

[H.A.S.C. No. 110-35]

HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED
PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
—
FULL COMMITTEE HEARING
ON
**BUDGET REQUEST FROM U.S. EUROPEAN
COMMAND AND JOINT FORCES COMMAND**
—

HEARING HELD
MARCH 15, 2007



—
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

38-369

WASHINGTON : 2008

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FISCAL YEAR 2008 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST FROM U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND AND JOINT FORCES COMMAND

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Thursday, March 15, 2007.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:09 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

We welcome General Craddock, General Smith. It is certainly good to see both of you, and I want to thank you for your leadership as well as thank the troops that you do lead.

General Craddock, this is your first time before our committee as the commander of European Command (EUCOM) and as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) commander and I want to congratulate you on your new position. You have your work cut out for you.

The European Command faced a number of critical security challenges pressing NATO and our allies. To significantly increase the contributions to security and stability is at the top of the list. I am personally frustrated with the fact that they have not offered more troops, despite the fact that the request has been made, and that a good number of their troops are limited in the scope of what they can do. And hopefully you can address that this morning. But I am doubly frustrated because of those two issues.

In a short time, we are anticipating a so-called spring offensive and there is a prediction the opium harvest this year will be at an all-time high in Afghanistan. And yet General Eikenberry recently testified before our committee that NATO's actual contribution of troops and equipment leave the approved NATO requirement seriously under-fulfilled.

I am convinced, General Craddock, that Afghanistan is winnable. Using the phrase of your predecessor, there is light at the end of the tunnel there. But our partners must seriously step up with more troops and more aid.

Afghanistan is not only a central front in the war on terrorism, but the outcome there could well determine the future of the NATO alliance. Think about it. One thing could lead to another. If we are not successful there, if NATO is not successful there, it could be

seen as an impotent organization and the fallout from that could be devastating.

And then ask yourself, who benefits from NATO's unsuccessful efforts if it were to become a skeletal—no pun intended—but if it were to become a skeletal organization. You can't let that happen. That is why they must step up to the plate in Afghanistan.

A special welcome, General Smith. It has been quite a while since the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) has appeared before our committee in a posture hearing, and we are glad to have the command back because of the importance we place on your command.

Joint Forces Command provides training to ready forces for our warfighters. It develops the joint warfighting concepts that will posture our forces in the 21st century. And we look forward to hearing about those concepts and the progress of your work. It is vital for us here in Congress to understand in order to help us consider the future challenges, authorizations and appropriations that Congress must give.

So, General Smith, we thank you for your work and for your consideration today.

We are interested in your work in joint training. As you sit next to General Craddock today, we would like to hear about your role in the allied command transformation. That is a big task, big words, but I look forward to your comments on that.

Without further adieu, I ask my friend, Mr. Kline, if he has any comments at this moment.

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for yielding the time and for holding this hearing.

Thanks to our witnesses today and to the Marines and airmen and soldiers and naval officers that are backing them. It is good to see you all this morning.

Mr. Chairman, with your indulgence, I am going to read the opening comments of the ranking member, Mr. Hunter, in his absence. I am not going to presume to try to edit them in real-time. So these are Ranking Member Duncan Hunter's words, not mine, although my suspicion is that I am going to be concurring wholeheartedly.

"Today this committee will consider the challenges and opportunities of the U.S. European Command, the U.S. Joint Forces Command and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The range of possible topics today is as broad as the vast reach of General Craddock's area of responsibility (AOR).

"Thank you both for joining us today to update us on your operations and initiatives and to explain how these efforts relate to the President's budget proposal.

"I especially hope that we can talk about how our global partners, particularly nations with the European Command are stepping up to commit their military forces to coalition operations and invest in their own military capabilities.

"I am also interested in hearing how U.S. forces are working with other partners, such as interagency players and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to advance U.S. national security interest around the world.

"While he was the commander of European Command and the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe"—my own parenthetical

note, that is always an amazing title to me, General Craddock. I am sure that has sunk in on you as well, Supreme Allied Commander—"General Jim Jones predicted that 2006 would be a pivotal year for NATO."

Mr. HUNTER [Off-mike.]

Mr. KLINE. Just look at his face and I will continue to read so we don't have to do this real-time editing.

"And indeed, the alliance has entered a new era. It has launched and sustained the significant deployment outside of Europe. It has taken the lead for security and stability operations in the entirety of Afghanistan. Some 37 countries are working together to help build a peaceful and stable Afghanistan through the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

"Generals, both of you have key roles to play in our important NATO alliance. I will be very interested in hearing your perspective regarding allied views on this critical effort. In particular, what will be NATO's role with respect to Afghanistan's long-term security requirements?

"Understanding the important impact of counternarcotics and alternative livelihood efforts on the security situation, what is and what should be NATO's role in these efforts? What are we doing to persuade other nations to reduce or eliminate the caveats that they have placed on the use of their forces in Afghanistan?

"NATO has also answered the call in Iraq. Earlier this week, I returned from a tour of U.S. operations in Fallujah, Ramadi and Baghdad. This trip only strengthened my strong conviction that a successful handoff of security responsibilities to the Iraqi Army and police forces, allowing U.S. forces to rotate out of the battlefield, is possible. But Iraqi forces must be ready and willing to accept such responsibilities.

"The NATO training mission in Iraq has helped professionalize Iraqi Army officers toward this end. It is gratifying to see NATO demonstrate its continuing commitment to the common values of freedom and democracy even as it proves its flexibility and its continuing relevance. I would appreciate your thoughts on how our NATO allies and partners view their current and future role in addressing long-term security, stability, transition and reconstruction needs in Iraq.

"On the topic of investment, I find it interesting that despite NATO's requirement that allies spend at least two percent of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on their militaries, only a handful of nations actually do so. Over the last several years, many of our allies have argued that the European Union's (EU) growing focus on security and defense could result in increased military spending and improved capabilities of member nations.

"However, it appears that fiscal realities have not supported this argument. Moreover, it seems that the alliance's emphasis on transformation, including leveraging the experience and expertise of joint forces command, has not resulted in noticeable increases in expenditures or capabilities. In fact, NATO nations have recognized a significant shortfall in strategic airlift, yet these nations' combined acquisition of C-17s relies in large part on U.S. contributions.

So, I wonder, how can we more effectively persuade our friends to transform and modernize their militaries?

"Finally, we will all be watching with interest the development of Africa Command (AFRICOM). As we have seen, ungoverned and under-governed spaces can become safe havens for terrorists. By partnering more closely with nations on the African continent, we can help to develop more secure borders, more responsible and capable military forces and security institutions that are more responsive to national governments and that can help to close the doors of any safe havens located there.

"I note that General Craddock's predecessors in European Command had worked with these nations. I look forward to hearing how standing up a new command may expand upon those efforts without creating dangerous seams with existing commands along the important security corridors found along the Mediterranean and the Horn of Africa.

"Generals, this is a pivotal time for the men and women under your command. Their work will continue both to strengthen U.S. military forces and capabilities and to foster the United States' vital relationships with multinational organizations, other nations bilaterally and non-governmental organizations.

"I thank you," speaking as Mr. Hunter. And I thank you as myself.

Mr. HUNTER. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. KLINE. The gentleman would be proud to yield.

STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman for yielding. I just wanted to thank him for making this opening statement. That is one of the best statements I have ever made. [Laughter.]

I thank my good friend from Minnesota.

The one point that I would hope that you would go to is the prospect for developing a formula for NATO participation, where we at least have a goal in terms of the amount of resources that nations, based on their gross domestic product, devote to NATO, to the organization.

Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

In consultation with Mr. Hunter, the last time we had a posture hearing, we will reverse the order in which we call upon the members of the committee. But I will remember to let the witnesses do their opening statements before that. Thank you very much.

General Craddock.

STATEMENT OF GEN. BANTZ J. CRADDOCK, COMMANDER, UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND, U.S. ARMY

General CRADDOCK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Representative Hunter, distinguished members of the committee. It is indeed my privilege to appear here before you today for the first time as commander of the United States European Command, EUCOM.

Mr. Chairman, I have submitted a written statement that I ask be made a part of the official record.

Before I continue, I would like to——

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, each of the written statements will be made part of the record.

General CRADDOCK. Thank you, sir.

Before I continue with my remarks, if I could, I would like to acknowledge here my wingman, Lance Smith. As you said earlier, we are the two supreme commanders, if you will, at the strategic level for NATO. It is a pleasure to be with him here today. And as much as we work routinely closely together, we will do so here today.

So, Lance, thank you.

And also, if you would permit me, I would like to introduce my senior non-commissioned officer in European Command, Command Sergeant Major Mark Farley. He is my battle buddy.

Mark, stand up, if you would.

And I think it is important that he is here today, because he represents all of the soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines, and he is continually out and about in the command, checking on the quality of life, training conditions, and is very essential to what we do every day.

[Applause.]

Since taking command of EUCOM, I have been struck by the command's expanse and diversity, the dedication and quality of our service members, the transformation of NATO in the 21st century and our Nation's commitment to this great alliance.

EUCOM is conducting a broad range of activities to assure both EUCOM's and NATO's continued relevance. I will provide a brief overview of our activities, highlighting the vital role EUCOM service members play in this vast theater.

While support for the global war on terror (GWOT) is our overarching priority, EUCOM is also focused on sustaining Europe as a global partner and furthering the U.S. security relationship with Africa.

European Command's strategy of active security seeks to defeat transnational terrorist entities and violent extremists who threaten the United States, its allies and our interests. We will do that by denying our enemies freedom of action and access to resources and by building partner nation capabilities that promote stability.

Security cooperation remains the cornerstone of this strategy. Our programs represent a proactive approach to building able partners. From airborne training to non-lethal weapons, education, EUCOM personnel and facilities provide practical and state-of-the-art education and training that assists our allies, our partners, in developing their capabilities to conduct effective peacekeeping and contingency operations with well-trained, disciplined forces.

These efforts mitigate the conditions that lead to conflict, prepare the way for success and reduce the need for substantial U.S. involvement. Security cooperation programs, such as the International Military Education and Training (IMET), foreign military financing (FMF), foreign military sales (FMS), the Georgia Sustainment and Stability Operations Program and the Section 1206 Security Assistance Program are just a few of the critically important tools you support that provide the resources to execute

our security cooperation activities throughout Europe, Eurasia and Africa.

European Command's ongoing transformation initiatives highlight the military effectiveness of forward-based and rotational forces that are powerful and visible instruments of national influence. Since 2002, our transformation plans have ensured that operational forces and pre-positioned logistics are postured to meet current and potential contingencies.

The current plan retains two brigade combat teams, one in Germany and one in Italy, along with eight fighter aircraft squadrons in the United Kingdom, Germany and Italy. Additionally, we will maintain a rotational brigade in Romania and Bulgaria as Joint Task Force East, sourced using the global force management process.

In addition to our conventional forces, special operations forces are essential. They enable EUCOM to develop and maintain trust and long-term relationships with partner nations as we help to build their capabilities and capacities.

NATO remains an alliance committed to the collective security of its member states and increasingly to a broader and more comprehensive view of security in an interdependent world where the threats are increasingly non-traditional and more global in nature.

While political consultations among the 26 NATO nations helps sustain a unity of purpose, the men and women of the alliance plus 17 other troop-contributing nations are redefining NATO's role by their actions in operations across Afghanistan, the Balkans, Mediterranean, Iraq, the Baltics and Africa. Today over 50,000 NATO military forces are deployed in support of NATO operations. This is a visible and effective demonstration of NATO resolve to meet both European and out-of-area security challenges.

In the current strategic environment, collective security is an essential factor in achieving national security. NATO, with the proper resources and political will, remains the preeminent security alliance in the world. It is in our national interest to ensure that NATO succeeds. The leadership and the capabilities our Nation contributes to the NATO alliance remain fundamental to preserving the transatlantic partnership.

Continued Congressional support for our efforts is essential to ensure that the European Command remains capable of effective engagement throughout our area of responsibility, that we can provide sustained support to the NATO Alliance and to our regional partners and that EUCOM meets the broad task set forth in the national military strategies.

The dedicated men and women of the United States European Command are committed to achieving our national goals and objectives.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding this hearing, and I look forward to addressing the committee's questions. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Craddock can be found in the Appendix on page 41.]

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly. Thank you.
General Smith.

**STATEMENT OF GEN. LANCE SMITH, COMMANDER, JOINT
FORCES COMMAND, U.S. AIR FORCE**

General SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, distinguished members. I am honored to testify today. It has been a long time, as the chairman indicated, since Joint Forces Command has held forth in this committee.

It is also a great pleasure and honor to testify with my friend, John Craddock. Our relationship, besides going back a ways, it is critical not just between our two NATO hats but also with our Joint Forces Command hat and our European Command hats, and we work closely in that.

I have also brought with me the senior enlisted member for Joint Forces Command, my very trusted adviser but also one of those individuals you don't see very often because he is constantly out with the services and with the other combatant commanders to get the temperature of the water in the enlisted force and to make sure that we are meeting the training needs and the requirements of those combatant commanders that use the enlisted force so greatly.

So, Mark, if you wouldn't mind standing up.

Sergeant Major Mark Ripka.

[Applause.]

Sir, as you have accepted my statement, I would like to just say a few words and then look forward to taking questions.

My message is really one that Joint Forces Command wakes up every morning to really do several things. Our first and foremost responsibility is to successfully pursue the war on terror, the global war on terror. We work every day to strengthen our joint warfighting capabilities. We have an entire group, but the entire command is committed to ensuring that the forces that we provide to the combatant commanders are trained and ready and try to keep a proper balance between the day-to-day business of Joint Forces Command.

The providing of force is the other thing that we do. But really to balance that with a look at the future, to make sure that we continue down the road toward transformation for the entire force.

I would also add that I have spent a fair amount of time visiting troops around the world in General Craddock's region, in Afghanistan, and throughout the Persian Gulf, and everything that I have seen during my visits has been impressive. In fact, awe-inspiring. The service and devotion and resolve of the troops that I meet every day is incredible and something I think we can all be proud of.

Just last week I visited Fort Stewart in Georgia and Fort Bragg at North Carolina in an effort to look at their training as they get ready to go into Iraq. One of those units is doing home station training of the Third Brigade, or the Second Brigade of the Third Infantry Division. And to watch what they are doing in preparation of the war and their progress as they practice to be the last unit of the surge. They will go over in May.

And I can report that your support and the support of the Nation is truly turning out the best-trained and the best-led force that I have ever seen in my professional career. I do consider it a privilege to serve with young men and women of that caliber in this critical time in our nation's history.

Mr. Chairman, thanks for this opportunity. I will be pleased to answer any questions. And I do want to take the opportunity to invite all the members down to Norfolk and Suffolk to see both the Joint Forces Command facilities and our Joint Futures Labs and the things that we are doing there, but to meet with the men and women of Allied Command Transformation, the NATO part of my job at Norfolk.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of General Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 96.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, General Smith.

Per our previous discussion, we will reverse the order and call on Mr. Cummings first, please.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Just let me remind the folks that the five-minute rule is hovering over us.

Thank you.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And General Craddock and General Smith, I want to thank you all for your service. And on behalf of all of us in the Congress, we hope that you will extend our appreciation to the men and women who valiantly serve our Nation and the world.

General Craddock, you noted in your testimony, in your written testimony, that Western Europe is the home to some of our oldest and closest allies, and there has been a moving trend in which the defense budgets of these same NATO allies steadily fall to a level that jeopardizes their ability to make long-term strategic military commitments to meet the alliance's 21st century ambitions.

In this same vein, as our allies continue to lessen their budgets and commitments, we have seen a steady flow of announcements from our allies of withdrawal plans from combat zones. Notably, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, back on February 21st, announced his plans for the imminent withdrawal of around 1,600 of his country's troops from Iraq. And then Denmark also plans to withdraw 460 coalition troops by August.

The question is, what efforts are being made to ensure that other allies do not allow the lead of Denmark and Great Britain and withdraw from Iraq or Afghanistan? And when do you think that the United States might be left alone, if you think they might be left alone, as a coalition of the willing?

General CRADDOCK. Well, thank you, sir.

Tough question. But the fact is, that right now the 26 NATO nations, with a goal of two percent of GDP apportioned to the defense establishment, only six meet the goal. And the trends, as you state, are negative. And those obviously are political decisions made by the nations, based on their priorities.

Now, with regard to the trends, indeed the United Kingdom announced they were going to withdraw troops from Iraq. At the same time, however, they announced that they were going to send additional troops to the ISAF mission, International Security Assistance Force, in Afghanistan of some 1,400.

Now, that is in addition to the some 800 troops they announced they would add to the ISAF mission earlier in the year. So there is indeed a significant plus-up there.

I think what we are seeing—and I don't know the cause of this other than I am an observer, and Central Command has the coalition, if you will, in Iraq. So I am not privy to the inside baseball there. But it appears to me that some nations, when they have made the judgments of where they want to contribute their forces, are moving forces from Iraq and at the same time creating head space and force availability to contribute to the NATO mission in Afghanistan.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Well, I would hope that would be the case, if they have got to leave.

Considering that we began our efforts in Afghanistan in October of 2001, what are the long-term and short-term goals of NATO and ISAF military presence in attaining stability in Afghanistan? And how would you define stability and success in that nation?

Just these few questions.

What are NATO, ISAF and those immediate concerns that stifle it from meeting these goals? Are we prepared for the spring offensive that the Taliban is expected to launch? Why do many of the nations that are part of NATO and ISAF force maintain national caveats that limit what their troops can do in Afghanistan?

And are Afghanistan's security forces capable of independently maintaining stability in Afghanistan? And how would you characterize their level of training, equipment and readiness?

General CRADDOCK. Okay, let me try to get some of those here.

What is the ISAF purpose, if you will, or mission? It is to create a secure and stable environment so that reconstruction and development can occur. The fact of the matter is, you cannot get reconstruction and development without a level of security that assures the safety, if you will, of the international organizations, the non-governmentals, who are chartered to do that.

On the other hand, you cannot have lasting, enduring security without investment which yields to opportunities, employment, development of infrastructure. So they go hand in hand.

What NATO has chartered to do here in the authorization of the North Atlantic Council is to conduct security operations to enable reconstruction and development of that country. At the same time, we recognize that it is essential that the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) be trained and developed over time to be capable of assuming their own security mission and ensuring both the public security, the police and the national security, the army of that nation.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Conaway, from Texas.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good morning, gentleman.

Command Sergeant Majors, thank you both for being here.

And, Generals, thank you both for coming.

General Craddock, as we talk about the two percent goal for NATO nations to contribute, do we put that in the context as what an overall NATO mission would look like and what our responsibilities would look like, and if the two percent is not there, where are the gaps and what NATO's capabilities would be if two percent of all of the countries had the two percent versus where they are

right now? And are those gaps that in all likelihood the United States would be asked to make up the difference for if called upon?

General CRADDOCK. Thank you, sir.

I think the manifestation of the lack of the two percent falls in two areas. One is transformation of that force from what largely these nations have had in the past, which are territorial forces at their borders ensuring that no other nation invades. They are largely heavy forces, if you will. The transformation to deployable, agile, capable forces.

And again, General Smith, through the Supreme Allied Command Transformation, is a part of working with that. That is the first place that suffers.

The second place that suffers is every decision to support the ISAF mission with forces boils down to a fiscal decision, and it costs the Nation to provide the forces, to sustain the forces, to equip the forces. Those are national responsibilities. And without that budget authority then, they have to weigh that in their decision authority to do that.

The fact is, the NATO level of ambition for these operational missions is not matched by its political will.

Mr. CONAWAY. You mentioned earlier in your statement about the political will to keep NATO viable. Is that our political will or the member nations' political will?

General CRADDOCK. No, it is the political will of the member nations.

Mr. CONAWAY. How does the growth in NATO—does that help or hurt this military capacity that NATO has?

General CRADDOCK. From the willingness to participate, it is very helpful.

These nations, those who for so long were under the Soviet Union, have not had the opportunities of freedom and democracy that others may have had in years past, are very forthright. They are eager to sign up and participate. They are looking for capability of development.

On the other hand, they do not have to the extent that they will in the future large budgets, and it is very difficult for them then to generate the resources to do this.

But I find that we continually—I am amazed by the opportunities they create and the will they have to participate. We have to find ways to enable that in the future.

Mr. CONAWAY. Given the commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, are you resource-constrained with respect to your new command? Have you had a chance to evaluate where you are thin and where you need resources?

General CRADDOCK. With regard to European Command, as I said, our transformation strategy, the theater transformation strategy which we began in 2002, was postulated on some assumptions that we made then. And in the intervening almost five years now, there has been changes in the geopolitical environment. There has been forces that are assigned to EUCOM that are part of the global force structure that are moved into Iraq and Afghanistan on a routine basis.

I think, and I have directed the EUCOM staff to go back and let us do an assessment of the assumptions we made in 2002 to see

how they fit today, are they still valid, and if not, what needs to be revised. And then let us look at the geopolitical environment of what has transpired in the global war on terror, what has transpired in the overall force structure, if you will, because the Army is going to have an increase in its force structure of some number of brigades, and let us validate the posture, because it may well be that our ability to support the national military strategy and the plan we made in 2002 with the numbers of forces may need adjustment.

I don't know the answer, but I think it is worthy of investigation.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, gentlemen.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

The gentlelady from Kansas, Ms. Boyda.

Mrs. BOYDA. Thank you very much.

And thank you for your service—and, Sergeant Majors, for yours as well, too. Being there with the troops is really what is so important in getting that feedback. Thank you so much.

We have heard so many times that our troop strength is really being stretched very thin, and clearly that must be what you are going through as well. You have alluded to it, and with the change of mission or the geopolitical change, just how comfortable do you feel about our strategic readiness, if an event were to happen in Europe or under the EUCOM command?

What is your specific readiness like, where the U.S. Command stands or—what am I trying to say? I have asked the question. But within EUCOM, where are you with regard to readiness for an event that, quite honestly, isn't on the radar screen today?

General CRADDOCK. Thank you.

I don't know if it is an issue of readiness or capacity. I think because the U.S. forces assigned to the European Command are in the global force pool, and not only the Army but the Air Force and Naval forces are being rotated into Operation Iraq Freedom (OIF), Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), into ISAF, the NATO mission on a routine basis, they are very ready.

Now, obviously, it is cyclic.

Mrs. BOYDA. They are or they aren't?

General CRADDOCK. No, they are ready. They train up for the mission. They deploy for a year, sometimes longer, based on the situation. And then they come back and they retrain.

So the readiness, I mean, this is an incredibly talented veteran force. They are very, very good. And they take this in stride. The question is one of capacity. If something else arises and the forces assigned to European Command are engaged in those missions, then I would have to go back to the chairman with a request for forces. And then falls into another process where the forces must be generated and assigned.

Mrs. BOYDA. Generally, in your years of command do you find that there is generally some capacity there to take care of events that were not planned? Are we in a different position than we were 3 years ago, 6 years ago, 10 years ago? And what level of comfort or discomfort do you have with your strategic readiness levels?

General CRADDOCK. I can only speak with regards to my comfort level with the capacity from the European Command. And we have

very little capacity left after we source the global force pool, if you will, for these ongoing.

My concern is this: that what we do, essentially, in our active strategy, is we try to shape the environment for the future. And that is by engagement, that is by theater security, cooperation—not assistance, but we cooperate. We send our forces and they cooperate and train and exercise with partner nations.

Our ability to do that now is limited because we don't have the forces available since they are in the rotation to the other—

Mrs. BOYDA. I appreciate your candor.

Let me ask one other question. When we are talking about NATO forces and it is a lack of political will, we believe, what do you think is the cause of that lack of political will?

General CRADDOCK. I think it is varied, depending on nations. To a certain extent, I believe there is the phenomena that if you haven't felt the pain of the global war on terror, then you may not realize that it is real and it is here and it is a threat today and, I think, into the future.

Second, I think that many nations have a notion that the defense against terrorism is a public security issue, read police, internal to a nation, as opposed to a national security issue, which would mean military, potentially abroad, not in the nation.

Mrs. BOYDA. Would you say there is a disconnect between how governments feel and leadership feels versus people? Or is it both that are on the same page? Or is this a public opinion phenomena? Or basically leadership? Or both?

General CRADDOCK. I am really not qualified to make that judgment since I am hearing and seeing and feeling it from a certain perspective.

Mrs. BOYDA. All right, thank you very much.

I yield back my time.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady.

I am going to ask Ms. Drake to proceed and hopefully we can get your five minutes in before we break, gentlemen, for our, it looks like two votes.

Ms. Drake.

Mrs. DRAKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I would like to thank both of you for being here with us today and for your service to our nation.

General Smith, as you know, I have visited you in Norfolk. I have been in your headquarters. I certainly remember the very poor condition of that building, the World War II era building that you are using as your headquarters. And this committee was, I think, very pleased to authorize the \$13 million for your new headquarters. And unfortunately, what happened with that bill in 2007, that money was not left in there.

So I wondered, from your perspective, if you could tell us, based on the importance of Joint Forces Command and its lead role in the training and transformation of our 21st-century military, what your perspective is on what can we do to help ensure that our warfighters have a modern headquarters that meets the requirements and the demands of Joint Forces Command.

General SMITH. Thank you, Congresswoman Drake.

You are indeed right. The location of part of my staff on the Norfolk side is in a converted Navy hospital. It was built over 60 years ago. And they suffer from electrical problems, water problems and the like.

And, frankly, it impacts the day-to-day ability to do business as well as the morale of the troops, and I can see a complete difference between that and the staff that is over on the Suffolk side in much better facilities.

The other part, they are living right next to the NATO headquarters, which is a considerably nicer building with considerably better facilities. So the U.S. folks are in the lesser facilities there.

The fact is, they will do what good soldiers always do, and they will go to work every day and they will work hard. But the fact that they do not have the connectivity, they don't have the facilities they need to be able to do the job, has an impact. And I know why the money didn't show up, because it was a new start and the Navy made a determination of that, and we very much appreciate your support and hope that we can get the funding as soon as possible so we can move down to getting the new facilities they deserve.

Mrs. DRAKE. Thank you for that.

And I would also like to ask you if our current strategy for modeling and simulation is deficient to meet warfighter requirements and the evolution toward interagency involvement. Or, in other words, we talk a lot in this committee about how do we do a Goldwater-Nichols for interagency and what can JFCOM do to help move us in that direction.

General SMITH. Well, first of all, the modeling and simulation piece, the headway that we have made in modeling and simulation is just extraordinary. And it is a wonderful partnership in that area, because we have a relationship with industry and with Old Dominion University, Virginia Tech and University of Virginia (UVA), all who are engaged in modeling and simulation. In fact, Virginia is building its modeling and simulation center just down the road from our facilities in Suffolk.

The next step I think to the modeling and simulation piece is being able to get it out in the field. So, we are using it wonderfully in the training arena, but it has application to the warfighter in the field as well, and that is our next step. And that will be a large step.

Through the whole training experience, we have seen more and more involvement by the interagency as well as an increase in the level of people that are coming. I mean, it used to be that the new guy on the block that would show up at exercises, and today we are seeing much more senior people from across the staff.

The beauty of modeling and simulation and distributed kind of things is that you don't have to all go to the same place to be able to do that. And as we make progress down that road, I think we will see more interagency involvement. It is not because they don't want to participate. It is because oftentimes they don't have the time or the capacity and they are one-deep in almost everything that they do.

Mrs. DRAKE. Thank you, General.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

And we will have a recess, gentlemen, until we come back from the vote. Thank you.

[Recess.]

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come back to order.

Thank you for your indulgence. We made the vote.

Ms. Davis.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you to both of you for being here. Thank you for your extraordinary service, as well.

I wanted to follow up with the last question on interagency coordination and I think you said that we don't have the time or the capacity to focus our resources as we should on that, despite the fact that we do have the modeling, the simulation, that are being developed, and I certainly appreciate that. We all do. I mean, that is a beginning step.

But how much of our resources are we actually contributing to that? How many people are focusing on how we do that? And I am really not suggesting that it is all in the military. I think our great frustration has been that you have shouldered the entire burden for this, and we need to expand that.

What suggestions do you have? Is it a matter of your really committing more resources to it and moving across those lines? What do you see as the Congress' responsibility in this?

General SMITH. Well, I mean, obviously, there is consideration out there for a Goldwater-Nichols II kind of thing for the interagency. Now, regardless of what you call it, I think anything that will tie us together closer I think is important and would be of benefit to everybody.

When I said we don't have the forces or the whatever to do it as much as we would like, I was really referring to the agencies more than anything else. I mean, the, you know, the State Department oftentimes is one-deep and when somebody goes off—we have the luxury within the military of having a two-week exercise and a week to plan the month before and stuff like that. Many agencies really don't have the time to be able to do that, and the demands that we make on them are pretty widespread.

So I would want them to participate in a joint exercise in Norfolk. General Craddock would want them to, you know, take part in an exercise in European Command. When he was down at Southern Command, he wanted them to take part in exercises down there. And they just go, "We would love to. We do have other jobs to do."

So it is not for lack of wanting to do it. So I think part of the answer in my view is the whole business that we are doing with the state coordinator for reconstruction and stabilization, Ambassador John Herbst, and his desire to build a state reserve corps of people who I think would have time and would have expertise to be able to participate in such things. That would help.

Now, having said that, we are also doing—I was at Fort Bragg on Friday, looking at provincial reconstruction team training that is going on down there for the troops or the people going into Afghanistan, and there were two U.S. Department of Agriculture people there doing part of the training and others taking part of the

training. There were two Department of State people and there were two United States Agency for International Development (USAID) people, senior people, all taking part in this training.

So we are much further down the road than we, I think, ever have been. At the same time, by the way, Foreign Service Institute is setting up training for Department of State for provincial reconstruction team members going into Iraq, and we are actively participating in the training with them.

There are opportunities now that are presenting themselves that, I think, all speak positive, but we have to have more opportunities and more capacity to do this.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. But it is not enough at this point?

General SMITH. Yes.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Could you share with me as well that—getting a sense, really, of how active NATO has been in providing the training, equipping and technical assistance to Iraqi personnel there in Iraq. How many Iraqi forces is NATO currently training through this mission and how many NATO trainers are there?

General SMITH. I think that is a mixed question for both General Craddock and I.

My responsibility for training with my Allied Command Transformation hat on for Iraqis is coordinating the effort outside of Iraq, for instance at the NATO school in Oberammergau or at the other institutions that the nations have to do that. That is what I do, and we do it at the request and approval of the Iraqi government.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Could I ask General Craddock, do you have a number, a sense, how many are actually engaged in that?

General CRADDOCK. The number varies. Right now, it is about 200.

It has been a little more than that in the past because we had some missions that involved training the trainer. What we had to do was train the Iraqi leaders in specialized courses. It is not unit training, it is individual, such as a staff training. And the intent there was to train those leaders while we trained instructors, then turn over the training to instructors, and so we have drawn down a little because we didn't need all of our instructors. We needed mentors for their instructors.

At the same time, there has been opportunities for new training. We will soon send—my headquarters will send the North Atlantic Council a proposal for police training done by the Italian carabinieri. They have made the visit. They want to do it. We have to get the authority from NATO headquarters. That will push the numbers back up as we start to train police leaders.

So it has been back and forth fungible. I think some 3,200-plus Iraqi officers and non-commissioned officers have been trained to date.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Gingrey.

Dr. GINGREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Craddock, General Smith, thank you very much for being here with us today and, of course, discussing European Com-

mand, Joint Forces Command and NATO. You certainly have a tremendous area of responsibility.

And as I look at the AOR, the map, and of course look at Russia, and think about the fact that some 70,000 troops, I think, have been rotated out of the European Command—and I think about the European Union, of course. They are the ones that traditionally I would think have a military that can give more support to NATO than the more recent entries, such as Romania and Bulgaria and Slovakia and the Baltic States, but yet the European Union is talking about forming their own defense headquarters, their own military mission. That frightens me in regard to what effect that is going to have on NATO.

I am also very frightened by the rhetoric coming out of President Putin lately in regard to our thoughts of having a missile defense system in Poland or maybe another European country that would welcome that. But Putin begins to make threatening remarks and, of course, he has been quite friendly to Iran in regard to the development of their nuclear program.

So I would like for both of you to address those issues and tell the committee how you feel about that. Do you share my concerns? And as we discuss your budget, what are your needs and how do you feel about moving 70,000 troops out of the European Command?

General CRADDOCK. I will go ahead and start first, if I could, sir.

The theater strategy is ongoing. As I said earlier, the concern I have is the ability to conduct the missions that we have been given in European Command with the forces available, because the forces are in this force pool and they're moving into Iraq and Afghanistan on a rotating basis.

That is why I directed a study, because I am concerned and I don't know, but I am skeptical that we have adequate forces available without having to come back and request forces to be sent over to us on a rotational basis.

Now, when you build relationships, theater security cooperation, one of the valuable opportunities is to build enduring relationships. And if we rotate our forces over for exercises and engagements and they go back and they could be active duty from Fort Bragg today and next year they are active duty from Fort Carson or a reserve component, we don't build the enduring relationships.

So even though we are doing it, the quality, if you will, suffers, and we don't optimize, I think, on the intent of the strategy. So we are going to take a look at it with a view toward making a determination. Do we have adequate troops available for the task we have been assigned?

With regard to the E.U., I think there was an agreement, Berlin Plus, where there was an arrangement between NATO and the European Union with regard to development of defense organizations. That is a good arrangement if it is followed. I think there is room for the European Union to develop niche capabilities while NATO retains a security role.

We must work together to avoid duplication, because at the end of the day the units are the same units. They have a different hat.

The Putin rhetoric, I think that it has already been stated by the secretary of state and I agree, there has been many meetings,

much engagement. We have had fair and open and transparent discussions with regard to the antimissile capability in Poland; the Czech Republic we are looking at, and I think that that is either miscommunication or potentially just deliberately overstating the case. We will continue to engage and make the point.

General SMITH. I share your concerns. General Craddock and I were both in Munich when Mr. Putin made those remarks, and the next day the minister of Foreign Affairs for Czechoslovakia stood up and said, well, he wanted to thank Mr. Putin for the speech, because it absolutely validated why Czechoslovakia joined NATO.

My concern is, yes, we are talking with Russia and the like, but there is an impact on the other nations. You see some concern on the part of Poland and hence some discussions about bilateral relationships with the United States based on their concerns about what they are looking at to the east. And that is what the rhetoric, I think, is causing, more than anything else.

Dr. GINGREY. Thank you, Generals.

And I see my time has expired. I yield back.

Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

We are nearing the list of those that arrived before the gavel.

Mr. Ortiz.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.

General Craddock, General Smith, good to see both of you, and you are accompanied by a group of old friends that are with you today. Thanks for joining us.

Now, I was just wondering, what is your assessment of your command's ability to effectively deal with the range of security concerns and responsibilities within the European Command? And how is your command affected by having units from Europe deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan?

And I ask this question because we have so many hot spots all over the world, sometimes I wonder that even when we, you know, raised our end strength by 65,000 people, sometimes I wonder whether we have enough.

And I am just wondering, you mentioned a few moments ago that you do not have enough capacity. Maybe you can elaborate a little bit on that, as well.

General CRADDOCK. Well, thank you, sir, for the question.

Obviously, it is a challenge, because we want to, in this enormous theater with 92 countries in the area of responsibility, we want to be able to engage. And the key here is, one, we have got forces available that are ready for any contingency. Second, we need to build partner nation capacity. And to do that, that is where theater security engagement opportunities exist.

Where we are unable to do it because of a lack of forces available, then it slows the progress. We have to more finitely and discretely prioritize what it is we do in order to get the greatest advantage or to partner and create the greatest opportunity and capacity in that nation that we are working with, to look for what they will be able to do in return. So it exacerbates the problem.

Now, we are still doing it to the extent that we have the forces available, but I will tell you that I reviewed all of the engagement opportunities over the last two years, the exercises that we do, and

ask for a listing of everything we had to cancel and why. And it was surprising in its volume. In other words, there was more there than I expected.

What is the reason? Because first of all, we have got headquarters and troop units involved in our rotation for the priority mission. It is the GWOT, and we understand that. At the same time, then, we have to very carefully pick and choose those events that we need to do.

Last, what we do is we request rotational forces from here, from the continental United States, and go over to engage on an episodic basis, not there for the duration, which will work, but it is in my judgment suboptimizing the opportunity to be able to have these long-term enduring relationships.

I just recall, when I was a division commander and assistant division commander in Germany in years past, those relationships that you established were very important, and they provided access, they provided trust and confidence. And the capacity building, I believe, moved along much faster.

Mr. ORTIZ. General Smith, I know that you are working with the coalition forces in Europe. I know we sometimes question about the ability of the Iraqi soldiers, whether they are prepared, you know, to go to war with us and whether they have the right equipment and so on.

Are you satisfied? Do you think that if something came up, a conflict somewhere, that you could depend on those troops? That they would not only join us, but that they have the right numbers of personnel, the right support forces and the right equipment?

And my concern is that I worry about the—we mentioned before the preposition stock. You know, not only do we worry about the preposition stock, we worry about sustainability, in case we do go into a long war, like we are now. For how long can we sustain it? Maybe both of you can share with your answer.

General SMITH. Well, you know, that is the million-dollar question, but it really depends on what level of effort you need or you determine you need to engage in.

We are taking some risk in our ability to operate in other parts of the world because of the commitment we have to Iraq and Afghanistan. I look at that on a pretty regular basis. At least twice a year we do a special assessment to look, to evaluate our ability to support plans in other parts of the world.

And indeed, as we go into the surge and take some of those preposition stocks, that does have an impact for our ability to operate elsewhere.

I think our time is up.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

We now have completed those who have arrived before the gavel, and we will go to those who have arrived after the gavel.

Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And General Craddock, General Smith, thank you very much for being here today.

I was particularly struck by the AOR, to see your areas of responsibility, to think that you have from the Azures to Vladivostok. But I look at it in a very positive way. I served in the Army Na-

tional Guard 31 years. I remember well studying Fulda Gap. I remember my National Guard unit preparing in the event of World War III to be deployed to resist a Soviet tank invasion of Greece.

How far we have come. It is particularly exciting—to me, it is a dream come true to see the newly liberated countries of Central Europe and Eastern Europe, to have visited Liberia, seen the return of democracy to Liberia. I believe all of this is due to peace through strength of the American military. And so I want to thank you.

And in particular, the expansion and growth of NATO, I am the co-chair of the Bulgaria Caucus. I visited there 17 years ago, saw their first free elections, and now I have seen them become a member of NATO, develop into a free market democracy. And on January 1, they became part of the European Union.

Can you tell me about the plans for bases in the Republic of Bulgaria?

General CRADDOCK. Thank you, Congressman.

The plans right now is what we call Joint Task Force East, where we are going to make some investments in both Romania and Bulgaria in order to provide facilities for a small forward headquarters that will be the command and control headquarters, then to accommodate rotational forces rotating continuously through both Romania and Bulgaria.

It is a joint operation. We have got U.S. Air Force Europe involved in that. They are already earmarking and providing forces for that capability.

The timelines are such that it appears that we will finish the Romanian side of it first and then with the fiscal year 2008 military construction (MILCON) submission that we have, that will, once approved, be able then to provide the in-state cooperative security location facilities that we will have—correct, the forward operating site facilities that we will have in Bulgaria.

We originally planned for about what we call a 1–0 presence, which means we will always have some level of rotational forces forward. We may not be able to do that. We may have to back it off a little bit based upon force availability.

I am looking and discussing the situation with both U.S. Army Europe, U.S. Air Force Europe, that if we have to, we may be able to forward deploy on a rotational basis our forces out of Europe as a proof of principal early on, to build to capacity, ensure that the facilities are right, and then continue.

I might also add, Bulgaria is a good NATO partner. Recently, as I have worked through our statement of requirements and tried to get more troop units and more capacity capability into Afghanistan, there was a need for a certain type of capability at the Khandahar Airfield.

We were working very diligently in trying to get someone to take that on, and just two days ago I received information from the chief of defense of Bulgaria that he would do that. So they volunteered. It is greatly appreciated. And that is the type of ally that we have got to depend on.

Mr. WILSON. It is just awesome to see the changes. In fact, I visited with the commander of Bulgarian forces in Kabul. What an extraordinary opportunity. And I also visited ten years ago in Roma-

nia, where they expressed their dream and hope and vision one day to be part of NATO, and who would ever imagine just within a couple of years this would come to fruition?

In terms of NATO expansion, for both of you, what is the prospects for Georgia and Ukraine?

General CRADDOCK. Very quickly, obviously, political decisions, we are working both very close, with regards to military relationships, to ensure that there are defense sector reforms and the conditions are set there from a military perspective.

I think right now with the recent announcement the Georgians are going to participate in the OIF in a significant way with providing troops and also potentially for Afghanistan, that is a plus.

I think that in Ukraine, obviously there is a political situation there with regards to the receptivity of the people as to whether or not they want to be NATO members at this time. So we will have to watch that political development.

Mr. WILSON. And a final question. Back in Darfur, I visited there, and you are training African Union (AU) troops. What is the success? I was impressed by the troops of Ghana.

General CRADDOCK. I think that the training opportunity is fruitful. It is helping them establish the staff-level competencies that are needed.

I think there is much more to do, and the turnover, of course, is one that will have to continue to train in order to offset that. But we must continue, in my judgment, to build the A.U. capacity and depth in their competency.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Meek.

Mr. MEEK. Thank you so very much, Mr. Chairman.

General Smith and General Craddock, I am glad you were able to join us this morning.

On the line of questioning that you have just closed off on, I was more concerned about the training of A.U. troops and in talking, I know that African Command will be up and going pretty soon.

I had an opportunity about a week and a half ago to travel to Ghana as part of the Speaker's official delegation to celebrate their 50th anniversary of their independence. And I can't help but say that, as you know, the growth of terrorism is going to grow in that neck of the woods and other areas.

I have had some conversations with some folks in the White House and some other folks that are a little apprehensive about getting involved in what is going on in Darfur due to the fact that there would be another Muslim country that the U.S. could be involved in.

But we had a major crisis that we haven't seen since the Holocaust that is going on there right under our noses, and we are the country set to be responsible for making sure that others are responsible. And when historians look back at this time, they are going to look at our contribution, what we did and what we did not do.

Framing it that way, the Speaker recently put me on the NATO—made me one of the representatives from the House, as it relates to the parliamentary.

I know we are doing training. I know we are providing some moving troops in that area. I want to hear from both of you on what more can we do to assist not only A.U. troops but to hopefully turn the tide in Darfur.

General CRADDOCK. I will go first and try to be quick.

I think there are a couple issues. One, we probably need to continue the airlift of the African Union troops in. Second, we need to continue the training of the African Union command and control capacity, the capability there, the management of the troops. And to the extent we need to make sure that the global peacekeeping operations initiative (GPOI), the ACOTA, the African Contingency Operations Training, continues, where that builds then the capacity of the contributing nations.

That is ongoing. That ACOTA gets a large percentage of the GPOI funding and in my judgment it is essential that it continues to do that, so that that capacity is built.

Now, from a NATO perspective, there will have to be a political decision for NATO to become involved. Oftentimes, as I said earlier, levels of ambition exceed political will. I think that NATO will watch the United Nations closely to see what the United Nations lead is and where the United Nations may turn for that intervention.

With regards to the European Command, I think we can continue to support, as we have. If there is a call for greater intervention, U.S. forces involvement, then European Command would have to come back. Obviously, we will put the plan together and request forces, then, from the Department of Defense.

Mr. MEEK. General Craddock, one of the questions that has surfaced out of your response, I am familiar with NATO's involvement, and I think as it relates from a U.S. standpoint, I was reading of the—well, the briefing, the country briefing on my way flying over.

Is it true that we are training—I am talking about we, the United States, we are training 60 percent of the peacekeeping troops or soldiers, African soldiers, in Africa? Is that under your command?

General CRADDOCK. It is. Well, I am responsible for Africa.

I don't know that we are in the—ACOTA is the African Contingency Training effort.

Mr. MEEK. Right.

General CRADDOCK. That is being funded under the global peacekeeping operations. About 60 percent of the funding of that program goes to ACOTA. So from us, it is 60 percent of our effort.

Now, is there anyone else doing that? I don't know if any European nations are providing any discreet peacekeeping training to specific nations on a bilateral basis.

Mr. MEEK. Okay.

General CRADDOCK. But pretty much, what is being trained is United States.

Mr. MEEK. General, I see my time is getting ready to run out. I am going to let you know that I am very interested in knowing what we can do. I believe that we can do more. I think the deck is going to be shuffled politically as it relates to Iraq, Afghanistan and while that deck is being shuffled, maybe we can look at how we can play a greater role in curbing the violence in Darfur.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ORTIZ [presiding]. Thank you.

Do you need a response?

Mr. MEEK. Well, General Smith was going to respond.

Mr. ORTIZ. Yes, go ahead.

Mr. MEEK. Thank you.

General.

General SMITH. Actually, I don't have a lot to add to what General Craddock said. I mean, we are part of the training effort, but in a very small way.

Mr. MEEK. Okay.

General SMITH. I am talking about the NATO side of my responsibilities.

Mr. MEEK. On the NATO side.

And usually, Mr. Chairman, we are going to be the lead as it relates to a number of these issues dealing with Darfur, and I am just trying to find out how this committee could be a part of the solution.

I feel that we should be doing more. I don't know if—the answer may not be boots on the ground. It may be the very support that we are already doing, but intensifying it and leading that effort in the NATO spirit.

Thank you.

General SMITH. I would say, it has not been ignored and the United Nations has not specifically asked NATO to go in, as General Craddock said. The E.U., I think, is debating and discussing how they can participate as well.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you.

My good friend from Mississippi, Mr. Taylor.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Craddock, I thank both of you for being here.

I am curious, what if anything could be done diplomatically to entice our NATO allies to get further involved in the effort in Iraq, in your opinion? Do you hear anything in conversations with your peers from Europe that might change things?

Because I happen to think that in retrospect, one of the things that worked so well in Bosnia is the international tone to the intervention.

General CRADDOCK. Well, thank you, Congressman.

That may be the \$64 question here. It is difficult. It is tough.

First of all, you know, the trend is just the opposite. They are pulling out the support. I, in discussion issues with chiefs of defense, my counterparts, equivalent of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, I do not hear any appetite or any discussion of greater involvement. On the contrary, the discussion is what they can do for NATO in Afghanistan, oftentimes at the expense of participation in Iraq, the offsets, if you will.

A couple of things. I think that, one, the success in Bosnia by NATO then kind of led to the European Union saying they have got this thing under control to the point we can probably finish it up and do that. It may well be that success and improving security environment in Iraq will entice some of that same type of thought. I think it is a long shot, but I would not rule it out.

But right now, there are nations that are risk averse. I think that has manifested, as we see caveats in Afghanistan, and I think I don't see that trend being reversed any time soon.

General SMITH. Could I add on that?

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, sir, General.

General SMITH. The fall of the Prodi government in Italy did not help the atmosphere at all in Europe either, because they fell in good part because of the Administration's support for Iraq.

Mr. TAYLOR. To what extent have the insurgent successes at destroying High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) with mines—to what extent has that migrated to Afghanistan? And this is a leading question to how many HMMWVs do you have in Afghanistan and is there any plan to transition them to some variant of the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP).

General CRADDOCK. I don't have the number of M114, 1114 HMMWVs. I can get that for you for U.S. forces. And the NATO nations all bring in various types of armored vehicles, and we will provide that for the record, if that is acceptable.

With regard to the Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), what we are seeing in Afghanistan is we are seeing an increase in the use of IEDs, because of its terror effect and it is asymmetrical effect.

The Taliban, the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) forces, are not going to stand and fight. They tried that last year, and it was devastating. So they now are moving more into these asymmetric attacks. We see more suicide IEDs, both vests and vehicles. We don't see right now a lot involving high-tech IEDs. But there are more numbers and there are more suicide bomber-type events.

We have been successful in being able to find some of the IED-makers, but it is still hit and miss.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 127.]

Mr. TAYLOR. Are the suicide bombers—I can only imagine the difficulty in trying to after the fact figure out who did it, but I am sure you try. Can you track where they come from? Are they Afghan? Are they from around the world? Is there a trend there?

General CRADDOCK. Generally speaking, they are trained in Pakistan, in the tri-border Waziristan area. They are equipped and they are coming in after being indoctrinated there.

Some are Afghans who have lived in Pakistan for years. Some are Afghans who moved across the border to get their training, their instruction, and moved back in to detonate the bomb.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank both of you, Generals, for being here.

Mr. ORTIZ. The lady from Florida, Ms. Castor.

Ms. CASTOR. Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today.

I want to continue the line that my colleague, Mr. Taylor, started on. Can you drill down and provide us greater detail with the reasoning what our allies are saying about why they will not commit more to the mission in Afghanistan? What reasons are they giving you?

General CRADDOCK. This is an ongoing debate. I think there are a couple of reasons.

First of all, there is a cost reason. They, as I said, six of the nations meet the two percent benchmark for two percent of GDP going to defense/security means. So the rest are on a shoestring. Any commitment they make, then, to send and support and train and equip their forces in Afghanistan comes out of an already tight top line.

Many of those nations, large, large percentages of those budgets go to personnel salaries. So there is very little flexibility. So that is the first thing I think that comes in as a problem area.

Second, I will tell you that to a great extent, they are already committed and not only internally but externally in other missions.

We do, in NATO, what we call a defense planning questionnaire, where we every year and sometimes more often send out and ask the nations to declare their forces available for NATO missions and then we take that data back, and that is what we use when we decide who to ask for what. Because we target our requests. We just don't throw it out in the newspaper and hope somebody bids on it. I mean, we kind of figure out who has what capability.

The goal, if you will, is that 40 percent of the nation's military capacity is available for deployment by NATO and that at any one time NATO has about 8 percent deployed. And that is the benchmarks we use. So I would tell you that it varies among nations. I send letters, "You need to step up your contribution. It is costly."

Second, as I said earlier, some of these nations look at this as, well, in the beginning it was a peacekeeping operation and now it has changed, so we don't want to be a part of that. Or if we do it, we are going to caveat it. It is unhelpful. It restrains the commander. It restricts flexibility. And we continually, on a daily basis, work with nations to try to reduce and eliminate to the extent we can those constraints.

General SMITH. The word I hear the most at the most senior levels is it lacks public support. And they fear for their government positions and the like because of that.

Ms. CASTOR. Thank you.

And then back to Africa, with the new regional combatant command in Africa, can you explain what the long-term vision is, what your understanding of the long-term mission is? And where are we spending funds now? And where will the request come in the future?

General CRADDOCK. With regards to Africa Command, the recognition of the fact is that Africa today has a much greater level of strategic interest to the United States and this command, I think, will be unique in terms of both its structure and application.

The challenges and the problems in Africa today cannot be solved by military means, okay. We believe that is fact. Now, there are terrorist issues in parts of that country because of the ungoverned spaces. But by and large, the challenges are not of the terrorist nature. They are of an economic nature. They are health with incredible endemic disease.

Ms. CASTOR. So will we see more requests for the indirect type of action and civilian—

General CRADDOCK. That is exactly the structure we are approaching for Africa Command, trying to make it an interagency command with greater civilian representation. And not only from

Department of State, but Energy, Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and others, because that is where the power, the knowledge, the capacities come from, so that, again, opportunities can be created, development, investment, and then this terrorism level of security, we think we can deal with from our classical approaches to security.

Mr. ORTIZ. My friend from Arkansas, Mr. Snyder.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Generals, I am sorry I was not here earlier. We had a ten Veterans Committee markup also, and I couldn't be here.

I wanted to pursue a little bit this issue of the Africa Command. I remember the general, I don't know, it must have been a decade ago now, when in response to questions would wish that he had more resources for dealing with Africa. And then General Jones was a big proponent of more involvement with Africa. In fact, he talked very eloquently several years ago before this committee about why he thought we needed to do more in Africa.

So I really appreciate the things you are saying, General Craddock.

It seems to me we have some issues, though, that are going to hold back the effectiveness of an Africa Command. I will just throw a couple of those out there. I think you talked a little bit about it earlier in response to Ms. Susan Davis from San Diego.

But, you know, the State Department for some years has had problems staffing some of the more difficult posts, the hardship posts. I think they are getting better on their personnel policies, but their personnel policies actually did not contribute very well to getting these things staffed up.

We have issues of coordination that still go on. I think there is a very strong interest on the part of a lot of us of having some kind of a Goldwater-Nichols-type study done imminently, if possible, that could deal with looking at this kind of coordination.

I will give you one specific example I saw several years ago. I went to Sierra Leone, this was shortly after the U.N. was moving in to take over at the end of the civil war, and there was a Brit team there, about 200 Brits, military, that were doing training of the new Sierra Leone Army.

We had three troops there, one Air Force, who coincidentally was from Little Rock Air Force Base, one Marine and one Army, is my recollection. And the Marine, I guess because I was a former Marine, came to me and said, "You all have to do something."

He said, "This is literally what happened." He said, "I arrived here on a helicopter with an American woman who was in her late 60's, wearing a neck brace because she had neck and back problems. She worked for a private non-governmental organization (NGO). We got off the helicopter, she got into a car and was taken somewhere out in rural Sierra Leone, some hours away, by drive."

He said, "Under the rules that we had at that time, I did not have permission to leave Freetown after dark, even with the ambassador's desire," and he did have that desire.

And, you know, we got that thing straightened out when I got back, but it just seems like we have got a lot of issues with regard to this coordination. And maybe the standing up of this new Africa Command will really help us work on those issues, because I don't

think it is just a problem for Africa. I think it is a problem all around the world.

As you pointed out, the kind of success we want to have in Africa is not going to be primarily because of military. I mean, we hope it is not because of military operations. We hope it is because of a whole lot of other things. But that is true of almost every place in the world. We hope that, you know, diplomatically and economic development and political development, democracy development and the rule of law and civilian control of military, all those kinds of things, will be what makes the world a better place.

I hope that as you run into problems as you are standing up this Africa Command, and whoever the first Africa commander is, I think you are going to run into legislative areas where it is not going to go as well as you want.

And there is a lot of interest in this Congress in looking at that, because this is really brought home in the whole issue of what is going on in Iraq right now, where the State Department had to come to Secretary Gates and say, "We can't get people to go to Iraq. We need you to provide 130 staff people to staff up the provincial reconstruction teams, because we can't get State Department people to go." And I think that really brought home the challenge that we have.

If you have any comments about that, that would be fine. But the one specific question I want to ask is I also think another thing that pulls us back in terms of our national security is our American propensity to disregard foreign language training.

I had three students from the People's Republic of China in my office a couple of hours ago who are in an exchange program with Hendrix College, in Arkansas. They said that they all started learning English in junior high. But they said that there has been big changes. She said now the kids are learning English in elementary school. And I am not sure I could find a school, a high school or a junior high in Arkansas, that teaches Chinese or Farsi or Arabic.

Would you comment on this general issue of language skill in our military and how that might be helped or if there is anything we might do as a Congress?

General CRADDOCK. I will take a shot at it.

Dr. SNYDER. Those weren't very military questions, were they?

General CRADDOCK. Well, no.

First of all, the language. You are absolutely right. In talking to some long-serving U.S. civilians in Afghanistan, who have been there for several years, before 2001, came back right after, and I said, "What is the greatest problem that we have?" And the answer was, "U.S. forces are not as culturally sensitive as NATO forces. One, they don't do any language. They don't even try."

Well, it is true, and it is unacceptable. But it is what it is. And we have got to, I think, as a nation invest in some language requirements, as you said, starting very young. Not everybody will be able to do it, but we have got to try. And I think it is telling everywhere I go that that is the case.

Part two, with regard to interagency, I already see it in terms of trying to put together this structure of a headquarters. I think that headquarters should be at least 40 percent civilian, guys in

ties, if you will, or whatever the case may be. And right now, that is not the case, because we are having a hard time getting subscribers to sign up.

I am probably being too harsh, but the question always is, one, what is in it for me and, two, who is going to pay the bill. And we have got to get by that and we have got to try something new, to see if this thing will make the difference that we need to make.

General SMITH. There are some good military programs out there to try and at least get basic conversational kind of things that we are doing as we embed people into Iraq, into the training transition teams, as well as Afghanistan. But it is the only place they are getting it. They are not getting it—I think there is one college in the United States that teaches Urdu or Pashtun or something like that. The opportunities aren't out there.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you.

Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Larsen.

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Craddock, General Smith, thanks for coming and helping us out.

My questions are really for General Craddock regarding missile defense.

I think in the next few weeks, our subcommittee on strategic forces will be looking at the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) budget and a variety of the needs there. So I wanted to get some perspective from you regarding European Command and missile defense.

If you could address some of these questions, what is your assessment of the impact of the missile defense program on our relationship with our European allies and partners and with Russia? If you can discuss at least your assessment of some of the hurdles that we may face as we try to move forward in Europe in placing a theater missile defense or regional missile defense system there.

General CRADDOCK. Thank you, Congressman.

First of all, with regard to theater missile defense, the Missile Defense Agency's initiative, I think that NATO has looked at that and has endorsed that concept. The secretary-general has said so even recently after the comments that have come back from Russia.

There is already and has been for some years talk, discussion, and looking at how one could integrate missile defense in Europe. There is some short-range capability. Very little intermediate or long-range. The consultations, the discussions, have been ongoing for some time.

Now, with this latest response from Russia, I think there has been a new viewpoint. We saw, I think, in the last couple of days the chancellor of Germany now has said there needs to be a debate, a discussion, a greater debate and discussion in NATO with regard to the MDA approach for basing of radars and interceptors in the Czech Republic and Poland.

I think that discussion will occur. I think that, again, there has been fair and complete disclosure by the United States with regard to the intent and so I would see personally a successful conclusion to that.

And at the end of the day, as General Smith said, we heard from the Czech foreign minister, it is their call. It is a bilateral decision

on their part. But they stand by the fact that it is a sovereign decision.

I think, again, there will be political controversy back and forth. But the facts are the facts, and I think once laid out in a very intellectual way and we get by the emotion of this, that there should be positive progress. And I think that the European partners and the nations will understand what this entails and what the threat is. That is the key aspect of it.

Mr. LARSEN. Do you think our European partners understand that, I want to be careful. I don't want to offend any of our partners here. But do you think Russia will understand that? That is, is it your assessment that if the decision is made by Czechoslovakia, Poland and so on that they want to be a partner in this and we move forward, that that is the end of the discussion?

General CRADDOCK. Congressman, I would submit to you that the facts are so compelling that there will in my judgment be no military misunderstanding of that concept, missile defense, theater missile defense. I think that the issues will be political in nature, and that is where the disagreements will be.

Mr. LARSEN. So it becomes our problem?

General CRADDOCK. In a manner of speaking, sir.

Mr. LARSEN. Sure. Sure.

Can you chat a little bit about Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) and the management structure of MEADS? Do you think it needs changing? Do you think it is going to work and is working and is going to work?

There seems to be some—we are going to explore this in a couple of weeks in a hearing, but I am just getting the impression that a relationship with Germany and Italy on MEADS isn't going as smoothly as possible and I wonder if you have an opinion on that.

General CRADDOCK. I am not enough of an expert to be able to make a judgment at this time. I am understanding a little bit of the history and how we got to where we are, and obviously with changing political considerations, then the relationships and agreements are going to change also. So I wouldn't want to do that now.

However, I would be quite happy to provide something for the record, a response, to give you an assessment of where we think it is to the extent that we can today, if that would be acceptable.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 127.]

Mr. LARSEN. That is fine. Fair enough answer. I appreciate that very much. That is good enough for me.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you so much.

Mr. FRANKS.

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank all of you, witnesses and those attending them, for, again, let me never miss telling you how grateful we are for all that you do for this country and for just the cause of human freedom.

I think that your testimony today, both your written and spoken testimony, has reminded us all that the warfighters in this country and across the world do indeed protect us from very real threats.

Just the most recently confession in Guantanamo Bay by Khalid Sheikh Mohammad should be prime facie evidence in that regard. Although it is a little hard to know about the credibility of a known terrorist, it is interesting that he confessed, among other things, that he was involved in other attacks and planning of other attacks and he did not have, because of all of you having the capability to interdict his plans, he did not have the chance to proceed with those plans in Panama Canal, the Sears Tower in Chicago, the New York Stock Exchange, the U.S. nuclear power plants, London's Heathrow Airport and Big Ben.

Mohammad said he shared responsibility also for planning the assassination of Pope John Paul in the Philippines. This should remind us all that the enemies we face are indeed very real and that the successful processes of the judicial process created by Congress in Guantanamo Bay continues to be needed.

Having said that, may I just shift gears and ask you, General Craddock, on a non-related issue to missile defense, you said in your testimony that an important aspect of EUCOM's strategy of active security is to defend against threats posed by emerging ballistic missile capabilities in Southwest Asia.

You mentioned that there is a planned acquisition and projected deployment of missile defense systems in the Czech Republic and Poland which will be funded through the MDA. Can you talk a little more specifically about the missile defense requirements for a European site?

General CRADDOCK. The negotiations will occur in the future with the specificity of who will be responsible for what. In discussions with the director of the MDA and EUCOM's equities and responsibilities, it appears that in each location the operational requirements, the investments, the MILCON required to build the sites themselves, would be responsibility for MDA to fund now and into the future.

The initial investment made for the facilities needed for the personnel to man the site, if you will, initially, would be MDA, and then it would have to be placed into service, program objective memorandums, the POMs, for future years.

We don't know the extent yet of what that will be. We don't have a full grasp of whether it will be DOD active duty, contractor, so the total investment or vulnerability has yet to be determined. So that is the context in which we made that statement.

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, sir.

Are there any missile defense capability systems or deployment within either of your scope of knowledge or purview that you think should be accelerated?

General CRADDOCK. Well, I think with regards to theater missile defense, and this issue by the Missile Defense Agency, it has got to be harmonized against missile development capacity from these rogue states. We talk about Iran specifically for the European theater.

So I think that is the timeline against which the acceleration must occur.

Second, we would, from a short-range perspective in the European Command, we have short-range capability there, we would

want to modernize that short-range capacity as quickly as possible, upgrade to a higher capable interceptor.

Mr. FRANKS. General Smith, could I shift over to you, sir, and ask you pretty much the same question. Are there missile defense deployments, either planned or that are in place now, that you would like to see accelerated?

General SMITH. I really don't know. That is not part of the stuff that I am doing as a force provider, yet. It perhaps will be, but it is really in the range of strategic command.

Mr. FRANKS. I understand.

Well, Mr. Chairman, if it is all right, I would like to go ahead and submit a few questions for the record.

And again, thank all of you for your courage and your commitment.

Mr. ORTIZ. If you can, whenever, you know, respond to the gentleman's questions for the record, then, with no objection, so ordered.

The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Forbes.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, General Craddock and General Smith, for being here.

I apologize. Mr. Franks and I have been down in the Judiciary Committee voting on a markup today, and we couldn't be in two places at one time.

But for the record, General Smith, I have two questions. I would like to throw them both out at you, if I could. And then just let you take my time to respond to those two questions.

The first one I have is, in fiscal year 2007, the Joint Forces Command took reductions of approximately \$38.4 million in Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) accounts and \$30 million in operations and management (O&M) account. Could you just elaborate to us what the impact of those reductions to JFCOM were?

And, second, I understand that the LAA, the Limited Acquisition Authority, is designed to allow you as the commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command to develop and acquire urgent requirements for combatant commanders and that these requirements can include equipment for battle management command, intelligence and other equipment necessary for the use of Joint Forces in military operations.

As I understand it, under current legislation the LAA is set to expire September 30, 2008. Do you believe the LAA should be extended beyond this date? And if so, what changes, if any, would you recommend to improve the authority?

General SMITH. Thank you, Congressman Forbes. Let me hit the last one first, if it is okay.

Limited Acquisition Authority does not come with money. It is strictly an authority and it gives us the ability in the joint world to bridge the gap between programs that are out there and the needs of the combatant commander. And the successes are pretty interesting.

Right now, we have a capability to deliver joint precision airdrop from a parachute with a 2,000 pound pallet through the weather in Afghanistan that was a capability that was out there, but be-

cause Special Operations Command wanted to move it quickly, we worked with them to pull it ahead 3 years and use our limited acquisition authority to get it moving. And now we have given them 10 of the systems. Central Command has 50. And we are working on a 10,000 and a 20,000 pound model.

That is the kind of things that we can do with the authority. And I would like to see it made permanent. I have not come to the point yet where I have determined that we absolutely need money with it. There is some—it is elegant sometimes that I have to go with a tin cup and ask somebody with money to support it. But having said that, that also keeps rigor in the system, to make sure that it is a product that somebody really does want and are willing to pony up some money for.

On the other hand, if we use it more than we are using it right now, then I would like to see some money attached to it later on, just so we have some flexibility to move the things rapidly.

The impact on our RDT&E cuts had some impacts in a variety of areas. It impacted some of the things that we were talking about earlier, our ability to exercise and experiment with the interagency to some degree, because we had to back off some of the exercises and experiments that were looking out toward the future.

And while it has not always the case, often we end up having to pay for interagency people. Certainly we pay for non-governmental and international organizations to come down to participate in exercises with us. And that is where we usually are oftentimes end up taking the cuts out of that.

So the impact is the exercises and the experiments, we are less able meet our goals and objectives, and that is what happened in 2007, and it moved a number of these programs to the right that I think are pretty critical.

The thing when Joint Forces Command gets cut, when money gets cut out of our budget, it doesn't really impact Joint Forces Command. It impacts my ability to support General Craddock in his needs and his programs, of which we are doing considerable support for the type of stuff that he is doing. Supporting Africa and the like, he had the responsibility for that and we provided people to help look at how we would do the interagency piece and do the mix.

These kinds of cuts, when they are mixed like that, they don't destroy programs, but they move them to the right and make them more difficult to accomplish.

Mr. FORBES. My time is up, but if you have any response to the questions I had for General Smith, if you would either offer them or submit them, either one would be fine.

General CRADDOCK. Okay. Thank you. I agree with him, but I will submit them for the record.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 127.]

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, General.

Thank you both for what you do.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you so much.

I have one more question. And I think that this has been a very informative hearing this morning.

General Craddock, I was just wondering if you could elaborate on NATO's involvement in Iraq. I understand that NATO is training Iraq's military personnel. And if so, you know, maybe, how many forces are they training and how many NATO trainers are there? And if you can just elaborate so that those members who are here, we are very few, but we will take it all in, okay?

General CRADDOCK. All right. Thank you, sir.

The NATO training mission in Iraq was initially designed to provide niche or unique training opportunities that was not being provided by the coalition.

What is that? Well, it is staff officer training, if you will, much like a general staff college, non-commissioned officer training, also, has been one of the areas where we have provided this. It has been ongoing for a few years, I think going on three now.

And the concept was that NATO would provide a cadre of trainers to do this professional development training, if you will, of individuals. This was individual training, not unit collective training. And that over time, the Iraqis would develop a cadre of their own trainers and that NATO would work with and mentor, and then we would turn over the training responsibility to these Iraqi trainers and NATO would step back and reduce numbers then and mentor them to make sure the standards were maintained throughout the training.

Now, that has happened. So originally, at times, we have had upwards of 300. I think now there is approximately 200, because as classes begin and the Iraqis take over more responsibility, we reduce numbers because our mentors go into effect, not our trainers.

We have to date I think around 3,200, maybe a few more than that, Iraqi leaders, if you will, both officer and NCO, have gone through the training and have graduated.

Now, there are two things happening. The numbers of NATO trainers are down because, as I have said, we have transitioned some of the responsibility to the Iraqis.

Second, the numbers of classes and class sizes have reduced because the Iraqis have made a conscious decision to put many of the students who would have been in school back with their unit because of the security crisis they are in now in Baghdad and other places. So they are reducing their school subscription rate right now. So we have had to, we believe temporarily, bring down the numbers of trainers we have.

Now, a new initiative, again, will be subject to approval by the North Atlantic Council, and that is the Italians have done a survey and it appears they are going to offer to NATO to provide police training from their carabinieri, a constabulary police force, very competent, very capable. We think, as do the Iraqis, that that is a capability they need.

The site survey is done. The proposals are being formulated now. And we think that probably by mid-May we will deliver, in conjunction with General Smith, a proposal to North Atlantic Council to authorize the Italian carabinieri to do that. And that will be, we think, a big plus.

So our effort has been up and down, and we work it with the numbers of Iraqis, the numbers of classes, the depth of the people

that are available, and also this transition to let them take this over.

Mr. ORTIZ. Does this include both officers and NCOs? Is it a combination of them?

General CRADDOCK. Yes, it is a combination, in different classes. But we do have a non-commissioned officer professional development component to it.

Mr. ORTIZ. So in your opinion, you think this is working?

General CRADDOCK. We get good reports from it, both from the trainers and from the Iraqis. I will tell you that because of the security situation there, and they have pulled these people back right now, we hope that they see this to fruition, that the security situation gets better and they can send these students back. We think it is helpful.

We also do some training outside of Iraq in NATO schools. The numbers are much smaller, but still it is ongoing, and that now again has become problematic because of the need to keep those leaders in the country during this turbulent period.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you so much.

Mr. Wilson, do you have any other questions?

General SMITH. Congressman, I might add to that that we have coordinated about 1,030 out-of-country Iraqi courses, and the positive piece is we have had to upgrade the quality of the courses and the content of the courses because the Iraqi officers, and it is mostly officers, are much more capable and they understand and have a lot better grasp of what they are doing than they did a year ago or two years ago or three years ago.

That is also a place that the other nations can contribute that don't support us inside Iraq. And they do do that.

Mr. ORTIZ. That is good news to hear.

Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. Again, this is good news. And I have had the privilege of visiting the police training facilities in Jordan, and indeed I was impressed by the training there. But additionally, the training in Europe is extraordinary. And then your training, too, of the provincial reconstruction teams for Afghanistan, indeed, also is making a difference. I visited with a joint U.S.-Korean and U.S.-Dutch personnel.

And so, thank you again for your service.

Mr. ORTIZ. I guess we have one very valuable member of this committee.

Mr. Sestak, do you have a question, sir?

Mr. SESTAK. Thank you.

I am sorry. I swore when I came to Congress I would be at every single hearing, and I had three simultaneously. I apologize, sirs.

If I could, I was curious, a question on U.S. FORCECOM, the flow of forces. It is a shared responsibility between Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) and FORCECOM. Is that correct? JFCOM, I apologize.

General SMITH. It is.

Mr. SESTAK. As you are working toward this global force management approach, there are some that believe that TRANSCOM should have it all, you know, from the beginning to the end, to fend for everything. And there have been several instances in the past

of this desire or approach, which I am sure you are familiar with, sir.

Do you think that is the best approach, particularly in the way that we flowed forces—although unusual, but we flowed forces in the build up to Iraq?

General SMITH. I don't think that that is the way to go. The relationship that we have with General Schwartz as TRANSCOM commander, being the joint distribution process owner, and me being the joint deployment process owner, works very well.

What that really means is that I have the responsibility to identify the forces for the secretary and ensure that they are notified and ready to go up to the point where Transportation Command takes on the actual physical execution and movement.

Now, he gives up responsibility for them when they are in theater. But as the deployment process owner, I am responsible for making sure I understand their readiness in theater and their needs in theater as well as when they will rotate out and how to get them out.

So I am more responsible for the policy and the decision level piece, or at least recommending to the secretary, and he does the actual execution.

Mr. SESTAK. And just, General, for you, for our forces in the former Yugoslavia, are we about to take away or have we taken away that combat duty?

General CRADDOCK. I am not aware of any change in the status or the entitlements.

Mr. SESTAK. Would you support taking away combat duty status for them?

General CRADDOCK. I am not sure what you mean by combat duty status. I think right now the situation there is such that the entitlements that have been there should remain until the future status proposal is announced and we see responses. Because as you know, three weeks ago there was a violent demonstration and part of the Kosovo force had to be employed in that, and I think the situation is a bit turbulent to be making any changes now from that perspective.

Mr. SESTAK. So you would continue to support their status of what they are receiving?

General CRADDOCK. I don't know what is proposed, but without knowing that I would not support a change at this time. It is too uncertain.

Mr. SESTAK. General, I forgot what the process is called that you are intimately involved with down in J8, as they look at the joint warfare with the joint capability warfare approach down there. What is the name again?

General SMITH. The joint combat developers is what they do.

Mr. SESTAK. Do you see, as have you been assigned some duties particularly in the command and control and interoperability area, do you think budget-wise that you should have greater control of the assets in the budget toward that?

General SMITH. I don't know that we at Joint Forces Command need more control over the budget in regards to the Joint Command and Control portfolio. That is what you are talking about.

Mr. SESTAK. Yes.

General SMITH. What we do need is visibility into the money.

Mr. SESTAK. Into—

General SMITH. Into the money. Where the money is being spent. Not so we can get into the service Title 10 responsibilities, but frankly the services as well as everybody else does not want to build a system that once they get at the 80 percent level, they have to then figure out how to make them talk to each other.

Mr. SESTAK. So the reason I ask that, is it just seems as though if you are having a problem with the transparency, from here it is even more difficult. It is hard to find where the heart is within our Armed Services Committee of Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR), the real transformation of the military. And so therefore he who has the money has the power and the say, should it be more transparent, more centralized? Particularly since that is your mission?

General SMITH. I think it should be more transparent, absolutely. But the vehicle we have, through me as the Joint Command and Control portfolio manager, and the process we have through the deputies working group, which has all the vice chiefs of the services on it as well as combatant command representative and chaired by the deputy secretary of defense, have the ability to make financial decisions to move money back and forth across the services to make sure that we do look at this from a holistic view.

Mr. SESTAK. You are saying you would like to have that?

General SMITH. No. We do have that in the experimental phase.

Mr. SESTAK. In the experimental phase.

General SMITH. In the experimental phase, through the Sec Def's authority.

Mr. SESTAK. And how much money is that?

General SMITH. The portfolio right now is \$4.4 billion. If we expanded it to the the whole Joint Command and Control arena, it would be over \$100 billion.

Mr. SESTAK. Last question is—that was my last? Was that the gavel?

Mr. ORTIZ. Yes, I am pretty sure that—we both have another meeting.

Mr. SESTAK. That is fine.

Mr. ORTIZ. But go ahead and ask your question.

Mr. SESTAK. Are you sure?

Expanding Joint Force headquarters, as what was proposed three years ago, the number, and where are we on achieving that and is it being adequately funded and manned?

General SMITH. It depends on the command. Now, in my command, we have two standing Joint Force headquarters. One we have dedicated to Central Command because they don't have the capacity really inside their headquarters to do that, and it is been used quite effectively a number of times.

The other standing Joint Force headquarters, which was really for global responsibilities as well as homeland defense, it is the standing Joint Force headquarters that deployed for Katrina, that we took a cut in our operations budget, so that will take another six months or so to get funded. And the Navy has agreed to use the Navy Reserve to help man it.

So the outlook on that, though I would rather we didn't have it kicked to the right like we did, is bright.

Now, General Craddock, when he was at SOUTHCOM, his standing Joint Force headquarters was stood up and rapidly working toward having deployable joint command and control capability and a lot of other things, and that was moving in a nice direction. His standing Joint Force headquarters in European Command is a little bit different and there is nothing wrong with that and I will defer to him on that.

The movement, we are right now in the con ops phase, and we had a lot of feedback from the combatant commanders on the direction we were going. I am an absolute believer in it, especially in the way that we have used it within my command, and I think it is a positive direction to go.

Mr. SESTAK. Thank you.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you so much for your leadership. Thank you for being with us.

We thank your soldiers, your troops, for doing a great job, and hopefully we can do something to make it better for the lives, not only your lives, but the lives of your families as well.

Thank you so much.

This hearing stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

MARCH 15, 2007

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

MARCH 15, 2007

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
UNTIL RELEASED BY THE
THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

STATEMENT OF
GENERAL BANTZ J. CRADDOCK, USA
COMMANDER,
UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND
BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
ON
15 MARCH 2007

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
UNTIL RELEASED BY THE
THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

House Armed Services Committee - Written Statement
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INTRODUCTION

United States European Command (EUCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR) comprises 92 diverse nations in Europe, Eurasia and most of Africa. The forward defense of the United States largely depends on our ability to work with our partners and allies to ensure common security. EUCOM's theater Strategy of Active Security supports the national defense strategy through a series of broad cooperative and engagement initiatives.

As the EUCOM Commander, I believe there are fundamental priorities that characterize our involvement in this AOR. While support to the Global War on Terror (GWOT) is the overarching priority, EUCOM is dedicated to retaining Europe as a global partner and furthering the U.S. security relationship with Africa through a new unified command. Embedded in these strategic priorities are our efforts to transform ourselves into a more expeditionary command, while cultivating and sustaining relations with numerous regional security organizations, such as NATO, the African Union (AU), and the European Union (EU).

In addition to my role as Commander EUCOM, I have responsibilities as the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, commanding all operational NATO forces. While these two roles have distinct mandates, there are many linkages between them. One fundamental linkage is transformation - both EUCOM's and NATO's transformation efforts are aggressive, ambitious, and geared toward realizing agile, flexible, and expeditionary forces capable of operating at strategic distances.

To fully capture how EUCOM will address these priorities I will provide an overview of the strategic environment in which we operate, explain our strategy and initiatives, highlight the contributions and requirements of my component commanders, and underscore the importance of the transatlantic security relationship.

STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

EUCOM's AOR is a vast geographic region covering over 21 million square miles and 16 time zones, stretching from the Barents Sea in the north to the waters stretching south to Antarctica, and from Greenland to Russia's Pacific coastline (See Enclosure 1). The scope and diversity of these 92 sovereign nations includes approximately 1.4 billion people, constituting 23 percent of the world's population. These 1,000 plus ethnic groups speak more than 400

languages, profess over 100 religious affiliations, and encompass the full range of human conditions and governments. The trends and issues which define the current environment in our theater include terrorism in all its forms, frozen conflicts, unresolved territorial disputes, complex geopolitical relationships between Russia and the nations of the former Soviet Union, the use of energy as a tool of foreign policy, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), and illegal immigration.

Because the challenges in this theater are not confined to a single nation, EUCOM takes a regional approach at analyzing this strategic environment. Our analysis is structured around three European and five African regions (See Enclosure 2). Europe's regions are Western Europe, Southeast Europe, and Eurasia. In Africa, the regions are North Africa, West Africa, Central Africa, East Africa, and South Africa.

Political Geography

Western Europe is home to some of our oldest and closest allies. For six decades, its mature democracies have experienced an unprecedented period of security and stability. A major contribution to this stability lies in the NATO Alliance and multinational institutions that have successfully addressed numerous security challenges over the past almost 60 years. NATO remains Europe's premier security organization and the international security instrument of choice. However, not all trends are positive. The defense budgets of many of these NATO nations have fallen to a level that jeopardizes their ability to make long-term strategic military commitments to meet the Alliance's 21st Century ambitions.

In Southeastern Europe, the political and military situations are improving, but there are unresolved issues which could destabilize the region. The Balkans remain somewhat volatile as new democratic governments attempt to deal with suppressed ethnic tensions, corruption, illegal immigration, and assimilation of citizens from different cultural backgrounds. The United Nations-led process to determine the future status of Kosovo is now in its critical and concluding stage, with discussions ongoing amongst the parties to address outstanding concerns with the Comprehensive Proposal for a Kosovo Status Settlement. Agreement and successful implementation of the provisions of a Status Settlement will be essential in maintaining stability in the Balkans.

As a regional leader, Turkey's European orientation for political and military security, along with its enduring relationship with the U.S., make

it a catalyst for stability in Southeast Europe, the Caucasus, Afghanistan, and the Black Sea region. Its key international lines of communication and proximity to Iran, Iraq, and the Russian Federation ensure Turkey will continue to play a vital role in international efforts to combat terrorism.

In Eurasia, some nations are at a decisional crossroads in terms of economic, political, and military reform. Other nations, such as Azerbaijan and Georgia, continue to pursue a positive trend towards economic sector, military, and political reform. After decades of life under the Soviet model, nations of this region struggle with balancing the challenging process of reform and the fundamental need for stability and predictability. Some nations have elected to freeze, stall or reverse reform, placing a greater priority on the maintenance of political power, internally and externally. Economic turmoil, unsettled interstate conflicts, insurgency, deteriorating infrastructure, and negative demographic trends exacerbate an already difficult and complex process of reform.

Despite continuing tensions from historical and unresolved ethnic and national enmity, the Caucasus is striving to gain regional stability and is of growing strategic importance to the U.S. and its allies principally due to its geostrategic location and the increasing flow of Caspian Sea hydrocarbons to the world energy market. In close proximity to Iran and Russia, Azerbaijan's geostrategic location is key for access to Caspian Sea energy resources. An example of Azerbaijan and the region's growing importance to the global energy market is the recently opened Baku-T'blisi-Ceyhan Pipeline, bringing oil from the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean. Additionally, the future Caucasus pipeline currently under construction will carry natural gas along much of the same route.

Regional security in the Caucasus and Moldova is challenged by four frozen conflicts: Azerbaijan and Armenia's dispute over the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and Abkhazia's separatists' attempts to gain independence from Georgia, and Transnistria's movement to separate from Moldova. Left unresolved, these conflicts remain the most significant obstacle to long-term stability in the Caucasus and have the potential to ignite into a high-intensity conflict in Europe's neighborhood.

As the dominant regional power in Eurasia and central Asia, Russia's cooperation with the U.S. and NATO is a strategic element in fostering security in the Euro-Atlantic arena. Progress has been made in engaging the Russian military to build interoperable capabilities, instill Western operational concepts, and strengthen the bilateral military relationship.

Russia demands specific concentration not only because of its influence in its "near abroad" border nations, which affects European stability, but globally because of its formidable nuclear capability, an extensive weapons trade program and influence on the international energy market.

While military-to-military relations with Russia are for the most part positive, much work remains to enhance cooperation and mutual understanding on key 21st Century issues such as threats posed by WMD proliferation, terrorism, and the disruption of energy supplies. Additionally, recent Russian strategies to exert influence run counter to U.S. and NATO security. As the world's largest producer of natural gas and a critical supplier of energy to Europe, Russia has demonstrated that it is prepared to use its position in the energy sector to impose its will on other nations. Also, Russia's recent aggressive tactics with Georgia and Ukraine raise concerns about its long-term security intentions. It is unclear to what future extent Russia may use energy or its military as leverage to achieve foreign policy goals, but it is a dynamic that needs to be monitored closely.

Ukraine's strategic location, contributions to international operations, and policy of Euro-Atlantic integration make it an increasingly important regional ally. Ukraine is at the nexus of its Cold War past and achieving Western standards of political, economic, and defense reform. Internal and external opposition since the 2004 Orange Revolution have slowed the pace of Ukraine's reform efforts. Ukraine's ability to attain its reform objectives remains a central focus of both U.S. and Alliance efforts.

In the Middle East, Israel is the U.S.'s closest ally that consistently and directly supports our interests through security cooperation and understanding of U.S. policy in the region. Providing a platform of stable governance in the region, Israel is a model nation promoting democratic ideals and pro-western economics and values. A steward of the largest Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program with well-established agreements with the U.S. government, Israel is a critical military partner in this difficult seam of the Middle East.

On the Continent of Africa, we face a complex environment with enormous challenge and potential. While Africa is rich in both human potential and mineral resources, it has historically struggled with relatively unstable governments, internal political strife, and economic problems. Many states remain fragile due to a variety of factors, including corruption, endemic and pandemic health problems, historical ethnic animosities, and endemic poverty.

In North Africa, broad expanses of minimally governed areas remain havens for extremists, terrorists and criminals. Authoritarian political structures inhibit political progress and reform on the continent. Developing economic systems have difficulty meeting the needs of a youthful and growing populace, hindering the emergence of an economically independent middle class. Additionally, a rising percentage of Europe's oil and natural gas imports come from North Africa, tying European Security to North African stability.

In West Africa, specifically the Gulf of Guinea, the energy potential defines this as a region of emerging U.S. strategic interest. West Africa now supplies over 16 percent of U.S. hydrocarbons and by 2015 it is estimated that it will supply more than 25 percent. In the next 10 years the Gulf of Guinea will provide the bulk of U.S. imports of sweet crude oil. In contrast to this potential are corruption, economic privation, political instability, and the challenges of potential civil unrest. This scenario has played out most recently in the crisis in Guinea. The civil unrest, subsequent martial law, and resultant departure of U.S. citizens highlight the fragile nature of democratic systems throughout the region. Ethnic and religious violence within and across porous borders also threatens Gulf of Guinea stability. With only marginal adherence to the rule of law and with no meaningful legal structures or political will present, the maritime security challenges in this region become almost insurmountable. Additionally, the security situation in the Niger Delta and other "promising" areas has been historically unstable and continues to demonstrate symptoms indicative of future problems. Violence between criminal gangs, often backed by powerful political or ethnic figures, makes the delta one of the most violent places in the region. Conflict will likely escalate further as the country approaches presidential elections in 2007.

Much of Central Africa and East Africa have been mired in armed conflicts that have defied the international community's capacity for crisis response and management since the mid to late 1990s. Numerous wars have been fought there, causing massive human suffering as well as political and economic stagnation. The Rwandan genocide of 1994, in which over 800,000 people lost their lives, left a devastated country in its wake and had a profoundly destabilizing effect on the region. Rwanda's neighbor Burundi, embroiled in ethnic warfare between 1993 and 2003, has completed its political transition and entered a critical peace-building period. Meanwhile, the Democratic Republic of Congo, facing the end of its postwar

transition, remains plagued by active militia, insufficient infrastructure and poor governance practices. Hopes for long-term peace in the long-running conflict between the government of Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) rebels were given new life in August 2006 after a cessation of hostilities between the two sides. However, many significant stumbling blocks remain.

Southern Africa's great potential is threatened by widespread corruption and unequal distribution of resources, which undermine efforts to develop a transparent and healthy economy. While AIDS is a health issue affecting the entire continent of Africa, Southern Africa is the most HIV-AIDS afflicted region in the world, with HIV infection rates averaging in the high 20 percent range. According to U.S. Population Reference Bureau estimates, South Africa's population will decline from 44.2 million to 41.9 million in 2009. The human costs aside, the AIDS epidemic has a direct negative impact on the region's stability and security. Security forces are being decimated as key personnel are lost, the ability to conduct operations is reduced, and nations are hard pressed to field and deploy healthy soldiers for participation in peacekeeping operations.

Transnational Terrorism in EUCOM's AOR

Like all Combatant Commands, EUCOM is dealing with terrorism in all its forms. Many terror networks are integrally tied to criminal and smuggling networks. Illegal activities such as credit card fraud, document forgery, and drug smuggling help fund extremist operations while Europe's open borders facilitate their travels across the region.

In Northern Africa, Al-Qa'ida-affiliated groups exploit ungoverned spaces to gain sanctuary, recruit, indoctrinate, train, equip, transit and mount operations. The Trans-Sahara region, in particular, offers sanctuary to Islamic extremist terrorists, smugglers of drugs and contraband, and insurgent groups. There is evidence of an increasing trend of North Africans being recruited as foreign fighters in Iraq; in addition, we are seeing increasing collaboration between Al-Qa'ida and North African terrorist groups. These negative developments are occurring despite many successful host nation security efforts. In the Trans-Sahara region, violent extremists continue to coordinate activities and interact with their associated networks in Europe. These groups take advantage of vast "ungoverned" spaces to attack their host governments and advance their anti-moderate, anti-Western agendas.

Western Europe, Southeast Europe, and Eurasia are increasingly used as a sanctuary and logistics center for extremists. Due to the exploitation of well-established civil liberties and the capacity to travel freely across many borders, Europe's ability to identify, arrest and prosecute transnational terrorists is an important element in the GWOT.

Another key characteristic of terrorism in the EUCOM AOR relates to the low-risk/high-consequence aspect of the use of WMD. With the majority of the world's nuclear weapons in the EUCOM AOR, the loss of control of any associated weapon or material could lead to catastrophic results, making the security of these items a significant aspect of the EUCOM WMD effort.

Demographic Trends within Africa

Changing population demographics increasingly challenge good governance. Rapid population growth, particularly a disproportionate "youth bulge" in the developing world, especially Africa, will significantly strain governments' ability to provide basic goods, services, and jobs. This could lead to a large pool of undereducated and unemployed youth presenting a potential source of instability and a lucrative target for violent extremist exploitation in countries where governments fail to meet the public's needs.

Immigration Issues

Europe has become a magnet for people who see European countries as lands of refuge as well as lands of plenty. Inevitably, with 15 million people unemployed in the European Union (EU) alone, the influx of outsiders has been resented in some areas. Over 100,000 illegal immigrants enter Europe from Africa each year. Many fear that asylum seekers are too great a burden for their countries' social welfare systems to bear. Others voice alarm that economic migrants may take their jobs. Some resent the dilution of traditional local culture from the influx of new arrivals. Coupled with legal immigration challenges are those associated with illegal immigration.

Criminal Issues

Directly connected to both immigration and organized crime is human trafficking. Human traffickers make annual profits of some \$7 billion in prostitution alone. Only the drug trade is more profitable. In Europe, human traffickers run the spectrum of criminal organizations. From complex

networks like the Italian and Russian organized crime elements to countless small "freelance" family groups, modern slavery continues to be a big-profit business.

Around Africa, vast coastal areas provide havens for smuggling, human trafficking, illegal immigration, piracy, and oil and fisheries theft. Piracy and theft are major concerns along the Gulf of Guinea coastal area that stretches nearly 2,000 nautical miles. Large-scale illegal oil theft in the Niger Delta has become significant over the last several years. Industry analysts estimate up to 200,000 barrels of oil per day are siphoned from pipelines in a process known as "hot-tapping" and sold to Nigerian or foreign buyers at approximately \$15 a barrel -- well below world oil price levels. Shipping ports, transit areas, harbors, oil production, and transshipment areas are largely uncontrolled, raising concerns regarding vulnerability to attacks by terrorist groups, criminal gangs, or separatist militias. Corruption and complicity in local, regional, and national governments only serve to exacerbate this problem.

A key challenge is drug use in Western Europe, and smuggling of drugs through Western Africa and Eurasia to the area of consumption. European cocaine use is at an all-time high (1.5 million users) and Europe is now the second most important destination for cocaine in the world.

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

On the periphery of the EUCOM's AOR, Iran's continued nuclear program poses a potential risk to U.S., NATO, and partner interests. Ballistic missile threats to the EUCOM AOR are well researched. Russian ballistic missile programs are historically documented, well understood, and continually reviewed for changes. Evolving threats from nations such as Iran pose new challenges. Furthermore, in Europe and Eurasia, there are stockpiles which are vulnerable to international and internal threats posed by corruption, criminal activity, or rogue actors. Strategic weapons, including conventional missiles, WMD, and weapons of mass effect are capabilities sought after by our adversaries who desire the capability to attack the U.S., its allies, and its strategic interests.

U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND

The U.S. European Command's developing Strategy of Active Security addresses the unique problems of EUCOM's nations and regions and the illegal

networks that span those nations and regions. The goal is to marginalize the enemies of peace and foster the growth of good governance, strong institutions, and civil society that promotes lasting security and stability. Our strategy addresses theater challenges and opportunities by employing the full range of military activities, from building and sustaining peace to prosecuting war if necessary.

EUCOM's Support to the Global War on Terror

EUCOM's number one theater-wide goal is to defeat transnational terrorist entities and violent extremists that threaten the U.S., its allies, and interests. We seek to do this by denying them freedom of action and access to resources, building partner capacity to combat terrorism, and working with partners to promote regional stability and diminish the conditions that foster violent extremism. We focus on deterring and defeating these imminent threats across our AOR, stretching from the Caucasus, through U.S. Central Command's Middle East, across North Africa and into the Gulf of Guinea.

Regional War on Terrorism

Operation ENDURING FREEDOM - TRANS-SAHARA (OEF-TS) is the Department of Defense component of the Department of State's Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP). TSCTP is a ground-breaking program that seeks to leverage the capabilities of those U.S. government agencies involved in building security on the Africa continent, with an emphasis on counterterrorism (CT) in North Africa. TSCTP seeks to maximize the return on investment by implementing reforms to help nations become more self-reliant in security and more stable in governance. OEF-TS - the military component - utilizes special operations forces to train partners on the conduct of CT operations.

The need for TSCTP stems from concern over the expansion of operations of Islamic terrorist organizations in the Sahel region, a region that approximates the size of the United States. OEF-TS is a preventive approach to combat terrorism and enhance partner nation border security and military capabilities in Trans-Saharan Africa. It is designed to assist governments seeking better control of their territories and to prevent terrorist groups from utilizing the vast open areas as safe havens.

TSCTP's overall approach is straightforward: to build indigenous capacity and facilitate cooperation among governments in the region.

Participating nations: Algeria, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Senegal, Nigeria and Tunisia. These countries have joined in the struggle against Islamic extremism in the Sahel region. OEF-TS builds upon the successful 2002 Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI) which helped train and equip forces in four Sahel states: Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Chad. OEF-TS is a follow-on complementary effort, more ambitious in both programmatic and geographic terms.

This cooperation strengthens regional counterterrorism capabilities and assists participating nations in halting the illegal flow of arms, goods, and people through the region. OEF-TS has the added effect of institutionalizing cooperation among the region's security forces and reinforcing the military's subordinate role to democratic governance. It also helps nations better protect vast borders to contribute to common security.

In the past, instability in Africa has often required costly, reactive, and repeated interventions (e.g. Liberia). An upheaval in one nation has often resulted in destabilizing neighboring states. Today, in an age of globalization, the damage individual states or groups within those states can do is unprecedented. For a relatively small investment, TSCTP has the potential to produce significant, positive results in countering terrorism. It can be a powerful brake on future terrorist expansion.

Security Cooperation

Security Cooperation (SC) programs remain the cornerstone of our Strategy of Active Security to promote common security, which ultimately supports national objectives in the GWOT. These programs contribute to building key relationships which support U.S. strategic interests, enhance partner security capabilities, provide for essential peacetime and contingency access and en-route infrastructure, and improve information exchange and intelligence sharing.

Our SC programs represent a proactive approach to building partnership capacity with the aim of enabling emerging democracies to defend their homelands, address and reduce regional conflicts, defeat terrorist extremists, develop common economic and security interests, and respond to emerging crises. From airborne training to non-lethal weapons education, EUCOM personnel and facilities provide practical and state of the art training. Assisting our allies and partners in developing their capabilities to conduct effective peacekeeping and contingency operations with well-trained, disciplined forces helps mitigate the conditions that lead to

conflict, prepares the way for success, and reduces the potential burden of U.S. involvement.

EUCOM SC efforts require consistent, predictable investment in order to impact the multitude of strategic, security, economic, and political challenges we face.

Security Cooperation Activities

Key among U.S. Combatant Commands' SC tools are programs which provide access and influence, help build professional, capable militaries in allied and partner nations, and promote interoperability. We execute larger security assistance programs using our 44 Offices of Defense Cooperation in concert with U.S. Embassy Country Teams, while smaller programs are executed by Defense Attachés and Embassy Offices.

International Military Education and Training (IMET) and Expanded IMET (E-IMET) provide education and training opportunities for foreign military and civilian personnel. The EUCOM portion of the FY 2008 IMET request is approximately \$40.5M. IMET remains our most powerful security cooperation tool and proves its long-term value every day. For a relatively small investment, IMET provides foreign military and civilian leaders' access to U.S. military training, builds relationships, and enhances influence. Indeed, today's IMET graduates are tomorrow's Chiefs of Defense, Ministers of Defense and Heads of State. Today, we continue to see the value of this program in the professional development and transformation of militaries in such establishing partners as Poland, Tunisia, Romania and many other countries. In Africa, we assess IMET and E-IMET to be the most successful programs in promoting democracy and human rights.

However, we face stiff competition in Africa, most notably from China. Beijing clearly understands the importance of building relationships to help shape the future landscape of the continent. The importance of IMET cannot be overstated, and we seek Congress' help in sustaining this excellent program.

Foreign Military Financing (FMF) provides critical resources to assist strategically important nations without the financial means to acquire U.S. military equipment and training. This year's FMF request for nations in the EUCOM AOR totals approximately \$2.5 billion, of which more than 93 percent is earmarked for Israel. FMF is an essential instrument of influence, building allied and coalition military capabilities, and improving interoperability

with U.S. and allied forces. When countries buy U.S. military equipment through the FMF program, they buy into a long-term commitment with the U.S. for spare parts and training. If FMF funding is reduced or forfeited as a result of U.S. imposed sanctions, long-term military ties may be affected. A number of strategic EUCOM countries face this situation as a result of the American Servicemembers Protection Act. An example is the deterioration in our security cooperation relationship with South Africa.

In 1965 and 1978, the U.S. sold C-130 and Boeing 707 aircraft, respectively, to South Africa. Due to ASPA sanctions against South Africa, we are no longer able to provide spare parts or training under the FMF program. One consequence is that South Africa now has very limited capability to transport African Union peacekeepers into Darfur and other peacekeeping missions in Africa. As a result, the U.S. and a number of allies must provide air transport at great cost. Another consequence is the compromise of our once solid relationships due to a perception that the U.S. is an unreliable and mercurial security partner over the long-term.

Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) demonstrate our nation's continued commitment to the security of our allies and partners by allowing them to acquire U.S. military equipment and training. FMS and DCS sales are vital to improving interoperability with U.S. and NATO forces, closing capability gaps, and modernizing the military forces of our allies and partners.

Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act, to Build the Capacity of Foreign Military Forces, is an experimental initiative provided by Congress in 2006. It couples the authorities of the Department of State with the resources of the Department of Defense to rapidly build and enhance military capacity of our key allies and partners. In 2006, EUCOM was provided over \$11M to build intelligence-sharing capacity for Pan-Sahel countries along with maritime domain awareness systems for countries in the Gulf of Guinea. In 2007, EUCOM has requested funding for innovative Train and Equip programs for partners interested in assisting the U.S. in the GWOT and to provide security and stability throughout the AOR. This bold effort has laid the foundation upon which security cooperation reform can be built.

The *National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP)* continues to be one of our most effective SC programs. By linking our states and territories with designated partner countries, we promote access, enhance military capabilities, improve interoperability, and advance the principles of

responsible governance. The unique civil-military nature of the National Guard allows it to actively participate in a wide range of security cooperation activities. For example, the National Guard conducted over 89 SPP events and members of the National Guard and Reserve participated in over 50 of 150 Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP) activities in 2006 alone. Both National Guard and Reserve personnel have added depth and breadth to our effects in the EUCOM AOR.

In 2006, Serbia entered into a SPP with the Ohio National Guard and Montenegro entered into a SPP agreement with the Maine National Guard. Enclosure 3 details countries in the EUCOM AOR that have active SPP partnerships. Like the comprehensive SPP programs in place in Europe, we strongly encourage National Guard units to expand the number of SPP relationships with Africa.

Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction is among our highest priorities as the majority of the world's nuclear powers are located in the EUCOM AOR. In some cases, these weapons and their related systems and technology are inadequately secured or maintained. The *Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)* works in concert with EUCOM to cover the entire spectrum of this unique mission: Cooperative Threat Reduction programs address the non-proliferation of known WMD; detection programs address counter-proliferation, particularly interdiction of unknown items; and DTRA's exercise programs address our consequence management responsibilities, reassuring our partners and allies regarding EUCOM capabilities.

Georgia Sustainment and Stability Operations Program (SSOP) focuses on enhancing the capabilities of military forces to assist in preparing deployments in support of U.S.-led coalition and NATO Operations. The utility of this program has been proven in Georgia. U.S. and Georgia have developed a solid, cost-effective partnership dedicated to promoting peace and stability and countering terrorism. With three land force brigades forming the core of their armed forces, Georgia is the largest per capita contributor of forces to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). Additionally, for the past three years, USAREUR has provided tactical human intelligence (HUMINT) collection and management training to our NATO Allies to include Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia. Recently, this initiative led to the training of the HUMINT force in the Romanian Army and for the last two Balkans rotations has allowed Romanian HUMINT teams to be embedded within the U.S. Task Force. We look forward to expanding this program to other countries eager to build needed military capabilities.

HIV/AIDS Prevention Programs continue to be an activity of key importance within our AOR. EUCOM works with DoD and other governmental and nongovernmental HIV/AIDS programs to improve the health and medical well-being of the African people. We advocate projects and programs sponsored by the country teams and work to incorporate these into our theater security cooperation plans. These programs are designed to stem the spread of HIV/AIDS and improve the readiness levels of African military units.

EUCOM is an active participant in the *U.S. Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA) Program*, executed by Departments of Defense and State and the U.S. Agency for International Development. HMA assists in relieving the plight of civilian populations experiencing adverse effects from landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW). EUCOM's efforts span 15 nations on three continents, with a focus on training the trainer and providing a mine action force multiplier capacity.

EUCOM's *Clearinghouse Initiatives* ensure that U.S. SC actions are coordinated with other nations involved in the same region or issue. Clearinghouse Initiatives help deconflict programs to avoid duplication and find ways to collaborate on matters of mutual interest. They are in place for Africa, the South Caucasus, and Southeast Europe, and enable interested countries to share information about security assistance programs. The goal is to capitalize on limited resources by merging various SC programs into a comprehensive, synchronized regional effort.

Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) is a Department of State program, planned in consultation with and implemented by DoD to train and equip peacekeepers. In Africa, GPOI funds supplement the existing Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program to provide training, equipment, and logistical capability to meet United Nations peace operations standards. The bulk of GPOI activities in EUCOM lies within the framework of ACOTA, which assists 19 ACOTA "partners" in developing the ability to participate in peace support operations.

In the coming months, the ACOTA program will provide multilateral battalion and brigade-level training for African sub-regional organizations. It will also increase training support to the AU staff and forces in joint operations.

ACOTA remains a crucial African engagement program, directly supporting U.S. national objectives of promoting stability, democratization, and military professionalism in Africa. GPOI funding sustains African

peacekeeping forces to enable these units to address the multiple crises on the African continent.

With *Caspian Maritime Security Cooperation*, EUCOM seeks to coordinate and complement U.S. government maritime security cooperation activities in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. Our maritime security cooperation efforts enhance the capabilities of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan to prevent and, if needed, respond to terrorism, nuclear proliferation, drug and other trafficking, and additional transnational threats in this littoral.

We are working with CENTCOM, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the Department of State, and the Department of Energy to improve Azerbaijan's and Kazakhstan's capacities in these vital areas of mutual interest. Related projects include maritime special operations training and equipment, providing WMD detection and response training and equipment, operations center upgrades, naval vessel and communications upgrades, developing rapid reaction capabilities, countering narcoterrorism and conducting border control training, naval infrastructure development planning, and inter-ministry information exchange events.

EUCOM has *Regional Centers* providing professional development of emerging civilian and military leaders, reinforcing ideals of democratic governance and stable apolitical militaries, and facilitating long-term dialogue with and among current and future international leaders. The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies and the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) play a central role in our engagement strategy by building trust and cooperative relationships with the leaders of nations across Europe, Eurasia and Africa.

The Marshall Center, co-sponsored by and located in Germany, is the preeminent transatlantic security and defense educational institution. In addition to offering a robust resident program, the Center is working to expand its non-resident activities to provide increased, shorter-term focused events conducted in nations across the AOR. The Marshall Center alumni network includes approximately 5200 graduates from 89 nations who are linked through the Regional International Outreach Website. This network preserves partnership capacities for the future with minimal additional investment. From its inception, 92 graduates have been promoted to general officer or serve in civilian equivalent or senior positions.

The Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) counters ideological support for terrorism, fosters regional cooperation on security issues, promotes democracy and good governance, and assists nations in improving

their security. However, as the ACSS is located in the U.S, its effectiveness would be enhanced by a permanent presence in the region it is designed to influence. A significant increase in the effectiveness of the ACSS was achieved in the Fall of 2006 where a small regional office was established in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. This office will serve to demonstrate our purpose and give Africans a sense of ownership. Additionally, committing personnel and resources in these regions enhances relationships with African leaders, the AU, and sub-regional organizations by providing a continuous, efficient, low-cost presence on the African continent.

EUCOM's *Maritime Domain Awareness* initiatives are designed to assist partner nations in their efforts to address numerous maritime challenges. The West Indian Ocean and Gulf of Guinea regions of Africa demonstrate a complexity of maritime challenges such as illicit and criminal activity, piracy, environmental and fisheries violations, resource theft, and trafficking.

The West Indian Ocean region of Africa, with over 4750 miles of coastline, has only 25 boats to provide maritime security. The region possesses virtually no capability to interdict fishery theft, piracy, narco-trafficking, or any other illicit activity in the maritime domain. Like the Western Indian Ocean region, the Gulf of Guinea region lacks significant naval forces, coastal security forces or security structures to provide any meaningful or realistic deterrent to the lawlessness that is currently the status quo. These threats are particularly relevant to U.S. national strategic interests given the Gulf of Guinea's energy potential.

EUCOM is committed to building strategic partnerships in order to expand our warfighting capabilities. Through funding activities such as the Coalition Warfare Program, we expect to extend our relationships with existing allies, and develop new relationships with countries eager to become members of the transatlantic alliance.

In short, though each region's issues are somewhat unique, the need for comprehensive maritime security and domain awareness solutions are the same. Through these maritime security initiatives, EUCOM is assisting partners to build the naval capacity to effectively combat and counter these threats.

Strategic Theater Transformation

EUCOM is also applying our Active Security strategy towards our ongoing transformation. This strategy relies on a mix of forward-based and deployed U.S. presence to provide security and stability with governments and

countries located in the AOR. Our forward-based and rotational forces are powerful and visible instruments of national influence. Central to EUCOM's efforts is the continuation of our Strategic Theater Transformation (STT) plan. This involves a basing strategy that seeks to sustain and leverage commitments to our long-standing allies and U.S. operations in other theaters, such as Operations ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF).

EUCOM's STT plan, in execution since 2002, ensures that operational forces and prepositioned logistics are correctly postured to meet current and potential challenges. We have consolidated forces from broadly dispersed locations to Main Operating Bases and Forward Operating Sites in the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Spain, Turkey, Greece, Belgium, The Netherlands, Bulgaria and Romania. Currently approved EUCOM plans include retaining two permanently stationed brigade combat teams in Germany and Italy respectively along with eight fighter aircraft squadrons in the United Kingdom (UK), Germany, and Italy. Despite recent political turmoil within Italy, we expect the government will continue to abide by its agreement with the U.S. and avoid any unnecessary delay in approving infrastructure projects. We will continue to monitor the situation closely. EUCOM has requested rotational forces in Romania and Bulgaria for Joint Task Force-East (JTF-E) using the Global Force Management Process (GFMP).

The EUCOM AOR has experienced numerous changes in the security dynamic. Over the past four years since decisions to adjust U.S. Force Posture in Europe were made, the Defense Department has embraced Theater Security Cooperation and issued a strategy to guide our operations. The GWOT is now guided by established and approved regional plans. NATO is no longer a static defensive alliance, but has commenced a transformation in its approach to new and emerging threats that have resulted in operations at strategic distance and a serious effort to transform its nations' military forces. Our current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have also altered the calculus in EUCOM's ability to source forces to address our theater's operational requirements. And, finally, the decision to establish a combatant command in Africa will ensure that our current robust engagement on that continent, especially Operation ENDURING FREEDOM - TRANS SAHARA, achieves tangible results.

These dynamics, individually or in combination, compel us to review the previous assumptions and document changes in the security and geo-political environment to determine if our planned posture fully supports the tasks and

missions we have been given -- to include assessments on effectiveness and efficiency.

In addition to our conventional forces, special operations forces (SOF) help enable EUCOM to develop and maintain trust and long-term relationships with partner nations as we help build their capabilities and capacities. Rotational SOF reinforces our ability to meet operational requirements and conduct large-scale exercises involving multiple partners.

EUCOM Transformation is not only happening in Europe, but in Africa as well. EUCOM has identified 13 Cooperative Security Locations (CSL), four of which have recently been utilized in support of OEF-TS. These CSL's secure our ability to respond to actual or potential future instability. CSL sites such as Libreville, Gabon, are located in nations where traditional examples of bilateral cooperation exist. Sites have also been established through fueling contracts in places where EUCOM is seeking increased engagement. CSLs in Africa represent minimal investment in infrastructure / operating cost, but provide access and broad freedom of action in times of crisis.

With STT, contributions of the Reserve Component (RC) are increasingly important in maintaining EUCOM's operational capability. On any given day, 4500 members of the RC are deployed across the theater, which includes 10 percent of the uniformed personnel on the EUCOM staff as well as over 50 percent of the community law enforcement for U.S. Army installations throughout the theater.

EUCOM's STT has been closely synchronized with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, Services and NATO to ensure that global efforts of other combatant commands, NATO, and the results of the Base Closure and Realignment Commission process in the United States are mutually supportive. We have closed 43 bases and installations and returned approximately 10,000 servicemembers and 13,800 family members to the U.S. Subject to developments in the geo-political environment, by 2012, current plans anticipate the closure of several hundred bases and installations, and the return of over 44,000 military personnel and over 57,000 family members, and the downsizing of 14,500 DoD civilians and host nation employee positions.

Strategically, relocating our forces at the Joint Multinational Training Center (JMTC) and at CSL's within our AOR, and establishing JTF-East in Eastern Europe, better positions EUCOM forces to conduct security cooperation activities and operations with our allies and partners.

Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)

As highlighted in the strategic environment, an increasingly important aspect of EUCOM's Strategy of Active Security is to defend against threats posed by emerging ballistic missile capabilities in Southwest Asia. EUCOM is working with the Joint Staff, U.S. Strategic Command, and the Missile Defense Agency to help field capabilities that will counter this threat consisting of a mix of interceptors, sensors, and command and control. The right combination of these systems is vital to protect U.S. interests and to send a strong signal to our partners and allies as well as potential adversaries.

EUCOM is planning to assist in the deployment of long-range Ground-Based Interceptors and supporting radars to Europe to enhance the defense of the U.S. homeland, U.S. forces stationed in Europe, partners, and allies from Intercontinental and intermediate range ballistic missiles. While the acquisition and planned/projected deployment of these systems to the Czech Republic and Poland will be funded through the Missile Defense Agency, the infrastructure requirements to support personnel and other site requirements remain undetermined. Once resolved, future military construction requirements will need to be programmed within the Department of Defense and submitted to Congress for its consideration. Additionally, we are planning for the potential deployment of AEGIS ballistic missile defense capable ships, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense Fire Units, and other systems to provide expanded coverage and improved levels of protection against Medium and Intermediate range threats. Finally, the planned upgrade of PATRIOT forces from PAC-2 to PAC-3 will improve EUCOM's ability to defend against short-range ballistic missiles significantly.

Component Command Activities

U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR)

For the past several years, USAREUR has aggressively pursued two initiatives to strengthen the Combatant Commander's ability to execute the GWOT and interoperability between the U.S. and our allies and partners. First, EUCOM is restructuring the Army posture further south and east in Europe to ensure strategic access to geopolitically unstable areas and protect lines of communication critical to sustaining operations on the front lines of the GWOT. Secondly, we are promoting the transformation of European ground forces into effective expeditionary partners through military-to-military engagement activities, exercises, and exchanges. Substantial

progress has been made in both areas despite heavy commitments to ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

USAREUR remains heavily engaged supporting the GWOT. During the past year, more than two-thirds of the Soldiers assigned to USAREUR were either preparing to deploy, were deployed, or had recently returned from a deployment. V Corps, the warfighting headquarters of USAREUR, deployed to OIF as the Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) Headquarters. The Southern European Task Force (SETAF) served as joint task force headquarters, along with the 173d Airborne Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) in Afghanistan from March 2005 to February 2006.

Since 2005, USAREUR has integrated an infantry company into a Romanian Infantry Battalion in Afghanistan. USAREUR Soldiers have conducted two six-month deployments to the Republic of Georgia to train three Georgian Infantry Battalions in support of OIF.

In line with the transformation of EUCOM's strategic posture, we are consolidating the 173rd ABCT at Vicenza, Italy. Additionally, USAREUR is establishing FOSs in Romania and Bulgaria to accommodate the rotational presence of a brigade-size unit. The JTF-E headquarters will represent USAREUR and U.S. Air Forces, Europe (USAFE) in Eastern Europe and provide the command, control and support for rotational forces. A squadron from the 2d Stryker Cavalry Regiment (SCR) will conduct a "proof of principle" rotation in the summer of 2007. Subsequent rotational forces will be scheduled through the Department of Defense's GFMP. From these FOSs, U.S. rotational forces will conduct SC activities and training exercises with our NATO allies and partner nations in both bilateral and multinational training exercises. When this rebasing process is complete, two-thirds of USAREUR's maneuver forces will be positioned in southern and eastern Europe, closer to areas of instability in the Caucasus, the Balkans and Africa.

As USAREUR's transformation continues, the end-state will be a smaller, strategically mobile force postured to meet the needs of EUCOM and other Geographic Combatant Commanders through the GFMP. Future transformation efforts include combining USAREUR and V Corps Headquarters into a single headquarters - 7th Army. In addition to the main 7th Army Headquarters, the objective command and control structure includes two rapidly deployable JTF capable headquarters. Combat capability will be provided by two permanently assigned combat brigades, the 2d SCR in Vilseck, Germany, and the 173d ABCT in Vicenza, Italy. These two brigades, along with a combat aviation brigade, an engineer brigade, a military police brigade, a sustainment brigade, an air

defense artillery battalion, and a rocket artillery battalion comprise the in-theater Army forces that are available for the GFMP.

Along with the arrival of the 2d SCR in Vilseck, Efficient Basing Grafenwoehr (EB-G) project consolidates a majority of the remaining permanently stationed Army forces in Germany and co-locates them with the Army's best training facilities in Europe. Completion of EB-G infrastructure investments will allow for the repositioning of 3,500 Soldiers and begins the closure of non-enduring installations.

Plans are in place for the consolidation of the six battalions of the 173d ABCT from their current positions in Vicenza, Italy, Bamberg and Schweinfurt, Germany, into new facilities at Vicenza once all required MILCON has been completed by FY11. This consolidation better positions U.S. forces for security cooperation in regions to the south and east of Western Europe. The 173d ABCT expanded into a full modular Airborne Brigade Combat Team in 2006. This conversion doubled the size of the brigade creating a greater capability for rapid deployment and forced entry operations and enhances the brigade's ability to sustain itself during joint and coalition operations.

Additionally, our land forces transformation efforts include returning Army personnel, family members, and units from Europe to the United States. One brigade of the First Infantry Division headquarters returned to the U.S. in 2006. A First Armored Division Brigade and the Third Corps Support Command will return to the U.S. in 2007. The headquarters and remaining units of First Armored Division will return to the U.S. when preparations for receiving installations are complete.

A key initiative for USAREUR is assisting European ground forces in their efforts to break from the Cold War model and become more expeditionary. USAREUR is playing a leading role in their transformation through a wide variety of security cooperation programs, mission rehearsal development assistance, OIF deployment assistance, Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) development, senior leader interaction, unit partnerships, and intelligence sharing. The conversion of USAREUR's training center in Germany into the Joint Multinational Training Command (JMTC) has greatly contributed to the acceleration of European ground force transformation. The JMTC exports high quality collective training, such as International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission rehearsal training to prepare NATO staffs to direct and conduct combat operations in support of OEF. The NATO Observer Mentor Liaison Training (OMLT) mission trained teams from Germany, The Netherlands, France, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Croatia, Slovenia, and Afghanistan to enable

them to operate and survive in a counter-insurgency environment. This training and logistics support has been indispensable to allies and partners which have deployed units to Iraq and Afghanistan.

U.S. Naval Forces, Europe (NAVEUR)

In 2006 NAVEUR moved forward rapidly in executing the vision to develop partner nation maritime capability and capacity in areas south of the Mediterranean and in the Black Sea to the east and will accelerate that trend in 2007.

Africa continues as an area of increased Naval emphasis. Last year our Naval presence in Africa was nearly continuous in contrast to 2004, a presence limited to some 20 days. The 2006 engagements include the deployment of the USS EMORY S. LAND, which provided training to eight Gulf of Guinea countries, consisting of over 750 African military personnel in a variety of subjects, such as: small boat maintenance, leadership, and C2 organization. Coupled with Mobile Training Teams, these deployments are representative of our future cooperation with these nations. Additionally in August 2006, USNS APACHE conducted harbor survey operations in the Port of Monrovia, Liberia, to significantly increase the port's capacity to support commercial maritime trade. In the Summer of 2007, NAVEUR will serve as a test bed for the Global Fleet Station concept with the long-term deployment of an amphibious ship to the Gulf of Guinea to provide the U.S. an opportunity to build upon previously established relationships.

NAVEUR has made significant progress in the military-to-military cooperation with Gulf of Guinea countries. Working with the U.S. Department of State, EUCOM and the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, NAVEUR led a ministerial level conference on Maritime Safety and Security in the Gulf of Guinea that was attended by representatives from each of the 11 Gulf of Guinea nations. The resulting communiqué provided a framework for future regional initiatives with commitments from these countries at the ministerial level. The overall goal of these efforts is to develop the capacity of Gulf of Guinea nations to provide regional maritime safety and security solutions.

Much of NAVEUR's focus is centered on activities designed to positively demonstrate our commitment to maritime safety and security by educating and exposing partners to issues and potential solutions. These missions require non-traditional skill sets of U.S. Navy professionals. Language and cultural

training for Navy personnel will remain priorities in preparing them for service in the strategically important areas of Africa and the Black Sea.

Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) is a key building block of maritime safety and security. Critical to the success of MDA is the information sharing among participating nations on the detection and identification of possible maritime threats at sea. The Automatic Identification System (AIS) is the first step to achieving MDA and will provide a critical foundation to the U.S. Navy's "Global Maritime Partnership." AIS shares data similar to the International Civilian Aeronautical Organization (ICAO) system used by civilian and military aircraft throughout the world. NAVEUR's goal is to bring this system to all maritime nations in the EUCOM AOR. Improving MDA and Maritime Interdiction capability will result in improved maritime safety.

In addition to engagement activities, NAVEUR conducts traditional naval operations. This was demonstrated in August 2006 when a substantial portion of the NAVEUR staff embarked on the Sixth Fleet flagship, USS MOUNT WHITNEY, to form the core of EUCOM's Joint Task Force-Lebanon (JTF-L). JTF-L took over from U.S. Naval Forces, Central Command Task Force 59, with the mission of supporting the U.S. Ambassador in Beirut during the Israeli - Hezbollah conflict in southern Lebanon. As the non-combatant evacuation operation drew to a close, JTF-L provided U.S. Embassy Beirut with security, logistical support, and contingency evacuation capability, ensuring the U.S. Embassy could continue operating throughout the crisis.

Like its fellow components, NAVEUR is maintaining its ability to execute its missions, while continuing force transformation. NAVEUR has reduced its end strength from 14,000 in 2004 to nearly 8,000 today. The departure of the USS EMORY S. LAND this October and the pending closure of NSA La Maddalena continue NAVEUR's transformation.

U.S. Air Forces, Europe (USAFE)

Over the last year, USAFE continued comprehensive transformation efforts: restructuring and streamlining its major command headquarters; enhancing and improving its warfighting headquarters support of EUCOM; working on joint transformation initiatives, while continuing to conduct current operations and support the GWOT. USAFE also continued to foster Theater Security Cooperation relationships in key geographical areas.

In 2006, over 4,500 USAFE Airmen deployed in support of OIF and OEF. USAFE's number one priority continues to be providing expeditionary-ready Airmen. In addition to providing forces, USAFE infrastructure plays a major

role in supporting GWOT operations in the EUCOM AOR as well as in support of CENTCOM. For the majority of aircraft entering and exiting CENTCOM's AOR, USAFE installations serve as the primary en-route support for combat aircraft, as well as the mobility aircraft that sustain our ongoing operations. Ramstein Air Base, and specifically the 435th Contingency Aeromedical Staging Facility, processed over 61,000 patients since March 2003, supporting our servicemembers hospitalized at Landstuhl Regional Medical Center (LRMC) as well as those returned to the U.S.

USAFE supported JTF-Lebanon by deploying personnel to man the JTF Headquarters and provided medical support with initial primary care capability, a level II resuscitative surgery team, and aerial port operation to include air terminal operations center, joint inspection, load team, in-transit visibility and equipment maintenance, and was prepared to provide KC-135 aerial refueling and C-130 transport aircraft. In November 2006, 3rd Air Force and its associated Air Operations Center effectively deployed personnel, equipment and aircraft to the Baltics to support NATO's Summit in Riga, Latvia. Augmenting and enhancing NATO's air policing function in the Baltics again demonstrated USAFE's ability to rapidly adapt to multinational airspace command and control.

USAFE, together with USAREUR, is providing warfighter integrated constructive simulations with virtual and live fire instrumented ranges. This provides theater forces and NATO allies training opportunities in both joint and combined operations at the operational and tactical level. By linking warfighters in live, virtual or constructive scenarios, the Warrior Preparation Center and Joint and Multinational Training Center (JMTC) is able to link warfighters from across Europe and around the world to each other in conducting exercises and training initiatives.

Consistent with EUCOM's shifting focus to the south and east, USAFE has joined with USAREUR in leading the way toward establishment of JTF-E in Romania and Bulgaria. Leveraging 2002 OIF investments to infrastructure in Romania, USAFE will provide a small number of forward stationed personnel to support Air Force, joint and combined air and ground operations as well as to stage bilateral and multilateral engagement exercises.

USAFE's leadership in SC and the Joint Exercise Program support EUCOM's Strategy of Active Security. In 2006, USAFE participated in 438 security cooperation events in 61 countries, including 24 Joint Staff-sponsored exercises. A key example of USAFE's Security Cooperation engagement was Exercise MEDFLAG 06, supporting Economic Community of West Africa States

(ECOWAS) and the Gulf of Guinea region. This USAFE-led joint and combined exercise, with strong Reserve Component participation, provided medical outreach and humanitarian assistance to approximately 14,000 patients in Ghana, Nigeria, Benin and Senegal. Bilateral medical and civil assistance training was also conducted with 355 host nation and ECOWAS staff personnel.

SC also extends to the operational arena. In order to further interdependence and extend the capacity of limited U.S. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets, USAFE has taken a two-pronged approach to SC. First, it has almost doubled its traditional intelligence exchanges and added new contacts with our partner nations. Second, because USAFE currently operates a limited number of airborne ISR assets in this theater, it has aggressively pursued working with partner nations who have or are developing airborne ISR capabilities. ISR collection shortfalls can be partially mitigated by building relationships and working with these nations to standardize tactics, techniques, and procedures while simultaneously pursuing methods to integrate ISR architectures and leverage coalition assets to satisfy mutual requirements.

As part of NATO assistance to the AU in Darfur, USAFE conducted airlift for African nations participating in peacekeeping operations. In February and April, 2006, USAFE supported the Botswanan Defense Force (BDF) with operational airlift mission planning, maintenance contingencies, airfield site surveys, and logistics efficiencies. These efforts directly supported successful joint BDF and USAFE airlift missions to Darfur in Sep 06.

USAFE has added depth to its engagement with the Russian Federation Air Force. Starting with a visit to Moscow and their main fighter training base, USAFE is developing that high-level relationship that will lead to more cooperation along with improved transparency and trust.

USAFE's comprehensive transformation program, critical infrastructure, development, wide-ranging SC initiatives, coupled with a focus on the joint and combined prosecution of the GWOT, continue to make lasting contributions to EUCOM's efforts throughout the AOR. USAFE will continue to be a leader of air, space, and cyberspace for EUCOM, its allies, and partners.

U.S. Marine Forces, Europe (MARFOREUR)

With a small headquarters of approximately 100 personnel, but no permanently assigned forces, MARFOREUR integrates its active duty and civilian staff with reserve Marines to augment its headquarters activities. MARFOREUR supports EUCOM's theater initiatives in OEF-TS; participates in

numerous security cooperation activities; assists with troops and equipment transiting the theater; facilitates strategic pre-positioning programs; supports the Regional Medical Center in Landstuhl, Germany; and serves as EUCOM's Executive Agent for non-lethal weapons.

Supporting EUCOM's efforts in OEF-TS, MARFOREUR has been instrumental in helping to build the operational-level capacity of the militaries in the countries of Chad, Niger, Mali, Senegal, Algeria and Morocco. MARFOREUR instituted an intelligence capacity building program to close the gap between unit-level intelligence training provided by SOF, and the headquarters-level expertise needed to employ those tactical forces. MARFOREUR is also providing tactical level support to this year's Exercise FLINTLOCK, the premier SOF training exercise in OEF-TS.

MARFOREUR's security cooperation activities provide maximum impact with minimal forces. In Africa, efforts are focused upon stability and capacity building in key countries through the Department of State's ACOTA program where MARFOREUR is one of the largest military contributors. MARFOREUR is an important participant in EUCOM's military-to-military programs, focusing its efforts in the OEF-TS countries, West Africa, and the Gulf of Guinea states, and in the Black Sea/Caucasus region. In FY 2007, MARFOREUR is expanding its involvement in Africa, and plans to conduct two to three events per month over the course of the year. MARFOREUR will also provide support to the Humanitarian Mine Action program and the International Military Assistance Training Team in Sierra Leone.

Conducting exercises involving units up to the battalion/squadron-sized level, MARFOREUR supports EUCOM's Joint Exercise Program which relies largely on the Marine Corps Reserve. This exercise program offers U.S.-based reservists unique annual training opportunities, while offsetting the impact of limited active duty force availability. Major exercises conducted by Marine forces include Exercise SHARED ACCORD in Senegal, Exercise AFRICAN LION in Morocco, and Exercise SEA BREEZE in Ukraine. Additionally, MARFOREUR was the most active component in Exercise AFRICAN ENDEAVOR, which conducted interoperability and capacity building training in the area of communications.

MARFOREUR also facilitates Marine operations in support of OEF and OIF. The majority of deploying Marines and Marine equipment and supplies pass through Europe – via both air and maritime means – and is expedited by the MARFOREUR headquarters staff. In FY 2006, some 91,000 Marines and 4,000 tons of equipment and supplies flowed through the EUCOM AOR. MARFOREUR has also

assisted with the deployment of our coalition partners to Iraq in support of U.S. efforts in OIF, having last year moved 1,150 troops and 40 tons of equipment and supplies from Republic of Georgia to Iraq. The two strategic prepositioning programs managed by MARFOREUR are largely committed to OIF and OEF. Of note, MARFOREUR has facilitated the current deployment of about 65 percent of the equipment from the Marine Corps Geo-Prepositioning Program-Norway (MCPN) to the CENTCOM AOR. MARFOREUR also helped deploy equipment from the caves of Norway in support of JTF-Lebanon.

The first faces that our wounded Marines see after being evacuated out of Iraq and Afghanistan are the MARFOREUR Hospital Liaison Team at Landstuhl Regional Medical Center. This extraordinary team facilitates the in-theater visits of family members with their wounded Marines. Since January 2003, approximately 930 Marines have been treated at Landstuhl.

As EUCOM's Executive Agent for non-lethal weapons, our forces enjoy a wider range of flexible response options. Non-lethal weapons provide another tool to help foster cooperative relationships with countries in the AOR. We will continue to expand our non-lethal weapons program through Mobile Training Teams, Professional Military Education, and the introduction of new and improved technologies.

U.S. Special Operations Command, Europe (SOCEUR)

Throughout 2006, SOCEUR remained focused on the GWOT. By executing a series of synchronized humanitarian, train and equip, and information operations under OEF-TS, the command enhanced the security capabilities of partners in the Trans-Sahara region of Africa and thereby enabled them to better enforce their sovereignty across ungoverned border regions. SOCEUR deployed an assessment and advisory team to Chad in response to a crisis in April 2006. SOCEUR performed a key role in the interagency effort to ensure security of American citizens during the Winter Olympics in Turin, Italy. Additionally, SOCEUR components and staff continue to deploy in support of Operations OEF, OIF, and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Finally, SOCEUR has a commitment to the NATO Response Force and will soon lead the transformation of NATO's SOF capability.

SOCEUR's main effort in 2006, and for 2007, is support of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership through EUCOM's OEF-TS. SOCEUR completed its Phase I assessments and analysis and established a Joint Special Operations Task Force-Trans-Sahara (JSOTF-TS) that will command and control all U.S. and assisting outside partner nation military elements participating

in OEF-TS. In addition, liaison elements in U.S. embassies and Joint Planning and Advisory Teams linked to host nation counterterrorism units have been very successful at facilitating coordination, solidifying partner nation relationships, and ensuring continuity of effort. The austere geographic conditions and challenging political nature of working in Africa make the environment ideal for specialized SOF forces. U.S. Army Special Forces and Navy SEALs are continuously engaged in the role of training, advising, and assisting host nation forces to build capacity and to patrol and control vast desert regions. Marine Special Operations Command Foreign Military Training Units are adding to security capabilities in the theater and the Air Force Special Operations Command is increasing the number of Aviation Advisor forces to assist partner Air Forces. SOCEUR also deployed Military Information Support Teams to several African countries in support of U.S. public diplomacy efforts and conducted various Humanitarian Assistance and Civic Action projects targeted at reducing the underlying conditions that contribute to violent extremism.

In 2006, SOCEUR conducted a major European counterterrorism exercise in the Baltic States to improve multi-national interoperability with these new NATO members, further improving SOCEUR's contingency response capabilities. In 2007, SOCEUR plans to deploy almost 1,000 personnel to Africa for Exercise FLINTLOCK to work with our African partners on eliminating terrorist sanctuaries within their borders. With major operations ongoing in U.S. Central Command's area of responsibility, SOCEUR has focused its security cooperation efforts on coalition SOF development. In FY 2006, SOCEUR executed 19 Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) events in 11 different countries, building the capability of U.S. and partner nations' Special Forces. The JCETs as well as other bilateral and multi-lateral engagement events, targeted primarily OEF-TS nations, with secondary emphasis on Caucasus and Baltic regional partner development and traditional NATO cooperation. In FY 2007, SOCEUR plans to conduct 47 events with 21 countries across the EUCOM AOR.

SOCEUR continues to promote theater transformation, in particular the transformation of NATO SOF. Recently, SOCEUR's role was expanded to become the chief proponent for efforts to establish a NATO SOF Coordination Center and NATO Federation of SOF Training Centers, both intended to develop, organize, and train interoperable SOF across the Alliance.

As SOCEUR recognizes that many of its successes to date have resulted from the trust earned from partner nations through focused, consistent

engagement, we are working closely with U.S. Special Operations Command to plan the transition from forward-stationed SOF to the new rotational Joint Special Operations Groups under the Global SOF Posture. This planning will ensure that rotational SOF are ready to support our need for persistent presence in priority countries, operational flexibility to respond to emerging crises, and supporting our NATO SOF transformation initiatives.

Theater Investment Needs

Theater Infrastructure

EUCOM's ability to transform and achieve U.S. national security objectives depends in large measure on the investment provided for military construction. This investment will also enable the U.S. to continue the recapitalization of our Main Operating Bases (MOBs), as well as establish new and, by design, relatively austere Forward Operating Sites (FOSs) in Eastern Europe. We are not investing MILCON resources in non-enduring installations.

To continue EUCOM's effort to transform the theater in concert with the Department's Global Defense Posture, the FY08 President's Budget requests a total of \$645.6M in military construction (MILCON) funds for EUCOM (Enclosure 5). This investment will enable us to continue the recapitalization of our enduring MOBs, as well as establishing new, austere FOSs along the Black Sea. It also includes projects that will pay dividends as we divest non-enduring bases and consolidate our forces into more efficient communities.

STT and Operational Programs

The FY08 MILCON request includes \$400.1M for five significant STT and operational programs:

- \$173M for completion of Army infrastructure at MOB Vicenza, Italy, and continued consolidation of the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team (ABCT), the only split-based brigade in the Army;
- \$73.6M for completion of expeditionary Army infrastructure at FOS Mikhail Kogalniceanu (MK) Air Base, Romania and to establish a FOS in Bulgaria in support of Joint Task Force-East (JTF-E), (formerly called Eastern European Task Force (EETAF));
- \$62M for completion of Army operational facilities at MOB Grafenwoehr and to complete the Efficient Basing-Grafenwoehr (EB-G) program;
- \$50.5M for five USAFE operational projects at MOB Ramstein, Germany and MOB Lakenheath, U.K.;

- \$41.0M for National Security Agency (NSA) infrastructure improvements at MOB Menwith Hill, U.K.

EUCOM Quality of Life (QoL) construction investments affirm our commitment to our servicemembers and families. Our request for Family Housing renovation and replacement projects and unaccompanied service member facilities will ensure our forces are afforded quality housing and barracks. Investment in medical facilities ensures our servicemembers and their families receive first-rate medical care. In addition, continued investment in our Department of Defense Education Activity (DoDEA) schools provides high quality education facilities for tomorrow's leaders.

Quality of Life

We are requesting the following QoL projects in the FY08 MILCON request:

- \$166.8M for Family Housing renovation and replacement:
 - \$52.0M in MILCON funds to construct 138 replacement housing units at MOB Ansbach, Germany;
 - \$114.8M for new construction and renovation of 688 housing units to meet the family housing requirements at MOB Ramstein, Germany; FOS Incirlik, Turkey; and FOS Croughton, U.K.
- \$14.9M for unaccompanied dormitory at MOB Ramstein, Germany;
- \$1.8M as the U.S. cost-share for construction of a dormitory at Albacete, Spain;
- \$30.1M to construct a replacement Medical/Dental Clinic at MOB Spangdahlem, Germany;
- \$6.0M for construction of a gymnasium and classrooms at Brussels, Belgium;
- \$5.4M for construction of a gymnasium and expansion of a multi-purpose room at MOB Ramstein, Germany;
- \$20.5M for expansion and renovation of classrooms at MOB Wiesbaden, Germany.

Family Housing in the EUCOM AOR will meet Defense Planning Guidance Standards with an additional investment in FY09. NAVFAC and USAREUR continue to improve their housing inventory through the Build-to-Lease (BTL) program. USAREUR is in the progress of constructing over 1,600 BTL houses in the Grafenwoehr area and is planning to construct over 215 in Vicenza. All

service components continue to explore additional BTL housing opportunities throughout Europe to meet our housing requirements.

EUCOM continues to aggressively pursue the common funding of operational facilities for U.S. forces that support approved NATO plans through the NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP). NSIP has a long history of supporting NATO infrastructure in Europe. In the future it will be key to leverage the necessary resources to strategically transform NATO from a static posture to one that is flexible and expeditionary, able to meet emerging security threats thousands of miles from Europe.

Quality of Life (QOL) Programs

Taking care of our most precious resource, our people, is fundamental to the character of the American Armed Forces and a key combat multiplier that positively affects our warfighting effectiveness. The GWOT has called for significant sacrifices on the part of our servicemembers and places a tremendous burden on their families. As we transform our defense posture in Europe, our military communities must continue to be able to provide predictability and capacity to meet the needs of our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Civilians, and their families.

While there are many facets to QOL, few are more important to our servicemembers, and their continued service to our nation, than those affecting their families. EUCOM's QOL focus continues to identify and improve critical family issues. One identified area of need involves providing needed child, youth and teen services. To that extent, we are requesting \$3.2M in "direct," non-construction supplemental funding to support the higher costs of doing business in a high deployment, transforming environment with few off-base options and unique joint service challenges. Off-base child care subsidies at remote sites and joint youth/teen summer camps to support at-risk youth would benefit from these funds. We are committed to executing MILCON requirements by identifying joint support options and construction of purpose-built facilities at enduring locations for school age, youth and teen programs which promote easy access to services and support healthy lifestyles and fitness.

Family member access to both health and dental care is challenging as military facilities must ensure a ready military force. Family members must often use services in a local community characterized by a different culture, language and medical practice standards. Additionally, family members are required to navigate complex insurance claim systems which can involve costly

up-front payments. The unique circumstances overseas dictate reliance on U.S. medical care professionals and liaisons to assist in accessing care in an often cumbersome system. Our ability to strengthen programs, and deploy beneficiary awareness campaigns will lead to a healthier community.

The EUCOM operational tempo has increased counseling service needs and thus created shortfalls across disciplines for servicemembers, spouses and children. Supplementing overseas counseling through off-base providers is extremely challenging due to language differences, standards of care and the inability to access the OSD sponsored Military One Source counseling referral program. We look forward to the DoD Mental Health Task Force team visit to the EUCOM theater to assist in determining our counseling shortfalls or needed improvements. We will continue to provide any service men and women, their families, and our support personnel the right services.

Overseas spouse education and career opportunities remain a concern. As employment opportunities are limited and not expected to grow, EUCOM and the Department of Defense have partnered in the past year to broaden the focus on improving both programs and resources. As a result, the Spouses to Teachers program has expanded to include European Theater spouses. While that is a step in the right direction, there is much more that can be done. Family readiness, and ultimately force readiness, can be best served by improving tuition assistance and targeted scholarship options for OCONUS spouses.

The quality of the Department's dependent education programs is a major contributor to the Quality of Life of EUCOM servicemembers. The 2006 TeraNova standardized test results show DoDEA students scored 10 to 26 points above the national average in all subject areas at all grade levels tested (3rd through 11th grades). We are very proud that this system is recognized as a benchmark for other public school systems and we need your continued support and funding to ensure high educational standards are maintained.

Education is not only important to our students, but also to our national interests and our NATO partners. We are most grateful for Congress' help to provide educational support for school-aged family members of foreign military personnel assigned to Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, in Mons, Belgium, which demonstrates your commitment to furthering our joint nation partnership. An international education begins the process of bridging diverse cultures and creating a joint mission-focused team.

Theater C2, Communications Systems, and ISR

In much of the EUCOM AOR, terrorist groups and support networks exploit international lines of communication with limited interference from U.S. and allied security. Moreover, the threat of a potential surprise attack on U.S. and partner nations remains very real. To minimize an adversary's use of these lines of communication and the likelihood or impact of an attack, Command and Control (C2) and communications systems, as well as ISR assets, provide necessary preventative and responsive safeguards against such threats. A critical investment need relates to the dissemination, analysis, and sharing of information. It is imperative that our C2 and communication system requirements include information sharing, electromagnetic spectrum access, assured information networks, and a robust and reliable Satellite Communications (SATCOM) architecture to operate in today's environment.

Our theater transformation plan places operational forces in regions not currently supported on a day-to-day basis by the DoD Global Information Grid (GIG). Establishing and sustaining a network and information sharing capacity with our allies and partners is a critical step to mitigate this problem. We need long-term investment in persistent ISR capability with assured electromagnetic spectrum access. Using up-to-date collection technologies to find, track and interdict mobile and technologically competent terrorist groups and platforms operating within the vast regions of Africa, Europe, and Eurasia, including both air and maritime environments, is key to achieving information dominance with regard to ongoing and future contingencies.

SATCOM is a critical enabler to both our information sharing initiatives and ISR capabilities. However, with aging military communications satellite constellations and the high and growing demands on limited satellite availability, all combatant commanders are burdened with greater risk in their areas of operation. We need to maintain funding for SATCOM programs that meet both near term requirements and the longer term goals of Transformational Communications Architecture, maintaining the continuity of current and future services.

Interoperability is crucial in the current operational environment because the likelihood of deploying unilaterally is low. EUCOM continues to execute the largest command, control, communications, and computer interoperability security cooperation events in the world through Exercises COMBINED and AFRICAN ENDEAVOR. Both the U.S. and partner nations

successfully used experiences/lessons learned from Exercise COMBINED ENDEAVOR to integrate multinational command, control, and communications in Iraq, ISAF, and UN Humanitarian Relief missions. Likewise, Exercise AFRICAN ENDEAVOR participants successfully used skills developed to support OEF-TS C2 integration efforts. Long-term funding is essential to sustain the ENDEAVOR series of exercises which enhance multinational interoperability and prepare partner nations for U.S.-coalition deployments with 71 of the 92 nations in our AOR. Specifically in Exercise AFRICAN ENDEAVOR, we are working with Africans to develop and plan collaborative communications links, as well as developing a leadership capable of organizing C2 planning, execution, and modernization. In coordination with the Joint Interoperability Test Command (JITC), we provide all ENDEAVOR exercise participants a resource guide that identifies all known compatibility issues between their collective architectures and systems. Groundwork laid today through documentation of technical interoperability issues and exercise of C2 architectures will prove to be a key enabler to future success with multinational forces.

We need to address the chronic shortage of information assurance personnel and the tools needed to defend networks that are critical to enabling theater command and control, both for warfighting and stability operations. All information professionals must be trained and certified to manage DoD networks securely. Information Assurance tools must be procured in an enterprise-wide managed manner that operates across spectrum of conditions.

Strategic Mobility and Maneuver

Our ability to respond rapidly to crises is greatly dependent on strategic lift. The distance from central Europe to southern Africa is equivalent to that between Europe to California. This vast distance, combined with limited civilian rail, road, and air transportation infrastructure, constrains the full range of EUCOM engagement and contingency activities. Due to the expanse of the African Continent and our desire to engage in Eastern Europe, we are expanding our en-route infrastructure system to respond to emerging contingencies in the underdeveloped regions of Africa and Eastern Europe.

The requirement to deploy troops and cargo rapidly across Africa and Europe has increased dramatically. The size of the EUCOM AOR and our operational experience requires strategic reach for intra-theater operations.

EUCOM's fleet of C-130s does not possess the range or capacity to support rapid movement of forces throughout our theater.

Pre-Positioned Equipment

Continued support of the Services' Pre-positioned War Reserve Materiel (PWRM) programs demonstrates commitment through presence and provides a broad spectrum of traditional crisis response and irregular warfare options globally. As EUCOM and the Services transform and transition to a more expeditionary posture, there is a heightened need for PWRM equipment sets in strategically flexible locations.

All four Services maintain PWRM in EUCOM's AOR, either on land or afloat. Attesting to the value of this program, and as validation to its continuing requirement in the EUCOM AOR, much of these stocks have been drawn down to support OEF and OIF and will not be reset prior to the end of combat operations. Over two-thirds of the Marine Corps Pre-positioning Program-Norway (MCPN) and the Maritime Pre-positioned Force (MPF) programs have directly supported OIF and OEF with weapon systems, ammunition, and equipment. Reconstitution and reconfiguration of these programs are essential to support future contingency operations while improving our flexibility to support irregular warfare and Theater Security Cooperation initiatives. Additionally, the Department of the Army's Heavy Brigade Combat Team pre-positioned set at Camp Darby near Livorno, Italy, has also been used to support OIF and OEF.

Continued service investment against this capability is necessary to ensure that a fully flexible range of options remains available to combatant commanders globally. EUCOM is actively involved in DoD-led studies examining the global disposition of PWRM and is working to ensure our strategic direction and operational requirements are incorporated in the study reviews and ultimately in an overarching DoD PWRM strategy.

Enhancing EUCOM's Mission

Congressional support enables EUCOM to perform a wide range of operations and engagement that advance U.S. national interests overseas. Beyond the provision of budgetary funding and authorities, your oversight has been and will continue to be indispensable as EUCOM continues to represent U.S. commitment to its European and African allies and partners.

There are three principal areas where legislative assistance would yield a considerable increase in the capabilities of Combatant Commands to affect

change and achieve goals throughout the AOR: support a U.S. long-range Ground-Based Missile Defense site in Europe, provide Combatant Commanders budgetary flexibility, and reform the current Security Cooperation structure to allow for more rapid and responsive activities.

Long Range Missile Defense a U.S. long-range Ground-Based Missile Defense site in Europe is necessary to enhance the defense of the U.S. homeland, U.S. forces stationed in Europe, partners, and allies from intercontinental and intermediate range ballistic missiles. The Department of Defense recommends continued Congressional support to provide funding for a ground-based interceptor site and supporting radars in Europe. Congressional support for associated MILCON will also be needed once planning has progressed to the point that detailed estimates are available.

Combatant Command Budgetary Authority Flexibility is essential to maximize combatant command responsiveness and agility in confronting the constantly changing geostrategic landscape in which we operate. Budgetary authority flexibility does not require an increase in the DoD top line, but rather a redirection of resources to align the financial authorities with the operational responsibilities of the theater commander.

One recent example of this is the Department of Defense's consolidation of joint training resources to establish the Combatant Commander's Exercise Engagement and Training Transformation (CE2T2) program under a single Defense-wide account. The DoD, the Joint Staff and COCOMs believe this will effectively align joint training initiatives that enhance the ability of the COCOM to conduct necessary Joint training. This initiative may provide an example for how to provide more effective constructs for future COCOM resource flexibility.

Reform of the Security Cooperation Structure is crucial to streamline the process where Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs), in coordination with the interagency, plan and conduct SC activities. We need reforms that will significantly improve our ability to help friendly nations develop capabilities to better govern and defend themselves and to work effectively in concert with our forces. A reformed SC structure must increase the speed and efficiency with which we can start programs to meet emerging requirements and ensure we have the right material on hand. It must assist our partners deploying alongside or instead of our own forces with logistical support and

equipment. It must enhance mutual understanding and build relationships by increasing shared education, facilitating common doctrine, and increasing our ability to work closely with allies through international institutions. It must also increase our flexibility for both planned humanitarian and stabilization activities and for commanders to provide immediate assistance during operations to meet the critical needs of local populations.

There are a number of programs and activities over which the GCC currently has been assigned the responsibility for execution to which the GCC has little to no influence or control due to its inability to control prioritization and allocation of resources. Additionally, there exist government and Non-Government (NGO) programs of which the GCC has limited visibility. Better synchronized policy and legislative lines of authority are necessary to achieve greater efficiencies within the interagency. This synchronization will lead to a more effective SC process.

Specifically for the Combatant Commander, SC initiatives conceptualized in the field often require nearly three years to move through the interagency approval and resource allocation process. Additionally, our unwieldy SC processes are increasingly compelling nations to turn elsewhere for their security assistance needs, thereby reducing America's overall influence in the region and providing "strategic opportunities" for near-peer competitors, especially in Africa.

Legislation geared toward streamlining current Title 10 and Title 22 SC authorities would certainly increase the agility and effectiveness of the designated agency responsible for executing these programs. Section 1206, Building Capacity of Foreign Military Forces, legislation enacted in 2005, is a step in the right direction and could serve as a framework for a more comprehensive SC reform effort. An improved process will better achieve our nation's foreign policy objectives.

AFRICA COMMAND (AFRICOM)

Africa is becoming a continent of increasing strategic importance to the U.S. and our allies. Africa's vast potential makes African stability a near term strategic imperative. It is in our national interest to help Africa achieve broad-based and sustainable economic, security, political and social development. The DoD, in collaboration with other U.S. agencies, is seeking more effective ways to mitigate or respond to humanitarian crises, sustain African unity and stability, and improve cooperation on such transnational

issues as terrorism and HIV/AIDS. There is little doubt that Africa will occupy an increasingly larger amount of our national attention in the years ahead.

As announced by the President and the Secretary of Defense on February 6, 2007, the U.S. will work aggressively with our interagency partners, allied nations, and African regional organizations to advance our common interests and values through the establishment of a new Unified Command focused on the African Continent. In the coming months, we will be considering adaptive and non-traditional options to optimize collaboration with interagency and coalition partners, regional security organizations, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations. This headquarters is projected to contain an innovative mix of U.S. military, DoD civilians, U.S. government, and international partners.

While the eventual goal is to establish Headquarters, U.S. Africa Command on the African continent, there are no plans envisioned in this effort to base operational U.S. forces in Africa. The DoD, in coordination with the Commander, AFRICOM, will develop a targeted and tailored set of rotational forces for the African AOR, expected to be the whole of Africa, with the exception of Egypt. The kinds of forces deployed will be largely based on the capabilities needed to counter the challenges Africa faces - among them humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, security sector reform, and counterterrorism. They will work with host nations to build up African militaries, as well as reinforce the importance of civilian control over the military.

EUCOM and NATO

We recognize that many of the challenges in the current security environment exceed the capacity of any one nation to resolve and that today's threats require a comprehensive approach by the international community, involving a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments. EUCOM's efforts are coordinated and complementary with a broad range of national, international and regional actors. Most notably, EUCOM is the focal point of the U.S. military commitment to the NATO Alliance. Across the NATO Military Command Structure, U.S. military leaders are privileged to hold key positions of influence, helping to develop the Alliance agenda and execute its operations (See Enclosure 6).

Operational Imperatives within the Alliance

NATO's contributions to both current and future security challenges consist of a wide range of initiatives and practical activities. While political consultations among nations help sustain a unity of purpose, men and women of the Alliance plus 17 other troop-contributing nations, are essentially redefining the role of NATO by their actions in operations across Afghanistan, the Balkans, the Mediterranean, Iraq, the Baltics, and Africa. The 50,000 deployed NATO military forces currently under my command as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) are a visible and effective demonstration of NATO's resolve to collectively meet both in- and out-of-region security challenges.

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) remains NATO's most important and challenging mission. With over 34,000 forces, including 15,000 Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines from the United States, the Alliance has responsibility for ISAF operations throughout Afghanistan. Working alongside an additional 11,500 U.S.-led coalition forces of OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and other international actors, ISAF's mission is to provide security and stability until Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) are trained and capable of doing so. The 25 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) under ISAF are the leading edge of NATO's efforts for security and reconstruction, supported by military forces capable of providing the security and stability.

The *Kosovo Force (KFOR)* mission continues under NATO leadership, with the U.S. contributing just over 10 percent of the 15,000 KFOR troops currently in Kosovo. KFOR remains committed to maintaining a safe and secure environment while the political process to determine the future status of Kosovo continues to run its course. We anticipate that United Nations (UN) Special Envoy Ahtisaari will present his final report with the proposed Status Settlement to the United Nations Security Council in the coming weeks. NATO forces are prepared to respond quickly to security contingencies and fully expect to play a significant role in the implementation of the security provisions of a Status Settlement. We expect that NATO forces will remain in Kosovo as the designated International Military Presence (IMP) to provide a safe and secure environment, in conjunction with the International Civilian Presence (ICP) and in support of Kosovo institutions, until such time as those institutions are capable of assuming responsibility for Kosovo's security.

Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR (OAE), the only operation currently conducted under Article V of the Washington Treaty, is focused on defending against terrorist-related threats in the Mediterranean. Maritime forces of OAE are patrolling sea lines of communication, sharing relevant intelligence and information with littoral nations, escorting ships, and conducting compliant boarding of suspect ships, when required. The first non-NATO contribution to this mission occurred in September 2006, when a Russian frigate was employed as part of a NATO Task Force. Additionally, we expect to integrate Ukrainian assets in OAE in 2007. Algeria, Israel, Morocco, Georgia, Croatia, and Albania are also involved in exploring ways they may contribute to this mission.

NATO's Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I) The Alliance supports Iraqi security forces through training, both in Iraq and at educational facilities across Europe. Its training efforts complement the work of the U.S.-led Multinational Security Transition Council (MNSTC-I). NATO focuses on strategic and operational level training, strengthening the Iraqi Training and Doctrine Command, and providing Command and Staff training for mid-level and senior officers. Additionally, NATO has facilitated the acquisition and delivery of military equipment donated by NATO nations for use by Iraqi security forces. We expect that future efforts will likely include gendarmerie training.

African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) NATO has assisted the African Union (AU) with expanding its AMIS peacekeeping mission in Darfur by providing airlift for troop rotations of peacekeepers, providing staff capacity building activities in key AU headquarters, and deploying mobile training teams to work with their AU counterparts. NATO's capacity building approach to increase stability and security on the continent complements EUCOM's efforts to deliver long-term effects with minimal, focused resources.

NATO Transformation

In parallel to EUCOM's transformation, NATO is embracing an ambitious transformation agenda to develop more agile, flexible, and expeditionary military forces. Allied Command Transformation (ACT), NATO's strategic headquarters based in Norfolk, Virginia, has the lead role in developing concepts and managing NATO transformation programs. It is in our nation's interests to ensure that our collective efforts are complementary and contribute to joint and multinational interoperability.

The NATO Response Force (NRF), an initiative proposed by the U.S. and adopted by the Alliance at the 2002 Prague Summit, is a vital part of the Alliance's ability to rapidly respond to emerging crises and conduct the full range of military missions at strategic distances. This joint and multinational force further serves as a catalyst for transformation and interoperability, improving NATO's expeditionary capability in key areas such as multinational logistics and deployable communications. Following a comprehensive and successful live exercise (LIVEX) in June 2006, with further contributions of critical capabilities by nations, NATO declared at the Riga Summit the NRF to have attained Full Operational Capability (FOC). At FOC, the NRF is capable of deploying at strategic distance and supporting the full range of potential Alliance missions, to include evacuations and disaster management, counter-terrorism and acting as an initial entry force for a larger, follow-on force. The future viability of the NRF, as it is currently structured, will depend on member nation's willingness to resource the necessary forces and commit to a more realistic structure of common Alliance funding to support the NRF. Challenges remain in securing adequate Alliance commitments to fill future 6-month NRF rotations, particularly with respect to critical logistics, communications, and support capabilities. EUCOM provides a substantial part of the U.S. force and operational enabler contributions to the NRF.

At the 2006 Riga Summit, NATO nations approved the Special Operations Force (SOF) Transformation Initiative, aimed at increasing the capabilities of SOF forces throughout the Alliance. EUCOM's Special Operations Command (SOCEUR) actively leads this effort to achieve closer cooperation, more effective training, and increased interoperability with the intent of strengthening NATO's SOF capacity.

EUCOM has additionally served as the lead agent in establishing an Intelligence Fusion Center (IFC), co-located with the U.S. Joint Analysis Center (JAC) at Molesworth, England. This multi-national center, formally activated in 2006, will improve information and intelligence sharing in support of Alliance operations.

One of NATO's most significant transformation initiatives is the decision to develop new capabilities for strategic airlift. In 2006, nations agreed to purchase three, perhaps four, C-17 aircraft to be flown by multinational crews with a multinational command and control structure. The goal is to receive the first C-17 aircraft in late 2007, with full operational capability in 2009, operating out of Ramstein Air Base in

Germany. The 16 nations participating in the program will use the aircraft to address national airlift requirements. While these airlift missions will often be used for requirements of a strictly national character, they will also support NATO operations or other international obligations.

Partnerships and Engagement

As with U.S. national engagement initiatives, there is a strategic value to NATO's partnership framework. The varied partnership mechanisms in place continue to deepen and broaden to meet both NATO's new priorities in the evolving security environment as well as the aspirations of the nations with which the Alliance engages. Partnership programs and initiatives cover the full spectrum of efforts, to include promoting dialogue with interested nations, building stable democratic structures, and developing defense capabilities that are interoperable with those of NATO. EUCOM provides the preponderance of U.S. forces that contribute to the success of many of these Alliance programs, most notably the Partnership for Peace (PfP). Building upon the success of the program to date, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Montenegro are now full members of the PfP.

NATO additionally maintains special relationships with Russia and Ukraine. NATO's establishment of Military Liaison Missions in Moscow and Kiev has improved communications and facilitated day-to-day coordination of activities. Notably, Russia, a Partner Nation, has a full delegation of personnel permanently assigned to my NATO headquarters at SHAPE. The U.S. military-to-military relationship with Russia, both bilaterally and in the NATO-Russia context, aims to develop and institutionalize the ability of Russia to operate alongside NATO forces to address common security issues, such as the defense against terrorist threats. Our ambitious agenda for practical cooperation with Russia has not yet been realized, in part due to the failure of the Duma to ratify the PfP Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which would allow Alliance forces to exercise on Russian territory.

NATO remains an Alliance committed to the common defense of its member states. It increasingly recognizes the concept of common security, a broader and more comprehensive view of security in an interdependent world where the threats are non-traditional and more global in nature. In a strategic environment marked by terrorism, failed states, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, common security is an absolutely essential factor in achieving individual national security. NATO is well-placed and,

with the proper resources and political will, capable of accomplishing great things. It is in our national interest to ensure that NATO succeeds.

CONCLUSION

The United States European Command is fully and actively engaged in addressing the challenges of this diverse and expansive area of responsibility. Even as EUCOM supports combat operations in other theaters, we are transforming our posture to shape the evolving security landscape in our area of responsibility.


While the U.S. military can help set the conditions to create a stable environment, it is but one part of the effort required to achieve lasting, effective solutions. New and deepened partnerships within the U.S. government and among combatant commands are required to more dynamically counter the transnational trends and issues which define our theater: threats of terrorism, frozen conflicts, unresolved territorial disputes, complex geopolitical relationships, humanitarian needs, disease, and threats posed by WMD. Moreover, global partnerships are required to better counter the threats to our collective security. EUCOM remains committed to working with European, African and Eurasian partners in collaborative efforts that meet our common security challenges. Finally, the leadership and the capabilities our nation contributes to the NATO Alliance will remain fundamental to preserving trans-Atlantic security, now and into the future.


Global posture shifts and U.S. military transformation have fundamentally changed our strategic positioning in the EUCOM theater. These efforts will culminate in a force posture capable of operating across the broad spectrum of conflict. The success of our engagement hinges on ensuring the presence of relevant capabilities in our theater. In parallel to EUCOM's transformation, NATO is restructuring itself to become more expeditionary and able to operate at strategic distance as evidenced by its current deployments of over 50,000 troops on three continents.

Continued Congressional support for our efforts is essential to ensuring EUCOM is capable of effective engagement and sustained support to the Alliance and our regional partners to meet the broad tasks assigned to EUCOM in the National Military Strategy. The assistance of the Members of this Committee is essential in ensuring EUCOM's effectiveness in its ongoing programs, operations, and initiatives. The dedicated men and women of the


United States European Command are committed to achieving our national goals and objectives.


Enclosure 1: United States European Command Area of Responsibility





Enclosure 3: State Partnership Program (SPP)





Enclosure 4: Theater Security Cooperation by Country

Funds Requested in President's FY 2008 Budget for International Military Education and Training (IMET) and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) in the EUCOM Area of Responsibility

Africa		
Algeria	700,000	0
Angola	500,000	0
Benin	150,000	0
Botswana	690,000	0
Burkina Faso	100,000	0
Burundi	200,000	0
Cameroon	295,000	0
Cape Verde	100,000	0
Central African Republic	100,000	0
Chad	100,000	0
Cote d'Ivoire	100,000	0
Democratic Republic of Congo	500,000	600,000
Equatorial Guinea	45,000	0
Gabon	200,000	0
Gambia	120,000	0
Ghana	600,000	300,000
Guinea	350,000	200,000
Guinea-Bissau	100,000	0
Lesotho	50,000	0
Liberia	300,000	1,000,000
Malawi	300,000	0
Mali	250,000	0
Mauritania	130,000	0
Morocco	1,800,000	3,655,000
Mozambique	300,000	200,000
Namibia	100,000	0
Niger	100,000	0
Nigeria	800,000	1,350,000
Republic of the Congo	100,000	0
Rwanda	400,000	0

Sao Tome and Principe	200,000	0
Senegal	1,100,000	0
Sierra Leone	400,000	0
South Africa ¹	900,000	100,000
Swaziland	100,000	0
Tanzania	300,000	0
Togo	100,000	0
Tunisia	1,800,000	2,064,000
Uganda	500,000	0
Zambia	400,000	0
STATE Africa Regional	133,000	0
Total, Africa	15,513,000	9,469,000
Europe and Eurasia		
Albania	600,000	2,600,000
Armenia	300,000	3,000,000
Azerbaijan	1,000,000	4,300,000
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1,000,000	7,800,000
Bulgaria	1,700,000	13,200,000
Croatia	179,000	0
Czech Republic	1,300,000	3,000,000
Estonia	1,100,000	3,000,000
Georgia	800,000	10,000,000
Greece	590,000	0
Hungary	1,200,000	2,000,000
Kosovo	400,000	0
Latvia	1,100,000	3,000,000
Lithuania	1,100,000	3,000,000
Macedonia	500,000	4,500,000
Malta	45,000	0
Moldova	600,000	0
Montenegro	100,000	0
Poland	2,000,000	27,200,000

¹ South Africa is currently barred from receiving FMF by the provisions of the American Servicemembers' Protection Act.


Portugal	690,000	0
Romania	1,800,000	18,400,000
Russia	700,000	0
<i>Serbia</i>	300,000	0
Slovakia	1,100,000	3,000,000
Slovenia	885,000	500,000
Turkey	3,000,000	11,825,000
Ukraine	1,900,000	9,000,000
Total, Europe and Eurasia	25,989,000	129,325,000
Total, Africa	15,513,000	9,469,000
Total, Europe/Eurasia/Africa	41,502,000	138,794,000
Near East		
Israel	0	2,400,000,000
Grand Total, EUCOM AOR	41,502,000	2,538,794,000

Enclosure 5: Theater Investment Needs

LINE ITEM MILITARY CONSTRUCTION/FAMILY HOUSING PROJECTS				
Comp/ Agency	Country	Location	Description	Approp. Request
USAREUR	Bulgaria	Novo Selo	JTF-E Base Camp (1)	61,000,000
USAREUR	Romania	MK Airbase	JTF-E Base Camp	12,600,000
USAREUR	Germany	Grafenwoehr	EBG Brigade Complex-Maint/Opns (2)	34,000,000
USAREUR	Germany	Grafenwoehr	EBG Brigade Complex-Maintenance & Opns	28,000,000
USAREUR	Italy	Vicenza	173 rd Brigade Complex-Maint and OPS (2)	87,000,000
USAREUR	Italy	Vicenza	Brigade Complex- Barracks & Support	86,000,000
USAREUR	Germany	Ansbach	New Townhouse Construction Ph I	52,000,000
USAFE	Germany	Ramstein	Construct Small Diameter Bomb Facility, Ph 2	6,260,000
USAFE	Germany	Ramstein	Construct Unaccompanied Dorm - 128 PN	14,949,000
USAFE	Germany	Ramstein	Construct Joint Mobility Processing Center	24,000,000
USAFE	Germany	Ramstein	Construct Fire Training Facility	3,000,000
USAFE	Germany	Ramstein	Replace Family Housing Phase E	56,275,000
USAFE	Germany	Spangdahlem	Medical/Dental Clinic Replacement	30,100,000
USAFE	Spain	Albacete	Tactical Leadership Program Dorm	1,800,000
USAFE	UK	Lakenheath	Construct Small Diameter Bomb Storage Igloo	1,800,000
USAFE	UK	Lakenheath	F-15C Squad Ops/AMU	15,500,000
NSA ²	UK	Menwith Hill	Power Availability and Infrastructure Improvements	10,000,000
NSA	UK	Menwith Hill	Add/Alter Operations & Technical Facility	31,000,000
DoDEA ³	Germany	Wiesbaden	Construct Gymnasium, Art, & Music Classrooms and Renovation	15,379,000
DoDEA	Germany	Wiesbaden	Construct Multipurpose Room	5,093,000
DoDEA	Germany	Ramstein	Construct Gymnasium; Renovate/expand Multipurpose Room	5,393,000
DoDEA	Belgium	Brussels	Construct Gymnasium, Art, & Music Classrooms	5,992,000
Total				\$587,141,000
NON LINE ITEM MILITARY CONSTRUCTION/FAMILY HOUSING PROJECTS				
USAFE	Germany	Ramstein	Improve Family Housing Phase E	4,700,000
USAFE	Turkey	Incirlik	Improve Family Housing	41,300,000
USAFE	UK	Croughton	Improve Family Housing	12,500,000
NON LINE ITEM TOTAL				\$58,500,000
TOTAL MILITARY CONSTRUCTION/FAMILY HOUSING PROJECT FUNDING REQUEST				\$645,641,000

¹ National Security Agency² Department of Defense Dependent Education Agency

Enclosure 6: EUCOM and NATO Command Structure



House Armed Services Committee



**POSTURE STATEMENT OF
GENERAL LANCE SMITH, USAF
COMMANDER, JOINT FORCES COMMAND**

**BEFORE THE 110TH CONGRESS
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
15 MARCH 2007**

House Armed Services Committee

United States Joint Forces Command
Congressional Posture Statement

The efforts of United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) are focused on providing forces and capabilities to help win the war today, while preparing forces for the challenges of tomorrow. Our current enemy in the War on Terror is adaptive, elusive and determined to win at all costs. Defeating such a broad and decentralized terrorist network requires innovation and agility. The capabilities of tomorrow's enemy are less clear. We don't know if it will be a peer competitor, a nation-state, or a transnational organization, but we can be assured that we will still need a trained and ready force capable of fighting and winning in any environment.

I am very pleased to be able to share the accomplishments of USJFCOM with the Committee. As a Command we work hard to ensure our 1.16 million Active Duty, National Guard, and Reserve Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines and civilians can operate seamlessly and interdependently with each other and with our interagency and multi-national partners, maximizing all instruments of National Power to fight and win.

USJFCOM is uniquely structured to provide Joint Force Commanders with timely, relevant enabling capabilities, including trained and ready joint forces, capable of integrated operations with governmental agencies, multi-national partners and non-governmental organizations. Our over 5,350 headquarters personnel – a blend of military from every branch of the Service, Reserves, and National Guard, along with government civilians and contractors – bring a combined expertise that is unique among military and

civilian organizations. Their pride and professionalism is the key to USJFCOM's success.

Working towards meeting both the needs of today and the challenges of tomorrow defines the mission of USJFCOM:

To provide mission ready Joint Capable forces and support the development and integration of Joint, Interagency, and Multinational capabilities to meet the present and future operational needs of the Joint Force.

With a renewed focus on the joint warfighter, 2006 was highlighted by great partnerships with the Combatant Commanders, the Services, federal agencies, academia and industry, and our Components: Air Combat Command, Marine Forces Command, Fleet Forces Command, and Army Forces Command. We provide:

- Multiple deployments of Standing Joint Force Headquarters and other assets in support of operational needs of the Combatant Commanders from Pakistan to Qatar and beyond
- Continuous robust and tailored tactical communications support to conventional and special operations forces in Iraq and Afghanistan by the Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE)
- The first time deployment of JCSE's CENTCOM C3 Quick Reaction Force to provide communications support for non-combatant evacuation operations in Lebanon
- Preparation of joint warfighters for operational missions, through six Mission Rehearsal Exercises and 16 Combatant Commander training events, conducting more than 70 collective joint training events involving more than 46,000 participants

- Realistic training for commanders and staffs of Joint Task Force Horn of Africa, Multi-National Force-Iraq, Multi-National Corps-Iraq, and Combined Joint Task Force 76 in Afghanistan
- Significant expansion of joint distance learning tools such as the Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution Capability
- Enabling technology for all major Service training centers and Combatant Commanders to train together in a distributed environment through the Joint National Training Capability
- Dedicated assessment teams to Iraq and Afghanistan to identify areas for improved command and control of US and multi-national forces
- Sourcing recommendations and coordinated the deployment of more than 310,000 personnel in support of Combatant Commanders
- The stand up of the Joint Command and Control Capability Portfolio Manager capabilities function to deliver integrated joint command and control capabilities, improve interoperability and increase joint operational effectiveness
- Leadership for Multinational Experiment 4, with participants from eight nations and NATO
- Advanced terrain analysis prototype software (Geospatial Analysis and Planning Support (GAPS)) to meet the warfighter requirements for rapid route analysis and identification, sensor planning and placement and counter fire systems planning and placement.
- Development of timely products such as the HARMONIEWeb Interagency collaborative tool and the Counter Improvised Explosive Device Knowledge and Information Fusion Exchange (KnIFE)

CORE COMPETENCIES

USJFCOM's five core competencies - unique mission areas - form the nucleus of the command's day-to-day operations.

Joint Force Provider

As the conventional Joint Force Provider, USJFCOM provides trained and capable forces to commanders in the field. This entails identifying and recommending global joint sourcing solutions in coordination with both the Services and Combatant Commanders.

Joint Force Trainer

As the lead Joint Force Trainer, USJFCOM conducts and assesses joint and multinational training and exercises for assigned forces, and assists the Chairman and other Combatant Commanders and Service Chiefs in their preparations for joint and combined operations.

Joint Force Integrator

As the lead Joint Integrator for all of DoD's uniformed components, USJFCOM is responsible for recommending changes in doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, personnel, and facilities to integrate Service, defense agency, and interagency and multinational capabilities. Efforts range from integrating the disparate systems and processes that exist today, to ensuring that the systems and processes of tomorrow are "born joint".

Joint Innovation & Experimentation

As the DoD lead for concept development and experimentation, USJFCOM leads the development, exploration and assessment of new joint concepts,

organizational structures and emerging technologies. This includes operational concepts involving multinational and interagency transformation efforts.

Joint Force Enabler

As a joint enabling capabilities provider to commanders in the field, USJFCOM provides joint enabling capabilities that streamline the rapid formation and organization of a Joint Task Force Headquarters. These include command and control capability, augmenting the headquarters with rapidly deployable critical skills support, and providing reach-back support as required.

Strategic Goals

The command's strategic goals are focused on helping the Joint Warfighters of today in their efforts to win the War on Terror, while working to transform the force to meet the threats and challenges of tomorrow. These strategic goals guide the application of USJFCOM's core competencies.

Provide Focused USJFCOM Support to Win the War on Terror

USJFCOM provides Combatant Commanders enhanced joint enabling capabilities for defeating violent extremism and building a security environment that is inhospitable to terrorist threats. These capabilities were provided to some 24 separate JTFs throughout the globe in 2006 with even greater requirements in 2007. We will continue to integrate our actions with US agencies and international partners to achieve a common purpose.

Joint Forces Command has established several joint enabling capabilities to complement service headquarters trained or designated to serve as Joint Task Force Headquarters. These capabilities provide unique, mission ready support to joint force commanders to aid in the accelerated formation and increased effectiveness of their headquarters.

The more significant joint enabling capabilities are:

- Standing Joint Force Headquarters Core Element (SJFHQ (CE))
- Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE)
- Intelligence Quick Reaction Team (QRT) [resourced from Joint Transformation Command- Intelligence (JTC-I)]
- Joint Public Affairs Support Element (JPASE)

The mission of the SJFHQ(CE) is to accelerate the transition of a Service component headquarters to a JTF headquarters. These core elements, ready to deploy world-wide on short notice, are capable of providing initial joint planning and operations within a collaborative environment to access information from global locations. Each core element's personnel and equipment can be tailored for a specific mission to support joint/combined planning, operations, knowledge management and information superiority.

The Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE) provides simultaneous communications support for two Joint Task Force (JTF) Headquarters and two Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) Headquarters within 72 hours of notification. JCSE also provides contingency and crisis communications to meet operational and support needs of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Unified Commands, Services, Defense agencies, and non-Defense agencies. These assets,

alert-postured and globally deployable, provide en-route and early entry Command, Control, Computers and Communications to Combatant Commanders.

The Joint Transformation Command - Intelligence (JTC-I) resourced Intelligence Quick Reaction Teams (QRT) provide military and civilian intelligence professionals with targeting and collection management expertise to a JTF within 24 hours of notification, or during events leading up to crisis/contingency operations.

The Joint Public Affairs Support Element (JPASE) provides dedicated and sustained joint public affairs capability on a scalable and expeditionary basis to support JTFs worldwide. The JPASE is also the joint public affairs defense-wide proponent.

In the last two years, these elements supported operations in numerous locations including the U.S. Gulf Coast, Iraq, Afghanistan, Qatar, Horn of Africa, Lebanon and Pakistan, in support of the war on terror, disaster relief and non-combatant evacuations.

USJFCOM searches for opportunities to develop new joint enabling capabilities that can accelerate the establishment and immediate effectiveness of JTF headquarters and related joint organizations. Joint enabling capabilities are integrated into JTF headquarters training and exercises to increase proficiency for future operations and doctrine changes.

A key USJFCOM capability supporting the war on terrorism is the Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC). This center develops and adapts modeling and simulation technologies for analysis, computation and the presentation of

options to combatant commands. JWAC's support to the warfighter in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2006 was substantial, and will be again in 2007.

Deliver Trained, Capable and Interoperable Joint Forces

USJFCOM provides forces that meet Combatant Commanders' requirements for trained and interdependent forces capable of adaptively operating in a joint, interagency, multinational, and coalition environment. USJFCOM supports:

- the continued improvement of the joint staffs and operating forces that are currently deployed
- provision of timely and tailored Joint training standards for tasks that are jointly executed
- creation of a collaborative environment that, in real time, routinely makes use of lessons learned and best practices
- reduction of solution cycle time to develop relevant, accessible, and value-added training capabilities to the joint warfighter

USJFCOM achieves these goals through timely and realistic joint training support at the operational level to Combatant Commanders, Services, and interagency/multinational partners. Each year USJFCOM coordinates and supports commanders through more than 70 collective joint training events involving 46,000 training participants, and individual joint training for more than 26,000 people. In addition, USJFCOM, through the Joint National Training Capability (JNTC), supports training for accredited service and Combatant Command training programs. This support extends to all Army, Air

Force, Marine Corps and Navy pre-deployment training environments by providing a joint training environment for their mission rehearsal events.

The Joint National Training Capability uses a mix of live, virtual, and constructive simulations. Key to this capability is the Joint Training and Experimentation Network (JTEN), a 32 node persistent global network to deliver realistic joint training to the warfighter at 72 sites across the Continental United States and abroad. JTEN provides connectivity with the Navy Cooperative Training Environment (NCTE), the Air Force Distributed Mission Operations Network, and OSD's Secret-Defense Research and Engineering Network, and will soon be connected with multinational partner training and experimentation networks. Connecting the JTEN and the NCTE enabled the delivery of Joint training during the Terminal Fury 07 Exercise to three countries, 14 states, across 19 time zones with 24 federated simulation systems.

USJFCOM uses this capability to conduct and support training for Combatant Commands, JTFs, functional component battle staffs, and Service selected tactical units worldwide, as well as leveraging 20+ Service training programs through an Accreditation and Certification process that identifies joint training shortfalls, to add joint context and provide operational and tactical level joint training. In addition, USJFCOM is currently coordinating with the National Defense University, the U.S. Army, and the NATO School to support joint training requirements for the Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRT) Training prior to deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq.

In 2006, USJFCOM prepared warfighters through six Mission Rehearsal Exercises, 16 Combatant Commander events, and 69 JNTC-enabled Service

training events through the use of 43 joint trainer support elements forward deployed to 20 Combatant Command and Service training sites.

USJFCOM significantly enhanced mission rehearsal exercises for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM with an unprecedented headquarters training exercise, in which NATO's International Security Assistance Force Afghanistan and a U.S. Regional Command (82d Airborne Division HQ) trained together in the same exercise. Headquarters personnel from the Afghan National Security Forces, Afghan National Army, Pakistani Army and the U.S. Embassy in Kabul also participated and achieved a significant level of multinational realism from both exercise and operational environments.

In conjunction with these training events, the Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution Capability (JKDDC) provides online training for individual augmentees and headquarters staff members. It is an adaptable and world class learning management system used by the warfighter, coalition forces and reserves for initial and continuous training in Joint Task Force headquarters. By April of this year, JKDDC will offer over 85 courses (700 hours of instruction) in a variety of subjects to include headquarters operations, interagency, and culturally related topics through a dynamic global network.

USJFCOM also executes its responsibilities to transform senior military leadership development and education by bringing joint training and professional military education together, ensuring military, coalition, and interagency leaders are prepared to operate cohesively in joint operations. The command hosts portions of three courses sponsored by USJFCOM and the National Defense University:

- Keystone joint operations module for command senior enlisted leaders (91 participants in FY06)
- Capstone joint operations module for newly selected flag and general officers (171 Fellows participated in FY06)
- Pinnacle course for two- and three-star commanders focusing on JTF Commander training (57 participants in FY06)

Additionally, USJFCOM oversees specialized training provided by:

- Standing Joint Force Headquarters
- Special Operations Command-Joint Forces Command
- Joint Transformation Command - Intelligence (JTC-I)
- Joint Targeting School
- Joint Public Affairs Support Element
- Joint Deployment Training Center
- Joint Personnel Recovery Agency
- JTC-I Quick Response Teams

USJFCOM supports the Combatant Commander's Exercise Engagement and Training Transformation (CE2T2) program, which addresses joint warfighter training shortfalls by consolidating existing resources. This will benefit the largest audience and enable portfolio management for the Joint Training Program. The CE2T2 program is based on an extension of the Training Transformation (T2) business model that has become a catalyst for inter-service coordination, and keeps programs on budget and on schedule while defraying costs of Service training programs. CE2T2 eliminates redundancy, and ensures resource alignment against validated needs.

Primary Joint Force Provider (Global Force Management)

As the conventional Joint Force Provider (JFP), USJFCOM provides DoD leadership with the necessary data and alternatives to make proactive, risk-informed force management and allocation decisions. USJFCOM uses a process that identifies risks to execute combatant commander missions, forecast sourcing challenges to execute contingencies and project Reserve Component unit mobilization/availability. This requires global visibility on unit readiness as well as the ability to analyze force structure, capabilities, availability, location, and apportionment of those assets.

USJFCOM's objective is to source all rotational and emergent force requirements, including individual and ad-hoc force capabilities in collaboration with components, Services (both active and reserve) and Combatant Commands' input to achieve effective/efficient sourcing solutions. USJFCOM also sources Secretary of Defense prioritized Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTF-HQ) and the individual augmentees identified to staff those JTF-HQs, in coordination with the Joint Staff, Combatant Commands, and Service Headquarters. In 2006, USJFCOM developed sourcing recommendations and coordinated the deployment of more than 310,000 personnel in support of all Combatant Commanders.

In addition, the expanding Joint Force Provider mission requires that USJFCOM attain an automated capability to assess and monitor force capabilities, availability, location, readiness, and assignment, and to be able to track the status of units through the entire pre-deployment, deployment, redeployment and reconstitution cycle for both the Active and Reserve components, down to an individual. This requirement is termed the Global Visibility Capability (GVC), for which the Defense Readiness Reporting

System (DRRS) and other contributing technologies such as the Joint Event Scheduling System (JESS) and the Joint Force Projection Advanced Capability Technology Demonstration (JFP-ACTD) are currently being pursued and/or enhanced.

USJFCOM is spearheading the development and enforcement of policies that transform Global Force Management into a predictive, streamlined and integrated process supported by net-centric tools that expand total force visibility. This effort will enable effective and efficient sourcing of all rotational and emergent force requirements while simultaneously seeking to reduce, and ultimately eliminate, persistent force capability shortfalls (Low Density/High Demand) and fully coordinating the availability of active and reserve forces. This will allow earlier notification of forces that will be deployed, thus adding stability of their personal lives, predictability to their schedules, and greater opportunities for their training.

In October 2006, USJFCOM gained responsibility for assignment of individual augmentees to deployed units, a sourcing workload of approximately 10,000 joint positions annually for 55 Joint Task Force Headquarters worldwide. This is a new mission requirement of our force provider role which demands an efficient and effective process in order to ensure these individual augmentees arrive where they were needed in a timely manner, trained and ready to fight.

Develop Joint Capabilities and Interoperable Joint Command and Control (JC2)

As the Joint Capability Developer, USJFCOM advances warfighter effectiveness, improves combat capability, and helps minimize fratricide by

leading the Combatant Commands, Services, Agencies, and multinational partners in the interdependent and integrated development and transition of Joint Warfighting Capabilities. In September 2006, the Deputy Secretary of Defense designated USJFCOM to lead a trial program as the Joint Command and Control Capability Portfolio Manager (JC2 CPM). In this capacity, USJFCOM has established a JC2 CPM capability function, characterized by short reporting lines, and close coordination with Service C2 programs. USJFCOM, along with a multitude of partners, is working to establish the technical expertise and attendant authorities necessary to eliminate unnecessary duplication, close capability gaps, and ensure joint integrated capability solutions for the warfighter.

A fully networked, interoperable, and interdependent joint force is essential to the achievement of successful military operations now and in the future. While we have come very far since the enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation, we still have much work to do with achieving this vision for our Armed Forces. As we learned in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, the lack of interoperability in command and control and other functions significantly reduces the effectiveness of our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines on the battlefield. Unique among Combatant Commands, USJFCOM works the critical seams of joint warfighting, leading the migration of existing Service-based systems toward a single, integrated joint capability.

USJFCOM's goal is to develop operational level forces and headquarters with the organic ability to fight as part of a joint and combined force alongside our multinational and interagency partners. The command's integration efforts will yield a joint command and control capability that ensures decision makers receive information when they need it, allowing them to observe, orient, decide, adjust and act faster than an adversary.

Moreover, it will meet the pressing demands of today's battlefield by linking voice and data from global and national command centers to joint task force headquarters, between component commands, and on to the Soldier, Sailor, Airman, Marine, coalition partner or governmental/non-governmental agency over the last tactical mile.

The goal is to create an "Interoperable JC2 Environment" that:

- Ensures a JC2 capability "Born Joint" not "Made Joint" on the battlefield, as was required for:
 - Blue Force Tracker
 - Joint Airborne Communications Suite
 - Joint Airborne Communications Center Command Post (JACC/CP)
- Provides a persistent test and evaluation environment to assess aspects of C2 portfolio programs
- Provides cross-program and enterprise-wide system engineering
- Recommends Program Objective Memorandum (POM) offsets to ensure the "Jointness" of Service and Agency C2 programs
- Supports future Joint Task Force Headquarters

The CPM will focus on the needs of the Combatant Commander to ensure proposed solutions contribute to joint C2 warfighting capabilities and that resources are distributed according to joint command and control priorities.

As part of its CPM duties, USJFCOM also serves as the operational proponent for the Net Enabled Command Capability (NECC), the web-based replacement for the stove-piped Global Command and Control (GCCS) family of systems. In this role, USJFCOM partners with the COCOMs and Services to establish the warfighter requirements for the new command and control system

and then ensures our acquisition partner, the Defense Information Systems Agency, delivers an interoperable capability that meets the warfighter's needs.

Beyond its Joint Command and Control duties, USJFCOM also develops additional warfighting capabilities for the joint force. These capabilities include Joint Data Link software, precision targeting system, and machine to machine interfaces for passing that targeting information without relying on voice transmission. All of these capabilities are in use today.

Since 2004, USJFCOM's implementation of Limited Acquisition Authority (LAA) in support of the Combatant Commands has been used to fund/provide several critical capabilities to the warfighter:

- The Joint Precision Air Drop System in partnership with USSOCOM, currently employed in theater (January 2006)
- The Change Detection Work Station (CDWS), a Marine Corps initiative, deployed to USCENTCOM in January 2005
- The Joint Task Force Commander Executive Command and Control Capability (JTF CDR EC2) delivered to CENTCOM/EUCOM Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) in Fiscal Year 04 -05
- Blue Force Situational Awareness (JBFS), in partnership with USSTRATCOM, in Iraq today with Multinational Force West (MNF-W) and currently being tested to support XVIII Airborne Corps in their upcoming Joint Task Force role

Warfare is inherently difficult and dangerous. To be effective in the Global War on Terror, and to be more interoperable with coalition partners, we need better cultural and language tools. To help overcome

the language barrier, USJFCOM has partnered with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to develop and provide over 1000 language translation devices for USCENTCOM and others. These devices include over 950 one-way speech translation devices (Phrasealator and Voice Response Translators) and nearly 100 prototype two-way Speech to Speech (English - Arabic) Translators.

Our Collaborative Information Environment Management Office (CIEMO) is working with the Services, to include the Virginia Army National Guard, non-government organizations and other mission partners to further develop and employ HARMONIEWeb (Humanitarian Assistance Response for Multi-partner Operations Network on Internet Enterprise). HARMONIEWeb, developed in the aftermath of Katrina, affords the ability for mission partners outside of the U.S. government to collaborate, share and better integrate information across the spectrum of support for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief operations.

To reduce the danger of fratricide, USJFCOM worked with the Services and COCOMs to establish a common training standard for authorizing service members to direct close air support fires to targets. Moreover, the Command planned and executed a Combat Identification experiment with over 700 US and coalition participants designed to assess the military utility of specific anti-fratricide technologies. This experiment was such a success and the results of sufficient rigor that the Army and Marines decided to purchase improved combat identification systems for use in the near future.

Two additional subordinate commands that support the Joint warfighter and facilitate the integration and interoperability effort are the Joint Fires Integration and Interoperability Team (JFIIT) and Joint Systems

Integration Command (JSIC). JFIIT, located at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, conducts joint tactical testing and evaluation designed to improve the integration, interoperability, and operational effectiveness of joint fires and combat identification. JSIC, located in Suffolk, Virginia, is the battle laboratory for analyzing command and control systems integration and interoperability issues and works closely with the Joint Warfighting Center and the Joint Futures Laboratory.

Lead Continuous Effort to Transform the Joint Force

USJFCOM coordinates the transformational actions of the Services, other government agencies, and our international partners to improve our ability to conduct integrated planning, coordination, and execution of complex operations. Our goal is to identify and develop the joint capabilities that provide Combatant Commanders with the ability to operate continuously and effectively within any adversary's decision-cycle, under any conditions, now and in the future.

Transformation is a continuous process of innovation, experimentation and the transition of solution capabilities into the hands of the nation's joint forces for today's fight and future engagements. The efforts of USJFCOM are directed to ensure the Joint Force Commander is equipped with improved concepts and capabilities across the spectrum of operations, and will be better prepared to command. For example, USJFCOM is engaged in providing near term Command and Control solutions while working toward the force of the future that will:

- Be more capable of working with joint, interagency and multinational partners
- Be able to work in an environment that deeply integrates planning, intelligence and operations
- Possess the tools and operational art required to operate at the Commanders' discretion,
- Be rapidly deployable and efficiently sustainable
- Be an enabled element within and contribute to a synchronized strategic communication environment

Transformation is about developing new concepts and capabilities together in a wider range of settings from the traditional laboratory experimentation to prototyping the emerging concepts and capabilities in the field. Much of our work is now informed by powerful federations of models and simulations run on supercomputers. This technological edge at the beginning of the development and experimentation process is a key enabler for producing what our primary customers, the Combatant Commanders, have told us they need to address today's realities and tomorrow's emerging challenges.

Modeling and Simulation (M&S) provides the foundation for innovation and experimentation. Ongoing sophisticated M&S capabilities include the Joint Semi-Automated Forces (JSAF), a high fidelity multi-dimensional environment that can replicate real-world urban environments such as Baghdad or Norfolk. Matching the real-time fidelity of JSAF, but in a faster-than-real-time capacity, is the Joint Analysis System (JAS). JAS, a constructive simulation, facilitates analysis of actions and results of those actions in an entire joint campaign, from pre-deployment, to employment, and re-deployment of forces. This lets us be more effective and efficient before, during, and after operations. Another emerging model is the Synthetic Environment for Analysis and Simulation, or SEAS. This tool models and simulates reactions of institutions, organizations, and individuals that make up a society and their effects on joint operations. We will soon be experimenting with this tool on the battlefield.

USJFCOM continues to leverage our affiliation with the Congressional Modeling and Simulation (M&S) Caucus. For the last two years, the Hampton Roads area has hosted the nation's leaders in M & S to highlight the importance of the industry. This provides a forum not only to share with industry and academia, but also to showcase M&S training initiatives of the

military in a joint task force environment, promote enhanced M&S capabilities, and understand the importance of such training to success on the battlefield. These conferences also provide a means to share with academia and industry, strategies to foster increased participation by college students in the math and science disciplines. This partnership with academia is a key area that we want to grow in 2007 and beyond.

Recent experiments like the Urban Resolve experimentation series address the capability gaps our commanders now face. By focusing on the challenges of urban operations in 2015, the Urban Resolve series analyzes the effectiveness of current and future capabilities in demanding environments. Over 1,000 people, including representatives from the Services, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), interagency and multi-national partners, from more than 19 sites, participated in and contributed to the USJFCOM lead Urban Resolve experiment series, designed to explore and deliver capabilities for the urban battlespace of tomorrow.

Likewise, the Multinational Experiment (MNE) Series brings the multinational and interagency communities together to examine better ways to work together. Eight partner countries, including the US, NATO and other nations participated in the MNE series in 2006. The experiment further refined an effects-based approach to operations, which led to the development of an effects-based planning tool that NATO is fielding to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.

In 2006, USJFCOM established the Joint Intelligence Operations Center - Experimental (JIOC-X) to conduct joint intelligence concept development and experimentation (JICD&E), to conduct joint training, and to incorporate

lessons learned, best practices and assessments in support of both Combatant Command and Defense JIOCs. The ultimate end-state of the JIOC is the integration of plans, intelligence, and operations in order to increase the speed, power, and combat effectiveness of DOD operations.

A key element in transforming the joint force is achieving Unified Action - achieving unity of effort in complex operations involving the participation of military forces, civilian agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations, and multinational partners. USJFCOM development partners in Unified Action include the National Security Council, Departments of Defense, State, Justice, Treasury, and Commerce, US Agency for International Development (USAID), the private sector, multinational and multilateral partners, and NGOs. Together, we must develop a coherent interagency planning process and the requisite tools necessary to synchronize the diverse capabilities that our civilian agencies, military, multilateral, international organizations and NGOs bring to the effort. The war on terrorism that we are fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan demand this kind of interagency and multinational participation. The Department of State Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization(S/CRS) maintains a strong partnership with USJFCOM as we work together to understand and develop solutions for common civilian-military planning and coordination, striving to improve the Whole of Government Approach. Our close partnership with Allied Command Transformation and NATO allows us to leverage each other's capabilities with S/CRS to enhance the integration of Defense, US Government, and other national and international agencies efforts in order to develop and deploy fully integrated and interdependent solutions. This will be a challenge and we must strive for seamless integration of our combined efforts.

The three year Unified Action development and experimentation program, which began in mid 2005, will identify capability gaps in the areas of Security, Economic Stabilization, Justice and Reconciliation, Humanitarian Assistance and Social Well-being, and Governance and Participation. These capability gaps will be cross-walked with developing initiatives across the Unified Action community of interest to develop potential solution sets.

Concurrently, USJFCOM and its partners are developing an integrated planning and implementation framework, to include a national security training and education program. These concepts will then be assessed during major experiments to include Unified Action 07 and Multinational Experiment 5 in fiscal year 2008.

Our new experimentation series in 2007, named Noble Resolve, is intended to improve information sharing, communications interoperability and unity of effort within the areas of Homeland Defense, Homeland Security and Defense Support to Civil Authorities. Utilizing advanced modeling and simulation, Noble Resolve uses a scenario focused on preventing overseas threats from migrating to the homeland. Partners and participants in this experiment include other Combatant Commands (NORTHCOM, EUCOM, STRATCOM, TRANSCOM, and PACOM), Department of Homeland Security, FBI, FEMA, port authorities, the Commonwealth of Virginia, the cities of Norfolk, Virginia, and Portland, Oregon, academic institutions like Old Dominion University, University of Virginia and Virginia Polytechnic Institute, as well as companies like Maersk Shipping. Through this innovative use of technology, we are able to focus on critical homeland defense skills, assess risk management, test command and control with first responders, and build counter-terrorism tools between States.

In developing the foundation for the Combatant Commanders' success in future operations, USJFCOM has pursued a wide range of activities that provide unique joint enhancing capabilities. For example, the Cross-Domain Collaborative Information Environment is a hardware and software solution that supports cross-mission and cross-domain information sharing throughout the battlespace. The key deliverable to the war fighter is the capability to allow multiple data types to pass from one classified domain to another.

Combatant Commanders have also identified a requirement for more robust joint logistic processes that impact the Joint Force Commander's ability to effectively plan, execute, and integrate logistics at the Operational level. As a result, USJFCOM, partnering with the Combatant Commands, the Services and the Defense Logistics Agency, is developing a family of scalable joint and combined capabilities (JxDS) that will enhance coordination, integration, and synchronization to increase force employment opportunities.

A unique challenge of Combatant Commanders conducting operations in the urban environment is inhibited employment of joint fires due to complex terrain, weapons effects and the proximity of non-combatants. The Joint Urban Fires Prototype (JUFP) focuses on improving the ability of joint commanders to apply precision fires in the urban environment by improving precision, discrimination and response.

"Angel Fire" is another joint enhancing capability showing tremendous potential, and is currently being tested on the battlefield by the Marine Corps. Angel Fire was pulled forward after our Urban Resolve experiment identified the dramatic value of persistent surveillance. The optical sensor device covers a 16 square kilometer area and can provide the joint war fighter with a dedicated sensor to rapidly respond to enemy actions and near

real-time reaction to an improvised explosive device (IED) or any other event in the area. The ability to pull forward tomorrow's capability to today is the most important thing we do.

USJFCOM's Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) assists in accelerating transformation of the joint force by producing recommendations for change derived from direct observations and sound analysis of current joint operations, exercises, and experiments. This mission is accomplished by providing tailored, world-wide deployable teams of multi-disciplined operations analysts, experts in joint, combined, and interagency matters, with reach-back to greater analytical expertise and an extensive lessons learned database.

JCOA conducts robust and timely analysis of operational issues in order to provide immediate feedback to the Joint Warfighter and provide input for transformational change to joint doctrine, organizations, training, material, leader development, personnel, and facilities. In support of this mission, JCOA has maintained a permanent presence in Iraq since May 2003 and in Afghanistan since September 2004. In addition to supporting USCENTCOM for Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM, JCOA has simultaneously supported other operations or missions around the world to include Pakistan earthquake assistance, the Lebanon Noncombatant Evacuation Operation, Tsunami Relief, Haiti and Guatemala disaster relief, and Hurricane Katrina relief operations. Last year, Congress received a copy of one of JCOA's most publicly visible products, the "Iraqi Perspectives Report."

JCOA also operates the Knowledge and Information Fusion Exchange (KnIFE), aimed specifically at the current threat to our forces posed by Improvised Explosive Devices or IEDs. KnIFE is a capability to

comprehensively fuse data sources, databases, best practices, tactics, techniques, and procedures dealing with asymmetric warfare into products requested by and provided to warfighters and our coalition partners.

USJFCOM continues to work to build innovative partnerships between private industry, academia and DoD through Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs). With projects of mutual benefit to these organizations and the DoD, these agreements, enable pooling of scarce research assets, and the sharing of information to facilitate fast, effective and efficient research and development of capabilities required by the joint warfighter today and in the future. We currently have CRADAs with approximately 20 companies and several academic institutions.

Allied Command Transformation

USJFCOM values a close working relationship with NATO's Allied Command - Transformation (ACT). This relationship provides a vehicle for achieving synergy in Allied interoperability, through collaboration on a multitude of levels, to include exercises, training, and sharing of lessons learned and best practices. JFCOM and ACT have combined on numerous projects to improve training and capabilities of U.S. and Coalition forces, solve capabilities shortfalls and identify solutions for NATO forces.

The combined capabilities and synergy of effort of USJFCOM and ACT are maximized through efforts such as the upcoming Multinational Experiment 5, which is focused on the "Whole of Government" approach, and the Coalition Warrior Interoperability Demonstration (CWID), that will test the interoperability of the NATO Network Enabled Capability.

This close working relationship allows development of appropriate "teamed" solutions that not only address the problems at hand, but strengthens relationships with and the capacity of our multi-national partners. The synergy of the projects we're working on together helps to improve Allied and coalition operations.

The Way Ahead

We are balancing the war today with the imperative needs of tomorrow. In 2007, USJFCOM continues to provide capabilities that will achieve this.

- The 33 training exercises scheduled for this fiscal year, in conjunction with training exercises conducted by 22 accredited Service and Combatant Command training programs, will be facilitated by the expanded Joint Training and Experimentation Network and the interactive Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution Capability (JKDDC) portal, which will enhance joint training immeasurably
- Experiments, focused on the integration of interagency and multinational partners, will bring the joint force closer to the realization of Unified Action
- As USJFCOM gains experience with management of Individual Augmentees and In-Lieu of Units, additional force providing efficiencies will be realized with the goal of moving unit, IA, and ILO force notification from weeks to months
- Deployment of responsive joint enabling capabilities will continue to contribute unique capabilities to the global war on terror and disaster relief/humanitarian assistance operations
- The JC2 Capabilities Portfolio Management effort will mature

- Based on assessment of training and current operations, USJFCOM will continue to improve and refine Mission Rehearsal Training for OIF and OEF forces and enhance information exchange abilities to help defeat Improved Explosive Devices
- USJFCOM will continue to work with OSD, Joint Staff, USCENTCOM, USEUCOM and NATO to improve Afghan National Security Force Training
- Establishing two Standing Joint Force Headquarters Core Elements with Full Operational Capability to deploy globally by 31 December 2007 in support of a wide range of mission sets
- Enabling the sustainment of two Standing Joint Force Headquarters Core Elements with the transformational use of 240 deployable Reservists in key billets
- Increase Homeland Security capabilities, and increase training and education opportunities for the National Guard and Reserve

Conclusion

USJFCOM is dedicated to the total force of Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines and civilians who serve our country and champion freedom around the globe. We stand ready to rapidly deploy enabling and enhancing capabilities to support the Joint warfighter as well as our interagency and multi-national partners in complex operations. We bring these current capabilities to bear while keeping a watchful eye toward the continuously changing threat to develop solutions to defend our freedoms today and tomorrow. On behalf of our 1.16 million great men and women, the Combatant Commanders, and our components, we thank you for this opportunity to present the USJFCOM story.

**QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE
RECORD**

MARCH 15, 2007

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TAYLOR

Mr. TAYLOR. To what extent have the insurgent successes at destroying High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) with mines—to what extent has that migrated to Afghanistan? And this is a leading question to how many HMMWVs do you have in Afghanistan and is there any plan to transition them to some variant of the MRAP?

General CRADDOCK. Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) attacks are the most effective enemy casualty producing tactic in both Iraq and Afghanistan (AFG). IEDs are the Islamic Terrorist and Insurgent's primary Fire-Support System and have been since the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. However, migration of specific IED tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) from Iraq to AFG have been fairly low. The two primary migrations are Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs) and Suicide Bombers (Vest and Vehicle). Both of these TTPs are al Qaeda (AQ TTPs. AQ is operating in both Combined Joint Operations Areas (CJOAs). Non-AQ IED TTPs (EFPs, etc.) have not migrated to AFG (yet). Radio-controlled IED and Pressure-plate IEDs (pseudo-mines) are also common to both Combined Joint Operating Areas and have developed at the same time in each (specific TTPs for these IEDs are not common between CJOAs).

The number of M114 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV) in Afghanistan:

TOTAL	1,937
CJTF-82	1,345
TASK FORCE PHOENIX	592
CJSOTF-A	175

With regards to any plan for transitioning HMMWVs to some variant of the Mine Resistance Ambush Protective (MRAP) vehicle, the Joint Requirements Oversight Committee (JROC) determined U.S. forces in AFG will get a small number (~375) of the overall MRAP systems that are produced. Once the MRAP production schedule is finalized, will we know when AFG will get their allocation.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LARSEN

Mr. LARSEN. Can you chat a little bit about Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) and the management structure of MEADS? Do you think it needs changing? Do you think it is going to work and is working and is going to work?

General CRADDOCK. According to the Department of the Army, the MEADS program is experiencing some challenges, but no uncharacteristic delays or overruns considering it's an international cooperative development program. The Design and Development phase is U.S.-led, providing greater control of day-to-day operations as opposed to previous phases which were led by Italy and Germany. In addition, changes in key NATO MEADS Management Agency (NAMEADSMA) management personnel are envisioned with the next six months to enhance the NAMEADSMA management teams' efficiency and effectiveness.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES

Mr. FORBES. In fiscal year 2007, the Joint Forces Command took reductions of approximately \$38.4 million in Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) accounts and \$30 million in O&M account. Could you just elaborate to us what the impact of those reductions to JFCOM were?

General CRADDOCK. The impacts of budget cuts to JFCOM support to EUCOM have been primarily related to exercise support. JFCOM, as the global force provider has refocused much of their effort to add joint context to the training of CONUS-based forces. Joint National Training Capability (JNTC) is the construct/

ability to execute Live-Virtual-Constructive joint training as part of an exercise. JNTC is oriented to interoperability training for CONUS based forces. It is critical to EUCOM training and exercises in support of component certifications and AFRICA COMMAND stand-up that JNTC funds continue to support IA role players. JFCOM's eagerness to support AFRICA COMMAND is welcomed, since AFRICA COMMAND Headquarters activities will likely be all about integrated operations. Proper support for the stand-up will require increasing the training budget and accelerating the development and timing of exercises due to the aggressive timeline to full operational capability.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KLINE

Mr. KLINE. The Department of Defense is currently conducting a world-wide review to determine whether current Imminent Danger Pay (IDP) and Combat Zone Tax Exclusion (CZTE) designations are appropriate. Do you feel the current IDP and CZTE designations for the KFOR mission in Kosovo is appropriate? Do you support the continued IDP/CZTE designation for the KFOR mission?

General CRADDOCK. Yes, the current Imminent Danger Pay (IDP) and Combat Zone Tax Exclusion (CZTE) designations for the Kosovo Force (KFOR) mission in Kosovo are appropriate. Eliminating the associated special pay and benefits would have a significantly negative impact on both the existing mission and on the morale of U.S. service members performing duties in the Balkans under Operation Joint Guardian in Task Force Falcon. These service members are upholding the requirements of United Nations Resolution 1244. An analysis of the dangers of the mission in Serbia (Kosovo) demonstrate that this area is close to active hostility between the indigenous ethnic groups while uniformed service members face dangerous situations on a routine basis during vehicle checkpoint duty, cordon and search operations, and smuggling interdiction.

At this time, I do support the continued IDP/CZTE designation for the KFOR mission.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CUMMINGS

Mr. CUMMINGS. General Craddock, you noted in your testimony that "Western Europe is home to some of our oldest and closet allies" and there has been a moving trend in which, the defense budgets of these same NATO allies steadily fall to "a level that jeopardizes their ability to make long-term strategic military commitments to meet the Alliance's 21st Century ambitions." In this same vein, as our allies continue to lessen its budgets and commitments, we have seen a resulting steady flow of withdrawal plans from some of our key partners. Notably, British Prime Minister Tony Blair on Wednesday, February 21st announced his plans for the imminent withdrawal of around 1,600 of his country's troops from Iraq in the coming months. The remaining British troops will simply support training efforts for Iraqi security forces; Denmark also plans to withdraw 460 coalition troops by August of this year. a. Recognizing the decreasing allied support, can the United States European Command be able to effectively and efficiently man the vast 21 million square mile area that includes 92 diverse nations in Europe, Eurasia and Africa along side, an already overstretched system due to the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan? b. In consideration of the clear decline in allied support, what efforts are being made to ensure that other allies do not follow the lead of Denmark and Great Britain in our efforts to stabilize Afghanistan and Iraq along with, areas throughout Africa and elsewhere?

General CRADDOCK. In response to your first question, European Command (EUCOM) has felt the impact of 9/11 on the ability to support security cooperation activities. For example, the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program is one of the United States' most effective programs in Africa, providing peacekeeping training and non-lethal equipment to 19 partner nations willing to send peacekeepers to United Nations or African Union peace support operations. Prior to 9/11, EUCOM Components provided 20-40 Service members for each ACOTA training cycle; now, two contract organizations provide the majority of training. EUCOM continues to support ACOTA through supplementing contractor with a handful of military "mentors," normally sourced from Reserve and National Guard forces.

The ACOTA program also offers EUCOM the greatest opportunity to engage with Allies to support U.S. efforts in Africa. Therefore, at every opportunity, EUCOM works with Allies and friends to increase involvement in ACOTA and match European military expertise with specific ACOTA Partner Nation training requirements.

Both Belgium and the United Kingdom have sent military training teams to work along side EUCOM military “mentors” at ACOTA training events. As well, EUCOM regularly supports the Department of State ACOTA Program Office efforts to deconflict training methodologies, technical language, and organizational structures. For example, U.S. and French trainers met to consolidate military terminology and phase training modules to best meet Senegalese requirements to prepare troops for peacekeeping missions.

In addition to increasing peacekeeping capability across the African continent, building African maritime security and maritime domain awareness are priorities for EUCOM in Africa. With a continuing strain on Global Naval Force Presence, the opportunity for naval engagement is limited, with fewer ships available to support direct military-to-military contact in Africa. As a result, EUCOM intends to focus available naval assets on security cooperation aimed at building capacity and increasing maritime domain awareness in the Gulf of Guinea. Eventually, this effort will expand to include the Southwest Indian Ocean region as well.

In response to your second question, it is important to point out that while the United Kingdom announced they were going to withdraw troops from Iraq, at the same time they announced that they were going to send additional troops to ISAF. This ISAF troop augmentation will add to the approximately 800 augmentation the United Kingdom (UK) announced earlier this year. It does appear that some nations are shifting forces from Iraq and in doing so freeing up forces that can be contributed to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) mission in Afghanistan.

EUCOM representatives at all levels regularly participate in trilateral meetings with counterparts from France and the United Kingdom. Trilateral meetings address both operational missions and security cooperation activities. Through this forum, EUCOM has been able to strengthen non-combatant evacuation operations coordination and address capacity building for the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union to create, support, and sustain standby forces. In the realm of traditional security cooperation activities, in-depth information sharing facilitates best utilization of each nation’s limited resources in order to meet security cooperation requirements in Africa.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Considering that we began our efforts in Afghanistan in October of 2001, what are the long-term and short-term goals of NATO/ISAF military presence in attaining stability? What are NATO/ISAF most immediate concerns that stifle it from meeting these goals?

General CRADDOCK. In 2003 the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) assumed the mission to establish and maintain a secure environment in order to facilitate the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan. ISAF’s long term goal for this mission is to leave the Government of Afghanistan (GoA) capable of providing its own security. The short-term goal is to establish the security required to enable stability operations. Stability operations include ISAF forces conducting short term reconstruction projects to create the conditions where the citizens of Afghanistan quickly recognize the benefits of maintaining a peaceful environment. With a stable environment, Afghan reconstruction and development can be conducted more effectively.

Critical to ISAF achieving its long term objective is building a trained and capable Afghan National Army (ANA). Therefore, as ISAF continues its mission, it’s most immediate concern is having adequate NATO forces and equipment to maintain security as well as to train, equip and mentor the ANA.

Of equal concern to NATO is ISAF’s inability to stem the flow of Taliban and other opposing militant forces (OMF) across the Pakistan border. As long as a safe haven exists for OMF in Pakistan, providing long term security in the southern and eastern regions of Afghanistan remains problematic.

Mr. CUMMINGS. You stated in your submitted testimony that “Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction are among the United States European Command Area of Responsibility (EUCOM AOR) highest priorities” since the majority of the world’s nuclear powers are located in this area. In addition, you also noted that “on the periphery of the EUCOM AOR is Iran’s continued nuclear program” which, is clearly a risk to U.S., NATO and partner interests. What further efforts in the Proliferation Security Initiative are being coordinated to protect the U.S. and our NATO partners from these risks?

General CRADDOCK. United States European Command (EUCOM) continues to support on-going Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) exercise planning and execution. We recently participated in Exercise ANATOLIAN SUN. This exercise, led by Turkey, involved U.S. Navy ships working in conjunction with other Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) participating nations and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners, to conduct interdiction training in the Mediterranean. EUCOM also coordinated other U.S. Interagency activities with their counterparts

in the government of Turkey. Planning is underway for Exercise EXPLORING HYPERION, a United Kingdom led PSI exercise focused on maritime interdiction planned for the Fall of 2007. We are in discussions with several other PSI nations to attend their upcoming exercises as either participants or observers. We participate in PSI Operational Experts Group (OEG) planning and coordination conferences on a quarterly basis. EUCOM continues to assist the Department of State in reaching out to those nations in our AOR who have not yet joined the PSI in order to encourage them to sign on to this valuable initiative. Our ultimate goal is to encourage other countries to develop their own Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) interdiction capabilities and to agree to work together in support of the goal of preventing WMD proliferation.

There have been successful interdictions of related WMD materials and technologies in EUCOM's Area of Responsibility. PSI provides a useful framework to further develop and enhance partner nation interdiction and counter proliferation capabilities. Because WMD proliferation will continue to be a global challenge that requires a coordinated global approach, we view PSI as a critical component of our overall Combating WMD efforts.

In addition to PSI, we participate in the International Counter Proliferation Program, Cooperative Threat Reduction, Biological Weapons Proliferation Prevention Initiative, WMD Proliferation Prevention Initiative, Caspian Guard and Black Sea Initiatives, and Operation Active Endeavor. These programs help support the goals of counter proliferation in the United States European Command Area of Responsibility (EUCOM AOR).

Through all these programs and initiatives, EUCOM, in support of broader U.S. government efforts and in cooperation with our partners and allies, is actively working to secure WMD stockpiles in the Area of Responsibility; to facilitate the destruction of WMD stockpiles; to deny terrorists access to WMD weapons, materials, and technologies; and to prevent the transfer of WMD weapons, materials, and technologies to state and non-state actors of concern.

Mr. CUMMINGS. On March 11th, a report in the New York Times and the French Press illustrated the ongoing problem of drug trafficking in Afghanistan. Specifically, the article detailed an Afghan man who was arrested at the central post office in Kabul when he tried to mail a coat to London. Unfortunately, the lining of this coat was filled to capacity with eight pounds of heroin. Given that NATO/ISAF officers traditionally concentrate their efforts in combating opium production and trafficking, what efforts are being made to counter other narcotics trafficking? In addition, how are our NATO allies assisting us in these efforts?

General CRADDOCK. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) efforts relative to countering the illegal narcotics trade in Afghanistan are limited to a supporting role to the Government of Afghanistan (GoA) and other sanctioned counter narcotics (CN) organizations operating in Afghanistan. NATO's authorized the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) to provide logistical support to the international communities CN agencies, intelligence support, information campaign support, and in extremis security support to the GoA and other international organizations as they conduct CN operations. ISAF forces cannot directly participate in the seizure of narcotics or the apprehension of suspected narcotics traffickers unless they are encountered incidental to the conduct of other routine military operations.

The GoA is responsible for the design and execution of CN operations within their border. The GoA's Ministry for Counter Narcotics develops policy with regard to CN and the Ministry of the Interior is responsible for the execution and enforcement of CN policies. NATO Alliance nations support to Afghan CN efforts is provided in varying direct and indirect means. The United Kingdom is the G8 nation lead for CN operations in Afghanistan, tasked with providing support to the GoA with regard to the policy development, planning, resourcing, and execution of CN operations. The U.S. and UK provide alternative livelihood support to former opium poppy farmers. The Italian Government is the lead G8 nation working judicial reform, which is an essential element in countering the illicit narcotics trade. The German Government serves as the lead nation for the development of the Afghan police force. Additionally, many Alliance nations have bilateral agreements with the GoA which directly support CN efforts.

Mr. CUMMINGS. As of the October 16th the Department of Defense announced its plan to resume mandatory anthrax vaccination after a nearly two-year hiatus. Since that time, our service members have been required to be injected with this potentially debilitating and deadly vaccine. More recently, I was made aware that many of our veterans have made complaints to their superior officers in the Army, Air Force and National Guard concerning how this understudied vaccine has caused burns, extreme bodily pain that limits or totally defrauds them of mobility, paralysis

or their death. a. General Craddock, what steps have been made to conduct further tests to ensure that this vaccine really is safe and effective? b. Considering that the U.S. appears to be the only nation in the world that forces its military personnel to take the anthrax vaccine, how concerned should we be about the threat of anthrax being used as a form of terrorism? c. These same service members that complained of the debilitating side effects of the anthrax vaccination also, noted the lack of health benefits made available to them. One particular Veteran of the Army suffers from extensive mobility problems as a result of his vaccination. Specifically, he went from scoring merits of physical achievement in his training to not being able to walk down the hallways of Rayburn without the help of a cane. This veteran further noted that the Army rated him at 20% which, resulted in him receiving a mere \$221.00 in benefits in order to support himself, his children and disabled wife. i. What measures are being taken to ensure that our service members are being supplied with adequate healthcare along with, a fair and effectively physical evaluation in order to determine their health benefits? ii. What measures are currently in place for individuals to appeal the physical evaluation results particularly, for our men and women in Iraq and Afghanistan?

General CRADDOCK. Congressman Cummings, since the answer to this question is outside the scope of day-to-day operations of United States European Command (EUCOM) and Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), I would like to refer you to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs for a response to this question.

Mr. CUMMINGS. General Craddock, you noted in your submitted testimony that "refugees from the conflict in the Darfur region of Sudan have created a humanitarian catastrophe. In many areas of Central Africa, such as the vast interior of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the northern sections of Chad, there is very little military or police presence, and often no central government influence. These problems, aggravated by difficult terrain and a lack of infrastructure, have allowed smuggling and conflict to flourish." Indeed, as of January 2007, approximately two million displaced people live in camps in Darfur and at least 232,000 people have fled to neighboring Chad, where they live in refugee camps. In addition to the people displaced by the conflict, at least 2 million other people are considered "conflict-affected" by the UN and many need some form of food assistance because the conflict has damaged the local economy, markets, and trade in Darfur. a. How effective has the EUCOM's contribution been to date in the efforts to stabilize and protect the people of Darfur? b. What efforts have been made to train African troops to date that have received training under the EUCOM initiative in securing this region? c. Overall, in assisting in the stabilization of the vast continent of Africa, how costly do you believe these efforts will be? In addition, how will our allies assist us in bearing the burden?

General CRADDOCK. In response to your first question, United States European Command's (USEUCOM's) contribution is only a part of the overall U.S. effort for Darfur and includes actions we have been directed to do in support of U.S. policy.

EUCOM has supported the African Union Mission in Sudan since 2004 by providing airlift support twice per year to rotate the three Rwandan Battalion peacekeeping contingents to/from Darfur as part of, I should emphasize, an overall North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led support effort to transport peacekeeping forces into Darfur. Previous EUCOM support has included the provision of airlift with both military aircraft and contracted commercial carriers.

EUCOM provided one officer to support the U.S. delegation to the Darfur Peace Agreement negotiations. This officer was on hand at the 5 May 06 signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement by the Government of Sudan and one of the rebel factions. EUCOM subsequently sent a team of three officers for 90 days to the African Union Mission in Sudan headquarters in Al Fashir, Sudan, with the duty of assisting the African Union (AU) with the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement. As of today, implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement remains incomplete because of the continually deteriorating political and security situation.

EUCOM provided military planner support to the United Nations and the Joint Staff in February and March 2006 to develop military options to support the African Union Mission in Sudan. At this point, options are limited by the reluctance of the Government of Sudan to permit international Western elements into Darfur.

In response to your second question, EUCOM actively supports the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI). GPOI is a Department of State program, planned in consultation with and implemented by Department of Defense (DoD) to train and equip peacekeepers. In Africa, GPOI funds supplement the existing Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program to provide training, equipment, and logistical capability to meet United Nations peace operations standards. The bulk of GPOI activities in EUCOM are within the framework of ACOTA,

which assists 19 ACOTA “partner countries” in developing the ability to participate in peace support operations.

In the coming months, the ACOTA program will provide multilateral battalion and brigade-level training for African sub-regional organizations. It will also increase training support to the AU staff and forces in joint operations. At the tactical level, USEUCOM will continue to increase its participation in the ACOTA program, providing military mentors and advisors to the Department of State contractor-led training effort, wherever possible. ACOTA remains a crucial African engagement program, directly supporting U.S. national objectives of promoting stability, democratization, and military professionalism in Africa. GPOI funding sustains African peacekeeping forces to enable these units to address the multiple crises on the African continent.

In response to your third question, because the challenges in Africa are not confined to a single nation, EUCOM takes a regional approach at analyzing this strategic environment. On the Continent of Africa, we face a complex environment with enormous challenge and potential. While Africa is rich in both human potential and mineral resources, it has historically struggled with relatively unstable governments, internal political strife, and economic problems. Many states remain fragile due to a variety of factors, including corruption, endemic and pandemic health problems, historical ethnic animosities, and endemic poverty. Security Cooperation (SC) programs remain the cornerstone of our Strategy of Active Security to promote common security, which ultimately supports national objectives in the global war on terror (GWOT). Our SC programs represent a proactive approach to building partnership capacity with the aim of enabling emerging democracies to defend their homelands, address and reduce regional conflicts, defeat terrorist extremists, develop common economic and security interests, and respond to emerging crises. From airborne training to non-lethal weapons education, EUCOM personnel and facilities provide practical and state of the art training. Assisting our allies and partners in developing their capabilities to conduct effective peacekeeping and contingency operations with well-trained, disciplined forces helps mitigate the conditions that lead to conflict, prepares the way for success, and reduces the potential burden of U.S. involvement.

EUCOM Security Cooperation efforts require consistent, predictable investment in order to impact the multitude of strategic, security, economic, and political challenges we face.

We recognize that many of the challenges in Africa’s stability exceed the capacity of any one nation to resolve and that today’s threats require a comprehensive approach by the international community, involving a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments. EUCOM’s efforts are coordinated and complementary with a broad range of national, international and regional actors.

Mr. CUMMINGS. General Smith, earlier I addressed a question to General Craddock (see question 1 for General Craddock) involving the steady downstream of long-term strategic military commitments and defense budgets of our allies that has stifled the ability to meet our 21st Century ambitions. Recognizing the need of our allies to ‘transform’ its capabilities in order to meet the ever growing challenges of modern security issues, a. What measures are being taken to ensure our allies are properly adapting to this continually changing environment? b. How differentiated are these approaches to “transformation” amongst our allies?

General SMITH. a. NATO’s ongoing transformation reflects cultural and institutional change on a grand scale as the Alliance and member nations explore and adopt new capabilities that will enhance their ability to meet the challenges of today and the future in a new and uncertain strategic environment. The process encompasses reorganization and re-equipping and introduces innovative ways of looking at challenges through the lens of capabilities. It is more than new technology; transformation includes the need to embed a culture of innovation and managed risk into our thinking. It is driven ever forward by the increasing requirement for NATO’s forces to be multinational and joint by design, deployable wherever and whenever needed and coherently interoperable in thought and action.

— NATO created Allied Command Transformation (ACT) as the Alliance’s dedicated instrument to co-ordinate, harmonize and pursue the process of transformation. NATO has seven transformation focus areas: Information Superiority, NATO Network Enabled Capability (NNEC), Effective Engagement, Joint Maneuver, Enhanced Civil-Military Co-operation, Expeditionary Operations and Integrated Logistics. As an example, NNEC seeks to enhance capabilities by employing Information Age to facilitate the delivery of military effects with unparalleled speed and accuracy. It will allow Nation’s forces to network together and the Allied Commander to conduct operations with real time information, confident in his situational awareness and coordination with others.

— In regard to output, NATO has already made considerable impact. ACT has provided several Member Nations with detailed and comprehensive assessments of their national defense programs, and has incorporated experiments into various NRF exercises and increased experimentation at the political/military level with plans to address the challenge of multinational and interagency engagement. Within the research and technology field, ACT is moving forward to develop concepts for the employment of Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUV) and Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR) technologies. Within Command and Control (C2), ACT delivered a NATO Network-Enabled Capability Foundation Document that provided an overarching concept and a roadmap for delivery of near-term initiatives, while progress continues on the development of a coherent and highly adaptive C2 capability for the NRF that will encompass the strategic environment. In resources and logistics, ACT is engaged in Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) experiments to provide NATO commanders with capabilities to track the flow of supplies between support facilities in Europe to 19 remote operational areas such as Afghanistan. ACT's delivery of a new multinational logistics concept has been agreed to by the Nations. ACT personnel are in Iraq providing support to the training of Iraqi Security Force personnel as well as providing support to their training at the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany. Likewise, ACT also provides specialized training to NATO's deployable Joint Task Force staffs in preparation for Afghanistan operations.

— A primary vehicle for evaluating new concepts and capability improvements is the NATO Response Force (NRF). A highly trained and technologically advanced operational military force, the NRF is ideally suited to identify new capabilities and concepts, through lessons learned, and then serve as a test-bed for their analysis. The NRF can deploy as a stand-alone force for Article 5 (collective Defence) or non-Article 5 crisis response operations such as evacuation operations, support disaster consequence management (including chemical biological, radiological and nuclear events), humanitarian crisis situations and counter terrorism operations; it can deploy as an initial entry force facilitating the arrival of larger follow-up forces; or it can deploy as a demonstrative force to show NATO's determination and solidarity to deter crises (quick response operations to support diplomacy as required). I think the key point here is the word "deploy," an example of the change that has occurred within NATO since the end of the Cold War, when the 16 nations of the Alliance were focused on fighting in place from well defended, fixed bases.

— I think the most important example that should assure us that the Alliance is adapting to a continually changing environment is its support of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.

— Ten of the NATO and PfP nations have formal bilateral agreements with USJFCOM that establish liaison officers across the Command to collaborate on efforts in support of greater interoperability and transformation. Overall, there are 47 nations (NATO, PfP and others) with an opportunity to interact with JFCOM in some manner, either as part of additional duties while assigned to other organizations in the local area, or fully integrated within the JFCOM structure. They are partners in training and experimentation and work together to find common areas for improving the quality of their armed forces. We had over 25 Ministers of Defense and Chiefs of Defense visit both Norfolk last year—this shows the importance individual countries place on what is happening with USJFCOM and ACT. We believe these efforts provide the synergy needed to ensure our Allies understand requirements for transformation.

b. There are many different approaches to transformation within NATO—there is not one way or one path. This is what has made NATO so enduring. The Cold War capabilities of the United States were expeditionary by nature—the battleground was going to be Europe and U.S. was geographically separated. Our incredible logistic capabilities were born during the throes of the Second World War, and were built up over the next 50 years—at a significant investment cost. Our Western European Allies did not have this capability. They did not require an expeditionary culture, but they are now developing one with some innovative transformation programs. It's also important to note that NATO is bigger, having gained new members from Eastern Europe that did not have common experiences with the Alliance during its evolution in the last half of the last century. It is a cultural shift for the entire Alliance—that will require development over time, but I think our partners have made much progress.

— NATO is not just the United States and Europe—it's the United States and 25 other nations, with the U.S. and Canada the only ones not in Europe. The unique challenge for NATO's transformation is that it is attempting this 'revolution' in an Alliance of 26 sovereign Nations. Addressing different military cultures, different ca-

pability starting points, different geographical and historical perspectives, unique national security issues and domestic law and budgetary constraints are not subjects for the faint-hearted. The agreed intent among all the Member Nations to invest in more agile forces, to collaborate widely in the requirements and procurement process, to share information and best business practices openly, will result in greater efficiencies on an Alliance-wide scale. Regular interaction between Nations' defense and acquisition planners and NATO's transformation organization will help ensure streamlined and targeted military infrastructures, forces and processes.

— Across the Alliance, we are seeing different levels of effort and different approaches to change, all dependent on each nation's internal budgets, economies, politics, and capabilities. In the long term NATO members, we're seeing a focus on shifting to capabilities-based approach to defense planning and acquisition reform. Modernization of existing equipment is also an area of considerable effort. This is critical to achieve the greater interoperability that is required on the missions that NATO is involved in now—missions that require much political commitment but a leaner and more agile fighting force able to bolt on to infrastructure provided by other nations or for other nations. Creative solutions, such as partnering together to create a strategic airlift capability, are also being developed, thus allowing the Nations to expand their contributions to Coalition forces worldwide. The newer members of NATO face a different set of problems to achieve transformation, yet many times we find them the most eager for change. These nations are struggling to move from a heavy land-based force to a more mobile and flexible professional force. This capability requires organic medical, mobility, security, and logistic elements than they've had in the past. Additionally, they must transform their overall military culture away from Soviet era doctrine, training, and tactics to NATO standards and practices that are consistent with our international security assistance policies and, ultimately, the United States' national security policy.

— One of the best catalysts to NATO transformation is having Allied Command Transformation and Joint Forces Command collocated in Norfolk, Virginia, with one person in command of both. Because of this, we are able to leverage capabilities across both commands to develop best practices. JFCOM's experimental and training infrastructures provide benefit not only to U.S. forces, but NATO Allies and other multinational partners, in order to develop solutions to problems that confront the international community. Additionally, we have strong linkages between commands within JFCOM—the Joint Warfighting Center, Joint National Training Capability, and Joint Center for Operational Analysis and Lessons Learned—with like functions in ACT such as the Joint Warfare Center in Norway the Joint Force Training Center in Poland, and the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Center in Portugal.

