[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE RAIL AND MASS TRANSIT SECURITY: INDUSTRY AND LABOR PERSPECTIVES
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION
SECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 13, 2007
__________
Serial No. 110-5
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
__________
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California, PETER T. KING, New York
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts LAMAR SMITH, Texas
NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
JANE HARMAN, California MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon TOM DAVIS, Virginia
NITA M. LOWEY, New York DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
Columbia BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana
ZOE LOFGREN, California DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
Islands GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida
BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
HENRY CUELLAR, Texas DAVID DAVIS, Tennessee
CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania
YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York
AL GREEN, Texas
ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado
VACANCY
Jessica Herrera-Flanigan, Staff Director & General Counsel
Todd Gee, Chief Counsel
Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Robert O'Connor, Minority Staff Director
______
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas, Chairwoman
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
Columbia GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York PETER T. KING, New York (Ex
ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado Officio)
BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex
Officio)
D. Michael Stroud, Director & Counsel
Natalie Nixon, Deputy Chief Clerk
Coley O'Brien, Minority Senior Counsel
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on
Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection.......... 1
The Honorable Daniel E. Lungren, a Representative in Congress
From the State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee
on Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection....... 4
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 5
The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 3
The Honorable Yvette D. Clarke, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York.......................................... 35
The Honorable Eleanor Holmes Norton, a Delegate in Congress From
the District of Columbia....................................... 32
Witnesses
Panel I
Mr. Lewis G. Schiliro, Director of Interagency Preparedness,
Metropolitan Transportation Authority, State of New York:
Oral Statement................................................. 23
Prepared Statement............................................. 25
Mr. Fred Weiderhold, Inspector General, Amtrak:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
Ms. Nancy Wilson, Vice President-Security Association of American
Railroads:
Oral Statement................................................. 11
Prepared Statement............................................. 13
Panel II
Mr. Gary Maslanka, International Vice President, Director of
Railroad Division, Transports Workers Union:
Oral statement................................................. 39
Prepared Statement............................................. 41
Mr. John Murphy, Director, Teamster Rail Conference,
International Brotherhood of Teamsters:
Oral statement................................................. 43
Prepared Statement............................................. 44
THE RAIL AND MASS TRANSIT SECURITY: INDUSTRY AND LABOR PERSPECTIVES
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Tuesday, February 13, 2007
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Transportation Security
and Infrastructure Protection,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:04 p.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Sheila Jackson Lee
[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Jackson Lee, DeFazio, Norton,
Clarke, Thompson, Lungren, Blackburn, and King.
Ms. Jackson Lee. [Presiding.] Good afternoon. The
subcommittee will come to order.
The subcommittee is meeting today to receive testimony on
the topic of rail and mass transit security, industry and labor
perspectives.
Welcome to the Subcommittee on Transportation Security and
Infrastructure Protection. I am delighted to have one of our
very able members join us at the very start. We know that
members are engaged in the debate on Iraq on the floor of the
House.
We thank you, Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes Norton, for your
presence, and also for the members of your constituency.
By proclamation of Congresswoman Norton, the House of
Representatives here is open. So if there is any information
about the government being closed, she has announced that we
are open.
[Laughter.]
And we thank you for your presence here today.
Let me first of all indicate that Chairman Thompson had as
one of his visions, which I join him in working with him
intently and intensely, is to have, after our work is done, the
best homeland security on our transportation systems that we
can possibly have. That is, a comprehensive approach that
involves local agencies, the federal government, and as well
the personnel that are engaged. Of course, our committee
addresses transportation from rail to aviation, to otherwise.
Your presence here today will help us be good fact-finders
so that we can be good legislators, and frankly, make good on
the promise after 9/11 that we made to the American people that
we would fix our intelligence system, that we would work to
develop a Department of Homeland Security, and for those of you
in local and state government, that we would actually
communicate with you so that you would know the information
that we have, and that you would be able to make, along with
us, the best judgment.
Certainly, I know that, like all Americans, you have become
increasingly alarmed at the lack of security for rail and
public transportation systems around the country. Each weekday,
11.3 million passengers in 35 metropolitan areas and 22 states
use commuter heavy or light rail. It is time for the department
to take concrete steps to protect these men and women. History
has shown that terrorists view rail and public transportation
systems as potential targets, but I believe, even as you work
very hard, we recognize that terrorists are very creative. So
we have to be vigilant and diligent on every aspect of
America's security and transportation system together.
Almost 3 years ago, terrorist bombs exploded on Madrid's
rail system, killing and maiming hundreds of innocent victims.
This coming July marks the second anniversary of the terrorist
bombings throughout London's Underground Tube system, and
abroad London transit buses. Last summer, a number of bombs
tore through Mumbai's rail system in the worst attack we have
seen on a public transportation system. Over the years, we have
seen in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that transportation
systems were used as a source of terrorism and suicide
bombings.
Our enemies around the world have proven that they can and
will kill hundreds and injure hundreds more by means of
terrorism, but they will also injure and maim and kill
thousands upon thousands, and maybe millions, of innocent
persons. That is our challenge. According to a RAND Corporation
database of worldwide terrorist incidents between 1995 and
June, 2005, there were over 250 terrorist attacks worldwide
against rail targets, resulting in almost 900 deaths and over
6,000 injuries. These numbers do not include those killed and
injured in the London and Mumbai attacks in 2005 and 2006.
Despite all of these attacks, rail and public
transportation security remains secondary to aviation. Most
importantly, our frontline workers have been left out in the
cold when it comes to security training. Labor organizations
have repeatedly called for additional training for rail and
mass transit employees. The absence of mandated security
training stands in stark contract to the maritime sector of the
United States. The Maritime Transportation Security Act
requires that every vessel and facility plan describe the
training, periodic unannounced drills, and security actions of
persons on the vessel or at the facility to be carried out
under the plan, to deter to the maximum extent practical a
transportation security incident or a substantial threat of
such a security incident.
The London Underground has recognized the importance of
training exercises. Every staff member has had training in
evacuation and safety procedures. In addition, the London
Underground system holds regular emergency exercises. There is
no reason that we cannot have this level of training for our
rail and mass transit workers. It defies belief that men and
women are working in high-target areas and have not been
provided the tools and training to safeguard lives and minimize
damage to our infrastructure and to our economy.
We have noticed that the federal government does not seem
to take rail and mass transit security seriously. That means
that for now we must rely on industry and local government to
make sure that adequate training is given to their frontline
workers. To the witnesses, let me be very clear. We want a
frank discussion today. This is an opportunity to be forthright
with us. We know that all of us equally will have to accept the
responsibility if we have some tragic incident occur. So teach
us. We are willing to learn.
We are engaged in legislation writing as we speak. So your
input will be vital to putting forward a very effective
legislative initiative that will not blame, but that will
incorporate your ideas and work toward real safety. For
example, I realize that jurisdictions like New York have a
heavy burden of local support of their transportation systems
in terms of security. For large systems like Washington, D.C.
and others as your very able members who are on this committee
have indicated, there must be a greater local-federal
partnership on security.
I believe that it is important for us to have a partnership
with all of the employees that have to be on the frontline of
transportation systems, and therefore the first ones to be the
first responders if a tragic incident occurs on light, heavy or
commute rail. However, I am concerned that the industry has not
had the sense of urgency that I think is important when it
comes to adequately staffing and training employees. I hope
that this is not the case, and that we will not suffer another
disaster because of it.
So we are here to listen to you and the system, fix the
kinks or the great gaps, or the great schisms in our system. My
colleagues and I will be introducing legislation, as I
indicated, in this Congress, mandating that the administration
take concrete steps to improve the nation's rail and public
transportation system. The American people deserve no less, and
I intend to push and work with this committee to pass the bill.
Let's do it in a way that incorporates all of the valuable
testimony and concerns and insight that you have. But most of
all, let's do it in keeping with our responsibility to secure
America and secure the homeland.
The chair now recognizes the ranking member of the full
committee, Mr. King of New York, for his opening statement.
Mr. King. I thank the chairwoman for yielding. I want to
commend her and the chairman of the full committee, Mr.
Thompson, for the effort they are putting into this whole issue
of rail and transit security, which obviously is an issue which
must be confronted and which is essential to the security of
our country. Just to look at Madrid and at London is an
occasion of how dangerous the situation can be, and how deadly
it can be.
Also, coming from New York, where we do have, as the
chairwoman mentioned, in many ways unique problems, with more
than 400 train stations, over, 1,000 exits and entrances, and
millions of passengers every day. In addition to that, we have
the commuter lines coming in from Nassau County, Suffolk
County, Westchester, Rockland, New Jersey. So it is obviously a
master problem, and even our Penn Station being rebuilt, there
have been some security issues there in the tunnels leading
into Manhattan.
So with all of that, I certainly look forward to working
with the chairman and the chairwoman as we go forward. I also
want to take this opportunity, though, to commend the MTA and
the NYPD for the efforts that they have taken in moving forward
and being aggressive and being proactive. They I believe really
are setting a standard for the rest of the nation. I hope that
whatever we do builds on that and incorporates into a federal
plan what has been achieved, and again, what else has to be
achieved in New York, because they would be the first to say
that we certainly have not achieved full security. In fact, I
think the uniqueness of rail and transit security does separate
it from aviation security. It is a different species
altogether.
I also want to, and I see that the ranking member of the
subcommittee has arrived, commend him for the efforts that he
put in last year when he was chairman of the subcommittee on
this issue. He certainly went forward with the issue and I
believe achieved a great deal. And also the department itself,
all of us know that more can be done. The fact is, with VIPR
teams and other efforts, they have made significant progress.
I would hope, too, as we go forward with legislation, that
whatever we do does not diminish the power of the Department of
Homeland Security and the TSA to have the final word. We should
not be ceding any jurisdiction or authority to any other
federal agency, certainly when it comes to the awarding of
grants. I think, in fact I know, that Homeland Security and TSA
are best equipped to make grant awards based upon risk and
threat analysis, and also as part of a national fabric. So I
would hope as we go forward that we are not ceding any of that
grant authority to any other federal agency or department.
So again, I look forward to the work of this subcommittee
and the full committee. I know we have a very aggressive and
energetic schedule over the next weeks and months. I look
forward to working with the chairwoman of the subcommittee, and
also the ranking member of the subcommittee, who has already
established such a fine record in this field.
With that, I yield back the balance of my time.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, Mr. King. Let me thank you for
your leadership, along with the leadership of the chairman of
the full committee, Mr. Thompson.
Let me, before I yield to the distinguished gentleman from
California, the ranking member of this subcommittee,
acknowledge the presence of Congresswoman Clarke of New York,
Mr. DeFazio of Oregon, and Ms. Blackburn of Tennessee. Thank
you.
It is my pleasure now to recognize the ranking member of
the subcommittee, the gentleman from California, for an opening
statement.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Madam Chairperson. I
congratulate you for these sets of hearings and for moving so
quickly on this issue. This is one on which there is a
bipartisan recognition of, that is that rail and mass transit
security is, by its very nature, unique. It is different,
certainly, from those that we have dealt with in the area of
aviation and some of the other areas. And yet it is one that
needs our attention.
As was suggested by the gentleman from New York, Mr. King,
we had started on this in the last 2 years, but we had just
started, and much remains to be done. I am particularly pleased
that you have representatives from industry and labor here
today because that gives us a perspective that we need to
continue to have. We in government don't have all the answers.
We have a lot of the questions, but we would make a mistake if
we did not seek the expertise of those who are actually on the
frontlines. If there is security to be had for rail and mass
transit, obviously the workers are the ones that are our first
line of defense, and they are the ones that would be, in
essence, the first responders to a problem.
So I think there is recognition among all of us, including
the administration, that much more needs to be done in the area
of training, and the grant programs, as we have all agreed,
must be done on a risk-based analysis setting. And so I hope
that we will continue with that.
Again, I thank you for beginning these hearings. I hope
that we can work on a bipartisan basis to come up with some
rail and mass transit security legislation.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Do you yield back? The gentleman yields
back.
The chair now recognizes the chairman of the full
committee, the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson, for
his opening statement. We thank him for his leadership on this
issue.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. I look
forward to the testimony of our witnesses this afternoon. I
think we all agree that rail security from a federal
perspective, is nonexistent because we have deferred to state
and locals to handle security. The federal government has
provided little direction from a homeland security perspective.
I look forward to the testimony. I look forward to the
Department of Homeland Security, with Congress's direction,
stepping forward and being more aggressive in this area, both
for passenger rail, as well as our freight van systems. It is
clear that investment is important. We spend about 2 cents per
passenger on rail security in this country. We spend around $9
per passenger on airline security, which is a significant
difference. Nonetheless, we have to step forward.
I am also privileged to see that organized labor is
committed to making sure that they are full participants in
this process. They have indicated that their members want more
training, so they can help on the frontlines with the war on
terrorism. I look forward to hearing what they have to report.
Madam Chair, I think we all recognize the vulnerability.
The question is, when we will move forward and make sure that
we address it? The public will expect nothing less. So I look
forward to the testimony and I look forward to crafting
legislation in pursuit of many of the items we hear in the
testimony.
I yield back.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the chairman for his challenge. We
are up for the task.
I would like to welcome now the first panel of witnesses.
Our first witness is Mr. Fred Weiderhold, the inspector
general of Amtrak, who brings more than 20 years of railroad
management experience.
Our second witness is Ms. Nancy Wilson, vice president for
security for the Association of American Railroads, who has
over 25 years of experience in the railroad industry.
Third is Lewis Schiliro, the director of interagency
preparedness for the New York Metropolitan Transportation
Authority. Mr. Schiliro is a 25-year veteran of the Federal
Bureau of Investigations, and currently works with all of the
MTA agencies to coordinate preparedness and prevention
policies.
Without objection, the witnesses' full statement will be
inserted into the record.
Before I allow you to proceed, might I also indicate that
other members of the subcommittee are reminded that under the
committee rules, opening statements may be submitted for the
record.
I would also ask each witness to summarize his or her
statement for 5 minutes, beginning with Mr. Weiderhold from
Amtrak.
Welcome, and thank you for your testimony.
STATEMENT OF FRED WEIDERHOLD, INSPECTOR GENERAL, AMTRAK
Mr. Weiderhold. Thank you, Madam Chairperson and members of
the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to appear here
today.
I am the inspector general for Amtrak, and I am responsible
for overseeing all of Amtrak's operations and programs,
including those involving safety and rail security.
My message to you today is fairly straightforward. Our
nation's passenger railroads are not as prepared for a
terrorist event as we can or we should be. We have made and we
are continuing to make inroads with multiple federal, state and
local partners, towards improving rail security, but we are not
there yet.
We should not underestimate those who would do us harm.
Recent history in Chechnya, Madrid, London and Mumbai clearly
demonstrates that passenger rail and transit are in the
terrorists' target folders. It may not be a question of ``if,''
but rather ``when.'' We cannot wait for the right technology or
silver bullet to evolve. Amtrak's board and senior management
understand the need to move quickly. Management has told me it
will provide more employee training, more emergency response
training, more canines and more security on its trains and in
its stations within the year.
That said, I am sure the committee realizes that Amtrak
operates in a very complex environment. Amtrak operates in 44
states and serves over 500 stations daily. Amtrak carries over
25 million passengers each year and the company operates much
of the northeast rail corridor, with over 1,000 trains and
600,000 riders using New York's Penn Station each day.
Amtrak operates trains through underwater and underground
tunnels, over bridges and under electrified track. The system
is designed with an open architecture, with multiple access
points, and with little redundancy. The challenges to fence,
gate and lockdown rail assets are considerable.
Passenger rail and Amtrak need your help. In my written
testimony, I make four recommendations that closely mirror what
this committee has proposed in its rail security agenda. First,
there needs to be a convergence in security research and
development through some kind of technology center. I think Ms.
Wilson from the AAR will comment on some of the things that the
rail industry is doing in that regard.
Second, there should be criteria, if not requirements, for
building in security into all capital projects. We readily
accept the need to engineer in factors of safety, but there is
no equivalent for security.
Third, we need effective security standards. Amtrak is
operating under a set of security directives that were
promulgated immediately after the Madrid attacks. These
directives need to be revisited with the rail sector to ensure
that the directives are applicable and add value.
The committee may want to look to APTA, the American Public
Transit Association, which is a designated standards-
development organization, what we call an SDO, for leadership
in this assignment. Amtrak is planning to work with domestic
and international engineering standards groups in this area,
which we will of course be closely coordinating with DHS.
Fourth, some level of passenger and baggage screening is
inevitable, especially during times of high alert or when
threat information is present. For many reasons, Amtrak cannot
go down the path of the aviation security experience, but
Amtrak should consider developing a policy that is defensible,
is consistent with its business model, and is effective.
Madam Chair, my office has conducted a number of reviews
and Red Teams of Amtrak and our rail system that we believe
will be of great interest to the committee. At an appropriate
time, and most likely in a closed setting, we will be happy to
brief you on this work and our other ongoing efforts.
Again, we appreciate this opportunity to testify today. You
have my assurance that my office will work very closely with
you and the subcommittee in the coming months.
Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Weiderhold follows:]
Prepared Statement of Fred E. Weiderhold
Thank you very much for the opportunity to appear before you today
to discuss rail security issues affecting passenger rail services and
Amtrak. I share your belief that rail security must be a national
priority, and I am pleased to attend this hearing. I will tell you
today that, although some progress is being made, we are not at all
where we need to be on rail passenger security; we have not moved far
enough, or fast enough. There should be a strong and united urgency to
do the right things that will protect rail infrastructure and rail
passengers, and we collectively have much work to do.
As Amtrak's Inspector General, I am responsible for oversight of
all of Amtrak's programs and operations. For the past several years, my
Office has been heavily involved in evaluating and overseeing security
operations within Amtrak. Immediately following the bombings in
Chechnya, in December 2003, Amtrak's Board Chairman asked me to conduct
an in-depth review of Amtrak's police and security operations. My
Office worked with the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) to obtain
the services of the RAND Corporation to conduct this review. We were
barely one month into our work when terrorists struck the Spanish rail
system on March 11, 2004. In April 2004, we provided Amtrak with our
observations and recommendations to improve security preparedness and
to formalize and upgrade its police and security planning and
operations. Amtrak has made some progress toward addressing some of the
security shortfalls that were identified, but significant challenges
remain.
We are a statutory Office of Inspector General (OIG), and we have
been very forward leaning in our security assessments. During the past
two years, my Office has conducted several ``red team'' operations
covering critical Amtrak assets; we have performed detailed CBRNE site
assessments using the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Homeland
Defense Operational Planning System (HOPS) group; we have been greatly
assisted by the California National Guard and the Technical Support
Working Group (TSWG) in contracting for highly detailed, virtual
digital mapping of key stations (for use by asset stakeholders and
first responders); and we have been similarly assisted by the National
Guard Bureau and their Full Spectrum Infrastructure Vulnerability
Assessment (FSIVA) teams. We have also independently contracted and
sponsored counter-surveillance training for select Amtrak police, OIG
staff, and other railroad security staff. In short, we on our own have
sought help from almost any quarter, be it federal, state, and private
entities, to find those ``right things'' to do.
My Office and Amtrak also reached out to the international rail and
security communities, sponsoring visits in February 2005 from the
Guardia Civil, Spain's premier counter-terrorism unit and Spain's
national railways operator, Renfe. In 2006, Amtrak officials were
briefed by both British and Indian Railway officials regarding attacks
in their countries, and as recently as last month, Amtrak senior
managers were provided special briefings by the British Transport
Police.
The Amtrak OIG has also joined the President's Council for
Integrity and Efficiency (PCIE) Homeland Security Roundtable, chaired
by DHS Inspector General Richard Skinner, where we will be sharing red
teaming and other security assessment approaches with the OIG
community. And we will begin using the PCIE's Guide to Evaluating
Agency Emergency Preparedness (November 2006) in our FY 2007
evaluations of emergency planning at Amtrak.
Given our extensive involvement in the rail security and the anti-
terrorism field, we make the following observations and recommendations
to the Committee.
Significant Challenges Exist to Secure Rail Infrastructure and
Passengers
The challenges to secure Amtrak and make passenger railroading
safer from potential terrorists' attacks are daunting. Amtrak operates
in 44 states serving over 500 cities and towns across the nation.
Amtrak operates 260 inter-city trains daily, and the company has
agreements with 15 states to operate and maintain trains for many
intra-state corridor services. As the owner and operator of much of the
Northeast Rail Corridor, between Washington, DC and Boston, Amtrak
controls and dispatches hundreds more trains for its rail and transit
partners, including New Jersey Transit and the Long Island Rail Road.
Amtrak directly owns many other critical fixed assets, such as New York
Penn Station and Chicago Union Station, and there are other customers
and tenants that make use of Amtrak's rights-of-way and other
properties. Outside of the Northeast Rail Corridor, Amtrak operates
over thousands of miles of the rail lines of its freight partners,
where train operations are controlled and monitored by the host
railroads.
Our nation's rail system is one of the more open, and some say
porous, passenger transportation systems in the world, both with
respect to physical infrastructure and the very nature of the business
itself. Amtrak's stations and trains are, by design, intended to allow
persons to move freely unto and off its trains and through its station
portals. There are multiple access points throughout our system and it
is difficult to fence, gate, and lock down many parts of the system.
Amtrak also operates trains through various tunnels, in New York
City, Baltimore, Maryland, and Washington DC, which present special
safety and security issues. However, even given these challenges,
effective access control and monitoring at critical nodes and around
high value assets must be designed and implemented.
Any attempt to replicate a TSA-style aviation security architecture
would most likely be extremely cost-prohibitive and ineffective. This
does not mean that there are not significant lessons to be learned from
TSA's aviation security model, and certainly some technologies and
monitoring processes to be shared, but the final solution set for
passenger rail security must be tailored to its unique environment.
Security Funding
A stable funding mechanism for sustained security and emergency
preparedness improvements at Amtrak, and within the passenger rail
sector, is critically important. Most of you know that Amtrak's
financial condition has been precarious in recent years, and Amtrak's
funding of police and security operations has been limited to its own
internal police forces (about 350 persons) and work on a major fire and
life-safety tunnel project in New York City. Amtrak was requested, on
several occasions, by both House and Senate Members to delineate what
it needs to advance its security and emergency preparedness, but well
intended bills have never been enacted.
Amtrak was not even eligible for DHS grant monies until FY 2005, at
which time Amtrak became eligible for approximately $6.0 million of
$150 million that was provided for ``intercity passenger rail, freight
rail, and transit security grants''. In subsequent appropriations,
Amtrak received $7.1 million in FY 2006 and $8.2 million in FY 2007.
Amtrak has used some of these grant funds to conduct vulnerability
assessments, install a pilot chemical sensor system in four stations,
fund a Washington tunnel security pilot project, and fund several other
higher priority projects. However, there are many more security and
emergency preparedness projects and initiatives for Amtrak that require
your support.
Due to these pressing security funding needs, Amtrak's Board of
Directors and its senior management are committed to doing as much as
possible within the limits of Amtrak's internal finances. Amtrak's new
Chief Risk Officer, a former high ranking DHS manager, has requested
that Amtrak increase its canine units and work immediately to get more
police and counter-terrorism security forces riding its trains. Amtrak
has had great difficulty in filling its police and security staffing
levels because its pay and retirement benefits are well below those of
competing jurisdictions, resulting in double-digit attrition and a high
vacancy rate. The Chief Risk Officer is working closely with Amtrak's
authorizing committees to find some relief for this most serious
problem.
Employee & Passenger Security Awareness
There is no substitute for having a well trained work force who can
serve as the `eyes and ears' and first line of defense in noticing
suspicious activities and things that are `out of place' on our
railroad. Likewise, we need an alert and vigilant public, who know what
to do and how to act before and during emergencies, and how to report
to matters that warrant the carrier's attention.
Amtrak has followed the Federal Transit Agency's and the American
Public Transit Association's lead in developing employee awareness
training. Using security awareness training developed by Rutgers
University National Transit Institute (NTI) for mass transit employees,
the transit training modules were modified slightly and customized to
address Amtrak's facilities and rail environment. An introductory block
of security training, including some class, Web-based, and CD-based
training was delivered to all Amtrak employees in FY 2006. This
training was intended to be equivalent to ``Security 101'' for railroad
workers. An additional four-hour training block for up to 14,000
employees is scheduled for FY 2007, with the first classes starting in
January 2007. My Office reviewed this training, and we believe that it
provides a good foundation of security awareness from which additional,
more specialized training can be targeted for select employees.
Amtrak has also begun a limited version of the popular ``see
something, say something'' program that is used by a number of transit
properties. Amtrak had implemented a station and on-board announcements
program, alerting the public to have control of their personal baggage
and carry-on articles, and to report suspicious behavior during high
threat levels declared at the national level. This program is being
expanded to be a part of Amtrak's normal business practice.
The OIG believes Amtrak should consider other programs, to include
programs for a LEO (law enforcement officer) rider's initiative and
adaptation of the British Transport Polices HOT program, a more
targeted employee training program to identify suspicious packages and
reduce `false-positive' results.
Vulnerability Assessments & Security Planning
We agree with the Committee's direction to mandate vulnerability
assessments and security plans for the rail sector. We believe the
Committee will find many carriers have already completed such
assessments, but we suspect that many of these assessments are carrier-
specific and not necessarily linked to larger system or nodal
vulnerabilities. An appropriate role for an Area Rail and Public
Security Committee, or larger DHS entity, would be to link the
assessments and plans into a larger rail transportation security
matrix.
Using DHS Office of Domestic Preparedness (now Grants & Training)
funds, an external firm completed a vulnerability assessment for
Amtrak's Northeast Corridor and Chicago Union Station in May 2006.
Vulnerability assessments for the balance of most of Amtrak's system
assets are scheduled to be delivered very shortly. We believe these
assessments, while not exhaustive, provide a valuable mapping of the
vulnerabilities of key Amtrak, and Amtrak-used, assets, but these are
only starting points.
Vulnerability assessments must be tied to threat and risk-based
analyses, which, in turn, drive coherent and coordinated defense,
deterrence, mitigation, and recovery strategies. These strategies must
be tied to `best practices' to ensure that appropriate technologies,
security and anti-terrorism processes, and human capital are invested
wisely. Ultimately, the culmination of these efforts should result in
an overall security plan that forms the bases for the ``Deter and
Detect (prevention) and Respond and Recover'' activities.
Thus far, we have observed that certain aspects of rail security
planning for the passenger sector are not mature and well integrated.
For example, Amtrak shares space with a number of transit partners
(over 20) in multi-modal stations but, with the exception of some
operations and train movement protocols, the security plans of the rail
partners are not all formally linked. Also, within certain facilities,
not all stakeholders and facility users are fully aware of security and
emergency response procedures. The overall security and risk focus
appears to be very traditional in that security planning has been
limited to facility ownership (and potential liability) rather than
directed more broadly.
On the good news side, in many locations, there is strong
information sharing between and among local operators and law
enforcement on a daily basis, but these are oftentimes the result of
personal relationships and networks. The strength of these
relationships may change as personnel change, and we want to see
stronger, more formal security networks between Amtrak and its rail and
transit partners. Also promising, emergency response drills and
exercises are being conducted with more regularity, and there is a
growing body of ``lessons learned'' from the exercises, drills, and
table-tops after-action reports that will assist investment decisions
and changes in operational protocols.
Information, Intelligence Sharing, & Special Security Efforts
Amtrak participates in the Surface Transportation Information
Sharing and Analysis Center (ST-ISAC), which was established and is
maintained by the Association of American Railroads (AAR). The ST-ISAC
provides useful information to Amtrak, especially in the areas of
cyber-security and after-action threat analyses. Amtrak also
participates in the Railway Alert Network (RAN), another AAR-maintained
information and intelligence sharing system.
More recently, Amtrak placed personnel on the FBI's New York and
Washington Field Office's Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs), and the
National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF), with access to those
units' intelligence centers. Additional Amtrak and OIG staff are
assigned to various Department of Justice sponsored Anti-Terrorism
Advisory Councils (ATACs) and working groups.
Another important development affecting Amtrak's Northeast Corridor
was the creation of Northeast Rail Police Coalition. Last year, NYPD
Commissioner Ray Kelly called for a summit of police chiefs and other
high ranking law enforcement officials from New York City to Washington
DC. Commissioner Kelly proposed a coordinated approach by city, state,
and local law enforcement to improve passenger rail security. The
group, comprised of NYPD, Amtrak Police, Baltimore City Police,
Delaware State Police and Delaware Homeland Security, Metropolitan DC
and Transit Police, New Jersey Transit Police, Philadelphia Police, and
other New Jersey and Pennsylvania State law enforcement, agreed to
provide periodic support to Amtrak by boarding trains with officers and
bomb dogs at key stations, conducting surveillance of the track and
other facilities, and conducting other protective measures. This
coalition began their work starting in July 2006, and we are pleased to
report has become an integral part of Amtrak's security operations.
During the last year, the Amtrak OIG has also placed a special
emphasis on security at Washington DC's Union Station. Union Station is
one of the most visited sites in the District and is a major
transportation hub for Virginia and Maryland rail services as well as
the anchor for Amtrak's Northeast Corridor. We have worked with Amtrak
Police, local Amtrak managers, local property management, adjacent
facility owners, and with transit and local police to establish a
Station Action Team. This group is dedicated to sharing security and
emergency preparedness information and will become a model for other
major urban stations. The OIG facilitated the creation of this team,
and we have prepared special security briefings that I would be happy
to share with the Committee or interested Members in a closed setting.
Recommendations
Making rail security a national priority is a shared responsibility
among a number of Federal departments and agencies, which also requires
the full commitment of private and other public sector stakeholders.
1. Technology Centers
The Committee has recognized the need for more collaborative
research and development and technology convergence to develop
affordable and effective rail security solutions; we very much agree.
There are considerable challenges for passenger carriers to find and
apply the most appropriate security technologies to fit their
environments. Much of what has been accomplished to date by passenger
rail is accomplished by information exchanges through existing industry
associations and through professional relationships and vendor
marketing. There has been some assistance provided by DHS in the form
of providing screening equipment for pilot projects and special
security events, but much more can be done in this area.
It is also appropriate to recognize important work being done in
security technology advancement by the rail industry. The AAR maintains
a Transportation Technology Center (TTCI) in Pueblo, Colorado, which is
used for both testing and training purposes, and Amtrak routinely uses
TTCI services for equipment testing.
2. ``Building In'' Security
Wherever possible, there should be criteria to guide design,
engineering, and procurement activity with an agreed-upon set of
security standards and requirements for capital projects. There is
considerable opportunity for all carriers to examine their general
capital spending programs to determine where security improvements can
be made.
Amtrak plans to work with international engineering standards
groups to determine what other nation's inter-city rail carriers are
doing to build-in security into retrofitting projects as well as new
construction.
3. Standards Development
One of the difficulties we have encountered in evaluating Amtrak's
efforts to improve its security posture is the lack of security
standards. Although some security directives were prepared by DHS in
May 2004, these directives are not necessarily the comprehensive bases
for an effective rail passenger security strategy.
The Committee should look to APTA, which is recognized as a
Standards Development Organization, as a starting point to develop
baselines for rail security and emergency preparedness best practices.
Amtrak also is re-examining its responsibilities and will most likely
develop its own baseline and security standards, working closely with
its rail and transit partners, as well as DHS.
4. Passenger & Baggage Screening
In testimony in March 2006, the GAO reported on the results of
their evaluations of the security practices of domestic and selected
foreign transit operators (www.gao.gov/new.items/d06557t.pdf). Included
in their testimony were recommendations, with certain caveats, to
consider implementing three practices they observed not being widely
used: covert testing, random screening, and establishing a government-
sponsored clearing house for technologies and best practices.
In my opinion, some level of passenger and limited baggage
screening on Amtrak is inevitable, especially during times of high
alert, when there is actionable intelligence, during special events,
and when police and security believe such security steps add real
value. Amtrak cannot go down the path of the aviation experience, but
it will have to develop criteria that are defensible, consistent with
its business model, and effective.
Conclusions
There are a number of good people trying to do the `right thing'
about rail security, but these efforts are not yet well integrated into
a larger transportation strategy. Our collective oars are not in the
water at the same time. Through your efforts, and with the help of
Amtrak's authorizing and appropriations committees, I hope we find the
convergence that leads to unified approaches to formulating security
plans and processes.
In a moment of decision, the best thing you can do is the right
thing. The worst thing you can do is nothing. (Theodore Roosevelt)
Ms. Jackson Lee. Ms. Wilson?
STATEMENT OF NANCY WILSON, VICE PRESIDENT FOR SECURITY,
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN RAILROADS
Ms. Wilson. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman. On
behalf of the members of the Association of American Railroads,
I want to thank you for the opportunity to discuss railroad
industry security programs.
Freight railroads acted immediately to improve security
after 9/11. We did not wait for government mandates to develop
a comprehensive security plan. Within days of the terrorist
attack, we created a top-level security task force comprised of
more than 150 railroads.
Freight railroads acted immediately to improve security
after 9/11. We did not wait for government mandates to develop
a comprehensive security plan. Within days of the terrorist
attack, we created a top-level security task force comprised of
more than 150 railroad, customer and intelligence personnel to
conduct an exhaustive evaluation of freight rail security
issues.
The result was the AAR Terrorism Risk Analysis and Security
Management Plan, a risk-based, intelligence-driven blueprint of
actions designed to raise the baseline of freight rail
security. The plan has been in effect since December 6, 2001.
As a result of that plan, freight railroads enacted more than
50 permanent security countermeasures to address the terrorist
threat. Railroads provided security awareness briefings to
employees who were instructed to maintain high awareness and to
immediately report suspicious activity.
In addition, the plan defines four progressively higher
security alert levels and details a series of actions to be
taken at each alert level. Railroads test the plan through
tabletop exercises twice yearly and modify it as needed to
ensure maximum continued effectiveness.
Because of the open nature of our 140,000-mile network, our
security program relies heavily on timely receipt and analysis
of intelligence information. To facilitate this, railroads
established a 24/7 operation center that is in constant
communication with government security agencies and individual
railroad operations centers. A railroad police officer sits on
the National Joint Terrorism Task Force to help assess
information that may impact railroad security.
One area of particular concern for us is the movement of
toxic inhalation hazard materials, or TIH. These commodities
constitute .03 percent of our total freight volume, but are
responsible for more than half of our insurance liability
costs. Because railroads are common carriers, they are required
to carry these materials whether they want to or not. The
railroads comply with this government mandate, but in doing so
they place their very existence at risk.
Experience has shown that accidents involving these
commodities can result in huge judgments, even where no one
gets hurt and the railroad is not at fault. The current
environment for rail transportation of highly hazardous
materials, especially TIH, is untenable. If the federal
government is going to require railroads to transport these
substances, it must address the bet the company risks it forces
railroads to assume. Congress should address this either by
enacting a liability cap or by relieving railroads of their
common carrier obligation with respect to highly hazardous
materials. In the long run, we believe, as does the GAO and the
National Research Council, that less hazardous substances
should be substituted for highly hazardous materials.
We also believe that forced re-routing does nothing to
enhance security, but merely shifts potential risk from one
area to another and could force railroads to less direct, less
safe routes. Our security efforts rely heavily on our
industry's dedicated and highly professional employees. They
are our eyes and ears for security. Railroads train their
employees to be vigilant, to report suspicious objects and
activities, and to keep out of harm's way.
Railroads began implementing employee security training
programs shortly after 9/11. Subsequently, railroads
collaborated with the National Transit Institute at Rutgers
University, which used funding from TSA to develop an
interactive uniform security awareness curriculum for public
transit employees. AAR adapted that curriculum for use by rail
freight employees.
The standardized curriculum includes four modules entitled
``What is Security?,'' ``Vulnerability Risk and Threat,''
``What to Look For,'' and ``The Employee's Role in Reducing
Risk.'' The goal is to provide risk employees with an
understanding of their roles and responsibilities, and how to
implement their company's procedures upon detection of
suspicious objects or activities.
It should be noted that railroads do not ask their
operating employees to put themselves in harm's way. Instead,
they are expected to follow the company's policies and
procedures, inform the appropriate authority of the situation,
move to a safe location, and wait for further instructions.
Railroads employ railroad police and hazardous materials
experts who are especially trained and equipped to handle
potentially dangerous situations.
Recently, TSA inspectors conducted a survey of 2,600
freight rail employees and determined that 80 percent meet or
exceed the desired level of security awareness. By the end of
this year, all rail employees will have received this new
training. Railroads are proud of the success they have achieved
in enhancing security, while keeping our nation's vital rail
network operating efficiently and safely. We will continue to
work with the Congress, federal agencies and other relevant
parties to improve security and safety even more.
Thank you.
[The statement of Ms. Wilson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Nancy Wilson
On behalf of the members of the Association of American Railroads
(AAR), thank you for the opportunity to discuss security from a freight
railroad perspective. Members of the AAR account for the vast majority
of railroad mileage, employees, and revenue in Canada, Mexico, and the
United States.
Unlike U.S. passenger railroads and transit systems, U.S. freight
railroads are, with minor exceptions, privately owned and operated, and
they rely almost exclusively on their own earnings to fund their
operations. Freight railroads are critical to our economic health and
global competitiveness. They move approximately 40 percent of our
nation's freight (measured in ton-miles)--everything from lumber to
vegetables, coal to orange juice, grain to automobiles, and chemicals
to scrap iron--and connect businesses with each other across the
country and with markets overseas.
From 1980 through 2006, Class I \1\ railroads spent more than $370
billion--more than 40 cents out of every revenue dollar--on capital
expenditures and maintenance expenses related to infrastructure and
equipment. Non-Class I carriers had billions of dollars of additional
spending. These massive, privately-funded expenditures help ensure that
railroads can meet our current and future freight transportation
demands safely and cost effectively.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ U.S. freight railroads are classified on the basis of revenue.
The seven Class I railroads each had revenue of at least $319 million
in 2005. Class I carriers comprise 1 percent of freight railroads, but
account for 70 percent of the industry's mileage operated, 89 percent
of its employees, and 93 percent of its freight revenue.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) noted in testimony to
this committee last week, ``The railroads have an outstanding record in
moving all goods safely.'' Indeed, nothing is more important for
railroads than the safety and security of their operations. For
railroads, safety and security are interconnected: a safer workplace
will tend to be a more secure workplace, and a more secure workplace
will tend to be a safer workplace. And railroads have become much
safer. According to FRA data, railroads reduced their overall train
accident rate by 64 percent from 1980--2005, and their rate of employee
casualties by 79 percent. Railroads have lower employee injury rates
than other modes of transportation and most other major industry
groups, including agriculture, construction, manufacturing, and private
industry as a whole.
We should also be encouraged by the continuing improvements in rail
safety. Based on preliminary data for the first 11 months, 2006 was the
safest year ever for railroads by the three most commonly-cited rail
safety measures: the train accident rate, the employee casualty rate,
and the grade crossing collision rate all reached record lows.
Freight railroads are justifiably proud of these accomplishments.
At the same time, though, railroads want rail safety and security to
continue to improve, and they are always willing to work cooperatively
with members of this committee, others in Congress, the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), the FRA, rail employees, and others to find
practical, effective ways to make this happen.
Below I will discuss the many ways that U.S. freight railroads have
addressed security in the post 9-11 era and how security efforts
(including hazmat security) can be improved.
The Aftermath of September 11
Almost immediately after the 9/11 attacks, the AAR Board of
Directors established a Railroad Security Task Force. The overarching
goals of this task force were to (1) help ensure the safety of rail
employees and the communities in which railroads operate; (2) protect
the viability of national and regional economic activity; and (3) make
certain that railroads can continue to play their vital role in support
of our military.
Over the next several months, the task force conducted a
comprehensive risk analysis of the freight rail industry. Using CIA and
national intelligence community ``best practices,'' five critical
action teams (consisting of more than 150 experienced railroad,
customer, and intelligence personnel) examined and prioritized railroad
assets, vulnerabilities, and threats. Critical action teams covered
information technology and communications; physical infrastructure;
operational security; hazardous materials; and military traffic needs.
Freight railroads also cooperated fully with a separate team covering
passenger rail security.
The Railroad Terrorism Risk Analysis and Security Management Plan
The end result of these analyses was the creation of the industry's
Terrorism Risk Analysis and Security Management Plan, a comprehensive,
intelligence-driven, priority-based blueprint of actions designed to
enhance freight rail security. The plan was adopted by the AAR in
December 2001 and remains in effect today.
As a result of the plan, freight railroads quickly enacted more
than 50 permanent security-enhancing countermeasures. For example,
access to key rail facilities and information has been restricted, and
cyber-security procedures and techniques have been strengthened. In
addition, the plan defines four progressively higher security alert
levels and details a series of actions to be taken at each level:
Alert Level 1 is ``New Normal Day-to-Day Operations'' and exists
when a general threat of possible terrorist activity exists, but
warrants only a routine security posture. Actions in effect at this
level include conducting security training and awareness activities;
restricting certain information to a need-to-know basis; restricting
the ability of unauthorized persons to trace certain sensitive
materials; and periodically testing that security systems are working
as intended.
Alert Level 2 (the level in effect today) is ``Heightened Security
Awareness.'' It applies when there is a general non-specific threat of
possible terrorist activity involving railroad personnel and
facilities. Additional actions in effect at this level include security
and awareness briefings as part of daily job briefings; content
inspections of cars and containers for cause; and spot content
inspections of motor vehicles on railroad property.
Alert Level 3 means there is ``a credible threat of an attack on
the United States or railroad industry.'' Examples of Level 3 actions
include further restricting physical access and increasing security
vigilance at control centers, communications hubs, and other designated
facilities, and requesting National Guard security for critical assets.
Alert Level 4 applies when a confirmed threat against the rail
industry exists, an attack against a railroad has occurred, an attack
in the United States causing mass casualties has occurred, or other
imminent actions create grave concerns about the safety of rail
operations. Security actions taken at this level include stopping non-
mission-essential contractor services with access to critical
facilities and systems; increasing vigilance and scrutiny of railcars
and equipment during mechanical inspections to look for unusual items;
and continuous guard presence at designated facilities and structures.
Alert Levels 3 and 4 can be declared industry-wide for a short
period of time or, if intelligence has identified that terrorist action
against a specific location or operation is imminent, for a particular
geographic area (e.g., the Midwest) or subset of rail traffic (e.g.,
hazardous materials).
Railroads test their security plan through table-top exercises
twice yearly, and evaluate and modify it as needed to ensure maximum
continued effectiveness.
Access to pertinent intelligence information is a critical element
of the plan. To this end, the rail industry is in constant
communication with the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and
elsewhere within DHS, the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department
of Transportation (DOT), the FBI's National Joint Terrorism Task Force
(NJTTF), state and local law enforcement, and others. A railroad police
officer and railroad analysts who hold Top Secret clearances work with
government intelligence analysts at NJTTF and at DHS to help evaluate
intelligence and serve as subject matter experts.
Intelligence information, in turn, is disseminated through the
Railway Alert Network (RAN), a secure 24/7 communications network
operated by the AAR at the Secret level that links federal security
personnel with railroad operations centers. Through the RAN, railroads
and the intelligence community share information to maintain
situational awareness and immediately institute appropriate alert
levels.
Communication is also enhanced by the Surface Transportation
Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ST-ISAC), which was
established by the AAR at the request of the DOT. The ST-ISAC collects,
analyzes, and distributes security information from worldwide resources
to help protect vital information technology systems and physical
assets from attack. It operates 24/7 at the Top Secret level. The ST-
ISAC grew out of Presidential Decision Directive 63 (May 22, 1998),
which recognizes freight railroads as ``essential to the minimum
operations of the economy and government.''
Rail security efforts strongly benefit from the fact that major
railroads have their own police forces. Security would be enhanced if
police officers of one railroad were permitted to exercise law
enforcement powers on the property of another railroad. This
flexibility could prove especially valuable in the event of a national
security threat involving an individual railroad. AAR strongly supports
legislation, such as S. 184 (the ``Surface Transportation and Rail
Security Act of 2007'') that would grant this flexibility.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ The measure was also contained in legislation (H.R. 2351)
introduced in the 109th Congress sponsored by Rep. James Oberstar,
chairman of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notwithstanding rail industry efforts, there can be no 100 percent
guarantee against terrorist assaults, including assaults involving
hazardous materials (hazmat) on railroads. If such an incident occurs,
railroads have well-established programs and procedures that would be
invoked that are designed to respond to and minimize the impact of such
incidents.
In this regard, emergency response efforts are critical. Railroads
help communities develop and evaluate hazmat emergency response plans.
Through their own efforts and the Transportation Community Awareness
and Emergency Response Program (TRANSCAER), they provide basic training
for more than 20,000 emergency responders each year.
In addition, more than 20 years ago, the AAR established the
Emergency Response Training Center (ERTC), a world-class training
facility that is part of the Transportation Technology Center, Inc.
(TTCI) in Pueblo, Colorado. The ERTC has provided in-depth hazmat
emergency response training to more than 38,000 emergency responders
and railroad and chemical industry professionals from all over the
country and abroad. Most recently, the ERTC agreed to provide critical
training for 100 new rail security inspectors hired by the TSA. This
summer, ERTC will be training NJTTF personnel.
The ERTC is considered by many to be the ``graduate school'' of
hazmat training because of its focus on comprehensive, hands-on
training using actual rail equipment. TTCI boasts a collection of
around 70 rail freight cars (including tank cars), some 15 rail
passenger cars, 25 highway cargo tanks, van trailers, and intermodal
containers, as well as computer work stations equipped with the latest
emergency response software. TTCI is currently developing a Passenger
Railcar Security and Integrity Training Facility to test the
effectiveness of various response and remediation techniques in
mitigating incidents involving passenger trains. This facility focuses
on chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or explosive incidents
and other activities associated with potential terrorist events.
The AAR strongly supports legislation soon to be introduced by Rep.
John Salazar that would make TTCI a member of the National Domestic
Preparedness Consortium (NDPC), which is a group of premier
institutions that develop, test, and deliver training to state and
local emergency responders. Today, a facility specifically targeted at
emergency response training for freight and passenger railroad
environments is notably absent from the NDPC. Including TTCI in the
NDPC offers a unique opportunity to improve our nation's ability to
prevent, minimize, and respond to potential rail-related terrorist
attacks similar to those witnessed in London and Madrid.
The rail industry is pleased that many members of Congress have had
the opportunity to visit TTCI in person. I extend an open invitation to
all members of this committee to visit the facility where they can gain
first-hand knowledge of its capabilities.
Hazardous Materials Movements by Rail
Each year, 1.7 to 1.8 million carloads of hazardous materials are
transported by rail in the United States, with two-thirds moving in
tank cars. ``Toxic inhalation hazards'' (TIH)--gases or liquids, such
as chlorine and anhydrous ammonia, that are especially hazardous if
released--are a subset of hazardous materials and are a major (though
not exclusive) focus of hazmat-related rail safety efforts. In each of
the past couple of years, railroads have transported just over 100,000
carloads of TIH, virtually all in tank cars.
Railroads recognize and deeply regret the occurrence of a few
tragic accidents involving hazardous materials over the past couple of
years. Nevertheless, the rail hazmat safety record is extremely
favorable. In 2005, 99.997 percent of rail hazmat shipments reached
their final destination without a release caused by an accident.
Railroads reduced hazmat accident rates by 86 percent from 1980 through
2005.
Still, no one disputes that efforts should be made to increase
hazmat safety and security where practical. Railroads understand this
better than anyone. Today, the federal government, through the
railroads' common carrier obligation, requires railroads to transport
highly-hazardous materials, whether railroads want to or not. Unlike
firms in other industries, including other transportation companies,
railroads today have not been able to ``just say no'' to entering into
a business relationship with consumers or manufacturers of these
materials.
Absent railroads' common carrier requirement, many railroads would
not transport these materials because of the potentially ruinous claims
that could arise in the event of a catastrophic accident involving a
release of these materials. Indeed, while accidents involving highly-
hazardous materials on railroads are exceedingly rare, history
demonstrates that railroads can suffer multi-billion dollar judgments,
even for accidents where no one gets hurt and the railroads do nothing
wrong. Drunk drivers, impatient motorists driving around a grade
crossing gate or ignoring a signal at a grade crossing, faulty repairs
by the owner of a tank car, and pranksters--not terrorists--have caused
incidents that could have been disastrous if they had involved the
release of these materials.
A few years ago in New Orleans, a tank car that railroads did not
own containing more than 30,000 gallons of liquid butadiene began to
leak. Vapor from the butadiene tank car rolled out across a
neighborhood until the pilot light of an outdoor gas water heater
ignited it. More than 900 people were evacuated. The National
Transportation Safety Board found that the probable cause of the
accident was an improper gasket that a chemical company had installed
on the tank car. Nevertheless, a state court jury entered a punitive
damages verdict against the railroads involved in the amount of $2.8
billion.
In essence, the transport of highly-hazardous materials is a ``bet
the business'' public service that the government makes railroads
perform.
Railroads face these huge risks for a tiny fraction of their
business. In 2005, railroads moved just over 100,000 TIH carloads and
nearly 37 million total carloads. Thus, shipments of TIH constituted
only about 0.3 percent of all rail carloads. The revenue that highly-
hazardous materials generate does not come close to covering the
potential liability to railroads associated with this traffic.
Moreover, the insurance industry is unwilling to fully insure railroads
against the multi-billion dollar risks associated with highly-hazardous
shipments. And even though TIH accounts for a tiny fraction of rail
carloads, it contributes approximately 50 percent of the rapidly-rising
overall cost of railroad insurance.
For all these reasons, the current environment for the rail
transportation of highly-hazardous materials, especially TIH, is
untenable. If the federal government is going to require railroads to
transport highly-hazardous materials, it must address the``bet the
company'' risk it forces railroads to assume.
Congress can address this inequity in one of at least three ways.
First, Congress could create a statutory liability cap for the
railroads similar to the one that applies to Amtrak. Amtrak's total
liability for all claims, including punitive damages, from a single
accident--regardless of fault--is capped at $200 million. Congress
could enact a similar type of cap on the liability a freight railroad
would incur from an accident involving highly-hazardous materials,
regardless of fault, with the government paying liabilities in excess
of the cap.
Congress could also enact a Price-Anderson type solution. Price-
Anderson limits the liability of a company from an incident involving
the release of nuclear material, including in transportation, and
provides for a fund to which all owners of nuclear power plants
contribute when an incident occurs to cover any damages in excess of
that limit. Under a similar proposal for TIH, the railroad would be
liable for some defined amount of damages arising from a railroad
accident involving a highly-hazardous material. Any damages above that
defined amount would be paid from a fund to which producers and end-
users of these materials would contribute in the event of an incident.
The main purpose of such legislation would be to cap the railroad's
liability for claims, while still ensuring compensation for the general
public. However, it also seeks to balance the societal need to
compensate the injured and damaged with the need for any railroad
involved to be able to continue to operate and remain viable.
Both of these proposals leave railroads with a substantial amount
of liability. Both are also reasonable, given railroads' federally-
imposed common carrier obligation and given that accidents occur even
when railroads operate carefully and safely. Under either proposal,
limiting freight railroads' liability from an accident involving
highly-hazardous materials would reduce the railroads' risk exposure.
It would also bring certainty to the insurance market, and hopefully
more insurance companies would once again be willing to offer railroads
coverage.
Absent these two alternatives, Congress should relieve railroads of
their common carrier obligation to haul TIH and other highly-hazardous
materials. If Congress will not provide some degree of protection from
unlimited potential liability from transporting these materials, then
it should not mandate that the railroads' shareholders assume that
risk. Rather, railroads should be permitted to decide for themselves
whether to accept, and at what price they are willing to accept, such
materials for transportation.
What Railroads Are Doing
In the meantime, railroads support prompt, bold actions by all
stakeholders to reduce the risks associated with hazmat transport.
Railroads themselves are taking the lead:
In December 2006, an industry committee approved a new
standard for chlorine and anhydrous ammonia tank cars that will
significantly reduce the risk of a release. (Anhydrous ammonia
and chlorine combined account for around 80 percent of rail TIH
movements.) The standard will be phased in beginning in
2008.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ The delay in implementation is due to an FRA request.
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As noted earlier, railroads help communities develop
and evaluate emergency response plans; provide training for
more than 20,000 emergency responders each year through their
own efforts and the Transportation Community Awareness and
Emergency Response Program (TRANSCAER); and support Operation
Respond, a nonprofit institute that develops technological
tools and training for emergency response professionals.
Railroads work closely with chemical manufacturers in
the Chemical Transportation Emergency Center (Chemtrec), a 24/7
resource that coordinates and communicates critical information
for use by emergency responders in mitigating hazmat incidents.
Upon request, railroads provide local emergency
response agencies with, at a minimum, a list of the top 25
hazardous materials transported through their communities. The
list helps responders prioritize emergency response plans.
For trains and routes carrying a substantial amount of
highly-hazardous materials, railroads utilize special operating
procedures to enhance safety.
Railroads participate in a variety of R&D efforts to
enhance tank car and hazmat safety. For example, the Tank Car
Safety Research and Test Project (which is funded by railroads,
tank car builders, and tank car owners) analyzes accidents
involving tank cars to help identify the causes of tank car
releases and prevent future occurrences.
In addition to implementing their Terrorism Risk
Analysis and Security Management Plan, railroads are working
with DHS and the DOT to identify opportunities to reduce
exposure to terrorism on rail property.
Railroads offer hazmat awareness training to all
employees who are involved in hazmat transportation. Employees
responsible for emergency hazmat response efforts receive far
more in-depth training.
Railroads are pursuing a variety of technological
advancements to enhance rail safety, including hazmat safety.
Railroads are working with TIH manufacturers,
consumers, and the government to explore the use of coordinated
routing arrangements to reduce the mileage and time in transit
of TIH movements.
What Hazmat Manufacturers and Consumers Should Do
Manufacturers and consumers of hazardous materials should take a
number of steps to help ensure hazmat safety.
First, concerted efforts should be made to encourage development
and utilization of ``inherently safer technologies,'' which involve the
substitution of less-hazardous materials for highly-hazardous
materials, especially TIH, in manufacturing and other processes. As
noted in a recent report by the National Research Council (part of the
National Academy of Sciences), ``the most desirable solution to
preventing chemical releases is to reduce or eliminate the hazard where
possible, not to control it.'' Ways this can be achieved include
``modifying processes where possible to minimize the amount of
hazardous material used'' and ``[replacing] a hazardous substance with
a less hazardous substitute.'' \4\ In a similar vein, in a January 2006
report, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) recommended that the
Department of Homeland Security ``work with EPA to study the advantages
and disadvantages of substituting safer chemicals and processes at some
chemical facilities.''\5\
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\4\ Terrorism and the Chemical Infrastructure: Protecting People
and Reducing Vulnerabilities, National Research Council--Board on
Chemical Sciences and Technology, May 2006, p. 106.
\5\ Homeland Security: DHS is Taking Steps to Enhance Security at
Chemical Facilities, but Additional Authority is Needed, Government
Accountability Office, January 2006, p. 7.
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One real-world example of product substitution occurred at the Blue
Plains wastewater treatment facility just a few miles from the U.S.
Capitol. Like many wastewater treatment facilities, Blue Plains used
chlorine to disinfect water. Not long after 9/11, the facility switched
to sodium hypochlorite, a safer alternative.
Railroads recognize that the use of TIH cannot be immediately
halted. However, over the medium to long term, product substitution
would go a long way in reducing hazmat risks.
Second, manufacturers and receivers of TIH, in conjunction with
railroads and the federal government, should continue to explore the
use of ``coordination projects'' to allow TIH consumers to source their
needs from closer suppliers. For manufacturers and users, this could
involve ``swaps.'' For example, if a chlorine user contracts with a
chlorine supplier located 600 miles away, but another supplier is
located 300 miles away, the supplier located 600 miles away might agree
to allow the closer shipper to supply the user.
Third, hazmat consumers and manufacturers should support efforts
aimed at increasing tank car safety and reliability. Recently, for
example, the FRA, Dow Chemical, Union Pacific, and the Union Tank Car
Company announced a collaborative partnership to design and implement a
next-generation railroad tank car. (TTCI has been selected to support
testing and developments initiatives related to this project.)
What the Government Should Do
The government too has a key role to play. First, as noted earlier,
if the government requires railroads to transport highly-hazardous
materials (via their common carrier obligation), it must address the
``bet the company'' risk this obligation forces railroads to assume.
Second, the government should help facilitate the ``coordinated
routing arrangements'' and ``coordination projects'' mentioned earlier.
Third, the government should encourage the rapid development and
use of ``inherently safer technologies'' to replace TIH and other
highly-hazardous materials.
Fourth, the government should reject proposals that would allow
state or local authorities to ban hazmat movements through their
jurisdictions or order railroads to provide local authorities advance
notification of hazmat movements through their jurisdictions.
The purposes of these types of proposals are protection of the
local populace against hazmat incidents, including terrorist attack
(especially in perceived ``high threat'' areas), and enhancing the
ability to react more quickly to hazmat incidents. The proposals may be
well intended, but the end result of their enactment on a locality-by-
locality basis would likely be an increase in exposure to hazmat
release and reduced safety and security.
Banning hazmat movements in individual jurisdictions would not
eliminate risks, but instead would shift them from one place to another
and from one population to another. In shifting that risk, it could
foreclose transportation routes that are optimal in terms of overall
safety, security, and efficiency and force railroads to use less
direct, less safe routes.
The rail network is not similar to the highway network where there
are myriad alternate routes. In the rail industry, rerouting could add
hundreds of miles and several days to a hazmat shipment, and those
extra miles and days could be on rail infrastructure that is less
suitable (for a variety of reasons) to handling hazmat. Additional
switching and handling of cars carrying hazmat could be needed, as
could additional dwell time in yards. As the Department of Justice and
DHS noted in a joint brief opposing a proposed D.C. hazmat ban, the
increase in the total miles over which hazmat travels and the increase
in total time in transit would ``increase their exposure to possible
terrorist action,'' and therefore potentially reduce safety and
security.\6\ The U.S. DOT also submitted a statement recognizing that
banning hazmat shipments through certain areas reduces both safety and
security.
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\6\ It has been estimated, for example, that a ban on hazmat
transport through the District of Columbia would result in some 2
million additional hazmat car-miles as carriers had to use circuitous
alternative routes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
If hazmat were banned in one jurisdiction, other jurisdictions
would undoubtedly follow suit. In fact, that is already happening. In
the wake of so far unsuccessful attempts by the D.C. City Council to
ban hazmat movements through Washington, similar efforts are being
discussed for Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, Cleveland, Chicago, Las
Vegas, Memphis, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and probably other cities
too, as well as for all of California.
An integrated, effective national network requires uniform
standards that apply nationwide. The clarity and efficiency that
uniformity brings would be lost if different localities and routes were
subject to widely different rules and standards, or if local and/or
state governments could dictate what types of freight could pass
through their jurisdictions. The problem is especially acute for
railroads, whose network characteristics and limited routing options
mean that disruptions in one area can have profound impacts thousands
of miles away. These disruptions would negatively affect all rail
traffic, not just hazmat traffic.
Thus, if policymakers determine that hazmat movements should be
banned, they should be banned nationwide, rather than on a locality-by-
locality basis.
Hazmat pre-notification to local authorities is problematic for
several reasons and may not accomplish the goals of those seeking it.
First, upon request the rail industry already notifies communities
of, at a minimum, the top 25 hazardous commodities likely to be
transported through their area. In the event of a hazmat incident,
train consists are available to emergency responders, and railroads, at
TSA request, have agreed to provide movement data on all TIH cars.
Second, pre-notification would vastly increase the accessibility of
hazmat location information. Making this information more accessible
could increase vulnerability to terrorist attack by magnifying the
possibility that the information could fall into the wrong hands.
Third, at any one time, thousands of hazmat carloads are moving by
rail throughout the country, constantly leaving one jurisdiction and
entering another. The vast majority of these carloads do not--and due
to the nature of rail operations, cannot be made to--follow a rigid,
predetermined schedule. The sheer quantity and transitory nature of
these movements would make a workable pre-notification system extremely
difficult and costly to implement, for railroads and local officials
alike. That is why the fire chief of Rialto, California, commented,
``You'd have to have an army of people to stay current on what's coming
through. I think it wouldn't be almost overwhelming. It would be
overwhelming.'' The greater the number of persons to be notified, the
greater the difficulty and cost.
Fourth, railroads provide training for hazmat emergency responders
in many of the communities they serve, and they already have well-
established, effective procedures in place to assist local authorities
in the event of hazmat incidents.
Finally, since railroads already make communities aware of what
types of hazardous materials are likely to be transported through their
area and since they already provide 24/7 assistance for emergency
responders (many of whom railroads have trained), it is not at all
clear that information obtained by local authorities through a pre-
notification system would improve their ability to respond to hazmat
incidents in any meaningful way.
Rail Employee Security Training
Railroad security efforts depend a great deal on the efforts of
railroads' dedicated and highly-professional employees--including
engineers and conductors aboard trains; maintenance of way crews,
inspectors, and signalmen working along railroad rights-of-way;
railroad police officers; and others. They are the ``eyes and ears'' in
the industry's security efforts, and we should all be grateful for
their vigilance and care.
In terms of employee security training, the freight rail industry's
focus has been on ``see something, say something,'' and ``keep out of
harm's way.'' The training has encompassed topics such as what to do
when an employee sees a stranger or suspicious activity on rail
property; to whom an anomaly should be reported; the need to keep
information about train movements and cargos confidential; and the need
to keep rail property secure and safe.
With 9/11, it became clear to railroads, as it did to firms in
other industries, that security awareness would have to take on new
importance. In response, Class I railroads soon thereafter provided a
training video and/or printed materials to all employees--in most cases
mailing the materials to employees--homes--that could be characterized
as ``Security Awareness 101.'' In the materials, the railroads
expressed to their employees three fundamental expectations that to
this day remain cornerstones of rail employees' responsibilities
regarding security: don't put yourself in danger; report suspicious
activities on or around railroad property; and don't divulge sensitive
information about rail operations to others.
Over time, freight railroads began to incorporate security issues
in a more formal fashion--for example, as part of employees' periodic
FRA-mandated safety rules recertification, as part of new-hire
training, and as part of new manager training. Many railroads have
incorporated security issues into employees' manual of standard
operating practices. Moreover, all railroads are compliant with U.S.
DOT-mandated HM-232 security training for employees who handle
hazardous materials.
More recently, railroads concluded that rail security would be
enhanced if rail employee security training was more harmonized across
railroads through use of a standardized curriculum, and railroads have
made that harmonization a reality.
Much has been done in collaboration with the National Transit
Institute (NTI) at Rutgers University. NTI was established under the
Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 to develop,
promote, and deliver training and education programs for the public
transit industry. Freight railroads are fortunate to have been able to
take advantage of NTI's success in promoting safety and security in
public transit to develop an interactive, uniform security awareness
curriculum for freight railroad employees.
The standardized curriculum has four modules: What is Security;
Vulnerability, Risk, and Threat; What to Look For; and Employees' Role
in Reducing Risk. The goal of the standardized curriculum is to provide
rail employees with an understanding of their role and responsibility
in system security, and how to implement their companies' procedures
upon detection of suspicious objects or activities.
For example, one module of the curriculum focuses on what system
security entails in a general sense--i.e., the use of operating and
management policies and procedures to reduce security vulnerabilities
to the lowest practical level, as well as a process focusing on
preventing all levels of crime against people and property. Under a
system security approach, rail employees are taught to realize that
they and their duties are part of a larger, extensive system and that
system security begins with the employee. To that end, employees are
encouraged to be observant and to be familiar with their companies'
policies and procedures in the event of a threat or incident.
Another module of the curriculum covers how to identify suspicious
or dangerous activities. In the case of suspicious individuals, the
focus is on behavior--specifically, where the person is, when he or she
is there, and what he or she is doing. Railroads know that their
employees know their daily work area better than anyone and are in the
best position to determine if something looks wrong or is out of place.
Thus, employee training emphasizes being familiar with the work area;
observing and reporting suspicious activities and objects; reporting
missing or malfunctioning equipment; and, if appropriate and endorsed
by railroad policies, approaching and engaging persons to resolve or
confirm suspicions. Rail employees are not to approach threatening
people; try to intervene in dangerous activities; or pick up, touch, or
move suspicious objects. They are expected to withdraw from dangerous
environments and situations and are expected to report dangerous
situations immediately.
As part of the standardized curriculum, employees are also trained
how to react to threats, which may take the form of perceived
suspicious activity, suspicious and/or out-of-place objects or
vehicles, evidence of tampering with equipment, phone calls or other
warnings, or other circumstances. Again, railroads do not expect their
employees to ``play the hero'' by potentially putting themselves in
harm's way. Instead, they are expected to follow their company's
policies and procedures, inform the appropriate authority of the
situation, move to a safe location, and wait for further instructions.
We submitted our employee security training program both to DHS and
to FRA for review and comment in February 2006. TSA reviewed the rail
industry's training program, and advised us that it is ``relevant and
up-to-date'' and is ``helpful'' in ``rais[ing] the baseline of
security-related knowledge.''
Class I railroads will complete security training for front-line
workers (security personnel, dispatchers, train operators, other on-
board employees, maintenance and maintenance support personnel, and
bridge tenders) by the end of this year. Going forward, rail employee
security training will be documented and records of it maintained.
As the information noted above makes clear, railroads treat very
seriously their obligations in regard to security and have made
sustained, earnest efforts to provide their employees with the tools
and training they need to react appropriately when security-related
issues arise. Moreover, railroads are not standing still in this
regard. Through their efforts with NTI and others, railroads are
continually refining their training efforts to improve their usefulness
and effectiveness. Railroads are also always open to reasonable,
constructive suggestions on how employee security training can be
improved.
At times, though, some rail industry critics, including some
elements within rail labor, are not always constructive or reasonable.
Members of this committee should be made aware that most major freight
railroads are currently engaged in negotiations concerning a new
national collective bargaining agreement with more than a dozen unions
representing rail industry employees. During this period of
negotiations, union leaders have at times engaged in self-serving
tactics aimed at the bargaining table that misrepresent the industry's
strong record of safety and security. A case in point is a recent
Teamsters-sponsored attack on the rail industry disguised as a
``study'' of security gaps on U.S. railroads.
Railroad Security Legislation
A number of proposals have been offered in the Senate and House of
Representatives regarding railroad security. Freight railroads are
always ready and willing to discuss how security can be enhanced more
effectively. To that end, railroads support provisions of rail security
legislation, some of which are found in S. 184 (the ``Surface
Transportation and Rail Security Act of 2007'') that:
Provide funding for rail security research and
deployment projects and rail security technologies.
Require federal authorities to develop a comprehensive
security plan that identifies the most important rail assets
and the biggest threats to those assets. The AAR's security
plan should be the basis for this federal effort.
Are built upon sound risk management principles, not
just reactions to ``what if'' scenarios. Given the limited
resources of all parties involved, not every risk can be
mitigated. Risk mitigation steps that do not meaningfully
alleviate substantive risks or are not cost effective actually
degrade security because they take away resources that could be
better spent enhancing security in other ways.
Address the ``bet the company'' risk railroads must
assume because of their common-carrier obligation to carry
highly-hazardous materials.
Allow police officers of one railroad to exercise law
enforcement powers on the property of another railroad.
Establish a proper balance between efforts to enhance
security and allowing the free flow of goods that is critical
to our societal and economic health.
Encourage rapid development and implementation of
``inherently safer technologies'' as substitutes for highly-
hazardous materials, especially TIH.
Encourage cooperative efforts by TIH transporters,
manufacturers, and users to work with appropriate government
agencies to move TIH over shorter appropriate routes through
``market swaps'' and other collaborative arrangements. The
overarching goal should be to reduce TIH mileage and time in
transit.
Ensure that any technology that is mandated to track
and locate rail cars carrying hazmat and/or to identify actual
or imminent hazmat release is fully proven, functional,
reliable, and cost effective, and does not impede or endanger
existing railroad systems.
Make expenses mandated by the government (including
mandates that result from high-risk corridor assessments)
eligible for critical infrastructure protection grants.
Ensure that a non-profit railroad research facility is
an eligible recipient of rail security and R&D grants.
Make TTCI a member of the National Domestic
Preparedness Consortium.
Engage the expertise and experience of rail industry
personnel as significant domestic intelligence assets.
Passenger Railroads
More than 90 percent of the mileage over which Amtrak operates, as
well as large portions of the trackage over which many commuter
railroads operate, are actually owned and maintained by freight
railroads. Therefore, actions taken by freight railroads to enhance
security also benefit passenger rail. Freight rail security officials
coordinate with and support Amtrak and commuter rail security officials
to, among other things, increase uniformed police presence in rail
passenger stations. Amtrak, commuter rail and transit authorities, and
freight railroads receive and share information through the RAN and the
ST-ISAC.
That said, freight railroad security plans and procedures are not
specifically designed to protect passengers or substitute for actions
that Amtrak or other passenger railroads might choose or be requested
to take. Moreover, freight railroads should not be expected to cover
costs associated with passenger rail security, and steps taken to
enhance passenger security must be designed to minimize undue
interference with freight railroad operations.
Conclusion
U.S. freight railroads are proud of the success they achieved in
keeping our nation's vital rail transport link open following the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Since then, railroads have taken
many steps to increase the security of our nation's rail network,
including the development of a comprehensive security management plan
that incorporates four progressively severe alert levels. Railroads
will continue to work with this committee, others in Congress, federal
agencies, and all other relevant parties to further enhance the safety
and security of our nation's railroads and the communities they serve.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank you for your testimony.
I now recognize Mr. Schiliro from MTA to summarize his
statement for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF LEWIS G. SCHILIRO, DIRECTOR OF INTERAGENCY
PREPAREDNESS, METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, STATE OF
NEW YORK
Mr. Schiliro. Good afternoon, Madam Chairwoman, and members
of the subcommittee. I also would like to thank you for the
opportunity to appear here today.
I am currently the director of interagency preparedness at
the MTA. I joined the MTA in 2005, after having served with the
FBI for 25 years. During that time, I was assigned as the agent
in charge of both domestic and international terrorism in the
FBI's New York office, and I subsequently served as director of
that office from 1998 until 2000.
My role currently is to ensure that the actions we are
taking in light of 9/11, Madrid, London, Tokyo and Mumbai will
prepare the MTA to respond to terrorists and other emergency
situations. The MTA is the largest transit provider in the
Western Hemisphere, with over 8 million daily subway, rail and
bus rides--one-third of all rides taken in the U.S. In
addition, 900,000 vehicles cross our seven bridges and two
tunnels each day, carrying over 1.4 million people.
Certainly, 9/11 was traumatic for New York and our system.
With three subway stations at Ground Zero and hundreds of
express and local buses serving its perimeter, we served more
than 80 percent of the Center's 50,000 workers. We were
fortunate that day. No one was killed or injured on our system.
But 9/11 focused us on making our system even more secure. With
our partners in New York City, New York State, and the federal
government, we did risk assessments to figure out what we
needed to do better.
Those assessments identified $2 billion to $3 billion in
capital needs. We immediately launched a two-phased capital
investment program to address those needs and harden our
system. Phase One, comprised of about $720 million, is now
nearing completion. While I can't detail in public many of the
projects we have undertaken, one of the most visible
initiatives we have done is to install over 1,000 surveillance
cameras and 3,000 motion detectors in our subways and railroads
as part of a $260 million integrated electronic surveillance
system.
We have just begun work on the $495 million Phase Two
program, which takes, in turn, the next most critical projects.
While the first phase is largely funded, Phase Two remains
largely unfunded. We need your help with these efforts, since
current DHS assistance is simply not structured to help with
such a large, but essential, capital investment security
program. DHS assistance has been helpful with what we refer to
as ``soft capital'' emergency equipment--radios, bollards and
training, where monies are provided to help with emergency
preparedness drills.
Since 2003, we have received $88 million, only a small
portion of the $300 million to $400 million we have spent in
local funds such as growing our police department by 39
percent, to 755 officers, at a cost of over $70 million, plus
an additional $37 million in overtime since 2002. We have hired
an additional 261 bridge and tunnel officers at a cost of $101
million. We spent $10 million to create and equip a 50-dog
canine unit, which are specially trained for bomb detection. We
have added two MTA police department emergency service units at
a cost of $6 million.
Costly, but necessary equipment, training and
communications are also underway. We have also continued to
undertake real-life emergency drills on all parts of the MTA
system, something that we have always done. In addition, all
key operating employees are provided formal security training,
and we are currently working with our employees and the unions
to update and review what we do to improve that training even
more--something that is definitely needed.
We have also focused on making sure that our customers are
aware of how they should respond in emergencies. We have
created the now internationally known, ``If you see something,
say something,'' campaign, telling our customers in print and
radio to be vigilant. Enlisting their help has given them an
outlet to report suspicious activities. Publicly sponsored, it
has been very positive, and we have shared our materials with
dozens of systems and municipalities around the globe.
While I have touched briefly on federal funding, I would
like to talk about DHS assistance more briefly. You know the
national numbers, but they mean more in the context of the
eight million daily riders we provide. In comparative terms, in
10 weeks we will have transported more people than the domestic
airlines do all year, and we are but one-third of the daily
transit ridership nationally. And yet the federal government
has spent over $24 billion on aviation security since 2001, but
only $549 million on transit security.
We don't deny that aviation security is critical and we are
appreciative of what has been done and provided, but we need
you to address this dramatic inequity as you shape the DHS
authorization. We have worked closely with Congress to increase
federal transit funding from the $65 million provided in 2003,
$50 million in 2004, to the $175 million provided in 2006 for
transit passenger and freight rail security. But those amounts,
taken together, barely make a dent in addressing the $6 billion
need.
We look forward to your efforts to help us address the
global transit needs through an authorization bill, and we
applaud past efforts to do so. We have worked closely with the
American Public Transportation Association, and share in their
concerns. We desperately need a funding program that is based
on objective and current risk and vulnerability assessments
applied on a national basis, annual transit and rail security
funding over the next 10 years that provides transit with a
minimum of $500 million to $600 million year, a program that
doesn't require local match. Even though in New York we have
spent a lot of our own money, such investments are
fundamentally a federal responsibility and should be based on
risk, not on the localities' ability to match.
The federal government could also be the most helpful in
developing safety and security best practices, guidelines and
product standards, and most importantly, on research and
development in technology, as technology will play a critical
role in future security efforts.
Madam Chair, in light of the nation's heightened security
needs since 9/11, we believe that increased federal investment
in public transportation security by Congress and DHS is
critical. We urge Congress to act decisively to create a formal
structure for transit, rail and bridge security funding, and we
look forward to working with you toward such a goal.
Thank you, and I look forward to any questions that you may
have.
[The statement of Mr. Schiliro follows:]
Prepared Statement of Lewis G. Schiliro
Good afternoon Chairwoman Jackson-Lee, Ranking Member Lungren,
Chairman Thompson, Congressman King, members of the Subcommittee. My
name is Lewis Schiliro, and I'm the Director of Interagency
Preparedness at the NYS State Metropolitan Transportation Authority
(MTA.) I joined the MTA in 2005 after having served with the FBI as
Assistant Special Agent in Charge of both domestic and international
terrorism cases in the FBI's New York office from 1994--1995 and
subsequently as director of that office from 1998--2000.
My role at the MTA is to ensure that the actions we are taking in
light of 9/11, Madrid, London, Tokyo and Mumbai, to prepare our
organization to respond to terrorist and other emergency incidents, are
the most efficient and effective in terms of their impact on our
mission to provide as secure an environment for our customers as
possible. I will talk about that, our relationship with DHS and the
federal government, and what our security needs are going forward.
As you may know, the MTA is the largest transit provider in the
Western Hemisphere and is comprised of several operating entities:
MTA New York City Transit (NYCT)
MTA Long Island Rail Road (LIRR)
MTA Long Island Bus (LIBus)
MTA Metro-North Railroad (MNR)
MTA Bridges and Tunnels (B&T)
MTA Capital Construction (MTA CC)
MTA Bus Company (MTABus)
We provide over 8 million subway, rail and bus rides each day in
the NY metro area--roughly one third of all transit rides nationally.
Approximately 900,000 vehicles cross our 7 bridges and 2 tunnels each
day, carrying over 1.4 million passengers.
The Impact of 9/11 on the MTA
Certainly 9/11 was traumatic for the New York metropolitan region
and our system. We were front and center at Ground Zero, with 3 subway
stations directly serving the Trade Center site and hundreds of express
and local buses serving its perimeter. It's likely that more than 80%
of the Trade Center's 50,000 workers took one or more MTA services to
get to work each day.
As tragic as the day was for New York, there was one positive for
the MTA. Despite one completely destroyed station and 4 others that
were completely put out of service for as much as a year, not a single
MTA customer or employee was killed or seriously injured in or on our
system. On 9/11 our subways whisked tens of thousands of riders from
the center of the World Trade Center site to safe locations north and
south. Our buses and subways evacuated millions more from Manhattan
island. Our railroads took shocked commuters safely to their homes and
returned with rescue workers who had no other way to get into the City
to help.
Since then we have done much work, both internally and with our
partners in NY City and NY State, the federal government and the
broader transit industry, to assess the risks of future acts of terror
on our system and to try to minimize them. We are doing so through a
series of capital and operating investments in the system and
additional employee training for our 65,000 employees. Let me first
talk about the capital and operating investments.
Capital and Operating Security Investments
In 2002, with the assistance of the Federal Transit Administration,
we conducted the first of a number of system-wide risk assessments,
identifying between $2 and $3 billion in needs. We immediately launched
the first Phase of a two-Phase capital investment program to address
those needs and harden our system. Phase I, comprised of $720 million
in investments is now nearing completion. While I cannot go into detail
in public about many of the projects we have undertaken, one of the
most visible initiatives we've undertaken are the over 1,000
surveillance cameras and 3,000 motion sensors we are adding to our
subways and commuter rail facilities as part of a $260 million
Integrated Electronic Security System. We have just begun work the $495
million Phase II, which takes, in turn, the next most critical
projects.
Of this more than $1.2 billion total, the only federal capital
assistance we received was in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11
attack itself--$143 million from FEMA. That funding was not so much
structured to address security risks, but to upgrade infrastructure we
were replacing. That has left us with the task of identifying funds for
the remainder, and while we have identified local funds for the balance
of Phase I, Phase II remains largely unfunded. We need your help with
those efforts, since current DHS assistance is simply not structured to
help with such large--but essential--capital-intensive security
investments.
What DHS assistance has been helpful with has been what we refer to
as ``soft-capital,'' which includes things like emergency equipment,
radios and bollards, and ``training'' where monies are provide to help
with emergency preparedness drills. We are very grateful for the $88
million we've received to date since 2003, but even that represents a
small portion of the $300 million to $400 million we've spent in local
funds in those same areas since 2002.
For example, we've grown our police department by 39% to 755
individuals at an additional cost of more than $70 million (plus an
additional $37 million in overtime) since 2002 and in the same time
period have added 261 bridge and tunnel officers at a cost of $101
million. The bridge and tunnel officers inspect vehicles entering our
bridge and tunnel facilities. We've spent over $10 million to create
and equip a 50 dog bomb-sniffing team and have added two MTA PD
emergency service units at an additional $6 million. Additional
equipment, training and communication efforts have also proven to be
very costly, but necessary.
Emergency Drills and Training
We also continue to undertake real-life emergency drills on all
parts of the MTA system. Much of the reason for our success in
evacuating Manhattan on 9/11 was that our organization is and has been
committed to preparing for emergencies. Our agencies have always done
more than simply write volumes of emergency and response plans that sit
on shelves. We drill those plans several times a year.
Some of what we experienced that day had been anticipated in
previous emergency drills--though admittedly not on as large or
dramatic a scale. Nonetheless, the experience, lessons learned, and
perhaps most importantly, the relationships forged in those exercises
certainly saved lives that day.
Each of our operating agencies prepare for emergencies regularly in
terms of both physical drills--with hundreds of participants--and
table-top drills. NYCT, the largest member of the MTA family, operates
8,000 subway and 46,000 bus trips a day within New York City. Transit
conducts four emergency drills annually in conjunction with the MTA PD,
the LIRR, LIBus and MNR as well as the NYPD, the FDNY, the Emergency
Medical Service (EMS) and the Office of Emergency Management (OEM).
In addition, all key NYCT operating employees are provided ongoing
formal ``eyes & ears'' training; fire protection & evacuation training;
and DuPont Safety training. Over 45,000 employees have taken these
courses and we about to conduct a top to bottom update and review of
those training courses in concert with our represented employees.
While FRA regulations already require one full-scale drill
annually, the LIRR conducts a minimum of 4 major full-scale emergency
drills annually, including one in NY's Penn Station, the busiest
railroad station in the country. Likewise, MNR conducts a number of
drills during the year, including one in Grand Central Terminal. The
carefully crafted emergency scenarios require emergency responders to
demonstrate skills in communications, fire fighting, rescue,
extrication, hazardous material and first aid and include county,
village and town Police, Fire and EMS services throughout Nassau and
Suffolk Westchester, Orange, Rockland, Dutchess and Putnam counties in
NY and Fairfield and New Haven counties in CT.
Railroad emergency preparedness training is conducted at a number
of locations, from Penn Station and Grand Central Terminal to major
hubs such as Flatbush/Atlantic Ave Terminal, Jamaica Station, Grand
Central Terminal, 125th Street, New Haven, as well as shop/yard
facilities in New York and Connecticut.
MTA Bridges and Tunnels, which operates 7 bridges and 2 tunnels
within NYC, the most notable of which includes the nation's longest
suspension bridge, the Verrazano Bridge, has since conducted over
twenty multi-agency (MTA PD, NYPD, FDNY, MTA, OEM) exercises that have
tested preparedness; response; inter-agency cooperation; perimeter
security; IED mitigation; Hazardous Materials Spills; decontamination,
and even power reduction scenarios.
Since 9/11 we've had other real-life opportunities to test what we
do on a regional scale. When the electrical grids in the Northeast went
out on August 14th, 2003, we--along with our partners in emergency
preparedness throughout the region--were able to safely evacuate of
over 400,000 riders from both underground and elevated parts of our
system. We're proud that there were no customer or employee injuries in
those instances--a truly amazing feat.
Engaging our Customers in Emergency Preparedness
As you've heard today, we're committed to aggressively training and
drilling our employees for potential emergencies. But we've also
focused on making sure that our customers are aware of how they should
respond in certain situations.
Through the creation of the widely recognized ``If You See
Something, Say Something'' customer information campaign, we've
informed our customers in print and on radio about being vigilant and
in the process have enlisted their help by giving them an outlet to
report suspicious activities: 1-888-NYC-SAFE. Public response has been
extremely positive and we have shared our materials with dozens of
transit systems and municipalities around the country and the globe.
In direct response to the lessons learned from the Madrid
bombings--we both customized our ads to focus on packages left in
transit vehicles and we've produced Customer Train Evacuation Brochures
and internet-based evacuation videos that show how to properly evacuate
subway and commuter railroad cars in an emergency. Printed copies of
this information were distributed on our subway and rail cars. We've
made both the printed material and videos available on our website,
www.mta.info. In addition, we've made these videos widely available to
local police departments, community groups and the public.
We also continue to supplement the more formalized training of our
operating personnel with Employee Safety Guides for all our employees
that tells them what to look for and how to react in emergencies.
Federal Funding
While I've touched briefly throughout my remarks on federal funding
we've received since 9/11, I'd like to talk about DHS assistance more
broadly. I know you have heard the national numbers on the inequities
of transit funding on many occasions, but they bear repetition. I will
do so today in the context of the number of transit riders who use our
system alone. The 8 million daily rides we provide on our system is
substantial. However, in comparative terms, in three days we move as
many people as Amtrak moves all year and in ten weeks as many as the
domestic airline moves all year. And we're but one-third of the daily
transit ridership nationally.
Nonetheless, the federal government has spent over $24 billion on
aviation security since 2001, but in the same period has allocated but
$549 million for transit security. We do not deny that aviation
security is critical--and we are appreciative of what has been provided
to transit--but we need you to look at this dramatic inequity as you
shape a DHS authorization.
We have worked hard with Congress to increase federal transit
funding from the $65 million provided in 2003 and $50 million in 2004
to the $175 million provided in 2006 for transit, passenger and freight
rail security, but those amounts, taken together, barely make a dent in
addressing the $6 billion in needs identified nationally for transit
systems alone.
We look forward to your efforts to help us address the global
transit need through an authorization bill and we applaud past efforts
to try and do so. For example, the Senate in 2004 and 2006 passed
legislation that would provide $3.5 billion over 3 years for transit
security. Late last week Senate Banking once again advanced similar
legislation and we anticipate it will move forward through the full
body. Similar attempts have been made in the House. We hope those
efforts will serve as the basis for a formal authorization.
As far as the structure of such an authorization effort is
concerned, we have worked closely with our colleagues in our national
trade association, the American Public Transportation Association
(APTA), to set forth a set of principles that we believe would guide a
successful effort. Funding is, of course, fundamental to addressing the
security need of transit systems nationwide. Annual transit and rail
security funding needs can most likely be addressed over the next ten
years through a program that provides a minimum of $500--$600 million a
year.
In addition, any funding must be structured to provide maximum
flexibility for local entities to use them for both hard and soft costs
such as the cost of additional transit agency and local law enforcement
personnel; funding for over-time costs and extra security personnel
during heightened alert levels, and; training for security and other
transit personnel.
We also urge Congress to resist requiring local match. While in the
MTA's case, we've spent many local dollars, philosophically, the
required security investments are fundamentally a federal
responsibility and should be based on risk, not on a locality's ability
to match.
The federal government could also be most helpful in developing
safety and security best practices, guidelines and product standards.
At the MTA we are regularly approached by companies who assert that
they have the best security products on the market, but we have no
independent way of knowing if those claims are true and against which
standards they should be judged. We end up being the test bed for some
of these products--a costly and time consuming process for individual
transit properties.
Madame Chair, in light of the nation's heightened security needs
since 9/11, we believe that increased federal investment in public
transportation security by Congress and DHS is critical. Terrorist
attacks against U.S. citizens are clearly a federal responsibility and
the federal government needs to step up to the plate with adequate
support for transit security improvements. We at the local level are
doing far more than our share in this effort and we need the federal
government to be a full partner across the range of transportation
modes. We urge Congress to act decisively to create a formal structure
for transit, rail and bridge security funding. Thank you and I look
forward to any questions you may have.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Schiliro. You are
a very good lobbyist, and we thank you for your testimony.
I thank all the witnesses for their testimony.
I will remind each member that he or she will have 5
minutes to question the panel.
I will now recognize myself for questions.
I will start out simply by indicating that I believe that
we have unanimity in this committee on the idea of risk-based
funding. Certainly, you lay out a very stark contrast by way of
funding between aviation security by the federal government,
and transit and rail and commuter security.
Whenever we say this, of course, we qualify it by saying
that we do understand 9/11's original generation, if you will,
but we also emphasize the creativity of those who wish to do us
harm. That is why we are holding this hearing. I would like to
pose questions to Ms. Wilson. I am going to rapidly try to go
through the questions.
Ms. Wilson, why don't you begin by thinking about a very
unique point that you made about the liability question with
rails and the transfer of hazardous materials. There are
overlapping issues there. I want to make sure you distinguish
safety from security. Safety is one issue, of course. It is
very important, for it is the precipitous actions of others
that we might not be aware of. How would you respond to that?
I am going to give a series of questions, so if you would
focus on that.
Mr. Weiderhold, you may recall that according to the GAO,
the FRA has been focusing its efforts to improve rail safety,
addressing issues such as human error, inspections and rail
track failure. Again, those are safety questions. Is there a
nexus between safety and security concerns? Where do these
overlap and where do they diverge?
My concern is that there is rail safety, but there is not
rail security. Why? Because again, security should impact the
precipitous actions of others, and it combines knowing
intelligence and I think very sophisticated security
protections. What measures have been or can be implemented that
serve both purposes of safety and security?
Mr. Schiliro, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey
released a report recently that the PATH train tunnels that run
under the Hudson River are more susceptible to attack than
previously thought. What steps are being taken to ensure the
security of the tunnels in New York and elsewhere? You might
want to add what you think the federal government needs to do,
and how much money will it cost to ensure these tunnels are
secure, and who should pay for the security upgrades.
Let me yield to Mr. Weiderhold first.
Mr. Weiderhold. Thank you for the question. It is a tough
one.
I believe that railroads traditionally, by
``traditionally'' I mean over decades have found a way to weave
safety into most everything they do. I have 30 years with the
railroad. I can tell you that in almost every shop on every
floor in every station you begin your day with some kind of
safety message. My definition of success is to get security on
the same level of safety in our culture. It is not there yet.
There has been a lot of security training that was started. Ms.
Wilson talked about the model that freights use, that Amtrak
customized and used, the same NTI product to generate its
original training that started in 2005. Additional training for
what we call the second phase of all employee training started
just last month.
The nexus between safety and security is large. While there
are differences, I can tell you an area such as emergency
response, whether or not you have an event on the railroad that
is precipitated by non-terrorists. You have a train derailment.
That same derailment could have been caused by a terrorist
activity. The results may very much be the same. So the way
that you prepare for that, the way that you bring first
responders on to your property to learn the characteristics of
your railroad, those are very similar events, very similar
events.
I think the differentiation is what you alluded to with
respect to what I would call the ``means and methods'' of the
terrorists. We can look at programs like the British Transport
Police HOT Program and other programs where employees need
additional training to look for suspicious packages. Trust me,
that is a lot easier than looking for suspicious persons,
because there are all kinds of pitfalls with respect to how
those programs need to be implemented.
Again, my definition of success for security on the
railroad is where security takes the same seat, the same front
seat as safety.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Ms. Wilson?
Ms. Wilson. Thank you.
We do not make a differentiation between the safety and
security causes of a catastrophic event involving TIH
materials. In making this proposal, we looked at a couple of
examples that currently exist, one of which is that Amtrak
actually has, by congressional statute, a cap on its liability
for all claims, including punitive damages. We also looked, as
an example, at Price-Anderson solutions, where again,
notwithstanding the cause of a release of nuclear material, the
liability of nuclear power plant owners would be limited.
The main purpose of our proposal would be to cap the
railroad's liability for claims regardless of the cause of the
release of the commodity, but we would still ensure
compensation for the general public.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Would you, then, spend more money on
security if you had a cap?
Ms. Wilson. Would we spend more money on security if we had
a cap? I think the answer to that question, Madam Chairwoman,
is that we are spending the amount of money that we can
possibly spend at this time, based on our risk assessments and
what we have concluded are prudent security investments.
Obviously, we are also working now with the Department of
Homeland Security, looking at some additional measures to
protect TIH shipments in particular, but I don't think that
there is a relationship there between our request for a cap on
liability and the amount of money that we would or would not
spend on security.
What we are looking for is the ability that should a
catastrophic event happen, that it would not be a bet-the-
company situation, that we would be able to, after paying
whatever amount that was determined was appropriate for us to
pay, up to the limit, but we would still be in a position to
provide the critical services to this country. So it is a
matter of survival, really, for our railroads.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Schiliro, I am going to ask you to
hold your answer, and I will have it at the end of my
colleague's.
Let me yield now to the ranking member for his questions.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.
Ms. Wilson, everybody here talked about the various things
that they thought ought to be done. Many of them had to do with
money. It sounds like direct outlays from the federal
government. It sounds like your major focus would be on this
liability protection.
Ms. Wilson. It is correct that we are not seeking specific
funds from the government for additional security measures. We
have put a number of measures into effect, and our security
plan actually looks at putting additional alert level actions
into place, depending on the threat. If legislation were to
proceed through the House, we would look favorably upon a
provision that would reimburse the freight railroads for the
cost of putting these additional counter-measures in place at
higher alert levels.
Mr. Lungren. I actually have been impressed overall by what
the railroads have done on their own volition, beginning with
the aftermath of 9/11. However, let me just ask you about one
thing that I have some concern about. That is, what is the
level of security at rail yards? The reason I ask that is, it
just appears to me that in many cases I have gone by rail
yards. There appears to be little fencing, if at all, any
fencing. And I know there are supposed to be regular
observation by security and/or railroad police.
What are you doing in terms of your association and your
members at reassessing that? Because it just dawns on me that
that is a tremendous vulnerability. If I ever wanted to attack
something or plant something on a particular car, it is a lot
easier to do that when it is sitting than when it is moving.
Ms. Wilson. Well, I am certainly aware that there has been
a lot of press recently about rail yards and the perceived lack
of security. I will say that our members are doing a number of
things. First of all, as I mentioned, we do instruct our
employees to be vigilant and report suspicious activities. We
do ramp up our inspections of all cars during routine
mechanical inspections, when there is an increased threat
level, to make sure that there is nothing foreign tacked onto
one of our freight cars.
Our members specifically work very closely with state and
local law enforcement to leverage their resources. We simply
don't have the security forces to be able to protect everything
all the time. Frankly, I don't believe that it is the right
thing to do to try to protect everything all the time. If you
try to protect everything all the time, you really end up
protecting nothing.
So I do believe that we have the right approach to rail
security with our yards, our operations, our critical
infrastructure, and that is a risk-based approach that ramps up
when there is threat information or heightened alert, which is
why we spend so much time and effort working with the federal
government to make sure that we are linked to real-time
security information.
Mr. Lungren. I am going to keep looking at that particular
issue, not that I have any expertise in the area, but it does
appear to me to be a vulnerability. I would like to continue to
have conversation with your members and your organization on
that.
To the other two members on the panel, I would ask this.
Look, we will be talking about grants and funding and all that
sort of thing, and believe me, we will get there. But what I
would like to know from each of you is what is the single most
important thing, other than funding, that you think would
enhance security on our rails, the ones for which you are
responsible? What is the one single thing the federal
government should do that we are not now doing, other than
funding?
Mr. Weiderhold. I will take the first shot at that. In my
written testimony, sir, I refer to the need. I think part of
the committee's agenda has been to make sure that DHS ensures
that the carriers, all of the affected carriers and rail, have
vulnerability assessments and have security plans. I think you
are going to find when you go out there that most of the
carriers do have those plans in place.
But what I have found, I am an Inspector General for
Amtrak. We share property with more than 20 different transit
agencies. In each of those properties, we do not have links to
security plans. We have good relationships. We have good local
contacts. But what you could do for us is to make sure that
when those assessments are made, that they are not just site-
specific, or facility-specific, or carrier-specific, but in
fact they are linked to the system. They are linked to the
node. They are linked to the larger critical asset that is out
there. That would be my first response.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you.
Mr. Schiliro?
Mr. Schiliro. Congressman, it is truly my belief that at
the MTA, as it is in any agency, people are the most important
part of this formula, our ability to attract and keep police
officers and first responders that are dedicated to this
mission. But it is my belief that in terms of the federal
response, as I mentioned in my comments, I do believe that we
need to do a better job in taking the lead on research and
development--our ability to develop chemical and biological
detectors, our ability to deploy explosive detection equipment.
It is my belief that someday that will allow us to better
secure the infrastructure that we are charged with.
When we talk about hardening assets, these are things that
we have to, on our own, take the expense and engineering to
develop. It is not something that you can go to Home Depot and
buy a kit to harden a bridge or a kit to harden a tunnel. I
think that some of those lessons that we are learning, you
know, the federal government really should take hold of and
assist us in the development engineering of some of these kinds
of things.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
I would like at this time to yield to the distinguished
chairman of the full committee, Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.
Following from the ranking member's comments, Ms. Wilson, a
lot of people on this committee are very concerned that most of
the rail yards in this country are not protected. You are aware
of stories where reporters have walked into a rail yard, left
their business card on a hazardous tank car, and left.
In light of situations like that, public is demanding that
we do something. If we, as members of Congress, don't get
involved in a real way on rail security, how can the industry
assure us that it will do something about situations like this?
Ms. Wilson. Chairman Thompson, I cannot sit here and
guarantee you that the freight railroad industry will ever be
in a position to achieve full protection of every rail yard in
the country. There are thousands of rail yards in this country.
Many, as you know, are in highly populated areas which is a
concern to the industry, as well as to the federal government.
We are working with TSA at this time on two levels--one, some
voluntary recommended security action items that address TIH
cars in high-threat urban areas. And another area where we are
working with TSA is on proposed rules that they have issued,
which would provide for the attendance of TIH cars in rail
yards in high-threat urban areas.
That rule would require the railroads and their customers,
the containees as well as the suppliers, to make sure that
every TIH card in a high-threat urban area is not left
unattended. That proposed rule is out for comment right now.
The industry is not opposed to the regulation. We are proposing
a way in which we think we would be able to comply with the
regulation. Our comments will be filed with the agency next
week, I believe the 20th is the due date.
Having said that, still we are not talking about full gates
and guards with guns. We are talking about a presence around
TIH cars in these high-threat urban areas.
Mr. Thompson. Not to cut you off, but I want you to
understand that it is very difficult for this committee, to
accept, having full knowledge that people have open access to
those yards, that the federal government does not have a policy
in this issue. Now, either we work with the industry or we are
going to be forced to do it without the industry. I am saying
to you that it is a real problem.
My friend from the District of Columbia talks all the time
about hazardous cargo coming through areas. I am sure she will
raise it when her time comes. I am told that in most
communities, when HAZMAT comeS through, they don't have any
idea of what is on the cargo. They are not notified. If
something happens, they can't communicate with them from an
interoperability standpoint.
These are other issues that this committee will be tasked
with over the next few weeks in coming up with some realistic
plans. Otherwise, local government will get involved in the
issue, which will then create a different dynamic. So I want to
impress upon you. I am not leaving the passenger folks out. You
know there are some issues associated on the passenger side
that we have to address. This notion that we have to leave it
to either freight or passenger fail, and they will do it right,
is probably not left up to this committee. But the public is
saying to us, there are vulnerabilities. We know they are
there. Members of Congress, what are you going to do about it?
That is why we are holding the hearing, to hear from the
industry and other people to get input. So I would implore you
to try not to defend what you are doing without offering some
going forward lessons for us to look at. Otherwise, you miss a
golden opportunity.
I yield back, Madam Chairman.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the chairman very much.
The gentlelady from the District of Columbia? We thank her
for her service. Congresswoman Norton, 5 minutes.
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. I thank the
chairman for opening up this hazardous substance matter with
me.
I think you may be surprised, Ms. Wilson, to see how I
approach it. I want to thank the chairman for working with me
on the major bill on passenger security, and the chair of our
new committee for making this the first order of priority. This
is a big fat hole in homeland security, and it is called all of
ground transportation, frankly--rail, metro, buses, you name
it. And yet, that is what Americans travel on every day.
We can't wait any longer, and yet your industry was the
great American industry, that was responsible. We didn't even
have roads until the Eisenhower highway traffic bill to get
things anywhere except for your great industry. You are now in
a position where you have to rebuild the railroads, because
they are so old, and the tracks are so old.
Let me just go quickly to this notion of hazardous
substances. I want to use the District of Columbia and what
happened there, because it is a case study. It makes me almost
feel sorry for the industry. Because there was no action, no
matter what we could do in committee, about the fact that
hazardous substances went within four blocks of the Capitol.
Without any prompting from me, I didn't have a thing to do with
it, the D.C. City Council then passed essentially a ban, a re-
routing ban. I do not believe that re-routing is the answer in
most jurisdictions. There didn't know what else to do, no
leadership from the federal government.
Now, look what you have. In your own testimony, Ms. Wilson
points to more than a half-dozen cities that are trying to do
the same thing. And guess what? Even though this is a matter of
interstate commerce, our courts have not yet said that the
District cannot do that because of a provision that says if the
federal government doesn't act, then you can protect your own
local jurisdiction. This is still going on 3 years later.
I don't blame you, Ms. Wilson, for saying, well, you can't
re-route. These tracks run a certain place. I disagree with you
that we would increase exposure, because of course we were
talking about re-routing in places like New York, where there
are huge population centers, or close to the Capitol of the
United States, for God's sake, and you have even been doing
some of that close to the Capitol of the United States.
So you know that there are some places not that are more
important than others, but that you would be particularly
vulnerable if in fact something occurred. If not re-routing,
let me ask you, don't you believe it is time for the industry
to sit down with the only power that can be a force here, the
government of the United States, to in fact figure a system of
either re-routing or alternatives that would uniformly be used
when hazardous substances went through high-population centers?
I am thinking of South Carolina. It doesn't have to a
terrorist. Would you be willing, if everybody was sitting at
the table, everybody under the same regime, so that nobody is
at a competitive disadvantage, to in fact see as the answer a
government-wide system that would apply to all, done in
collaboration with the industry so we take into account its
practices. So you don't end up banning something that there is
no other real way to get there.
But you would have uniformity. Would the industry be
willing to submit itself to those, not that we need your
permission, by the way, to that kind of regime in order to
straighten out this hazardous substances re-routing matter,
where we can't ask CSX, ``Hey, you do it,'' but the other
company within whom you are competition, they don't have to do
it. You have to do it because you happen to be in this set of
tracks, and make yourself uncompetitive with them, but they
don't have to do it.
I would like to know whether you think that is a plausible
answer to this problem of hazardous substance going through
large population centers.
Ms. Wilson. Thank you for that question, Congresswoman
Norton. I can tell you, first of all, that we are always
willing to sit down with government officials.
Ms. Norton. You bet you are.
Ms. Wilson. To try to resolve some of these very difficult
issues, because one of the things that we learned very early on
after 9/11, as we were trying to protect these shipments of TIH
materials, is that if you are not very careful, you can,
through your actions, produce some unintended consequences that
can have a worse effect perhaps than the effect that you are
trying to prevent.
Ms. Norton. Well, you named insurance or liability, and yet
you say that your hazard would be increased if it took more
time. Well, nothing could increase your hazard more than
somehow having some terrible accident in New York, Chicago or
the District of Columbia. You don't know what your liability
would be. Putting caps on your liability, you are a common
carrier. It is pretty hard for you not to be subject to
punitive damages no matter what you do.
So is there any way to do it except making sure that
everybody is under the same regime? That is my question.
Ms. Wilson. What we have been doing recently is working
with the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of
Transportation to look at possible ways to streamline this
transportation, with a goal of reducing the number of miles
that these products need to be transported, with the goal also
of evaluating the routes that we currently use to determine
whether or not we are transporting these commodities over the
safest, most secure routes. And we are working, actually the
Railroad Research Foundation is working under a grant from the
Department of Homeland Security to develop a tool that will
help railroads evaluate both the safety and security risks of
their hazardous materials routes, and alternate routes, to
help?
Ms. Norton. Ms. Wilson, I think you have answered my
question. Your sitting with them at this late date, trying to
in fact get some agreement. Frankly, I compliment the industry
because I think the initiative has come from passenger and
rail. And yet we heard testimony from the Inspector General. We
can't ignore what the Amtrak testimony said. Essentially, it is
that, and I am quoting you, sir, we suspect that many of these
very good assessments that some may have done, others may not
be as good, are carrier-specific, and not necessarily linked to
larger system and modal vulnerabilities--in other words, no
nationwide rail transportation system, the way we now have
developed in plans.
This is very, very bothersome to this committee, which is
why you see the priority we are giving to it. I didn't mean to
put you on the spot, Ms. Wilson, because I think unless the
Department of Homeland Security says all of you all are under
some regime, I don't expect CSX to say, ``Okay, we will re-
route,'' even around the nation's capitol, even though I know
you have been doing it because you know what would happen if
you blew up four blocks from the Capitol.
Just let me ask one more question of Amtrak. Just let met
get it on the record. We had to fight on the floor--was it last
session or 2 years ago?--to get Amtrak enough money to stay up
and running. Is Amtrak in any financial condition to provide
the security of the kind we have been talking about here, in
addition to keeping themselves up and running? Mr. Weiderhold?
Mr. Weiderhold. I have been with Amtrak 30 years. I have
been up and down that roller-coaster of teetering on
bankruptcy, and then having a little bit of cash left at the
end of the year. In a grant and legislative request that the
company is submitting, as a matter of fact this week, as part
of its annual package, it is making security its number one
investment priority, which I think is a good thing.
But it is doing it with its internal finances. It is
redirecting money from other company activities, probably
appropriately, I think, mostly appropriately. Is it enough? Not
yet. More needs to be done. In 3 years, Amtrak has received
about $21 million or $22 million from DHS for all things rail
security. So most of what Amtrak does has to come out of its
own hide.
It is making progress. I am the IG. I am responsible for
oversight. I can tell you it is not enough, and it is not fast
enough. So more needs to be done.
Ms. Norton. Madam Chairman, I thank you for your
graciousness, but I take that as a ``no.'' If he is saying just
to keep the railroad running, they are having to borrow money
from keeping the railroad running for security because they
recognize their vulnerability. We can see that we have a
railroad on its last legs, which cannot provide the security
that you and the chairman are expecting.
Thank you very much.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I think your probing has highlighted the
purpose of this hearing, which is the distinction between
safety and security.
As the young people leave this room, I will take the
personal privilege of letting them know how much we appreciate
them going in and out of our hearings, and hopefully they are
getting a sense of the importance of the work. Thank you for
being here.
I am just about to yield to the distinguished gentlelady
from New York. I do want to emphasize the heart of this
hearing. The testimony suggests that we do have to do a
regulatory scheme, if you will. I think you captured it, Mr.
Weiderhold, and that is to make security number one. I don't
sense it, even though there is a great interest.
I believe that through the period of time of legislation
and markup, we need to hear from more of the railroads
collectively to be able to frame what is going to be a
regulatory process for making security number one.
I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished gentlelady from New
York, Congresswoman Clarke.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
And to the three of you, thank you so much for your
testimony here today. It sort of puts everything in context and
real-time as we look at how we secure our nation's
transportation systems.
What I found really just sort of alarming is the fact that
the Department of Homeland Security has spent approximately $24
billion on aviation security, compared to $549 million in
transit security since 9/11. It begs the question, how are we
going to really tame this tiger?
I think ``tame this tiger'' because all of you are
operating each and every day with the specter of, my goodness,
this should not be the day that something goes wrong. I can
understand what that pressure must be like.
I would like to just sort of ask Mr. Schiliro, I have a
little bias here, but I would like to get a sense from you. You
talked about rail transit security needing to be at a minimum
of $500 million to $600 million per year. Has your estimate for
the required minimum annual funding for transit security been
endorsed by any other transit agencies or professional agencies
in the country?
Mr. Schiliro. Congresswoman Clarke, just to put that into a
little bit of perspective, this year's transit security grant
for the New York metropolitan region was approximately $61
million. That money will be divided among the MTA, New Jersey
Transit, I think Amtrak shares in that among Grand Central and
Penn Station. So I think in terms of trying to balance how we
arrive at it, we do take into account the needs of our sister
agencies in coming up with that figure.
As far as what it would take to go back to the original
assessments that were done after 9/11, now obviously those
things change. I think that we would need to reevaluate it in
terms of an annual assessment. But the $61 million that we are
going to share this year, I can assure you will not cover
anywhere near what we would need in order to keep pace with the
kinds of projects that are still pending. The problem is that
the assessments that were done in 2002 and 2003 identified
vulnerabilities that we cannot get to. That is an issue.
Ms. Clarke. Let me also just take a moment to commend each
of you for doing what you could with what you have, just to
secure us in the best way that we can. We all accept the fact
that that is not where we need to be right now, but I want to
thank you for the efforts that you have put in place.
You provided some very useful figures, Mr. Schirilo, on how
much money the MTA has spent from its own resources to
strengthen security since 9/11. How much money would you
estimate the MTA has spent on security training and exercises
since 9/11?
Mr. Schiliro. Congresswoman, I would have to get back to
you with a precise figure, but I would say in the neighborhood,
since 9/11, between the transit security grants and our own
money, probably just for exercises and training, in the
neighborhood of $20 million to $30 million, but I could provide
some precise numbers on that for you.
Ms. Clarke. We would appreciate that. Does the MTA fully
participate in the New York Intelligence Fusion Center and the
New York City JTTF? And do you feel that the MTA has been
sufficiently briefed on the more exotic terrorist threats from
radiological, biological and chemical terrorist threats?
Mr. Schiliro. Congresswoman, we do have two detectives
assigned to the New York Fusion Center, and also two detectives
assigned to the FBI's Joint Terrorist Task Force. That is a
great benefit to us in terms of the kind of tactical
information that we need every day to protect the system.
I think if there is a weakness in the process, it is
probably doing a better job in terms of the development of
strategic information as it pertains to transit safety and
transit security. That is something we are working on improving
now. But as far as the day-to-day dissemination of tactical
information, I left the FBI in 2000 and I can assure it is a
lot better today than it was when I left. I think everybody
does a very honest job of it.
Ms. Clarke. To Ms. Wilson and Mr. Weiderhold, do you
participate in briefings around the threats that are occurring
on a regular basis with DHS or any other regulatory bodies?
Ms. Wilson. We do to a limited extent. We ask the
intelligence analysts at DHS and others in the intelligence
community to meet with us and our own analysts on a quarterly
basis to review the intelligence and to determine what more we
need to know. We also, as I mentioned in my testimony, have a
railroad police officer who sits at the NJTTF. Railroad police
work very closely at the local JTTF levels so that they are
plugged-in there.
We also have our 24/7 Operations Center at AAR that is a
DOD-cleared facility and operates at secret. So we do have the
capability to receive and store threat information if it
becomes available. We have been working more recently with a
relatively new group at DHS called HITRAC. We are in contact
with them on a regular basis. They do provide regular threat
assessments for the rail industry.
Mr. Weiderhold. Likewise, Amtrak has staff assigned to both
the Washington field office of JTTF, as well as the New York
JTTF. My office has staff also assigned to the JTTF here at the
Washington field office. We have ongoing contact with HITRAC
and with AAR through their centers.
As an IG, I like to test those things from time to time, so
we will be coming back to the committee about what the results
of those tests are, to make sure that we are getting
intelligence information, the right kind of information,
getting it quickly and on time. I am looking forward to those
tests.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. I look
forward to working with you and our colleagues to really deal
with this issue.
I think the key in a lot of this is the funding. Certainly,
we have heard that there seems to be some level of
communication about the security issues, but it is kind of out
of balance if you are not in a position to do the type of
infrastructure-building and supports that are required.
I want to thank you, Madam Chair, for the opportunity.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the gentlelady. We know that her
city in particular has enormous needs, along with our other
large systems, and certainly we are going to welcome her
insight.
Mr. Schiliro, you were trying to answer the last question.
I would appreciate it if you would.
Mr. Schiliro. Yes, Congresswoman. The MTA does share a very
serious concern on under-river tunnels. We operate 14 transit
under-river tunnels in the City of New York. Without getting
into the details, our tunnels are constructed differently than
the PATH tunnel, so that does represent a different
vulnerability.
We undertook in the middle of 2003 a program to harden
where necessary those tunnels. We anticipate another year or
two before that tunnel is completed as far as structural
hardening. The second part of the three-part equation is the
application of fire and life safety techniques to those
tunnels. That is the ability to provide redundant lighting and
signage in the event that an evacuation of a tunnel is needed.
Also, we deploy electronic security devices in terms of
intrusion detection and cameras at each of those tunnels. That
was part of the integrated electronic system that we talked a
little bit about before. But tunnels do represent a
vulnerability, there is no doubt about it.
I think the program that we currently have in place,
considering the age of those tunnels, is appropriate and
reasonable under the circumstances. In a private session, we
can certainly discuss the vulnerabilities and the tests that
were done in order to arrive at that. But I think we generally
do share the port's concern with tunnels, but I think we have a
fairly good program.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Do you self-fund?
Mr. Schiliro. For the most part. This last year, in 2006,
part of our transit security grant was for under-river tunnels.
We have not received it yet, but we feel confident that we are
going to get some money to do that.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much for answering the
question.
Let me thank the witnesses for their testimony, and let me
thank them, for their insight. I hope that we will continue
this dialogue as we proceed in the legislative process. I thank
the first witnesses, and I know that we will now listen to
witnesses who are addressing the concerns of employees.
Let me simply conclude on the first panel by saying it is
certainly well known that railroads, rail systems are vast.
Rail yards are vast. But pre-9/11, airplanes were vast. There
were many airplanes. In fact, there might have been thousands.
And you recognized that on 9/11 we grounded those airplanes. My
message is that we do what we have to do.
I would like to be able to do what we have to do before the
possibility of a horrific and tragic act that is plaguing our
railroads. So I think there is no doubt that we must act and we
will look forward to working with you. My concluding point is,
let me associate myself with the words of Mr. King, that I do
believe that the funding source should be vested in the agency
that deals with security, and hopefully that will be a process
that we will have captured in our legislation.
With that, I thank the witnesses for their testimony.
I am prepared now to move forward to the second panel.
Allow me to welcome the second panel of witnesses, and to
thank you for participating in this hearing.
I think, as you have noted, we are awaiting your testimony
because we believe rail security is a combination of not only
industry and the federal government and local authorities, but
it keenly falls on the shoulders of employees who are there
every single day with the traveling public, or either helping
to transport hazardous materials or otherwise going back and
forth across America or up and down the East Coast.
So I welcome the second panel of witnesses.
I note our first witness will be Mr. Gary Maslanka,
international vice president and director for the Railroad
Division of the Transport Workers Union, who has 33 years of
railroad experience that began with the Penn Central Railroad
in 1974.
Our second witness is Mr. John Murphy, who is the director
of the Teamster Rail Conference of the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters. We thank you also for your knowledge
and service in this industry.
Without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be
inserted in the record. I now ask each witness to summarize his
statement for 5 minutes, beginning with Mr. Maslanka from the
Transit Workers Union.
STATEMENT OF GARY MASLANKA, INTERNATIONAL VICE PRESIDENT,
DIRECTOR OF RAILROAD DIVISION, TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION
Mr. Maslanka. Good afternoon, Madam Chairman Jackson Lee,
Ranking Member Lungren, Chairman Thompson and members of the
committee.
My name is Gary Maslanka. I am director of the Transport
Workers Union of America, Railroad Division. I would like to
thank you for the invitation to appear before the committee to
provide testimony on railroad security issues. On behalf of the
over 120,000 members of the Transport Workers Union, I would
also like to thank you very much for conducting this very
critical hearing.
The Transport Workers Union is comprised of, among other
sectors, members who work on mass transit systems, including
the MTA in New York, rail and airlines. Inasmuch, as hear a lot
of feedback on security issues. So I would point out that TW
members were some of the first to respond to the horrific
attacks in 2001.
We certainly understand the need to provide safe and secure
transportation systems, and we recognize the vulnerabilities of
the nation's transportation systems, as numerous reports over
the past several years have highlighted, and as the discussions
have highlighted again today.
I would just like to point out one of those reports, which
I believe is an excellent report, ``Detour Ahead.'' I think
that encapsules the entire problem and refers to many other
reports. It is an excellent piece of work and we thank the
committee for that.
One of our most important issues here is obviously employee
training. All frontline workers require training preparation
and response, and as has been said by labor for quite some time
now, employee security training to this point has been woefully
inadequate. I know we hear and we see different pieces of
testimony through the hearings that take place about all the
wonderful plans and all the wonderful training that is going
on, but frankly we don't see it.
It has got to be more than just a handout saying to
employees that you are the eyes and the ears of the railroad.
Along those lines, I just want to point to some testimony from
last week from Michael Haley, Deputy Chief Counsel for the FRA.
He referenced in his testimony leveraging some training that
could be partnered, or in a cooperative effort with the
National Labor College. I believe that training issue was also
discussed a bit in the ``Detour Ahead'' report. I want to say
that is encouraging. I mean, if that could happen, as has
happened in the past with the hazmat training and other
initiatives through the Center, that is what we view as real
training.
I am not going to elaborate on the proper funding needs.
That has been discussed here a little bit earlier today. I
would just point out that it is really unrealistic to expect,
for example, Amtrak, which is fighting to survive with the
under-funding it receives on a regular basis. It is unrealistic
to believe that they have the appropriate money, and they
require funding to get the training done.
Quickly, I want to turn to something that was mentioned in
our written testimony--that is, on-board service workers on
Amtrak in comparison to airline flight attendants, with respect
to safety and security. It is our view, much like flight
attendants, on-board service workers on Amtrak are there, yes,
for the comfort of the passenger, but that can never or should
never overshadow their first and foremost priority, and that is
the safety and security of the passengers.
Again, I refer to Michael Haley's testimony from last week,
wherein he references emergency preparedness regulations under
the FRA, Federal Railroad Administration. I would just point
out a few things there, quickly. One is that regulation does
not provide for appropriate security training. And moreover, by
the limitation of the definition of a ``crewmember,'' it
doesn't even provide for the appropriate training of all the
crewmembers on board a train. It is a missed opportunity and a
step backwards. FRA recognizes the safety benefit of providing
every on-board employee training, including contractors, but
indeed, it concludes that safety would be enhanced by limiting
the definition of ``crewmember.''
I am watching the clock here, so I am going to make it
quick. I would just point out that while we are talking about
the woeful needs for training of employees, it is not just
here. It is in the federal regulations. It has got to be
addressed there. As we speak today, I think it was mentioned
earlier, the current rulemaking going on with the Department of
Homeland Security, there again there is a rulemaking to address
security plans on railroads, both passenger and freight, but
there is no mention and no requirements for security training.
Thank you again. I will do my best to answer any questions
you may have.
[The statement of Mr. Maslanka follows:]
Submitted Prepared Statement of Gary Maslanka Submitted by James C.
Little
Chairwoman Jackson Lee, Ranking Member Lungren, and other members
of the Subcommittee, on behalf of the more than 120,000 members of the
Transport Workers Union of America (TWU), we thank you for this
opportunity to testify today at this very important hearing and give
TWU's perspective on rail and mass transit security.
TWU's transportation Members are bus, subway, light and heavy rail
operators, clerks and maintenance employees at transit, commuter and
freight rail systems, school bus operators, rail onboard service
workers, rail mechanics, and rail cleaners. Our Members are also
employed in various capacities in the airline industry--including but
not limited to flight attendants, aircraft maintenance technicians, and
ramp service personnel. We understand the need to provide safe and
secure transportation systems, because our Members were some of the
first responders in New York after the dreadful attacks of September
11, 2001.
Other deadly terrorist attacks on major rail and transit systems
around the globe, in places like Mumbai, India, the London Underground,
Moscow and Madrid should have prompted our government to provide the
necessary comprehensive strategy, oversight, guidance and funding to
ensure protection of the nations railroads and transit systems. Even
before these more recent threats, the bombings at the Paris Metro and
the release of sarin gas in the Tokyo subway system pointed out
vulnerabilities in public transportation. It is obvious that mass
transportation systems are attractive targets for terrorists.
Therefore, we applaud the efforts of Chairman Thompson, Chairwoman
Jackson Lee and the members of this committee in moving forward
legislative initiatives in a bipartisan manner to protect our nation's
transportation system.
The safety and security of our mass transit and rail system is of
paramount importance to the leaders and members of TWU. In particular,
we strongly believe that all frontline rail and transit employees
should receive training to prepare them to prevent and respond to acts
of terrorism. A comprehensive security training program for workers on
the scene of a security threat is vital to securing and safeguarding
our transit and rail networks. As with flight attendants and pilots in
the airline industry, onboard service workers and conductors in rail as
well as bus drivers, subway operators, conductors and toll booth
personnel in transit are obviously the group of frontline workers that
are best positioned to spot potential security breaches or other
potential problems. Reports of threats, suspicious activities and
potential problems are usually communicated to frontline workers by
passengers. And, oftentimes frontline workers themselves discover the
suspicious activity or threat. Thus, it is essential that these ``eyes
on the scene'' receive full and proper training in how to handle these
threats and activities with a specific protocol of action to follow.
Rail and transit first responders deserve proper training because
1) they are the first on the scene--arriving even before police, fire
fighter, and emergency medical responders and what is done in the first
few minutes is crucial to minimize the destruction and loss of life; 2)
investing in worker security training is a sound investment; 3) a
mandatory worker security training program enhances the layered
approach in protecting the public from destructive terrorist acts by
giving frontline employees adequate tools to protect themselves and
passengers from harm and 4) it is the right thing to do.
Funding for initiatives that strategically enable us to protect our
nation and its workers is vital. We admire the committee's commitment
to use meaningful technology to help in the course of planning,
preparing and protecting our homeland. However, we were disappointed
that the Administration failed to include in last year's FY 2007 DHS
budget proposal a specific line item funding amount for transit
security.
In the aviation industry, $9 is spent on security for every
passenger who flies. It is frightening to realize that we currently
invest just one penny per rail and transit passenger on security.
But airline security measures are not without their flaws and we
hopefully can learn from them as we implement security programs in
transit and rail. The security training for our nation's flight
attendants has never been properly funded nor has the piecemeal
solution been an adequate strategy for flight attendant frontline
workers. Instead, the crew member self defense training (CMSDT) program
was doomed from the beginning without mandatory participation coupled
with problematic training locations and dates.
Hopefully, we have learned from the poorly managed flight attendant
program so that rail and transit frontline workers will be given the
proper, structured, consistent, adequate and well distributed security
training program that is needed to meet their needs. The comparison of
the work groups of flight attendants and onboard service workers is
instructive. While flight attendants see to the comfort of passengers
this is never allowed to interfere with or supplant their
responsibilities for safety and now security.
Likewise, the passenger serving responsibilities of on-board rail
workers can never be allowed to overshadow their responsibility for
dealing with safety and security--tasks like communicating with
passengers, train evacuation, etc. Both flight attendants and on-board
rail workers undergo extensive first aid training. Both groups have as
a priority the safety and security of passengers as both groups have
rules, and federal regulations that govern both sets of workers
receiving initial and recurrent emergency preparedness training
(121.401 FAR and 49 CFR 239). Both groups work in an environment that
is unique and involves numerous challenges that are either passenger or
equipment related.
Numerous gaps and inconsistencies exist in our transportation
security system. Though the ``layered'' approach to protecting
passengers is a good one it cannot work effectively without properly
training workers how to respond to suspicious activities. It is not
enough to ask workers, the eyes and ears of their workplace to be
vigilant and alert of potential security threats. They must be taught
how to recognize potential problems, what protocols to follow in
reporting and responding to potential threats and how best to protect
themselves and their passengers from harm. Freight railroad workers
also need training to properly and efficiently handle the security
threats that they confront on their job as well.
Rafi Ron, former Director of Security at Tel-Aviv Bun-Gurion
International Airport has testified before Congress that ``training
provides the skills and confidence. . .to employees who are present at
every point in the system. No one is in a better position to recognize
irregularities on the ground than the people who regularly work
there.'' We strongly echo these sentiments. Workers are the eyes and
ears of potential breaches to security in their workplace. It is
imperative that we arm them with the proper tool of security training
to protect their passengers and themselves. As a result of attacks on
public transportation systems in other parts of the world, the American
Public Transportation Association (APTA) testified recently before the
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs that these
attacks ``highlight the need to strengthen security on public transit
systems in the US and to do so without delay.''
Officials from both FTA and TSA have publicly recognized the need
for training. In fact, a list of 17 ``action Items for Transit
Agencies,'' jointly-developed by TSA and FTA includes establishing and
maintaining a security and emergency training program for all
employees, Yet, little, if anything is being done to ensure that this
training is provided. There is no ``real'' training being done on a
comprehensive basis. Watching a short 10 or 15 min video does not
prepare a worker for a real security incident. This method did not work
in the airlines prior to 9/11 with the flight attendants and this
method does not adequately prepare our frontline transit and rail
workers.
From information sharing of intelligence to developing safety
guidelines and standards to sharing best practices and expertise in
development of programs that will enhance transit and rail security, it
is essential that the federal government ensure and use every means
available to enhance and increase security. It is time for the federal
government to step in and not only provide funding for the operating
costs associated with training, but also to require all transit and
rail systems to train each and every frontline employee. It is the role
of the federal government to ensure that this happens. Leaving it
exclusively to the will of the industry is not just insufficient but
could lead to disastrous consequences.
The security of our rail and transit systems is the joint
responsibility of all stakeholders. It is critical that the rail and
transit employees who are on the scene where these threats strike be
fully included in the implementation of any rail and transit security
program. It is equally critical that they, through their
representatives in labor, be fully included in all phases of planning
and developing such a program. On behalf of the Transport Workers Union
of America I look forward to working with this Committee to achieve
these ends.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you for your testimony.
I now recognize Mr. Murphy with the Teamsters Rail
Conference to summarize his statement for 5 minutes. Mr.
Murphy?
STATEMENT OF JOHN MURPHY, DIRECTOR, TEAMSTER RAIL CONFERENCE,
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS
Mr. Murphy. Good afternoon, Madam Chairman Jackson Lee,
Ranking Member Lungren, Congressman Thompson, and members of
the subcommittee. I am John Murphy, director of the Teamsters
Rail Conference. Thank you for inviting me to testify on
railroad security.
The Teamsters Rail Conference represents more than 70,000
frontline rail workers. As the eyes and ears of the nation's
rail transportation system, our rail members are dedicated to
improving rail security and safety in America. Unfortunately, I
must report that the state of security on our rail system today
is dangerously inadequate. It is tragic because we have seen
firsthand the damage rail accidents can cause, and are aware of
the catastrophic destruction that can be wrought by terrorism
or sabotage.
I can summarize my testimony in the simplest and starkest
terms possible. Railroad employees are highly skilled
professionals whose safety and security concerns are largely
ignored by the rail corporations. The rail carrier security
systems are woefully inadequate. Employee security training is
virtually nonexistent. In the hands of the wrong people, trains
are potential weapons of mass destruction.
Since 9/11, the federal government has spent billions on
aviation security, while spending a pittance on the nation's
rail systems, even though railroads run freight trains laden
with hazardous chemical tank cars through densely populated
areas every single day. A chlorine tank car, if targeted by an
explosive device, could create a toxic cloud 40 miles long and
10 miles wide. Such a toxic plume could kill or injure as many
as 100,000 people in less than 1 hour. The FBI considers them
potential weapons of mass destruction. Such an event on the
railroad tracks just four blocks from this building would
endanger everyone in Congress and the Supreme Court. We sitting
here today would be among the dead.
In 2005, an individual hijacked a locomotive with a bow and
arrow. In 2007, two young boys took a locomotive on a 12-mile
joyride. If teenagers and a man with a bow and arrow can do
this, just think of what a terrorist can do with such a
potential weapon of mass destruction.
The federal government has left the awesome responsibility
for rail security in the hands of the rail carriers. We feel
the federal government's faith in the rail carriers to self-
regulate the security measures is misplaced. The rail carriers
claim to have instituted a rail safety plan. However, our
members have not been trained in the plan's specifics. As the
true first responders to rail emergencies, if there is such a
plan, shouldn't the rail carriers share it with their
employees? According to our members, they have not.
The only security training is usually nothing more than a
printed brochure or a 10-minute videotape. About 80 percent of
our members said that they have not received any additional
security-related training since 9/11. Therefore, we welcome and
strongly support legislation that would mandate quality,
comprehensive security training for rail employees.
This woeful state of rail security is documented in our
report called ``High Alert,'' some of which you may have seen.
This report reveals a shocking inattention to security by the
nation's largest rail corporations. The report's conclusions
are that the nation's rail system is vulnerable to terrorist
attack and the rail corporations have not taken seriously the
safety of their employees and the general public.
We are not alone in these concerns. News organizations
across the United States have produced investigative news
stories on the shocking lack of security, some of which we have
supplied to you in the form of this DVD. Please look at it.
Those who say that rail security has improved should read last
month's investigative news article in the Pittsburgh
Tribune.\1\ The reporter on that story penetrated 48 plants and
freight lines to reach catastrophic chemicals. The reporter
asked, what if he was a terrorist and not a reporter? This is
the same question the Teamsters have raised in our report. Even
where the FRA has already noticed security defects at rail
facilities years ago, the reporter found access was still
easily obtained today.
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\1\See article Pittsburgh Tribune, Terror on Tracks, January 14,
2007, Sunday.
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We respectfully request the new Congress to mandate a
comprehensive vulnerability assessment of the rail carriers,
and to pass legislation that will compel rail corporations to
train their employees on proper safety and evacuation
procedures, on the use of appropriate emergency escape
apparatus, on the special handling of hazardous materials, and
to clarify the responsibility of rail employees within the
railroad security plans. Most importantly for our members, we
strongly support the inclusion of whistleblower protection.
Railroad workers should not and cannot be subjected to
dismissal when they provide security threat information to the
federal government.
The Teamster Rail Conference looks forward to working with
this committee and the Congress to address the issues of rail
security nationwide. I thank you for this opportunity to be
here today, and I will try to answer any questions that you may
have.
[The statement of Mr. Murphy follows:]
Prepared Statement of John Murphy
Good Afternoon. Madame Chairwoman Jackson-Lee, Ranking Member
Lungren and Members of the Subcommittee, my name is John Murphy,
Director of the Teamster's Rail Conference. I would like to thank you
for inviting me here today to testify on the issue of railroad
security. On the behalf of the more than 70,000 Teamsters Rail
Conference members, I thank you for holding this hearing on this
important subject.
The issue of railroad security is of vital concern to all railroad
workers, including Teamster Rail Conference members represented by the
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen (BLET) and the
Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes Division (BMWED). The
Teamsters Rail Conference is dedicated to improving rail security and
safety in America to adequately protect rail workers and the
communities they serve. Each and every day, we are on the front lines
of the nation's transportation system and see the woeful lack of
security on our railroads. This lack of security is more than just
troubling; it is tragic because we have seen the damage that can be
done by accidents on the railroads and shudder to think of the damage
that could be wrought by terrorism or sabotage.
It is frightening to think that there were more than 250 terror
attacks on railroads world wide from 1995 until June of 2005. Since
June 2005, we have seen attacks perpetrated in London and Mumbai,
India. In the past 11 years, there has been one successful attempt to
attack a railroad in the U.S. and several more attempted attacks. The
attack in Hyder, Arizona, on October 9, 1995, killed an Amtrak employee
and injured 78 other people.
The case was never solved. More recently, plans were uncovered to
attack the New York subway system on three different occasions.
The frequency and severity of the attacks on railroads worldwide
and here at home demonstrate the urgency for change in the way our rail
security system works. However, our current regulations are severely
inadequate.
As you know, the Department of Homeland Security and the
Transportation Security Administration spends nine dollars per airline
passenger on security, but only spends one penny per rail/mass transit
passenger. This is a pittance when compared to the number of riders
each day on our nation's rail and mass transit systems. Each weekday,
11.3 million passengers in 35 metropolitan areas and 22 states use some
form of rail or mass transit.
These passengers ride on trains that cover over 10,000 miles of
commuter and urban rail lines. The very nature of the rail system makes
it vulnerable to attack. In addition to the more than 10,000 miles of
commuter and urban rail lines, there are 300,000 miles of freight rail
lines. These lines are open and easily accessible to the general
public.
In response to these concerns, the Teamsters Rail Conference has
taken a number of concrete steps. For example, the BLET and BMWED have
drafted model security legislation that has been introduced at the
state level in every section of the country. This legislation would
accomplish the following:
Require rail operators to conduct a risk assessment of
their facilities, cargo, and hazardous material storage
procedures, paying special attention to storage within a
fifteen mile radius of a school, hospital, nursing home, public
utility, or public safety facility;
Develop a comprehensive security plan, to be filed
with the state's Transportation Department;
Implement a Community Protection Plan covering
security, training, and emergency response; and
Provide for whistle-blower protection for all rail
workers and rail contractor employees.
Also, at a May 2006 meeting of the Federal Railroad
Administration's Railroad Safety Advisory Committee, two locomotive
engineers from the Rail Conference made a presentation on currently
available locking devices for a locomotive's automatic brake valve.
These locks--which would prevent an unauthorized person from moving a
locomotive--are already in use in some European countries and in other
parts of the world. As recently as January 16, 2007 two boys escaped
from a juvenile detention home in Nelsonville, Ohio, broke into a
building that housed a locomotive, and took the locomotive on a 12-mile
joy ride before being apprehended by police. If two juveniles can do
this for fun, just think of what a terrorist could do with such a
potential weapon of mass destruction. In October 2005, in Southern
California, an individual hijacked a locomotive with a bow and arrow.
In that case, the locomotive was stopped at a signal; the hijacker
boarded the locomotive and forced the engineer and conductor to flee.
Fortunately, the engineer disabled the locomotive by activating a
remote fuel shut off switch. But what if the hijacker had killed or
incapacitated the crewmembers? While stories of hijacking with a bow
and arrow and joyriding juveniles may sound amusing, those stories
starkly portray the continuing lack of safety and security on
locomotives today that put their crew members and public at large in
serious danger. We strongly urge the committee to mandate the use of
such locking devices to prevent unauthorized movement of locomotives,
and we advocate the ``hardening'' of locomotive cabs to prevent
unauthorized intrusion into locomotives.
Ultimately, the strongest response to potential security threats
faced by the railroad and transit industries begins here in Washington.
We believe that the disproportionate concentration of federal resources
in the aviation industry has left rail and transit systems vulnerable.
While we applaud ongoing efforts to focus on the vulnerabilities of
freight and passenger rail systems, we are concerned that we are not
doing enough, fast enough.
One area of grave concern is that safety and security training for
rail employees, and rail security measures in general, have been not
been given the attention they deserve. We believe that the
Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) recent proposals for
rail transport of hazardous materials still falls short when it comes
to the safety of rail employees and the public. Although the proposed
rules bring some of the dangers of hazardous materials storage to
light, they do not adequately address quality safety, security, and
emergency response training for rail employees. We respectfully request
the new Congress to pass legislation that will compel rail corporations
to train their employees on proper safety and evacuation procedures;
the use of appropriate emergency escape apparatus; the special handling
of hazardous materials; and the roles and responsibilities of rail
employees within the railroad's security plans, including an
understanding of the plan's threat level index and notification to
employees each time the threat level is changed.
Locomotive engineers, trainmen and track maintenance workers are
the true first responders to rail emergencies--the eyes and ears of the
industry. They are the first on the scene, and often the last to leave.
Yet, the rail corporations do not have quality safety and security
training for employees in place. That failure places these first
responders in harm's way, and by implication puts the communities
served by the railroads in harm's way as well. A good example is the
recent CSX derailment in Kentucky near the Cincinnati airport. In that
case, none of the rail employees knew what was in the train or how to
contain the hazard and the local first responders began by dousing the
flames with water which did not extinguish the fire and permitted the
hazardous materials to spread by putting them in solution with the
water.
Even since 9/11 and the attacks on rail and transit systems
overseas, the security training given to rail employees has been
minimal, usually comprised of nothing more than a printed brochure or
10-minute videotape. Moreover, 80 percent of our members who
participated in a rail security and safety survey said that they had
not received any additional security related training since 9/11.
Therefore, we would welcome and support legislation that would mandate
quality comprehensive security training for rail employees.
The lack of quality training is documented in the Teamsters Rail
Conference report ``High Alert: Workers Warn of Security Gaps on
Nation's Railroads. This report was based on survey responses gathered
over the previous year from more than 4,000 Rail Conference members
employed on freight and passenger railroads nationwide. The survey
asked rail workers to report the safety and security measures in place
on any one workday during the nearly year-long survey period. The
report reveals a shocking inattention to security by the nation's
largest rail corporations. Rail employees have little, if any, company-
sponsored training on the handling of hazardous materials. The practice
of leaving rail engines and other machinery unlocked is far too common.
The report's conclusions are that the nation's rail system is
vulnerable to terrorist attack, and the rail corporations have not
taken seriously the safety of their employees and the public. The
findings of that report include the following:
94% of respondents said that rail yard access was not
secure;
83% of respondents said that they had not received
any, or additional, training related to terrorism prevention
and response during the 12 months prior to the survey;
70% of respondents reported seeing trespassers in the
yard; and
Only minimal security training had been provided to
employees who have been warned that they could be the targets
of a terrorist attack.
Madame Chairwoman, I would ask that this ``High Alert'' report be
made part of the hearing record.
A week after the release of ``High Alert'', the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) released its own report on rail security,
prompting Senator Olympia Snowe (R-ME) to declare, ``We are in a
situation where our individual rail services across the country have no
clear understanding of what the best means are for securing their rail
systems.//
Based upon these and other findings, comprehensive vulnerability
assessments conducted by the appropriate federal agencies should be
mandatory for all railroads. Such would aid in addressing key areas
that many believe are not adequately being handled by the industry.
Such vulnerability assessments should be used as a basis for
implementing recommendations that include:
Improving the security of rail tunnels, bridges,
switching and car storage areas, other rail infrastructure and
facilities, information systems, and other areas identified as
posing significant risks to public safety and the movement of
interstate commerce, taking into account the impact that any
proposed security measure might have on the provision of rail
service;
Deploying equipment to detect explosives and hazardous
chemical, biological and radioactive substances, and any
appropriate countermeasures;
Training employees in terrorism prevention, passenger
evacuation and response activities;
Conducting public outreach campaigns on passenger
railroads;
Deploying surveillance equipment; and
Identifying the immediate and long-term costs of
measures that may be required to address those risks.
Employee training is one of the Rail Conference's most sought after
security provisions. Throughout the country, railroad workers have
established that their employers provide little or no specific training
for terrorism prevention or response. In the High Alert survey, 84% of
respondents said that they had not received any additional training in
terrorism response or prevention in the 12 months preceding the survey;
and 99% said they did not receive training related to the monitoring of
nuclear shipments. This lack of training should be of critical interest
to citizens who live near rail yards and tracks. The workers who lack
this training will often be the first ones to respond to incidents.
The railroad industry has also not adequately trained and
integrated its employees into the security plans currently required.
Railroad employees remain largely in the dark regarding the carriers'
security plans and, while we can appreciate that certain security
information must remain confidential, we believe that employee hazmat
and security training is critically lacking and must be expanded and
improved. Rail employees must know and understand the basic framework
of their employer's security plan, including their roles and
limitations within the employers' overall security plans, how the
plan's threat level matrix is structured, and how notification to
employees will be transmitted each time the threat level is changed.
Today, rail employees do not have this information. Rail employees are
not trained to know and understand the carrier's threat level matrix,
and they are not notified when the threat level is changed due to
either general or specific threats.
Railroads boast that their workers are the eyes and ears of the
industry, but we frankly feel more like canaries in a mine whose only
clue of pending disaster will be when disaster strikes. As workers on
the front line, our members will be solely relied upon by passengers,
the public, and emergency responders to assist in the first critical
moments of any rail emergency. Therefore, comprehensive security and
response training for rail employees is an absolute must, and I
strongly encourage this committee to address this long-outstanding
issue.
In the absence of training by the railroads, the Teamsters Rail
Conference unions have worked together with six other rail unions to
develop, on their own, a five day intensive Hazardous Materials and
Rail Security training course for members, with funding from a National
Institute of Environmental Health Sciences training grant. This
training is provided through the National Labor College/George Meany
Center in Silver Spring, MD. Labor is doing its part, but we cannot do
it alone. The carriers must step up to the plate, share the basic
elements of their security plans with their employees, and provide
comprehensive training to front line rail workers.
The Rail Conference also believes that one of the keys to railroad
security and the protection of hazardous shipments from malicious
intent is to strengthen security in and around yards and facilities
where such materials in rail cars are stationary and in ``storage
incidental to movement.'' These stationary shipments are extremely
vulnerable to malicious intent. Privacy fencing, restricted access by
outside non-railroad entities, improved safety and security training
for rail employees, and perimeter security and patrols are among the
more feasible solutions to improving security in rail yards and other
``temporary storage'' facilities. Shielding Toxic By Inhalation Hazard
(TIH) shipments and other high-hazard materials on tracks within yards
may also enhance rail security, i.e., placing these high-hazard cars on
tracks not readily visible from areas of public access.
These are not just frontline rail workers who are raising concerns
regarding the shocking lack of security where rail cars carrying highly
toxic chemicals are sitting unsecured on the nation's rail lines. There
have been in-depth, multi-part rail safety investigative stories by
local and national newspapers and broadcast news networks in over fifty
cities across the United States. News media reports with headlines such
as ``Terrorism on the Rails'', ``Terror Trains'', ``Rolling Dirty
Bombs'', and ``Toxic Trains'' have appeared in Sacramento, Buffalo, St.
Louis, Kansas City, Miami, PBS, Fox News, Atlanta, Cincinnati, Fresno,
New York City, Dallas-Ft. Worth, Omaha, Houston, Memphis, Washington,
D.C., Pittsburgh, Philadelphia and dozens of other cities. The
Teamsters Rail Conference has compiled a ten-minute video of news clips
of investigative reports from television stations across the country
that demonstrates how serious and widespread lax security measures are
in the rail industry. We have distributed a copy of this DVD to each
member of the Subcommittee, and we encourage you to take a few minutes
to watch it.
I have also attached to my written testimony a copy of an
investigative article by Carl Prine, a reporter for the Pittsburgh
Tribune Review newspaper. For those that will say that our ``High
Alert'' report is dated, and that rail security has significantly
improved over the past few years, I recommend you read this
documentation of numerous breaches in security at plants and rail lines
across the United States. It paints a picture of an individual
unchallenged as he climbed all over rail cars loaded with highly toxic
or explosive materials. Even where the Federal Railroad Administration
had noted defects in security in 2003 at some rail facilities, access
was easily obtained four years later. I can't help but think that this
reporter went unchallenged in plain view of workers, in part, because
rail workers have not been given the security awareness training that
would cause them to recognize and report suspicious activity and
security breaches to the proper authorities.
We support allowing Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officials working with TSA to
enter rail yards and other facilities where rail cars are stored or
awaiting transportation to conduct security inspections and copy
records pertinent to rail security. We also support electronic tracking
of hazardous materials cars and chain of custody requirements for
certain hazardous materials.
Wherever possible, high-hazard shipments should also be prohibited
from being placed in stationary ``incidental to movement'' storage in
high-population areas. This only makes sense given that the stated goal
of terror organizations is to cause mass casualties. Limiting
stationary ``incidental to movement'' storage in high-population areas
would greatly reduce the incentive to attack such shipments simply
because the impact of such an attack occurring in a remotely populated
area would not achieve the terrorist's stated goal of causing mass
casualties.
The Teamster Rail Conference strongly supports the inclusion of
``whistleblower'' protection in any rail security legislation. Railroad
workers should not--and cannot--be subjected to dismissal when they
provide security threat information to the government.
The Teamster Rail Conference looks forward to working with this
committee and the Congress to address the issues of rail security
nationwide. I thank you for the opportunity to testify before you
today, and I will try to answer any questions you may have.
Attachment
Pittsburgh Tribune Review *
January 14, 2007 Sunday
TERROR ON THE TRACKS
By Carl Prine
Let's say the Pittsburgh Tribune-Review reporter really was a
terrorist.
What if those were bombs he was placing on the chemical placard of
a rail car inside the Thatcher Chemical Co. plant in suburban Las
Vegas, and not his business cards?
Instead of a camera recording lax security over some of the
deadliest chemicals ever produced, he held a detonator? And the string
of chlorine gas cars trundling down Union Pacific Railroad tracks in
the heart of Vegas was his prey?
If he was a terrorist, and his goal was to release a potentially
catastrophic cloud of deadly gases, explosives and caustic acids--in
unguarded cars, left abandoned--then a U.S. Department of Homeland
Security's planning scenario might apply: 17,500 people dead, another
10,000 suffering injuries and 100,000 more flooding trauma wards,
convinced they've been poisoned. The environmental damage would take
weeks to clean up, forcing the evacuation of as many as 70,000
residents from a city built on sin, military might and heavy industry.
Less detailed and unlikely ``Worst Case Scenario'' plans filed with
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency suggest the gases that could
be released by the reporter perched atop millions of pounds of zinc
chloride, phosphoric and sulfuric acids, and chlorine gas could drift
18 miles and threaten 1.1 million people with death, displacement or
injury.
But, luckily, he was only a reporter.
Five years after terrorists murdered 2,996 people in the Sept. 11
attacks, the Trib embarked on a probe to see how well railroads and
their customers secure lethal hazardous materials--termed ``hazmat'' by
first responders. The road map: Reports compiled since 2003 by the
Federal Railroad Administration detailing defects in the way railroads
and chemical plants conducted counter-terrorism security planning and
worker training.
Armed with that data, the Trib penetrated 48 plants and the freight
lines that service them to reach potentially catastrophic chemicals in
populated parts of Seattle, Tacoma, Atlanta, Pittsburgh, Las Vegas, San
Francisco's Bay Area and the New Jersey suburbs, as well as two port
facilities in Oregon and Washington.
``What you uncovered is a criminal tragedy, and it's a criminal
tragedy that's just waiting to happen. It's also criminal what we
haven't done about this,'' said U.S. Sen. Joseph Biden, D-Delaware, who
has sponsored legislation designed to revamp rail hazmat security
nationwide and pledges to hold hearings on the issue.
Biden has taken at least 7,000 round trips by rail from his home in
Wilmington to Washington, D.C., since entering the Senate in 1972. He
routinely talks to railworkers, and when he pulls into a depot, he
scans for hazmat tankers, guards and gates.
He loves railroads so much that he wants to protect them by
slashing tax cuts and take the extra cash to fund every recommendation
of the 9/11 Commission that investigated the 2001 attacks. He demands
more federal cops in the rail yards, more cameras and gates, less
dangerous chemicals on the tracks and rerouting of particularly lethal
shipments around big cities.
``All you have to do is look,'' Biden said. ``I can walk into a
freight yard right now, and I can put plastique explosive on a railcar
and detonate it. This is a distant concern to many people in
Washington, D.C., but I see and I hear about it every day and we have
to do something about it.''
The Association of American Railroads, with a membership hauling
almost 90 percent of the nation's hazmat tank cars, said freight
security has improved since 2001 but conceded more has to be done to
protect 240,000 miles of mostly unguarded line.
``You've got to remember the open architecture of railroads,'' said
Nancy Wilson, AAR vice president and director of security. ``We're not
static facilities. We cannot protect every railcar, every rail yard or
every customer's facility all the time.''
In the years since the Sept. 11 attacks, intelligence tips have
warned about U.S. chemical plant targets and terrorists have hit
freight trains abroad. Still, Homeland Security and the AAR insist
there's no indication that terrorists are plotting hazmat rail attacks
in the U.S. now.
Good thing, because the Trib found:
Little visible differences in security between the largest and
smallest train lines. The Trib easily reached hazmat shipments or
locomotives controlled by 12 railroads, ranging from giant
Union Pacific to the tiny, city-owned Tacoma Municipal Beltline.
Workers never challenged the reporter as he climbed trains,
photographed derailing levers or peeked into signaling boxes
controlling rail traffic.
No police presence. Despite long trips down tracks nationwide, no
rail cops detained the reporter. At a Clifton, N.J., station where
explosive railcars hug teeming commuter lines, a Transit Police cruiser
idled unconcerned while the reporter spent an hour around hazmat cars.
According to the railroads, fewer than 2,300 cops patrol the tracks,
about one for every 100 miles.
Shoddy security even at 11 refineries, railroads and chemical
plants bound by ``stringent'' voluntary guidelines created by the AAR
and other industries. The Trib penetrated security at four railways
adhering to AAR's guidelines. Seven plants that had voluntarily
upgraded security to meet standards of their trade groups also had
tracks open to terrorists.
No executive at a large railroad would talk to the Trib about the
newspaper's findings. Local and state security officials in California,
Washington and Georgia also were silent when the Trib tried to discuss
hazmat security.
The Nevada Homeland Security Commission, however, is investigating
shortfalls uncovered by the Trib's Vegas vacation.
``Closing gates, making sure workers and guards and police are
aware of our chemicals, that's important,'' said Commission Supervisor
Larry Casey. ``Unfortunately, the farther we get from 9/11, the more
people forget about staying vigilant.
``Then there's the funding issue. The federal pot gets smaller and
smaller. The farther we get from the major event in our lives, the
threat goes up while the money to stop it goes down.''
Chlorine gas unguarded in the suburbs of Las Vegas. The Trib
reached 11 tankers filled with deadly gases and acids inside plants or
along tracks in one of America's largest cities.
In 2001, five of the 19 al-Qaida terrorists visited Las Vegas
before hijacking airliners for suicide missions to Manhattan and
Washington, D.C.
Las Vegas annually hosts more than 37 million visitors. The city
received about $28 million in federal counter-terrorism funding last
year, but officials have been told that's being scaled back, leaving
almost nothing for safeguarding the tracks latticing the city.
According to Homeland Security's Inspector General, 90 percent of
taxpayer anti-terrorism funding has gone to protecting aviation. In
2006, $4.6 billion flowed to securing U.S. airports, leaving $32
million for safeguarding surface transportation, including railroads.
The Burning of Atlanta
Following FRA's deficiency reports to 12 facilities near Atlanta,
the Trib found numerous security snafus in one of Dixie's largest
cities.
Along CSX lines in Dekalb County, a Trib reporter climbed unguarded
stores of deadly insecticides, flammable petroleum distillates and
acetone, a chemical that can trigger a vapor cloud explosion if leaked.
Since 2003, FRA has noted 53 defects with CSX counter-terrorism
planning and training in five states, including Georgia.
A year ago, FRA reported that Bulkmatic's plant in the Atlanta
suburbs failed to properly address potential intruders. A fence
``locked'' with almost 2 feet of slack meant a Trib reporter could
stroll by employees there who made no effort to challenge him. Federal
inspectors had previously written up Bulkmatic chemical operations
there and in Buffalo and Chicago for security problems.
After visiting Alchem's Atlanta's caustic soda operation in 2005,
an inspector wrote, ``Is there a fence? Is facility manned 24 hours a
day?''
Woodbridge Corp.'s deadly toluene diisocyanate railcars in the
bustling Atlanta suburbs stand open to sabotage. The Trib easily
accessed highly toxic or explosive rail shipments in a dozen rail and
chemical facilities in one of Dixie's largest cities.
In September, the Trib found the answer was, ``No.''
In Marietta, Ga., the Trib reached hundreds of thousands of pounds
of acrylic acid, a highly explosive chemical with choking fumes, stowed
on the tracks near several factories. Woodbridge Corp.'s toluene
diisocyanate railcars in Lithonia also were unguarded. If ruptured, the
chemical can cause severe burns or death as gases seek out moist human
flesh.
Bombs also easily could have been placed on propane, caustic soda
and fuming sulfuric acid tankers and vats in nearby Carroll, Fulton and
Gwinnett counties, causing massive explosions and corrosive gas
releases.
Atlanta and Georgia homeland security officials declined to comment
on the Trib's findings. Neither would Alchem, Bulkmatic, Woodbridge and
CSX.
``To me, this is a no-brainer for terrorists in Atlanta or anywhere
else,'' said Sal DePasquale, a Georgia State University expert on
counter-terrorism and retired security director for chemical titan
Georgia Pacific. ``It's toxic material. It's unprotected. If you're a
railroad or a chemical plant and you won't have someone ready to kill
the adversary ready to attack your plant, then what can you do?
``What's happened here is simple. Railroads were constructed and
industry grew up along them. Then people came to live near the
industry. Railroads by their nature are open to access and now we have
to figure out how to protect them. Do we reach the point where we say,
'In the interest of public health and safety, we're going to close down
your ability to ship toxic material?' What happens then? It's a tough
question to answer.''
West Coast swing
One of the deadliest cargos known to man with a Trib business card
tucked into placard No. 1017--chlorine gas. A weapon of mass
destruction in World War I, this chlorine in Tacoma is so corrosive it
will eat through human teeth.
For almost three weeks, a Trib reporter followed the rails from
Seattle to San Francisco to Las Vegas. Of 23 railroads, chemical
facilities and seaports hit with FRA security defects, the Trib
penetrated 18 of them in Washington, Oregon, California and Nevada.
Two years after FRA found security plan defects at Cascade Columbia
Distribution's Seattle warehouse, a Trib reporter found himself
underneath stacks of explosive hydrogen peroxide, toxic ferrous
chloride, blinding fluorosilicic acid and deadly muriatic acid.
With cameras, roving patrols and high fences, Pioneer America's
Tacoma bleach plant seeks to bar terrorists from chlorine railcars. But
a Trib reporter walked past rail switching levers and safety chocks to
90 tons of deadly gas abandoned by the Tacoma Municipal Beltline
Railroad outside the gates. In 2004, FRA reported the railway failed to
create a security plan and the Trib certainly didn't find one that kept
chlorine gas safe from intruders two years later.
According to EPA ``Worst Case Scenario'' filings, a catastrophic
chlorine tank rupture there could push gas to as many as 14 miles,
threatening 900,000 people.
``We can't switch out the chlorine on our own,'' said Pioneer's
plant manager, George Karscig. ``The railroad brings in the cars. There
are some days when they come and they don't make the switch and that's
what you found when you came here.''
Karscig immediately ensured that his guards policed railroad tracks
Pioneer doesn't own.
Union Pacific's bustling yard bisects Martinez, Calif., and the
sprawling Shell refinery that brews large quantities of Liquid
Petroleum Gas there. The Trib found Shell's safeguarding of 10 million
pounds of highly explosive isopentane to be rigorous. That's important,
because vapors released by a terrorists could trigger a flash explosion
across much of the seaside town, according to EPA files.
LPG is so flammable, a detonation of one railcar can cause second-
degree burns more than a mile away.
But Shell officials concede there is little they can do to babysit
dozens of tankers holding what first responders call ``LPG'' outside
refinery property. During the Trib's odyssey across a pipeline and
through Shell's rail channel, the Trib encountered three workers on
Union Pacific tracks. They didn't stop the reporter or ask what he was
doing.
Detonating one LPG railcar can cause second-degree burns more than
a mile away. A terrorist who explodes 18 LPG tank cars would unleash as
much energy as the atomic bomb that was dropped on Hiroshima in 1945,
according to federal reports.
In Benicia, San Jose, Salinas, Richmond and Fairfield, Calif., the
Trib found that a terrorist easily could have placed bombs on more than
100 other tank cars containing asphyxiating anhydrous ammonia,
flammable petroleum distillates, highly explosive propane, and LPG,
often on Union Pacific tracks.
It wasn't the first encounter by either the Trib or FRA with lax
Union Pacific security. In 2005, an inspector noted that anyone could
enter the Brenntag Great Lakes warehouse in Milwaukee's suburbs because
a Union Pacific employee ``does not lock gate after switching
facility.'' FRA also detailed problems with the railroad's security
plans, training and intrusion protections in Oakland, New Orleans and
Seattle.
After FRA visited the Seattle yard in 2005, an inspector reported
``concern with the lack of railroad crews requesting his ID or
credentials during inspections.'' A Trib visit a year later found three
bums sleeping under a bridge and a flurry of locomotives moving
freight, but no sign of rail police.
Open gates, torn fencelines and unguarded rail lines allowed
unfettered access to 18 facilities and railroads along the Pacific
coast, including this plant along a Union Pacific spur in the suburbs
of San Francisco.
In Nevada, a Trib reporter would simply wait for a Pioneer factory
to disgorge its deadly chlorine and caustic soda tankers to an
unguarded rail spur owned by Union Pacific. Although the Trib decorated
Union Pacific hazmat tankers with more than 100 business cards from
Vegas to Seattle, the company won't discuss it.
``Our only statement is that we believe what you did is dangerous
and we strongly encourage people to stay away from railroad tracks,''
said railroad spokesman Jim Barnes.
A Jersey state mind
In the crowded New Jersey suburbs rimming New York City, the Trib
found tougher chemical plant security than any other place. But track
protection was no better than other states, and of 48 facilities and
railroads found to have security defects by FRA, the Trib entered 12 of
them in July.
At the Black Prince Distillery in Clifton, N.J., explosive tankers
share space with passenger trains on New Jersey Transit's bustling
Mainline from Manhattan. A Trib reporter eased past video cameras and a
patrolling police cruiser three times during trips in and out of the
plant and along the tracks, even while commuter cars zipped by.
That concerned Richard Canas, director of the New Jersey Office of
Homeland Security and Preparedness.
``The storage of hazardous material on commuter rail lines is
something to be considered and that scenario goes to my biggest fear--
mass transit,'' he said. ``In our state, you've got a high population
density. You have rail out the kazoo that moves at a lightning pace.
There are things we do, like ramping up vigilance, conducting searches,
doing shows of force. But this is expensive and must be sustained for
it to be effective.''
A Trib reporter followed bums under a bridge and through the woods
to a large depot run by Conrail to service refineries stretching from
Sewaren to Perth Amboy along ``The Chemical Coast'' line. On tracks
stacked almost a mile deep with highly explosive chemicals, the
reporter climbed tankers and waved at nearby trucks.
Riding the rails atop a highly explosive shipment through the
``Chemical Corridor'' of New Jersey. The Trib penetrated security at a
dozen Jersey facilities, often finding catastrophic amounts of gases or
explosives unguarded in one of America's most populated areas.
Adding another two chemical plants in Parlin and Carteret, a pair
of propane warehouses, an Edison distiller and the railroads connecting
Morristown, Whippany, Dayton, Tennent, Ringoes and Newark, a
coordinated attack on Garden State hazmat reached by the Trib would
have released enough deadly ethylene oxide, toxic methylamine,
explosive LPG, lethal hydrogen chloride and flammable denatured alcohol
to threaten 527,000 people, according to EPA documents filed by the
companies themselves.
Once informed of the Trib's breaches and delivered photos of
unguarded chemicals, New Jersey's Homeland Security experts sped to
sensitive sites to probe what went wrong. That wasn't unexpected. Like
Michigan, Trenton has fully merged state police and emergency
management agencies so that a threat potentially impacting the
environment or public health draws rapid law enforcement scrutiny, too.
The state is creating an intelligence hub linked to other high-
target regional cities and states to better track vulnerabilities.
Although New Jersey law already requires stiffer security at chemical
plants than what's found in other states, Caas said voluntary efforts
at high-risk factories often work, too.
Trib stakeouts at Dupont, Air Products, Shell and ExxonMobil plants
found outstanding perimeter and rail yard protection--despite earlier
FRA defects--forcing the reporter to seek softer targets along the
rails, something terrorists might do, too.
``New Jersey has done a lot,'' said Canas. ``But we're still
extremely vulnerable in some areas. You exposed some of that--there's
no denying that--but I think overall there's a spirit of cooperation
here that you won't find in other states.''
Why?
``They still feel 9/11,'' said Canas. ``They feel it every day.
They haven't forgotten.''
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the witnesses for their testimony.
I look forward to continuing this dialogue. I also will look
forward to the utilization of your testimony, which I think is
enormously important.
I will begin the questioning. I will ask both Mr. Maslanka
and Mr. Murphy, and I will refer to your report, Mr. Murphy,
and just read some language. Your report states that workers
report working alone, long hours, without rest, unpredictable
work schedules, unsecured rail yards with unattended equipment
and unsecured hazmat, very few if any rail police and workers
being unsure, if not ignorant, of security procedures.
We are holding this hearing because we respect the
importance of the term ``safety,'' but we distinguish that term
from the word ``security.'' So to both of you, would you
represent or do you believe that your employees feel
vulnerable? If they feel vulnerable, have you made continuous
and intense representations to the industry that you would like
not only safety training, but security training?
I might venture to say that security training is somewhat
distinctive. It means, of course, that you would be assured, I
think, that there is sufficient communication with the industry
on intelligence information that is relevant to the industry,
and that it would be digested sufficiently for employees to be
made aware of it; that there would be certain forms of
technology used to detect matters dealing with security issues;
that employees might be rested; that their hours might be
regular so that they could be rested.
There are a number of issues that I hope that you can
distinguish for us between safety and security. Mr. Maslanka?
Mr. Maslanka. I would venture to say that we have made them
aware of our concerns with safety and security issues. Over the
years, we have been involved in various types of programs. I
will just provide you with one example. Some years ago in the
mid-1990s, we talk a lot about safety here, of hazardous
materials. Although that is a safety issue, it could easily
become a security issue by somebody with the wrong intent.
But as far as the training aspect of it, in the early 1990s
on a railroad by the name of Conrail, through the efforts of
the George Meany Center, we put together a cooperative
partnership for hazardous material training, where the railroad
participated, the labor organization participated, and we got
the expertise from the National Labor College. It was an
excellent program. It was a model program of how these things
can be accomplished.
Then, Conrail was eaten up by two big rail carries, CSX and
Norfolk Southern. We made presentations for those carriers. We
tried to get these programs in place, but that was not their
choice. That is just one example.
I think there are a lot of similarities in safety and
security, but as far as the security end of it goes, we have
not seen any legitimate straightforward training telling people
what to look for, protocols and all those types of things. The
best we see are pamphlets or documents. It kind of reminds me
of the days when I would be in a shanty in a railroad yard and
I would see a box. I was nosy enough to look in the box to find
out there were 150 North American emergency response guidebooks
in it, which are valuable tools for railroad workers. But they
were laying in the box because they were never given to the
employees, or did the employees ever receive any instruction.
That all changed with the cooperative centers through the Meany
Center.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Your employees, then, feel vulnerable?
Mr. Maslanka. Yes, they do.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Murphy, you listed a number of items.
Would you comment on whether your employees feel vulnerable,
and whether or not we need federal intervention?
Mr. Murphy. I listened today to the testimony of the first
panel, particularly Ms. Wilson's testimony about the number of
employees that have received security training in the past few
months and all that. The week before last, I was at the House
Transportation Committee that was conducting hearings on
safety, and heard another representative from the industry
claim amazing improvements in the training of employees.
I talked with my brother union members afterwards, from the
industry, and asked them. How could they make these claims in
the light that most of our members, if not all, still report to
us that they have not received any training related to
security? So I find it bewildering, and I think that is the
task of this committee. You have to balance what the claims of
the industry are against what the workers are telling you.
I can assure the committee that any rail worker, who would
have to be given protection by this committee because one of
the problems that we face today is that the railroad companies
will take job action, disciplinary action against rail workers
who report security violations. You have to take that into
account, but they would tell you if they were so protected,
that they feel as vulnerable as they did on September 12 today.
Security and safety issues are necessarily intertwined. The
distinction, I think, is that the carriers, like any other
employer in this country, when they train workers about safety
it is either personal safety or protection of property--usually
the employer's property. But it is when the accidents happen
that we can see why the safety issues are so well connected to
the security issues.
Just recently, the derailment in Kentucky, you may have
read about that. The employees of that train did not know what
hazardous chemical was on the cars that ruptured. So when the
firefighters arrived, they could not tell them what was
leaking. The firefighters, now know what to do, poured water on
the chemical, which only spread it further. So that is where
the safety and security issue joins. Railroad workers have to
be educated to the point where they are alert for what in
normal circumstances would be an ordinary situation that might
turn into a security risk.
I can tell you one anecdotal story of a locomotive engineer
this past summer. He was at a rail yard in Michigan. A
gentleman hopped on the cab and flashed a security I.D. at him,
and said he was from some particular agency. This engineer, who
had received no training, just accepted the presence of that
person in the cab. It was only later that he realized, ``I
should have questioned that employee,'' or ``How come no one
told me that this federal agency security force would be around
today?'' He realized that he willy-nilly allowed that person to
get on the cab, because he flashed some kind of an official
credential at him.
That is the real state of security training in our rail
system today. The carriers can give you all the impressive
numbers, but Madam Chairman, I can assure you that none of that
training has reached our members yet. Remember, harking back to
September 10, 2001, the New York City first responders had been
trained to prepare for another bombing of the World Trade
Centers. No one could imagine that aircraft would be used as
flying missiles.
What the Teamsters and the rest of organized labor have
been saying for years now is, we need to be better prepared.
And the carriers have to accept the responsibility to assume
that kind of training for our workforce.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you. I assume you are saying we need
federal intervention.
Mr. Murphy. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Mr. Lungren, I yield 5 minutes to the ranking member of the
subcommittee.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much.
And thank you both for your testimony.
I am concerned. I hear two diametrically opposed versions
of the state of affairs here. I find from the railroads, and I
believe this is certainly credible, that they did embark on a
program to reassess where they were from a security standpoint
after 9/11, and that they had tried to use best practices and
actually consulted the national intelligence community.
I have looked at some of the material they have out, and I
have had testimony as to what they do. But then I hear from the
two of you that somehow it is not getting from here to there.
How do we find out? How do we determine what the state is here?
I would think it would be in the common interest of both
management and labor to protect the products that they are
moving. I would suspect that partnership is better than
adversarial relationship in this. I am no expert on the
relationship of employees to management in a railroad, but I
have done some reading, and I understand you have had ups and
downs and things.
But let me just ask both of you, what is the level of
training that you believe to be necessary? For instance, should
railroad workers be trained to intercept a suspicious
individual? Should railroad workers be trained to dispose of or
in some way handle suspicious packages? Should railroad workers
be trained in non-lethal methods of incapacitating suspects?
Should railroad workers be trained rather to observe and
inform, as opposed to those other things?
I mean, what is the level that you are talking about, both
of you, that would be necessary to give the level of protection
for your employees, and as importantly, to the public at large
from what could take place as a result of some terrorist
attempting to intercept a train, or in some way attack the most
hazardous material that might be there?
Mr. Maslanka. I would say, very briefly, I don't think we
are asking for stun guns. We don't want to get involved to that
extent where we are working for some kind of training to take
on something. But what we really need is to see a security
plan, a real security plan, and understand what the provisions
of that security plan are. I am speaking of the employees.
To understand how to recognize problems, how to recognize
packages. You know, there are tell-tale things out there that
would help people to understand what their responsibility is.
And how to not only recognize, but respond, God forbid,
something should happen.
Along those lines, I think another thing that is being
overlooked very widely is the expertise of the employees
themselves, who know the lay of the land better than those in
the ivory towers. I mean, the railroad workers out there are
working every day. They know the lay of the land. They know
where the most porous areas are and where there can be a
problem, but nobody comes and asks them about these things.
There ought to be a little bit of brainstorming going on with
the employees who know the lay of the land. You could probably
develop better security plans if you used those resources.
Mr. Lungren. Mr. Murphy?
Mr. Murphy. Well, you present the dilemma, that you have to
solve sometime this session, because it is really a matter of
resources. In our ``High Alert'' report, we talk about the
inadequate number of railroad police. Taking that one step
further, there is certainly a lack of security personnel
throughout the entire railroad system in this country.
So if you want to try to find the bright line between where
the proactive intervention should start and end, you have to
address the lack of security police personnel within the
industry. If the industry, at least on the freight side, can be
compelled to increase the level of security personnel, then
those type of interventionist actions that you just outlined
should be handled by them. But if that force does not increase,
then necessarily you are going to ask for more responsibility
from the people that go to work every single day.
And then if you do that, then in fact you are talking about
a much more complex and thorough training program. It is not an
easy answer of where the responsibility should lie, but just
let me tell you how demanding it is, or how necessary it is. In
the testimony of Ms. Wilson earlier today, she talked about the
levels of security that the industry has invoked.
With me today is Rick Inclima, the director of safety for
the Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, part of the
Teamster Rail Conference. This was the first time he has seen
those levels and their definitions, today.
This is what is going on. Don't you think that it makes
sense, as my brother said, that this should be a joint effort
between the carriers and their employees? How to figure these
things out? But here it is, 2007, and we just see the
definition of their security levels for the first time. That in
itself should tell you mountains about what we need to do here.
Mr. Lungren. I hope at least he will pick up the phone, or
someone will pick up the phone and call one another, and do
that.
Mr. Murphy. We may need you to mediate on that.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the ranking member.
Now, I would like to yield 5 minutes to the chairman of the
full committee, Mr. Thompson of Mississippi.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Let me say from the outset that I am concerned, too,
because in some instances we have heard the complete opposite
of testimony in this hearing today. As I said earlier, our goal
is to try to create a rail system that is secure. But I also
want, for the record, to make sure that the information we get
is correct, because we take that and use it to craft
legislation.
I would also say, Madam Chairman, that for future hearings
we might need a little more definition on some of these.
Two points, is it your testimony that, and I will take both
of you on this, that the present training received by your
membership is viewed as inadequate, from a security standpoint?
Mr. Maslanka. Woefully inadequate, yes.
Mr. Murphy. The training that most or all of our members
have received so far has either been a brochure or watching a
video. That says volumes.
Mr. Thompson. What you heard with the panel before you also
was a system where we were being told, ``let us do it; we can
do it without federal intervention, or what have you, and trust
us.'' And so again, do you think that based on what you have
heard in your membership over time as experienced, that we can
in fact trust the industry to secure itself, without
significant federal intervention?
Mr. Maslanka. No, absolutely not. Self-governance does not
work. We have seen it time and time again. That is why I talked
about the bit I did with the 239 regulation, the emergency
preparedness, that it needs to be mandatory. It just doesn't
work. Then you get budget cuts and sometimes when budget cuts
happen, the first thing to suffer is training. At other times,
there are not training staff, so they turn the training over to
maybe departmental heads just as another burden and another
duty, and they are not qualified with the skill sets to provide
training. No, they can't be trusted to self-govern.
I guess one other additional point I would make, whether it
be in legislation or regulation, if there were specific
provisions for specific training regimens and plans and review
of those plans, and proper enforcement, I think that is where
we need to go, because it is not working. The highlight of this
all came about in 2001. It is now 2007 and it hasn't happened.
That, in itself, says unless it is mandated by legislation or
regulation, it is not going to happen.
Mr. Murphy. Let me just answer, Congressman, by saying that
phrase, ``the past is prologue,'' would absolutely ring true in
this case. Unfortunately, from labor's point of view in any
industry, not just the rail industry, anytime that safety and
security for workers and the general public has been left to
their responsibility, it has proven to be inadequate and
Congress has had to intervene by regulating it. I see this as
no different.
There is no accountability unless you impose enforceable
standards upon the railroad companies.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much.
I yield back.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like a second round for questions that I would like
to pose to the gentlemen.
There are stark differences between the testimony that we
heard in the first panel and that of the second panel, but it
does not mean that we will not ultimately find a common ground
that should be reflected in our legislation. It doesn't mean
either that we are going to ignore the starkness of your
testimony.
I think what frustrates me is the fact that we are now in
2007, and representatives of workers on rail yards and rail
systems are saying that they have no security training or
training as it relates to safety, period. This hearing, of
course, is about security. There is a fine line that has to be,
I think, made uniquely distinctive.
We had safety in the airports before 9/11. We would like to
think we have security. We have the Transportation Security
Administration with employees that are employed by the federal
government. We have certain procedures that occur.
I guess one of the challenges that, of course, I would
expect a great outcry by not only the traveling public, but
maybe even rail workers, is a kind of security system that the
aviation system has. But the very fact that there are no
scanning at all raises, of course, concerns. The question will
be: What else do you put in place?
I would like to know from both of you whether or not the
Transportation Security Administration has begun to engage any
of you, your leadership, your workers, as stakeholders in how
they should best proceed, as of course they will be entrusted
with the responsibility of security for railroads, commuter and
other systems that this process would instill. Meaning, has TSA
reached out to you as stakeholders to secure your thoughts
about training and other security measures for the rail
systems?
Mr. Maslanka. I can't speak for other organizations, but as
far as our organization, other than seeing TSA representatives
at a few meetings that involved the Federal Railroad
Administration, I would have to say no, at least from the
railroad sector. I want to make it clear, I don't speak for the
mass transit or the airline sector. I can submit that for the
record after we have additional information.
I just was looking at this earlier today. It is actually a
letter from the TSA two stakeholders, whoever they may be,
advising them of the current rulemaking. But no, we didn't
receive that, nor have we received any other information or
calls asking for our input. I think there is a gap there
because many of us in rail labor participate in the Rail Safety
Advisory Committee, which does negotiated rulemakings and
handles all kinds of safety things. And FRA interacts with TSA,
so I would say they know who we are. They know who the
stakeholders are, but we haven't heard from them.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Murphy, thank you.
Mr. Murphy. I would concur with my brother's remarks. In
fact, you should take note that we supplied or forwarded a copy
of our ``High Alert'' report to TSA in early 2006 and never
even received any kind of response back, not even a curious
request for more details.
Ms. Jackson Lee. You also made note that the industry has
focused a lot on technology. We hear that often in my other
committees dealing with homeland security as well, and
technology has its place, but not enough emphasis on the real-
life training of employees.
Mr. Maslanka, you made a very important point about
noticing a box. You did make an interesting point that in the
box, there were some manuals regarding safety. But it was your
curiosity, or the employees' curiosity, that made you go look.
The question would be: Wouldn't that be an aspect of
training, people-to-people training, to know how to be
intuitive about boxes and/or people? I think you made the point
that you can't really stop, and I mentioned scanning, and that
is a broader issue, but you can't really stop the masses that
get on trains, either whether it is long distance or whether or
not it is transit. The point is, can you train employees to
feel comfortable with their knowledge and to feel comfortable
with what they might have to see and detect as being rail
employees?
Let's start with Mr. Murphy first.
Mr. Murphy. Obviously, the issue that this committee is
charged with addressing is so very important. Trying to find
ways in which we can make immediate recommendations, given the
panoply of issues that we face, from our perspective, and I
hope I am not ranging too far afield from your question, but we
would think that training in the simplest or the most basic
elementary levels of the railroad's security threat levels
should be done immediately, as a start, and what they actually
need.
We would think that that kind of education, along with
somehow getting employees to recognize what would be considered
ordinary might not be, in unusual circumstances, and it is an
essential part of the type of security training that we would
seek. While you were asking me the question, I was thinking
about one important point that we raised in our report which we
released at the end of September, 2005, when we talked about
the lack of training for evacuation plans for our members on
the Northeast Corridor, and the train tunnels. I know that
Metro-North was talking about their plans. I am talking about
in Baltimore, and further up the coast.
As of today, there has been no coordinated effort in
training our members on evacuating passengers if an emergency
resulted. I mean, it is just, where do you start? Where do you
get the kind of commitment from the carriers so that looking at
that box, which turned out to be important information, is
something that I have to pay attention to.
You were right, Madam Chairman, when you pointed out that
before 9/11, there was security in the airline industry. It
took a tragedy to find out that it was inadequate. That is what
our fear is. We have been saying this to the carriers for more
than 3 years now: It is not enough. It is your responsibility
to make the commitment so we don't have to pick up the pieces
after another event, and then come to that recognition that it
is inadequate.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Maslanka, you have also made note,
would you wish to finish, to answer that question?
Mr. Maslanka. Yes. I think the question was?
Ms. Jackson Lee. Is it more emphasis on technology than the
actual training of the employees?
Mr. Maslanka. Yes, I believe that is correct. I would just
say, to the extent that training is available, I mean, using
the materials that are put together, and maybe making the
materials better, but using them for more than just saying
``here they are,'' or popping in a video and letting the video
run for 10 minutes, and saying, ``you have signed the register
so you have now complied with the regulations.'
There has got to be real meaning behind it. You have to
really impart the knowledge and the skills, and that is hot
taking place thus far.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Lungren of California, the ranking
member, you have 5 minutes.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you.
On the state of training, when I was Attorney General of
California, we had a very tough issue about safety programs for
the use of guns. There were those who said, ``Man, you make
these people go through all these hoops, you are going to
restrict their Second Amendment rights.''
And so we came up with a training program that was one of
two things. Either you had to take a test--10 questions, 15
questions, I forget what it was--that talked about the safety
of the use of a gun; or you had to watch a video. The argument
was that this was not too intrusive on one's rights, but gave
them the information that would allow them to do this, and we
allowed them to have that.
So I don't necessarily judge whether a program is effective
by whether it is direct or whether it is indirect or whether it
is interactive or whether it is by printed material or whether
it is by film. I mean, is it effective?
So let me just ask both of you this: Can you tell me if
your workers receive this type of training, and if so,
approximately how many hours a year of training they have:
emergency response, safety, and security, and in the area of
security, suspicious behavior or individuals, suspicious
package recognition, and general security training.
Do you have figures on that that is more than anecdotal or
would you have to submit that for the record?
Mr. Maslanka. I think the safest way to do that would be to
submit it for the record, because it varies on different
carriers, and that exercise would also require the cooperation
of the carriers to receive that information.
Mr. Lungren. Well, I guess what I am saying, is you could
survey your members or if you have done a survey of your
members so we know. We would then have that set of data, and
then if we talked to management, we could ask them what they
see from their program, and see if they meld, and if they
don't, if there is a discrepancy.
Because I think you folks are trying to tell the truth
here. I think the other panel was trying to tell the truth.
Sometimes we look at the same thing and see something
different. What I would like to know is something that is
quantifiable.
Mr. Murphy?
Mr. Murphy. The committee should keep cognizant of the fact
that by regulation the carriers are required to do some levels
of safety training. And those reports are generated from their
training.
But to your question about security training, to be able to
identify suspicious individuals, packages--other than the
brochure and the 10-minute video, the Teamsters Rail Conference
is not aware, and maybe the carriers will write-off 1 hour that
10-minute video, and maybe 1 hour for reading the brochure, but
other than that, we cannot quantify a number on training for
adequate security, because there is none.
Mr. Lungren. Would it be possible to have a survey of a
certain random number of your members to see what their
response is, so that we could find out what they think they are
getting and how much time they are spending, so we could sort
of start to see where we are on this thing. Do you know what I
am saying?
Mr. Murphy. Well, we did a survey in our report. Despite
the accusations of the industry, our report was based upon the
responses from rail members, their employees. They tried to
dismiss it as some kind of collective bargaining tactic. And
that report was published at the end of September, 2005, and 83
percent of the employees who responded said they had not
received any security training. But if you are asking, would
the Teamsters be willing to do another survey of its membership
to reflect what has transpired since the end of September, we
would be more than willing to do that.
Obviously, we would need some months to do it because you
have to put the survey forms out, and remember, we have to, at
least in terms of the BMWE, those reports cannot be filled out
while they are at work because they will place themselves in
jeopardy. So that was one of the problems we faced in
collecting the data. It all had to be done after they finished
their shifts on the reports, and we did it over a 30-day period
with the BMWE.
But we would be glad to try to do it, but I am comfortable
in telling the Representative that the data that we published
in 2005 will not have changed significantly one way or another.
Mr. Lungren. That would be a disappointment if that is
true, but I appreciate your position. It is just for our
guidance, for public policy decisions, it would be helpful if
we had quantifiable material or evidence to help us make our
best judgment.
I am not trying to take one side or the other. I am not
trying to beat up on anybody. I am trying to improve the
situation for you folks, for your employers, and for the folks
that are riding the rails, or happen to be living by rails and
rail yards. We are all in this together, as far as I can tell.
Mr. Murphy. As I said, the Teamsters would be willing to do
another survey of its members and submit that new data to the
committee, if you are interested.
Mr. Lungren. Okay. I think that would be very helpful.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the distinguished ranking member.
We welcome that information and we welcome any expanded
information that you may want to submit. We also will allow the
members of the subcommittee that may have additional questions
for the witnesses, we would ask that the members submit these
in writing and that the witnesses would do so.
Allow me to conclude simply with a concluding remark, and
that is that there has to be a coming together of these two
disparate positions. I sympathize with the ranking member's
frustration. I think the difference, what I am hearing of this
second panel is that for training to be received as training,
it has to be concrete; it has to be somewhat extended; and the
individuals that are being trained have to recognize that they
are being trained.
We are hoping that we can find that balance with federal
intervention, as I have listened to both panels have indicated
by both their testimony and the responses to questions, that
federal intervention is a necessity. I think the training has
to be ramped up. When you leave the training for security, and
again I focus on security, you have to leave the training with
the sense that you have been trained, or that there is
something different about the way you will behave, something
different about the information that you have, so that you can
behave differently.
With that in mind, I would look forward to, again, any
submissions that the two witnesses would wish to submit, as
well as the first panel, and I believe the inquiry made by Mr.
Lungren is a timely inquiry, and I would ask that if you are
able to survey your employees, both of you, in a timely
fashion, or a sample of such, we would certainly welcome that.
Again, hearing no further business, the chairwoman thanks
both witnesses of the second panel and the witnesses of the
first panel. And hearing no further business, the subcommittee
stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:16 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]