[House Document 111-18]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
111th Congress, 1st Session - - - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 111-18
REPORT RELATING TO THE INTERDICTION OF AIRCRAFT INVOLVED IN ILLICIT
DRUG TRAFFICKING
__________
COMMUNICATION
from
THEPRESIDENTOFTHEUNITEDSTATES
transmitting
A REPORT INCLUDING MATTERS RELATING TO THE INTERDICTION OF AIRCRAFT
ENGAGED IN ILLICIT DRUG TRAFFICKING, PURSUANT TO 22 U.S.C. 2291-4 PUB
L. 107-108
February 2, 2009.--Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and
ordered to be printed
The White House,
Washington, January 30, 2009.
Hon. Nancy Pelosi,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Madam Speaker: Consistent with the authorities related
to official immunity in the interdiction of aircraft engaged in
illicit drug trafficking (Public Law 107-108, 22 U.S.C. 2291-
4), as amended, and in order to keep the Congress fully
informed, I am providing a report by my Administration. This
report includes matters related to support for the interdiction
of aircraft engaged in illicit drug trafficking.
Sincerely,
Barack Obama.
United States Assistance for the Interdiction of Aircraft Engaged in
Illicit Drug Trafficking
Columbia and Brazil are the only countries for which the
President made a certification under 22 U.S.C. 2291-4 in
calendar year 2008. The President signed Presidential
Determination 2008-24 on August 15, 2008, for Colombia and
Presidential Determination 2009-4 on October 15, 2008, for
Brazil. In doing so, the President certified, with respect to
Colombia and Brazil, that (1) the interdiction of aircraft
reasonably suspected to be primarily engaged in illicit drug
trafficking in that country's airspace is necessary because of
the extraordinary threat posed by illicit drug trafficking to
the national security of that country; and (2) each country has
appropriate procedures in place to protect against the loss of
innocent life in the air and on the ground in connection with
such interdiction, which shall at a minimum include effective
means to identify and warn an aircraft before the use of force
is directed against the aircraft. Consistent with 22 U.S.C.
2291-4(c), this report contains the following information of or
both Colombia and Brazil: (a) the nature of the illicit drug
trafficking threat to the country; (b) an explanation of safety
procedures in place to protect against the loss of innocent
life in the air and on the ground in connection with
interdiction, including any training and other mechanisms in
place to ensure adherence to such procedures; (c) a description
of assistance provided by the United States to the interdiction
program; and (d) a summary of the country's aircraft
interception activity for which the United States provided
assistance in calendar year 2008.
COLOMBIA
(A) On August 21, 2003, the Airbridge Denial (ABD) Program
in Colombia began operations. In making a sixth certification
for Colombia in August 2008, the President determined that
narcotrafficking continues to pose an extraordinary threat to
Colombia's national security on the basis of several factors.
These factors include the fact that Colombia is still the
world's largest producer of cocaine and a supplier of high-
quality heroin; that Colombia faces a growing domestic cocaine
abuse problem; that Colombia drug trafficking organizations
suborn Colombian officials and pay illegal armed groups to
protect their organizations; that illegal revenue from the
Colombian drug trade disrupts the licit Colombian economy and
that narcotrafficking presents a corrosive threat to the
democratic institutions of government and law enforcement.
Significantly, drug trafficking also serves as the primary
source of funding for the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC) and an important source of funding for the
Colombian United Self-Defense Forces (AUC) and the Colombia
National Liberation Army (ELN), all of which are classified as
Foreign Terrorist Organizations by the Department of State.
(B) The Colombia ABC Program's safety procedures are set
forth in the bilateral Letter of Agreement, signed on December
20, 2007. In calendar year 2008, the basic procedures for
aerial interception of an unidentified, assumed suspect (UAS)
flight were as follows:
Detection, Sorting, and Identification. When the
Government of Colombia detects or is informed of an aircraft
operating in a defined zone of control that is a candidate for
possible ABD action (a ``track of interest''), information on
that aircraft shall be gathered by the Government of Colombia
from all reasonably available sources, including radar systems,
radio and visual contact with the aircraft, electronic systems
(which help determine whether the plane is traveling on a filed
flight plan and what type of plane it is), and relevant air
traffic control centers, to begin to determine whether the
aircraft is reasonably suspected to be primarily engaged in
illicit drug trafficking. That determination shall be made by
the Battle Commander Officer in the Colombian Air Force's
Command and Control Center (CAFCCC), based upon certain factors
set out in the Agreement, in conjunction with other information
provided to Colombia Government and United States Government
participants in the ongoing action.
Monitoring. If the Government of Colombia
determines or has preliminary reasons to believe that an
aircraft is primarily engaged in illicit drug trafficking, that
aircraft shall be tracked and monitored. If tracking is
intermittent, positive reidentification shall be made with
reasonable certainty before the ABD event may continue. If the
Government of Colombia has been unable to identify the track of
interest as a legitimate track, the aircraft shall be
considered suspect by the Colombian Air Force (CAF) under CAF
procedures and may be intercepted.
Phase I--Interception. The interception phase
includes attempts to contact the intercepted aircraft by radio
and, if necessary, by visual signals in order to determine the
identity of the pilot or intercepted aircraft. If, during this
phase, the Colombian Government determines that the aircraft is
reasonably suspected to be primarily engaged in illicit drug
trafficking (on the basis of several considered factors), the
CAF may order the intercepted aircraft to land at a designated
place suitable for a safe landing. If, after being intercepted,
the suspect aircraft does not comply with the procedures and
instructions given by the CAF, the CAF pilot may request
permission to proceed to Phase II.
Phase II--Use of Warning Shots. Phase II consists
of the firing of warning shots, using ammunition containing
tracer rounds, in order to demonstrate to the pilot of the
intercepted aircraft that he must comply with the CAF
interceptor's order. If all of the procedures required under
the Agreement have been followed, the information gathered
continues to indicate that an aircraft is suspect, and the
aircraft fails to respond to the interceptor's orders to land,
the Government of Colombia may, in accordance with the
following procedures, move to Phase III.
Phase III--Firing of Weapons at Intercepted
Aircraft in the Air. If, after warning shots are fired under
Phase II, the intercepted aircraft does not acknowledge or
follow the interceptor's directions, the Colombian interceptor
aircraft may only fire weapons at the intercepted aircraft if
he requests and receives permission to do so. The Commander of
the Colombian Air Force (COCAF) must review all such requests.
The COCAF may approve such request after verifying that all
procedures required under the Agreement have been followed.
Upon receipt of the authorization, the interceptor aircraft
must warn the intercepted aircraft that it will be fired upon
if it refuses to comply, using International Civil Aviation
Organization radio communications procedures, and using the
appropriate frequencies.
The interceptor must use reasonable force to disable the
intercepted aircraft, starting with a minimum level of fire in
an attempt to persuade the intercepted aircraft to land as
directed. The intercepted aircraft shall be given a reasonable
opportunity to obey the previously issued order to land before
the CAF interceptor uses additional force. Levels of force may
be increased if the intercepted aircraft continues to refuse to
follow the interceptor's directions. Both the United States
Government and the Government of Colombia acknowledge that even
the minimum level of force could result in loss of life. If the
intercepted aircraft has landed or has been shot down, the
interceptor aircraft or tracker aircraft shall give immediate
notice to the CAFCCC of the location of the intercepted
aircraft.
The safety procedures require similar identification and
warning procedures when a suspected narcotrafficking aircraft
has been located on the ground. Further, the United States
Government and Government of Colombia have agreed upon
additional restraints on the use of force, including a
prohibition on the use of force against state or commercial
aircraft, aircraft that have filed and are not significantly
deviating from a flight plan, aircraft whose pilots appear to
be incapacitated, and aircraft whose pilots genuinely appear to
be under duress.
In addition to the safety procedures described above, the
Letter of Agreement governing the ABD Program provide for
safety oversight by two Colombian personnel (the ground safety
monitor and an air safety monitor) as well as the United States
(through the Joint Interagency Task Force--South (JIATF-S)
Command Duty Officer). Collectively, these three individuals
are referred to as the ABD ``safety oversight triad'' and are
required to oversee all Phase I, II, and III actions.
In the past years, the United States Government trained the
Colombian Government's pilots and sensor operators to operate
Citation aircraft involved in the program. In 2008, as the
program matured, pilot and crew refresher training, as well as
training of new Colombian personnel, continued. A semiannual
review of the program, held in February 2008, helped to address
issues that had arisen in the program's implementation. The
United States Government also received weekly and monthly
reports on program events.
(C) In 2008, the United States Government provided
personnel to staff positions in Colombia's ABD Program,
including a Department of Defense JIATF-S Tactical Commander
and JIATF-S Command Duty Officer, and a Host Nation Rider
Assistant.
JIATF-S's Tactical Commander exercised command and control
of United States Government ABD assets through JIATF-S's Joint
Operation Center (JOC). The JIATF-S Command Duty Officer was
the Tactical Commander's senior watch officer at the JOC. The
Host National Rider Assistant served as a United States
Government representative who assisted the Host Nation Rider on
board the detection aircraft. One employee of the Narcotics
Affairs Section in the United States Embassy in Bogota is
devoted exclusively to overseeing implementation of this
program.
From January 1, 2008, until December 31, 2008, the United
States Government provided maintenance support to the Colombian
Government's five Citation aircraft for the ABD Program. On
January 1, 2008, the title to these aircraft was transferred to
the Government of Colombia. The United States Government also
provided radar information and intelligence to the Colombian
Government. Additional United States Government assets (both
aircraft and personnel) from the Departments of Defense and
Homeland Security have provided support for this program under
the conditions contained in the Agreement.
(D) From January 1, 2008, until December 31, 2008, the
Government of Colombia, with the assistance of the United
States Government, located 60 UAS flights within Colombian
airspace. Of these 60 UAS flights, ten were determined to be
legitimate flights. Of the remaining aircraft, none were
subject to warning shots or lethal force, nor were any aircraft
forced to land. In part due to the efficacy of the ABD Program,
most UAS flights were located near the Venezuelan border and
remained only briefly in Colombian airspace, thereby reducing
the Colombian Government's ability to engage the aircraft via
ABD procedures. While conducting law enforcement inspections as
part of the ABD Program at airfields throughout the country,
the Government of Colombia impounded two aircraft, seizing one
metric ton of cocaine from those aircraft, and arresting five
persons. The United States Government is unaware of any deaths
or injuries resulting from the Government of Colombia's actions
with respect to these flights.
BRAZIL
(A) Brazil's ABD Program began operations on October 17,
2004. In making a fifth certification for Brazil pursuant to 22
U.S.C. Sec. 2291-4, the President determined that
narcotrafficking continues to pose an extraordinary threat to
Brazil's national security on the basis of several factors.
These factors include the fact that aerial drug shipments are a
key component of this threat and a preferred method of
narcotrafficking; that the amount of cocaine shipped through
Brazil has increased over the last decade; and that it is
estimated that well over 100 metric tons of cocaine enter
Brazil annually, with one-third to one-half of it remaining in-
country, making Brazil the second largest consumer of illicit
drugs. In addition, there are confirmed ties between drug
traffickers and those involved in illegal arms trafficking. The
resulting domestic drug trade has fueled widespread urban
violence in Brazil, notably in Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, as
organized criminal gangs fight to control a share of the
lucrative enterprise.
(B) The Brazil ABD Program's operating guidelines are
contained in the Operational Guidelines of the Aerospace
Defense System, the details of which have been disclosed to the
United States in the form of Brazilian responses to U.S.
questions appended to a 2004 exchange of diplomatic notes.
According to that 2004 exchange of notes and subsequent
discussions with Brazilian officials, the key safety procedures
built into the Brazil program include that interdiction is
restricted to presumed illegal drug distribution routes and
areas without high population density. Also, commercial
aircraft, hijacked aircraft, aircraft with innocent people on
board, or aircraft in which the pilot appears incapacitated or
under duress are not subject to interdiction. Furthermore,
International Civil Aviation Organization procedures for visual
and electronic means of communication are adhered to during the
identification and communication phases. The decision-making
authority throughout the interdiction process is limited to
specifically defined Air Defense personnel.
Also, according to the Government of Brazil, Brazil has a
multistage procedure to identity, evaluate, and take action
against an aircraft reasonably suspected of being primarily
engaged in illicit drug trafficking. The key stages of that
process are as follows:
Initial Classification. When the Government of
Brazil detects an aircraft that displays irregular air traffic
traits, it will consider that aircraft to be ``unidentified''
(also referred to as ``track of interest'') and a candidate for
possible aerial interception. The Brazilian Government will
proceed to gather information on the aircraft to determine
whether the aircraft is reasonably suspected to be primarily
engaged in illicit drug trafficking. If the Brazilian
Government is unable to identify the aircraft as legitimate,
the aircraft will be considered ``surveillance worthy'' by the
Brazilian Air Force and may be intercepted.
Interception. During interception, the Government
of Brazil will attempt to determine with greater certainty the
identity of the intercepted aircraft. The tracker or
interceptor aircraft will take all reasonable measures to
identify the intercepted aircraft by visual or electronic
observation of the nationality markings, registration number,
license number, or identifying features of the intercepted
aircraft. The Government of Brazil will further attempt to
gather information regarding the intercepted aircraft that may
help determine whether the intercepted aircraft is reasonably
suspected to be primarily engaged in illicit drug trafficking.
If the aircraft is determined to be reasonably suspected of
being primarily engaged in illicit drug trafficking, the
Brazilian Air Force classifies the aircraft as ``suspicious''
and may proceed to the interrogation phase.
Interrogation in the Air. The tracker or
interceptor aircraft will attempt to establish communications
with the intercepted aircraft through radio communications or
visual signals and order the intercepted aircraft to change its
routing or to land, if factors continue to support a
determination that the aircraft is primarily engaged in illicit
drug trafficking.
Use of Warning Shots. The Government of Brazil
will move to the firing of warning shots to demonstrate to the
pilot of the intercepted aircraft that he must comply with the
interceptor's order if the gathered information continues to
indicate that an aircraft is suspect and the aircraft fails to
respond to the interceptor's order to land. Warning shots may
only be ordered and authorized by the Airspace Defense Senior
Authority or the Air Operations Commander after verification
that all requisite procedures have been satisfied. The
intercepting aircraft will fire the warning shots from abeam of
the intercepted aircraft, in a position that will permit the
intercepted aircraft to see the intercepting aircraft but that
will avoid damage to the intercepted aircraft. Intercepted
aircraft that comply with the orders of the interceptor
aircraft after warning shots have been fired will be escorted
to land at a designated airfield, where law enforcement
authorities will subject it to ground control measures.
Firing of Weapons at Intercepted Aircraft in the Air. If,
after warning shots are fired, the intercepted aircraft does
not acknowledge or follow the interceptor's directions, the
aircraft will be designate as ``hostile.'' The Brazilian Air
Force Commander-in-Chief may only authorize the use of lethal
force after verifying that all requisite procedures have been
followed. The first burst of fire used against the intercepted
aircraft will be as brief as possible and preferably avoid
using ammunition capable of causing a fuel tank explosion.
After the first burst of fire, the pilot of the intercepting
aircraft will relay information regarding the effect of the
fire to the Air Force Commander-in-Chief and try to contact the
intercepted aircraft again, if possible, before requesting
authorization to fire again. Once an intercepted aircraft
lands, the Brazilian federal police will attempt to take
control of the aircraft for law enforcement purposes.
(C) Brazil's aerial interdiction program differs from
Colombia's in that, among other things, Brazil independently
administers its program. The Government of Brazil is solely
responsible for all actions relating to each aerial
interdiction event, but has committed to share pertinent
operational information about such events after the fact with
the United States Government in a timely and transparent
manner. The United States does not provide significant or
direct assistance to Brazil's program. Some United States
Government activities that could potentially contribute to
Brazil's ABD Program indirectly are the Department of Defense's
training program for pilots and other Government of Brazil
officials, United States Government authorization of sales of
defense articles to the Government of Brazil, and real-time
radar track data made available to Brazil's Liaison Officer at
JIATF-S.
(D) During the 2008 reporting cycle, the United States is
unaware of any incidents in which the Brazilian Air Force
security forces, including the Brazilian Air Force, federal
police, and other law enforcement agencies, used lethal force
against aircraft under Brazil's interdiction program or any
deaths or injuries resulting from Brazilian Air Force action
related to the program.
The Government of Brazil has shared with the United States
its official statistics for the operation of its interdiction
program between January and September 2008 on the condition
that the information be treated confidentially. The data is not
included in this report, but can be made available upon request
to Members and staff. The United States Embassy in Brasilia is
seeking from the Government of Brazil the program's operational
statistics for the remainder of 2008 and will make those
statistics available upon request as well.