular operations.

Secretary Rumsfeld emphasized the QDR was not in itself an end state; particular emphasis will continue in several critical areas through the development of following roadmaps.

The purpose of the Irregular Warfare Roadmap is to facilitate implementation of 2006 QDR decisions regarding DOD capabilities and capacity to conduct and support protracted irregular warfare.

The Irregular Warfare Execution Roadmap converts the broad policy objectives established during the QDR into actionable tasks. It also provides the Department's senior leadership with a mechanism to advance high-priority irregular warfare issues for program decisions through the fiscal year 2008–2013 Future Years Defense Program as well as establishing an oversight and management process for implementing irregular warfare initiatives.

The execution roadmap addresses the need to develop an increased capabilities and capacities throughout the Department by grouping lists in five broad subject areas of reliance of operation. Mr. Mancuso referred to those five areas, so I will not repeat those at this point.

Today, we must cope not only with the threats produced by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile technology among nation-states but also with threats posed by individual terrorists and terrorist networks with global reach.

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review was a crucial step forward in addressing the challenges posed by these new threats. By providing a method for continuous assessment and refinement, the Irregular Warfare Execution Roadmap serves as a primary means for implementing those forward-thinking decisions.

Chairman Saxton, committee members, thank you for your interest in and support of the Department's Irregular Warfare Roadmap. We stand here ready to answer your questions.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Mannon can be found in the Appendix on page 42.]

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, General.

Let me just take care of a little housekeeping item here. After consultation with the minority, I now ask unanimous consent that Mr. Taylor, a member of the House Armed Services Committee, be allowed to participate in today's subcommittee hearing and be authorized to question witnesses. Mr. Taylor will be recognized at the conclusion of the questions by members of the subcommittee. Thank you.

Mr. Smith, would you like to lead off?

Mr. SMITH. Certainly. Thank you. I appreciate the information. I am most interested in getting down to some of the specifics in terms of how all of this is working in the various places we are trying to deploy, obviously more in Iraq and Afghanistan, our two most prominent places. And we are struggling in both in varying degrees in terms of reducing violence and getting a stable government in place and, frankly, winning support of the people broadly in both of those countries for support of those governments. You can disagree with that assessment if you like.

But if you don't, how are we doing? How can we do better? How can we get to the point where we start to see success in Iraq, and I guess the other important question overarching all of this is, what is the metric of success? Because that is something that, as a policy maker, I am wrestling with now, is we have 140,000 U.S. troops in Iraq.

How are they making the situation better? There hasn't been a lot of evidence of that, frankly, in the last, well, certainly year, maybe longer. And if not, you know, that certainly shows some weaknesses in what we can do.

Is there a way to change it to start having more success? To boil that all down, what is the measure of success focusing on Iraq and Afghanistan? Why haven't we done better, you know, hitting those metrics? And what is the plan to get there, to get to the point? And overarching all of that is my assumption that success is, you know, having a stable government that you know is at least not directly hostile to us.

If you can take a stab at that and how unconventional warfare is playing out and how we can do better at it, that would be very helpful.

Secretary MANCUSO. Sir, thank you for the question.

To begin with, what I would like to say is the Irregular Warfare Roadmap is more broadly about how we can get better and how we can institutionalize some of the best practices. So as we think about the roadmap, it is not tied to—it is certainly not tied to Iraq and Afghanistan directly, nor is it tied to any particular operation. It is tied really to the future and our ambitions for it.

Mr. SMITH. Certainly, and I understand that. But that is indicative. And I don't wish to limit it just to that; I think it does have those broad applications that you mentioned, but getting into the specific helps us understand better how it is going to apply elsewhere.

Secretary MANCUSO. Yes, sir. But in one sense, it is tied in a very important way, and that is the best practices that we have developed; the insights that our troops on the ground have developed in fighting a protracted irregular warfare in places like Iraq and Afghanistan have been folded up into our process as we think about it.

So in that sense, Iraq and Afghanistan, not only are they important missions in and of themselves, but they are important classrooms. And I don't mean to diminish those missions by describing them as such for the future as the Department builds up its capability and capacity to do that.

But to get to your metric of success, clearly a free, democratic and secure Iraq is important. We believe we are making very, very good progress. Clearly, it is a difficult mission. But in terms of the broader metrics and how we succeed in the global war on terror—

Mr. SMITH. Focus on the progress piece of that; where we are making very, very good progress, that would be a good place to go for metrics. What is the metrics of your assessment of that progress? Where is it that this is getting better; that is getting better? What is the progress you discussed specifically?

Secretary MANCUSO. Sir, I am not sure I am the best person equipped to talk about Iraq generally. I have a fairly narrow—an important but narrow portfolio on our counterterrorism Special Operations. So I would be happy to go into that. I could take that question for the record and get back to you.

Mr. SMITH. That would be helpful. Yes, that would be helpful if you can do that.

Secretary MANCUSO. Yes, I would certainly do that. Thank you. [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 53.]

Mr. SMITH. I thought you were going to go into some of those metrics for success.

Secretary MANCUSO. I can do that.

Our strategic end state is essentially impacting our enemy's ability to act globally and catastrophically—the enemy, as I use it, is al Qaeda and the affiliated movement—and to ensure that its ability to act locally in venues is outweighed by the capacity and willingness of our partners to defeat them.

That sounds grand, and it sounds nebulous, but we are well on the way of breaking up a global threat, emulsifying it, if you will, and then focusing in on our partners and allies in equipping them and ensuring that they are equipped to defeat the local threat, to keep it contained. That is the strategic end state. Are we there yet? No, we are not.

But we are making progress as we are engaged throughout the world and throughout the entire global war on terror.

Mr. SMITH. Admiral, General, if either one of you had anything to add to that?

Admiral OLSON. Sir, I think you have honed in very quickly on the somewhat nebulous nature of irregular warfare. The desired end state is an environment that is inhospitable to terrorism and terrorist activity.

And there are different approaches to getting there that will have different measures of success. Clearly, in terms of the direct approach, that being disrupting terrorist activity and preventing the acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction, I think the metrics of effectiveness of a terrorist network clearly would show success.

We are aware of the removal, either by death or capture, of several of the leaders of al Qaeda in Iraq. We are aware that their infrastructure has been disrupted to the point that it is less effective over time.

But the longer-term actions that will ultimately be decisive in a terrorist campaign, those being partner issues, nation capacity, an atmosphere, an environment that does not provide tacit or active support to terrorist activity, the metrics for those are a little bit, are quite a bit different. And in some ways, the direct action activities do not support and in some cases may even work against the metrics of the indirect approach.

Mr. SMITH. Absolutely. Let me take one final stab.

I appreciate your forbearance, Mr. Chairman.

Sort of getting the population on your side is one of the key parts of irregular warfare. You know then they are cooperating with you when it is no longer popular to be an insurgent. You sort of— hearts and minds, not to be cliché. But that is what we are talking about. And that is where, when I look at what has happened in Iraq and to a lesser extent in Afghanistan, I wouldn't be happy with the outcome if I was you—and I am not happy with the outcome being me—it seems like we haven't done a lot of, you know, we haven't had a lot of success in terms of getting the population to believe that we are the good guys and the guys we are fighting

are the bad guys. And that is where you get into the irregular aspect of it. That is where you get beyond, okay, there is a bunch of terrorists, we have to go blow them up; to, how do we work with the population to get them to see that we are working in a more positive direction? We haven't been terribly successful at that. I am going to try one more time to try to drag you into the specific here because I would think that, given what you do learning specific lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan, would be right at the top of the list in understanding how to do better both there and elsewhere. So in terms of getting the population to see us as the better, we have not done that very well. What have we learned in terms of how we can do that better, either there or elsewhere?

Admiral OLSON. I will take that first, sir. I couldn't tell who you were addressing that to.

Mr. SMITH. Any one of the three of you that thinks he has a good and answer is fine, so.

Admiral OLSON. I think the attitude of the people, particularly in Iraq but not only in Iraq, depends to a large degree on the stability of the environment in which they live.

The stability of the environment in which they live is largely determined by the development, the effectiveness of an Iraqi government, self rule, and the training and effectiveness of Iraqi police and military units so that they can ensure stability and safety in the populace.

Those are longer-term efforts than capturing and killing terrorists. And as those efforts are underway with, in a robust way with great vigor, we are still in a situation where we need to capture and kill a certain number of violent extremist organization leaders.

And I think it is undeniable that the activities in the direct action approach may work against some of the activities in the indirect approach and then, therefore, create an environment that, again, where the metrics of the direct approach are more easily measurable than the metrics in the indirect approach.

Clearly, we understand that—the lessons learned are that stability contributes to success. So the efforts are to create a stable environment, and that is occurring in many ways.

There are partner nation-building activities across Iraq and Afghanistan that will ultimately be decisive in the global war on terror.

Secretary MANCUSO. Congressman Smith, I would like to add something. You described Iraq. In many—first, what I would like to say is, I am not sure I agree with your assessment of how the local population feels toward U.S. forces. That is not to say that the situation is not complex. But I think it is highly variable depending clearly upon who you talk to and what part of the country you are in. But in that respect, that entire debate is off stage left because in terms of an irregular warfare paradigm, what is most important is not what the Iraqis think of us but what they think of their own government, a sovereign government of Iraq that is in the process of standing up—that has stood up but is in the process of maturing versus those who would destroy that government. And I think in this complex battle, it is clear that the Iraqi people have a greater faith in their government. But to underscore something that Admi-

ral Olson said, stability is key. And that is the variable that will be decisive over the longer term.

And it is our contention that as the government matures, as it is better able to provide security, that that internal dynamic between the insurgency and the government to state it very, very succinctly, that dynamic will improve in favor of a free, democratic and secure Iraq.

In terms of what we have learned from the dynamic, we really learned that the world is a complex place; that irregular warfare clearly favors indirect approaches, which is precisely why, wherever possible, we work with the host nation. We work with partner countries because it is their country. They know it better, and it just works better.

Mr. SAXTON. We are going to go to Mr. Hayes in just a minute, but on the way there, one aspect of indirect warfare is training people to be our partners. And I wonder if whoever wants to take this question could just comment on our progress in carrying out the mission of getting, particularly in Iraq but perhaps also in Afghanistan, the indigenous people trained up. We hear numbers. Sometimes we hear some assessments.

What is your assessment of how we are doing with regard to the Iraqi military and the Iraqi police force?

Secretary MANCUSO. Sir, I don't have the most recent numbers. The last time I checked, the general trend was positive. It was not going as quickly as we would like, but we were generally on schedule. I can get back with the specific response, and we will get numbers to you. And we can take that for the record.

Admiral OLSON. I don't have specific numbers either, but I think we can generally feel pretty good about the training activity that is taking place and its effectiveness. I will say that it may not be going as quickly as we would have hoped, but I don't think we knew how quickly we should expect it to go.

But we are nonstop working very closely with selected Iraqi forces and of course, the forces of the Army and the Marine Corps mostly, but all services are also working with Iraq and Afghanistan on a much larger scale than we are. It is just a different segment of the force.

And I think, anecdotally but also measurably, we have shifted in many areas, many locations, those forces with which we have worked the longest; we have shifted from leading them on the target to following them on the target. We have shifted from planning their operations to watching them plan their own operations. And so the members of Special Operations—which I can address specifically—who are out there doing that, they are proud of what they are doing, and they feel—they believe that they have good reason to think that the Iraqis in particular and the Afghans are showing great success over time.

General MANNON. Sir, one other lesson that we have learned that may be a valid point here is the fact that the ability of the United States Military to train and equip indigenous forces, that we need the help of the interagency community, and we outstrip their ability to support us. So that is one of the lessons that we found and that the Irregular Warfare Roadmap intends to at least improve on so that we can move forward faster.

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you.

Mr. Hayes.

Mr. HAYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, thank you for being here.

Admiral, following up on Mr. Smith's question, which was certainly a good one, could you describe for us the conditions in Fallujah today and Fallujah a year or 18 months ago? I think there is dramatic progress that has occurred there. I can't describe it too accurately, but if you are familiar, status now versus status back then, Admiral Olson.

Admiral OLSON. Sir, I would rather take that for the record. I haven't been to Fallujah lately. I would be reporting second- or third-hand information, and therefore, in the in the interests of being accurate, I would like to confirm that with people who I think would give a better report.

Mr. HAYES. Fair enough. I don't want to put you on the spot, but I know there are dramatic changes from—significant stability has occurred there or is what is happening there versus the extreme instability not that long ago. It is difficult—people at home, people in Washington, they want a yard stick. They want to be able to measure where are we on the yard stick. It is so hard to do. Again, going forward, people, even though we here get to see and hear things that are extremely reassuring, anything you all can do to help us get the message out clearly and accurately that progress being made, and it is difficult. You have the challenge of—we don't do body counts. I think that is wise, but again, kind of a hypothetical but actual situation when we were in control of the southern part of Afghanistan; I was over there recently; been there a number of times. U.S. Forces view the enemy and General Boykin refers to the enemy as a worldwide insurgency. It is not just a localized insurgency. What the insurgents have done against U.S. Forces because of their capabilities is to embed themselves anywhere they can and hide in the civilian population; Baghdad, places like that.

Is there a significance to the fact, again looking for a sign of progress, that once the U.S. Forces turned over that part of Afghanistan to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), all of a sudden the tactics at least temporary changed where significant forces came out in the open and chose to engage our coalition partners, NATO, as opposed to really sticking with the insurgency as long as we were there. That seems to me to be again a sign of where we are and where we are going. They have done that. They have been countered successfully.

Is it positive? Is it constructive? To comment on that, General Mannon or Admiral Olson.

General MANNON. Sir, in a general statement, I would say that with regard to your question concerning Afghanistan and the transition, the enemy has reacted like all enemies during that transition period and attempted to exploit a perceived seam. As a result of that, we have had reasonable success in the—again, not getting to a body count—but in pursuing the enemy, by supporting our coalition forces through air power, and we have been able to turn that back around, and we have also seen some indications at this level

that they may be changing the way in which they want to approach the fight in Afghanistan.

Mr. HAYES. Admiral Olson, comment, again this is from having been there with Ray, talking to General Richardson of NATO, who is anxious to get in the fight; it is good news, want us to maintain the assets, air, to support them, and they have done a very good job. Seems like the enemy changed their tactics. Now they are going back because of the success being had there, and not to say it is not a tough fight.

Admiral OLSON. Sir, the circle of operation against the terrorist threat is to isolate the threat, defeat the threat and then prevent the reemergence of that threat. I think we have been successful in many places in isolating the threat and defeating the threat where we have isolated it. Preventing the reemergence of it is a continuous effort. And we will see flare ups in different regions where we see a reemergence of the threat which we need to isolate and then defeat it again.

We see that in Anbar province in Iraq. We see it a little bit in Oruzgan province in Afghanistan. And it is so thus far that is why I was uncomfortable upfront speaking with confidence because I don't know exactly where we are in this reemergence of the threat. When we—when we defeat the threat, we often don't know that we have defeated it forever.

So it requires continuous pressure in some of these areas.

Obviously, we have reason to feel good about success in Fallujah today. It is a much more stable environment than it was a year ago, as you alluded.

What I don't know well enough is what the potential for reemergence for a threat is in Fallujah and how much we are going to be able to shift our focus into other regions, sir.

Mr. HAYES. I think I see a red light, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. I will—

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you.

Mr. Larsen.

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And Mr. Mancuso, are we going to expect to see in the 2008 budget proposal some language from you all regarding section 1206 and 1208 of title 10?

Secretary MANCUSO. We expect that language, yes. The answer is, yes.

Mr. LARSEN. For something more long-term as opposed to, we usually end up getting filed in appropriations as opposed to over here in authorization.

Secretary MANCUSO. We can get back to you.

Mr. LARSEN. But we should expect to see language, some language?

Secretary MANCUSO. 1206 and 1208, that is correct, sir.

Mr. LARSEN. Are we also going to see in the 2008 budget proposal some specific initiatives to reflect the five principles that are laid out in your testimony, and, Major—I am sorry, General Mannon's testimony?

Secretary MANCUSO. Sir, there are specific initiatives, but they are internal. Once again, these execution roadmaps are guidance internal to the Department except with regard to building partner-

ship capacity, which partly relates to the Department but more importantly relates outward in the interagency and multinationally.

But those initiatives will be internal to us.

But the end state will be to improve the capability and the capacity for us and the interagency—

Mr. LARSEN. We will look at the 2008 budget proposal which is the first year the 2008 to 2013 fit up the year that you talked about, how are we going to be able to assess next February when we do the budget whether or not the budget proposal is reflecting this, reflecting the roadmap?

Secretary MANCUSO. Excuse me.

Mr. LARSEN. Stop the clock, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary MANCUSO. I have just been told by my subject matter expert here—excuse me—what will be reflected is a request for authority which is what I referenced but not a request for additional funding. To the extent that IW issues will be addressed, they will be addressed internally inside the Department and will not otherwise be reflected in the budget document.

Mr. LARSEN. I understand that, and I guess I will make a point, Mr. Chairman, that if we are going to continue to show some interest in this as a committee, we probably want to show some interest in the internal discussions of the Department to be sure that stays on track as well and reflective of the kinds of interest we have here on committee.

The—seems to me, moving forward, on Irregular Warfare Roadmap, your definitions have to be pretty firm. And General Mannon, on page 3 of your testimony, on the bottom you say, increasingly sophisticated irregular methods, such as terrorism and insurgency, challenge U.S. security interests.

And I guess for you, General, and for you, Admiral, how are you going to pick which—I had a couple of questions. How do we pick which terrorists to engage? How do we pick which insurgencies to care about? And are you going to aggressively fight within the DOD bureaucracy to ensure that we have an accurate definition of what a terrorist is and what an insurgency is, because not all terrorists are insurgents and not all insurgents are terrorists? And it seems to me the definition of what these folks are will have a very important impact on what you do and where we send you.

General, you are first. I will decide for you.

General MANNON. Thank you. Sir, we have, for approximately 4 months now since the roadmap was signed and released with the proposed definition, we have worked between SOCOM, the Interagency and Office of the Secretary of Defense to address where to put our efforts, our priority of efforts based on intelligence assessments as well as operational assessments of how to tie all the proper pieces together, the various interagency pieces, to go forward and to take our limited assets and put them where they need to be placed.

So we are not completely there yet, but we have made some reasonable progress in my estimation with regard to a listing of or a priority of effort in various areas of the world as well as various organizations.

Mr. LARSEN. Admiral, do you have any comments with regard to how we define, how we put a definition on these two terms? Or are

there other terms we may use when we make decisions about where we send our folks?

Admiral OLSON. Sir, the terms are being defined. Some of them are doctrinally defined already. Terms like irregular warfare, we have a working definition; I assume that that or something very close to it will become the doctrinal definition before long.

In the meantime, we have a fairly sophisticated process for rank ordering, you know, the priority of efforts for the Department of Defense with respect to the global war on terror. Under the global war on terror campaign plan, there is a complex matrix by which countries, regions are identified for resourcing efforts, some of them because they are nations with adversaries, some because they are partner nations with which we want to develop a stronger relationship and build more capacity.

This list is recommended by Special Operations Command through the Joint Staffs of the Department of Defense for approval. And once that list is approved, then it becomes a factor in prioritizing the resourcing effort.

I feel pretty good about the level of sophistication of the list. I feel pretty good about the fidelity of the list. I feel pretty good about how much in concert that list seems to be within DOD and across the interagency environment. And it is a driver for application of resources in 2008 and beyond.

Mr. LARSEN. Mr. Chairman, if I could make two points and conclude time. Thank you.

The first point I want to make is with regards to Iraq. It seems the terms terrorist and insurgents get interchanged quite a bit. And the insurgency is something that is very much homegrown. The terrorism is something that is very much the foreign fighter. They may use the same tactics, but their goals end up being very different. And how we approach them may be the same, but they have very different goals in mind, and so what we end up doing with them in the end may have an impact on what happens in Iraq, good or bad. I am just trying to make a point that we have to be discerning in how we approach these. And I want to hear from you that we are being discerning.

The second point I want to make about the government in Iraq is that, yes, there are folks who want to take that government down, including some of the people in the government. This whole fight over federalism in Iraq is in part a fight about whether or not to have a centralized government in Iraq or to have three governments in Iraq. And we are spending, our military is spending time in Iraq keeping the country from falling apart, and our State Department is spending all this time trying to keep that government together in one piece. And that is where we are spending so much time focusing on those things that we can't focus on getting the other things done in Iraq that we need to get done.

General MANNON. Congressman Larsen, let me make explicit what I hope was implicit: We are discerning in terms of our strategies with respect to sort of the homegrown component of the insurgency versus al Qaeda-affiliated, for lack of a better term, terrorists.

And that clearly is fully accounted for. We think about it all the time.

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you. I haven't asked my questions yet, but, Gene, if you want to go ahead; I am going to be a bit longer, so why don't you go ahead.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank our witnesses.

Couple of things I would like clarification from, particularly since one of the many things our special operators do is understand the hearts and minds of people who are on our side, the people who might be on our side and the people who aren't on our side.

And I think it is kind of in the lessons learned category not only for this conflict but for future conflicts. Let's start with the palaces. I have had a special operator tell me early on that he just thought that the American occupation of the palaces was just incredibly counterproductive; that those palaces had come to be associated with evil because they were part of the Hussein network. And when you move into that palace, you get associated with that evil. And as you think about it, as we watched the polling shift of the Iraqis coming to think of us at first as liberators but then later on as occupiers, to what extent does the occupation by General Casey of the water palace and I guess the 4th Infantry Division (ID) from time to time has stayed at the palace up near the River, and other military units in the palaces, what does that do presently? Or is there something I am missing? Is it sending a message that we are in control here, and we are going to occupy any place we want? Or is there something subliminal there that I'm missing because I see it as counterproductive.

Second part is Abu Ghraib. I remember when our Nation happily produced Zogby polls, professional pollster that showed that the Iraqis overwhelmingly were in favor of the American presence there.

Somewhere around December of 2004, we quit getting those polls. And I remember asking when I was in Baghdad, and I believe the chairman was with me, January of 2005, hadn't seen those polls for a while, what is the number? And they were kind of sheepish around the table and finally someone said, 80 percent. I said, damn, we are still running at 80 percent favorable, and he said, no, 80 percent unfavorable. The timeline, if I recall, the information about Abu Ghraib came out around Spring of 2004, so this would have been a good 12 months after that or close to it.

Again, am I missing something? Because I would think that what happened there was counterproductive, or is there something about the minds of the folks in that part of the world where it actually helped our case to do that. I am asking this in the form of a question because, to a certain extent, that is kind of the debate that is going on on the House floor today.

I don't give a flip about terrorists. I don't give a flip about enemies of the United States, but I realize each of you people in uniform is a potential prisoner; that something could go wrong, and you could get captured. And I sure as heck wouldn't want any of you mistreated or held to a lower standard because of what is happening or what is perceived is happening. And so these are very sincere questions. Am I missing something? Do we gain any sort of advantage by being in the water palace? Did what happened at Abu Ghraib in any way help our case? And to what extent do the

conventional forces, if the answer to the first thing is counter-productive, to what extent is the regular force listening? And to what extent do we see to it that that mistake is not made again?

Secretary MANCUSO. Sir, I will start with your last question first. We are all listening. We understand that—and I started my comments by saying the global war on terror is an irregular war in a fundamental sense. Well, the war in Iraq is irregular in the sense that it is about all instruments of national power, including for example, information.

And so starting with the fact that we are all listening, I would like to say, of course, instances—well, real or perceived instances of abuse that were contrary to policy by individual soldiers, clearly that did not help us, and in fact, it hurt. But at the same time, the many instances of good work done by the large majority of our forces every day in multiple parts of the world including Iraq and all parts of Iraq, that also counts for something. I can't gauge the precise impact, what the tradeoff is, but there is no doubt in my mind that those specific instances hurt us but also that the incredible good that our forces are doing and doing every day in Iraq help us, and thank goodness for them.

With respect to your question about occupying the palaces, I would be in no position to assess. I think that is certainly an important point to consider.

Mr. TAYLOR. If I may, sir, in fairness, and again, I walked in kind of late, but I take it that you are a political appointee who is responsible for that segment of the United States Military.

Secretary MANCUSO. I am a political appointee responsible for the Special Operations and combating terrorism.

Mr. TAYLOR. There may be instances where the only U.S. troops who are sent somewhere will be special operators, future conflict. So if a future conflict comes along and a likely place to billet special operators is the palace, what do you tell those guys? Because I think we have made a blunder. I didn't think of this, but the guy who brought it to my attention made a pretty convincing argument that moving into those palaces was a blunder. I have come to agree with that. So are we learning anything?

If the only people dispatched to an area are special operators, therefore, they would be under your direction, what would you tell them?

Secretary MANCUSO. Well, what I would say is this: First of all, I recognize that there might be severe policy and strategic impacts to operational decisions. Clearly, there is no question but that that is true. And with respect to your example of palaces, in general, do I think that is likely a bad idea? Probably. But there are operational tradeoffs that a bureaucrat essentially sitting in Washington is frankly not empowered to make in the sense that I don't have entire situational awareness.

Now while I would say, in general, that is a bad idea to sit in a palace, if there is a commander on the ground that has a full battle picture and has to make a tradeoff between bad optics versus bad security, that is a decision that I think we owe to our troops on the ground.

I was prior service; I am actually a combat veteran of Iraq myself. We had a dictum when I was a soldier: Mission first, people

always. And as a bureaucrat sitting in Washington, while I can generally agree with the optics piece, I would not feel comfortable telling that on-the-ground commander to make that tradeoff from Washington.

Mr. SAXTON. Gene, we are going to have votes between quarter of and 4.

Admiral OLSON. Can I quickly address that question? I can address it solely as Special Operations Command, and it is all right for special operators not to occupy palaces but to live, eat, breath, work with the local populations in which they serve. And as I have traveled around the theater, I have visited Special Operations Forces in a number of remote outposts where they are the only Americans for miles around and where they are sharing their compounds with their Iraqi or Afghan counterparts. Many of these are in high-risk locations, and as they are defending against mortar attacks each night, they are out each day building bridges across rivers and building schools and broadcasting on radio stations that they man themselves and running patrols to ensure the security of their compound along the way.

I visited one palace occupied by Special Operations soldiers. It was in a corner of Baghdad and a corner of the Baghdad international airport. It is a palace that was occupied because it was the highest terrain around, and in an unstable environment, it was the best place from which to defend oneself, and a couple miles down the road from that compound, most of the forces assigned to that mission are living and working with their Iraqi counterparts, the Iraqi special operations forces and operating with them each night, coming back and eating with them in their chow halls.

I don't think we in Special Operations would consider occupying a compound to be a wise move. It may be the operationally sound move for a period of time. It may be the expedient move for security, but the goal will always be to move out of the palaces and be out with the people. That is how Special Operations typically works, sir.

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, Admiral.

Mr. Secretary, I believe—and I believe that perhaps you believe as well—that irregular warfare will be the dominant or at least one of the dominant forms of conflict for the foreseeable future. Assuming that we are successful in dealing with al Qaeda, what do you see our Nation facing in terms of continued irregular warfare threats?

Secretary MANCUSO. Mr. Chairman, when we talk about irregular warfare, we often think in terms of terrorist networks and that is clearly the most urgent, pressing manifestation of the problem. But irregular warfare is not limited to non-state adversaries in terms of using it. States, hostile states in some instances, hostile states armed with nuclear weapons or WMDs, rather, more generally could use irregular warfare against us, and so the United States not only has, in my view, not only has to be in a position to defend against irregular warfare used by non-state actors; we also have to be in a position to defend against irregular warfare used by states and be able to counter and use irregular warfare consistent with international law and U.S. law against both non-state actors and state actors as well.

Mr. SAXTON. I assume that you are thinking of Iran and Hezbollah.

Secretary MANCUSO. Sir, I wasn't actually thinking of any particular country but countries that are hostile to the United States, particularly countries that might have weapons of mass destruction or intentions of having weapons of mass destruction, IW may give us more strategic choices and flex in terms of how we might deal with them.

Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Secretary, you described the need for an all-out government effort, not just a military approach. How are we coordinating a truly national effort in conducting irregular warfare in order to comply with all forms of national power at this time?

Secretary MANCUSO. Very aggressively. We are—first of all, the Department of Defense recognizes—and I said this on my testimony, sir, and I will reiterate it because it is such an important point—that, in most instances, the lion's share of the burden in terms of irregular warfare is not uniquely military; it is other. It is information, diplomacy. It is the other elements of national power. And what we at the Department of Defense recognize is that it is incumbent upon us to work with our interagency partners and with our partners and allies throughout the world to develop their capacity along with their instruments of national power to get the job done.

This is manifested concretely in things like the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF). It is manifested concretely in interagency working groups. We haven't mastered the puzzle yet. We don't have the answer. We have recognized the problem, and we are moving with all deliberate speed to implement the right solution.

But our institutional plumbing, Mr. Chairman, as you know very well, wasn't geared to addressing these kinds of threats, and so right now we are in the process of having—sort of changing our plumbing, if you will, being able to face all of the threats and being able to hedge against uncertainty in a national security environment across—interagency and with our partners and allies.

Mr. SAXTON. You mentioned in that answer building partner capacity a couple of times. Can you describe the linkage between the Irregular Warfare Roadmap and Building Partner Capacity Roadmap?

Secretary MANCUSO. We think about it inside the Department of Defense, sir, as sort of opposite sides of the same coin but I would like to define what I mean by building partnership capacity and what we more generally understand.

When we talk in terms of building partnership capacity, it at the most basic level means developing the capacity of our partners to do discrete tasks, but there is also a second and perhaps more important sense that we talk about building partnership capacity; that is in terms of not just building the capacity of our partners to do things but to build the capacity of the partnership, relationships with our partners and allies throughout the world. And that is what we are focused on.

So, in the Department of Defense, when we work with our partners and allies, of course, we are focused on transferring skill sets because we want to empower them to do things that we would oth-

erwise be called to do and out of the fact that we are mindful that terrorism is a collective threat and they themselves in their societies are under siege as well.

But we also remember as we migrate these skill sets, we are also mindful of the fact that, as we do that, we are building relationships which institutionally over time will make us much more effective in the global war on terror, and we have certainly seen tremendous progress on that front as well.

In terms of numbers, in terms of when we ask about discrete things, what are we doing in different countries? That is an important part of the question, but the other part is, how are we getting along, if you will? How are we developing more organic relationships? And we are working on that, too, and that is critically important.

Mr. SAXTON. Let me ask you this, let me put it this way, we have relationships with Saudi Arabia. We have relationships with Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirate (UAE), Egypt. Let me ask you this, did the statement made by the Iranian president recently that—or was it the Hezbollah leader—that they are next going to concentrate on posing threats to Israel and the Gulf states, and does that create an opportunity for us to change or to enhance our partnerships with some countries?

Secretary MANCUSO. Well, we certainly think that, as the rest of the world, particularly in the Middle East, recognizes that this threat is not unique to the United States, that it is in fact a threat shared across cultures, across geographies, that any opportunity, particularly a statement to that effect—I am not quite sure which statement specifically you are referring to—that might underscore the fact that the threat is collective, that creates opportunities for us; opportunities to work together with other countries in the region and opportunities to ensure that we build a kind of better ecosystem, better partnership to combat terrorism.

Mr. SAXTON. I believe the statement I was referring may have been Nazrallah, and he said, we are next going to attack Israel and the Gulf states. When I saw that headline, I thought, what an opportunity to create and enhance relationships with Gulf states in particular.

Secretary MANCUSO. Mr. Chairman, I would not want to get into sort of classified information, but what I would suggest is a statement to that effect is likely not an effective growth strategy for Hezbollah.

Mr. SAXTON. Admiral, you offered a definition of irregular warfare as a form of warfare that focuses on undermining or subverting the credibility, legitimacy of a political authority in question. How would you define the political authority that we are combating in the global war on terror?

Admiral OLSON. Sir, the working definition of irregular warfare was a definition arrived at by a committee approved by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. I think that irregular warfare best describes the actions that we are countering, but we have applied it to use those counteractions themselves and lumped it all under the term irregular warfare, which can both be offensive and defensive under the new definition. I think the irregular warfare that is taking place in Iraq is clearly trying to counter the emergence of a legiti-

mate government in Iraq; same thing in Afghanistan. Our efforts to counter those irregular warfare activities against those governments are also irregular warfare activities.

Mr. SAXTON. Were you going to say something?

I have no more questions.

At this point I want to thank you for being here. We are going to have a series of votes here very soon. I want to just say that the definition of progress for all of us is different, and we believe that the changes that—I believe, I don't speak for others, that the changes that SOCOM has made and the understandings it has developed in how to fight an irregular war are very significant pieces of progress and I want to thank you for, each of you, for your leadership and what you do. You are performing a great service to our country in a very difficult time and thank you for being here today. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 4 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

SEPTEMBER 27, 2006

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

SEPTEMBER 27, 2006



**HOUSE ARMED SERVICES SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM AND
UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS
JIM SAXTON, NEW JERSEY
CHAIRMAN**

PRESS RELEASE

For Immediate Release:
September 27, 2006

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OPENING STATEMENT OF JIM SAXTON

Hearing on the Department of Defense's Irregular Warfare Roadmap

Washington, D.C. – The Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities meets today to discuss the Department of Defense's Irregular Warfare Roadmap. The terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001 marked the engagement of the United States in a very different form of warfare than had been the focus of strategic military planning during the Cold War. The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) is defined by its long-term and irregular nature, and it requires an approach that does not solely focus on conventional capabilities or direct action missions to kill or capture terrorists and their supporters.

Recognizing the irregular nature of the GWOT, the Department of Defense is taking measures to adapt to this new threat environment and to focus on building and improving our military's irregular warfare capability by expanding special operations forces, shifting conventional forces towards irregular warfare, and, significantly, developing an Irregular Warfare Roadmap. This roadmap will guide the implementation of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review recommendations as well as provide an important tool for the Department to continue refinement of its approaches to the GWOT.

At the end of the hearing, we should walk away with a good understanding of where the Department of Defense stands in developing the Irregular Warfare Roadmap; what impacts the roadmap will have on policy, planning, and resourcing decisions; and what operational activities and issues can be expected in the conduct of an Irregular Warfare campaign. As a committee, we must remain focused on the strategic objectives in this war, and Irregular Warfare will prove to be a deciding factor in the GWOT.

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Statement by

Mr. Mario Mancuso

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

and Combating Terrorism

Before the 109th Congress

Committee on Armed Services

Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities

United States House of Representatives

September 27, 2006

Introduction

Chairman Saxton, Representative Meehan, and distinguished members of the committee: thank you for inviting me here today to present you with an update on where the Department of Defense is heading regarding Irregular Warfare.

As the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review stated, the United States is involved in a “Long War.” This war is irregular in its nature and our enemies are not traditional, conventional military forces but rather dispersed, global terrorist networks that exploit Islam to advance radical political aims. Three factors have intensified the danger of this irregular warfare challenge: the rise of extremist ideologies, the absence of effective governance in many areas of the world, and the potential for these enemies to acquire weapons of mass destruction.

Irregular Warfare Definition

Irregular Warfare is a form of warfare and has a long history. Unlike traditional warfare, which focuses on defeating an adversary’s military forces, the focus of Irregular Warfare is on the legitimacy of the relevant political authority. Irregular Warfare favors indirect approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other elements of national power, to erode an adversary’s power, influence and will.

Irregular Warfare will likely be the dominant form of conflict our nation faces over the next two decades. The Global War on Terrorism, an irregular war in the most fundamental sense, will require the U.S. military to adopt non-traditional and indirect approaches. And while we must maintain our ability to deal with traditional threats, our Armed Forces must rebalance to adjust to this changing environment. Our experience thus far in the war on terrorism underscores the need to reorient our military forces to be able to project power through indirect approaches on a global scale and for an indefinite period.

The future security environment will challenge traditional US military advantages. The US and its partners are likely to face state and non-state enemies that employ Irregular Warfare as their primary form of warfare. Strategic, policy, operational or other factors may preclude or constrain our Armed Forces from conducting conventional military campaigns against them. This problem will be exacerbated by nuclear-armed hostile states with sophisticated anti-access capabilities that may preclude direct military options. These situations will require or favor an all-of-government effort, including an irregular military approach using indirect and often non-traditional methods and means to achieve US strategic objectives. Moreover, even when the use of direct, conventional military confrontation is feasible, the US Government may seek use of indirect strategic alternatives instead.

The offensive use of Irregular Warfare will likely become an increasingly attractive strategic option and a preferred form of warfare for the United States to meet its challenges and achieve its national security objectives. Our Armed Forces will therefore require sufficient capability and capacity to wage protracted Irregular Warfare on a regional or global scale and for an indefinite period. The US has a long history of waging irregular warfare, but our experience has been based on limited engagements and for limited periods of time, normally in association with conventional military operations.

What differentiates irregular warfare from more conventional warfare is its emphasis on the use of irregular forces and other indirect, non-conventional methods and means to subvert, attrite, and exhaust an adversary, or render him irrelevant to the host population, rather than on defeating him through direct conventional military confrontation. Unlike conventional warfare, which focuses on defeating an adversary's military forces or seizing key terrain, the focus of Irregular Warfare is on eroding an enemy's power, influence, and will to exercise political authority over an indigenous population. Ultimately, Irregular Warfare is an armed political struggle for control or influence over, and the support of, an indigenous population.

National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT)

The President's recently released National Strategy for Combating Terrorism provides the vision for defeating terrorism and winning this kind of war. The War on Terrorism is both a battle of arms and a battle of ideas. This war will require us to meet and fight our terrorist enemies in the Irregular Warfare battle space, while promoting freedom and human dignity as alternatives to the terrorists' ideology of oppression and totalitarian rule. The Strategy will require the application and integration of all elements of national power and influence. The military must be resourced to rebalance the force to permit victory in this type of war. Specifically, we must improve the capability of our General Purpose Forces to conduct counterinsurgency operations and to partner with and train foreign forces to defeat insurgencies and terrorist organizations on a global scale and for an indefinite period. Our Special Operations Forces must also rebalance to devote a greater degree of effort to counter terrorism operations, defeating terrorist networks, and combating the threat of WMD proliferation.

The National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (NMSP-WOT)

The National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism describes the approach the Department of Defense will take to fulfill its role within the larger national strategy for combating terrorism and provides the Secretary of Defense's strategic framework for the application of the military instrument of national power

in the Global War on Terrorism. This plan established six strategic military objectives to permit development of the Defense Department's Campaign Plan for the Global War on Terrorism. The six objectives are:

1. Denying terrorists the resources they need to operate and survive
2. Enabling partner nations to counter terrorist threats
3. Denying weapons of mass destruction technology to our enemies and increasing our capacity for consequence management
4. Defeating terrorist organizations and networks
5. Countering state and non-state support for terrorism, in coordination with other US government agencies and partner nations
6. And countering ideological support for terrorism.

Quadrennial Defense Review

As noted in the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review, the Department of Defense must rebalance its forces to support the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism. The Department of Defense has established an aggressive timeline for implementing approximately 30 tasks over the next year in order to improve our ability to conduct irregular warfare, known as the Irregular Warfare Roadmap. The focus of this roadmap is enhancing Irregular Warfare capabilities and capacity throughout the Department. A companion effort titled the Building Partnership Capacity Roadmap addresses interagency and multinational

initiatives related to Irregular Warfare. Both of these roadmaps are complemented by Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, which directs the Department of Defense to improve its capabilities to conduct stability operations. Stability operations capabilities, which focus on protecting indigenous populations and enhancing their government's abilities to strengthen and secure their societies, are essential to conducting Irregular Warfare. The Department of Defense's 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review highlighted that success in Irregular Warfare will often require an indirect approach – building capacity with others while seeking to defeat adversaries physically and psychologically.

The Irregular Warfare Execution Roadmap has begun to provide senior leadership with a mechanism to advance high priority issues for decision through the FY08-13 defense program. The Irregular Warfare Road map will transform the Department through the implementation of five major initiatives in the 2008-2013 defense program:

1. Changing the way we manage the people necessary to support Irregular Warfare
2. Rebalancing our General Purpose Forces to better support Irregular Warfare
3. Increasing our Special Operations Forces capabilities and capacity to support Irregular Warfare
4. Increasing our capacity to conduct Counter Network Operations

5. And redesigning our Joint and Service Education and Training programs to conduct Irregular Warfare.

Special Operations

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict is fully committed to supporting the Irregular Warfare Roadmap and identifying and addressing capability and capacity shortfalls related to Irregular Warfare, in coordination with the U.S. Special Operations Command and the Joint Staff. In addition, we are identifying and requesting assistance to address legal authorities related to Irregular Warfare, specifically Section 1206 and Section 1208 of Title X, which provides the legal authority for U.S. military personnel to train and equip foreign forces supporting the War on Terrorism.

Conclusion

Throughout our history, U.S. military forces – Active Duty, Reserves, and National Guard -- have adapted to engage new threats to our nation. The 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review identified the capability and capacity shortfalls that must be addressed to meet the full range of challenges to the United States: irregular, conventional, disruptive, and catastrophic. The Irregular Warfare Roadmap in particular, represents a concerted effort to transform how we manage and train our forces and to rebalance our General Purpose Forces and Special Operations Forces to meet the Irregular Warfare challenge.

Chairman Saxton, Representative Meehan, distinguished members: thank you again for your interest in, and support of the Department's Irregular Warfare initiatives. I am honored to appear here today before this distinguished committee and to answer your questions.

Thank you.

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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM,
UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

STATEMENT OF
VICE ADMIRAL ERIC T. OLSON, U.S. NAVY
DEPUTY COMMANDER
UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
BEFORE THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND
CAPABILITIES
ON IRREGULAR WARFARE
SEPTEMBER 27, 2006

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STATEMENT OF
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UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

Chairman Saxton, Representative Meehan, distinguished Members of the Committee, I am honored to report to you today on the continuing efforts of the Department of Defense (DoD) and the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) to improve and institutionalize our approaches and methodology for conducting and countering Irregular Warfare (IW).

The Department's current working definition of IW refers to "a form of warfare that has as its objective the credibility and/or legitimacy of the relevant political authority with the goal of undermining or supporting that authority."

IW often employs indirect approaches to gain asymmetric advantages over an adversary, and special operations forces (SOF) have long excelled in many IW tasks. Unconventional warfare, counterterrorism, counter-insurgency, civil-military operations, psychological operations, and foreign internal defense are all traditional special operations core activities. IW is not a new mission, but rather a new way to think about, describe, and categorize various threats and adversaries we currently face, or are likely to face in the future – threats not best suited to traditional military operations. IW is also a set of activities that U.S. forces, both SOF and non-SOF, can incorporate into their approach to countering threats.

IW synthesizes indirect and direct methods. It brings all elements of U.S. power to bear on a problem in a synchronized and coordinated manner.

Throughout their history, special operations forces have combined direct and indirect methods, and have partnered with others to accomplish the mission at hand. This mindset has enabled SOF to gain access, build relationships, foster influence, and take or support direct action when necessary. USSOCOM understands that, as important as direct actions are in IW, many equally carefully planned, less visible indirect actions are at least as decisive in their impact. SOF are performing indirect actions in every region of the world, with real results in the Global War on Terror.

Missions such as foreign counterpart training, civil-military operations, information distribution, infrastructure development, and the development of medical, dental, and veterinary clinics may not get the same headlines as the death or capture of a key Al Qaeda leader, but they are essential elements of IW. At remote base camps in the Philippines, Afghanistan, Columbia, Iraq, and elsewhere, small elements of special operators are working with their hosts and counterparts to help establish the conditions to disrupt and defeat terrorism. Operating a radio station that transmits true messages that counter terrorist disinformation; building roads, piers, bridges, and water systems to enable local economies to thrive; training indigenous security forces to perform their duties and gain the trust of their constituents – these are a few of the important missions SOF are performing today. Although we are underrepresented in some areas of the world, once the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) directed growth occurs, SOF will be better postured to establish the conditions to counter and defeat terrorism around the globe.

USSOCOM and its subordinate commands will continue to play a key role in planning and executing IW operations. The general purpose forces of the military

Services are doing the same, and we are working closely with them as we strive to match the most efficient and effective force to each mission.

Many factors may preclude or restrain a joint force from conducting conventional military campaigns. These situations will require or favor an irregular military approach, using indirect and often non-traditional methods to achieve U.S. strategic objectives. IW will become an increasingly attractive strategic option and perhaps a preferred means for the U.S. to influence, deter, or defeat hostile states, occupying powers, and non-state adversaries. At the same time, the defensive use of IW will help keep in check those who wish to do us or our friends or allies harm.

SOF are organized, trained, educated, equipped, and manned to conduct IW. We conduct constant self-assessment to ensure that lessons learned in operational environments are incorporated back into our training and education, and operational planning and execution. The curricula at our schoolhouses have been tailored to our more immediate threats, and this adjustment will continue. As part of a larger DoD process of re-tooling our forces to better face today's and tomorrow's threats, USSOCOM has been actively engaged in the execution of the Department's Irregular Warfare Roadmap.

To improve the capabilities of the joint force to plan and execute IW, USSOCOM is co-authoring a Joint Operating Concept (JOC) for IW which should be complete by the end of the year. The purpose of the IW Joint Operating Concept is to broadly describe how joint force commanders will conduct protracted IW to accomplish national objectives on a regional level or global scale. The IW Joint Operating Concept will apply across the full range of military operations and result in a more balanced DoD

approach to conflict. The concept will also provide guidance for force development that could result in changes to doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leader development and education, personnel and facilities.

Another important task being pursued within the IW Roadmap is identifying which IW tasks should be handed off from SOF to the general purpose forces. This will codify an assessment process to ensure that capable forces, whether conventional forces or SOF, are conducting each IW mission. Increasing the IW capabilities of the general purpose forces will serve to increase the availability of SOF to perform activities for which they are specially trained and equipped.

In summary, the Department, USSOCOM and the Services are improving their postures to both conduct and combat Irregular Warfare. We are dedicated to improving the ability of the U.S. to do so by having the right forces in the right place at the right time, always with the right training and the right equipment. I thank the distinguished members of this subcommittee for your important role in enabling us to do just that, and I very much appreciate the opportunity to be with you here today.

This concludes my prepared remarks, and I am available to answer any questions you may have.

Statement by

Brigadier General Otis G. Mannon (USAF)

Deputy Director, Special Operations, J-3

Joint Staff

Before the 109th Congress

Committee on Armed Services

Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities

United States House of Representatives

September 27, 2006

Introduction

Chairman Saxton, Representative Meehan, distinguished members, thank you for inviting us here today to present you with additional information on the direction the Department of Defense is pursuing regarding Irregular Warfare.

For most of the 20th Century, we knew who our enemies were and where they lived. They had armies, navies, and air forces to attack, with recognized capitals and populations to put at risk. However in the 21st Century, we face a different enemy, an enemy defined by a complex network of ideologically driven extremists who will attempt to engage us not only far from U.S. shores, but also here at home. Future efforts in the long war against terrorist networks include many operations characterized by Irregular Warfare – operations in which the enemy is not a regular military force of a nation-state. We are engaged in a global conflict, and our efforts confronting the enemy must also be global in nature. These operations will occur on multiple fronts and cannot be limited to primarily military activities. We submit the long war effort must aggressively use all elements of America's power, including diplomatic, informational, economic, intelligence, and law enforcement activities.

The Quadrennial Defense Review and Irregular Warfare

The Department of Defense's 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) highlighted that success in Irregular Warfare will often require an indirect approach. The indirect approach focuses on building partnership capacity, working through, by or with partner nations. Through this approach, we are assisting in building new capabilities and seeking to affect the enemy both physically and psychologically. It also describes the Department's efforts to shift emphasis from a focus on major conventional combat operations to multiple, irregular operations. At the same time, Secretary Rumsfeld emphasized the QDR was not itself an end-state – particular emphasis would continue in

several critical areas through the development of follow-on “roadmaps.” These execution roadmaps include the subject of today’s hearing – Irregular Warfare – as well as related roadmaps on building partnership capacity and strategic communications.

The purpose of the Irregular Warfare Roadmap is to facilitate implementation of the 2006 QDR decisions regarding DoD capabilities and capacity to conduct and support protracted Irregular Warfare. The Irregular Warfare Execution Roadmap converts the broad policy objectives established during the QDR into actionable tasks. It also provides the Department’s senior leadership with a mechanism to advance high priority Irregular Warfare issues for programmatic decision through the Fiscal Year 2008-2013 Future Years Defense Program, as well as establishing an oversight and management process for implementing Irregular Warfare initiatives.

The Irregular Warfare Roadmap does not exist in a vacuum. It complements the Strategic Planning Guidance efforts identifying joint force capabilities required to operationalize Global War on Terror campaign plans and other related activities within the Department. In particular, the relationship between the Irregular Warfare and Building Partnership Capacity Roadmaps merit attention as they are essentially opposing sides of the same coin. The Irregular Warfare Roadmap focuses internally on DoD’s Irregular Warfare capabilities and capacity, while the companion Building Partnership Capacity Roadmap addresses the Department’s efforts with interagency and international partners. Another QDR developed initiative, the Strategic Communications Roadmap, addresses strengthening the Department’s abilities to counter ideological support for terrorism through the use of strategic communications thus providing additional support for Irregular Warfare actions.

The Irregular Warfare Problem

Increasingly sophisticated irregular methods, including terrorism and insurgency, challenge U.S. security interests. Adversaries employing irregular methods aim to erode U.S. influence and political will. These adversaries are often non-state actors who are

transnationally connected and globally networked, using modern technologies to raise money, transmit their ideology, and train new recruits. Irregular opponents often take a long-term approach, attempting to impose prohibitive human, material, financial, and political costs on the United States. Irregular warfare will likely be the dominant form of conflict we face over the coming decades. Defeating terrorist extremist networks, in addition to their state and non-state supporters, requires long-duration complex operations that synchronize the application of all instruments of national power.

Irregular Warfare Defined

The QDR described Irregular Warfare as operations in which the enemy is not a regular military force of a nation-state. The Irregular Warfare Roadmap includes the following working definition:

“a form of warfare that has as its objective the credibility and or legitimacy of the relevant political authority with the goal of undermining or supporting that authority. Irregular warfare favors indirect approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities to seek asymmetric approaches, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.”

While the precise definition continues to be refined, there is broad agreement within the Department on the nature and scope of Irregular Warfare. What differentiates Irregular Warfare from other forms of warfare is its emphasis on the use of irregular forces and indirect methods and means to subvert, attrit and exhaust an enemy, or render him irrelevant rather than to defeat him through direct, conventional military confrontation. Unlike conventional warfare, which focuses on defeating an adversary’s military forces or seizing key physical terrain, the focus of Irregular Warfare is on eroding an enemy’s power, influence, and will to exercise political authority over an indigenous population. Common characteristics of irregular wars include protraction, intertwining of military and non-military methods, participation by individuals and groups not belonging to the regular armed forces or police of any state, and efforts to gain control of or influence the host population. Irregular Warfare operations may occur as part of traditional warfare or independently.

Irregular warfare includes a wide variety of operations and activities, both offensive and defensive. Examples include, but are not limited to: insurgency and counterinsurgency; terrorism and counterterrorism; unconventional warfare; foreign internal defense; stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations; transnational criminal activities; information operations (including psychological operations); and intelligence and counterintelligence operations. Obviously, U.S. Government agencies do not conduct Irregular Warfare activities such as terrorism or transnational criminal activities that violate U.S. and international law, but we must be prepared to defend against such activities.

At times, the term Irregular Warfare has been used interchangeably with unconventional warfare. Unconventional warfare (UW) is an established DoD term that is defined as:

"A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominately conducted through, with, and by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery. (JP 1-02)"

The term unconventional warfare is more appropriate to describe certain types of operations and activities that comprise Irregular Warfare. Unconventional Warfare could be viewed as a subset of Irregular Warfare, encompassing its offensive aspects. Irregular Warfare extends beyond the military domain to include political, psychological, informational, diplomatic and economic methods that are enabled and supported by the actions of military, security, or irregular forces.

In the months ahead, we will develop a final Irregular Warfare definition that facilitates additional doctrinal development as a Department priority.

The Irregular Warfare Roadmap Lines of Operation

The Irregular Warfare Execution Roadmap addresses the need to develop and increase Irregular Warfare capabilities and capacity throughout the Department by grouping tasks in five broad subject areas or Lines of Operations. The areas include:

- Transforming the way DoD manages people;
- Rebalancing General Purpose Forces (GPF);
- Increasing Special Operations Forces (SOF) capability and capacity;
- Increasing DoD's capability and capacity to conduct counter-network operations;
- and
- Redesigning Joint and Service education and training.

The Irregular Warfare Roadmap details specific tasks that address these five lines of operation. These tasks stretch across the entire Department of Defense and are scheduled to be completed within the next 12 months. Let me present a brief synopsis of each area:

- Transforming the way DoD manages people necessary to support Irregular Warfare is the first priority of the Irregular Warfare Roadmap. The current Service personnel management systems are designed to produce, develop, and promote traditional warfare specialists. DoD must take the necessary steps to produce new generations of senior Irregular Warfare specialists. This can occur only if the Military Services change the way they identify, access, educate, train, develop, utilize, and retain Irregular Warfare specialists.
- Rebalancing General Purpose Forces capabilities and capacity to better support Irregular Warfare requires the Military Departments and Services to increase their abilities for conducting long duration counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations. These activities include increased frequency of operations with host nation security forces and improving on General Purpose Force's ability to train, equip, and advise large numbers of these foreign forces.

- Increasing Special Operations Forces capabilities and capacity to support Irregular Warfare is essential to defeating terrorist extremism in the Long War. Beyond defeating terrorist extremism and other irregular challenges to U.S. interests, increasing Special Operations Forces capability and capacity broadens and deepens U.S. strategic options for dealing with hostile states and occupying powers through the support of friendly insurgent groups, surrogate warfare, and other uses of Irregular Warfare practices.
- DoD must also increase its capability and capacity to conduct Counter-Network Operations. These operations entail the ability to identify, find, locate, characterize, and perturb and disrupt extremist cells, networks, and individuals; and to predict their operational behavior on a global scale. This effort includes enhancing our ability to integrate valuable social science research and expertise including increased use of anthropologists, sociologists, and geographers.
- Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM remind us that tactical and operational competence in conventional warfighting does not equate to tactical, operational, or strategic success in operations and activities associated with Irregular Warfare. Until recently, DoD educational and training institutions have not placed a priority on the importance of preparing DoD personnel to operate, thrive and succeed in Irregular Warfare environments. The Irregular Warfare Roadmap's final area of emphasis is thus on redesigning Joint and Service education and training to conduct Irregular Warfare.

Conclusion

Throughout our history, U.S. military forces – Active Duty, Reserves, and National Guard -- have defended our nation against its enemies on land, at sea, and in the air, while adapting continuously to engage new to our nation. Today we must cope not only with the threats produced by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile technology among nation-states, but also with threats posed by individual terrorists and terrorist networks with global reach. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review was a crucial step forward in addressing the challenges posed by these new threats. By providing a means for continuous assessment and refinement, the Irregular Warfare Execution Roadmap serves as a primary catalyst for the Department's efforts in shifting emphasis from major conventional warfare to a focus on Irregular Warfare.

Chairman Saxton, Representative Meehan, distinguished members: thank you for your interest in, and support of the Department's Irregular Warfare initiatives and for allowing us to talk today about the Department's Irregular Warfare Execution Roadmap. The citizens of this nation, its institutions, and our brave men and women in uniform have repeatedly demonstrated the patriotism, innovation, determination, and resiliency necessary to defeat our enemies while retaining our freedoms. There is no doubt in my mind that those capabilities will be tested against this newest enemy threat – nor is there any doubt that we will prevail. Once again, I am honored to appear here before this distinguished committee.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

SEPTEMBER 27, 2006

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH

Mr. SMITH. Focus on the progress piece of that; where we are making very, very good progress, that would be a good place to go for metrics. What is the metrics of your assessment of that progress? Where is it that this is getting better? What is the progress you discussed specifically?

Secretary MANCUSO. The Department of Defense (DOD) has developed an assessment process to measure progress in the global war on terror (GWOT). The purpose of the assessment is to examine the efficacy of DOD's strategy for prosecuting the GWOT.

The GWOT Assessment is a measurement tool comprised of discrete metrics, which are derived from the six military strategic objectives for the GWOT, outlined in the National Military Strategic Plan for the war on terror.

The six military strategic objectives are:

- Deny terrorist the resources they need to operate and survive
- Enable partner nations to counter terrorism
- Deny WMD/E proliferation, recover and eliminate uncontrolled materials, and maintain capacity for consequence management
- Defeat terrorists and their organizations
- Counter state and non-state support for terrorism in coordination with other US government agencies and partner nations
- Contribute to the establishment of conditions that counter ideological support for terrorism

The DOD develops GWOT action plans to address shortfalls derived from the assessments findings. Currently there are 25 GWOT Action Plans, which track the progress of policy, legislative and resourcing issues and identify factors that inhibit the successful prosecution of the GWOT.

In addition to this testimony, DOD is in the process of preparing a formal GWOT Assessment for Congress. This assessment is due March 1, 2007.

In regard to Iraq, specific metrics are being developed, in line with the President's strategy, to measure the performance of the Iraqi military and government. The military commitments will make up the initial assessment of Iraqi performance and its ability to reduce the cycle of violence. Included in the security assessment will be Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) focusing on political and economic progress.

