DOD Personnel Clearances: Comprehensive Timeliness Reporting, Complete Clearance Documentation, and Quality Measures Are Needed to Further Improve the Clearance Process

In 2009, GAO reported that the absence of comprehensive reporting limited the full visibility over the timeliness of initial clearance decisions. At the time, 80 percent of initial clearance decisions were to be made within 120 days, on average, and by December 2009, a plan was to be implemented in which, to the extent practical, 90 percent of initial clearance decisions were to be made within 60 days, on average. We further reported that under both requirements, the executive branch could exclude the slowest percent and then report on an average time of the remaining clearances. At the time, the most recent report stated that the average time to complete the fastest 90 percent of initial clearances for military and DOD civilians in fiscal year 2008 was 124 days. However, without taking averages or excluding the slowest clearances, we analyzed 100 percent of initial clearances granted in 2008 and found that 39 percent still took more than 120 days. To provide more comprehensive information about personnel security clearance timeliness, we recommended that the Office of Management and Budget's Deputy Director for Management include appropriate statistics that describe the full range of the time required to complete all initial clearance applications in the executive branch's required annual reports to Congress on personnel security clearances. In February 2011, the 2010 annually required report included metrics on the time required to complete all initial clearances completed in FY 2010. Specifically, the report states that in the aggregate, the average timeliness of 100 percent of initial clearance cases is 79 days for FY 2010, versus 86 days for FY 2009, an improvement of 7 days.

In 2009, GAO estimated that 22 percent of 3,500 adjudicative files that adjudicators used to document their rationale for granting clearances were incomplete and the documentation most often missing was related to foreign influence. We reported that DOD did not measure the completeness of its adjudicative files and could not explain why this documentation was incomplete. We further reported that incomplete documentation may lead to increases in both the time needed to complete the clearance process and in overall process costs and may reduce the assurance that appropriate safeguards are in place to prevent DOD from granting clearances to untrustworthy individuals. To improve the completeness of future adjudication documentation, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to measure the frequency with which adjudicative files meet the requirements of DOD regulation. In November 2009, DOD issued a memorandum that established a tool to measure the frequency with which adjudicative files meet the requirements of DOD regulation. Specifically, the DOD memorandum stated that the DOD Personnel Security Research Center will use a tool called the Review of Adjudication Documentation Accuracy and Rationales or RADAR to gather specific information about adjudication processes at the adjudication facilities and assess the quality of adjudicative documentation. The RADAR will enable DOD to independently evaluate the quality of adjudicative decisions against the adjudicative standards. According to the memorandum, each of DOD adjudication facility will provide case samples to the DOD Personnel Security Research Center for analysis.

In 2009, we estimated that 87 percent of about 3,500 investigative reports that adjudicators used to make clearance decisions were missing required documentation. Although DOD leadership asserted that adjudicators followed a risk-managed approach, DOD had not issued formal guidance clarifying if and under what circumstances adjudicators could adjudicate incomplete investigative reports. We further reported that incomplete documentation may lead to increases in both the time needed to complete the clearance process and in overall process costs and may reduce the assurance that appropriate safeguards were in place to prevent DOD from granting clearances to untrustworthy individuals. In response to this recommendation, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence issued guidance on March 10, 2010 that clarifies when adjudicators may use incomplete investigative reports as the basis for granting clearances. The guidance, which the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence developed in coordination with the DOD Central Adjudication Facilities and issued as a result of GAO's recommendation, focuses on four factors that DOD adjudicators are to consider when deciding whether to adjudicate an investigation with missing or incomplete scope items or return it to the investigation provider: whether the investigator provided a sufficient explanation for the missing or incomplete scope item; the importance of the scope item; the number of leads or sources that make up the scope item, and whether the missing or incomplete scope item is relevant for resolving an adjudicative issue that is present in the case. With the issuance of this guidance, DOD will be able to assure that adjudicators are basing their decisions to accept and adjudicate from these investigative reports on a more uniform and consistent risk tolerance standard that is acceptable to DOD.