

[H.A.S.C. No. 110-62]

**ORGANIZING THE ROLES, MISSIONS, AND
REQUIREMENTS OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE**

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HEARING HELD
JUNE 20, 2007



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

38-834

WASHINGTON : 2008

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina	DUNCAN HUNTER, California
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas	JIM SEXTON, New Jersey
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi	JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii	TERRY EVERETT, Alabama
MARTY MEEHAN, Massachusetts	ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
SILVESTRE REYES, Texas	HOWARD P. "BUCK" McKEON, California
VIC SNYDER, Arkansas	MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
ADAM SMITH, Washington	WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California	ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina
MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina	KEN CALVERT, California
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California	JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia
ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania	W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey	J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California	JEFF MILLER, Florida
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island	JOE WILSON, South Carolina
RICK LARSEN, Washington	FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey
JIM COOPER, Tennessee	TOM COLE, Oklahoma
JIM MARSHALL, Georgia	ROB BISHOP, Utah
MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam	MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
MARK UDALL, Colorado	JOHN KLINE, Minnesota
DAN BOREN, Oklahoma	CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan
BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana	PHIL GINGREY, Georgia
NANCY BOYDA, Kansas	MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
PATRICK MURPHY, Pennsylvania	TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
HANK JOHNSON, Georgia	THELMA DRAKE, Virginia
CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire	CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut	MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa	GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky
KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND, New York	
JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania	
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona	
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland	
KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida	
KATHY CASTOR, Florida	

ERIN C. CONATON, *Staff Director*

ANDREW HUNTER, *Professional Staff Member*

JENNESS SIMLER, *Professional Staff Member*

MARGEE MECKSTROTH, *Staff Assistant*

CONTENTS

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS

2008

	Page
HEARING:	
Wednesday, June 20, 2007, Organizing the Roles, Missions, and Requirements of the Department of Defense	1
APPENDIX:	
Wednesday, June 20, 2007	55

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 20, 2007

ORGANIZING THE ROLES, MISSIONS, AND REQUIREMENTS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California, Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services	3
Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services	1

WITNESSES

Hamre, Dr. John J., President and CEO, Center for Strategic and International Studies	4
Krepinevich, Dr. Andrew F., President, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments	8

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS:	
Hunter, Hon. Duncan	59
Hamre, Dr. John J.	65
Krepinevich, Dr. Andrew F.	70
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:	
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), List of Government Funded Contracts/Grants 10/01/03 - Present	89
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:	
Mr. Skelton	97

ORGANIZING THE ROLES, MISSIONS, AND REQUIREMENTS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, June 20, 2007.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. Ladies and gentlemen, welcome to today's hearing, which is on organizing the roles and missions and the requirements of the Department of Defense.

Before we start, I wish to introduce a very special group that is with us from Afghanistan. And I would like to call their names, and if I may ask them to stand.

First Noorulhaq Olumi, the Chair of the Defense Committee; Zalmai Mujadidi, the Chair of the National and Domestic Security Committee; Jamil Karzia, a Pashtun member of the National and Domestic Security Committee; Mohammad Almas, a member of the National and Domestic Security Committee; and Helaluddin Helal, a member of the National and Domestic Security Committee.

We are also pleased to welcome Ambassador Jawad, who is with us today. Ambassador, thank you. We certainly appreciate you being with us. Several of us, on a bipartisan basis, had the opportunity to visit with you, and it was very, very helpful, and we do appreciate your thoughts and your suggestions; most of all, your friendship.

So thank you again for being with us.

Today we have two very distinguished witnesses to discuss this all-important and yet in all respects, as has been in the past, at least up through 1958, a controversial issue: Dr. John Hamre, president of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, former Deputy Secretary of Defense; Dr. Andrew Krepinevich, president of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and officer of the United States Army, retired.

You two gentlemen were called to testify because you have given deep study through the years to some of the most important issues facing the Department of Defense.

Today's topic is a very crucial one. It has been a topic of intense debate, and since the Key West agreement—my staff says 1948, I say 1947, you will have to clarify that—but today's definition of the roles and missions is largely the same as the agreement reached

then and as modified in 1953 and then again in 1958, but nothing, nothing has been done under those roles and missions since 1958.

While the operational part of the military has been made fully joint thanks to the Congress of the United States, the training and equipment side remains fragmented and stovepiped, and our committee adopted significant and far-reaching legislative recommendations of roles and missions and requirements in our recent defense act, passed and sent to the Senate. These recommendations were developed on a bipartisan basis and reflect a deep commitment on the part of our committee to reform and modernize that Department.

We require the Secretary of Defense to review the rules and missions of the Department every four years in the down time between the Quadrennial Defense Reviews. We recommend that the Secretary determine the core competencies agencies and military services and defense agencies currently offer in fulfilling these missions; ensure that they develop the core competencies that are currently lacking; and generate some capabilities that are not related to core competencies.

Now, this is going to be a tough job for them that has to be done, and that is why your testimony today is so important.

The committee's recommendations would also reform the requirement process to organize it according to the core mission areas identified by the Secretary; require that the requirement process be informed by realistic estimates of the resources available. The bill requires the Department to present its budget by mission area in addition to the traditional presentation by appropriation. It requires combat commanders to engage directly, I think for the first time, in planning for future capabilities.

I have reviewed your written statements, gentlemen. I am struck by the fact that both of you indicate there are serious and significant deficiencies in the way the Department of Defense determines its missions, how it organizes itself, how it equips itself. Both of you suggest the Department is not adequately preparing themselves for the nontraditional missions that are likely to be increasingly relevant in today's security environment.

Both of you also suggest in your statements that the requirements process is dominated by service interests sometimes to the detriment of the warfighter. In these judgments, I believe we are all in consensus. I know, however, that you propose some additions and alternative recommendations for our bill.

And I think we know that our bill in that regard is not perfect, but we did address it, and the fact that we did address it for the first time since 1958 is significant. And you are here to help us—we still, of course, have conference with the Senate, and I am not sure if the Senate will even touch the issue. I just have no knowledge of that whatsoever, which means that the burden will be on this committee to carry forward this issue, and that is why your testimony, gentlemen, is so important.

The Ranking Member, my good friend, Duncan Hunter.

**STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON
ARMED SERVICES**

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding this hearing this morning. I think that this reflects on your understanding of military history and your being the guardian of our military education facilities, and I think your understanding that we are involved in nontraditional wars right now. And sometimes it is tough to overlay the structure of the services over these new challenges that we have and to determine where jointness applies, and where new roles and missions need to be taken up or need to be sorted out, and where just enormous flexibility needs to be embedded in the services. So thanks for having this hearing.

And I also welcome our guests and welcome our gentlemen who are on this panel who have contributed so much to national defense. So to Dr. Hamre, you have done a loyal yeoman's work for this country and for this committee for many years, and we sure appreciate you.

And, Dr. Krepinevich, thank you for your contributions to our country. You gentlemen have great judgment, and you have shared it with us over many, many years on important issues. This is one of those issues.

Although the Department of Defense, as it is currently organized, has been in existence since 1947, we have continued to struggle with the appropriate roles and missions of the Department and what capabilities each of our military services should have in order to fulfill those roles and missions. And since the end of the Cold War, it has become apparent that the Department must respond to both the changes in the geopolitical climate and to the adaptation of modern technology which poses what you might call irregular and disruptive threats.

And these changes require no less than a complete review of the missions of the Department of Defense and reevaluation of the capabilities needed to deliver desired effects.

I might say on that point the fact we are in a shooting war in two major theaters and smaller contingencies around the world right now I think has given us an urgency in terms of sorting out roles and missions, one that doesn't usually attend peacetime eras, but in light of the fact that we are executing, if you will, new roles and missions every day as a matter of necessity in the warfighting theaters, I think it is instructive to us in many areas and hopefully to you as well.

I want to get—I don't want to put my entire statement—read my entire statement, Mr. Chairman. I ask unanimous consent that it be put into the record and just say this before we get started.

It looks to me like there is going to be three key factors that we are going to have to look at carefully that attend this issue. One is jointness; of course, the ability to do things together, work together. I think we have never had probably more jointness than we have right now; but also flexibility, and that means the ability of a military leader to step beyond the perimeters that have been established by doctrine and by schooling and by the—and by regulations and undertake two new missions, and be able to do a couple of things to step out of his box, his or her box, and move into new

areas, and also to work with his troubled service in such a way that the new mission is undertaken in a cooperative way with maximum effect. And, last, I think that creativity is going to be an important element now and a necessary element in the leadership of our officers.

It is—because we are going to have—we are going to have missions which aren't susceptible to easy categorization, which are going to require lots of new thinking, and to some degree there may be some push-back from the services as it appears that one service is trespassing on something that they think is in their traditional jurisdiction, if you will. And so this is going to be a time when people that are willing to take risks in the officers corps are going to need to step to the fore. And everything can't be laid out in terms of prescribed regulations. Basically the blueprint can't be perfectly designed by us, nor can it be perfectly designed by Pentagon leadership. This is going to be a time when people take risks and are held accountable to some degree for risk taking. I think it is going to be a time for boldness in our military leadership.

Having said those few words, I look forward to listening to these two gentlemen who I think represent the finest, very finest, representation of a great pool of individuals who have lots of experience, who have shared their wisdom with us over many years to take on this challenge.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hunter.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hunter can be found in the Appendix on page 59.]

The CHAIRMAN. My good staff tells me that the Key West agreement regarding roles and missions which was urged by President Harry Truman actually was dated 1948, and I was wrong on that by one year, but I was right in the initial urging by the then President. So this is really important. This is very important. That is why we are here.

Mr. Hamre.

Dr. HAMRE. I was a staffer for ten years, and I never made the mistake of correcting my Chairman in a public meeting. So I—forgive me, Andrew.

Thank you for inviting me to.

Mr. SPRATT. Dr. Hamre, welcome to the people's House.

**STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN J. HAMRE, PRESIDENT AND CEO,
CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES**

Dr. HAMRE. And let me just begin by saying how grateful I am that all of you are serving in this role and holding this hearing. I think it is crucial.

You know, I have worked for the Congress for 17 years before I went to the executive branch, and I honestly believe that our Congress is the crown jewel of American democracy. When you think of the Nation, you think of the President; but when you say "we, the people," you think about the Congress. And I think it is that crucial balance in America that has been so important, and it has made this such a glorious democracy. So I thank you all for serving with us in this and being the representatives of the people on these very big issues.

Sir, I prepared a written statement, but I think I made a mistake. I think I drafted that statement too narrowly concerning the provisions that were in your bill. I am happy to talk about them, but you framed this hearing in a much larger way today, and so if you would permit me to put the statement in the record, and could I make a few general observations and maybe use that as a jumping-off point for what I hope would be a useful conversation.

I was on the staff of the Senate Armed Services Committee when we worked on the Senate side of Goldwater-Nichols, and I remember Bill Nichols, a great man, having led this committee in leading for what it brought to the table for this really remarkable legislation. And it did transform the Defense Department in very positive ways.

There were three crucial things that were in Goldwater-Nichols. The first was it raised the importance and prominence of the Chairman and the Vice Chairman and the Joint staff.

The second thing is it raised in prominence the Unified Combatant Commanders—we used to call them Commanders in Chief (CINCs)—but the Combatant Commanders, and it gave them a much stronger voice inside DOD deliberations.

And the third thing it did was it required—it stipulated that no one could become an admiral or general until you had joint duty, you had served in a joint command. That was really the foundation of Goldwater-Nichols, and it really transformed the Department.

Now, I think it is extremely important to understand what this did. What that—what Goldwater-Nichols did was to clean up and give much more of a balance to what I call the supply and demand equation in the Department. You need advocates of supply, and you need advocates of demand. And we had very weak voices for demand because back then the people who were the supply guys, the chiefs of the military departments, were also kind of in charge of demand, and we were not getting a good balance between the two.

So we raised up and lifted up the voices that demand combat services and capabilities, and we balance it against the very strong, powerful forces of supply in the Department, and it is a good compromise. It is a very good formula.

And I think this clarity of supply and demand, I would ask you to keep it in mind as you are thinking about it. We have some problems, the way it is structured, and I will come back to it in just a moment.

Now, I would say that the central problem in the Department today, and I am not making—I will only comment on experiences that I had when I was the Deputy Secretary. I am not commenting on how it has operated in the last six years. I have not been there. I would ask you to think about the concept of friction. You know, there is good friction, and there is bad friction. Good friction is congressional oversight. I mean, you don't want to move too fast. You want oversight, and that is good friction, and you want good friction so that when decisions are coming up to the Secretary, you really do have a point of view that has been vetted, you know, in a cross-sectional way so that you really do have a good feel for the implications. You want good friction.

We have a lot of bad friction in the Defense Department. We have got a lot of competition which is really more about turf than

we do about responsibility. And I think what I would ask you to think about when you are designing this legislation is that you think about properly structuring the good friction that you want, the oversight that you want and that you need, and minimizing the bad friction, and we have got a lot of it.

Now, if it is in that regard, may I just say I spent a fair amount of time when I was in the Senate working on the Armed Services Committee on rules and missions, and I had never worked in the Department before I had done it. I had spent then seven and a half years working in the Department, and I will honestly tell you that a rules and missions initiative really sets off a lot of friction in the Department, and I think it works against a very important goal that I know you all have, which is to improve jointness.

We want our services to fight in an integrated way better, but when you force people to fight over rules and missions, it forces them into a parochial posture. They fall back on things that they feel they have to do for the good of their service rather than things they need to do for the good functioning of the whole Department in a joint way.

So I would ask you to think very carefully about how you want to press this issue of demanding a rules and missions review, because I do think it probably cuts against the grain when you want to promote better jointness.

Second issue I would ask you to think about, our form of government holds—when I was the Deputy Secretary of Defense, I was responsible to the American people through the President and through the Secretary. And everybody in the Department is responsible to the American people through two chains: through the President when you are appointed, and to you, the Congress, representing the people. Everybody. And that goes down to the buck private.

That chain of command has one central person who is the most important person who is accountable to you, and the person—and that is the Secretary of Defense, and I would ask you to be careful not to undermine the Secretary of Defense when you design some of the directions that we are talking about here.

Now, I know we have had a period where we have had some rough edges between the Department and the Secretary in the last several years. I think we have a superb Secretary of Defense. Bob Gates is a superb man. You do not want to—you want to have as much clarity in what comes to the Secretary so that when he makes a decision, he is accountable for it. But you don't want to precook what it is that he designed by having things decided at lower levels. The Secretary has to be accountable. The Secretary has to have that authority.

Now let me speak to one of the concerns that I have, and that is it is about the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, the JROC. The JROC is meant to be a place in the Pentagon where we at the very senior level decide what do we need as a requirement to fight together in the future. It should be largely populated by people who are responsible for demand, not supply. But if you look at the competition of the JROC, it is all of the supply side of the equation and not the demand side of the equation. It is the Vice Chiefs of the services who are in the business of supplying goods, services and

equipment. It is not the CINCs or the Combatant Commanders who really are the ones who say, here is what I need now, here is what I think we are going to need in the future.

So we have a problem with the way the JROC is structured today. It is too much oriented around—it is a demand function that is run by supply people. That is a problem, and we should work on that.

Now, what I don't think is a good idea is to put more supply and demand inside JROC, because that is basically deciding issues before the Secretary decides them, and ultimately you are holding the Secretary accountable; you are not holding the JROC accountable. You have to let the Secretary have the full authority to decide and be responsible for what he decides. So I would ask you to look at that provision. I think it is a very important one.

I understand exactly what you are trying to do. You are trying to strengthen the good friction, the oversight that we need, and minimize the bad friction, and I think that is exactly the right spirit to have, and I would ask you to think about how you have done it in the legislation.

If I could say a word about core competencies, and, again, I understand very much what you are after. You are trying to make sure that we focus on what it is going to take to win wars not just today, but in the future. But if you start with the premise you identify core competencies, I would argue that is what the services do well already. I mean, nobody does night ops off of an aircraft carrier better than the United States Navy. That is a core competency. They do that exceptionally well. But what we don't do well are noncore competencies, things that are perceived to be noncore competencies.

But if you start by directing people to work on core competencies, you probably are keeping them from looking at the big problem, which are the things that aren't core, and we should probably think about working that legislation so it pushes us in that direction.

The CHAIRMAN. For instance?

Dr. HAMRE. For example, postconflict reconstruction. We are not good—we were very good at winning wars. We are not very good at building functioning societies after wars, and it is unclear when that is a military responsibility and when that is a civilian responsibility, and we need to work on that. Obviously we are responsible, DOD, we are responsible for the security environment, but we haven't been focusing on that like we should have.

Now, you can say maybe that is a core competency now, but it wasn't seen as a core competency six years ago.

So I would ask you to think about, in a slightly different way, think about what are the key missions you think we are going to have to undertake as a Nation and whether or not we are addressing them properly, but if you start by saying, I want you, DOD, to focus on core competencies, you are probably going to get them to focus on things that aren't problems and not look at the things that are problems.

Finally, could I say a word about the provision you have in your bill that calls for creating an under secretary for management? I like the idea of having an under secretary for management. Now let me explain what I think is the problem.

Again, I think it is very important to keep a clean distinction between staff and line. You know, in a corporation you will have a staff headquarters at the corporate headquarters, and then you will have line responsibilities, line managers.

In the Defense Department, our line managers, there are three line managers: the Combatant Commanders, because they are out fighting a war. It is our service chiefs and service secretaries; they are running the departments. And then it is the defense agencies.

The defense agencies do not have good management oversight. The defense agencies all report to the Secretary of Defense through an assistant secretary, and the assistant secretaries are basically staff guys. Those are staff functions. Those are not line operations.

It would be very good to create an under secretary for management and have that under secretary for management be responsible for the defense agencies and for the purple activities that fall through the cracks of the Department, and we have a lot of those.

So I think it is a very important initiative. I support what you are recommending. I think the way it is currently in the bill, it is a little confusing whether you have in mind a line function or a staff function. And I think you should take a look at that. I personally think you need line management, and I think it would be good to have an under secretary who has the same responsibilities to the defense agencies that the Secretary for the Air Force has for the Air Force or the Secretary for the Army does for the Army. I think that would be a very good thing to do, and I would encourage that. And I would be delighted to work with you and the staff, Mr. Chairman, if you want to refine that idea if you think it is worth pursuing.

Let me conclude to say thank you. This really is important work. Too often hearings are held about the little issues, the daily issues. They are not held about the structural issues. And this is a matter of a hearing on structural importance, and I think it is really terrific that you are taking this opportunity to lead the American people this way.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Hamre, thank you for your excellent testimony and recommendations.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Hamre can be found in the Appendix on page 65.]

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Krepinevich, welcome.

**STATEMENT OF DR. ANDREW F. KREPINEVICH, PRESIDENT,
CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS**

Dr. KREPINEVICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As always it is an honor to appear before you in this committee.

I share your concerns regarding the need for analysis of military service roles and missions, also core competencies and capabilities. I think we all share a concern that despite the decade-old rhetoric about the need for transformation, the new threats, the new challenges that we see emerging and existing, and the new missions that are clearly there, missions that certainly weren't there in 1948, I guess it was, when the Key West agreement was arrived at, missions like layered homeland defense against nontraditional attack by weapons of mass destruction, or locating and neutralizing

loose nuclear weapons, undersea commerce defense, defeating modern insurgency, cyberdefense, power projection against rogue states armed with nuclear weapons, these sorts of missions for the most part didn't exist 20 years ago, let alone 60 years ago, and yet in many ways we have been remarkably slow to adapt.

In fact, when you talk about transformation, our effort seems to have been primarily reactive as opposed to anticipating threats, anticipating problems and getting out in front of them, and even there, when we are trying to react, the pace of reaction has been excruciatingly slow.

Having said that, I am not convinced that a solution to these problems, to these broad issues, as the Chairman said, can be found in new processes or, to be precise, in new processes alone. To paraphrase Shakespeare, I think the flaws lie not so much in our processes, but in ourselves.

What do I mean by that? Well, our organization has done a fair amount of study on historical case studies where militaries have been confronted with new circumstances, new situations, new roles and new missions. As Dr. Hamre said, under those circumstances, it is not the existing core competencies or set of expertise that you have that may count the most. You may have to develop new ones.

And when you look at how these military organizations have adapted successfully, there are a number of factors that come through again and again as characteristic of what you look for in a military that is adaptive, that is aware of changing circumstances and is getting out in front of the threat as opposed to reacting to it.

One is clearly a vision. You know, what are the big new threats to our security? What are those challenges? How are they going to manifest themselves? What sorts of new technologies and capabilities do we have to put in our toolbox that might be useful? What new competencies do we need to develop?

Time and again, what you see are very insightful senior military leaders, leaders who can think broadly the way that this committee is encouraging us to think, leaders like, for example, Admiral Moffett, the father of naval aviation; Admiral Rickover, the father of the nuclear Navy; General Hamilton House, the father of Army aviation.

And it is not only their intelligence that is striking, but it is also their extended tenure. For example, Admiral Moffett served in his billet 12 consecutive years as the Navy struggled to adapt itself from a fleet centered on battleships to one centered on the Fast Carrier Task Force that enabled us to win World War II in the Pacific. These leaders were able to successfully distill these threats into a series of planning scenarios or contingencies for the military.

And in my testimony, I allude to the famous color plans that were developed by our military a century ago in dealing with a very uncertain world, a world where we didn't know where the next threat was coming from. We were plagued by small wars, we were dealing with rapidly advancing technology. And were mistakes made? Yes. But did they get it right for the most part? Absolutely.

So in a sense, when you asked the Defense Department, you know, what are your defense planning scenarios, you are getting a

sense of what the military—the problems, the threats that the military has been asked to address, the problems they have been told they need to solve.

Now, how do they go about solving the problem? This is where process really comes into play. But my experience, and certainly the experience of these historical case studies, would indicate that a lot of it has to do with military professionals practicing their profession. It involves them learning skills through professional military education.

When you look at some of our best commanders in the field in Iraq, for example, people like General Petraeus, General Corelli, some of the field grade officers, H.R. McMaster and John Noggle, these are officers that went off the beaten path to develop their professional skills through education. I taught with Petraeus and Corelli at West Point. That is five years out of your military career, in a sense, if you want to call it that, to get that two-year graduate education and spend three years on a faculty.

Professional military education becomes key because this kind of thought enables you to get the right diagnosis. It enables senior military leaders to avoid putting old wine in new bottles. Second, at the schoolhouse, they get involved in war gaming and simulations. The military services involve themselves in field exercises, and in a sense they take a hard look at where they are and where they need to go. It enables someone like Admiral Sims in 1925 to sit before a congressional committee and declare in heretical terms that the carrier, not the battleship, is where the Navy needs to go. It is where an admiral like Chester Nimitz can say after World War II, because of what the Naval War College did and the exercises the Navy conducted to figure out how to essentially address these scenarios, address these color plans, that the U.S. Navy was not surprised by anything it encountered in the Pacific war, including Pearl Harbor, with the exception of the kamikazes. We seem to have lost that ability today.

In 2002, the largest peacetime exercise in recent years, Millennium Challenge 2002, was conducted to look at a specific problem, and the problem was how do we deal with low-end nuclear states who have so-called anti-access aerial denial capabilities. We discovered significant problems in our ability to deal with that kind of situation and with littoral sea control.

So what does the process tell you to do then to solve those problems? Well, what we did was we layered on more process. Joint Forces Command introduced Operational Net Assessment. We have Combined Joint Task Force Headquarters cells. Now, these processes and these headquarters cells may be what we need and what we are looking for, but what we really need an answer to is how are we going to deal with that particular kind of military problem? That is what we want. We want an answer to that question.

Now, as Congressman Hunter said, we want creativity, but this kind of creativity creates winners and losers. When we talk about a very different problem set, it is unlikely that the same old forces, the same old capabilities, the same old programs are going to one to one map on to this new circumstance.

So once you start conducting these kinds of exercises, once you tell the military this is the new problem set, that is where friction,

as Dr. Hamre said, really comes into play, because you are creating winners and losers, winners and losers among service cultures, among service budgets, among service programs. And they react rather strenuously in opposition to that. That is why change can be so difficult.

What do you need? You need a Defense Department leadership, civilian and military, that is willing to make tough decisions; willing to force concentration on the problems; divine the lessons that come out of these kinds of processes, education, analysis, war games, field exercises, and say, look, we are going to make the right decisions here, and we are going to make them stick. We haven't seen that capacity, I think, for quite some time now.

It also requires a Congress that is willing to promote competition among the services as well as to eliminate redundancies.

There are certain areas where we have built up excess capacity over time through competition. There are other areas, the new core competencies that Dr. Hamre talks about, where we are not quite sure how we are going to solve this problem. Here is where we need competition. Here is where some redundancy can do you some good.

A classic example in the American military is in the 1950's. Each of the services had its own ballistic military program, and if you ever see the movie, *The Right Stuff*, you will see we were blowing up a lot of these missiles on the launch pad. We were failing left and right, but at the end of the day, the Air Force gave us the Minuteman missile, the Navy gave us the Polaris, the Army gave us the Jupiter/Redstone that launched our space program, and eventually the Army dropped out of that mission area, if you will.

But what you want in a situation where the answers aren't obvious, where the missions are new, is competition among the services, and you want to encourage that, and you want to tolerate honest failure; not incompetence, but honest failure.

And what you also need, and I think Congressman Hunter here said, flexibility. What you need is speed. If you look at the kinds of military competitions we are in today, time is becoming an increasingly precious asset in terms of security. Whether it is trying to keep up with the improvised explosive device (IED) competition in Iraq, the war of ideas that is being waged within the information cycle in the media, defense against cyberattack, covert weapons of mass destruction (WMD), biological and nuclear attack, building partner capacity rapidly so we don't overstress and overstrain our forces, time and the ability to be flexible and use time as an ally and not an enemy becomes a very important factor and consideration. I don't know how we necessarily work this into our process, but it is something that seems to me that we need to address.

So in short, I think that what we need is a military that learns from the past, anticipates in the future, can move quickly based upon the conclusions it reaches about this, and I would caution against legislation that essentially, while it is good in its motivation and asks the right questions, does not incentivize the Pentagon as it exists today to really give you the kind of answers you are looking for.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy to respond to any questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Krepinevich can be found in the Appendix on page 70.]

The CHAIRMAN. And as you know, interest in professional military education really came from this committee back in 1987, 1988 and helped revise the war colleges and increased their rigor, among other positive aspects.

Between the wars, World War I and World War II, we found our country in the golden age of military education because there were more fine officers than there were billets of command, and so many of them found themselves not only in classrooms, but teaching in classrooms. And it did a marvelous job in preparing them not just what Admiral Nimitz said about the Orange Plan and about the Navy War College, but as an example, Troy Middleton spent ten years of his life in the classroom either as a student or as an instructor, and later on he was the corps commander during the Battle of the Bulge, and there are others that did the same thing.

So I welcome your comments. I hope we can follow through.

We are going to have votes within the near future, and that is why I am going to eliminate my questions right now, and I will go straight to Mr. Hunter and then the others.

Mr. Hunter.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you.

Gentlemen, thank you very much for your great opening statements. You really have covered a broad range.

Let me go quickly to something Dr. Hamre talked about.

You talked about demand and supply. One of the frustrations that I have seen during the current conduct in the warfighting theaters that exist in Iraq and Afghanistan is this: We have a supply system which is heavy with power, and we have a battlefield system that is using the equipment that is produced by the supply system, and it occurs to me that when we see things that we desperately need on the battlefield, you have lower-ranking officers requesting—making requests to very high-ranking officers in the supply system to get equipment to the battlefield, which is exactly the wrong—the wrong way to do things, in my estimation.

I think you should have the demand side—that is, the users of military equipment should have the stars on their shoulders and should be making the demand to the supply side and ensuring and holding them accountable if they don't get it.

Time after time I have looked inside the warfighting theaters, and you will see a lieutenant colonel or a colonel begging on bended knee to a supply system in the United States. And you are right; I think Mr. Krepinevich described it as the storekeepers. Essentially Congress and the Pentagon comprises the storekeepers for the people on the battlefield, but you will see the people on the battlefields and the warfighting theaters as supplicants to this supply system which has enormous power, which tells them they will get stuff to them when they get around to that.

To combat that, two years ago I put into the law this language, and I have got it here. We tried to move the power, the brass, to the battlefield, and we mandated the designation of a senior com-

missioned officer with the responsibility of administering—who has capability in acquisition experience to act as a head of contingency contracting during combat operations, who reports directly to the Commander of the Combatant Command, the guys we used to call the CINCs. That means the guys that is running Central Command (CENTCOM) or whatever other area of operations that the warfighter is taking.

Now, that wasn't taken to heart by DOD. And you see the same reports coming back from the field that says, here is the 85 things we asked for; here are the five things that we got from this recalcitrant, slow-moving supply system on this side of the water.

So I would like your comment on that.

Now, to go to Dr. Krepinevich, you made, I thought, a great response to the Chairman in my opening statement to the effect—and if I am getting it right, tell me, and if I am getting it wrong, tell me—but essentially your statement is you need to maintain not monopolies for the services in various areas, but you need to maintain some competition. Maybe it is a little bit like our nuclear weapons laboratories. We set them up to compete with each other, and the ones that had the best idea would then be, if you had a follow-on program—would be the leader in that program, and the ones that didn't, the losers, would be the follow-on, or they would be the supporters in that particular program. And you used the three missiles done by the Navy, the Air Force, and the Army as an example of that.

So the idea of maintaining some competition, of course, costs money, I mean, because we are going to look at this thing as a committee and say, wait a minute, you got three missiles being developed here, if we were back in 1950, and couldn't we just designate one service as a missile development service; and your answer might be we could do that, but we are not going to have the best system.

Now, let me go—so I would like your comment on how we maintain that balance, how we maintain the efficiency that you have with a monopolistic system, so to speak, or a strict role or mission with respect to acquisition, and yet you maintain the creativity, the competitiveness that produces excellent systems.

Last thing, you know, this committee has got a lot of innovation, and we have had in the past what I call the Wal-Mart hearings where we brought in people who had—Members, Members who had great stuff that was invented in their districts. We just saw some good force protection outside that just came from Virginia.

You know, this committee built a ship. It wasn't built by Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA). It was built by the Office of Naval Research because we made them build it. We built a ship that is now the fastest ship in the Navy. It goes 60 miles an hour. The leadership of the Navy sat where you are sitting and said, we need a couple of things. We need speed with our ships. Then they said, we have got these high manning levels, these three and four and five manning-person levels in our ships. We need to knock that down. We need to go to low-manning levels. And then, you know, we need this multirole capability. We want ships that can strike, we want ships that can accommodate Special Operations and mine

lanes and things like that. We want ships that can operate unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

This committee built a ship. We built a ship called the X-Craft. We built it up in Mr. Larsen's district up in Washington. This ship called the X-Craft, now I think named the Sea Fighter, goes 60 miles an hour. This ship has a capability—it has got a UAV platform, which the Navy told us they needed. It has got a helicopter platform. It has got a Special Operations capability, and you can stuff it with 524 medium-range ballistic missiles, which is roughly four times the loadout of ships that cost ten times as much as this ship and have enormous strike capability.

In fact, the former Under Secretary of the Navy went out and visited the ship, went on it during its operations, wrote a glowing letter about what this ship does. That ship was created by the Armed Services Committee by the members who sit on this committee.

The Navy hates it, and the same admiral who gets up and makes the Rotary Club speech about transformation saying we need speed, multimission capability—it does all of this, incidentally, with a crew of 26 people to go to low manning. 26 people. So the same admiral that makes or Secretary who makes the statement that we need speed, we need multimission capability, we need firepower, and we need low manning levels, he steps off the speaker's dais, and a reporter comes up and says, so what are you building this year, Admiral? And he says, let me see, an attack submarine, a carrier, and a couple of guided missile destroyer (DDGs). And the reporter said, what about the speech you just made? He says, that was a speech. This is what we are building.

How do we force our services to break out of this role that they seem to fall back into so readily? That is my question.

Dr. KREPINEVICH. Goodness.

You need to—there is—as Dr. Hamre said, and you said, Congressman, you need to look at the resource issue as well. And I think part of any look at roles and missions is to look at where you have excess capacity, where you have capacity in missions that seem to be progressively less relevant.

Let me give you two examples. In the second Gulf War, we used 40 percent of the strike aircraft in terms of numbers that we did in the first Gulf War because they have become so much more effective with the advent of precision munitions. This isn't a mission that is important, but it is an issue where precision munitions arguably have given us excess capacity for certain kinds of contingencies. And then you look at how many more major combat operations where we are going to find an enemy like the Republican Guard like we encountered. So that is one possibility.

Another area where we may have excess capacity is in ground forces oriented on traditional or conventional warfare. The warfare of choice of our enemy seems to be irregular warfare, as you pointed out in your opening statement. What is the Army doing? The Army is going to take the 65,000 soldiers that have been approved and authorized, and they are going to build six more brigade combat teams (BCTs), which are not particularly oriented on this kind of warfare, nor is the Army in general.

So, again, we are in a situation where in certain areas we have excess capacity.

In terms of not creating monopolies and promoting competition, let me just give you one example. For at least a decade now, the services and people like us having think tanks have been talking about the antiaccess aerial denial threat, antiaccess referring particularly to the ballistic and cruise missile threats and positioning their forces at fixed forward bases; and the aerial denial threat being the threat to naval forces operating close to the coast or in constricted waters like the Persian Gulf, for example. And exercises in war games have shown that this is a problem. This is something that needs to be addressed. This is something that is only going to get worse over time as technology continues to diffuse.

Well, there is no obvious answer as to what service should have predominance in dealing with this kind of threat to our ability to protect power. It could be that missile defenses are the answer, or it could be that long-range strikes that destroy the enemy's missile forces combined with Special Operations Forces that battle damage assessment and so on is the answer. Or the answer could be in networkcentric warfare, the idea that you can greatly—you can use information technology to have highly distributed, highly networked forces that don't really rely on large fixed forward bases.

And here is where you can have a healthy competition. You can say, look, this is an extremely important problem for the American military to be able to solve for our vital interests. We don't know the answer to this. We are going to think about it at our war colleges. We are going to war-game it. We are going to field-exercise it. We are going to invest some money in prototypes, and we want you services to compete for the best way for us to be able to deal with this problem.

And maybe the answer in the end is heavy on missile defense, or maybe it is heavy on networkcentric operation. We don't know. We know it is important to find the answer. It is important to find the answer quickly before our enemies threaten us, and it is important to get it right.

So that is an area where I would say a healthy competition and the sorts of things that you mentioned, and this has been done before. Congress has helped the military do smart things, and it has helped it avoid doing dumb things. As Congressman Skelton surely knows, in 1926, the Congress told the Navy go out and build 3,000 planes, and we will fund that, because we know the commercial aviation industry is on its duff. We know you don't have much of a big budget, but we think this is an area worth investing in. And about seven years later when the Navy wanted to build some god awful thing called the flying deck cruiser, the front end was a cruiser and the back end was a flight deck, Congress said not only no, but hell no. And thank God they did because it was a terrible idea. What we ended up winning the war with, of course, was aircraft carriers.

So congressional involvement in terms of oversight is absolutely crucial, but it is that mix between identifying where the excess capacity is, identifying where the big problems are, and promoting innovation and competition to get the best answer. That would be an

enormous service. It is a service that Congress could provide. It is a service that Congress has provided by virtue of its oversight.

Dr. HAMRE. Sir, I will be very brief.

To the question of the acquisition process, our Nation has been at war now for four years, but our acquisition community has not. I mean, it is a peacetime mentality, I am afraid, and I think that is structural. When Goldwater-Nichols was passed, the acquisition reforms were not part of Goldwater-Nichols, but they were attached at the same time.

We made a mistake, in my view, at that time. We took the chiefs, the military service chiefs, out of the chain of command for acquisition. We made the service chiefs responsible for buying people, facilities, training, but we took them out of the responsibility for buying things, and we put that in a different chain, and that has created a fault line within the Department where we do not have the capacity to hold people accountable.

I think the chiefs ought to be brought back in the chain of command and made accountable for acquisition.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much.

Mr. Spratt.

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you for excellent testimony, very provocative testimony.

You mentioned the Under Secretary for Management, Dr. Hamre. You in particular addressed that, but you say what we have got in the proposed legislation is muddy.

How do you avoid, if you are going to have this creature called the Under Secretary of Management, which you support, basically overlapping, muddy definitions?

Dr. HAMRE. Sir, I think—what I think is muddy is the distinction between line responsibilities and staff oversight, and I see both of them inside the provision that you have written. I think you need to decide which one you want.

I personally think it would be good to have an under secretary responsible for the defense agencies that has the same responsibilities that a service Secretary has for putting together a budget overseeing, being accountable for the activities inside that service. I would make them a line manager and have them responsible for running those defense agencies. That would be a line function.

Now, you could create it exclusively as a staff function, and then it is kind of a—it is an inspector general on steroids kind of thing, or Viagra, I guess.

But I personally don't think that is your best answer. I think it would be good to get management brought in, management over the defense agencies. These are now large businesses, and they deserve first-line talent that is good at managing them and running them.

Mr. SPRATT. It seems to me the problem we have as a committee, and I appreciate your recognition of the committee's role. I think there is clearly one. And I think there are examples from the past that we should hold out to try to emulate, each of us, from Ike Skelton to Bill Nichols and Arch Barrett, let's not forget him, the players in that process who really made fundamental changes. But we really run risk here in the House and the Congress if we get too prescriptive in defining roles and missions. We want our judg-

ment to be executed and carried out, but if we get too prescriptive, we encourage jurisdictional fights between the services. How do we tread that line?

Dr. HAMRE. Sir, again, I think it is positive and negative friction. We need you to create positive friction. And that is through this oversight process. I can't overstate how important it is. The Department really does take seriously when they have to come up and testify to you. They really do. It has a powerful impact. You may be frustrated that it doesn't produce results all the time, and then you should just follow up. I always used to say in the Pentagon nobody takes you seriously until after your third meeting on the subject. Because at the first meeting, people are saying, oh, okay, that is what it is about.

The second meeting they try to come and tell you, oh, we already did it, but we did it a better way, and it was the way we were planning to do it. And it is only at the third meeting when they say he really cares about this. You tend to hold oversight hearings, but you only hold one. You need to come back on these things. You really need to come back on oversight. And I think it is a powerful tool, sir. I agree with you, don't tell the Department how to organize. Hold them accountable for efficient organization.

Mr. SPRATT. Let me ask both of you a specific question about a problem that is now before us, and the issue now before us, and that is UAVs. Who is to have executive management oversight at least of UAVs? How would you resolve that in the sense of assigning roles and missions? Because this could be part of air warfare in the future in a much bigger way than it is now. This could be a 1947-like decision.

Dr. KREPINEVICH. Well, again I would go back and look at what I have called the problem set. You know, what are the key set of scenarios or contingencies that the military is looking at? And there may be an executive agent for unmanned aerial vehicles for purposes of administration, but I would not restrict any of the services in terms of competing. If they thought that there were—there is or are particular UAV programs that would help them successfully execute what they see as their part of that mission. And so for example the QDR lays out three major areas of challenge. One is irregular warfare, a second is essentially a proliferated world with nuclear rogues, and third is countries at strategic crossroads, which I believe is code for China.

Mr. SPRATT. Do you think sorting through this is our responsibility primarily? We will certainly have to sit in judgment on it? Is it our responsibility primarily or should the JROC be undertaking this themselves?

Dr. KREPINEVICH. In the ideal world the JROC would undertake this. On the other hand, I don't think during the course of its existence the JROC, at least in my estimation, has really contributed a lot in terms of reconciling these kinds of issues. Certainly not if you are saying looking at the broad sweeping changes that we are confronting. And what programs need to be accelerated, where does competition need to occur, what major programs need to be terminated? I don't think the JROC has really produced those kinds of results. And in part, it is because those vice chiefs have to go back to their services at night and report on what happened.

And there was a term that developed in the 1990's called the volunteers dilemma. I would be glad to elaborate on it. But it essentially spoke to the disincentives that services had to really make those kinds of trades, to give up certain programs for the opportunity to get into a new area or do something different. And they learned their lesson—the Navy in particular learned their lesson the hard way in 1994. And we have seen the results ever since.

Mr. SPRATT. Dr. Hamre.

Dr. HAMRE. Mr. Spratt, first of all, let me congratulate you. I think it is much better if you got a problem, force the Department to wrestle with the problem. Don't create a generic roles and missions process to get out of a specific problem. This is a specific problem here. And it is good for you to bore in on it. And it's every bit of the responsibility of this committee to bring the Department's attention to it. So that is a very good thing you are doing. I think any time you get new capabilities it is probably okay to have some competition.

Now, to be honest, we haven't—we have not yet developed really highly reliable UAVs. We are still in an infancy in many ways on UAVs. And so some competition here, in many ways, it is a little like where we were when we had all the X planes. It is not bad. It doesn't mean, however, that you should not be forcing the Department to confront the larger question of how do you plan? Where are you going? What is your strategic direction? How does it fit with each of you? And when you are talking about your core competencies, how do UAVs fit with that? Is there a more efficient way to do it from a joint perspective? Those are all extremely important and very legitimate inquiries that only you can bring their attention to. That will not naturally come out of the Department. Only you can make that happen.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. Before I call on Mr. Saxton, let me say that your testimony is just excellent, and we appreciate it in the interests of the committee. This is historic turf. Our committee needs to follow through on it. And you continue to use the word "oversight," and I hope this decade will prove that this committee is good at that oversight. Mr. Saxton.

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me just follow up on something the chairman just said. I believe that what we are—the discussion that I have heard here this morning has been extremely helpful and educational, and it has caused me to think some things that perhaps I wouldn't have thought had I not been part of this conversation. So thank you for your straightforward approach.

The term "changing circumstances" has been mentioned here a couple of times this morning. And I think it is very important that we understand—it seems to me that it is very important to me that we understand that changing threat is, in fact, changing circumstances. And that looking forward it is very important that we understand what those changing circumstances are and what they are likely to be going forward. And that the structure of our military needs to be designed in order to be flexible enough, as Ranking Member Hunter said, to be able to look down the road to understand what those changes are about and how to deal with them.

In the current situation, it seems to me that we can learn some lessons by looking at a couple of changing circumstances. One is a

changing circumstance which has occurred over the last 20 years or so in terms of the ideology of the foes that we face. Certainly during the Cold War, we had a foe which had an ideology, and we were able to design a defense mechanism that held them at bay until they were economically defeated. And that was quite a thing. Today's ideology of our foe is much different. And the mechanisms that we used during the Cold War no longer seem to work. Second, technology is a changing circumstance. Nuclear technology is no longer new, but nuclear technology is changing in terms of its dissemination. Certainly a changing circumstance. Biological weapons are relatively new and extremely dangerous and something that we need to deal with.

And I might say that there is a new world in terms of the Internet. Someone pointed out to me not long ago when we were talking about the Fort Dix Six terror cell, somebody said they weren't connected to al Qaeda. And somebody else said, oh, yes, they were, because they used the al Qaeda training manuals that are on the Internet. And who knows how many other Fort Dix Six groups there are who are being trained without training camps or training bases because of information that exists on a new world called the Internet? And so these changing circumstances it seems to me are things that we need to be able to deal with. And my question then comes how do we structure our defense mechanism to deal with these kinds of rapidly changing circumstances?

Dr. KREPINEVICH. You raise at least three new problems, Congressman. One is ideology linked to modern information technology. Modern insurgency is similar to traditional insurgency in that the insurgents are trying to mobilize the population against us or against a regime. As you pointed out, they have a mass media now that they never had access to before. Things like the Internet that helps them recruit, organize, train and equip, lessons learned. That is a situation that we have to essentially reorient ourselves toward. It has to be a core mission. The Secretary of Defense directive, I think it is 3000.05 says these kinds of operations are now a core mission co-equal with conventional or traditional operations. And what we have to do, again, as I said before, is it is not going to be necessarily an acquisition process, although that might be important. But what is going to be important is to begin to understand the cultural terrain that we are going to be operating on. And that is going to come from our war colleges, from academia and so on, to exercise. We are changing our training ranges, such as the Army's National Training Center, to put people into this kind of environment. But what you want is a sense from the military, you know, this is a new problem.

What is—how do you plan to solve this problem? What are each of the services going to do to defeat modern insurgency warfare? Whether you find it in Iraq or whether there is a failed state in Pakistan or Nigeria or Indonesia or in Latin America. You know, what is our approach for dealing with this new and different kind of problem? In terms of nuclear and biological weapons, the big threat now, or one of the big concerns is the fact that with a proliferated world ambiguous aggression becomes much more of a risk, especially with the possibility of a covert attack on the United States.

I was at a briefing of one of our commands, and they said we looked at Katrina and we looked at one of these, and this is Katrina times ten. And so the logical question is wait a minute now, in the Quadrennial Defense Review, we say we are going to defend the homeland in depth. Well, what does that mean? How are we going to do that? Are we going to try and hit the enemy before he hits us? Fine. But how do we protect the approaches to our coastlines and our borders? How do we control those borders? How do we detect, particularly in the case of a biological agent, an attack so we can begin quickly to undertake remedial operations and limit the damage? How do we do what the military calls consequence management? It is what happens after the weapon goes off. How do we think about retaliation?

So in my mind process is good, but I would rather have some answers to these kinds of questions, and say look, not only how is the military, but I think John may have alluded to this, how is the U.S. Government prepared and organized to deal with these kinds of problems? I mean, I don't want to oversimplify it, but at the end of the day it is as a good doctor, how we diagnosed the real threats to our security, the threats as you point out, that are changing, that are new in form, and new perhaps in the scale at which they might be mounted. And what is it that we are doing to solve them? It is really not rocket science. It is some pretty basic direct questions that you would like to get answers to.

And I will tell you from my own personal experience, being part of a group that looked at the aftermath of Millennium Challenge in 2002, where our fleet got sunk essentially in the Persian Gulf, or heavily damaged by the opposition force, that the response wasn't, well, how do we operate our fleet effectively under these kinds of circumstances? It was all about process. It was about, well, we need an operational net assessment. We need joint task force standing headquarters elements. And again they may be important to improve the effectiveness of what we do, but we need to think about what we are going to do to deal with these problems. And that I think is the common frustration that I share with this committee. We see these problems emerging, and we would like to get some sense of just how we are going to deal with them. And we have seen what happens when you run into a problem like modern insurgency warfare in places like Iraq and other parts of the Middle East and you haven't thought about it in advance. And that is my concern.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Several who are on the list that arrived before the gavel have stepped out, but we will go ahead with that list. The next gentleman that is present is Mr. Thornberry. It looks like Mr. Meehan and Mr. Thornberry and then Ms. Davis. Mr. Thornberry. Or excuse me, Mr. Meehan first. I am sorry.

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to both witnesses for outstanding testimony. I just have one question. The Quadrennial Defense Review process, does it provide the best venue for evaluating the division of labor for the roles and missions of the Department of Defense? And if it does provide the best venue, why do you believe that this analysis appears to have been done in such a cursory way in recent years? For example,

there was a one paragraph summary in the most recent QDR. And if it doesn't provide the best venue, do you—do either of you believe that Congress should require a separate review for consideration of roles and missions?

Dr. HAMRE. Sir, I participated in three QDRs and I have watched three QDRs—no, I say I participated in two and I have watched three QDRs. They almost all start out as a very grand process of thinking about the future, and they always end up as a budget drill, because that is ultimately what you have to register. You have to register your choices and put budget plans against those choices. You do need a framework that lifts you out of the mechanics of budgeting to a larger vision. And I think that the QDR is helpful in that regard. Roles and missions is a constant process that is going on all the time.

The competition between the services over how to deal with a problem is ongoing. I think it is a good thing to have it ongoing. My fear is that if we elevate it and say we are going to—every four years we are going to force everybody to go through it, you are saving up all of the tensions, and you just get the negative side of that roles and missions review, not the positive side. Roles and missions is best when you have to confront the advantages of new technology, the constraints of old technology, the affordability of force structure, etc. And the services have made enormous changes over the last ten years, but it has never been called a roles and missions review. We used to have an enormous amount of the Navy, for example, that was dedicated to submarine warfare. You know, P3s. We had a huge P3 fleet to do submarine warfare. We have retooled the P3 fleet to do useful things because it is not hunting submarines any more.

This is what process is going on, sir. If you force it to a grand process, you know, a once every four years look at roles and missions you are going to get a lot of friction, negative friction I am afraid. And I would like to find a way to avoid that.

Mr. MEEHAN. Would you agree it has come to be more cursory in the last few years?

Dr. HAMRE. I think the explicit roles and missions reviews have become cursory because they are always a fistfight, and people don't want to just end up spending energy in a fistfight. What I think you should do is target issues that you think are important, bring in outside counsel to help you. If you need to create a commission, create a commission. But find issues that you think are really important. I personally think back to Mr. Saxton's question. I think the most important issue we should be facing in roles and missions is who has responsibility for preventing a nuclear terrorist incident in this country? Who is doing that? And what is the plan? Now, that is a very concrete task. And that is a mission worth drilling in on. And if you take things like that and say let's get to the bottom.

Who in the Department is working on that? Are you working together? Do you have integrated plans? Are you working with the rest of the executive branch? That would be a great service. But if you just step back and say I want you to do a roles and missions review, you are going to get the Army and the Marine Corps ready to fight each other about infantry, and the Air Force and the Ma-

rine Corps and the Navy getting ready to fight each other about aviation. It isn't going to produce a positive result. But if you pick a problem you know exists and say we are not dealing with it, and force them to get in on it, that would be a great service to the country.

Dr. KREPINEVICH. I would agree with a lot of what Dr. Hamre says. In terms of the potential value of a Quadrennial Defense Review, I think at least among us wonks in the think tanks there was a lot of anticipation about what would come out of the most recent one. It was the first one that had been conducted since the 9/11 attacks, since the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, confronting new insurgency, concerns as Dr. Hamre says about homeland WMD attack. You had a sitting Secretary of Defense, so he wasn't new. He had four or five years of experience in sort of deciding what was important to him.

So of course, the great disappointment that essentially no tough choices were made, no new directions were really taken on. But I think there is a value there. And my experience, like Dr. Hamre, I have been part of every review going back to 1989. It is kind of like Ground Hog Day for us. Every four years we wake up and here we are again. But going through every one since 1989, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have to know going in pretty much what they want to do, what they see as the big problems, and the answers that they are going to demand of those problems. They have to be willing to put those to the services. And they have to be willing to act if the services don't give them a good answer. And in 2001, my experience was Secretary Rumsfeld said these are new problems. And I think he expected different answers, you know, changes in the program and so on. And he sort of got the Henry Ford answer. You know, I will give you any Ford you want as long as it is black. You can have any program you want as long as it is the program of record. And under those circumstances you have to be willing, independent of the services, to make decisions. And you have to be able to make them stick, because you have worked it with the Hill and you have also worked it with industry.

And that was not something that they had prepared themselves to do, as you know from personal experience. But if you are expecting a bureaucracy of hundreds of thousands of people to give you the answer of where future warfare is going, where the big problems of the world are going, and to identify the scenario set that is the right scenario set to capture these problems, you are not going to get it. The leadership here has got to come from the top. It has got to be directive. And you look for advice and insights from your staff, which you hope is a good staff. But you have got to—I think it has got to be driven by a Secretary of Defense and a Chairman of the JCS that have a vision, a common vision of what the big problems are, and at least some sense, a point of departure of sense of how they are going to solve them.

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I am intrigued, Dr. Hamre, about your suggestion in looking at the problems rather than creating the fistfight that we anticipate in roles and missions within the Department between the services. May I make a request of each of you to give

us a list of five—and for the record, not today—but make a list of five of those unanswerable questions that should go into the roles and missions mix? And I realize—I don't want you to just fly them by the seat of your pants today, but think about them, and within the very near future give them to us for the record. Thank you. Mr. Thornberry.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 89.]

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And first I want to thank you for having this hearing and asking these questions and for having these witnesses who, with the organizations they represent, I think are among the leading national security thinkers in the country. It does seem to me, though, that today we are just beginning to scratch the surface of a lot of questions and issues that we need to pursue in this committee in the future, as the witnesses have said. And I hope that we can do that.

I have listened to you both. Just to follow up on what the chairman was just saying, I have listened to you both saying you need to take specific problems, try to work them through, whether it is the UAV executive agent, or whether it is nuclear prevention, or whether it is who is responsible for cyber warfare. To take another example, press reports show that it looks like Estonia was attacked in some ways. Who is responsible not only for defending us and our allies, but for having a strategy?

When you are not dealing with tremendous numbers of things coming off an assembly line, and you are in some ways dealing with more intellectual problem sets, whether it is the war of ideas or cyber or other things, it seems to me more difficult. So I hear what you are saying about that. But as I look at the new chair of the personnel subcommittee, I also think about the incentives to changes in culture that come with personnel rules. That was part of Goldwater-Nichols. It wasn't just rearranging the boxes. It was saying if you are going to get promoted, you got to do joint duty. And so my question to you is, understanding what you say about the specific problems, are there incentives, areas that we should look at to encourage creativity and speed and flexibility for the problems that we may see distantly or may not even see? Ways to improve the system that do fall within our responsibility, or at least areas that we can encourage?

Dr. KREPINEVICH. Oh, goodness. I think the ultimate incentive really is the power of the purse. It is the committee deciding itself, you know, what are the important challenges confronting us? And again, they can't just be loose nuclear weapons. It has to be specific enough so that you can pin the Defense Department down in terms of, all right, how are we going to solve these problems? What tools come out of the toolbox in terms of forces and capabilities? Which ones seem to be left in there? And again, use the power of the purse.

And in some cases, perhaps the power of legislation to help promote that kind of activity. Legislation pertaining, for example, to the process that I discussed, which is not only professional military education, to make sure that—for example, there are a lot of stresses on the Army right now, and there are a lot of pressures to ignore what is going on in the school house. And yet, you know,

to do that is to eat our seed corn. We have just passed in the world the demographic point where over 50 percent of the world's population now lives in urban areas. Ten years ago, a commission that I was on recommended the establishment of a joint urban warfare training center, which the Defense Department has never gotten around to making a priority.

But again, that can help you find answers to where future warfare might be going. It may be not only incentivizing the Defense Department to decide who is responsible for cyber warfare, but asking ourselves the question are the best cyber warriors really in a military uniform? Are they perhaps working for Citigroup and firms like that that are attacked on a constant basis that realize monetary losses? Or maybe, again, among private citizens. Incentivizing groups.

And again, about ten years ago, the Marsh Commission met, trying to look at these sorts of questions, and found that business didn't want to work with the government. Business didn't want to work with the government in terms of cyber warfare because they didn't trust the government to keep a secret. They didn't think the government was better than they are in terms of protecting it. And they didn't trust that the government could do any kind of an exceptional job of protecting them. So can we reduce the barriers to those kinds of cooperation? So those are, I guess, a few of the things that occur to me off the top of my head.

Dr. HAMRE. Sir, it is a huge question. And to be honest, I don't think I have very good answers to it. With your permission, I would like to come back, if I could. Could I offer, however, two comments about some structural things I think that would be very helpful for you to consider? First, we do not have an adequate or strong enough voice for the people who are most interested in joint operations, the combatant commanders here in Washington. We do not have that voice adequately presented in Washington. The JROC, which is a demand office, is populated by supply people. We need to get that stronger voice here. And how do we strengthen the Joint Forces Command? Or do we bring—do we make the deputy of the Joint Forces Command a Washington guy who sits in the JROC? Maybe sits in the Tank? I mean how do we get a stronger joint voice?

I think if you and the committee and the committee staff could work on that it would be great. I have my own ideas, but they are not necessarily well developed. But I would be happy, and I think it would be great if you could work on that.

The second issue I would encourage you to look at, we have a superb officer corps, because we buy ten percent more officers than we need for all the billets that we have. And we use that ten percent to be able to send them to training, to joint duty assignments, to a year off working for the State Department. In other words, we grow a phenomenal officer corps because we budget an excess that they can then go off and do it. You don't have to have everybody in every job. When it comes to civilians, we do not do that. We only budget maybe one half of one percent. And so there isn't enough excess capacity where you could force civilians to go get joint experience. If you want to get an experienced person at DOD who

knows something about State Department operations, you know, you got to dig it out of hide, because there isn't that overhead.

Now it doesn't have to be ten percent. And it certainly doesn't have to be ten percent of the entire officer corps. It is probably the GS-14s, 15s and up where you budget a surplus. But we do not budget enough overhead for civilians. And this would be maybe, you know, \$50 to \$70 million a year on—but that is not expensive when you think about the talent you could be buying. So I would ask you to look at that as well, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. Mr. Cooper.

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to congratulate you for the committee stepping up to its real responsibilities by asking these tough questions, and I appreciate the expert testimony of the witnesses. Also I want to thank Dr. Hamre in particular, because your reports from CSIS, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols, have been extremely helpful to the committee. And we are particularly sensitive of the section on Congress not necessarily meeting its responsibilities. We hope to improve on past records. In your testimony, Dr. Hamre, you mentioned, you suggest perhaps we need to have a four-star general to advocate more for the demand side in the Pentagon. Could you elaborate on that suggestion?

Dr. HAMRE. Thank you, sir. Currently, we ask that—the voice for that four-star voice outside of the chairman and the vice chairman is really Joint Forces Command. Joint Forces Command is extremely important, probably doesn't have enough horsepower to be able to do all of what is needed. It could come from strengthening the Joint Forces Command commander, give him more resources, more depth. Or it may be creating maybe a deputy to the Joint Forces Commander who is actually in Washington. Some way we have got to get that voice more in the Pentagon, not just in the Department. You know, when you are located 150 miles away you are not at the key meetings all the time. We need to have that voice in the meetings, the key meetings.

Mr. COOPER. Would that do enough to address the supply and demand imbalance that you mentioned in your testimony? That one—

Dr. HAMRE. No, sir. You know, Washington is about supply. I mean it is about the institutions that provide things looking forward. And we don't do nearly the quality job for oversight and follow through. We never have. I must confess when I was staffing over in the Senate side I did not hold many hearings that looked at what we had done. I was always organizing hearings for what we ought to do for the future. We don't do a good job of assessing our current operations. And I think that again comes with oversight. I mean who is it, General Mark Clark that said organizations do well the things that the boss checks. And you are the boss.

Mr. COOPER. Your suggestion that the Under Secretary for Management be focused on defense agency problems, what recent problems do you have in mind from the defense agencies that they could do a better job of supervising?

Dr. HAMRE. Well, sir, I will use this as—again, I am very careful, I don't want to criticize people when I don't know the decisions that they had to make. So let me go back to something that was a problem we had that I felt I didn't deal with very well. When the De-

fense Commissary Agency was going to bring in, you know, these bar code scanners, you know, that you have in the grocery store, we—it took us two years to buy through an acquisition process a bar code scanner. Two years. Commercial vendors you could have had this out in the commissaries within two months. It took us two years. And that is because there wasn't sufficient high level attention, there wasn't an insistence on performance along the way. We let the acquisitions system grind on mindlessly. And I think it is that sort of—we need a business man who is overseeing the operation of the business activities of those defense agencies.

Mr. COOPER. Your suggestion that we put the service chiefs back in responsibility for some acquisition decisions. What changes of behavior do you think that would cause?

Dr. HAMRE. Well, sir, again my personal sense is that where DOD gets in trouble is when there is—when it is an unclear set of authorities and responsibilities. And we have an unclear set of the responsibilities. We get the service chiefs that are designing budgets, we get the service chiefs that are sitting in the JROC and putting in on requirements, but the service chiefs are not responsible for the outcome of the acquisition system.

That is really in a separate chain. And so it is that fault line when they aren't completely—they have to be accountable and they have to be responsible, but there is now a breakdown. And we have not done well in equipping a force that is at war. And I can only say that is because you haven't put that responsibility on one person and say you are accountable here. I do not want to see troops without flak jackets. I want that fixed, and you got a week to fix it. You know, that is the kind of stuff that we need do to get the acquisition system moving.

Mr. COOPER. Dr. Krepinevich, in the short time remaining, I hate to ask you a tough question, but if we were to call for a hearing in the next couple of weeks from the Pentagon on who is in charge of defending the homeland against rogue nuclear attack, what is the likely process in the Pentagon that would go on between now and that hearing other than panic?

Dr. KREPINEVICH. Goodness. Well, I think they would probably call up Northern Command and assign the task to them of responding. There are multiple entities right now that are responsible in some way, shape or form to dealing with an attack on the United States. And it is not just the Defense Department. It is other branches of the government in terms of the executive branch, but also State and local, obviously, authorities in terms of responding. And again, that is an area where there are so many seams and so many levels of responsibility. You know, I have had conversations with people at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), people on the Homeland Security Council and so on, and it is a big problem. I think as the chairman alluded to, he mentioned 1958. You know, that was 11 years after the Defense Department was formed. And we still had major problems to sort out. We were fortunate then that in the span of those 11 years we never were attacked in the way we fear we might be today in our homeland.

So again, I think that is one of those areas where, as Dr. Hamre says, boy, the responsibilities aren't clear, you know, who is going to do what and when and how does that all fit together? Again,

that would be again a great opportunity to begin to look at, okay, what are the contingencies? You know, let's get the relevant organizations together and see how effectively we would respond. I could go on at length about some of these issues. Congressman Thornberry and I are on the advisory board of Joint Forces Command. About a year or so ago we were down for a briefing, and they were looking at Hurricane Katrina, and the response there, and they were looking at a nuclear event, and the conclusion was the nuclear event was sort of an order of magnitude at least more challenging than Katrina. And so you get a sense of the magnitude of the problem. And of course what you want to jump up and scream, okay, Joint Forces Command, how are we going to solve this problem? You know, we just want to know. And again, there, I think as Dr. Hamre alluded to, there is a lot of stay in your lane, don't get out of your lane, you know, this is what you are responsible for and so on. You can just see how it kind of hems in that kind of organization. And it does it I think to the detriment of our security.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. Dr. Gingrey?

Dr. GINGREY. Mr. Chairman, let me, first of all, thank you for holding the hearing. I think this has been one of the more interesting ones that I have attended in the five years that I have been on the committee. Dr. Hamre and Dr. Krepinevich, your testimony, your oral statements, and your written testimony was very, very good. I find some of your thoughts, particularly Dr. Hamre in regard to JROC, very, very interesting. And I would like to hopefully have an opportunity to follow up on that with you. I particularly wanted to ask a question about the education requirements under Goldwater-Nichols for our general and staff officers, our flag officers. The Key West agreement was in 1948. I was in the first grade at that time, and not thinking too much about Key West agreement. I obviously was not here for Goldwater-Nichols, and learning more and more about that. But I wonder if the unintended consequences of Goldwater-Nichols and the jointness requirement, educational requirement in the War College for general and flag officers has not taken away some of the time that they would—the respective branch potential general and flag officers need to spend in their own particular branch learning what they need to know. And I don't question the importance of jointness, but I worry about the dilution factor in regard to the educational requirements.

The CHAIRMAN. May I interrupt it then? And I will take it out of your time. We did consider that. And all the testimony that we had and the evidence that we had, that it did not detract. I was insistent going into this issue, Dr. Gingrey, that the officer be the best and most competent Army, Air Force, Navy as possible before they even touched the jointness arena, because people learn from each other in the schools. And I hope that has been fulfilled. But that was considered at that time those many years ago. And I will take that out of your time. But that is my clear recollection.

Dr. GINGREY. Mr. Chairman, thank you for that, and thank you for not taking that out of my time. And it may be that we need to go back and look at it and relook at it. And as the chairman says, it has been a while since we have looked at it. So that would be one question. And other thing I think, Dr. Hamre, in your writ-

ten testimony, you maybe described JROC as like a corporation of outside members of the board of directors, where they tend to scratch each other's back. And I think that that is a problem, would be a problem. And it would be important for us to know, well, how can they function better? And what changes specifically, if you are prepared to make that recommendation to us here today, or I would also be interested in Dr. Krepinevich's opinion on the same subject.

Dr. HAMRE. You want to talk about the education thing?

Dr. KREPINEVICH. Sure. I think that is a fundamental question in terms of education. It really speaks to what kind of an overall skillset do we need for our senior leaders to have? I think if you—let me just give you the Army as an example, because I am fairly familiar with the Army. And you look at the Army right now looking at spending somewhere between \$50 and \$100 billion, maybe \$150 billion to reset the force. Well, it is an extremely important strategic question, how do you reset the Army? You know, do we just rebuild the old force or do we create a new one? And you look at some of the things you have to understand to make those kinds of decisions as say General Casey or General Cody have to make. The idea of how to wage modern counterinsurgency warfare, how to conduct stability operations, how to conduct urban operations in an increasingly urbanized world, how to conduct protracted operations, how to engage in building partner capacity not only with allies, but with perhaps tribes, as we found out in al-Anbar province.

These are all things that you don't learn at the National Training Center. And in fact, I think that there is one danger, at least in terms of the Army as a service, is that over the years, the National Training Center has become the be all and the end all. But what the National Training Center, until recently, taught officers is, number one, how to fight conventional warfare, and number two, how to be very good tacticians. You go to the War College to learn to think about strategy, about the broad issues, about the things that you are going to need to know to be a senior general. And again, I think that is why that part of the education is absolutely critical. And what I am concerned about right now is not that we are doing too much of that, but that we are doing too little.

Dr. HAMRE. Sir, may I just speak to the question of the JROC? I was looking very quickly to make sure I didn't use the word scratching each other's back, because I didn't want to give you or any of the members the impression that I didn't think that members of the JROC were trying very hard to do a good job. They are. The vice chiefs serve on the JROC, and they take very seriously the goal of understanding how we are going to fight jointly together with new systems looking into the future. But they will do that as one or two hours out of a week, and the rest of the week they are spending really on service issues, service-specific issues. It isn't their daily job to think about joint activities the way it is for a combatant commander or for Joint Forces Command.

So I personally believe that the Joint Requirements Oversight Council actually should be populated by people that come from the demand side of the equation rather than the supply side of the equation. And that I would try to find a way to get the combatant commanders to have a stronger voice. Now we can't have them

here all the time. They got to be out fighting wars. So I don't want to waste their time. They need stronger J8 functions. That is the planning, budgeting functions. They don't tend to have good strong J8s. And there needs to be a focal point for them in Washington. Now that could either be through the Joint Forces Command or we could create something new.

So again, thank you for letting me clarify. I don't mean to imply, and do not believe that the current members of the JROC are not really trying hard to do the job of that organization. It is that it is not their day to day inclination.

Dr. GINGREY. Right. Dr. Hamre, I apologize if I mischaracterized your—either your oral or written testimony, and I appreciate that explanation. But I think that both of you have done a great job this morning, and I appreciate your testimony. And I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. I might add, in addition to my comments earlier, being somewhat familiar with those chosen to go to the Joint Forces Staff College down in Norfolk, that they are a group of heavy hitters and specialists in what they do. As a matter of fact, to give you an example, a young Missouri student roomed with the four-striped captain whose next assignment was to take command of the USS Nimitz. So it gives you a reflection that they are choosing the right caliber of people to go into the joint billets, which frankly encourages me.

Ms. Davis.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for both for being here. This has been, I think, a very important hearing. And I would go along with my colleague, Mr. Thornberry, and I say I think we need more of them. So thank you very much. I wonder if you could expand a little bit on the noncore competencies that you mentioned and the military versus civilian input in a post-war conflict. Can you design that without the state or other executive departments? Can you design that jointness? And I know a lot of very smart people, and in fact the chairman as well is very interested in this interagency work that we need to do, as well as focusing on the Congress. And yet I think that it is difficult to quite define who should lead that effort.

If the military leads that effort, if DOD leads that effort, then they will, in fact, impose on it as they have now. And unfortunately, as we know, the other departments have basically been absent without leave (AWOL) at this. So help me out with this. Where should that—the real focus for that planning begin? How should it develop? And how does the leadership develop out of that as well?

Dr. HAMRE. Ms. Davis, you have just asked the hardest question in front of the country, to be honest. And the reason this is so hard is that you are dealing with probably the largest fault line in the American Constitution. We have a separation of powers between the executive branch and the legislative branch. There is no question that the Congress has a right to oversee the operation of the departments of the executive branch. That is well established. But when it comes to the interagency process, that is seen as being a Presidential prerogative, how he organizes the National Security Council and the coordination process. And if I were working—when

I was at DOD I would have fought very vigorously to keep the President alone responsible for that.

So we have a strong constitutional problem here. We don't have well functioning interagency processes. But you can't put the burden on just the Defense Department to solve it. You know, so this is a—I really don't have a good answer for you because it is such a crucial question. I don't think it is possible to do a Goldwater-Nichols for the interagency process, because you are, in essence, saying the Congress is going to tell the President how he is going to organize the interagency working of the executive branch. And I would have fought that when I was in the executive branch. And I understand that.

So how do we get around it? I think we should find—we need to strengthen the capabilities of the departments. We need to hold them accountable. I don't know if this committee has ever asked a State Department guy to come up here and talk about postconflict reconstruction. I think you should. I think you should help. I mean Congress—I also must say Congress reinforces the lack of cooperation in the executive branch, because we all report to committees of standing jurisdiction.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. We all have our own jurisdiction.

Dr. HAMRE. We are all part of this. This merits deep, deep thinking. But I don't think it is susceptible to a Goldwater-Nichols solution the way we had before. But Andy may have more insights.

Dr. KREPINEVICH. Just a couple of observations. First of all, I very much agree with what Dr. Hamre said. Second, I noticed in the legislation, unless I missed it, there was really no definition of what a core competency is. The term comes originally from the business literature. And there has been some work in the Defense Department, particularly in the Office of Net Assessment, to try and apply that to defense circumstances. There are two—well, several things that characterize core competencies. One is it is a complex combination of things. And so it would be people, equipment, doctrine, industrial base, and experience that enables the U.S. military to do something of strategic significance exceedingly well. So it is complex, it is hard to create, it is hard to replicate. It allows you to do something that has strategic impact and allows you to do it at a world class level. And so again, if you are going to go in that direction with legislation, I think definitions become important. A couple of examples I would give you, global command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) would be a core competence of the American military. Long-range precision strike, 24-hour all-weather operations. These are things that are really complex combinations. If you are looking at where we might expand, I would say operations in complex terrain, meaning urban terrain, cultural terrain and littoral terrain, which is usually heavily trafficked, time-based competition. The world is—the military competition is becoming increasingly time sensitive. And we are getting worse and worse and worse at acting promptly and quickly. With respect to jointness in the interagency, in a sense it goes beyond the interagency, really looking at the interface between the Federal Government, State and local, but also the civil sector.

So for example, if you are looking at cyberdefense, again I think it is very blurry who is responsible for what. And it may be that the private sector does a better job than the government sector would. You know, World War II we worried about bombing factories, and so we had air defense systems to protect them from air attack. It may be again that Citicorp is best at protecting Citicorp. I don't know, but I think it is important for us to begin to figure those sorts of things out. Satellites, space defense, a lot of what is up there that we use is in the commercial sector.

But certainly, irregular warfare is an area where the interagency issue has come up again and again. And I think at this point in time the military does not want that mission. But as you pointed out, the weight of historical experience, whether it was Vietnam in the 60's or what we confront now in Afghanistan and Iraq indicates it is the military that ends up doing it. And I think the burden of proof is on the other elements of the interagency to explain how they somehow are going to remedy that.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you very much. I know my time is up.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. I will go to Mr. Jones next. But let me tell the committee we have four votes, one 15-minute vote that has already started, and three five-minute votes. We will return. And gentlemen, we appreciate your waiting us out for that. Mr. Jones?

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you. And to the panelists, thank you very much. And Dr. Hamre, I will ask this question of both, but you mentioned in your testimony, and no wonder thinking of the committee, about under secretary for finances. I have been here 14 years, and one of my biggest frustrations is the fact—and I am just talking about budgets now, I am not talking about investments in new equipment, but budgets—is that it seems that each and every year, even before Iraq and Afghanistan, that there is very serious concern about the bureaucracy, and how—I don't want to say fraud, but waste in the Department of Defense as it relates to their budgets. And I took it upon myself four or five years ago, and I cannot remember the gentleman's name, he was number two at GAO. I had seen him on some talk show, so I asked him to come in and brief me. And he said Congressman, you know about the only way that you will ever get a handle on the budgets at the Department of Defense is if an individual could have an appointment for six years, and either the Congress could remove the person or the president.

I don't know how that should be structured, no idea. But he said that you have got to have a person that has the knowledge and has the control that you can get these budgets to where they are more efficient and less wasteful. Do you think that makes any sense at all, that this person is like David Walker now is the Comptroller General of the GAO. But it seems like these budgets at the Department of Defense, and I am not criticizing anybody, but you have got too many hands in the pie. And it seems like that they are autonomous in one respect. And the Secretary of Defense does not have the time. I know he has, you know, assistant secretaries. But I am thinking if we are going to ever really get it straight. Does that make any sense? And it is not my idea.

Dr. HAMRE. Sir, it probably was Gene Dodaro, who is a friend of mine, who was the deputy to Dave Walker. I served for four years as the Comptroller, Chief Financial Officer for the Defense Department. Initially went over for Les Aspin, and then with Bill Perry. And so I know a lot of about how we put budgets together and how we manage the financial resources of the Department. This is the primary tool by which the Secretary brings policy control over this very large, complex organization.

I used to say to people, I said if you want to breathe oxygen, I can give you oxygen, but you are going to breathe the Secretary's oxygen. And you are going to follow through, because the Secretary was going to be accountable to you. And so the system over there is designed really for policy accountability more than anything. And accountability to the Congress. All the systems, the accounting systems, financial management systems are really designed to make sure we can answer the questions you are going to ask when we come up and ask for more money. Now so I say that to the following. We have set up a system where we control the Department, the primary mechanism of political control, policy control is budgetary. And if you are going to create a different system for budgeting, then you have got a much larger question we have to wrestle with, which is how is the Secretary going to manage the Department? It is, in essence, his primary tool. I am very open to exploring ideas with you, sir. I do think that you—again, the Secretary is accountable for everything that happens in that department. Everything down to a buck private. And he has to have the authority to be able to control that.

And so, giving him a comptroller that he controls, as opposed to one that has kind of an autonomous role, is I think is important. I would not support an idea of having kind of an independent financial manager that is separate from the Secretary.

Mr. JONES. If I could, very briefly to the doctor, I don't think—the issue is when you look at the fact that we have had testimony after testimony—I know we are in a war, so let me make that clear—but we have had—I mean, I brought to the committee last year an ice maker that you could go to Lowe's and buy for \$4,000, it is like would go into a plane that they were paying \$25,000 and \$30,000 for. I mean it was documented. And to me if the checks and balances, if you don't have—I know my time is up, Mr. Chairman, and I will be real quick—but if you don't have—the Secretary of Defense, in my opinion, has so much in front of him that he has got to have some help to make this system more efficient. Because we are in a competition with the Chinese and other nations. And if we cannot account to the taxpayer how that money is being spent—

Dr. HAMRE. Yes.

Mr. JONES [continuing]. Then I don't know if we will be doing the same thing, having these same hearings five or six years from now.

Dr. HAMRE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. And to the witnesses we thank you, and we shall return. And if you don't mind, when we return, to continue our questions. Thank you. We will be in recess.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will resume. Thank you for waiting.

Mr. Sestak.

Mr. SESTAK. Thank you, sir. It is a pleasure.

I was struck. There were a couple of things that were mentioned in your testimony.

You both used the word “capability” and you know we have gone to a capability-based or tried to go to capability-based analysis over there. Again, lead by Andy Marshall and others. And you both focused upon the issue of, I think, jointness. And to me, jointness talks about commonality and understanding. And you also mentioned the common challenges of terror and anti-denial, anti-access.

My question has to do with some perceptions of the Defense Department.

They are human beings over there. They respond to incentives. To some degree, you have talked about changing incentives in the process, the JROC is a good example and in warfare capability in the Goldwater-Nichols Act that the chairman read from over here, and we changed incentives and there is really only two incentives over there, promotion or owning the money. So you changed the incentive for promotion for joint warfare by saying you are not going to get promoted, not unless you go join.

My question comes to some degree, Doctor, to you, Dr. Hamre first. You have talked about the roles and missions and having watched a number of efforts over the years kind of come up with the same thin rule at the outcome.

Do we need to really not look so much at roles and missions and try to delineate who has what but focus on the proper incentive that hasn't been touched yet, that is the money, and try to change, not just the process by putting more civilians in that JROC because they haven't done badly. They have got them OSD in the lower level and they are even going to put somebody in the JROC in the vice.

But in the second change, the second incentive we have, which is the money, and move that into the joint world for the one that is common to everyone. And it is truly—and Dr. Krepinevich kind of talked about it, is truly at the center of the real transformation. It is not kind of delineating the roles anymore. It is what is common, and if it is common, how do you incentivize everybody to come and meet the same requirement. Why not give the money for C4ISR to the joint staff and change the incentive?

JROC is great. I have watched them come up with these common denominators time and again and whichever one said this is a requirement didn't matter. Did you have the money to make them come up with the requirement?

What is wrong with that is the real essence of the second—Goldwater two, so to speak, where we haven't touched that incentive in what truly is one of the tragedies of Iraq, the transformation that never occurred.

Sir.

Dr. HAMRE. First, Admiral, thank you for continuing to serve your country. I am really grateful that you are here.

When we first started Goldwater, this beyond Goldwater-Nichols, we started with a threshold question. Do we want to change the basic formula where we give the dollars to the military departments and they buy things. Do we want to take that away. Other

countries have done that. They have removed the funding from the military services and centralized, et cetera. We thought that that would not be a good move except in one important area and that is C4ISR.

If you really want seamless interoperability, you cannot do that by trying to build it from the outside and work your way in. You have to start by starting with the center activity and work your way out.

And so if you leave the command and control funding with the services, their first interest is to make the eaches in the field talk to each other and then they will work their way toward the center, and that is why we have profound interoperability problems to this day.

I would do exactly what you said. I would take the funding for command and control, and I would centrally administer it for the department on an enterprise-wide basis and I would certainly use the J-6, which is the J-Code function. I would turn that into the—into the acquisition executive for command and control, enterprise-wide command and control for the Department.

Now, Secretary Rumsfeld has experimented, but we have got two different experiments going on: We have got an experiment where Strategic Command (STRATCOM) is doing enterprise and Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) is doing enterprise-wide. And instead of having horizontal, or I mean vertical stovepipes, we are now getting horizontal stovepipes. This is not the right answer. We need to get a single idea. I like the J-6.

Now the J-6 would probably have to count on this to be its technical arm underneath it. We would have to augment because the J-6 doesn't have the organic capacity to do it in just the J-6, but I think it is a good idea, and I think it ought to be explored as an issue.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Dr. Snyder.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you. I apologize for having had to leave. I presided over the House for the last two and a half hours, but I intend to read the transcript so I am going to ask you a couple of questions, and if you have covered them, tell me. I assume that somebody asked about the issues that have been floating around out there about some people's belief that we need to do a real major study in terms of some kind of jointness study with regard to other agencies other than the military.

Did that topic come up during this hearing?

Dr. HAMRE. Partly, but it is worth talking about again.

Dr. SNYDER. Because we talk about the Administration, everyone acknowledges that mistakes have been made over the last several years in Iraq that we are not getting to our end results as quickly as we want to.

But I think the military has been frustrated because I think they feel like if they had, I don't know, a level of commitment, level of effort, the kind of personnel they needed brought forward early on from other agencies in the Pentagon and the military, that we would be much further down.

And so what are your comments about where we need to go with regard to, for want of a better word, we call it some kind of a jointness study with regard to other agencies?

Dr. HAMRE. I spoke to an earlier question that spoke to this, and let me let Andy begin with this, and I will offer one comment.

Dr. KREPINEVICH. Part of the discussion as Dr. Hamre said earlier did get to this issue. I guess to summarize a response, there are a number of existing and emerging challenges we confront that can't be confined to the Defense Department in terms of the skillset needed to respond.

The one that clearly hits us is insurgency. Modern insurgency warfare requires a combination of diplomacy, intelligence, reconstruction efforts as well as security efforts. And it is beyond the purview of the Defense Department, beyond the assigned skillset.

There are other areas. We talked about Homeland Security against non-traditional WMD attack, cyber warfare that may get us beyond the interagency and into the private sector and their engagement on the issue. And what strikes me if you go back to the 1994 commission on roles and missions headed by John White, the predecessor to Dr. Hamre as Deputy Defense Secretary, the Commission calls for a Quadrennial Security Review, and I thought that was one of the really insightful recommendations of that commission. That in fact the threat, the kinds of challenges and threats we were confronting couldn't be neatly compartmentalized necessarily within the Defense Department within all issues.

And if you look at—I mean, going further back in time, I would argue that we are in a position right now somewhat comparable to the late 1940's, early 1950's where the Soviet Union was a new threat, communism was an ideology, was in our face. You had new technologies, ballistic weapons, nuclear weapons, satellites, and so on. And now it is radical Islamism, it is a proliferated world, it is the very unusual things China is doing. These are problems that don't seem likely to go away any time soon just as the Soviets didn't seem likely to go away any time soon.

And what the Truman Administration did through National Security Council Report 68 (NSC-68) and the Eisenhower Administration did through Solarium is say we need a grand strategy review. And in the case of Eisenhower in particular, he became directly involved in the effort and the idea was we can't, you know, a lot of this is focused on defense but we can't, we can't limit it to defense. There has to be a propaganda element to this. There has to be a diplomacy effort. There has to be an assurance that we have essentially provided for our commission foundation which is a source of enduring strength for this country.

It was really, you know, strategic planning, the way you would like to see it done by two very different administrations in some ways.

And I think we are lacking that kind of an effort right now. I think it should be one of the top priorities for whoever the next administration turns out to be.

And finally, I would say as a practical matter, the Defense Department is—sort of feels it is in a catch 22. If it deploys forces for these kinds of contingencies, especially a regular warfare, they know it can't succeed unless the interagency shows up. But Vietnam has showed us, Iraq has showed us, Afghanistan has shown us that if the interagency doesn't show up in sufficient numbers and sufficiently quickly to enable us to succeed the way we need

to, so does the Department begin to step on other toes in trying to do it itself, or does it continue to its own knitting.

And I think that is a gray area of inquiry and oversight that this committee might investigate.

Dr. HAMRE. I will be very brief.

I know that the interagency process can be fixed the way Goldwater-Nichols fixed the Defense Department. And the reason I say that is the interagency process is about how the President chooses to organize the executive branch and his operations, and any President is going to resist a Congressional solution as to how he is going to organize it. There is no question that Congress has a role over the departments, but how the interagency works is really an ambiguous part of our government, and it is in—any President will fight you to say that you should organize that.

I do think there are important things that contribute to our poor job of coordination, and one of them is there is very little excess capacity for contingencies in non-DOD agencies. There are no extra civil servants in management positions sitting around in peacetime. We buy ten percent more officers in the military than jobs. That way we can send them to schools, joint duty assignments, on a training exercise with State Department.

But the other agencies of the executive branch do not do that. They budget about one half of one percent, which is the long-term disability rate. So they don't have people they can send to Iraq. They have to take them out of a job where they need them in that job as well.

So one of the things we could do would be to start buying more management capability by buying more—a little more depth in some of these critical agencies. I think that is something we can do.

I also think it would be possible to think of some mechanical things that would help.

Every administration struggles its first couple of years before it gets its sea legs on how to work together. And I think creating like a field activity that works for the executive secretariat that could become the core of a crisis action team which when a problem comes up, you would have the ready made, at least the connective tissue. You still need decision makers. You still need to follow through with your decisions. That has been a problem. But at least you would have the mechanics in place.

I think there are some things that can be done, but inherently we have a constitutional problem saying how you are going to organize the President's operation. I think that is going to be a difficult one to solve.

The CHAIRMAN. Grand strategy review. I am intrigued by that because you are so correct.

Recently, the chief of Naval operations, Mike Mullen, gave a speech stating that we were in need of a strategic plan for the Navy, sea power. Strategic review, for lack of a better phrase. And he set forth certain criteria in that speech. I am not sure if you are familiar with it or not. But it was reflected in a recent news story.

Let me ask each of you very briefly.

What would you include in your grand strategy review, and since you mentioned the phrase first, Dr. Krepinevich, we will let you answer the question first.

Dr. KREPINEVICH. I think it would have to focus on the three principal challenges that we see to our security, which I think radical Islamism being one, but I think in the larger context we are looking at an increasingly disordered world for a number of reasons. And so essentially how to deal with that.

The second, the consequences of a more proliferated world, particularly with respect to nuclear weapons. And third, how to deal with the rise of China, not that China is the second coming of the Soviet Union. But we have seen, as history shows us, that rising powers in the past, if the situation isn't tended to, can sometimes produce very unwelcome outcomes.

And I think given those three challenges, then you need to look at the geopolitical situation, the military situation, the economic situation as well as I would say the social situation. And here I am just cribbing directly off of Truman and Eisenhower.

They—Eisenhower's guidance, he had three principal elements of guidance in terms of looking at the challenges he saw. One was he would support no grand strategy that undermined the economic foundation of the country, and certainly there is a lot we need to do to get our economic foundation in better shape.

And that also gets to the issue of energy dependence and these kind of issues.

Second, he would support no strategy that would not be supported by our critical allies. I think we are in a situation today where we are not quite sure, given the very different kind of problems who we confront, who our critical allies are going to be in five or ten years. Particularly since the focus of the problem has moved from Europe really to the Middle East, south Asia and east Asia.

And we are probably going to find allies in these tougher neighborhoods, I think, more in the future than we will, perhaps, in some of the traditional areas.

And third, he would not support a new strategy that ran a high risk of nuclear war. And again here, I think one of the critical issues is how do we prevent the use of weapons of mass destruction.

So, again, I think you would have to look very comprehensively and from that, begin to distill what you saw as, again, the major contingencies, the major scenarios that you would have to address, make sure they are representative enough so that you cover what you consider to be the full waterfront of potential problems. And then ask, you know, bring together some very smart people to work on it.

It was Paul Nitsa and a few others in the Truman Administration. Eisenhower formed three groups. Sent them over to the National Defense University. They worked seven days a week for six weeks. George Kennan headed one of the groups. They came back to report to Eisenhower in the White House Solarium, hence the phrase Solarium Project, and what is astounding to me is George Kennan, who had an enormous ego, himself writes later when they all finished, Eisenhower stood up and spoke extemporaneously for

45 minutes on grand strategy and in the course of that 45 minutes proved himself the intellectual superior of everyone in the room.

I think that is the kind of effort, the level of effort and the kind of firepower that we need to bring to bear. And again, you really do get into some of these broad issues. The Eisenhower review, just very quickly to sum up, you got into areas like where to invest in science and technology, the whole issue of Homeland Defense, alliance relationships, expanding the alliance relationships and so on. It really was profound in terms of its scope.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that the last time we got it right?

Dr. KREPINEVICH. That was the last time I think we had the kind of circumstance that we have today. The Soviet Union was our ally until the middle 1940's. All of a sudden, it is an enemy. It is a new ideology. It is not fascism. It is communism. Much more virulent. Atomic weapons, hydrogen weapons, ballistic missiles, we were looking for the first time at an existential threat to our homeland, and if you look at the situation now, again, the issue of the forces of disorder, as was mentioned before, I think, their ability to organize, direct efforts, coordinate efforts and their access to ever increasing amounts of destructive power whether potentially nuclear, radiological or biological weapons, makes them a potential large-scale threat to this country.

The issue of rogue states armed with nuclear weapons perhaps trafficking in fissile materials, using these weapons and then the issue of China which, again, we don't know what their intentions are but their building capabilities, for example, to challenge our ability to access and control the global commons: Space, cyber space, the sea and the undersea.

And this is a very different kind of problem set than we are comfortable and familiar with. And that is why I say there is a comparison between now and that period in the late 1940's and early 1950's. So we got it right enough then that we won the Cold War. We are in the very unusual period again, and it is extremely important that we get it right this time as well.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Hamre.

Dr. HAMRE. Sir, I think there are four factors that when they are combined, create the peril of our time.

I think the first is the residue of the Cold War that left lots of nuclear, biological, chemical weapons.

I think we have the rise of transnational terrorist organizations that embrace a suicide approach to warfare. We have irresponsible nation states that give harbor to these transnational actors. And then we have an air of globalization where we make it very easy for people to move about.

And I think it is those four in combination that create the peril of the era we are in and I think we need to design a grand strategy that deals with those four elements. I don't think we have in place that grand strategy.

At the core obviously is building stronger capabilities in government around the world and establishing closer working ties with those governments, and we are going to have to build from the bottom up a network that is going to help us prevail against this threat. It is going to take a long time. But I think it deals with those four things.

And if I could ask one thing of this committee today is that you take as a priority trying to get the government focused on how do we prevent nuclear terrorism more than anything that is the existential threat that we face as a country.

Another 9/11 or where they fly into buildings, that will be a bad day, but that will not be an existential day for American democracy. But if a nuclear device goes off in a major city in the country, that will take American constitutional democracy down for some period of time.

And we can't afford that. And we need a comprehensive strategy for dealing with that.

Dr. KREPINEVICH. Just one final point. If you look at the deliberations of NSC 68 and the Solarium project, what Dr. Hamre said was very important. Not only were they concerned about the existential threat to the survival and security of the United States, but also what they would have to do to ensure it. In other words, would we need to develop a strategy that is that to began to compromise our civil liberties and our way of life that we stopped being who we are. And that has got to be a critical part of any grand strategy that is developed.

The CHAIRMAN. Excellent. Thank you.

Ms. Bordallo, and then we will go to the second round.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding this meeting.

To me it is very important for our new majority to hold oversight hearings on the performance of the Department of Defense, and I think we are very fortunate this morning and this afternoon to have two very informed witnesses to be with us.

To that end, I feel that there is a critical piece lacking in these discussions, and that is the role of the Department of Defense in homeland defense and in support of civilian authorities.

To any of the witnesses who wish to answer, at present, the current statutory mission of the Department of Defense does not explicitly include a requirement to provide support to civilian authorities in times of domestic emergencies.

In the post 9/11 world with its increased terrorist threats, it seems prudent for us to for acknowledge a more integrated civil military capability to protect Americans from any future catastrophe. So do you agree that the formal mission and requirements of DOD should be extended to include providing support to civilian authorities?

Dr. HAMRE. If I might begin, and I will turn to Andy.

I think this is a crucial issue. And it is a very difficult issue because Americans don't feel comfortable having American soldiers driving around their streets. They feel comfortable if they are policemen or if they are National Guardsmen, but they are very uneasy if they are military people. And yet we know that a catastrophic event will be so large and so horrible it will require the Department of Defense to get involved. And so we have this dilemma. We don't feel comfortable working with the military working with the civilian response authorities in peacetime, and yet we know we are going to need it in wartime.

So we have this organizational problem. How are we going to bridge across that gap?

I don't think we have it right now. I think that the idea that we will—that the Defense Department only deals with war and the Department of Homeland Security only deals with consequences is not going to work. We know that there is one core competence that the Department has which is to carry out an order when the President gives it to you. And we know the President is going to tell us that we have to get involved to help when it happens.

Now if I could make one recommendation that I think would help in the near term.

The Department of Homeland Security is struggling, to be candid. It doesn't have the kind of operational culture yet. It will get it at some point, but it does not have it now.

It doesn't have the kind of operational culture that the Defense Department has when it runs command centers.

I would personally like to see that NORTHCOM, the northern command which is located out in Colorado, it is too far away from Washington to get integrated with domestic response. I would like it like it to have a Washington liaison organization that provides command and control interface with the Department of Homeland Security. And that it become the core around which we have a seamless integration between the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Defense. I think it can be done, and I think it can be done with a very straightforward organizational implementation.

I would be delighted to come up and talk with you about it some time because I think it would make a great difference.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you.

Dr. KREPINEVICH. I would agree with what Dr. Hamre said at least in terms of what the Defense Department, the attitude that I sense, and I think it is not only confined to them, this is something that we are not used to doing. We play away games. We don't play home games. So this is not—it is kind of uncomfortable.

Second, there is no money in it. You know, nobody is going to drop a huge slug of money that we are aware of to help us support this mission.

Third, there is a civil liberties issues, as Dr. Hamre says, you know. It has all sorts of concerns about men on horseback and the military running things inside the country. So there is that issue.

So for a number of reasons, unfamiliarity, lack of resources concerns about negative reaction, the military, in my sense, has kept this at arm's length.

But as you point out and as we discussed, the ability to respond very quickly to an attack like this may be critical, especially in the event of a biological attack, for example. The ability to identify that, to respond very quickly, to provide support for those affected but also to quarantine an area, all of this is going to have to happen exceedingly fast. And what you don't get from, you know, Justice is responsible for this and the Coast Guard is responsible for this and the military that and NORTHCOM—is speed of response. You just don't get it.

And, again, my suggestion would be to keep posing that question and say look, I am not—I don't care about operational net assessment organizations or that staff. I want to know how you are going to solve this problem. I am giving you a problem. It is a problem

we are all worried about. It is on our top ten list. How are you going to solve it and put the burden on them as part of your oversight to say well now, here is a contingency. Here is how we would operate and then, of course, you have to begin to practice oversight in terms of what makes sense and what doesn't. And there are going to be a lot of embedded assumptions and a lot of magic will likely happen the first time around in terms of things that work seamlessly that you know in your gut can't.

And that is the great virtue of the Congressional oversight system. You could just keep pressing and pressing and pressing until you get an answer. And you have got the power of the purse. As Congressman Sestak says, that certainly gets people's attention. And you also have to have the power, at least in Congress in certain cases, to approve the appointment of certain people to senior positions and you can press them on those occasions as well.

Ms. BORDALLO. Well, after hearing the two of you, I think I agree that it is important that we continue to pursue this.

Do you believe, my next question, the National Guard and the Reserve Commissions findings and this committee's passage of the National Guard Empowerment Act are remedy enough in solving DOD's cultural avoidance of embracing the homeland defense and civil support? Civil support mission?

Dr. KREPINEVICH. I have to confess that I am not familiar—

Dr. HAMRE. I know some about it.

But first of all, we have to start with the premise that the National Guard is forward deployed for homeland security. They should be the lead for the Department of Defense in working on homeland security issues.

I think a good deal of the legislation or a good deal of the recommendations however deal a lot with the internal dynamics and politics in terms of the reserve components and the active. And that is a sensitive complicated issue—first of all, Andy and I would need to study it. I would be happy to come up and talk with you about it. But to the basic point you are raising, isn't the role of the reserve components to be the forward deployed leading element in homeland security?

Ms. BORDALLO. The reasons I brought these questions up, Mr. Chairman, is the failures of Katrina, and I remember the guard responded but the integration with the home department of Homeland Security was poor, and I would very much like to meet with you and further discuss this if it could be possible.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady.

Mr. Hunter just mentioned to me that the two of you are so good that we hate to let you go.

With that, Mr. Hunter.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen, thank you for having some endurance here today and, again, for your great contribution to our deliberation. It has been great.

Let me ask you a question, Mr. Hamre.

You talked about the threat of the nuclear device. And what that would tend to lead me to, and I think the logical conclusion that most folks would derive, is this: That because that amounts to enormous leverage for a rogue nation or even a group should they acquire such a device, that a policy of pre-emption should be very

carefully considered. That is, if this is the age of leverage where just one or two people or a small group of people can hold a nation literally in terror by the delivery—hiding of a device in an urban area in a city, and then a series of blackmail demands, that the policy whereas we have always recoiled in a cultural way from a policy of pre-emption, that that is something that civilized nations don't do. They don't go in and take out things before they occur. And probably on the heels of the Iraq operation, there will be even more political pressure never to do that.

But don't you think that that should invite a new discussion on the policy of presumption?

And my other question—I would like you, Mr. Krepinevich, to talk about that.

But the second question is, a big piece of this, and the ability of on your enemies to gain leverage over us is something that the military can't control and that is technology transfer. And what a civilian company can do to this country in terms of moving technology that lends itself to weapons of mass destruction in many cases or a community of companies, for example, like the A.Q. Khan network, is much more dangerous than a military operation. And it is something that the military is not in a position to avoid because the regulations and the system that constructs the flow of killing technology from our shores and from the shores of our allies is basically a domestic policy.

It is a policy in which security interests regularly collide with commercial interests, the interests and the need to make a buck. And typically the security interests lose.

I mean, that is why we have shipped tons of dual use capability to China, and there has been almost no review of the end use of that dual use capability. And I think one time I checked on the super computers that had moved over ostensibly to benign organizations in China, and I think out of something like in excess of a hundred shipments, there was precisely one determination that the end use was, in fact, had been—as had been described on the initial application for transfer.

So do you think we need to have a new regime of technology control, not only for the United States but for our allies?

Dr. HAMRE. Sir, you really should have a dedicated hearing just to this subject. I think this is a huge, very important subject. And it is so much more complicated today because, you know, 50 years ago when we were doing technology control, our manufacturing processes were limited, so basically our engineers and scientists had to be close to where we made things. So you found it concentrated and it was easier to put controls around it.

We are now living in an era where things are done virtually around the world.

So designing a regime of technology control that really does stop bad things from happening and doesn't stop good commerce from happening is extraordinarily more difficult today. And I really would like to talk with you about it, and I think it would be useful for you to think about doing that as a hearing.

But it is very hard.

And especially in an era where 50 years ago, 85 to 90 percent of all of the advanced technology was in the United States, and

that is just not the case anymore. So it is a much more complicated problem today.

So I would love to talk with you about that.

Sir, I will be very brief on the issue you said about pre-emption.

If we really did know who and where a group got an illicit nuclear device was, of course we would do that. It is a risky issue now because of the question of salvage fusing. In the attack will they simply detonate on location, and that is a real complication that we have to think our way through very clearly.

It has to be part of the strategy, but it can't be the only part of the strategy. We need to do a lot more to reduce the amount of nuclear material and its loose stewardship around the world.

Russia continues to have over 10,000 warheads. For what purpose? You know, they could easily—one could easily fall in the wrong hands. We have got to get the nuclear material in control, we have got to get better forensics so that we can get accountability if something goes off, whose was it. So that you can hold them accountable.

The best way to stop diversion of nuclear material is for a country to know if it is diverted from their country they are going to be held accountable. There are so many things we need to do. And I include the pre-emption where we have the capacity.

But our current capacity to detect is very limited. We can't go into it in a public setting. It is very limited.

We need better detection capability and tools, and then we need to integrate that into a broad strategy.

I would love to talk with you about it both issues.

Dr. KREPINEVICH. On pre-emption and then on technology transfer.

Another thing that is somewhat similar to the 1950's, and right now is in the 1950's, there was an enormous amount of intellectual effort devoted to understanding what I would call the first nuclear regime, the United States and the Soviet Union having large numbers of nuclear weapons. We are in an entirely different regime now and moving to in every way, every day it seems, a multi-polar nuclear world, a broad range of nuclear powers, potential, as Dr. Hamre says, for some non-state entities.

In the case of non-state entities we might be able to make the argument that we are already at war and so pre-emption is something that we can do and not define it as such.

But I share your concerns.

For example, North Korea sells everything that they can lay their hands on. Why wouldn't they at some point begin to sell fissile material, and what would they do if we found that out?

In terms of the grand strategy element, one that we have been encouraged to think about is not only trying to prevent this, but how does the world change after an event like this?

Things that the American people would never sanction prior to the kind of nuclear event that Dr. Hamre talks about would, I am afraid, become all too plausible once it did.

The strategic degrees of freedom if you will would expand dramatically, and we saw that after 9/11. We saw it after 12/7, which was even bigger event in history, December 7th.

But in World War II, once we were hit at Pearl Harbor, we began unrestricted submarine warfare, something we went to war over against Germany in World War I. And we had condemned the German Luftwasa for bombing Warsaw and Rotterdam, and we did it ten times over against Japan and Germany.

You have to think about the consequences in that context, too. There may be a much broader latitude on the American people for pre-emption but the strategic question becomes who do I go after? How do I pre-empt? What capabilities do I have now to execute this new strategic degree of freedom?

In terms of technology transfer. One of the big differences from this era in the Cold War era is the fact that so much of the advancing technologies is occurring out in the open in the commercial sector. Not in weapons labs. When you think about nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, there were weapons laboratories and they really did have the keys on this technology and they had it locked up pretty well, and we could have regimes like COCOM.

The other thing is the ubiquitousness of information. The Internet, that we developed, spreads information around at a fantastic rate in ways you can't put your fingers in the dike. Contrast that with what happened after Einstein sent the letter to Roosevelt warning about the dangers of what is going on in physics development. All of a sudden, discussion in the physics literature just goes away about these kind of issues.

It would seem to me inconceivable that you could block that kind of information today about biotechnology, which gets me back to my earlier point which is if you can't compete by restricting technology, then you have to compete based on the ability to exploit it more rapidly than your enemies.

This gets back to time base competition. So it is not just competition just in terms of reacting to particular problems, but it is the ability to translate very quickly technology that is broadly available into military capabilities that can help us defend our security. More quickly than our enemies can.

Dr. HAMRE. Mr. Hunter, would you let me offer one further—

Mr. HUNTER. I sure will.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Mr. HUNTER. Before you do that, I want to note one. You mentioned the letter that Einstein sent Roosevelt.

Edward Teller told me one time about a story about when he—was it Enrico Fermi? Was Fermi a great physicist?

They went to try to find Einstein to sit down to talk about the letter they were going were going to send to Roosevelt, and I think he lived in Long Island and Teller said that he had to drive because Fermi couldn't drive or else he couldn't drive so Fermi drove.

Dr. KREPINEVICH. What actually happened, Teller was a Hungarian refugee, so was this fellow Leo Szilard, who was a physicist, and it was the summer of 1939 and Einstein was vacationing on the south shore of Long Island, and Zolard didn't drive. So they got in the car and drove out there and they sat down with Einstein and they convinced him this he needed to write a letter to President Roosevelt. Only his stature would get the attention of the President. That is how the Manhattan Project got started.

Mr. HUNTER. That is how Teller told me how they found him. They said they saw a little blond girl jumping rope, and Teller said they pulled up and he rolled the window down, and he said little girl, and she stopped jumping rope, and he said, where is Professor Einstein with that very heavy Hungarian accent to the end, and she said I have no idea and then he said, where is the old man with all of the white fluffy hair. And the little girl said, right over there. And they went up to the—they went up to the door and knocked and said Einstein came out in his bathrobe and invited him in and went over the letter.

So sometimes it pays to know little girls that are jumping rope.

The CHAIRMAN. It is also nice to see my California friend becoming such a historian.

Mr. HUNTER. I am following your lead here.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Ms. Davis, please.

Mr. HUNTER. Did you want to answer something else?

Dr. HAMRE. Just to drive a point about how crucial this issue of nuclear terrorism is and how it relates to responding as a Nation.

When I was at DOD, we did an exercise, we simulated a terrorist incident destroying a major urban city in the United States. And the issues you have to confront there are just mind numbing. How do you dispose of 16,000 radioactive corpses? Within the first hour there is a lethal plume of radiation that has been laid over a population. You have got to get those people out. Where did it go? You can get a theoretical calculation on where it went, but how do you know for sure where it went, and how do you tell people they are in that area?

You have got another plume where it is not lethal and people need to leave and how do you tell those people where to go? Who protects their homes after you tell them to leave? Do they take their pets with them? Or what are you going to do?

How are you going to feed 150,000 people who are displaced for 3 months from their homes while you are waiting for the radiation to die down? What do you do with the 500,000 cattle that have walked down in the water shed and died in the water shed because they have been exposed to radiation poisoning?

How are you going to keep a father from not going down to find his kid in a day care center because it is in that plume where there is lethal radiation?

What are you going to do? These are frightening ideas, and all of that is very real. There is only one way we can avoid that horror, and that is to prevent that. We have to find a way to make sure that we never have a nuclear terrorist incident in this country.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Snyder has a question.

Dr. SNYDER. Dr. Hamre, in your opening statement you said that defense agencies don't have good oversight. I think you were using a broader definition of oversight. I assume what you meant was the management within the Pentagon. Did you also mean congressional oversight or were you primarily talking about Pentagon oversight?

Dr. HAMRE. Sir, I think, in general, congressional oversight depends on good management oversight in the Department; and if you don't have good management oversight in the Department, you

probably are not going to have good oversight from Congress because you don't have as much that you can work from.

Right now, every defense agency reports to the Secretary of Defense through an Assistant Secretary; and those guys are staff guys. I mean, I was one of those guys. I had finance and accounting service reported to the Secretary through me. I was the comptroller at the time. I wasn't the guy that should have been overseeing the business management in that sense. I took an interest in it.

But most of the guys that really have oversight of the defense agencies, it is a small, irritating part of their duties. They would rather be doing policy. They would rather be doing policy oversight and guidance than they would overseeing how you run a commissary or how you run a depot or how you run a contract administration office.

So I believe that we need to have real management overseeing those things so that you can hold them accountable, just like we hold the Secretary of the Army accountable for what goes on in the Army. That is why I believe an Under Secretary for Management that has line responsibilities would be good.

Dr. SNYDER. I wanted to ask you a very specific question, and then I will be done.

You all have both taken a very broad picture of kind of the upper level management kind of issues that we are talking about here, and where does the issue of foreign language skills for our guys and gals on the ground right now that are going door to door in Baghdad—we are now over four years into this war, and I think our Arabic language training is—I mean, the number of people that we have that speak Arabic is still infinitesimal from what I think it ought to be.

Where does that type of skill—you say the core competencies are very good. I would argue if you still have, after this length of time, pretty poor ability to communicate with the level of language that we ought to have this far into the war, I would argue that our core competencies are not as good as they ought to be. I mean, where does that fit in y'all's analysis of where we are at?

Dr. KREPINEVICH. As I mentioned, I think, earlier, I think a core competency that the U.S. military might want to consider developing is the ability to operate on complex cultural terrain. And of course this war has highlighted the fact that in many ways, particularly in this part of the world, we are deficient in terms of not only in terms of the language but how well do we understand cultural mores, taboos, this sort of things.

Dr. SNYDER. That shouldn't be a new lesson. That is a lesson that we should have learned—

Dr. KREPINEVICH. We are learning it, and there are changes. I sat on a board last year reviewing the U.S. Marine Corps's professional military education, and there is a much stronger emphasis that we recommended not only on language skills but also in terms of understanding culture. You can pick up 500 words of the language, but you really need to understand the culture as well. As least that was the result of our efforts. There were about eight of us.

But, also, you need to understand—you need to understand the profile of who the leaders are in this particular part of the world.

You may need to know in parts of the world where they have tribal and clan structures, what are the relationships among them? Because those may be your allies in that part of the world in that conflict, and they have their long-standing animosities and relationships and so on. And you have to understand how being the ally of one is influencing your relation with others.

So there is that issue, as well as identifying leaders. You would like to be able to find a charismatic leader. In the Philippines, for example, we came upon——

Dr. SNYDER. Excuse me, you moved that way up the food chain. I am talking about the guy on the ground in terms of foreign language skills.

It just seems like the kind of urban warfare and the things that we need to be doing, I don't expect a Private First Class (PFC) in the Marine Corps to be identifying a foreign leader, but it is a reasonable expectation of the American people that they should be trained—I would think that we would have a greater number of people with the kind of Arabic language skills that they could keep themselves from getting into hot spots that they might be able to avoid if they could just communicate.

Dr. KREPINEVICH. The short answer is that particularly the Army and the Marine Corps are working on it and making improvements, but they have a long way to go.

Dr. HAMRE. Mr. Snyder, there is another dimension to reinforce what you are saying. Because we did not have language skills in depth, we tended to bring in and trust anybody who spoke English; and that is one of the reasons why we have got spies throughout the operation.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

I did an article quite some time ago on the frontier wars and asymmetrical warfare, and what you mentioned about tribalism can be traced back to our earlier days when there was tribalism in the frontiers and trying to have one or two tribes on your side as opposed to the Shawnees or whoever else was out there on the other side. As well as studying that era, it was asymmetric warfare at its height with a different set of weapons systems called tomahawks, bows, arrows, knives. But it is the same thing.

I would hope our war colleges would take to heart that type of study. Whether they read my article or not does not make any difference, but I think you learn an awful lot from reading of yesterday.

Mrs. Davis.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and thank you all for being here again for a second round and hopefully a quick round on my part.

But I wanted to just go back to the issue of leadership and developing that. You mentioned, as we all know, there is just no substitute for experience and for the length of time that an individual has been exposed to any particular problem. What else can you tell us about how we begin to try and train people in that kind of cross-jurisdictional way, taking what is good from military training and develop that more in the civic sector? Do you have any thoughts about that that we might glean that perhaps has not been said?

And the other question really just goes to the heart of some of the issues that you are talking about in terms of the role that the armed service department plays vis-a-vis the intelligence, either committee, community, et cetera.

How do you feel in our role as oversight that we can play a more—I am not sure it is a central role because we are not trying to overstep one's jurisdiction. How do you think the Armed Services Committee can be better apprised as we deal with these issues that are so critically, critically important?

And, finally, is there anything you haven't said today that you would like to say?

Dr. KREPINEVICH. Oh, goodness, I will try and be brief.

A few additional things with respect to leadership. One is, in periods where you do have this large-scale change and you do identify a critical leader, senior person, exceptions are often made to keep that person in that position for an extended period of time because it does take a while to overcome a lot of the friction that Dr. Hamre talked about.

More specifically, and this is sort of in the role of posing questions, take the Army, for example, right now. The Army is going to reset itself and modify itself based on a number of factors. The Army has a critical decision to make: Is it going to reset itself and orient itself on major conventional warfare or reset itself with an emphasis on irregular warfare?

Depending on the answer to that question, you are going to need a different set of leaders. Different people will excel in one particular kind of warfare that won't in the other. You are going to need different training, different education, different career progression.

We are engaged in some work on that right now. I would be happy to come and brief you on it. But it does really lead to a different career progression path, different kinds of education, and what is most interesting from an analytic point of view, it really changes the cultural hierarchy within the Army in a way that has not been changed for nearly a century.

And this is profound. This is as important in resetting the Army as the anywhere between \$60 and \$160 billion it is going to cost to replace the equipment.

With respect to intelligence, again, I think from my point of view that is a very perceptive comment, particularly when you are looking at irregular warfare which is confronting us in the immediate sense. It is very much an intelligence war. If we know who the enemy is and where the enemy is, the war is over.

The Army that I grew up in, it was always, "Do we have enough tanks to stop the Soviets? Do we have enough planes and ships and artillery and submarines?" That is not the problem here. The problem is identifying who these people are and where they are.

So the intelligence dimension of this kind of competition is extraordinarily high in a relative sense to what we are used to; and it is part of the oversight responsibility of this committee to understand what the military is doing to win that intelligence war that can, as much as any weapons system or program, to achieve success.

The CHAIRMAN. May I interrupt right there, Mrs. Davis?

Are you saying that we don't give enough personnel or assets or attention to the military intelligence?

Dr. KREPINEVICH. I am saying, Mr. Chairman—I don't know the answer to that question. My sense, though, given our own admission, our own admission being the Department's admission of how poorly we understand the cultural terrain we are operating on, I think in the areas of human intelligence (HUMINT) in particular we are almost certainly deficient; and, of course, it is an area that is absolutely essential in irregular warfare. It is dominated by human intelligence. Lesser so signals intelligence (SIGINT), and then you go on up the chain there. But certainly in the area of HUMINT I think we are incredibly deficient.

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Davis go ahead. Thank you.

Dr. HAMRE. I will be very brief. We don't do well in developing operational leadership skills in civilian agencies, and I would suggest that there are three things we should explore.

One, there aren't enough civilians. They just buy enough people to fill every single job they have. They don't have extras to send them off to training or send them off for a year in another agency for experience. There aren't enough people in leadership positions that we can afford to train them well. So that is one thing we could do.

Second, DOD does a very good job with war games and simulations; and if we could find a way to bring more simulation, war gaming into civilian agencies, the kinds of problems they are going to confront when they are involved in an unanticipated emergency and let them think it through in advance. We do this all the time in DOD, and that is good.

Of course, that means you have to have the civilians that can take the two weeks off to go to a war game; and, right now, we can don't have it. But if we do fix that that would be a good thing.

The third thing we need to do is encourage them to build a lessons-learned capability like we do in DOD. We have an office in DOD that after every exercise—this is in our culture—we say, what went right? What went wrong? What went well? What did not go well? How do we learn from this? And we systematically capture the lessons of previous experiences and bring them forward to future planning.

Other agencies don't do that. And if we could do those three things: buy more people, do more war gaming and simulation, and great create an explicit lessons learned process—right now, lessons learned in the domestic agency tends to be as people get older they have lived through more experiences. It would be good to systematize that. We have done that in DOD. I think that would be helpful.

And if I may, briefly, on intelligence in civil society, obviously, this is the hardest question. Americans want to be protected by the government, and they want to be protected from the government, and the only way to reconcile those two is through strong congressional oversight of the intelligence process. We have to have stronger domestic surveillance in this country, but none of us will trust it unless we know that you are watching out to protect us.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. Jones.

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much; and, Dr. Krepinevich—I hope I did not do too poorly with the name. I have been practicing. That is the reason I came back. I did not do well, I apologize for that.

I want to ask you and Dr. Hamre—I want to go back just briefly. My comments about spending, very little control, the agencies, the DOD being more efficient. But I want to go a little bit further this time. You gentlemen are experts in your fields and probably other fields as well.

This Nation right now, according to the Blue Dogs, is about \$8.8 trillion in debt. David Walker, the Comptroller General of the GAO, says the true debt of this Nation is about \$53 trillion.

I am asking you professionals, you experts, that when—we had a classified briefing on China last week. I sit here and listen very intently and carefully because there is so much I don't know, and I am trying to learn. But how in the world, knowing that President Reagan brought the Soviet Union down because of the arms race. They tried to compete. They had a weak economy or shaky economy, and they could not compete. How long can this country, knowing that you know about the roles and missions and the different systems that this country needs to fight terrorism or fight a China or North Korea, where are we going and how will we be able to fund what we need if this country does not get serious about being more frugal and efficient with the taxpayers' money?

And I am not talking about DOD. I am just saying, I wonder where we are going. Is this of any concern to you as to what this will mean to our military at the rate we are going?

Dr. KREPINEVICH. I am not sure if you were here when we were talking about a grand strategy review. But we talked about the review in the early 1950's, and one of the key elements President Eisenhower gave in coming up with this review was that he would not support any grand strategy that undermined the economic foundation of the country because he viewed that as critical to this country's long-term success.

And if you look at some of the recent trends in terms of the geopolitical environment certainly relative to the 1990's, the challenges we face, the threats that we face today are on a much greater scale than the North Koreans and the Iraqs that we worried about principally in the 1990's. Radical Islamism, the needs for homeland defense, concerns about loose nuclear weapons and the efforts that it will take to develop counters to that, nuclear armed rogue states, the rise of China, these are problems on a much greater scale than we confronted in the 1990's.

And not only that, but we have a number of adversaries who are pursuing what people in the Pentagon call cost-imposing strategies. Very simply a cost-imposing strategy is you spend a million dollars to attack the World Trade Center leading the United States to spend \$40 billion trying to keep you from doing it.

So the increase in scale, the application of cost-imposing strategies and, quite frankly, the decline in support from our allies—either because they choose to act as free riders or because they have less confidence in our leadership—all of this means that we cannot afford to take a cavalier approach to our economic foundation, as President Eisenhower warned us.

And the fact that we have these deficits, that we are passing on these problems to future generations, that we have borrowed and become the world's biggest debtor nation, not as we did in the late 19th century, to build the infrastructure of this country to improve our productive capacity, but rather basically for consumption purposes, is really eroding our flexibility to pursue certain kinds of strategies that could again effectively provide for our security.

Dr. HAMRE. Sir, I don't think America can remain a global superpower if it has economic feet of clay.

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, may I ask just one quick question? How much time do we have, in your opinion, to reverse where we are going?

Dr. KREPINEVICH. That is sort of like predicting where the stock market is going to be.

Mr. JONES. I understand.

Dr. KREPINEVICH. A lot of it has to do with the psychology of Americans, of people who hold our debt. I mean, there are myriad factors that go into creating an economic crisis of confidence. And the instability in the oil-producing countries, many of them which could exacerbate our economic circumstances. But certainly there are numerous clouds on the horizon, and you know it is coming. Whether it is coming sooner or later, it is coming if we persist in this particular path that we are on now.

Dr. HAMRE. If I could just say, I don't know when we run out of time, but I do know if we don't do it this year, it is harder next year. It will be much harder two years from now, much harder five years from now.

It is not that hard to solve the Social Security problem. It takes some courage, but it is not that hard. Both parties have to do it jointly.

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Dr. HAMRE. It is going to be much harder to solve the health care entitlement problem, because it is an infinitely more complicated problem, but we have to start now because it will be impossible to solve if we wait ten years.

Mr. JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Sestak for questioning.

Mr. SESTAK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think Mr. Jones asked the defining question. I was going to ask a different question and probably going to end up making a statement, and I always swore when I got here I wouldn't do that.

But what I am taken with is—and you kind of said some of these things—is you have laid out some of the challenges of the future. And they all were a little different: proliferation, globalization, loose nukes, irresponsible nation states that harbor terrorists, and anti-access. If I were to step back and say, okay, what is the one common theme that is among those, you also then time and again said fast response. Even in exploiting getting technology quicker than the other one, you said, Dr. Hamre, detection quickly or words to that effect.

As I step back and I hear Mr. Jones bring up China, anti-access, 70, 75 submarines. We will probably end up 49, maybe, if we go the way we are, probably lower.

You, Dr. Hamre, seemed to throw out the real issue here, both here in Congress and over there. You said we have got some leftover stuff from the Cold War. I would venture to say we have some leftover cultural ethos from the Cold War. Everything you just mentioned, why are we saying we are measuring ourselves in greatness by the number of ships? Dr. Krepinevich referred to this. By the number of brigades? By the number of squadrons? Isn't that an output?

So are we here in Congress—and, by the way, we know the Services are—holding on to measuring ourselves in capability by actually measuring capacity vice capability? What if we were all of a sudden not beholden to the past, however we came to the past, from shipyards or whatever, and were to say, maybe we don't need a submarine to find each one of those 75 submarines, maybe we just need to sprinkle these cheap little sensors the size of a Coke can out there. They are interconnected, and wherever it goes we know where that submarine is, and it sends a signal. You fly a plane over, and it drops a torpedo.

My issue is, if you could comment on it, are we measuring the wrong thing? If you now have the tool in the Defense Department—and I know those simulators. They have shown it is not more ships, it is more C4ISR that is needed. And you come over here to Congress and you want to find a committee that does C4ISR, you can't. I looked.

So my question is how do we change that? If I am not wrong, it is knowledge. What if we had known Saddam Hussein was going into Kuwait? What if we had known Japan was going to strike Pearl Harbor? And what if we know someone is about to launch a loose nuke? To my mind, you all touched on it, but what is the real role that we should start a mission that we have to change to and how do we measure ourselves for that? It seems to me that measuring in numbers of ships ain't the answer. Dr. Hamre? Dr. Krepinevich?

Dr. KREPINEVICH. I think the common theme in terms of—one common theme, anyway—is that we have gone from a century where the principal threats to our security looked a lot like us: the Kaiser's Army, the Imperial Japanese Navy, the Wehrmacht, the Soviet military. We had ships, they had ships, and so on down the line. It was a symmetrical threat to a great extent.

The three challenges that I mentioned: radical Islamism, modern insurgency warfare, rogue nuclear states and China, particularly in light of the "Assassin's Mace" literature, is all asymmetrical. We have done so well we have driven everyone else out of the business. As you point out, if the competition changes that much, then the metrics by which you measure success typically change on a great scale as well.

As you are familiar from your Navy experience, on the one hand, we continue to measure the number of ships, but, on the other hand, we also know that even though the fleet is smaller that the Navy is a much more powerful instrument. It can strike far many more targets than it could even 15 years ago, almost in multiples. So I think the answer to how do you define the new metrics is the new problem set and how do you see yourself solving that problem?

Just very quickly, you mentioned Pearl Harbor. The way the Navy saw itself solving the problem of the Japanese navy leading up to the World War II was the battle line, and the metric was the weight of the broadside. How many shells in how many minutes and carriers couldn't compete because they did not have that kind of throw rate, that kind of firepower?

After Pearl Harbor, the metrics changed dramatically. It became could you find the enemy fleet before it found you and how many bombs could you drop at an extended range using aircraft? So the metrics changed rather profoundly.

But the history of transformation is the search for the new opportunity or identifying the way to solve the new problem, and in the process of doing that you begin to identify what the metrics are. At least that has been the history of it.

Again, I think that is where the committee in its oversight role, if it can get to the point where it says these are the problems that this committee is worried about, these are the problems that the country is worried about, and, quite frankly, if you put them in scenario form, these are the problems that your constituents can understand best and you can find out just what resonates with them and then put it to the military to give you answers as to how they intend to solve these problems and use your expertise to begin to say, well, if that is the way, then these are the metrics that begin to emerge and these are the sorts of things perhaps we could evaluate you on in terms of what you are buying and what kind of forces you are fielding and what scale.

Dr. HAMRE. Sir, I think you are right. I mean, we tend to measure things that were measured in the past and we carry it on through inertia. We haven't thought about how we should be thinking about our power in this era and how it could change the way we choose to invest. I think you are absolutely on the right direction.

I am afraid I haven't thought enough about it deeply enough to be helpful to you right now. I would like to see a change in how we think about it. I think very much oriented toward outcomes, less toward input would be quite constructive. I hope that you will define this quest broadly.

America's power has always been based on both its powers of intimidation and its powers of inspiration, and we have let our inspirational powers atrophy. 9/11 changed us from being a confident and proud Nation and now an angry and frightened Nation, and I think that did more damage to us than anything. If we can recover the foundations of America's confidence and optimism in addressing the future, it will be doing more for our national security than anything I can think we will buy in the defense budget.

The CHAIRMAN. Your last comment is of great concern. How do we restore this country as an inspirational state? That is what we grew up with. And being transformed into a state of concern or, as you mentioned, fear does cause that to atrophy tremendously. How are we doing? How do we reverse that?

Dr. HAMRE. We all have to work on this together. I mean, I think this is about—it is so profound. The way we treat foreigners when they come to get a visa in our embassies. The way we project a fear when a new idea comes up. Dubai ports and the way that just ran

away in fear. We are spending too much of our effort on homeland security with muscle, not brains.

Let's think our way through this security problem. Let's just not just fearfully embrace brute force to try to stop this problem. Let's think our way through it. We are a smart, capable, sophisticated country. We can do better than we are doing.

The CHAIRMAN. A special thanks to each of you. This has been one of the best hearings that this committee has experienced, and we are deeply grateful to you, and we hope you will make yourself available in the days ahead for us. It has just been fantastic having you here, and we appreciate it very much.

[Whereupon, at 2:06 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

JUNE 20, 2007

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

JUNE 20, 2007

**Statement of Ranking Member Duncan Hunter
Committee on Armed Services**

**Organizing the Roles, Missions, and Requirements of the
Department of Defense**

June 20, 2007

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning Dr. Hamre and Dr. Krepinevich. I appreciate you being with us today to share your insights on organizing the roles, missions, and requirements of the Department of Defense. You bring with you many years of experience studying and influencing these matters.

As well, I am pleased to welcome five members of the Afghan parliament, who are with us today. These distinguished members of parliament include the chair of the Defense Committee and chair and three additional members of the National and Domestic Security Committee. Gentlemen, good morning. I hope you will find today's hearing interesting and relevant to the very decisions and plans you are making for your own national security.

Although the U.S. Department of Defense, as it is currently organized, has been in existence since 1947, we continue to struggle to determine what the appropriate roles and missions are for the Department and what capabilities each of our military services should have in order to fulfill those roles and missions. Since the end of the Cold War, it has become apparent that the Department must respond to both the changes in the geopolitical climate and to the adaptation of modern technology, which poses irregular and disruptive threats. These changes require no less than a complete review of the missions of the Department of Defense and a re-evaluation of the capabilities needed to deliver desired effects. This naturally poses a considerable challenge in today's resource constrained environment.

Congress' concerns over the roles and missions of the Department of Defense are not new. One very relevant example is the need for high quality intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, or ISR. In the current threat environment, where our enemies hide amongst indigenous populations and in which

targets may be fleeting, the importance of integrated, timely, and accurate ISR cannot be overstated.

In the 2004 Defense Authorization Act, Congress took legislative actions to address the lack of clear requirements, inadequate integration and management, and funding deficiencies in the ISR programs of the Department. Of specific concern was the acquisition and employment of unmanned aerial vehicles.

DOD responded by producing an ISR roadmap in 2005 that only met two of the six statutory requirements. A GAO review of the roadmap finds that it does not identify future requirements or funding priorities, and has no way of measuring progress in meeting requirements.

Furthermore, a recent study by the U.S. Strategic Command determined that even today there is no baseline for determining ISR requirements or capacity. Just this April, in a hearing held before this committee, we had general officers from all four services aggressively disagreeing about the roles and missions of

the services in developing, procuring, and operating unmanned aerial vehicles.

This is just one example of many in which the roles and missions of the services have become blurred to a degree that not only results in inefficiencies and duplication, but also hampers jointness. If the roles and missions are not clear, then it becomes nearly impossible to determine requirements for capabilities. Moreover, it tends to cause the services to think in terms of competing for funding for a program they would really like to have, rather than trusting on their sister service to bring the needed capability to the fight. In a fiscally constrained environment, we simply cannot afford to have each service equipped for every mission of the Department.

I believe there is little disagreement that these challenges are real and that corrective actions are needed. There have been a number of studies, internal and external to the Department of Defense, that have looked at these issues. For example, Dr. Hamre is leading the on-going Beyond Goldwater-Nichols project. The

Deputy Secretary of Defense, at Congress' request, chartered the Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment project, which also reported several recommendations in this area. The Department's own Defense Science Board in its summer study on transformation made key findings regarding roles, missions, and the requirements process. Each of these commissions has been composed of seasoned professionals from the military, the civilian sector, and from outside organizations. Each has agreed on the problem. However, each has offered different recommendations on how to respond. Similarly, the Armed Services Committee has taken a bipartisan first step to address these issues in the recently passed National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008. The Committee relied on its own experience, as well as the recommendations from these groups, in crafting this legislation. We understand that there will continue to be disagreement as to the correct approach for organizing the roles, missions, and requirements of the Department, and we welcome all feedback from interested parties – particularly from the witnesses we have

with us today. We will consider all opinions as we wait to conference the defense bill with the Senate and thank today's witnesses for their commitment to these matters and for their perspectives.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to today's testimony.



**Testimony before the
House Armed Services Committee**

**“Roles, Missions, and Requirements of the
Department of Defense”**

June 19, 2007

A Statement by

John J. Hamre
President and CEO

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, 1800 K STREET, NW, WASHINGTON, DC 20006
TELEPHONE: (202) 887-0200 FACSIMILE: (202) 775-3199 WWW.CSIS.ORG

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Committee, I am honored to appear before you today on the issue of roles, missions, and requirements in the Department of Defense. The 1986 passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act was a watershed event in the evolution of inter-service jointness. In the twenty years since Goldwater-Nichols, the Department of Defense has made great strides in expanding jointness, moving from simple deconfliction of military functions to, in many instances, true operational interdependency across the services.

While there has been enormous progress during my professional lifetime, there yet remains work to be done. Four years back, the Center for Strategic and International Studies sought to build on the last generation's progress through a five-year program we call "Beyond Goldwater Nichols." I believe we need to promote a new era of defense reform that better reflects the geo-strategic realities facing today's military. In pursuing reform, we must focus on three key challenges:

- Increasing joint warfighting commanders' capabilities today and in the future;
- Striking a prudent balance between the modernization of the Military Departments and the growing imperative to undertake seamless joint operations; and
- Improve the efficiency of decision-making processes within the Defense Department.

I will address each of these challenges in turn, but before I do, let me offer an introductory perspective I hope you will consider as you review the legislation you are proposing.

I was on the staff of the Senate Armed Services Committee when the Committee developed its version of the ultimate Goldwater-Nichols Act. There were three critical pillars of the reform legislation. First, the act strengthened the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and gave the Chairman and Vice Chairman and the Joint Staff dramatically more power and influence in the Department. Second, the Act raised the profile of the Combatant Commanders (formerly called the Unified Commanders in Chief). The third critical initiative was to require officers to have experience in joint operations before they could become a general or flag officer. I can't overstate the importance of these three key innovations. They fundamentally have reformed the Defense Department.

In essence, Goldwater-Nichols created a new and healthy balance of "supply" and "demand" for military capabilities. The Military Departments—the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force—are now "supply" operations—providing the personnel, equipment, training program and facilities required to undertake military missions. The "demand" function is now concentrated in the combatant commanders. The Joint Staff and the Chairman/Vice Chairman integrate the operational needs of the combatant commanders and advise the Secretary of Defense concerning those operations.

It is this healthy balance of "supply" and "demand" that needs to be at the center of your thinking as you consider organizational reform of the defense department.

The Joint Warfighter as Customer

The Goldwater-Nichols Act created an effective "supply-demand" relationship in the Department. Today, however, DoD's requirements and resource allocation processes are dominated by the "suppliers" of military capability—most notably the military services.

The Military Departments have a vital *role* to play in national security: they organize, train, and equip US military forces. Their success in this role is unparalleled in the world, and we must continue to strengthen their unique capabilities to man, train, and equip the force. But the Military Services do not conduct combat operations—the Combatant Commanders do.

Since Goldwater-Nichols, military *missions* have been the distinct operational province of the unified combatant commands. Joint commanders are charged with effectively employing military force, typically in a multi-service and multi-national environment, in order to secure US national interests. Combatant commanders write all war plans, oversee all peacetime military activities, and conduct all military operations.

We need to organize the Department's decision-making procedures so that they bring both the advocates of supply and demand to the table equally before the Secretary. I believe that too often the Washington councils are populated just by the "supply" side of the equation. The Chairman and Vice Chairman have to carry the full burden of representing operational demand, and I don't think that they have all the horsepower that is needed for this task.

We can't ask each Combatant Commander to spend all his time in Washington attending meetings. He needs to be in the field fighting wars. But we do need the voice of the operator in these councils. We believe that the Department should establish a new 4-star advocate for the future joint warfighter, with sufficient, analytically capable staff to coordinate effectively with combatant commands and assess the needs of the future joint force through doctrine, organization training, materiel, logistics, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF). We are still discussing this idea in our Beyond Goldwater-Nichols working groups. This could be a re-tooling and strengthening of the Joint Forces Command. But the most important thing is to have that commander sit in all major requirements and resource allocation forums in order to advise the Secretary of Defense on the needs of the joint force in the Future Years Defense Program and beyond.

Mr. Chairman, the key goal here is to bring a balance to the supply and demand dynamic in the Pentagon. Currently the decision making is too dominated by the voices of supply.

Core Competencies and Roles and Missions

Mr. Chairman, the House version of the 2008 defense authorization bill has several provisions (sections 941, 942 and 943) that establish new procedures to identify core competencies and roles and missions in the Department. When I worked for the Senate Armed Services Committee, I worked on similar provisions back in the late 1980s and early 1990s. I later worked at the Defense Department, first as the Comptroller and later as the Deputy Secretary.

I understand the spirit that is moving you to introduce this legislation, but let me suggest that you are contradicting your own interests. If you demand that the Department go through a detailed study of core competencies and roles and missions, you are in essence putting in motion a great tidal wave of service uniqueness and exceptionalism. There is understandable rivalry among the Military Services. That rivalry is basically healthy, in my view. But at times it becomes a negative force. If you launch a major analytic drive to force the services to define core competencies and unique roles and missions, you will unleash forces that make it harder to get jointness.

The key problem in the department is not core competencies. The services manage their core competencies very, very well. No one in the world is as good at night time flight

operations from an aircraft carrier than is the United States Navy. No one does amphibious assault operations as well as the United States Navy. The United States Air Force is unparalleled in air superiority. Combined maneuver of battle formations is the Army's unchallenged expertise. Core competencies are not the problem in DoD.

I believe there are two much larger problems. The first is the efficient preparation for and management of joint operations, and second, the operations and activities that are critical, but which the Military Departments do not consider to be core missions. The great debate going on in the Army today is whether post-conflict reconstruction is a core mission. Before Iraq, the Army felt that was not a core mission. They are now working hard to develop expertise.

Legislation that forces the Defense Department to undertake core competency and roles and mission reviews will only reinforce the things that the services do well and keep us from focusing on the things that we don't do as well.

I understand your goal to reduce unnecessary redundancy and provide better stewardship of taxpayer dollars. Both of these goals are laudable, but they are better achieved through improvements to the Secretary of Defense's toolkit for making the right long-term joint investments. A welcome addition to that toolkit would be a capable advocate for the future joint warfighter who is engaged in major decision forums. Second, we need to strengthen OSD's ability to undertake mission area analyses, now often referred to as capability portfolio assessments. The Department does not systematically and comprehensively assess the linkage between the future years defense program and the missions needed to support the defense strategy. We did this in an earlier day. We need to bring this back.

Enabling the Secretary of Defense

Let me turn to the third primary point I wish to make this morning. We have a system of government where the Secretary of Defense is accountable to the American people through the President and the Congress. This means that the Secretary of Defense is singularly responsible for balancing competing demands and limited capability supply within the Department.

You have a provision in your just-passed defense authorization bill (Section 944) that would beef up the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. The JROC reports to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and is chartered to validate joint military requirements. Continued emphasis on strengthening the JROC suffers from two significant shortcomings that, if uncorrected, will ultimately undermine the Secretary of Defense's capability and authority.

First, the JROC's charter and its membership are poorly matched. Were it appropriately constituted with future joint warfighting representation, the JROC could provide powerful demand-side advice to the Secretary by way of the Chairman. It is not so constituted today. Instead, in addition to the Vice Chairman, it is comprised of senior representatives of the four military services. These officers can represent what the services could, would, or would like to provide to the future joint force, but they cannot speak to the future mission requirements that must be met.

Second, efforts to push resource allocation and requirements decision-making down to the Chairman and the JROC ultimately undermine the Secretary of Defense's prerogatives and authority for balancing supply and demand. The Chairman is a critical advisor to the Secretary in making hard choices, but he is not the only advisor. Consolidating military

advice so fully under the Chairman filters too much out for the good of civilian control. I also think this would weaken the OSD staff compared to the Joint Staff.

Effective governance of DoD must start with the Secretary of Defense. It is imperative that the Secretary routinely and directly hear from the Service Chiefs, the Chairman, the Combatant Commanders, and an advocate for the future joint warfighter if he is to execute the president's defense agenda.

Creating a Chief Management Officer Position

Finally, let me comment on Section 906 in your bill. Section 906 would create a Chief Management officer in the Defense Department. This has been a recommendation of the General Accountability Office (GAO) for several years. I have had an ongoing discussions/debate with my friends at GAO on this question. Let me offer the following observation.

It is critical that we not confuse the "line versus staff" functions that need to be performed. The Office of the Secretary of Defense is inherently a "staff" function. OSD doesn't—or shouldn't in my mind—conduct operations. That is left to the line organizations in DoD. There are four primary line organizations—the Army, Navy Department (Navy and Marine Corps) and the Air Force, and the Defense Agencies.

The line management for the three military departments is good. There is weak line management for the Defense Agencies. The Defense Agencies are huge enterprises, and I think they are doing well. But we don't have the strong management oversight for the defense agencies.

I support the creation of an Under Secretary for Management, and to make that Under Secretary responsible for the efficient operation of all the defense agencies. Right now these defense agencies report up to assistant secretaries in OSD, but these assistant secretaries are basically staff officers working for the Secretary. We need effective senior management, and having the defense agencies report to a new undersecretary for management is a good idea. The under secretary should have the same responsibility to build the budgets and oversee the operations of the defense agencies as a service secretary has for his respective military department.

I read section 906 and frankly it is a muddy construction. There isn't a clear understanding of what this new undersecretary would do. Is this new management under secretary a line manager (like a service secretary/service chief) or a staff officer (like an assistant secretary)? Does the new undersecretary have the power to overrule a service secretary or service chief? The legislation is ambiguous. I don't think he should have that authority. I think the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army are directly responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the operation of the Army. If you want better management in a military department, get a different secretary. Don't muddy the waters by creating an under secretary for management with ambiguous authorities.

Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Committee, the Congress has a vital role to play in shaping and improving the Department of Defense's structure and in promoting greater jointness in our military operations. I think this hearing is essential and I commend you for hold it. I stand ready to assist as you move forward on this important issue.

Defense Roles, Missions, and Requirements

TESTIMONY

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Andrew F. Krepinevich

President

Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments

June 20, 2007

Introduction

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to appear before you today, and to share my views on the subject of *Defense Roles, Missions, and Requirements*. My testimony focuses on how we might best restructure the US military in light of circumstances in which we now find ourselves that are very different from those which existed less than a decade ago.

The last major change in military roles and missions occurred following the United States' victory in World War II, when it carried out a major restructuring of its defense establishment. This effort was highlighted by the National Security Act of 1947, and culminated with the agreement of the military services at Key West, Florida, in March 1948. These efforts led to the creation of the National Security Council, the Department of Defense, an entirely new service—the US Air Force—and the Central Intelligence Agency, as well as the delineation of Service roles and missions.

The reorganization was stimulated by several factors. Among them were the geopolitical revolution and the new role the United States saw itself playing in the post-war world. Within a relatively short period the international system had been transformed from a multipolar world in which the United States viewed itself as an aloof member of a club comprising perhaps half a dozen great powers, to a bipolar system of two opposing superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union.

By mid-1948 the United States was moving rapidly away from its traditional peacetime semi-isolationist security posture: the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan had been announced; the Soviet blockade of Berlin had produced the American-led Berlin Airlift; and Washington was less than a year away from entering into its first peacetime alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The major overhaul of the US defense structure reflected the political and military leadership's ability to react quickly and, in hindsight, fairly effectively to the demands of these momentous events.

But these changes, to include those in the Key West agreement, were also driven by the country's experience in World War II. The war saw the American military involved in missions and operations that were significantly and, in some cases, radically different from those in previous conflicts. The Army exploited advances in mechanization, aviation and communication to field forces capable of waging the new *blitzkrieg* form of warfare introduced by the Germans. The Army Air Corps transformed itself from a force that had been seen by some as little more than a novelty in its early days to a major fighting force with the advent of strategic aerial bombardment and aerial interdiction campaigns that provided "flying artillery" support to ground forces. In the span of a few years, the Navy transformed itself from a fleet dominated by the battleship and the battle line to one that revolved around fast carrier task forces striking at long distances, and employing the submarine as a strategic weapon. Finally, the Marine Corps altered its organization from conducting the "small wars" missions that had occupied much of its attention during the 1920s and 1930s into a modern amphibious assault force capable of seizing stoutly defended positions.

The rapid improvements in technology related to mechanization, aviation, radio and radar also saw the Services acting together more frequently and more elaborately than ever before in a series of “joint” operations, as the traditional geographic division of Service responsibilities became increasingly blurred, and as warfare moved into the third dimension—the air—and into the electromagnetic spectrum. For instance, carrier-based aircraft could influence operations on land to a far greater extent than the biggest battleship guns, and Army Air Corps land-based bombers could shape combat hundreds of miles out at sea, far beyond the range of the Army’s coastal artillery batteries. The Services were beginning to “crowd” one another’s traditional battlespace far more extensively than had ever been the case before.

At Key West, two issues dominated the discussions. One concerned air power, and centered on whether the Air Force and Navy should share the strategic nuclear bombing mission. The second issue involved the ground forces, where the talks focused on the size and capabilities of the Marine Corps. The National Security Act and the agreement reached among the Services at Key West did little to resolve the dilemma that new technologies posed for Service roles and missions. To be sure, the Air Force was assigned the responsibility of controlling the air; the Army, the land; and the Navy, the seas. But, in addition to these primary functions, the Services also had “collateral functions” that could—and did—lead to overlapping capabilities, and redundancy. For example, the Navy’s conduct of a naval campaign could also involve its carrier-based aircraft bombing targets on land.

This combination of technological advances, the Services’ fears that their sister Services did not understand their requirements (or would not act upon them even if they did), and the vague language that characterized much of the Key West agreement all but insured the Services would poach on one another’s traditional “turf.” For example, the Army and the Marine Corps doubted that sufficient resources would be devoted by the Air Force and Navy, respectively, to provide them with close-air support. Consequently, the Army eventually developed its own “air force” in the form of attack helicopters, while the Marine Corps preserved its independent air wings. Over time, actions like these ran the risk of creating a duplication of effort and excess capacity. Yet many of these issues remained unresolved through the Cold War. Despite some efforts to resolve them after the Cold War, such as those of the Commission on Roles and Missions, they persist to this day.

In some cases, mission overlap, redundancy and excess capacity have been exacerbated by ever-advancing technology that has enhanced the Services’ abilities to operate in one another’s battlespace more extensively than they could thirty years ago, let alone the nearly sixty years that have passed since the Key West agreement.

Now the US military finds itself entering a new era, again characterized by major changes in the geopolitical environment, rapid advances in military technology, new security challenges, and the prospect that the rapid rise in resources for defense that has characterized much of this decade is coming to an end. In short, forces similar to those that produced a major restructuring of the US national security architecture and military roles and missions are at work today; indeed, they have been for some time. Yet we have not responded to them as quickly as that earlier generation of American leaders, who six decades ago laid the foundation of the military that would see us safely through the Cold War.

The results have been predictable. When enemies have challenged us in forms of conflict similar to those of the Cold War era, such as Saddam Hussein in the First and Second Gulf Wars, the US military has performed at a high level of effectiveness. Here our excess capacity was clearly in evidence. The Second Gulf War required less than half the strike aircraft employed in the First Gulf War, and only one of the Army's six heavy divisions was employed in the "March to Baghdad." However, when confronted with new forms of warfare, such as modern insurgency in Afghanistan and Iraq, the results have been far less satisfactory. Making matters worse, America's current and potential rivals are clearly looking to alter the form of the military challenges they can pose to our security.

How to Think About Restructuring the US Military

How might the Congress exercise its role "to raise and support Armies" and to "provide and maintain a Navy" to enable the Defense Department to restructure the military services' roles and missions during this period of rapid geopolitical and military-technical change? The following outlines some steps that may prove useful in addressing this question.

What Kinds of Challenges do We Face?

The first matter that must be addressed is "What kind of military do we need?" We should stop maintaining large forces for conducting missions that are of little relevance to coping with the threats that confront the nation and recognize and support new mission requirements in light of changing threats.

Today, the United States confronts three major and enduring challenges to its security. One involves the war with radical Islamists. The second concerns the increasingly proliferated world of nuclear-armed states characterized by the "nuclearization" of Asia and the advent of a "Second Nuclear Regime" that has succeeded the superpower-dominated Cold War regime. Finally, there is the rise of China as a great regional power, which appears bent on developing a novel set of military capabilities sometimes referred to as the "Assassin's Mace," whose purpose may be to erode US influence in the Far East, undermine the confidence of America's allies in its ability to aid in their defense, and challenge the United States' *de facto* stewardship of the global commons.

The challenges posed by a rising China, the ongoing war against radical Islamists, and the recent surge in nuclear proliferation are unlikely to be resolved over the next few years, or perhaps even the next few decades. Moreover, they represent changes in the character of the military challenges to US security. Consequently, the US military must adjust its thinking regarding what constitutes its core missions, with some needing to be retained, others divested of excessive capacity, and new ones created. To inform our thinking on this central issue, it is useful to examine how the competition has changed, and how it might continue to change.

Changes in Form and Scale

How has the military competition changed since the end of the Cold War—or since the "strategic pause" of the 1990s? The three principal challenges described above are different in *form* from

what the US military focused its principal weight of effort during the Cold War and for much of the 1990s. These challenges are also far greater in *scale* than those confronted during the 1990s, and may, over time, exceed that posed by Soviet Russia during the Cold War. Consequently, US strategists and force planners are confronted with considering not only a different set of problems, but new military missions as well.

For example, radical Islamism can be based described as a theologically based transnational insurgent movement. But its leaders also seek to exploit advanced technology to mobilize the masses in support of their aims, and to intimidate and coerce those opposing them. Toward this end, they have declared their intention to gain access to weapons of mass destruction and disruption. To date, radical Islamists have also demonstrated a far superior capability than has the United States to exploit information (i.e., propaganda) to win others to their side, and to undermine the will of those who oppose them. This is critical, as the center of gravity in insurgency warfare is typically the indigenous population. In this kind of warfare, the ability to convince the population that you represent their aspirations and—more importantly—that you are the side that will emerge victorious, is critical to success.

In some respects China poses a “traditional” state-on-state challenge for the United States. Yet an ongoing information-technology-driven military revolution offers China a range of options for pursuing military competitions that are quite different from the traditional, symmetrical tank-on-tank, fighter-versus-fighter, and ship-against-ship kind of warfare that dominated US military planning during much of the 20th century.

A key element of Chinese military transformation appears to be oriented toward generating anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities for the purpose of extending the country’s effective defense perimeter substantially beyond China’s littoral area.¹ Of course, in the process of increasing its defensive depth by making it increasingly risky for US forces to operate along the eastern periphery of China, Beijing will also be increasing the insecurity of other states in the region, like Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, who rely on the US security umbrella to protect them from Chinese coercion or aggression. China’s military has paid particular attention to developing what some military analysts call “Assassin’s Mace” forces to field a multidimensional, anti-access/area-denial capability. In 2001 the Defense Intelligence Agency determined that:

In terms of its conventional forces, Beijing is pursuing the capability to defend its eastern seaboard—the economic heartland—from attack by a “high-technology” opponent employing long-range precision strike capabilities. This means China is expanding its air, anti-air, anti-submarine, anti-surface ship, and battle management capabilities, to

¹ Generally speaking, anti-access forces are designed to deny US forces access to forward bases. Area-denial capabilities are generally directed on denying US forces freedom of action in the littoral. In a larger sense, anti-access strategies seek to prevent US forces from entering a theater of operations, while area-denial strategies look to deny US forces freedom of action in a particular area within the theater of operations.

enable the PLA [People's Liberation Army] to project "defensive" power out to the first island chain.²

The effort has only increased since then. In a recent report on the state of China's military, the Defense Department noted

[E]vidence suggests the PLA is engaged in a sustained effort to interdict, at long ranges, aircraft carrier and expeditionary strike groups that might deploy to the western Pacific China is developing forces and concepts focused on denying an adversary the ability to deploy to locations from which it can conduct military operations. Increasingly, China's area denial forces overlap, providing multiple layers of offensive capability.³

Finally, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by hostile rogue regimes also threatens to disrupt the favorable military balance now enjoyed by the United States in key areas of the world. All things being equal, the United States' willingness to project power would likely be much more constrained against nuclear-armed adversaries compared to against those who do not possess them. At a minimum, Washington may be compelled to alter its war aims when confronted by rogue states armed with nuclear weapons (e.g., abandoning the option of regime change).

This seems to be a principal motive for North Korea and Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. As this occurs, it will reduce substantially, and perhaps precipitously, US freedom of action in two regions of vital interest. It may also make it far more difficult to deal effectively with ambiguous forms of aggression, such as Iran's support for the insurgency in Iraq, or potential North Korean trafficking in fissile materials.

It is fair to ask whether the United States would strike a nuclear-armed state under *any* circumstances. Here it must be remembered that during the Cold War the US military had plans to attack its nuclear superpower rival, the Soviet Union, with nuclear and non-nuclear weapons. It is possible to envision plausible scenarios, to include those involving regime change, when a nuclear-armed adversary would be subjected to the full range of US military capabilities. For instance, were North Korea to employ nuclear weapons, or execute attacks that resulted in mass casualties, the United States might consider regime change operations to be necessary.

In the case of Iran and North Korea, there also exists the possibility that the regimes in power will, at some point, either collapse or be overthrown. Should this occur, a period of chaos may ensue. If so, the security of these countries' nuclear arsenals could be at risk of falling into the hands of terrorist or criminal organizations.

² Vice Admiral Thomas Wilson (Director, Defense Intelligence Agency), "Global Threats and Challenges Through 2015," *Statement before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence*, February 7, 2001, p. 12.

³ Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People's Republic of China*, (2006), pp. 24-25.

Moreover, as the number of state (and perhaps non-state) entities armed with nuclear weapons grows, the potential for conducting ambiguous acts of aggression with these weapons stands to increase, perhaps dramatically.⁴ This may be especially true for lesser nuclear powers in a world in which the United States aggressively deploys missile and air defenses. Under these circumstances, a lesser power may find it more attractive to deliver its nuclear strike through unconventional (covert) means. There are two reasons for this: first, the aggressor may calculate that it has a greater chance of penetrating lax US border controls and internal defenses than American missile and air defenses; second, it may offer the prospect of inflicting catastrophic damage on the United States without being identified as the source of the attack. To be sure, as the number of nuclear-armed states increases, it will likely become increasingly plausible to contemplate ambiguous aggression through traditional delivery means. For example, it may prove difficult to trace the origins of a cruise missile-borne attack that emanates from transport craft off the US coast. Or consider another example: a decade from now, will it be possible to attribute a missile salvo launched from a site near the Iran-Pakistan border? From a launch site near the Yalu River separating China from North Korea?

In a similar vein, if they prove ubiquitous, effective, and difficult to trace and tag, electronic forms of strategic strike, such as those that recently were inflicted on Estonia, could also usher in an era of ambiguous warfare.⁵ The elements of deterrence that could sustain a limited warfare regime could hardly be expected to hold if an aggressor could not be quickly or reliably identified. An assessment of the emerging strategic-strike regime should, therefore, accord high priority to determining whether the uncertainty surrounding this form of strategic warfare can be reduced to the level where strategic electronic strikes cannot be executed without being promptly detected and, better still, defeated. This obviously implies a much greater role for intelligence that extends well beyond attack warning and heavy reliance on national technical means.

These shifts in the form of the threat to the national security stem in part from the United States' dominance in most traditional forms of military capability. This has exerted a strong dissuasive effect on its enemies and potential rivals, who are unable to challenge US military power directly. This has yielded clear benefits. However, it also finds rivals seeking other means for advancing their interests, and in so doing creating an age of asymmetric warfare. This stands in marked contrast to the 20th century, which found the US military's most important competitions occurring against enemies possessing forces roughly symmetrical to its own.

⁴ Worries over ambiguous attacks in a more proliferated world emerged early in the First Nuclear/Strategic-Strike Regime. Nevil Shute's book, *On the Beach*, written in the late 1950s, chronicles the risks of an ambiguous nuclear attack in a proliferated world. In Shute's book, a major nuclear exchange is stimulated by an atomic attack on the United Kingdom by Egypt. As the Egyptian aircraft used were manufactured in the USSR, the attack was mistaken as one led by the Soviets, leading to a nuclear retaliation on the USSR by the United States and Great Britain, which precipitated a major nuclear exchange.

⁵ In addition to tracing the electronic strategic strike to its source, it will likely be necessary to tag the source as representing the conscious act of a government or organization. For example, the United States was able to trace the source of electronic attacks during Operation Allied Force to locations in Russia and China. The US government apparently was not able, however, to discern whether the governments of those states sanctioned these attacks.

Geographic Shift

There has been a fundamental shift in the principal theater of geopolitical competition, from Europe to Asia. In the 20th century the US strategic posture was dominated by threats emanating from Europe. The First World War saw the first large-scale deployment of US forces outside of the Western Hemisphere, to Europe. World War II was, indeed, global, but primacy was again accorded to the European Theater of Operations. The 40-year Cold War with the Soviet Union riveted US defense planners' attention on Europe and the central front in Germany.

If the 20th century was the "Century of Europe," the 21st century stands to be the "Century of Asia" for American strategic planners. Radical Islamism is concentrated in the Middle East and, to a lesser extent, in South and Southeast Asia. China's power is centered in the Far East. The recent proliferation of nuclear arsenals in India, Pakistan, North Korea and, as seems likely by decade's end, Iran, threatens to present the world with an unbroken line of nuclear-armed states stretching from the Persian Gulf to the Sea of Japan—an atomic arc of instability.

As the principal threats to US security have shifted to the east, so too has the center of economic power outside the United States. Projections are that China and India (in addition to Japan) will outstrip any single European state in terms of their GDP by 2025. The United States' economic interests, both in terms of trade and resources (i.e., oil) are almost certain to shift more in Asia's direction in the coming years relative to Europe.

The shift to Asia also finds the United States confronting a cultural, as well as a geographic, shift in the competition. If American defense planners were preoccupied with Germany and Russia—both products of western civilization—during the 20th century, they now confront rivals who come from a range of other civilizations—Arab, Persian, Chinese/Confucian, and others. The leaders of these current or prospective rivals likely see the world in very different ways than do western leaders. They may compete (indeed, they *are* competing) with us in ways that are quite different from America's 20th century western enemies. This must be taken into account in determining what military roles and missions the United States should seek to develop or maintain.

What Kind of Military Do We Need?

Contingency Planning

Once we have developed a clear understanding of how both the United States' existing and potential rivals intend to compete, it becomes possible to craft a set of scenarios or contingencies that can inform the kinds of missions the US military must be prepared to execute in defense of the nation's interests. These scenarios should reflect the new circumstances in which the military must operate. Properly crafted and evaluated, these scenarios can anticipate what roles and missions will be most important in meeting the new challenges to our national security.

The value of this approach can be seen in the "Color Plans" developed by the US military in the early 20th century, a time of great geopolitical and military-technical change. The original "Color" plans were developed between 1904 and 1938. The color plans established were:

Germany: Black; Great Britain: Red; Japan: Orange; Mexico: Green; China: Yellow; the United States: Blue; and US internal rebellion: White. Thus, for example, the US Navy prepared for contingencies involving a range of plausible adversaries and their navies. This was necessary since, during much of this period, it was unclear what kind of maritime threat the Navy might confront. These plans helped the US military to hedge against an uncertain future by focusing its efforts on preparing to confront a range of plausible contingencies, as opposed to the most familiar or those believed to be the most likely.

In the late 1930s, as the threat to US security became clear, the Color Plans were succeeded by the Rainbow Plans, which were designed to deal with potential conflicts that would arise in multiple theaters, involving several enemies. Another key element of the move to Rainbow Plans involved the need to plan for coalition warfare.

What set of Color Plans should be selected today to inform the Pentagon's thinking about Service roles and missions? The choice should be made carefully, not only with respect to the particular geopolitical situation (e.g., whether or not surprise is achieved; the disposition of key allies and other important state/nonstate entities, etc), but also in terms of what types of military capabilities might be available to the enemy, and in what quantities.

Given the time and effort required to develop a representative set of planning contingencies, the best that can be attempted here is a first cut at a set of Color Plans. While the range of plausible futures in which US security interests might be challenged is infinite, the number of Color Plans must be restricted to a handful, as there is a limit to how many plans can be reasonably evaluated, planned against, exercised against, and so on. The goal here is to identify a *representative* set of contingencies—one that encompasses the principal challenges the United States may plausibly encounter over the planning horizon (which the QDR sets at 20 years). If this can be accomplished, then even if the Color Plans do not depict the precise contingencies that will be encountered (an unlikely event), they will still be “close enough” to what actually occurs so that the planning process yields a US military that has given priority to preparing for the right set of missions and whose Service roles are well-defined and understood.

Some point-of-departure contingencies worth consideration are:

- Major Power Anti-Access/Area-Denial (Plan Yellow)
- Minor Nuclear State Aggression (Plan Red)
- Nuclear State Failure (Plan Green)
- Modern Insurgency (Plan Purple)
- Global Commerce Raiding (Plan Black)
- Global Commons (Space, Cyberspace, Sea, Undersea) Attack (Plan Orange)
- Nuclear/Biological Homeland Attack (Plan Blue)

Once a set of plausible scenarios is developed, they should be tested through simulations, war games and field exercises with an eye toward identifying how they are changing the character of the threats to US security, and how the US military might need to adapt to deal with them effectively. This involves identifying missions (and associated core capabilities) that the military should maintain, as well as those that might be divested or accorded reduced emphasis, and new ones that need to be developed.

Among the primary missions these contingencies seem likely to spawn are the following:

- Projecting and sustaining decisive power (i.e., power sufficient to achieve US security objectives) promptly and discriminately, over long distances, against a major power armed with anti-access/area-denial capabilities;
- Controlling the “Global Commons”—space, the seas, the undersea, and cyberspace—to enable power projection operations and homeland defense; and to preserve access to the global economy for the well-being of both the United States and the international community;
- Deterring, preempting, defending against, and mitigating the consequences of the use of weapons of mass destruction/disruption—particularly nuclear weapons, but also biological and cyber weapons—against the US homeland and vital interests overseas;
- Employing superior intelligence and “strategic communications” capabilities, along with prompt global discriminate strikes and stability, security, transition and reconstruction (SSTR) operations to defeat adversaries seeking to mobilize popular movements, at home and abroad, whose objective is to threaten the homeland and US vital interests;
- Developing and maintaining a dominant position in the ability to adapt rapidly in the face of relatively high geopolitical and military-technical uncertainty, to include rapid fielding of equipment and capabilities (especially in the areas of the biological sciences; nanotechnology; robotics; directed energy; and the intersections of these technologies); doctrinal development; and education and training; and
- Maintaining and expanding, quickly when needed, the ability of allies and partners to increase the range and scale of US military effectiveness.

This list is meant to be illustrative, rather than comprehensive. Moreover, it also is meant to convey an understanding of the substantial way in which the US military’s “mission set” has changed over the past decade or so. The Committee Members will easily recognize that certain “core” military missions of the Cold War era, such as defeating combined arms mechanized forces, preserving sea control against a blue-water maritime surface threat, and establishing air

superiority against a manned enemy air force are not emphasized, since America's enemies and rivals are no longer posing, or even working to pose, these kinds of threats.⁶

Establishing or Extending—and Selectively Divesting—Allies and Alliances

Since the dawn of organized warfare, kingdoms and states have formed alliances to enhance their military capability and, by extension, their security. Through their contribution of military capabilities, allies can exert an important influence on any discussion of roles and missions. For example, during the Cold War the US Navy greatly reduced its emphasis on the countermine warfare mission, since many of its NATO allies agreed to take on the responsibility as a part of their contribution to collective defense.

At the time of the Key West agreement, the United States was building an alliance structure from scratch. Today strains are appearing in America's alliance edifice. It may be that the alliances that won the Cold War, like the Soviet threat that animated them, are destined to pass into history. As recent experience shows, it is the common interests of the allied states that bind them together, far more than the existence of the alliance itself. What Lord Palmerston said over a century ago, that "Britain has no permanent allies, only permanent interests," holds true for America and its allies today, as does former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's observation that "The mission determines the coalition, the coalition does not determine the mission." Put another way, alliances are formed to provide for the collective defense of their members. When the threat to their common security has passed, alliances tend to dissolve.

Thus, when the Soviet Union represented the principal danger to the security of many states, it was possible to form a broad alliance against the common threat. Today, however, the United States does not confront a super power challenger posing a threat on a global scale, but three relatively diffused challenges. Not surprisingly, then, the interests of many regional powers that comprise the ranks of America's most valued allies has become increasingly local. For instance, while the United States, the sole remaining power with global interests, may be concerned about the way in which China's rising power manifests itself, European states generally demonstrate comparatively little alarm, either because they do not see it as affecting them, or because they do not have (or plan to field) any significant military capability to influence the situation. While much of the world remains concerned about nuclear proliferation, the fact remains that, at least with respect to the latter, the United States is the only country with sufficient power to threaten nuclear rogues like Iran or North Korea with substantial military action.

Another factor working against the maintenance of the large, stable alliance structures that existed during the Cold War is the preponderance of US power. States have traditionally banded together to balance the power of a hostile power or coalition. Although this may change in the future, in recent years the United States has not required allies for balancing purposes. Thus

⁶ This is not to say that the US military should divest itself of this capability. In fact, a substantial competence in these areas should be maintained to dissuade rivals from challenging the United States in these areas of military competition. However, far less emphasis should be placed on these capabilities than was the case in the past, and which remains so today.

states whose interests generally coincide with America's have been able to act as "free riders"—counting on the United States to enforce a *Pax Americana* of sorts while contributing little if anything to the effort.

There is, finally, the matter of strategic posture and alliances. Simply put, it is easier to form a coalition to deter aggression or respond in its wake than it is for the purpose of taking preventive action. This was true before the Second Gulf War and is even more true in its aftermath. Yet it may be increasingly necessary to consider such action—as the Clinton Administration did with respect to North Korea and as the Bush Administration did with Iraq—in order to prevent a far more dangerous situation from emerging out of inaction.

Finally, the United States will likely need to seek allies among nonstate entities, such as tribes and clans, in those parts of the world where national governments do not exert an effective monopoly of power within their borders. Nonstate allies could prove important in helping to stabilize failed or failing states, such as those in sub-Saharan Africa. They may also prove important in the Middle East and Central Asia, where family, clan, and tribal ties still run strong.

The alliance requirements for a new era may prove challenging for US security planners, who may still think of alliances in Cold War terms—as grand (i.e., comprising many major allies focusing on a common threat) and enduring. Instead, alliances may come to be more a series of multiple transient coalitions—one for each of the three major challenges confronting the United States. These coalitions may be significantly different from each other, depending upon the particular threat and the defense posture (e.g., deterrence; preventive measures) adopted to address them. Ironically, while allies are likely to be an increasingly important factor in US defense planning, they are also likely to be less reliable and less durable in character. Consequently, even though the United States is almost certain to need allies more in the future, it may prove difficult to assess those circumstances under which allies will commit their militaries to conduct combined operations with US forces.⁷

Promote Competition Among the Services—and Minimize Redundancy

There have never been sufficient resources available to any nation to eliminate entirely the risks to its security. The best that can be done with limited resources is to minimize the overall risk. Accomplishing this means moving resources into mission areas where the threat is growing and away from those areas where threats are diminishing; i.e., where "excess capacity" exists.

Each Service tends to recognize the value of its encroachments on the traditional battlespace of its sister Services. Yet each Service typically recoils at the notion that it should reduce its capacity in those areas where it has traditionally dominated but where other Services can now operate effectively. Thus the Air Force sees how its long-range bomber force, with its global reach, can substitute for carrier aviation strikes in a number of contingencies. But the Air Force

⁷ This is not to say that the United States should not try to engage allies for this purpose. For example, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Michael Mullen, has talked of a "1,000 Ship Navy" involving the fleets of other maritime nations with an interest in preserving global trade security against low-end threats.

has a more difficult time accepting that the Army's growing capacity to conduct precision artillery fires may reduce the need for certain kinds of close air support. Similarly, the Navy rightly touts the virtues of its carriers, whose mobility makes their air wings less vulnerable to enemy ballistic and cruise missile strikes than Air Force strike aircraft located at fixed forward bases. Yet, again, the Navy has trouble seeing how long-range air power might reduce the need for forward-stationed carrier forces.

The Services must realize that, in certain mature mission areas, they have long since lost their mission monopolies. Here the Services need to create "alliances" to minimize excess capacity in certain traditional capability areas and move resources to develop capabilities that are currently undersubscribed. By combining their assets to cover a mission area, the Services can complicate enemy planning by presenting the need to counter several different US military capabilities, as opposed to just one. This was the unrealized hope of Defense Secretary James Forrestal when he convened the Key West meeting nearly 60 years ago.

When it comes to *new* mission areas, however, a different approach is needed, one that initially promotes "redundancy" in order to stimulate competition among the Services to identify the best way of exploiting a new capability and/or addressing a new mission requirement. Here the Congress should *support* inter- and intra-Service competition. This approach has paid dividends in the past. For example, in the 1950s when ballistic missiles were in their infancy, the Army, Navy and Air Force each had their own ballistic missile programs.

To some, this might be considered to be a wasteful and redundant use of resources. Yet the Air Force program led to the Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), a key leg in the US nuclear triad. The Navy program produced the Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), another key component of the nuclear triad. The Army's ballistic missile program was instrumental in the birth of the US space effort, thanks in part to its Jupiter/Redstone rocket. As the nuclear strike and space missions matured, the Army effort was eventually terminated.

The competition fostered among the Services during the early stages of ballistic missile development produced highly desirable outcomes. The same kind of competition might be useful in today's emerging mission areas, such as projecting power in against an enemy armed with A2/AD capabilities, or maintaining C4ISR capabilities against an enemy with an anti-satellite (ASAT) capability, or in defending the homeland against cruise missile attacks, or in cyber warfare at the strategic and operational levels.

The Challenge

The time has long since passed for the US military to restructure itself in light of the new set of roles and missions emerging in the wake of profound changes in the geopolitical and military technical environment. How should this be done? What missions should remain the monopoly of a single Service? Which should be shared? Scaled back? Competed? "Outsourced" to allies or other executive branch departments and agencies—or even to the private sector?

Finding answers to these questions will depend on our ability to grasp the key aspects of what has become a competitive environment very different from that which existed at the time of the

Key West agreement of 1948, or even from the Cold War era that ended forty years later (and nearly two decades ago). What kinds of security challenges will we confront? How will we choose to address them? What resources will be made available for these purposes? What contributions can be reasonably expected from allies and partners and other elements of the executive branch? These are fundamental, first-order questions, matters to be considered as part of a review of US grand strategy—a review that has yet to be undertaken. But these questions must be addressed before a comprehensive review of roles and missions can be usefully undertaken.

**DISCLOSURE FORM FOR WITNESSES
CONCERNING FEDERAL CONTRACT AND GRANT INFORMATION**

INSTRUCTION TO WITNESSES: Rule 11, clause 2(g)(4), of the Rules of the U.S. House of Representatives for the 110th Congress requires nongovernmental witnesses appearing before House committees to include in their written statements a curriculum vitae and a disclosure of the amount and source of any federal contracts or grants (including subcontracts and subgrants) received during the current and two previous fiscal years either by the witness or by an entity represented by the witness. This form is intended to assist witnesses appearing before the House Armed Services Committee in complying with the House rule.

Witness name Andrew Krepinevich

Capacity in which appearing: (check one)

☐ Individual

☒ Representative

If appearing in a representative capacity, name of the company, association or other entity being represented: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment
(CSBA)

FISCAL YEAR 2007

federal grant(s)/ contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant
NDU	DOD	\$68,000	Corporate Fellow Orientation
OFT	DOD	\$489,653	Transformation Roadmap
ONA	DOD	\$5.8 million	for Irregular Warfare Analysis, Wargames, Briefings on Military Trans, GWOT, Long Term Strategy

FISCAL YEAR 2006

federal grant(s)/ contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant
DARPA	US Army	\$232,000	EHPA
ONA	DOD	\$3.4 million	Analysis, Wargames, Briefings on Military Trans, GWOT, Long Term
NDU	DOD	\$66,000	Corporate Fellows Orientation

FISCAL YEAR 2005

Federal grant(s)/ contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant
NDU	DoD	\$65,000	Corporate Fellow-Orbit
DARPA	US Army	\$230,000	EHPA
DNA	DoD	\$4.9,000	Analysis, Wargames Brief on military Transf. EWOT, QDR

Federal Contract Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government:

Current fiscal year (2007): Three;
 Fiscal year 2006: Three;
 Fiscal year 2005: Three;

Federal agencies with which federal contracts are held:

Current fiscal year (2007): 1;
 Fiscal year 2006: 1;
 Fiscal year 2005: 1;

List of subjects of federal contract(s) (for example, ship construction, aircraft parts manufacturing, software design, force structure consultant, architecture & engineering services, etc.):

Current fiscal year (2007): Military Transformation, Long Term Strategy,
 Fiscal year 2006: " Future Security
 Fiscal year 2005: " Environment

Aggregate dollar value of federal contracts held:

Current fiscal year (2007): 6,357,000;
 Fiscal year 2006: 3,698,000;
 Fiscal year 2005: 5,195,000;

Federal Grant Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has grants (including subgrants) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of grants (including subgrants) with the federal government:

Current fiscal year (2007): N/A;
Fiscal year 2006: _____;
Fiscal year 2005: _____.

Federal agencies with which federal grants are held:

Current fiscal year (2007): _____;
Fiscal year 2006: _____;
Fiscal year 2005: _____.

List of subjects of federal grants(s) (for example, materials research, sociological study, software design, etc.):

Current fiscal year (2007): _____;
Fiscal year 2006: _____;
Fiscal year 2005: _____.

Aggregate dollar value of federal grants held:

Current fiscal year (2007): _____;
Fiscal year 2006: _____;
Fiscal year 2005: _____.

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

JUNE 20, 2007

**Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
List of Government Funded Contracts/Grants
10/1/2003 - Present**

Project	Contract/Grant Number	Period of Performance	Prime Contractor	Funding Agency	Funded Amount
US China Nuclear Strategic Dialogue	Order # SAQMPD06M2236		CSIS	Dept of State	\$ 30,000
Reader on US Foreign Policy NGOs and Restricted Access to the Media in Russia	SAQMPD04M1541 S-LMAQM-02-H-0073	6/25/04-1/31/05	CSIS	Dept of State	\$ 21,785
OP/IA Net Assessment	4400139635	7/15/02 - 7/15/03	CSIS	Dept of State	\$ 203,000
	HDTF401-05-C-0011	12/1/06-6/30/07	AMTI/SAIC	DHS	\$ 339,350
DTRA-PONI		2/18/05-4/17/06	CSIS	DTRA	\$ 121,053
F-SI - Transformational Diplomacy	Order # SFSIAQ05M1277	8/22/05 - 4/30/07	CSIS	Foreign Service Institute	\$ 85,000
Biodetense Net Assessment	W81XWH-04-D-0011	10/1/06-8/31/07	Analytic Services, Inc.	Homeland Security Institute	\$ 150,000
APL	Sub Contract # 876456	11/19/03 - 9/3/04	CSIS	John Hopkins University APL	\$ 61,560
Missile Defense Agency NIC - Technology & Power: Anticipating Global Technology Futures	HQ0006-05-F-0003	1/3/05 - 7/3/05	CSIS	Missile Defense Agency (MDA)	\$ 149,978
NIC - Technology & Power: Anticipating Global Technology Futures	2004-G710900-000	11/01/03 - 10/31/04	CSIS	National Intelligence Council	\$ 386,830
NIC - Technology & Power: Anticipating Global Technology Futures	2004-G710900-000	11/1/03 - 2/28/05	CSIS	National Intelligence Council	\$ 485,835
Europeenizing Bosnia-Herzegovina		2/1/06-5/1/06	CSIS	National Intelligence Council	\$ 52,298
Strategic Implications of a Proliferated World	2006-107121-000	7/17/06-7/16/07	CSIS	National Intelligence Council	\$ 372,449

6/18/2007

HASC Listing 6-18.xls

Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
List of Government Funded Contracts/Grants
10/1/2003 - Present

Project	Contract/Grant Number	Period of Performance	Prime Contractor	Funding Agency	Funded Amount
Brazil-Argentina Conference-Phase 1	2004-N001600-000	08/09/04-11/08/04	CSIS	Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)	\$ 15,986
Future U. S. Alliance Dynamics and Strategic Postures Project	2003-N400-00-000	3/28/03 - 7/28/03	CSIS	Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)	\$ 240,589
Washington Roundtable Series	2005*N238400*000	4/1/05 - 10/31/05	CSIS	Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)	\$ 115,639
Mexico Roundtable Series	2006*N010100*000	4/1/06 - 3/31/07	CSIS	Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)	\$ 101,817
Balancing and Bandwagoning in the War Against Terrorism	2003-P462600-000	5/1/03 - 4/1/04	CSIS	Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)	\$ 199,797
China-North Korea Nuclear Policy	2005*N280300*000	5/23/05-12/31/05	CSIS	Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)	\$ 66,385
Information Technology & Security Relations in China	2003-P544300-000	7/24/03 - 7/23/04	CSIS	Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)	\$ 493,782
East Asia Military Conference - PF	2004-N986200-000	7/26/04 - 11/1/06	CSIS	Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)	\$ 108,371
East Asia Military Conference - Asian Studies	2004-N986200-000	7/26/04 - 11/1/06	CSIS	Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)	\$ 147,629
USG3 Evolving Asia	2005*P361100*000	8/1/05-7/31/06	CSIS	Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)	\$ 203,481

6/18/2007

HASC Listing 6-18.xls

Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
List of Government Funded Contracts/Grants
10/1/2003 - Present

Project	Contract/Grant Number	Period of Performance	Prime Contractor	Funding Agency	Funded Amount
Changing Face of Proliferation	2004-N974000-000	8/2/04-11/15/06	CSIS	Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)	\$ 531,381
Document Flow and Decision Making in the People's Republic of China and Taiwan	202-P153100-000	8/22/02 - 4/25/04	CSIS	Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)	\$ 286,166
Brazil-Argentina Conference- Phase 1	2004-N001600-000	8/9/04-11/8/04	CSIS	Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)	\$ 15,986
Transatlantic Dialogue on Terrorism	2005-G394300-000	9/1/05-8/31/06	CSIS	Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)	\$ 318,772
Chinese Views of the Political and Economic Situation in North Korea	2005-G394300-000	9/1/05-8/31/06	CSIS	Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)	\$ 55,439
Post-Conflict Economic Reconstruction Workshop - Sherman Kent School	2003-Y647700-000	9/10/03-2/4/04	CSIS	Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)	\$ 94,222
Alternative Futures Project to Develop a New Privacy Oversight Model	2002-N038900-000	9/16/02-6/15/04	CSIS	Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)	\$ 58,272
DARPA- SRS	PO # 4400071065	5/1/03 - 12/31/03	Hicks & Associates	DARPA	\$ 221,857
CSIS Taskforce on Biotechnology Countermeasures	00636.006.001.802	05/01/04-12/31/04	SRS	DARPA	\$ 99,449
N/A	SB1341-03W-1222	9/22/03 - 12/21/03	CSIS	Department of Commerce	\$ 74,998
	Sub Contract # 876456	11/19/03 - 09/03/04	John Hopkins University APL	Dept of Defense	\$ 61,560

6/18/2007

HASC Listing 6-18.xls

Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
List of Government Funded Contracts/Grants
10/1/2003 - Present

Project	Contract/Grant Number	Period of Performance	Prime Contractor	Funding Agency	Funded Amount
Chinese Military Modernization	2007*0725026*000	5/1/07 - 4/30/09	CSIS	Dept of Defense	\$ 251,410
African Policy Advisory Panel	S-LMAQM-03-C0035	7/15/03 - 3/15/04	CSIS	Dept of Defense	\$ 98,333
Capabilities-Based Planning Conceptual Framework	HQ0034-07-A-1007 (BPA Task 0001)	3/1/07-8/31/07	CSIS	Dept of Defense	\$ 114,488
Export Controls	HQ0034-07-A-1007 (BPA Task 0002)	5/1/07-12/31/07	CSIS	Dept of Defense	\$ 492,575
Afghan Initiative	W74V8H-04-P-0324	5/6/04-5/6/05	CSIS	Dept of Defense	\$ 350,583
BGN-Phase II	W74V8H-04-P-0234	5/7/04-5/6/05	CSIS	Dept of Defense	\$ 966,562
BGN-Phase III-G&R	W74V8H-05-T-0132	6/6/05-6/5/06	CSIS	Dept of Defense	\$ 948,421
BGN-Phase IV	W91QUZ-06-C-0027	9/26/06-9/25/07	CSIS	Dept of Defense	\$ 1,223,961
Strategies Countering Hegemony	DASW01-D-98-0039	1/01/02 - 9/30/02	SAIC	Dept of Defense	\$ 167,500
HUB II	Subcontract 201754 DE-AP26-06NT05722	10/18/06-9/30/07	ITT Corp	Dept of Defense	\$ 89,937
Southern Cone Project	DE-FF03-97SF21331	10/1/06 - 3/31/07	CSIS	Dept of Energy	\$ 23,000
Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific	S-LMAQM-03-C0035	9/20/00 - 9/19/03	CSIS	Dept of Energy	\$ 375,000
African Policy Advisory Panel	S-LMAQM-03-C0035	7/15/03-3/15/04	CSIS	Dept of State	\$ 98,333
African Policy Advisory Panel	S-LMAQM-03-C0035	7/15/03-3/15/04	CSIS	Dept of State	\$ 400,141

6/18/2007

HASC Listing 6-18.xls

Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
List of Government Funded Contracts/Grants
10/1/2003 - Present

Project	Contract/Grant Number	Period of Performance	Prime Contractor	Funding Agency	Funded Amount
Islamic Charities	2006-1071211-000	7/17/06-7/16/07	CSIS	National Intelligence Council	\$ 256,775
North American Future 2025	2006-1071211-000	7/17/06-7/16/07	CSIS	National Intelligence Council	\$ 236,153
Global Climate Change	2006-1071211-000	8/17/06-7/16/07	CSIS	National Intelligence Council	\$ 360,268
PONI	4400122612	4/1/06-5/31/07	SAIC	NNSA	\$ 115,784
Eport Controls/Space		5/11/07-9/1/07	SAIC	NSSO	\$ 36,000
OPM Community of Interest Analysis (HUB)	RQ000204	11/1/05-2/28/06	SRA	OPM	\$ 199,933
Systems Engineering	Subcontract 4400129447	5/24/06-9/30/06	CSIS	SAIC	\$ 269,833
SIGIR	W74V8H-06-F-0106	2/8/06-8/7/07	CSIS	SIGIR (Dept of Defense)	\$ 833,098
SIGIR	W74V8H-06-F-0106	7/28/06-5/27/07	CSIS	SIGIR (Dept of Defense)	\$ 95,000
Military Cooperation	PO # 6117-093-144	3/1/03 - 6/1/03	ENSS through MPRI	U. S. Army	\$ 49,907
Homeland Defense Exercise	N/A	1/01/01 - 8/31/03	Memorial Inst. For the Prevention of Terrorism	U.S. Department of Justice	\$ 115,170
Planning for a Post-Conflict Iraq Democracy & Human Rights in Russia	HAD-G-00-03-00053-00	1/17/03 - 7/16/03	CSIS	USAID	\$ 149,030
Philanthropy in the Arab and Muslim World	118-A-00-02-00178	5/1/03-11/30/04	CSIS	USAID	\$ 208,056
Measuring Progress in Afghanistan Reconstruction	RAN-A-00-03-00013-00	5/5/03 - 11/4/03	CSIS	USAID	\$ 75,660
	306-G-00-06-00510	6/7/06-2/6/07	CSIS	USAID	\$ 232,467

6/18/2007

HASC Listing 6-18.xls

Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
List of Government Funded Contracts/Grants
10/1/2003 - Present

Project	Contract/Grant Number	Period of Performance	Prime Contractor	Funding Agency	Funded Amount
Task Force on the United Nations	IOP-05-167 E4012239	1/1/05 - 6/15/05	CSIS	USIP	\$ 217,295
Rising U.S. Stakes in the Gulf of Guinea	USIP-349-02F	7/1/03 - 12/31/03	CSIS	USIP	\$ 40,000
Post Conflict Stabilization Governance	E4007981 7140132	9/13/04-2/12/05 8/15/06-1/31/07	CSIS CSIS	USIP World Bank	\$ 19,100 \$ 325,000

**QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE
RECORD**

JUNE 20, 2007

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SKELTON

The CHAIRMAN. I am intrigued, Dr. Hamre, about your suggestion in looking at the problems rather than creating the fistfight that we anticipate in roles and missions within the Department between the services. May I make a request of each of you to give us a list of five—and for the record, not today—but make a list of five of those unanswerable questions that should go into the roles and missions mix? And I realize—I don't want you to just fly them by the seat of your pants today, but think about them, and within the very near future give them to us for the record.

Dr. KREPINEVICH. **1. Grand Strategy:** Today, a decade-and-a-half after the Cold War's end, the United States is in a position comparable to that which it confronted in the Cold War's early days. The tranquil years that characterized the decade following the Soviet Union's dissolution have been succeeded by troubling times presenting formidable new dangers that may grow only more threatening in the coming years. Unlike the early Cold War period, however, when the Soviet Union stood out as by far the greatest danger to U.S. security, there are now **three** major endurings challenge to U.S. security—radical Islamism, a rising China, and nuclear proliferation in Asia. These challenges are sufficiently severe, their potential to threaten the American people's security, institutions, and way of life is sufficiently great, and their character suitably enduring as to require a comprehensive strategy similar to that which emerged out of the Truman Administration's NSC-68 and the Eisenhower Administration's "Solarium" effort in the early Cold War period. The objective of such a strategy should be to place the United States in the best possible competitive position. Given the character of the competition, the strategy must be sustainable over an extended period, as long as a generation or two if necessary. Consequently, it is imperative that the strategy be the product of a bipartisan effort. CSBA is exploring grand strategy options and I would be happy to brief you on our efforts.

2. Army Reset: Congress and the Defense Department must decide how best to "reset" the Army for an era in which irregular warfare is likely to dominate its operations—while retaining the capability to fight a major combat operation (albeit one quite different from either of the Gulf Wars), if required. The Pentagon's 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review took an initial step to address this problem when it called for a strategy that emphasized "building partner capacity" training and equipping indigenous military forces in those countries threatened by radical elements, and doing the same for the militaries of those countries that stand by us as allies and partners. The idea is to acknowledge America's manpower limitations and to work with allies and partners, to include indigenous forces, to generate the forces required for sustained irregular warfare operations. Unfortunately, there has been little in the way of action to back up this noteworthy idea, aside from mandating a significant increase in our special operations forces (SOF).

The Army plans to utilize its 65,000-troop end-strength increase to expand the number of its active brigade combat teams, which are oriented primarily on conventional warfare operations. I am aware of no plans the Army has to create training and advising organizations to build "partner capacity" by enabling America's allies and partners to "scale up" quickly to meet the challenges that might be posed by irregular warfare contingencies. In its defense, the Service cites the need to maintain a rotation base of brigades for such conflicts and the need to "hedge" against a major combat operation characterized by conventional warfare. While the Army is right to see the need to address these issues, as noted above, the way in which it is doing so appears highly imbalanced in favor of conventional warfare contingencies.

Put another way, given the overwhelming success of our ground forces in conventional warfare operations, and the shift of rival militaries and nonstate entities toward irregular warfare, orienting 48 active Army brigades, 28 National Guard brigades, and three Marine Corps divisions primarily on conventional warfare operations would appear to reflect a desire to prepare for the kinds of challenges we would prefer to confront, rather than those we will most likely encounter. The Committee would be well-served to exercise its oversight role in reviewing the Army's

reset plans before moving forward with a program that may consume as much as \$100 billion or more.

3. The Nuclear Posture: The United States today exists under a Second Nuclear/Strategic Strike Regime, which emerged as a consequence of the major geopolitical and military-technical changes that have transpired over the past 15 years. These changes have dramatically altered the competition with respect to strategic strike operations in general, and nuclear weapons use in particular.

There has been a blurring of the distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear forms of strategic strike, stemming from the rise of precision and cyber strike capabilities, and the shift toward post-industrial economies, which has made the target base more susceptible to non-nuclear forms of attack. The new strategic strike regime is further complicated by the growing number of states possessing strategic strike capabilities—nuclear weapons in particular—combined with our lack of understanding as to how they calculate costs and benefits, and their relative tolerance for taking risks.

Owing to the growing number of nuclear-armed states and the potential for nonstate entities to possess nuclear weapons, the probability of nuclear use and ambiguous nuclear aggression is increasing. If nuclear weapons are used, there is a significant likelihood that the United States will survive the attack as a functioning society, with all the consequences that entails. Whether the attack occurs at home or abroad, the nation will likely be confronted with a massive stability operations challenge for which it is currently ill-prepared.

Despite the dramatic change in the character of the military competition with respect to nuclear weapons and strategic strike, comparatively little study has been given to the matter—especially when measured against the analysis undertaken in the first decade or so of the First Nuclear/Strategic Strike Regime. The United States has yet to develop a comprehensive strategy for the Second Nuclear/Strategic Strike Regime. Given the consequences of failure in this aspect of the military competition, high priority should be given to this matter.

4. Post-Iraq Strategy: It is important to realize that while Iraq is the “central front” in the war with Radical Islamists, it is also one campaign in a “long war” that may stretch out over decades. If we withdraw the bulk of our forces (or all our forces) from Iraq without achieving our minimal objectives, this defeat may be our “Dunkirk,” but it will not likely be our “Saigon.” We will not be able to “call it a day.” The war with the forces of instability and radicalism in that part of the world will almost certainly go on, just as Britain’s war with Germany continued after it withdrew from the Continent.

But we need a strategy, lest we be left grasping for one as we did during the onset of Phase IV operations in Iraq in the summer of 2003. The strategy must acknowledge that the conflict has multiple dimensions, and the primary theater runs from the shores of the eastern Mediterranean to the Hindu Kush. The war is certainly seen in that context by Iran. We need to think in strategic terms how we might shape events in our favor over the longer term. We can, to a significant extent, still shape our future. The Committee can do much useful work here by encouraging a strategy for the theater of war—not just the “central front.”

5. Dissuasion Strategies: Dissuasion is defined as actions taken to increase the target’s perception of the anticipated cost and/or decrease its perception of the likely benefits from developing, expanding, or transferring a military capability that would be threatening or otherwise undesirable from the U.S. perspective. In simpler terms, dissuasion can be viewed as a kind of “pre-deterrence” in which the target is discouraged, not from employing the military capabilities it possesses, but from creating such capabilities in the first place.

Dissuasion, like deterrence, is a means of shaping the behavior of prospective adversaries. Unlike deterrence, however, *allies can also be targets of dissuasion*. For example, during the Cold War the United States vigorously pursued dissuasion strategies to discourage a number of its allies from developing nuclear weapons. Indeed, while it has gained increased attention in recent years, dissuasion is not a new strategic concept. The Cold War era was also characterized by thinking about how the United States might shape Soviet behavior. Channeling the ongoing competition with the Soviet Union into more stable and less threatening areas than those in which they might otherwise be inclined to engage, or into areas where they functioned relatively ineffectively, was an explicit goal of U.S. defense strategy in the mid-to-late 1980s. The Cold War ended, however, before it could be firmly institutionalized within the Department of Defense.

Some dissuasion strategy initiatives are best pursued in the light of day, where the target (or targets) and others can readily discern their presence and effect. On the other hand, some dissuasion strategies are best pursued covertly, such that a rival cannot easily discern a direct link between U.S. actions and their intent. This

is especially useful when an acknowledged link would serve to increase the target's resolve to pursue the course of action that is the object of U.S. dissuasion efforts.

Dissuasion strategies should be the province of the Secretary of Defense, a small number of senior defense decision-makers, and a small analytic staff. Some aspects of a U.S. strategy will need to remain covert. Thus the fewer people who are aware of these efforts, the better. Consequently, the Committee might most usefully conduct its oversight role with regard to dissuasion through discrete discussions with the most senior defense officials.

The CHAIRMAN. I am intrigued, Dr. Hamre, about your suggestion in looking at the problems rather than creating the fistfight that we anticipate in roles and missions within the Department between the services. May I make a request of each of you to give us a list of five—and for the record, not today—but make a list of five of those unanswerable questions that should go into the roles and missions mix? And I realize—I don't want you to just fly them by the seat of your pants today, but think about them, and within the very near future give them to us for the record.

Dr. HAMRE. I have listed below the five areas where I believe the precise mission remains opaque, and the relative service and/or agency roles undefined.

- Military support to domestic civilian authorities—the creation of U.S. Northern Command has not resolved fundamental questions about how the Defense Department will function in coordination with other federal agencies in times of emergency. There has been considerable attention devoted to hard defense missions (e.g., intercepting commercial aircraft in flight) but far too little attention to the Defense Department's role in, and planning and capabilities for, consequence management and civilian law enforcement.
- Space management—Despite the Rumsfeld Commission's recommendations, space management remains troubled in the Department. Mission advocacy is divided among multiple voices, and there is no clear structure to coordinate space management on an interagency basis.
- Detection, mitigation and response to domestic nuclear terrorism—This is the most serious threat we face from terrorism. Indeed, I believe this one threat vastly overshadows everything else we do in homeland security. We do not have a coherent plan as a nation to deal with this threat. There are perhaps a dozen discrete steps or phases in the progression from a terrorist cell acquiring a nuclear device to its potential detonation in the United States. The United States government can apply its capabilities at each step of this process, yet we are hampered by the lack of coherence in our approach. No one entity in the government oversees the whole, and insufficient coordination is taking place among the many agencies and bureaus with counterterrorism and counterproliferation responsibilities. Disproportionate resources go into tactical detection within 100 feet, but virtually nothing in other areas. This entire mission area needs urgent attention.
- Cyber operations—This is an especially difficult mission area because the most serious and likely threats may well be attacks against non-military assets. Normal defense missions involve threats to military or governmental assets or the population itself. In this instance, 99% of the cyber infrastructure is in the private sector. So what is the appropriate role of the Defense Department—and indeed the entire Federal Government—in protecting against hostile cyber operations?
- Security, stabilization, reconstruction, and transition (SSTR) operations—Our armed forces can win any battle, but when it comes to rebuilding civil society in a conquered nation, we do not do well and we struggle with basic organization responsibilities in our own government. After four years, we still lack a reliable structure to integrate the full capabilities and resources of the Federal Government.

There are undoubtedly more missions for which structured, disciplined study and oversight are needed. But I would ask you to give high priority to these five issues. I and my colleagues would be pleased to follow up with you and the Committee at any time. I also believe you will find an Executive Branch that will accept the need for work in these areas.