[Senate Hearing 110-779]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-779
EXAMINING THE STATE OF TRANSIT SECURITY
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON
BANKING,HOUSING,AND URBAN AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
EXAMINING THE STATE OF TRANSIT SECURITY
__________
JANUARY 18, 2007
__________
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COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut, Chairman
TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama
JACK REED, Rhode Island ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah
CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado
EVAN BAYH, Indiana MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JIM BUNNING, Kentucky
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii MIKE CRAPO, Idaho
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire
ROBERT P. CASEY, Pennsylvania ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina
JON TESTER, Montana MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
Shawn Maher, Staff Director
William D. Duhnke, Republican Staff Director and Counsel
Aaron Klein, Democratic Chief Economist
Sherry E. Little, Republican Senior Professional Staff Member
Joseph R. Kolinski, Chief Clerk and Computer Systems Administrator
George Whittle, Editor
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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THURSDAY, JANUARY 18, 2007
Page
Opening statement of Chairman Dodd............................... 1
Opening statements, comments, or prepared statements of:
Senator Shelby............................................... 3
Senator Bennett.............................................. 7
Senator Reed................................................. 7
Senator Allard............................................... 8
Prepared statement....................................... 31
WITNESSES
Hon. Dannel P. Malloy, Mayor, Stamford, CT, and Trustee, The U.S.
Conference of Mayors........................................... 10
Prepared statement........................................... 31
William W. Millar, President, American Public Transportation
Association.................................................... 11
Prepared statement........................................... 45
Warren S. George, International President, Amalgamated Transit
Union.......................................................... 13
Prepared statement........................................... 49
Aurelio Rojo Garrido, Operational Director, Metro Madrid, and
Secretary General, Association of Latin American Metros and
Subways (ALAMYS)............................................... 15
Prepared statement........................................... 53
Tim O'Toole, Managing Director, London Underground, Transport for
London, England................................................ 17
Prepared statement........................................... 53
(iii)
EXAMINING THE STATE OF TRANSIT SECURITY
----------
THURSDAY, JANUARY 18, 2007
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in
room SD-538, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator
Christopher J. Dodd (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN DODD
Chairman Dodd. The Committee will come to order. Welcome to
the Banking Committee. I want to thank all of you for being
here at the inaugural meeting of the Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs for the 110th Congress. I am very
pleased this morning to address this Committee as Chairman. It
has been a long time. I must say I was beginning to wonder if
this day would ever arrive. My wife reminded me the other day
that at age 62 I am the average age of a U.S. Senator. That is
the good news.
Senator Shelby. Younger.
Chairman Dodd. Younger. Thank you.
[Laughter.]
Chairman Dodd. But I have been on this Committee for
awhile. When I first arrived in the U.S. Senate back in January
1981, I was assigned to this Committee and sat in the chair
where Bob Casey is sitting today. And it has taken a quarter of
a century to move along these chairs here one at a time. So I
am delighted to be here this morning in this capacity.
Of the three major committees on which I serve, I had the
pleasure to serve behind Senator Kennedy on the Health,
Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee. I still sit in that
chair next to him. Senator Biden on the Foreign Relations
Committee, I still sit next to Senator Biden after 25 years,
and I sat behind Senator Sarbanes as well. Little did I know
when I joined the Senate a quarter of a century ago that each
of these men would have the Constitution of a bull. And so they
have been here for many, many years and made me wait a quarter
of a century to assume this Committee chairmanship.
Let me say a few words, if I can, of a general nature. Then
we will proceed to the business at hand this morning.
First I want to acknowledge my friend and colleague from
Alabama, former Chairman Dick Shelby, with whom I have a
longstanding and very sound and wonderful relationship. A
couple of days after the November elections, Senator Shelby and
I had breakfast together. At that point we still did not know
for certain which of our two parties would hold a majority in
the U.S. Senate. But we both agreed that whatever the outcome,
we would work together as we have over the years to find common
ground on this Committee, to advance issues of mutual concern.
That was not a difficult agreement to reach, I would tell
you. Senator Shelby's leadership of this Committee has been
marked, in my opinion, first by a commitment to address the
critical issues of the day, which he did in a stellar fashion;
and, second, to work in a bipartisan fashion. Some people speak
that language rather readily. Dick Shelby has demonstrated over
and over and over again his understanding of how important
these relationships are in terms of advancing the issues the
American people want us to confront.
It is my intention and hope that those two characteristics
will continue to be identified with the leadership of this
Committee. As I have said previously, it is my intention to
focus this Committee's attention on two fundamental objectives:
first, strengthening our Nation's ability to keep our people
and businesses as secure as possible against the risk of attack
from those who wish us ill; and, second, expanding prosperity
for businesses and consumers throughout our Nation.
I am deeply troubled by what has happened in our economy
over the past several years. Men and women are working much
harder. They are paying more for the essentials of a
financially stable and secure life. And many are actually
falling behind, as many of us know. Due to no fault of their
own, these people have become trapped in a downward spiral of
debt from which they have little chance of escape. Others are
victims of unscrupulous lending practices that have stripped
them of their equity and sometimes their entire homes.
In addition, vast numbers of small and medium-sized
businesses struggle to compete in a global marketplace, where
our national leadership is doing little, if anything, to ensure
that the competitive playing field is as level as possible.
Some of our fellow citizens are doing very well in this
economy, but most are struggling, struggling very hard every
single day. It is my intention--and I hope the Committee's
intention--to make their cause the work of this Committee. On
that, I am confident that we can find common ground as Senators
and as Americans.
In addition, I would like to pay a tribute to our former
colleague, Paul Sarbanes. Paul is an extraordinary public
servant. He certainly set a very high standard for me and
others by his thoughtfulness and dedication to the public
interest of our Nation. And just as I am committed to carrying
on the qualities of leadership shown by Senator Shelby, so,
too, am I committed to carrying forward many of the qualities
of leadership that characterized the service of Paul Sarbanes
of Maryland.
I also want to acknowledge one of our colleagues who is not
with us here today, our very good friend and the person I have
sat next to on this Committee for many years, Tim Johnson, who
has been a wonderful Member of the U.S. Senate. I am sure that
I speak for everyone, not only on this side of the dais but
also in this room and elsewhere, certainly the people of his
State, in wishing him continued progress. And it has been
reported to us just in the last 24 hours how much better Tim is
doing every single day, involved in a good, strong rehab
program, and all of us wish him and his family well. And he
will return to his service in the Congress as soon as possible.
I look forward to working with him throughout this Congress.
With that, let me recognize my friend and Ranking Member,
Senator Shelby, for any opening statement he wants to make, and
I want to thank him. Someone came up when I walked in the room
and they said, ``Look at this room. You have got this redone
room. You Democrats are already spending money up here.'' I
quickly pointed out that this was my good friend, this very
conservative Republican from Alabama, who spent all this money
to get this nice room done.
[Laughter.]
Chairman Dodd. And I thank him for his leadership and for
turning this Committee room into a modern Committee room where
we have the advantages of the technology that will allow us to
have very good hearings.
I want to point out, my colleagues may have noted that we
have not switched sides here. In the past, when you became the
majority, the majority would move over to this side of the
table, because in the past too often cameras would gather at
one side or the other. I am proud to say to you here that there
is no longer any advantage. You all have an equal opportunity
to make a fool of yourself with a frontal picture here because
of the cameras now stationed in a way here that they are not
going to be picking up one side of the room or the other. But
again, Dick, I thank you immensely for your leadership and the
floor is yours.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SHELBY
Senator Shelby. Thank you, Senator Dodd. Reluctantly, I
will--not really--congratulate you as the Chairman of the
Banking Committee.
[Laughter.]
Senator Shelby. We kid and talk about that. We know
elections have consequences. We hope you will not be Chairman
too long. You never know.
[Laughter.]
Senator Shelby. But, in that regard, we are going to
continue to work with you----
Senator Bennett. Is that a prediction about the outcome of
the Presidential race?
[Laughter.]
Senator Shelby. It could be, but we do not know, either
way.
Chairman Dodd. You could call me ``Mr. Secretary.''
[Laughter.]
Senator Shelby. We could, but we are going to hold all that
back for a while and see what happens. But I do want to
sincerely congratulate you. You have worked on this Committee
for many, many years. We have both been here through the thrift
crisis and everything that goes with it. But today I want to
thank you for holding this hearing.
Transit security has been the focus of the Committee's
attention for a number of years here. Since 2001, right here we
have held a number of informative hearings. We have requested
and received a GAO report on the matter, and we have twice
marked up and reported comprehensive transit security
legislation.
Many Members of this Committee on both sides of the aisle
have focused a great deal on the issues surrounding transit
security. Former Senator Sarbanes and Senators Allard and Reed
have been very active on these issues. They were instrumental
in making transit security a priority in the Committee and
worked diligently to ensure passage on the Senate floor, and I
want to thank them again for their efforts.
Past attacks on the transit system of our friends and
allies have clearly established the nature and magnitude of the
threat to our own transit infrastructure. Throughout our
country, 14 million people board trains and buses as a part of
their daily routine. I have long believed that we can and we
should be doing more to protect them. There are a number of
steps that we can take to increase security while preserving
the accessibility that we have come to expect in this country.
We need more bomb-sniffing dogs, more closed-caption
televisions, more public address systems, and more detection
equipment. Yes, we need the capability to share information
about potential threats on a real-time basis, and we need
additional operational funds to provide training for transit
workers. In the past, the funds provided by the Department of
Homeland Security have been woefully inadequate, barely
scratching the surface of the needs. The Banking Committee's
transit security bill would have authorized $3.5 billion that
could go directly to transit agencies responsible for systems
deemed to be at risk for potential terrorist attacks.
I applaud Chairman Dodd here today for his early focus on
this issue, and I will support his effort to revisit the
Committee's legislation.
We have a diverse panel of witnesses before us today. In
addition to hearing from industry, a local mayor, and the
workforce, we are pleased to welcome representatives from both
Madrid and London. They, of course, can speak firsthand about
the terrorist attacks in their own countries, as well as share
the steps they have taken to prevent future attacks.
I look forward to hearing today's witnesses, and I thank
you again for calling this hearing so soon.
Chairman Dodd. Thank you very much, Senator Shelby. I
should have said at the outset but let me do it here, if I can,
I want to--Senator Dan Akaka is with us here and back on the
Committee, and I wanted to recognize Dan, who has served on
this Committee before and cares deeply about transportation,
financial education, and other issues. We have missed you on
the Committee, Senator Akaka, and we welcome you back to this
Committee and thank you for your service to the Banking
Committee.
Senator Sherrod Brown joins us as well, after having served
six terms in the House of Representatives, and previously as
Ohio Secretary of State. Before politics, he was a professor at
Ohio State University. He is not yet here this morning, but I
am sure he is coming over. He spent 4 years in Connecticut, I
might point out, at one of our colleges and universities and at
Yale, and I am delighted he is a Member of the Committee.
Bob Casey I have already referenced in that last chair over
there, Bob, we are thrilled to have you here. You bring some
wonderful experience. No stranger whatsoever to financial
services questions, and we are going to look to you to make a
valuable contribution to the work of this Committee. He served
as the Pennsylvania Auditor General, Pennsylvania State
Treasurer, an attorney, went to law school here in DC, and so
we welcome you to the Committee and look forward to your
service.
Jon Tester was President of the Montana State Senate, and
previously he was on the Big Sky School Board, in addition to
running a farm and a custom butcher shop. We have got some
good, practical experience from Jon Tester, who was here at the
outset of the hearing and I know has other commitments this
morning.
So I thank our new members. Dan, we thank you for coming
back, and the Members who I have served with on this Committee,
I appreciate your presence here.
Let me, if I can, just make a couple of quick opening
comments about the subject matter here and welcome our
witnesses this morning, and then we will get right to the
testimony.
As Senator Shelby has pointed out, the Committee examines
this morning the state of transit security in the United
States. We have chosen this topic as the subject of the
Committee's first hearing for one overriding reason: because
the safety of more than 14 million Americans, as Senator Shelby
pointed out, and the prosperity of our Nation is at stake. It
is no secret that worldwide terrorists have favored public
transit as a target. I would draw your attention, by the way--
my staff gave me a few minutes ago a story this morning in
Moscow where Russian authorities are sending more police as we
gather here into the streets of Moscow. They have ordered the
shutting off of all cell phones in their subway system this
morning on a very high alert. They are worried about their
transit systems. They have been hit by terrorist attacks and so
forth. But, again, as we gather here, once again we are finding
a major city around the world is being faced with the
challenges that Madrid and London and others have been through.
As I said, it is no secret that worldwide terrorists have
found public transit as a very attractive target. Transit has
been the single most frequent target of terrorism, in fact. In
the decade leading up to 2001, 42 percent of terrorist attacks
worldwide targeted rail systems or buses, according to the
Brookings Institution. In 2005, they attacked London's rail
system and bus system, which we will be hearing about, killing
52 riders and injuring almost 700 people that day in what has
been called ``London's bloodiest peacetime attack.''
In 2004, the attack on Madrid's Metro system took the lives
of 192 people and 1,500 people were injured, and Mr. Garrido
from Spain will be talking to us about that experience and what
they have gone through.
Previous attacks in Moscow, what I mentioned here today, in
Seoul, Korea, and Tokyo, not to mention many Israeli bombings
that we have heard about with far too great a frequency,
demonstrate that this is, in fact, a global threat. Anyone who
believes that America's transit system is somehow immune from
attack need only to consider the experiences that other nations
are having and ask why would anyone think that we would be
immune from this.
Transit is frequently targeted because it is tremendously
important to our Nation's economy. Securing our transit systems
and our transportation systems generally is a difficult
challenge under any circumstances. Every act to increase
security potentially limits the mobility that our citizens
cherish and want. Yet the difficulty of the task must not
thwart us from completing it. We must make certain that our
Nation's leaders are doing everything possible to adequately
address the threats posed by terrorism on our public transit
systems.
Senator Shelby has been a leader in this effort over the
years, and, again, I want to recognize and thank him for his
excellent work, along with Senator Sarbanes and others, in
making sure that the Banking Committee has been at the
forefront frequently in attempts to enhance our Nation's
security systems and our transit systems. This issue is a clear
example, in my view, of how we can work together on this
Committee and in this Congress to achieve the two fundamental
objectives of this Committee about which I spoke a moment ago:
security and prosperity.
I was proud to work with Senator Shelby, former Senator
Sarbanes, Senator Jack Reed, and Senator Allard, who is with us
today, and many others, including Senator Schumer, when we
crafted transit security legislation, which passed this
Committee unanimously in both the previous two Congresses. We
have been working on this issue in a bipartisan manner for the
last two Congresses and have made considerable progress. Twice
we have passed our bill to the full Senate, and once we
received a majority vote--53, I would point out--on the Senate
floor to fully fund the legislation authored by Senator Shelby
and the others I have mentioned. It is my hope that we can
continue to work together and finally enact this legislation,
working with our colleagues in the House of Representatives and
additional committees here in the U.S. Senate.
While this Committee has worked to meet its obligation to
the millions of transit riders, the same cannot be said about
the Congress as a whole or the current administration, I would
point out. The need is clear for enhanced transit security.
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Federal
Government has invested nearly $24 billion in aviation
security. None of us are going to fault that investment. But I
would point out that protecting the 1.8 million people who fly
on average every day, as important as that is, is not investing
as much as we should in transit security. In transit security,
compared to $24 billion, we have invested $386 million in
transit security to protect 14 million people who, every day,
ride on non-air transit systems around the country--1.8
million, $24 billion; $386 million, 14 million. The math is not
complicated. We need to be doing a far better job at this,
particularly when you are given the statistics I have cited to
you earlier.
Put to you another way, since 2001, our Nation has spent
over $7.50 per passenger on aviation security but less than 1
penny per passenger on transit security in this country. I am
not suggesting at all that we ought to be investing equally,
but clearly this is not an appropriate balance. I do not think
anyone would agree with that. The stakes to our Nation are
simply far too high, as, again, the news out of Moscow points
out this morning, to ignore the urgent call by Governors,
mayors, fire and police chiefs, and others for greater national
leadership in this area.
If we are truly serious--truly serious--about keeping our
Nation safe from the risks of terrorism, and if we are
committed to economic prosperity, then I believe it is
imperative that we act to strengthen America's transit
networks.
With that, I want to thank again the Members of the
Committee here today in recognizing that this first hearing is
one that does really address the two ambitions I have for this
Committee, that is, prosperity and heightened security for our
country.
With that, Senator Shelby, I do not know if you have any
additional opening comments you want to make. If not, then let
me turn to our witnesses, if I can here, and then we will go to
our Members. I want to ask our witnesses--well, do you want to
make any opening comments? I will ask my colleagues if they
have any opening statements they want to make.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BENNETT
Senator Bennett. No, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do want to
publicly congratulate you on your elevation to this position
and tell you how much we look forward to working with you.
I have ridden transit systems in many countries around the
world and recognize how vulnerable they are, so as a cosponsor
of the original bill, I am grateful to you for holding the
hearings.
Chairman Dodd. Thank you.
Senator Reed.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR REED
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
let me congratulate you for your new position and commend
Senator Shelby for the great leadership he has shown. As he
mentioned, he and with many of our colleagues, particularly
Senator Allard, have been working very diligently on this issue
of transit security, and I see many of the panelists we have
had before, and thank you for joining us today.
Senator Dodd mentioned that there is a fear in Moscow, but
just this morning CNN is reporting that the Los Angeles Joint
Terrorism Task Force is investigating a suspicious spill in
their subway system of mercury. An unidentified individual
dropped some mercury, and from a surveillance camera, it could
be deliberate or accidental. But it also could be a test of
their responsiveness. And, frankly, it took 8 hours for the
authorities to respond.
So transit security is not a Moscow problem or a Madrid
problem. It is a worldwide problem, particularly in the United
States, and we have to be cognizant of that. And I think this
Committee has acted under the leadership of Senator Shelby and
Senator Sarbanes appropriately, but we have yet to bridge the
gap. It is a $6 billion gap between the transit security needs
in this country and the resources available. And as Senator
Dodd has pointed out, we have done a lot to secure aviation. We
have done very little, not enough to secure transit in this
country. And as our friends from Madrid and from London will
point out, this is one of the major vulnerabilities in any
industrialized country in the world.
I look forward to working with Chairman Dodd, who is my
leader in so many things, in a bipartisan way to try to address
this issue.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Dodd. Thanks very much.
Senator Allard.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ALLARD
Senator Allard. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to
congratulate you on your position here on the Committee, and I
look forward to working with you. I always felt that you were
willing to work in a bipartisan way, and I always enjoyed
having an opportunity to work with you whenever that has
presented itself.
As you mentioned, I have a real interest in mass transit
systems because of working with Senator Reed. I think we have
been able to work in a bipartisan way on many pieces of
legislation, and we will continue to work on those efforts. So
I think it is entirely appropriate that you deal with mass
transit system security.
You will have to forgive me, Mr. Chairman, that I have to
mention that in Colorado we have a test facility for trains
that is unprecedented in the world, and we have been working to
get that as part of the Security Consortium for Mass Transit,
and we haven't been successful. It is not anything that is in
this Committee. With high-speed trains and everything else, it
is important to have an open enough and isolated area where you
can actually test explosives and these kinds of things, which I
think is an important part of developing public transportation
systems that are secure. You have to have somewhere you can
test them out, and we have that facility in Colorado and are
working on it.
So I am very happy that you are emphasizing this as one of
your major priorities. I think our Nation needs that
leadership, and I am glad to see the Banking Committee step
forward on that.
I ask that my full statement be entered into the record.
Chairman Dodd. Thanks very much, Senator.
Let me just do some housekeeping measures here. I have read
all of your testimony, and it is very excellent testimony. I
would ask you if you can to try and keep your testimony down to
about 5 to 7 minutes or so. Your full testimony will be part of
the record, without any question whatsoever. But in order to
get to the question period here, which is also very valuable
for Members, I would ask you to keep that in mind. All of the
opening statements that my colleagues have here will be
included in the record as well, fuller statements they may have
on the issue before us here this morning. And I am again very
grateful to our witnesses.
I am going to continue the practice that has been the
practice of this Committee for some time, and that is to
recognize Members in the order in which they arrive in the
Committee, with the exception of the Ranking Member, which has
been the custom as well here.
Senator Shelby. Then I had better be on time.
[Laughter.]
Chairman Dodd. That is all right. Nonetheless, I think it
is a good practice you have. It is frustrating at times, but I
just want to announce that ahead of time that we will be
continuing the very system that Senator Shelby and, I think,
Senator Sarbanes and others have followed over the years.
Let me introduce our panel of witnesses, and we will get
right to it here this morning. Again, I thank them for being
with us.
I am delighted to introduce as our first witness--and I
make no bones about it--a very good friend of mine. He is the
mayor of Stamford, CT, and we have known each other a long,
long time. He has been an excellent, excellent mayor in
Connecticut. He has been the mayor of Stamford the last 12
years and has done a fabulous job. He works on many issues, as
all mayors do across our country, but transit issues have been
sort of a hallmark of Dan Malloy's service. He lives in and
represents a city in that congested corner of our State not far
from New York that many are familiar with, the I-95 corridor in
there, and mass transit systems, Metro North, Amtrak, and the
like. So he really has to struggle and grapple with these
issues all the time, and I am very, very grateful to Dan for
coming here this morning to talk about this issue on behalf of
not only the city of Stamford itself but also the Conference of
Mayors that will be gathering next week here in the city and
have suggested some ideas on what we might do in this area.
Bill Millar, the President of American Public
Transportation Association, has testified before this Committee
previously on transit security and is recognized as an expert
in these areas, and we thank you very, very much for being with
us.
I want to welcome Warren George, again, who is no stranger
to these issues, the International President of the Amalgamated
Transit Union, founded in 1892, has a longstanding involvement
with these important questions. ATU is the largest transit
union, representing 180,000 members in 270 locals, spread
across 46 States. He brings obviously a tremendous amount of
information and talent to this discussion.
We are very pleased to welcome Aurelio Rojo Garrido. I
don't get to do this very often, so bienvenido a nuestro
comite. Yo hablo Espanol fracamento simplacer. That is pretty
good. I got to do that once.
[Laughter.]
Chairman Dodd. From my days as a Peace Corps volunteer. I
am not going to get a break here on this Committee no matter
what I do here along the way. But thank you for coming and
joining us here this morning. The Secretary General of the
Association of Latin American Metros and Subways and the
Operational Director of Madrid's Metro system. We are very
honored to have you at the Committee.
Last, we are joined by Mr. Tim O'Toole, who is the Managing
Director of the Transport for London, which operates London's
subway and bus systems, the oldest subway system in the world.
Again, we are very grateful to both of you for being a part of
this hearing. London and Madrid are Europe's two largest
transit systems and have been the targets, as I pointed out
earlier, of terrorist attacks over the past 3 years. I hope
that we can learn from your tragedy, and we appreciate your
coming a great distance to be before this Committee today, and
all of us are deeply grateful to both of you for making the
effort.
Mayor Malloy, the floor is yours. We welcome your testimony
and thank you for being here.
STATEMENT OF HON. DANNEL P. MALLOY, MAYOR, STAMFORD, CT, AND
TRUSTEE, THE U.S. CONFERENCE OF
MAYORS
Mr. Malloy. Good morning, Senator Dodd. As a fellow son of
Connecticut, I am particularly proud to be here this morning as
you ascend to the chairmanship of this Committee, and thank you
for the opportunity to be with you.
I would like to single out Ranking Member Shelby and thank
him for all of his work with America's mayors on behalf of
transit systems and transit security. We greatly appreciate
your friendship.
I am Dannel Malloy. I am the mayor of the city of Stamford,
CT, and a trustee of the U.S. Conference of Mayors, and I want
to certainly thank all of the members for inviting me to
participate.
On behalf of the U.S. Conference of Mayors, we appreciate
your interest in public transportation security and look
forward to working with you as you develop legislation to
safeguard America's bus, rail, and ferry systems.
One month after September 11th, the Conference of Mayors
called an emergency homeland security summit in Washington, DC,
and drafted a sweeping ``National Action Plan for Safety and
Security in America's Cities.'' The National Action Plan was
updated in October of 2005 with special emphasis on transit
security following the attacks in London's Underground Tube
system, aboard London's transit buses, and certainly the Madrid
strike as well.
In addition, my comments originate from the conference's
``Strong Cities, Strong Families for a Strong America 10-Point
Plan'' which will be presented next week at the U.S. Conference
of Mayors 75th Winter Meeting.
We must strengthen our partnership with the Federal
Government to make sure that our first preventers and first
responders have the resources and training they need to succeed
and that all necessary Federal support is ready in the event of
an event that might attack us.
As the American Public Transportation Association's survey
identified, Congress has allocated--and as Senator Dodd
mentioned--only $386 million to transit security through fiscal
year 2006, yet transit agencies have identified in excess of $6
billion in transit security investment needs.
For Stamford, securing these wide open and vulnerable
systems is a priority--a priority on which I spend a great deal
of time and a great deal of worry. As part of the New York
metropolitan area, Stamford is a major transportation hub for
the communities in Connecticut and is located on one of the
busiest stretches of public transportation in the Nation.
We believe that any public transportation security
legislation should be guided by four principles:
First, the establishment of a flexible Federal transit
security grant program.
Second, as we have done with aviation, securing public
transit is a Federal responsibility and should not require a
local or State match.
Third, transit security funds should go directly to the
transit authority or the jurisdiction providing security. We
must continue to make improvements in the grant application
process and delivery mechanism for Federal Homeland Security
resources to make sure that the funding quickly reaches the
transit system's first responders.
Since the early days after September 11, 2001, mayors have
expressed serious concern with a State-based system for
coordinating preparedness and responses to acts of terrorism.
Many mayors have positive working relationships with State
and Federal partners, but there was a real concern from the
beginning that a complex, Federal distribution system which
involved various approval levels for first responder resources
and training would be slow and result in serious delays in
funding reaching the high-threat, high-risk populations and
infrastructures, including mass transit.
Fourth, there should be a robust funding source for
transit-related security research and development technology.
I know that our Nation has made significant progress on
increasing homeland security since September 11th and that our
Federal-local partnership is much stronger today, with more
resources, better information sharing, and a greater level of
general communication. But I fervently hope that the tragic
attacks in India, the United Kingdom, Spain, and, as was
referenced today, Moscow serve as a reminder that we must not
settle for ``good enough.'' These and other attacks
dramatically highlight the vulnerability of mass transit
worldwide to terrorism and the need for an increased focus by
the Federal Government on security for these systems.
We must recommit ourselves to doing all that we can to make
sure that our citizens can get on a bus, step onto a train, go
to work, cheer at a sporting event, or just go about their
daily lives knowing that everything that can be done has, in
fact, been done to combat terror.
We urge Congress to act decisively on this issue. The U.S.
Conference of Mayors stands ready to work with this new
Congress in a bipartisan way to safeguard one of our Nation's
most critical infrastructures.
I wish to thank you all once again.
Chairman Dodd. Thank you very much, Mayor. Thank you very,
very much for that.
Mr. Millar, thank you very much again for being here.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM W. MILLAR, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN PUBLIC
TRANSPORTATION ASSOCIATION
Mr. Millar. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and congratulations to
you. I have had the privilege of testifying before this
Committee since 1978, so I watched you go from there to there
to there to there. And to Mr. Shelby, thank you so much for
your leadership over the years and for the many courtesies and
privileges you afforded me in coming before the Committee. And
I am very pleased, Mr. Chair, to hear that you want to carry on
the tradition of this Committee of working in a bipartisan way
and working on issues that are important to the American
people. We thank you very much for that.
I also want to thank you for--I understand yesterday you
and Mr. Shelby and Mr. Reed and Mr. Allard sent a jointly
signed letter, along with the Environment and Public Works
Committee, to the leadership of the Senate that points out how
important it is in resolving the 2007 appropriations issues
that the levels for highway and transit funding that were
included in Safety be honored, and I thank you again for that
bipartisan leadership and approach on that. That is very
important indeed.
As I listened to the opening statements, as I listened to
the mayor, I am very tempted to just sit back and say ``Ditto''
and ``Amen.'' It is very clear that this Committee, the mayors,
and so many others understand the issues. Today is a weekday.
Thirty-three million times, Americans will board public
transportation vehicles today. Almost all of the equipment that
they will use has been federally assisted in its purchase.
There can be no doubt that the Federal Government has a major
role not only in protecting the lives of Americans, but in
protecting the investment that the Federal Government has made
over the years.
I appreciated in the opening statements the important
review of the history of the commitment of this Committee to
transit security, and we were very pleased to work with the
Committee as it guided--to unanimous approval by the Senate--
two security bills in two different Congresses. And as you
pointed out, unfortunately they never became law, but we must
keep trying. It is important to do so. And we note with great
pleasure the important symbolism that the very first hearing of
this Committee in the 110th Congress is not only about
security, as important as that is, but that among all the
things in the Committee's jurisdiction, you chose public
transit first, and we appreciate that. Greater emphasis has to
be placed on making our riders safer, making our employees
safer, and making the communities in which they reside and work
safer as well.
As has been pointed out, while it is important to secure
the Nation's airline system, 16 times more Americans will use
public transit today than will use the Nation's airlines. They
are different kinds of systems. The same type of security is
not going to be appropriate for both systems. But as some have
mistakenly argued that, well, you just cannot do anything to
improve security in public transit, it is such an open system,
that is simply wrong. Many things have been done. Many more
things could be done. And we must do a much better job of
training our employees. We must do a much better job of
equipping our employees. We must do a much better job of making
sure that there are joint law enforcement training exercises,
that we improve the communications systems, that we improve the
security around the perimeters of locations where transit
vehicles and workers are. And the list goes on and on and on.
We have provided to the Committee on many occasions results
of survey work among our members. Yes, the investment levels
would seem high and seem daunting, but the benefit is so large
we simply must do that. We do not want to be in a position of
getting yet another wake-up call. We do not want to be in the
position of coming back to the Congress after an incident has
happened in America, and then funding what we knew we should
have been funding all along.
The transit systems of America have already invested
billions of dollars of their own resources. They are prepared
to invest additional sums. But we need the Federal Government
as a full partner, and we encourage the Committee to again
introduce legislation, as you have in the past, and we will be
standing firmly and strongly with you in an effort to see that
it is passed.
My testimony includes many other very specific suggestions,
but, again, Mr. Chair, we are very pleased to be here today. We
look forward to working with you and the other Members of the
Committee, and anything that we can do to help, we want to
help.
Thank you very much, sir.
Chairman Dodd. Thank you, Mr. Millar. I appreciate your
time and your comments as well about Senator Shelby and the
work of this Committee. And as you have pointed out, as we have
all pointed out, we have been through this now on a couple of
occasions over the last 4 years, so we have a pretty good
understanding of the issues. There may be some new ideas that
can come into this, but basically the fundamental principles I
think that we incorporated earlier make a lot of sense to me.
And I will be listening to Senators Shelby, Reed, and Allard as
well, who have carried the lion's share of the load on this
thing, for any additional thoughts they have. But my sincere
hope is that rather quickly we will mark up a bill here and
have it available, working with the Commerce Committee as well,
too, to have a unified bill that we can then present to the
leadership for early consideration. So, I appreciate your
strong comments.
Mr. George, welcome.
STATEMENT OF WARREN S. GEORGE, INTERNATIONAL PRESIDENT,
AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION
Mr. George. Good morning, and thank you, Chairman Dodd,
Ranking Member Shelby, and Members of the Committee. On behalf
of the members of the Amalgamated Transit Union, I want to
thank you for giving us this opportunity to testify today on
the ATU's priorities and strategies for enhancing transit
security.
I applaud this Committee's efforts over the past several
years to work together in a bipartisan manner to address this
important issue.
The safety and security of our Nation's public transit
systems is of utmost importance to the leadership and the
members of the ATU.
Faced with the reality of terrorist attacks against mass
transit, the ATU has for years worked to raise the awareness of
our members and their employers to this danger and to advance
real, concrete solutions and initiatives to enhance the safety
and security of the systems operated and maintained by ATU
members.
We strongly believe that the labor community must be a
partner in any comprehensive effort to address the security
threats facing our industries. For that reason, we have worked
closely with our members in the transit industry and officials
at all levels of Government, including many Members of this
Committee.
Many transit agencies themselves have also taken steps to
securing their operations, but due in large part to funding
constraints, they have not gone far enough. The reality is that
the industry and the ATU cannot do this alone. The Federal
Government must step up to the plate and provide the necessary
funding, guidance, and even mandates to provide the level of
security that transit passengers and employees deserve.
More than 2 years ago, Congress directed the administration
to take comprehensive steps to address transportation security
risks, including risks faced by the transit industry.
It was not until a little over a month ago that President
Bush issued an order to Secretary Chertoff to draft a plan to
address security issues in the transit industry.
Two years later is not a time for drafting plans. It is a
time for concrete action. The Federal Government must provide
funding directly to transit agencies for security purposes and
must ensure that transit employees are prepared in the event of
an emergency.
Mr. Millar has already presented a compelling case for
increased Federal funding for transit security initiatives,
which the ATU wholeheartedly agrees. And as such, I would like
to take this opportunity to discuss another necessary component
of transit security that has gone unaddressed for far too long.
That is employee training.
Common sense tells us that the single most important thing
that we can do to increase transit security is to provide each
and every front-line transit employee, including rail and bus
operators, customer service personnel, and maintenance
employees, with security and emergency preparedness and
response training.
While we should not abandon the research and deployment of
new technologies, we need to recognize what has been proven to
be the most cost-effective security measure: employee training.
In the event of a terrorist attack within a mass transit
system, the response of employees at the scene within the first
few minutes is crucial to minimizing the loss of life and to
evacuating passengers away from the incident. Transit employees
are the first on the scene, even before police, firefighters,
or emergency medical responders. They must know what to do in
order to save the lives of their passengers and themselves.
Front-line transit employees are also crucial in preventing
attacks. They are the eyes and ears of the system and are often
first to discover suspicious activities and threats, or the
first to receive reports from passengers. These employees need
to know how to recognize security threats and need to know the
appropriate protocols to follow for reporting and responding to
potential threats.
Security experts and officials from the FTA and the TSA
have publicly recognized the need for employee training. In
fact, a list of 17 ``Action Items for Transit Agencies,''
jointly developed by the TSA and the FTA, includes establishing
and maintaining a security and emergency training program for
all employees. And yet little has been done to ensure that this
training is provided.
While many in the transit industry claim that the employees
are being trained, this is simply not the reality. I know this
because I have talked to our members--the ones who are
supposedly being trained--and they tell me a different story.
They are scared, not because they know there is a threat, but
because they feel out of the information loop, and they have no
idea how to help prevent an incident or what to do if one
occurs.
What is most surprising is that many of the members of my
union I hear this from are employees of the transit systems in
major cities that are at high risk of terrorist attacks. For
security reasons, I will not publicly disclose the names of
those systems.
FTA's own numbers show that only a fraction of industry
employees, less than 25 percent--I repeat, less than 25
percent--have been trained through the leading industry
training program which is now provided at transit agencies free
of cost by the National Transit Institute in partnership with
the FTA.
I would be happy to answer any questions you might have on
it. I know you have my full testimony, and I will not burden
the record any further. Thank you.
Chairman Dodd. Thank you very much, Mr. George. We
appreciate your testimony and the work that your members
perform every single day. And the issue of training I think is
one we are going to spend some time talking about here this
morning, and I am very confident you are going to hear from a
unanimous panel about the importance of that issue. So we thank
you for your emphasis on it here this morning.
Again, welcome, Mr. Garrido. Thank you for coming such a
long distance to be with us. And please express again our
sincere condolences to the people of Spain for what you have
been through, and we are very anxious to hear your testimony.
STATEMENT OF AURELIO ROJO GARRIDO, OPERATIONAL DIRECTOR, METRO
MADRID, AND SECRETARY GENERAL, ASSOCIATION OF LATIN AMERICAN
METROS AND SUBWAYS (ALAMYS)
Mr. Rojo Garrido. Thank you very much. I really appreciate
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Dodd, and Mr. Shelby, the Ranking Member,
inviting Madrid Metro to share our tragic experiences in Madrid
and also our decision that we took after this tragedy.
Chairman Dodd. I should point out, you have a program here,
a slide presentation here for us.
Mr. Rojo Garrido. I will show you some pictures that
normally we do not show, but I think it is important for all of
you to see the real situation after the explosion.
I have some figures about Madrid Metro. The Madrid region
has 6 million citizens, and Madrid Metro now is 227 kilometers.
In the next 5 months, we will extend 50 kilometers more.
In relation with the attacks in Madrid, 13 bombs exploded
in 4 trains. The trains were in three different stations or
close to a station. It was in the rush hour, and almost 200
people were killed and more than 1,500 people were injured. All
the trains came from the Alcala de Henares Station, a city 50
kilometers from Madrid.
Here is a picture with the crowded platform in the same
hour of the bomb. One of the bombs exploded in this station.
The other bombs exploded in the open surface. Here you can
see one of the trains. In this train, the terrorists put three
bombs.
Here you can see the first moment after the explosion. Here
in this tragic picture you can see the first help. The same
passengers tried to help the others until the members of the
police and the emergency service came.
More pictures inside the trains, it was very, very helpful.
In the picture on the left is some picture of the period when
the bomb exploded in the platform.
We did some special measures quickly. We started to do
inspections on the surface rail. We have 30 kilometers on
surface; the other 200 are in tunnels. Before opening the
services, we decided to close the bins, and we changed our
patrolling systems. We also started to control technical areas.
We started to do our awareness campaign in order to ask the
passengers to collaborate with us and with the police. We
raised many information about the technical assistance that we
have in order to know our passengers this system.
The police presence was increased. The Municipal Police,
which is the second police in Madrid, came also for 2 months
for Madrid Metro. And we increased also the budget to contract
private security, more than 20 percent. And what was very
effective is to create mixed patrols between national police
and private security guards. It is very interesting for us. We
decided to remove luggage racks in the trains to the airport,
and a very important thing is to involve the staff in the
supervision of security matters and the security training. All
the courses, the training courses, we did one or 2 days to
share the latest knowledge in security matters in the
underground.
In relation with the management system, we decided to
implement a new security post in all lines. It is a very
important decision for us. We already had before the Post
Command Center and the station and the trains. We decided to
implement line security posts for all lines, with technical
assistance to help with the security matters.
We started to patrol also with trained dogs, some of them
specialists in explosives, and also we introduced mobile bomb
detectors.
After the conversation with the police and the Spanish
security, we feel it is very difficult to protect a huge
network with 1 million square meters area, 100 kilometers of
corridors and platforms, many doors. It is very difficult to
close a system as underground. For that, we decided to
implement the general level, introducing technical systems to
help the police, the security staff, and the operational staff
to control the space. We introduced PDA for the staff. In this
PDA it is possible to control and to receive alarms and to
watch the CCTV system.
Our regional government decided to have funds to increase
the security matters, more or less $100 million to spend in 2
years to improve our communication system and security system
established, especially the CCTV system.
We think now on behalf of our association, ALAMYS, the
Latin American association, our members, the commitment of the
politics with the leaks in the transit system will be fully
adopted. We take the decision in order to give funds to
increase the security level because the target of the
terrorists is these days the transit system more and more. And
also the role of the Metropolitan Railway is to collaborate,
coordinate, facilitate the operation with technical assistance,
emergency plan, and staff preparedness.
I think we have many plans in Europe, in the European
Community, but the central government usually has the main
responsibility for addressing the plans to fight against
terrorism.
Thank you very much. Sorry for taking more minutes. The
message for all of you is all we can fight against terrorism if
we are together. Thank you very much.
Chairman Dodd. Thank you very much, Mr. Garrido. I should
have mentioned this. I know just recently you have been through
again another round of terrorist attacks in your country. In
this case, I think it was ETA who perpetrated these attacks.
You have been through a lot in Spain over the last number of
years, and I want you to know you have the support and sympathy
of the people in this country. I served for a number of years
as the Chairman of the U.S.-Spain Council, having joint
meetings every year both here and in Spain to talk about issues
of common interest, and this was always a subject matter, and
we can learn a great deal from you. You have made some very
solid and sound suggestions here that I think are going to be
valuable to us as we look to our new legislation. But we thank
you immensely again for your thoughts and comments.
Mr. O'Toole, again, you have been through a great deal, and
we are very grateful to you and the British Government for
participating here today.
STATEMENT OF TIM O'TOOLE, MANAGING DIRECTOR, LONDON
UNDERGROUND, TRANSPORT FOR LONDON, ENGLAND
Mr. O'Toole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and congratulations
to you. I hope my accent isn't too great a disappointment to
you all. I am the Managing Director of London Underground, and
we are the oldest and one of the largest underground railways
in the world. We are grateful you would include us in your
consideration of this subject which is so important to us. As
the Chairman has already pointed out, on the 7th of July in
2005, four young men, 24 hours after London had just finished
celebrating winning the Olympics, sauntered into one of my
stations, Kings Cross. One of them got on a Circle Line train
headed east. One got on a Circle Line train headed west. One
got on a Piccadilly Line train headed south. And one we believe
meant to get on a Northern Line train but got delayed,
confused, and appears to have been evacuated from the station
onto a double-decker bus.
The three who got on the trains waited until the trains got
into the tunnels, and then they simultaneously detonated bombs
they carried in rucksacks on their backs. About an hour later,
the man who got on the bus detonated his bomb. And, as the
Chairman has already pointed out, 52 people died, 700 people
were injured, many of them in life-changing ways.
I am very proud of the way my staff reacted to these
events. Within minutes, within 2 minutes, they were in the
tunnels starting to attend to those trains. Within 20 minutes,
we had made the decision to evacuate the network. We had over
500 trains in service at that time, and within 1 hour, we got
250,000 people off that network without a single injury. Within
2 hours, we had divided management into very separate tasks
focused on dealing with the immediate scene, designing a new
service plan, and finding ways, engineering designs to bring
those sites back.
You can imagine going through an experience like that, you
learn a lot of lessons, but I thought I would just focus on the
one, and the Chairman has already anticipated it. The primary
lesson is this: You have to invest in your staff and rely on
them. You have to invest in technology but don't rely on it.
You have to respond much faster than management can intervene,
and the only ones who are going to do that are the people on
the site at the time.
My staff is competent and professional, and they are that
way because of the drills we do--not just the drills in London
Underground, but the drills with all of the agencies, the
emergency services. My testimony includes a reference to the
very elaborate and expensive drill we did at Bank Station
simulating a chemical attack. But we also do them regularly on
our network with the local fire department simulating an
emergency at a local station. So my staff knows what to do, and
what they have to learn is the complexity of the situation they
are going to address. It is not just having people of a quality
who have the stomach to run into a darkened tunnel where a bomb
went off. It is also having a staff intelligent enough to know
that they have got to split their resources, and half of them
cannot run into the tunnel. They have got to go take control of
the entrance, they have to take control of the gate line,
because the people keep coming at you. They do not understand
what has happened, and they will complicate the situation
unless you have staff who are clever enough and trained enough
to take care of the situation.
The other great advantage of drills, which I strongly
recommend, is the fact of the trust that builds up among the
different people involved. There is nothing worse than having
one great organization with a lot of power but does not have
the competency to actually manage the situation.
In Great Britain, we have a situation that, when an
emergency happens, the metropolitan police assume plenary
authority. I report to the metropolitan police at that point.
My headquarters is right across the street from New Scotland
Yard. Yet when these bombs went off, an officer didn't come
across the street to oversee us. The reason they didn't is they
knew what we would do. They knew we were trained and they could
rely on us. So the people with different expertise can just get
on with what they have to do, and that is a very, very
important element to have in your organization. In other words,
it is not just the front-line people. The entire institution
has to be trained and made competent.
The second half of that lesson is to invest in technology
but don't rely on it. There are certain elements that are going
to fail you. Certainly some things are not going to survive a
bomb blast. The mobile or cell phone network could not handle
the traffic, so if you have a management structure that relies
on getting a hold of people with cell phones, you are in big
trouble. But there certainly are elements of technology that
are useful. Certainly our CCTV system proved extremely useful
in the attack that followed 2 weeks later on the 21st and
allowed the metropolitan police a way to arrest those people
fairly quickly.
The only point I want to emphasize is that whatever you
invest in, it must be as a result of firm risk-based analysis
and not be simply an investment that panders to the fear in
society. Railways are extremely inhospitable environments. If
you introduce a lot of very delicate detection equipment, all
you are going to do is impose an extremely expensive
maintenance burden on an institution that we know is invariably
underfunded. So we have to make sure the things we invest in
actually lower the risk for the people involved; otherwise, the
money is better off going into making sure the trains are
reliable.
It was an awful day in London on the 7th of July 2005, but
my staff performed magnificently, and I am very proud of them.
Thank you, and I would be happy to answer any questions.
Chairman Dodd. Great testimony. I am grateful to all of you
for your comments.
Let's pick up on the emphasis that Mr. O'Toole raised here.
You have all addressed it. Mr. George did. Certainly Dan has
talked about it as well. Let me ask you, Mr. Garrido, to
comment on the statement that you need technology but not to
rely on it and personnel really needs to have the training and
background to do the technology aspects of these systems, which
are rugged systems, that go through a lot. Do you have any
additional comments to make? Do you have anything you would add
to what Mr. O'Toole suggested?
Mr. Rojo Garrido. I agree with Mr. O'Toole and all the
principle is to have a staff with commitment, with the--
associated with terrorists, and the facilities, the technical
assistance has to be in to help them to fight against
terrorism, also against the other security departments in our
networks.
I agree also it is very difficult to implement different
kinds of detectors for this. We already use the mobile
detectors, decided not to implement fixed detectors because the
cost of this system is very high, and as we have a huge
surface, it is impossible to protect.
The collaboration between police and our operational staff
is very, very important. It is very important, and we run
different meetings in order to share between them their
experiences.
I agree with Mr. O'Toole, but also I think to decide to
implement some kind of technical services because without this
assistance, our staff can manage some situations well, and it
is very useful for the normal service, the level of security in
Madrid Metro is now higher in many different fields.
Chairman Dodd. Great. Thank you very much.
Let me ask the other panelists. Dan, do you want to comment
on the training aspects of this and the personnel?
Mr. Malloy. Well, I listened to Mr. O'Toole and his
comments about drilling, and I was thinking of how un-American
that is. We are not used to drilling. We do not do the kind of
work that other countries have learned is so vitally important
in preventing and recovering from the kinds of incidences which
he described, and I certainly applaud his performance and that
of his agency.
Listening to your first question, Mr. Chairman, I am
reminded that interoperability, which is a huge issue, not just
in transportation but in so many other areas, from recovery
from natural-occurring incidences as well as terrorism,
presents a huge challenge to America's cities and America's
mayors. We need real leadership coming from the Federal
Government on this issue. Interoperability is really a great
worry, and the reality is, as I sit here today, that many
cities and States are struggling with that issue and not
including transit security in their planning.
That is a reality. I know it to be the case. And we need
leadership from this Committee to stress that importance.
Chairman Dodd. Mr. Millar and Mr. George, I would like you
to comment on this as well. You talked about it, Mr. Millar, as
well, and obviously, Mr. George, you represent an awful lot of
people out there whose lives and careers are at stake. Give us
some sense of what is happening today. Are we doing enough
drilling? Is there enough training going on?
Mr. George. No, Chairman Dodd. There is really not enough
training going on. We have not even tipped the iceberg in any
way of training. Our people are out there. They are trying to
do what is best. They are doing it in a way that they are
inexperienced. They think they might see something, but they do
not. I think the transit agencies are hard-pressed for funding
just to operate the systems. I do not think they have a desire
not to do the training. It is just impossible for them to do it
at this time, and I think it is just a recipe for disaster
someday if we do not get on board and do this. We are willing
to work with this. It is our lives on the lines at the same
time as we are protecting our passengers.
So there is a common goal here. There should never be any
difference. And this is one where the transit agencies and
labor and management completely are cooperative in doing the
training. We just do not have the training out there in the
major systems.
Just recently here, on the Metro system where they had an
accident, it took the operator to get off the train and walk
through the tunnel back and report what it was and come back
up. And there are all kinds of estimates of 10, 20 minutes of
lost time in that. It is just not acceptable in today's world.
Chairman Dodd. But I gather you are saying what Mayor
Malloy said. Can you cite any example in the United States
today where we are doing anything along the lines that Mr.
O'Toole described, what is being done in London?
Mr. George. No.
Chairman Dodd. There is not a single example of it?
Mr. George. Not one single example.
Mr. Millar. I am not sure I would 100 percent agree with
that. Certainly, the major cities, particularly New York City
has been a leader. But as Mr. George has said, there is no
disagreement. We may disagree on the amount of training going
on, but whatever that number is, it is not enough and we are in
complete agreement that we need to be doing more training.
As Mr. George said in his testimony, transit workers are
also first responders. You know, to take nothing away from
police or fire or other emergency people, but before they get
there, transit workers are going to be the ones on the scene.
And as Mr. O'Toole said, if the transit workers know what to do
and begin the process of securing that scene, when the other
responders are able to arrive it is a much different situation.
I would also comment on the technology. I think that is a
very wise statement Mr. O'Toole has made, that you cannot rely
on the technology. Yet we know technology can be a big help,
and the mayor referred to interoperability and communications,
for example, as an important issue.
Since 9/11, everyone with a different form of snake oil, if
I can use that word in this context, a new gadget, has
approached public transit. We have asked the Department of
Homeland Security if they wouldn't have their research people
begin to evaluate what is out there. We are not the experts
that they are on all the types of gadgets that might be
helpful. And so we would need--we believe we also need a bigger
investment in the Federal research aspects of this thing
because there are some uses for technology and good uses for
technology as well.
But to your fundamental point, we agree there needs to be
much more training. There is no system that I know of that
would be willing to come and testify and say we are doing all
the training that anyone should do. We would like to do more.
As President George has pointed out, it is largely a matter of
money; it is not a matter of will.
Chairman Dodd. My last question, I presume that the things
that you are doing today, Mr. Garrido, in Spain, what you are
doing today in London--to what extent is the London budget or
the Madrid budget--or is it the national budget which has been
contributing to this heightened degree of security in the wake
of these events? Is it a local expenditure or is it a national
expenditure?
Mr. Rojo Garrido. Yes.
Mr. O'Toole. Well, when we participate in these drills
within our agency, you know, we are funding our own expenses,
that is part of our budget, as do the other agencies as well.
So it is just part of the funding of the enterprise.
Mr. Rojo Garrido. Now in Spain, the responsibility for
regional transport and urban transport is for the region
government. But the central government gives money for the
general transport system in each region, but the responsibility
how to spend this money is the regional government. In Madrid,
the regional government decided to spend contract security,
private agents, and to spend in facilities and in training our
staff. It is a local decision.
Chairman Dodd. The region government makes----
Mr. Rojo Garrido. The regional.
Chairman Dodd. Thank you very much.
Senator Shelby.
Senator Shelby. Thank you.
Mr. O'Toole, you are absolutely right about what goes on in
London and how cool you are and how well trained you are. I was
in London the day of the bombings. Actually, I was in a meeting
at Scotland Yard across the street, dealing with an area of
responsibility of this Committee, that is, the terrorist
financing, which we pursue diligently on both sides of the
aisle here. And I was amazed at the response time, how you got
people off, and then got the transit system, the Tube, moving
again because a couple of days later I was on it. I was a
little reluctant to get on it, but my wife and granddaughter
had been riding it, and I said, ``If they can ride it, I can
ride it.'' So I commend you on that.
Mr. O'Toole. Thank you.
Senator Shelby. And I think a lot of that is training that
you have. I have been in Madrid since the big bombing, I would
call it--you know, all of them are big--and met with a lot of
your people there, and I commend the people of Spain, and
Madrid especially, for how you responded to that.
This is a topic that Chairman Dodd has long been interested
in, and the whole Committee, and we pushed. We have had a
majority of the votes to fund the fight against terrorism and
try to protect our transit system on the floor of the U.S.
Senate. And we have got to do better because it might take 60
votes instead of a majority, and the Chairman understands this.
Mr. O'Toole, we all know that there is nothing better than
the training of the people because of this, but you use a lot
of the closed-circuit TV. I think you had 6,000. You are adding
a lot more. How important are they? And is that something that
we should really push in this country?
Mr. O'Toole. I think, Senator, absolutely. We had 6,000
cameras in July. We are rebuilding the whole system right now.
We are up to around 8,000 now. We will get to 12,000 before
this is done. They will all be digital. We will record for
every second.
It is very important for me to send a message that you come
on our system, we are taking your picture. And that does not
help if you are dealing with a 7th of July situation, a suicide
bomber, but I have to believe it did play a role in the Madrid
situation because they got on the commuter rail. They did not
get on his Metro system directly where they would have
confronted a very different situation. So if you want to get
away, you are not going to come onto a Metro system that has
CCTV.
It plays another role, though, that I think is sometimes
missed by people who talk against the investment. If you are
trying to lead a society, it seems to me, you are really
dealing with the phenomenon of fear. I mean, the deaths are
awful, but, you know, people die from different causes all the
time. It is when they die in this situation that causes society
to panic.
With CCTV, you are immediately able to analyze and present
what happened. When those pictures were presented on July 22nd
following the unsuccessful bombing attack, the underlying
message to all of London was: Here they are, you know what will
happen next, we are going to arrest them.
If those pictures did not exist, it would have contributed
to that sense of fear, they do not know what is going on, they
are going to come back. CCTV allows you to take control of the
situation and project this sense of control, and I think that
is as important as almost any other attribute that leadership
brings to one of these situations.
Senator Shelby. I want to pick up on what Senator Dodd was
alluding to earlier, and that is the funding source. First,
transit security or Tube security, Underground security in
London, do you have a local or a Metro source of funds, or is
it a national source of funds from the House of Commons?
Mr. O'Toole. In Great Britain, everything comes from the
Chancellor, so----
Senator Shelby. Chancellor Gordon Brown.
Mr. O'Toole. Right. So we have got the money we raise at
the till, and then we get a grant from government.
Senator Shelby. OK.
Mr. O'Toole. The Federal Government.
Senator Shelby. In Madrid, what is your funding source--
national--for security of the Madrid system and rail system?
Mr. Rojo Garrido. The budget is from the regional
government. Regional, it is like a State here in the United
States. But the central government framework, more or less 30
percent of the budget of the regional transit system are
provided for the central government. But the regional
government has the decision in which to invest, in more
security, more stations, more traffic security. The political
decision is taken at this moment by the regional government.
Senator Shelby. Are there similarities of how you run your
transit security in Madrid to the way they do in London? I am
sure there are some differences, but are there similarities? Do
you have a lot of closed-circuit TV? You check the rails a lot,
all these things. Is that just fundamental to security of a
transit system?
Mr. Rojo Garrido. Yes, it is similar. Before the attacks,
we have closed-circuit TV locally in the station, but now we
can record all the cameras, not before, and it is possible to
share from the Post Command Center and the local security post.
And in the case of Madrid, the police could know the moment of
the terrorist in the underground because the terrorists travel
in the underground using record files. And it is important
because now almost 40 people are imprisoned after the
investigation of the police, and they used many, many
frequently the system of the Madrid Metro. It is very useful
for police.
Senator Shelby. Mayor Malloy, tell me what you mean by a
flexible Federal transit security grant program.
Mr. Malloy. I want you to get money to where it needs to
be.
Senator Shelby. That is a great answer.
Mr. Malloy. That is what I want.
Senator Shelby. For security.
Chairman Dodd. This guy agrees with you.
Mr. Malloy. I know.
[Laughter.]
Senator Shelby. For security.
Mr. Malloy. For security. And, you know, this is such--you
know, if you look at this on a national basis, these are very
different systems, very different needs. Decisions need to be
made close to the ground. But to implement those decisions, we
need money. We need resources. Quite frankly, Senator, you need
to get it to us, and I began my remarks by thanking and
congratulating you for your work with us. We need your
continued leadership on this issue.
But the reality is that we are ready to build that system.
We are ready to make America safer. We are ready to have safer
transit. But, quite frankly, the resources need to come to us
to allow us to do that.
Senator Shelby. I agree with you.
Mr. Millar, you have been before this Committee many times.
We have worked with you on this very subject. How important is
to have a funding source separate and distinct from the
Department of Homeland Security's transit passenger and freight
rail security funds?
Mr. Millar. Yes, we believe that having a dedicated funding
source to public transit is essential. When you are mixed in
with many other----
Senator Shelby. For security.
Mr. Millar. For security, absolutely, because if it is
mixed in with--you need to secure the ports. You need to secure
the airports. You need to secure transit. You need to secure--
the list goes on. And if it is all in one big melange, you do
not do any of them well. We need to set the kinds of standards
that we want.
For example, we have proposed to the Department of Homeland
Security--APTA is a standard-setting organization--we have
proposed that we would work with them to develop standards so
we would know when you have a rail transit system, here are the
kinds of things you ought to be doing; a bus system, these
kinds of things.
So a dedicated source of funding for transit security is
essential.
Senator Shelby. Well, we hate to talk about things like
this in public, but we have to because this is part of our
obligations and responsibilities.
Mr. Millar. Yes, sir.
Senator Shelby. But we have, as we all know, a great
vulnerability in our passenger system, our rail system, our bus
system. All of it goes together, and I do not think we have
addressed that in any adequate way.
Mr. Millar. I agree with you.
Senator Shelby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Dodd. Well, thank you again, Senator Shelby, for
your leadership on that, and the other individuals who have
spent a lot of time on these issues.
To my colleague from Rhode Island, I went through this a
while ago, and I would be remiss at this historic moment of my
new chairmanship not to point out that at long last I have a
colleague who has a younger child than I do.
[Laughter.]
Chairman Dodd. I want to announce publicly here that we
welcome Emily.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Chairman Dodd. I hope Julia is doing well, and
congratulations to our good friend from Rhode Island on the new
arrival.
Senator Reed. If Emily were here, it would be hard to hear
anything else.
[Laughter.]
Senator Reed. She is now celebrating her 16th or 17th day
with us, so thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Dodd. Congratulations to you.
Senator Reed. I just want to commend again not only the
Chairman and the Ranking Member but the panelists for excellent
testimony. And one reason--and this echoes, I think, Senator
Shelby's comment--is this terrorist threat, as we have been
standing still, has been metastasizing to a much more
sophisticated--and if you look, and I have spent some time on
the Armed Services Committee, the fear today is not a bunch of
17- , 18-year-old amateurs, although very deadly; it is very
sophisticated sole operators getting instructions through
cyberspace, and that is why this incident in Los Angeles is one
that is quite disturbing. A lone individual may have been
testing the system and may have been either an agent or--and we
hope it is nothing, but this is a threat that is very serious.
And we have not yet provided the resources, the direction, and
the coordination we need. So I hope we can do that. I am
confident that with Chairman Dodd and Senator Shelby we will.
Anyway, I thought all the testimony was excellent. Mr.
O'Toole pointed out that one of the advantages they had in
London was a centralized chain of command in a military sense.
People know exactly who is in charge. Not just in your city but
across the country, do you think at the local level there is a
need for a centralized chain of command with interoperable
communication, et cetera, so everyone knows who is in charge,
who does what, is that your sense?
Mr. O'Toole. Senator, I think we have made progress, but
the reality, if we are talking about the ability of local first
responders to cooperate, aid, and assist on a transit basis, I
do not think we are anywhere near where we need to be. And to
piggyback on the point that Senator Shelby made, we actually
need you to set those priorities. I think that is why I am
here. Other governments--State governments, governments that do
not have as active or robust transit systems as some others
will--will always set this at a very low priority. It will be a
back-seat issue. And that is why the leadership of the U.S.
Senate and the House is vitally important to setting this
agenda.
If you say it has to be done, and if you provide the funds
to do it, it will be done. And, quite frankly, if you fail to
do that, unfortunately, not because of this Committee's work,
but our government has failed to do it, we are not making the
kind of progress that we need to make.
I hope that answers your question.
Senator Reed. It does, but let me also ask another
question, I think, that my colleagues have suggested, which is,
the current structure of Homeland Security funding flows
through the States, and for many reasons--and you alluded to
them--that money never seems to get into transit because there
are these other demands out there.
In some respects, we have not given enough money, but in
other respects, there is a natural kind of sponge at the State
level. And I am not suggesting they are doing anything that I
would not do if I was a governor, but it always seems that the
last person in line is the transit system and a local mayor.
Mr. Malloy. I think that that is correct. It has been the
position of the U.S. Conference of Mayors from December 12th on
that mayors needed to be viewed as partners in building the
system that will allow us to defeat terrorism, and certainly to
recover from it when it strikes.
As mayors--and the U.S. Conference of Mayors represents
some 1,200 communities with populations of 30,000 or more--we
do not believe this current system is working well for local
government. It is delaying implementation. It is siphoning off
funds that need to go. And to be very direct and to agree with
you, Senator, one of the results is a lack of money and the
lack of efforts on behalf of transit.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Mr. Millar and Mr. George, thank you for your testimony,
and I enjoyed working with you and continue to look forward to
doing that. Mr. O'Toole and Mr. Garrido laid out a
comprehensive approach to transit security. Senator Dodd asked
about training, but I am asking a broader question. Is there
any community in the United States that matches the model of
Madrid and London, who are reacting to this violence already?
They have internalized it, not just in training but in
technology, in coordination, in the whole gamut. Can you cite
one?
Mr. Millar. Certainly New York City and the agencies there
are, in my opinion, far ahead of many other places. Here in
Washington, DC, a very good job has been done as well. But
much, much more needs to be done.
We agree with the model. It is what we aspire to do. But
for all the reasons we have talked about today, it has not
happened yet to the degree it should. But we agree.
Ironically, the day that the terrible bombings occurred in
Madrid, my Director of Safety happened to be in London, and
Madrid officials were also in London because we were all trying
to learn from one another. There has been very good
international cooperation in sharing experiences, and I
particularly want to thank my colleagues not only for coming
today at your invitation, but for sharing their experiences.
They have helped us develop a model so we know what needs to be
done. Now we need to get about the business of funding and
implementing.
Senator Reed. In other words, even our most advanced
municipal metropolitan areas have not reached the level of sort
of security that we see in London and Madrid.
Mr. Millar. That is my opinion, yes, sir.
Senator Reed. And, Mr. George, we have talked about
training. It is so essential. And I must say, because our
hearings before, particularly after our incident on 9/11,
because of the spontaneous actions of transit workers in New
York City and in Washington, DC, many, many people were saved.
The transit workers in Washington moved trains from the
Pentagon, evacuated people, kept moving, and there were
critical decisions made by New York transit workers--your
members, I presume--who at the risk of their own lives either
moved trains out or stopped trains of their own volition, not
going to that subway station below the World Trade Center.
But the point I think we have all said today is we cannot
count on just spontaneous instincts and, you know, the wisdom
of--we have got to instill that, and I think that is your
position.
Mr. George. That is correct, and I might add, one thing
that goes unnoticed and that we are very proud of in the
Amalgamated, we also moved 250,000 school children safely home
in yellow buses that day, and it gets no notoriety, and that is
fine. But those members returned from their homes in that split
shift in a day and automatically on their own, without
direction, went and picked those kids up. They thought that was
their primary duty. And the bridges were all closed, as we
know, so they had a very difficult time.
Chairman Dodd. But Jack's point is that was done by
instinct.
Mr. George. Instinct.
Chairman Dodd. That was not because someone had thought
about this ahead of time.
Mr. George. No, it was not. And I guess really what it--the
training aspect of it, you know, we run very good transit
systems in this country, and we run them with really good
members, my members and employees. This is a new ingredient
that has come into the fold that no one really knows. And I
think the leadership of this Committee that has to put the
mandates down, we do not have--we haven't reached that area of
expertise where we do work on--like they do in Madrid and they
do in London. We are far from that area yet. We are going at it
as novice, and we have to really go at it with a professional
type of thing. And I think that is where it takes the funding,
and I think it takes a mandate from the Federal Government with
Homeland Security to say, look, this is an important thing.
I might add, I know we are talking about public transit,
but we have our over-the-road industry which I represent, and
that, too, is very vulnerable at the time. And those over-the-
road operators cannot afford to do the things that some of the
public transit are doing right at this time with the limited
amount of funding they have.
So it is a great concern to my members.
Senator Reed. Well, I have a great deal of respect for your
members. My great-grandfather and grandfather were transit
workers in Providence, Rhode Island, starting on the horse cars
and then going to the electric trolleys.
Mr. George. Very good.
Senator Reed. So this is a genetic disposition on my part.
[Laughter.]
Mr. George. Thank you.
Senator Reed. A final question, and I think I have been
told to relinquish my time. Both Mr. Garrido and Mr. O'Toole,
if you could just tell us the three recommendations you would
make. You know, what are the three top things you felt you had
to do immediately either to get the system in shape or to
respond to this attack? Mr. Garrido.
Mr. Rojo Garrido. It is necessary to balance, to manage
people and systems, both, in our opinion, necessary, in first
place, of course, people but with the help of the technical
system. The commitment for politics that fight against
terrorism in the field of public transport because in this
moment one of the main objectives for them. And if our citizens
don't feel well in our system, our cities, we don't develop in
a sustainable way. And to maintain safe transit system, it is
essential for our cities today. These are our main suggestions.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Mr. O'Toole.
Mr. O'Toole. I would say the ability to not reward these
people with chaos and fear, and that means, number one, you
have got to bring the system back immediately. You cannot have
any delay.
The second thing is to allow that to happen, you have to
have a plan so that you project this sense of control.
And I would like to add, it is not just about training
everyone, you run here and you run there. It is also about a
comprehensive plan, and I would like to just give you two
examples that you will be judged by.
Senator Reed. Please.
Mr. O'Toole. Number one, every transit agency better know
where they would and how they would set up a family and victim
assistance center. You do not get a couple of days to think
about this. These people come at you right away, and you will
be judged on whether or not you have those kinds of facilities.
The second thing is your employees in a situation like this
confront things people are not supposed to see in everyday
life, and the violence we see on movies and television is
antiseptic compared to what they will confront. You saw some of
those pictures. But we have people going into darkened tunnels
with limbs spread all over and stepping on pieces of humans,
and it is just--this sticks with people. So you better know how
you are going to deliver a lot of counseling to these people.
It is not enough to call them heroes the next day. They need
help, and you have to be able to deliver it. And if you don't
know how you are going to deliver it, you are going to be
judged very harshly on that as well.
So you really need a group to sit down and think about an
incident like this all the way through and divide up the
various tasks. It is just about kind of projecting this whole
plan to the community.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Chairman Dodd. That is great testimony. I was thinking of
the importance of that and thinking in a holistic way about all
of this. I noted the other day, picking up on Senator Reed's
point here about talking about Washington, DC, the control
center for the Metro system in Washington, DC, is just a few
blocks from the White House. And I know that there has been an
effort over the past number of years to try and move that
center out to one of the more suburban areas, one of the
reasons being that if you faced a tragedy here in the city, you
could end up not only with that tragedy on your hands, but also
shutting down your entire Metro system, given the proximity to
some of these targets that could be attractive to these people.
So it really does need this thinking. They cannot get the
funding for this, by the way. That has been the problem. There
is no funding to move this. So you are faced with these kinds
of dilemmas.
And you said something, Mr. O'Toole, that I want to pick up
on. Dan may remember this. We had a meeting in Fairfield
County, at the University of Fairfield, in fact, about a year
or so ago, where we just were talking not about specific
transit systems but what would happen in Lower Fairfield
County, which is a highly congested area, if we had an incident
on Route 95, one of these major problems, whether it be an
accident or something more manmade. How is everyone going to
respond to this? What happens in our hospitals? What happens in
our schools? The first responder, as someone pointed out, is in
this case transit and transit workers. If it is a building, it
is the employees in that building. The first responders are the
people who are on the site where the incident occurs. So to
what extent have you thought really getting into this is how do
we respond to it.
And it was very revealing, even there sitting down, saying
they had thought about it but never in a complete enough way.
And I wonder if we have any sense of this about first
responders, in addition to what we are doing with the transit
workers and the employees involved in this situation, to what
extent, asking Jack's question again, has there been any
thought beyond some isolated anecdotal cases, are we really
working at this, even sitting down and talking about it? Forget
about going to a drill. Are people sitting down someplace and
saying what do you do and what do you do and what do you do?
Mr. Millar. Yes, that is happening, and that is recognized,
and that is one of the important lessons we have learned from
around the world. So, yes, that type of comprehensive approach
is worked through, and I would venture to say that in most
major metropolitan areas, that basic level has been decided.
But when you get past that top level is where we need more
work.
Chairman Dodd. Again, I thank all of you for being here. I
am going to turn to Senator Shelby. He has got another couple
of questions here. But this is a top priority for this
Committee. The reason we had this as our first hearing, I think
Mr. O'Toole made the point, not only responding to get things
back up, it is the mentality, it is the ripple effect beyond
the actual event itself that can have huge implications. And
you end up with a good percentage of your people not wanting to
get back onto a system. Just imagine what effect that is in
terms of just commerce, if that goes on for days what happens.
So it is fear sometimes far beyond the actual event that
these people are trying to create, and I think it is very
important, the prosperity aspects of this beyond the incident
itself are critically important for our discussion. And I am
very much enthusiastic about Dick Shelby's concepts and ideas,
and this is where we are focusing on where the risks are. And I
was thinking here, as the author of the FIRE Act and the FIRE
grants, these monies have all gone directly to the communities
involved, and it has made a huge difference just in terms of
how well a dollar gets spent and what the priorities are, and
it has worked very well.
Mr. Malloy. Senator, it is a far better model than the one
that we are pursuing on a national basis today. That is the
reality. This is what mayors have been saying. Clearly you have
heard that from your fire departments from across the United
States.
Chairman Dodd. Senator Shelby.
Senator Shelby. I will reserve any questions, but I do want
to join you in thanking all of you for your concern, your
involvement, and also for coming a long way, from London and
Madrid, you two, to be with us today. We will continue to work
on this.
I think we cannot alleviate all the fear and all the risk,
but we can cut out a lot of it, and we can reassure a lot of
the traveling public that we are meeting our responsibility,
that is, if we can get our colleagues to join us.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Dodd. You bet. I would just note in the Committee,
because this would be my first day, I looked out in the
audience and there is a fellow by the name of Jack Hargett who
is in the audience. Jack Hargett goes back. I have known him
almost all my life. He worked with my father up here in the
U.S. Senate many, many years ago. So, Jack, it is good to see a
familiar face, and someone who is deeply involved in these
issues, I might point out as well. So thank you for being here.
I think all of us, with all due respect to our domestic
witnesses here, I cannot tell you, Mr. Garrido, how much we
appreciate your being here. And it means a great deal, Mr.
O'Toole. Thank you very much.
Senator Shelby. One other comment if you would recognize
me.
Chairman Dodd. Yes.
Senator Shelby. I think I would be remiss if I didn't
recognize publicly the work that Senator Reed and Senator
Allard have done in this area. I did not know it was genetic
with Senator Reed, but he has worked hard in transit security
and all aspects of this. And I wanted to publicly do that for
the record.
Chairman Dodd. Well, very good. Again, thanks to all of
you.
We are going to keep the record open for members who may
want to ask some questions. We will leave it open for about a
week because we want to get right back to a markup if we can
soon on this bill. We want to move things along. So there may
be some additional questions that colleagues would like to
raise with you, so we will leave that availability open, and we
hope you could respond fairly quickly to some additional
questions that may come up.
Again, I thank all of you for being here today and I thank
my colleagues.
The Committee will stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:36 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
[Prepared statements supplied for the record follow:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR WAYNE ALLARD
I would like to thank Chairman Dodd for convening today's hearing
on transit security. It is an appropriate topic to be the Committee's
first issue for consideration in the 110th Congress.
Every single day in America, millions of people ride public
transportation, and we all represent transit riders. Following the
tragic attacks on public transportation systems around the world, we
have all become acutely aware of the need to strengthen security for
American transit.
Yet, transit systems present a unique security challenge--the
success and efficiency of public transportation is predicated on open
access. The security approaches utilized in other modes, such as
aviation, would destroy the viability of a transit system.
There are ways in which the unique security needs of public
transportation can be addressed. Although part of their expertise comes
from unfortunate personal experience, Mr. Garrido and Mr. O'Toole can
help us learn from the Madrid and London tragedies. I sincerely
appreciate their willingness to appear here today to help us better
understand this issue.
In my previous capacity as Chairman of the Housing and
Transportation Subcommittee, I was pleased to work with my counterpart
from across the aisle, Senator Reed, along with our full committee
leadership, Senator Shelby and former Senator Sarbanes, in drafting
legislation to make America's public transportation systems safer. I am
confident that Chairman Dodd will continue the active interest of
Senator Sarbanes.
In particular, I was pleased that the grant allocations were to be
based on security assessments conducted by the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS). They are in the best position to identify risks and
vulnerabilities, while factoring in relevant security information, in
order to prioritize needs for grant allocation. This would ensure that
the program is as efficient as possible in meeting transit security
needs, rather than simply becoming another pork program.
Although our bill passed the Senate on multiple occasions, it has
yet to be enacted into law. I am hopeful that the committee will be
able to move legislation quickly, and I look forward to working with my
colleagues and Chairman Dodd to accomplish this goal.
Although it is not in the Banking Committee's jurisdiction, I
wanted to take this opportunity to mention another bill which I believe
will be very beneficial to transit security. At the beginning of the
110th Congress, I reintroduced legislation to expand the National
Domestic Preparedness Consortium to include the Transportation
Technology Center in Pueblo, CO. This unique facility enhances
technology and training to prevent, minimize, and respond to potential
terrorist attacks. I believe that it is an excellent complement to the
legislation that has previously passed the Banking Committee, and I
hope my colleagues will join me in supporting it.
I regret that I will be unable to stay for this hearing due to
another hearing in a different committee; however, I intend to
carefully review the information from this hearing. This is an
extremely important issue, and I thank the Chairman for making it such
a high priority.
______
PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. DANNEL P. MALLOY
Mayor of Stamford, CT, and Trustee, The U.S. Conference of Mayors
January 18, 2007
Thank you very much for inviting me to speak with you today on
behalf of The United States Conference of Mayors regarding the state of
transit security. The United States Conference of Mayors is the
official nonpartisan organization of cities with populations of 30,000
or more. There are 1,139 such cities in the country today, each
represented in the Conference by its chief elected official, the Mayor.
On behalf of The United States Conference of Mayors, and the
hundreds of mayors we represent, we appreciate your interest in public
transportation security, and we look forward to working with you as you
develop legislation to safeguard America's bus, rail, and ferry
systems.
The written comments delivered this morning will focus on four key
transit security areas identified by the mayors:
1. The establishment of a flexible Federal transit security grant
program.
2. Securing public transportation systems is a Federal
responsibility.
3. Transit security funds should go directly to the transit
authority or that jurisdiction providing security.
4. Robust resources for transit-related security research and
development of technology.
Overview
One month after September 11, the leadership of the Conference of
Mayors called an emergency homeland security summit in Washington, DC,
Hundreds of mayors, police, fire, emergency management, and
transportation officials came to that summit and drafted a sweeping
``National Action Plan for Safety and Security in America's Cities.''
That National Action Plan was updated in October of 2005 with special
emphasis on transit security following the attacks on London's
Underground Tube system, aboard London Transit Buses, and Madrid's rail
system.
In addition, my comments delivered this morning originate from the
Conference's ``Strong Cities . . . Strong Families . . . For a Strong
America'' 10-Point Plan which will be presented next week at The United
States Conference of Mayors 75th Winter Meeting in Washington, DC.
The United States Conference of Mayors and its members have
dedicated themselves to making America's cities safer by preventing
possible acts of terrorism, and being ready to respond should
terrorists strike.
Mayors have never waited for assistance from others to act. Mayors
and cities continue to focus on protecting their citizens from possible
terrorist attacks, including attacks on mass transit. At the same time,
we must further strengthen our partnership with the Federal government
to make sure that our ``first preventers'' and ``first responders''
have the resources and training they need to succeed, and that all
necessary Federal support is ready in the event of a catastrophic
event.
To this point, the nation's mayors believe more must be done at the
Federal level of government to make sure that our cities are able to
respond to the growing challenges of securing public transportation
infrastructure. As the American Public Transportation Association's
(APTA) survey identified, Congress has allocated only $386 million to
transit security through Fiscal Year 2006, yet transit agencies have
identified in excess of $6 billion in transit security investment
needs. \1\
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\1\APTA's transportation security survey identified needed
enhancements costing at least $5.2 billion in additional capital
funding to maintain, modernize, and expand transit system security
functions to meet increased security demands. Over $800 million in
increased costs for security personnel, training, technical support,
and research and development have been identified, bringing total
additional transit security funding needs to more than $6 billion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We urge Congress to act decisively on this issue.
For the city of Stamford, CT, securing these wide open and
vulnerable systems is a priority. As part of the New York metropolitan
area, Stamford, a city of nearly 127,000, is one of the largest cities
on the route between New York and Boston. It is a major transportation
hub for other communities in the State of Connecticut and is located on
one of the busiest stretches of public transportation in the Nation.
\2\
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\2\ Stamford is located on the main branch of the New Haven Line
on the Metro-North Railroad, the commuter rail system for northern
metropolitan New York City. Stamford Station is the last express
station in the direction of New York City, and thus serves as a major
transfer point for faster trains into New York City. Stamford Station
is also the terminus of a Metro-North branch line that ends in New
Canaan, about 15 miles away and is also a major Amtrak station served
by the high-speed Acela trains that run from Washington, DC, to Boston.
Amtrak's Regional and Vermonter service has linked Stamford with daily
trains to Virginia, Vermont, and intermediate points. Bus service runs
along major arterial roads as well as connecting the city with New
York.
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Priorities for Enhanced Public Transportation Security
With more than 7.8 billion trips taken nationwide on public transit
in the first 9 months of 2006, \3\ protecting riders from potential
terrorist attacks remains a high priority for mayors, public safety
officials, and first responders.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ APTA announced on January 7, 2007, that public transportation
ridership has increased by nearly 3 percent in the first 9 months of
2006, as Americans took 7.8 billion trips on public transit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We believe that any public transportation security legislation
should be guided by four principles.
First, the Nation's mayors are calling for the establishment of a
flexible Federal transit security grant program to improve security in
the areas of communications, surveillance, detection systems,
personnel, training, and research. Specifically, this grant program
should fund security cameras onboard public transportation vehicles and
in bus and rail stations, video surveillance and threat detection
cameras, increased surveillance via closed circuit TV, and automated
bus and rail locator systems. As far as infrastructure expansion,
modernization and rehabilitation, the grant program should fund
permanent chemical, biological, and explosive detection systems,
fencing and barriers, lighting, alarms and access control for tunnels,
bridges, interlockings, tracks, yards and facilities, redesign of
infrastructure to eliminate hiding places, the life safety program in
New York City, and to rehabilitate existing Baltimore and Washington,
DC, tunnels.
Second, as we have done with aviation, securing public transit is a
Federal responsibility and should not require a local or State match.
Third, mass transit security funds should go directly to the
transit authority or the jurisdiction providing security. We must
continue to make improvements in the grant application process and
delivery mechanism for Federal Homeland Security resources to make sure
that the funding quickly reaches the transit system's first responders.
Since the early days after September 11, 2001, the Nation's mayors
have expressed serious concern with the state-based system for
coordinating preparedness and responses to acts of terrorism.
Many mayors have positive working relationships with State and
Federal partners, but there was a real concern from the beginning that
a complex, Federal distribution system that involved various approval
levels for first-responder resources and training would be slow and
result in serious delays in funding reaching high-threat, high-risked
populations and infrastructures, including mass transit.
Unfortunately, the many surveys our organization conducted proved
this to be the case. Time and time again, our surveys showed that
resources were not reaching our cities and the critical infrastructure
quickly.\4\
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\4\ The United States Conference of Mayors 231-City/50-State 2004
Third Report to the Nation on Tracking Federal Homeland Security Funds
showed that of the cities responsible for providing transit security,
one-fourth of the cities reported that their State was exercising its
option to keep a portion of the transit security funds to complement
State assets at transit sites.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fourth, there should be a robust and dedicated funding source for
transit-related security research and development technology.
Recognizing the threat posed to mass transit systems by acts of
terrorism, mayors urge increased research and development to counter
these growing challenges, both by improvements to current capabilities
and development of new technologies.
Conclusion
Chairman Dodd, Ranking Member Shelby and Members of this Committee,
let me make some closing comments.
I know that our Nation has made significant progress on increasing
homeland security since September 11, and that our Federal-local
partnership is much stronger with more resources, better information
sharing, and a greater level of general communication.
But I fervently hope that the tragic attacks in India, the United
Kingdom, Spain, and Israel serve as a reminder that we must not settle
for ``good enough.'' These and other attacks dramatically highlight the
vulnerability of mass transit worldwide to terrorism and the need for
an increased focus by the Federal Government on security for these
systems.
We must recommit ourselves to doing all that we can to make sure
our city and county citizens can get on that bus, step into that train,
go to work, cheer at that sporting event, and just go about their daily
lives knowing that everything that can be done is being done to make
them safe from terror.
I cannot over-emphasize the critical importance of public
transportation to our local economies and the long-term vitality of our
cities and the Nation. That is why we must invest in transportation
security.
We are all in this together.
On behalf of the Nation's mayors, The United States Conference of
Mayors stands ready to work with this new Congress in a bi-partisan way
to safeguard one of our Nation's most critical infrastructures, public
transportation.
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today.
I look forward to questions.
EXHIBIT A
The United States Conference of Mayors
Mayors' 10-Point Plan
Strong Cities . . . Strong Families . . . For a Strong America
1. Energy and Environmental Block Grant (Climate Change)
Mayors from across the Nation, working through The U.S. Conference
of Mayors, are leading the Nation in taking action on the critical
issue of global warming. Local governments are in a unique position to
implement and coordinate local action that will lead to significant and
real reductions in energy use and its impact on global warming.
When our Federal Government refused to take action on the issue of
Climate Change, over 350 cities pledged their commitment to the U.S.
Mayors Climate Protection Agreement to call attention to the global
warming crisis and to begin development of local programs to reduce
carbon emissions. This community-based, grass roots effort is key to a
successful national strategy to reduce our energy dependence, decrease
carbon emissions, and improve the environment.
The U.S. Conference of Mayors proposes creation of an Energy and
Environmental Block Grant, modeled after the highly successful
Community Development Block Grant, to provide funding directly to
cities and urban counties for programs that 1) improve community energy
efficiency; 2) develop and implement community strategies to reduce
carbon emissions, including but not limited to achieving ``carbon
free'' buildings by 2030; 3) develop and implement community and
transportation energy conservation programs; 4) encourage the
development of new technologies and systems to decrease our dependence
on foreign oil; and 5) promotion and development of alternative/
renewable energy sources. Funds could also be used to support local
non-profit organizations to meet the objectives of the program. The
Block Grant would be distributed under a formula based on population
and other factors, modeled after CDBG, and include measurable
objectives.
Initial funding for the Block Grant could come from (in part or in
whole) from revenues derived from the proposed repeal of the 2004 tax
cuts for the oil and gas industry and royalty payment from off-shore
oil and gas leases.
Eligible activities under the Block Grant would include, but not be
limited to, development of comprehensive energy, environment, and
climate protection strategic plans, weatherization programs, energy
efficiency audits, alternative fuel infrastructure, incentives for
energy efficiency technologies, promotion of public transit, methane
recovery programs, conversion of alternative fuel fleets, public
education, brownfields redevelopment, land-use policies, etc.
2. Federal-Local Partnership on Crime Prevention (Violent Crime Rising,
Federal Resources Cut, Trust Fund Needed)
For a growing number of cities across the United States, violent
crime is accelerating at an alarming pace. The FBI's Uniform Crime
Report for 2005 showed the largest single year percent increase in
violent crime in 14 years. This trend continued in 2006 according to a
Police Executive Research Forum survey of 55 law enforcement agencies,
with many cities seeing double-digit increases in murder, assault, and
robbery rates.
Mayors and police chiefs have identified a number of contributing
factors for this rise in crime including a growing culture of violence
among youth, gangs, a proliferation of illegal guns, drug activity, the
re-entry of ex-offenders, and social problems related to school truancy
and a lack of jobs. Funding for major Department of Justice law
enforcement programs has been slashed in recent years, with the COPS
hiring program (once funded at almost $1.5 billion) and Local Law
Enforcement Block Grant program (once funded at approximately $523
million) both being eliminated.
To address these issues, the Nation's mayors are calling for a new
crime initiative to restore the Federal-local partnership on hometown
security. As was done under the 1994 Crime Bill, mayors are calling for
a Federal trust fund to provide flexible resources for the deployment
of law enforcement personnel, support local innovations, fight domestic
violence, and fund technology that helps fight crime. Specifically,
funding for COPS and the local block grant should be restored, and
mayors fully support strong accountability standards tied to these
grants. In addition, resources are needed to help promote crime
prevention and provide positive alternatives for youth, and address the
need to provide alternatives for the more than 600,000 ex-offenders who
are coming back into cities each year.
3. Community Development Block Grants (Successful Results, Threatened,
Double Resources)
For 32 years, the Community Development Block Grant program has
served as a vital resource to help cities, counties, and States meet
their unique community development, affordable housing, and economic
development needs. Since its enactment in 1974, the program has been,
and continues to be, a critical affordable housing and neighborhood
revitalization tool for communities. While providing essential services
to citizens nationwide, CDBG also improves local economies. According
to HUD, in fiscal year 2004 alone, CDBG provided funds for thousands of
activities, assisting over 23 million persons and households. CDBG
funds a broad spectrum of activities, including: expanding
homeownership opportunities, elimination of slums and blight, improved
infrastructure such as roads, water and sewer systems, libraries, fire
stations, community centers, adult day care and after school care for
children, homeless facilities, employment training, transportation
services, crime awareness, business and job creation. In fact,
according to HUD, more than 78,000 jobs were created by CDBG in fiscal
year 2004 alone.
But over the last several years, CDBG formula grants have been
significantly reduced. The program was also targeted for elimination at
HUD, and transferred to the Department of Commerce along with 17 other
programs at a greatly reduced funding level. In fiscal year 2006, the
program was cut by 10 percent, and in fiscal year 2005, the cut was 5
percent, resulting in a 15 percent cut in 2 years. A survey released in
March, 2006, by the Conference of Mayors and 20 other organizations
found that the reduced formula allocations has had a substantial
negative effect on entitlement communities and States.
The Nation's mayors recommend that CDBG formula funding be doubled
to $8 billion. This additional funding would address the delayed
projects and activities which have come about because of cuts to CDBG,
and further build on the proven record of an effective affordable
housing and revitalization program.
4. Affordable Housing Fund
Last October, the House passed H.R. 1461, the ``Federal Housing
Finance Reform Act of 2006,'' creating a strong, world-class regulator
for the Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac. The legislation would also create a new affordable housing fund
with the GSEs contributing initially 3.5 percent increasing to 5
percent of their after-tax earnings for projects in underserved areas.
The Nation's mayors support an affordable housing fund to be
administered by the GSEs, (not by HUD or State housing agencies) funded
by at least 5 percent of their profits, with local government projects
eligible to be assisted.
5. Public Housing
Operating Subsidies
On December 28, HUD sent a memo to public housing agencies
informing them that they would have to operate with 76 cents for every
dollar needed for their operations. This memo, announcing a 24 percent
cut, did not take into account an already existing problem: HUD's
budget request was $300 million or more below what the public housing
agencies actually needed. When the Continuing Resolution expires on
February 15, the situation could actually get worse with Congress
holding spending to the fiscal year 2006 level. This would result in an
even lower funding level for operating subsidies.
The Nation's mayors support restoration of all public housing
operating subsidies in fiscal year 2007, including funding that was not
part of the budget request but that is now needed because of utility
costs previously not anticipated.
HOPE VI
HOPE VI for severely distressed public housing has been targeted
for elimination over the past several years, but has survived through
nominal congressional appropriations. The Nation's mayors support the
restoration of HOPE VI to a funding level that returns the program to
an effective national tool for public housing development.
6. Infrastructure Tax Incentives and Bonds (Transportation, Water,
Wastewater, Brownfields, Energy, Telecommunications, Schools,
Affordable Housing)
Congested highways, crowded schools, transit demand exceeding
resources, aging water facilities, and a crumbling energy
infrastructure are urgent reminders of the infrastructure crisis that
is jeopardizing America's prosperity. From transit to energy, this
critical infrastructure has been neglected for far too long by the
Federal Government and it is now deteriorating at an alarming rate.
And, according to the American Society of Civil Engineers' 2005 Report
Card for America's Infrastructure, the Nation's overall infrastructure
received a D grade with the Report Card calling for $1.6 trillion to
alleviate our Nation's infrastructure needs.
To address this growing infrastructure threat, the Nation's mayors
are calling for tax incentives, bonds, and other measures to support
local and State efforts, and stimulate private sector participation, to
improve infrastructure including transportation, water, wastewater,
brownfields, energy, telecommunications, schools, and affordable
housing options in America's cities. These tax incentives and bonds
would help create hundreds of thousands of family-wage jobs and
revitalize our critical infrastructure across the country at the same
time.
7. Competitive Workforce
In this time of global competition, America's economic health
depends on the development of a skilled workforce with the knowledge
and ability to adapt to an ever-changing economy. Baby boomers are
retiring at increasing rates, and the next generation of workers does
not have the required post-secondary degree attainment nor the
necessary technical skills to replace them. More importantly, and more
alarmingly, our emerging workforce is increasingly disconnected from
educational pathways and the world of work. High school dropout rates
in some cities are as high as 50 percent, and the youth unemployment
rate is at its highest level in decades.
The U.S. Conference of Mayors believes that it is crucial to
support a sustained commitment to local workforce development programs
that produce measurable results to ensure our continued competitiveness
in the 21st century global economy. As such, the Nation's mayors call
for timely reauthorization of the Workforce Investment Act, and full
funding of its programs to ensure a significant investment in lifelong
learning for every American citizen. In addition, resources are needed
to help train and provide employment opportunities for the more than
600,000 ex-offenders who are coming back into cities every year.
8. Children and Youth
No Child Left Behind
Mayors know that better schools make better cities. As they work to
more effectively align city policies and programs that affect children
and families, mayors are taking on an increasingly stronger leadership
role on issues related to public schools. As such, it is critical that
mayors be involved in every aspect of No Child Left Behind
reauthorization, including discussions on full funding, teacher
quality, performance standards, testing and evaluation, and methods of
assessment and accountability.
Children's Health Insurance
Mayors recognize that student achievement is inextricably linked to
early childhood programs, health and nutrition, social service supports
and parental involvement. As such, it is crucial that funding for
programs such as Head Start, Early Head Start, the State Children's
Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) be increased to their full
authorization levels.
Summer Youth
And, to further address these issues, the Nation's mayors are
calling for a new summer youth employment initiative to provide funding
directly to cities and urban counties for programs that 1) offer
educational work experiences that provide linkage between job skills
and classroom learning standards; 2) provide skills training and
education strategies to young people as part of a local workforce
development system that aligns with the labor market demands of local
economies; and 3) establish opportunities for skills development and
career exposure to young people.
After-School Youth
Mayors also call for an increased funding commitment directly
allocated to cities for quality after-school programs. Most
specifically, it is crucial to strengthen and fully fund the 21st
Century Learning Centers and other after-school programming.
9. Homeland Security (9/11 Commission Recommendations Not Completed)
While significant progress has been made on homeland security since
9/11, more can and should be done to make sure that our Nation's first
responders are prepared to prevent, respond and recover from either
attacks or natural disasters. We must continue the emphasis on key
issues related to airport, port, rail, transit, and border security.
Interoperable Communications
First, a major concern is the limited funding to assist cities and
their first responders to achieve full communications interoperability.
The Office of Management and Budget estimated interoperability
solutions would cost more than $15 billion, but since 2003, the
Department of Homeland Security has only awarded $2.9 billion in
funding for State and local interoperable communications efforts. The
Nation's mayors are calling on a well-funded, stand-alone, Federal
emergency communications grant program to carry out initiatives to
improve interoperable communications, including flexible direct grants
to cities and their first responders.
Transit Security
Second, with more than 7.8 billion trips taken on public transit in
the first 9 months of 2006, securing this critical infrastructure and
protecting riders from terrorist attacks must be a major priority.
Congress has allocated only $386 million to transit security through
Fiscal Year 2006, yet according to the American Public Transportation
Association, transit agencies have identified $6 billion in security
needs. The Nation's mayors are calling for a flexible Federal transit
security initiative to improve security in the areas of communications,
surveillance, detection systems, personnel, and training. As we have
done with aviation, securing public transit is a Federal responsibility
and should not require a local or State match. Furthermore, security
funds should go directly to the operator of that system or the
jurisdiction providing the security.
Funding Mechanism
Third, we must continue to make improvements in the grant
application process and delivery mechanism for Federal Homeland
Security resources to make sure that the process is user friendly, the
funding quickly reaches cities, and that funding is flexible to meet
local needs.
10. Unfunded Mandates/Preemptions
The passage of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 was a
positive step toward restricting the ability of Congress to impose new,
costly unfunded mandates on State and local governments, or preempt
their ability to fund critical local programs. However, the issue of
unfunded Federal mandates remains a major problem. For example, Members
of Congress continue to propose legislation that would preempt local
governments in areas such as internet access fee collection and
wireless telecommunications services.
Therefore, mayors call for new legislation to strengthen the
Federal-local partnership and further restrict the ability of Congress
to impose unfunded Federal mandates or preempt local authority.
EXHIBIT B
The United States Conference of Mayors
2005 National Action Plan on Safety and Security in America's Cities
(Working Paper of 10/24/05)
Overview
One month after the attacks of September 11, 2001, The United
States Conference of Mayors brought together mayors, police chiefs,
fire chiefs, and emergency services/health care leaders for a Summit in
Washington, DC. That Summit resulted in the release of A National
Action Plan for Safety and Security in America's Cities focused on
transportation security, emergency preparedness and Federal-local law
enforcement--which has guided the Conference of Mayors' advocacy
efforts for the last 4 years.
Upon assuming the Presidency of The U.S. Conference of Mayors in
June of 2005, Long Beach Mayor Beverly O'Neill charged the Conference's
relevant standing committees and task forces--including the Criminal
and Social Justice Committee, the Transportation and Communications
Committee, the Homeland Security Task Force, and the Mayors and Police
Chiefs Task Force--to review the progress that has been made on the
National Action Plan and make recommendation on needed refinements and
new priorities.
This effort became more urgent following Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita that devastated cities in Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and
then Texas. As Mayor O'Neill and the Conference learned firsthand
during a mission to the New Orleans/Baton Rouge/Gulf Coast area on
September 15-16 to meet with New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin and dozens of
other impacted mayors, additional changes are needed in the Federal-
local partnership on disaster preparedness and response.
The discussion on these updated priorities began on September 23-24
during the Conference's Fall Leadership Meeting in Long Beach, and
culminated in an emergency meeting in Washington, DC, on October 23-24
of key mayors and local public safety personnel. Following are key
recommendations and priorities that have emerged from these discussions
in five areas:
I. Fixing the FEMA Disaster Response System
II. Military Involvement in Disaster Response and Recovery
III. Communications Interoperability
IV. Enhanced Transportation Security
V. First Responder Funding--A Better Distribution System Is Needed
These recommendations will be carried to Congress and the
Administration, and will be further discussed and refined during the
74th Winter Meeting of The U.S. Conference of Mayors to be held in
Washington, DC, on January 25-27, 2006.
I. Fixing the FEMA Disaster Response System
Mayors and local police, fire and emergency medical services
personnel are America's true first responders to any disaster, whether
natural or man-made.
Mayoral concerns with the state control on homeland security and
disaster preparedness and response relate to what mayors experienced
during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
Mayors recognize the important role of FEMA, the states, and the
National Guard in responding to disasters. But as the Conference of
Mayors learned from its mission to the Gulf Coast area following
Hurricane Katrina, the fact is that aid did not come in time.
For example, in the early days of response to Hurricane Katrina,
mayors were told by DHS that all offers of assistance to the impacted
area had to be made through their states, and that these offers would
then be coordinated through the Emergency Management Assistance
Compact, or EMAC, system.
For some cities this seemed to have worked. But others found this
system very slow to respond, and were forced to self-deploy first
responder and other resources to the area. Mayors do not like to watch
television for days after a disaster and see areas that reporters can
get to, but seemingly no Federal resources, and then be told that they
cannot send help.
Virtually every municipality has entered into ``mutual aid'' or
``inter-local'' agreements for first responder activities, debris
removal, etc. However, as was seen with Hurricanes Katrina and Rita,
such agreements were rendered useless as almost all municipalities in
the respective target region required full deployment of their
personnel and assets. What should be explored is the ability of
municipalities to enter into such ``mutual aid'' agreements with other
cities/metro areas with geographic dispersion to enable regions to
provide ``real time'' assistance and aid to the target region.
In addition to the issue of disaster response, there are many
questions that continue to be raised by cities regarding disaster
recovery assistance, such as housing and reimbursement policies. We
were pleased that Congress recently approved $750 million in loans for
hurricane hit cities, which was a major priority for our organization
following our mission to the New Orleans/Baton Rouge/Gulf Coast area.
However, we were outraged that Congress adopted language that would--
for the first time--prohibit these loans from being forgivable by FEMA,
even if local conditions necessitate.
Therefore:
Congress and the Administration should implement a more
focused process to work directly with mayors and first
responders to review and make changes to the national disaster
preparedness and recovery process.
Congress must reverse its decision to make loans to cities
hard hit by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, under the Disaster
Assistance Loan Program, non-forgivable.
Congress and the Administration should work with The U.S.
Conference of Mayors to authorize a mechanism that would allow
city-to-city mutual aid agreements to trigger reimbursement
procedures and liability protection under the Stafford Act
during an emergency.
The Federal Government should utilize untapped resources
through the development of specialized ``go-teams'' to respond
to major events who could be the liaisons with local mayors,
EMS, police and fire departments (at the executive level) to
assist in the response of FEMA and other Federal assets.
The Federal Government should support funding for training
on an all-hazards approach by allowing local jurisdictions the
flexibility to quickly adapt and meet local needs, we will be
better prepared to respond to natural disasters like Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita, as well as terrorist attacks we hope won't
come.
Congress and the Administration must work with mayors to
better define Federal reimbursement and other policies related
to housing, transportation, and health and human services for
evacuees from disasters--and how these policies are coordinated
across Federal agencies.
II. Military Involvement in Disaster Response and Recovery
The use of military armed forces to support civilian response is
conditioned by certain legal restrictions that define their possible
activities. The military is precluded, except under certain
circumstances, from conducting law enforcement operations in civilian
setting under the Posse Comitatus Act.
More recently, the Stafford Act has broadened the military's role
in civil support. Under the Stafford Act, the military may engage in:
Debris removal and road clearance
Search and rescue (EMS)
Sheltering and feeding
Public information
Providing advice to local government on disaster and
health/safety issues
Under the Stafford Act the military may not engage in:
Traffic control
Security at non-Federal facilities
Patrolling civilian neighborhoods except to provide
humanitarian relief
Clearly, there are events of a certain nature that require
immediate military intervention and/or pre-staging. For example:
The detonation of a nuclear device, such as a suitcase
nuclear device, would be expected to render the local and state
government incapable of mounting adequate disaster response.
Widespread biological attack or disease outbreak would
require national command and control measures be implemented.
Mega-catastrophes such as Katrina and Rita that could be
reasonably anticipated to overwhelm local and state response
capabilities.
The military can also offer expertise in many areas that support
disaster relief:
Ability to mobilize large numbers of self-sufficient
personnel.
Advanced logistical operations support.
Experience with command and control methodologies just now
being implemented at the local level via NIMS.
Capability to provide mass feeding, water, shelters and
other support to disaster victims.
Easily move across political boundaries.
Provide specialized equipment and trained personnel to
address incidents involving chemical, biological, radiological,
nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) agents.
Re-establish critical infrastructure including
communications and mass care.
The current legal paradigm is that the military is viewed as the
``resource of last resort'' deployed to restore order. However,
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita have given us reason to re-evaluate this
paradigm. Because of the sheer magnitude of the hurricane events
recently experienced, and because acts of terrorism may spring up
during or in the wake of such natural disasters, it is advantageous to
consider an increased role for the military in disaster response.
Immediately after a storm occurs is the time when the military is
most needed, not to take over the duty or responsibility of a mayor or
a Governor or a county commissioner--not to impose by itself martial
law or make police power decisions. Those decisions, of course, must
still be the province of elected officials. But what the military has
is the skills, the experience, the training, the duty, responsibility
to help restore order after there has been a disaster, and to marshal
the equipment, training and manpower to put things back together
because they have to do that in a time of war.
Therefore:
The Federal Government should allow for greater military
involvement in the immediate response to such overwhelming
disasters, at the very least during the first days and weeks of
response and when requested by local or state governments.
Cities need a mechanism to request direct assistance in
form of military assets during a major natural disaster or
terrorist attack. It is too cumbersome for cities to have to go
through the state apparatus.
The Federal Government should identify a lead military
agency to work directly with local governments on the
deployment of Federal resources needed immediately prior to and
after a disaster.
III. Communications Interoperability
Major incidents, whether the 9/11 attacks, the Oklahoma City
bombing, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, or tornadoes or floods,
repeatedly show the criticality of first responder communications.
Interoperable Communications
A major concern related to communications interoperability is the
limited access to spectrum for public safety. The limited availability
of spectrum continues to force first responders to operate on several
different and incompatible and congested voice channels. This continues
to be identified by mayors and their first responders as an obstacle to
achieving full interoperability--as identified in the Conference's 2004
Interoperable Communications Survey of 192 cities.
For example, in our survey:
Of the cities with a major chemical plant, 97 percent
reported that they did not have interoperable capability
between the chemical plant, police, fire and emergency medical
services.
60 percent of the cities reported that they did not have
interoperable capability with state emergency operations
centers.
75 percent of the cities said that limited funding was
preventing achieving full interoperable capability.
It is essential to have access to this spectrum to enable
deployment of advanced mobile technologies such as images and video to
police, fire and other emergency responders. A major barrier to public
safety interoperability is cost. The Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) estimated interoperability solutions would cost more than $15
billion.
According to the Conference's 2004 survey on interoperable
communications:
Cities under 100,000 reported an average of $4.7 million in
funding is needed to achieve full interoperability.
Cities of 100,001 to 400,000 require approximately $5.4
million to achieve full interoperability.
Cities over 400,001 reported an average of $30 million is
needed to achieve full interoperability.
Therefore:
Congress must make expansion of the communications spectrum
for public safety a Congressional priority by establishing a
firm date for the transition of analog broadcast to digital as
close to December 31, 2006, as possible.
Congress should provide urgent funding to assist cities and
their first responders achieve full interoperability.
Congress and the Administration should require cellular,
VOIP and other advance telecommunications to provide 911,
reverse 911 (preemptive) and other emergency communications.
Congress and the Administration should provide the funding
and infrastructure support for emergency first responder
redundant telecommunications systems.
Congress and the Administration should work with the
military to provide redundant telecommunications communications
systems for first responders during emergencies.
3-1-1 Communications
The U.S. Conference of Mayors recognized in December 2001 in ``A
National Action Plan for Safety and Security in America's Cities'' that
in the event of a terrorist attack using weapons of mass destruction a
city's 9-1-1 system could be quickly overwhelmed and, therefore, 3-1-1
systems should be put in place to handle the large volumes of incoming
calls from citizens.
The Department of Homeland Security's Authorized Equipment List
currently includes under the Terrorism Incident Prevention Equipment
category items such as data collection and information gathering
software, alert/notification systems and hardware/software that allow
for information exchange and dissemination; and under the Interoperable
Communications Equipment category includes public notification and
warning systems and computer-aided dispatch systems; and under the
Information Technology category includes tracking and accountability
systems.
3-1-1 systems can facilitate post-incident recovery efforts by
tracking damage assessment and providing a detailed accounting of
clean-up efforts that is required for Federal or state assistance.
Unfortunately, DHS recently ruled in a letter to the Conference of
Mayors that 3-1-1 systems are not eligible under first responder
funding because, ``they are not specifically devoted to non-emergency
situations and are not related to the inherent homeland security
mission of the Department of Homeland Security.'' However, mayors
strongly believe that dual use of homeland security equipment is
essential for homeland security and fiscal responsibility.
Therefore:
Congress and the Administration must clarify that 3-1-1
systems are an allowable cost under its homeland security grant
programs and to make explicit reference to 3-1-1 systems in the
Authorized Equipment List.
IV. Enhanced Transportation Security
Public Transportation: Bus and Rail
With more than 9.6 billion trips logged on the Nation's public
transportation systems in 2004, securing this critical infrastructure
and protecting riders from potential terrorist attacks rank as a high
priority.
Despite the fact that Americans use public transportation 32
million times each weekday, and with the growing number of terror
attacks on bus and rail systems worldwide, such as the attacks this
summer in London killing more than 50, and last year in Madrid killing
191 and Moscow killing 41, since 9/11, bus and rail public
transportation have received only $400 million in Federal security
grants. By contrast, in 2004, transit agencies identified $6 billion in
security needs, including $5.2 billion in capital and $800 million in
operating.
Therefore:
Congress and the Administration should fund deployment of
security and communications technologies including:
Voice and video interoperable communication
systems;
Security cameras onboard public transportation
vehicles and in bus and rail stations;
Video surveillance and threat detection cameras;
Increased surveillance via closed circuit TV; and
Automated bus and rail locator systems.
Congress and the Administration should fund security
infrastructure expansion, modernization and rehabilitation
including:
Permanent chemical, biological and explosive
detection systems;
Fencing and barriers, lighting, alarms and access
control for tunnels, bridges, interlockings, track, yards, and
facilities;
Redesign of infrastructure to eliminate hiding
places; and
The life safety program in New York City and to
rehabilitate existing Baltimore and Washington, DC, tunnels.
Congress and the Administration should clarify that Federal
public transportation security funding can be used for extra
personnel during heightened alert levels, payment for overtime
costs, reassignment of law enforcement officers and increased
training for security personnel.
Congress and the Administration should provide flexible
funding of at least $6 billion, $2 billion per year over a 3-
year period, to safeguard the nation's bus and rail critical
infrastructure.
Port Security
Not enough is being done about security at our Nation's ports.
Ports remain exposed to large-scale acts of terrorism, including
weapons of mass destruction or other dangerous materials. For example,
according to the Government Accountability Office in a May 2005 report,
only 17.5 percent of containers deemed ``high risks'' were being
inspected.
A terrorist act involving chemical, biological, radiological, or
nuclear weapons at one of these seaports could result in extensive loss
of lives, property, and business; affect the operations of harbors and
the transportation infrastructure (bridges, railroads, and highways)
within the port limits; cause extensive environmental damage; and
disrupt the free flow of trade. Port security remains largely under-
funded at the Federal level. Since 2002, the Department of Homeland
Security Port Security Grant Program has provided $882 million for
seaports. In contrast, the U.S. Coast Guard has estimated that ports
would have to spend $5.4 billion over 10 years to meet Federal mandated
port security enhancements. That's on top of the more than $3 billion
ports have to spend already annually on infrastructure improvements and
operations, maintenance and personnel expenses just to keep pace with
world trade.
Therefore:
Congress and the Administration should provide full and
flexible funding for port security needs including:
Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Detection and
Prevention Systems;
Video Surveillance and Threat Detection Cameras;
Fiber Optic Communications Connectivity;
Access control communications;
Command and control facilities; and
Personnel and detection dogs for screening and
checking cargo and passengers.
Congress and the Administration should provide a Federal
funding mechanism to sustain the significant annual operating
costs for the reoccurring maintenance of the new security
systems and security personnel salaries that have not yet been
identified.
Congress and the Administration should direct the
Department of Homeland Security to issue Letters of Intent for
multi-year funding to ports with plans to carry out long-term
security improvements.
Freight Rail
Each day hundreds of thousands of shipments of extremely hazardous
materials such as chlorine, ammonia, phosphoric acid, and molten sulfur
travel through the hearts of our cities and near critical
infrastructure. A major break of a single tanker of hazardous materials
can result in mass casualties.
The U.S. Conference of Mayors supports advance notification for
hazardous freight rail. Mayors recognize that there are sensitive
issues that need to be addressed, such as concern that terrorists might
also mistakenly gain access to such information, and the freight rail
carriers are apprehensive about sharing their client's proprietary
commercial information. We want to work with Congress and the
Administration to address these issues so a system of advance
notification can be implemented.
Therefore:
Congress and the Administration should direct the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security and the U.S. Department of
Transportation to conduct an assessment of freight railroad
notification procedures for the transport of hazardous
materials through local jurisdictions.
Congress and the Administration should direct the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security and the U.S. Department of
Transportation to establish a coordinated system for notifying
appropriate local first responders of the transportation of
rail hazardous materials through local jurisdictions, including
a rail carrier's comprehensive list of all hazardous materials
scheduled to be transported.
Congress and the Administration should direct the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security and the U.S. Department of
Transportation to work with railroad operators to increase
physical security measures surrounding shipments and storage of
hazardous materials, with such increases to include the number
of hazardous materials inspectors employed by the Federal
Railroad Administration, lighting fencing, alarms and access
control for tunnels, bridges, interlockings, tracks, yards, and
facilities.
Airport Security
Mandated to screen all checked baggage using explosive detection
systems at airports by December 31, 2003, the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) deployed two types of screening equipment:
explosives detection systems (EDS), which use computer-aided tomography
X-rays to recognize the characteristics of explosives, and explosives
trace detection (ETD) systems, which use chemical analysis to detect
traces of explosive material vapors or residues.
TSA has made substantial progress in installing EDS and ETD systems
at the nation's more than 400 airports to provide the capability to
screen all checked baggage using explosive detection systems, as
mandated by Congress. However, in initially deploying EDS and ETD
equipment, TSA placed standalone ETD and the minivan-sized EDS
machines--mainly in airport lobbies--that were not integrated in line
with airport baggage conveyor systems. TSA officials stated that the
agency's ability to initially install in-line systems was limited
because of the high costs.
Therefore:
Congress and the Administration should significantly
increase funding and reimburse airports at the statutorily
authorized Federal share for in-line baggage and cargo
screening system and airport facility expansion to accommodate
in-line systems to streamline airport and TSA operations,
reduce screening costs, and enhance security.
The U.S. Conference of Mayors reaffirms our policy calling
for a fully Federalized workforce at points of passenger,
baggage, and cargo inspections.
V. First Responder Funding--A Better Distribution System Is Needed
Since the early days after September 11, 2001, there was serious
concern that an over-reliance by the Federal Government on a multi-
layered, state-based distribution system for first responder resources
and training, which then often is further channeled through counties,
would be slow and result in delays in funding reaching high-threat,
high-risk population cities.
Unfortunately, the many surveys the Conference of Mayors conducted
proved this to be the case. Time and time again, these surveys have
showed that money was not reaching cities quickly, and when it did
reach cities, it often came with Federal restrictions and rules that
made it very difficult to spend on what was needed most, such as
limitations on the use of overtime.
By raising concern on this issue through the release of our
studies, we were able to get support from President George W. Bush and
former Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Tom Ridge to
examine why money was ``stuck'' in many States. The special DHS task
force created to work on this effort came up with a number of helpful
recommendations, some of which, like a waiver from the Cash Management
Act, have been implemented for new funding. Some additional flexibility
for the use of overtime, especially for the larger cities, has also
been provided. But the DHS task force was not allowed to even consider
the issue of direct funding for cities.
Congress did create a new high-threat urban areas program, called
UASI (Urban Area Security Initiative), which ensures that some of the
bigger metro areas get funding, but this funding is still sent through
the States. And, major changes to the current state-based system still
have not been made.
Now, Congress is using the fact that because previous money they
have appropriated is not being spent fast enough--as mayors predicted--
it is now acceptable to cut funding. Over the last 2 years, funding has
been cut by more than a billion dollars.
And, the Administration and Congress have been slashing funding for
key law enforcement programs like COPS and the local law enforcement
block grant since 9/11. Their stated argument was that cities would be
getting funding from Homeland Security, so did not need it for law
enforcement programs. But, Homeland Security funding cannot be used to
put officers on the streets like COPS can, and the eyes and ears of
officers on the streets can be the best defense against acts of
terrorism.
Mayors strongly support regional cooperation, and have been working
across city boundaries to enhance mutual aid agreements and develop new
concepts such as regional logistics centers for the management and
deployment of resources. However, mayors believe that a slow,
complicated, and multi-layered distribution system for Federal
resources is not necessary, and in fact counterproductive, for
fostering regional cooperation.
Therefore:
Congress should increase, not decrease, funding for key
first responder grant programs.
Authorizing legislation should ensure that the waiver of
the Cash Management Act, approved by Congress for fiscal years
2005 and 2006, is made permanent, and made retroactive for
fiscal years prior to 2005.
Congress and the Administration should support the
establishment of regional logistics centers, not only those
previously established under the Pre-Positioned Equipment
Program within ODP, but also additional capabilities to be
established under regional control, to help consolidate State
and local assets, provide life-cycle management and maintenance
of equipment, allow for easy identification and rapid
deployment during an incident, and allow for the sharing of
inventories across jurisdictions.
Congress should work with the Conference of Mayors to make
other refinements needed to the first responder program.
Congress should restore funding for key law enforcement/
homeland security programs like COPS and the Justice Assistance
Grant program, and allow Department of Homeland Security first
responder funding to be used for hiring and overtime for
police, fire, and EMS personnel.
Congress should amend the current state-based system for
distribution of Federal first responder assistance to provide a
significant portion of the funding directly to cities and local
areas.
EXHIBIT C
Enhanced Transportation Security: Public Transportation
Whereas, the issue of public transportation security is a
vitalcomponent of every community; and
Whereas, public transportation security in the U.S. must be maintained
on the rails, highway and waterways; and
Whereas, mayors are owners and/or operators of many of the major public
transportation facilities and systems in the Nation and
securing these systems and protecting users from potential
terrorist activity is a high priority; and
Whereas, with more than 9.7 billion trips logged on the nation's public
transportation systems in 2005, with public transportation
growing at a faster rate than highway travel, securing this
critical infrastructure and protecting riders from potential
terrorist attacks rank as high priorities; and
Whereas, despite the fact that public transportation is growing faster
than any other mode of transportation, and with growing number
of terror attacks on bus and rail systems worldwide, such as
the London attacks in 2005 killing more than 50, and in 2004 in
Madrid killing 191 and in Moscow killing 41, since 9/11, bus
and rail public transportation have received only $545 million
in Federal security grants; and
Whereas, by contrast, in 2004, transit agencies identified $6 billion
in security needs, including $5.2 billion in capital and $800
million in operating; and
Whereas, transit authorities have significant and specific transit
security needs:
Based on the American Public Transportation Association's
2003 Infrastructure Database survey, over 2,000 rail stations
do not have security cameras;
According to our 2005 Transit Vehicle Database, 53,000
buses, over 5,000 commuter rail cars, and over 10,000 heavy
rail cars do not have security cameras;
Fewer than one-half of all buses have automatic vehicle
locator systems (AVLs) that allow dispatchers to know the
location of the bus when an emergency occurs;
Nearly 75 percent of demand response vehicles lack these
AVLs;
Furthermore, no transit system has a permanent biological
detection system; and
Only two transit authorities have a permanent chemical
detection system; and
Whereas, public transportation requires state-of-the-art technology
(that is currently in the research and development stage) to
detect and/or neutralize potential chemical, biological,
radiological and/or nuclear attacks at our stations, on board
our trains and buses, as well as throughout our nation's mass
transit infrastructure; and
Whereas, such technologies must be able to interface with existing
technologies and work effectively under the open system that
mass transit operates under today; and
Whereas, further, research and development can also address the rising
operating costs associated with added security personnel; and
Whereas, an investment in public transportation security programs,
resources and infrastructure, provides a direct benefit in
preparation and response to natural disasters,
Now, Therefore, Be It Resolved, that The United States Conference of
Mayors urges the Administration and Congress to provide at
least $560 million in the FY07 Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations bill for transit security grants to assist
public transportation systems to continue to address the$6
billion in security needs identified by transit agencies; and
Be It Further Resolved, that The United States Conference of Mayors
urges the Administration and Congress to support a robust and
dedicated funding source for transit-related research and
development technology; and
Be It Further Resolved, that The United States Conference of Mayors
urges the Administration and Congress to fund deployment of
security and communications technologies including:
Voice and video interoperable communication systems;
Security cameras on board public transportation vehicles
and in bus and rail stations;
Video surveillance and threat detection cameras;
Increased surveillance via closed circuit TV; and
Automated bus and rail locator systems; and
Be It Further Resolved, that The United States Conference of Mayors
urges the Administration and Congress to fund security
infrastructure expansion, modernization and rehabilitation
including:
Permanent chemical, biological, and explosive detection
systems;
Fencing and barriers, lighting, alarms and access control
for tunnels, bridges, interlockings, track, yards, and
facilities;
Redesign of infrastructure to eliminate hiding places; and
The life safety program in New York City and to
rehabilitate existing Baltimore and Washington, DC, tunnels.
______
PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM W. MILLAR
President, American Public Transportation Association
January 18, 2007
Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to provide testimony
to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs on the
security and safety of public transportation systems. We appreciate
your interest in public transportation security, and we look forward to
working with you.
About APTA
The American Public Transportation Association (APTA) is a
nonprofit international association of more than 1,500 public and
private member organizations including transit systems and commuter
rail operators; planning, design, construction, and finance firms;
product and service providers; academic institutions; transit
associations and state departments of transportation. APTA members
serve the public interest by providing safe, efficient, and economical
transit services and products. More than 90 percent of the people using
public transportation in the United States and Canada are served by
APTA member systems.
Overview
Mr. Chairman, public transportation is one of the Nation's critical
infrastructures. We cannot overemphasize the critical importance of the
service we provide in communities throughout the country. Americans
take more than 9.7 billion transit trips each year. People use public
transportation vehicles over 33 million each weekday. This is more than
sixteen times the number of daily boardings on the Nation's domestic
airlines.
In particular, we want to recognize and thank this committee for
its leadership in advancing legislation that enhances the Federal role
in protecting transit users against terrorism. The Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs Committee has unanimously approved transit security
bills in each of the last two Congresses, both of which also passed the
Senate unanimously, and its leadership led the successful effort in the
Senate to amend the port security bill last year to include a transit
security authorization. We appreciate the Committee's decision to make
transit security a priority in the new Congress, and the work you have
done with the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs and other committees with jurisdiction over homeland security.
Safety and security are the top priority of the public
transportation industry. The Government Accountability Office (GAO)
released a report several years ago which said ``about one-third of
terrorist attacks worldwide target transportation systems, and transit
systems are the mode most commonly attacked.'' Transit systems took
many steps to improve security prior to 9/11 and have significantly
increased efforts since then. Since September 11, 2001, public transit
agencies in the United States have spent over $2.5 billion on security
and emergency preparedness programs, and technology to support these
programs, from their own budgets with only minimal federal funding.
Last year's attacks in Mumbai and the previous attacks in London and
Madrid further highlight the need to strengthen security on public
transit systems in the United States and to do so without delay. We
need to do what we can to prevent the kind of attacks that caused more
than 400 deaths and nearly 3,000 injuries on rail systems in Mumbai,
London, and Madrid.
We urge Congress to act decisively. While transit systems are doing
their part, we need the Federal Government to be a full partner in the
fight against terrorism. Terrorist attacks against U.S. citizens are
clearly a Federal responsibility and the Federal Government needs to
increase spending on transit security. In light of the documented
needs, we urge Congress to increase Federal support for transit
security grants to assist transit systems in addressing the $6 billion
in identified transit security needs. Last year, we asked Congress to
provide no less than $545 million in the Homeland Security
Appropriations bill. Funding at that level annually would allow for
dramatic improvement in security for the Nation's transit users over a
10-year period. Federal funding for additional security needs should
provide for both hard and soft costs as described below and be separate
from investments in the Federal transit capital program.
We also urge Congress to provide $500,000 to the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) so that DHS can in turn provide that amount in
grant funding to the APTA security standards program which includes
participation with our Federal partners to assist with the development
of transit security standards. In addition, we respectfully urge
Congress to provide $600,000 to maintain the Public Transit Information
Sharing Analysis Center (ISAC).
With regard to improving the distribution of funds under the
existing transit security programs, we recommend that the existing
process for distributing DHS grants be modified so that funds are made
directly to transit authorities, rather than through State
Administrating Agencies (SAA). We believe direct funding to the transit
agencies would be quicker and cheaper. The current process and grant
approval procedures have created significant barriers and time delays
in getting funds into the hands of transit agencies and thus
productively used.
As transit security is part of the larger war on terrorism, Federal
funding for transit security grants should be provided with no state or
local match requirement. The requirement of a local or state match
would have detrimental consequences that would create a scenario of
disparity that ensures stronger security only to regions with available
local funding. A local match would require the approval of a local
governing body. This approval would not be possible to obtain under the
current DHS transit security structure, which does not allow transit
providers to anticipate their funding levels or know what projects will
be funded. Once the project to be funded is identified, the local
governing body would need to approve funding in an open, public forum,
where specific project information would be discussed. This would be
problematic for security sensitive projects.
Background
In 2004 APTA surveyed its U.S. transit system members to determine
what actions they needed to take to improve security for their
customers, employees, and facilities. In response to the survey,
transit agencies around the country have identified in excess of $6
billion in transit security investment needs. State and local
governments and transit agencies are doing what they can to improve
security, but it is important that the Federal Government be a full
partner in the effort to ensure the security of the Nation's transit
users.
In FY 2003, $65 million in federal funds was allocated for transit
systems by DHS for 20 transit systems. In FY 2004, $50 million was
allocated by DHS for 30 transit systems. In FY 2005, Congress
specifically appropriated $150 million for transit, passenger and
freight rail security. Out of the $150 million, transit received $135
million. In FY 2006, Congress appropriated $150 million. Out of the
$150 million, transit received $136 million. In FY 2007, Congress
appropriated $175 million. Out of $175 million, transit is slated to
receive $163 million. We are very appreciative of these efforts.
However, in the face of significant needs, more needs to be done.
It is important to point out that there have been significant
efforts in support of transit security authorization legislation in the
Senate. As noted earlier, the Senate in 2004 and 2006 unanimously
passed legislation that would have provided $3.5 billion over 3 years
for transit security. That legislation was reported out of this
Committee, and we very much appreciate the Committee's support in that
regard. We look forward to working with the Committee on these and
other issues important to the transit industry.
Transit authorities have significant and specific transit security
needs. Based on APTA's 2003 Infrastructure Database survey, over 2,000
rail stations do not have security cameras. According to our 2005
Transit Vehicle Database, 53,000 buses, over 5,000 commuter rail cars,
and over 10,000 heavy rail cars do not have security cameras. Less than
one-half of all buses have automatic vehicle locator systems (AVLs)
that allow dispatchers to know the location of the bus if an emergency
occurs. Nearly 75 percent of demand response vehicles lack these AVLs.
Furthermore, no transit system has a permanent biological detection
system. In addition, only two transit authorities have a permanent
chemical detection system. A more robust partnership with the Federal
Government could help to better address many of these specific needs.
We are disappointed that the Administration proposed only $600
million for a Targeted Infrastructure Protection Program in last year's
FY 2007 DHS budget proposal, which would fund infrastructure security
grants for transit, seaports, railways and other facilities. We are
also disappointed that the Administration failed to include a specific
line item funding amount for transit security. We look forward to
working with the Administration and Congress to increase transit
security funding and better address unmet transit security needs
throughout the country.
APTA is a Standards Development Organization (SDO) for the public
transportation industry. We are now applying our growing expertise in
standards development to transit industry safety and security, best
practices, guidelines and standards. We have already begun to initiate
our efforts for security standards development and we have engaged our
federal partners from both the DHS and Department of Transportation in
this process. We look forward to working with the Administration and
Congress in support of this initiative. Unfortunately, DHS has not
agreed to provide funding to APTA in this effort. We respectfully urge
Congress to provide $500,000 to the DHS so that it can in turn provide
that amount in grant funding to the APTA security standards program
which includes participation of our Federal partners to assist with the
development of such standards and practices consistent with what we
have already seen through the Federal Transit Administration (FTA). Our
efforts in standards development for commuter rail, rail transit, and
bus transit operations have been significant and our status as a SDO is
acknowledged by both the FTA and the Federal Railroad Administration
(FRA). The FTA and the Transportation Research Board have supported our
standards initiatives through the provision of grants.
We also would like to work with Congress and the Department of
Homeland Security's Directorate of Science and Technology to take a
leadership role in advancing research and technology development to
enhance security and emergency preparedness for public transportation.
Information Sharing
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, public transit
systems across the country have worked very hard to strengthen their
security plans and procedures. They have also been very active in
training personnel and conducting drills to test their capacity to
respond to emergencies. Also, to the extent possible within their
respective budgets, transit systems have been incrementally hardening
their facilities through the introduction of additional technologies
such as surveillance equipment, access control and intrusion detection
systems. While transit systems have been diligent, they have been
unable to fully implement programs with the current levels of
assistance from the Federal Government.
A vital component of ensuring public transit's ability to prepare
and respond to critical events is the timely receipt of security
intelligence in the form of threats, warnings, advisories and access to
informational resources. Accordingly, in 2003, the American Public
Transportation Association, supported by Presidential Decision
Directive #63, established an ISAC for public transit systems
throughout the United States. A funding grant in the amount of $1.2
million was provided to APTA by the Federal Transit Administration to
establish a very successful Public Transit ISAC that operated 24 hours
a day, 7 days a week, and gathered information from various sources,
including DHS, and then passed information on to transit systems
following a careful analysis of that information. However, given that
the Federal Transit Administration was subsequently unable to access
security funds, and given the decision of DHS to not fund ISAC
operations, APTA then had to look for an alternate method of providing
security intelligence through DHS's newly created Homeland Security
Information Network (HSIN). APTA continues to work with DHS staff to
create a useful HSIN application for the transit industry. It is clear,
however, that while the HSIN may become an effective resource, it does
not match the 24/7 two-way communication functions provided through the
Public Transit ISAC. However, we believe that consistent, ongoing and
reliable funds from Congress should be provided for the Public Transit
ISAC that has been proven an effective delivery mechanism for security
intelligence. Therefore, we respectfully urge Congress to provide
$600,000 to maintain the Public Transit ISAC.
In addition, APTA's membership includes many major international
public transportation systems, including the London Underground, Madrid
Metro, and the Moscow Metro. APTA also has a strong partnership with
the European-based transportation association, the International Union
of Public Transport. Through these relationships, APTA has participated
in a number of special forums in Europe and Asia to give U.S. transit
agencies the benefit of their experiences and to help address transit
security both here and abroad.
Cost of Heightened Security
Following the attacks on London in 2005, APTA was asked to assist
the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) in conducting a
teleconference between the TSA and transit officials to discuss transit
impacts pertaining to both increasing and decreasing the DHS threat
levels. There is no question that increased threat levels have a
dramatic impact on budget expenditures of transit systems and extended
periods pose significant impacts on personnel costs. These costs
totaled $900,000 per day for U.S. public transit systems or an
estimated $33.3 million from July 7 to August 12, 2005, during the
heightened state of ``orange'' for public transportation. This amount
does not include costs associated with additional efforts by New York,
New Jersey, and other systems to conduct random searches.
Many transit systems are also implementing other major programs to
upgrade security. For example, New York's Metropolitan Transportation
Authority (NY-MTA) is taking broad and sweeping steps to help ensure
the safety and security of its transportation systems in what are among
the most extensive security measures taken by a public transportation
system to date. NY-MTA will add 1,000 surveillance cameras and 3,000
motion sensors to its network of subways and commuter rail facilities
as part of a $212 million security upgrade announced late in 2005 with
the Lockheed Martin Corporation. In fact, NY-MTA plans to spend over
$1.1 billion through 2009 on transit security.
Security Investment Needs
Mr. Chairman, since the awful events of 9/11, the transit industry
has invested more than $2.5 billion of its own funds for enhanced
security measures, building on the industry's already considerable
efforts. At the same time, our industry undertook a comprehensive
review to determine how we could build upon our existing industry
security practices. This included a range of activities, which include
research, best practices, education, information sharing in the
industry, and surveys. As a result of these efforts we have a better
understanding of how to create a more secure environment for our riders
and the most critical security investment needs.
Our survey of public transportation security identified
enhancements of at least $5.2 billion in additional capital funding to
maintain, modernize, and expand transit system security functions to
meet increased security demands. Over $800 million in increased costs
for security personnel, training, technical support, and research and
development have been identified, bringing total additional transit
security funding needs to more than $6 billion.
Responding transit agencies were asked to prioritize the uses for
which they required additional federal investment for security
improvements. Priority examples of operational improvements include:
Funding current and additional transit agency and local law
enforcement personnel
Funding for overtime costs and extra security personnel
during heightened alert levels
Training for security personnel
Joint transit/law enforcement training
Security planning activities
Security training for other transit personnel
Priority examples of security capital investment improvements include:
Radio communications systems
Security cameras onboard transit vehicles and in transit
stations
Controlling access to transit facilities and secure areas
Automated vehicle locator systems
Security fencing around facilities
Transit agencies with large rail operations also reported a
priority need for Federal capital funding for intrusion detection
devices.
Mr. Chairman, the Department of Homeland Security issued directives
for the transit industry in May 2004 which would require that transit
authorities beef up security and to take a series of precautions to set
the stage for more extensive measures without any Federal funding
assistance. Transit systems have already carried out many of the
measures that Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is calling
for, such as drafting security plans, removing trash bins and setting
up procedures to deal with suspicious packages. The cost of these
measures and further diligence taken during times of heightened alert
is of particular concern to us. We look forward to working with you in
addressing these issues.
Ongoing Transit Security Programs
Mr. Chairman, while transit agencies have moved to a heightened
level of security alertness, the leadership of APTA has been actively
working with its strategic partners to develop a practical plan to
address our industry's security and emergency preparedness needs. In
light of our new realities for security, the APTA Executive Committee
has established a Security Affairs Steering Committee. This committee
addresses our security strategic issues and directions for our
initiatives. This committee will also serve as the mass transit sector
coordination council that will interface with DHS and other federal
agencies forming the government coordinating council.
In partnerships with the Transportation Research Board, APTA
supported two Transportation Cooperative Research Program (TCRP) Panels
that identified and initiated specific projects developed to address
Preparedness/Detection/Response to Incidents and Prevention and
Mitigation.
In addition to the TCRP funded efforts, APTA has been instrumental
in the development of numerous security and emergency preparedness
tools and resources. Many of these resources were developed in close
partnership with the FTA and we are presently focused on continuing
that same level of partnership with various entities within DHS. Also,
APTA has reached out to other organizations and international
transportation associations to formally engage in sharing information
on our respective security programs and to continue efforts that raise
the bar for safety and security effectiveness.
APTA has long-established safety audit programs for commuter rail,
bus, and rail transit operations. Within the scope of these programs
are specific elements pertaining to Emergency Response Planning and
Training as well as Security Planning. In keeping with our industry's
increased emphasis on these areas, the APTA Safety Management Audit
Programs have been modified to place added attention to these critical
elements.
Conclusion
Mr. Chairman, in light of our Nation's heightened security needs
post 9/11, we believe that increased Federal investment in public
transportation security by Congress and DHS is critical. The public
transportation industry has made great strides in transit security
improvements since 9/11 but much more needs to be done. We need the
Federal Government increase its support for transit security grants
that will help transit systems continue to address the $6 billion in
identified transit security investment needs. We also respectfully urge
Congress to provide $500,000 to the Department of Homeland Security so
that DHS can in turn provide that amount in grant funding to the APTA
security standards program which includes participation of our federal
partners to assist with the development of transit security standards
and practices consistent with what we have already seen through the
FTA. In addition, we respectfully urge Congress to provide $600,000 to
maintain the Public Transit ISAC.
We have also found that investment in public transit security
programs, resources and infrastructures provides a direct benefit in
preparation and response to natural disasters as well. Again, we
appreciate the Committee's strong support for transit security in
recent years. We look forward to building on our cooperative working
relationship with the Department of Homeland Security and Congress to
begin to address these needs. We again thank you and the Committee for
allowing us to provide testimony on these critical issues and look
forward to working with you on safety and security issues.
______
PREPARED STATEMENT OF WARREN S. GEORGE
International President, Amalgamated Transit Union
January 18, 2007
Chairman Dodd, Ranking Member Shelby, and Members of the Committee,
on behalf of the more than 180,000 members of the Amalgamated Transit
Union (ATU), I want to thank you for giving me the opportunity to
testify today on the ATU's priorities and strategies for enhancing
transit security.
I applaud this Committee's efforts over the past several years to
work together, in a bipartisan manner, to address this important issue.
The ATU is the largest labor union representing public
transportation employees in the United States and Canada. ATU members
are bus, van, subway, and light rail operators, clerks, baggage
handlers, and maintenance employees in urban transit, over-the-road and
school bus industries, as well as paramedical personnel, ambulance
operators, clerical personnel, and municipal workers.
The safety and security of our Nation's public transportation
systems is of utmost importance to the leadership and members of the
ATU--in particular, we firmly believe that all transit employees should
receive training to prepare them to prevent and respond to a terrorist
or other emergency incident.
Mass transit, by its very nature, is an attractive target for crime
and terrorist attacks. It brings masses of people together, is open,
highly visible and familiar, and when threatened or attacked, it can
disrupt commerce, instill fear, and bring an entire region to a
grinding halt.
The recent examples of the Mumbai, London, Moscow, and Madrid
bombings--all within the last 3 years--are tragic examples of this
reality.
In London we saw the crippling effects that such an attack can have
on an entire community. When four suicide bombers detonated explosive
devices in the London Underground and aboard a double-decker bus, 56
people died and more than 700 people were injured. In addition, the
entire City of London was paralyzed as citizens were left with no way
to or from work, and others, including tourists, steered clear of the
city for fear of additional attacks. A separate failed attempt two
weeks later similarly stalled normal operations in London and
surrounding areas.
A decade earlier, ongoing bombing campaigns directed at the Paris
Metro resulted in hundreds of casualties; and the release of sarin gas
in the Tokyo subway system threatened the lives of between 5,000 and
6,000 people, resulting in 12 deaths and marking the first time
chemical or biological weapons have been deployed on a large scale by
terrorists.
And this isn't just happening in our rail systems. In Israel and
elsewhere, buses have too often been the unfortunate targets of
terrorist bombings.
We would be foolish to think that similar incidents couldn't happen
on our soil, in our transit systems.
The ATU's Role in Transit Security
Faced with this reality, the ATU has for years worked to raise the
awareness of our members and their employers to this danger and to
advance real, concrete solutions and initiatives to enhance the safety
and security of the systems operated and maintained by ATU members.
We strongly believe that the labor community must be a partner in
any comprehensive effort to address the security threats facing our
industries. For that reason, we have worked closely with our members,
the transit and bus industries, the Federal Transit Administration
(FTA), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and elected
officials at all levels of government, including many members of this
committee.
Shortly after September 11, the ATU produced and distributed a
security training video and pamphlets providing guidance to our members
on how to prevent, deter, and respond in emergency situations. We also
conducted a joint labor-management conference on transit security that
was attended by more than 100 transit agency officials and employees
from across the United States. We worked with DOT and industry security
experts to develop Transit Watch, a nationwide safety and security
awareness program that encourages the active participation and
vigilance of transit passengers and employees. And we contributed to
the design, distribution, and promotion of the National Transit
Institute's security and emergency response training programs for
frontline transit employees.
We have also testified numerous times before Congress on this
issue, including on October 4, 2001, before a subcommittee of this
committee. We have continuously advocated for increased funding for
transit security enhancements, and have assisted in developing
legislation, including legislation introduced by Members of this
Committee, that would enhance transit security.
The Need for Federal Government Action
Many transit agencies themselves have also taken admirable steps
toward securing their operations, but--due in large part to funding
constraints--they have not gone far enough. The reality is that the
industry and the ATU can not do this alone. The Federal Government must
step up to the plate and provide the necessary funding, guidance and
even mandates to provide the level of security that transit passengers
and employees deserve.
The Federal Government has not yet stepped up to the plate.
More than 2 years ago, Congress directed the Administration to take
comprehensive steps to address transportation security risks, including
risks faced by the transit industry. It was not until a little over a
month ago that President Bush issued an order to Secretary Chertoff to
draft a plan to address security issues in the transit industry.
Now is not a time for drafting plans, it is a time for concrete
action. The Federal Government must provide funding directly to transit
agencies for security purposes and must ensure that transit employees
are prepared in the event of an emergency.
With much of the emphasis on airlines, rail, and port security, no
sector of our transportation network has been more neglected when it
comes to security than transit. The deficiency in security funding for
this industry is staggering. While the industry has estimated the
actual need to be $6 billion in order to adequately secure the network,
only a sliver of that has already been provided and the budget requests
submitted by the Administration have been woefully inadequate.
Security Training for Transit Employees
In addition to funding, it is the responsibility of the Federal
Government to ensure that certain necessary steps are taken to enhance
security.
Common sense tells us that the single most important thing that we
can do to increase transit security is to provide each and every
frontline transit employee--including rail and bus operators, customer
service personnel and maintenance employees--with security and
emergency preparedness and response training.
While we should not abandon research and deployment of new
technologies, we need to recognize what has been proven to be the most
cost-effective security measure: employee training.
In the event of a terrorist attack within a mass transit system,
the response of employees at the scene within the first few minutes is
crucial to minimizing the loss of life and to evacuating passengers
away from the incident. Transit employees are the first on the scene,
even before police, firefighters, or emergency medical responders. They
must know what to do in order to save the lives of their passengers and
themselves.
During the 1995 sarin gas incident in Tokyo, two transit employees
unnecessarily lost their lives when they tried to dispose of the agent
dispersal device themselves, instead of simply evacuating the scene.
Proper training would have prevented these losses and possibly
decreased the number of passengers who were exposed to the deadly gas.
Frontline transit employees are also crucial in preventing attacks.
They are the eyes and ears of the system and are often the first to
discover suspicious activities and threats, or the first to receive
reports from passengers. These employees need to know how to recognize
security threats and need to know the appropriate protocols to follow
for reporting and responding to potential threats.
International security experts confirm that employee training is
effective and crucial in security efforts. Rafi Ron, former Director of
Security at Tel-Aviv Ben-Gurion International Airport recently told
another Senate Committee that behavior pattern ``techniques implemented
by trained security and non-security personnel have proven to be a
valuable measure in the detection and prevention of terrorist attacks
in public facilities.'' Ron went on to observe that ``training provides
the skills and confidence not only to law enforcement officers . . .
but also to employees who are present at every point in the system. No
one is in a better position to recognize irregularities on the ground
than the people who regularly work there.''
The Volpe Center likewise recently concluded that ``probably the
most significant factor in determining whether a transportation
employee makes a helpful or harmful decision during an emergency is
training. Trained and alert transportation professionals can make the
difference between success and disaster. Characteristics such as acting
responsibly to protect the lives of the public; keeping one's cool and
keeping passengers calm; contacting emergency assistance authorities
quickly and reporting the essential details accurately; working
cooperatively as a member (and sometimes a leader) of a team with a
common goal--can all be enhanced through proper training.''
Officials from both FTA and TSA have publicly recognized the need
for this training. In fact, a list of 17 ``Action Items for Transit
Agencies,'' jointly-developed by TSA and FTA, includes establishing and
maintaining a security and emergency training program for all
employees. And yet little, if anything, is being done to ensure that
this training is provided.
While vague press releases and statements from these federal
agencies and the transit industry claim that employees are being
trained, this is simply not the reality. I know this because I have
talked to our members--the ones who are supposedly being trained--and
they tell me a different story. They are scared--not because they know
there is a threat, but because they feel out of the information loop.
They have no idea how to help prevent an incident or what to do if one
occurs.
What is most surprising is that many of the members I hear this
from are employees of transit systems in major cities that are at high
risk of terrorist attacks. For security reasons, I will not publicly
disclose the names of those systems.
Some transit systems, including most recently WMATA here in DC,
have chosen to train all of their frontline employees, and others are
making comprehensive efforts to likewise train their employees. We
applaud these systems for their commitment to security. Unfortunately,
they are not the majority in the industry.
In many cases, workers receive at most a piece of paper asking them
to be ``vigilant'' and to be aware of suspicions persons or packages.
Other workers have watched a short 10-15 minute video. These materials
do nothing to prepare a worker for a real security incident.
In testimony before a House Subcommittee, Chris Kozub, Associate
Director of Safety and Security at the National Transit Institute
(NTI), stated that ``a large number of frontline transit employees in
this country still lack proper training and preparedness for preventing
and/or responding to incidents.'' By FTA's own numbers, presented in
testimony before another House Subcommittee last fall, NTI's training
program--which is funded and developed in coordination with FTA and is
considered to be the leading security training program in the transit
industry--has only been provided to less than a quarter of our Nation's
transit employees. It is significant to point out that the NTI security
training programs are available to transit agencies free-of-charge.
Unfortunately, the availability of a free training program and the
overwhelming evidence of the need for training has not been sufficient
to convince many transit agencies to provide the necessary training.
Transit systems continue to resist calls for training because of the
operating costs to pay employees and to keep the buses and trains
running during training sessions.
It is time for the Federal Government to step in and to not only
provide funding for the operating costs associated with training, but
to also require all transit systems to train each and every frontline
transit employee. It is the role of the Federal Government to ensure
that this happens. Leaving it exclusively to the will of the industry
is, as experience dictates, not sufficient.
The Public Transportation Terrorism Prevention Act
I want to applaud the members and leaders of this committee, in
this Congress and the previous two sessions of Congress, for
recognizing the need for Federal Government action in this realm. The
Public Transportation Terrorism Prevention Act, which has twice passed
this Committee, would go a long way toward addressing the needs of the
Nation's transit systems and their employees.
Not only would this legislation provide significant funding
resources for crucial capital enhancements, such as perimeter
protection systems, communications equipment, and decontamination
equipment, but it also recognizes the need for training and would
provide dedicated funding for necessary frontline employee training,
drills, and exercises. The ATU is very supportive of these provisions.
In addition, we appreciate that this legislation would provide
these grants directly to the transit agencies, as opposed to funneling
the money through the states. We believe this will allow for more
effective and efficient use of these much needed funds. Further, we
strongly support the provisions requiring, as a condition of receiving
grant funds, that transit agencies identify a security coordinator and
develop a comprehensive plan for use of the funds.
I would, at this time, however, urge this committee to go one step
farther and require, as an additional condition of receiving grant
funds, that a transit agency provide security and emergency
preparedness training to all frontline employees, including vehicle
operators, maintenance personnel, and customer service providers.
Such a requirement has been included in bills introduced in the
last Congress by the leadership of the House Transportation and
Infrastructure Committee and the current leadership of the House
Homeland Security Committee. We are currently working with the
leadership on both of these committees to draft new legislation that
would include a training requirement. It is my understanding that this
legislation will be introduced in late January or February.
Significantly, security and emergency preparedness training has
already been required for workers in other transportation modes
including, most recently, port and longshore workers and carriers of
hazardous materials. Legislation introduced and passed last session by
the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation would
likewise require training for all rail workers.
We need to take action now to address the security needs of the
transit industry--and most importantly to train the workers in this
industry.
We urge this Committee to act expeditiously to markup legislation
that would include the necessary funding and training. Doing so now
will save lives.
I thank you again for the opportunity to testify today on behalf of
the ATU. I can not stress enough how important it is to include the
input of transportation labor in this discussion. It is our members who
are on the front lines of this battle and who know best what dangers
they face everyday on the job. I appreciate your recognition of this
fact and look forward to working with you to address the important
issues raised here today.
______
PREPARED STATEMENT OF AURELIO ROJO GARRIDO *
Operational Director, Metro Madrid, and Secretary General, Association
of Latin American Metros and Subways (ALAMYS)
January 18, 2007
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* ``The Security Model of Madrid Metro''--PowerPoint presentation
retained in Committee files.
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______
PREPARED STATEMENT OF TIM O'TOOLE
Managing Director, London Underground, Transport for London, England
January 18, 2007
I shall provide a brief overview of the London Underground's (LU)
current performance and its security situation with particular
reference to July 7, 2005--how we dealt with that incident, how we
prepared for such an incident, and what we have done since.
LU has made great strides in the past 4 years. We are carrying
record numbers of passengers--nearly 4m journeys on 1 day in December
and well over a billion journeys annually-- and delivering more train
kilometres than ever before. We are the oldest Underground subway in
the world, and that distinction is our charm and our burden. We are
determined to bring the system into the 21st century supporting
London's continuing growth. As a consequence, the system is undergoing
the biggest transformation in its history, with a massive rebuilding
and change programme. Yet customer satisfaction is also at an all time
high. That is largely down to the professionalism and commitment of
management and staff, which in turn stems from their training and
experience.
It is those factors which were also at the root of the Tube's
ability to withstand and very rapidly recover from the attacks of July
7, 2005. Also vital was the multi-agency planning that was put in place
following September 11 by the U.K. Government, supported by the Mayor
of London. LU was fully involved in that planning, with a senior
manager seconded to the London Resilience team since it was
established, to ensure that the operational realities of a mass
transport metro system can be properly considered in political and
investment decisions.
This team has led work in areas of planning such as evacuation of
parts of London, response to chemical, biological, and radiological
attacks, and most visibly has arranged tabletop and live emergency
exercises to test preparedness for such attacks. The largest of these
was a weekend exercise at Bank London Underground Station which
simulated a chemical attack at one of the largest, most complex
stations on the network. This was a multi-agency exercise which was
also attended by political leaders. This is in addition to the regular
exercises that we hold with our own and emergency services staff to
test our readiness for a wide variety of operational emergency
situations. The learning from all these exercises played a vital role
for Underground senior managers in revising training and in their own
actions on July 7.
The training that all staff receive is in my view the most
important factor in dealing with emergency situations. Our ability on
July 7 to evacuate around a quarter-of-a-million people from the
network within an hour, without injury, is testimony to that. As is the
restoration of services by the following morning. Our experience
teaches us that you must invest in your staff and rely on them; you
must investigate and invest in technology but do not rely on it. The
professionalism and competence of our staff made the difference on the
day.
In terms of what can be done to secure mass transit systems, we are
in a very different position to some other forms of transport. One has
only to buy a ticket to secure largely unrestrained access to the
public areas of the system--500 trains, 275 stations--along with
millions of fellow passengers. The phenomenon of the suicide bomber is
one where conventional responses will not be enough.
But we have a number of ways of controlling the risk that having an
open access system creates. CCTV is vital to managing security on the
Underground. In July 2005 we already had over 6,000 cameras, covering
nearly all stations and some of our trains. The number is ever
increasing as part of the transformation of the system, and will reach
12,000 cameras within 5 years. The quality of the equipment is also
being upgraded where necessary.
Work is also in place to monitor areas that are not effectively
monitored at the moment, such as ventilation shafts, more monitoring of
car parks and other potential entry points to the network; 6.3 million
pounds is being spent on such investment.
The Tube network is policed by a dedicated Transport Police force
comprising nearly 700 police officers, the numbers having increased
significantly in recent years thanks to additional funding for the
force from the Mayor of London.
Six thousand frontline station staff are deployed across the Tube's
stations. These staff work either on platforms, at ticket barriers or
in station control rooms. All trains have a driver in their cab who is
in contact by radio with a line control centre.
All LU job applicants have to prove their identity and are subject
to a level of criminal conviction checks. In this as with other areas
we strictly adhere to the guidance of the U.K. security services.
We have, in conjunction with the U.K. government, run trials of
equipment at a small number of stations to scan and search passengers.
It remains our view however that screening and checking of all those
who use the Tube on a daily basis is impracticable. But CCTV and
policing, together with the vigilance of our own staff, allow us to
monitor the system closely. Our passengers also have a vital role to
play, and we have encouraged them through information campaigns to be
on the look out for, and to report, any suspicious behaviour or
unattended items.
Communications between staff, and with the Police, are vital and we
are now rolling out a new radio communications network for the Tube,
which will link control centres, trains, stations, and depots,
replacing the existing systems that are less integrated and which have
been too prone to failures. The new system is being put into operation
on each Underground line once it has passed stringent validation,
operational, and safety checks.
Although it is worth pointing out, any radio system would be
unlikely to remain operable at the site of an explosion with a degree
of force as that experienced on July 7, 2005, in London.
Since July 7 we have investigated and implemented a number of other
improvements to our resilience, including better first aid kit
provision at stations and new safety notices on trains. We have
reviewed other emergency equipment in conjunction with the emergency
services and other relevant experts.
At the core of our resilience strategy is that we constantly work
in close cooperation with the government, its security services, the
Police, Fire and Ambulance services, and other agencies and transport
operators. It is that cooperation and coordination that enables us to
be aware of and respond to changing circumstances. We know that the
threat remains high and that we need to do everything we can to combat
it, and that we need to be ready to deal with another attack. We
believe our greatest defence comes from our rapid response and
restoration of service, denying terrorists the chaos and fear that they
are seeking and thereby discouraging their return.