[Senate Hearing 110-741]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-741
THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN AFFAIRS BUDGET
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 13, 2008
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BILL NELSON, Florida GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
BARACK OBAMA, Illinois LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
JIM WEBB, Virginia JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
Antony J. Blinken, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hon. Joseph Biden, Jr., U.S. Senator From Delaware............... 1
Hon. Richard G. Lugar. U.S. Senator From Indiana................. 5
Hon. Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State, Department of State,
Washington, DC................................................. 8
Prepared statement......................................... 12
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Prepared statement of Senator Russell D. Feingold.......... 71
APPENDIX
Responses to Additional Questions Submitted for the Record to
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice by Members of the Committee
Questions Submitted by Senator Biden....................... 73
Questions Submitted by Senator Lugar....................... 91
Questions Submitted by Senator Boxer....................... 117
Questions Submitted by Senator Coleman..................... 122
Questions Submitted by Senator Menendez.................... 126
Questions Submitted by Senator Vitter...................... 129
Questions Submitted by Senator Casey....................... 130
Question Submitted by Senator Isakson...................... 132
(iii)
THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN AFFAIRS BUDGET
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WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 13, 2008
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in
room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R.
Biden, Jr. (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Biden, Dodd, Kerry, Feingold, Boxer,
Menendez, Cardin, Casey, Webb, Lugar, Hagel, Coleman, Corker,
Voinovich, Murkowski, Isakson, Vitter, and Barrasso.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH BIDEN, JR.,
U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE
The Chairman. The hearing will come to order. It's a great
pleasure to have Secretary Rice before us today to present the
budget of the State Department and talk about that and other
things with us. And it's an honor to have you here Madame
Secretary. And it's hard to believe that this is the last--at
least maybe--the last budget you'll be presenting, at least
under President Bush. And who knows, maybe--maybe it will
continue, but we thank you for being here, Madame Secretary,
and appreciate your cooperation.
Before we begin, I'd like to acknowledge what all of us are
aware of, but it warrants being acknowledged, that our
counterpart in the House, Tom Lantos, has passed away. Tom
Lantos, we all had relationship with Tom, but as we say, as a
point of personal privilege, my relationship with Tom goes back
a long, long time. Tom was actually my foreign policy advisor.
Tom was working for the Bank of America and teaching at the
University of San Francisco as an economics professor. And I
met him out there and on one occasion, and I talked him into
coming back to work as my staffer. And I may be the only
chairman who ever had a chairman work as a staffer.
But we became very close friends, our families, and his
daughter, Katrina, worked for me as well. And his grandson
Tomicah is a Ph.D. and handles Europe for me on the committee
as we speak. But Tom, as we all know, was the only survivor of
the Holocaust to ever serve in the United States Congress. In a
sense, Tom was more American than the son of the American
Revolution. Tom Tom epitomized every value that we herald as
being an American value. Above all, as the Secretary knows, he
was a consummate gentleman.
I used to kid him, I used to tell him that I believe that
the Blarney Stone in Ireland was probably first found in
Budapest, because I've never--I've never run across a more
charming, more decent, and a more brilliant man, with all those
qualities rolled into one. And, he is--it's a big loss for the
country, and I know he was a close friend of Barbara's as well,
being a fellow Californian and coming from her neck of the
State. So, I just want to acknowledge how profoundly missed
that Tom will be.
I'd also like to welcome the newest member of our
committee, Senator Barrasso. Where--is he here? Oh, there he
is. I'm looking the wrong way. I'm so used to looking right
when I think Republican. I apologize. And you were appointed
last evening to take the place of Senator Sununu, who left the
committee to take a seat on the Finance Committee. I welcome
you and I really look forward--and I know you're going to have
to leave because you're on the Energy Committee, as well, and
there's a major issue coming before that committee today. But,
we just want you to know how welcome you are and look forward
to working with you on this committee.
Madame Secretary, today the committee meets to hear from
you on the President's budget for Foreign Affairs for fiscal
year 2009. The budget submitted to Congress last week, seeks
$39.5 billion in spending for Foreign Affairs, a substantial
increase over the last year, and I commend you. I commend you
for persuading the President to continue to expand the Foreign
Affairs budget.
I'm particularly pleased by the nearly $250 million for
funding requested for the Civilian Stabilization Initiative,
which was an initiative of my colleague and Chairman Senator
Lugar and I, but he was the main engine behind all of that. And
I think it is extremely important. This builds on legislation
that we developed 4 years ago, to establish a corps of Active
Duty and Reserve civilian personnel that we can send overseas
on short notice to address post-conflict needs and humanitarian
crisis. We still have unfinished business here in the Senate
and the Congress, the latest version of our legislation has
been stalled in the Senate for nearly a year. It is my hope we
can unglue it and get it passed.
I'm also pleased that you are working to increase the
number of Foreign Service personnel, as well as diplomatic
security agents. Secretary Powell began that expansion, but it
has been offset by the demands of Iraq, and there continues to
be reports of personnel shortages in many areas of the
department.
The President's Emergency Action Program for HIV/AIDS has
saved more than a million lives. It may be the greatest legacy
this President leaves, or any President could leave. It's saved
more than a million lives, and it also, not only did the right
thing, is doing the right thing, but puts America in the right
light, once again trumpeting our values and our humanity, not
just our power.
This year's budget includes $6 billion for HIV/AIDS. I know
that sounds like a lot of money and is a lot of money, but, in
reality, the request only marginally increases the program over
last year. We're not doubling our investment as the President
said, we're just barely maintaining it. And I believe we can do
even better than that, so this may be a case where briar rabbit
is allowed to be thrown into the briars, because my intention
to try to expand that number, and I believe others will join me
in that regard.
So Madame Secretary, I strongly support most of your budget
efforts. What I don't support, and this is not your
responsibility, is the practice of placing tens of billions of
dollars for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan in the category of
so-called emergency spending, which the President again exempts
from normal budget rules. I think it is wrong to force the
taxpayers of tomorrow to pay for the wars of today.
Beyond the budget, this is an opportunity for you to talk
about your policy priorities for the remaining months of the
administration.
And let me briefly mention a few of mine and what I'm going
to attempt to, with the help of Senator Lugar and others, have
the committee focus on. In Iraq, all of us welcome the recent
decline in violence. Our military, as it always has, has done
its job and has done its job remarkably well. And they've taken
advantage of other critical developments, including the
awakening movement among Sunnis and the Sadr cease-fire among
Shiites. Unfortunately, political progress, which was the
principle aim of the surge, has not followed.
I still see no strategy for achieving what virtually
everyone agrees is the key to success in Iraq, a sustainable
political settlement that convinces Iraqis they can pursue
their interest peacefully without bullets and bombs. Without a
political settlement, Madame Secretary, we could easily see a
resurgence of violence, no matter how many troops we keep in
Iraq. And, we just can't keep this many troops in Iraq for a
whole lot longer. Every day we stay in these numbers is another
day of terrible strain on our fighting forces and their
families, on our military readiness and ability to meet other
threats to American security, on our taxpayers and government's
capacity to meet challenges here at home, and our standing in
the world.
The President says our strategy is to ``to leave on
success.'' The question is: Does that mean that it is his
intent to stay on failure? Because right now, in the absence of
a political strategy in Iraq, that's what we're doing. We're
treading water. That's better than drowning, but we can't keep
doing it.
I'm pleased that both you and Defense Secretary Gates have
now clarified the so-called framework for normalization of
relations. That is the administration's plan to negotiate with
the Government of Iraq. And you've laid out clearly, it does
not include security commitments that would bind us to engage
our military in Iraq's defense. As I made clear to the
President in a letter last December, any such commitment would
require the consent of the Senate.
And I'm also pleased that the President himself has said on
the record, the United States seeks no permanent military bases
in Iraq. We have passed such legislation, I believe on several
occasions in the Senate, and once finally, the entire Congress,
signed by the President. I've repeatedly put a prohibition
against permanent bases in legislation because the misplaced
belief in Iraq and the wider Arab and Muslim world, is that we
seek a permanent presence, has been used as a recruiting tool
for al-Qaeda, and it is an accelerant for anti-Americanism, and
I'm glad the President has stated flatly that is not our
intention.
What I hope to hear from you today, Madame Secretary, and
in the weeks ahead, is just how we get to success. What is the
political strategy in Iraq? What is the diplomatic strategy to
help achieve it? You know my views and my colleagues,
unfortunately, know my views. I've been like a broken record,
as they used to say, but unless and until we put our energy
into helping the Iraqis build what is already in their
Constitution, a federal system that brings resources and
responsibility down to the local and regional level, I don't
believe we're going to reach that political solution. Where are
we on that? And if we continue to reject that plan, which
Congress overwhelmingly endorsed, what's the alternative?
If we should have surged forces anywhere, I think most of
the committee would agree it was in Afghanistan. I know you're
just back from there, and Senators Kerry and Hagel and I are
about to go. When we return, the committee will want to hear
your ideas for how we can turn around the situation that seems
to most of us, if not the administration, to be slipping from
our grasp. Violence is up, the Taliban is back, drug production
is at an all time high, and people seem to be losing faith in
Karzai government's ability to deliver progress.
Afghanistan's fate, as you know better than anyone, is
linked to Pakistan's future, and so is American security. We're
going to see, next week, what the elections bring in Pakistan,
but we'll be anxious to hear from you after that.
But no matter what the result, we need to move in Pakistan
from Musharraf policy to a Pakistan policy, one that
demonstrates to its moderate majority that we are with them for
the long haul, with the help to build schools, roads, clinics,
and that we're going to demand accountability for the billions
of dollars in a blank check that we keep writing for the
Pakistan military.
And finally, in Darfur, the United Nations and the African
Union jointly assumed control over the peacekeeping mission on
December 31, but fewer than 10,000 of the 26,000 authorized
troops are on the ground. One reason is Khartoum's
obstructionism, but the other is the pathetic fact that the
international community can not muster 24 helicopters needed
for this mission. I would like to know exactly which leaders
you and the President have personally contacted to get these
helicopters, and what can be done to deal with that.
There's a lot more to talk about, Kosovo's imminent
declaration of independence, your plans for the NATO summit,
your efforts in the Middle East, the challenges posed by Iran,
Syria, and Lebanon.
And this committee is going to spend a lot of time in the
months ahead on some long-term challenges that may seem less
urgent, but are no less important to America's future, the
emergence of China, India, and Russia, the critical issues of
energy, security, and climate change, which Chairman Lugar
started in earnest the last 2 years, and the need for a more
effective strategy to advance democracy and combat extremism
that will help us recapture the totality of America's strength.
We won't have time today to cover even a small piece of
this agenda, so I hope you'll come back a few times before the
year is out, Madame Secretary.
And with that, let me turn to Senator Lugar for his opening
comments.
Senator Lugar. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Let me
ask of--I note the presence of a quorum, and both parties have
been consulted about legislation, five pieces and 19 nominees
that have unanimous consent, whether it might be the pleasure
of the chairman to proceed to that business.
The Chairman. Well, I would ask the Secretary if she minds
us interrupting.
[Recess.]
The Chairman. Now we'll move back to regular session and
the floor is yours.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR.
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Lugar. I thank the chairman, and I know the
Secretary thanks the chairman. Nineteen worthy Americans will
be heading out to embassies that need to have our presence, and
we appreciate very much this action.
And I join the chairman in thoughts about Tom Lantos. He
was a very dear friend and a wonderful partner with this
committee. We have appreciated that leadership very much
throughout the years, as well as opportunities to be with him
in Hungary during CODELs in the past, in which he enriched our
understanding.
Likewise, I want to welcome our new member, Senator John
Barrasso. He is going to be a very able and eager participant
in our hearings. He'll be back, I understand, after he does his
work in the Energy Committee today.
I join you, Mr. Chairman, in welcoming the Secretary. This
hearing gives the committee an opportunity to examine the State
Department's budget and ask fundamental questions about the
Bush administration's foreign policies. It's especially
important in a year of transition to examine international
projects that we have in motion, and the overall strategies of
our foreign policy institutions. We should ask whether the
State Department, the Bush administration, and indeed, the
entire political establishment of our country, both Democrat
and Republican, are adapting to the world as it is.
Have bureaucrats and budgetary inertia consigned us to
spend most of our time preparing for yesterday's military and
diplomatic threats, or are we fixated on old processes and
tactics that are being overwhelmed by global economic,
demographic, and technological changes?
The understandable Bush administration response after
September 11, 2001, was to shift assets toward combating
terrorists. And defending this country from terrorist attacks
remains a fundamental national security priority. We are also
engaged in vital diplomatic efforts related to problem
countries, including Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, North Korea, but
the gravity of these situations should not keep us from
responding to dynamic global changes.
In a recent piece from the Financial Times, the eminent
columnist, Martin Wolf wrote, ``Neo-classical economics
analyzed economic growth in terms of capital, labor, and
technical progress, but I now think it is more enlightening to
view the fundamental drivers as energy and ideas.'' If Wolf is
correct, and I believe he is, our economy and our foreign
policy are at risk of being overwhelmed by forces that are
receiving far too little attention within our Government.
Principal among these forces is the burgeoning demand for
energy from China, India, and elsewhere, and the cosmic
economic shifts that are being driven by these immense, rapidly
industrializing societies. The immediate effect is rising
energy prices, but longer term effects include accelerating
climate change and shortages of hydrocarbon supplies, both of
which could become sources of serious conflict.
The most eye-opening statistics emanate from China. That
country's rapid industrialization is obliterating old ways of
thinking about the global economy. Consider that the Chinese
coals plants that came online in 2006 alone, added a net 80
gigawatts of electricity generation to the Chinese system, an
amount roughly equal to the entire electrical capacity of Great
Britain.
Meanwhile, China last year used 32 percent of all the steel
consumed in the world. The 7.2 million vehicles sold in China
in 2006 were 4\1/2\ times as many as were sold in China just 9
years earlier.
And thanks both to foreign direct investment in China and
its massive current surplus, China has nearly $1.5 trillion in
official foreign currency reserves. That accounts for a quarter
of all the reserves in the world. The value of the dollar has
fallen, as our trade deficit has risen and our savings rate
remains near zero. We are not just buying what they are making,
America is, in effect, importing debt, along with consumer
satisfaction.
Such statistics raise many disconcerting questions about
global stability, the United States influence in the world, and
the maintenance of American living standards.
I make these points today because there is a temptation in
the last year of an administration for observers to dismiss,
not only the budgetary priorities of the outgoing President,
but also important foreign policy initiatives. Lame-duck
administrations sometimes embed such attitudes by failing to
quickly appoint nominees, as numerous vacancies come open, and
by giving up on initiatives that require approval from
Congress. I would emphasize the United States can not afford to
take a year off, and I trust the administration believes that
very stoutly.
The President should be reaching out to the Congress in an
effort to construct a consensus on how we can respond, not only
to a high-profile threat such as terrorism and climate change,
but also more nuanced problems such as U.S. energy
vulnerability, the struggle to diversify central Asian energy
supplies, our weakened debt positions, the shift of financial
influence to Asia, the growth of sovereign wealth funds, and
the coming expansion and demand for nuclear power, which will
complicate our nonproliferation efforts.
These are economic and political problems that require the
reorientation of the State Department. For example, traditional
ways of thinking about Russia have less salience when Russian
foreign policy is now largely based on maximizing the political
leverage and financial earnings of its energy supplies, and
dominating the transport of energy in Eurasia.
Secretary Rice, I congratulate you for moving toward a
much-needed reinvigoration of U.S. international energy
diplomacy. I would highlight agreements with Brazil on
biofuels, and with India on civilian nuclear power as examples
of how our strategic alliances can bring together our foreign
policy, our energy security, and climate change interests.
I hope that you will act quickly upon legislation
establishing an international energy coordinator within your
office. The legislation was passed unanimously by this
committee and signed into law by President Bush in December
2007. Swift implementation of this legislation, with your clear
support, would empower the international energy coordinator to
galvanize diplomatic capacities currently stove-piped within
the State Department and other executive agencies.
Last month, I traveled to Georgia, Kazakhstan,
Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Ukraine to advocate for greater
cooperation on energy security. The stakes there are high, as
President Putin has repeatedly traveled to the region to
solidify Russian domination of energy supplies. Chairman Biden
and I have joined in urging the administration to appoint a
high-level, Special Envoy for energy in that region. Indeed,
during my trip, leaders of those countries asked that the
United States send such a representative to affirm U.S.
interest in central Asia and affirm U.S. security.
Madame Secretary, I'm hopeful you will share with us your
strategy for the region, and whether you intend to appoint such
an envoy.
As we think about how to achieve our goals, we must also
consider how to strengthen our diplomatic capabilities. The
Bush administration deserves praise for its international
affairs budgets, which have attempted to reverse the downward
spiral in U.S. foreign policy capabilities imposed during the
1990s.
By 2001, embassy security upgrades were behind schedule. We
lacked adequate numbers of diplomats with key language skills,
many important overseas posts were filled by junior Foreign
Service officers, and our public diplomacy was completely
inadequate for the mission in an era of global terrorism. Our
diplomatic capabilities have made progress under President
Bush, but much work is left to be done.
Congress however, must begin to ask more fundamental
questions about the national security budget as a whole.
Although our Defense, Foreign Affairs and Homeland Security and
Intelligence, Energy budgets are carefully examined from the
incremental perspective of where they were the last year, it is
not apparent that Congress is adequately evaluating whether the
money flowing to these areas represents the proper mix for the
21st century security threats that we face.
Last year, in my opening statement at our State Department
budget hearing, I pointed out that the Foreign Affairs account
was just one-fourteenth the size of the Defense budget. Defense
agencies increasingly have been granted authority to fill gaps
in foreign assistance and public information programs, but the
military is ill-suited to run such programs. A far more
rational approach would be to give the State Department the
resources it should have to achieve what clearly our civilian
missions.
This view was echoed by Defense Secretary Gates in a speech
last month at CSIS. He pointed out that the total Foreign
Affairs budget request was roughly equivalent to what the
Pentagon spends on health care alone. He also noted that the
planned 7,000 troop increase in the Army expected for 2008 is
an, ``equivalent to adding the entire U.S. Foreign Service to
the Army in one year.'' We must adjust our civilian foreign
policy capabilities to deal with a dynamic world, where
national security threats are increasingly based on nonmilitary
factors.
Though the State Department has numerous underfunded
priorities, I would emphasize the urgency of establishing a
rapidly deployable civilian corps that is trained to work with
the military on stabilization and reconstruction missions to
hostile environments.
I am very pleased that after several years of work by this
committee and the State Department, the Bush administration is
requesting $248.6 million for the Civilian Stabilization
Initiative. Creating and sustaining this civilian capacity is
precisely the intent of the Lugar-Biden-Hagel legislation that
passed the Senate in 2006, and passed this committee again last
March.
In addition to meeting contingencies in Iraq and
Afghanistan, we must be ready for the next post-conflict
mission.
Madame Secretary, it is a pleasure always to have you with
us. We look forward to your insights and many other matters
that you wish to bring before us.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Chairman, thank you for an insightful
statement. I appreciate it.
Madame Secretary, one housekeeping measure. We're told
there's going to be a vote around 10:30, and what I'd like to
suggest is you begin your statement and I'd have you go through
your statement. But it may be that one of us will leave. I've
read your statement in its entirety already, believe it or not,
and may leave to vote so we can come back without interruption,
and just keep this going. But I apologize for the interruption,
which is likely to occur around 10:30.
The floor is yours, Madame Secretary, and again, welcome.
Thank you for being here.
STATEMENT OF HON. CONDOLEEZZA RICE, SECRETARY OF STATE,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Secretary Rice. Thank you very much, Chairman Biden.
I would first like to thank the committee. This is, indeed,
the last budget that I will present to you as Secretary of
State.
I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank Senator
Lugar, and all of the members of the committee for what, I
think, we have achieved together over the last several years.
I'd also like to take just a moment to say how much
Congressman Tom Lantos will be missed. He was, of course, a
northern Californian, someone that I knew very well. I feel
that I've lost an inspirational mentor, and I've lost a good
friend. And when I testify today before the House Foreign
Affairs Committee, it will be a sad moment to see him not
sitting there. He was a true American hero, and I think he
embodied the best of our country.
I want to thank you very much for what we have been able to
do together. I have a full statement, Mr. Chairman, but I'll
just have that entered into the record with your permission.
The Chairman. Without objection, the entire statement will
be placed in the record.
Secretary Rice. Thank you.
I'd like to just mention a few highlights of what I think
we've be able to do together, and then to address three
questions that came up in the remarks that you and Senator
Lugar have made.
First, I'd like to thank you very much for the support of
this committee in significantly increasing foreign assistance
during this administration. Really, foreign assistance had been
essentially flat-lined for almost 2 decades, and it was time
for the United States to do more.
We have to be able, with your help, to double foreign
assistance for Latin America, to triple it worldwide, and to
quadruple it in Africa. That includes, of course, the
development of the HIV/AIDS PEPFAR initiative, which you
mentioned, Senator Biden, as well as the development of
innovative approaches in foreign assistance, like the
Millennium Challenge Corporation. I think it's been a good
story.
If I could say one thing from a point of privilege, I hope
that it will continue into the future. Because we've learned,
as important as development assistance is, foreign assistance
is because of our moral obligation to help those less
fortunate, it is also critical to our national security. We
have seen what happens when states are failed states, when they
are unable to deliver for their people. And we have both an
obligation and an interest in having well-governed, democratic
states that can deliver for their people, that can fight
poverty, that can defend their borders. And I think foreign
assistance is our most valuable tool in doing so.
Second, I'd like to thank you very much for the support
that you've given to the Department as we've tried to transform
the Department into one that is capable of taking on the myriad
challenges that we face. We are sending diplomats into places
that diplomats didn't used to go. And I want to take a moment
to thank the men and women of the Foreign Service, the Civil
Service, and especially Foreign Service Nationals, for their
willingness to serve in extremely difficult places and
difficult circumstances.
We've tried to give them new tools. We've tried to develop
new ways of doing this, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams,
for instance, in Iraq and Afghanistan that, in effect, marry us
with our military counterparts. Because, while the military can
buy time and space, it is really civilians who have to help
these people and these governments build governance structures,
nongovernmental institutions, rule of law, justice, and
functioning economies. And I think that the Provincial
Reconstruction Teams will also live on as a way to think about
post-conflict operations.
I'm especially pleased that we have included the budget
request for the Civilian Response Corps. To be very frank, I
think we tried in Afghanistan to deal with counterinsurgency,
and reconstruction through a kind of international effort--I'll
be very frank--it was a kind of an adopt-a-ministry for each
country for capacity-building. It was very good to have so many
countries involved, I've seen those efforts. But it also has
led to some incoherence, with which we are still dealing. And I
will make a comment about that, when I turn to Afghanistan.
And then, in response, in Iraq, we tried the single U.S.
Government department, the Department of Defense took
responsibility, but I think did not--was not able to--fully
mobilize the range of capabilities that were needed. There was
no single, U.S. Government institution or agency that was
capable of doing that.
I think that under the State Department with the Civilian
Response Corps, we would be better capable of getting the city
planners, and the justices and the lawyers, and the health
experts, out into the field to help countries recover in post-
conflict situations.
And it's not just the large ones like Iraq or Afghanistan,
but Haiti or Liberia, or the many places that have to develop.
And I thank you for the innovation of the Civilian Response
Corps, for the work that you and Senator Lugar, and Senator
Hagel have done, and I sincerely hope that we can get it stood
up and really working. It is probably one of the most important
things that we can do as the United States Government.
I want to thank you, also, for the support of increases in
public diplomacy. When I first testified before this committee
for my confirmation hearing, I said that we would try and
increase the resources to public diplomacy--this is a long-term
prospect. It's not something that is going to take hold
overnight. But we've increased, dramatically, the number of
exchanges. We have record numbers of foreign students studying
in the United States now.
I think we've overcome some of the difficulties of the
post-9/11 period, when we really did--I have to think hard
about who was coming into the country, but where we were in
danger of sacrificing one of our best, long-term tools in
improving the understanding of the United States and respect
for it. That is, people who come here and study and go back to
their countries to be leaders. And I'm very grateful that we've
been able to rebuild that function. There's much more work to
do, and I'm sure that Jim Glassman, as he replaces Karen
Hughes, will put energy into that.
I would also like to note that there is a request for a
substantial increase in the number of Foreign Service Officers,
and USAID officers--roughly 1,100 in the Foreign Service, and
300 in USAID. We're just very small. And on many occasions,
I've been asked if the State Department could do things, it's
been hard to do it. We have roughly 6,500 professionals
worldwide. I believe there are twice as many lawyers in the
Defense Department as Foreign Service Officers. And while
Secretary Powell and the President started the process of
rebuilding after the 1990s, with roughly 2,000 over 4 years,
this is another important increment, and I will be counting on
your support with the appropriators to make sure that we can,
this time, fully fund the personnel requests.
It will be important, as a part of that, also, to do
compensation reform, so that our people do not lose locality
pay when they serve over, abroad. It is principally our younger
officers that suffer from that disparity, and we will press
again for compensation reform.
I say all of this because it has been an extraordinary
period for the United States, in which we've been taking on
challenges, and difficult challenges, that I think perhaps none
of us could have fully foreseen in 2001. It has required us to
make some difficult decisions. We have not always agreed about
those decision. But I think that we have always done it in the
spirit of our great democracy, which is one that recognizes
that people can disagree and still be patriots. That recognizes
that we must always support our men and women in uniform, as
well as our civilians abroad.
We have much work to do in the remaining 11 months, and I
want to assure you--we will sprint to the finish. We, the
United States of America cannot afford any less.
In this regard, let me just say briefly on Iraq and
Afghanistan and then, perhaps, a comment on the energy issue.
It has been difficult in Iraq, but I do believe that not only
are we starting to see security improvements, but we're
starting to see the Iraqis rebuilding their country and
developing a young political system to deal with their
differences.
I would just note that reconciliation is taking place, from
the bottom up, of course, with provincial councils and local
councils that are working. With an awakening movement--not just
in Anbar, but efforts to spread it to the southern part of the
country. With, frankly, Senator Biden, as we've talked, a
pretty decentralized structure, which I think is probably best
for a country as complex as Iraq.
The local citizens committees that are coming out to defend
their territory are coming out--not unlike a tradition we've
had in our own country for people to defend that which is
nearest to them, which is their neighborhoods and their
districts.
The political progress that we're seeing at those local
levels--and I will say, I sat with the Kirkuk provincial
council and watched Kurds and Arabs trying to overcome their
difference through political dialog, but those local efforts
are starting to have an effect on the national level.
Frankly, I think we thought that it would be the national
level, downward. In some ways it's been the local level upward
that has put the pressure on the Iraqi national leaders to be
responsive. And thus, they have passed in recent months, a
pension law, an investment law, a justice and accountability
law--in other words a de-Baathification reform. Just today, a
provincial powers law, setting a date for provincial elections
to take place during the fall. A general amnesty--which is very
much welcomed by the Sunni population, and a 2008 budget, which
has significant increases for provincial governments, for
Iraq's own security forces, and a capital budget that also has
a significant provincial element.
So, it is hard work, it is harder work, perhaps, than we
thought when we began this enterprise. But they are going about
the business of building a political structure.
That is welcome among their neighbors. We are seeing Arab
States begin to engage with them. The Saudis have said that
they will put a diplomatic mission there, as well as others.
The Russians have now forgiven, on Paris Club terms, some 90
percent of the Iraqi debt. And we will have--I've just accepted
the invitation of the Kuwaiti Government to hold the third
Iraqi Expanded Neighbors Conference toward the end of April.
So, I believe that we see progress on all fronts, although it
is fragile, and there is still much work to do.
If I may, just one word on Afghanistan. I was just there. I
was in both Kabul and in Kandahar. It is quite clear that
militarily there are battlefield successes against the Taliban
that, quite frankly, doesn't do very well when it comes at the
coalition forces or our forces in military-type formations, and
has therefore gone to hit-and-run tactics, to suicide bombings
to try and to terrorize the population.
And I had extensive discussions there about the importance
of refocusing on population security and the importance of
building police forces, and local citizens forces. That can--
after an area has been cleared by coalition forces--hold the
territory so that building can take place. And I just want to
say that there's been a lot of attention to NATO in the South,
and can we get more NATO forces in to help the forces that are
fighting there--the Canadians, the Danes, the British, the
Dutch--and they deserve to have the help that they have asked
for. And Secretary Bob Gates and others are working very hard
on that.
But I also saw reconstruction efforts that, frankly, are
not as coherent as they should to be. And we are searching now
for an envoy who can help to bring coherence to that
international effort, because we now understand that in
counterinsurgency, you have to defeat the enemy, keep him from
coming back, and then give the population reason to believe in
a better future.
I believe that we--that the Afghan project is making
progress. The situation is better than some reports, it is not
as good as it needs to be. And we are paying a lot of attention
to improving the circumstances in Afghanistan.
Let me say just finally, Senator Lugar, on the energy
piece--and I'll be very brief--I agree with you, it is a really
important part of diplomacy. In fact, I think I would go so far
as to say that some of the politics of energy is warping
diplomacy in certain parts of the world. And I do, indeed,
intend to appoint, and we are looking for a special energy
coordinator who could especially spend time on the central
Asian and Caspian region.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Rice follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State,
Department of State, Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members of the committee, thank you
for this opportunity to appear before the committee today in support of
the President's FY 2009 international affairs budget request, and to
discuss our Nation's foreign policy priorities. This is the fourth time
I have come before this committee to discuss and defend the
international affairs budget. As you know, this is the last budget I
will present to you in my capacity as Secretary of State. I want to
take this occasion to thank the committee, and especially the chairman
and ranking member, for their support and cooperation on many of the
issues we addressed here in the past 3 years, and to let you know that
this administration is committed to a vigorous foreign policy during
our remaining 11 months. We have many critical issues before us and we
intend to press forward our national interests on all fronts. I look
forward to working with the committee to do just that.
I would like to take a moment to ask you to act quickly on the
balance of funding requested in the FY 2008 global war on terror
supplemental. These additional resources are critical to the
Department's continued diplomatic operations in Iraq. The supplemental
also addresses critical security and construction requirements in
Afghanistan, support for international organizations functioning in
Iraq and Afghanistan, and peacekeeping missions in Darfur as well as
other urgent humanitarian and foreign assistance efforts. This funding
is necessary to our ongoing diplomatic mission and I ask for your
support.
fy 2009 state operations request
Let me begin by discussing our request for Department of State
operations. This request funds the platform on which we build our
foreign policy activities, including diplomacy and foreign assistance,
around the world.
The FY 2009 budget for Department of State Operations totals
$11.456 billion. These funds will significantly strengthen the core
programming, policy, and management capabilities of the Department
which are necessary to carry out vital U.S. diplomatic and consular
relations with more than 180 countries. They will also support
strategic U.S. engagement abroad through public diplomacy and
multilateral diplomacy.
Diplomatic Solutions to National Security Issues
The request provides $3.806 billion to increase the capacity of
American diplomacy to meet challenges to U.S. national security and
welfare in the international arena where power is defined increasingly
in economic and financial terms and where transnational threats like
terrorism, disease, and drug trafficking have become urgent. The
requested funding will strengthen the global operating platform for the
U.S. Government and add 1,095 new positions. These new positions will
allow us to expand training in much-needed skills, including in
critical foreign languages. The positions will also increase the number
of political advisors to the military combatant commends, enhance
interagency collaboration, and allow Department employees to take
advantage of interagency development and training opportunities.
Increased interagency cooperation is a valuable means to advance our
diplomacy, but we need sufficient numbers of trained personnel to
execute complex, coordinated efforts abroad. Building the Department's
capacity to fill this role is my highest priority and I ask for your
strong support.
The request also includes funding, as in previous years, for
Foreign Service Compensation Reform, which would eliminate the pay
disincentive caused by the loss of locality pay upon transfer to
foreign assignments. When the Government instituted locality pay in the
1990s, it did not include Foreign Service employees working abroad. As
a result, when officers transfer to overseas assignments, they lose the
locality portion of their pay. With the Washington, DC, rate now equal
to approximately 20 percent of employee compensation, this loss
severely undermines the salaries of officers assigned abroad. Moreover,
this sizable and growing disincentive undermines our ability to attract
talent and reward sacrifice. Diplomacy is a difficult, sometimes
dangerous business, and the sacrifices made by Foreign Service officers
and their families are real. In implementing Senior Pay Reform, we were
able to eliminate this disincentive for our senior members of the
Foreign Service, but the problem remains--and is more acute--for our
mid-level and junior officers. I am asking that you provide the
necessary authorization requested by the administration to address this
problem by enabling a transition to a performance-based pay system and
a global rate of pay.
Civilian Stabilization in Post-Conflict States
The request provides $249 million, including funding for 351
positions, in a new appropriation, the Civilian Stabilization
Initiative, to build a U.S. Government civilian capacity that can
assist in reconstruction and stabilization efforts in post-conflict
states. The requested funding will support, train, equip, and deploy an
interagency civilian response corps comprised of interagency Active and
Standby components and a Civilian Reserve of outside experts. This
effort will provide mission-ready experts in fields such as policing
and the rule of law, transitional governance, and economic
stabilization and development. The request will also fund the personnel
and operating expenses of the Office of the Coordinator that provides
Washington leadership to whole-of-government strategic planning,
analysis, policy direction, and coordination of USG reconstruction and
stabilization activities. The CSI complements our request for
additional personnel and has the strong support of the Department of
Defense. This is a high priority and we need to get this accomplished.
Protecting America's Borders
The FY 2009 budget provides $2.124 billion for the Border Security
Program. This program helps secure American borders against illegal
entry by terrorists and others who threaten homeland security. At the
same time, it facilitates the entry of legitimate foreign visitors and
students. Revenue from Machine Readable Visa (MRV) fees, Enhanced
Border Security Program fees, the Western Hemisphere Travel Surcharge,
and visa fraud prevention fees will fund continuous improvements in
systems, processes, and programs. The fees will also fund 448
additional positions required to address rising passport demand
associated with the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative and rising
visa demand, including increases related to Border Crossing Card
renewals.
Providing Secure Diplomatic Facilities
The request provides $1.163 billion for worldwide Security
Protection to increase security for diplomatic personnel, property, and
information in the face of international terrorism. The funding will
extend the program to upgrade security equipment and technical support,
information and systems security, perimeter security, and security
training. This funding will also support the worldwide local guard
force protecting diplomatic missions and residences. Funding increases
will help meet new security demands in all regions and implement the
Visa and Passport Security Strategic Plan to safeguard the integrity of
U.S. travel documents. Because people continue to be the single most
important factor in deterrence and response to terrorist acts, the
funding will add 200 security professionals.
The request provides $1.790 billion to continue security-driven
construction projects and to address the major physical security and
maintenance needs of U.S. embassies and consulates. This total includes
$844 million for the Capital Security Construction Program to replace
diplomatic facilities at the most vulnerable overseas posts. FY 2009
proposed projects include new embassy compounds in Santo Domingo,
Dakar, Maputo, and Malabo. During the fifth year of Capital Security
Cost Sharing (CSCS), U.S. Government agencies with personnel abroad
under chief-of-mission authority will contribute $455 million to CSCS
construction. The request also includes $105 million to upgrade
compound security at high-risk posts and to increase protection for
soft targets such as schools and recreation facilities. In addition,
the request includes $841 million for ongoing operations, including
major rehabilitations. These programs are essential to protect the
investment in real estate assets which are currently valued at over $14
billion and to keep more than 15,000 properties in good working order.
Influencing Foreign Opinion Through Public Diplomacy
The request provides $395 million in appropriations for public
diplomacy to influence foreign opinion and win support for U.S. foreign
policy goals, including through providing 20 new public diplomacy
positions. In addition to advocating U.S. policies, public diplomacy
communicates the principles that underpin them and fosters a sense of
common values and interests. Objectives of the national public
diplomacy strategy include promoting democracy and good governance,
marginalizing extremist leaders and organizations, and preventing
extremist messaging from gaining a foothold with vulnerable
populations. Through innovative programs we are providing positive
alternatives for Muslim youths, and helping build networks among
progressive-minded Muslims, in many cases working in partnership with
the private sector, civil society, and academia. We also place a high
priority on modernizing our communications architecture to strengthen
our leadership in the war of ideas and sharpen our messaging to counter
terrorist propaganda.
Exchange Programs
The request provides $522 million and 19 positions for educational
and cultural exchanges to increase mutual understanding and to engage
the leaders of tomorrow. Aligned with other public diplomacy efforts,
these people-to-people programs are uniquely able to address difficult
issues. The request includes increased funding for academic and
professional programs to reach constituencies vital for America--youth
and those who influence youth. The programs include English language,
Fulbright, and other academic initiatives, and Citizens Exchanges,
within the President's Partnership for Latin American Youth. The
funding will also continue to support the President's National Security
Language Initiative, promoting teaching and study of critical foreign
languages, including the Arabic, Chinese, Korean, and Russian
languages, and the Indic, Turkic, and Persian language families.
Information Technology
The request provides $414 million for State's Central Fund,
including revenue from fees, for Central Fund investments in
``knowledge management'' and information technology (IT). The ability
of the Department to support transformational diplomacy, information
sharing, rightsizing efforts, and E-Government initiatives depends
increasingly on robust, secure IT. Funding increases in FY 2009 will
help support the State Messaging and Archive Retrieval Toolset project,
diplomacy through collaboration, and IT infrastructure that provides
American diplomats with anytime/anywhere computing.
Multilateral Diplomacy
The request provides $1.529 billion to pay U.S. assessed
contributions to 47 international organizations, including the United
Nations. The request includes payments to address outstanding U.S.
arrears to international organizations. The request recognizes U.S.
international obligations and reflects a commitment to maintain the
financial stability and efficiency of those organizations. Membership
in international organizations assists in building coalitions and
gaining support for U.S. policies and interests. Further, multilateral
diplomacy through such organizations serves key U.S. foreign policy
goals, including advancing democratic principles and fundamental human
rights, promoting economic growth through free trade and investment,
settling disputes peacefully, encouraging nonproliferation and arms
control, and strengthening international cooperation in environment,
agriculture, technology, science, education, and health.
International Peacekeeping
The request provides $1.497 billion to pay the U.S. share of costs
for U.N. peacekeeping missions. This funding will help support
peacekeeping efforts worldwide, including the activities of ongoing
missions in Lebanon, Haiti, Liberia, and the Congo. Proposed funding
increases will also pay U.S. assessments for new missions in Darfur and
Chad. These peacekeeping activities further U.S. goals by maintaining
peace and strengthening regional confidence and stability. They also
leverage U.S. political, military, and financial assets through the
participation of other states that provide funds and peacekeepers for
conflicts around the world.
fy 2009 foreign operations request
Let me turn now to our foreign assistance request. The total State
Department and USAID Foreign Operations request for FY 2009 is $22.7
billion. These funds support the strategic purposes of our diplomacy:
Securing peace, supporting democracy, advocating our principles and
ideals, meeting global challenges, and aiding our friends and allies.
War on Terror
Fighting and winning the war on terror remains the greatest
challenge to our national security, and it will continue to be the
focus of our military and diplomatic efforts as long as extremist
ideologies and their proponents find safety and support in unstable and
failing states. We have made enormous strides in diplomatic and foreign
assistance efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, which are notable for their
successes even as we recognize the daunting work that remains. We
credit our progress in these countries to many who have struggled
there, to our military and our diplomats, to the international
community, to our counterparts in the military and government in these
countries, and to the citizens in Iraq and Afghanistan who recognize
and are fighting for the full benefits of freedom.
Iraq
Our engagement with Iraq remains a centerpiece of the United States
effort in the war on terror.
The administration's FY 2009 requests of $404 million in foreign
assistance funding and $65 million in operations funding are critical
to meet these goals. Of this total, $300 million in Economic Support
Funds will help consolidate the security gains realized in 2007 and
2008, and will increase the capacity of local and national Iraqi
Governments ($75 million) to provide services for their population,
which in turn will reduce support for extremist elements. The
administration is also requesting funds to help the nonoil economy
grow, including the development of the agricultural sector ($50
million), support for business formation ($25 million), and continued
support for key Iraqi economic reforms ($62 million), such as reducing
subsidies. These programs will generate jobs and stimulate economic
growth. This request also includes funding for the Iraqi-American
Enterprise Fund ($40 million), which will address a critical lack of
access to capital and know-how that is preventing Iraqi entrepreneurs
from forming companies. This request also includes $48 million to
continue Democracy and Civil Society programs, which will be vital to
support Iraq's nascent democracy, particularly in working with new
representatives and/or parties elected in anticipated nationwide
elections in 2009. Democracy and Civil Society programs also will have
a direct impact in fostering political reconciliation.
The administration is also requesting $75 million in funding under
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) to bolster
Iraq's rule of law, including continuing training and security for
judges and program support for major crime task forces, which will help
Iraq combat terrorism and a growing criminal element, and mentoring to
Iraq's corrections service to ensure criminals are effectively and
humanely kept off the streets. The administration is also requesting
$20 million in Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, and Demining (NADR)
programs, of which $16 million will support expansion of a successful
humanitarian demining program that has allowed hundreds of communities
to bring agricultural and industrial land back into production, and $4
million in programs to combat terrorism.
Taken together, these programs are an integrated approach to build
on the significant investment we have already made in Iraq's success.
The FY 2009 programs complement our previous investments in
infrastructure, security, and capacity-building and will hasten the
ability of the Iraqi people to meet their own needs. Failure to fully
fund these programs will endanger the progress we have made over the
last 5 years. In order for us to carry out these programs, we need the
full $65 million request for operational funding for core Embassy
functions.
As a final point on Iraq, I would like to bring some clarity to
discussions about the agreement that we plan to negotiate with Iraq.
With the U.N. Security Council mandate due to expire at the end of this
year, we need an agreement with Iraq that will ensure that U.S. forces
continue to have the authorities and protections they need to operate
in Iraq. An agreement with Iraq will not contain a ``security
commitment''; that is, there will be no binding U.S. obligation to act
in the common defense in the event of an armed attack on Iraq, it will
not set troop levels, and it will not provide for permanent bases in
Iraq. This arrangement will not ``lock in'' specific policies, but will
leave policy options open for the next President. In addition, much as
we did in Afghanistan, we expect to negotiate a strategic framework
arrangement building on the Declaration of Principles that will
formalize our intentions to cooperate in political, economic, cultural,
and security fields. We have begun to brief Members of Congress and
will continue to do so as our discussions with Iraq progress.
Afghanistan
For FY 2009, the President has requested $1.054 billion in foreign
assistance to help prevent Afghanistan from ever again becoming a
sanctuary for terrorists. We have achieved many successes in our fight
against the Taliban and al-Qaida, but we have not won yet. The funds
requested are critical to supporting our comprehensive approach to
defeat the insurgency and return Afghanistan to long-term stability
based on Afghan national sovereignty, democratic principles, and
respect for human rights. The Afghan Government enjoys broad support,
while the Taliban offers no political vision. We are collaborating
bilaterally, with donors, and through NATO and other multilateral
organizations to tighten the coherence of security, economic, and
governance capacity-building efforts. Development and security efforts
on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border aim to prevent the
deterioration of overall progress.
Recognizing that counterinsurgency requires more than physical
security, we have requested $370 million for counternarcotics efforts,
$248 million for democracy and governance, $109 million for health and
education, $226 million for economic growth, $74 million to support the
work of our Provincial Reconstruction Teams, and $12 million in
nonemergency food aid. Development efforts to improve Afghan governance
at the national and regional and local levels and to achieve prosperity
for the Afghan people are as crucial to winning the war as security
assistance to fight insurgent groups, to prevent Afghanistan from
becoming an illicit narcotics-based economy, and to train the Afghan
Security Forces. Simultaneously, the efforts of the United States and
the international community to work with the Government of Afghanistan
to improve security, build government capacity, protect human rights,
reconstruct infrastructure, and provide humanitarian assistance
generate confidence in the Afghan Government and in turn decrease
support for insurgents. As part of these efforts, we look forward to
working with Congress on Reconstruction Opportunity Zone (ROZ)
legislation that would help create employment and sustainable economic
development in Afghanistan and the border regions of Pakistan.
West Bank/Gaza
The United States is firmly committed to supporting Israelis and
Palestinians as they work to realize peace. Working with international
donors and Quartet Representative Tony Blair, the United States is
strengthening our support for the Palestinian Authority (PA) Government
to help achieve this end.
Our FY 2009 funding request for the West Bank and Gaza is $100
million. This includes $25 million for the Palestinian Authority
Security Sector Reform Program, part of a broader U.S. and
international effort to strengthen and transform the Palestinian
security sector and assist the PA in its efforts to extend law and
order and meet its roadmap obligations to dismantle the terrorist
infrastructure, thereby providing a reliable partner for Israel.
Establishing the rule of law and effective security in the West Bank
will support President Mahmoud Abbas and Prime Minister Salam Fayyad by
demonstrating to the Palestinian people that the PA can reduce
lawlessness and improve their lives, and by building the capacity of
the PA to address security threats against Israel. The request includes
$24 million for democracy projects that will assist the PA government
to extend the rule of law and improve governance, including bolstering
the justice system through training judges and building judicial
independence, and supporting local municipalities. A further $18
million will assist the PA to achieve economic growth by focusing on
activities that increase agricultural productivity, provide support for
microenterprises, create private sector opportunity and increase trade.
Finally, $33 million will assist the PA government to provide essential
health, education, and humanitarian services to the Palestinian people.
U.S. Government assistance in these areas will help the Palestinian
people directly and support moderates such as President Abbas and Prime
Minister Fayyad, while also providing tools through security
improvements, civil society building, and economic growth to combat
Hamas and its terrorist infrastructure.
Pakistan
A broad, long-term, and strategic relationship with Pakistan is now
crucial to global security and regional economic interests. We are
encouraging formation of a moderate center to complete the transition
to democracy and underwrite the fight against violent extremism. Our
programs support transparent elections, democratic institutions, and
long-term development. We are cooperating closely with the Pakistanis
to defeat extremist groups and networks. U.S. assistance programs
support all these goals.
For FY 2009, the Department of State is requesting $826 million for
Pakistan, to bolster four areas of cooperation: Peace and security,
democracy, economic growth, and health and education.
To win the war on terror, this request includes $150 million
specifically to support development in the Federally Administered
Tribal Areas. This is the second tranche of a 5-year $750 million
Presidential Commitment initiated in 2007. This will allow the United
States to help the Government of Pakistan recast its relationship with
the country's Federally Administered Tribal Areas.
Of the total $826 million, we are requesting $343 million for peace
and security assistance, including $7.7 million for counterterrorism
programs and $32 million for border security, law enforcement capacity-
building, and counternarcotics efforts. This will aid the Government of
Pakistan in countering the terrorist threat, enhancing border security,
addressing illicit narcotics activities, and establishing the means to
provide for a peaceful and secure environment.
Recognizing that the war on terror can not be won solely by
improving security, our request includes $55 million to strengthen
democracy and good governance, $119 million to expand economic
opportunity, and $260 million for health and education.
Lebanon
Progress in Lebanon remains a critical element of our efforts to
foster democracy and security in the Middle East. We have joined hands
with Lebanon's elected government to support their struggle for
freedom, independence, and security. For FY 2009, the Department of
State has requested $142 million in foreign assistance for Lebanon to
support two parallel objectives: Countering threats to Lebanon's
sovereignty and security from armed groups backed by Syria and Iran,
and helping foster good governance and a vibrant economy.
Three years ago this week, former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq
Hariri was assassinated. One month later, the Lebanese people demanded
an end to foreign domination and political violence, taking to the
streets to call for Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. The FY 2009 budget
request includes support for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon--a
concrete demonstration of our unwavering commitment to justice, an end
to political violence, and the protection of Lebanese sovereignty.
Since then, Lebanon has elected a new Parliament and deployed its
army to the south of the country for the first time in 40 years.
However, Lebanon remains under siege by a Syrian and Iranian-backed
opposition working to undermine the nation's stability, sovereignty,
and state institutions. Meanwhile, political violence continues,
including a January 15 bombing of an American Embassy vehicle. Our
vision of a safe, secure, and democratic Middle East cannot survive
without a sovereign and stable Lebanon.
economic assistance
Economic Support Funds
The FY 2009 request for Economic Support Funds (ESF) is $3.15
billion, an increase of $164 million over the FY 2008 enacted level.
ESF remains a reliable assistance mechanism by which we advance U.S.
interests through programs that help recipient countries address short-
and long-term political, economic, and security needs. ESF also
supports major foreign policy initiatives such as working to resolve
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and regional economic integration in
East Asia. ESF funds global and regional programs that support specific
U.S. foreign policy goals, including assistance to states critical in
the war on terror.
The request includes significant increases in some activities over
the administration's request for FY 2008, such as programs in Nepal to
address rural poverty and help blunt the appeal of Maoist rebels,
Lebanon to bolster that country's democratic traditions and reduce the
ability of Hezbollah to divide the populace, and south and central Asia
to improve communications and transportation linkages between
Afghanistan and its regional neighbors.
The administration's strategic priorities for FY 2009 ESF include
funding for our partners in the war on terror to mitigate the influence
of terrorist and insurgent groups and reduce their potential to recruit
in regions bereft of political and economic participation; countries
and regions at risk of civil unrest, to assist in building democratic
institutions, fight poverty, and provide basic services and economic
opportunities; states of concern to encourage democratic reform and
build civil society; and regional and thematic programs like the Asia-
Pacific Partnership, Middle East Partnership Initiative, and promoting
implementation of Free Trade Agreements, especially improving labor and
environmental conditions, and efforts to combat Trafficking in Persons.
Millennium Challenge Corporation
The request of $2.225 billion supports the continuing assistance
efforts of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), an important
contributor to U.S. foreign assistance through the principles of
promoting growth through good governance, investment in health and
education, and economic freedom. By early FY 2008, the MCC had approved
a total of 16 compacts worth over $5.5 billion. An additional 14
threshold agreements were in place at the end of FY 2007, and there is
a robust pipeline of compacts under development. MCC expects to sign
compacts with Tanzania ($698 million) in February 2008, and with
Burkina Faso ($500-$550 million) and Namibia ($300-$325 million) this
summer. MCC is also engaged with Jordan, Moldova, Malawi and other
countries in the compact development process, and foresees sizable
compacts with those countries in FY 09.
Eight compacts are entering their second or third year of
implementation, and are achieving tangible results. For example, in
Georgia, the first phase of gas pipeline repairs is complete, providing
Georgian citizens and businesses with needed electricity and heat. In
Honduras and Madagascar, farmers are employing new techniques to
improve productivity and links to reliable markets, thereby increasing
their incomes.
MCC and USAID programs are complementary and mutually reinforcing.
USAID programs help countries improve policies to qualify for compacts,
build their capacity to manage funds and administer compact and
threshold programs, and support overall U.S. efforts to keep MCC
countries on a transformational development track. MCC programs
frequently build on existing USAID programs and other USG assistance.
They do not overlap with them, and USAID adjusts programs to augment
funding for opportunities created by MCC programs, and to enhance and
sustain assistance in other areas.
Development Assistance
The Development Assistance request of $1.639 billion supports
programs in countries that range from those with very low incomes whose
governments are sufficiently stable and organized, to those with income
levels above MCC eligibility that are relatively well-governed. The
goal of all Development Assistance is to foster an expanded community
of well-governed states that respond to the needs of their people and
act responsibly within the international community.
Countries receiving DA face a range of long-term development
challenges. Experience shows that the most effective response is to
provide a well-balanced package that includes sustained support for
transformational democratic and economic reforms and that is closely
coordinated with MCC programs and the President's Emergency Plan for
AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). These assistance programs also must complement
and reinforce other development-related foreign policy initiatives,
including our diplomatic efforts to advance freedom and democracy,
expand international trade opportunities, and address climate change
and other critical environmental issues. Our strategic priorities for
DA funding in FY 2009 include: Long-term democratic governance and
economic growth programs in Africa; trade capacity-building programs in
Africa and the Western Hemisphere; capacity-building in support of the
Global Climate Change initiative; strengthened democratic governance in
the Western Hemisphere; accelerated literacy and numeracy programs
under the President's International Education Initiative, and more
broadly in Africa, the Western Hemisphere, and the Middle East, and
alternative development in the Andean countries.
We also recognize that any effort to improve development
initiatives will require a significantly increased overseas presence of
USAID, together with expanded technical and stewardship capabilities.
Therefore, we are requesting $767.2 million in USAID Operating Expenses
which will allow USAID to increase its overseas workforce. Under the
Development Leadership Initiative, USAID will hire 300 Foreign Service
officers above attrition in FY 2009 to build the capacity to implement
the National Security Strategy for foreign assistance.
Trade Agreements
Let me say a word about the trade agreements we have concluded with
Colombia, Panama, and Korea. Expanding trade opportunities advances
American economic and national security interests. The Department is
deeply involved in international trade issues at all levels. I recently
traveled to Colombia with nine Members of Congress, who saw firsthand
the impressive results of economic and political reform there. Our
missions abroad actively support the negotiation and enforcement of our
trade agreements.
Through multilateral, regional, and bilateral trade agreements, we
lower tariff and nontariff barriers to U.S. businesses, farmers,
ranchers, and entrepreneurs. The American worker can compete
successfully with anyone so long as the rules are fair. We help set
those rules by promoting open markets, as we have done since the end of
World War II. Our efforts at the World Trade Organization (WTO)
strengthen these rules and expand opportunities globally. We are at a
critical juncture in the Doha Round of WTO negotiations, which the
President has described as a ``once in a generation opportunity'' to
create economic opportunity, promote development, and alleviate
poverty. As the President noted in his State of the Union Address, the
United States is committed to the conclusion of a strong Doha Round
this year, and will provide the leadership necessary to achieve this
objective.
With respect to bilateral trade agreements, our free trade
agreement with Colombia is a prime example of how such agreements can
strengthen both our economy and national security. The United States
currently provides duty-free treatment to virtually all Colombian
products entering the United States under the Andean Trade Preference
Act. With the United States-Colombia Free Trade Agreement, U.S. GDP
will grow by an estimated $2.5 billion by expanding opportunities for
U.S. exporters as the significant tariffs that are assessed on U.S.
exports to Colombia are reduced and eliminated. We urge Congress to
consider and pass the Colombia FTA to allow our exporters to receive
the same treatment as is available to Colombian exports to the United
States.
The importance of the agreement, however, extends beyond trade. The
current and previous administrations, as well as the Congress, have
made a significant commitment to Colombia by providing over $5 billion
in assistance through Plan Colombia. Security in Colombia is vastly
improved, the economy has rebounded, and Colombians have real hope for
the future. The proposed FTA advances our partnership and cements these
gains. The Colombia FTA reflects the open, democratic, economic, and
political system which is our vision for Latin America. Colombia is a
friend of the United States. Its government has taken great risks to
achieve the successes it has achieved. I urge the Congress to pass this
agreement for internal security reasons as well.
Two additional key allies of the United States are also awaiting
congressional action on free trade agreements: Panama and Korea. The
United States-Panama Free Trade Agreement will build on our already
vibrant trade relations and support the consolidation of freedom and
democracy in this important country. The United States-Korea Free Trade
Agreement is the most commercially significant FTA in over 15 years.
Korea has been a steadfast partner and ally in promoting peace and
security in Northeast Asia and globally. I urge your action on these
agreements as well.
security assistance
Foreign Military Financing
The request of $4.812 billion for Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
will advance U.S. interests by ensuring that coalition partners,
allies, and friendly foreign governments have the equipment and
training necessary for common security goals and burden-sharing in
joint missions. This request includes $2.55 billion for Israel, the
first year of a 10-year $30 billion commitment. FMF promotes our
national security by strengthening the defense of friendly governments
and bolstering their abilities to contain transnational threats,
terrorism, and trafficking in persons, weapons, and narcotics. This
request provides funding for Egypt to foster a modern, well-trained
Egyptian military, and support for force modernization, border
surveillance, and counterterrorism efforts in Jordan. FMF is helping to
build a Lebanese army capable of implementing U.N. Security Council
resolutions 1559 and 1701, secure Lebanon's border against weapons
smuggling, and begin the process of disarming militias in Lebanon. The
request also finances programs with the Gulf States of Bahrain and Oman
as part of the Gulf Security Dialogue. FMF will also assist ongoing
efforts to incorporate into NATO the most recent members of the
alliance and to support prospective NATO members and coalition
partners, as well as partners in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The International Military Education and Training
The International Military Education and Training (IMET) program
request for FY 2009 is $90.5 million. Through professional and
technical course curricula and specialized instruction, this key
component of U.S. security assistance provides valuable education and
training on U.S. military practices within a context of respect for
democratic values and internationally recognized standards of human
rights. IMET programs in Europe advance regional security and force
integration among NATO and European Armed Forces, most notably in
Turkey, Poland, Ukraine, and the Czech Republic. In the Near East, IMET
provides technical training necessary to maintain U.S.-origin equipment
in Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon and Oman. In Africa,
IMET provides training programs for Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal,
and South Africa, countries central to long-term regional peace and
stability. In east Asia, IMET programs with the Philippines and
Indonesia, for example, focus on professionalizing defense forces and
developing skills in fighting the war on terror. In south Asia, IMET
programs improve military interoperability with the United States and
educate south Asian armies in respect for human rights and civilian-
military cooperation. In the Western Hemisphere, IMET focuses on
building capacity to respond to regional security challenges, with
major programs in El Salvador, Colombia, and Mexico.
IMET is a critical tool to strengthen important military
relationships in the global fight against terrorism and to do so in the
context of support for human rights. IMET helps ensure that future
leaders of foreign militaries are well trained, exposed to the U.S.
system of civilian control of the military, and have lasting ties to
the U.S. defense community.
Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs
The request for the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and
Related Programs Account is $499 million. With this year's request,
three separate subaccounts, Humanitarian Demining, International Trust
Fund, and Small Arms/Light Weapons, are combined into one line item in
the budget to address more appropriately our global Conventional
Weapons Destruction efforts. We are also establishing a proposed new
subaccount for WMD terrorism to undertake projects that improve
international capabilities to respond to potential WMD terrorist
attacks.
The FY 2009 request includes increases in several important areas.
We propose continued funding for humanitarian demining and increased
funding for programs to address the threat to civil and military
aviation posed by terrorists and insurgents armed with MANPADS. We have
also proposed increased funding for the Nonproliferation and
Disarmament Fund to address emergent nonproliferation and disarmament
requirements including additional support for disablement and
dismantlement activities in North Korea, as they are achieved in the
ongoing six party talks. Increases in the Global Threat Reduction
program will strengthen biosecurity programs and antinuclear smuggling
programs.
Under the Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program, we are expanding
the TransSahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) in the North
Africa region, and strengthening linkages with the existing TSCTP in
sub-Saharan Africa to prevent terrorist movement between Mahgreb and
sub-Saharan states and to promote greater regional cooperation.
Increased funding for ATA will also support counterterrorism programs
in East Africa.
Peacekeeping Operations
The FY 2009 request for Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) is $247.2
million, which is necessary to advance international support for
voluntary, multinational stabilization efforts, including support for
non-U.N. missions and for U.S. conflict-resolution programs. PKO
funding enhances the ability of states to participate in peacekeeping
and stability operations and to address counterterrorism threats. In
the aftermath of conflict, PKO funds help transform foreign military
establishments into professional military forces guided by the rule of
law.
An important element of FY 2009 PKO funding is the President's
Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), now in its fifth year. FY
2009 funding will train over 15,000 peacekeeping troops to reach the
initiative's goal of 75,000 peacekeeping troops trained worldwide. GPOI
includes the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance
(ACOTA) program, as well as train-and-equip programs outside of Africa.
GPOI assists in the deployment of peace operations troops, provides
logistics and transportation support, and assists regional
organizations in planning and managing peacekeeping operations. PKO
funding also helps support TSCTP; Security Sector Reform programs in
Liberia, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo; peacekeeping
activities in Somalia; and the Multinational Force and Observers
peacekeeping mission in the Sinai.
global challenges
Democracy & Human Rights
We will continue to promote democratic development and uphold
international standards of human and worker rights globally. We are
requesting $1.745 billion for programs to advance good governance,
democracy and human rights in support of the President's Freedom
Agenda, including political competition and consensus building, rule of
law, and civil society activities in countries around the world. This
budget will support centrally managed and multilateral efforts that
provide targeted funding for unforeseen needs and opportunities,
advance democracy in difficult countries where bilateral programs are
not feasible and provide technical support to our overseas missions on
democracy issues and programs.
Our request includes $60 million in ESF for the Human Rights and
Democracy Fund to support innovative activities that open political
space in struggling and nascent democracies and in authoritarian
regimes as the leading element of the U.S. Government's efforts to
effect positive and lasting change. HRDF will allow us to support
pivotal democracy and human rights programming in critical target
countries such as China, Belarus, Russia, Lebanon, North Korea,
Thailand, Venezuela, Somalia, Burma, and Pakistan. With HRDF, we will
continue to support the Global Human Rights Defenders Fund, a program
that enables us to quickly disburse small grants to human rights
defenders facing extraordinary needs due to government repression. In
addition, we will fund innovative approaches to advance labor rights
abroad by strengthening democratic trade unions and will promote
corporate social responsibility globally.
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
The $1.202 billion request for International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement (INCLE) and $406 million for the Andean Counterdrug Program
(ACP) in FY 2009 supports bilateral and global programs to combat
transnational crime, illicit narcotics threats, and terrorist networks
built upon and funded by the illegal drug trade. These programs aim to
strengthen and professionalize law enforcement institutions that are
weak or subject to corruption.
INCLE funds are focused mainly on countries in which serious
security threats exist, both to host governments and to our national
interests as well. This includes countries like Afghanistan, Iraq,
Pakistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Indonesia, Liberia,
and Sudan.
Of particular note this year is the importance and timeliness of
the Merida Initiative, our new program for security and law enforcement
cooperation with Mexico and the nations of Central America. The
President has requested $550 million in FY 2008 and in FY 2009, a total
of $1.1 billion. The administration believes that we must act now to
assist our southern neighbors in their fight against the criminal
organizations that threaten their security and prosperity, as well as
our own. These nations have demonstrated the political will to tackle
critical problems and have asked us to cooperate with them as partners.
I strongly urge Congress to fund this important national security
initiative both through the FY 2008 supplemental and the FY 2009
appropriation.
Migration and Refugees Assistance
Our commitment to providing humanitarian assistance and protection
for refugees, conflict victims, and vulnerable migrants remains strong.
We are requesting $764 million in FY 2009 to fund contributions to key
international humanitarian and nongovernmental organizations and for
bilateral programs to respond to humanitarian needs abroad and identify
durable solutions, including resettlement of refugees in the United
States. These funds provide for basic needs to sustain life, protect
refugees and conflict victims, assist refugees with voluntary
repatriation, local integration, or permanent resettlement in a third
country. They are a humane and effective response to pressing needs
that reflects the compassion of the American people. Humanitarian needs
related to Iraq and Afghanistan will be subject to a separate FY 2009
supplemental request. The request of $45 million for the President's
Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund is critical to meet
urgent and unforeseen humanitarian requirements.
Global HIV/AIDS Initiative
The Global HIV/AIDS Initiative account (GHAI) is the largest source
of funding for the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR).
The request of $4.779 billion is a substantial increase over the FY
2008 enacted level for the PEPFAR bilateral program, and capitalizes on
the demonstrated capacity-building and programmatic successes in
prevention, care, and treatment during the first 5 years of the
program. Funding will support country-based activities, international
partners, technical support, and oversight and management. The FY 2009
request is the first of a new, 5-year, $30 billion Presidential
commitment that builds upon and expands our initial 5-year, $15 billion
commitment.
The request also proposes the development of a ``Partnership
Compact'' model, with the goal of strengthening host government
commitment. In selected countries, compacts will outline reciprocal
responsibilities, linking our resources to increased host country
resources for HIV/AIDS and the establishment of policies that foster an
effective HIV/AIDS response.
Environment
As President Bush said in his State of the Union Address, the
United States is committed to confronting the challenge of climate
change. We want an international agreement that will slow, stop, and
eventually reverse the growth of greenhouse gasses. Achieving that goal
will require commitments by all major economies, a point we have made
in the two Major Economies Meetings on Energy Security and Climate
Change under the initiative launched by the President in support of
U.N. negotiations.
In Indonesia this past December, the United States joined with the
other parties to the U.N. Framework on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to adopt
the ``Bali Action Plan.'' This document will guide negotiations of a
new post-2012 climate change arrangement by 2009. Our FY 2009 budget
request includes $64 million to support our efforts to address
adaptation and reduce deforestation, major elements of the ``Bali
Roadmap.''
Through the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and
Climate (APP), the United States works with China, India, Australia,
South Korea, Canada, and Japan to accelerate the adoption of clean
energy technologies. Over 100 APP projects and activities are reducing
emissions in major sectors such as power generation, cement, steel,
aluminum, and buildings. Our FY 2009 foreign assistance budget request
for APP totals $26 million.
As part of our long-term commitment to protecting the Earth's ozone
layer we are proposing $19 million for the Montreal Protocol
Multilateral Fund. Last year, the international community agreed to a
landmark U.S. proposal to accelerate the phaseout of ozone depleting
substances. Over the next two decades, this acceleration will provide
climate system benefits that could exceed those contemplated under the
Kyoto Protocol.
Finally, a request of $40 million supports our commitment to labor
and trade-
related environmental initiatives with our Dominican Republic-Central
American Free Trade Agreement partners. These activities will
strengthen institutions for more effective implementation and
enforcement of environmental laws and promote biodiversity, market-
based conservation, and private-sector environmental performance.
conclusion
Mr. Chairman, the FY 2009 International Affairs request proposes an
increase of 16 percent over the FY 2008 base appropriation, and more
than 9 percent over all FY 2008 appropriations enacted to date. I
understand that this is a significant increase. But the President and
I, as well as the officials in all departments and agencies which
administer the foreign affairs account, strongly believe this request
is fully justified and critical to the national security interests of
the United States. We understand that these funds are the result of the
efforts of hard-working American taxpayers. You have our commitment
that we will manage these funds efficiently as stewards of the
resources entrusted to us by the American people.
The Chairman. Based on who's here, we can start with 10-
minute rounds, but we'll start with 10-minute rounds, and if it
turns out that other people show up, they'll just get less
time. That's the price of coming late. So, we'll begin with 10-
minute rounds, here.
Madame Secretary, there are reports of growing frustrations
in the ranks of the former Sunni insurgents, a co-called
``Awakening'' to whom we have been providing monthly payments
of $300, which I agree with, that's not a criticism. They want
to be integrated into the Iraqi Government and security forces,
but the central government seems--even with the changes made as
recently as yesterday--to be balking, particularly in mixed
areas close to Baghdad.
The situation is said to be so bad that our military has
started developing plans to create a Depression-era style
Civilian Job Corps, so these folks are going to be gainfully
employed. What are the consequences of the Iraqi Government's
failure to hire these exinsurgents, or to the concerned local
citizens, as they are called by our military? What are we going
to do to increase this integration? And, if they're not
integrated, can we--by stepping in--stave off what is a growing
discontent?
Secretary Rice. The Iraqi Government I think it's fair to
say, was initially quite skeptical of the local citizens
committees, in part, because they worried they might be new
militias, in a sense. And what we have done is to work with the
Maliki government. There is a committee that reviews, now, the
local citizens committees, and their integration into the
security forces. Not all of them will be integrated into
security forces, and it is important that there be job
opportunities for them. There is work going on in that--not
just temporary jobs, but real jobs through, for instance, we
believe that if the Iraqi Government fully executes its budget
for housing--the construction industry brings a lot of jobs--
that that might be a way to absorb some of these people.
I'm heartened by the budgets that are now coming out for
provincial governments. You are starting to see more of an
emphasis on budgetary resources from the center, going to the
provinces.
We have had--through the Provincial Reconstruction Teams--
to intensify our efforts to make it possible for the provincial
governments, then, to spend the resources that they're getting.
I've sat with the sheikhs of the awakening--both in Iraqi
and when they were here--they want more project money into
their province. In fact, there was an Anbar supplemental of
about $70 million. The Anbaris are politically powerful enough
that several national politicians decided they should go and
deliver it by hand. And there was a big ceremony for it.
The--ultimately I think you will see that the elections at
the provincial level will be the real answer to this. Because
some of the provincial councils, which are not so
representative, because of the way that the elections took
place in 2005, I think, will be renovated by a new provincial
powers, and it's why--by new elections--and it's why the
provincial powers law is so important.
I might just say that they were engaged in debates about
the provincial powers that we would recognize from our own
history. What was the role of governors who could remove them?
Did governors have the right to mobilize military forces--these
were really very crucial debates, and I think it's a good thing
that they've gotten a law.
The Chairman. I was there for that ceremony. I was there
when the central government came out to meet with the sheikhs
and with Satr, not Sadr, Satr--who was the guy who organized
the sheikh, who organized the other sheikhs. And I was there at
that ceremony. I, along with Ambassador Crocker and the
General.
And it was an interesting phenomenon. The fact was that I
was told by two of the Vice Presidents that came from Baghdad--
one Sunni and one Shia--that Maliki wouldn't sign the check
until the very last minute, and I assume it was because of some
significant pressure from Ambassador Crocker, I don't know
that.
And the point I'm making is this--at least it may have
changed in the last month or so. But there is an overwhelming
distrust, as you know, as to whether or not these are merely
stopgap measures.
And what I keep being told is that there is a need for
there to be actual integration--not just in the regional
government, and the regional elections that will be coming up,
but in the central government, and in the security forces.
And I haven't--I may be missing something, and I'm not
being facetious--I may be missing something here, but I don't
see any of that integration occurring. Because that's where--
what the sheikhs with whom I personally met, and there were, I
think, six present--they wanted to make sure that they were
integrated into the security apparatus, on a permanent basis.
And the bottom line was, because they didn't want Shia
patrolling their streets, they didn't want Kurds patrolling
their streets, and they wanted to be able to patrol their own
streets, being a representative of the central government, but
in their own areas.
Secretary Rice. There is a program that is working with the
Iraqi Government. There is a committee that the Prime Minister,
himself, appointed--to do precisely that--to work these people
into permanent structures of the state.
I think, not everybody who's in the local citizen committee
will be.
The Chairman. No, no.
Secretary Rice. But, you're right, Senator--this will take
some time. This was a very fortuitous development, Awakening
and the local citizens' committee, it was frankly not
envisioned in the way that the security forces were planned.
And now working them into the structure if very important. But
it is underway. And my only point is it's, I think, working in
the security structures is important, but also having Awakening
feel that they are really a part of the political process.
The Chairman. No; I understand both. And I agree. All I'm
saying to you is, I think we are, we should be pushing, quite
frankly, and according to the military, with whom I speak,
considerably harder. And as you pointed out, that real progress
has come--not the only progress--but real progress has come the
more we've empowered people. And I really would argue, again,
for you all to take another look at what the Congress passed
here, about pushing forward on this whole Federal system that
their constitution envisions. But, I'll come back to that.
In my remaining 2\1/2\ minutes here, I'd like to ask you
about the de-Baathification law. As you know, whether the
recently passed de-Baathification law promotes healing or
further division, depends on how it's implemented. If you
listen to some of the voices of those, such as Dr. Chalibi, who
has been closely associated with de-Baathification, the law
will actually lead to the expulsion of more individuals from
key government jobs, then inclusion.
What steps are we taking, and how are we monitoring this to
make sure that the de-Baathification law actually integrates
more people, rather than has this negative impact. Because, the
devil really is in the details of how this is read, and how it
is being advertised, if you will, in Iraq by those individuals
representing the sectarian interests in Iraq.
Secretary Rice. We made the point, precisely, that you've
made. That the issue here is going to be implementation. The
law itself is not a perfect law, it is a compromise law. And,
obviously, with any law, it is subject to interpretation.
But when we've talked, particularly, with Tariq al-Hashimi,
the Vice President, he is now very focused on the question of
implementation, and also whether or not there need to be
certain understandings about how it will be implemented. And we
have people in the Embassy who are working on that.
One of those things that has come about, when I was out
there, a couple of times ago, Senator, I worked very hard with
Prime Minister Maliki to restart something called the three-
plus-one, which is--they now call their Executive Council the
Presidency plus the Prime Minister. And, by meeting weekly, and
then having a little steering committee of their people to meet
even more frequently--we've encouraged them to--practically,
every day, to look at this and how it's going forward.
I think the principle concerns are about what may happen to
certain people in the security forces, and in the intelligence
forces. It should be helped by the fact that the pension law
and, frankly, also by the amnesty--but we've been making
exactly the point, regarding the implementation, and whether
there need to be certain understandings about it.
The Chairman. I think Hashimi's come a long way, I've spent
a lot of time with him, and I think he's come a long way in
terms of greater regional authority. And I think there still is
a significant deal to be made here, tied to oil, but my time is
up. And I yield to Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Madame Secretary, yesterday Russian President Vladimir
Putin, while President Yushenko of Ukraine was sitting next to
him, threatened to target Ukraine with nuclear weapons if
Ukraine was to deepen their relationship with NATO. Now, this
comes on the heels of similar threats to Poland, and the Czech
Republic, if those nations were to cooperate with us on missile
defense.
Last year the Russian Government, fomented unrest and stood
idly by while government-sponsored groups physically threatened
the Estonian Ambassador at her Embassy in Moscow, and are
suspected of sponsoring a massive cyber-attack on their Baltic
neighbor, all because the government in Talin moved a Soviet
statue.
Last year, Russia withdrew from a treaty, restricting
conventional weapons in Europe. And this week, a Russian bomber
risked an international military incident when it flew over a
U.S. aircraft carrier, while another bomber simultaneously
violated Japanese airspace.
And President Putin announced that Russia is in the midst
of a new arms race with the United States and our allies.
Meanwhile, Gazprom, the Russian state energy company,
threatened to cut off energy supplies to Ukraine, although the
intervention yesterday by President Yushenko and some agreement
may have postponed that for the winter--and Moscow continues to
use energy as a weapon against its neighbors, to extort sales
of vital infrastructure, with the goal of monopolizing energy
development and transportation.
Other forms used by Russia to bully its neighbors have
taken the form of a blockage of Georgia, and daily threats to
those capitals who work cooperatively with the United States.
Now, given this record of behavior, why is NATO considering
inviting President Putin to the Summit Conference in Bucharest
in early April? It would seem that the alliance might very well
be intimidated by that presence, given all of the experiences
of its members.
I just simply want to ask you to discuss for a moment what
you perceive in the event the agenda at NATO is new members--
three have been strongly suggested--our two MAP programs, for
Ukraine and Georgia, and then, of course, discussion of
Afghanistan, or other issues in which we are, as an alliance,
involved.
What is the effect of joining President Putin to join the
conversation?
Secretary Rice. Thank you, Senator.
First of all, let me just say that I said it at Davos, that
the unhelpful and, really, reprehensible rhetoric that is
coming out of Moscow is unacceptable and is not helpful to a
relationship that, actually, I think, has some positive
aspects. And we have cooperated on North Korean
denuclearization, and Iran and the Middle East, and of course
the cooperative threat reduction and global nuclear terrorism--
a lot of things. And yet, when it comes to issues that I would
say come out of the structure of the post-cold-war order in
Europe, we get this kind of rhetoric which is most certainly
not helpful.
As to the NATO agenda, it's the administration's strong
belief that NATO will do what it must as an alliance, and
Russia has no veto.
So, in fact, we will look at what the status of various
aspirants really is, and whether they're ready for different
stages of, either NATO membership or the various relationships
that NATO can offer, and we'll make the decision on that basis.
I think that's the only way that NATO can proceed.
We've also been very clear that we are absolutely devoted
to the independence and sovereignty of Ukraine and of the other
states that were once as part of the Soviet Union. The Soviet
Union had all of these parts, but that was another point in
time. It is gone forever. And I hope that Russia understands
that.
Now, as to how these discussions go, I've sat through, at
least, the ministerials of the NATO-Russian Council. And very
often, Senator, it goes the other way. It's an opportunity for
Russia to see the unity of the alliance. It's very often an
opportunity for the Russians to sit and recognize that the
Baltic States are part of NATO, and therefore enjoy the
protection of Article V and of the European and North Atlantic
allies.
And so, in that sense, these sessions tend not to be one in
which the alliance is intimidated by Russia, but rather where a
very strong message of alliance unity can be communicated.
And I would hope that if we do go forward with a NATO-
Russia Council in Bucharest, that that would be what is being
communicated--that it is a Russia-NATO conversation, but that
NATO is a strong and unified alliance that is not going to see
a return to the cold war, and that means, neither to Russia's
ability to intimidate its neighbors, nor to the times when we
had an implacably hostile relationship with the Soviet Union.
Senator Lugar. Well, I thank you for that response. Can you
give us an indication of how vigorous the administration will
be in backing the three new membership applications that are
imminent, as well as the MAP designation for Ukraine and
Georgia?
Secretary Rice. Well, on the three aspirants, we believe
they're making very good progress. We will obviously reserve
judgment until the time that we've had a chance with our allies
to determine whether or not they've met the standard.
But, should they meet the standard, it's our view that they
ought to be invited for membership.
In terms of the Membership Action Plans, of course, those
also require an examination of where a state is, and I would
give the same answer--we've always believed that states ought
to meet these, or receive these relationships as they become
able and capable for carrying out the responsibilities that go
with them.
Senator Lugar. Well, we will certainly ask you, as April
approaches, to inform the committee about the impressions of
the administration, the vigor of this pursuit. Because, as you
know, action will need to be taken by the Senate. The last
round was a joyous occasion. Of a good debate, ending in the
morning, about noontime. The Foreign Ministers of the countries
involved, sitting in the gallery of the Senate. Proceeding to
the White House for a celebration. I would hope that this would
be the case on this occasion, as opposed to a very tentative
situation in which the countries may or may not know where they
stand with you or with the Senate.
And we've not had much discussion on the issue, but I cite
this as a very important set of developments, rather stoutly
ahead of us, at this point.
Secretary Rice. Thank you, Senator. Let me just add that
it's also very important to the future stability of the
Balkans, as well, so we're mindful of the fact that this could
help in issues of stability in the Balkans.
Senator Lugar. I appreciate very much, your response and
your opening statement that a special coordinator or negotiator
or however one wants to designate this person, may be charged
with a very heavy duty in the Near East.
I cite this, specifically, having come through Kazakhstan
and Turkmenistan within a week after President Putin,
literally, had been on the telephone with the Presidents of
those two countries, almost personally negotiating a natural
gas deal, of very sizable amounts.
This is not a bureaucratic functionary from Russia, this is
at the top. And the necessity of gaining those resources, then,
to pass them through Russia where--even while I was traveling--
deals were being inscribed with Bulgaria, with Russia taking
control of 50 percent of the pipelines underneath that country,
and then shortly after, with Serbia. Negating, in part, the so-
called Nabuko pipeline idea that we have. So, life is going on,
rather seriously in this area, which we need to be following.
And the new President in Turkmenistan, as you know because
you have met him--is a very different President. After a long
stretch of total, absolute control by someone with whom we
really had no dealings. So, there's an opportunity. He has
already been in touch with President Sakasvili of Georgia. They
see each other as the same generation, and what had seemed
impossible before, with trans-Caspian pipelines, or ships, may
happen. And that is new.
But we really need to be there, in Ashkbat, as well as with
all of the dealings in Astona now, with the six powers, the
very large Kashagan field--this is a huge situation, for the
world, as well as for us.
You know this, but I just applaud the need for our State
Department to be on top of it. With somebody--almost on a daily
basis--in touch with these leaders who want to talk to us. And
especially President Aleyev, who is waiting for assistance, but
values the security of the relationship, vis-a-vis, Russia,
Iran--anyone else who might breathe heavily in the area.
Thank you very much.
Secretary Rice. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Dodd is next, but he suggested I----
Senator Dodd. Well, no, Mr. Chairman, having just arrived,
let me defer to my colleagues. We had a markup on a Banking
Committee bill, Madame Secretary, and I'll defer my time and
come back in a few minutes, thanks.
The Chairman. Senator Kerry.
Senator Kerry. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Let me join you and the ranking member in expressing our
sadness at the loss of Tom Lantos. My daughters and I had the
chance to have one of those wonderful trips you referred to
with him, in Budapest, and he was just so full of enthusiasm
and energy, and had this marvelous warmth and brightness about
him that we all remember.
And we will miss him, and his passion for human rights, and
for the issues that we're talking about here today.
And what a family--a great, unbelievable family.
Madame Secretary, thank you so much for being here with us
today, for what you're doing. And I want to congratulate you on
the increase of the State Department personnel, the Foreign
Service personnel and USAID personnel--that is so important.
And this is a very significant increase that you have asked
for, and I'm confident the committee will embrace it
wholeheartedly. I think it is long overdue.
One concern--well, a number of concerns on the budget,
overall. Secretary Gates, in a speech at Kansas State
University, he said, ``There's a need for a dramatic increase
in spending on the civilian instruments of national security.
Diplomacy, strategic communications, foreign assistance, civic
action, and economic reconstruction and development.'' And I
think it's wonderful to have the Secretary of Defense, who is
making that argument.
The question is, really, whether or not this budget, in
fact, fully meets that task. I know it's an increase and we
welcome the increase and you cited the various increases that
have taken place.
But specifically, for instance, turning to Afghanistan
where General Jones and others--I might ask you,
parenthetically, to perhaps comment on that, I mean you're
familiar with the report--of these eminent persons who really
see the Afghanistan situation slipping away, and that's the way
they've cited it. And General Eickenberry has said, ``Where the
road ends, the Taliban begins.'' And there's this whole notion
that we need to be making a stronger commitment. I think the
budget is a plus-up of $150 million over what you asked for in
the regular budget. Then, of course, there was a supplemental
above that. So, the total last year as over $1 billion.
But the question is asked, why wouldn't we be asking for
that full amount here in this budget, and why would the
increase not be more significant with respect to the support
for the PRTs which, I think is around $50 million or something,
that vicinity.
So, are you asking for enough to really, in fact, get the
job done, and where do you assess that situation at this
moment, with respect to General Jones reports, et cetera?
Secretary Rice. Thank you, Senator.
Well, first of all, I believe that the budget represents,
as you said, a significant increase. And I'd like to focus very
intensely this year on getting it fully funded.
I think that one of the problems that we've had is that
we've had increases, and then we've not be able to get them
approved--particularly on the personnel side. In the last
budget we asked for 280 positions--that didn't get approved.
And so, I believe this is a very, very significant increase,
and if we could get this fully funded, then we would leave the
Department during the next budgetary cycle, in a position to
increase the funding again, and to get to a place where we need
to be.--
Senator Kerry. But that's the personnel part, right?
Secretary Rice. That's the personnel part.
Senator Kerry. Right.
Secretary Rice. On Afghanistan, we have tried, in part,
through supplemental funding, which is really focused on the
kinds of things that we don't think will be recurring costs in
the budget for extended period of time, to infuse
counterinsurgency funding.
A lot of the funding that we think will be longer run
governance, the building of capacity and all of that--we've
started to put into the regular budget. But there's certain
things--and this is where the PRTs are very important, where we
really are very much linked up in a war-like environment, where
we are part of the counterinsurgency effort.
I think these are the right numbers. I will be the first to
say that we have made a priority decision in favor of roads and
electricity. And it's in part, because of what you mentioned--
the insurgency begins where roads end.
It is also because we believe that the electricity piece is
very important.
Senator Kerry. Which part of the package goes to that? I'm
trying to just break it down, here.
There's $370 million for counternarcotics, there's $240
million for democracy and governance, $109 million for health
and education, $74 million for the PRTs, $12 million for
nonemergency food aid.
Secretary Rice. And there's an infrastructure piece in the
supplemental; we had a road-building plan over a number of
years.
Senator Kerry. It's in the supplemental.
Secretary Rice. Yes; it's in the supplemental.
Senator Kerry. I see.
Secretary Rice. So we are building roads.
Senator Kerry. Why wouldn't that be part of the overall
budget request, to accurately reflect what we need to do in
Afghanistan?
Secretary Rice. Yeah; there's $834 million in the
supplemental. A significant portion of that is for
infrastructure. I'll get the exact breakout for you, Senator.
[The information referred to above follows: ]
In the Fiscal Year 2008 Base Budget, the Department of State has
allocated on a preliminary basis $94.5 million for power and $95.3
million for roads. An additional $60 million for power and $279 million
for roads has been requested in the Fiscal Year 2008 Supplemental for
the Global War on Terror.
After the original Supplemental request for Fiscal Year 2008 had
been submitted, the Government of Afghanistan approached the United
States Government with an emergency request for diesel generators for
Kabul and the Northern Electrical Power System. Furthermore, the
development of Sheberghan, a thermal power plant with adjacent oil and
gas fields that would feed electricity into the Northern Electrical
Power System, became a high priority for infrastructure development. It
has the potential to increase access to electrical power for 50 percent
of Afghanistan's population and greatly reduce Afghanistan's reliance
on imported electricity and fuel. To fund these high priority
infrastructure projects, the Department of State amended its Fiscal
Year 2008 Supplemental request to include an additional $115 million
for power and an additional $50 million for roads.
Senator Kerry. Come to the heart of the issue; when are you
going to measure that against what General Jones has said, what
the Secretary has said, and others--we still have the luxury of
the majority of the people supporting our presence. We've got
to keep that, which means we've got to turn around the on-the-
ground delivery, rapidly.
Secretary Rice. Yes. And I think, Senator, only a portion
of that, and I would say, a relatively small portion relates to
resources. I think the problem that we really have--and here I
do think the international effort has got to be more coherent--
is that you really have a significant counterinsurgency problem
in the South. And the forces are able to clear these areas.
If you take a place like Musukala, they have been able to
clear it. The question is: Can it be held? And so there is a
significant program now that I talked to the one-star general
who has been put in charge of it out there, to rapidly increase
the number of police. We will work with them on doing that.
There are certain limitations.
One of the problems in Afghanistan, as you know, this is a
very poor country with people who are largely illiterate. Just
finding people is not an easy matter. But, it's really being
able to hold, and then making sure that all of the multiple
reconstruction efforts--ours plus those of the rest of the
international community--are really getting into an area, and
building quickly.
They have a plan for what they're calling ``Focus District
Development'' in the south, which means, taking a district,
looking at the needs of clearing, looking at the needs of
holding and then putting the right reconstruction efforts in. I
think that will give us a much more focused way of doing it.
Senator Kerry. Let me follow up on that.
Secretary Rice. It's just the two of us.
Senator Kerry. But let me take advantage of that.
The Paddy Ashdown situation, and your recent trip--did you
make any progress with the British foreign circuit and Foreign
Secretary Miliband on the question of NATO troops, additional
troops? And obviously, this is an enormous test for NATO. I
think Secretary Gates made the right comments.
As I stated, this is really an important test. Can you
report to us what progress you made, and what happens if NATO
doesn't provide more troops? What are you planning?
Secretary Rice. Well, as you know, as a temporary matter,
we are surging some 3,200 marines into Afghanistan. But the
real answer here is that somebody's going to have to join the
Canadians in the south. And the Canadians have been clear about
that--it is not a request that should be beyond the alliance to
do it.
And Secretary Gates is working very hard on it, I'm working
very hard on it. The French have said that they may be able to
help some, in some parts of the country, there are others who
might help.
Senator Kerry. Why do you think this is proving so
difficult? I realize that a majority of the German population
doesn't want the troops there. When I was in Brussels, I met
with the Ambassadors there, and the Dutch might be
characterized as squeamish--everybody's squeamish about this.
Where does that leave us, with respect to this first mission
out of area for NATO and the future?
Secretary Rice. Well, I think the first point to make is,
it is NATO's first really big mission out of area. And this was
not what, I think, the alliance would have thought that it was
going to be doing, 4 or 5 years ago. And I think the
capabilities have come along more slowly than the new demands.
I also believe, Senator, that we've got a bit of a problem,
in that governments are going to have to be more
straightforward with their people, that this is not just
another peacekeeping operation. That this is really a
peacemaking operation, and that there are going to be
casualties.
It is going to be tough fighting. You can't do it all with
reconstruction assistance. And part of what we've been trying
to do--Bob Gates and myself--is to just say to people, ``We
appreciate that you're doing what you can do, but this is a
different kind of mission than peacekeeping.'' And so when you
have allies like the Canadians, the Danes, and others in the
south, who are encountering really tough fights. It's important
to get them the military help that they need.
And balancing the rhetoric with populations, about the need
to do reconstruction and build schools and do health clinics,
with a full understanding that there is a really tough military
mission that has to be carried out here, has been part of the
problem.
Senator Kerry. Is it fair to say that the NATO reluctance
puts the mission in jeopardy?
Secretary Rice. I believe that if NATO is--if allies, all
allies remain reluctant, yes, there is a real problem.
Senator Kerry. And is the administration envisioning
picking up that slack with our own troops? I mean, does the
temporary deployment of Marines then become permanent? Does it
become larger?
Secretary Rice. I believe there are still good options for
the alliance. A lot of effort is being put toward the common of
Bucharest, to resolve some of these issues. We have increased
in-flows, and willingness to give equipment and to use Special
Forces, that's important.
We need more people in the training units, who are--and you
know, this is not training in a classroom, very often. This is
mentoring out in a rough neighborhood where you might encounter
terrorists, as well.
And so I know, and we can all be critical of how the
alliance has taken this on, but I think we need to recognize
that the alliance, which was structured to do something else,
has only slowly transformed itself, and that the mentality of
what it requires to do Afghanistan is only now really dawning
on certain members of the alliance.
Senator Kerry. If NATO does not accept this responsibility,
does this, in fact, put NATO's rationale on the table?
Secretary Rice. Well, NATO is doing a lot of things,
Senator. They're also, you know, they have a training program
in Afghanistan for leadership, we're in Darfur as a planning
element. I still believe the alliance will meet this test. But
we have not minced words, that an alliance that has taken this
mission on--and I want to underscore, this was a decision taken
by the NAC, to take this mission on. It is a consensus
organization. So there was no one who didn't want to take this
mission on. And we've not----
Senator Kerry. I understand.
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Minced words that we better
succeed, or the alliance, in fact, will be weakened.
Senator Kerry. In your judgment, as you have these
discussions with the various ministers and others involved, do
they express an understanding of the challenge of the stakes in
Afghanistan, but simply see a different way of dealing with it?
Or do they not see the, sort of, downstream impact of Taliban
resurgence, al-Qaeda, et cetera?
Secretary Rice. I would say that it's mixed. A lot of
countries now that are taking on this very heavy fighting
understand, fundamentally, now what counterinsurgency is all
about.
To be fair to them, this is something we've had to learn,
as well. This has not been easy to learn that this is a
continuum--you clear, you hold, you build--it all has to happen
in a continuum. There isn't a fine line between war and peace.
Senator Kerry. It's also fair to say, they have lived with
these kinds of things longer, in some ways. Whether it's been
the Basques or the IRA or other forms of terror.
Secretary Rice. Well, they've certainly lived with
terrorism, but I think it's different, this is a different
branch, a different form.
Senator Kerry. And you think they understand that? Or not?
Secretary Rice. I think they understand it, it's been
harder to come to a realization about what to do with it, what
to do about it. But in my visits down to the ISAF headquarters,
I think people are coming to terms with it.
The problem is the alliance has to come to terms with it,
as a whole. It cannot just be Canadians and Brits and Danes and
Americans and a few others.
Senator Kerry. And what did Foreign Secretary Miliband say
to you with respect to the British?
Secretary Rice. The British, I think, understand this
fight. If there's a big piece of this I think we all are going
to have to work very hard on it. And David Miliband and I spent
a lot of time on this. I believe the ISAF mission is really
understanding better, militarily, what has to be done. That
you're going to be fighting for population security in
circumstances where they won't come at you as an integrated
military grouping, because then they get really destroyed. The
tried that at Kandahar, they tried that on a spring offensive,
they got destroyed.
The harder piece is the piece that is rounding up cells,
using information and intelligence from the population to take
down that suicide bombing network. It's that piece of it that
they are now really trying to do.
But the piece that I don't believe is really pulling its
weight is the build part. And only a small part of it is
resources. Everybody would love to have more resources. But
unless you're quick, and capable of going right into a
community, and saying, ``All right, you have helped clear your
area of bad guys. We can hold, they're not coming back.''
Senator Kerry. Now we're going to make a difference.
Secretary Rice. Now, let's make a difference for you. A lot
of the structures of aid--institutions are not really
structured to that.
Senator Kerry. I know I'm trying to draw this out a little
bit for somebody to get back here so I can go vote. But,
Pakistan--Senator Biden and Senator Hagel and I are going to be
there on the election day and the next day. Can you share with
us what the Republican Institute has pulled out of the
electoral process. What are we doing, and what is your standard
going to be, to make a judgment about the fairness of those
elections?
Secretary Rice. Well, we will--for a variety of reasons, as
you said, IRI had to pull out. There's a large European
Commission monitoring mission. We will, of course, listen very
closely to them, there are other NGOs that will be involved, we
will listen closely to them. We have tried to help train, even
local officials in election monitoring and the like, and we
will have our people out and around the country--we have, as
you know, several consulates, we'll have people out and around
to observe----
Senator Kerry. What's your confidence level at this point,
about the prospects of those elections being held?
Secretary Rice. Well, I believe that the Pakistani
leadership understands that they have to have an election that
inspires confidence in the Pakistani people that this is a step
forward for democracy, I think they understand that.
It's not going to be easy, we're all concerned about the
potential for violence, we're all concerned, of course, about
the potential that there will be, at least, pockets where there
may be problems with the elections. But I think we have to keep
pressing and encouraging and insisting that this is an election
on which a lot is holding. They have got to inspire confidence
that people got to vote freely.
Once that is done, once the elections are over, the key is
going to be to bring about a government that, again, can
inspire that there are a wide range of moderate voices that
have been integrated into it.
Senator Kerry. Madame Secretary, thank you, I need to go
vote.
Senator Lugar, I think you get a second round, here.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much.
Senator Kerry. Thank you, Madame Secretary, very much.
Secretary Rice. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Kerry. Thank you.
Senator Lugar. While awaiting my colleagues, let me ask a
question about our relations with Serbia. It's anticipated that
action may occur in Kosovo within days. The Serbians have had
an election recently, Tadic was elected--a person who appears
to be headed toward affiliation with Europe, and that is very
encouraging, but can you describe any efforts that we are
making to maintain very strong ties between the United States
and Serbia, and thoughts on this transition, period, that may
accompany a Kosovo announcement?
Secretary Rice. Thank you, Senator.
We want a Serbia that is looking to its future, and that
future is in Europe. And we've been the strongest advocates of
its agreement between Europe and Serbia, for reasons having to
do with Serbian politics, they've delayed that somewhat but, I
think we find our European allies recognizing that the Serbs
need a European perspective.
I personally intervened so that the Partnership for Peace
could be offered to Serbia. It doesn't mean that we are unaware
of, or are uninterested in the important work of still getting
the war criminals--we are. But we felt that it was time to move
Serbia closer to NATO.
I do know that this is going to be an extraordinarily
difficult period of time for the Serbian people. And what the
United States will be doing is offering a hand of friendship,
saying that the status of Kosovo and its resolution will allow
Serbia to look forward, and to move on, then, with what it
needs to do.
We hope to be good partners in exchanges, in economic
assistance and all the ways that we could reach out to Serbia.
But it's a great culture, and they're a great people. And I
hope that they will look to that future, and not to the past.
Senator Lugar. I was interim, waiting for Senator Hagel's
arrival, and now I'll turn attention to him.
Senator Hagel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madame Secretary, I add my thanks to you, for your many
years of leadership and commitment to this country, in
particular, foreign policy. I know this will not be the last
time we see you, I'm sure--I hope--before this committee this
year, before your tenure ends. But, as was noted at the
beginning, it will be your last budget, most likely, that you
will present.
And this country is grateful to you for your leadership and
your good work and your efforts.
I wanted to go back to a couple of points that were made by
Chairman Biden and Senator Lugar in their remarks. One
references--as you have noted in your budget presentation, to
increasing a number of our programs. And in particular, what
Secretary Gates said, recently, in two speeches over the last 6
weeks, about increasing our soft power, our diplomatic power.
Our entire arsenal of influence that's so critical for our
country at a time, as both Senators Lugar and Biden noted--this
is a different world, and you understand it, as well as anyone.
It is going to require a 21st century frame of reference, that
I'm not sure we're there, yet. I don't think that's anyone's
fault, it is just realities of the world we're dealing in, and
a world that experiencing the greatest diffusion of
geopolitical, economic power in the history of man.
And to accommodate and to address those great challenges of
our time, we are going to rely greatly, I think, on what you
have within your portfolio, and the next Secretary of State,
and the next group of leaders that comes behind you, and the
President and your team.
And I want to compliment you--as has been noted here, too--
for following along with what Secretary Powell has started, in
enlarging, deepening those resources that are required as the
State Department.
And General Petraeus has said, and others, there is no
military solution to Iraq. There is no military solution to any
of these problems. So, we're going to have to depend more and
more on this arsenal of influence that, sometimes we've not
coordinated as well as we needed to.
And, in particular, the energy aspect--what Senator Lugar
talked about--your reference to trying to implement that energy
coordinator before you leave office, which I think is one of
the more important parts of dealing with these great issues.
I wanted to focus on a couple of areas more specifically,
and go back to Iraq, because when we really look at this great
framework of challenges in the world today, we the United
States, are committed in two areas, in two wars. Roughly
180,000 troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. We're pouring
tremendous resources, as we have been, into those two
countries.
We took more casualties, as you know, in Iraq and
Afghanistan, American casualties, last year than any other
year. Our casualties in Iraq last month are the highest they've
been in 4 months, with more violence.
And when you were talking here, and I didn't hear all of
the conversation because of the vote, about the focus on
bottom-up, and in fact you and I have had this conversation in
your office. Efforts to secure and stabilize at the regional
level, community level, which is obviously critically important
because that's an area that represents the human dimension,
jobs, growth. How are the individual Iraqi lives--how are those
lives being improved?
But also there's a risk in that, in that it has the
potential to weaken the strength of a national government. And,
if on one hand, we are focused on strengthening Iraq,
strengthening the loyalty to a nation--not loyalty to a tribe,
not loyalty to a region. And further, trying to strengthen a
national army--loyalty to a national army. Trying to root out--
which everyone recognizes, a tremendous amount of corruption
that we are dealing with.
We've got to have some balance, obviously, to that, and I
know you try to deal with that. And, in particular, I want to
note an AP story that I just saw this morning that came out of
Iraq last night, and I'd like to get your reaction to this.
This is an Associated Press story out of Baghdad. Last
night, and I'll quote just a sentence or two from it, ``The
Speaker of Iraq's fragmented Parliament threatened Tuesday to
disband the legislature in Iraq, saying it is so riddled with
distrust, it appears unable to adopt the budget, or agree on a
law setting a date for provincial elections, or any other
bills.''
And it goes on in some detail, it quotes other legislators,
how much and how deeply troubled the Parliament is, and unable,
as a result of that, to accommodate and address some of these
great challenges that we know need to go forward. And, of
course, that was the entire point of the so-called thrust that
we, militarily, worked through last year, and the surge that
was to buy time for the politicians, for the national interest,
the leaders of Iraq, to not just move toward political
reconciliation, but toward some political accommodation, in
order to get these differences on some ground, in order to deal
with a reconciliation.
And, as you have noted, we've all noted, that progress has
been lacking.
Would you comment on this story, and if its accurate, and
where we go from here?
Thank you.
Secretary Rice. Yes, Senator; I was following--I've been
following very closely what has been happening in the Iraqi
Parliament, and I think the Speaker, who I actually know, Mr.
Mashhadani, was perhaps engaging in a little hyperbole to rally
the troops. And they, this morning, came back.
What had been the dispute was going to be the sequencing of
the bills, because the Kurds wanted their 17 percent before
they voted the provincial powers, others wanted.
As you might imagine, legislative sequencing is something
you understand better than I. They went back and they figured
out how to do it all as one package, and this morning, they
voted all three. They voted provincial powers, they set a--
apparently, although I don't have my own confirmation of this,
I was passed a note--that they've said, they will try to hold
provincial elections before October 1.
Those provincial elections are going to be very important
to renovating provincial councils that are, perhaps, not wholly
representative. They passed their 2008 budget, with significant
increases to the provinces for funding. They also passed an
amnesty that the Sunnis are very pleased to see.
So, the legislature has actually done a lot. We talk a lot
about bottom-up reconciliation, and I don't think that's very,
very key--the Concerned Citizens Committees, The Awakening
movement, the functioning provincial councils.
When I was here on my first testimony on Iraq, in 2005, I
talked about the formation of Provincial Reconstruction Teams
as something we wanted to do.
I opened the first in 2005 in Mosul. They've gotten
stronger and stronger as a way to bring about provincial and
local capability to do things like execute budgets.
But, you're right--the national level has to work, too. And
in the last few months, they've passed a pension law, an
investment law, a justice and accountability law, a provincial
powers law, a general amnesty and a 2008 budget.
They also, Senator--we've worked very hard with them--
they've created a structure now, their Executive Council, which
gets the Prime Minister to work with the Presidency Council on
a weekly basis, and they've created a Secretariat for that.
It's still hard, you're right, there's a lot of distrust.
There is a lot of feeling that is very deep. But when we talk
about reconciliation, I think it's important to realize what
they're trying to do right now is what I would call de jure
reconciliation. They're trying to get the right laws in place,
the right distribution of power. The coming together of peoples
will happen over a longer period of time.
But, you see every day, efforts between Sunnis and Shia to
assert their ``Iraqi-ness'' not their Sunni or their Shia
element, and it will be helped by these laws that have been
passed.
So, yes; it was a big kerfluffle last night in the Council
of Representatives, apparently they solved it this morning.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Madame Secretary, for testifying before the committee. We are
at a critical time right now, with regards to our foreign
policy, and related spending, which makes this hearing all the
more timely. And I'd like to just make a few quick remarks, and
ask that my full statement be placed in the record.
I'm a strong supporter of increased funding for State
Department operations, to ensure that we have a robust and
fully functioning agency. I'm pleased that the President's
proposed fiscal year 2009 State Department budget has increased
8.5 percent from last year's budget request, including
emergency funding.
I nonetheless remain deeply concerned that the President is
still failing to properly allocate resources, so we can address
our top national security priority, and that of course is the
global threat posed by al-Qaeda and its affiliates.
The misguided and narrow focus on the war in Iraq is
depleting our financial, diplomatic, and material resources
around the globe--whether in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Indonesia,
the Democratic Republic of Congo, or Algeria--and making it
much more difficult for us to pursue a policy agenda that does,
in fact, contribute to our national security.
Following the Defense Secretary's lead, last week the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs testified before the Senate Arms
Services Committee and noted that we need to do a better job of
developing the capabilities and capacity in other agencies,
outside of the Defense Department, including State and USAID.
And, you know, how have we--how has this happened? How have
we reached the point where the Defense Department has to
advocate more strongly for building and strengthening our
civilian and diplomatic capacity than our own State Department?
In addition to my concerns about misplaced priorities, I
continue to be concerned about this administration's misleading
budgeting. As in previous years, the President's budgeting
fails to account for the cost of the wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq and fails to pay for those costs, thus sticking our
children and grandchildren with the bill. Passing the tab for
these wars onto future generations is simply irresponsible.
And I'd also like to echo the comments of some my
colleagues with respect to Iraq and Afghanistan and the need to
ensure that we are equally focusing on the so-called
``nonkinetic'' programs. I think such priorities are essential
and needs to be substantially robust.
Madame Secretary, I understand this budget request includes
creating an additional 50 positions for political liaisons with
military counterparts, designed to provide additional support
for the Department of Defense. And I do believe and understand
that these relationships are key to ensuring that U.S. military
actions are consistent with U.S. foreign policy objectives.
However, given that the Department of State is incapable of
meeting critical foreign policy needs overseas, coupled with
the fact that the U.S. military is increasingly filling the
gaps when the Department of State cannot, it almost seems like
the Department of State is outsourcing its mission and its jobs
to the Department of Defense.
What steps have you taken to ensure that the Department of
State does not cede its foreign policy responsibilities to the
Department of Defense, and retains its position--which I, of
course, believe in--as the primary agency responsible for
foreign policy?
Secretary Rice. Well, Senator, let me start by saying this
problem began in the 1990s, when we tried to capitalize on the
peace dividend. It was when USIA went away, it was when there
was a hiring freeze on Foreign Service officer--we now will
experience a bubble in a couple of years, where we simply
didn't hire anybody for years.
As so, what we have done in this administration, and what I
have done with the support of this committee--and frankly, not
just starting this year--is to rebuild those capabilities, over
a period of time. That's why public diplomacy funding has been
up every year in the President's budget. That's why funding for
foreign assistance has quadrupled in Africa, doubled in Latin
America, tripled worldwide. It's why we have, not just spent
more money, but we've completely restructured the way we think
about what the State Department is doing.
I have, frankly, 300 diplomats in Europe that I didn't
need. They're now someplace else. And I think it's important
that they're in India and Brazil and in parts of Africa. I had
as many diplomats in Germany as I had in India. That was an
outrage.
And so, it is, in fact, not just more people, although,
thank goodness we are asking for a lot more people--1,100 new
Foreign Service, and 300 new USAID--but it's also, what are
those people going to be doing?
It's a great thing to have great political reporting--I
believe in it. But I've said to my officers in places like
London and Berlin, I talk to those people all the time. The
political reporting I need is, how are we mobilizing the trans-
Atlantic alliance to do something about Darfur--where you've
had a tremendous interest, sir--or to do something about
Somalia?
And so, we've been changing the whole structure of the way
that we think about diplomacy. I gave a speech yesterday, a
second speech--I gave the first at Georgetown 2 years ago, and
I went to update it, called Transformational Diplomacy--what
are diplomats going to be doing?
Now, in that regard, diplomats are going to be doing more
to help people improve their lives, through being able to
manage foreign assistance as part of our foreign policy.
Diplomats are going to be working with the military, which is
why the PolAds are important, because we fully believe--and by
the way, so do our military counterparts--that they don't want
to, nor should they have, the mission of carrying out the
foreign policy of the United States. It would erode the State
Department's mission, and it would erode their mission in terms
of military functions.
But, increasingly we have a continuum. And not just in
places like Iraq or Afghanistan, but in a Haiti or a Liberia,
where an area might not yet quite be stable, so you have to
work with military assets while you build the capacity of the
government, which is why you see us working very hard for these
civil/military-type apparatuses, like the Provincial
Reconstruction Teams.
Finally, I was really quite unhappy that, when it came to
staffing major civilian reconstruction, that we had not
developed, in the United States of America, civilian
institutions to do that.
I mentioned, Senator Feingold, I think you might not yet
have been here--the way we did it in Afghanistan with the bond
process, I will label ``adopt-a-ministry.'' So, one country
took this ministry, and another country took that ministry, and
frankly, we're still paying for the incoherence of that effort.
Then we got to Iraq, and it was given to the Defense
Department. But they would be the first to say that they
weren't capable of mobilizing the full range of civilian
capability for reconstruction. And it's only when we went to
Provincial Reconstruction Teams, this kind of integration of
civilian and military, that we were able to do more.
Now, the last big step in that is what Senator Lugar and
Senator Biden and Senator Hagel and the State Department have
been so interested in, the Civilian Response Corps. Because
what we really ought to be able to do is not to turn to the
National Guard or to the Reserves to provide city planners, or
to provide judges or people who know how to do a health care
system. We ought to be able to ask Americans who want to serve,
to say, ``If you're an Arizona prosecutor, and you want to take
a year off and help the Liberian people develop rule of law--
the U.S. Government will put you in the Civilian Response Corps
and we'll call on you to do that.
So, I believe that these are all innovations that we've
made over the last several years, with increased resources, but
not just with increased resources. With really changing the way
that we think about what diplomats are going to do. And I'm
very pleased and proud to say that I think that the men and
women of the State Department have been excited by the
challenge. They've been willing to think about the different
kind of training, and the different kind of light that that's
going to require.
We have had to support families better, just one final
example--when we wanted people to go to Afghanistan, or to
Iraq, unaccompanied--in the old days their family had to move
back to the United States, that was very disruptive. Now we can
leave them in theater.
So, we've made a lot of innovations. I want to say that I
think we've made them together, and we've increased the
resources together. But this is going to take more than what
we've been able to do in one administration, and long after I'm
gone, I hope the United States will continue to build these
capabilities.
Senator Feingold. Madame Secretary, you know from past
experience, I normally wouldn't tolerate such a long answer,
but you really were trying to talk about this fundamental
issue, and I appreciate the breadth of what you talked about,
especially the reference to the civilian corps at the end--this
is exactly what we need to do.
And let me just say, as my time is running out, you know,
having been to Africa many times, and seeing the work of our
military in some of these situations--it is so moving and
wonderful to see, for example, in a place called Dire Dawa,
Ethiopia, they actually provided these army tents when there
was a flood, and it's the only reason people were OK--and this
wasn't even in a military situation, this was a situation just,
where we helped people.
But what bothers me, and I know you're sensitive to it, is,
you know, you see the kids running up to the military people,
and that's a lovely sight and they're excited and grateful. But
for our face to be, first and foremost, military in a situation
like that. I know you're sensitive to this, but somehow we have
to get to the point where our first face is not military in
these situations. Their role is important, but we have got to
have the diplomatic and other resources so that it isn't, ``the
United States does good things, if they're in uniform, only.''
It can't just be that.
And I realize you're sensitive to that, but I think that is
one of the most overarching issues for our foreign policy
throughout the world, and it is a continuum between Defense and
State in those functions, but I think too often the continuum
right now is too much on the appearance of a military side, and
make it more balanced, appropriately balance it, it would be
great.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Coleman.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madame Secretary, I want to join my colleagues in thanking
you for your service, it has been an honor for me to work with
you. And I do hope that, though this might be your last budget
presentation, I'm sure there will be lots of conversations that
will go on until the end of the President's term.
Let me just, I want to just start by reflecting on some
positives, and then raise some areas of concern.
I also join in appreciation for the increase, 8.5 percent
increase in State Department funding, I think that's important.
I support and applaud the continuing commitment to
Millennium Challenge Account, though I would hope that we in
Congress could do better. I think this is one of the really
important ways in which we do foreign aid, which is to work
with local governments, and have them identify what they need.
And then have in place those indices of accountability and
transparency that give us a greater sense that they'll return
for the investment, that watch it be used in the way it's
intended.
So, I applaud the continued commitment, I would hope that
we could do better than what's set forth in the budget. The
robust funding for global AIDS, I think the--this
administration has not gotten the recognition for the
incredible commitment we've made to global AIDS, and the impact
it's had, in terms of saving lives, and I applaud that.
I participated in a meeting with Ambassador Negroponte just
the other day on the Merida initiative, with the Ambassador
from Mexico and El Salvador, and I applaud the commitment there
to combat transnational organized crime. The places in
Minnesota are impacted by the inability to deal with organized
crime and drug trafficking in Mexico.
And finally, if that's not of great focus, but of great
significance has been your personal efforts, and the efforts of
the State Department to expand the opportunities of student
visas, bringing students into this country. I think in the
post-9/11 universe, we squeezed back, and I have been concerned
by the long-term implications of that. And we talked about
this, I think during your confirmation you made a commitment to
change that. And as I've reviewed the numbers, I think we're
back to pre-9/11 numbers of students from other countries. And
here, we're doing a lot of work now with the Arab countries. I
think it's important that the best face of America--I can only
imagine in 10 years, someone in this seat, 15 years, talking to
a Prime Minister from an Arab nation or South American nation,
if they studied here, it makes a difference, and so I applaud
that.
Two areas of significant concern. One, I am concerned about
what appears to be a push by this administration to complete a
Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement with the Russians. We've
talked a little bit and Chairman Lugar raised the issue of some
of the language which you, yourself, you know, labeled
unhelpful, reprehensive rhetoric.
I understand that--or our intelligence community has
confirmed that Russia continues to assist the Iranians in long-
ranch missile programs, I'd, at least that has been reported. I
would ask you, one question would be--is that an accurate
assessment?
I also understand that Russia is selling advanced air
defenses to Iran, defenses that could be deployed to defend
Iran's nuclear sites. And I believe the Clinton administration
made a point of demanding in the late 1990s that--a limitation
of that. Have we reversed that? Are we allowing that to go
forward?
And then, finally, and this is the issue, this--the whole
question of proliferation. I supported the India agreement, I
thought it was--it made sense.
But on the one hand, we have--we're putting diplomatic
pressure on nations not to trade with Iran, not to support it,
not to put it in a position to expand its nuclear efforts.
You've talked about upping the impact of sanctions about 20
percent, to significantly higher, we begin to see the efforts
of that.
I understand that a few weeks ago, Moscow made its final
shipment of nuclear fuel, needed to start up a massive power
plant reactor at Bushehr. My understanding is that once this
plant is up and running, it will produce enough near weapons-
grade plutonium for roughly 60 crude nuclear weapons.
So, that's the information that we're hearing. I'm hearing
that, and I don't know whether that's Energy or State
Department, that doesn't matter to me. The bottom line is, help
me understand whether, in fact, this is a path we're moving
down. If I'm wrong in the assertions I've made, let me know.
But I would state very clearly that it's a deep concern to me,
that moving forward with a Russian Civil Nuclear Cooperation
Agreement, particularly in light of their activities in Iran,
really are inconsistent and contrary to the diplomatic efforts
we're trying to assert, regarding Iran and its capacity to
develop a nuclear weapon.
Secretary Rice. Thank you, Senator.
Well, there certainly are concerns about Russian
conventional transfers, air defense capabilities, and the like,
to Iran. And this is something that I bring up consistently and
frequently with my counterpart. They say, ``Well, these are not
arms sales that are illegal,'' and we say, ``Not everything
that is legal, is wise.'' And this is a discussion we have, and
will continue to have.
I do believe that we think that the Civ Nuke agreement--and
we've not yet initialed it, we have largely negotiated it, but
we've not initialed it--we do believe that a Civ Nuke agreement
with Russia makes sense. They are one of the members of the
Nuclear Suppliers group. We believe that their proliferation
activities--or nonproliferation activities, let me put it that
way--on nuclear matters are consistent with the obligations
that we would be taking and they would be taking under the 123
Agreement, and that it would be in the benefit of both sides to
have it.
Let me just say, on Bushehr--we frankly have had, over
time, a kind of evolution of our policy on Bushehr, because
when it became clear that what we needed to do was to stop the
Iranians from enrichment and reprocessing, but not to deny that
they had the right to peaceful nuclear uses, that the Bushehr
strategy, the Bushehr framework by which the enrichment and
reprocessing of fuel would take place, that all spent fuel
would be returned to Russia, and that the Iranians would not be
involved in the technology, therefore learning how to enrich
and reprocess on their own, was actually a good model going
forward, for how countries might acquire civil nuclear power,
but not have the proliferation risk associated with the fuel
cycle.
Senator Coleman. But, wouldn't that be a good model, Madame
Secretary? If, in fact, the Iranians agreed to step back on,
and we had a sense of assurance that we're stepping back on
reprocessing and enrichment, because we don't have that right
now, and there's nothing in the NIE estimates or anything that
says that they--so they're getting the best of both worlds.
Secretary Rice. I agree. What we'd like them to do, I mean,
what would be acceptable is if they would stop their own
indigenous efforts at reprocessing and enrichment, and accept
that fuel would be supplied by outside powers. Wewe and the
Russians have even put forward the concept of a kind of assured
fuel supply that might be given by the Nuclear Suppliers Group,
or some members of it, so that countries don't acquire the fuel
cycle. This was a proposal that the President made in a speech
at the National Defense University a couple of years ago, and
he and President Putin have agreed that that would be a good
thing.
So, my point is that we believe Bushehr is a model that
would make sense. And the last fuel shipment was sent with the
Russians saying to the Iranians, ``All right, now you don't
need indigenous reprocessing and enrichment,'' and I think,
frankly, has helped us to move forward on the next Security
Council resolution, which I hope will be voted sometime in the
next few weeks.
That does not excuse, Senator, the problems we continue to
have with the Russians on, particularly, the advanced weapons
systems sales to Iran. Even if the Russians wish to talk about
them as defensive in character, we will continue to press on
that. But I think we believe that in the nuclear side, for the
most part, we have a system in which the obligations of the 123
Agreement would be sustainable.
Senator Coleman. Again, my concern is to be moving forth in
a Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement at a time that the
Russians engage in a range of activities which we find
unhelpful--unhelpful, at least, and perhaps dangerous--perhaps
dangerous, I think certainly this body, I anticipate, will be
looking very closely at that.
Last area of concern, I had forwarded a letter signed by 26
of my colleagues about the Durban II conference--and this is an
issue, obviously, close to the heart of Tom Lantos, who
attended Durban I, which we walked out of at the end, first the
Secretary of State wasn't going to participate, and then we
sent a lower level delegation. And then, ultimately, when it
resulted at every level, in perpetuating the idea that Zionism
is a race and falling into that anti-Semitic--just an
unhelpful--unhelpful international process, of which Tom Lantos
said was, you know, recognized that.
We're now in Durban II and I appreciate the fact that we
made a statement about U.S. funding, we're voting against the
budget because it included funding for this. We're not
participating in the preparatory activities, but we're walking
down the same path.
And I believe the Canadians have said they are not going to
provide credibility to this process by participating, we
haven't made that statement yet. Are we going to make that
statement?
Secretary Rice. Well, we've not made that statement, but
let me assure you, Senator, we have no intention of
participating in something like Durban I. It was an outrage,
and I've been very clear with my counterparts about that. We
sent a signal on the budget, and we've not tried to make a
final decision on this, but let me just state very clearly, we
don't have any interest in participating in something that
deteriorates into the kind of conference that Durban I was.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Madame Secretary.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Dodd.
Senator Dodd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I'm going to be
brief in all of this, because I know my other colleagues have
been here a little longer than I have this morning.
And let me join with the chairman and others who have
expressed their sorrow over the loss of Tom Lantos, as well. I
had a nice conversation with his son-in-law Dick Swett the
other day, and Katrina and Annette, and they're just wonderful
people.
I go back, running for Congress 30 years ago, when Tom
Lantos was in the private sector, and very supportive of many
of us, beginning early on. He had a remarkable career, made a
difference in every stage of it. So, it's a real loss for the
country and I know you and others expressed your similar
sentiments. So, I wanted to join you in that.
Let me ask you about Latin America a bit. I know we're--
obviously tension in Iraq and Afghanistan and these other
issues that Senators have raised--but there's some huge issues
looming. I was going to address the issue of the Merida
program, and at some point I'll talk to you or your staff about
that--the $500 million that are being requested on the drug
issue. And that's the obvious issue in Mexico and obviously
Colombia we need to deal with.
But, we're reading about Bolivia these days, the issue of
what's happening with energy resources. You've got a new
President in Argentina. Obviously, the problems that are still
looming, and maybe growing larger in Venezuela, the issue of
the FARC and what's going on between Venezuela and Colombia.
It seems to me that there are a whole series of issues. And
I've said this over and over again, I want you to know, that
obviously the issues of Iraq and Afghanistan have sucked a lot
of the oxygen out of what would be, normally, a foreign policy
debate that would have included Latin America a lot more.
That's not to say its been avoided entirely, but certainly
there's only so many places you can keep the kind of level of
attention. And, obviously, some huge issues here that need our
attention.
And I wonder if you might give us some idea of what
thoughts, plans, ideas--the post-Castro regime--are there plans
being formulated? Are we thinking about this? Are we talking to
regional leaders as to what might happen, is there a glide path
that others have talked about that would allow for an easier
transition, if that occurs.
Would you spend just a couple of minutes and share with me
some thoughts, and sort of range around the region, if you
will, for me a bit--beyond the drugs issues--as to where the
administration is?
Secretary Rice. Thank you.
Well, I think we've had, actually, quite a lot of focus on
Latin America. I think the President's been there five times,
or something like that, I've been there an additional three--I
was just in Colombia.
We've doubled assistance to Latin America, and I think we
have a very positive agenda for Latin America, which is one
that looks for open markets and democracy, and frankly, a much
more, a much stronger identification with the social justice
agenda than the United States has had in the past.
And I think it's served us well to be very clear that we
don't have any ideological tests for our friends. We have very
good relations with left governments like Brazil and Chile and
Uruguay, and equally good relations with countries like
Colombia. And a very, very budding and strong relationship with
Brazil which, of course, is the big power in South America.
We, of course, with Central America, have had the Central
America Free Trade Agreement and we've had a number of other
free trade agreements.
I would say that, it is true that there are some
troublesome regimes in Latin America, but there are equally as
many who have come into power who are very strong friends and
allies of the United States like, for instance, Peru, where
we've just passed a trade agreement.
The one single thing I'd most want to do is pass the
Colombia Free Trade Agreement--I was just there. This is a
remarkable story. We're talking about a country that, in 2001,
everybody was talking about it as a failed state.
Thanks to early work by the Clinton administration, we've
expanded that work. We now have a Colombia that has literally
has taken its country back from both paramilitaries and from
the guerillas. It's a country that can now extend police power
and military power throughout the country.
We were just in Medellin, which was synonymous, of course,
with Pablo Escobar and trouble, and is now a thriving city.
It's not all perfect, because they're continuing to work on the
justice system, and issues of impunity and human rights, I
understand that. But Colombia is an extraordinary, bipartisan
success for the United States of America and it stands as a
symbol to the rest of the region that friendship with America,
and willing to work on your difficulties can--you can succeed.
We also, of course, are working very hard through the
Millennium Challenge Program with some of the poorest
countries. I would note that even though Nicaragua has a
government with which, shall I say, we have a history, they've
been fierce defenders of the Millennium Challenge, even though
the areas in which that is being done is the Sandinista or
Sandinista areas--those Sandinista mayors have been really
clear that they want those programs to go forward.
And so, I think the combination of support for democratic
development, willingness to admit that democracy doesn't
necessarily mean social justice, and that we, therefore, have
to have programs that expand the reach. I, personally, have had
a focus on Afro-Colombian, and Afro-Brazilian affairs, I'm
looking forward to going to Balilla very shortly, and the
inclusion of marginalized populations.
I think we're doing rather well in Latin America. But it is
a place that is always in the balance, having made the moves
away from juntas and from governments that were nondemocratic,
there's always the problem of democratic governments getting
elected, and then not be able to deliver for their people. And
that's what we've been very, very focused on, and we've tried
to do it as a positive agenda, not as an agenda against anyone,
but rather as a positive agenda.
Senator Dodd. I thank you for that and I won't take the
time right now, but I'd love to spend a little time with some
people, possibly, and talk about this--the $500 million account
and how that's going to work. I know it's starting with Mexico
and Columbia, principally, I presume.
Secretary Rice. And Central America, there's a significance
there.
Senator Dodd. I know the transit points. Well, thank you
very much.
Secretary Rice. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you. First of all, I'd like to
join with my colleagues and say how much the loss of Tom Lantos
is going to be to this country and to the cause of human
rights. I got to know Tom during the last several years, when
we working on the issue of anti-Semitism and trying to bring it
to the priority list of the OSCE and make sure there was an
effort to combat anti-Semitism in the 55 OSCE countries.
Madame Secretary, I am really happy to see that the
Department of State has been included as a National Security
Agency in the President's FY 2009 budget. I think that for too
long we have ignored the importance of public diplomacy and
soft power in our national security interests. This time last
year, we talked about getting more personnel for the job. You
said you were aware of the problem, and I congratulate you for
being candid about the needs of the State Department and
requesting the new positions. I'm very interested in personnel
training management. I think that's one of the areas where we
need to really improve our Federal Government.
I've been asked to be on the Advisory Committee for the
American Academy of Diplomacy, led by Ambassador Pickering, to
examine the Foreign Affairs budget and resources. I hope these
recommendations you've made in the President's final budget
will be looked upon with great approval by this group, as they
advise the next President on the challenges in your area.
I also believe the Civilian Stabilization Initiative is
extremely important. We all know that we must to do a much
better job in post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction.
I'll never forget being in Iraq and talking to some of the
sheikhs, particularly the Sunni, who said, ``We changed our
attitude because one, we've concluded you don't want to occupy
our country. No. 2, we don't like al-Qaeda, we don't like their
brand of the Sunnis. And No. 3, we love your PRTs.''
The PRTs have contributed greatly to our success in Iraq
and also Afghanistan. We need to do more in this area, and the
fact that you recognize the need to have people in the State
Department to do so, the fact that we're going to cascade this
out in other agencies of the Federal Government so they also
are prepared to contribute will be a wonderful step in the
right direction.
I also mentioned anti-Semitism. I'm a little concerned that
there doesn't seem to be any money in the budget for the OSCE
because it's critical right now. The Russians are putting a lot
of effort into the OSCE. Ambassador Christian Strohal, the
director of the OSCE's Office of Democratic Institutions and
Human Rights (ODAIR), is stepping down, and it's anti-Semitism
adviser also is leaving. I hope that somebody at the State
Department pays attention to the new people that we choose to
run ODAIR and the funding that I cannot find it in the budget.
One of my favorite topics--not so favorite right now
because we don't know what's going to happen--is Kosovo. I
recently sent you a letter explaining my concerns about that,
and I know that you share my concerns about preserving human
rights there. I'm very, very worried, Madame Secretary, about
what's going to happen there because I'm getting mixed signals.
I think Kosovo probably will declare its independence, and the
European Union will go along with it, but I'm really fearful
that the institutions and infrastructure referred to in the
Ahtisaari plan will not be put in place for the plan to be
successful. If it's not successful, I think it will cause a
real problem for our goal of integrating Southeast Europe into
the EU.
I was interested also in Senator Lugar's comments about the
three new countries joining NATO. I'm hopeful that you'll
support extending an offer of Membership Action Plans to
Georgia and Ukraine, and maybe even Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia,
and Montenegro. I really believe that if we can get these
countries into NATO and the EU, we will have accomplished a
great deal.
Finally, I'd like for you to comment on why there's no
money in the President's FY 2009 budget for the OSCE, and if
that is a priority.
Secretary Rice. Well, thank you, Senator Voinovich. First
of all, I think that there is OSCE money. I'm told it is both
in the SEED account and in the DNCP account, and it's about $25
million. So, it may be distributed in ways that you can't see.
I'll get you a full accounting for it.
[The information referred to above follows: ]
In the President's FY 2009 budget, a total of $26.5 million has
been requested for the OSCE in the following accounts: $7.875 million
in the Assistance for the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union
(FSA) account; $14.625 million in the Assistance for Eastern Europe and
Baltic States (SEED) account; and $4 million in the Diplomatic and
Consular Affairs Program (D&CP) account. We expect to meet our
financial obligations to the OSCE and continue the practice of
providing additional, voluntary funding over and above our OSCE budget
contributions for activities such as election monitoring, extra-
budgetary projects and personnel secondments, albeit at lower levels
than in the past due to overall funding constraints. In an era of tight
budgets, we in the U.S. Government must--and do--work hard to ensure
that OSCE's activities fulfill its core missions, complement without
duplicating other local and international efforts and does so in ways
that are fiscally sound.
The administration remains a strong supporter of the OSCE, and
appreciates consistent Helsinki Commission and bipartisan Congressional
support. In a constrained budget environment, we need to focus on top
priorities, promote budgetary discipline, and reduce expenses where
appropriate (e.g., the OSCE Secretariat). We are working with the OSCE
and others member states to develop OSCE budgets for 2008 and beyond
that reflect these goals. As the only post-Cold War multilateral
organization in the Euro-Atlantic region, the OSCE remains the most
effective--and cost-effective--organization for promoting core U.S.
policy objectives on security, democratization, rule of law, and human
rights in the region. We look forward to developing a carefully
targeted OSCE program to build border security and customs capacity
along the Afghanistan border, thereby enhancing cooperation between
Afghanistan and its Central Asian neighbors.
The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR)
remains one of our top priorities, especially in connection with its
democratization and human rights promotion efforts. The United States
has contributed generously to ODIHR extra-budgetary programs and
projects in the last few years, with a particular focus on election
observation and tolerance programs. The majority of our contributions
for the tolerance programs have been for projects to combat anti-
Semitism. With this support, the ODIHR has published a number of
handbooks on teaching about the Holocaust and is providing educators
with tools for curriculum development to promote tolerance education.
Our 2008 agenda for supporting events to highlight the continuing
problem of anti-Semitism is extensive. One expert event has already
occurred in Berlin, another event focusing on hate crimes is scheduled
for the summer in Helsinki, and the Romanian Government will sponsor a
conference on anti-Semitism in September. We will seek to have an
additional session at the yearly October Human Dimension Implementation
Meeting in Warsaw devoted to a review of implementation of existing
commitments to fight anti-Semitism and other racial and religious
intolerance.
We share your concern over the need to protect the rights of
minority populations in Kosovo and are pleased that the Kosovo Assembly
has shown its commitment to a multi-ethnic Kosovo by moving quickly to
adopt much of the legislation required to implement the Ahtisaari plan;
we expect that all the Ahtisaari legislation will be adopted soon.
Kosovo Police are actively supporting international efforts to protect
all minorities in Kosovo. We also are encouraging these actors to
improve the situation at Roma camps in the north and to be mindful of
the particular challenges facing the Roma minority.
Secretary Rice. But there is money for the OSCE. I'm very
supportive, as you know, of the work that the organization
does, both its peacekeeping operations and its election
monitoring. It was very critical in helping us in Kyrgyzstan
when that was--that drama was unfolding. I made a visit to
Vienna and addressed the Perm Reps. I've said I want to look,
at some point, the distribution between what we're doing in
Vienna and what's done in the field, but it's obviously a very
important----
Senator Voinovich. Well, we had a hearing before the
Helsinki Commission. I'm not on it, but Senator Cardin is, and
the people that testified indicated they thought that there was
less interest by the State Department in the OSCE, compared to
what it was 2 or 3 years ago.
Secretary Rice. No; we're very interested in it, following
it very carefully. I think there is a question of the relative
distribution of resources between Vienna and the actual
activities of the OSCE. But no, it's a very important
organization and we've continued to work very hard on it. And
you're right, there are those who would turn it to other
purposes, which is another reason to be very vigilant about the
organization.
Senator Voinovich. By the way, I am concerned that the
biggest contingent of people in the OSCE is in Kosovo.
Secretary Rice. Yes.
Senator Voinovich. And now OSCE is going to pull them all
out. Who will fill the jobs that those people are now doing?
Secretary Rice. Well, we've spent a lot of time with our
European allies looking at the so-called supervised
independence, should it come to that for Kosovo. The Europeans
have a mission that will be going in, including an ESDP mission
to deal with policing and police training and the like. There
is, of course, still a U.N. activity there. And so, we're very
aware that helping Kosovo develop the infrastructure--we expect
there will have to be a donors conference for Kosovo. I don't
want to get too far ahead of myself in terms of what will
happen here, but we've spent a lot of time being very concerned
about the very issues that you've mentioned out of the
Ahtisaari plan, the human rights issues, the respect for holy
sites, and what happens to the population, the minority
populations in Kosovo. So, it is something that's very much on
my mind and very much in our planning.
In fact, we had a Principles Committee meeting yesterday
and a National Security Council meeting just today about this
very issue.
Senator Voinovich. I also appreciate the fact that you
supported the Partnership for Peace program for Serbia, and
that we have a State partnership with them. We've got to
continue to let the Serbian people and President Boris Tadic
know that we are supportive of them and we want to see their
economy and quality of life improve.
Finally, to my last question. I have spent some time with
Ban Ki-Moon, Secretary General of the United Nations, talking
about the issue of our arrearage, in terms of our dues for
peacekeeping and generally for the United Nations. Would you
comment on how this year's budget impacts our arrears to the
United Nations? I know there is $1.497 billion for
international peacekeeping. Does pay our dues in that area? And
what about the other general dues?
Secretary Rice. Well, what it does, Senator, is it allows
us to meet the peacekeeping assessment that we anticipate. We
also have some voluntary peacekeeping funds that would come in
supplemental, for instance, for Darfur and the like. It will
not help us to make much progress on the arrearages. My goal
right now is to prevent us from continuing to fall into greater
arrearage. I think we can manage this with what is forecast in
the budget, but we really need to fully fund this this time.
We've experienced difficulty in fully funding. That has caused
us to slip, and I would ask that we get the full funding. We
also, of course, have work going on to look at the cap, which
is a part of the problem.
Senator Voinovich. Well, the peacekeeping funds are really
important because the U.N. is accomplishing a lot through its
peacekeeping efforts that we're very interested in, and it's
multilateral in terms of the participants. I think that getting
ourselves up to date on the peacekeeping dues will mean a great
deal to those we're trying to get involved.
Secretary Rice. I think we can manage it with the resources
that we've requested, but we really do need the full funding
this time.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you. I want to thank my colleagues.
They've all stayed within the 10 minutes and we'll do 10
minutes with Senator Boxer. Depending on how long the question
is, we promised we'd get the Secretary out at 1 o'clock. We're
going to run very close. I warn my remaining five colleagues, I
may cut it back to 8 minutes in order to accommodate her--her
schedule, but I thank everybody for sticking with the time.
And thank you for your physical endurance, Madame
Secretary.
Senator Boxer.
Senator Boxer. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, to everyone for your beautiful remarks about
Tom Lantos. I will tell Annette and she will be so happy to
hear that this is one area we all agree on.
Secretary Rice, with 157,000 American troops in Iraq. The
United States now makes up 94 percent of the total force there.
The number of forces from other nations has decreased from
47,000 in 2003 to 10,600 as of today. British forces, which
once numbered 45,000, have been reduced to 4,500. An additional
2,000 British soldiers are expected to leave Iraq this spring,
yet you have described our coalition partners as strong and
active.
As our strongest allies like Great Britain pull out of
Iraq, I don't see how you can believe that they're strong and
active. Here's the point, the American people are beginning to
really get more and more uncomfortable with the burden that
they have to bear for this war. Last week, an AP poll asked
Americans how to best fix our ailing economy. And redeploying
from Iraq ranked first. People are connecting the dots. Sixty-
eight percent said ending the Iraq war would help fix our
economy. Now the administration first said this war would cost
tens of billions of dollars. It's already cost half a trillion,
and there is no end in sight. Some are saying it could be quite
a while--I believe Senator McCain said we could be in Iraq for
100 years. The war is costing about $10 billion a month, while,
to give you an example, we spend less than $1 billion a month
on all the after school programs for our children in a year.
How much more do you think we should spend in Iraq, especially
since some of our States are already in a recession? How much
more do you think we should spend in Iraq?
Secretary Rice. Well Senator, I can't give you an answer to
how much more we need to spend in Iraq. I can tell you what I
think we need to achieve in Iraq.
Senator Boxer. I'm not asking that question.
Secretary Rice. Well, Senator, I'm sorry, I can't give you
an answer.
Senator Boxer. Because people in my State----
Secretary Rice. I can't give you a number.
Senator Boxer [continuing]. The people that this
administration talks about all the time, the taxpayers, are
getting very disturbed that the burden of this war is on their
shoulders. So you have no answer----
Secretary Rice. Senator----
Senator Boxer [continuing]. To----
Secretary Rice. Senator----
Senator Boxer [continuing]. What we should have to spend.
Secretary Rice [continuing]. I'm not going to try to come
up with a number of how much more I think we will spend in
Iraq.
Senator Boxer. Then let's get on to another question.
Secretary Rice. What I can tell you?
Senator Boxer. I don't want another answer. I want an
answer to how much more we are going to spend.
Secretary Rice. Well Senator, you asked me a question.
Senator Boxer. No; you said you can't answer my question,
so I'm moving to----
Secretary Rice. Senator, you asked me a question, and I'd
like to have an opportunity to answer.
Senator Boxer. Well, you just said you can't answer it.
Secretary Rice. I'm not going to answer how much we need to
spend.
Senator Boxer. Right, well, that's my question.
Secretary Rice Force levels are being determined by the
President and by the commanders on the ground through Secretary
Gates to get the mission accomplished. Now, Iraqi forces are
making up an ever increasing number----
Senator Boxer. Madame Secretary, the only reason I'm
interrupting you is because you said you couldn't answer my
question and I have another couple of questions.
Secretary Rice. Senator, I don't think there is an answer
to your question.
Senator Boxer. Well, that is a sad statement about the lack
of planning and foresight. There's no way out. There's no end
in sight, and no one knows what they're doing and no one can
answer important questions.
Secretary Rice, construction of the U.S. Embassy in Iraq is
seen by many as a symbol of the administration's failed policy
in Iraq. It is plagued by delays, cost overruns, and life-
threatening safety concerns.
And I'll put those statements in the record, Mr. Chairman,
if I might, backing up what I just said.
[The information referred to above follows:]
Fortress America\1\
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\1\ This article first appeared in the September/October 2007
edition of Foreign Policy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
By Jane C. Loeffler
The new U.S. Embassy in Baghdad is the largest the world has ever
known. Thousands will live inside its blast walls, isolated from the
bloody realities of a nation at war. Why has the United States built
this place-and what does it mean?
A citadel is rising on the banks of the Tigris. There, on the
river's western side, the United States is building the world's largest
embassy. The land beneath it was once a riverside park. What sits atop
today is a massive, fortified compound. Encircled by blast walls and
cut off from the rest of Baghdad, it stands out like the crusader
castles that once dotted the landscape of the Middle East. Its size and
scope bring into question whether it is even correct to call this
facility an ``embassy.'' Why is the United States building something so
large, so expensive, and so disconnected from the realities of Iraq? In
a country shattered by war, what is the meaning of this place?
For security reasons, many details about the embassy's design and
construction must remain classified. But the broad outline of its
layout says a lot about one of America's most important architectural
projects. Located in Baghdad's 4-square-mile Green Zone, the embassy
will occupy 104 acres. It will be six times larger than the U.N.
complex in New York and more than 10 times the size of the new U.S.
Embassy being built in Beijing, which at 10 acres is America's second-
largest mission. The Baghdad compound will be entirely self-sufficient,
with no need to rely on the Iraqis for services of any kind. The
embassy has its own electricity plant, fresh water and sewage treatment
facilities, storage warehouses, and maintenance shops. The embassy is
composed of more than 20 buildings, including six apartment complexes
with 619 one-bedroom units. Two office blocks will accomodate about
1,000 employees. High-ranking diplomats will enjoy well-appointed
private residences. Once inside the compound, Americans will have
almost no reason to leave. It will have a shopping market, food court,
movie theater, beauty salon, gymnasium, swimming pool, tennis courts, a
school, and an American Club for social gatherings. To protect it all,
the embassy is reportedly surrounded by a wall at least 9 feet high-and
it has its own defense force. The U.S. Congress has appropriated $592
million for the embassy's construction, though some estimates put the
expected building costs much higher. Once built, it could cost as much
as $1 billion a year to run. Charles E. Williams, who directs the State
Department's Overseas Buildings Operations, proudly refers to it as
``the largest U.S. mission ever built.''
But, the idea of an embassy this huge, this costly, and this
isolated from events taking place outside its walls is not necessarily
a cause for celebration. Traditionally, at least, embassies were
designed to further interaction with the community in which they were
built. Diplomats visited the offices of local government officials,
shopped at local businesses, took their suits to the neighborhood dry
cleaner, socialized with community leaders, and mixed with the general
public. Diplomacy is not the sort of work that can be done by remote
control. It takes direct contact to build goodwill for the United
States and promote democratic values. Otherwise, there would be no
reason for the United States to maintain its 250-plus diplomatic posts
around the world. The embassy in Baghdad, however, appears to represent
a sea change in U.S. diplomacy. Although U.S. diplomats will
technically be "in Iraq," they may as well be in Washington. Judging by
the embassy's design, planners were thinking more in terms of a
frontier outpost than a facility engaged with its community. ``The
embassy,'' says Edward L. Peck, the former U.S. ambassador to Iraq,
``is going to have a thousand people hunkered behind sandbags. I don't
know how you conduct diplomacy in that way.''
It is tempting to think that the Baghdad compound must be an
anomaly, a special circumstance dictated by events on the ground in
Iraq. But, while it is larger in scope than other U.S. embassies
opening around the world, it is hardly unique. Since al Qaeda bombed
the American missions in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, the State
Department has been aggressively replacing obsolete or vulnerable
embassies with ones designed under a program it calls Standard Embassy
Design. The program mandates look-alike embassies, not the boldly
individual designs built during the Cold War, when architecture played
an important ideological role and U.S. embassies were functionally and
architecturally open. The United States opened 14 newly built embassies
last year alone, and long-range plans call for 76 more, including 12 to
be completed this year. The result will be a radical redesign of the
diplomatic landscape-not only in Baghdad, but in Bamako, Belmopan, Cape
Town, Dushanbe, Kabul, Lome and elsewhere.
If architecture reflects the society that creates it, the new U.S.
embassy in Baghdad makes a devastating comment about America's global
outlook. Although the U.S. government regularly proclaims confidence in
Iraq's democratic future, the United States has designed an embassy
that conveys no confidence in Iraqis and little hope for their future.
Instead, the United States has built a fortress capable of sustaining a
massive, long-term presence in the face of continued violence.
Forty years ago, America was forced to flee a newly constructed
embassy in Baghdad just five years after it was opened, when the United
States broke off relations with Iraq after the 1967 Six Day War. Given
the costs of the new compound, the United States would not likely part
with its latest Baghdad embassy under almost any circumstances,
including escalating violence. As much as the situation there may
deteriorate-the fighting already includes missile and mortar attacks in
the Green Zone-the biggest problem may not be the embassy's security;
indeed, it is the most impenetrable embassy ever built. Rather, the
question is, with its high walls and isolation, will it be hospitable
for conducting American diplomacy?
a city upon a hill
An embassy's precise design is classified. But earlier this year,
sketches of the massive new U.S. Embassy in Iraq surfaced on the
Internet. Herewith, a brief tour of Baghdad, U.S.A.
Mission Colossal
The main embassy building will include a central atrium and a rear
portion housing classified offices, including the ambassador's.
Hundreds of non-diplomatic personnel from dozens of U.S. agencies will
work in the annex building. The two office buildings will house about
1,000 employees.
Battle Ready
Marines will provide embassy security and live in their own
separate barracks. The embassy grounds will be surrounded by high blast
walls, which are all that most Iraqis will ever see of the U.S.
Embassy.
Home Sweet Home
Inside the compound, staff will feel right at home. The complex
will include a shopping market, beauty salon, movie theater, and
American fast food.
Compound Cribs
The ambassador's private residence will offer the most comfortable
quarters. Lower-level employees will squeeze into 619 one-bedroom
apartments.
Jane C. Loeffler teaches architectural history at the University of
Maryland and is author of The Architecture of Diplomacy: Building
America's Embassies (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1998).
______
the associated press
October 9, 2007 Tuesday 9:25 PM GMT
State Department struggles with Iraq embassy delays, vows to hold
contractor accountable
BYLINE: By Matthew Lee, Associated Press Writer
SECTION: Business News
LENGTH: 795 words
DATELINE: Washington
The State Department vowed Tuesday to hold contractors accountable
for delays and construction problems with the massive new U.S. Embassy
in Iraq, saying it would not pay for ``a turkey.''
As the U.S. government orders major repairs to correct deficiencies
at the Vatican-size compound in Baghdad, the department sought to fend
off mounting congressional criticism of the project and its broader
operations in Iraq, including the use of private security firms to
protect diplomats.
The embassy, which will be the world's largest diplomatic mission,
had been scheduled to be completed in September, but last week
officials said it was badly behind and might not open for business
until well into 2008. It will also cost nearly $150 million more than
its original $600 million price tag, they said.
The delays, charges of shoddy workmanship and fraud by the main
contractor have caused growing concerns in Congress, where two top
Democratic lawmakers, Reps. Tom Lantos and Henry Waxman, the chairmen
of the House International Relations and House Oversight and Government
Reform committees, are demanding answers and a new timeline for the
embassy's opening.
State Department spokesman Sean McCormack said Tuesday he was
unable to provide a revised date for the completion of the project.
``We don't have an answer,'' he told reporters, adding that
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was pursuing the matter. ``I can't
tell you when it will open up.''
But McCormack insisted the repairs would be made and that the
contractor in question, First Kuwaiti General Trading & Contracting
Co., would be required to finish the embassy for the $592 million it
agreed to build it for. At the same time, he noted that changes ordered
to the original design would cost an additional $144 million.
``We're not going to buy ourself a turkey here,'' he said. ``We're
going to make sure that we get what we paid for.''
McCormack's comments came in response to questions about the
construction posed by Waxman in a 10-page letter sent to Rice on
Tuesday and a similar letter sent last week to Deputy Secretary of
State John Negroponte by Lantos.
Both lawmakers noted that they had been assured, in July and again
in August, that the embassy was ``on schedule and on budget'' for
September completion and that staff would begin moving in ``shortly
thereafter.''
McCormack maintained that while he could not offer a new opening
date, the project was now only nine days overdue and that Rice was
willing to accept a reasonable delay, particularly on such a large
compound.
``She's willing to cut everybody involved in the construction
project some slack if it falls within a reasonable period of time and
it falls within the normal practices of opening up a large embassy
compound around the world if it's consistent with our past practices,''
he said.
Her patience, however, is not infinite.
``There will come a point if the embassy isn't opened up and
doesn't meet the standards that have been required of the contractor,
then you have a problem,'' McCormack said. ``I can't tell you when that
point is going to be.''
In his letter, which McCormack said he had not read, Waxman details
multiple failures of electrical wiring and fire sprinklers that have
been pointed out by State Department building inspectors.
An internal Sept. 4 inspection report cited by Waxman says the
``entire (fire suppression) installation is unacceptable'' and notes
widespread deficiencies with electrical wiring.
McCormack said he could not address the specifics outlined in the
letter.
Embassy employees have been working and living in a makeshift
complex in and around a Saddam-era palace that the Iraqis have said
they want back quickly.
The temporary quarters are cramped and increasingly dangerous. Many
employees live in trailers that are not fully protected from mortars
fired from outside the Green Zone.
Insurgents have gotten better at firing into the heavily guarded
zone in attacks this year have killed several people. The new complex
is supposed to be safer, with additional blast walls and other
protection.
McCormack also said he could not speak to allegations by Waxman
that First Kuwaiti had been involved in illegal kickback schemes on a
prior project for the U.S. government that should have raised concerns
when the State Department hired the company for the embassy job.
Waxman has been a persistent critic of the State Department and its
operations in Iraq, including its dependence on private security
contractors like Blackwater USA to protect diplomats and refusal to
divulge details of corruption in the Iraqi government.
``Increasingly, it appears that the State Department's efforts in
Iraq are in disarray,'' he wrote in the letter. McCormack shot back
when asked about that remark. ``That is just a ridiculous statement,''
he said.
LOAD-DATE: October 10, 2007
LANGUAGE: ENGLISH
PUBLICATION TYPE: Newswire
Copyright 2007 Associated Press--All Rights Reserved
Senator Boxer. There's also an ongoing criminal probe by
the Justice Department into the awarding of the contracts. The
$700 million Embassy, originally budgeted at $500 million, will
be six times larger than the U.N. complex in New York, more
than 10 times the size of the new U.S. Embassy being built in
Beijing. Iraqis, who resent the U.S. occupation, are set to
call the Embassy, ``George W.'s Palace.''
Jane Loeffler, an expert on the architecture of embassies,
has written that, ``Encircled by blast walls and cut off from
the rest of Baghdad, it stands out like the crusader castles
that once dominated the Middle East.'' Secretary Rice, do you
agree with these criticisms?
Secretary Rice. No.
Senator Boxer. OK, so you don't think that the Embassy that
we're going to build, that's 10 times the size of our largest
Embassy and way larger than the U.N. complex in New York, sends
a message of a long-term occupation to the people of the world?
Secretary Rice. No, Senator. I think it sends a message
that we are going to continue, through our political presence,
to be a good partner for an Iraq that is trying to emerge from
years of tyranny, that will be a stable ally in the Middle
East, that will be at the center of a different kind of Middle
East, and certainly we need a different kind of Middle East
than the one that we inherited in 2001 that produced an
ideology of hatred so great that people attacked innocent
civilians. So, that's how I see the Embassy.
I see it as a place that our men and women can work in safe
conditions, that they can work in conditions that will allow
them to carry out their mission. I think you've heard a number
of people talk about how our Provincial Reconstruction Teams
are viewed as a force for good among Iraqis who are trying to
better their lives, and that's how I see the Embassy.
Senator Boxer. OK. I would just say, to put our people in
this walled-off Embassy does not send the type of signal that
we usually send around the world.
Now, in August 2007, the New York Times quoted a Central
Command official, who stated, ``If we were not in Iraq, we'd
have the Special Forces you need most to conduct precise
operations in Afghanistan. We'd have more CIA. Anyone who tells
you differently is blowing smoke.'' Just last week, the
Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, admitted that the war in
Iraq has hurt our efforts in Afghanistan, particularly in
respect to participation form our European allies.
Speaking before an International Security Conference in
Europe, Secretary Gates said that, ``Europeans, many of them I
think, have a problem with our involvement in Iraq and project
that to Afghanistan.'' In Afghanistan, attacks by al-Qaeda,
Taliban, and other extremists are becoming increasingly common
and deadly. The number of improvised explosive devices,
including car and suicide bombs, has nearly tripled since 2005.
Support for the Taliban is growing, and poppy production
continues to rise. It is now accounting for 93 percent of the
world's illicit opium supply. And Osama bin Laden is still on
the loose.
Secretary Rice, do you agree with Secretary Gates, that the
war in Iraq is making it harder to get our allies to contribute
to Afghanistan?
Secretary Rice. I will tell you what I think the problem is
in getting our forces--getting our allies, to the extent that
they're not contributing, to contribute. And I gave the answer
to Senator Kerry.
Senator Boxer. But do you agree with what Secretary Gates
said?
Secretary Rice. I would like to answer, Senator.
Senator Boxer. But my question was do you agree with what
Secretary Gates said? That was my question.
Secretary Rice. Senator, I would like to give you an answer
to your question.
Senator Boxer. Well, I'd like you to answer whether or not
you agree with what he said.
Secretary Rice. Senator, I will answer your question if you
permit me the courtesy----
Senator Boxer. Please go ahead.
Secretary Rice [continuing]. To allow me to do so.
Senator Boxer. And please answer the question, yes.
Secretary Rice. Thank you. As I said to Senator Kerry, I
believe that the problem with our allies in Afghanistan--by the
way, all of whom undertook a decision to go into Afghanistan
through the North Atlantic Counsel of NATO in a consensus
decision to go into Afghanistan, so there was no question that
our allies were prepared and willing to go into Afghanistan--I
do think that there has been difficulty with some allies in
wanting to deal with the fact that this is not a peacekeeping
operation, that it is a heavy-duty military operation in parts
of the country. I think that is the problem with the allies.
Senator Boxer. OK. Well, let the record show that Secretary
Gates said that many of our allies have a problem with our
involvement in Iraq and project that to Afghanistan.
Secretary Rice, last Friday in a lead editorial titled, ``A
President Who Tortured,'' the Washington Post said that,
``Water boarding will leave an indelible stain on the legacy of
George W. Bush.'' Last week, the Director of the CIA admitted
that the U.S. Government had subjected suspected terrorists to
water boarding in 2002 and 2003, years in which you served as
President Bush's National Security Advisor. In 2004, you wrote
a letter to Congress opposing legislation that would have
prevented the intelligence community from using extreme
interrogation tactics. In 2005, then-Attorney General Alberto
Gonzalez, approved two secret memos specifically authorizing
water boarding, head slapping, and frigid temperatures. NBC
News reported that you were aware of these secret memos.
Secretary Rice, do you remember those memos and do you
believe water boarding is torture?
Secretary Rice. Senator Boxer, I'm not going to comment on
matters that I was involved in as National Security Advisor. I
will simply repeat what General Hayden has said, which is that
this is not a part of the CIA program now. If there are issues
to be raised about this, they will have to be raised through
the Attorney General, but as a general proposition, let me
state very clearly that the President of the United States has
never authorized torture and that everything that has been
done, has been done in accordance with our obligations, legal
obligations, both domestic and international.
Senator Boxer. Thank you.
My last question. Earlier this year, the Center for Public
Integrity released a report documenting 935 false statements by
administration officials leading up to the Iraq war. According
to this study, you were responsible for 56 of them. This report
only reinforces what we all know now to be true, that the
nation was led to war under false pretense. Back in 2003, the
main justifications for going to war in Iraq were the
allegations that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction and links
to al-Qaeda that simply did not exist, as we all know.
Today, the Bush administration claims that one goal of the
ongoing war in Iraq is to make sure that the country is
``democratic.'' We hear that all the time. But just 2 years
ago, you stated, ``Let's be very clear about the grounds for
war against Iraq,'' and it was actually not to bring democracy
to Iraq. So I would ask you, what is the mission now?
Secretary Rice. Senator, I remember very well the quote
that you are--you are referencing. What I said was that much in
World War II, where we took down Adolph Hitler, not to bring
democracy to Germany. We then, in order to make stable Germany
for the future, insisted on a democratic Germany. In the case
of Saddam Hussein, he was a threat to our interests, he was a
threat to our security, we had gone to war with him in 1991,
we'd gone to war with him in 1998. We believed that he had
weapons of mass destruction, and with all due respect, the
intelligence community believed he had weapons of mass
destruction, the United Nations believed he had weapons of mass
destruction, and he was a threat as he continued to threaten
our pilots and take advantage of an Oil for Food program that
had become a scandal. And so that's why we went to war.
Having gone to war, we believe that the most stable course
for Iraq and for the Middle East is, if Iraq can develop
democratic institutions that can make it a center of a
different kind of Middle East, and that is the work in which we
are now engaged.
And so with all due respect, Senator, the quote is not in
context and it does not reflect what I have said. What I have
said is, that the reason to go to war was because Saddam
Hussein was a threat. The reason to build democracy in Iraq is
because the only way to make certain that Iraq is stable for
the long run, is if they learn to resolve their differences
democratically, not be force or not by tyranny.
Senator Boxer. Yes; I think we all share that and many of
us think it's up to them and it isn't up to us as an occupying
force to do that.
Thank you very much.
Secretary Rice. May I just comment on one thing?
The Chairman. Sure.
Secretary Rice. Because I think it's extremely important
that we don't leave on the record that American men and women
in Iraq, who are sacrificing every day, are an occupying force.
They are there on U.N. mandate. They are there at the
invitation of a democratically elected Iraqi Government. They
are there fighting al-Qaeda forces that take--that take women
who are mentally challenged and send them as suicide bombers.
And so I would not like to leave it on the record that our men
and women in uniform are occupiers.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Boxer.
Senator Boxer. Mr. Chairman, I would take backseat to no
one in caring about our men and women in uniform, because many
of those who have been killed or wounded in Iraq have been from
California or based in California. We have lost 3,960
Americans, and we have more than 29,000-plus wounded. We have
more soldiers committing suicide. This war is a disaster, and
the fact is that many of us believe it is now time for the
Iraqis to take over and to do what most nations do. And many of
us believe that we have spent too much blood and too much
money, and that it is time to bring this war to a close. But to
say that anyone here, in any way, doesn't love, respect, and
revere our fighting men and women, I think is a low blow.
Secretary Rice. Senator, I also take no backseat to support
for our men and women in uniform, but I would never call them
occupiers.
Senator Boxer. That's fine.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator--now look, here we are. We've reached the point
where we have half an hour left and we have two, three, four,
five, six people to ask questions. So, I'm afraid that we're
going to have to limit it to 5 minutes in order to meet our
commitment to the Secretary.
Senator Corker. Mr. Chairman, I'll be even more brief than
that. I do sense we----
The Chairman. Then we'll give additional time.
Senator Corker. Good, I do sense we've moved away from the
budget that's being discussed. I'm sorry to arrive late, but I
noticed that coming in. I would, sense we have moved away from
the budgetary process, we had a meeting the other day, in sort
of a private setting, with our Envoy to Darfur, Richard
Williamson. And I have to tell you, this is not a critical
comment, I just love to hear your comments regarding that. He's
got four people who work with him. From what I can tell, has no
budget.
My sense is, that if we had 26 helicopters there, we could
make a huge difference in Darfur today. I know there's some
security issues that surround that.
But I have to tell you, when he left, I did wonder, and I
don't mean this in any way to be critical, I did wonder whether
we had a Special Envoy in name, but really had no real activity
taking place as it related to that. And I wish, if you could, I
know several of us seemed to sense that when we left there and
I wonder if you could focus on that for just 1 minute. And that
will be my only question, may be my only question.
Secretary Rice. Thank you, Senator.
On Darfur, we have a full-time effort, not just with the
Special Envoy, but, of course, he has at his disposal the
resources of the Department to do whatever he needs to do. We
have an Africa Bureau that will send people out when he needs.
We have an Assistant Secretary who's also concerned with that
account. We're working it in the United Nations all the time.
And so I think the four people who work for him, it would be
deceptive to think that those are the only people working on
Darfur.
And, we, of course, have requested significant resources
for Darfur, in terms of peacekeeping and for the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement between Southern Sudan and Northern Sudan,
which would help to bring stability to Sudan as a whole. So, it
is a very big effort.
The difficulty has been really to get the U.N. peacekeeping
forces, capable to get the numbers in place in order to be able
to put that U.N. hybrid force on the ground to protect these
innocent civilians.
Just yesterday, spoke with the Foreign Minister of Sudan,
who came to see me. I said to him in no uncertain terms that it
was time for Sudan to stop making excuses for why the hybrid
force can't get in. We've also been very supportive of the
peace negotiations that are going on to try to bring rebels and
the government together.
And so it's a very active effort in the Department, but
we're hoping that Rich Williamson, who is a very fine diplomat
and who everybody thinks very highly of, will be able to bring
a certain focus to the effort, just as Andrew Natsios did
before him.
Senator Corker. It seemed like he did not have the tools
available and I don't know----
Secretary Rice. He'll have those.
Senator Corker [continuing]. The other departments. If you
could just look at that.
Secretary Rice. I certainly will.
[The information referred to above follows:]
The Department of State fully supports the efforts of the
President's Special Envoy Richard S. Williamson in advancing the
administration's goal of enhancing overall the stability in Sudan and
bringing an end to the violence in Darfur through rapid deployment of
the United Nations-African Union peacekeeping mission in Darfur
(UNAMID), reinvigoration of the Darfur peace talks, and full
implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
With regard to operational resources, Congress has generously
provided since 2006 more than $850,000 specifically to support the
Special Envoy's office. The Department of State has provided additional
resources above and beyond this amount to cover the extensive travel
and support costs of the Special Envoy. Special Envoy Williamson has
specifically requested and has been provided with a personal staff of
two policy officers and an office management specialist located in
Washington, DC and a senior policy advisor in the U.S. Mission to the
U.N. The latter is specifically devoted to coordinating U.S. efforts
within the U.N. system to facilitate UNAMID's deployment.
In addition to his personal staff, Special Envoy Williamson is
further assisted by the Bureau of African Affairs and its Sudan
Programs Group Office (SPG) of more than 15 staff. The Special Envoy
has the full backing of the National Security Council and the
Department of Defense, which has offered the Special Envoy a Colonel to
serve as a defense advisor as needed. The Special Envoy's efforts are
also supported by the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum, including two Foreign
Service Officers located in Darfur, and our Consulate General in Juba,
Southern Sudan. In al of his efforts, Special Envoy Williamson has the
complete support of the administration and the Department of State.
Senator Corker. And if 26 helicopters are keeping us from
saving thousands of lives, I hope we will not let that be an
impediment, by blaming it on other countries not supplying
those.
But thank you very much for your testimony.
Secretary Rice. Thank you.
Senator Lugar. Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the
recognition there.
First, let me add my voice on the loss of Tom Lantos. Tom
Lantos was clearly our leader to globally advance human rights.
I cherish the time that I spent with him in the House, usually
doing rollcall votes, where we would sit down and talk about
strategizing and what we could do to advance human rights.
And I also had the opportunity to visit Budapest when he
was there, and to see firsthand the struggles that he went
through.
Madame Secretary, I want to thank you for being here. I
want to follow up, first, on the point that Senator Voinovich
raised on the OSCE budget.
All of us are very much in favor of the expanded budget
you've brought forward on post-conflict resolution. But we have
an international organization that's been very effective on
that. The OSCE field missions have been very effective, as to
the work they're doing in Afghanistan, on the Tajikistan
border, what they've done in Kosovo, and what they've done in
Bosnia.
The budget that you have submitted is actually 20 percent
below the current budget for the U.S. commitment to OSCE, and I
would hope that you would take a look at that.
But, I want to refer specifically to the point that Senator
Voinovich raised on the work of ODAIR on human rights. We just
talked about Tom Lantos, and I think it's appropriate.
The United States, through extra-budget means, have always
been a leader in providing the wherewithal to advance the human
rights agenda. We're responsible for initiating the efforts to
fight anti-Semitism, and we should be proud of that. But
there's virtually no support and no funding for that effort.
The United States had led donor nations to provide extra budget
support, there's zero, I believe, in this year's budget to do
that.
So, I would just ask if you would get back to me and
Senator Voinovich as to how we can clearly send the right
signal internationally that the United States commitment today
is strong as ever for OSCE.
[Secretary Rice's response appears on page 47 of this
hearing print.]
Secretary Rice. I'll take a look at it. Clearly, we will
support ODAIR, so let me take a look at it, and get back to
you, Senator.
Senator Cardin. I thank you very much, Madame Secretary.
I want to follow up on a point that my colleagues have been
making. You usually talk about the DOD budget when it comes to
Iraq, and how much of it is spent in that regards, but your
budget, the State Department's budget, is very much impacted by
our responsibilities in Iraq. I personally believe there are so
many areas of the world we need to be engaged in. That we are
spending so much effort in Iraq is detracting from our ability
to resolve problems in other parts of the world.
But, in one respect, I'm not sure we're doing what we
should be doing. And that is, we now know there are 2 million
refugees from Iraq in Jordan and Syria, primarily. There are
2.2 million internally displaced people in Iraq, and yet the
budget doesn't appear to provide help to deal with the refugee
issue, which I think the United States, again, must be the
leader on. And I appreciate your comments as to why we are not
doing more to help the refugees?
Secretary Rice. I'm sorry, Senator, did you mean refugees,
in general, or refugees in Iraq?
Senator Cardin. Refugees, internally displaced people in
Iraq and the Iraqi refugees in Jordan, Syria, and other
countries.
Secretary Rice. Yes.
Well, I appointed an Iraq Refugee Coordinator so we could
have a focus on, exactly, this problem. And we have provided
resources, as a matter of fact I think we're something like 25
percent of the U.N. effort on refugees, and we are--we have
money in supplementals for refugee affairs for the Iraqis.
It hasn't really, quite frankly, been so much an issue of
funding. It has been a problem of the kind of infrastructure of
dealing with Iraqi refugees. We only recently have begun to
make some progress with Syria on the ability to process people
coming out, to come out of Syria. We have a very good operation
in Jordan. We've even provided some support to countries that
are educating the children of Iraqi refugees.
We've also worked very hard, and the Iraqi Government
itself has earmarked $25 million for its own refugee problem.
In that sense, it's not a country without some resources.
But it really is more of a problem of processing people,
and getting them out and----
Senator Cardin. I would just request that we make this a
priority. There are so many people who are displaced, and I
think we have a responsibility to be a leader on that
internationally.
Secretary Rice. Yes.
Senator Cardin. I do want to mention two other parts of the
world. We're not going to have time for a full response. But in
Kosovo, we do expect some activity this month, and I want to
make sure that we're prepared to support the independence of
Kosovo.
I think the United States has played a very constructive
role here, but I expect it will be a challenge, internationally
in moving forward, considering the positions of Serbia and the
Russian Federation.
And then second, so I can get both questions in, under the
wire, we haven't asked you about the status of peace between
Israel and the Palestinians. We all, very much, support the
initiatives that you brought forward in Annapolis, and want to
be as helpful as we can to make as much progress as we can in
2008.
Secretary Rice. Thank you.
I'll just very briefly--just one other point on refugees.
Another thing that we're trying to do is, there are certain
parts of Iraq that people can now return to, but the housing,
and the like, is not there. And encouraging Iraqis to rebuild
housing in places like Ramadi is also part of our program.
On Kosovo, yes; we have been working very hard to try to
make this as smooth a transition as possible. I think you know
that we believe that the status of Kosovo has to be resolved,
and we are prepared to take our responsibilities in helping to
do so.
As to the Middle East peace, I think Annapolis was a very
good start, in that it brought together the right coalition of
countries to help support the bilateral peace process. I talk
to the Israelis and the Palestinians quite frequently about how
they're doing. They're continuing to have their negotiations
and their discussions. They've tried to do it off stage, to a
certain extent, to do it without much public glare on those
conversations. I think that's probably a good point.
But, to the degree that they will need help to get to an
agreement, we're prepared to help. I will probably return to
the region at the beginning of March, Senator, to see if we can
help them. We are focused a lot, right now, on trying to
improve the circumstances of Palestinians on the ground.
Tony Blair, as you know, has a mission there. This morning
I met with General Jones, and with GEN Will Frazier who are
helping with the security and roadmap obligations piece of
that.
There are a lot of pieces. We've been very much challenged
by what is going on in Gaza. We've been very much challenged by
continued terrorist and rocket attacks against Israel, and the
irresponsible behavior--the deadly behavior--of Hamas. But, I
think the good news is that the parties, who seem really quite
devoted to trying to solve their conflict this time, are
continuing their negotiations, and we will be there to try to
help them. Because, as the President said, the time is now to
try to create a Palestinian state, and finally end that
conflict.
Senator Cardin. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator. OK.
Senator Isakson. Thank you, Senator Murkowski, and I'll be
very brief. One comment and one question.
And the comment is, with respect to Senator Cardin's
question on displaced persons and refugees--I've just returned
from a trip to Iraq and saw firsthand, two things that might
help you.
One was, in Ghazaliyah, where I walked the streets, people
are returning home because of the security, and the second
reason they're returning is because of the microloans we
approved in last year's budget, the $500 to $2,500 loans to
restart businesses. In the particular little shopping area I
went to, 18 of the 24 booths had reopened, and the colonel who
traveled with me picked up three more applications for loans--
which are really grants--to them to reestablish their
businesses.
So, I think when you look at the investment in security,
and then building their economy, people are coming home, and
they're coming home at a pretty rapid rate in that part of
Iraq. So, your investment there has paid off.
My question is this: On that same trip I returned through
Djibouti and Equatorial Guinea, and I wrote you with regard to
the Embassy in Equatorial Guinea, and I'm very pleased to see
it's in the 2009 budget, but I do want to make a comment.
Equatorial Guinea has gone from being the poorest country in
the world, to the most rapidly developing economy in the world.
The Chinese are building an embassy--I couldn't see it finished
yet, because it wasn't finished--but it will be a huge
compound. The Spanish are doing the same thing. The Americans
and Equatorial Guineans have discovered one of the world's
largest reserves of natural gas. They're liquefying it, and
it's shipping into the United States.
Our Embassy has a hole in the ceiling so big you could
drive a car through it, and it rains inside. And next to it is
an apartment--a 2-bedroom, 1-bath apartment, where the
Ambassador lives, which has no security.
So, I thank you for appropriating the money--or asking for
the money for us to appropriate--for construction of the
Embassy in Malabo.
But it may be helpful for you to look at the residents as
part of that. The security of our Ambassadors and our people, I
think is very important, although that country is relatively
safe, it's not totally safe, and I would certainly encourage
you to take a look at including the housing of those key State
Department personnel, as well as the Embassy, in that
appropriation request.
Secretary Rice. Thank you, Senator, I will do that, thank
you.
Senator Casey. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Madame Secretary, thank you for your presence here today,
your testimony, and of course your public service.
I'm going to be referring to--as a predicate to my
questions--your prepared testimony today, and in particular,
one aspect of our Iraq policy, where you use the word
``bringing clarity'' to discussions about this. That's the
reason for my question, since I think on any issue of
importance, but especially the grave question of war and our
foreign policy, I think it's critically important that we have
as much clarity as is possible.
If you'd just bear with me for a couple of moments, I just
wanted to make reference to a couple of documents, a couple of
parts of the record, so to speak, and some of which I'll add to
the record before I ask a question.
The first thing I'd start with is a letter that I
spearheaded in December 6, 2007. I wrote--along with 5 other
U.S. Senators--to the President, a letter pertaining to the
question about a declaration of principles, with regard to our
ongoing relationship with Iraq. And I'll submit the whole
letter for the record, but I do want to just read one sentence
from it that encapsulates, really, what we're concerned about.
[The material referred to above follows:]
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC 20510,
December 6, 2007.
President George W. Bush,
The White House, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. President: We write you today regarding the ``Declaration
of Principles'' agreed upon last week between the United States and
Iraq outlining the broad scope of discussions to be held over the next
6 months to institutionalize long term U.S.-Iraqi cooperation in the
political, economic, and security realms. It is our understanding that
these discussions seek to produce a strategic framework agreement, no
later than July 31, 2008, to help define ``a long-term relationship of
cooperation and friendship as two fully sovereign and independent
states with common interests.''
The future of American policy towards Iraq, especially in regard to
the issues of U.S. troop levels, permanent U.S. military bases, and
future security commitments, has generated strong debate among the
American people and their elected representatives. Agreements between
our two countries relating to these issues must involve the full
participation and consent of the Congress as a co-equal branch of the
U.S. Government. Furthermore, the future U.S. presence in Iraq is a
central issue in the current Presidential campaign. We believe a
security commitment that obligates the United States to go to war on
behalf of the Government of Iraq at this time is not in America's long-
term national security interest and does not reflect the will of the
American people. Commitments made during the final year of your
Presidency should not unduly or artificially constrain your successor
when it comes to Iraq.
In particular, we want to convey our strong concern regarding any
commitments made by the United States with respect to American security
assurances to Iraq to help deter and defend against foreign aggression
or other violations of Iraq's territorial integrity. Security
assurances, once made, cannot be easily rolled back without incurring a
great cost to America's strategic credibility and imperiling the
stability of our nations's other alliances around the world.
Accordingly, security assurances must be extended with great care and
only in the context of broad bipartisan agreement that such assurances
serve jour abiding national interest. Such assurances, if legally
binding, are generally made in the context of a formal treaty subject
to the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate but in any case cannot be
made without Congressional authorization.
Our unease is heightened by remarks made on November 26 by General
Douglas Lute, the assistant to the President for Iraq and Afghanistan,
that Congressional input is not foreseen. General Lute was quoted as
asserting at a White House press briefing, ``We don't anticipate now
that these negotiations will lead to the status of a formal treaty
which would then bring us to formal negotiations or formal inputs from
the Congress.'' It is unacceptable for your administration to
unilaterally fashion a long-term relationship with Iraq without the
full and comprehensive participation of Congress from the very start of
such negotiations.
We look forward to learning more details as the administration
commences negotiations with the Iraqi Government on the contours of
long-term political, economic, and security ties between our two
nations. We trust you agree that the proposed extension of long-term
U.S. security commitments to a nation in a critical region of the world
requires the full participation and consent of the Congress as a co-
equal branch of our Government.
Robert P. Casey, Jr.,
United States Senator.
Robert C. Byrd,
United States Senator.
Edward M. Kennedy,
United States Senator.
Jim Webb,
United States Senator.
Hiliary Rodham Clinton,
United States Senator.
Carl Levin,
United States Senator.
Senator Casey. I'm quoting from the second paragraph, ``I
believe--'' or, we believe, I should say, ``a security
commitment that obligates the United States to go war on behalf
of the Government of Iraq, at this time is not in America's
long-term national security interests, and does not reflect the
will of the American people.''
Later in the letter, we referred to a statement by General
Douglas Lute, the Assistant to the President for Iraq and
Afghanistan, and I'm quoting from him, here. ``We''
representing the administration, ``We don't anticipate now that
these negotiations will lead to the status of a formal treaty,
which would then bring us to formal negotiations, or formal
input from the Congress.''
Then I will go to your op-ed today in the Washington Post.
In this op-ed written by you and Secretary Gates, you say, with
regard to the agreement with Iraq, ``Nothing will set troop
levels, nothing will commit the United States to join Iraq in a
war against another country, or provide other security
commitments, and nothing will authorize permanent bases in
Iraq.''
Finally, I will go to testimony by Secretary Gates, in
front of the Armed Services Committee, February 6, where he
said in different parts, basically what you said in the op-ed,
together. There's no commitment for security, and there's no
security equipment, nothing to bind a future administration.
And then I come to--all of which I think is what we were
aiming at in our letter. Then I come to the language in the
Declaration of Principles, ``Providing security assurances and
commitments to the Republic of Iraq to deter foreign aggression
against Iraq that violates its sovereignty and integrity of its
territories, waters or airspace.''
So, what I'm aiming for, here, is clarity, and an
explanation as to what all this means.
Here's the question. The question for you and the
administration is, is it the administration's position--its
policy, its intention--and contrary to anything else that's
been written so far, in op-eds, or policy or statements--is it
the policy of this government, this administration, to say
categorically that there will be no permanent bases in Iraq,
No. 1, and No. 2, that there will not be a guarantee of a
security arrangement, as it pertains to Iraq being invaded, or
having to defend itself against another country?
Secretary Rice. On the first of those, Senator, the
President has also said we don't seek permanent bases in Iraq,
and we do not.
Second, in terms of security, what we want to do is provide
for Iraq the capacity to secure itself and to defend itself,
which is why we are securing, why we are training their Armed
Forces and the like, and obviously an Iraq that can defend
itself is going to make the region more stable, but the United
States is not taking on that obligation, as Secretary Gates and
I have put forward in the op-ed.
Senator Casey. But, I still don't understand why in the
Declaration of Principles we would have language that says,
``Providing security assurances and commitments to the Republic
of Iraq.'' Why would that appear in the Declaration of
Principles if the administration's policy is not to provide, or
to----
Secretary Rice. Well----
Senator Casey [continuing]. Set forth a security agreement?
Secretary Rice. Senator, that Declaration of Principles is
a broad document that talks about the relationship of Iraq and
the United States in the broadest possible way, over time. But,
I just wanted to assure you that nothing in the actual document
that we will be negotiating with the Iraqis--and I want to be
very clear, we will also continue, of course, to consult with
the Congress on it--nothing in that document would commit the
United States to provide security guarantees or to engage
ourselves in Iraq's wars with its neighbors.
Senator Casey. And finally, and I know we're----
Secretary Rice. Which we hope would never happen, because
we hope, now, that a democratic and stable Iraq will be a force
for security in the region, not for trouble, the way that
Saddam Hussein's Iraq was.
Senator Casey. In my remaining minute, I have to say that
what you're saying and what you've written--and others have
written in the administration--seems to conflict, along with
the President's signing statement.
I'm reading from President Bush's January 28th signing
statement as it pertains to the Department of Defense
authorization act for 2008. And it says, in part, and I'm
quoting from the beginning, ``Provisions of this Act--'' the
DOD act, ``including Sections 841, 846, 1079, and Section 1222,
which pertains specifically to permanent bases--''. How do we
square that--not just in the context of this signing statement,
but in the context of other signing statements? This is an
administration and a President that has had a lot of signing
statements which calls into question whether or not despite or
in contravention of statute, that this administration thinks
that it can go around statutes, or interpret statutes in a way
that Congress didn't intend.
So, based upon that, I would consider this a bad track
record as it pertains to signing statements, and the reason for
them, and based upon what I perceive as an apparent conflict
between rhetoric about no permanent bases and rhetoric about no
long-term security commitment, in the actual policy, I don't
see how you can square the two. And I would ask you to----
Secretary Rice. Well, Senator, we will----
Senator Casey [continuing]. Attempt to do that.
Secretary Rice. I think we all believe that we will be
committed, in effect, to Iraq for a long time--politically,
economically, et cetera. We want to help build their security
forces so that they can secure themselves, so that they can be
a stabilizing force in the region, not a destabilizing one. And
I would separate that notion, which I think is very much at the
base of everything that we're trying to do with Iraq, and which
I think has, in a sense, broad support that that's the kind of
thing that we ought to be doing.
From the document that is being negotiated with the Iraqis,
which is principally about a Status of Forces agreement so that
our forces can operate there in a legal fashion when the U.S.
Security Council resolution goes out of business at the end of
the year--I'm not really--I'm not able to reflect on the
specific signing statements, Senator, I don't--I haven't read
them, I don't remember them specifically right now. But only to
say that what Secretary Gates and I have said in the op-ed,
that this is not about permanent bases, this is not about a--
undertaking security assurances to the defense of Iraq--but it
is about a long-term relationship with Iraq that would help
Iraq be a stable and good neighbor in the region, and that our
forces have to be legal in what they're doing there, that
that's really what this is about.
Senator Casey. Well, I would ask--and I know I'm way over
time--but I would ask that you communicate with the President
that I think people are looking for a lot more clarity on this.
When you have an internally inconsistent policy, in my
judgment. When you juxtapose a signing statement, and you
juxtapose some of the language in the Declaration of Principles
with what you have said and written and what Secretary Gates
has said in testimony, what he has written.
So, I'd ask for--I think that the committee's record should
be completed with a clearer and more declarative statement from
the administration.
I'd wrap up, because I know I'm over, I ask unanimous
consent to include in the record any of those documents that I
referred to.
The Chairman. Without objection, we'll include them.
[The information referred to above was not available when
this hearing print was sent to press.]
The Chairman. Senator Murkowski.
Senator Murkowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And welcome, Secretary.
I'm going to move from Iraq to the Arctic--not a surprise.
We've had discussions about this, and I've always said you're
going to look at me and think about the Arctic, and I want you
to think about the Arctic again today. And when we look at the
area of the world where we have a clean slate in building
relationships and, in truly developing policies, the Arctic is
an opportunity for us.
We've got the International Polar Year underway, some very
substantive research projects going on. We're going to be
having the Biennial Conference of the Arctic Parliamentarians
Meeting in Alaska in August, this is the legislative branch
equivalent of the Arctic Council.
Just within this past week, we've got new mapping data from
the Coast Guard cutter Healy's Arctic Expedition that
demonstrates that Alaska's Continental Shelf extends more than
100 nautical miles further from the North Coast than we had
originally thought, giving us an opportunity, clearly, to lay
greater claim to the Arctic region, but we're still not a
signatory to the Law of the Sea Treaty.
Others nations, as we're talking with them about Arctic
policy, clearly want to work with the United States on
developing and working with an Arctic policy. Can you give me
any indication where we are in terms of developing that and the
support within the budget to provide for a policy that does
move the United States into more of a leadership role on Arctic
issues?
Secretary Rice. Well, Senator, we have provided funding for
the Arctic Council, and there will be, I think, a meeting
fairly soon, and Paula Dobrianski has represented us in the
past, and she will in the future.
There are obviously countries with which we share a lot of
interests, and the Russians, in particular, have been
interested in developing those ties concerning the Arctic.
I agree with you that it would be a very good thing if we
had the Law of the Sea Treaty. That would obviously make
possible some elements of our leadership that we've, that are
more difficult without it.
So, the President has put the Law of the Sea Treaty on his
list of treaties that he wants to see passed. But we are
providing both funding and representation in the Arctic Council
affairs.
Senator Murkowski. And we would hope that with that
funding, there is a push to not only talk about the policy, but
actually to get a policy that is adopted. We've been dealing
with a policy that, as you know, is old and it is important
that we try to revamp that.
Very quickly, then, and going back to the Middle East now--
there was a GAO report back in October about the amount of
money that the international donors had pledged for Iraq
reconstruction, a total of about $16.4 billion. Of that amount,
only about $7 billion has been provided, as I am sure you are
very well aware. But in looking at the list of the countries
that have made the pledges and what has been delivered so far,
what strikes me is that the countries who would be most
immediately impacted if the Iraq Government were to collapse--
essentially the neighboring countries surrounding Iraq--are the
ones who are really not living up to their level of commitment
in terms of keeping their pledges. What are we doing here in
the United States to get Iraq's neighbors really more active in
their support of the Iraq Government?
Secretary Rice. Well, we have an International Compact for
Iraq and I think it's under that vehicle that we have seen the
pledges made.
There have been some significant pledges from Iraq's
neighbors. One of the problems, and one of the reasons that
there's a distinction or a difference between what has been
pledged and what has been spent, is that frankly, until
recently, I think people could either cite the security
situation as a reason--or some might say, an excuse--and that
the security situation is improving and that it is now possible
to make some of those reconstruction efforts.
We are, and the Iraqis are redoubling their effort to,
actually have states deliver on those pledges. And I think,
it's my hope that you'll start to see countries come forward in
that way.
For instance, some of the funding from Kuwait and Saudi
Arabia is project funding, and not budgetary support, and
frankly, the Iraqis don't need budgetary support, the project
funding is what is helpful to them. And so we expect that they
will begin to spend out that project funding as the security
situation improves, and we're working with them on precisely
that.
But it has been a combination of slow absorption by the
Iraqis, and a security situation that I think has now improved
to the place where we could expect these disbursements to take
place more quickly.
Senator Murkowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Vitter, thank you for your patience.
Senator Vitter. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Madame Secretary for all of your service. We
really do appreciate it.
I'm actually going to stay in the Arctic, where Lisa
brought us, in terms of the Law of the Sea Treaty.
It's clear that I disagree with you and the administration
and some of my colleagues, like Lisa, on the Law of the Sea
Treaty. We won't resolve that today, and for now we can put
that disagreement to the side.
What I am concerned about, no matter what anybody might
think about the merits of the Treaty, is that there is about $5
million designated for two entities created under the Law of
the Sea Treaty. This is a significant amount of money. There's
$1.3 million budgeted to go to the International Seabed
Authority. And there is $3.6 million budgeted to go to the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. I hope we can
all agree that this money being budgeted for entities, which
are part of a treaty that is currently before the Senate, and
has yet to be ratified by the Senate. Isn't it completely
jumping the gun, and completely presumptuous for those two line
items to be in the budget?
Secretary Rice. Senator, we're obviously not going to do
anything in terms of the Law of the Sea Treaty until it's
ratified by the Senate. As I understand it, some of these
elements we've been willing to attend meetings to provide some
technical assessments, because we have entities in the United
States, including the U.S. Navy and some of our business
interests, that are very concerned that people not use our
absence of the ratification of the Law of the Sea to take
advantage of us.
Senator Vitter. Well, let me just----
Secretary Rice. But, we will not spend any funding----
Senator Vitter [continuing]. Clarify your response. Is this
money for American personnel to go to meetings? Will this money
go to the international entities created by the Law of the Sea
Treaty?
Secretary Rice. I assure you, Senator, we're not going to
actually spend anything in conjunction with Law of the Sea
unless it is ratified by the Senate. But, in hopes that it
might be ratified, we've made some requests going forward, that
would allow us to rapidly begin to implement it if it does go
forward.
Senator Vitter. While that should be reassuring, I would
like to point out that what you just said is not in the budget.
The budget does not contain your caveat that this money is not
available before the Senate ratifies the Treaty, and that the
money's just there in case the Treaty is ratified. So, I think
it's completely presumptuous----
Secretary Rice. Senator, I think there may be--let me get
you, in writing, an answer. Because I think there are some
elements of this, the International Seabed, for instance, that
we have wanted to support in order to protect our own
interests. But I will get a--an answer to you in writing.
Senator Vitter. So, therefore, what you are actually saying
is that the money in the budget could go to Law of the Sea
related activities or entities prior to Senate ratification.
Secretary Rice. Senator, I want to have an opportunity to
review it, and to come back to you in writing on precisely how
we would use that funding, if we would use it at all.
Senator Vitter. OK, great. I look forward to that.
[The information referred to above follows: ]
The President's budget request included funding to pay assessed
contributions of $1.3 million to the International Seabed Authority and
$3.6 million to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in FY
2009. In both cases, the budget request explicitly conditioned
expenditure of the requested funds on Senate approval of U.S. accession
to the Law of the Sea Convention. Attached are pages 737 and 740 from
the President's FY 09 budget, which clearly indicate that no funds will
be provided to either organization until the United States accedes to
the Convention.
We would like to reiterate the administrations's strong support for
U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention. Joining the 154 other
parties to the Convention would promote U.S. security, economic, and
environmental interests, with very modest financial implications,
especially when weighed against the substantial benefits that would
accrue to the United States.
______
Contributions to International Organizations\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Transcribed from pages 737 and 740 of the President's 2009
Budget.
International Seabed Authority, Kingston, Jamaica
($ in thousands)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2007 Actual FY 2008 FY 2009
Computation of Estimate Estimate Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. Requirements in Dollars................................. 0 0 1,296
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The International Seabed Authority (ISA) is the institution through
which states parties to the Law of the Sea Convention regulate
activities in those portions of the seabed and ocean floor that are
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. Regulated activities
include exploration and exploration and exploitation of solid, liquid
and gaseous mineral resources at or beneath the seabed. ISA currently
has 148 members. The principal organs of ISA are the Assembly, to which
all members may belong, a 36-member Council and the Secretariat.
ISA carries out the Convention's provisions for non-discriminatory
access to deep seabed mineral resources and adopts rules and
regulations setting forth specific terms and conditions for exploration
and development, including environmental safeguards. ISA has contracts
in place with ``pioneer investors,'' has adopted regulations on
prospecting and exploration, developed recommendations for assessing
the potential environmental impact of certain exploration activities,
and is working on rules for the exploration of certain oceanic crusts.
ISA is also active in collecting and disseminating data on specific
issues relating to deep seabed mining. Although deep seabed mining is
not economically feasible at present, ISA will have the authority to
grant unimpeded access to mining sites when it is. U.S. investors would
benefit substantially from this predictability.
Explanation of Estimate
The FY 2009 request provides for the U.S. assessed contribution for
2009, the first year of the 2009-2010 biennial budget. Expenditure of
the requested funds is contingent on Senate ratification of the
International Law of the Sea Convention, which would establish U.S.
membership in ISA. As a member of ISA, the U.S. would contribute 22
percent of the assessed budget, which represents the ceiling on member
state assessed contributions.
Explanation of Estimate
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2007 Actual FY 2008 FY 2009
Detailed Computation of Estimate Estimate Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Assessment against members (in dollars)...................... 0 0 5,891
United States percentage share............................... 0 0 22
United States assessment (in dollars)........................ 0 0 1,296
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * * * * * *
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Hamburg, Germany
($ in thousands)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2007 Actual FY 2008 FY 2009
Computation of Estimate Estimate Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. Requirements in Dollars................................. 0 0 3,608
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) was
established by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea as
one of several dispute resolution mechanisms available to states
parties. Although the U.S. would choose arbitration tribunals rather
that ITLOS for settlement of disputes where the choice is available,
the U.S. woul dbe subject to the Tribunal's jurisdiction in certain
circumstances involving prompt release of vessels and disputes relating
to seabed mining. For this reason, and because the U.S. has an interest
in influencing the interpretation and application of the Convention,
mmbership [sic] in ITLOS would be of significant benefit to the U.S. As
a member of ITLOS, the U.S. would also be able to nominate a judge for
election to ITLOS, which would result in a U.S. judge being in the
position to promote interpretation and application of the Convention in
ways that would be helpful to U.S. interests.
Explanation of Estimate
The FY 2009 request provides for the U.S. assessed contribution for
2009, the first year of the 2009-2010 biennial budget. Expenditure of
the requested funds is contingent on Senate ratification of the
Convention of the Law of the Sea, which woul destablish U.S. membership
in ITLOS. As a member of the ITLOS, the U.S. would contribute
contribute 22 percent of the assessed budget, which represents the
ceiling on member state assessed contributions.
Explanation of Estimate
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2007 Actual FY 2008 FY 2009
Detailed Computation of Estimate Estimate Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Assessment against members (in euros)........................ 0 0 11,200
United States percentage share............................... 0 0 22
United States assessment (in euros).......................... 0 0 2,464
Approximate Exchange Rate (euros to dollars)................. 0 0 0.686
U.S. requirement (in dollars)................................ 0 0 3,608
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senator Vitter. Let me just say that I think it's
inappropriate request or provide the money before the Senate
acts. I strongly urge the administration, and strongly urge the
Congress, to strike this particular budget request.
I would also note, one of the two entities listed in the
budget provision, the International Tribunal for the Law of the
Sea, is an entity in which the U.S. has said it will not
participate if we ratify the Treaty. We're not going to submit
to its jurisdiction. We don't trust it to consistently rule on
matters involving the U.S. in a fair and impartial manner.
Ratification is not going to change this. And yet we are asking
for funding for this Tribunal anyway. I don not think there is
any precedent for sending money to organizations created by a
treaty on which the Senate has yet to act, and has not yet
acted. I would request a review of this, and hopefully a change
of policy. I would make the same request to Congress.
Thank you.
Secretary Rice. Thank you.
The Chairman. Madame Secretary, thank you for your patience
and thank you for your presence. And believe it or not, it is 1
o'clock.
Secretary Rice. Perfect.
The Chairman. We got you out.
We are adjourned.
Secretary Rice. Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 1 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Prepared Statement of Hon. Russell D. Feingold,
U.S. Senator From Wisconsin
Thank you, Madam Secretary, for testifying before this committee,
and thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. We are at a
critical time right now with regard to our foreign policy and related
spending, which makes this hearing all the more timely.
I am a strong supporter of increased funding for State Department
operations to ensure that we have a robust and fully functioning
agency. I am pleased that the President's proposed FY09 State
Department budget has increased 8\1/2\ percent from last year's budget
request, including emergency funding. We have thousands of dedicated
Americans who commit themselves to serving this country by working at
the Department of State--both overseas and at home--and without
adequate funding our foreign policy agenda is shortchanged as critical
staff does not have the necessary resources to do their job. This
capacity and resource gap needs to be addressed immediately, and while
these initial plus-ups are small compared to the overall needs, I am
nonetheless pleased to see them.
Madam Secretary, I remain deeply concerned that the President is
still failing to properly allocate resources so we can best address our
top national security priority--the global threat posed by al-Qaeda and
its affiliates. The misguided and narrow focus on the war in Iraq is
depleting our financial, diplomatic, and material resources around the
globe--whether in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Indonesia, Democratic Republic
of Congo, or Algeria--and making it more difficult for us to pursue a
policy agenda that does, in fact, contribute to our national security.
While we are spending $10 billion per month in Iraq, our efforts in
Afghanistan are being short-changed and vital development, disaster
assistance, education and health programs that are essential for
building strong nations and restoring stability in post-conflict
situations are underfunded. These programs can play an important role
in eradicating some of the factors that contribute to extremism and
terrorism.
Following the Defense Secretary's lead, last week the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs testified before the Senate Armed Services and noted
that we need to do a better job of developing the capabilities and
capacity in other agencies outside the Defense Department--including
State and USAID. He also said we need to do a better job of deterring
conflict and being prepared to ``defeat foes globally by rebalancing
our strategic risk.'' How have we reached the point where the Defense
Department is advocating more strongly for building and strengthening
our civilian and diplomatic capacity than our own State Department?
In addition to my concerns about misplaced priorities, I continue
to be concerned about this administration's misleading budgeting. As in
previous years, the President's budget fails to account for the cost of
the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and fails to pay for those costs,
thus sticking our children and grandchildren with the bill. Passing the
tab for these wars onto future generations is simply irresponsible.
______
A P P E N D I X
----------
Responses to Additional Questions Submitted for
the Record to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
by Members of the Committee
Questions Submitted by Senator Biden
Question 1. There are at least 10 departments, 25 agencies, and a
total of 60 government units engaged in foreign assistance in the U.S.
government. Did the FY 2009 foreign affairs budget request result from
a multi-year strategic planning process for development that is
coordinated across the entire United States Government? If not, how can
we hope to get a coherent, strategic funding plan if the management of
foreign aid is so fragmented across the United States Government?
Answer. Central to our foreign assistance reform efforts is the
goal of improving our ability to provide assistance more strategically
and effectively. Since its establishment in June 2006, the Office of
the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance has developed and implemented
integrated budget planning, program planning, and results monitoring
tools. These tools are designed to provide senior leadership with the
necessary information to assess progress and trade-offs, and improve
decision-making that supports policy goals, including our goal of
achieving transformational diplomacy. The FY 2009 budget is country
focused with the aim of identifying what programs are needed for the
unique situation of each recipient country in reaching the
transformational diplomacy goal. Based on lessons learned from the FY
2008 budget process, the FY 2009 budget process was adjusted to
incorporate greater input from our experts in the field. The first
stage of the FY 2009 budget build relied on our embassies and USAID
missions around the world to form the initial basis for each country
request through Mission Strategic Plans--a joint State-USAID filed
submission of budget and allocation levels by program element.
Washington core teams have been replaced by Assistance Working Groups,
composed of regional and functional representatives, who evaluate the
field-proposed priorities and programs, recommending adjustments and
addressing global and regional issues. In contrast to last year's
process, the field had defined and concrete input at multiple stages,
which resulted in a budget that represents both field and Washington
priorities. Additionally, this budget was built in coordination with
the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and the Department of
Defense. In some cases, this entailed a realignment of State and USAID
assistance programs to complement or reinforce MCC programs, and avoid
redundancy. As a result of these changes to the budget process, the FY
2009 request represents a budget that is truly coordinated between
field and headquarters, State and USAID.
We are at the beginning of true foreign assistance reform, not in
the middle and not at the end. While there is not yet a multi-year
strategic planning process, we are making progress in that direction.
We have started developing a multi-year Global Assistance Strategy and
will be piloting multi-year country assistance strategies in the coming
months. Through the Development Policy Coordination Committee we are
working with other U.S. Government agencies to see how we can better
align our foreign assistance programs. The Development Policy
Coordinating Committee has agreed to focus on intra-government
coordination in a select number of countries. Lessons learned will then
be adopted on a broader scale. We will better integrate the work of our
non-government partners for a comprehensive development approach in
each country.
There are many aspects of the foreign assistance apparatus that
have to be carefully examined; for example, whether the current
authorities and account structures are equipped to meet the evolving
needs of a post 9-11 world. We are committed to fully engaging with
Congress in a collaborative manner regarding further steps and
improvements to the foreign assistance process and our reform efforts.
Question 2. There is widespread concern about the growing role of
defense strategy in setting development policy. It seems we may also
run the risk of our diplomatic strategy overwhelming a sound
development policy. For example, we spend 40% of our foreign aid in the
10 countries where we have key strategic interests. But we only spend
4% among the world's 10 poorest countries. Are you concerned that with
the budget planning process run by the State Department, we will get a
development strategy beholden to our diplomatic strategy? What are the
consequences of that for our development goals? How would we avoid
that?
Answer. It has become clear that the security and well-being of
Americans is inextricably linked to the capacity of foreign states to
govern justly and effectively. The U.S. Government can no longer draw
neat, clear lines between security interests, development efforts, and
democratic ideals. With proper focus and coordination, we can achieve
both our development and diplomatic objectives without sacrificing the
principle of long term development for shorter term objectives. In the
past, there was a perception that development policy and foreign policy
objectives were entirely separate and typically at odds. Poverty
reduction, good governance, and capacity building for sustainable long
term success are long-held development goals. Foreign policy goals also
now recognize that lasting peace and prosperity cannot be achieved
unless we expand opportunities for all citizens of the global community
to live hopeful and prosperous lives. A driving purpose behind the
establishment of the Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance
was to strengthen the U.S. commitment to long term development. One of
the key principles of foreign assistance reform is to ensure that
State/USAID resources support shared goals, and that our planning,
budgeting, management and implementation processes for foreign
assistance capitalize on the respective strengths of State and USAID.
I believe that the FY 2009 budget demonstrates our commitment to
long term development needs. The budget reflects increased investments
aimed at expanding the community of stable, democratically-governed,
and prosperous nations. This emphasis is reflected in the request for
Development Assistance account, which is nearly 60% higher than the
President's FY 2008 request. Funding for programs to consolidate
democratic gains has been increased by 27% from FY 2008 enacted levels.
Funding for programs that expand economic freedom, help countries open
their markets, and spur growth has been increased by nearly $94
million. The United States is on track to double assistance to sub-
Saharan Africa between 2004 and 2010 to $8.7 billion--the FY 2009
request reflects a 25% increase (without GHAI) compared to the FY 2008
requests. Similarly, the Western Hemisphere region saw a $41 million
increase (without the Merida Initiative and GHAI) from the FY 2008
request.
Question 3. Many responsible government leaders overseas express
concern about the challenge of dealing with multiple development
donors. Some recipient countries receive as many as 800 new development
projects each year, host more than 1,000 donor missions, and are
required to present 2,400 quarterly progress reports. Ashraf Ghani, the
former Finance Minister of Afghanistan, has argued that the costs and
frustrations of dealing with foreign aid donors overwhelm poor
governments-and that, in fact, the costs of accepting money from rich
countries often outweigh the benefits. How do we make the aid system
simpler?
Answer. This is an issue that we take very seriously. As stewards
of tax payers' dollars, we look to find that balance between being
accountable and programming for results, ensuring that our assistance
isn't diverted to terrorist entities, following all legal requirements,
and being flexible and responsive to host country needs. One step that
we have taken to improve aid delivery is to hire more staff in the
stewardship and technical areas. The President's Fiscal Year 2009
Budget includes $92.1 million dollars to hire 300 foreign service
officers for USAID--above attrition--in Fiscal Year 2009, a 30 percent
increase in our foreign service workforce. This will move USAID toward
a 100 percent increase in deployable staff resources over the next
three years.
The Development Leadership Initiative will address critical
staffing deficiencies in the stewardship and technical areas by hiring
officers in the areas of program and planning; executive management;
contracting; financial management; legal; health; economic growth and
trade; alliance building; education; and democracy, conflict, human
rights, and governance.
We are also taking steps to improve our internal coordination as a
donor. In addition to establishing joint and common planning,
budgeting, and performance evaluation systems for State/USAID, for the
first time, the Director of Foreign Assistance and USAID Administrator
is chairing the US government's interagency policy coordinating
committee on Development, which is a forum for consultation and
collaboration among senior policy officials representing a wide range
of federal agencies involved in foreign assistance activities. As the
chair of this forum, the Director of Foreign Assistance and USAID
Administrator is enhancing the impact of US Government assistance by
forging agreement on whole-of-government approaches at the country
level and on collaboration to foster private sector-led growth in
Africa; and strengthening our voice on the international stage on key
assistance issues such as aid effectiveness and achievement of the
Millennium Development Goals.
Outside of Washington, the USG is an engaged partner with other
donors, providing leadership on practical and results oriented
collaboration. This past October, USAID agreed with Denmark, Finland,
Ireland, Norway, the Netherlands, Sweden, and United Kingdom, referred
to as the Nordic Plus, to publicly and enthusiastically confirm our
strong commitment to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and
most importantly to work in tangible ways to demonstrate this
commitment. As a result, we've committed to work together in Ghana and
Tanzania to enhance the impact of our aid efforts through greater
coordination among donors and with host country development strategies.
Finally, within our PEPFAR program, the USG is a co-sponsor,
together with the UK and UNAIDS, of the ``three ones'' approach, in
which donors seek to work under one country strategy, one monitoring
and evaluation system, and through one coordinating mechanism in-
country.
We share your concern about the importance of making aid
streamlined, flexible and responsive, and welcome your input and
feedback on our ongoing efforts.
Question 4. We need to be able to measure the results of our
development aid so that we can ensure that we are getting value for
taxpayer dollars. But who gets to evaluate? Who determines what
``success'' is? Are we evaluating development projects for how well
they deliver the results that the U.S. government wants? Or, are they
measured by how well they deliver the results that poor people in
developing countries want? Whose measurement tools are we using? And
how can we design measurement tools that ensure our efforts are
benefiting poor people?
Answer. Accountability for development results is one of the
fundamental principles of the reform launched in 2006. The U.S.
Government incorporates the interests of many constituents when
determining the goals and outcomes of its foreign assistance programs.
Certainly, we recognize that without the ownership of host country
governments and the validation and support of non-governmental
organizations and multilateral donor agencies our efforts stand a
lesser chance of success.
Therefore, just as it is important to recognize that the results
that we are striving to achieve through foreign assistance are
established jointly, it is equally important to have an understanding
of whether we are achieving U.S. strategic objectives and the long-term
development goals of the recipient countries.
We measure the results of foreign assistance programs in several
distinct but inter-related ways. First, each program that is funded
must include specified results and related performance measures--
indicators--that are monitored by the office overseeing the program to
determine whether we are meeting our targets. These results and
indicators are determined jointly, in advance of starting the project,
with host country governments and beneficiaries. The Office of the
Director of Foreign Assistance has also developed a set of standard
performance indicators that are intended to enable the aggregation of
results across countries and programs to tell us what the U.S.
government achieved from foreign assistance during a fiscal year. For
example, the standard indicators can tell us how many people we have
inoculated, how many farmers we assisted with new crops varieties, or
how many electoral systems we have strengthened. By being able to look
at assistance data on a country-by-country level as well as in
aggregate, we are able to measure whether we are achieving success in
partnership with individual countries and stakeholders, but also at a
broader level that is the core of the overarching U.S. foreign policy
strategy.
To further assist our ability to measure progress, a set of 51
representative indicators were identified and utilized in the FY 2007
Foreign Assistance Annual Report, published in conjunction with the FY
2009 CBJ. Each of the short-term (annual) indicators included
information on the results target set for FY 2007, whether the target
was achieved and steps that will be taken to improve performance if it
fell short. The process of identifying, analyzing and reporting on this
indicator set pointed to needed adjustments in the process that will be
incorporated into future reports.
Additionally, we also monitor the overall progress of a country or
region in the sectors we are supporting by using data and information
gathered by established organizations. For example, by using Freedom
House indicators, we are able to determine the progress that a country
or region has been making or not making towards democracy and human
rights. Using these second-party measurements helps us to validate that
our programs are not simply achieving shorter term objectives and
needs, but that they are contributing to a portfolio of efforts that
are accomplishing long-term sustainable change that serve the
individual countries as well as the regions where they are located.
Finally, USAID Missions and bureaus and some State Department
Bureaus conduct evaluations of their major development projects and
programs. Last year, USAID offices conducted over 200 evaluations which
examined questions such as what were the effects of projects and
programs, what problems they faced during implementation, and what
lessons can be learned for the future to aid in designing programs that
will achieve greater impact.
Evaluations invariably take into consideration the views and
judgments of the intended beneficiaries. Evaluation teams routinely
interview the real and intended beneficiaries to understand their
perspectives and perceptions.
USAID Administrator and Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance Fore
has stressed the importance of rigorous and objectives evaluations of
all programs administered by State and USAID. Both USAID and the State
Department are exploring ways to strengthen the evaluation function and
to improve upon the performance management systems now in place.
Question 5. The President has requested that Congress provide
twenty-five percent of PL-480 funds to purchase food aid locally in
emergencies. What are the advantages of this approach? Could you
identify specific cases where development or humanitarian assistance
funds would have more impact if they were spent in recipient countries?
Answer. What is paramount to the Title II program is having
adequate food aid available when needed to save lives. Food purchased
in the U.S. normally takes up to four months to arrive at its
destination. Food purchased locally, however, can reach the
beneficiaries within days or weeks. The ability to use even a fraction
of Title II for local and regional purchase will allow the U.S. to move
with greater speed and flexibility to save lives and prevent famine.
Such speed is sometimes necessary when a sudden emergency occurs (e.g.,
a natural disaster or an outbreak of fighting), food deliveries are
unexpectedly interrupted (e.g., a pipeline break), or an unexpected
and, often, short-lived cease fire allows rapid access to populations
in need. We will be better equipped to deal with emergencies if our
``tool-box'' were to include cash that can be used to provide immediate
relief until US commodities arrive, or fill in when there are pipeline
breaks.
Local procurement can also save funds, allowing us to feed more
people, which is especially important as the increasing commodity costs
erode the purchasing power of the Title II account. Had the U.S. been
able to procure commodities in Uganda for persons displaced by conflict
there, we would have been able to increase our support by 31 percent.
In 2006 alone, had we purchased commodities available in Uganda we
would have saved over US$3 million, which could have been used to
supply Ugandan displaced persons with 6,000 tons of additional
commodities.
Our U.S-grown food will continue to play the primary role and will
be the first choice in meeting global needs. We plan to use local and
regional purchases judiciously.
Question 6. How can the U.S. Government improve its coordination
across the different agencies that conduct international development
and health work, like MCC and PEPFAR, especially given that the latter
two programs are outside the direct authority of the Director of
Foreign Assistance? While the Director of Foreign Assistance does have
coordinating authority over those agencies, the experience over the
last two years has not demonstrated that that authority is sufficient
to effectively coordinate the activities and budget planning between
USAID, MCC, and PEPFAR--either here in Washington or at the country
level.
Answer. The establishment of a dual-hatted Director of U.S. Foreign
Assistance and USAID Administrator has led to continued improvement in
the interagency coordination of activities and budget planning. For FY
2008, for example, with the establishment of common objectives, a
common program lexicon, and common budget and program planning
processes, State (including PEPFAR) and USAID were able to improve
coordination, with steps taken toward greater MCC and DOD coordination.
For FY 2009, MCC and DOD were formally added as participants in State
and USAID's budget and program planning process, in addition to their
coordination in the field.
The evidence of such coordination is illustrated by a number of
examples: In Ghana, for instance, USAID is focusing its programming on
enhancing the capacity of local government, which is responsible for
implementing MCC compact activities in economic growth. In Honduras,
USAID programming focuses on trade and investment capacity building and
private sector competitiveness, in order to complement MCC compact
investments in infrastructure and agricultural diversification.
With respect to PEPFAR, the greater coordination achieved through
the DFA helped highlight development gaps in our non-HIV/AIDS
programming, including interventions in governance and economic growth
that will help build host government capacity to sustain further
progress on their own. Thus, in FY 2009, the budget includes $2.1
billion for State Department and USAID programs in Africa to address
development gaps and support economic opportunity and governance
programs critical to the success of the investments we have made
through PEPFAR.
A number of additional activities are ongoing for this year that we
hope will further improve coordination. A strong interagency country
strategy development process is being planned for specific pilot
countries. The 3-to-5-year strategic plan will be developed by the
field, under the leadership of Ambassadors, and is explicitly targeted
to include full interagency, other donor, and where appropriate, host
government participation. As with last year, the annual Operational
Plan process will provide additional opportunities for the interagency
in the field to develop comprehensive program plans, working together
to ensure coordination.
Finally, to extend coherence across all U.S. Government foreign
assistance, the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance and USAID
Administrator now leads the interagency Development Policy Coordination
Committee. This committee is an important tool for aligning U.S.
Government efforts, making joint policy decisions on critical
development issues, and forging stronger collaboration to deliver
greater impact from the U.S. Government's development efforts around
the world. The Development Policy Coordinating Committee has agreed to
focus on intra-government coordination-including the use of the DFA-
established common objectives, program lexicon, and planning processes
in a select number of countries. Lessons learned from this pilot will
then be adopted on a broader scale.
We share your concern about the importance of such comprehensive
coordination, and welcome your input and feedback on our ongoing
efforts.
Question 7. Our national security strategy is built around three
pillars, also known as the ``Three D's'': Defense, Diplomacy and
Development. Each pillar is intended to be equally crucial to a
balanced foreign policy strategy, yet our government's resources are
overwhelming tilted towards the defense pillar. For every dollar of
funding we spend on diplomacy and development, we spend $19 on defense.
Military-led development is the fastest growing form of U.S. overseas
aid. Are you concerned about the consequences of this imbalance? How
does this budget request address that imbalance?
Answer. President Bush's Fiscal Year 2009 Foreign Operations Budget
for the Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) and other foreign affairs agencies totals $26.1
billion, an increase of 8.9 percent over the total Fiscal Year 2008
enacted to date, including emergency funding, or 14.3 percent over the
FY 2008 enacted base. This increase reflects a determined effort to
enhance civilian instruments of national security-including the
capacity of our civilian agencies, with staff increases for the
Department of State and the largest requested increase in USAID's
operational budget in nearly two decades-and our development,
reconstruction, and security assistance.
Development now plays a vastly elevated role in America's foreign
policy. The charge I have given to our diplomatic corps is a long-term
development goal-to help build and sustain democratic, well-governed
states that respond to the needs of their people, reduce widespread
poverty, and behave responsibly toward their people and the
international system. In the 21st century, defined as it is thus far by
an unprecedented and increasing interdependence, human development is
both a moral end in itself and also a central pillar of our national
security. Today, the idea that foreign assistance-and specifically
long-term development-is a vital tool of our international statecraft
is met with broad and growing support.
With respect to funding, we have continued to boost the quantity of
our assistance. Since 2001, with the support and partnership of
Congress, President Bush has launched the largest development agenda
since the Marshall Plan. In the past six years, we have nearly tripled
official development assistance worldwide and quadrupled it to Sub-
Saharan Africa.
As noted above, the FY 2009 request reflects the continuation of
this effort, further illustrating the emerging national consensus in
support of development. The resources requested in the Fiscal Year 2009
Foreign Operations Budget demonstrate our strong commitment to fighting
poverty, with a focus on strengthening democratic governance and
promoting economic growth. This is reflected in our request for the
Development Assistance account, which is nearly 60 percent higher than
the Fiscal Year 2008 request, and our request of $1.7 billion for
democracy promotion and governance.
I would also like to specifically mention the State Department's
Civilian Stabilization Initiative (CSI) that is included in the
President's budget. CSI is the product of the work of 15 agencies,
including Defense, to build the full complement of U.S. government
expertise necessary to respond to a stabilization crisis and to promote
effective rule of law, economic stabilization and transitional
governance in weak and failing states.
With the requested resources, the Department of State, USAID and
other foreign affairs agencies strive to create the conditions
conducive to sustained progress in governance, economic growth, and
human capacity, recognizing that countries that move in this direction
become our partners in global peace and prosperity.
Question 8. USAID has been systematically under-resourced,
overstretched, and disempowered over the last three decades-severely
affecting the United State's capacity to provide global leadership on
foreign assistance. Some example of this attrition: In the 1990s, 37
percent of USAID's workforce left without being replaced. The number of
direct hires working in the field dropped by 29 percent from 2002 to
2005. The average U.S. contracting officer should manage about $10
million dollars in grants. Today, they manage more than $50 million on
average. This budget contains an impressive increase for USAID
Operating Expenses. However, some observers argue this attrition has
taken place because USAID has lacked the stature necessary to defend
itself in the budget process. How have you addressed this issue? And,
once that rebuilding is complete, what steps would we need to take to
ensure that this erosion doesn't happen again in the future?
Answer. Over the last several years USAID's OE budget has remained
at a virtually straight-lined level, while USAID-managed program
funding has increased by approximately 40%. The National Security
Strategy now recognizes the importance of foreign assistance to the
achievement of the nation's foreign policy objectives. The FY 2009
budget supports this goal of reestablishing Development as the third
leg of the foreign policy triad along with Diplomacy and Defense.
Leadership at both the Departments of State and Defense are on record
supporting these increases.
Without sufficient operating expense funds to hire permanent staff,
USAID has been forced to utilize a variety of program-funded hiring
mechanisms to achieve its goals. The way to ensure that the Agency is
not again subject to this type of erosion to its permanent workforce is
to support the requested level of operating expenses.
Question 9. The HELP Commission focused intensively on the issue of
procurement and the weaknesses of our current contracting system. USAID
has, in the words of General Chiarelli, become ``little more than a
contracting agency.'' More than 50% of USAID funding in Afghanistan
goes to five for-profit companies who do contracting. Each USAID
contracting officer should manage about $10 million in grants. Today,
according to USAID Acting Deputy Administrator James Kunder, they
manage an average of $50 million. How far will the requested increase
in operating expenses go to address this problem?
Answer. The FY 2009 budget requests an increase in hiring which
will include approximately 35 Foreign Service contracting officers as
part of the Development Leadership Initiative (DLI). USAID's
contracting officer shortage will also be addressed by increased hiring
in Washington, as well as a pilot program to re-tool a limited number
of qualified Foreign Service Officers into contracting officers.
It should be noted that the requested increase will also address
shortages in other stewardship categories such as financial management,
legal, program and budget.
Question 10. Recently, the HELP Commission issued its report on
reforming U.S. foreign assistance. Among its recommendations was to
dedicate the Economic Support Funds account, or ESF, for short-term
economic needs, and protect the Development Assistance Account, or DA,
for long-term goals. This budget request continues in the trend of
funding development work through ESF. Why has the President requested
funds for development through ESF? Do you think this is a wise
strategy? And, if not, what are the obstacles that you feel force the
USG to fund development work through ESF?
Answer. We continue to work towards having a clearer and more
transparent way of allocating Economic Support Funds (ESF) and
Development Assistance (DA) funds. The FY 2009 request reflects
allocations in the two accounts that are consistent with the current
purposes of each appropriation. Using the Foreign Assistance Framework
country categories as a basis, we have funded countries/bureaus with
either ESF or DA funds (with one exception, Liberia). We are following
a one account--one country rule in order to clarify the use of the DA
and ESF accounts and end the practice of using both accounts in a
single country.
The DA request funds programs in Developing, Transforming, and
Sustaining Partner countries (e.g., Bangladesh, Bolivia, Cambodia,
Ethiopia, Guatemala, Indonesia, Peru, Philippines, Yemen). The ESF
request funds programs in Restrictive and Rebuilding countries (e.g.,
Afghanistan, Burma, Haiti, Liberia, Nepal, Sudan) as well as foreign
policy priorities such as Egypt and Jordan. By consolidating country
programs previously funded with both ESF and DA, the Administration
seeks to improve transparency and facilitate the performance monitoring
of long-term development programs. Additionally, in the FY 2009
request, we have made a concerted effort to elevate the importance of
development, in balance with other foreign assistance priorities. This
led to a $600 million increase in the DA account over the FY 2008
request. About one-third of the increase is due to a shift from the ESF
account, while two-thirds are programmatic increases.
Question 11. The global health sector, more than any other part of
foreign assistance, is perhaps the most fragmented, with two major
health initiatives aimed at HIV/AIDS and malaria that are currently not
linked into on-going global health programs, such as maternal and child
health programs at USAID. As a result, a large majority of our global
health funding is aimed at 15 countries, most of which are in sub-
Saharan Africa, but only through two programs, one directed towards
HIV/AIDS and one towards malaria. Many have called for a more
``comprehensive'' or holistic approach to global health. How does this
budget request, in the short term, help coordinate its global health
assistance and ensure that services on the ground cover the core
components of basic health services that are maternal and child health,
infectious diseases and HIV/AIDS? How do you reconcile that with a 14
percent cut in the overall Child Survival and Health Account?
Answer. This budget request will support the existing foreign
assistance strategy to achieve and sustain the greatest possible
reduction of maternal and child mortality and malnutrition. As the U.S.
Government's lead foreign assistance agency in the global health
sector, USAID coordinates health programming to the fullest extent
possible--an approach that increases the affordability and
sustainability of our global efforts to tackle critical public health
challenges. We coordinate global health assistance and ensure that
services on the ground cover the core components of basic health
services, including maternal and child health, family planning,
infectious diseases and HIV/AIDS. This is done through high-level
coordination with other U.S. Government and host-government partners
and strategic coordination of services in context-specific approaches.
This includes coordination with CDC, FDA, HHS, NIH and OGAC, both in
strategy development and in-country coordination with host governments
and other bilateral and multilateral donor agencies.
An example of coordination of services is the delivery of
antenatal, delivery, and post-partum care. We know that good antenatal
care--including the promotion of adequate nutrition and anemia
prevention, detection and treatment of infections and complications,
and planning for adequate care at birth--can have important positive
effects on outcomes for both women and their babies. In areas where
malaria is prevalent, we promote antenatal care as a key opportunity to
provide anti-malarial treatment and the use of insecticide-treated
nets, protecting women from anemia and illness and their unborn
children from the low birth weight caused by maternal malaria
infection. In areas where HIV is prevalent, antenatal care is one of
the best opportunities to offer testing and counseling services and
identify mothers requiring anti-retroviral treatment or prevention of
mother-to-child transmission (PMTCT) of HIV. Most of our missions
already support integrated maternal and child health/family planning
(MCH/FP) and malaria programs and help to build broad-based health
systems. These programs also strengthen drug management, supervision,
community outreach and other critical systems across the board that are
needed to deliver basic public health services.
Question 12. One response to the calls for greater integration
between HIV/AIDS programs and other health, social, and economic needs
is ``wrap-around'' programs. But the non-HIV/AIDS programs often have
dramatically less funding or may be geographically separated from most
AIDS programs. How can greater integration be achieved under these
circumstances?
Answer. Even with geographic or financial disparities, greater
integration can be achieved by strengthening and building upon common
service delivery platforms, implementing national and district-level
policies directing such integration, targeting resources, and
incorporating strong monitoring and evaluation into programs. Service
integration becomes formalized when outlined in cross-cutting national
and district-level policies and championed by country leadership, as in
Mozambique, Rwanda and other countries. Critical to this process is
resource mapping at the community, primary facility, and district
levels and then targeting resources.
The successful integration of programs is more than co-location of
services. Although obvious benefits exist in the integration of
services, program, logistic, and financial barriers can negate these
benefits. HIV programming in Rwanda has shown that improved health
systems performance through a Pay-for-Performance model contributes to
improved management in HIV/AIDS services, as well as family planning
and child health services. An evaluation is underway to elucidate the
key components with perceived successful integration of HIV/AIDS and
other public health programming in at least three countries (i.e.,
Malawi, Mozambique and Rwanda). Strong monitoring and evaluation of
integration efforts are necessary for sustained program quality and
coverage. Monitoring and evaluation should address donor concerns about
accountability and transparency of combined resources. The monitoring
and evaluation system should be able to track task shifting and give
some sense of how the health system and health workers may become
overburdened in an environment of limited resources but increasing
expectations.
Opportunities exist where integration makes sense, building upon
the strengths of the different programs. For example, in many countries
antenatal visits and child immunization visits are relatively high.
Extending from these strong points to the post-partum period may be an
incremental approach to integration. High-quality care at delivery is
one of the most critical interventions for the survival and health of
mothers and newborns; it prevents or resolves life-threatening
complications and provides essential immediate care to newborns. It
also provides a key opportunity for the prevention of mother-to-child
transmission (PMTCT) of HIV. Increasingly, we are extending care into
the post-partum period, allowing for the detection and treatment of
serious maternal and newborn complications and better promotion of
breastfeeding and essential newborn care. This extension allows us the
opportunity to conduct early infant diagnosis and start cotrimoxazole
preventive therapy that has integrated benefits for HIV-exposed and
HIV-infected children for prevention of death from pneumonia, TB and
malaria. This post-partum period is also one of the most important
opportunities to counsel women in voluntary family planning methods.
Thus, in practice, our maternal, child health, and family planning
programs are delivered holistically, yielding greater impact and
sustainability and providing a platform for other important health
programs.
Question 13. When, realistically, do you think the joint United
Nations-African Union force will be fully deployed to Darfur? What is
the anticipated timeline for this deployment?
Answer. Security Council Resolution 1769 authorizes a force of up
to 19,555 military personnel, including 360 military observers and
liaison officers, and an appropriate civilian component, including up
to 3,772 police personnel and 19 formed police units of up to 140
personnel each. Currently 9,000 personnel are deployed with an
additional 3,600 expected by June.
Special Envoy Williamson recently launched, on behalf of the United
States and in partnership with Canada, the Friends of UNAMID.
Secretary-General Ban has given his full support to this group
comprising like-minded states that meets weekly in New York for the
purpose of helping the UN accelerate deployment of an effective UNAMID.
The Friends aim to help UNAMID meet its deployment goals of an
additional 3,600 African troops by June.
We are hopeful that deployment of an additional 1,600 troops can be
achieved shortly thereafter, and are pressing for the deployment of the
remainder of UNAMID's troops by December 31.
Question 14. For months, the United Nations has been calling for
urgently needed helicopters for the peacekeeping mission in Darfur.
I've written the President on this, more than once. The Senate recently
approved a resolution that Senator Lugar and I wrote calling for the
President himself to personally engage on this issue with other heads
of state. I don't get the sense that this is as high a priority as it
should be. Can you tell me the degree of engagement you have had on
this issue and with whom? How many foreign ministers have you called?
With how many heads of state has President Bush raised this issue?
Answer. The United States has been at the forefront of Darfur
peacekeeping support since the African Union first deployed in July of
2004. Since that time we have provided Darfur peacekeepers with more
than $400 million in assistance. We have been engaged in an intense
high-level diplomatic campaign, both in public and behind the scenes,
to lobby on behalf of the UN and the people of Darfur to generate and
deploy tactical and utility helicopters as well as other critical
mission requirements. This diplomatic campaign is starting to bear
fruit: Ethiopia has offered 4 attack helicopters to the mission. Our
efforts have also included high-level coordination and outreach to
multiple NATO and non-NATO countries, including China. We have worked
closely with the UN to identify those countries most likely to
contribute helicopters to this operation. Officials at the most senior
levels of the US government have approached their counterparts in these
countries' governments to urge them to provide the required support. We
are also in touch with the UN on the full range of alternative options
to meet these urgent requirements and to assist other countries to
strengthen their capabilities to contribute.
Question 15. The need for peacekeepers in Africa is immense.
Darfur, Chad, and Somalia are still in the grips of terrible conflicts.
The Democratic Republic of Congo, which has seen horrendous violence in
recent years, may be on the verge of a breakthrough toward genuine
peace. The President's budget request, however, has significant cuts
for UN peacekeeping--a cut of $75 million for the Congo mission, a cut
of $56 million for the mission in Liberia, and a cut of $39 million in
the Cote d'Ivoire mission. What will be the impact of these budget cuts
on these missions and these and other countries' efforts to ensure that
gains made in peacemaking are secured?
Answer. There are eight UN peacekeeping missions in Africa that
account for $1.1 billion of our FY 2009 request. The exact requirements
for UN peacekeeping funds for future years are difficult to predict,
because the size and cost of UN peacekeeping missions depend on UN
Security Council decisions based on conditions on the ground and UN
General Assembly review of the financial implications associated with
those decisions. With respect to these missions, we are hopeful for
some drawdown of peacekeeping forces. In Liberia, a plan is being
implemented to consolidate and draw down the mission, measured against
progress in building Liberian security institutions. The UN Security
Council will consider possible further reductions. In Cote d'Ivoire,
progress of implementing a peace agreement should open the possibility
of an eventual drawdown; and in the Congo, we expect a gradual
reduction as national forces assume roles and political,
reconstruction, and military benchmarks are achieved.
Question 16. What is the Administration's rationale for proposed
reductions in assistance to Armenia, despite increased levels of
support for several neighboring countries?
Answer. Within the FY 2009 assistance request for Eurasia, funding
is prioritized to help the most reform-oriented countries in the
region--Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova--by promoting economic and energy
independence, helping to diversify export markets, and improving
democratic governance in the face of increasing Russian economic and
political pressure. Other priorities for the region include democracy
programming in Russia and elsewhere and opportunities to promote reform
in Turkmenistan and the rest of Central Asia.
Excluding the funding Armenia receives as part of its $235.65
million Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Compact, the
Administration's FY 2009 request for Armenia totals $27.9 million.
While funding for the Eurasia region as a whole has declined sharply
over the last several fiscal years, reductions to the Armenia budget
have not declined as drastically. The reduced request for FY 2009 does
not detract from the critical importance of Armenia to U.S. interests
nor does it signal a change in U.S. policy. Rather, the request level
meets the country's development needs and is appropriate within the
context of assistance priorities within the region and around the
globe. Armenia has made real progress on reversing rural poverty;
nevertheless, the government's commitment to reform is not as strong as
others in the region and the country still struggles with rampant
corruption and with weak democratic institutions, as illustrated by
recent events.
Within the Caucasus, the Administration's request prioritizes
funding for Georgia. Led by a Western-oriented government under
increasing pressure, U.S. assistance is intended to help Georgia
consolidate its democratic, economic, and social reforms, address rural
poverty, encourage the peaceful resolution of its separatist conflicts,
and strengthen Georgia's economy while decreasing its dependence on
Russia as an export market and for energy resources. The FY 2009
request for Georgia ($67.1 million) is a five percent increase over FY
2008 enacted levels.
Question 17. As U.S. assistance to Europe and Eurasia has declined
in recent years, many nations in the region have experienced a
breakdown in democracy and the rule of law. Despite this trend, the
Administration's budget proposes further drastic cuts in assistance to
the area. How does the Administration justify these cutbacks,
particularly in view of the President's rhetoric about the importance
of democracy promotion?
Answer. Within the Europe and Eurasian region, FREEDOM Support Act
(FSA) and Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act funding for FY
2009 is prioritized to:
advance reform in countries that have faced Russian pressure
(Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine);
support democracy and rule of law in Russia and elsewhere;
address concerns about the final status of Kosovo and its impact on
the region; and
promote needed reforms in Central Asia and linkages between Central
and South Asia.
In the Europe and Eurasian region, challenges to democracy and rule
of law remain most serious in countries in the former Soviet space.
From 2006 to 2007, democratic reforms and freedoms improved in only two
of the countries and regressed in five. Reforming governments have had
difficulty consolidating the democratic breakthroughs of 2003-2005.
Reflecting these challenges, the Administration's FY 2009 FSA request
for the Governing Justly and Democratically (GJD) program objective
remains the largest of all five program objectives at over $137
million. While this year's request represents a decline from the FY
2008 enacted level, we believe that the Administration's FSA request
for GJD programming is appropriate and reflects the needs of the region
given progress made by some of the Eurasian countries in promoting
reform, and increased reliance on self-sustaining NGOs and legacy
grant-making institutions to support democratic reform, particularly in
Russia.
As FSA resources decline, the Administration's request for FY 2009
continues to prioritize FSA-funded GJD programming, directing support
to beleaguered democracy activists and advancing democratic openings
where they exist. As a statement of Administration priorities, the FSA
request for GJD assistance is nearly $10 million higher than last
year's request and funding for these programs is increasing as a
percentage of the total FSA, up to 42 percent in FY 2009. In addition,
relative to the Administration's FY 2008 request for FSA-funded GJD
programming, the GJD request in FY 2009 has significantly increased
support for GJD programs to support civil society and media
organizations, including in Georgia and Ukraine. A strategic eight-fold
increase in Central Asia regional GJD programming will help promote
access to independent media in the region and a 30 percent increase in
democracy assistance to Turkmenistan will help take advantage of
openings to promote reform there.
For Russia, while this year's GJD request is a decrease from the FY
2008 enacted level, the Administration has requested a total of $30.3
million for the programs in FY 2009, an increase of over $4 million
from last year's request. These funds will be used to broaden support
for Russian independent media and civil society, including NGO watchdog
organizations such as human rights groups, as they face increasing
political pressure. Programs will also strengthen political, civil and
justice sector institutions that reinforce democratic principles and
the rule of law. The FY 2009 request level also takes into account the
resources of the U.S.-Russia Foundation for Economic Advancement and
the Rule of Law (the U.S.-Russia Investment Fund or TUSRIF legacy
foundation), which will have over $180 million at its disposal to
support development in Russia, including the rule of law and the free
flow of information through its grant-making and other activities.
Reflecting the important work still needed to promote democracy in
the countries of South Eastern Europe, the FY 2009 SEED request for the
GJD program objective remains robust at $79 million. As a percentage of
the overall SEED budget, GJD assistance declines modestly in FY 2009
compared with FY 2008 enacted levels, from 32 percent in FY 2008 to 29
percent in FY 2009. There are several factors that explain this
decline:
A decrease of slightly more than $5 million in Kosovo GJD
assistance accounts for approximately half of the decline in
SEED GJD assistance from FY 2008 to FY 2009; this decrease
reflects a return to a more sustainable annual level of
transition assistance following a ``spike'' in requested
resources in the FY 2007 Emergency Supplemental and the FY 2008
budget request. This ``spike'' was aimed at providing direct
support for a successful settlement of Kosovo's status.
The SEED request continues to give high priority to Economic Growth
in order to create needed jobs, promote economic
diversification, repay World Bank debt for Kosovo, and
integrate the region with the world economy, decreasing EG
funding in the request by 1 percent compared with the FY 2008
enacted level. Economic progress and prosperity continue to be
critical factors in checking extreme nationalism, radicalism,
and anti-reform sentiment in Eastern Europe.
Progress made on democratic reforms and freedoms in the countries
of South Eastern Europe over the last several years, if
somewhat uneven, allows for the Administration to focus SEED
funding to assist reform in sectors in which SEED-funding
recipients remain fragile and, in the case of Kosovo, to stand
up new governance structures and procedures.
To maintain robust security relationships with the countries of
South Eastern Europe and assist their integration into NATO,
the Administration's FY 2009 request responds to a decrease in
FMF funding allocated to the region by increasing Peace and
Security assistance by 5 percent over the FY 2008 enacted
level; some of this assistance advances respect for the rule of
law through law enforcement reform.
Regional programs also play an important role in furthering
democratization. One of our key tools for the promotion of democracy,
human rights, and the rule of law throughout Europe and Eurasia is the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The OSCE
enables the United States to advance these interests effectively in
concert with our friend and allies, with shared costs. In addition to
FSA and SEED funding, other U.S. resources are being used to support
democracy in Europe and Eurasia. For example, Millennium Challenge
Account (MCA) resources leverage the impact of other U.S. assistance in
strengthening democracy and good governance, with three countries
holding Threshold Programs (Ukraine, Moldova. and Albania) and one soon
to sign a Threshold Program (Kyrgyz Republic). These programs
supplement SEED and FSA assistance by helping to fight corruption,
increase government transparency, and strengthen civil society watchdog
capacity. U.S. resources continue to be used to leverage other donor
funding and to establish legacy institutions that support civil
society, the rule of law, and the transfer of knowledge about democracy
throughout the region (e.g., the New Eurasia Foundation in Russia, the
Eurasia Foundation of Central Asia, the Black Sea Trust for Regional
Cooperation, and the Balkan Trust for Democracy).
Question 18. There are reports of growing frustration in Iraq in
the ranks of former Sunni insurgents to whom we are providing monthly
payments of $300. They want to be integrated into the Iraqi government
and security forces, but the central government is balking,
particularly in mixed areas close to Baghdad. The situation is said to
be so bad that our military has started developing plans to create a
depression-era style civil job corps. ?What are the consequences of the
Iraqi government failing to hire these ex-insurgents, or ``Concerned
Local Citizens'' as they are called by our military? What are we doing
to increase their hiring and integration?
Answer. The Concerned Local Citizen program represents an important
element of current Iraqi and Multi-National Forces--Iraq security
efforts; this program has recently been renamed the Sons of Iraq (SOI)
program. Through the SOI program, members of communities, including
former insurgents, work with Coalition and Iraqi forces to improve
security and economic conditions at the local level. This program is
estimated to currently have approximately 91,000 volunteers and
enhances the ability of Iraqi and Coalition forces to interact with
local residents and obtain information on insurgents and illegal
militia activity, and protect key infrastructure. The GoI leadership
has made public statements lauding the contribution of SOIs to improved
security. The SOI effort is crucial to the counterinsurgency effort and
will require continued support.
The long-term goal of the SOI program is to transition
approximately 20-25% of the SOI members into the Iraqi Security Forces
(ISF) as police or army personnel. The remaining members will
eventually transition into other public or private sector education or
employment. To date, close to 20,000 have transitioned to the ISF or
civil employment. The GOI has supported the integration of more than
9,000 former SOI members into Iraqi forces in Baghdad alone.
Approximately 19,000 additional members of SOI groups have expressed
their desire to join the Iraqi forces and they await an expansion of
the government's integration and training programs.
The Iraqi and U.S. Governments are also jointly funding multiple
private employment and joint technical education programs focusing on
SOI members and former detainees. For example, the Coalition is teaming
with the GoI to implement a new technical training and employment
program entitled the Joint Technical Education and Reintegration
Program (JTERP). This program consists of vocational training, on-the-
job training and job placement for Iraqis, with priority going to
former SOIs and recently released detainees. JTERP is a collaboration
of efforts among multiple ministries to include the Ministry of Labor
and Social Affairs, Ministry of Higher Education, Ministry of
Education, and Ministry of Industry and Minerals, as well as the
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Committee.
Question 19. As you know, whether the recently passed de-
Ba'athification law promotes healing or further division depends upon
how it is implemented. According to some voices, such as Dr. Chalabi,
who has been closely associated with De-Ba'athification, the law will
actually lead to the expulsion of more than 7,000 individuals from key
government jobs. What steps are you taking to ensure that the de-
Ba'athification law has a positive, rather than a negative, impact?
Answer. Since the issuance of the De- Ba'athification Order under
CPA in 2003, many Sunni Arabs have perceived the de-Ba'athification
process as opaque and politicized. However, in the last few months,
several key laws have been passed that together will help address Sunni
Arab concerns.
In December, the Council of Representatives (CoR) passed amendments
to the Unified Pension Law, which, among other things, restores pension
rights to former civil servants and military officials without regard
to former party affiliation. In January, the CoR passed an amnesty law,
which sets provisions by which Iraqis held in detention facilities, the
majority of whom are Sunni Arabs, can be released. Also in January, the
CoR passed the Law on Accountability and Justice, which reforms the de-
Ba'athification process by allowing some former mid-level party members
back into government employment and by establishing an appeals
procedure. These three laws are necessary for national reconciliation,
and passage of these laws shows that Iraqis are committed to work
together in building the new Iraq.
As you note, effective implementation of the Accountability and
Justice Law is vital to broad Iraqi support for the de-Ba'athification
process. Although the law provides basic rights to those it affects,
the regulations and procedures to implement it will determine its
political effect.
Before any action under the law can be taken, the GOI must create a
commission, which will then establish the new de-Ba'athification
process and select judges for the appeals committee. We are encouraging
the GOI to create the commission as soon as possible and, in a spirit
of reconciliation, show the Sunni Arab community that the government is
committed to reforming the de-Ba'athification process.
Additionally, one section of particular concern requires that all
former employees of Ba'ath-era security and intelligence agencies be
dismissed from government employment, regardless of whether they were
party members. We are encouraging the GOI to consider issuing
exemptions for all those individuals who would be terminated because
they worked in the former security apparatus if they have been working
since the establishment of the current government, without incident, to
help rebuild Iraq.
Although there is some ambiguity in the language that needs to be
clarified, and on which the Presidency Council has been working,
passage of the Accountability and Justice Law has shown that Iraqis are
able to compromise on important legislation. The Presidency Council is
also reviewing the law, and may seek amendments to further refine and
clarify the legislation.
Question 20. What is the process for obtaining additional
international sanctions against Iran if it continues to fail to halt
its uranium enrichment and plutonium production activities? When would
you anticipate a fourth UN Security Council resolution? What elements
are in the third resolution? What separate sanctions will Europe
consider? What understandings do you have with Russia and China?
Answer. The Council clearly expressed its intention in UN Security
Council resolution 1747 to consider the adoption of further appropriate
measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter if the IAEA
Director General's report showed that Iran had failed to comply with UN
Security Council resolutions 1737 and 1747. The Director General has
reported three times since the adoption of that resolution in March
2007 that Iran has failed to do so.
The Foreign Ministers of China, France, Germany, Russia, UK, and
the United States (P5+1) reached agreement on the elements of a third
UNSC sanctions resolution on 22 January 2008 in Berlin. France and the
UK shared the draft resolution with the full Council on 5 February
2008. The Council has been engaged in negotiations on the resolution in
New York for the past several weeks. We expect the Council will adopt
the resolution soon.
Pursuant to the standing P5+1 strategy of incremental escalation of
sanctions on Iran until it meets its Security Council obligations, the
draft resolution increases the severity of existing sanctions and
expands upon the previous two UNSC sanctions resolutions (UNSC
Resolutions 1737 and 1747). Key provisions include a travel ban, a ban
on transfers to Iran of all dual use items controlled by the Nuclear
Suppliers Group, and calls for inspecting cargo, limiting export
credits and monitoring activities of financial institutions. The
resolution is the product of intense negotiations between the members
of the P5+1 and is a clear signal to the Iranian regime that the P5+1
are united in ensuring that Iran complies with its UNSC obligations.
On next steps, the draft resolution includes a request for a report
from the IAEA Director General within 90 days on whether Iran has
complied with its obligations. The Council will review the report and
if it shows that Iran has not complied, the Council expresses its
intention to adopt further measures under Chapter VII to persuade Iran
to comply. UNSC sanctions are part of our dual track strategy to
clarify to Iran's leaders the consequences of its continued
noncompliance, while also keeping open the door to direct negotiations.
It is our understanding that the European Union is waiting for the
Council to adopt the third sanctions resolution before adopting
additional sanctions on Iran outside the UNSC framework. We will urge
the EU both to implement the provision in the new resolution as quickly
as possible and to move forward with complementary, autonomous
sanctions.
Update to take into account recent developments:
On 22 February 2008, the IAEA Director General reported that Iran
is continuing to fail to comply with its UN Security Council
obligations and calls by the IAEA Board of Governors to suspend all
proliferation sensitive nuclear activities, including enrichment-
related activities, and has not undertaken full and complete
transparency with the IAEA. This is particularly the case with respect
to full disclosure by Iran of past nuclear weaponization-related
activities described in an extensive body of Iranian-origin
documentation made available to the IAEA. The IAEA has concluded that
full disclosure by Iran is ``critical to an assessment of a possible
military dimension to Iran's nuclear program.'' After allowing for time
to review and consider the IAEA Director General's report, the Council
adopted UNSC sanctions resolution 1803 on 3 March 2008 by a vote of 14-
0 with one abstention (Indonesia).
While we regret the necessity, we are very pleased that the Council
acted for a third time to impose legally-binding Chapter VII sanctions
on Iran for its failure to comply with the Council's demands. The
Council's actions, and the high level of support for this third
sanctions resolution, reflect the international community's profound
concerns over Iran's nuclear program. While the international community
waits for Iran to make the strategic decision to comply with its
international nonproliferation obligations, we will focus our efforts
and attention on the robust implementation of the provisions of 1737,
1747, and 1803.
As stated in the P5+1 Ministers Statement of March 3, the P5+1,
including Russia and China, remains committed to an early negotiated
solution to the Iranian nuclear issue and a dual-track approach. We
have asked Dr. Javier Solana, the European Union's High Representative
for Common Foreign and Security Policy, to meet with Dr. Saeed Jalili,
Secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, to create the
conditions for negotiations. We have also reiterated our commitment to
the proposals included in the generous June 2006 P5+1 incentives
package, which remains on the table. The Secretary's historic offer to
sit down with her Iranian counterpart, at any time and any place to
discuss any issue, once Iran has fully and verifiably suspended its
uranium enrichment-related and reprocessing activities--also remains on
the table.
It is our understanding that the European Commission has completed
draft language to implement UNSCR 1803, which will now have to make its
way through the formal EU approval process prior to final adoption at a
Ministerial level meeting. We hope that EU ministerial level adoption
of UNSCR 1803 will take place in April. We will continue to urge the EU
both to implement UNSCR 1803 as quickly as possible and to move forward
with complementary, autonomous sanctions.
Question 21. How detailed of a peace treaty do you expect the
Israelis and Palestinians to achieve this year? Is the aim a general
framework agreement or a more detailed treaty? How quickly could such a
peace treaty be implemented?
Answer. Prime Minister Olmert and President Abbas agreed at the
Annapolis Conference that they would make every effort to conclude a
peace agreement before the end of 2008. The nature and level of detail
of that agreement depends on the parties' own intentions as well as
their ability to bridge the gaps that remain on the core issues. Their
negotiations are proceeding, and the fact that both parties have kept
the details of these talks secret should be seen as a sign of their
seriousness.
At Annapolis the leaders also agreed that implementation of a peace
agreement would be subject to implementation of the Roadmap. We are
encouraging more rapid progress by both parties in fulfilling their
commitments under the Roadmap, and we have named LTG William Fraser III
to monitor and promote progress in this area. Exactly how long it will
take to implement any agreement reached is unclear and will depend on
the efforts and commitment of both Israel and the Palestinians, as well
as the continuing and expanded support of the international community
in the areas of capacity building, reform, and economic growth. A vital
element to implementing a peace agreement will be the commitment and
performance of the PA fighting terrorism. We are already working with
the PA to train, reform, and professionalize its security forces and we
plan to continue and expand that effort, including with other donors.
Question 22. In the spring 2007 war supplemental the administration
requested, and Congress provided, $220 million in Foreign Military
Financing for training and equipment for the Lebanese Armed Forces. But
by the end of September, less than one percent of those funds had
actually been spent. Committee staff has been told that part of the
reason for the delay is that it took a long time to actually develop a
request that the United States could work with. How much of the $220
million in supplemental funds to train and equip the Lebanese Armed
Forces have been spent? What steps has the United States Government
taken to improve the ability of the Government of Lebanon to request
training and equipment from those funds, to ensure that they can take
advantage of our assistance in a timely and effective manner? What
additional steps might be needed?
Answer. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) has programmed the entire
$220 million in Foreign Military Financing to purchase ammunition,
equipment, and training. Cases totaling $95 million are under
development, and $11 million has been committed thus far. This pace
reflects: (1) the LAF began only in late 2006 to re-learn USG security
assistance procedures following over a decade of Syrian occupation; (2)
Embassy Beirut's Office of Defense Cooperation needed to boost staff
levels to handle the enormous growth in our security assistance
relationship; and (3) nearly all LAF procurements (save for emergency
ammunition supplies) were interrupted by the conflict in the Nahr al-
Barid refugee camp in the summer of 2007. All of these challenges have
now been overcome.
Ongoing USG security assistance engagement will continue to help
the LAF specify and articulate defense requirements, facilitating the
processing of Foreign Military Sales cases and speeding the expenditure
of funds. In early 2008, a contractor-led survey team provided an
assessment of LAF needs, and, in the wake of Under Secretary of Defense
Eric Edelman's February visit to Beirut, U.S. officials will meet
Lebanese counterparts in the first mid-level security assistance review
since 1996.
As Lebanon's political situation permits, we will continue our
bilateral political-military discussions with the LAF. Our goal will
remain to better gauge its needs in coming months and help the
Government of Lebanon develop a national strategy to develop and
professionalize its security forces to face the challenge of foreign
interference in its internal affairs and lingering threats from
militant groups operating within the country's borders.
Question 23. The budget for the Department requests a total of
1,543 new positions, including 448 of which would be funded by fees.
Assuming that all requested funds are provided, how quickly do you
expect to be able to hire for these additional positions?
Answer. If approved and funded by Congress, the Department will
immediately begin the process of recruiting and hiring qualified
personnel to fill the 1,543 positions requested in the FY 09 budget.
This type of surge is not unprecedented. In 2002, the Department
brought on more than 900 new employees, including 360 Foreign and Civil
Service Officers as part of the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative, 51 IT
security professionals, 12 positions devoted to Counterterrorism, 98
fee-funded Border Security positions, and 389 security personnel funded
by the Worldwide Security Upgrades account. And just last year, more
than 500 permanent Civil Service personnel were hired to handle the
surge in passport demand. The Department rose to the task in 2002 and
2007, and we will do so again if Congress approves the much needed
positions in our FY 09 budget.
The 1,543 new positions in the FY 09 budget request are split
between Foreign Service positions and Civil Service positions. For the
new Foreign Service positions, the Department will rely on the faster,
redesigned Foreign Service intake process that was introduced in
September 2007. The new online Foreign Service Officer Test will be
offered three times a year, rather than just once or twice, and the
time between the test and the oral assessment will be significantly
reduced. Utilizing this new system, the Department can hire the
approximately 820 Foreign Service positions out of the 1543 in the FY
09 request.
The approximately 720 Civil Service positions requested in the FY
09 budget will be advertised on the www.USAjobs.gov website and hired
by the relevant bureaus or offices, including passport agencies across
the country. Recent efforts to consolidate the Department's HR services
into more efficient shared service centers should speed up the process
of advertising, vetting, and hiring these new Civil Service personnel.
We are confident in our ability to attract and bring on board qualified
new employees.
Question 24. What has been the level of attrition for the past two
fiscal years (FY 2006 and FY 2007) in the Foreign Service, by grade?
Answer. Foreign Service attrition levels for fiscal years 2006 and
2007 were as follows:
Foreign Service Attrition Levels for Fiscal Years 2006 and 2007
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2006 FY 2007
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CM.................................................. 5 3
MC.................................................. 51 57
OC.................................................. 45 31
FS-1................................................ 87 103
FS-2................................................ 97 93
FS-3................................................ 58 69
FS-4................................................ 119 95
FS-5................................................ 28 18
FS-6................................................ 22 27
FS-7 and below...................................... 1 2
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total............................................. 513 498
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The numbers above represent an attrition rate of 4.4 percent (2006)
and 4.6 percent (2007) for Foreign Service Generalists. The attrition
rates for Foreign Service Specialists were 5.3 percent (2006) and 5.0
percent (2007).Q02
Question 25. What has been the level of attrition for the past two
fiscal years (FY 2006 and FY 2007) in the Civil Service?
Answer. Civil Service career full-time permanent attrition was 624
in 2006 (8%) and 637 in 2007 (8%). The Department's Civil Service
attrition rate is lower than the government-wide average, but is
projected to increase over the coming years as more Civil Service
employees reach retirement age.
Question 26. Of the 20 new positions requested for public
diplomacy, how many positions will be overseas and how many positions
will be in domestic offices?
Answer. At the time we prepared the FY 2009 budget submission, we
planned on using 16 of the 20 new public diplomacy positions overseas
and four in Washington. Although there might be a slight change in that
plan during FY 2009, depending on the situation at that time, we do not
anticipate a major change.
Question 27. The CBJ indicates a more than 100 percent increase in
``Presidential-Vice Presidential Travel Support between FY 2007
($960,000) to FY 2008 ($2 million) (page 386 of FY 2009 CBJ). What are
the reasons for such a large increase?
Answer. The Department provides funding for Presidential and Vice
Presidential travel support from a number of sources, including funds
provided to the Bureau of Administration. The amount allocated for
Presidential-Vice Presidential Travel Support is funded from D&CP
public diplomacy funds and contributes to travel expenses for personnel
who deliver the US Government message abroad in connection with travel
of the President and Vice President. D&CP funds allocated for White
House Travel, also within the Bureau of Administration, are used to
support other White House travel activities.
The FY 2008 estimates for these two activities are currently being
revised to reflect the increase in travel planned for the President and
Vice President in FY 2008 compared to FY 2007.
Question 28. What is the backlog of FOIA cases as of October 1,
2007? What is the average length of time a request has been pending?
Answer. The Department's backlog on October 1, 2007 was 3,430
cases. During Fiscal Year 2007, the median number of days a valid,
active case had been pending was 226 days. In that same time span, the
Department processed fast track cases in a median of 67 days, routine
and complex requests in a median of 212 days, and expedited cases in a
median of 41 days.
Question 29. The budget requests $17.6 million to consolidate DS
training at a single facility. How will a site for this facility be
chosen? What are the requirements? What is the expected timeline for
decision? Please provide a more detailed breakdown of the costs
associated with this request.
Answer. The requirement for a dedicated Diplomatic Security (DS)
consolidated training center in the D.C. area has existed for more than
10 years. DS currently trains personnel in more than 15 locations
throughout Northern Virginia, Maryland, and West Virginia. DS resources
are already stretched to the limits, and the mission is growing.
DS provides training in law enforcement, personal security, attack
recognition, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), Anti-Terrorism
Assistance, and other specialized training for Department of State
employees and dependents, other U.S. government agency personnel, and
our foreign partners. Specialized training, especially the ``hard
skills'' training, such as weapons, counter-threat driving, defensive
tactics, and high-threat protection, requires suitable driving tracks,
firearms ranges and adequate facilities. The current Diplomatic
Security Training Center (DSTC) does not accommodate the volume of
students or provide the infrastructure necessary to meet these
specialized requirements. Consequently, DS must currently utilize
multiple sites encompassing three states.
Among the courses that DS administers is the Foreign Affairs
Counter Threat (FACT) Course. This training is essential for all
Foreign Service Officers and other U.S. government personnel preparing
for deployment to critical and high threat posts around the world,
including Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Conducting this training
outside of driving range of the D.C. area is impractical due to the
expensive travel and housing costs associated with the heavy volume of
USG employees that require FACT training prior to deployment overseas.
A consolidated facility would be capable of incorporating all of the
necessary hard and soft skills training, physical fitness, classroom
instruction, administrative functions and housing in to one location.
DS plans to identify acceptable property no later than the end of
FY 2009. It is estimated that funding in the amount of $17.6 million
will be required to fund an architectural and engineering study and to
make the initial land procurement. In furtherance of these efforts, the
Bureau of Diplomatic Security, in conjunction with the State
Department's Office of Real Property Management and GSA, intends to
conduct a requirements analysis and search for property that would
accommodate all DS tactical and technical training needs. The base
requirement is for rural property, within a 100-mile radius of
Washington, where firearms, explosives, and high-speed driving training
can occur without the threat of encroachment.
In the interim, and to meet current requirements while the search
for a consolidated facility continues, DS has established a temporary
training facility at Summit Point, West Virginia.
Question 30. Why is funding for Blair House renovation divided
between Protocol and the Bureau of Administration?
Answer. The Blair House serves multiple functions and relies on
resources from several accounts that have the authority to provide
funds for those activities. These include:
Diplomatic and Consular Programs (D&CP) Bureau of Administration
(A): Lease payments, operations and maintenance, utilities and
minor facility renovations and repairs.
D&CP Office of the Chief of Protocol (CPR): Household expenses,
operations and maintenance related to official visitors.
Emergencies in the Diplomatic & Consular Service (K Fund):
Representational expenses
General Services Administration (GSA): Capital improvements--
structural repairs and stabilization
Blair House Restoration Fund: Decor
Question 31. What has been the amount expended to date for the
SMART initiative (State Messaging and Archive Retrieval Toolset)? The
CBJ indicates that in FY 2008, deployment to 12 pilot posts and
selected domestic bureaus will be initiated. How many domestic bureaus?
Has deployment begun and is it on schedule?
Answer. The planned budget to date is $51.2 million. SMART is
currently within budget, with actual spending of $49.6 million.
Funds Expended to Date for the State Messaging and Archive Retrieval Toolset (SMART)
(in U.S. dollars)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Planned Actual Remaining
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 07..................................................... $38,234,520 $38,234,520 $0
FY 08..................................................... $53,692,883 $11,368,281 $42,324,602
FY 09..................................................... $36,329,000 $0 $36,329,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SMART will be piloted in three domestic bureaus: one functional
bureau, one regional bureau, and the IRM bureau itself.
Deployment of Instant Messaging was completed April 2007, on
schedule. Deployment of SharePoint (MOSS 2007), a centrally-hosted
collaboration tool, is underway. Pilot I for SMART Messaging
(integrating cables, e-mails, and memos)--conducted in Belgrade,
Stockholm, and Muscat--was successfully completed January 2008, on
schedule.
Pilots II and III, beginning, respectively, in September and
December 2008, will constitute the first wave of deployment, as SMART
will permanently replace legacy messaging systems at the 12 pilot posts
and 3 domestic bureaus. The initiation of worldwide deployment of SMART
Messaging will be delayed by six months to satisfy all requirements and
ensure system integrity. However, if the pace of the roll out is
accelerated, deployment could be completed by September 2009, on
schedule.
Question 32. The CBJ indicates that the ``network of passport
facilities will be expanded to accommodate'' new hires. Yet the request
of $40.4 million is $23.7 million below the FY 2008 estimate. Why is
there such a sizable reduction in the request?
Answer. We made reductions to our facilities budget estimates for
FY 2008 because of the following:
Actual costs for renovations to existing spaces, and build-outs for
new ones, were 52 percent less than previous estimates;
Acquisition of leases on new office space for field offices was
deferred to FY 2009; and
Telecommunications costs attributable to the acquisition of new
office space were also deferred to FY 2009.Senator Joseph
Biden, Jr. (#33)
Question. Two years ago, on January 18, 2006, in your speech on
Transformational Diplomacy, you described a repositioning of officers,
stating that ``over the next few years the United States will begin to
shift several hundred of our diplomatic positions to new critical posts
for the 21st century. We will begin this year with a down payment of
moving 100 positions from Europe and, yes, from here in Washington,
D.C., to countries like China and India and Nigeria and Lebanon, where
additional staffing will make an essential difference.'' Since that
speech, through FY 2007, how many positions have been shifted, by
region?
Answer. I initiated the Global Repositioning (GRP) process in
autumn 2005 as part of my Transformational Diplomacy initiative. Over
three rounds of GRP, we have approved the realignment or creation of
201 Foreign Service positions overseas, among six regional areas, by
reallocating positions and implementing other management reforms. The
Foreign Service Officers who fill these positions conduct
transformational diplomacy through public outreach, increased
cooperation with military combatant commands, and by establishing a
U.S. presence in population centers outside of capitol cities. The
regions of East Asia & Pacific (EAP), South Central Asia (SCA), and
Near East & Northern Africa (NEA) have been allotted the most new
positions, with our missions in India and China receiving the largest
staffing increases. We have effectively repositioned one-tenth of all
of our political, economic and public diplomacy officers overseas
through the GRP process.
The chart below reflects the distribution of all 201 positions as
well as the number of overseas positions in each region which were used
to offset the creation of the GRP positions.
Distribution of Positions Used to Offset Creation of GRP Positions
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Region Created Reprogrammed Net Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AF........................................................ 24 6 18
EAP....................................................... 50 19 31
EUR....................................................... 21 59 -38
IO........................................................ 0 2 -2
NEA....................................................... 32 3 29
SCA....................................................... 47 5 42
WHA....................................................... 27 16 11
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subtotal................................................ 201 110 91
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 34. In comparing FY 2006 data to the request in FY 2009
(in the D & CP budget only), the transformation in the geographic
bureaus has been relatively modest in all of them except EUR (lost 120
positions) and SCA (gained 133 positions). The shift in other bureaus
has been minor or nonexistent (e.g., WHA lost one position in this
period, while EAP gained one position). Do you believe the
transformation is accomplishing its purpose, and if so, why?
Answer. Global Repositioning (GRP) has been very successful in
supporting the Secretary's transformational agenda through the
wholesale reprogramming of resources to missions overseas facing high
priority policy challenges. Over two years, three phases of GRP have
resulted in the effective redistribution of 10 percent of the
Department's collective overseas base of Political, Economic, and
Public Diplomacy positions. Our missions in China and India were
greatly strengthened to manage the pressing transformational problems
which we faced in those countries. Beyond that, a significant number of
mid and smaller sized missions in virtually all areas of the world,
including Indonesia, UAE, Nigeria, and Venezuela, among others,
received increases in Foreign Service staffing to address specific
transformational challenges that have arisen in the last several years.
This was largely accomplished by the reprogramming of resources
principally from Washington, DC, as well as from our embassies in
Europe.
The FY 2009 budget reflects the implementation of the first two
phases of Global Diplomatic Repositioning, as decisions on the third
phase were made after the FY 2009 budget went to press. Within the
bureau totals there are also shifts between domestic and overseas
positions. In addition, the comparison between FY 2009 and FY 2006
reflects the transfer of five posts (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) from EUR to SCA as part of a
regional bureau reorganization.
Question 35. In a press release issued on January 28, 2008, the
President objected to Section 1222 of the FY 2008 National Defense
Authorization Act (P.L. 110-181), which prohibits the obligation or
expenditure of funds to establish ``any military installation or base
for the purpose of providing for the permanent stationing of United
States Armed Forces in Iraq'' or to ``exercise United States control of
the oil resources of Iraq.''
This is the first time the President has raised a constitutional
objection to the provision, despite the fact that the same provision is
found in two prior laws: Section 9012 of the FY 2007 Defense
Appropriations Act (P.L. 108-289) and Section 1519 of the FY 2007
Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 109-364).
The basis of the President's objection to Section 1222 is unclear
from the statement, which refers to four different provisions in the
law to which the President says he has constitutional objections
(sections 841, 846, 1079, and 1222). In a Statement of Administration
Policy issued in relation to an earlier Senate version of the FY 2008
Defense Authorization Act (S.1547) that included this same provision, a
constitutional concern was raised with respect to the provision, but
only with regard to the second paragraph, which prohibits the
obligation or expenditure of funds to ``exercise United States control
of the oil resources of Iraq.'' No objection was raised with respect to
the first paragraph, which prohibits the obligation or expenditure of
funds to establish ``any military installation or base for the purpose
of providing for the permanent stationing of United States Armed Forces
in Iraq.''
Please clarify whether the objection raised with respect to Section
1222 of the 2008 Defense Authorization Act by the President in his
statement of January 28, 2008, is related only to Section 1222(2), or
if the objection is relevant to Section 1222(1). In addition, please
explain in detail the Executive Branch's constitutional concern with
respect to either or both paragraphs of Section 1222, as appropriate.
Answer. The United States is not seeking to establish or maintain
permanent bases in Iraq. With respect to your specific question, the
objection in question was addressed to Section 1222(2). As Attorney
General Mukasey explained in a November 13, 2007 letter to Chairman
Levin concerning the House and Senate versions of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, section 1222(2) of the Act
raises a constitutional concern to the extent that it purports to
prohibit U.S. control over oil resources in Iraq in connection with
U.S. combat operations. More specifically, the provision ``may
impermissibly interfere with the President's constitutional authority
as Commander in Chief to conduct and direct military operations in
Iraq, because in combat operations, taking temporary control over a
particular oil resource might be a tactical necessity.''
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Lugar
Question 1. I note that the Department's vacancy rate for its
positions exceeds 18% for our missions overseas and exceeds 11% for
positions in Washington. How far will your request, assuming it is
filled in total this year, go towards correcting such a situation? How
many of these positions will be security personnel for Baghdad to
address the recent difficulties with contract security firms? If none,
where will those positions, and how many, be funded from?
Answer. NOTE: In the question above, the Department's domestic and
overseas vacancy rates have been reversed. As of January 2008, the
Department's overseas vacancy rate is around 11 percent and domestic
vacancy rate is around 18 percent for a total of 13 percent overall.
If approved and fully funded by Congress, the Department's FY 2009
request for 1543 new positions (1095 from State Operations
Appropriations and 448 fee funded positions under the Border Security
Program) would significantly reduce the Department's overall vacancy
rate. With the 300 new positions requested for language training, for
example, the Department's overseas vacancy rate could be cut in half to
approximately 6 percent. The overseas vacancies are the most important
positions for the Department to fill at this time.
The 300 language training positions would allow us to backfill
overseas and domestic positions that are currently left vacant while
Foreign Service officers take needed foreign language training. A March
2007 study of the Department's training and personnel needs conducted
by the State Department's Office of Resource Management and Analysis
(HR/RMA) showed that around 240 new positions were required at that
time to cover the number of personnel allocated to foreign language
training slots without creating vacancies elsewhere. Since the 2007
study, the number of language designated positions has increased even
further, including positions requiring ``superhard'' languages, such as
Arabic and Chinese, which generally require two years of training to
reach a level of general professional proficiency.
Many of the other new position requests in the FY 2009 budget would
support important Department initiatives, such as the Civilian
Stabilization Initiative, but would not reduce the current vacancy
rate. These requests include 351 positions for the Civilian
Stabilization Initiative, 20 new Public Diplomacy positions, 75
positions to increase the number of State personnel who can attend
military training institutions, 75 positions to support increased
interagency exchanges and details, 200 positions for Worldwide Security
Protection, 50 new positions to serve as Political Advisors to military
commands, 19 positions for Educational and Cultural Affairs program
increases, and five positions for Embassy Security, Construction and
Maintenance. The 448 fee-funded positions under the Border Security
Program will meet increasing requirements for visa and passport
adjudicators and fraud investigations.
The Department authorized a permanent increase in Baghdad staffing
consistent with the staffing recommendations of the Secretary of
State's Panel on Personal Protective Services in Iraq. This increased
staffing includes 88 Special Agents and 13 contract positions overseas
to implement both the Panel's recommendations and the December 2007 MOA
with the Department of Defense. The additional personnel will provide
staffing for contract oversight, a joint DoS/DoD investigative response
unit, and other administrative positions.
Unbudgeted Costs of the Falling Dollar
Question 2. The falling value of the dollar continues to put
enormous pressure on the Department's budget, much of which must be
paid in foreign currencies including the Pound, Euro and Yen. This
resulted in costs of some $38 million in FY 08, money that was paid out
of its overall budget.
Was any funding budgeted in FY 2009 to cover such likely costs
given the continued devaluation of the dollar?
What figure is the Department using for FY 2009 for anticipated
exchange rate losses?
Answer. Our FY 2009 budget request incorporates exchange rate
assumptions as of December 2007. It does not factor in exchange rate
losses that will be incurred if the dollar continues to weaken over the
coming year. Aside from the uncertainty of predicting exchange rates
12-18 months in advance, releasing such a prediction could be
misinterpreted by some observers as an official U.S. government
forecast or policy.
We are aware that some independent economic forecasters predict
that the dollar's six-year slide is likely to continue. For example,
according to the Global Insight forecasting firm, the dollar may
decline another 8% vs. the euro over the next 12 months.
Exchange rate losses cost the Department nearly $83 million in FY
07 purchasing power and perhaps may cost twice that amount in FY 08.
Such losses would overwhelm our limited tools to absorb exchange rate
fluctuations. Prior to FY 2004, exchange rate losses were offset by the
Buying Power Maintenance Account (BPMA), at the account had over $16
million at the beginning of FY 2003. During FY 2003 and FY 2004,
exchange rate fluctuations resulted in the total depletion of the
account. In the absence of appropriated funding to replenish the BPMA,
the Department is seeking legislation that would allow the Department
to utilize expired funds to more quickly replenish this fund. Greater
flexibility to sweep unobligated expired balances from D&CP and related
accounts could significantly enhance our ability to replenish the BPMA
up to its $100 million ceiling.
PEPFAR
Question 3. (a) This Congress worked hard to increase funding core
health programs, especially in the areas of maternal and child health
in FY 08. I was dismayed to see that the FY 09 budget request for the
Child Survival and Health Fund faced a decrease of 14 percent from the
FY 08 enacted level and a decrease of 9 percent from the FY 07 enacted
level.
(b) Can you explain where the cuts occurred and why?
Answer. (a) The President's Child Survival and Health (CSH) budget
request for FY 2009 is $1.58 billion, a slight increase from the FY
2008 request of $1.56 billion. It represents a 14 percent reduction
from the FY 2008 estimated level of $1.83 billion.
Within a constrained budget, the CSH level still represents about
30 percent of all program funds appropriated to USAID--making it
USAID's largest single sectoral program. The USG clearly remains the
largest donor for health assistance and retains its leadership status
in this sector.
(b) The requested levels for FY 2009 were equal to or higher than
the requested levels in FY 2008 for all CSH elements except Avian
Influenza and Malaria. A lower request for Avian Influenza (AI) funding
in FY 2009 was enabled by building stockpiles of commodities to combat
AI. Funds requested for Malaria in FY 2009 are above the FY 2008
estimate (by $28 million) to restore funding to the level requested in
FY 2008 and ensure meeting the goals of the Presidential Malaria
Initiative.
Severe funding constraints led to difficult choices on how to
address health assistance. The FY 2009 request is less than the FY 2008
estimate for Family Planning and Reproductive Health (by $90 million),
Maternal and Child Health (by $77 million), Avian Influenza (by $65
million), Tuberculosis (by $57 million), HIV/AIDS (by $5 million), and
Vulnerable Children (by $5 million).
Question 4. The FY 09 budget request for the Global HIV/AIDS
Initiative account includes a line item request for ``partnership
compacts.''
Can you elaborate further on what this assistance will be used for?
Are you planning on moving towards the compact approach for FY 09?
Answer. We plan to move forward on Partnership Compacts in FY 09.
Reflecting the paradigm shift from a `donor-recipient' relationship to
one of partnership embodied by PEPFAR, the U.S. Government will work
with host governments to develop Partnership Compacts based on mutual
trust and respect with obligations and responsibilities for all
partners. Compacts will be pursued with countries with significant HIV/
AIDS burdens in which the U.S. Government has a well established on-
the-ground presence and where U.S. Government resources would play a
substantial role and have a comparative advantage in the fight against
HIV/AIDS.
A country's progress on financial or policy parameters will not be
a pre-condition for developing a Compact, and continued efforts in
countries currently receiving resources will not be conditioned on
Compacts. Rather, Compacts will serve as a framework for moving forward
together to save as many lives as possible with the resources that are
available. Compacts will be structured to promote deeper integration of
HIV/AIDS services into health systems, seeking to promote
sustainability by ensuring that HIV/AIDS programs build capacity and
benefit health systems overall.
Additional PEPFAR resources under Compacts will not necessarily be
provided through governments, but will be provided in support of multi-
sectoral national HIV/AIDS plans. Compacts must be tailored to local
circumstances, so their development will be led by U.S. Government
personnel in-country, who have relationships with key government
counterparts. Compacts are anticipated in both PEPFAR's current focus
countries and in additional countries, and will link new U.S.
Government resources to host country commitments in two key areas:
1. Financial commitment
Resources differ dramatically from country to country, based on
each nation's level of development. Almost every nation severely
affected by HIV/AIDS can do more. For example, in the 2005 Abuja
Declaration, African governments committed themselves to devote at
least 15% of their budgets to health; only a few have reached this
level. Several current focus countries have significant resource
allocations to HIV/AIDS, yet nearly all can do more. In some countries,
``more'' can be measured in hundreds of thousands of dollars, in others
millions, tens of millions or more. It is important that resources for
HIV/AIDS do not offset other health or development areas, and this will
be reflected in the Compacts.
2. Policy commitment
Policy changes can create an environment conducive to an effective
health and HIV/AIDS response, ensuring that available resources are
optimally used to save as many lives as possible. While agreements
would vary from one country to another, key issues addressed might
include:
Workforce: Regulations and policies that allow effective task-
shifting for health care workers.
Gender: Regulations and policies to limit gender-based violence and
discrimination, prevent transgenerational sex, and protect
women's inheritance rights.
Orphans: Regulations and policies to protect the inheritance rights
of children.
HIV-specific: Regulations and policies that promote opt-out
counseling and testing, pediatric diagnosis, rapid, tariff-free
regulatory procedures for drugs and commodities, and full
inclusion of people living with HIV/AIDS in a multi-sectoral
national response.
Question 5. The FY 09 Budget requests $30 billion for PEPFAR over
the next five years. There are many legislators and interested parties
advocating for the US commitment to increase to $50-60 Billion over the
five years.
What affect would that large of an increase have on existing
development assistance allocations?
Answer. On May 30, 2007, President Bush announced his intention to
work with U.S. Congress to reauthorize the Emergency Plan. He proposed
a five-year, $30 billion extension that would double the United States'
initial $15 billion commitment. Under the proposal, PEPFAR would
support treatment for 2.5 million people, prevention of 12 million new
infections, and care for 12 million people infected and affected by
HIV/AIDS, including 5 million orphans and vulnerable children.
As you note, some members of Congress have advocated that the
reauthorizing legislation for PEPFAR commit $50-60 billion in funding
in the next phase. We are sympathetic to the generous intentions behind
such commitments, but are cautious that the proposals must encompass a
comprehensive view of U.S. development assistance that would not
require either an unrealistic increase in foreign assistance funding or
significant cuts to other valuable programs. We look forward to working
with the appropriators to further analyze the authorization and verify
program need.
Energy
Question 6. On December 19, 2007, President Bush signed into law
the Energy Independence and Security Act. This law contained several
international energy provisions affecting U.S. foreign policy, State
Department organization, and requires reporting on U.S. international
energy diplomatic activities.
What is the State Department's plan for implementing the
International Energy Coordinator position? How much funding is required
for the office? How much staff support is to be allocated to the
Coordinator?
Answer. We expect to announce the International Energy Coordinator
in the very near future. The position will be staffed and funded via
restructuring/reallocation of existing resources. This is a high
priority for the Department of State and will result in increased
attention to energy issues.
Note: On March 11, 2008, Under Secretary for Economic, Energy and
Agricultural Affairs, Ruben Jeffery III, was designated by Secretary
Rice Coordinator for International Energy Affairs.
Question 7. Secretary Rice testified to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee on February 13, 2008, that a special envoy for
energy security for the Caspian region and East-West Corridor
initiative would be appointed. What is the timeline for such a person
to be appointed? To whom will the envoy report?
Answer. We intend to appoint, and we are looking for, a special
energy coordinator, who could especially spend time on the Central
Asian and Caspian region. This effort is ongoing. We anticipate that
the envoy most likely will report to the Secretary through the
Coordinator for International Energy. We also have a strong team of
senior and mid-level officers who give special emphasis to energy
issues in Central Asia and the Caspian region, as well as to broader
European energy security issues.
Question 8. What progress has been made on formulating policies to
advance energy cooperation with the Government of Chile? Are there
specific sectoral areas of interest? (Biofuels, hydraulic, cellulosic,
gas, nuclear, solar, etc).
Answer. We have created a four-tiered action plan to deepen our
bilateral engagement with Chile on energy. The four main categories of
our cooperation are:
1. Renewable Energy: Biofuels, Geothermal, Wind, and Solar
2. Nuclear Power for Electricity Generation
3. Energy Policy
4. Energy Efficiency
Last year, working with the Department of Energy's and business and
science organizations, the U.S. Trade and Development Agency sponsored
a visit of Chileans to study geothermal energy in the United States.
From September 30 to October 6, 2007, a dozen Chilean government,
private sector, and academic experts met with U.S. industry and
government experts to explore the potential for cooperation on
geothermal energy development.
From April 7-11, a team of eight Chilean government officials who
play important roles in determining Chile's national policies on energy
issues, including those related to nuclear power and national security,
will visit U.S. nuclear facilities and regulators as part of the
Voluntary Visitors program organized by the Department of State. The
costs of this program will be shared by the USG and the Government of
Chile and the delegation will be led by the Chilean Minister of Energy
Marcelo Tokman. The group will have meetings with senior officials at
the Department of State, Department of Energy, NRC, EPA, FEMA, the U.S.
Congress, and representatives of the private sector and of non-
governmental organizations active on nuclear energy issues. There are
also plans for the group to visit a nuclear reactor and to explore
emergency management issues at the local level.
In addition, U.S. Ambassador to Chile Paul Simons and Chilean
Ambassador to the U.S. Mariano Fernandez traveled to California on
February 14 and 15, 2008. They identified partnership opportunities
with the California Energy Commission, California Air Resources Board,
University of California at Davis, and private sector organizations.
The Economics, Energy and Business Bureau has also sent a science
fellow to Embassy Santiago who will further energy cooperation with
Chile.
Using U.S. funds at the Organization of American States, the OAS
will organize a Southern Cone renewable energy conference to be held
this spring in Santiago, which will bring policy and technology experts
to provide specific energy recommendations to accelerate the deployment
of renewable energy technologies.
The Department of State is also assisting with implementing and
funding an extensive new academic exchange program with Chile that will
enable Chilean students to pursue advanced graduate study in the United
States, and some of these grantees are expected to be enrolled in Ph.D.
programs concentrating on energy issues.
Question 9. What, if any, steps are being taken to increase
communication on international energy policy formulation and
coordination in implementing international energy diplomatic activities
with the Department of Energy and other executive agencies?
Answer. The Department of State continues to coordinate broadly
with the Department of Energy and other departments on energy policy.
State and DOE work closely together in bilateral dialogues with key
energy producers. These include the Energy Working Group with Saudi
Arabia, the Energy Consultative Mechanism with Canada, and the North
America Energy Working Group, part of the Security and Prosperity
Partnership with Mexico and Canada. The State Department works very
closely with DOE in our extensive energy engagement with China and
India.
We exchange information and coordinate with DOE on Caspian energy
developments. Leaders from both Departments have traveled together to
key Caspian countries to promote our energy security goals of
diversification of sources of supply and transportation routes for oil
and gas. Furthermore, a regular interagency mechanism has been launched
involving NSC and State leadership to coordinate interagency work on
Eurasian energy topics.
We coordinate closely with DOE in multilateral fora, including the
Five Party Energy Ministerial (China, India, Japan, South Korea, USA),
APEC, and the G8. Both the Department of State and DOE are on the Board
of the International Energy Agency (IEA) and jointly develop U.S.
Government positions in the IEA.
The Department of State has asked the Department of Energy to be
part of the Management Committee of the U.S.-Brazil Memorandum of
Understanding on Biofuels Cooperation. The Department of State and the
Department of Energy are also working closely together on the Global
Critical Energy Infrastructure Security strategy.
Question 10. (a) How much funding is required to implement the
Global Critical Energy Infrastructure Security Program?
(b) How much staff support is allocated to this project?
Answer. (a) Global Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection is a
key U.S. priority, and the Department has been working both bilaterally
and multilaterally on efforts to address it. With our G-8 partners, in
APEC, and in the OAS, the U.S. is leading initiatives to promote
greater recognition of the threat and propose programs to address it.
Similarly, with U.S. encouragement, NATO is considering an initiative
to monitor and assess energy developments that are linked to regional
instabilities or terrorist threats.
The U.S. is also working aggressively to address Critical Global
Energy Infrastructure protection on a bilateral basis. The Department
is working with experts from across the interagency to help key
partners improve security measures at key installations and improve
their own internal capabilities to protect these facilities. While the
U.S. is aiding these efforts by providing expertise, no State
Department funds have been requested specifically for this initiative.
Most of the countries with whom we are dealing have their own assets,
and we anticipate that they will be both able and willing to cover the
full costs of developing and implementing recommended security
improvements.
(b) At the moment, two individuals have been assigned to work full
time on this project in the Office of the Coordinator for
Counterterrorism. As has been the case previously in this initiative,
however, the Department has identified individuals in other agencies
and other bureaus of the Department with subject matter expertise and
utilized their skills in this project on an ``as needed'' basis.
Question 11. Funding for the Multilateral Donor's Fund for the
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative was authorized in
legislation signed by the President in December 2007. What is the State
Department's policy on contributing to the Fund?
Answer. We support EITI, participate actively on the EITI board and
assist with EITI implementation directly through our embassies. Our
financial support to date has been:
FY 06--$990,000 in total funds ($1 million before rescissions) to
support civil society participation in EITI implementation,
administered by USAID
Peru--$445,000 for catalyzing EITI planning and
stronger civil society participation in EITI
Nigeria--$445,000 to expand civil society oversight
of EITI
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)--$100,000 to
expand civil society and private sector engagement in
EITI
FY 07--$1 million to support civil society participation in EITI
implementation. USAID is currently determining the recipient
countries.
FY 08--The FY 08 funding estimate is $3 million. The Foreign
Operations Conference Report directs that no less than this
amount be provided to the EITI multi-donor trust fund at the
World Bank; however, the final determinations on the amount and
destination of the money are subject to 653(a) negotiations on
FY 08 allocations.
Clean Technology Fund
Question 12. What other mechanisms are available to the U.S. to
fund clean technology? For example, what is available through the
International Finance Corporation, the Global Environment Facility,
OPIC, Ex-Im Bank, USAID, Environmental Protection Agency, the Energy
Department, the Trade and Development Agency, etc.?
Answer. The Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) are all active in
financing clean technology projects in developing countries and are
expanding their support for low carbon investments. For example, the
World Bank Group provided $1.4 billion in financing for low carbon
energy projects in 2007. In addition, the Global Environment Facility
has played an important role in leveraging MDB funds to help developing
countries remove policy, institutional, and other barriers to the
uptake of cleaner energy technologies.
The Clean Technology Fund would focus on scaling up the deployment
of existing commercially available technologies in a smaller number of
developing countries with significant emissions that are committed to
mitigating greenhouse gas emissions. The CTF would help to finance the
cost difference between more expensive clean technologies and cheaper
dirty technologies. The CTF would leverage the existing capital of the
multilateral development banks to substantially increase the level of
their funding of clean technology-related activities. The CTF would
also leverage substantial private sector investment in clean
technologies through the private sector arms of the MDBs.
Bilateral agencies, such as OPIC and Ex-Im Bank are expanding their
support for clean technology, in particular renewable energy projects,
and could be co-financiers in CTF investments.
Question 13. In December 2007, President Bush signed into law
creation of a Clean Energy Foundation with similar purposes to the
Clean Technology Fund. What is the justification for two new programs
with essentially the same goals? How would their work be complementary?
Answer. The CTF would be a multilateral fund targeted at
transforming key sectors of major emitting developing countries to
lower carbon trajectories by deploying clean technologies on a large
scale and rewarding appropriate policy reform in recipient countries.
By pooling resources from countries such as the UK and Japan, and
drawing upon the existing MDB capital base, the MDBs' ongoing policy
dialogue with developing countries and the technical expertise of these
institutions, the CTF will develop the scale needed to positively
affect policy reform and public and private investment decisions.
The Clean Energy Foundation would promote the deployment of U.S.
clean technology overseas. We expect that both activities, if funded,
could provide synergies to achieve a common goal of lowering greenhouse
gas emissions.
Question 14. How will the Clean Technology Fund work? Who will
provide staff? Will they be seconded or will their salaries be paid out
of the Fund? Where will the Fund be housed? How much will be charged
for overhead? How will funding decisions be made? Will there be a
matching grant component so that recipient countries contribute some
portion of the grant as well?
Answer. The CTF would be a multilateral trust fund administered by
the World Bank, as Trustee, but controlled by a trust fund committee
composed of donors with the participation of recipient countries. The
fund would provide grants and concessional financing to support
national policies and efforts to create better market conditions for
the uptake of clean technologies, and to help finance the cost
difference between clean and dirty technologies in select developing
countries. The public and private sector windows of the World Bank and
regional development banks would submit requests for CTF funding to the
trust fund committee. The MDBs and their staff would work with public
and private investors to finance individual projects. By working
through the MDBs, including their private sector-lending windows, the
CTF would be able to leverage significant existing public and private
sector financing to scale up deployment of clean technologies in major
developing countries.
The CTF's trust fund committee would review and approve country
programs and projects generated through a cooperative process between
the MDBs and the recipient countries based on these countries' low
carbon economic development strategies. Once CTF funding is approved,
the MDB implementing the project would follow its normal project
approval, implementation and safeguard procedures, and provide periodic
reporting on the status of use of Fund resources back to the World Bank
for consolidation into reports for the trust fund committee.
The World Bank would charge the CTF for the actual costs of
administering the Fund, and there will not be a fixed administrative
fee. A small administrative unit would be created in the World Bank to
coordinate the functions of the CTF, organize meetings and prepare
needed reports. The costs of the unit as well as other administrative
functions provided by the World Bank (e.g. accounting/audit) would be
charged to the Fund. The CTF would not have its own staff for project
development because MDB staff would develop projects for CTF support as
part of their normal project development process. To receive funding,
we think that recipient countries should take a variety of actions to
demonstrate their national commitment to reducing greenhouse gas
emissions, and co-financing is one of those possible actions.
Question 15. How will the Clean Technology Fund work in conjunction
with the Asia-Pacific Partnership?
Answer. Many of the countries and sectors being supported through
the APP are also priorities for the CTF. Projects developed for the CTF
would benefit from sectoral and project development work of APP
subgroups and project financing and technical assistance relationships,
such as those with the Asian Development Bank.
Question 16. Is establishment of the Clean Technology Fund an act
in fulfillment of the United States' obligations under the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change?
Answer. There is no U.S. obligation under the UNFCCC to set up the
kind of fund, or level of funding, that we have proposed. Having said
that, the Clean Technology Fund is one of a number of mechanisms that
will serve to implement general obligations under the UNFCCC to promote
technology transfer. By assisting major developing countries in
implementing low carbon growth strategies, the CTF will contribute to
the achievement of the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC to stabilize
atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases.
Question 17. Why is the Administration proposing to start a new
Clean Technology Fund rather than clear U.S. arrears (unfulfilled
commitments) to the Global Environment Facility for $170.6 million and
to the International Development Association for $377.9 million?
Answer. Energy security and climate change are important priorities
for the Administration. Therefore, in September 2007, President Bush
proposed a major multilateral initiative to create a new international
clean technology fund to help developing countries harness the power of
clean energy technologies and address the growing problem of
accelerating greenhouse gas emissions in major developing countries.
The Administration is working with donors and developing countries to
create a fund, to be launched in 2008, that will catalyze resources of
the multilateral development banks and the private sector to create
innovative financing instruments to spur clean technology investments
in the major emitting developing countries.
The Administration has tried to keep its FY 2009 budget request to
a responsible, prudent level consistent with the President's overall
emphasis on budget discipline. Unfortunately, the Congress did not fund
our request for arrears last year--in fact, arrears increased overall--
and we hope this year's request is more in line with Congress's
expectations and funding intentions. That said, it is even more
imperative that Congress fully fund the FY 2009 request of $1.671
billion for the multilateral development banks so as not to further
increase our arrears and worsen our credibility in the institutions and
among fellow donors.
Question 18. What is the reasoning for the size of the Clean
Technology Fund request at $400 million?
Answer. The World Bank estimates that there is a $30 billion annual
gap between the cost of deploying clean technology versus dirtier
technology in the power sector alone in developing countries. This fund
would help leverage public and private capital to reduce the cost of
investing in cleaner technology or energy efficiency in power,
transport, and other sectors so that developing countries are able to
close that gap. The goal is for the CTF to have a meaningful impact in
incentivizing key high emissions developing countries to substantially
reduce their emissions trajectories.
The Administration is seeking authorization for a $2 billion
contribution to a multilateral effort that would total up to $10
billion. $400 million is the proposed first year amount of a three year
contribution.
Question 19. Does the Administration intend to send authorizing or
other legislation for Clean Technology Fund activities for
Congressional consideration? If so, when will that legislation be sent
to Congress?
Answer. Yes. The Administration intends to send to Congress
authorizing legislation for the Clean Technology Fund in March.
Question 20. What type of reporting will the Administration provide
on the activities of the Clean Technology Fund?
Answer. The World Bank, as trustee for the multilateral CTF, would
generate reports on the activities of the Fund, and the finances of the
Fund will be audited in conjunction with the World Bank annual
financial audit. These reports would follow World Bank standards and
procedures and be made publicly available.
Question 21. Will the Treasury Inspector General have investigation
authorities over the Clean Technology Fund? If not, what part of the
U.S. Government will have the authority to investigate any fraud and
misuse of the Clean Technology Fund?
Answer. The Treasury IG does not audit U.S. contributions to the
World Bank. The MDBs' internal and external personnel and auditors
would conduct oversight of funds contributed to the Clean Technology
Fund, and investigate any alleged fraud or misuse. The GAO could
conduct reviews relating to specific issues of concern as they do on
other MDB issues.
Question 22. If the Clean Technology Fund is housed at the World
Bank, would it be legal and appropriate to allow Fund proceeds to be
given to China given that the U.S. is legislatively mandated not to
support World Bank loans to China due to military audit and human
rights concerns?
Answer. The United States would participate in the CTF in a manner
consistent with U.S. law. Currently, under certain legislative
mandates, the United States does not vote in favor of loans or other
assistance to China in the MDBs unless the loans or assistance support
basic human needs.
Treasury plans to continue to consult closely with Members and
staff on how to address the existing legislative restrictions that
relate to U.S. support for clean technology projects in certain
countries. The United States has a strong interest in promoting the
adoption of clean technology and reducing green house gas emissions
from developing countries, including China, in an environmentally
effective and economically efficient manner, given the direct global
benefits of such an outcome and the fact that the poor are
disproportionately vulnerable to the negative effects of global climate
change and environmental degradation.
Question 23. How do we explain to constituents who might argue that
China has enough funds of its own, as demonstrated by their Sovereign
Wealth Fund, to fund clean technology investments in their own country.
What is your response to this assertion?
Answer. This fund is aimed at the broader issue of rapid growth in
greenhouse gas emissions by developing countries. Its purpose is to
create positive incentives to put in place legal and regulatory
frameworks to encourage the deployment of low carbon technologies and
to help reduce the risk to public and private investors of committing
to new clean technology projects.
By 2030, global demand for energy will increase by 55%, of which
74% will come from developing countries. Meeting developing country
energy needs will require an estimated $10 trillion of investment in
energy supply infrastructure over the next two decades. Using old,
dirty technologies to meet these needs would massively increase global
greenhouse gas emissions and offset reductions made in the United
States and other developed countries. It is in the U.S. interest to
encourage major developing countries to act now to begin reducing their
emissions growth.
No country would have a guarantee of funding from the CTF. The CTF
would have selection criteria where interested countries will have to
demonstrate a strong commitment to national action to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions. China would only be eligible for funding if it were to
meet the fund's eligibility requirements. In addition, the CTF would
have a limit on the share of CTF financing that any one country may
receive. Donors are currently considering a country limit of 15-20
percent.
Given China's capacity to finance its own development and the scale
of its needs, we expect that the Chinese Government and Chinese private
sector would bear the preponderant share of financing costs and
obligations needed for energy investments. Any CTF funding in China
would play a catalytic role and seek to leverage these and other funds.
Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs)
Question 24. Why did the administration only request $42 million to
clear the U.S. arrears to the international financial institutions when
the total of U.S. arrears to the institutions is $872.3 million as of
end-FY2008?
Answer. The Treasury Department tried to keep their request to a
responsible, prudent level consistent with the President's overall
emphasis on budget discipline. Unfortunately, the Congress did not fund
the request for arrears last year--in fact arrears increased overall--
and we hope this year's request is more in line with Congress'
expectations and funding intentions. That said, it is even more
imperative that Congress fully fund the FY 2009 request of $1.671
billion for the MDBs so as not to further increase our arrears and
worsen our credibility in the institutions and among fellow donors.
Question 25. How do continued U.S. arrears impact U.S. influence at
the multilateral development banks?
Answer. Rising arrears jeopardize U.S. credibility and underscore
the growing international perception that the United States does not
fulfill its international commitments. Our arrears to the International
Development Association (IDA), the World Bank's concessional window,
threaten our ability to meet U.S. debt relief commitments to the World
Bank. Arrears also undermine our ability to advance key reforms on
which the United States is the most forceful advocate--continued
progress on the anti-corruption agenda, improved results of assistance
programs, and increased transparency and accountability of World Bank
operations. Finally, our arrears demonstrate a lack of commitment to
the capital base of the institutions, which is leading to our shares
being auctioned off to other countries.
Civilian Stability Initiative
Question 26. Explain the interagency process that took place in
developing the Civilian Stabilization Initiative. Provide a breakdown
of the individual agencies and their equities in this coordinated
effort to respond to the demand for civilian skills in the field.
Answer. The Civilian Stabilization Initiative (CSI) is the
culmination of two years of work by more than 15 agencies, including
State, DOD and USAID, with extraordinary additional support from the
academic community and members of Congress, to determine the full
civilian capacity needs of the U.S. Government to respond to the
stabilization challenges that we face and will continue to face over
the next decade. Out of this interagency collaboration, the Interagency
Management System (IMS) for Reconstruction and Stabilization was
developed and approved by the Administration.
With agreement of the CSI and IMS in place, S/CRS joined with
USAID, multiple State Department offices, and the Departments of
Justice, Commerce, Agriculture, Treasury, HHS, and DHS, to form an
Interagency Task Force to finalize the design of the Active, Standby
and Civilian Reserve components. All eight agencies involved in the
taskforce will develop Active Response Corps members and field Standby
Response Corps members. Each of the agencies will also act as
``proponents'' for categories of Civilian Reserve Corps members
according to the agencies' specialization, for example: USAID is the
proponent for specific governance, public administration, and
infrastructure positions, while Treasury is the proponent for the
fiscal, monetary, and tax policy and banking systems positions.
Question 27. If such coordination was available in 2001, what
impact might it have had on U.S. forces deployment and effectiveness?
Do you have any estimates of the potential savings such civilian
preparation might afford the U.S. government?
Answer. The Civilian Stabilization Initiative is designed to
provide trained and equipped civilians with the right skill sets to
deploy quickly in a stabilization operation. The Interagency Management
System, the command and control structure for civilian operations, will
improve greatly the efficiency of these operations and should save
lives and money.
That said, it is difficult to estimate the potential savings that
civilian capability might afford the U.S. Government because it has not
yet been implemented on a broad scale. However, in testimony before the
House Armed Services Committee in January, Carlos Pascual of the
Brookings Institute estimated that if we had a civilian capacity in
Iraq that allowed us to withdraw one division one month early, we would
have saved $1.2 billion.
Question 28. What are the key first steps that such a civilian
response capacity would have to take to make the best use of the
critical first days of a crisis?
Answer. S/CRS would convene a CRSG (Country Reconstruction and
Stabilization Group) with the NSC, the State Department geographic
bureau, and with policy levels at USAID, DOD and other federal agencies
likely to be involved in a response to determine an initial course of
action and to task immediate information collection and response
assessment. A CRSG secretariat would be established to join up civilian
and military planning, consult with the U.S. embassy in country (if
any), dispatch a coordination group, or Integrated Planning Cell (IPC),
to the relevant military combatant command, and deploy an Advanced
Civilian Team (ACT) of highly trained experts to the country in crisis.
S/CRS and the CRSG secretariat would be responsible for calling up
the civilian response from all the agencies participating in the CSI.
The first responders would, for the most part, come from the inter-
agency Active Response Corps (ARC). S/CRS would also activate the
interagency Stand-by Response Corps (SRC) and thereby identify and make
available a wider pool of government employees with relevant skills.
The Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC) Home Office, a part of S/CRS,
would review critical civilian skills needed to support the request and
begin identifying possible CRC members to alert for federal activation.
The initial ARC teams could be on the ground at the site of an
overseas crisis 48 hours after the decision to deploy them, and begin
the response effort in coordination with the existing U.S. mission in
country (if any) and any other crisis response teams (such as USAID's
DART) that might be there. This civilian response would partner, as
necessary and advisable, with any U.S. military assets deployed to the
crisis (for instance, a Joint Task Force), and/or with partners or
international organizations that might also be part of a broader
international response.
Question 29. Describe the Coordinator's role and position with
respect to his ability to coordinate among the most senior officials at
fellow agencies? How will you support the Coordinator in this
responsibility?
Answer. Under National Security Presidential Directive 44, the
Secretary of State is charged with leading and coordinating integrated
United States Government efforts to prepare, plan for, and conduct
stabilization and reconstruction activities. I have instructed the
Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, Ambassador John
Herbst, to act on my behalf in fulfilling this directive.
The role of the State Department in this context is one of
leadership and coordination, not directive authority. However, the
Coordinator has very effectively led an interagency effort to prepare
and plan for such activities. The Coordinator reports directly to me
and has my full support in this effort.
Question 30. Please describe the Defense Authorization Section 1207
funding. How would you and the Coordinator utilize such funding? How
would you be able to prevent its premature use for other purposes as
was apparently the case when State sought funding to respond to the
Lebanon crisis in 2006 and only some $17 million remained from the
original $100 million authorized? Please provide a breakdown of the
amounts and uses of Section 1207 funding by year since its inception.
Answer. Section 1207 of the FY 06 National Defense Authorization
Act authorized the Secretary of Defense to transfer to the Department
of State up to $100 million in both FY 06 and FY 07 to improve U.S.
capacity and interagency coordination for immediate reconstruction,
security or stabilization assistance to a foreign country. Section 1210
of the FY 08 National Defense Authorization Act extended the
authorization for $100 million through FY 08.
S/CRS used FY 06 and FY 07 funds for projects in eight countries
where security, stabilization and reconstruction issues overlap. The
first one of these projects, and the only expenditure under 1207 in FY
06, was $10 million for assistance to Lebanon in August 2006. The
Lebanese Internal Security forces received $5 million and $5 million
was used for demining activities. Because this project also occurred at
the end of the fiscal year, there was not sufficient time to use all
available 1207 funding for 2006.
In FY 07, an interagency Technical Working Group (TWG) composed of
S/CRS, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, and the Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance (F)
was formed to ensure a more cohesive decision-making process and to
evaluate and fund projects throughout the year.
In FY 07, a total of $99.7 million, or virtually the entire amount
of the authority, was funded for activities in Haiti ($20m), Somalia
($25m), Nepal ($10m), Colombia ($4m), Yemen ($8.845m), the Trans Sahara
Counterterrorism Program ($15m for Mauritania, Mali and Niger), and the
East Asia Tri-Border Initiative ($16.9m for Malaysia, Indonesia and the
Philippines. These funds are being used for activities ranging from
police training to public diplomacy, civil society support and
employment generation.
AFRICOM
Political Advisors
Question 31. The FY 2009 budget request includes 50 additional FTE
positions for ``Political Advisors.'' State has indicated that these
are intended to meet the demand for new Combatant Command positions.
a. To whom will they belong organizationally and through what chain
of command will they be responsible? Who will pay their salaries when
attached to a COCOM?
Answer. Foreign Policy Advisors (POLADs) are State Department
officers detailed to the command in which they are serving. Their
salaries will be paid by the Department of State. The command pays for
travel expenses associated with their duties at the command.
Question b. Will these State Department and other civilian agency
personnel be responsive to their respective Congressional Committees of
Oversight?
Answer. Yes
Question c. Will the State Department and USAID IG offices
participate in review of the COCOM activities insofar as they fall
within U.S. foreign policy parameters such as humanitarian or
development assistance, security cooperation etc.?
Answer. The Department of State Office of Inspector General (OIG)
regularly reviews coordination between Chiefs of Mission and the
respective combatant commands (COCOM) when inspecting U.S. embassies.
OIG will solicit input from DOS Political Advisors (POLADs) who are
assigned to COCOMs on areas such as the adequacy of political or
economic advocacy and reporting in specific missions, and extent and
effectiveness of COM coordination with all DoD elements with programs
or interests in the country. OIG considers entering into, as
circumstances and resources allow, joint reviews with other OIGs, e.g.,
USAID OIG and DoD OIG, on implementation of humanitarian and
development assistance, security cooperation, etc.
Question d. What authority will these personnel have to use or
direct the use of State Department or USAID funding?
Answer. None.
Question e. What specific training with these personnel receive
that differs from other State Department personnel?
Answer. POLADs attend an Orientation course organized by the Bureau
of Political-Military Affairs at the Foreign Service Institute as they
assume their assignments. They are also encouraged to take the Foreign
Service Institute's Political-Military Course. Other training is
available based on the officer's experience and the position they will
take.
Question f. AFRICOM stand-up personnel have briefed staff that
their intent is to seek 150 or more non-DoD civilian personnel? How
many have they requested to date from State and USAID? How many have
been provided from State and USAID or are intended to be provided by
State and USAID? Please provide a list of the position or roles that
will be filled at the COCOM.
Answer. Our discussions with the Department of Defense over a
period of months have focused on different numbers of State Department
and/or USAID detailees to AFRICOM. Currently, State and USAID have
filled or are planning to fill six positions at AFRICOM. The State
Department has detailed personnel for the positions of Deputy to the
Commander for Civil-Military Activities and of Foreign Policy to the
Commander (POLAD), and a USAID employee is in the Senior Development
Advisor position. In addition, USAID plans to detail one of its
personnel to serve as the Chief of
Humanitarian Assistance at AFRICOM, and State and USAID anticipate
making nominations for two more positions in the near future: Chief of
Outreach and Director of Programs. We have not received any additional
requests from DoD to fill positions at AFRICOM. We are prepared to
consider any future requests, taking into account our own staffing
requirements and available funding.
Question g. Are any other agencies making similar personnel
requests for the purpose of manning the new model of COCOM? Is the
Department of Energy providing personnel?
Answer. We suggest that you may wish to contact the Department of
Defense on this point. According to what we have heard from DoD, the
Environmental Protection Agency and the Departments of Energy,
Treasury, Education, and Homeland Security have provided nominees for
the positions of either the Chief of Outreach and/or the Director or
Programs. We understand that a Department of Commerce nominee has been
selected for the position of Deputy Director for Resources.
Budget
The DoD budget request for FY 2009 includes $389 million ``to
establish a new command'' known as AFRICOM.
Question 32a. What if any funding is requested for FY 2009 in the
150 or 050 account for the planning, preparation or construction of a
military headquarters in Africa in FY 2009 or thereafter?
Answer. The State Department has not requested any funds for
AFRICOM from the 150 account for the planning, preparation or
construction of a military headquarters in Africa. We understand from
the Department of Defense that there are no funds in its FY 2009 050
budget request for the construction of a military headquarters. We
suggest, however, that you may wish to contact DoD directly on this
point.
Question 32b. What is the budget of the State Department/USAID
personnel contingent for AFRICOM in FY 2009 and are the funds from the
050 or 150 account resources?
Answer. With the exception of the Foreign Policy Advisor to the
Commander (POLAD), all direct hire State Department/USAID positions at
the Command are reimbursable by the Department of Defense and therefore
do not have specific implications for the 150 account. The POLAD
position is funded from the State Operations budget. A contractor
position to be filled by the Office of Disaster Assistance (OFDA) will
be funded from International Disaster Famine Assistance (IDFA)
resources.
Question 32c. Has there been any coordination on planning for an
African continent-based AFRICOM headquarters?
Answer. No specific plans or decisions have been made regarding an
AFRICOM Headquarters on the African continent. We expect the
headquarters to remain in Stuttgart for the immediate future.
Question 32d. What is the extent of such planning and what
countries does it involve?
Answer. No plans have been made regarding an AFRICOM headquarters
on the African continent.
Question 32e. Has Liberia formally or informally requested that the
AFRICOM headquarters be based in that country?
Answer. President Johnson Sirleaf has publicly expressed Liberia's
interest in hosting an AFRICOM presence.
Question 32f. What is State Department's position on Liberia as the
location of AFRICOM?
Answer. Liberia is the only country that has publicly expressed an
interest in hosting an AFRICOM presence. Selection of any location for
an AFRICOM presence would depend foremost on host nation willingness.
Additional factors would likely include other foreign policy
considerations, security, infrastructure, and logistical
supportability. No decisions have been made regarding the structure or
location of an AFRICOM headquarters on the continent. However,
President Bush said during his recent trip to Africa that he would
strongly consider Liberia's offer to host AFRICOM.
Question 32g. Would you provide any review that has been made of
options for physical location or locations of AFRICOM?
Answer. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) led a
technical mission to visit a small number of African countries in
November 2007. The site visits were intended to support U.S. decision-
making processes. A representative of the Bureau of African Affairs
participated in the site visits. We suggest you may want to contact OSD
for the trip report.
Democracy and Governance
Question 33. Describe the planned U.S. democracy and governance
programming for FY 2008 and FY 2009 in Ethiopia, Nigeria, Kenya and
Pakistan.
What lessons have been learned and what changes in such programming
are being incorporated in the wake of disappointing progress in these
four instances?
Answer. In Ethiopia, the USG adapted to the flawed 2005 elections
with a strategy to work outside the national government while also
recognizing the potential for future democratic progress. To exploit
potential openings, the USG is promoting constructive dialogue on key
issues, legislation, and policies; expanding conflict management and
reconciliation work at the national and local levels; and supporting
multi-party capacity building in the legislature. Working outside the
government, the USG started new programs to strengthen independent
human rights monitoring. These programs complement efforts to improve
respect for human rights in the judiciary and police. Support is also
being provided to assist the Gambella and Somali Regional State and
Municipal Governments to improve governance through better service
delivery. The USG has reduced its plans to contribute to long-term
multilateral support for the national and regional state parliaments
and the National Elections Board (NEB) due to significant cuts in FY
2008 funding and a lack of demonstrated openness on the part of the
Government of Ethiopia to consultative reform. The USG is currently
soliciting new proposals for Ethiopia to provide legal assistance to
journalists; build the capacity of independent media outlets; build the
capacity of the judiciary; and improve the capacity of civil society to
effectively monitor and report on human rights.
In Nigeria, the primary democracy and governance problem is that
political power, both formal and informal, lies almost exclusively in
the hands of non-accountable political elites. This problem existed
before last year's flawed elections, and it still exists today.
Consequently, the USG strategy in Nigeria is to address the elite
control of political power at the national level and the crippling
dysfunctions it creates at the sub-national level. USG assistance will
support the creation of more responsive governance structures and help
build the capacity of civil society organizations. U.S. assistance will
also work to improve the capacity and credibility of the electoral
commission and promote civil society input into electoral and
constitutional reform dialogue in advance of the 2011 elections. We
hope to start a new rule of law program in FY 2009.
In Kenya, the USG is working to develop a new strategy in response
to the current political crisis. It is clear that Constitutional and
electoral reforms will be essential to address the issues that have
arisen since December. Parliament and civil society will both be
critical to the success of reform efforts. USG programs will work with
the Parliament, local government, and political parties to improve the
system of checks and balances and to facilitate necessary anti-
corruption reforms. U.S. assistance will also promote civil society
efforts to advocate for further governance reforms, provide citizen
input to influence government policy, and monitor the government's
progress. In addition, the U.S. is providing funds to assist civil
society in promoting national dialogue and discussion on a political
solution to the current crisis. The USG will also support longer-term
constitutional, land, and electoral reforms as part of the recent peace
and reconciliation accord following the flawed general elections of
December 27, 2007.
In Pakistan, in the aftermath of the February 18 Parliamentary and
Provincial elections, the USG will continue to support the
strengthening of political processes to support the Government of
Pakistan to establish truly democratic institutions with significant
involvement by Pakistani civil society groups and NGOs. The USG
strategy includes supporting the empowerment of women and youth to take
active roles in civil society, promoting rule of law, strengthening
political party development, promoting electoral reform, and expanding
independent media. The USG will also help Pakistan strengthen its legal
institutions and support reform of the judicial systems to protect
human rights and promote the rule of law.
Our experience in these four countries indicates the importance of
an independent electoral commission and a proper election adjudication
system to ensure open and fair electoral processes that instill
legitimacy in newly-elected governments. These countries also
illustrate the need for civil society to expand its base beyond
politically motivated individuals engaged in episodic political events
and address broader constituency demands in order for democratic
institution building to take root over the long term.
Afghanistan
Question 34. Describe the planned U.S. programming for FY 2008 and
FY 2009 with regard to building judicial capacity in Afghanistan.
Answer. The primary U.S. agencies involved in building
Afghanistan's justice sector are the Department of State's Bureau for
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), the United
States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Department
of Justice (DOJ). The Department of Defense (DOD) is also expanding its
rule of law programming, focusing on Eastern Afghanistan and on police-
prosecutor overlaps. Over the past year these agencies have played a
central role in improving the justice sector, including the judiciary
(Supreme Court), the Ministry of Justice, the Attorney General's
office, and various governmental and non-governmental entities that are
key to establishing the rule of law. They have been implementing the
goals of a U.S. strategy approved by the National Security Council in
August 2006 to (a) accelerate U.S. Government justice programs at the
central level, (b) encourage increased donor contributions, and (c)
expand justice to the provinces. We have made significant progress in
all areas.
At the central level, we have roughly doubled the scope of our
assistance to the three primary justice institutions since early 2007,
launching organizational reforms, rolling out a new court
administration program, revising legislation that governs the
administration of justice, establishing new training and mentoring
programs, and providing infrastructure and equipment support. At the
same time, we have played a leading role in Kabul and with other
capitals in increasing the focus on the justice system. Our strong
encouragement was a major factor in the Government of Italy's decision
to host the July 2007 Rome Conference on the Rule of Law in
Afghanistan, co-hosted by the Italian Prime Minister, Afghan President
Hamid Karzai, and the United Nations Secretary General. The conference
garnered $98 million in new contributions to the justice sector over
four years, on top of existing commitments. We also have pushed the
expansion of justice assistance into the provinces, which have received
comparatively little support to date, by expanding our own bilateral
programs and developing the Provincial Justice Coordination Mechanism,
which is presently deploying rule of law coordinators across the
country to work with Afghan and international actors.
Meanwhile, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
(GIRoA) is finalizing the National Justice Sector Strategy of the
Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), which sets
development goals to be met by 2013. To implement these, the GIRoA and
international community are finalizing the National Justice Program
(NJP) which will use a combination of Afghan and donor programs (both
bilateral and multilateral) to develop and reform the justice system.
The World Bank is establishing a justice program that will support the
NJP, using pooled donor funding to reduce the number of small-scale
implementers.
With the National Justice Program providing a new strategic
framework for the justice sector, the U.S. Government is developing its
own strategy to support the NJP that is coordinated through the U.S.
Embassy and incorporates U.S. military efforts. This new strategy,
currently under development, will ensure the NJP priorities are
implemented. These priority areas include: accelerating institutional
reform; building provincial infrastructure and capacities; bolstering
counter-narcotics and anti-corruption prosecutions; investing in the
corrections system; improving linkages between police and prosecutors;
and focusing on public awareness and legal aid to improve public
confidence and access to justice. These efforts support the overall
U.S. Government push to project governance to the provincial and
district levels, which in turn will build nationwide confidence in the
central Government's ability to provide security and services.
Building Afghanistan's capacities to manage its own system is
fundamental to success in Afghanistan. U.S. Government efforts also
recognize that building justice sector capacities and public demand for
justice alone will do little without high-level political will on the
part of the GIRoA to tackle corruption, from the top down. To that end,
the U.S. strategy emphasizes using diplomatic, political, and law
enforcement tools to strengthen the Afghan political will to institute
true reforms and tackle corruption within their government. We have
seen several positive signs, including the recent passage of the
Advocates Law (establishing a national bar and legal defense service).
The GIRoA recently became a signatory to the United Nations Convention
Against Corruption (UNCAC), an important step in the right direction.
Question 34a. What are the levels of U.S. assistance and in what
areas has U.S. assistance been used to reform the judicial system, with
the exception of police training?
Answer. U.S. Government assistance to the justice sector has
gradually grown over the years, with an FY 07 budget of $67.35 million
($55 million in INLCLE funding and $12.35 million in USAID funding).
For FY 08, the projected INCLE funding level for justice is $68
million, while USAID is projected at $4 million. This makes the U.S.
Government the largest donor in the justice sector.
As noted above, there are four US agencies primarily involved in
building Afghanistan's justice system: INL, USAID, DOJ, and DOD. These
agencies and their programs are coordinated through the US Embassy
Special Committee on the Rule of Law, chaired by the U.S. Rule of Law
Coordinator. Below is an overview of each agency's activities.
Department of State--International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs
The INL Afghanistan Administration of Justice program is primary
concerned with building and reforming the criminal justice and
corrections systems. Two major assistance platforms support this
program: the Justice Sector Support Program (JSSP) and the Corrections
System Support Program (CSSP), described in greater detail below. Both
programs are implemented by Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE)
Government Services and have been in place since mid 2005 and early
2006, respectively.
In addition to these two primary programs, INL also supports
several smaller initiatives, including: (1) a grant with the University
of Washington--Seattle which brings Afghan law professors to the U.S.
to earn certificate and Master's of Law (LLM) degrees; (2) a grant with
the International Association of Women Judges (IAWJ) to support women
in the legal profession; (3) an agreement with the United States
Institute of Peace (USIP) to focus on specific policy and reform
issues; (4) contributions to two multilateral trust funds to address
disproportionately low salaries for judges, prosecutors and corrections
personnel; and (5) funding to support three field offices of the
Provincial Justice Coordination Mechanism mentioned above. INL also
funds the Department of Justice (DOJ) Senior Federal Prosecutors
Program in Afghanistan.
The JSSP supports 30 U.S. justice advisors (prosecutors, judges,
defense attorneys, and criminal justice systems experts) and 30 Afghan
legal advisors, and has permanent teams based in Kabul, Herat, Balkh,
Konduz, and Nangarhar provinces to build Afghanistan's criminal justice
system. JSSP provincial teams as well as DOJ prosecutors are conducting
police-prosecutor training and mentoring, and will soon establish a new
training program to improve justice capacities at the district level,
working closely with the police program's Focused District Development
initiative. To date, DOJ and the JSSP have trained more than 1,000
Afghan lawyers. The Kabul JSSP team is split into three sections. The
first section consists of 16 U.S. and Afghan advisors who are
reorganizing the Attorney General's Office, providing training and
mentoring, and advising the Afghan Attorney General on key matters. The
second section supports the Ministry of Justice and its key
directorates with three U.S. and 11 Afghan advisors, including the
recently established (entirely Afghan staffed) Policy and Strategy Unit
which provides policy and organizational reform advice to the Minister.
The third JSSP section focuses on improving access to justice, which
includes mentoring and capacity building for private legal defense
organizations, legal education and training, and organizing provincial
justice conferences. The JSSP also has a gender justice advisor who is
developing linkages between police Family Response Units and the
prosecution services; as well as a military liaison to coordinate joint
police-justice efforts.
The CSSP supports over 30 U.S. corrections advisors in Kabul,
Herat, Balkh, Nangarhar and Paktia provinces and is focused on four
areas: training, capacity-building, infrastructure support, and
operations and maintenance for a new facility in Kabul. The provincial
teams have trained over 1,300 corrections officers to date in a basic
8-week course and a ``train the trainers'' course. The training
program, which is based on international and United Nations human
rights standards and was developed specifically for (and with) the
Afghan Government, and is launching numerous advanced and specialized
courses this year. The CSSP also supports a capacity-building program
which is advising the Ministry of Justice's Central Prison Directorate
(CPD) on prison policies, prison management, establishing a prisoner
tracking system and organizational reforms. The third CSSP component is
the infrastructure team, which has refurbished the national corrections
training center, completed numerous small-scale renovations of prisons,
provided a new annex for the CPD headquarters for staff, and
established an Afghan Engineering Office within the CPD. Together with
Afghan architects and engineers, the CSSP has developed a ``hybrid''
prison design that incorporates international human rights standards
with Afghan realities and cost-effectiveness to create a sustainable,
humane, and secure prison design. In addition to constructing two
prisons over the coming year, the CSSP is also advising other donors to
ensure that their designs and construction of prisons implement this
Afghan-approved sustainable model. Lastly, the CSSP will support the
operations and maintenance of the Counter-Narcotics Justice Center
(CNJC) in Kabul, a secure facility built by the Army Corps of Engineers
that will house the Counter-Narcotics Criminal Justice Task Force
(CJTF) and Central Narcotics Tribunal (CNT) as well as a detention
center.
Finally, INL entered into an agreement with the United States
Institute of Peace in mid 2007 to work with Afghan and international
actors to develop policies and possible linkages with the non-state
system of dispute resolution. While the focus of U.S. assistance must
be on building the central government's reach through the formal
justice institutions, there may be linkages with the informal system
for certain civil (but not criminal) disputes that could maximize
efficiency and utilize the legitimacy that many customary systems
enjoy, so long as human rights and gender rights are respected and
enforced.
United States Agency for International Development
The USAID-funded Afghanistan Rule of Law Project assists in the
development of a democratic Afghan government, which has broad citizen
participation and a vigorous economic sector, by improving the
country's legal infrastructure.
Working with the Ministry of Justice and the Supreme Court, as well
as with faculties of law and Sharia in five provincial universities,
the project works to: improve the formal court system; strengthen
institutional capacity for lawmaking, and increase citizens' awareness
of their legal rights and how the judicial system operates.
The project is divided into seven components:
Court administration. Simplifies and standardizes court
administration procedures to improve access to court
information
Judicial Training and Professional Development. Creates
opportunities for improving judicial professionalism, knowledge
and skills
Commercial Dispute Resolution. Lays a foundation for the effective
resolution of commercial disputes
Legal Education. Strengthens the formal legal education system
Legislative Process Reform. Improves the legislative process and
access to legal information
Women's Rights Under Islam. Increases knowledge of women's rights
under Islam
Access to Justice and Building Links to the Informal Justice
Sector. Ensures that the appropriate sector for resolving
disputes is recognized
USAID is also working to assist the Afghan government in fighting
corruption. Judicial corruption remains endemic in Afghanistan. Since
his appointment to the Supreme Court in August 2006, Chief Justice
Abdul Salam Azimi has made cleaning up the courts his top priority. He
has instituted an aggressive, two-pronged approach to reduce the level
of corruption in the courts and to raise the level of public trust and
confidence in the judiciary. The strategy includes instituting a new
code of conduct for judges and raising judges' salaries so they are
more immune to bribery.
The New Regulation of Judicial Conduct. The first part of the
Supreme Court strategy focused on developing a modern code of judicial
conduct that establishes ethical standards for how all of Afghanistan's
judges are to conduct their affairs. On June 19, 2007, that code,
entitled the Regulation of Judicial Conduct for the Judges of the
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, was adopted. Each of Afghanistan's
1,280 judges will receive training on the Regulation's meaning and
importance by the end of September 2008.
Improving Judicial Salaries and Working Conditions. The second part
of the strategy focuses on securing funds from the international
community to increase judges' wages and improve their working
conditions so that they are less inclined to accept bribes. Donor money
for judges' salaries was incorporated as one of the court's highest
funding priorities this past July, when the Supreme Court presented its
Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) to international
donors at the Rome Conference on the Rule of Law in Afghanistan, July
2-3, 2007.
Starting in 2007, the Supreme Court also began sending its justices
on inspection tours of provincial courts to ensure they are in
compliance with judicial regulations. The inspections are followed by
three-day conferences, where the visiting Supreme Court justice will
discuss the inspection results, recent or coming changes in court
policy and operations. Judges participating in these conferences, which
are supported by the Afghanistan Rule of Law Project (ARoLP), also
receive training in the Regulation of Judicial Conduct and the recently
adopted Afghan Court Administration System (ACAS) for streamlining the
courts' case-management processes.
Department of Justice
Since 2005, the Department of Justice DOJ has assigned up to four
senior Assistant United States Attorneys as Senior Legal Advisors and
three senior experienced criminal investigators to Kabul to assist in
law reform and training and mentoring of the Criminal Justice Task
Force (CJTF) and the Central Narcotics Tribunal (CNT), a special task
force of Afghan judges, prosecutors, and police investigators
responsible for cases against mid- and high-level drug traffickers.
DOJ's Senior Federal Prosecutor Program also provides criminal law
advice to the Embassy and Afghan leadership and U.S. law enforcement,
upon request. The prosecutors have succeeded in 1) drafting and
enacting a comprehensive counternarcotics law that also provides for
the use of modern investigative techniques (e.g., electronic
surveillance, and the use of informants and undercover officers); 2)
establishing a specialized narcotics court with nationwide exclusive
jurisdiction for cases against mid- and high-level traffickers; 3)
achieving the first-ever extraditions (of major drug traffickers) from
Afghanistan to the U.S., and 4) working with our U.S, and international
partners to establish, train, and mentor the CJTF and CNT.
More specifically, DOJ's prosecutors have:
1. Drafted (in consultation with Afghan legal advisors, DOJ's
Criminal Division, and the international community) and had signed into
law a Comprehensive Counter-Narcotics Law that builds upon former
Afghan law to criminalize all narcotics and narcotics-related offenses,
sets controls on processing chemicals, authorizes the use of modern
investigative techniques, and confirms the use of the 1988 U.N.
Convention against Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances in
extradition;
2. Drafted and had signed into law the Presidential Decree
establishing the Central Narcotics Tribunal with exclusive nationwide
authority for the trial of all mid- and high-level narcotics
trafficking cases;
3. Refined and had signed into law the Military Courts Legislation
and Military Courts Penal and Procedural Law that established a
separate court and its law and attendant procedures for the Afghan
National Army that meet international standards;
4. Drafted counter-terrorism and extradition laws now under review
by the Afghan legislative unit at the Ministry of Justice;
5. Prepared a legal analysis of Afghanistan's former, interim, and
proposed criminal procedure codes, highlighting areas for reform;
6. Deployed a DOJ expert team to Kabul to assess current capacities
and make recommendations for assisting the Afghan Attorney General and
the CJTF with an anti-corruption initiative. As a result, DOJ has now
assigned one of the federal prosecutors full-time to the Attorney
General's Office and will be establishing a sub-unit within the CJTF
dedicated to investigating and prosecuting narcotics-related corruption
cases upon country clearance approval from the Department of State for
additional DOJ attorneys;
7. Provided and continues to provide prosecutorial advice to the
Embassy leadership, Afghan officials, and U.S. law enforcement (DEA and
FBI) and prosecutors in the development of criminal investigations for
prosecution in Afghanistan, the U.S., or elsewhere;
8. Prepared an in-depth training regime and conducted training for
the CJTF and CNT focused on the new Afghan Counternarcotics Law and
proactive investigations. In addition, the DOJ attorneys provide in-
depth special topics seminars for the CJTF, CNT, and provincial
prosecutors on regular basis to improve understanding of fundamental
concepts and the implementation of investigative modern techniques;
9. Advised on the design of Afghanistan's Counter-Narcotics Justice
Center in Kabul that is under construction and will soon house the CJTF
and CNT;
10. Assisted in the development of an adjunct project by the U.S.
Marshals Service that has been deployed to train a protective corps
drawn from the Afghan National Police to provide court security at the
CNT and protection to CNT judges and CJTF prosecutors; and
11. Coordinated with Department of Defense/Combined Joint Task
Force-82 (CJTF-82) authorities regarding counternarcotics and
counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan.
Department of Defense
The Department of Defense has increased its activities in providing
rule of law assistance over the past year in two main areas: improving
linkages between the justice and police sectors, and expanding rule of
law programming by the Judge Advocate General Corps in eastern
Afghanistan.
On police-justice integration, Combined Security Transition
Command--Afghanistan (CSTC-A) has played an important role in
furthering joint initiatives to support the justice sector and CSTC-A's
primary mission, building the Afghan National Police and the Ministry
of Interior (MOI). In this capacity, CSTC-A has advised the MOI Legal
Advisor's Office on key legislation and procedures that govern law
enforcement, and is working closely with other US agency efforts and
the international community on advancing overall justice sector
development and reform.
In addition, Combined Joint Task Force--82 (CJTF-82) is
implementing rule of law initiates in its area of operations under
NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Eastern
Afghanistan. CJTF-82 has worked with the US Embassy and programs listed
above on legal training, distribution of legal texts, and
infrastructure support to improve provincial and district level justice
systems.
Question 34b. What assistance has the international community
provided to date and in what areas of the country has it been applied,
with the exception of police training?
Answer. The international community has been a key partner in the
justice sector. Unfortunately, the enormous gaps in the justice system
overwhelm the capacity of any single donor; as a result, there is a
proliferation of small-scale donor assistance programs. The National
Justice Program and its subordinate multilateral implementation
mechanisms will likely reduce the number of bilateral programs at the
central level over the coming years, as donors' small contributions are
pooled. This will also reduce the number of actors involved in
institutional reform over the next several years. The primary donors at
present include Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States, Germany,
Italy, and the European Commission. Key implementers include direct-
hire international officials (such as prosecutors), various United
Nations agencies, NGO's, and government contractors.
The focus of the international community to date has been on
building and reforming the Kabul institutions, though progress has been
slow. Major accomplishments include advancing reforms in the Ministry
of Justice, progress on reforming and amending the legislative
framework for governance, improving detention conditions for women and
juveniles, training for prosecutors and judges, and construction of
justice facilities and prisons. The United Kingdom has been a key
partner in the area of corrections and counter-narcotics justice. The
Italian Government completed the National Legal Training Center in
2007, with support from the U.S., which is currently home to a judicial
training program.
Some donors have launched provincial justice programs, including
the U.K. in Helmand, Canada in Kandahar, and Germany in Balkh and
Konduz. Others, such as Italy, have launched provincial assistance
programs based out of Kabul, but have not established provincial
advisor teams. Thus, the U.S. is the only donor that has deployed
advisor teams across the nation. The hope is that with additional
commitments from the Rome Conference and the establishment of the
Provincial Justice Coordination Program, the number of donor programs
outside of Kabul will increase.
Question 34c. What is the State Department assessment of the status
of the Afghan judicial system from the district to national level? How
many narcotics cases have been brought to trial in 2007 by region? How
many have been sentenced?
Answer. The GIRoA has made strides in drafting and consolidating
the National Justice Sector Strategy (NJSS). However,
disproportionately low salaries, widespread corruption, poor
infrastructure, inefficient organizational structures, untrained
professionals, and a lack of equipment and supplies plague the system.
To ensure the integrity of legal reform, the justice sector must be
built out from the center to ensure standardized training and
application of laws. At the same time, we must build the 34 provincial
justice systems, which at present remain very weak and have limited
capacities to administer justice effectively. Many districts don't have
courthouses or prosecutors due to infrastructure gaps, and to the fact
that judges and prosecutors with jurisdiction over the districts often
reside in the provincial capital. Detention centers and prisons can be
found in most districts and provinces, though many are rented houses
and are unacceptable in terms of living conditions. Furthermore,
Afghans frequently turn to the informal justice system to resolve their
disputes, which do not always adhere to the constitutional rights of
citizens, particularly women.
On a positive note, the central justice institutions have competent
leaders willing to work with the international community. Several key
laws have been passed or are being revised that will lay the foundation
for the justice sector, and the institutions are generally being
supportive of organizational restructuring and civil service reform.
In addition, the GIRoA is advancing narcotics prosecutions under
the Central Narcotics Tribunal (CNT) and Criminal Justice Task Force
(CJTF) in Kabul. Since March 2005, when the CJTF was set up, it has
investigated and prosecuted over 1200 cases involving 1600 defendants
from 33 provinces for narcotics-related crimes. Of these, 1450
defendants were convicted. Convictions include the high-level narcotics
traffickers Misri Khan, Bahram Kahn, and Noor Ullah who are currently
serving their sentence in Afghanistan. Other Afghan high-level
narcotics traffickers have been sent to the United States for
prosecution and are awaiting trial, sentencing, or are serving their
sentence. They include Haji Bushehr Noorzai, Haji Baz Mohammad,
Mohammad Essa, and Khan Mohammad. The President of the United States
had designated two high-level traffickers--Noorzai and Baz Mohammad--as
foreign narcotics kingpins under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin
Designation Act.
To effectively move the justice sector forward, the GIRoA and
international community must carefully build and balance the central,
provincial and district levels in a coordinated manner. At the central
level, our programs and Embassy are working closely with the Afghan
Government and international community, and are making progress. At the
provincial level, our programs are leading the way, but the needs far
exceed available donor resources and programs at present. At the
district level, there are few justice systems in the first place, but
we are launching a plan to train district-level personnel at the
provincial level starting in the summer of 2008. In summary, we are
making notable progress and have carefully prioritized our U.S.
Government assistance programs, though the overall needs of the justice
sector and demands placed on it outpace available international
resources.
MEPI
Question 35. Please describe the scope of intended Middle East
Partnership Initiative (MEPI) programming. Have there been any
substantive or organizational changes to MEPI?
Answer. MEPI programs seek to redress the deficits in the region
associated with unaccountable governments, weak educational systems,
inadequate government services, lack of political and economic
opportunities for women, poor governance, and economies that provide
insufficient job opportunities for young people.
There have been no substantive or organizational changes to the
Middle East Partnership Initiative. MEPI programs are still focused on
four primary areas:
1. To promote democratic reform by providing technical assistance
for parliamentary and municipal elections; supporting and training
political parties and candidates; aiding democratic reformers and
activists; assisting local NGOs with voter education, reform advocacy,
and popular mobilization behind the reform agenda; and expanding
independent media, civil society, and rule of law programming.
2. To advance women's empowerment by promoting women's political
and economic rights, providing increased professional development
opportunities and political training, helping secure women's equal
rights under the law, and building public-private partnerships that
champion women's issues.
3. To enhance the existing business environment and encourage
private sector-led economic growth by assisting political, judicial,
regulatory, and commercial leaders in making improvements to their
policies, laws, and organizational structures.
4. To revitalize education systems to improve curriculum content
and delivery, increase students' awareness of civic rights and
responsibilities, and develop their leadership and critical thinking
skills.
Merida Initiative
According to U.S. Director of National Intelligence Michael
McConnell, Venezuela is undermining counterdrug efforts in neighboring
countries by serving as an increasingly frequent transit zone for
Colombian cocaine. In 2005, the Government of Venezuela ended its long-
standing cooperative relationship with the US Drug Enforcement Agency,
claiming DEA agents were nothing but American spies. Since that year,
President Bush has continually designated Venezuela as having ``failed
demonstrably'' in certification for his annual report on the major drug
producing and/or transit countries.
Question 36. How have actions undertaken by the Government of
Venezuela undermined success in U.S. counternarcotics assistance to
Colombia (Plan Colombia)? What are the potential implications for the
Merida Initiative and Central American Security Assistance (CASA)
programs?
Answer. The Government of Venezuela's unwillingness to cooperate
creates opportunities for drug trafficking organizations to resist and
evade U.S.-supported counternarcotics efforts in Colombia and the
region as a whole. The Venezuelan government has not systematically
policed the 1,400-mile Venezuelan-Colombian border to prevent the
movement of groups of armed terrorists or to meaningfully interdict the
flow of arms and illicit narcotics. Particularly damaging has been
President Chavez' ideological and political tolerance of the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National
Liberation Army (ELN) terrorist organizations which finance their
activities through the proceeds of drug-running. As a result, Venezuela
has failed to prevent its territory from being used as a safe haven by
the FARC and the ELN, effectively flouting UN Security Council
Resolutions 1373 and 1540. FARC and ELN units often cross into
Venezuelan territory to rest and regroup with relative impunity. It
remains unclear to what extent the Venezuelan government provides
material support to Colombian terrorists. Limited amounts of weapons
and ammunition--some from official Venezuelan stocks and facilities--
have turned up in the hands of Colombian terrorist organizations.
Regardless, it is clear that a conscientious partner in Venezuela would
increase the effectiveness of U.S. counternarcotics assistance to
Colombia.
Because Venezuela is not fully cooperating in the fight against
narcotics traffickers, there is a gap in our regional line of defense.
That line should run in a semi-circle around the Caribbean, giving drug
runners no space to ply their trade. The break in the line of defense
puts everyone more at risk and complicates our approach at every turn.
The evidence is clear.
As for the second question, while the Venezuelan government's
unwillingness to cooperate may assist the narcotics traffickers, the
Merida Initiative demonstrates the commitment of the United States and
our partners in Mexico and Central America to work together to confront
the criminal organizations that plague the region and spill over into
the United States. By focusing our efforts in Mexico and Central
America, we can deny these groups the bulk of the territory they
currently use to transit narcotics and other contraband, regardless of
the Venezuelan government's unwillingness to cooperate.
Question 37. You have a 19% vacancy rate across NEA, which some
would suggest is a key region in the war on terror. Can you explain the
trendline on this? In Iraq, you have made extensive use of temporary
hires to fill State Department positions. Many of these individuals are
very impressive. Nevertheless, with recruiting, training and especially
overtime pay, this is tremendously costly. Have you put a cost figure
to the savings that replacing temporary personnel with Foreign Service
officers will bring you over a year?
Answer. The Department has done its best to staff Foreign Service
positions at overseas posts, particularly those deemed as high priority
to meet our policy goals. The overall overseas vacancy rate of 13
percent demonstrates the deficit of midlevel Foreign Service personnel
due to hiring shortages in the 1990s. The 19 percent vacancy rate in
Near East Asia (NEA)--while appearing slightly higher than the overall
overseas rate--does not take into consideration the more than 60
Foreign Service generalists and specialists who have volunteered to
serve in Iraq and been sent on long or short-term temporary duty (TDY)
assignments from other overseas posts or from Washington. These TDY
Foreign Service employees are filling high priority jobs in Iraq and
other posts--though that means the positions they left behind in other
overseas posts or in Washington remain empty, as there are not enough
Foreign Service personnel to backfill.
The 19 percent vacancy rate referred to above was derived from a
calculation that considered only the status of permanent Foreign
Service positions at Near East Asia (NEA) posts. Positions designated
for employees of and within the Iraq Transition Support Office (ITAO),
a 5 U.S.C. Sec. 3161 temporary organization, or positions staffed by
other federal agencies were not counted. We have not used ITAO
employees to fill vacant Foreign Service positions.
The cost of filling Iraq positions with Foreign Service officers on
temporary duty is not significantly higher than assigning them to Iraq
on a permanent basis. Because these employees are recruited from within
the existing Foreign Service corps, there are no additional recruiting
costs. The costs associated with training and overtime are the same for
employees on permanent assignment or TDY. All Foreign Service personnel
going to Baghdad on permanent assignment or TDY are required to take
training courses to prepare them for their responsibilities in Iraq and
its security environment. Whether on TDY or permanently assigned,
untenured Foreign Service officers and specialists are eligible for
overtime pay for hours worked beyond the normal 40 hours work week and
tenured Foreign Service personnel, who are not entitled to overtime,
may be eligible for a special differential. The main differences in the
cost of permanent assignment versus TDY relate to the eligibility for
locality pay or Involuntary Separate Maintenance Allowance and not to
recruiting, training, or overtime.
Question 38. A Washington Post article critical of the SIGIR
operations noted the extensive overtime pay claimed and paid to its
temporary employees. Do State Department temporary employees earn the
same pays? How many hours on average does a 3161 employee claim in a
week?
How many 3161 hires are working on Iraq for the Department of
State--both in country and elsewhere? What is the annual cost of the
average 3161 hire--including overtime, care and feeding, travel
expenses and other compensations?
Can you describe how you recruit 3161 hires with specialties
suitable for Iraq missions? What advertising do you do and where?
Do State Department temporary employees earn the same pay?
Answer. Compensation paid to employees hired under 3161
appointments is based on the grade of the position. Grades are
determined according to OPM classification standards and pay rates are
equivalent to General Service (GS) employees with similar levels of
responsibilities. 3161's receive the same benefits as GS employees. Our
3161 employees are paid overtime based on hours submitted, although the
hourly pay for overtime is straight time and not time and a half.
Question 39. How many hours on average does a 3161 employee claim
in a week?
Answer. Taking a sample of two pay periods, the average overtime
hours per pay period was 34 hours for 145 Baghdad employees and 4 hours
for 14 DC employees.
Question 40. How many 3161 hires are working on Iraq for the
Department of State--both in country and elsewhere?
Answer. As of February 2008, there are currently 156 3161 hires
working in Iraq and an additional 25 3161 hire in Washington, DC.
Question 41. What is the annual cost of the average 3161 hire--
including overtime, care and feeding, travel expenses and other
compensation?
Answer. These positions run from the equivalent of a GS-9 to that
of a Senior Executive Service position (there are only 5 such
positions). The average salary is $107,800 (taking the total salary of
all 3161's and dividing it by the number of such employees)--related
costs are as follows:
Salary and Related Costs of 3161 Employees
(in U.S. dollars)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Employees Employees
located in DC located in Iraq
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Base pay.......................... $107,800 $107,800
Overtime for Baghdad Employees.... $45,814
Overtime for DC Employees......... $5,389
Post differential (35% of pay).... $37,730
Danger pay (35% of pay)........... $37,730
Costs for food and lodging in Iraq $60,000
Initial deployment travel and $4,600
miscellaneous costs..............
Initial training costs............ $3,500
Annual cost of travel for rest/ $8,300
consultation breaks..............
Return travel at end of $2,200
appointment......................
Unaccompanied Air Baggage......... $2,200
Total........................... $113,189.00 $309,874.00
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 42. Can you describe how you recruit 3161 hires with
specialties suitable for Iraq missions? What advertising do you do and
where?
Answer. Our main source of recruiting is USAJobs, the OPM website.
However, we have also advertised on other on-line job banks such as
Monster, CareerBuilder, and engineeringjobs.net. As needed, we also
meet with officials and advertise on websites connected with
professional organizations such as the Government Finance Officer
Association, the Foreign Policy Association, and American Banker's
Association.
Question 43. In Irbil, there has been a plan to move the RRT
(Regional Reconstruction Team) to the Korean base. What are the
advantages to this? Some have expressed concern that this will further
isolate the team from interaction with Iraqis, NGO's and other
visitors.
Answer. RRT Erbil is a Coalition unit. The operation in the city of
Erbil was always intended to be temporary. The plan was to get the team
up and running while the site at the Korean base, about 10-20 minutes
away from the current location, is being prepared. The current offices
in the city are too small to house all the elements of the RRT. In
addition, following the massive truck bombing in Erbil, the RSO
determined that the site in the city of Erbil where the team works and
lives is too vulnerable. The work to prepare the new site at the Korean
Camp is now underway and with completion scheduled for August, after
which employees will be housed on the base. The former site in the city
of Erbil has been retained as an office and meeting site in order to
facilitate frequent and convenient interactions with Iraqi
counterparts, but the USG personnel will live in safer conditions at
the Korean base. While some have voiced concern that Iraqis will not be
as likely to visit the Korean site, our experience in REOs Al-Hillah
and Basra tell us that this is not the case. Both sites host frequent
meetings with Iraqi counterparts and are in areas are much less
hospitable than the Korean base.
Question 44. This morning the Parliament passed the 2008 Budget,
the Amnesty Law and the Provincial Powers law. This is a tremendous
accomplishment for the Iraqi Parliament. Do you see any hope for the
Hydrocarbon Laws with the Minister of Oil and the Kurds taking such
strong and potentially poisonous stances?
It appears that the Iraqis are coming to practical pragmatic
accommodations to work through major legislative and political issues,
and perhaps the Council of Representatives is finding its feet and
working through the building blocks that will ``bring Iraqis together
as Iraqis.'' At the top, they are using almost 3+1 collaborative
government whereby Prime Minister Maliki, President Talabani, and the
two Deputy Prime Ministers (Hashimi and Abdel Mahdi) come to a
consensus before moving forward. Can you comment on how this is viewed
within the Iraqi body politic? Is this sustainable?
Answer. Political reconciliation is an essential component of a
peaceful, stable, and democratic Iraq. Iraqi leaders are working to
reach a political accommodation among the various parties in Baghdad,
and as importantly, in the provinces. Iraqis still struggle with
fundamental questions about how to share power, accept their
differences and overcome their past. Most Iraqis genuinely accept Iraq
as a multi-ethnic, multi-sectarian society.
The Executive Council (which embodies the process formerly known as
the 3+1 power sharing agreement), made up of the Prime Minister, the
President, and the two Vice Presidents, met for the first time in
January 2008. They have since established a secretariat and are meeting
regularly. These events show that Iraq's leaders recognize that to
achieve national reconciliation and political progress, they must
cooperate across sectarian, party, and institutional lines. Iraqis
prefer to see their political leaders work together toward common
goals; effective power sharing is one area in which Iraq's leaders can
meet the expectations of their citizens.
The United States Government is engaging with leaders from both
sides at a high level to encourage them to address the unresolved oil
law issues, which relate to authority to approve contracts and how
revenue will be shared. Despite the disagreements by both sides this
past year, we believe a settlement is still possible, because until a
national law is ratified, all parties face enormous legal obstacles to
developing the hydrocarbon industry and the KRG cannot export any crude
oil. The United States Government continues to discourage the KRG from
signing deals until a national law is ratified.
We will continue our efforts to assist Iraqis in the pursuit of
national reconciliation, while recognizing that progress on this front
may come in many forms and must ultimately be achieved by Iraqis
themselves.
UNAMI
Question 45. I am pleased at the news that UNAMI has taken on work
to help resolve the Article 140 issues in Iraq. Increased UN activity
in Iraq can only be good, and they have a long hill to climb to
overcome the scars from the Canal Hotel bombing and the Oil For Food
scandal. What can we do to help them with their transportation needs--
specifically airlift? We have been informed that DoD cannot provide a
dedicated aircraft to support their needs.
Answer. The U.S. welcomes the increased UN involvement in Iraq
since the adoption of their expanded mandate in UNSCR 1770. Staffan de
Mistura, the new Special Representative of the Secretary General
(SRSG), and his staff are to be commended for the work they are
undertaking in difficult circumstances. Plans to increase UN staffing
in Baghdad and in Erbil are further positive steps.
The Department of Defense (DOD) has supported UNAMI's
transportation requests over the past seven months. At the same time
UNAMI is signing logistical support contracts with international
corporations and securing the lease of an aircraft. DOD will continue
to provide the maximum possible support to UNAMI's mission while the UN
works to get a contract carrier in place. The SRSG appreciates the
transportation being provided by the U.S.
The U.S. will continue to support UNAMI. We will also urge other
member states to maintain and expand their assistance to ensure the
success of the UN mission in Iraq, and to respond favorably to SRSG de
Mistura's appeals for logistical and other assistance.
Regional Support
Question 46. I noted your announcement that the Kuwaitis would be
hosting another Neighbors' Summit. This is encouraging; nevertheless,
short of hosting refugees, we have seen no additional reports of
concrete activities taken by Iraq's neighbors (the sending of
ambassadors, assistance, calling of regional working groups, etc.) What
headway are the Iraqis making in getting along with their Arab
neighbors?
Answer. The Government of Iraq is making considerable headway in
getting along with its neighbors, but admittedly, there is still room
for improvement. Over the last year, the Expanded Neighbors of Iraq
process has emerged as a forum in which Iraq's neighbors, and others in
the international community, can address the political and security
challenges facing Iraq. As you note, the next Ministerial is scheduled
to take place in Kuwait in April, with working groups hosted by Jordan,
Syria and Turkey convening sometime in March.
Arab states need to do more to increase support for the Government
of Iraq. We continue to urge them to openly demonstrate their support
on a bilateral basis by opening diplomatic missions and sending
ambassadors. We are starting to see some progress in this area; during
a January 15, 2008 press conference in Riyadh, Saudi FM Prince Saud al
Faisal reiterated his government's commitment to re-open a diplomatic
mission in Baghdad and post a resident ambassador. The Saudis have
since sent a delegation to Baghdad to discuss possible embassy sites.
This is welcome progress, and we are actively encouraging other
countries to take similar steps.
The launching of the International Compact with Iraq (ICI)
represented a major step forward in Iraq's economic integration into
the international community and its neighbors played a significant role
in this process. Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia were
members of the Preparatory Group that drafted the ICI. The UAE hosted
the conference where the broad outlines of the ICI were agreed, and
Kuwait hosted the conference in October 2006 where the final text of
the ICI was adopted. Egypt hosted the launching of the ICI with more
than 70 countries and international organizations in attendance.
Iraq's neighbors have also been helpful in other ways when it comes
to assistance. Kuwait and Iraq recently signed a memorandum of
understanding providing $160 million of Kuwaiti economic assistance to
Iraq, and Saudi-Iraqi negotiations on debt forgiveness continue.
Saudi and Iraqi officials have met to discuss security issues, and
the Saudis are working to stop the flow of foreign fighters to Iraq. We
continue to urge them to intensify their efforts.
Question 47. I was pleased to hear that this morning the
legislature passed the 2008 Iraqi budget, which reports estimate at 60
trillion Dinar, or about $50 billion. Charts that the Committee has
received indicate that oil revenues have steadily increased from $31.3
billion in 2006 to $41 billion in 2007. January 2008 figures show $5.21
billion generated in 2008 already, with exports expected to rise. Can
you provide further detail on Iraq's budget situation, cash on hand,
etc, including prior years unexpended funds? How much do they retain in
cash reserves? Please include all provincial and ministerial
allocations and disbursements.
Answer. On account of high oil prices and increased export levels
in the second half of the year, the Government of Iraq (GOI) earned
significantly more in 2007 than projected. Early estimates indicate
that the GOI received over $37 billion in oil revenues, compared to $31
billion projected in the 2007 budget.
With higher-than-expected revenue, the Ministry of Finance has
accumulated cash balances at the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI).
According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the DFI balance is
currently estimated at $12.5 billion. The money in the DFI represents
the funds on which the Iraqi Government can draw to pay for its
expenditures.
The GOI will use part of these funds to cover projected 2008
deficits, which are estimated to be $6 billion. The GOI needs to
maintain a reserves cushion in the DFI going forward because of the
volatility of the oil sector, which contributes 90 percent of budget
revenue.
In separate accounts, the foreign currency reserves at the Central
Bank of Iraq (CBI) have reached $27 billion. These funds are controlled
by the CBI, which is an independent institution. CBI reserves support
monetary policy, not GOI expenditure. The current IMF Stand-By
Agreement sets a floor of approximately $21 billion on net
international reserves for the CBI. The Central Bank Law prohibits CBI
lending to the Ministry of Finance for budget purposes or to other
government entities. These reserves will also be used for Iraq to
finance large external debt service payments beginning in 2011. Debt
service to the Paris Club will exceed $3 billion in 2011, and required
debt repayments will increase in later years as non-Paris Club and
commercial debt repayments come due.
The 2008 GOI Budget, which was passed by the Council of
Representatives on February 13, projects $42.5 billion in revenues and
allocates $48.4 billion for expenditures. The GOI is increasingly
allocating its revenues for security and capital investment. The 2008
budget allocates $9 billion to security ministries and $13 billion for
capital projects and reconstruction. This represents a 23 percent
increase and a 29 percent increase, respectively, over 2007 allocations
in these areas. Oil revenues in the 2008 budget are based on oil prices
of $57 per barrel and oil exports of 1.7 million barrels per day. If
oil prices remain high, it is likely that the budget deficit for 2008
will be less than the projected $6 billion.
Regarding prior year unexpended funds, complete GOI expenditure
data for 2007 is not yet available; expenditure data in Iraq as
elsewhere takes time to consolidate. However, a recent unofficial
Ministry of Finance (MoF) special report on capital expenditures
indicates that, through October 31, 2007, the Iraqis had contributed
over $6 billion of their own money to capital projects and
reconstruction at the national, regional, and provincial levels in
2007. This includes central government ministries expending 37 percent
of their 2007 capital budgets, the Kurdistan Regional Government
expending 89 percent of its 2007 capital budget, and provincial
governments expending over 57 percent of their combined 2006 and 2007
capital budgets, through October 31, 2007.
While the ability of the GOI to spend its own resources improved
substantially in 2007, the two year old government still suffers from
maturing budgetary processes, leaving it unable to execute its entire
2007 capital budget. Residual funds can be used in 2008 or revert to
the DFI. The serious challenges to capital budget execution continue to
include the security environment, corruption, fear of corruption
charges, lack of clarity on budget execution rules and responsibilities
and, in many cases, a lack of technical expertise. U.S. Embassy
officials and Provincial Reconstruction Teams continue to work with
central government and provincial officials to improve this picture
through building technical capacity on budgeting and budget execution.
Question 48. Reports received by the Committee suggest that on
average, Iraqi ministries are ineffective, they lack management skills,
budgetary controls, executive capacity, they fail to cooperate with
each other, management is not empowered, and much worse they continue
to fail in delivery of basic services. This is dire news. Do the Iraqis
recognize this? Roughly how much has the United States spent to improve
ministerial capacity over the past five years? How much is left in the
current contract? What do you estimate to be the most effective
programs?
Answer. Iraqi Government ministries have made progress, in some
cases very significant progress, over the two years of their existence.
The maturing institutions are improving their capacity to deliver
essential services to the Iraqi people. These ministries are making
progress both at the national level, and in their regional offices,
which are helping improve delivery of services in the provinces. There
is no question that the record of achievement is mixed, with some
ministries performing better than others, and all the ministries
continue to face significant challenges. Over the past two years,
security has posed a challenge for USAID contractors working with some
of these ministries. Also during this period several ministries
objected to working with the USG. With the improvement of security on
the ground, and changes in some ministers, we have largely been able to
overcome these difficulties.
Despite these constraints, the Embassy and USAID have identified a
number of alternative and creative approaches to deliver assistance.
The National Capacity Development Program (NCDP) involves engagement on
the part of the Embassy and USAID with the leadership and working-level
civil servants at the Iraqi ministries. The Iraq Transition Assistance
Office (ITAO) oversees several short-term projects organized to enable
rapid response to immediate priorities. These projects, the program
administered by USAID (Tatweer) and the Embassy's Rule of Law program
are designed to assist Iraq's transition to self-sufficiency by
enabling the government to provide security, to ensure the rule of law,
to deliver essential services to the Iraqi people, and to develop a
market-driven economy through democratic processes.
USAID's Tatweer program is designed to meet this goal by developing
the skills and qualifications of public servants through public
management and administration training. In addition to working with key
ministries to improve their ability to carry out core functions, such
as strategic planning and policy development, budgeting, training, and
managing a personnel system, CD programs are also being implemented in
the Prime Minister's and Deputy Prime Minister's offices as well as the
Council of Ministers' Secretariat. Tatweer is a three-year program with
an award ceiling of $209.5 million. To date, USAID has received
$205,000,000 to support ministerial capacity development programs.
In January 2008 the Embassy's Ministerial Engagement Team concluded
an informal assessment of the 11 civilian ministries participating in
USAID's Tatweer program and ITAO's short-term national capacity
development programs. This informal assessment covered the period of
January 2006 through December 2007. Across the board, improvement was
noted in the areas of budget execution, contracting and procurement.
These findings are confirmed by the increased national spending rates.
The January ministerial assessment revealed that in the areas of
technology development, strategic planning, and human resource and
workforce management, weaknesses exist. We are working with our
implementers, international partners and the Government of Iraq to
address shortcomings.
Our capacity development programs do not stop at the national
level. Our Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are instrumental in
strengthening provincial government capacity to transparently allocate
and spend their capital budgets through direct US technical assistance
and training and by fostering working relations with national
ministries. In 2006 and 2007 the central government channeled over $3
billion to the provinces, of which over $2 billion has been spent.
Acting as a driver of political reconciliation, the budget has drawn
different partners to work together to improve the lives of Iraqi
citizens. Another important outcome of PRT efforts has been to generate
domestic, bottom-up pressure for improved ministerial performance.
However, insurgents hurt the ability of the provincial governments to
perform. Provinces with the lowest level of attacks in 2007 executed
the highest portion of their budgets.
The Provincial Reconstruction Development Council (PRDC) program
and the Local Governance Program (LGP) are just two examples of ongoing
provincial level capacity building programs implemented via the PRTs.
The PRDC program helps develop local and provincial capabilities to
plan and execute small-scale infrastructure projects using USG and
Iraqi resources. USAID's Local Governance Program (LGP) builds the
capacity of local political institutions at the governorate, district,
sub-district, and neighborhood levels. Congress has allocated
approximately $790 million for PRDC and $245 million for LGP in the
2006 and 2007 supplementals.
Refugees
Question 49. Can you provide an update on Iraq's $25 million
pledge to Syria and Jordan to help support its citizens who are being
hosted by those governments? Are more contributions expected?
Please describe US, Iraqi efforts to resettle families who wish to
return. Are international organizations actively involved on the
ground? Are the Iraqis willing to fund this further?
The Administration has increased sanctions against Syria against
reports that the Syrian government has been helpful to the Iraqis who
have sought refuge there. How many refugees have been interviewed for
processing by US teams in Syria? Do you expect the Syrians to
reciprocate? What provisions have been made to ensure our DHS and State
Department teams who have been working to process Iraqi refugees are
not limited by new sanctions?
Answer. The Government of Iraq pledged to provide $25 million in
refugee assistance to Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon. The Iraqi government
has delivered $15 million directly to the Syrian government and $2
million to the Lebanese government. The $8 million allocated by Iraq
for assistance to refugees in Jordan has not yet been disbursed. The
Iraqi and Jordanian governments are still engaged in discussions about
the mechanism through which these funds will be disbursed to support
Iraqi refugees in Jordan. Senior GoI officials agreed with Under
Secretary for Democracy and Global Affairs Paula Dobriansky during her
visit to Baghdad on February 7, 2008, that the Iraqi government needs
to do more for its vulnerable citizens displaced abroad.
Recent reports from international humanitarian organizations
caution that conditions for Iraqis displaced inside Iraq and in the
region continue to deteriorate. These reports, along with the short-
lived spike in repatriation in late 2007, have focused GOI, USG, and
international humanitarian community attention on the need to prepare
for returns.
The Iraqi Government has launched a number of initiatives to
address displacement and repatriation. In the spring of 2007, the GOI
announced that it would make one-time payments of one million Iraqi
dinars, approximately USD 800, to displaced families who returned to
their homes in Baghdad. Several thousand families received payments
under this program before it was temporarily suspended. In late
November, when there was a sudden surge in returns of both refugees and
IDPs, the GOI, in coordination with the UN, launched the Joint Rapid
Response Plan. This Plan is a pilot project to target assistance to the
most vulnerable returnees.
UNHCR provided funding of more than $10 million to assist returnees
to Baghdad at that time.
The USG, UN, and other international humanitarian organizations are
also working closely with the Iraqi government to plan for returns.
Embassy and MNF-I staff meet regularly with senior GOI and UN officials
to urge the GOI to take a more pro-active role in preparing for large
scale IDP and refugee returns, including the creation of a broad
national policy, the identification of resources, and the creation of
governmental coordination structures to manage returns. The USG has
established an inter-agency working group in Washington, DC that
focuses on planning for Iraqi returns and repatriation.
The international humanitarian community is increasing its
engagement as well. UN High Commissioner for Refugees Antonio Guterres
announced during his visit to Baghdad on February 16 that UNHCR would
increase its international staff in Baghdad from two to six people,
including the senior-level Resident Representative. Commissioner
Guterres also announced that UNHCR had proposed to join the GOI in
assessing conditions for large-scale return of displaced Iraqis. UNHCR
and the GOI are now discussing Terms of Reference for the proposed
mission. A conference is also being planned to include the Iraqi
Ministry of Migration (MoM), the UN, PRTs, USAID, the International
Organization for Migration, and the U.S. Embassy. The goals of the
conference are to further refine GoI policy on internally displaced
Iraqis and to coordinate technical assistance to the MoM from the USG,
its implementing partners, and the UN.
Regarding Syria, we recognize that the Syrian government plays an
important humanitarian role in hosting almost half of all refugees
displaced in the region. The State Department has engaged the Syrians
on this important humanitarian issue. Former Assistant Secretary for
the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration Ellen Sauerbrey
visited Damascus in March 2007 to discuss humanitarian and refugee
issues. Ambassador James Foley, the Secretary's Senior Coordinator for
Iraqi Refugee Affairs, traveled to Damascus in October 2007, where he
reiterated our commitment to providing assistance to Iraqis living in
Syria through the United Nations and our international partners, as
well as our commitment to resettling particularly vulnerable refugees
in the United States. Due to A/S Sauerbrey's and Ambassador Foley's
efforts, we have an agreed framework with the Syrian Government and the
UNHCR for carrying out U.S. refugee admissions processing in Syria.
As of February 13, UNHCR had referred 6,451 Iraqi refugees in Syria
to the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program, of which 2,483 individuals had
been interviewed by the Department of Homeland Security. The remainder
will be interviewed by DHS between March and July of this year.
We would like the Syrians to do more; refugee processing in Syria
is contingent upon the ability of DHS and State Department officials to
continue to receive visas to enter the country, and we have asked the
SARG to provide those visas as needed. We have also asked the SARG to
allow our implementing partner in refugee processing, the International
Organization for Migration (IOM), to bring in added staff necessary for
training and processing. While the DHS visas have generally been
granted, we have not had success with visas for IOM staff.
U.S.-Brazil MOU
Question 50. What progress has been made on implementing the
biofuels investment feasibility studies envisioned under the U.S.-
Brazil Memorandum of Understanding?
Answer. We have identified nearly 30 possible feasibility studies
and technical assistance projects across our four target countries: El
Salvador, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and St. Kitts and Nevis.
Working with the target country governments and our consultants
(Winrock International and Getulio Vargas Foundation), we identified
eight priority opportunities, which involve feasibility studies and/or
technical assistance in each of the target countries and have begun
committing funds for each. The United States, Brazil, and our donor
partners will support as many projects as possible in the coming
months. Our consultants will continue to develop funding proposals for
the remaining projects.
Question 51. How much funding is required to implement the MOU?
Answer. The eight current projects are budgeted at $2.5 million.
The United States is collaborating with donors including the
Organization of American States (OAS), Inter-American Development Bank
(IDB), and United Nations Foundation that have expressed their
willingness to contribute a total of $11 million. We are pleased with
our commitments to date and do not foresee the need for additional
funding.
Question 52. Has the Brazilian government met their obligations
under the MOU?
Answer. Yes, the GOB has met its obligations, both in management
and implementation of the agreement as evidenced by the strong progress
across all three prongs of the MOU.
To advance the bilateral R&D cooperation, the GOB sent a team of
Brazilian scientists to the United States in September 2007 to visit
U.S. Departments of Energy and Agriculture renewable energy labs and
offered to receive a team of U.S. scientists for a reciprocal visit in
the Spring or Summer 2008. We expect joint agreement on areas of
cooperation and an implementation roadmap shortly after. Additionally,
the U.S. Department of Energy and the Brazilian government (Ministry of
Foreign Relations/Ministry of Science and Technology) initiated a
bilateral project on the impact on greenhouse gases (GHG) from the
expansion of ethanol production in the two countries. The National
Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) and the State University of Campinas
(UNICAMP, Brazil) are implementing this project.
To advance regional cooperation, the GOB hired technical
consultants from the Fundacao Getulio Vargas to assist target country
governments in their long-term planning for biofuels development. The
GOB has joined the United States in engaging diplomatically in the
target countries and meetings with target country officials in the
United States.
To advance multilateral cooperation on standards and codes, the GOB
established the International Biofuels Forum (IBF) in the fall of 2006.
In addition to Brazil and the U.S., the IBF includes India, China, the
European Commission (EC), and South Africa. The United States, GOB, and
EC have advanced work on standards and codes through our respective
standards bodies (NIST in the case of the United States). The results
of the collaboration are summarized in the United States, Brazil, and
the European Union Release Report on Biofuels Standards http://
www.nist.gov/public_affairs/biofuels_report_fact_sheet.pdf and the
white paper is available at http://www.nist.gov/public_affairs/
biofuels_report.pdf.
Question 53. Is the State Department planning to send the Congress
proposed legislation for the U.S.-Brazil led biofuels initiative? Would
authorizing legislation be useful in maintaining momentum for the
initiative past January 2007?
Answer. The Department currently has no plans to propose
legislation to the Congress on this initiative. Given the broad support
for the partnership, we do not anticipate barriers to continuing work
beyond January 2009.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Boxer
Question 1. In 2005, when you were Secretary of State, then
attorney general Alberto Gonzales reportedly approved two secret memos
specifically authorizing waterboarding, head slapping, and frigid
temperatures. NBC News reported that you were aware of these secret
memos. Were you aware of these memos? If so, did you agree with the
decision to authorize waterboarding?
Is waterboarding ever permitted under the U.N. Convention Against
Torture?
Answer. Although I would not comment on the accuracy that report, I
was aware that the Department of Justice prepared legal opinions in
2005 relating to the CIA interrogation program.
As to the question whether waterboarding would be lawful, I would
emphasize that there have been a number of changes in the law
applicable to interrogation techniques, including enactment of the
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 and the Military Commissions Act of
2006, and the promulgation of the President's Executive Order of July
2007, which implement the Supreme Court's decision in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld (2006) that Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions
applies to the armed conflict with al Qaeda. These provisions make
clear that any techniques within the CIA program must comply with the
legal prohibitions on torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment,
and the humane treatment requirements of Common Article 3. Were any
U.S. agency or person to propose the use of waterboarding in the
future, it would be necessary to consider the lawfulness of the
technique under all applicable domestic and international law.
Furthermore, the President would have to determine whether to authorize
its use.
Question 2. I remain very concerned about Iran's failure to
suspend its nuclear enrichment program as required by the UN Security
Council. What are the prospects for a tough UN Security Council
resolution that has the support of the international community?
Answer. The Council clearly expressed its intention in UN Security
Council resolution 1747 to consider the adoption of further appropriate
measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter if the IAEA
Director General's report showed that Iran had failed to comply with UN
Security Council resolutions 1737 and 1747. The Director General has
reported three times since the adoption of that resolution in March
2007 that Iran has failed to do so.
The Foreign Ministers of China, France, Germany, Russia, UK, and
the United States (P5+1) reached agreement on the elements of a third
UNSC sanctions resolution on 22 January 2008 in Berlin. The EU3 shared
the draft resolution with the full Council on 5 February 2008. The
Council has been engaged in negotiations on the resolution in New York
for the past several weeks. We expect the Council will adopt the
resolution soon.
Pursuant to standing P5+1 strategy of incremental increases on
sanctions on Iran until it meets its Security Council obligations, the
draft resolution increases the severity of existing sanctions and
expands upon the previous two UNSC sanctions resolutions (UNSC
Resolutions 1737 and 1747). The resolution is the product of intense
negotiations between the members of the P5+1 and is a clear signal to
the Iranian regime that the P5+1 are united in ensuring that Iran
complies with its UNSC obligations. These obligations include providing
the IAEA with the all of the information and access it needs to verify
that Iran has permanently ceased all weapons-related work.
Until Iran meets its UNSC obligations, as clearly outlined in
UNSCRs 1696, 1737, and 1747, and the calls of the IAEA Board of
Governors and has fully disclosed any weapons-related activities to the
IAEA, the international community can have no confidence in the
exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program. UNSC sanctions
are part of our dual track strategy to clarify to Iran's leaders the
consequences of its continued noncompliance, while also keeping open
the door to direct negotiations.
Update to take into account recent developments:
On 22 February 2008 the IAEA Director General reported that Iran is
continuing to fail to comply with its UN Security Council obligations
and calls by the IAEA Board of Governors to suspend all proliferation
sensitive nuclear activities, including enrichment-related activities,
and has not undertaken full and complete transparency with the IAEA.
After allowing for time to review and consider the IAEA Director
General's report, the Council adopted UNSC sanctions resolution 1803 on
3 March 2008 by a vote of 14-0 with one abstention (Indonesia). This is
now the third time that the Council has imposed Chapter VII sanctions
on Iran.
Question 3. Please describe the progress made, if any, by the
Philippine Government in implementing the recommendations of the United
Nations Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary
Executions.
Answer. United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary
or Arbitrary Executions Philip Alston visited the Philippines in
February 2007. In his final report, which was released in November
2007, the Special Rapporteur made numerous recommendations aimed at
eliminating extrajudicial killings (EJKs) from counterinsurgency
operations, achieving convictions in EJK cases, reforming the witness
protection program, and bolstering human rights enforcement throughout
the government's civilian, military and security agencies.
The Philippine government has taken significant measures to address
the problem of EJKs. To begin, President Arroyo has been clear in
directing members of the Armed Forces to adhere strictly to human
rights principles. The military leadership issued a directive outlining
command responsibility as a basis for criminal liability.
The Philippine government has underway a number of investigations
and prosecutions into EJKs and forced disappearances. As of December
2007, the Philippine Department of Justice State Prosecutor Task Force
was investigating 23 cases. Between January and November 2007, the
Commission on Human Rights (CHR) investigated 30 cases of politically
motivated killings involving 38 victims. The Philippine National Police
Task Force Usig reports that it has filed 59 cases in court, archived
49 as ``cold'' (no developments or progress in one year), and dropped
one.
The Philippine Department of Justice reports that one police
officer and eight civilians have been convicted for extrajudicial
killings. According to the Philippine Supreme Court, 45 cases of
extrajudicial killings are currently pending in the regional trial
courts. To streamline the prosecution of these and other EJK cases,
President Arroyo has mandated cooperation and coordination between
prosecutors and police from the outset of a political or media killing
until the termination of cases in court.
Further, the Philippine Department of Justice has implemented
several reforms to the Witness Protection Program. According to the
Philippine government, admission requirements for witness protection
coverage have been liberalized. Regional prosecutors have also been
authorized to grant provisional coverage to high-risk witnesses under
threat pending confirmation of their admission to the Program. The
economic benefits and social services for witnesses under the Program
have also been enhanced.
In October 2007, the Philippine Supreme Court issued new rules
regarding the ``writ of amparo,'' a remedy available to human rights
advocates and families of victims of human rights abuses by government
agencies. Under the new rules, any aggrieved person or family member
may file a petition against any public official or agency. The judge
may then issue a writ of amparo mandating that the respondent within
five days produce the missing person, provide information on the
person's whereabouts, or demonstrate that the government agency is
taking affirmative action to locate the missing person. The judge may
also issue inspection orders to search particular locations. Human
rights lawyers have filed at least 15 writs of amparo against the
military. Seven cases were resolved and eight are pending hearings. Of
the seven resolved cases, four resulted in the release of the accused
from military custody.
In 2007, there was a significant decline in EJKs. According to Task
Force Usig, there were seven EJKs in 2007, down from 41 in 2006.
Similarly, the Commission on Human Rights reported 38 victims through
November 2007, down from 159 during the equivalent time frame in 2006.
The NGO Karapatan reported 68 victims in 2007, down from 209 in 2006.
The numbers vary because each organization differs in its definition of
EJK; however, there is an unmistakable downward trend in each report.
The decline in extrajudicial killings was most likely due to the
measures noted above, along with heightened international attention to
the issue.
While we welcome the government's steps and last year's apparent
decline in EJKs, we remain concerned about the problem of EJKs and
continue to press the Philippine authorities to pursue these
investigations and seek convictions, as well as to further strengthen
institutional efforts to combat EJKs.
Question 4. Please describe the progress made, if any, by the
Philippine Government in implementing a policy of promoting military
personnel who demonstrate professionalism and respect for human rights,
and investigating and prosecuting military personnel and others who
have been credibly alleged to have committed extrajudicial executions
or other violations of human rights.
Answer. It is the Department's understanding that professionalism
and respect for human rights are among the factors considered by the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in making promotion decisions.
The Human Rights Office of the AFP, which was created in January 2007,
organizes continuing human rights education programs and investigates
formal complaints on alleged violations of human rights. We remain
concerned about the problem of EJKs and continue to press the Armed
Forces of the Philippines to pursue investigations and seek
convictions, as well as to further strengthen institutional efforts to
combat EJKs.
Question 5. Is the Philippine military engaging in acts of
intimidation or violence against members of legal organizations who
advocate for human rights?
Answer. Concerns that members of the security forces are involved
in extrajudicial killings persist. U.S. military assistance programs
continue to encourage respect for due process, combat corruption, and
strengthen the professionalism, commitment to human rights, discipline,
and technical expertise of the Philippine military. Hence, significant
numbers of Philippine soldiers each year receive some form of human
rights training, which is embedded in training exercises, by U.S.
military personnel. U.S. support for the Philippine Defense Reform
program remains crucial for building the command and control necessary
to end practices such as extrajudicial killings and ensure widespread
respect for human rights.
Question 6. Japan is the only G-7 industrialized country which is
not a party to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction. Please describe the State Department's
efforts to resolve active cases of international parental child
abduction involving Japan.
Answer. The Office of Children's Issues currently maintains more
than forty open cases of international parental child abduction to
Japan involving more than fifty children. That number increases
steadily because children abducted to Japan are seldom returned. The
Department is aware of only three cases of abduction to Japan that have
resolved favorably. In two of those cases, the couple reconciled. In a
third, a sixteen-year-old boy surreptitiously left the taking parent's
home with the aid of the left-behind parent. The consulate issued the
boy an emergency U.S. passport and assisted him as appropriate with his
return to the United States.
Through our Office of Children's Issues, the Department provides a
point of contact and a resource for left-behind parents whose children
have been taken to Japan. We tailor our efforts to the individual
situation and work diligently to be responsive to the requests of our
left-behind parents while balancing the realities of the tragic
situation. The Office of Children's Issues works individually with the
parents to advise them regarding options in domestic courts, with local
law enforcement and the FBI, and in the courts in Japan. We advise them
to move expediently to seek custody of their children in U.S. courts.
We assist them in communicating the gravity of the situation to local
law enforcement and the FBI and identifying federal statutes that may
be applicable. We consult with attorneys, many of whom are dealing with
an international abduction situation for the first time. We inform
left-behind parents of patterns observed in the behavior of taking
parents in Japan and the difficulty facing American parents in Japanese
courts. The Department also seeks to designate non-U.S. citizen
abductors and those who assist them as ineligible for U.S. visas.
Measures such as pursuing criminal charges, seeking Interpol notices,
and designating abductors ineligible for U.S. visas restrict taking
parents' ability to travel and put pressure on them to negotiate a
resolution.
Where it is appropriate, we work to build communication between the
parties. By so doing, in other EAP countries, we are occasionally able
to help negotiate informal solutions or compromises whereby a left-
behind parent can gain occasional access to their child. While these
compromises fall short of a full resolution of the situation, most
parents consider occasional access preferable to being completely cut
off from their child as frequently happens in Japan.
Our ability to help the left-behind parent is crucial, but the
highest priority of the Department is safeguarding the welfare of U.S.
citizen children. To protect our most vulnerable citizens, the victims
of parental child abduction, we work through our embassy in Tokyo and
consulates to conduct welfare and whereabouts visits with abducted
children; we raise abuse and neglect concerns with the Japanese
government; and we pursue all lawful and appropriate means to return
abducted children to their custodial parents.
Welfare visits often require assistance from the host government,
as taking parents may not provide information about their whereabouts
to the left behind parents. Citing privacy laws and legal and cultural
differences, and noting that the children in question are often
Japanese citizens as well, the Government of Japan has long declined to
assist with welfare and whereabouts visits. In one notable example, a
diplomatic note requesting assistance in gaining consular access to an
abducted child has gone unanswered for more than a year. However, in a
recent break with that policy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
responded quickly to a subsequent diplomatic note in a separate case
and contacted the attorney of a taking parent to underscore our request
for a welfare and whereabouts visit. Although the taking parent
continued her refusal and no visit has occurred, this direct action by
the Government of Japan was the first of its kind.
In Japan, our ability to assist on individual cases has proven
consistently to be sharply limited. Consequently, the Department
focuses significant effort on the bi-lateral relationship between the
United States and Japan to enable us to provide better assistance to
left-behind parents in the United States. When the Hague Convention on
the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction applies, the Office
of Children's Issues, which is the Central Authority for the
Convention, assists parents in filing an application with foreign
central authorities for return of, or access to, the child. Japan is
not a partner in the Hague Abduction Convention. Consequently, our
strategy with respect to international parental abduction cases to
Japan is to raise the issue with the Government of Japan at every
appropriate opportunity.
When Ambassador Maura Harty, then the Assistant Secretary of the
Bureau of Consular Affairs, traveled to Tokyo in December 2005, she
initiated a high-level State Department dialogue with the Japanese
Government on issues involving international parental child abduction.
On September 6, 2006, U.S. and Japanese representatives met again in
Tokyo to discuss international parental abduction. The Department once
again urged Japan to accede to the Hague Abduction Convention, which we
have been doing since the early 1990's. In March 2008, the Department
participated in a Canadian-sponsored symposium in Japan to once again
press the issue. In conjunction with her participation in the
symposium, the Deputy Director of the Office of Children's Issues met
with Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials to stress the importance of
the issue to the U.S. Government. However, the Japanese Government's
reception to these requests to join the Hague Convention has been
consistently unfavorable.
Other efforts appear to be yielding incremental, but significant,
gains. In parallel with their efforts to gain Japan's agreement to join
the Hague Convention, State Department officials in Washington have
pressed the Japanese Embassy at a high level on the abduction issue.
The Department has encouraged the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo to identify and
push for alternative ways the Japanese Government can address the
concerns of the left behind parents. These meetings, coupled with the
senior-official discussions held in Japan, appear to have increased
Japanese Government awareness of the agonizing separation forced upon
the left-behind parents and encouraged a willingness in the central
government to consider how they could promote greater readiness at the
local level in Japan to assist in such cases. At the conclusion of the
Canadian-sponsored symposium, Japanese officials delivered a long-
awaited ``handbook'' to guide left-behind parents whose children are in
Japan and those seeking to assist them. The U.S. Embassy in Tokyo is
working to translate the document to analyze how this will affect the
Department's assistance to left-behind parents.
Given the difficulties in resolving the situation after a child has
been taken to Japan, it is infinitely preferable if the child does not
become a victim in the first place. Consequently, we work to prevent
abductions. The Prevention Unit of the Bureau's Office of Children's
Issues educates parents on the dangers of international abduction and
works with them to protect children in the United States from this
threat. Prevention tools on the Bureau of Consular Affairs website
(www.travel.state.gov) include information on precautions for parents,
the importance of custody orders, passport requirements for minor
children including parental consent regulations, and the Children's
Passport Issuance Alert Program (CPIAP). This important program enables
Children's Issues to notify a parent or court-ordered legal guardian
before issuing a U.S. passport to his or her minor child. To enter a
child's name in the program, parents or guardians need to submit a
written request to Children's Issues.
We also endeavor to interrupt abductions in progress. Our abduction
and prevention officers often act as points of contact as a parent
works to marshal legal remedies to try to prevent a potential abductor
from leaving the United States. By working with a parent's legal
representative, local law enforcement, and the FBI, we are sometimes
able to utilize the Department of Homeland Security's Prevent Departure
program to keep a potential abductor from leaving the United States.
Question 7. On January 25, 2008, I sent a letter with my
colleague, Sen. Dianne Feinstein, to the Prime Minister of Vietnam, Mr.
Nguyen Tan Dung regarding Mr. Nguyen Quoc Quan, an American citizen and
California resident. According to available news reports, Mr. Nguyen
Quoc Quan was arrested in Vietnam on November 17, 2007 for peacefully
distributing pro-democracy leaflets. Our letter called for Mr. Nguyen
Quoc Quan's release and the release of all political prisoners detained
for the peaceful advocacy of democracy. Will you continue to work for
the release of Mr. Nguyen Quoc Quan? What more can be done to encourage
Vietnam to improve its human rights record?
Answer. We have expressed our concern over the arrest of American
citizen Dr. Nguyen Quoc Quan to senior Vietnamese officials in Hanoi
and to the Vietnamese Ambassador in Washington. We have made clear that
the United Stated opposes the arrest of anyone for the peaceful
expression of his or her views, and that anyone detained on that basis
should be released immediately. We will continue to raise at high
levels our concerns with the Vietnamese government.
We continue to press Vietnam to improve its human rights record. We
are urging Vietnam to release all remaining political prisoners, and
end the use of catch-all ``national security'' provisions like Article
88 of the criminal code, which outlaws ``propaganda against the State''
and is used to suppress political opposition. The next round of our
bilateral Human Rights Dialogue is planned for May this year. We have
made clear to the Vietnamese that the Dialogue must lead to concrete
action to improve the human rights situation. More broadly, we have
underscored that expanding our relationship will depend on progress in
all areas, including greater respect for human rights and more freedom
for the people of Vietnam.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Coleman
Hmong Human Rights
Question 1. What are we doing in conjunction with the Thai
government to protect the lives of Hmong refugees and ensure that they
are not deported back to Laos?
Answer. We have repeatedly urged the Thai government to evaluate
all Hmong claims to refugee status individually before a decision is
made on deportation. We understand that the Thai government has
established a vetting process to evaluate Hmong asylum-seekers' cases
and has consistently assured us that Hmong asylum-seekers with a
legitimate fear of persecution will not be repatriated to Laos.
Nevertheless, Thai authorities did deport several groups of Hmong
asylum-seekers without screening in 2006 and 2007. We have registered
strong concerns about those repatriations at senior levels of the Thai
government.
The Department of State, through the Bureau of Population,
Refugees, and Migration, in late 2007 contributed approximately
$500,000 to support basic humanitarian assistance at the Hmong
settlement at Petchaboon, Thailand through a contribution to the United
Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). UNICEF works with the sole non-
governmental organization present at the settlement, Medecins Sans
Frontieres (MSF), to provide food, cooking fuel, blankets and other
basic assistance to residents. MSF has provided basic health care for
the Hmong at Petchaboon for over two years. UNICEF will continue to
monitor living conditions there during regular visits to the
settlement.
With respect to the issue of potential return of any Hmong not
found to be refugees, we have urged the Lao government to allow
international monitors access to areas where Hmong have been
repatriated and permit humanitarian organizations based outside of Laos
to assist with reintegration. That system was in place in the 1990s
when Thailand repatriated to Laos the last of approximately 29,000
ethnic Hmong and others deemed economic migrants, and UNHCR was
permitted to monitor their return and reintegration. It should be noted
that UNHCR assessed that these returnees were not mistreated by the Lao
government, and UNHCR closed its office in Laos in 2001. U.S. officials
will also continue to seek expanded international access to Hmong areas
in general.
Question. What other efforts are being made to improve the human
rights situation in Laos?
Answer. Senior U.S. officials, including Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Southeast Asia Scot Marciel during his visit to Laos in January
2008 and Ambassador Ravic Huso on several recent occasions, have had
productive discussions with Lao officials on improving the status of
the Hmong ethnic minority. We have actively raised a range of Hmong-
related issues, including: Hmong asylum-seekers in Thailand, treatment
of those in hiding in remote areas of Laos, and the Lao government's
overall relations with this ethnic minority group. In general, the Lao
response to our concerns in recent months has been cautious but
slightly more encouraging than in the past. Nonetheless, we will
continue to urge the Lao government to permit international
humanitarian access to and monitoring of the Hmong in remote areas.
Bahrain
Question 3. I am concerned about reports of abuses in Bahraini
prisons, particularly of individuals whose imprisonment may have been
politically motivated. Does the State Department believe Bahrain holds
political prisoners? What is the Department's view about allegations of
mistreatment of individuals detained in Bahrain? Can you tell me the
Department's position on the jailing and reported abuse of activist
Mohamed Al-Singace?
Answer. In December 2007, Bahraini officials arrested many
individuals in connection with protest-related violence and the beating
of one police officer. Fifteen men are being held on an array of
offenses including arson, attempted murder of a police officer, theft
of a weapon, and illegal possession of a firearm. On February 24, the
detainees appeared in court to hear the charges against them. Human
rights observers, family members, and the defendant's legal
representatives were present at the hearing. The Bahraini government
has refused to allow a few of the detainees access to legal counsel or
family members. Two men received temporary release from jail in order
to complete education and family obligations.
The Department of State views the allegations of abuse relating to
Mr. Mohamed Al-Singace quite seriously and although we are satisfied
with the review of his case thus far, we continue to discuss this
matter with appropriate Bahraini officials and human rights activists
in an effort to ensure that Mr. Al-Singace receives a transparent and
fair review of his case.
Question 4. As a board member of the National Endowment for
Democracy, I'm concerned about the fact that the National Democratic
Institute was expelled from Bahrain. Can you please tell me how the
Department responded to that expulsion, and what the U.S. is doing to
promote democratic reform in Bahrain?
Answer. In July 2007, NDI resumed activities in Bahrain in
cooperation with the Bahrain Institute for Political Development. USG
dialogue with the government of Bahrain, led by our Embassy in Manama
and by the State Department, was instrumental in NDI's successful
return to Bahrain. Since reaching agreement, NDI has successfully
completed two parliamentary training programs and has received Bahraini
permission to carry out additional programs in March and April 2008.
In May 2006, the Government of Bahrain declined to renew a
residency permit for the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI)
funded Country Director of the National Democratic Institute (NDI),
effectively closing down NDI's operations in Bahrain. While USG
programs on democratic development (many of them implemented by NDI)
were paralyzed for a period of time, NDI and the Government of Bahrain
began a dialogue about proposed Bahraini-NDI cooperation a short while
later. During these discussions senior USG officials strongly urged the
Bahraini government to support NDI activities. The Department
recognizes that increased and sustained Bahraini support for NDI
activities is critical to continued democratic reform in Bahrain.
Bahrain is a friend and ally to the United States; human rights and
democratic development continue to progress despite some setbacks and
challenges. We continue to promote these issues in Bahrain through
frank and constructive dialogue with Bahraini government officials and
activists. Additionally, our Embassy in Manama has at its disposal an
array of public diplomacy tools to support democratic development as
well as effective programs funded by the Middle East Partnership
Initiative to increase respect for human rights and the rule of law in
Bahrain.
Question 5. Some have suggested that Bahraini elections are a sham
because elected leaders wield little real power. Do you agree or
disagree with this viewpoint? What is the Department doing to
strengthen Bahraini elected institutions?
Answer. The November 2006 parliamentary and municipal elections in
Bahrain have largely been viewed as a success. The elections were
Bahrain's second since democratic reforms were instituted in 1999. In
contrast to its decision to boycott the 2002 parliamentary elections,
the Shia oppositionist group Al-Wifaq chose to participate during the
2006 elections and now holds 18 of 40 seats in the elected Council of
Representative (COR), making it the COR's largest block. Al-Wifaq has
used its new position of influence to seek positive, tangible reforms
to benefit Bahrain's Shia community. However, Al-Wifaq's increasingly
prominent role in the Bahraini political process is a positive example
of democratic participation in Bahrain.Strong Bahraini institutions are
important to Bahrain's ongoing democratic development, and despite some
powers such as the ability to propose legislation and question
ministers, more needs to be done to support COR authority. NDI has held
two successful training sessions to empower and educate Bahraini
parliamentarians, and two additional sessions are scheduled to take
place in spring 2008. Embassy Manama continues to work diligently to
strengthen democratic institutions by encouraging broad participation
in Bahrain's political process and by participating in meetings and
dialogue with Bahraini officials and activists.
Question 6. During President Bush's recent visit to Bahrain, I
understand a petition with more than 83,000 signatures was delivered to
the U.S. Embassy to express concern about a lack of democracy in
Bahrain. Can you tell me how this petition was received and what is the
U.S. response to it?
Answer. On January 8, Embassy Manama made special accommodations to
receive the petition you mention, delivered by Mr. Abdujalil Singace.
Despite a holiday-related closure, the Embassy opened its doors to Mr.
Singace and made special accommodations to facilitate his entry onto
the Embassy compound. Mr. Singace requested to personally deliver the
petition to President Bush. Embassy staff could not accommodate this
request, but did deliver the petition to appropriate White House staff
during President Bush's January 12-13 visit to Bahrain. Embassy Manama
did not confirm the number of signatures on the petition before
delivering it to White House staff. The petition remains under review
by White House staff.
Question 7. Does the U.S. Embassy in Bahrain or State Department in
Washington meet with Bahraini political dissidents and democracy
activists?
Answer. U.S. officials in Bahrain and Washington regularly meet
with those Bahraini activists who responsibly express their opposition
and do not advocate violence or extremism. Senior U.S. officials also
regularly meet with such activists and NGO leaders. For example, during
a February 25-26 visit to Bahrain, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for Near Eastern Affairs Kent Patton hosted separate roundtable
discussions with Bahraini oppositionists and NGO leaders. In July 2007,
the Bureau of Democracy Human Rights and Labor Affairs sponsored a
roundtable discussion in Washington among then U.S. Ambassador-
designate to Bahrain Adam Ereli, NGO representatives, and Bahraini
activists. Ambassador Ereli has pledged to engage the Bahraini
government in a dialogue about human rights and hopes ongoing
discussion will continue to highlight the importance of NGO groups as
an asset in promoting respect for democratic reform and human rights in
Bahrain.
Philippines
Question 8. Could you please describe the efforts of how the State
Department is working with the Philippine government to monitor and
ensure that ``command responsibility'' is being properly implemented in
the Philippine military, and that current and former military officers
credibly alleged to be responsible for extrajudicial executions and
disappearances are prosecuted?
Answer. Senior USG officials, both in Washington and Manila,
repeatedly raise concerns about allegations of extrajudicial killings
(EJKs) and urge the Philippine authorities to investigate cases and
prosecute cases, if credible evidence is discovered. State Department
officers also communicate with international and local NGOs and
activists to receive updates on human rights conditions in the
Philippines, including extrajudicial killings, forced disappearances,
and implementation of command responsibility.
In May 2007, as part of its ongoing efforts to help the Philippine
government promote and protect human rights and rule of law, the U.S.
Embassy held a seven-day seminar that included a significant component
on command responsibility. This seminar was taught by a U.S. Attorney's
Office expert and focused on the investigation and prosecution of
extrajudicial killings. It was attended by 31 Philippine investigators,
10 Philippine Department of Justice prosecutors who specialize in the
prosecution of these cases, and four Philippine Commission on Human
Rights regional directors.
Ongoing U.S. military assistance programs enhance professionalism,
encourage respect for human rights, and strengthen the concept of
command responsibility among members of the Philippine Armed Forces.
Each year, thousands of soldiers receive some form of human rights
training, which is embedded in training exercises conducted by U.S.
military personnel.
Question 9. What role is the State Department playing in helping
the Philippine government with the reform of the newly enacted anti-
terror law, the Human Security Act, so that the law provides basic
procedural guarantees and are in accordance with international human
rights standards?
Answer. The Philippine Human Security Act of 2007, signed into law
on March 6, 2007, expanded the tools available to the Philippine
government to investigate and prosecute acts of terrorism. The United
States supported the passage of this legislation since the lack of a
prior legal framework for counterterrorism efforts by law enforcement
agencies had contributed to the Philippines becoming a haven safe for
al Qaida-linked groups, such as the Abu Sayyaf Group and Jemaah
Islamiya. The Human Security Act should enable prosecutors to use new
investigative tools, including electronic surveillance, which will help
bolster their cases against terrorists in court.
The legislation has been criticized by some non-government
organizations concerned about potential government abuse of the Act's
provisions. Accordingly, the Philippine Senate added safeguards to
ensure the Act was not misused by targeting government critics and
opposition politicians. These safeguard provisions are considered
highly protective of civil liberties; some Philippine Congressmen have
since expressed concerns that these provisions are exceedingly strong,
so much so that the Act itself may be difficult to implement.
Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo publicly promised that
``law abiding Filipinos have nothing to fear.for it is a weapon that
shall be wielded against bombers and not protesters.'' To further allay
public concerns, President Arroyo delayed implementation of the Act
until two months after the May 2007 mid-term elections.
The U.S. Embassy worked closely with Philippine legislators and
officials to improve and strengthen the counterterrorism legislation
prior to its passage, while strongly advocating for the inclusion of
built-in protections of the rights of Philippine citizens. After the
act was signed, the Embassy also issued a statement congratulating the
Philippine government and Congress for taking a positive step in
countering and preventing terrorism in the Philippines by providing
needed legal tools while ensuring protection of civil liberties and
human rights.
Since the passage of the Act, we continue to work with the
Philippine government as it implements the law. The Embassy provides
training and assistance to officials from the military, police, and the
Philippines National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, who implement
the Human Security Act. U.S.-sponsored training, whether for the
military, intelligence, or law enforcement community, includes a human
rights component. We will continue to encourage the Philippine
government to use its new counterterrorism tools so as to ensure that
the rights of Philippine citizens are protected in accordance with
international human rights standards.
In December 2007, the U.S. Department of Justice conducted a
training program with the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency and
representatives of the Philippine Anti-Terrorism Council that addressed
the Act and compared it with U.S. law. The focus was on use of
electronic surveillance for presentation in court and, among other
things, discussed the procedural safeguards contained in U.S. law as a
basis for implementation of the act's provisions. The conference also
addressed the current restrictions of the act and the need for
accountability of law enforcement through the public criminal justice
system.
Question 10. Prior to providing military assistance to the
Philippine military, how is the State Department monitoring and
identifying those military units whose members have been credibly
alleged to have committed human rights violations, as required by the
Leahy Law?
Answer. We conduct intensive vetting of all Philippine members of
law enforcement or military units who are candidates for U.S.-funded
training, including civilians attached or assigned to security force
units. The three-part vetting process includes 1) internal vetting by
relevant USG law enforcement agencies at post, including the Drug
Enforcement Administration, the Department of Homeland Security, and
the Regional Security Office; 2) host country vetting by the Philippine
National Bureau of Investigation and the Philippine Commission on Human
Rights; and 3) vetting with the State Department's Bureau for
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor; Bureau of East Asian and Pacific
Affairs; Bureau of Intelligence and Research; and Bureau of Political-
Military Affairs. If there is no credible information of gross
violations of human rights by the candidate at all three levels, the
individual and/or unit are permitted to attend the scheduled training.
Candidates for whom questionable or identified derogatory information
is available have been and will continue to be excluded from receiving
U.S. assistance, as required by the Leahy Amendment. All derogatory
information received on vetted individuals and units is maintained for
review and consultation in future vetting processes.
In 2007, we vetted 2,235 law enforcement and armed forces training
candidates and identified derogatory information on 196 candidates.
Upon further investigation, we excluded 39 individuals and one entire
unit for various human rights violations.
Question 11. Is the State Department working with the Philippine
National Police and the Armed Forces of the Philippines to ensure that
all writs of amparo and other summonses issued by Philippine courts and
the Philippine Commission on Human Rights are fully and completely
enforced and responded to by the PNP and AFP?
Answer. In October 2007, the Philippine Supreme Court promulgated
new rules regarding the writ of amparo, a remedy available to victims
of human rights abuses, particularly extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances. The writ may be filed in any of the 800
Regional Trial Courts against any agency, public official, or private
individual and gives the respondent five working days to provide all
relevant information regarding the case, including steps taken to
investigate the fate or whereabouts of the victim. Since the rules came
into effect in October 2007, human rights lawyers have filed 17 writ of
amparo petitions against the military. Six petitions have resulted in
the release of six persons from military custody.
The USG supported the development and application of the writ of
amparo through programs implemented by the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID). In July 2007, USAID co-sponsored the
Supreme Court's National Consultative Summit on Extra-judicial Killings
and Enforced Disappearances, which identified measures to address human
rights violations in the country, including the urgent need for the
writ of amparo. After the Supreme Court issued the writ of amparo in
October 2007, USAID supported a series of events designed to foster
greater understanding of the writ and to encourage its appropriate use,
including a USAID-supported one-day Supreme Court event with 20 human
rights organizations to discuss guidelines for their accreditation as
private protection providers (the writ of amparo stipulates that
private organizations can provide witness protection in human rights
cases).
In November 2007, USAID support enabled 247 judges and clerks of
court from the regions of Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao to participate
in a conference to clarify provisions of the new rule and to discuss
how petitions should be handled. This February, USAID supported a case
conference attended by networks of human rights organizations to
discuss specific actions needed to support the filing of petitions for
writ of amparo in connection with ten cases of enforced disappearances.
USAID is currently working with the Supreme Court to develop
information materials that will easily convey, through storytelling and
illustrations, the legal procedures involved in securing a writ of
amparo.
In 2007, the Department of Justice/International Criminal
Investigative Training Assistance Program (DOJ/ICITAP) provided
training to approximately 1,500 police officers. While all training
includes a human rights component, approximately 500 of these officers
were specifically trained in Police Ethics or Human Rights. We are on
course to train another 250 by the end of March. Finally, our ICITAP
program is collaborating with the Philippine National Police Human
Rights Affairs Office to help support them with the delivery of their
own in-house human rights training throughout the country.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Menendez
Question 1. The Administration requested $550 million in the 2008
supplemental and now another $550 million in the 2009 budget for a
counterdrug package in Mexico. In light of this increase, please
justify the $37 million overall cut in the 2009 request from DA, ESF,
and CSH accounts compared to the 2008 levels in Latin America.
Answer. A key priority in building the FY 2009 foreign assistance
request was reinvigorating our investment in the Western Hemisphere.
While the Merida security initiative to combat drug trafficking,
transnational crime, and terrorism in the region is an important focus
of this year's request, the FY 2009 budget also prioritizes funding for
development objectives in the Western Hemisphere such as advancing
democracy and free trade. Excluding funding for the Merida initiative,
the FY 2009 request for the region represents $31.5 million (2.1
percent) increase over FY 2008 enacted levels.
The FY 2009 budget acknowledges criticism of last year's request by
increasing development assistance (DA/ESF) funding for the region.
Combined, these two accounts increase $77.3 million (13.8 percent) from
last year's request, with significant investments for Bolivia, Ecuador,
and Central America to promote democratic governance and economic
opportunity, as well as support for the implementation of the Central
American and Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR).
Funding is also targeted to expand democracy, poverty reduction, and
environment programs in Haiti.
We appreciate Congress' strong support for programs funded from the
Child Survival and Health (CSH) account, reflected by an FY 2008
enacted level for the region of $134 million, a 24 percent increase
over the Administration's FY 2008 request. CSH programs are a top
priority for this Administration as we continue to balance assistance
across all sectors to support sustainable development practices. As a
result, the FY 2009 request for the CSH in the Western Hemisphere is
essentially straight lined from last year's request level.
Staffing at USAID
I believe that the strength of U.S. development assistance efforts
depends on the strength and morale of the people who make up its
workforce. I also believe, that one good way to ensure impact of our
programs is ensure that we have the most capable, dedicated, and
diverse workforce on the ground. Over the last few decades, there has
been a stark erosion of the technical and managerial capacity at USAID.
As a result, many of USAID's staff have left to pursue better
opportunities.
I recently sent a letter along with Sen. Biden asking USAID
Administrator Fore to come to Congress with a comprehensive plan to
staff up the Agency, rather than the stop-gap measure they have
proposed to increase the number of Foreign Service officers. While I
believe that getting more people is important, but it won't solve the
problem--getting the right people and retaining the best people is the
only way that USAID is going to re-establish itself as the heavy-weight
in the U.S. Government's foreign assistance. In your budget request,
the Administration has asked for an 18 percent increase of Overhead
Expenses (OE) or $117 million dollars. While more resources are part of
this equation, they are only a small part.
Question 2. What are you doing to make sure that USAID is able to
attract and retain the most qualified workforce?
Answer. Recognizing the development landscape has changed over the
past two decades with levels in trade, foreign direct investment and
remittances overtaking official, development assistance, I have
instituted an aggressive outreach program that will target candidates
with the skills needed for a 21st Century USAID workforce.
Demonstrating a commitment to enriching the application pool, senior
USAID leadership will be participating in recruitment events that will
identify quality candidates to be considered for upcoming Foreign
Service Officer positions.
Question 3. Do you plan to make a sincere gesture to build the
capacity of the staff at USAID, instead of just increasing the number
of Foreign Service Officers?
Answer. New initiatives have been undertaken focusing on
strengthening the skills of the entire workforce. The USAID training
budget was doubled for FY 2007 and maintained at this level in FY 2008
even under significant budget constraints. I have directed the staff to
look at the content and how we deliver training, including bringing a
greater number of more relevant courses to the desk tops of our staff
through e-learning. In addition, USAID is moving to greatly expand our
foreign language training beyond French, Spanish, Portuguese and
Russian to include Arabic, the languages of South and East Asia and
some of the more common African languages.
Question 4. What percentage of Personal Services Contractors and
Institutional Contractors, respectively, represent in the current USAID
workforce?
Answer. The total U.S. workforce is 3,308. Of this total, Personal
Services Contractor and institutional contractor staff amount to 628
and 280, respectively. The percentage of the USAID U.S. workforce for
Personal Services Contractors is 15% and for institutional contractor
staff it is 19%.
Question 5. How will these individuals be integrated into the
staffing at USAID?
Answer. As I have mentioned in the past, USAID cannot double the
size of the Foreign Service workforce by solely bringing in entry-level
hires. The workforce gap analysis is identifying areas of mid-level
shortfalls taking into account the organizational needs and on-board
staff. USAID will then competitively recruit to fill these gaps. It is
anticipated that qualified Personal Services Contractors that apply
would rise to the top of the list. There will also be a continued need
for a very small number of Personal Services Contractor staff to fill
short-term targeted needs.
Question 6. In November, Defense Secretary Gates stated in a speech
at Kansas State University that there is a ``need for a dramatic
increase in spending on the civilian instruments of national security--
diplomacy, strategic communications, foreign assistance, civic action,
and economic reconstruction and development.'' Do you agree with this?
If so, can you elaborate?
Please comment specifically on why the key elements of our
development assistance efforts--basic education for example, or
fighting disease and improving health care--are particularly effective
instruments of national security today, and will be even more so in the
months and years to come?
Answer. I absolutely agree with Secretary Gate's statement.
President Bush's Fiscal Year 2009 Foreign Operations Budget for the
Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) and other foreign affairs agencies totals $26.1 billion, an
increase of 8.9 percent over the total Fiscal Year 2008 enacted to
date, including emergency funding, or 14.3 percent over the FY 2008
enacted base. This increase reflects a determined effort to enhance
civilian instruments of national security-including the capacity of our
civilian agencies, with staff increases for the Department of State and
the largest requested increase in USAID's operational budget in nearly
two decades-and our development, reconstruction, and security
assistance.
Development now plays a vastly elevated role in America's foreign
policy. The charge I have given to our diplomatic corps is a long-term
development goal-to help build and sustain democratic, well-governed
states that respond to the needs of their people, reduce widespread
poverty, and behave responsibly toward their people and the
international system. In the 21st century, defined as it is thus far by
an unprecedented and increasing interdependence, human development is
both a moral end in itself and also a central pillar of our national
security.
Today, the idea that foreign assistance-and specifically long-term
development-is a vital tool of our international statecraft meets with
broad and growing support. The closer collaboration of State and USAID
enacted under the establishment of a dual-hatted Director of U.S.
Foreign Assistance and USAID Administrator has aided that effort,
providing our development professionals the opportunity-indeed the
mandate-to more fully participate at all levels of budget and program
planning, providing their insight, perspective, and superior
development expertise across the range of our programs and accounts,
not just those appropriated to USAID, and to the tough choices that
need to be made across our global budget.
With respect to funding, we have continued to boost the quantity of
our assistance. Since 2001, with the support and partnership of
Congress, President Bush has launched the largest development agenda
since the Marshall Plan. In the past six years, we have nearly tripled
official development assistance worldwide and quadrupled it to Sub-
Saharan Africa.
As noted above, the FY 2009 request reflects the continuation of
this effort, further illustrating the emerging national consensus in
support of development. The resources requested in the Fiscal Year 2009
Foreign Operations Budget demonstrate our strong commitment to fighting
poverty, with a focus on strengthening democratic governance and
promoting economic growth. This is reflected in our request for the
Development Assistance account, which is nearly 60 percent higher than
the Fiscal Year 2008 request, and our request of $1.7 billion for
democracy promotion and governance.
I would also like to specifically mention the State Department's
Civilian Stabilization Initiative (CSI) that is included in the
President's budget. CSI is the product of the work of 15 agencies,
including Defense, to build the full complement of U.S. government
expertise necessary to respond to a stabilization crisis and to promote
effective rule of law, economic stabilization and transitional
governance in weak and failing states.
With the requested resources, the Department of State, USAID and
other foreign affairs agencies strive to create the conditions
conducive to sustained progress in governance, economic growth, and
human capacity, recognizing that countries that move in this direction
become our partners in global peace and prosperity.
Question 7. How can the U.S. Government improve its coordination
across the different agencies conducting international development and
health work, like MCC and PEPFAR, especially given that the latter two
programs are outside the direct authority of the Director of Foreign
Assistance? While the Director of Foreign Assistance does have
coordinating authority over those agencies, the experience over the
last two years has not demonstrated that that authority is sufficient
to effectively coordinate the activities and budget planning between
USAID, MCC, and PEPFAR--either here in Washington or at the country
level.
Answer. The establishment of a dual-hatted Director of U.S. Foreign
Assistance and USAID Administrator has led to continued improvement in
the interagency coordination of activities and budget planning. For FY
2008, for example, with the establishment of common objectives, a
common program lexicon, and common budget and program planning
processes, State (including PEPFAR) and USAID were able to improve
coordination, with steps taken toward greater MCC and DOD coordination.
For FY 2009, MCC and DOD were formally added as participants in State
and USAID's budget and program planning process, in addition to their
coordination in the field.
The evidence of such coordination is illustrated by a number of
examples: In Ghana, for instance, USAID is focusing its programming on
enhancing the capacity of local government, which is responsible for
implementing MCC compact activities in economic growth. In Honduras,
USAID programming focuses on trade and investment capacity building and
private sector competitiveness, in order to complement MCC compact
investments in infrastructure and agricultural diversification.
With respect to PEPFAR, the greater coordination achieved through
the DFA helped highlight development gaps in our non-HIV/AIDS
programming, including interventions in governance and economic growth
that will help build host government capacity to sustain further
progress on their own. Thus, in FY 2009, the budget includes $2.1
billion for State Department and USAID programs in Africa to address
development gaps and support economic opportunity and governance
programs critical to the success of the investments we have made
through PEPFAR.
A number of additional activities are ongoing for this year that we
hope will further improve coordination. A strong interagency country
strategy development process is being planned for specific pilot
countries. The 3-to-5-year strategic plan will be developed by the
field, under the leadership of Ambassadors, and is explicitly targeted
to include full interagency, other donor, and where appropriate, host
government participation. As with last year, the annual Operational
Plan process will provide additional opportunities for the interagency
in the field to develop comprehensive program plans, working together
to ensure coordination.
Finally, to extend coherence across all U.S. Government foreign
assistance, the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance and USAID
Administrator now leads the interagency Development Policy Coordination
Committee. As technical as it sounds, this committee is an important
tool for aligning U.S. Government efforts, making joint policy
decisions on critical development issues, and forging stronger
collaboration to deliver greater impact from the U.S. Government's
development efforts around the world. The Development Policy
Coordinating Committee has agreed to focus on intra-government
coordination-including the use of the DFA-established common
objectives, program lexicon, and planning processes-in a select number
of countries. Lessons learned from this pilot will then be adopted on a
broader scale.
We share your concern about the importance of such comprehensive
coordination, and welcome your input and feedback on our ongoing
efforts.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Vitter
Question 1. The United States has not ratified the Law of the Sea
Treaty (LOST) and therefore is not a party to the Treaty. Under the
U.S. Constitution, without Senate ratification, the Treaty has no force
of law in the U.S. and the U.S. is not bound to provide financial
support to the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) and
the Deep Seabed Authority (the ``Authority'').
For what reason is the Administration requesting funding for
entities to which the U.S. has no financial obligation, have not been
previously funded, and were created by a Treaty that has not been
ratified?
Under what authority does the Administration propose to fund
international organizations created by a Treaty which has not been
ratified by the U.S. Senate?
Answer. The Administration did not request funding for a treaty
that has not been ratified. The President's budget request related to
the Law of the Sea Convention ($1.3 million to the International Seabed
Authority and $3.6 million to the International Tribunal for the Law of
the Sea in FY 2009) was explicitly conditioned on Senate approval of
U.S. accession to the Convention. (Attached are pages 737 and 740 from
the Contributions to International Organizations Appropriation section
of the FY 2009 Department of State Congressional Budget Justification.)
As our budget presentation indicates, no funds will be provided to
either organization until the United States accedes to the Convention.
Let me reiterate the Administration's strong support for U.S.
accession to the Law of the Sea Convention. Joining the 154 other
parties to the Convention would promote U.S. security, economic, and
environmental interests, with very modest financial implications,
especially when weighed against the substantial benefits that would
accrue to the United States.
Question 2. Even if the Senate ratifies LOST, the U.S. will not
fall under the jurisdiction of ITLOS; to settle disputes arising under
LOST, the U.S. has chosen to utilize arbitral tribunals created under
Annex VII, and special arbitral tribunals for specified categories of
disputes constituted pursuant to Annex VIII.
Why is the Administration funding an international tribunal (ITLOS)
that has no jurisdiction over the U.S. and to which, even if LOST is
ratified, the U.S. has no plans to submit?
Answer. You correctly note that the United States would not
generally be subject to ITLOS jurisdiction (choosing arbitration and
special arbitration for its disputes). However, as the Administration
and others have made clear, certain matters can be brought to ITLOS in
any event (such as the prompt release of vessels held for fishing
violations, which cannot wait for the establishment of an arbitral
tribunal).
It should also be noted that joining the Convention would give the
United States the opportunity to nominate a judge to sit on the ITLOS.
Thus, while we would generally not be subject to its jurisdiction, a
U.S. national would potentially be in a position to influence its
deliberations.
Question 3. Not only is the Administration funding international
entities that are not approved by the Senate, but it is handing over
American dollars to organizations at which there are no American
representatives present to protect U.S. interests. There are no
American representatives because the U.S. is not a member of this
treaty.
Has the Administration taken steps necessary to restrict the uses
of U.S. funding to the Authority and ITLOS, to ensure it is spent only
to further U.S. interests?
Has the Administration taken any precautions to ensure that
American taxpayers' money is not used to support endless bureaucratic
meetings or bloated payrolls?
Has the Administration tied restrictions to the uses of the
funding?
Answer. As stated in the response to Question 1, no funds will be
provided to either entity until the United States accedes to the
Convention. As a Party to the Convention, the United States along with
the other States Parties would approve the budget of the International
Tribunal and review its expenditures at an annual meeting. As a Party,
the United States would have a guaranteed seat on the Finance Committee
of the International Seabed Authority, which has jurisdiction over all
budgetary and financial matters; the Finance Committee must make
decisions by consensus.
We believe the activities of both the Seabed Authority and the
Tribunal are consistent with U.S. interests. The United States has
consistently sought the inclusion of effective dispute settlement
provisions in any law of the sea treaty, as an additional tool to
promote compliance. Consistent with U.S. interests, the 1982 Convention
provides appropriate flexibility to parties with respect to both forum
and subject matter.
Question 4. Among its various flaws, LOST creates new
unaccountable, bureaucratic institutions manned by foreign interests
that may be hostile to the U.S.; threatens American sovereignty by
leaving open the question of ``military activities'' and intelligence
operations to the jurisdiction of binding international tribunals; and
promises to undermine our economy through environmental law-fare. Yet
the Administration is proposing to provide the funding for two LOST
organizations (ITLOS, the Authority).
Has the Administration taken any precautions to ensure that
American dollars would not be used in a way that would harm U.S.
interests?
Answer. Please see the answers to the first three questions. The
Administration does not agree with your characterizations of these two
organizations. We strongly support U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea
Convention. Joining the 154 other parties to the Convention would
promote U.S. security, economic, and environmental interests, with very
modest financial implications, especially when weighed against the
substantial benefits that would accrue to the United States.
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Questions Submitted by Senator Casey
Question 1. Why was the budget request for the State Department's
nonproliferation programs cut? The final FY 2008 appropriations for
State Department nonproliferation programs came in at $211 million, yet
the Administration is only requesting $210 million for the upcoming
year.
In particular, why was funding reduced for such key
nonproliferation initiatives like the State Department's Export
Controls and Border Security program ($4.3 million dollar cut) and U.S.
contributions to the International Atomic Energy Agency ($1 million
cut)?
Answer. The State Department strongly supports robust funding for
its nonproliferation programs and, since FY 2007 we have provided a 6
percent increase in these programs. However, in FY 2009, due to
competing priorities, we were not able to plus-up the nonproliferation
programs as a whole. Our FY 2009 requests for the Export Control and
Related Border Security (EXBS) program and for the U.S. voluntary
contribution to the IAEA were the same as the President's request for
FY 2008 (the final FY 2008 appropriation reflects additional funding by
Congress), and continue to reflect adequate funding for these two
important nonproliferation programs.
Question 2. The Blackwater shooting incident on September 16, 2007,
in which Blackwater employees opened fire in a crowd of Iraqis killing
17 civilians and wounding 27 others publicly revealed many of the
dangers that private contractors in Iraq pose for the broader U.S.
mission in the country. In late October, you reached an agreement with
Secretary Gates to revise the rules under which security contractors
working for the State Department operate in Iraq. That agreement was
implemented by a memorandum of understanding between General Petraeus
and Ambassador Crocker in early December.
How have the new rules addressed the problems revealed by the Sept
16th incident? What legislative actions or policy recommendations do
you suggest the Congress take to ensure that security contractors
operate fully within the military chain of command and in support of
the broader national interest?
Answer. Following the events of September 16, 2007, the Department
of State initiated a thorough review of its security operations in
Iraq. A panel of experts assembled by the Secretary of State determined
the Department's security practices in Iraq to be highly effective in
ensuring the safety of mission personnel and recommended additional
measures to strengthen coordination, oversight, and accountability of
the Department's security programs. Many of the panel's recommendations
are incorporated into the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) signed on
December 5, 2007, between the Department of State (DOS) and the
Department of Defense (DOD). The MOA represents a joint effort to
develop and implement core standards for all DOS- and DOD-contracted
private security companies (PSCs) in Iraq.
The Department continues to move forward with implementation of the
panel's recommendations and provisions of the MOA. Significant progress
has been made in a number of critical areas, including use-of-force
policies, incident response and investigation, and movement
coordination and control. The Department increased the staffing levels,
bolstered Iraq-specific training for security contractors, and
increased the use of technology. The Department has also taken strides
to strengthen oversight and accountability of PSCs that protect
contractors, subcontractors, or grantees of the State Department or
other civilian agencies under Chief of Mission authority.
The joint efforts between the Departments of State and Defense in
developing and implementing the December 2007 MOA have established a
strong foundation for continued coordination in meeting the
requirements of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2008, Sections 861 (Memorandum of Understanding on Matters Relating to
Contracting) and 862 (Contractors Performing Private Security Functions
in Areas of Combat Operations). We feel that the December 2007 MOA
coupled with the newly enacted legislation found in NDAA 08 Sections
861 and 862 provides all necessary guidelines to integrate DOS and DOD
operations in a designated battle space. For example, DOS is prepared
to participate in DOD's Synchronized Pre-Deployment Operational
Tracking (SPOT) database, upon its anticipated rollout to the
Department this March.
The Department believes its efforts have positively impacted
operations and have effectively strengthened accountability and
oversight of private security contractors. The Department strongly
supports efforts to provide greater legal accountability for unlawful
acts its security contractors may commit abroad. The Administration is
currently working with Congress on legislation to clarify coverage of
U.S. criminal laws, so that we have the laws we need to hold private
contractors overseas accountable when appropriate.
Question 3. The criminal investigation into the conduct of the
Blackwater security contractors during the September 16th shooting
incident has been hindered by a number of significant legal
complications. Among those legal setbacks is the promise of limited
immunity from prosecution that was granted to Blackwater employees by
State Department investigators.
How is the State Department cooperating with the Justice Department
to resolve these legal issues so that the contractors and Blackwater
can be held accountable for their actions?
Answer. The Department of State is not in a position to immunize
individuals from federal criminal prosecution. The Department of
Justice, in their October 30, 2007 press release, indicated that any
suggestion of immunity from federal criminal prosecution for Blackwater
employees is inaccurate. The Department of State continues to cooperate
fully with the Department of Justice and the FBI in their ongoing
investigation of the September 16 shooting incident.
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Question Submitted by Senator Isakson
Question 1. Does the Department plan to advance the schedule of the
Malabo New Embassy Compound (NEC) for construction; also, are their
plans for improving the Ambassador's residence?
Answer. The Department of State has a Congressionally-mandated
process by which our embassy facilities are ranked and prioritized for
replacement construction. Under the Secure Embassy Construction and
Counterterrorism Act of 1999 (SECCA), the Department is authorized to
spend security capital appropriations only among the top 80 most
vulnerable posts (the ``top 80 list''). (Although SECCA contained a
sunset provision after 5 years, the Department continues to work with
Congress consistent with SECCA requirements.)
Annually, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) reviews the
vulnerability of all chancery and consulate buildings, considering many
security factors and assigned threat levels. the regional bureaus, in
consultation with DS, Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO), and
Department senior management, recommend posts for addition to the top
80 list, and each regional bureau prioritizes its posts within the top
80.
In August 2006, Malabo was added to the top 80 list for
construction of a NEC and was at that time prioritized by the Bureau of
African Affairs for a construction award for FY 2014. However, in
December 2005, the Government of Equatorial Guinea passed a resolution
to grant a 12.3-acre site to the United States at no cost. The site was
determined to be viable for a NEC, and on October 18, 2007, Embassy
Malabo took title in the name of the United States of America. As a
result of this action, Malabo is currently planned for a new embassy
contract award in FY 2009.
Suitable housing is scarce and expensive in Malabo. Post and OBO
have been working to find a more suitable Chief of Mission Residence
(CMR), even before current Ambassador Johnson's arrival at post.
Unfortunately, there are major problems in finding properties in Malabo
that meet a wide variety of OBO and Diplomatic Security requirements.
We are continuing our search for an adequate CMR. In order to assist in
the search, OBO's Division of Real Estate will be sending a team to
Malabo to review the housing situation at post.