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HERALDING UNHEARD VOICES: THE ROLE OF FAITH-BASED ORGANIZATIONS AND NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS DURING DISASTERS

Final Report

December 18, 2006

**Prepared for the
Department of Homeland Security
Science and Technology Directorate**

Acknowledgements

In particular, we wish to express our deep gratitude to the following people whose help in this report was so valuable:

Bill Bollier, State of Louisiana
Reverend John Boyles, Faith Prepared Network
Captain Wilbur Douglass III, Chaplain Corps, U.S. Navy
Captain Leroy Gilbert, Chaplain Corps, U.S. Navy (Ret.)
Chaplain Gene Ground, Victim Relief Ministries
Jody L. Herrington, Operation Blessing
Bill Horan, Operation Blessing
Dr. Gary Huckabay, U.S. Northern Command
Dr. Ernest L. Johnson, Louisiana NAACP
Bill Lokey, Federal Emergency Management Agency
Mary Marr, Christian Emergency Network
Keith Rothfus, Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, DHS
Reverend Daniel K. Soliday, Nazarene Disaster Response
Kate Summers, U.S. Senate Sergeant at Arms
Susan Taylor, Churches of Scientology Disaster Response
Kenneth G. Thompson, Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism

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HSI Publication Number: RP006-44-01

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GLOSSARY

AAR	after-action report
ACORN	Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now
ARC	American Red Cross
BISCO	Bayou Interfaith Shared Community Organization
CEN	Christian Emergency Network
CMSA	Case Management Society of America
CWE	Christian World Embassy
DCC	disaster child care
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DMAT	Disaster Medical Assistance Team
EMT	emergency medical technician
EOP	emergency operations plan
ESF	Emergency Support Function
FBO	faith-based organization
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
GAO	Government Accountability Office
HHS	Department of Health and Human Services
HSI	Homeland Security Institute
HSRI	Human Services Response Institute
HUD	Department of Housing and Urban Development
IRD	international relief and development
IRS	Internal Revenue Service
LANO	Louisiana Association of Nonprofit Organizations
LDR	Lutheran Disaster Response
LSU	Louisiana State University
NAACP	National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
NDR	Nazarene Disaster Response

NGO	nongovernmental organization
NRCC	National Response Coordination Center
NRP	National Response Plan
OBI	Operation Blessing International
OIG	Office of the Inspector General
POD	point of distribution
SBC	Southern Baptist Convention
SDR	Churches of Scientology Disaster Response
SOP	standard operating procedure
TBM	Texas Baptist Men
TRACK	Transitional Recovery Action Center for Katrina/Rita
USERRA	Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act
UMC	United Methodist Church
UMCOR	United Methodist Committee on Relief
UPC	University Presbyterian Church
USCG	U.S. Coast Guard
VAL	volunteer agency liaisons
VOAD	Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster
YMCA	Young Men's Christian Association

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Faith-based organizations (FBOs) and secular nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) stepped in to fill the gaps when the geographic scales, intensities, and durations of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita overwhelmed the existing disaster response resources. FBOs and NGOs undertook a surprisingly large, varied, and demanding set of activities with extraordinary effectiveness.

They provided shelter, food, medical services, hygiene services, mental health and spiritual care, physical reconstruction, logistics management and services, transportation, children's services, and case management. The FBOs' and NGOs' successes in providing these services are a stark contrast to the many chronicled deficiencies and failures of government during the catastrophic 2005 hurricane season. By studying these organizations' successes, we can learn lessons that may make the nation better prepared for, and thus more responsive to, such disasters.

Objectives

This Homeland Security Institute (HSI) project analyzed the role of FBOs and NGOs during disasters. The study is not a comparison between government efforts and those of other organizations. Nor does the study compare small organizations to large organizations.

Our goal was to learn from their experience, to recognize the roles played by these organizations, and to provide the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with an understanding that will enable government to work more effectively with these organizations in future disasters.

The research focused on five key research questions:

1. Did FBOs and NGOs have a significant beneficial impact during and after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita?
2. What are the services performed by FBOs and NGOs?
3. What are the limitations and challenges to FBOs and NGOs in performing these services?
4. What best practices did FBOs and NGOs develop related to those services?
5. If they did have significant beneficial impact, why were they so effective?

Approach

Our methodology incorporated two techniques: historical analysis and quantitative analysis. The historical analysis drew upon extensive interviews with staff and volunteers from organizations most of which are located in the region directly affected. We contacted 1,082 FBOs and NGOs and conducted 252 phone interviews and 46 in-person, in-depth interviews. We also convened a conference in Baton Rouge of 233 attendees, mostly from local FBOs and NGOs. The breakout sessions from that conference provided us with additional data and enabled us to validate initial findings. The quantitative analysis drew upon our survey. We sent the survey to 694 organizations. We received 153 responses from 127 organizations. The survey asked questions about 41 relief and recovery activities.

Findings

HSI's major findings from this study include:

1. FBOs and NGOs had a significant beneficial impact during and after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Thousands of FBOs and NGOs provided services across the entire geographic region affected by the hurricanes. The scale of their response was unprecedented. In some communities, they—not the government—were the focal point for services. In other communities, they were the sole or lead provider of services for days or weeks. They made life-and-death differences in people's lives. They gave food to the hungry and vulnerable. They reduced suffering, facilitated restoration of infrastructure (primarily by housing relief workers and volunteers), and lessened the economic impact of the hurricanes by donating services and material resources.

2. FBOs and NGOs provided services in at least ten distinct service areas: shelter, food services, medical services, personal hygiene services, mental health and spiritual support, physical reconstruction, logistics management and services, transportation management and services, children's services, and case management and related services.

3. FBOs and NGOs faced significant limitations and challenges in performing these services: inadequate government planning, overlooked service needs, inadequate coordination and integration, problems with access and credentialing, inadequate training and experience, cost (economic, physical, and emotional), unanticipated needs for long-term services, and waste management and sanitation.

4. Organizations adapted and developed effective practices to deal with these limitations and challenges. These are three of the best practices that apply broadly:

- **Specialization.** Many FBOs and NGOs specialized in one or a few services. This proved highly effective, especially if the organization could partner with others that were providing complementary services. Specialization optimizes the contribution of organizations during a disaster. Specialization was a best practice noted in four functional areas: food, medical services, mental health and spiritual support, and physical reconstruction.
- **Partnering.** Organizations partnered with one another to meet complementary needs. This also was highly effective. Examples were arrangements where one FBO served as the shelter, while a community NGO prepared the meals and delivered them to the shelter. Partnering was a best practice noted in four functional areas: food, logistics management and services, children's services, and case management.
- **Preserving family unity.** Shelters that strove to preserve family unity found that this practice had beneficial ramifications in shelter operations, medical services, mental health and spiritual support, and children's services. This was also a best practice for facilitating care for those with special needs.

Additional best practices unique to just one service area are identified in the appendix for that service.

5. FBOs and NGOs were effective for three broad reasons: their specific mission and strong motivation to be responsive to whatever people needed, their closeness to and familiarity with the communities they served, and access, either directly or through networks, to unique resources and capabilities directly applicable to the types of services needed following a disaster.

Recommendations

Governments should:

1. Encourage and learn from FBO and NGO best practices
2. Address overlooked services such as routine transportation, children's services, and pop-up shelters in response and recovery planning
3. Investigate inclusion of FBOs and NGOs, particularly local ones, in planning, coordination, integration, training, and exercises
4. Resolve challenges with
 - a. Access and credentialing
 - b. Long-term services
 - c. Waste management and sanitation
5. Reconsider the appropriate balance between government and nongovernment responsibilities and between local and higher levels, to provide good, quick and flexible response to disasters

1. INTRODUCTION

Americans responded to Hurricane Katrina in unprecedented ways.... The Federal Government knows a lot about the works of non-governmental agencies that are approved or affiliated with the federal, state, local agencies. However, little is known about the role and effectiveness of grassroots faith-based organizations that provided incalculable services to victims of Hurricane Katrina.

Captain Leroy Gilbert, Chaplain Corps, U.S. Navy (retired), keynote address,
Heralding Unheard Voices Conference¹

Surprising Successes Amid Chaos

In Hattiesburg, MS, Temple Baptist Church opens its doors as a shelter for over 300 workers from the local power utility. Church volunteers operate the facility around the clock for three weeks so linemen and technicians can rest between their arduous shifts returning power to the battered community.² In East Baton Rouge, LA, University Methodist Church operates a distribution center providing critical supplies to other shelters.³ Elsewhere in Baton Rouge, Lifting Up This Temple Unto God Full Gospel Church uses its bus to shuttle evacuees to medical clinics and bathing facilities.⁴ In Opelousas, LA, Pastor Nathaniel Carter opens the New Life Church of God in Christ as a shelter the night Hurricane Katrina makes landfall. He does so without direction from any government authority. Over the next five months, the shelter provides refuge for 200 to 300 evacuees each evening.⁵

These are four snapshots from hundreds of similar examples that occurred in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. In the hours, weeks, and months following those disasters, faith-based organizations (FBOs) and other nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) provided critically needed services, resources, and capabilities.

These hurricanes brought together those with experience, skill, and resources with those who only had a desire to serve in a noble and very necessary cause: to bring relief to suffering people. For some organizations, such as the international relief organization Operation Blessing, disaster response is a core capability, their *raison d'être*. But for many organizations, particularly local churches, such as Christway Church in Bentley, LA, that is not the case. Christway Church is a very small congregation that had no experience in sheltering prior to Hurricane Katrina. Yet the congregation of Christway Church found a way to shelter evacuees, and it did so for two months.⁶

Large national organizations and small neighborhood ones, faith-based and secular, from all 50 states and beyond, came together in this time of our nation's need. These organizations didn't wait for authority and guidance from anyone other than their own leadership, members, and/or congregants. Local organizations often began helping others while they themselves were suffering from the effects of the storms.

FBOs and other NGOs were incredibly effective even though they were not included in much of the government pre-disaster planning and did not have experience in such relief efforts. These organizations sheltered tens of thousands of evacuees, prepared and served millions of meals, and provided a broad range of services: medical care, warehousing, physical reconstruction, and more. They provided these services not only for evacuees, but also for relief workers and volunteers. This is a critical and often overlooked aspect of these organizations. By hosting those who came into a community to rebuild and restore, FBOs and NGOs enabled communities to heal and return to a more normal condition. Many are still doing so today.

In the four examples above, we see a glimpse of past efforts, and, no doubt, visions of future ones. These and hundreds of other examples show us what could happen should there be another devastating event that cripples government and slows its response. In the absence of governments, neighbors will help neighbors. This is a powerful force in America and one that is not well understood at the state or federal level in any coherent fashion. But should we ever face another disaster of the magnitude of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita—or greater—it will be these national and local organizations that will be there day after day, on the front lines, serving meals, caring for the victims, restoring services, and rebuilding lives and communities.

FBOs and NGOs had a significant beneficial impact for many victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. They provided shelter, food, medical services, hygiene services, mental health and spiritual care, physical reconstruction, logistics management and services, transportation, children's services, and case management. What follows is a glimpse into the world of FBOs and NGOs and their actions following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. It is a journey into a world of volunteers, of small local churches and large national denominations, of neighbors helping neighbors and also helping strangers, of downtown soup kitchens and outreach centers, and of those dedicated to serving others: good Samaritans all.

In the midst of all the horrible things that went wrong in Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, theirs is an untold story that exemplifies the best of America. Perhaps even more important, the keys to their success point the way to improvements in disaster response by all sources, at all levels, in the future.

The Context: Filling the Breach Left by Traditional Resources

In the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, what many may consider the big story has already been told: the story of the governments' performance. Many after-action reports (AARs) focused on the various levels of government, on government agencies, and on the American Red Cross (ARC). Few have highlighted the successes of faith-based organizations and nongovernmental organizations; the account of the disaster response and recovery effort is not complete without their stories.

Previously, the ARC provided shelters following a disaster, but the geographic scale, intensity, and duration of these two hurricanes overwhelmed the existing disaster response architecture. Few Americans realize that in the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, hundreds of pop-up shelters—often simple churches with nothing but a few cots and a strong sense of compassion—opened their doors to evacuees.⁷ FBOs and NGOs had stepped in to fill the gaps.

The successes of FBOs and NGOs in the wake of these disasters are a stark contrast to the many chronicled deficiencies and failures of government. From these organizations' successes, we can learn lessons that could make the nation better prepared for, and thus more responsive to, such catastrophes.

2. PROJECT OVERVIEW

...organizations stepped in to provide for “unmet needs.” When the government (federal, state, local) or national emergency organizations failed to act expeditiously or could not provide the essential services for victims of Katrina, grassroots faith-based organizations saw what needed to be done and acted according to the needs of the people.

Captain Leroy Gilbert, Chaplain Corps, U.S. Navy (retired), keynote address,
Heralding Unheard Voices Conference⁸

The Project’s Objectives

This project analyzed the role of FBOs and NGOs during and after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The research focused on five key questions:

1. Did FBOs and NGOs have a significant *beneficial impact* during and after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita?
2. What were and are the *services* performed by FBOs and NGOs?
3. What are the *limitations and challenges* to FBOs and NGOs performing these services?
4. What *best practices* did they develop related to those functions?
5. If they did have significant beneficial impact, why were they so *effective*?

Our primary purpose in conducting this study has been to learn what FBOs and NGOs, particularly local ones, did in the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Although there have been a number of AARs following these disasters, there has yet to be a comprehensive accounting of the experiences of these specific communities. Thus, the goal of this study is to inform the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) of the range of capabilities that FBOs and NGOs have at their disposal during times of crisis and, by doing so, to encourage better utilization of these organizations.

Scope

The scope of this study was bounded by three dimensions:

1. *Organizations*. We looked only at FBOs and NGOs. We did not examine the performance of government agencies, such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). In those cases where there was interaction between an organization and the government, we examined the issue from the organization’s perspective.
2. *Unheralded*. We looked only at organizations whose roles in the wake of the hurricanes may not be well known. For example, we did not examine the ARC, as much has already been written about it. It has produced its own after-action report, and its representatives have testified before Congress. In those cases where there was interaction between an organization and the ARC, we examined the issue from the organization’s perspective.
3. *Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Only*. We did not look at the role of FBOs and other NGOs in disasters other than Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. However, the findings identified can apply to many events, particularly those that cover a large geographic area.

Methodology

The geographically dispersed, naturally distributed, sometimes nonhierarchical nature of these organizations—some of the characteristics that can contribute to their effectiveness in a disaster—also makes them difficult to research. There is no single source that can provide a comprehensive view of the contribution made by these organizations in the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. In fact, even a year after the event, no single comprehensive database identifies all of the organizations that participated and what they did. This is particularly true of the smaller FBOs.

Quantitative data simply do not exist for this subject matter. Therefore, our methodology was largely qualitative, augmented with limited quantitative data.

Our approach included the following:

- Literature search and review
- Contact with 1,082 organizations
- 252 phone interviews
- 46 in-depth in-person interviews
- Visits to New Orleans, Baton Rouge, and other affected areas
- A conference where speakers, panels, and breakout sessions provided us with additional data and enabled us to validate initial findings
- Surveys of 127 organizations

Interviews

The bulk of our data is drawn from 252 phone interviews and 46 individual in-person interviews conducted from February through June 2006.

Telephone interviews were open ended: we did not seek specific answers to specific questions. Rather, in each interview, our team members encouraged interviewees to simply tell us their story. This approach was necessary; some interviewees were initially reluctant to speak with an interviewer who represented the government. Many of the caregivers were themselves traumatized and harmed by the events. Our dialogue was designed to reassure them and cause no additional emotional harm. Finally, it was important to explore the background and issues associated with this topic, and an “open topic” approach seemed to encourage the necessary type of dialogue we sought.

Additionally, we interviewed 46 individuals in person. As a part of these interviews, members of our team visited the facilities of Operation Blessing, the Salvation Army, the Louisiana Family Assistance Center, and others. These interviews were invaluable in establishing relationships with those organizations on the ground. They helped deepen our understanding of the issues. For a complete list of all the participating individuals, please see Appendix D.

Survey

We sent our survey to 694 individuals and organizations. We received 153 responses from 127 organizations. The survey asks binary questions (yes or no) about 41 relief and recovery activities that were performed by FBOs and NGOs after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.

Complete documentation of the survey is provided in Appendix B.

Conference

On June 7, 2006, the Homeland Security Institute hosted a one-day conference entitled “Heralding Unheard Voices: The Role of Faith-Based and Non-Governmental Organizations During Disaster,” at the River Center in Baton Rouge, LA. The conference was open to any FBO or NGO that provided services during or after Hurricanes Katrina or Rita. A total of 233 attendees ranged from national directors of large organizations to first-time volunteers and included several DHS, FEMA, and state government representatives.

The conference included plenary sessions with speakers and panels, as well as breakout sessions that allowed HSI to gather comments from attendees.

Transcripts of speeches, and all other conference-related documents, are provided in Appendix B.

FBO and NGO Distinction

For the purposes of this study, FBOs are defined as organizations having a religious or faith-based affiliation; these are usually associated to some degree with a larger denomination. Other NGOs, referred to simply as “NGOs” for brevity’s sake, are defined as organizations that do not have such an orientation.

For many FBOs and NGOs, participation in disaster response and recovery is not their primary role. According to John Berglund, the National Disaster Services Coordinator for the Salvation Army, when it comes to mass care, FEMA and the ARC are the two primary responsible agencies. They are followed by a sizeable list of federal agencies and then by the Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster. “And underneath all of those are all the faith-based organizations, and all other organizations that provide services,” states Berglund.

However, he continues: “... Being a support agency, you support—you help where you can, when you can, how you can. And that’s where the Salvation Army fits in, that’s where the Southern Baptists fit in, that’s where the Mennonites fit in, the Adventists.... For us [FBOs and NGOs], disaster services isn’t even a core mission—it’s a service that we provide.”⁹

U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) teams visiting the Gulf Coast region in October 2005 observed that “in areas where the American Red Cross did not provide services, the Salvation Army and smaller organizations—often local churches—were able to meet many of the charitable needs of hard-to-reach communities.... Further, where the American Red Cross was able to establish shelters, the needs of victims sometimes exceeded the capacity of the American Red Cross.”¹⁰ In those areas, it was Berglund’s bottom tier (FBOs and NGOs) who mobilized to address the needs of their congregations and of the broader community.

Assumptions

Four assumptions, although not articulated formally, were initially present:

1. FBOs and NGOs who responded to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita augmented government and American Red Cross response
2. Their impact, though beneficial, was not significant, at least not compared to the impact of government and the American Red Cross
3. Their contribution was limited to traditional areas of FBO and NGO service, such as mental health and spiritual services
4. Their story could be told within the scope and scale of this project

All four assumptions proved not to be true.

Services

The analysis is presented from the perspective of “services.” We asked the questions “What did the organization do?” and “What service or function did the organization provide?”

FBOs and NGOs provide communities with a range of services. Examples are shelter, food, and medical care. We focused our research on those services performed most frequently by FBOs and NGOs.

Disaster Child Care Ministry

The Church of the Brethren denomination is an example of a faith-based organization that provides services during disasters.

According to Roy Winter, Emergency Relief Director with the Church of the Brethren’s Disaster Child Care Ministry, volunteers seek to “create a safe and friendly environment to give children the freedom to act like children.” Volunteers give child victims individual attention and engage them in therapeutic play activities designed to relieve stress and calm fears stemming from the disaster. The Ministry also focuses on education and training for educators and parents on the effects of disasters on children.*

In response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the Church of the Brethren mobilized 3,000 churches from across the nation to supply emergency child care volunteers through its Disaster Child Care Ministry. These volunteers established child care centers at numerous shelters along the Gulf Coast.†

Within each service, we examined several sub-functions. For example, within Shelter, we found two sub-functions: (1) Shelter Evacuees and (2) Shelter Relief Workers or Volunteers.

* Disaster Service/Emergency Ministries, Church of the Brethren, “Disaster Child Care,” www.brethren.org/genbd/ersm/dcc.htm.

† Roy Winter, Emergency Relief Director, Church of the Brethren Emergency Response/Service Ministries, new Windsor, MD, interview with Steve Bowen, April 18, 2006.

We found that FBOs and NGOs performed at least ten major services and 33 sub-functions. They performed other services, but these were the more important and most frequent ones. One would expect FBOs and NGOs to do some of these, such as spiritual counseling. It makes sense that faith-based organizations would be engaged in spiritual counseling during and following a crisis. However, other services provided are quite unexpected. For example, 67 FBOs and NGOs out of 127 organizations surveyed provided for the warehousing of supplies.

Those ten services are

1. Shelter services
2. Food services
3. Medical services
4. Personal hygiene services
5. Mental health and spiritual support
6. Physical reconstruction services
7. Logistics management and services
8. Transportation management and services
9. Children's services
10. Case management services

Organization of Findings

In the following sections we present our findings related to each of the five research questions. These are significant cross-cutting themes that apply to many functional areas.

Appendices A1–A10 present additional information on the findings specific to each of the services provided by FBOs and NGOs.

The main body of this paper provides DHS personnel, principally decision makers and operators who may have to work with the FBO and NGO communities during a disaster, with key information. While the appendices contain findings valuable to that audience, we wrote them with the FBO and NGO communities in mind. We believe that the appendices may be particularly helpful to readers wishing to gain greater understanding of the role of FBOs and NGOs during and following disasters.

3. SIGNIFICANT IMPACT

The number of volunteer and non-profit organizations providing support to the Hurricane Katrina relief effort was truly extraordinary. Virtually every national, regional and local charitable organization in the U.S., and many from abroad, contributed aid to the victims of Hurricane Katrina.

The White House, *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned*¹¹

Research Question 1

Did FBOs and NGOs have a significant beneficial impact during and after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita?

In discussions with government officials prior to the launch of this project, we found a general recognition that FBOs and NGOs played a role during and after the hurricanes. However, it was not clear how significant that role may have been. The prevailing opinion seemed to be that FBOs and NGOs augmented, in some small way, government services and the services of others who respond to disasters.

We found just the opposite to be true. It was neighborhood congregations, local food banks, community outreach centers, the churches, mosques, synagogues, temples, and other community organizations—the local fabric of America—that appear to have carried the day to a great degree.

Findings

FBOs and NGOs had a significant beneficial impact in at least ten services areas. (See Appendices A1–A10.) Through their efforts in these areas, they reduced suffering, facilitated restoration of infrastructure (mostly by housing relief workers and volunteers), and lessened the economic impact of the hurricanes by donating services and material resources.

In particular, findings related to the scope, scale, focal point, and the lead or sole provider demonstrated the significant FBO/NGO impact.

Scope. FBOs and NGOs provided services across the entire geographic region affected by the hurricanes. National organizations and denominations brought resources to the four states most affected by the hurricanes: Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Texas. Some of the larger national organizations and several denominations began staging materials and personnel in neighboring states prior to Hurricane Katrina's landfall so that they would be ready to deploy into the disaster area once the hurricane had passed. Local FBOs and NGOs across the entire region also responded. Conversations with those organizations reveal that many did not anticipate the scope of disaster. However, once the need arose, they endeavored to meet it as best they could with the resources on hand and available to them through networks.

Victim Relief Ministries

Victim Relief Ministries is an example of an FBO that made a significant impact following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.

The mission of Victim Relief Ministries is to “provide a system of faith-based assistance from highly trained local church volunteers of all denominations, reaching out to meet the physical, emotional and spiritual needs of victims of crime.”*

When Hurricane Katrina hit, Victim Relief Ministries mobilized volunteer Victim Chaplains and Crisis Responders and dispatched them to the disaster area. “Even though this was not a crime, we knew our chaplains needed to be there to help,” says Gene Grounds, President of Victim Relief Ministries.

Those chaplains served a variety of spiritual functions. When many former residents of New Orleans’ Ninth Ward returned home for the first time to “look and leave,” they were accompanied by Victim Relief Chaplains. Victim Relief Chaplains were on duty in the Louisiana Family Assistance Center. There, they comforted the families of the deceased and encouraged those searching for missing loved ones. We saw one of their functions during our visit to New Orleans’ devastated Ninth Ward. The fire department believed they had found human remains that day in the wreckage of a building; they called for a Victim Relief Chaplain to be present as they removed the last bit of rubble. Had a body been found, the Chaplain would have said a brief prayer. That morning, remains were not found. But on many other occasions, they were. In those instances, Victim Relief Chaplains offered a nondenominational prayer. In fact, we included one Victim Relief Chaplain in each of our eight breakout groups at the *Heralding Unheard Voices* conference in case our questions reopened barely closed wounds. The Chaplains were there to provide strength and comfort to anyone who might need it.

The relationships between Victim Relief Ministries and local police departments are unique. While many local police departments have chaplains on the force, often they minister to the spiritual needs of police officers and other responders; but the victim and the family of victims also need spiritual support during crises, and thus was born Victim Relief Ministries.

And while the organization is small compared to some of the other national and international organizations, it has had a tremendous impact in providing support to those most in need in the Gulf Coast.

Scale. Thousands of organizations provided tens of thousands of volunteer hours and hundreds of millions of dollars in resources. Organizations from all 50 states and the international community responded. Local FBOs, in particular, from across the nation, on their own accord, provided donations, material, and in many cases teams of volunteers. Some of these efforts were coordinated through national organizations or denominations. Often, staff or congregation members of one FBO would establish contact with someone they knew in a church or organization in the disaster area, and based on that contact would send donations or material or arrange for a team of volunteers to travel to the disaster area.

* Victim Relief Ministries, “A Faith Based Organization with a Heart for Helping Victims,” www.victimrelief.org/about.htm.

Focal point. FBOs and NGOs were central to the response and recovery effort. In some communities, FBOs and NGOs were the only organizations and agencies providing aid. In some cases, when government services returned to a community, they rallied around or used the local FBO or NGO as a focal point for services.

Lead or sole provider. In many service areas, FBOs and NGOs did not augment government response. Rather, they took the lead, and government augmented their efforts. In some communities, they were the only ones to provide shelter, food, or medical services for days or even weeks. And today, in many communities, FBOs and NGOs are still providing recovery services.

4. SERVICES

Hurricane Katrina showed us faith-based organizations doing superb work and being way ahead of government.

Jim Towey, Director of the White House Office for Faith-Based and Community Initiatives¹²

Research Question 2

What are the services performed by FBOs and NGOs?

We expected that the range of services provided by these organizations would be somewhat limited. The prevailing assumption was that FBOs and NGOs expanded upon existing services—such as spiritual counseling—and that they added a few emergency services, such as shelter, food, and water.

Instead, we found a network of thousands of FBOs and NGOs with advanced technical capabilities, with armies of volunteers, with facilities, capabilities, and processes on a scale that is remarkable. For example, one church provided dialysis treatments for those desperately in need of this essential medical treatment. Operation Blessing’s medical clinics’ teams of doctors and nurses provided advanced medical care. Organizations provided a host of other services, such as warehousing and distribution of supplies, transportation of evacuees, relief workers and volunteers, case management so victims could register for aid, and, of course, shelter and food.

Findings

FBOs and NGOs provided services in at least ten service areas.

<p>Shelter. Hurricane Katrina destroyed 300,000 homes and displaced 770,000 people. Evacuees needed shelter. Pop-up shelters—those not associated with the ARC or FEMA—opened their doors to evacuees. Relief workers and volunteers also needed shelter. Without them, recovery could not begin. Local FBOs and NGOs sheltered hundreds of thousands of evacuees, relief workers, and volunteers. (See Appendix A1.)</p> <p>Of the local organizations we surveyed, 79% provided shelter to either evacuees or to relief workers and volunteers, or both; 65% provided shelter to evacuees; 51% provided shelter to relief workers and volunteers.</p> <p>(Note: In this service as well as in subsequent ones, percentages associated with sub-functions exceed 100%. This reflects the fact that many organizations performed more than one sub-function in a service area.)</p>	<p><i>Survey Results: Shelter</i></p> <p>79% provided shelter to evacuees, relief workers and volunteers, or both</p> <p>65% provided shelter to evacuees</p> <p>51% provided shelter to relief workers and volunteers</p>
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<p>Food services. Organizations, like the Salvation Army and Southern Baptist Convention provided millions of meals. (See Appendix A2.)</p> <p>Of the organizations we surveyed, 85% provided some type of food service: 65% prepared meals that they served or that they provided to other organizations for serving; 69% served meals that they either prepared themselves or received from others; 43% distributed prepared food to other communities or organizations.</p>	<p><i>Survey Results: Food Services</i></p> <p>85% provided some type of food service</p> <p>65% prepared meals that they served or that they provided to other organizations for serving</p> <p>69% served meals that they either prepared themselves or received from others</p> <p>43% distributed prepared food to other communities or organizations</p>
<p>Medical services. Medical services provided by FBOs and NGOs included a wide range of activities that were administered by both professional medical personnel and by organization staff and volunteers with varying degrees of training. (See Appendix A3.)</p> <p>Of the organizations we surveyed, 62% performed some type of medical service: 35% provided advanced medical care; 43% provided basic medical care or first aid; 30% assisted with medical prescriptions.</p>	<p><i>Survey Results: Medical Services</i></p> <p>62% performed some type of medical service</p> <p>35% provided advanced medical care</p> <p>43% provided basic medical care or first aid</p> <p>30% assisted with medical prescriptions</p>

<p>Personal hygiene services. Personal hygiene is a fundamental challenge following a disaster. Evacuees, relief workers, and volunteers may be at risk from contaminated flood waters, debris, and damaged buildings. Evacuees may have fled their homes without basic toiletry articles. In mass shelters such as the Superdome, toilets may fail. Adequate numbers of toilets and the cleanliness of toilet facilities was an issue. While all organizations had toilet facilities of some kind, the issue of availability and cleanliness of those facilities was often cited. Shelter hygiene is closely linked to personal hygiene; shelters need to be kept clean. (See Appendix A4.)</p> <p>Of the organizations we surveyed, 88% provided some type of personal hygiene services; 80% assembled or distributed supply kits including toiletries and cleanup supplies; 50% provided laundry services; 55% provided showers and other hygiene services.</p>	<p><i>Survey Results: Personal Hygiene</i></p> <p>88% provided some type of personal hygiene service</p> <p>80% assembled or distributed supply kits including toiletries and cleanup supplies</p> <p>50% provided laundry services</p> <p>55% provided showers and other hygiene services</p>
<p>Mental health and spiritual support. Mental health and spiritual support services were common efforts provided by members of the FBO and NGO community. (See Appendix A5.)</p> <p>Of the organizations we surveyed, 87% provided some form of mental or spiritual counseling and care services; 58% provided mental health services; 81% provided spiritual counseling and care services.</p>	<p><i>Survey Results: Mental Health and Spiritual Support</i></p> <p>87% provided some form of mental or spiritual counseling and care services</p> <p>58% provided mental or spiritual counseling and care services</p> <p>81% provided spiritual counseling and care services</p>
<p>Physical reconstruction services. “Physical reconstruction” refers to a broad set of actions performed by organizations to reconstitute private physical property, such as individual homes and community structures. (See Appendix A6.)</p> <p>Of the organizations we surveyed, 54% were involved in some form of physical reconstruction services; 43% removed debris or trees; 34% removed mud and cleaned up homes; 47% provided home repair services such as interior gutting or roof repair.</p>	<p><i>Survey Results: Physical Reconstruction Services</i></p> <p>54% were involved in some form of physical reconstruction services</p> <p>43% removed debris or trees</p> <p>34% removed mud or cleaned up homes</p> <p>47% provided home repair services such as interior gutting or roof repair</p>

<p>Logistics management and services. FBOs and NGOs acquired, organized, and delivered emergency supplies to the victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. (See Appendix A7.)</p> <p>Of the organizations we surveyed, 80% provided some form of logistics management and services; 53% conducted assessments of community needs; 72% transported or distributed supplies; 53% warehoused supplies.</p>	<p><i>Survey Results: Logistics Management and Services</i></p> <p>80% provided some form of logistics management and services</p> <p>53% conducted assessments of community needs</p> <p>72% transported or distributed supplies</p> <p>53% warehoused supplies</p>
<p>Transportation management and services. Following disasters, many people need ordinary and routine transportation. Routine transportation is essential to reducing human suffering and lessening the economic impact of the disaster: people need to return to normal life as soon as the situation may allow. However, this fundamental need is not accommodated in most emergency planning, which commonly focuses on evacuation. Organizations found that this was one of the more important services they could provide. (See Appendix A8.)</p> <p>Of the organizations we surveyed, 61% provided some form of transportation services; 42% shuttled evacuees to places such as government offices and the offices of service providers; 38% shuttled relief workers and volunteers; 37% evacuated and/or relocated evacuees.</p>	<p><i>Survey Results: Transportation Management and Services</i></p> <p>61% provided some form of transportation management and services</p> <p>42% shuttled evacuees</p> <p>38% shuttled relief workers and volunteers</p> <p>37% evacuated or relocated evacuees</p>
<p>Children’s services. FBOs and NGOs provided specialized care for children and for families with children following both hurricanes. (See Appendix A9.)</p> <p>Of the organizations we surveyed, 50% provided child care or educational services; 24% established a formal child care center or program; 46% provided educational services. Shelters also provided recreational activities specifically for children.</p>	<p><i>Survey Results: Children’s Services</i></p> <p>50% provided child care or educational services</p> <p>24% established a formal child care center or program</p> <p>46% provided educational services</p>

<p>Case management and related services. Case management is formal assistance provided to individuals and families to gain health and human services to which they are entitled. This involves trained case workers familiar with local, state, federal, and charitable assistance programs. (See Appendix A10.)</p> <p>Of the organizations we surveyed, 92% provided some form of case management or related service; 79% provided information to evacuees; 87% referred evacuees to others, such as the Salvation Army or FEMA, to obtain services and care; 63% assisted evacuees in completing forms and applications; 71% provided direct financial relief to evacuees.</p>	<p><i>Survey Results: Case Management and Related Services</i></p> <p>92% provided some form of case management or related service</p> <p>79% provided information to evacuees</p> <p>87% provided referral services</p> <p>63% assisted evacuees in completing forms and applications</p> <p>71% provided direct financial relief to evacuees</p>
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5. LIMITATIONS AND CHALLENGES

Social science research has consistently shown that community residents are the true first responders in both disasters and terrorist attacks, but homeland security initiatives ignore the vital role the public plays in disaster response....Social science knowledge with respect to the value of grass-roots preparedness efforts, community-based organizations, and the role played by both pre-planned and emergent disaster volunteer groups was never used in developing planning schemes for extreme events.

Kathleen Tierney, *The Red Pill*¹³

Research Question 3

What are the limitations and challenges to FBOs and NGOs providing these services?

Limitations and challenges fell into two broad groupings: (1) coordination and planning and (2) resources. Within Coordination and Planning, four specific limitations and challenges were often cited: (1) government planning, (2) services overlooked, (3) coordination and integration, and (4) access and credentialing. Likewise, within Resources, four specific limitations and challenges were often cited: (1) training and experience, (2) cost, (3) long-term routine needs, and (4) waste management and sanitation.

Findings

1. Coordination and Planning

- **Non-inclusive government planning.** FBOs and NGOs, with a few exceptions, are not included in the majority of governments' planning for disaster response and recovery. They are generally not included in exercises and training events that would make them more effective in a crisis, and rarely consulted about what resources, including information, would be most helpful to them. This is particularly true for local organizations. Planning was a major limitation and challenge in six functional areas: shelter, medical services, hygiene, transportation management and services, children's services, and case management.
- **Overlooked service needs.** Emergency plans do not address emergent needs such as pop-up shelters and routine transportation. The requirement for pop-up shelters to accommodate a mass of evacuees unable to reach government or ARC shelters is not addressed in government planning. Likewise, routine transportation of evacuees to help them resume normal lives as well as routine transportation of relief workers and volunteers appears to be overlooked and yet was a large-scale problem.

Routine Transportation

First United Methodist Church of Monroe, LA, provided routine daily transportation for evacuees and ferried volunteers and relief workers.

First United Methodist Church housed evacuees in 12 locations. This presented a significant transportation challenge: how do you move those evacuees, every day, to all the places to which they need to go? The church had buses, so it recruited volunteer drivers, creating a makeshift local bus network for the evacuees.

Besides providing local bus transportation for evacuees, the church made one-day blitzes to the Gulf Coast, ferrying teams of 20 to 40 volunteers to Gretna and Port Sulfur, LA, where they engaged in physical reconstruction services.*

- **Inadequate coordination and integration.** Government authorities and others failed to coordinate adequately with local and national FBOs and NGOs, even when the FBOs and NGOs were providing the bulk of services in a community. Local organizations, especially smaller organizations, are not integrated into emergency operations plans for their communities. Consequently, they found it difficult to operate efficiently. Coordination and integration were major limitations and challenges in four of the ten functional areas: shelter, medical services, physical reconstruction services, and logistics management and services.
- **Problems with access and credentialing.** FBOs and NGOs, particularly local ones, had difficulty with physical access to disaster areas and associated activities. Without government-issued credentials identifying them as serving in some official capacity, they found themselves blocked from delivering resources and services. This was particularly an issue for smaller FBOs and NGOs that were not recognized at law enforcement and military checkpoints. In addition, spiritual care providers were not allowed access to some shelters. Access and credentialing were major limitations and challenges in three functional areas: mental health and spiritual support, logistics management and services, and transportation management and services.

2. Resources

- **Inadequate training and experience.** The great geographic scale of destruction and the intensity of this disaster prompted many local organizations who had never served in this capacity before to take action. The challenge of the destruction of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita was so great that FBOs and NGOs not usually involved in disaster relief became shelter operators, builders, case managers, shelter providers, caregivers, food and medicine providers, etc. Their effectiveness improved quickly. However, their lack of initial training and experience proved to be a challenge. Many local organizations had little or no training. Those that had prior training fared much better initially than those who had none. Training and experience were limitations and challenges in three functional areas: shelter, medical services, and physical reconstruction services.

* Rev. Terry Love, Associate Pastor, First United Methodist Church of Monroe, LA, phone interview with Richard Rowe, May 10, 2006.

- **Cost.** There is a significant cost to providing emergency relief. Organizations that undertook such missions bore financial, physical, and human costs. Interviewees frequently mentioned volunteer fatigue and staff burnout. Cost—particularly the human cost of serving—was an issue in every functional area, especially sheltering. There is little quantitative data on the human cost impact to organizations of serving during and after a disaster. However, the human cost became apparent to interviewees during the data collection phase of the project: calls to organizations, particularly smaller ones, were often met with news that the staff who served during and after the hurricanes had since departed the organization.
- **Unanticipated needs for long-term routine services.** The needs of evacuees following the initial response—particularly in an event such as Hurricane Katrina, where the effects linger for months or years—are not adequately anticipated by government and others. For example, the need for routine transportation for evacuees is not included in emergency planning. Long-term routine needs are overlooked or are inadequately addressed in six functional areas: shelter, mental health and spiritual support, physical reconstruction, transportation, children’s services, and case management.
- **Waste management and sanitation.** Waste management and sanitation proved to be one of the most significant challenges for which organizations were unable to develop a mitigating best practice. After public and private waste management and sanitation services broke down, no other agency stepped in to solve this problem. None of the FBOs and NGOs was equipped to provide a solution. Debris and solid waste were limitations and challenges in four functional areas: shelter, medical services, personal hygiene, and physical reconstruction.

These were significant impediments to FBOs and NGOs’ making an even greater beneficial impact than they did. FBOs and NGOs developed practices to work around some of these limitations and challenges. Their success in doing so varied greatly. Two challenges and limitations were not adequately resolved: (1) access and credentialing and (2) waste management and sanitation.

All of these challenges and limitations are issues that fall within the generally accepted role of government and government agencies following a disaster. Interviewees conveyed an impression that if government could address these limitations and challenges, FBOs and NGOs’ beneficial impact would be heightened.

6. BEST PRACTICES

People and communities in crisis need ... Such ...help is ...the natural mode of operation of non-governmental groups, from non-profit organizations ...to congregations and ethnic associations.

Mark Chaves and William Tsitsos, "Congregations and Social Services: What They Do, How They Do It, and With Whom"¹⁴

Research Question 4

What best practices did organizations develop related to those services?

There is no universally accepted definition of a best practice. In some fields, such as medicine, law enforcement, and the military, there are mechanisms for evaluating lessons learned and identifying those practices that are best. No such mechanism exists in the FBO and NGO world with regard to disaster response and recovery.

In this world, practices that have been adopted and seemed to work well are shared informally, often through conferences or journals and articles. Some practices flow down to the local level from the ARC, the Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster, the Salvation Army, and other national organizations. The ARC identifies practices to be used in its shelters and when organizations operate in conjunction with it. It disseminates those through classes and training, and it requires an organization wishing to be an ARC supported provider during a disaster to adhere to those practices.

The purpose of this paper did not include evaluating ARC practices to see whether they were best. Rather, what we sought was to identify the practices local FBOs and NGOs, particularly those outside the ARC umbrella, adopted to deal with limitations and challenges. For the sake of brevity, we did not reiterate practices that are well established and already recognized.

Findings

We discovered best practices that reached across all functions as well as best practices that applied to just one function or a few functions. Best practices that apply broadly are cited below.

- **Specialization.** Many FBOs and NGOs specialized in one or a few services. This proved highly effective, especially if the organization could partner with others in its community that were providing complementary services. Specialization optimizes the contributions of organizations during a disaster. The major denominations have chosen to specialize in certain aspects of disaster response and recovery. Specialization was a best practice noted in four functional areas: food, medical services, mental health and spiritual support, and physical reconstruction.
- **Partnering.** Organizations partnered with one another to meet complementary needs. This was also highly effective. An example is an arrangement in which one FBO serves as the shelter while a community NGO prepares the meals and delivers them to the shelter. Partnering was a best practice noted in four functional areas: food, logistics management and services, children's services, and case management.
- **Family unity.** Shelters that strove to preserve family unity found that this practice had beneficial ramifications in shelter operations, medical services, mental health and spiritual support, and children's services. This was also a best practice for facilitating care for those with special needs.

Special-Needs Victims

Special-needs victims presented special challenges to FBOs and NGOs in all ten service areas. FBOs and NGOs developed best practices to assist them with special needs victims. However, in many cases, organizations lacked specific in-house expertise in the particular needs of these individuals.

One example of an FBO that provided support for special-needs victims comes from Opelousas, LA. Reverend Dale Hensarling of the Louisiana Memorial United Methodist Church there resolved to address the needs of one special group of evacuees: those with kidney illnesses. The National Kidney Foundation recognized that some evacuees would need kidney dialysis treatment. The foundation provided Hensarling with a grant that enabled the church to establish a system (well before Katrina) that evacuated victims needing dialysis and family members from the devastated areas to Baton Rouge and Lafayette, then further north to Hensarling's church to facilitate treatment at local medical facilities.*

Several elements made this approach successful. It preserved family units during evacuations. By keeping the family together, members could provide long-term care for the patient. Second, they planned before the crisis, demonstrating the need for FBOs and NGOs to anticipate problems. Third, the initiative was possible only through partnership with other organizations, both national and local, highlighting the importance of partnering. Fourth, this example highlights the power of specialization. By specializing in this specific niche, Louisiana Memorial United Methodist Church was able to serve a community that might not have been served—and thus might have perished—otherwise.

* Reverend Dale Hensarling, Louisiana Memorial United Methodist Church, Opelousas, LA, phone interview with Richard Rowe, March 28, 2006.

7. WHY WERE FBOs AND NGOs SO EFFECTIVE?

Many of the charities responding to Katrina worked with each other to coordinate the delivery of a multitude of services, including providing food, shelter, and medical assistance.

U.S. House of Representatives, *A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina*¹⁵

Research Question 5

If they did have significant beneficial impact, why were they so effective?

FBOs and NGOs had a significantly beneficial impact and demonstrably proved their effectiveness in providing disaster relief services.

Findings

FBOs and NGOs were effective for three principal reasons. The first involves their nature or *raison d'être*. The mission of almost all of the more than 1,000 organizations contacted is “people.” These FBOs and NGOs are intended to be responsive to whatever people need. The second is their closeness to and familiarity with the communities they serve. The third involves their unique resources and capabilities. Organizations have, or can gain access to through networks, resources and capabilities directly applicable to the types of services needed following a disaster. Specific findings, grouped by the three areas, are discussed below.

1. Mission

- **Exceptionally strong motivation.** A theme that was often cited throughout the interviews and at the *Heralding Unheard Voices* Conference was that of “higher calling.” Organizations’ staff members and volunteers indicated that they served, sometimes at great personal physical, emotional, and financial cost, because they felt called to do so by a higher authority. Interviewees felt that this sense of higher calling on the part of staff and volunteers was an important factor in making their organizations more responsive to people in need, and more persistent in the face of adversity, than they would have been otherwise.
- **Unity of purpose.** FBOs and NGOs are a disparate group with a broad range of racial, ethnic, religious, cultural, and regional characteristics. Despite those differences, this disparate group of organizations managed to achieve a noteworthy cohesion and unity of purpose under trying circumstances. Interviewees stressed that traditional barriers between organizations evaporated and organizations of differing purposes and characteristics worked well together.

2. Local Focus

- **Community.** Local organizations were often integrated into the community. They knew the local community—people, resources, organizations, etc.—enabling them to work more effectively than an organization unfamiliar with the local terrain. Also, this identification with the local community imbues the organization with dedication and steadfastness to serve its community in times of need. Many of those organizations interviewed that chose to remain and serve in

geographic areas the ARC and FEMA had difficulty reaching did so out of loyalty to their community and love of their neighbors.

- **Speed of response.** Government and national organizations did not reach many areas for some time due to flood waters, damaged infrastructure, and overwhelming demand. In contrast, local organizations were already on the scene or close by. In addition, they were unhampered by bureaucratic restraints. The combination of local presence, independence from bureaucratic restraints, and smaller size enabled these organizations to act quickly.
- **Independence.** Many organizations, particularly smaller local ones, successfully operated without government or ARC support or direction. The combination of independence from government and ARC direction and small size enabled organizations to be agile and immediately responsive to human need: leaders of small organizations made decisions, such as commitment of resources, often based on quick and informal discussions with boards of elders or similar boards and councils.
- **Standing capability.** Many organizations provided day-to-day care for those in need before the disaster. They were already involved in community services of some type when the hurricanes struck and thus were able to adapt to the crisis conditions and surge their capacity to meet the increased need. Social service case managers became disaster case managers; food banks for the homeless and needy supplied pop-up shelters with food; and counselors addressed the needs of disaster victims.
- **Excess capacity.** Churches and similar organizations that are designed for peak attendance over short periods have excess physical capacity at other times. Many have dining halls, basements, family life centers, or large meeting rooms that can serve as shelters. This excess physical capacity when coupled with the manpower available from volunteers to staff facilities proved a powerful force.

3. Unique Resources

- **Beachhead.** Those national organizations with links to local ones, such as the Southern Baptist Convention's relationship to local Baptist churches, were able to use the local entity as a beachhead—a starting point from which to serve the community. These beachheads often became local points of distribution for services and material provided by the national organizations. They also served as shelters and feeding stations for the thousands of volunteers dispatched to the region by national organizations.
- **Small scale.** Smaller organizations, particularly shelters, were responsive to evacuees, volunteers, and relief workers. Despite emphasis on large facilities and service providers in government planning, small-scale efforts were highly successful. Smaller shelters that were located in, or that popped up in, churches of all sizes and denominations, in boys' and girls' clubs, in recreation halls, and in schools run by local community volunteers were able to address various issues, including personal hygiene, quality feeding, personal mental and spiritual care, and family needs, more effectively than many larger shelters. These smaller shelters enabled evacuees to get back on their feet, become more self-sufficient earlier, and leave the shelter better equipped. Shelter operators noted that smaller facilities and the community atmosphere they promoted contributed to psychological well-being.

- **Support from networks and national organizations.** Many organizations had local and national support networks to draw upon, at times surpassing the capabilities of government agencies. Locally, informal networks such as councils and alliances enabled local organizations to coordinate activities and share resources within their community. Also, most of the organizations interviewed are linked to larger national organizations, such as denominations. National organizations provided local organizations with access to resources such as donations, material, skilled relief workers, and volunteers well beyond what was available locally. Examples of national organizations that responded are the Salvation Army, Operation Blessing, Victim Relief, and Christ in Action. Examples of national disaster response organizations associated with denominations are Catholic Relief Services, Catholic Charities, several ministries of the Southern Baptist Convention, and Lutheran Disaster Response.
- **Volunteerism.** The tens of thousands of volunteers who stopped their normal lives to do the extraordinary—to give of their time and energy—were a unique strength of FBOs and NGOs. They brought skills, energy, and compassion to the problem. These volunteers came from all over. For example, the Churches of Scientology Disaster Response provided over one thousand volunteers from all over the country who served in operating shelters, gave mental and spiritual care to evacuees as well as to caregivers and responders, and helped with logistical services and physical reconstruction services.¹⁶ While some volunteers may have had only limited training—for example, college students who assisted with debris removal, mud-out, and cleaning—many others were highly skilled and prepared to respond to disasters.

These 11 characteristics are not the exclusive domain of FBOs and NGOs. For example, government employees may have *exceptionally strong motivation* that sustains them in a disaster; government plans, such as the National Response Plan, promote *unity of purpose*; and local governments have a *local focus*. Rather, these 11 characteristics were cited by interviewees as contributing to their successes. It appears that it is the combination of these 11 characteristics that makes FBOs and NGOs uniquely suited to serve during and following a disaster.

8. CONCLUSION

More than half of all congregations and many other faith-based organizations provide some form of human services. Congregational participation in providing human services is greater among worship communities that are large (and hence have more resources), are located in low-income neighborhoods, are theologically liberal, and are African American.¹⁷

The Urban Institute, *Faith-Based Organizations in Community Development*

Exploration and Discovery

We found that FBOs and NGOs made an unexpectedly significant impact in response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Many of the starting assumptions of the project—those that framed and inspired perceptions going into the project—proved to be inconsistent with the extraordinary roles that these organizations performed.

FBOs' and NGOs' contributions to relief and recovery efforts during these disasters document the essential roles they performed. The common starting perceptions did not recognize or indicate the scope and scale of their efforts. As the research progressed, the discoveries became more and more meaningful.

In conclusion, these organizations did so much more than is commonly understood within government and by the general public that the difference between the commonly accepted picture and the facts is staggering.

Findings

Many significant cross-cutting themes among our findings apply to service areas summarized below. We also identified findings specific to individual services; these are presented in appendices A1 through A10.

Research Question 1: Did FBOs and NGOs have a significant beneficial impact during and after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita?

Yes. FBOs and NGOs had a significant beneficial impact throughout Hurricanes Katrina and Rita relief efforts.

They literally gave shelter in a storm. They made life-and-death differences in people's lives. They gave food to the hungry and vulnerable. They reduced suffering, facilitated restoration of infrastructure (mostly by housing relief workers and volunteers), and lessened the economic impact of the hurricanes by donating services and material resources.

They were central to the response and recovery effort. In many functional areas, they took the lead, and government augmented their efforts. In some communities, they were the only ones to provide shelter, food, or medical services for days or even weeks. And today, in many communities, FBOs and NGOs are still providing recovery services.

Research Question 2: What are the services provided by FBOs and NGOs?

FBOs and NGOs provided assistance in at least ten areas:

1. Shelter
2. Food services
3. Medical services
4. Personal hygiene services
5. Mental health and spiritual support
6. Physical reconstruction services
7. Logistics management and services
8. Transportation management and services
9. Children's services
10. Case management and related services

These are described in greater detail in Appendices A1-A10.

Research Question 3: What are the limitations and challenges to FBOs and NGOs' performing these functions?

Most organizations faced similar limitations and challenges. In general, these limitations and challenges were related either to coordination and planning or to resources.

The coordination and planning limitations and challenges were these:

- **Inadequate government planning.** FBOs and NGOs are not included in much of governments' planning for disaster response and recovery.
- **Overlooked service needs.** Some of the services needed following a disaster are overlooked in government planning.
- **Inadequate coordination and integration.** Government authorities and others failed to coordinate adequately with local and national FBOs and NGOs, even when the FBOs and NGOs were providing the bulk of services in a community.
- **Problems with access and credentialing.** FBOs and NGOs, particularly local ones, had difficulty with physical access to disaster areas.
- **Inadequate training and experience.** Many local organizations that had never served during a disaster stepped up to take action. Their lack of initial training and experience proved to be a challenge.
- **Cost.** Organizations that served incurred significant financial, physical, and human costs.
- **Unanticipated need for long-term routine services.** The long-term routine needs of evacuees are not adequately anticipated by government and others.
- **Waste management and sanitation.** Waste management and sanitation proved to be one of the most significant challenges for which organizations were unable to develop a mitigating best

practice. After public and private waste management services broke down, no other agency stepped in to solve this problem. FBOs and NGOs cited this problem as a key challenge to their work and one that was beyond their capabilities to resolve.

Research Question 4: What best practices did organizations develop related to those functions?

Organizations adapted and developed practices to deal with limitations and challenges. Best practices reached across all functions or applied to just one or a few functions. The best practices that applied broadly included these:

- **Specialization.** Specialization optimizes the contribution of organizations during a disaster.
- **Partnering.** Organizations partnered with one another to meet complementary needs.
- **Preserving family unity.** Shelters that strove to preserve family unity found that this practice had beneficial ramifications in shelter operations, medical services, mental health and spiritual support, and children's services.

Best practices that applied to just one or a few functions are discussed in Appendix A.

Research Question 5: Why were they so effective?

FBOs and other NGOs demonstrably proved their effectiveness in providing disaster relief services. They were effective for three broad reasons:

- Their specific mission and strong motivation to be responsive to whatever people needed
- Their closeness to and familiarity with the communities they served
- Access, either directly or through networks, to unique resources and capabilities directly applicable to the types of services needed following a disaster

Recommendations

In day-to-day disasters, such as an apartment complex fire that harms dozens and requires a city to focus its humanitarian services on assisting those who were affected, the existing response and recovery structure works well. That structure includes concepts of mutual aid and support from neighboring communities, states, and, in more dire events, even the federal government. The agencies and organizations that respond every day are well practiced.

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita exceeded the capacity of that structure. In that way, the hurricanes give us a glimpse into what may happen should we face another large-scale catastrophe, perhaps even one caused not by nature, but by those meaning us harm.

In these larger events, governments and national agencies and organizations require time to mobilize, plus time to gather forces and supplies and move those to the disaster area. In contrast, the local FBOs and NGOs are already there on the ground, and those that are unaffected will endeavor—as best they may—to assist those in need.

Preparing FBOs and NGOs and enhancing their ability to provide the most immediate beneficial impact during and following a disaster seems prudent and appropriate, a critical component of improved national preparedness.

In that context, we offer the following five recommendations. Across the ten service areas examined during this project, there could be dozens of recommendations, but these five are the most immediate and apply most broadly:

1. **Encourage and learn from FBO and NGO best practices.** Governments and national agencies and organizations should identify best practices for FBOs and NGOs operating outside of the traditional emergency management structure while awaiting response by the ARC, FEMA, or others. For example, there are no standards or guidelines for shelters and for food preparation in an emergency. Procedures established by the ARC for operating an ARC-affiliated shelter may not be applicable if the ARC cannot reach the shelter or if the facility never anticipated that it would find itself in that role and thus has not gone through the ARC's training or certification programs. In those cases, there should be guidelines and standards that help organizations.
2. **Address overlooked services.** Three services are overlooked or not adequately addressed in government planning: routine transportation after the evacuation, children's services, and pop-up shelters. Pop-up shelters are significant in the first few days or weeks until government can respond. Routine transportation and children's services are particularly important in events that last for long periods.
3. **Include FBOs and NGOs, particularly local ones, in planning, coordination, integration, training and exercises, and information sharing.** Government response is not coordinated with FBOs and NGOs, and these organizations are not provided with training that would greatly facilitate their ability to respond. Governments should investigate how to integrate FBOs and NGOs in coordinated response planning.
4. **Specific challenges.** Governments should address three specific limitations and challenges for which FBOs and NGOs cannot develop mitigating best practices:
 - a. **Access and credentialing.** Governments should recognize that FBOs and NGOs, particularly local ones, will require and should be allowed access to disaster areas.
 - b. **Long-term services.** Hurricanes Katrina and Rita highlighted the long-term effects of catastrophes. Yet, government planning appears to focus on the near-term immediate consequences and impacts, such as evacuation. Governments should address the long-term consequences and plan with FBOs and NGOs to mobilize all available resources in future events.
 - c. **Waste management and sanitation.** Governments should make restoration of waste management and sanitation services a priority. FBOs and NGOs do not have the means to dispose of debris and waste that accumulate during and following a disaster. This may be a health hazard, it interferes with mobility (transportation services and logistics services), and it lowers morale.
5. **Reconsider the appropriate balance between government and nongovernment responsibilities, and between local and higher levels, to provide good, quick, flexible response.**

Moving Forward

FBOs' and NGOs' contributions to and roles in disaster relief are significant and merit more extensive, focused study and attention.

The findings of this research effort apply not only to hurricanes, but to any wide-scale disaster of significant scope. Almost every one of our major findings touches upon an area that is not well understood and requires additional work. Two areas, in particular, may be (1) a faith-based community primer and (2) inherent attributes.

Faith-Based Community Primer

The faith-based world is complicated. Denominations may be difficult to understand and there are many varieties, each with unique characteristics and qualities. Organizational structures and nomenclature are unique within each denomination. Furthermore, some organizations in the faith-based world are not hierarchal. There is no single comprehensive authority to interact with FBOs.

In our conversations with DHS and FEMA officials, it became apparent that the faith-based world, with all of its varieties and dimensions, is difficult for government personnel to understand fully. While some within DHS and FEMA may have personal knowledge of one aspect of the faith-based world given their own affiliation and practices, the range of organizations is immense and the differences are not well understood.

Recommendation: Produce a manual that maps out the faith-based world with regard to disaster response and gives DHS a reference by which to interact with that world. This may include, as well, creating and clearly disseminating a standard source of information for FBOs and NGOs to learn how best to deal with government entities in times of crisis.

Inherent Attributes

FBOs and NGOs have inherent attributes that make them uniquely suited to serve others following a disaster. If DHS had a better understanding of those attributes and how they come into play during a crisis, the government could encourage the groups in a way that would enhance a community's resiliency.

Recommendation: Produce an analysis of the inherent attributes of FBOs and NGOs with an emphasis on means by which government may encourage and support those organizations to serve in times of need.

Epilogue

We hope we have provided a glimpse into the world of FBOs and NGOs: a world of volunteers, of small local churches and large national denominations, of neighbors helping neighbors and also helping strangers, of downtown soup kitchens and outreach centers, and of those dedicated to serving others: good Samaritans all.

In the midst of all the horrible things that went wrong in Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, theirs is the untold story that exemplifies the best of America and its people.

We have been privileged to work on this project and begin to chronicle their experiences so that DHS and others may better understand these unheralded heroes. We salute them and thank them for their service to their nation.

APPENDIX A1. SHELTER SERVICES

Hurricane Katrina transformed thousands of people's lives into a battle for survival—and, for some, finding adequate shelter proved at least as difficult as finding something to eat or drink.

The Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, *A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina*¹⁸

The National Response Plan (NRP) addresses shelter under Emergency Support Function (ESF) #6: Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services. The NRP states that the ARC is the primary agency for mass care.¹⁹

The NRP defines mass care as including “overall coordination, shelter, feeding and other activities to support emergency needs of victims ...” According to the NRP, “Emergency shelter includes the use of pre-identified shelter sites in existing structures, creation of temporary facilities or the temporary construction of shelters, and use of similar facilities outside the incident area, should evacuation be necessary.”²⁰

Although the NRP assigns primary agency responsibility for sheltering to the ARC, a large number of shelters post-Katrina were pop-up shelters not associated with the ARC. Some of these shelters were local FBOs or NGOs that already provided shelter to disadvantaged populations.

The following discussion of shelter services focuses on two sub-functions provided by FBOs and NGOs:

1. Shelter evacuees
2. Shelter volunteers and relief workers

Discussion

In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, 300,000 homes were destroyed²¹ and 770,000 people were displaced.²² While families, friends, neighbors, and government agencies provided housing, tens of thousands of victims were left without shelter.

Reporting from the national media and government after-action reports has focused on the distressing conditions of the “shelters of last resort,” such as the Superdome and the Convention Center.²³ Meanwhile, many other evacuees found safety for their families, shelter from the storms and their aftermath, and a place to rest in smaller FBOs and NGOs.

Local FBOs and NGOs sheltered hundreds of thousands of evacuees, relief workers, and volunteers. Of the 78 local FBOs and NGOs we surveyed, 79% (62) provided some form of shelter.

- 65% (51) sheltered evacuees
- 51% (40) sheltered relief workers or volunteers

Pop-up Shelters

In the first hours after disaster strikes, people desperately need a safe place with a roof over their heads where they can find refuge. Many FBOs and NGOs spontaneously opened to accept the heavy flow of evacuees from the Katrina-affected areas. These shelters popped up wherever they were needed. Unlike other shelters, typically they are not coordinated with the ARC and with FEMA. In some cases, the shelters' operators had never intended to serve as a shelter, and so they were untrained and inexperienced.

Most of these pop-up shelters were established and operated by local FBOs and NGOs. Bill Lokey, the Federal Coordinating Officer for Hurricane Katrina, estimates that around Louisiana alone, 488 pop-up shelters—unaffiliated with the ARC—opened their doors at some point to house evacuees.²⁴

Kip Holden, mayor of Baton Rouge, LA, added in a media interview that hundreds of pop-up shelters had been established across Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, and Texas. Holden estimated that in Baton Rouge alone, in “pop-up shelters ... those are the ones established by the churches ... we’re looking at about 11,000 to 12,000 people.”²⁵ Meanwhile, at the mass shelters established in Baton Rouge, Holden believed, the ARC was ministering to only 3,000 to 7,000 individuals.²⁶

Relief Worker and Volunteer Shelter

Government planning focuses on evacuees’ needs for shelter but pays little attention to the needs of relief workers and volunteers for shelter. Yet relief workers and volunteers were, and continue to be, critical to restoring the Gulf Coast. They need shelter each evening—a place to rest, eat, and prepare for the arduous work ahead of them the next day.

In the hours, days, and weeks following the hurricanes, sheltering evacuees was a priority. But a gradual transition occurs as time passes: it becomes important to shelter relief workers and volunteers so that the longer-term process of recovery may be completed.

The number of relief workers and volunteers who have responded since the hurricanes is staggering. Although a good accounting of the total number is unavailable, it is easily in the tens of thousands and continues to grow each month as additional relief workers and volunteers participate in the recovery effort. For example, Southern Baptist Relief alone has provided more than 6,000 volunteers, from 36 state conventions, who served in five states after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.²⁷ Southern Baptist churches in the immediate area provided those volunteers with shelter.

Pop-up Shelters

Covenant House in New Orleans is an example of a pop-up shelter. The building’s maintenance supervisor kept it open as Hurricane Katrina approached. When the storm hit, the supervisor began bringing people who remained in New Orleans back to Covenant House and established a shelter for several days until they could be moved elsewhere.*

In contrast, some shelters kept evacuees for months at a time and provided a range of services. These longer-term shelters provided more permanent housing arrangements, along with a range of other services, from case management to education. At Mount Pilgrim Baptist Church in Baton Rouge, for example, the church sheltered 264 total evacuees and remained open from August 30 to November 29. In this three-month period, shelter coordinators and volunteers provided not only basics such as food and shelter, but also other long-term recovery aid.†

* Renee Blanche, Development Director, Covenant House, New Orleans, phone interview with Russell Miller, May 2, 2006.

† Irma Miller, Administrative Assistant to the Pastor, Mount Pilgrim Baptist Church, Baton Rouge, LA, phone interview with Richard Rowe, March 30, 2006.

Sub-function: Shelter Evacuees

Local FBOs and NGOs played a critical role in providing shelter to evacuees. A large number of national and denominational organizations also responded by providing shelter.²⁸

In Orange, TX, the Church of the Nazarene sits right off the Interstate that carried many evacuees from Louisiana. As a result, the church was strategically placed to attract many evacuees in need of temporary or longer-term shelter. The church sheltered 100 to 125 evacuees after Hurricane Katrina.

The church had never served as a shelter before. Before the storm, it was not designated by the ARC as a shelter. Its staff had no formal shelter training. However, the church provided everything that the evacuees needed: food, water, homes for families to stay at for longer periods, transportation to medical treatment, and many of the other services discussed in this study.²⁹

Collins (MS) United Methodist Church provided housing for 100 evacuees in its “family life center,” a common hall used by the church for various functions. Family life centers served as evacuee shelters for many churches. Such facilities are regular features of churches that host community events and gatherings and may be cleared and converted to shelters should the need arise. Moreover, at Collins United Methodist Church, the family life center also acted as a ready-made shelter for groups of volunteer workers who were essential to the rebuilding process in Mississippi.

This church is also an example of interdenominational cooperation. When a group of Mennonite volunteers arrived in Collins, the Collins United Methodist Church offered them shelter. The Mennonites brought desperately needed heavy construction equipment with them, and from their base of operations at the church, they were able to play a tremendous role in community rebuilding and reconstruction.³⁰

Some FBOs were also capable of providing a range of services in addition to sheltering evacuees. For example, at the First Christian Church in Tyler, TX, 150 to 250 individuals at any one time lived in the church’s family life center over the course of two and a half months. The shelter served meals; administered medical services with a staff of private, National Guard, and ARC doctors and nurses; provided clothing for evacuees, Internet services, and evacuee transportation with buses from the local school district; and helped evacuees buy cars and find new homes in their community.³¹

Christchurch Baptist Fellowship in Houston opened its doors to 450 evacuees. The church had little to no previous training, and shelter organizers had only a week’s worth of ARC training. However, the skills and compassion of those who worked in the shelter transformed the church into what several officials considered the best-operated shelter in Houston.³²

FBOs with connections to national relief infrastructures, such as the United Methodist Church or Southern Baptist Convention, received supplies and support from their national organizations.

Florida Boulevard Baptist Church in Baton Rouge, LA, is an example. Feeling compelled to help meet the needs of the waves of evacuees coming from southern Louisiana to Baton Rouge, church leaders quickly opened up their facilities to help shelter evacuees and began massive feeding operations. The church has a kitchen capable of feeding 15,000 people a day; however, organizers required a significant amount of resources to operate its shelter and supply food to its shelter population and evacuees from around the community. To meet this need, Florida Boulevard Baptist Church called on its connections with the Southern Baptist Convention, and not long after its shelter operations began, the Southern Baptist Feeding

Unit from Oklahoma arrived to prepare and serve meals. Thus, a critical need of the shelter was met through the shelter's relationship with larger national relief infrastructures.³³

Sub-function: Shelter Relief Workers and Volunteers

Multitudes of volunteers traveled to the Gulf Coast to help in the relief and recovery efforts. These groups and individuals needed places to stay. Moreover, many first responders, such as the National Guard, used local church facilities for shelter while they were conducting relief operations. These groups and individuals presented many of the same logistical challenges to FBOs and NGOs in the Gulf Coast as evacuees did.

National organizations such as the Southern Baptist Convention, the United Methodist Committee on Relief, and Psychiatrist Disaster Response sent thousands of volunteers to the region to provide relief and recovery services, often operating through their local church and NGO affiliates.

Well-resourced national and international organizations had the experience and capabilities to establish shelters in areas that did not otherwise have space available. Christian World Embassy, an international FBO based in Conroe, TX, set up a camp for volunteer workers in New Orleans in the first week after Hurricane Katrina. Operating from two sites, it is a primary distribution center for relief supplies in New Orleans and has since housed more than 15,000 volunteers. Its facilities allowed 1,000 to 2,000 volunteers to sleep at its camps. Using these sites as home bases, Christian World Embassy volunteers have worked to restore churches, homes, and public spaces around New Orleans.³⁴

In Waynesboro, MS, Calvary Baptist Church opened as a shelter for evacuees on the day Katrina hit land. However, the church could maintain this operation for only the first 24 hours after the storm. The church shifted its mission to supporting other evacuee shelters in its community by collecting goods for distribution to shelters in need. Calvary Baptist Church again adapted its mission when, at the request of a congregation member and the state homeland security representatives, it provided two National Guard units with beds, showering and cleaning facilities, and meals.³⁵

Findings

- **Significant impact.** Local and national FBOs and NGOs sheltered tens of thousands of evacuees, relief workers, and volunteers.
- **Relief workers and volunteers.** Overall, shelters found it much easier to house relief workers and volunteers than to house evacuees. The workers were not in the shelter during the day and did not need many of the services evacuees required. Also, they usually had definite arrival and departure dates that made it easier for the shelter to plan.
- **Focus of community support.** Local FBOs and NGOs received a variety of donated goods and services from people living in their immediate area who sought to render aid in any way that they could. These donations often flowed to the nearest shelter.
- **Shelter autonomy.** Many shelters found autonomy from ARC and government rules to be beneficial because it allowed them to set their own appropriate procedures, avoid seemingly cumbersome policies, and cooperatively govern the shelter as operators and evacuees themselves saw necessary.

- **Utilities.** All shelters require basic utility services. Without potable water, ventilation, waste removal, and safe and sanitary conditions, shelters cannot be maintained. Shelters depend upon local government to meet many of these needs.³⁶
- **Excess capacity.** FBOs are structured to accommodate peak numbers, typically on the weekends, and thus have excess capacity during much of the week. This excess physical capacity provides them with the space required to serve as a shelter.

Limitations and Challenges

- **Functions overlooked.** Pop-up shelters not associated with the ARC were established by FBOs and NGOs and sheltered tens of thousands of evacuees. Relief and recovery efforts depend, in part, upon a community's capability to shelter relief workers and volunteers. Relief workers' and volunteers' shelter needs should be included in planning for disasters.
- **Coordination and integration.** Agencies and organizations supporting ESF-6 failed to adequately coordinate with and integrate many of the FBOs and NGOs that provided shelter. FBO and NGO shelter activities need to be integrated into local and state disaster plans.
- **Shelter costs.** The cost of providing shelter is significant. Housing dozens, hundreds, or even thousands of people puts wear and tear on organization property in addition to the costs associated with maintaining a working shelter, and it could affect the organization's future viability. FBOs and NGOs beforehand should determine whether they have the capabilities and ability to recover from the financial and physical burdens of sheltering.
- **Volunteer and staff fatigue.** In addition to the financial and physical cost of sheltering, there is a tremendous human cost. Operating a shelter takes a tremendous toll on staff and volunteers. For example, North Eunice Baptist Mission, Eunice, LA, sheltered Hurricane Katrina evacuees for three weeks and Hurricane Rita evacuees for two weeks. Eventually, staff exhaustion forced the shelter to close and convert to a feeding station.³⁷
- **Communication.** Advisories and information from authorities were often unreliable and sporadic. As a result, FBO and NGO shelters experienced difficulty in receiving accurate information and thus could not disseminate information to evacuees.
- **Open-door policy.** Shelters often faced problems in registering residents' arrivals and departures. ARC-designated shelters were required to keep their doors open 24 hours a day, and evacuees were free to leave at any time. Operators of these shelters found it difficult to keep an accurate roster of residents.
- **Waste management and sanitation.** Shelters in areas where public services were disrupted did not have the means to dispose of solid waste. This adversely impacted the shelters' operations, personal hygiene, and the morale of the evacuees.
- **Planning.** Government planning did not include many of the organizations that provided shelter, particularly those that were pop-up shelters.
- **Training and experience.** Many organizations had no training and no previous experience serving as a shelter. This was particularly true of the pop-up shelters.

Best Practices

- **Resident identification.** The Beech Street First Baptist Church partnered with the local school district to produce identification cards. Residents were required to display the cards when entering and exiting the church shelter. Not only were these cards helpful in identifying who had access to the church's shelter, they were used by local businesses that employed evacuees.³⁸
- **Teams.** To help break up the responsibilities around the shelter among the staff, FBOs and NGOs established work details that served as the meals team, security team, sanitation team, etc. These teams reduced staff fatigue and enhanced the orderliness of the shelter.³⁹
- **Record keeping.** For a variety of reasons, good record keeping is important. FBOs such as St. Mary's Catholic Church in Brenham, TX, kept detailed, accurate records of every evacuee they sheltered and of all church costs associated with housing these individuals.⁴⁰
- **Planning.** Organizations should plan beforehand whether they will be able to house evacuees, volunteers, relief workers, or all three. As one church representative at the conference said, "You have to have a plan when 150 people in a bus pull up into your parking lot looking for a place to stay and you didn't know they were headed your way!"⁴¹
- **Evacuee employment.** Employing evacuees directed their energy in a productive pursuit and was effective in helping to curb evacuee frustration that could have translated into security problems.
- **Rules and guidelines.** At New Wine Baptist Church in New Orleans, which housed 800 evacuees, shelter organizers set clear guidelines, rules, and expectations for the evacuees. Among these was zero tolerance for alcohol, drugs, or smoking, along with a lights-out curfew that required evacuees to be in the shelter and in bed by a certain time each night or else they would be locked out for the night. With so many people depending on the church for their own safety, organizers believed that the ability to establish these rules was vital.
- **Family unity.** Shelters found it beneficial to preserve family unity by keeping families together. This way, family members could provide child care for their own children. This lessened the burden on shelter operators.

APPENDIX A2. FOOD SERVICES

[The Salvation Army] loaded meals on 72 mobile canteens, each capable of providing 5,000 hot meals per day, and two 54-foot mobile kitchens, each capable of providing 20,000 hot meals per day.

U.S. House of Representatives, *A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina*⁴²

[Operation Blessing International's] own mobile kitchen has made its maiden voyage to Slidell, La., where it's set to begin preparing thousands of meals daily for local hurricane victims. In this overlooked disaster-stricken area, feeding and relief activities were urgently needed, and Operation Blessing is answering this Louisiana town's dire need for help.

Operation Blessing International website⁴³

The two quotes above refer to a function that the NRP calls “feeding.” In the NRP, feeding falls under ESF #6, “Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services.” According to the NRP, “feeding” is “provided to victims through a combination of fixed sites, mobile feeding units, and bulk distribution of food.”⁴⁴ The NRP identifies the ARC as the “primary agency for mass care under ESF #6 ...”⁴⁵

In our analysis of food services, we did not look at bulk supply, transport, and distribution. (We do address distribution in the section on logistics management and services.) In this section, we focus on the two feeding sub-functions that are closest to the point of service:

- Preparation of meals
- Serving of meals

Discussion

Immediately following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, large numbers of Americans suffered from a lack of food and water. As local, state, and federal governments mounted their relief efforts, the FBO and NGO communities mobilized and provided water and hundreds of thousands of meals each day.

Of 127 organizations surveyed, 85% (108) indicated that they performed some type of food service.

- 65% (83) prepared meals
- 69% (87) served prepared food
- 43% (55) distributed prepared food to other communities or organizations⁴⁶

Not only did evacuees need food and water, but the thousands of relief workers and volunteers serving in the region also needed daily meals. Without that, the response and recovery effort would have slowed or stalled.

Like Salvation Army and Operation Blessing, mentioned above, the Southern Baptist Convention and the Texas Baptist Men provided food services. These organizations specialize in food service following disasters. They provide an example of a denomination specializing effectively in one aspect of disaster relief.

Partnering was a particularly important corollary to specialization. FBOs and NGOs worked well together. For example, the Southern Baptists and the ARC partnered to provide food. The ARC provided the food supplies while the Southern Baptists provided the manpower—that is, cooks, drivers and helpers, and the mobile kitchens. The Southern Baptist Convention’s mobile kitchens produced meals, which the ARC then sent to “feeding stations” using vehicles designed for hot meal transport.⁴⁷

The Texas Baptist Men

The Texas Baptist Men began operations in support of Hurricane Katrina victims on August 31, 2005, two days after the hurricane made landfall. Units from across Texas responded within the state and in Louisiana to serve emergency meals to evacuees.* In disasters such as this, the Texas Baptist Men respond only upon invitation by the Southern Baptist Convention, the Baptist North American Mission Board, a particular church, the ARC, or another group. This invitation-only policy assures the Texas Baptist Men that they will have a partner upon arrival and that the group will not expend resources and effort where its services are not needed.† When Katrina struck, the Texas Baptist Men had 13 mobile kitchens based throughout the state of Texas. By mid-September 2005, the Southern Baptists had more than 30 mobile kitchens operating in the disaster zone and had already served eight million meals.

Sub-function: Prepare Meals

One of the main functions of the FBO and NGO community was to use donated bulk food to prepare hot meals for evacuees, relief worker, and volunteers.

Many shelters used several strategies throughout the post-hurricane period. River of Praise Church in Tomball, TX, provides a good example. Early in the response period, the church relied on donated meals from restaurants. As businesses returned to regular retail operations, volunteers from partner churches filled the void by preparing food at home and delivering it to the shelter. Finally, as volunteers returned to their normal lives, River of Praise and the surrounding shelters turned to the broader community for prepared meals. They launched an effort called “dinner nights.” Through this initiative, the local community prepared meals to lessen the burden on shelters.⁴⁸

Local FBO and NGO shelters did not rely on one uniform model to prepare meals. Different organizations provided food services in different ways.

Congregation Meal Preparation

Some FBO shelters, such as Tills Total Ministry, which housed 12 evacuees in the home of the pastor, depended on congregants to prepare food in their own homes for subsequent distribution to the evacuees.

* John Hall, “Texas Baptist Men Teams Move Into Louisiana.” Texas Baptist Men website, August 31, 2005, <http://www.bgct.org/texasbaptists/Page.aspx?&pid=900&srcid=789>.

† Gary B. Smith, Volunteer Coordinator for Disaster Relief, Texas Baptist Men, phone interview with Russell Miller, May 11, 2006.

This model was frequently used in small-scale facilities.⁴⁹ This approach distributes the burden of sheltering among many individuals. It does, however, require an active congregation willing to support the evacuees over the long term.

We also noted that congregations filled in until the ARC could establish a local meal program. For example, the congregation at North Orange Baptist Church contributed meals for three or four days to the church's 300 evacuees until the ARC established its food supply network and could deliver meals.⁵⁰

Shelter Meal Preparation

Many FBOs and NGOs have kitchen facilities with excess capacity. Those facilities used their onsite kitchen facilities to cook meals. For example, New Wine Baptist Church in New Orleans prepared food for the 200 to 250 evacuees who resided at its shelter at any given time and for others who came in just for the meals. Over two and one-half months, New Wine Baptist Church provided 15,000 meals.⁵¹

At other shelters, evacuees prepared their own meals. At Union Springs Baptist Church in Converse, LA, evacuees prepared their own meals in the church's kitchen. When an experienced caterer arrived as an evacuee and offered to direct kitchen operations, this approach became even more productive.⁵² At Christway Church in Bentley, LA, evacuees asked to cook for themselves so they would be less of a burden on the facility staff.⁵³ This scheme decreased the need for volunteer labor and gave the evacuees a meaningful role in shelter operations.

Partner Meal Preparation

Shelters also partnered with other organizations that prepared meals. By outsourcing some or all of the meal preparation responsibilities, the shelter could focus its resources and labor on other aspects of sheltering, while its partner could specialize in and gain economies in food preparation.

Madison United Methodist Church in Madison, MS, formed an agreement with two neighboring United Methodist churches soon after Hurricane Katrina struck: Madison United Methodist Church would serve as the shelter, but the other churches would support its sheltering effort through various efforts such as food services.⁵⁴

Poplar Springs Drive Baptist Church in Meridian, MS, could not open as a shelter following Hurricane Katrina because the church was under renovation. The church instead brought in generators and gas to run its kitchen in support of other shelters in the community. The church provided meals to Poplar Springs Drive United Methodist Church and to Trinity Episcopal Church.⁵⁵

Mass Meal Preparation

Small FBOs as well as large disaster response organizations provided large-scale food production for distribution to other centers, usually to shelters.

Christian Life Church in Orange Beach, AL, is an example of a smaller organization that prepared meals. Three days after Hurricane Katrina, Christian Life Church sent a team to Biloxi, MS. This effort eventually grew as Christian Life Church partnered with others to feed 6,000 individuals per day.⁵⁶

Professional disaster response organizations have significant expertise in mass feeding. Operation Blessing set up a kitchen in Slidell, LA, that served 6,000 hot meals per week for a number of weeks and still operates walk-in kitchens in St. Bernard Parish and City Park, New Orleans. It also moved a large

mobile kitchen to Metairie, LA, where it served 17,000 meals per week. Volunteers transported these meals, and meals from the other kitchens, into stricken areas.⁵⁷

Sub-function: Serve Meals

After FBOs and NGOs prepared meals using one or more of the approaches detailed above, they had to serve those meals to shelter residents, resident and nonresident evacuees, and relief workers and volunteers.

Rusk Church of Christ in Smith, TX, housed 120 of the 300 total evacuees in the town. However, all of the town's evacuees ate their meals at the church's large dining facility.⁵⁸ Christchurch Baptist Fellowship in Houston fed as many as 650 individuals at a time, serving both present and former residents of its shelter.⁵⁹ In addition to serving meals to those at its own facility, shelter coordinators at Antioch Baptist Church in Farmerville, LA, fed people at the local recreation center and provided food to evacuees who were living in the state park nearby.⁶⁰

Findings

- **Significant impact.** FBOs and NGOs provided millions of meals to evacuees, relief workers, and volunteers. Without their efforts, not only would evacuees have suffered further, but it is likely that relief and recovery work would have been slowed.

Limitations and Challenges

- **Evacuee movement.** Evacuees may not have remained at one shelter continuously. This movement complicated shelters' efforts to prepare appropriate amounts of food.
- **Resident identification.** Shelters had trouble distinguishing between shelter residents and nonresidents. Shelters could plan for residents, but not knowing how many nonresidents would show up for meals made planning difficult.

Best Practices

- **Specialization.** Specialization enabled organizations with limited resources to concentrate on those tasks that were within their capabilities. For example, organizations that lacked the capacity to provide all of the services of a shelter could have an impact by feeding evacuees in someone else's shelter, or they could serve as a shelter but receive food from a partner organization that specialized in preparing meals.
- **Partnering.** Burden sharing through partnerships was common and useful. It was particularly effective in those cases where the organizations knew each other before the event and thus had understanding of each other's roles and capabilities.
- **At-home preparation.** When bulk food and mass food services networks were incomplete or insufficient, local FBOs' congregations prepared meals. Already connected to the FBO through church ties, such associations operated efficiently on short notice.
- **Evacuee participation.** As with other functions, enlisting the services of evacuees to assist with food preparation and serving decreased the burden on FBO staff and volunteers. It also improved evacuee morale.

APPENDIX A3. MEDICAL SERVICES

Medical care and evacuations suffered from a lack of advance preparations, inadequate communications, and difficulties coordinating efforts.

U.S. House of Representatives, *A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina*⁶¹

FEMA defines “emergency medical services” as “personnel, facilities, and equipment required to ensure proper medical care for the sick and injured from the time of injury to the time of final disposition, including medical disposition within a hospital, temporary medical facility, or special care facility, release from site, or declared dead.”⁶²

Medical services provided by FBOs and NGOs included a wide range of activities that were administered by both medical professionals and by organization staff and volunteers with varying degrees of training.

We noted three sub-functions that fall within medical services:

1. Advanced medical care
2. Basic medical care or first aid
3. Prescription medication service

Discussion

Evacuees arrived on the doorsteps of FBOs and NGOs not just looking for food and shelter but, in many cases, requiring medical care as well.

In the hours immediately following the hurricanes, many of the primarily local FBOs and NGOs were thrust into the role of providing for injured evacuees. Volunteers and staff performed basic medical care for minor needs. Advanced medical care was administered by doctors or nurses, many of whom were members of the local organization. Once able to reach the disaster area, national and large organizations were able to bring specialized and advanced medical care to the area.

The lack of prescription medications presented issues. The FBO and NGO community worked with doctors, pharmacists, and the private sector to secure the medications necessary for those in need. Another medical service provided was assistance to special-needs patients.

Of 127 organizations surveyed, 62% (79) performed some type of medical service.

- 35% (45) provided advanced medical care
- 43% (54) provided basic medical care or first aid
- 30% (38) provided assistance with medical prescriptions

First Baptist Church of Montgomery, Texas

When 400 evacuees from the Superdome arrived at the First Baptist Church in Montgomery, TX, the church community faced a number of medical challenges. Basic medical care was provided by church members and some local nurse volunteers. Those with more serious ailments were transported to the local hospital. Even with rooms and space at a premium, staff and volunteers from the church community separated the elderly and other special-needs evacuees so that they could receive more attentive care. The members of First Baptist Church provided these medical services for six weeks.*

Sub-function: Advanced Medical Care

Local doctors, nurses, and dentists either volunteered their services at their local church or shelter or opened their offices to evacuees requiring medical attention. National organizations brought in medical professionals from around the country.

When Katrina struck, Broadmoor Baptist Church of Madison, MS, established a medical clinic that was staffed by local doctors and registered nurses. The church took in 150 Katrina evacuees, many of whom had varying ailments. The doctors and nurses initially worked around the clock to tend to their immediate needs; eventually this cadre coordinated their schedules to ensure that the church had a medical professional on site at all times.⁶³

At the other end of the FBO spectrum are organizations such as Operation Blessing, a nondenominational international relief and development organization. Operation Blessing operated free medical clinics throughout New Orleans. These clinics were staffed with volunteer doctors and registered nurses who treated walk-in patients, coordinating with city and state health departments. Operation Blessing also maintained a free dental clinic in St. Bernard Parish.⁶⁴

Sub-function: Basic Medical Care or First Aid

Those FBOs and NGOs that were not fortunate enough to have professional medical personnel working at their facility provided basic medical care to their victims to the best of their ability.

Faith Presbyterian Church in Brookhaven, MS, tended to the less serious first-aid needs of their evacuees using church medical supplies. Additionally, Faith Presbyterian Church agreed to serve as a post-operation recovery center for the local hospital. While the hospital did send a few nurses to staff the post-operation recovery center, these professionals were significantly augmented by church staff and volunteers.⁶⁵

Sub-function: Prescription Medication

Of the numerous medical challenges that fell to the FBO and NGO community, assisting evacuees in getting prescription medications was among the most demanding.

* Donna Haney, Pastor's Assistant, First Baptist Church of Montgomery, TX, phone interview with Steve Bowen, March 29, 2006.

God's Storehouse in Amite, LA, provided shelter, food, clothing, and hygiene products to evacuees of the hurricanes. Like many FBOs and NGOs, the church did not anticipate the need for prescription drugs. The church reached an agreement with local pharmacies to help evacuees get prescriptions filled.⁶⁶

Findings

- **Significant impact.** Almost all FBOs and NGOs that served as shelters found themselves providing basic medical care or first aid. In so doing, they cared for those who may have otherwise sought medical attention at already overburdened hospitals. Large national organizations, such as Operation Blessing, brought advanced medical care teams to the region; these provided advanced medical care to thousands of patients.
- **Wide range of services.** Organizations provided basic medical care, advanced medical care, access to prescription medication, and care for those with special needs. The availability and degree of service ranged widely from one organization to the next.
- **Gap-fillers.** Many FBOs and NGOs were able to provide immediate basic medical care and did so for days or weeks until more advanced care services could reach their area.

Limitations and Challenges

- **Communications.** FBO and NGO shelters were hampered by a lack of prioritized communications ability with the local hospital to facilitate transportation of injured victims.
- **Liability insurance.** A number of conference attendees mentioned that some liability insurances will not cover doctors and nurses outside their clinical setting and therefore made many medical professionals reluctant to staff FBO or NGO shelters.⁶⁷
- **Coordination and integration.** Medical services within many communities were not well coordinated for days. In day-to-day operations, emergency medical services, local hospitals, and local governments coordinate emergency medical care for large-scale events. However, in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, those service providers were, in some cases, gone or destroyed, or they were so overwhelmed they could not coordinate care. In those instances, FBOs and NGOs with medical capabilities set out on their own to provide care.
- **“Getting plugged in.”** Some doctors and nurses could not get themselves plugged into the system in order to help. A conference member from the Islamic Center of Baton Rouge stated that he knew doctors and nurses who wanted to volunteer their services but didn't know whom to call or where to show up.⁶⁸
- **Training and expertise.** Lack of training and expertise was an issue. In some instances, church staff and volunteers could provide little more for the injured than transportation to the inevitably overcrowded local hospital.
- **Waste management and sanitation.** The facilities used by FBOs and NGOs, especially after days of sheltering hundreds of evacuees, were no longer clean or sanitary for medical purposes.
- **Prescription medication.** The lack of access to prescription medication was a nearly universal issue. Two concerns are (1) finding an operating and cooperating pharmacy and (2) locating a doctor to prescribe medication.

- **Medical records.** The inability to access records made providing medical care problematic. A large number of conference attendees cited this as a serious impediment, especially for evacuees requiring prescription drugs.⁶⁹ Many evacuees did not have their prescriptions or an empty pill container with them. Without records indicating that they were authorized to receive the prescription, this became a problem for many.

Best Practices

- **Specialization.** Those FBOs and NGOs, particularly larger, national organizations, that specialized in medical care brought significant resources and capabilities to the area.
- **Mobile medical units.** The mobile medical units operated by FBOs and NGOs were outstanding assets, particularly in the crucial first week of the recovery.
- **Customer databases.** Larger pharmacies, such as Walgreens, had customer databases with prescription information so that evacuees without prescriptions on hand and unsure of their medication specifics could receive proper medication.
- **Anticipate injuries.** Hurricanes Katrina and Rita proved that in an evacuation, people will arrive at the shelters with a wide range of injuries. Shelters that adopted this mindset were better prepared to deal with medical issues.
- **Know your congregants.** St. James Parish, LA, established a list of key individuals, including anyone with medical training.⁷⁰ Organizations that knew their volunteers or congregations well, particularly those with resource lists, were able to quickly draw upon the right talents.
- **Family unity.** Preserving family unity in the shelters was helpful in cases where a family member was injured or ill or had a special need. Other family members were able to provide basic care and comfort to that person.
- **Interdenominational cooperation.** Pastors Resource Council Compassion is an interdenominational cooperative network of more than 500 churches and ministries that formed in the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. It facilitated 5,952 medical encounters using primarily mobile medical units.⁷¹

APPENDIX A4. PERSONAL HYGIENE SERVICES

One of Louisiana's greatest shortages was portable toilets, which were requested for the Superdome but never arrived there, as more than 20,000 people were forced to reside inside the Dome without working plumbing for nearly a week.

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, *Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared*⁷²

Personal hygiene is a fundamental challenge following a disaster. Evacuees may be at risk from contaminated flood waters. Volunteers and relief workers may be at risk from debris and damaged buildings. Evacuees may have fled their homes without basic toiletry articles. In mass shelters such as the Superdome, toilets may fail.

Shelter hygiene is closely linked to personal hygiene, and so it is included in this section. Shelters need to be kept clean. The challenge is that often shelters are not equipped to accommodate large numbers of people over long periods.

We looked at these sub-functions within personal hygiene:

1. Toilets
2. Toiletries
3. Shower facilities
4. Laundry services

Discussion

Of the 127 FBOs and NGOs surveyed, 88% (112) provided some type of personal hygiene services.

- 80% (102) assembled or distributed supply kits, including toiletries and cleanup supplies
- 50% (63) provided laundry services
- 55% (70) provided showers or other hygiene services

Personal hygiene is directly related to several other functions. Shelters need to be kept clean and hygienic. Food needs to be prepared in a clean, uncontaminated environment. Without the ability to clean and disinfect themselves, evacuees face disease and discomfort. Personal hygiene is related to a person's sense of well-being. It is a factor in physical reconstruction services; relief workers and volunteers need the means to remove and clean contaminated materials and waste from their bodies and clothing.

Following the hurricanes, hygiene was a particularly important issue for shelters. The issue was a major one: large numbers of people were crowded into places not intended for long-term habitation.

Smaller Is Better

However, when it comes to shelters, from the perspective of hygiene, smaller is better.

The success of the FBO shelter coordinators in creating hospitable and hygienic conditions at smaller shelters contrasts markedly with the conditions at large shelters such as the Superdome. The unsanitary and contaminated conditions reported at mass shelters were not evident anywhere at FBO shelters.

The hygiene conditions at the FBO shelters were far better. Outside inspections concur with this assessment. A member of an ARC inspection team, Dr. Hilarie H. Cranmer, wrote, “[i]n a little over four days, our multidisciplinary and interagency teams assessed more than 200 shelters housing nearly 30,000 people. Amazingly, in a majority of cases, the basic public health needs were being met.”⁷³

Representatives from local and county health authorities also monitored some shelters. Pineroft Baptist Church in Caddo, LA, for example, indicated that a local health inspector frequently visited the shelter housing 30 to 40 people to assess sanitation conditions.⁷⁴

The benefit of smaller shelters from a hygiene perspective contradicts current emergency preparedness thinking that leans toward use of larger shelters, such as stadiums and armories, provided by governments.

Case Study

In New Orleans, Wayne and Paula Roaten helped establish sanitation services at the First Church of God, which was damaged by the storm. The couple used their backgrounds in the construction and public health fields, respectively, and in missionary work abroad to establish a work camp at the church. Mr. Roaten submitted calls to the national Church of God network for trailers for the site and then worked to connect these to existing power and sewage systems. The first volunteers, in addition to repairing the church, established a bathroom–laundry house, complete with air conditioning and insulation, in a building shell that donations had provided for the site. These early sanitation measures facilitated the use of the site to house many volunteers.

Sub-function: Assemble and Distribute Toiletry Supplies

Toiletries were sorely needed by many evacuees who did not bring such supplies with them when they fled their homes. It was also important to provide basic items to make them more comfortable under their difficult circumstances.⁷⁵

One example of a systematic approach to supplying hygiene products is the Nazarene Disaster Response’s Crisis Care Kits. Nazarene Disaster Response is a denominationally supported network of disaster volunteers. As part of its mission, Nazarene churches throughout the country assemble small kits containing toiletries and basic medicines. These are stored centrally in Pennsylvania in a distribution center from which they can be shipped rapidly when needed. Nazarene Disaster Response shipped 100,000 kits from this center to the relief areas it managed in the towns of Slidell and Pearl River, LA.⁷⁶

Many organizations drew upon local community donations for hygiene products. For example, Linwood Baptist Mission in Shreveport, LA, was self-reliant, supplying all the needs, including toiletries, for an average of 60 evacuees for three weeks and received no help from FEMA or the ARC.⁷⁷ God’s Storehouse, an FBO based in Amite, LA, had a series of logistics sites containing various supplies, including hygiene products, from which evacuees, upon showing their identification to the site staff, could draw upon.⁷⁸

Toiletry supplies, whether supplied by a larger logistics network or locally from the shelter’s surrounding community, were vital to the maintenance of healthy living conditions at shelters.

Sub-function: Toilet Facilities

Conditions at the Superdome demonstrate the need for both *adequate* and *clean* toilet facilities. In the Senate investigation of the response to Katrina, inhabitants recalled being surrounded by human excrement and a horrible stench exacerbated by a lack of fresh air.⁷⁹ The House’s report reiterated these concerns and described similar conditions at the Convention Center.⁸⁰ By September 1, the national press was reporting these horrendous conditions. The *Los Angeles Times* reported filthy conditions, in which evacuees relieved themselves on the ground where children slept, and “people had wrapped plastic bags on their feet to escape the urine and wastewater seeping from piles of trash.”⁸¹

Under these conditions, and in a facility lacking showers and laundry facilities for thousands, health problems were a serious threat.

Even at FBOs’ facilities that may have an adequate number of toilet facilities, their cleanliness was an additional issue that FBO shelter coordinators needed to address.

Sub-function: Showers

The need for adequate shower facilities became a sheltering concern in the FBO and NGO communities. In some cases, flood waters had contaminated evacuees as they escaped, and they needed to bathe themselves immediately. Over the longer term, adequate shower facilities were a necessity for relief workers and volunteers who repeatedly exposed themselves to potentially hazardous environments and needed to clean themselves.

Some locations did have adequate shower facilities to address the needs of evacuees. Shelter coordinators for Opelousas Family Worship Center in Opelousas, LA, for example, housed some families at the facility’s “guest minister” suites. These onsite apartments not only provided adequate toilet and shower facilities for the evacuees, but also ensured family and individual privacy.⁸²

Other shelters developed alternative strategies to provide for the showering needs of evacuees:

- Central South Presbytery, a regional FBO in Natchez, MS, purchased building shells and plumbing materials and converted rooms into showers. This solution generated capacity that other neighboring shelters used throughout the Gulf Coast.⁸³
- Other FBO shelters also created their own shower facilities. Christway Church in Bentley, LA—a small church with an average Sunday congregation of only 50 people—decided to open a small shelter. To accommodate evacuees, it hired a plumber to install a shower in the Church’s baptistery. Pleasant Hill Baptist Church in DeRidder, LA (which housed 250 to 300 people over 15 days⁸⁴), and First Baptist Church in St. Francisville, LA (which housed 57 people after the disasters⁸⁵), both installed shower facilities for their evacuees.
- Other shelters brought in mobile showering units. This option typically required partnering with a large organization that had such resources. Christus Victor Lutheran Church in Ocean Springs, MS, partnered with the Christian Appalachian Project, which sent three shower trailers that remained in the region for six months.⁸⁶ Tapp United Methodist Church sheltered 187 evacuees. The church partnered with the local Army depot to set up hazmat showers for the evacuees’ regular use.⁸⁷

- Lastly, some shelters decided that the best way to serve the needs of evacuees was to transport people to other, more suitable shower facilities. Some shelters, such as Lifting Up This Temple Unto God Full Gospel Church in Baton Rouge, LA, existed on compounds with multiple structures, at which the shelter facility was separate from the shower facilities. Shelter coordinators transported its 36 evacuees to their separate daycare center for showers every day. Rusk Church of Christ in Smith, TX, cooperated with the local school district to arrange convenient times, after school hours, for the 120 evacuees at Rusk to use the school's gym showers.⁸⁸ In Texarkana, AR, Sugar Hill United Methodist Church also used local public schools as the shower location for the approximately 70 evacuees housed there.⁸⁹ In Houston, the YMCA partnered with St. Peter Claver Catholic Church to bring some of its 3,000 to 4,000 residents to the facility for showers.⁹⁰

These examples demonstrate that even facilities not originally intended as shelters, such as schools and recreation facilities, can be utilized to serve that purpose with the proper support.

It is also important to note not only that evacuees required showering facilities, but that the thousands of relief workers and volunteers who responded to the Gulf to help with recovery also needed hygienic living conditions and facilities.

In March 2006, Dr. George Garrison, professor at Kent State University in Ohio, led a caravan of 400 students and staff to Mississippi on a volunteer mission he had organized to provide labor for recovery services. They arrived at a "tent village" that Navy SeaBees had constructed originally for evacuees in Pass Christian. Garrison pulled several of his teams off home rebuilding duty to construct a permanent shower facility at the tent site for his group and all subsequent groups to use. This was a valuable contribution to facilitate ongoing relief.⁹¹

Shower facilities, existing or built onsite, in mobile units, or offsite at a partner facility, were an indispensable asset to every shelter and respite.

Sub-function: Laundry Services

Another challenge for shelters was their ability to provide laundry services for evacuees. Some shelters were very creative in their approach to this.

Several FBO shelters acquired washing machines and dryers to use onsite. Madison United Methodist Church in Madison, MS—with the help of two other churches in its community—purchased washing and drying machines for its shelter.⁹²

Other shelters outsourced laundry services, either to partner organizations or to individuals in the congregation. Christchurch Baptist Fellowship, which housed 450 evacuees, partnered with neighboring churches for a variety of tasks, one of which was laundry services.⁹³

Fairview Baptist Church's congregation performed laundry services for the evacuees. The group of churches of which Fairview is a member sheltered a total of 3,500 evacuees. For two months, Fairview and its partners operated a laundry system. Evacuees bagged their dirty clothes and then volunteers from the various congregations took the laundry home to clean.⁹⁴

Waste Management

The principal unsolved hygiene challenge for our sample of FBOs and NGOs was solid waste disposal. After public and private waste management services broke down, no other agency stepped in to solve this problem. Moreover, none of the FBOs or NGOs was equipped to provide backup services. This is a serious problem: human waste, garbage, and debris are havens for disease, rodents, insects, and environmental risks.

Triumph Church in Nederland, TX, for example, ran a feeding program for thousands of people at several sites. Yet shelter coordinators could not find a service to remove their trash. *

Waste management was also a problem at St. Anthony's Catholic Church in East Baton Rouge, LA, which by prearranged agreement became an alternate site for a New Orleans nursing home. St. Anthony's desperately needed sanitation services, especially dumpsters for all the waste that the shelter was producing and the furniture that had to be discarded (and was eventually destroyed). In the end, the church paid \$10,000 for its garbage bill. †

No FBO or NGO shelters encountered in this research found a solution to the challenge of solid waste disposal when normal service had broken down. Though this challenge affected only certain members of our sample, it was a major challenge for them because these organizations did not have the resources to cope with trash removal, sewage, or other forms of waste.

Findings

- **Hygiene is critical.** It minimizes the spread of bacteria and viruses and promotes comfort, personal dignity, and mental well-being. Adequate and clean toilets, showers, and laundry services are key to operating an effective shelter.
- **Smaller is better.** Smaller facilities were better able to maintain cleanliness and provide for basic sanitation and hygiene.

Limitations and Challenges

- **Plan ahead.** Shelter plans for disaster typically focus on the need for beds. The accompanying need for adequate shower facilities is not sufficiently addressed. For example, Dr. Garrison noted that FEMA withdrew its shower trailer upon the departure of hurricane survivors instead of leaving it for the incoming relief volunteers.⁹⁵
- **Waste management and sanitation.** Organizations do not have the physical means to remove the large volumes of waste produced by tens, hundreds, or thousands of evacuees, relief workers, and volunteers.

* Jerry Parsons, Lead Pastor, Triumph Church, Nederland, TX, phone interview with Russell Miller, April 11, 2006.

† Alice Reine, Secretary, St. Anthony's Catholic Church, East Baton Rouge, LA, phone interview with Russell Miller, March 29, 2006.

Best Practices

- **Schedules.** Creating schedules for showers and laundry use maximizes the capacity of limited facilities. Smyrna Church in Rapides, LA, encouraged evacuees to create schedules to manage the use of shower and laundry facilities.⁹⁶

APPENDIX A5. MENTAL HEALTH AND SPIRITUAL SUPPORT

Compared to 2003, over twice as many people in New Orleans have trouble sleeping, keeping their mind on track and feeling sad. Most troubling is that one-fifth or more report feeling this way five to seven days in the previous week ... the person experiences this symptom nearly every day.

Susan E. Howell and Jeanne S. Hurlbert, et al., "The 2006 Citizen Recovery Survey: New Orleans and Jefferson Parish"⁹⁷

The NRP addresses mental health services in ESF #6. Mental health services involve "supporting various services impacting individuals and households, including a coordinated system to address victims' incident-related recovery efforts through crisis counseling and other supportive services."⁹⁸ Also, "Supporting immediate, short-term assistance for individuals, households, and groups dealing with the anxieties, stress, and trauma associated with a disaster, act of terrorism, and/or incident of mass criminal violence."⁹⁹

Spiritual counseling is much more difficult to define as a service, given the wide variety of traditions, denominations, beliefs, and methods of delivery among the faith-based community. Moreover, the NRP does not provide a common working definition for spiritual support. Nevertheless, such efforts are important.

Following a disaster, FBOs help people deal with loss and restore their hope through traditional faith-based services, such as group prayer, and through counseling and support that call upon the supernatural power of whatever God they may believe in to heal them and help them through the crisis.

Mental health and spiritual support services were a common service provided by members of the FBO and NGO community.

Discussion

Why offer mental health services and spiritual care? Isn't it more important to get a roof over evacuees' heads, or find them a job, than to dwell on a traumatic experience?

The answer is that mental health and spiritual support are desperately needed following a disaster. "People recognize us as chaplains and ask us to pray with them and for them. Even those who may not have had strong spiritual beliefs before the disaster seek the comfort of prayer," says Gene Grounds of Victim Relief.

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita damaged not only physical structures, but the lives of hundreds of thousands of people. Losing a home, a job, or a loved one to a disaster on the scale of these storms can leave individuals in a serious state of trauma, stress, or shock.

One survey, conducted by Louisiana State University in the first few months after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, states that "in terms of psychological effects, 53 percent of respondents reported feeling depressed as [a] result of the hurricanes, and 39 percent reported feeling angry. Only 7 percent had sought psychological counseling."¹⁰⁰ In February 2006, an Urban Institute survey asked respondents to list the top three social and health needs in their city or neighborhood. Thirty-six percent ranked mental health services, including counseling, among the top three community needs in New Orleans.¹⁰¹

According to *Spirituality in Patient Care* by Dr. Harold Koenig, “96% of Americans believe in God, over 90% pray, nearly 70% are church members and over 40% have attended church, synagogue or temple within the past seven days.”¹⁰²

To meet these needs, FBOs and NGOs provided a wide range of mental health and spiritual care services to evacuees and to others who had been affected by the storms.

Of the 127 organizations surveyed, 87% (111) indicated providing some form of mental or spiritual care services.

- 58% (74) provided mental health services
- 81% (103) provided spiritual counseling

Sub-function: Mental Health Services

Mental health services involve counseling, crisis intervention, or special-needs treatment. Mental health workers can provide short-term crisis counseling, which involves helping “people responding normally to an abnormal experience.”¹⁰³ That is—

...assisting disaster survivors in understanding their current situation and reactions, mitigating additional stress, assisting survivors in reviewing their options, promoting the use of or development of coping strategies, providing emotional support, and encouraging linkages with other individuals and agencies who may help survivors recover to their pre-disaster level of functioning.¹⁰⁴

Over the longer term, mental health counseling involves “formal mental health services such as medications, office-based therapy, diagnostic services, psychiatric treatment or substance abuse treatment.”¹⁰⁵

The Family Tree, an NGO based in Lafayette, LA, provides counseling services daily. The organization is contracted to the State of Louisiana to offer mental health services, and in its response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the organization sent clinicians to special-needs shelters to diagnose and assess mental health patient evacuees. Mental health counseling was offered to families, children, and individuals. Mental health is the Family Tree’s niche in disaster response, and, as a result, the organization was able to simply expand its operations, rather than attempt to begin providing an entirely new service. For example, the Family Tree used its know-how to expand its operations to set up educational workshops for children to facilitate crisis coping.¹⁰⁶

Many FBOs also provided mental health professionals to encourage psychological healing and recovery from the storms. One such shelter was run by Bethel Istrouma African Methodist Episcopal Church, where some of the 151 evacuees sheltered at the church were “walking in a daze.” The church partnered with Dr. Deborah Thomas, professor of rehabilitation psychology at Langston University Rehabilitation Department in Oklahoma. Dr. Thomas found support at her university and eventually traveled to Bethel Istrouma African Methodist Episcopal Church three times with a team of mental health experts to provide care. Dr. Thomas relocated those patients who were experiencing the most extreme of mental health problems to rehabilitation centers outside the area.¹⁰⁷

Options for Independence, an NGO based in Houma, LA, provided mental health counseling for evacuees. Options for Independence went to many of the shelters around Louisiana, where it assisted with the emotional health of evacuees in one-on-one and group sessions. The organization continues to provide

education for groups of individuals still dealing with the psychological consequences of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Currently, Options for Independence is holding seminars on post-crisis trauma and providing information to communities and families on emotional recovery.¹⁰⁸

Sub-function: Spiritual Support Services

FBOs added a unique dimension to the relief efforts, one that was not addressed by government and secular organizations. They played a major role in the psychological healing process for many of those impacted by the storms.

Evacuees stressed the importance of faith and religion in the immediate aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. A survey of adult evacuees who had traveled to Houston after Katrina, conducted by the *Washington Post* in conjunction with the Kaiser Family Foundation and Harvard University in September 2005, found that 92% of respondents believed that religion was important to them after the hurricane. Even more telling, 81% of these respondents said that the evacuation had actually strengthened their religious faith.¹⁰⁹

One local FBO, Mendenhall United Methodist Church, in Mendenhall, MS, sent ministers to work in local churches in affected areas and offer regular spiritual support to relief efforts.¹¹⁰

Churches of Scientology Disaster Response focused on treatment of mentally and spiritually traumatized victims and burned-out responders. Typically, the organization partners with local first responders to assist them, those they are working with, other caregivers, and victims during and after disasters. For example, following Hurricane Katrina, the group partnered with government and community leaders in Vermilion Parish, LA, to establish a shelter where they provided many services, including organizational skill and spiritual assists to evacuees traumatized by the disaster. Using this shelter as one of the bases, they worked with evacuees at multiple locations in Louisiana and Mississippi, paying particular attention not only to those victimized by the disaster but to the first responder and care-giver population.¹¹¹

In some cases, there was a blurring between mental health counseling and spiritual counseling. For example, at the Resurrection Life Glory House Ministries in Baton Rouge, shelter operators performed their regular ministry with evacuees to provide a form of psychological healing through faith while they brought in secular mental health and grief counselors to tend to those needing mental health support.¹¹²

Findings

- **Spiritual care significant.** Surveys since Hurricane Katrina have underscored the fact that many people look to God during times of extreme crisis. The experiences of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita demonstrate that spiritual care is an important component of providing for those harmed by a disaster. FBOs provided these necessary services following the hurricanes.
- **Holistic approach.** Psychological mental health is a function of many of the other services that FBOs and NGOs provided. Providing an evacuee with clear information, clean housing, and regular meals along with a sense of dignity supports psychological well-being.
- **Common experience.** Evacuees responded to those people who had shared their experiences. Psychological healing outreach, whether spiritual or secular, was well received when counselors or mental health professionals had been through what evacuees had been through.

- **Higher level of trust.** Conference attendees stated that evacuees were more likely to share their experiences with members of the faith-based community because there was a higher level of trust with members of FBOs.¹¹³

Limitations and Challenges

- **Provide for providers.** Representatives from both FBOs and NGOs repeatedly spoke of a need to “provide for the providers”¹¹⁴ and to find a way to address the psychological health of care providers who may not be used to dealing with tragedy on a massive scale. Organizations found that it was important to take care of their volunteers. For example, it is important to ensure that shelter workers take breaks and get enough sleep. Too often, those who were trying to help evacuees became exhausted both physically and mentally and eventually lost all effectiveness in helping hurricane survivors.¹¹⁵
- **Access and credentialing.** Some FBOs in our sample took issue with what they felt was an unwillingness of the ARC to allow FBOs to see to the spiritual health of those impacted by the storm. Several FBO representatives complained that the ARC refused to allow FBOs to administer spiritual counseling at ARC shelters.¹¹⁶

Best Practices

- **Specialization.** Mental health and spiritual support are both highly specialized functions. Those organizations, such as Victim Relief Ministries, that specialized in this function were much better equipped to deal with the unique aspects of it.
- **Family unity.** Shelter operators believed that those shelters that made an effort to preserve family unity benefited in many ways, including mental health and spiritual support. Family members had fewer problems when the preexistent family structure was maintained.

APPENDIX A6. PHYSICAL RECONSTRUCTION SERVICES

The storm surge of Katrina struck the Mississippi coastline with such ferocity that entire coastal communities were obliterated, some left with little more than the foundations upon which homes, businesses, government facilities, and other historical buildings once stood.

*National Hurricane Center Katrina Report*¹¹⁷

“Physical reconstruction” refers to a broad set of actions to reconstitute private physical property, such as individual homes and places of worship. It involves clearing debris and removing trees so that families may return to their homes to assess the damage or gather belongings. Reconstruction requires crews of volunteers to remove mud and clean the home. And it includes very basic home repair such as gutting wet drywall or patching roofs.

The rebuilding of communities—home by home—is a critical function that continues to engage organizations to this day. While reconstruction involves all those functions and more, we chose to limit our focus to three specific aspects, all of which occur early in the recovery phase:

1. Debris and tree removal
2. Mud removal and cleanup
3. Home repair, including gutting and roof repair

Physical reconstruction is carried out in phases by organizations of varying size and specialization. Following the disaster, debris must be removed from the streets and then from around the home or building so that neighborhoods may be accessed. Next, if it is safe to enter the home, crews remove debris from inside the house. This includes everything from furniture and refrigerators to wet carpets and clothes. Also, if there are trees or other objects, such as telephone poles, leaning on the building, they have to be cut away to reduce the risk to workers and the risk of further harm to the structure. The next step is mud removal and cleanup. In this phase, crews shovel the mud out of the home and begin the cleaning process. Crews then remove sheetrock or drywall that has been soaked in the flood waters. This is called gutting and is critical to reducing health hazards such as mold. Finally, they may do minor repairs such as patching the roof to stop further rain damage.

These are not necessarily discrete sequential steps. Each home is different. Some or all of these steps may be performed, and their order can vary. If all of these steps are done, the homeowner is left with the shell of a building: bare two-by-four studs for walls, concrete floors, and a roof.

Following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, smaller local FBOs and NGOs cleared debris, removed trees, and gutted homes. Larger FBOs and NGOs have the physical resources (such as tools, trucks, and warehouses), personnel with advanced vocational training, and a volunteer force that enabled them to tackle the larger physical reconstruction projects.

One particularly effective strategy that some FBOs and NGOs followed was that of establishing beachheads in the local community. Organizations restored local places of worship first to provide a base from which to conduct neighborhood projects.

Of the 127 organizations surveyed, 54% (68) were involved in physical reconstruction services.

- 43% conducted debris or tree removal
- 34% conducted mud removal and cleanup
- 47% provided home repair services such as gutting or roof repair

Case Study

The Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN), an NGO, is involved in almost every aspect of the enormous physical reconstruction effort facing New Orleans. The organization's approach consists of mudding out the home and then either a reconstruction effort or demolition and construction of a new home.

ACORN has partnered with Louisiana State University and Cornell University engineers to determine which homes are suitable for reconstruction and which need to be demolished.*

Sub-function: Debris and Tree Removal

“Debris clearing” refers to the efforts of thousands of volunteers to remove wreckage. The size and force of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita left gigantic debris fields and hundred of thousands of downed trees in their wake. Tree clearing was typically conducted by FBO chainsaw gangs.

Debris and tree removal were functions that most FBOs and NGOs, particularly the local churches, could organize fairly easily. Chainsaws are relatively simple to operate, and many volunteers already owned one.

Many local volunteers gravitated to the local church or NGO that, in many cases, was already conducting cleanup. FBOs and NGOs made good use of local high school and university student volunteers for such manual labor. One conference member noted that Louisiana State University students made up a large portion of the workforce.¹¹⁸

Christus Victor Lutheran Church of Ocean Springs, MS, is one FBO that removed debris and trees. The church's volunteers cleared over 1,000 property lots of debris. Anyone could request assistance with debris and tree removal. The request would be routed to the church's case management center, which administered the construction crews and assigned volunteer coordinators to manage the workers.¹¹⁹

Sub-function: Structure Mudding Out and Cleanup

FBOs and NGOs mudded out thousands of homes in the areas affected by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. This was an important precursor to rebuilding a damaged home. Flooding contamination causes a type of mold that can be very harmful if inhaled. Therefore, structures had to be first cleaned and then allowed to dry in order to eliminate this risk and allow the homeowner to take the next steps in the process.¹²⁰

* Martin M. Ellissetche, External Relations, Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now, New Orleans, phone interview with Russell Miller, April 10, 2006.

Tommy Gillon, Disaster Coordinator for Fairview Baptist Church in Columbus, MS, organized congregants for such services into two 30-person details to the Gulf Coast each week. These teams have cleaned yards, cut trees, removed sheet rock, and repaired roofs. Thus far, they have mudded out 42 homes and continue their work.

Fairview Baptist Church bought and staged bulldozers and other heavy equipment down in the Gulf Coast to continue and expand the church's mud removal and cleanup efforts, spending over \$185,000 on this equipment.¹²¹

Christus Victor Lutheran Church of Ocean Springs, MS, mudded out and cleaned between 1,300 and 1,500 homes.¹²²

The national organization Catholic Charities embarked on a physical reconstruction program called Operation Helping Hands, coordinated through the Archdiocese of New Orleans. In New Orleans, Operation Helping Hands recruited 3,286 volunteers who have gutted 107 homes for elderly, uninsured, or under-insured residents. On average, Catholic Charities sends 170 volunteers out for similar physical reconstruction projects every day.¹²³

Sub-function: Home Repair

After a home is mudded out, work crews gut the house and perform other physical reconstruction services, such as roof repair.

Friends Disaster Service of Lisbon, OH, has specialized in disaster physical reconstruction services since 1974.¹²⁴ This organization provides roof work, drywall, and other construction capabilities. The Friends Disaster network transported teams of 30 workers and their equipment down to the affected areas.¹²⁵

Habitat for Humanity is an internationally recognized organization that focuses on new home construction.¹²⁶ That organization has launched Operation Home Delivery to provide new homes for Katrina and Rita victims. The Habitat for Humanity office operating in Americus, GA, has been responsible for this mission and has been active in Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. Because Habitat for Humanity is structured towards new home construction, it has partnered with Church World Service, an international FBO that specializes in home repair.¹²⁷ Together, these two large organizations are building and repairing thousands of homes throughout the Gulf Coast.¹²⁸

Findings

- **Significant impact.** FBOs and NGOs have provided tens of thousands of volunteer hours for physical reconstruction services on thousands of homes.
- **Local organizations.** The local church or shelter in a community often had the best information as to what needed to be accomplished there.
- **Training and experience.** Many of the national denominations conduct internal advanced training toward their specialization. This is particularly true of FBOs and NGOs engaged in physical reconstruction.
- **Student volunteers.** College and high school student volunteers composed a significant workforce to assist in the physical reconstruction efforts.

Limitations and Challenges

- **Coordination and integration.** In many communities, there was no central authority with comprehensive knowledge of the jobs that needed completion and the local teams capable of doing the work. Hence, there was no (or extremely limited) coordination of efforts other than by the individual organization conducting the work.
- **Waste management and sanitation.** Lack of city services, particularly debris and garbage pickup, was a significant challenge. Often, FBO and NGO volunteer teams would spend a day cleaning a street or park only to see their collected pile of debris sit for weeks before it was picked up.

Best Practices

- **Specialization.** National denominations have specialized in physical reconstruction services. A number of conference members also mentioned that it was helpful to know that they could count on these particular denominations to provide these services.¹²⁹
- **Assess first.** Sending personnel to survey the job site before assigning an entire crew allowed FBO and NGO decision makers to ensure the proper assignment of personnel and equipment.
- **Skilled volunteers.** The FBO and NGO community, particularly the larger organizations, have successfully drawn on an abundance of volunteers, many of whom have basic construction skills.
- **Beachheads.** Both a practical and a symbolic gesture, repairing the local church created a staging and coordination area for the community recovery effort and represented a visible icon for the community to rally around.¹³⁰

APPENDIX A7. LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT AND SERVICES

*The whole challenge was to get it where it needs to be when it needs to be there.*¹³¹

Conference participant, Breakout Group Two, *Heralding Unheard Voices Conference*,
June 7, 2006.

FEMA defines “resource management” as “those actions taken by government to: identify sources and obtain resources needed to support disaster response activities; coordinate the supply, allocation, distribution, and delivery of resources so that they arrive where and when most needed; and maintain accountability for the resources used.”¹³²

We defined “logistics management and services” as the efforts by FBOs and NGOs to acquire, organize, and deliver emergency supplies to the victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.

Three aspects of logistics management and services are

1. Assessing the community’s needs
2. Transporting and distributing supplies
3. Warehousing supplies

Discussion

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita forced many evacuees to abandon their homes and possessions with little more than what they could carry. Few evacuees anticipated that days would become weeks that would turn into months before they could return home or move on to a new life and a new place to live. Many arrived at FBO and NGO shelters with nothing beyond the clothes on their back. They needed everything from food and water to shoes, clothes, and toiletries.

Organizations faced four broad challenges in addressing evacuees’ needs:

- **Lack of resources.** The level of preparedness varied greatly throughout the FBO and NGO communities. Local organizations in particular lacked resources such as food, water, and clothing. Few had access to warehouses. Small organizations had limited capabilities for transporting and distributing supplies.
- **Overwhelming response.** When supplies did begin arriving from other parts of the country, they arrived in overwhelming numbers. This created a new, unexpected challenge: how to manage, particularly how to transport and distribute, those supplies.
- **Duration.** The combined disasters caused another significant challenge for the FBO and NGO communities: they found themselves providing material resources for evacuees not just over the short term, but for much longer than anticipated.

- **Change over time.** What evacuees needed changed over time. As one conference attendee put it, “Needs go in stages. As time goes on evacuees have different needs. By the time that supplies arrive, they are on their second or third need.”¹³³

Of the 127 organizations we surveyed, 80% provided at least one form of logistics management and services:

- 53% conducted assessments
- 72% transported or distributed supplies
- 53% warehoused supplies

Sub-function: Assess Community Logistics Needs

FBOs and NGOs examined the requirements of their communities, then looked at their capabilities and resources and decided how best to acquire, organize, and distribute the required supplies.

The Southern Baptist Convention used church members trained specifically in disaster response to assess community needs.

For example, of the 105 Southern Baptist Convention churches in the Mobile Baptist Association, 103 were adversely affected by Hurricane Katrina. Within hours of the storm, Davis and Charles Matthews were in the field doing damage and needs assessments. Both of them are Southern Baptist Convention Disaster Relief “Blue Caps.” Their initial assessment allowed the Southern Baptist Convention to target the right supplies to the areas needing that specific support.¹³⁴

Sub-function: Transport and Distribute Supplies

FBOs and NGOs managed transportation and distribution of supplies. They delivered food, water, ice, clothing, and many other vital commodities that sustained thousands of hurricane evacuees.

First Baptist Church of Ellisville, MS, was typical of many local FBOs that converted their facilities into a distribution center. First Baptist Church volunteered itself to be the central distribution point for its community and partnered with local FBOs and NGOs to coordinate transport and distribution of the supplies. Church vehicles, both First Baptist’s own vehicles and vehicles from partner churches and shelters, ferried supplies to and from the church.¹³⁵

Case Study

Organizations approached these challenges in a variety of ways. In general, smaller FBO and NGO facilities opened up as distribution points while the larger organizations used their manpower and assets for transportation of supplies.

Triumph Church of Nederland, TX, is an example of an FBO that played a significant role in the management of logistics in its community. The church had made preparations for disaster but did not anticipate that it would play this particular role.

Instead of sheltering evacuees, Triumph Church became the logistics distribution hub for the Nederland area, providing for hundreds of staff and volunteers who managed those logistics. The church had access to a warehouse, supplied church distribution points, and managed transportation.

Triumph Church received round-the-clock truckloads of supplies. The church facilitated distribution of two cargo planes and 100 truckloads (at 40,000 pounds each) of supplies, mostly food. Church staff and volunteers organized these supplies and sent them to one of three distribution points in their community. The church partnered with a network of regional faith-based organizations, including PRC Compassion and Operation Blessing.

Additionally, Triumph set up three “meals on wheels” to transport food to other shelters and to those who could not reach the distribution points.* In total, Triumph Church served 120,000 hot meals and distributed 80,000 bags of groceries during the recovery period. The pastor estimated that the church fed between 3,000 and 4,000 people a day.

Some of the larger FBOs, such as UMCOR, provided and staged supplies and set aside vehicles for transportation of those supplies to hurricane victims.¹³⁶ UMCOR’s system involved a variety of “kits” that were prepackaged for delivery to those in need. UMCOR collected specific types of donations and then assembled medical, bedding, health, school, and other types of kits, which were staged for transportation when disaster strikes.¹³⁷

An example of a larger FBO that addressed the transportation of emergency supplies is Convoy of Hope, which has a fleet of 18-wheeler tractor-trailer trucks that are preloaded with supplies in preparation for both disaster response and community outreach missions.¹³⁸ During Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, truck drivers were linked to the Convoy of Hope headquarters, where they could get real-time updates. Convoy of Hope’s truck drivers were able to chase the tail of the storm all the way into the disaster area. Using relationships with over 13,000 churches of all denominations and organizing nearly 5,000 volunteers, they made a significant impact.¹³⁹

Sub-function: Warehousing

As supplies arrive near the disaster area, they have to be transferred from larger vehicles to a warehouse for temporary storage. In the warehouse, they are sorted according to needs and then loaded onto smaller vehicles for delivery to distribution points. This receiving, sorting, maintaining, and distribution of supplies is a significant function: if not done properly, perishables spoil, supplies don’t reach the recipients who most urgently need those supplies, and people suffer needlessly.

Organizations used their own or others’ facilities for warehousing.

New Hope Baptist Church of Baton Rouge, LA, dedicated itself to warehousing supplies for other shelters and distribution points. Its pastor networked with the Fourth District Baptist Association to procure supplies for the warehouse. The pastor also took the initiative to get a warehouse certification and received supplies from across the country shortly thereafter. The next step was to identify and coordinate

* Jerry Parsons, Lead Pastor, Triumph Church of Nederland, TX, phone interview with Russell Miller, April 11, 2006.

with shelters that could serve as his distribution points. His preexisting relationships with other churches in his district facilitated this coordination.¹⁴⁰

Effective warehousing proved to be a vital component of success for FBOs and NGOs large and small. The relatively small and ad hoc warehouses like the one run by New Hope Baptist Church served as suppliers to shelter distribution points.

These warehouses were usually stocked from local donations or from the churches' national denominations. Meanwhile, established and typically larger warehouses run by national organizations facilitated efficient loading of the hundreds of trucks that moved supplies into the disaster areas.

Findings

- **Limits.** A number of local churches emphasized that if a church is understaffed, it should refrain from providing both logistics and shelter services. The impact of trying to do both overwhelmed some organizations.
- **Media.** Public-service announcements over radio and television, as well as the Internet, identified the types of supplies that were required and the location of distribution points.
- **Equipment.** Warehouses and distribution points required appropriate equipment. Forklifts and motorized dollies were necessary for moving large amounts of supplies. Fuel for these essential equipment was also an issue. In cases where equipment was unavailable, volunteers unloaded the trucks by hand. However, this was slow and fatiguing.
- **Lengthy storage.** Lengthy storage of supplies, especially perishables, was a problem. One conference member stated that the ideal situation would be that upon arrival of the trucks, volunteers are ready to unload and distribute the supplies.¹⁴¹

Limitations and Challenges

- **Large footprint.** Smaller, mostly local FBO-operated, pop-up warehouses found they did not have adequate space. Many of these were not really warehouses at all, but rather the church's family life center or a gymnasium that had been adapted for this purpose. Operators did not anticipate the large volume of material they would need to accommodate.
- **Truck access.** Access and parking for the numerous vehicles that moved in and out of facilities presented problems. Many of the larger organizations used 18-wheelers to transport their supplies. However, these large trucks couldn't access very rural areas or regions where the storm's damage had degraded roadways. As a result, many truckloads of supplies were left on the highways surrounding the affected areas.
- **Right timing.** Supplies rarely kept up with the changing needs of the evacuees. Organizations had little control over the rate at which they received supplies and the types of supplies they received. The changing needs of evacuees coupled with the lag in the supply line resulted in supplies chasing need.
- **Coordination and integration.** In some cases, truckloads of supplies reached their intended destination, but the church or shelter had been damaged by the storms, or evacuated, or both.

- **Shortage of volunteers.** Often there were not enough volunteers to unload truckloads. Unloading 18-wheelers by hand was a laborious and time-consuming effort.¹⁴²
- **Access and credentialing.** Smaller FBOs and NGOs were unable to reach affected areas because of law enforcement roadblocks. Larger organizations had prearranged agreements and were allowed to pass through these control points.¹⁴³ Smaller organizations were forced to turn around. Conference members agreed almost unanimously that credentialing was one of the biggest impediments to their logistics operations.¹⁴⁴

Best Practices

- **Needs timelines.** Many FBOs and NGOs created needs timelines that corresponded to the changing needs of evacuees. These timelines allowed the organizations to advise those who wanted to donate to their organization as to what would likely be needed by the time the donations arrived.
- **Assessment.** Teams sent in ahead of supplies communicated with, and directed, trucks filled with supplies. This proved to be an effective tactic for getting the right supplies into the affected areas quickly after the storms.
- **Partnering.** Because warehouse space, vehicles, and fuel were all precious commodities following the disaster, partnering with other organizations proved particularly effective. For example, Save the Children, an NGO, was able to enlist the services of a local truck-driving school to drive its truckloads of supplies down to the Gulf Coast.¹⁴⁵

APPENDIX A8. TRANSPORTATION MANAGEMENT AND SERVICES

*The Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development, whose Secretary had personally accepted departmental responsibility under the state's emergency operations plan to arrange for transportation for evacuation in emergencies, had done nothing to prepare for that responsibility prior to Katrina.*¹⁴⁶

Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs.
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared

Transportation management is defined in the NRP as “transportation prioritizing, ordering, sourcing, and acquisition; time-phasing plans; fleet management; and movement coordination and tracking.”¹⁴⁷ This definition describes a strategic function, from the perspective of the federal government or other authorities, and is directed at managing “fleets” of transportation assets.

The quote above from the Senate Committee report focuses on a specific transportation requirement: emergency evacuation of residents.

However, a whole class of transportation activities is not reflected in either of the applications above. Following disasters, people need “routine” transportation:

- Evacuees need to find housing, find employment, and go to doctors' offices and to other service providers. They need to file claims and meet with case workers and visit the local school and enroll their children. Evacuees have to buy groceries and household supplies, and they do other things aimed at leading them back to a more normal life.
- Volunteers and relief workers need transportation to and from worksites.
- Evacuees need to be relocated.

While one may consider these needs “routine,” they are essential to eliminating human suffering and lessening the economic impact of disaster: people need to return to as regular a life as the situation may allow. Routine transportation is a key component of that.

Many evacuees did not have personal vehicles, and public transportation was disrupted. Consequently, for days, weeks, or even months, FBOs and NGOs, particularly those sheltering evacuees or providing temporary housing for volunteers and relief workers, found that one of the important services they needed to provide was routine transportation.

This aspect of transportation—the non-emergency routine movement of people over long periods so that they may rebuild their lives—is not sufficiently addressed in emergency management doctrine and government plans. Most references to transportation focus exclusively on evacuation.

However, evacuation is just the first link in a chain of transportation services that have to be provided throughout the response and recovery phases.

The sub-functions were

1. Evacuee shuttles
2. Volunteer and relief worker shuttles
3. Relocation of evacuees

Discussion

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita caused massive transportation problems. The transportation infrastructure was gone, degraded, or overburdened. Gasoline was in short supply. Nevertheless, thousands of evacuees without their own means of transportation needed to reach service providers. They needed transportation to reach shower facilities or to get food. They needed to go to banks, insurance companies, doctors' offices, FEMA locations, and other offices necessary to start their personal recovery.

Many Hurricane Katrina victims who evacuated to western Louisiana and eastern Texas had to be uprooted again when Rita came ashore. Some FBO shelters had the dual problem of evacuating themselves—their staff and volunteers—and the hundreds of Hurricane Katrina victims they had taken in. When FBOs and NGOs couldn't transport their evacuees in their own organization's vehicles, they subsidized train, plane, or bus fares, bought gas tokens, and even assisted some evacuees in buying used vehicles.

At the same time, a massive influx of volunteers needed daily transportation.

The FBO and NGO community improvised. They partnered with local officials and each other to pool vehicle resources, they recruited drivers from their congregations and volunteers, and some congregations volunteered their own personal vehicles to shuttle evacuees and workers.

Of the 127 organizations surveyed, 61% provided at least one form of transportation services.

- 42% shuttled evacuees
- 38% shuttled volunteers and relief workers
- 37% evacuated and/or relocated evacuees

Sub-function: Evacuee Shuttles

FBOs and NGOs that operated shelters faced the difficulties of providing daily transportation for evacuees to numerous places. Over the course of weeks and months, this became a significant challenge, consuming a significant amount of many sheltering organizations' time and resources.

First Baptist Church in Jonesboro, AR, sheltered 180 to 200 hurricane victims in its family life center. Shortly after accepting the evacuees, the pastor recognized that the guests' major need was to "get their lives back together." For many without transportation, this meant finding a way to get to and from different government offices. The government center in Jonesboro included offices of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), FEMA, the U.S. Postal Service, the ARC, the Salvation Army, and other service providers. First Baptist Church set up routine scheduled trips, using its own vehicles, to transport shelter residents to this government center.¹⁴⁸

Baskin Baptist Church of Baskin, LA, also set up a daily shuttle service. It posted a schedule of vehicles that would leave for doctors' offices, showering facilities, the hospital, and other locations at prearranged times. Initially, it was a scramble to get everyone where they needed to be; however, once established, the scheduled shuttle service became reliable.¹⁴⁹

Sub-function: Volunteer and Relief Worker Shuttles

The devastation of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita motivated Americans from across the country to travel to the affected areas and lend a hand. Thousands volunteered through their local church, a larger FBO, or an NGO. Others acted independently.

Many needed daily routine transportation to and from worksites. In some cases, those worksites were at considerable distance from wherever the volunteers and relief workers rested at night.

Others needed transportation to a "beachhead," a place established in the ravaged area and used as a forward base of operations. Most often these beachheads were organizations' facilities. The volunteers and relief workers would work from those forward locations for several days or a week or two and then need transportation back away from the disaster area.

Dave and Patty Baldwin are the disaster coordinators for First Baptist Church in Vicksburg, MS. First Baptist Church housed 246 people in the church's family life center. As evacuees were able to move out of the shelter, Dave and Patty looked for another way to assist in the recovery.

First Baptist Church partnered with First Southern Baptist Church of Pearlinton, MS. The church in Pearlinton had been destroyed by the storm and then repaired, enabling it to serve as a forward operating base for the recovery effort.

Dave and Patty Baldwin organized transportation for groups of volunteers down to the coast. They set up a schedule and provided shuttle service to move the volunteers between the two Mississippi towns. Volunteers would arrive at the recently repaired First Southern Baptist Church of Pearlinton and be put to work on any number of jobs in the local area.¹⁵⁰

In contrast to smaller organizations such as First Baptist Church of Vicksburg, larger FBOs and NGOs began a massive, well-coordinated movement of personnel and equipment almost immediately.

Operation Blessing moved hundreds of volunteers to a staging point in Ocala, FL, as the storms were approaching. After the storms passed, Operation Blessing moved the volunteers into Louisiana and set up mobile kitchens and other services throughout the state. For example, Operation Blessing transported 200 to 300 volunteers to Slidell, LA, where they were housed. From this facility, Operation Blessing volunteers were able to provide services throughout the area.¹⁵¹

These large-scale movements of volunteers were coordinated by the parent organization and often involved using the organization's own vehicles.

Sub-function: Evacuate or Relocate Victims

Some members of the FBO and NGO communities evacuated victims from danger or transported them, once safely evacuated, to different areas.

This sub-function took many forms: organizations coordinated movement for evacuees, drove evacuees to their new location, provided them with the financial resources (such as bus tickets), provided them with fuel, repaired vehicles, or, in one case, even gave them vehicles.

For example, Beech Street First Baptist Church in Texarkana, AR, took in 200 evacuees and provided for all of their daily requirements. While many of the evacuees would stay at the Beech Street shelter for months, many others just needed a place to stay for a couple nights while on their way to reach friends or family. For these victims who didn't have their own vehicles, the staff and volunteers of Beech Street purchased bus tickets.¹⁵²

Faith Family Church in Victoria, TX, assisted its evacuees by repairing vehicles so the evacuees could get back on the road. The church's staff and volunteers even bought fixer-upper vehicles from local lots, repaired the vehicles, and gave them to evacuees free of charge.¹⁵³

Findings

- **Significant impact.** Organizations provided much of the transportation needed by evacuees, relief workers, and volunteers.
- **Routine transportation.** Evacuees, volunteers, and relief workers need routine transportation during the recovery phase. In the case of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, this need persisted for months. The frequency and number of trips needed by evacuees was surprising.
- **Overlooked in planning.** It appears that the requirement for routine transportation is largely absent from government planning guidance.
- **“Shelter” means “transportation” too.** Many of the organizations we interviewed that provided shelter did not realize that they would also need to provide transportation. Yet the two go hand in hand. Many smaller organizations did not anticipate how much time and effort would be devoted to this service.
- **Multiple trips to service providers.** Evacuees will need to make multiple trips to the same service providers. Once these service providers have been identified, regularly scheduled shuttle service to them is beneficial.

Limitations and Challenges

- **Credentialing and access.** Access to and from the disaster area for FBOs and NGOs transporting volunteers and relief workers was an issue. Law enforcement and military checkpoints did not recognize the smaller FBOs and NGOs. Lacking an official credential that identified them as having legitimate reason to be in the disaster area, they were, on occasion, blocked from providing services.
- **Scarcity of fuel.** All local transportation depends on gasoline and diesel fuel. Yet these were in critically short supply.
- **Limited number of vehicles.** Typically, smaller organizations do not have fleets of vehicles and do not have access to vehicles such as school buses. Consequently, they frequently found the demand for their own limited vehicles overwhelming. In some instances, organizations' members donated the use of their personal vehicles for transportation.

Best Practices

- **Co-locate shelter services.** Shelters that could provide meals, shower facilities, and other services all at one location saved a considerable amount of time, money, and effort by not having to run daily shuttles.
- **Co-locate service providers.** Ferrying shelter residents to many stops for services was a huge transportation burden. Co-locating government services such as FEMA, the ARC, the Salvation Army, and the IRS greatly reduced the transportation burden for organizations sheltering evacuees.
- **Create a regular bus schedule.** Many organizations established a regular bus schedule. This approach worked well. Shelter residents could count on it.
- **Schedule regular trips.** Many organizations have established regularly scheduled trips to the affected areas so that volunteers could work on specific projects. Volunteers signed up for trips that fit their schedules and specific jobs that took advantage of their expertise.
- **“Beachheads” facilitate movement.** Using one location within a community or a neighborhood from which services volunteers and relief workers could sortie to provide services worked well. Among other things, it reduced the transportation burden for the host shelter.

APPENDIX A9. CHILDREN’S SERVICES

Creating safe spaces for children is critically important after a crisis such as Hurricane Katrina. Children have lost homes, pets, belongings and sometimes even family members and friends. We know from our years of dealing with emergencies around the world that schools, child care centers and after-school programs provide services essential to a return to normalcy and, ultimately, recovery.

Jeanne-Aimee De Marrais, Team Leader for Katrina Response, Save the Children¹⁵⁴

Faith-based organizations natural constituency includes children, as shown by nurseries, Sunday school rooms and youth centers. In addition, many FBO house day care centers and schools in their facilities for the outside community. This prepares them to serve families during a crisis.

Reverend John Boyles, President, Faith Prepared Network¹⁵⁵

As Jeanne-Aimee De Marrais points out in the quote above, providing for children following a hurricane is an important function. However, it appears to be largely overlooked or minimized in disaster planning. Yet the scope of this function is immense.

For example, the special care required by children is not addressed in the NRP. Two ESFs within the NRP might be expected to address services for children: ESF #6 (Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services) and ESF #14 (Long-Term Community Recovery and Mitigation). Yet neither ESF addresses children’s services.

In contrast, FBOs and NGOs recognized this critical need and provided specialized care for children and for families with children following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.

We created a new definition (absent in the NRP) to describe the actual range of children’s services provided after the hurricanes by FBOs and NGOs. We define children’s services as including the following sub-functions:

- Child care services
- Recreational activities
- Educational services

Discussion

As we drove past row after row of homes destroyed by the surge of flood water in the Ninth Ward of New Orleans, Victim Relief Chaplain Gene Grounds explained, “Every house you see here is a family in crisis. The youngest of those families—children—are especially hard hit by the disaster.”¹⁵⁶

Without the benefits of maturity and perspective, children are a vulnerable population who could be further traumatized without proper care and attention.

The scope of this problem was, and in some ways remains, extensive. According to one estimate, Hurricane Katrina displaced 189,000 children. Approximately 110,000 still had not returned to their normal homes nine months after the storm. Louisiana State University estimated that 30% of affected children show “symptoms of depression or post-traumatic stress disorder.”¹⁵⁷

So what are the specialized needs of children during and following a disaster?

Like adults, children need basic services such as shelter, food, and medical care. However, when providing for children after disasters, some additional needs and considerations are worth noting:

- **Emotional trauma.** The chaos of an evacuation; loss of friends, family, and pets; destruction of homes and property; removal from familiar surroundings; separation from community structure; and disruption to routine are examples of factors that may be particularly traumatic to children.
- **Physical environment.** Debris, fast-moving storm water, unsanitary conditions, crowded shelters, and unfamiliarity with their surroundings are special challenges children face. In the aftermath of a disaster, the world is a more dangerous place for children.
- **Shelter environment.** Unsupervised children in the unfamiliar environment of a temporary shelter are a challenge. Shelter operators stressed to us the importance of providing programs to occupy children. Participants at the *Heralding Unheard Voices* conference told us that shelter-orchestrated children's programs contributed to the smooth functioning of the shelter and facilitated the long-term recovery of the evacuees.¹⁵⁸
- **Parental absences.** Evacuees who are parents of children face a recovery challenge: who takes care of their children while they look for housing and employment, meet with case managers to apply for aid, return to their homes to salvage what little is left, and do the myriad of other tasks required to return their lives to something more normal? By providing volunteers and staff to care for children, FBOs and NGOs gave adult evacuees the time they needed to address their future long-term recovery.¹⁵⁹

FBOs and NGOs offered services that addressed the above needs. Of the 127 organizations we surveyed, 50% (64) provided child care and/or educational services for children.

- 24% (31) established a formal child care program¹⁶⁰
- 46% (58) provided education services

Sub-function: Child Care Services

"Child care services" refers to tending to children who are evacuees. It may be a restatement of the obvious, but children need supervision. This is particularly so in the aftermath of a hurricane, for the factors cited above.

All three sub-functions contain a component of supervision. Both recreational activities and educational services are carried out in a controlled environment. But supervision is the principal purpose of child care services.

Before the hurricane, this supervision may have come from parents, grandparents or siblings, child care centers, a neighbor, a school or associated program, or the social structure of the neighborhood. Evacuees sheltering in a facility in a new community may not have access to familiar social services and traditional support networks for a long time. Accordingly, the shelter or some other organization must make provision for child care.

Organizations may provide child care within their own shelter, may rely upon congregants to provide baby sitting, or may partner with an offsite organization that provides child care services. For example, at

Christchurch Baptist Fellowship in Houston, volunteers from the congregation ran a daily child care center in the church for the children of evacuees associated with that shelter.¹⁶¹

Most FBOs routinely provide baby sitting and child care during worship services. They are at an advantage since they have an established child care program and resources (trained volunteers, rooms set up for children, etc.).

During the long-term recovery phase, two other services emerged: pre-existing child care centers reopened and “summer camps” were established.

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita destroyed or caused child care centers in the region to be closed. For example, Covenant House acts as a homeless shelter for children and young adults. It has 21 sites in North America, including one in New Orleans. Covenant House staff closed that shelter and evacuated to Houston during Hurricane Katrina.

When the staff returned, Renee Blanche, Development Director of the Covenant House in New Orleans, was struck by the immediate urgent need for child care services. “There are few such centers in New Orleans, and Covenant House has a long waiting list for its child care services,” she told us. “It is important to evacuees as they return to their community to restart their lives.”¹⁶²

Preserving Family Unity

Interviewees stressed that keeping families together was important. Families provided supervision of children and assisted family members with special needs.

A strategy many shelters used was to house families in separate rooms or areas. This ensured a degree of privacy for the family and helped guarantee that it would continue as a functional unit in which parents and other adults could supervise the children as they normally would at home. Shelter coordinators at Crossroads Church in Plattenville, LA, for example, used the facility’s onsite classrooms to house families. Shelters that could subdivide their facility into rooms were able to preserve family care, the traditional mechanism for supervising children.*

Other organizations, such as Save the Children, established initiatives to rebuild child care centers in the Gulf Coast states.¹⁶³

A longer-term approach that brought the children out of the shelters for periods of time was to create “summer camps.” For example, University Presbyterian Church in Baton Rouge, LA, in cooperation with Habitat for Humanity and FEMA, worked in late spring 2006 to establish summer day camps for evacuee children at FEMA trailer parks.¹⁶⁴

Sub-function: Recreational Services

Some FBO and NGO shelters provided children-oriented recreational activities. Generally, the programs were simple activities with the added goals of distracting children from their families’ troubles and

* Carolyn Dugas, Secretary and Financial Officer, Crossroads Church, Plattenville, LA, phone interview, April 13, 2006.

improving their quality of life. Shelter coordinators indicated that these programs not only improved the children's spirits, but also reduced stress in families and among shelter residents.

The East Texas Baptist Encampment in Newton, TX, which housed 476 evacuees, devoted substantial resources to children's recreation. Coordinators designated some buildings for children's services. The East Texas Baptist Encampment partnered with other organizations, such as the Texas State Troopers, Army Corps of Engineers, ARC, Habitat for Humanity, the Salvation Army, Texas Baptist Men (which cooked most of the food), and FEMA (which established a computer center in one building).¹⁶⁵

Dr. George Garrison, a Kent State University professor who led that institution's food drive and spring break rebuilding program, used an informal network of friends from across the country to organize Christmas gifts for evacuee children.¹⁶⁶ Christmas celebrations were also important to the 125 children at Bethel Istrouma African Methodist Episcopal Church in Baton Rouge, LA. Pastor Marjorie Cobb-Thomas coordinated with FEMA Community Relations Directors to organize "Christmas in the Country," a series of outings and gift-giving services that were very meaningful to the children. Pastor Cobb-Thomas indicated that this event and others, such as Mother's Day festivities, were crucial to maintaining the morale and hope of the evacuee population.¹⁶⁷

Sub-function: Educational Services

Forty-six percent of organizations provided education services to children, such as classes and tutoring onsite, facilitating cooperation with local school districts to enroll evacuees, and providing evacuees with school supplies. Educational services helped normalize children's lives, and it freed parents to undertake other tasks.

St. Margaret Mary Church in Slidell, LA, participated in onsite education by offering its facility as a school for a nearby church that Hurricane Katrina had destroyed. Using a flex schedule, the school split the day in half to teach St. Margaret Mary students in the morning and the other church's students in the afternoon, thus accommodating both groups for the entire 2005-2006 academic year. This solution was possible only by using the destroyed church's teachers and administrators, who shared facilities with their St. Margaret Mary counterparts.¹⁶⁸

The F. H. Dunn Resurrection Center, a Christian community center within New Hope Church in New Orleans, runs programs dedicated to helping victims of Katrina recover. One of its programs is an after-school tutoring and counseling service for children.¹⁶⁹ The Church of Scientology volunteers also tutored children.¹⁷⁰

If the local school district was intact and functioning, the preferred solution among FBO shelters was to register the children in local schools. As part of this mission, shelter coordinators frequently organized transportation for the children from the shelters to the schools. The school system of Houston, for example, sent representatives to the Christchurch Baptist Fellowship shelter to register students. Local representatives interviewed all the parents at the shelter about their children to gather information and ensure placement at the correct class level.¹⁷¹

Transportation to and from school was a task performed by some FBOs. Lifting Up This Temple Unto God Full Gospel Church in Baton Rouge, LA, arranged for a dozen evacuee children to attend local schools. The church transported them to and from school every day until the shelter coordinators convinced school administrators to extend the bus route to the shelter.¹⁷² Other FBOs throughout the region also encouraged school districts to extend local bus routes.

School supplies were an issue for some evacuee children. At Kingwood United Methodist Church in Kingwood, TX, 35 of the 150 individuals were of school age. In total, school materials were a significant expense. Consequently, the church started an “adopt a child” program in which a family from the congregation could supply each evacuee child with school supplies, books, and school clothes.¹⁷³

Many larger FBOs and NGOs also provided school materials. For example, Christian World Embassy, an international disaster relief organization, provided supplies to schools throughout New Orleans and provided backpacks filled with additional personal supplies to their students.¹⁷⁴

Findings

- **Family unity.** Shelter operators found it beneficial to families to have them live together in one room within the shelter.
- **Preexisting capabilities.** Some FBOs perform children’s services as an everyday function, such as operating day care centers, children’s programs during services, or full-service schools. This gave them expertise, organization, and resources directly applicable to disaster relief children services. For example, Beech Street First Baptist Church in Texarkana, AR, leveraged its existing supplies from the church’s day-care nursery to run a disaster nursery for evacuees.¹⁷⁵
- **Classrooms.** Facilities are particularly well suited to child care if they already include classrooms.
- **Time for recovery activities.** Child care services, recreation activities, and school classes release parents from child care responsibilities for at least some of the day, allowing them to focus on long-term recovery needs.
- **Long-term housing for children.** Shelters should make finding long-term housing for families with children their first priority. Children need a stable living environment to readjust, which means getting them out of a shelter as soon as possible.¹⁷⁶
- **Net benefit of recreation.** Children’s recreation activities created a sense of normalcy for children, freed parents for long-term recovery activities, and contributed to the smooth operation of shelters. Those organizations that ran programs for children indicated that the benefits far outweighed the costs of conducting them.

Limitations and Challenges

- **Long-term evacuation and school enrollment.** FBOs and NGOs found themselves doing something unprecedented: facilitating children’s reintegration into a different educational system. Previous recent evacuations did not displace individuals for long enough to warrant enrollment in a different school district.
- **Expectant mothers and newborns.** Interviewees told us that expectant mothers and newborns required specialized care.¹⁷⁷ There was a general sentiment from our sample that baby-specific goods were in short supply, though Save the Children specialized in shipping these to the disaster region in bulk.¹⁷⁸ The USA Shoutout Shelter in Baton Rouge coped with the challenge of expectant mothers and newborns by using volunteers to care specifically for infants and pregnant women.¹⁷⁹

- **Family reunification.** Rapid and chaotic evacuation of New Orleans separated children from their families, causing difficulty in reuniting them and caring for the children.¹⁸⁰

Best Practices

- **Return to local established schools.** Sending children to local school districts, as opposed to schooling them in the shelter, was beneficial to the shelter. It did, however, create the need for transportation services from the FBOs to the schools by FBO staff or volunteers.
- **Close relationship with school district administration.** Close communication among the district administrators, the shelters, and evacuee parents is ideal.
- **Rapid enrollment.** It is important to get children into local schools as soon as possible.¹⁸¹ As the evacuee students had a relatively high chance, compared to previous evacuations, of actually remaining in the municipalities in which they sheltered, enrolling them in schools as early as possible to minimize disruptive transitions was a favorable practice.
- **Home sheltering.** Shelter coordinators believed that evacuees placed in homes with families recovered faster and had fewer side effects than those in group shelters. They indicated that the beneficial effect of home sheltering was particularly noticeable with regard to children.¹⁸²
- **Tutoring or mentoring.** While we found only a few examples of organizations offering tutoring or mentoring, those we did find offered that they felt this was highly successful for the children and beneficial to the shelter.
- **Partnering.** Partnering with other organizations for classes, tutoring or mentoring, transportation to and from school, recreation activities, or child care served parents and children well and facilitated shelter operations.

APPENDIX A10. CASE MANAGEMENT AND RELATED SERVICES

The applications, forms, and understanding of the criteria required for each service can be intimidating. Survivors often have a tough time knowing their rights and whom to trust. Case managers reach out to people having a hard time finding their way around the system—people who may not drive a car, who may have vision handicaps, who may not read and write. The case manager comes from the community and is intimately acquainted with available resources.

United Methodist Committee on Relief¹⁸³

The Department of Health and Human Services defines case management services as “... arrangement, coordination, and monitoring of services to meet the needs of individuals and families.”¹⁸⁴ The Case Management Society of America describes healthcare case management as “a collaborative process of assessment, planning, facilitation and advocacy for options and services to meet an individual’s health needs through communication and available resources to promote quality cost-effective outcomes.”¹⁸⁵

Case management is formal assistance provided to individuals and families to gain them health and human services to which they are entitled. This involves trained case workers familiar with local, state, and federal assistance programs.

Fundamentally, some aspects of case management come down to properly filling out forms or applications and getting them into the appropriate system. FEMA forms, ARC forms, applications for new driver’s licenses, changes in address forms, requests for state or federal assistance, insurance claims, registrations for school, and unemployment claims are just a few examples of the overwhelming sea of paper an evacuee has to navigate. And each of these forms or applications requires some understanding of how that particular agency operates and how to get the claim or the application into the system.

The sub-functions analyzed are

1. Providing information
2. Referral services
3. Form and application assistance
4. Financial relief

FBOs and NGOs provided case management and related services. Some FBOs and NGOs already specialized in case management before the hurricanes hit. The Salvation Army had to greatly expand its regular case management services in response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Other organizations that normally perform similar functions as a social service for the underprivileged in non-disaster periods also had to expand their service to include other aspects of case management. Finally, some organizations, particularly those offering shelter for the first time, found themselves providing case management services for the first time out of necessity.

Shelter coordinators and other members of the FBO and NGO community indicated that case management was an area for which they were least prepared.¹⁸⁶

Of 127 FBOs and NGOs, 92% (117) provided some form of case management and/or related service:

- 79% provided information
- 87% referred evacuees to others to obtain services and care
- 63% assisted evacuees in completing forms and applications
- 71% provided direct financial relief to evacuees

Sub-function: Provide Information

Evacuees desperately need information in order to return their lives to normalcy. Organizations made best efforts to provide reliable information to the evacuee population in various ways, including making computers and the Internet available for use and providing phone banks, television, and, as needed, personal counseling sessions.

Information was in high demand at many shelters. Organizations became information managers, communicators, and advisors. They attempted to supply the evacuees with accurate information on government aid and on the overall recovery process. Many facilities made use of computers and the Internet to provide information and register evacuees with FEMA. The necessity of Internet access was frequently mentioned by interviewees.

Case Study

The United Methodist Committee on Relief (UMCOR) is well established in the case management world. It has run specialized case management training for its members for the past 13 years and has designed training for others.

UMCOR describes its own brand of case management as “face to face,” “supportive,” and “empowering.” The goal is to enable people to again become self-sufficient.

According to UMCOR, the case manager evaluates the client’s needs, reviews what relief the client has already received, and determines whether the client has registered for FEMA assistance. The UMCOR case manager then provides information about what’s needed to proceed further. The final stage puts the client on the path to returning to a normal life by referring him or her to the appropriate assistance services, acting as an advocate for the client’s interests if necessary, and finally offering direct assistance with bills if the client requires it. Ultimately, the client family and the case worker jointly decide when the process is complete and the family can operate independently of aid once again.*

Pastor Joe Ratcliff at the First Baptist Church in St. Francisville, LA, described how volunteers at his church established computer stations in the shelter. These volunteers worked with 57 residents of the shelter to register them online with government agencies. Upon learning of this service, hundreds of shelter non-residents came to First Baptist Church for help.¹⁸⁷

* United Methodist Committee on Relief, “National Case Management Questions & Answers,” October 2005, <http://new.gbgm-umc.org/umcor/newsroom/releases/archives05/?search=case%20management&C=1470&I=1996>.

Pastor Joe Landrum at Madison (MS) United Methodist Church noted that computer stations allowed evacuees to fill out forms, locate lost family members through databases, and view satellite imagery of their property to perform initial damage assessments. Computers and the large-screen television broadcasting cable news 24 hours a day were partly successful in providing evacuees with needed information.¹⁸⁸

Sub-function: Referral Services

Organizations connected evacuees with FEMA or other service providers. In some cases, FBOs and NGOs brought in outside professionals to address evacuees' needs.

Many organizations that operated shelters found that the best way to facilitate contact between evacuees and the federal bureaucracy was to bring into the shelter representatives from relevant service providers. For example, Madison United Methodist Church brought in FEMA representatives who met with the shelter's 96 evacuees and assisted them in filling out the required forms.¹⁸⁹ Similar instances took place at other shelters, such as at North Orange Baptist Church in Orange, TX.¹⁹⁰ There, FEMA representatives explained federal policies to evacuees and assisted them in registering with the appropriate authorities.

Organizations served as a liaison between evacuees and social service agencies. Jim Colbert from the USA Shoutout Shelter, which housed 135 evacuees, described how his group coordinated with authorities and service providers to get Social Security payments, food stamps, and other aid to evacuees.¹⁹¹

Other shelters chose to transport the evacuees to the necessary facilities. The Church of the Nazarene in Orange, TX, which housed 100 to 125 evacuees, transported residents to offices to register for food stamps and FEMA aid.¹⁹²

Sub-function: Form and Application Assistance

A crucial step in the recovery process involves one's registration with the ARC, FEMA, other government agencies, and other service providers for relief services. Some organizations assisted evacuees in this process.

It is critical to register for aid quickly. Some shelters provided Internet facilities and volunteer assistance. For example, Hope Alive Community Worship Center in Broussard, LA, had an Internet area set up at the shelter for evacuees to use.¹⁹³

However, organizations needed guidance from authorities in order to help their evacuees. Unfortunately, they were often unable to reach government offices and other agencies. Shelter coordinators at Washington Baptist Church in Natchez, LA, were unable to provide evacuees with needed information such as how to go about obtaining welfare and Social Security checks.¹⁹⁴

Establishing telephone contact was a persistent problem in obtaining information. Though some organizations, such as Options for Independence in Houma, LA, made use of phone banks to serve evacuees, many organizations expressed their high frustration at the inability to contact FEMA or the ARC via telephone. Rose Cusic, Managing Consultant at USA Shoutout Shelters, notes that the telephone networks were so overwhelmed that the only time evacuees could get through on the phone was late at night or very early in the morning, forcing them to rely on computers with Internet access.

Sub-function: Financial Relief

Local congregations, organization partners, individual donors, and denominational organizations provided funds for local organizations to give to evacuees or use to support evacuees.

Immanuel Baptist Church in Hattiesburg, MS, collected and distributed funds. Students from Dillard University provided each evacuee family at Praise Temple Full Gospel Baptist Cathedral, Shreveport, LA, with a monetary contribution.¹⁹⁵ Trinity Baptist Church in Port Arthur, TX, received a \$10,000 donation from another church and used some of those funds to buy gas and food cards for the evacuees in their care.¹⁹⁶

Contributions came from all over the country. Immanuel Baptist Church received financial contributions from a church in California and partnered with several churches in Georgia through the Southern Baptist Convention.¹⁹⁷ Reverend Judy Tefteller of Kingwood United Methodist Church in Kingwood, TX, noted the generous community donations of nearly \$100,000 in collections designated for Katrina victims.¹⁹⁸

Many individuals and organizations felt that contributing to grass-roots organizations was preferable to contributing to a general fund at larger, national organizations. By contributing to a church on the ground, for example, an individual, company, FBO, or NGO had more control over the destination of its money and could view directly the impact of its funding.

Findings

- **Timely accurate information.** Providing evacuees with accurate, timely, and needed information is not only useful to evacuees, but also reduces anxiety. Lack of accurate information from government representatives and some service providers was a common problem.
- **Inflexibility.** Case managers were frustrated with the inflexibility of government and other support institutions. Local organizations that provided case management services felt that government and others failed to recognize that they were dealing with extraordinary circumstances and that ordinary practices were not sufficient to meet these needs.
- **Know your congregation.** Knowing the composition, particularly the skill sets, of a congregation helped FBOs provide services. Organizations with a good understanding of their congregations or volunteers were able to mobilize the proper personnel who could provide specific assistance, such as legal advice, related to various aspects of case management.
- **Information tools.** Computers and Internet access were invaluable. Having these resources established at a potential shelter beforehand facilitates case management.

Limitations and Challenges

- **Impact of nonresidency.** Evacuees who left their home state faced an additional challenge. Parkway Baptist Church is located in Natchez, MS, just across the state line from Louisiana. The church transported 832 evacuees to a family service center in Louisiana to apply for help. After long waits, the state officials at the center informed the evacuees that they were ineligible for aid from Louisiana because they resided in a Mississippi shelter and were therefore Mississippi residents.

- **Illegal aliens.** Illegal aliens need help but don't have Social Security numbers. FEMA required identification, such as Social Security numbers, to register with the government. Since illegal aliens do not have Social Security numbers, they had difficulty getting aid.
- **Identification.** Identification issues also existed for citizen evacuees who had not brought or had lost their identification.
- **Inaccurate information.** Inaccurate information was a consistent problem. Pastor Richard Jennings at the River of Praise Church in Tomball, TX, noted how evacuees in the community heard five different instructions regarding where they could receive FEMA vouchers. One of those announcements named River of Praise Church, even though it had no involvement with the voucher process.¹⁹⁹
- **Computer literacy.** Though using computers and online applications expedited the process of applying for assistance, many evacuees were not familiar with computers.

Best Practices

- **Planning.** Organizations' leadership could benefit from deciding how to use funds before a disaster strikes. They might also benefit from establishing an agreement with a professional accountant to manage finances in the event of a disaster, which would resolve accountability issues.
- **Computer mentors.** Judy Hawkins of Christchurch Baptist Fellowship in Houston emphasized the importance of having computer-literate volunteers on hand to operate the computers.²⁰⁰ At the *Heralding Unheard Voices* conference, one participant noted how one of the evacuees helped solve this problem when he approached the shelter coordinators and offered his computer skills. By obtaining a computer and wireless Internet connection for this individual, the shelter coordinators enabled him to work all day online to register the other shelter residents.²⁰¹
- **Partnering.** Using partners was a common theme. A local bank in Kingwood, TX, gave all the evacuees at Kingwood United Methodist Church a bank account, a required aspect of their FEMA application, but for which many lacked their old information.²⁰²
- **Daily briefings.** Holding daily meetings to give evacuees accurate information and inform them of the overall government aid process was also a helpful step.²⁰³

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APPENDIX B. CONFERENCE MATERIAL

This appendix contains all the conference materials used for our research.

APPENDIX B1. CONFERENCE INVITATION



**Homeland
Security
Institute**
2900 South Quincy Street, Arlington, VA 22206

YOU HAVE BEEN CORDIALLY INVITED TO ATTEND AN UPCOMING CONFERENCE

Date: Wednesday, June 7, 2006

Location: Baton Rouge River Center
275 South River Road
Baton Rouge, LA 70802
(225) 389-3030
<http://brrivercenter.com>

Title: *Heralding Unheard Voices: The Role of Faith-Based and Non-Governmental Organizations During Disaster*

Faith-based and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as yours provide capabilities and resources for the community. During times of crisis, those capabilities and resources are critical; you make a difference. Your community is more resilient thanks to your organization's efforts. Yet the role of your organization - particularly if it is small and not affiliated with a larger denomination or national organization - may not be well understood outside of the NGO community. This conference is an attempt to focus on your organization and on how you contribute to your community's resilience.

Sponsor: This project is sponsored by Homeland Security Institute.

Organizers: Who are we? The Homeland Security Institute (HSI) is the Department of Homeland Security's think tank; the proper name is Federally Funded Research and Development Center. (Just to dispel any fears, we are not part of any investigation or inquiry; truly the intent is to herald the role of unsung heroes in our nation's response and recovery world - organizations like yours.)

Agenda: The agenda is attached. We have two speakers and a panel session. However, most of the time is reserved for breakout sessions so that we may hear what you have to say. CAPT Leroy Gilbert, U.S. Navy, (Ret.) former chaplain of the US Coast Guard, will provide the keynote address. Mr. Ken Thompson, Director of External Affairs at the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, will provide the afternoon address.

Breakout Sessions: There are two sessions scheduled. Each breakout group will be 30-40 people and will be facilitated by staff from HSI and by one of the panelists. Here's what we're looking for from those sessions: (1) What did your organization learn during recent disasters that you didn't anticipate? What worked exceptionally well for you? (2) What would you like to be able to do to be better prepared for future disasters?

Registration: Each attendee must complete the attached registration form and return it to us **no later than Wednesday, May 24, 2006**. Please feel free to extend this invitation to other faith-based or non-governmental organizations that you feel should be invited.

Nearest Hotel: Sheraton Baton Rouge Convention Center Hotel
102 France Street
Baton Rouge, LA 70802
(225) 242-2662

We look forward to your attendance. Thank you.

APPENDIX B2. CONFERENCE AGENDA

Heralding Unheard Voices:

The Role of Faith-Based and Non-Governmental Organizations During Disaster

Wednesday, June 7, 2006
Baton Rouge River Center
275 South River Road
Baton Rouge, LA 70802
(225) 389-3030

8:00 – 9:00 am	Registration	Level 2, Concessions
9:00 – 9:15 am	Welcome/Purposes: Pete Hull	Level 1, Exhibition Hall 2
9:15 – 9:45 am	Speaker: CAPT Leroy Gilbert, Chaplain Corps, U.S. Navy (Ret.)	Level 1, Exhibition Hall 2
9:45 – 9:55 am	Break	Level 2, Refreshments
9:55 – 11:45 am	Group Breakout	Level 2, Mtg. Rooms 1-7
11:45 – 1:00 pm	Lunch	Level 2, Concessions
1:00 – 1:30 pm	Speaker: Ken Thompson, MIPT	Level 1, Exhibition Hall 2
1:35 – 2:50 pm	Group Breakout	Level 2, Mtg. Rooms 1-7
2:50 – 3:05 pm	Break	Level 2, Refreshments
3:05 – 4:30 pm	Panel Discussion	Level 1, Exhibition Hall 2
4:30 – 4:45 pm	Closing Remarks: Pete Hull	Level 1, Exhibition Hall 2
4:45 – 5:00 pm	Closing Statement: CAPT Leroy Gilbert, Chaplain Corps, U.S. Navy (Ret.)	Level 1, Exhibition Hall 2

APPENDIX B3. PANELISTS' BIOGRAPHIES

CAPT Leroy Gilbert, Chaplain Corps, U.S. Navy (Ret.): Dr. Gilbert served as a Chaplain in the United States Navy Chaplain Corps. He was assigned to all three of the sea services: Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. He retired from Navy with the rank of Navy Captain. He was assigned to several key leadership, administrative, and pastoral positions, including the Chaplain of the United States Coast Guard. Dr. Gilbert has a wealth of experiences and training in disaster ministry. He coordinated Joint Services chaplains' emergency response team at the Pentagon and Ground Zero in the aftermath of 9/11. He also provided or facilitated pastoral care and humanitarian leadership in several critical incidents, including: Egypt Air 990, John F. Kennedy, Jr. tragedy, TWA 800. Dr. Gilbert assisted in the research, writing, and implementation of the Coast Guard Incident Management National Interagency Incident Management System (NIIMS) and the Coast Guard Incident Command System Manual (ICS) in regards to chaplain services.

Kenneth G. Thompson: As Director of External Affairs for the Oklahoma City National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, Ken Thompson is responsible for education, outreach and assisting the Institute in its mission to prevent and deter terrorism or mitigate its effects. As a family member, Ken has first-hand experience of the effects of terrorism in our world today. His mother was the last person identified in the Oklahoma City Bombing. Ken waited alongside his brother and sister for 43 days for the rescue teams to find their mother. Since April 19, 1995, Ken has been an active participant in the planning, establishment and construction of the Oklahoma City National Memorial, the Museum, and the Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism. Ken's activities have included co-chairing the Oklahoma City National Memorial Family, Survivor & Rescue Worker Conscience Committee, serving as a board member of the Oklahoma City National Memorial, and serving as a founding member of the Institute's advisory committee. Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Ken volunteered time in New York and was instrumental in guiding New York City leaders through a process for family members and survivors to begin dealing with the long-term effects of the tragedy.

Bill Bollier: As the Executive Director of the Louisiana Strategic Medical Assistance & Response Team (SMART), Bill has served in the emergency services arena for over 20 years. He started with the Shreveport Fire Department in 1983 as a Firefighter and Emergency Medical Technician - Paramedic. In 1994, Billy left the Shreveport Fire Department and worked for Jackson Parish until December of 2003, first as Director of the parish Emergency Medical Services and also served as Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness. He serves on several Boards and Committees and was appointed by Governor Blanco to the LERN Committee in 2005, was appointed by Governor Foster to the State-Wide Regional Trauma Task Force in June 2003, and was also asked to serve on a pre-hospital and hospital-based Weapons of Mass Destruction training planning committee by the LA Department of Health and Hospitals in 2002. Billy continues to educate himself in pertinent emergency services topics, and is a certified instructor in several emergency services disciplines. Under the direction of Dr. Crieese, Secretary of the Department of Health and Hospitals for the state of Louisiana, Bill worked as the Operations Chief in the Superdome during Hurricane Katrina, and also served as the federal liaison between the military and the state for all medical evacuations and removal of special needs patients from August 30th thru Sept 3rd of 2005.

CAPT Wilbur Douglass III, Chaplain Corps, U.S. Navy: Chaplain Wilbur Douglass III has served with commands from all three sea services. As the Area Chaplain for Commander, U.S Atlantic Area/Fifth Coast Guard District from 1997-2002, Chaplain Douglass III led 29 chaplains over six weeks

at Ground Zero in New York City. There he provided spiritual care and support to Coast Guard personnel, family members of the victims, and to emergency and rescue personnel responding to the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center. For his work he was awarded the Legion of Merit. Currently, as the Chaplain of the U.S. Coast Guard, he is directly responsible for the oversight and care of 37 active duty and 11 reserve Navy chaplains serving in various U.S. Coast Guard commands.

Jody L. Herrington: Jody Herrington serves as the Disaster Relief Manager for Operation Blessing International. In her capacity as Disaster Relief Manager, Jody manages a variety of services that includes a cash grant program (since Katrina, 267 grants exceeding 4.5 million dollars to 215 faith-based and non-profit organizations); a fleet of 18 tractors and 65 trailers that transport resources and medical supplies; a command center that serves as a base for volunteer coordination (to date Operation Blessing has provided 2,303 volunteers totaling over 111,256 hours of Katrina relief volunteer service); free medical and dental services; and an innovative project with the City of New Orleans to fight mosquitoes that can carry West Nile Virus, Encephalitis and other diseases. Jody brings years of experience working with churches, non-profits, and international ministries. During Hurricane Katrina, she served an active role at the New Orleans Emergency Operations Center with the Mass Care Committee, FEMA Voluntary Agency Liaisons, Greater New Orleans Disaster Relief Partnership, as well as partnerships with hundreds of pastors across the Gulf Coast.

Dr. Ernest L. Johnson: Dr. Ernest Johnson is President of the Louisiana State Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and serves as a member of the NAACP's National Resolutions Committee from Region VI. He has over 29 years professional, leadership and management experience in a number of high-level legal, financial, educational, civic and public policy positions. Beyond his legal career, Mr. Johnson, an ordained Minister, has achieved distinction in numerous other educational and civic endeavors. He served for one year as vice-chairman of the Governor's Blue Ribbon Committee for Grambling State University, which resulted in significant operational and educational improvements, and has served as an adjunct professor at Southern University Law School since 1984. Following Hurricane Katrina, Dr. Johnson served as a vital link with FEMA. Among other efforts to aid evacuees, he encouraged the establishment of shelter committees which gave the evacuees a voice in their treatment.

Rev. Daniel K. Soliday: Reverend Dan Soliday currently serves as the Coordinator for Nazarene Compassionate Ministries, USA/Canada for the Church of the Nazarene and as the CEO and President of Domestic Operations for Nazarene Compassionate Ministries, Inc. NCM, Inc. is an intermediary organization working to *Create Awareness, Develop Resources* and *Build Capacity* within 182 USA/Canada faith-based and grassroots non-profit organizations and more than 40 NGOs outside the USA. NCM, Inc. also manages the denomination's disaster response organization, Nazarene Disaster Response. Supported by a survey, Nazarene Disaster Response has raised over \$4.5 million in direct financial assistance for Hurricane Katrina and more than \$18 million in total financial, volunteerism and in-kind contributions. Dan is deeply involved in the start-up and continuing development of faith-based non-profit organizations and community-based collaborative initiatives. He has served as training facilitator, speaker/preacher and consultant for various church & faith-based entities to assist them in carrying out their mission of social transformation, compassion, and justice within their local context.

APPENDIX B4. KEYNOTE SPEECH (1)

Reflections on Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Grassroots Faith-based Organizations (FBOs) Response to 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina

By Rev. Leroy Gilbert, Ph.D.

Introduction

My proudest moment as an American happened during one of the worst events in our nation's history. A few hours after the terrorists had flown a plane in the Pentagon, I was on the scene providing crisis ministry and chaplaincy leadership. After a few hours of being at the site, I paused and noticed how the various rescue workers were working together in complete harmony. As the emergency rescue workers emerged from the hole caused by the intruding plane at the Pentagon, they were all covered with white ashes and dark dust. No one could recognize the ethnicity of the rescue workers. They all were of one accord, working together in perfect harmony. For that moment in time, I beheld, I saw, I experienced the fulfillment of a prophecy by Martin Luther King, Jr. of a colorless society, where people would not be judged by "the pigmentation of their skin but by the content of their character." On that fatal and fateful day (9/11, 2001), a crisis brought Americans together as one people with singleness of purpose. It was the worst of time but the finest moment in our American history.

I have heard the song, "America the Beautiful" several times but it never touched me like it did on that fateful night. As the rescue workers were working together, putting out fires, bringing body parts out of the building, looking for survivors doing what was necessary to stabilize the situation, I could hear in the distant background a recording of "America the Beautiful." America in the darkest, most tragic time of our history truly looked beautiful because of the soul of the people in the aftermath of 9/11.

What also made this event one of the finest moments in our history was how charities, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and faith-based organizations (FBOs) responded to 9/11. In a matter of a few hours, charitable relief organizations had mobilized their resources and set up a support city at the Pentagon. Rescue workers, volunteers, military personnel had a place to get a hot meal, relax, receive counseling, debriefing, spiritual nourishment, and a reprieve during their arduous tasks at the Pentagon.

In New York where the terrorists attacked the Twin Towers, there was a synergy between local government and non-governmental organizations, charities and the faith-based community in the rescue and recovery operations. Before 9/11, the Coast Guard Chaplains had received critical incident training and certification courses from various relief organizations. Because of this collaboration with other relief organizations, we were able to get immediate access and the required badges to function at Ground Zero and the Family Assistance Center.

The services, support, and funds that charitable organizations, non-governmental organizations, and the faith-based institutions provided to our nation during and after the attack at the Pentagon and in New York demonstrated how resourceful and helpful such organizations can be in disaster management.

Some people try to make a comparison between the relief operation of 9/11 with the relief operation of Hurricane Katrina. My intention is not to make such an analogy but to draw from lessons learned from 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina because both catastrophes have compelled faith-based organizations and non-governmental agencies to redefine their roles in major disasters. While the invasion of 9/11 was

catastrophic, both in Washington, DC, and New York City, the damage was isolated to small areas of the cities. Conversely, Hurricane Katrina destroyed major Gulf Coast cities and flattened 150 miles of coastline, and more than 1.1 million persons were displaced and dispersed throughout the country. In fact, 80% of New Orleans was under water, and whole towns in southeastern Louisiana ceased to exist. Hurricane Katrina was the most destructive natural disaster in U.S. history. It was unprecedented, we have nothing to compare to this catastrophic hurricane.

Americans responded to Hurricane Katrina in unprecedented ways. Scholars, researchers, and governmental agencies are still gathering data, analyzing information to discern lessons learned from this disaster. The Federal Government knows a lot about the works of non-governmental agencies that are approved or affiliated with the federal, state, local agencies. However, little is known about the role and effectiveness of grassroots faith-based organizations that provided incalculable services to victims of Hurricane Katrina.

Definition of Grassroots Organizations

Before we go further, I want to establish a working definition for grassroots faith-based organizations. Robert L. Woodson, in his landmark book, “The Triumphs of Joseph: How Today’s Community Healers Are Reviving Our Streets and Neighborhoods,” provides an operational definition of grassroots faith-based organizations (FBOs). Grassroots FBO is a religious congregation (church, mosque, synagogue, or temple), an organization, program, or project sponsored/hosted by a religious group. Woodson indicates that grassroots organizations are small neighborhood non-profit organizations located in the same “zip code,” as the people they serve. They have a firsthand knowledge of the problems they live with and a personal stake in the success of their solutions. Grassroots organizations, according to Woodson, provide not only authority and structure, but also the love that is necessary for an individual to undergo healing growth, and development. Grassroots FBOs not only provide needed services but do so in an environment of care and mutual support.

The Focus of the Conference

Do you know the name of the man from New Orleans who saved nearly 100 people during the great flood of 1927? Few people know his name and his courageous, heroic, life saving, humanitarian efforts have pathetically gone unnoticed. His name is Mr. Samuel White. This African-American man in his early 30’s worked in the stockyard of a railroad company on Franklin Avenue in New Orleans.

The storm of 1927 took many by surprise. Fourteen inches of rain fell on the city on Good Friday, April 15. To make matters worse, lightning struck the main power cables of several drainage plants. White, whose home was on railroad property well above street level in the Edgewood area, noticed the rising floodwaters, so he built a wooden raft by lashing together several beams. He made several trips into low-lying areas, rescuing family after family, taking them to his home and, when it was full, to empty boxcars.

According to a story in the Times-Picayune, on Tuesday, April 19, 1927, his wife, the former Marguerite Rochon, cared for and fed the victims, including sick children, while taking care of her own four children. Mary White Jones, the daughter of Mr. and Mrs. White reflecting on her parents’ heroic rescue mission remarked, “My father never said a word to us about what he did, but my mother used to talk about it all the time.” Although Mr. Smith did not expect recognition or honors, his daughter said, “They always give people a medal or document or something, but my father never received any kind of formal recognition.”

Rear Admiral Stephen Rachon, USCG, a native of New Orleans, has been trying to get people to recognize the contributions of this unsung hero. Mr. Smith did what he did not for recognition, honor or fame. He did not even know that he was doing something extraordinary; he was just an ordinary person trying to do what he could to save lives and provide support for those in a desperate situation.

Homeland Security Institute and I are concerned that the great works done by grassroots individuals and organizations may go unnoticed. Therefore, the purpose of this conference is to highlight and to learn more about how grassroots FBOs, locally and nationally, made a difference in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. One of the things we hope to accomplish in this conference is to identify and articulate the role of the grassroots faith-based organizations in disaster relief. The Homeland Security Institute has interviewed hundreds of grassroots faith-based organizations to learn of their involvement and ministries to the victims of Hurricane Katrina. We are learning something everyday about the unsung grassroots FBOs who provided invaluable services in the aftermath of Katrina, and continue to do so.

The data gathered so far reveals a particular role that grassroots organizations played in the aftermath of Katrina: these organizations stepped-in to provide for “unmet needs.” When the government (federal, state, local) or national emergency organizations failed to act expeditiously or could not provide the essential services for victims of Katrina, grassroots faith-based organizations saw what needed to be done and acted according to the needs of the people.

Many studies have been conducted regarding the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in order to discern lessons learned for the purpose of improving administrative and operational effectiveness in the future. The primary focus of these studies has been similar to an autopsy. The examiners are basically interested in discovering the causes of death, who may be blamed, what went wrong. We approach this conference not as researchers, examiners or investigators but as reporters to hear, interview, learn, and report the unsung courageous work of grassroots FBOs and NGOs during and after the worst natural catastrophe that our country has ever known.

The Root Causes of Problems Before and After Katrina

Lessons learned from 9/11 and previous disasters revealed a need to have a more coordinated system between governmental agencies at every level and with humanitarian organizations. After Hurricane Katrina devastated the Gulf Coast, the President of the United States, on September 15, 2005, acknowledged from Jackson Square in New Orleans, that “the system, at every level of government, was not well-coordinated ... and the Federal Government will learn the lessons of Hurricane Katrina.” Some of the root causes of the delivery services problems in the Gulf Coast region after Katrina and Rita may be found in the National Response Plan (NRP). The U.S. government’s National Response Plan provides a single comprehensive framework for the federal response to domestic incidents, such as natural disasters and terrorist attacks. The plan provides the structure and mechanism for the coordination of federal support and localities. Major cabinet and other federal agencies are signatories of this plan, along with the American Red Cross and the National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (National VOAD). The plan incorporates and replaces several previous plans, which were originally signed in 1992. One of the ways the plan changed the Federal Response Plan was by not naming charities active in disaster relief other than the American Red Cross, but instead incorporated them under the umbrella organization, National VOAD.

The NRP plan designates 15 Emergencies Support Functions, each identifying a specific disaster response need as well as organizations that have key roles in helping meet those needs. The 6th Emergency

Support Function is most relevant to charities involved in disaster relief. This function creates a working group of key federal agencies and charitable organizations to address:

- Mass care, including sheltering, feeding, and emergency first aid;
- Housing, both short-and long-term, and
- Human services, such as counseling, processing of benefits, and identifying support for persons with special needs.

Under the Emergency Support Function 6 with FEMA, the American Red Cross is the only charity to serve as a primary agency. The plan gives the American Red Cross responsibility for coordinating federal mass care assistance in support of state and local efforts. The American Red Cross also has responsibilities under the Emergency Support Functions, such as providing counseling services and working with the Federal Government to distribute ice and water. The National VOAD, a membership organization composed of approximately 40 charities that provide services following disasters, is designated as a support agency under Emergency Support Function 6, but it does not provide direct services to victims. Rather, National VOAD is responsible for sharing information with its members organizations regarding the severity of the disaster, needs identified, and actions taken to address these needs.

When the GAO team visited the Gulf Coast in October 2005, the team had an opportunity to observe and assess how the Emergency Support Functions 6 worked before, during, and after Hurricane Katrina. The GAO team found great successes in the plan and many areas that require improvement and modifications. The team observed that the American Red Cross did not provide relief in certain areas because of safety policies; and thus, other charities, faith-based organizations helped to meet the needs of those areas.

The American Red Cross in consultation with the American Society for Civil Engineers and FEMA, developed policies intended to protect the safety of service providers and victims following a disaster. These policies include not establishing shelters in areas that may become flooded during a disaster or in structures that strong winds may compromise. However, as observed in the Gulf Coast, victims often remained in areas where the American Red Cross would not establish shelters. The GAO team assessed that where the American Red Cross was able to establish shelters, the needs of the victims sometimes exceeded the capacity of the American Red Cross. The GAO team further observed that smaller charities, such as the local church organizations, filled many of the needs for volunteer services that the American Red Cross did not meet.

Grassroots Response

During Hurricane Katrina, grassroots religious organizations found avenues to provide direct resources, help, support to victims with or without going through well established relief organizations. Religious organizations never involved in relief efforts began to develop strategies of involvement largely because of the actions or inaction of the Federal Government and responsible relief agencies.

In the Washington Post, Tuesday, April 11, 2006 section A6, there was article entitled, “Red Cross to Announce Disaster Response Changes.” The article quotes volunteers who rushed to the Gulf Coast to care for Katrina evacuees. One upset volunteer stated, “His team accomplished its mission in spite of— not because of that charity.” The American Red Cross admitted that mistakes were made and they are working on rectifying those mistakes. The Federal Government also admitted mistakes and is determined to correct problem areas. However, some of these observed and acknowledged mistakes caused some

distrust and compelled grassroots religious organizations to circumvent established charities and governmental agencies to provide direct, needed, and immediate help to the evacuees.

Direct and Indirect Help from Grassroots Organizations

During the first few days after Katrina, our nation was shocked and horrified by the actions or inaction of our Federal Government. We stood in awe and wondered why could not the greatest nation on earth rescue the evacuees at the New Orleans Superdome expeditiously. The news media indicated that people were without water; children were being molested; people did not have toilet facilities, and it was extremely hot, and overcrowded at the Superdome. People of goodwill all over America were moved to do something to help. Everyone wanted to help the hurricane victims, to rescue them from the Superdome, to provide food, clothing, shelter, counseling, support, or whatever was needed. People responded in two primary ways. They either contributed funds to charitable organizations and/or volunteered their services as workers in the Gulf Coast.

Contributions

The American Institute of Philanthropy reported that in a little more than 3 months, charities raised more than \$2.5 billion of charitable aid for victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Individuals, organizations, businesses, churches, governmental agencies, and charities are still giving and raising funds for the hurricane victims.

Charitable organizations have incredible resources and funds that are available or could be raised for emergencies. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) reported that for 2002, 501(c)(3) organizations, which include charities, had total assets of over \$1.7 trillion. In 2004, the Internal Revenue Service recognized 820,000 charities, accounting for about 90 percent of 501(c)3 organizations. One of the lessons learned from the Federal Government is the importance of integrating and synchronizing the nation's homeland security policies, strategies, and plan not only across federal, state, and local government, but also across private sector, non-governmental agencies, faith-based groups, communities, and individual citizens.

Mobilizing Resources

Although churches gave millions to charitable organizations and denominational relief funds, numerous religious institutions and Non-governmental Organizations felt the urgency and need to do more. Congregations throughout America asked and answered their own question, "What can we do to help." Churches converged on the Gulf Coast with truck loads of supplies, food, water, clothing, blankets, etc. Trained and untrained volunteers came in the region to provide whatever help that was needed.

Some denominational congregations and independent congregations made direct connections with their affiliated churches in the Gulf Coast region to assess need, damage, and arrange support. Numerous churches across the country managed to develop a connection with local churches in the Gulf Coast for the purpose of providing direct services, support, care, and funds to the victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. In fact, some African American pastors donated a portion of their salaries to pay colleagues in the storm areas whose congregations were destroyed.

Lessons Learned from Katrina From a Faith-Based Perspective

1. The Limitation of the Federal Government

In their report regarding Lessons Learned from Katrina, Homeland Security acknowledged that “Our current system for homeland security does not provide the necessary framework to manage the challenges posed by 21st Century catastrophic threats.” But to be clear, Homeland Security stressed that “it is unrealistic to think that even the strongest framework can perfectly anticipate and overcome all challenges in a crisis.” The Federal Government cannot provide for most of the needs of victims of catastrophic incidents. Non-governmental organizations, the private sector, individuals, volunteers, and the faith-based community are essential partners to federal, state, and local agencies in providing short and long term services to victim of natural disaster. Nevertheless, how this partnership will be collaborated in the future is a matter for further discussions. Some religious groups do not want to engage in a partnership with the government; however, they have a mission and zeal to be of service to those victimized by a natural disaster, such as Katrina. Whereas these organizations may be a liability in certain restricted areas of the disaster zone, they may be of great service in areas not served by certified relief organizations.

2. When Plans Don’t Work

National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the National Response Plan (NRP) are designed to coordinate resources to meet the needs of local and state governments based upon their requests for assistance. The report from Homeland Security on Lessons Learned from Katrina indicated some flaws in this framework. The framework in NIMS and NRP does not address the conditions of a catastrophic event with large scale competing needs, insufficient resources, and the absence of functioning local governments. Consequently, these limitations, according to Homeland Security, proved to be major inhibitors to the effective marshalling of federal, state, and local resources to respond to Katrina.

Melvin Holden, Mayor-President of Baton Rouge, Louisiana, noted that, the National Response Plan’s Mission Assignment process proved to be far too bureaucratic to support the response to a catastrophe. He noted that, “requirements for paper work and form completions hindered immediate action and deployment of people and materials to assist in rescue and recovery efforts.” When bureaucracy delays the federal, state, and local agencies from responding immediately to major catastrophes, it is almost with certainty that non-governmental organizations, faith-based organizations, volunteers, and the private sector will feel compelled to mobilize their resources to mitigate the impact of the disaster. Just as the government realizes that better coordination between agencies is imperative. It is equally imperative for non-governmental organizations and the faith-based organizations to establish better coordination between each other and with the federal, state, local agencies.

3. Unscripted, Unpredictable Contingency Plan

Homeland Security reported that one of the lessons learned from Katrina revealed that the primary reasons why the response to Katrina did not go as planned is that key decision-makers at all levels simply were not familiar with the National Response Plans (NRP). The NRP was relatively new to many at the federal, state, and local levels before the events of Hurricane Katrina. The NRP itself provides only the “base plan” outlining the overall elements of a response: Federal departments and agencies were required to develop supporting operational plans and standard operating procedures (SOPs) to integrate their activities into the national response. Homeland Security discovered that in almost all cases, the integrating SOPs were either non-existent or still under development when Hurricane Katrina hit. Consequently,

some of the specific procedures and processes of the NRP were not properly implemented, and Federal partners had to operate without any prescribed guidelines or chains of command.

The American Red Cross and the National VOAD are included in the NRP under function 6. If the federal agencies were not familiar with the NRP, it may explain why there was a lack of coordination between non-governmental organizations and various faith-based groups. Because of the unpredictable nature of hurricanes there will always be a need for grassroots organizations that are not connected to the American Red Cross or the National VOAD. Local churches and volunteers just pitching in doing what is needed to care for victims of catastrophic storms must be included in the state and local NRP.

4. Short-Term and Long-Term Strategies

When a disaster occurs, it draws media attention, public outcry, compassion, and an influx of financial aid. In the first three months after Hurricane Katrina struck over 2.5 billion dollars were raised for the relief efforts. After the media and public attention and government funding have disappeared, the victims of the disaster are left to deal with months, years or lifetimes of hardship and uncertainty.

There are charitable organizations that deal primarily with short-term needs and others deal with long-term services. Short term needs involve but are not limited to emergency assistance, rescue, transportation, shelter, food, clothing, medical assistance, etc. Long-term needs include but are not limited to rebuilding housing, or new accommodations, jobs, education, health services, counseling, and financial assistance. Non-governmental organizations and faith-based organizations responded to the immediate needs of victims of hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and continue to solicit funds and volunteer services for those who still need help.

In cities where the evacuees have migrated, the local churches, especially, have been tremendously instrumental in helping evacuees of the hurricane to receive the help, support, and care they need. Parishioners have not only opened up their wallets but also their hearts and homes to individuals who lost everything in the storms. It is a biblical concept that those who serve others in distress are serving God. May those who have shown and are still lending a helping hand to the evacuees—find comfort in Hebrews 6:10 (NIV), “God is not unjust; he will not forget your work and the love you have shown him as you have helped his people and continue to help them.”

5. Hurricane Katrina Is Not An Anomaly

The year 2005 was the worst recorded hurricane season in the history of the North Atlantic and the year 2006 North Atlantic hurricane season is forecasted to be also catastrophic. If the weather forecast for the 2006 North Atlantic hurricane season bears out to be true, the grassroots faith-based response to Hurricane Katrina as being first responders may prove to be the role of local faith-based organizations rather than an exception to the rule.

Allow me to pose a hypothetical situation for your deliberation. Florida has been hit nearly twice as often as any other state as long as records have been kept. Residents in Florida know what to do. But what would happen if a major hurricane struck New York City? As you know hurricane alley is from the North Carolina southward to Texas. But hurricanes move more quickly and become very difficult to predict when they head north of the Carolinas. In a likely scenario, experts say there might only be hours of warning. History reveals that New York and the Northeast have been hit hard before, and with little warning. Scientists say the next major hurricane to strike the city of New York is a question of when, not if.

Here lies the challenge for FBOs. When a hurricane hits a populated area unexpectedly or quickly, there is going to be mass chaos, especially, if the city does not have a viable natural disaster response plan. Even before governmental agencies can respond appropriately to the needs of the people, there is work that needs to be done immediately. This is where local FBOs are most effective, responding to immediate, emergency needs such as providing food, shelter, clothing, emotional and spiritual support, and referral services. This is what FBOs and NGOs did during Hurricane Katrina that made a tremendous difference.

Conclusion

America is a great country not because of our military might—with a budget equal to that of the rest of the world combined; not because of our advancement in technology and science; not because of our great institutions of learning and entrepreneurship. America's greatness derives from the soul of its people.

America is a great nation because we have a long tradition of compassion, volunteerism, and humanitarian services to those in need. Although our system of government is the best in the world, the best of America shines brightest—in times of a catastrophic event—not through a system of government, but through the hearts of Americans as we band together giving of our time, resources, and skills to help victims to survive, live through and recover from a natural disaster.

America is great because we constantly seek to make improvement. We don't subscribe to the old adage, "if it ain't broke, don't fix it." We are always seeking better ways of improving services and how we do business. We are a great nation because we learn from our mistakes. We transform mistakes into steps of improvement. The lessons learned from hurricane Katrina will help non-governmental organizations, charitable organizations, faith-based organizations (local, state, and national), and the private sector examine their crisis response plans and make improvements accordingly.

Helping others in times of natural chaos or in urgent emergencies are values Americans hold very dear to our hearts. Even though we may fall short in operational practice, there is a spiritual dimension that runs through our hearts, minds, and spirits that compels us to act for the sake of God's people. This spiritual dimension makes America a beacon of hope for the world.

APPENDIX B5. SURVEY

Did your organization...

Yes	No
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Shelter Services

1. Shelter evacuees?
2. Shelter relief workers or volunteers?

Food Services

3. Have kitchen facilities used for preparing meals?
4. Serve prepared food?
5. Distribute prepared food to other communities or organizations?

Medical Services

6. Perform triage to assess the medical priorities of disaster victims?
7. Provide basic medical care to disaster victims such as first aid?
8. Provide advanced medical care for victims administered by RNs or Doctors?
9. Provide prescription medication services on-site to those in need?
10. Transport patients to medical care?

Mental Health and Spiritual Support

11. Provide mental health services to evacuees such as counseling, crisis intervention, or special needs for the mentally ill?
12. Provide spiritual counseling?

Case Management Services

13. Provide information to evacuees?
14. Provide translation services for evacuees?
15. Provide evacuee referral services to help people contact relief agencies? (i.e. a phone bank, or in-house case management)
16. Refer disaster victims to government agencies or others to obtain services and relief care for the victims?
17. Facilitate or directly provide legal advice or services for evacuees?
18. Provide aid or offer advice to evacuees in completing insurance/government/relief or other forms and applications?
19. Distribute financial relief from individuals or organizations to evacuees?

Physical Reconstruction Services

20. Conduct debris removal?

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- | | | |
|--|--|--|
| 21. Conduct tree removal? | | |
| 22. Conduct mud removal and clean-up? | | |
| 23. Provide home repair services such as gutting or roof repair? | | |

Recovery Services

- | | | |
|--|--|--|
| 24. Create a formal program, e.g., "adopt-a-church," to sponsor care for churches, families or orphans affected by the disaster? | | |
| 25. Help organize other community partners for collective disaster response? | | |
| 26. Help evacuees find employment? | | |
| 27. Help displaced evacuees find long-term housing? | | |

Children Services

- | | | |
|---|--|--|
| 28. Organize a formal program to care for children? (i.e., child care centers) | | |
| 29. Provide education services? (i.e., enrolling evacuees in the local school district, or providing on-site classes) | | |

Hygiene

- | | | |
|--|--|--|
| 30. Provide laundry services? | | |
| 31. Provide showers, or other hygiene services? | | |
| 32. Collect or distribute clothing to those in need? | | |
| 33. Assemble or distribute supply kits (toiletries or cleanup) for disaster victims? | | |

Transportation Management and Services

- | | | |
|---|--|--|
| 34. Provide shuttle service to other service providers? | | |
| 35. Provide shuttle service for volunteers to affected areas? | | |
| 36. Provide transportation to evacuate or relocate evacuees? | | |

Logistics Management and Services

- | | | |
|---|--|--|
| 37. Conduct assessments of community logistics needs? | | |
| 38. Distribute (transport) non-financial donations? | | |
| 39. Provide warehousing? | | |

Other

- | | | |
|--|--|--|
| 40. Provide care for animals? (i.e., evacuee pets) | | |
| 41. Receive training prior to disaster for members/volunteers? | | |

Feel free to add or expand on any services your organization provided below (optional):

APPENDIX C. SURVEYS REFERENCED FOR RESEARCH

1. Louisiana Public Policy Research Lab, Manship School of Mass Communication's Reilly Center for Media & Public Affairs, *The 2006 Louisiana Survey*, Louisiana State University, May 8, 2006.

Notes: This survey illustrates how dramatic events can restructure the social, political, and economical environment. 2005—"Louisiana residents rated the response of religious organizations as highly effective, giving them an 8.1 on a scale of 1-10 with 1 being highly ineffective and 10 being very effective. They rated nonprofit organizations as a 7.5 on the same scale."

2. Auer, Jennifer Claire, and Linda M. Lapkin in partnership with the Louisiana Association of Nonprofit Organizations, *Open and Operating? An Assessment of Louisiana Nonprofit Health and Human Services After Hurricane Katrina and Rita* (Washington, DC: The Urban Institute, February, 2006).

Notes: While separately incorporated FBOs and subsidiaries of churches were surveyed in this study, individual churches and church networks were not.

3. New America Media, *Lessons of Katrina: America's Major Racial and Ethnic Groups Find Common Ground After the Storm*, Oct. 27, 2005.

Notes: This survey was by Bendixen & Associates and included a telephone poll of 1,035 respondents Oct. 14-21.

4. *Hurricane Katrina: Perceptions of the Affected* (San Francisco, CA: Fritz Institute, 2006).

Notes: This report presents a summary of findings from research conducted among a total of 1,089 adults affected by Hurricane Katrina who were living in Louisiana, Alabama, or Mississippi before the storm hit and looks at relief provided during the first 48 hours and 30 days after the hurricane.

5. Shwalb, David W., and Barbara J. *Effects of Hurricane Katrina on Displaced vs. Regular College Students*, Southeastern Louisiana University Department of Psychology, December 2005.

Notes: This survey included 315 "guest" students relocated at Southeastern from 10 New Orleans-area universities and 510 currently enrolled Southeastern students and was conducted through Dec. 2, 2005.

6. The *Washington Post*–Kaiser Family Foundation–Harvard University, *Survey of Hurricane Katrina Evacuees*, Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, September 2005.

Notes: This survey took place Sept. 10-12, 2005, among 680 randomly selected adult evacuees residing in Houston shelters. It was conducted by International Communications Research of Media, PA.

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Notes: This survey estimated that churches have contributed over \$16 million to Katrina relief efforts. "The [Nazarene]denomination has contributed through its missions department at least 100,000 crisis care kits, documented by other denominational offices through which flowed this resource ... Those most involved believe that our figure is closer to 200,000."

APPENDIX D. LIST OF IN-PERSON INTERVIEWS

(Titles and affiliations were current at the time of the interview.)

Jody L. Herrington, Disaster Relief Manager, Operation Blessing

Bill Horan, President, Operation Blessing

Dan Moore, Disaster Relief Manager Assistant, Operation Blessing

Sam Constantine, Construction Coordinator, Operation Blessing

Steven W. O'Grady, Director of Operations & Logistics, Operation Blessing

Major Mel James, ESC Coordinator, Salvation Army

Elmo Winters, Reverend, Baptist Builders

Mickey Caison, Disaster Operation Center Manager, North American Mission Board

Dr. Gibbie McMillan, Men and Volunteer Ministries, Director, Louisiana Baptist Convention

David Abernathy, Director, Rolling Hills Ministries, Inc.

Cal Jones, former State Director, Southern Baptist Convention Disaster Relief

Mike Abiatti, Associate Commissioner for Information and Learning, Louisiana Higher Education, Board of Regents

Sue Taylor, International Spokesperson, Church of Scientology

Colonel David Park, Senior Analyst, Analytic Services, Inc., Louisiana Family Assistance Center

James Player, Vice President of Operations, Analytic Services Inc., Louisiana Family Assistance Center

Gene Grounds, Sr. Chaplain, Executive Director, Victim Relief Ministries

John Lay, Associate Director, Victim Relief Ministries

Rhonda Hebert Ruffino, Convention Sales Manager, Baton Rouge River Center

Randy Philipson, Director of Event Services, Baton Rouge River Center

Bill Lokey, Director, FEMA National Response Coordination Center

Charles B. Stuart, Deputy Branch Director, FEMA

Keith Rothfus, Director, DHS Center for Faith-Based and Community Initiatives

Bill Bollier, Executive Director, Louisiana Strategic Medical Assistance & Response Team (SMART)

Reverend Leroy Gilbert, Ph. D., Captain, Chaplain Corps, U.S. Navy (retired)

Kenneth G. Thompson, Director of Outreach, National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism

Kate Summers, Emergency Preparedness Planner, U.S. Senate

Reverend John Boyles, President, Faith Prepared Network

Wilbur Douglass III, Chaplain, U.S. Coast Guard

Dr. Ernest Johnson, President, Louisiana State Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)

Reverend Dan Soliday, CEO and President, Domestic Operations for Nazarene Compassionate Ministries, Inc.

Valerie Keller, CEO, Acadiana Outreach Center

Mary Marr, President, Christian Emergency Network

Katie Loovis, Associate Director of Public Liaison, USA Freedom Corps

Richard Davis, Director of Prevention Policy, Homeland Security Council at the White House

J. Elizabeth Farrell, Associate Director, Domestic Counterterrorism, Homeland Security Council

Edna Casey, Shelter Coordinator, St. John the Baptist Church, LA

Beth Davis, Chairperson, Unmet Needs Committee, Tangipahoa

Daniel Palka, Director, Catholic Community Services, Baton Rouge, LA

Israel Garcia, Director, Society of St. Vincent DePaul, Baton Rouge, LA

Bob Putnam, Director of Gulf Coast Operations, CAN-DO Organization, LA

Zach Mitchell, Associate Pastor, Inter-Faith Fellowship, New Iberia, LA

Kerry Statin, Planning & Budget Director, ASSIST, Acadian, Vermilion, and Jefferson parishes, LA

Clyde Stutts, Executive Vice President & Chief Operations Officer, Compassion Tampa, Tampa, FL

Reverend Marjorie Cobb-Thomas, Lamp of Listening and Bethel Istrouma African Methodist Episcopal Church

Rich Olhson, Director of Domestic Disaster Preparedness and Response, Episcopal Relief and Development

Patty Whitney, Organizer, Bayou Interfaith Shared Community Organizing

NOTES

¹ Captain Leroy Gilbert, Chaplain Corps, U.S. Navy (ret.), keynote address, *Heralding Unheard Voices Conference*, June 7, 2006, Baton Rouge, LA.

² Gary Shiles, Executive Pastor, Temple Baptist Church, Hattiesburg, MS, phone interview, April 20, 2006.

³ Kyle Woodridge, Disaster Preparedness Coordinator, University Methodist Church, East Baton Rouge, LA, phone interview, April 7, 2006.

⁴ Carolyn Landry, Pastor, Lifting Up This Temple Unto God Full Gospel Church, Baton Rouge, LA, phone interview, April 4, 2006.

⁵ Nathaniel Carter, Pastor, New Life of Church of God in Christ, Opelousas, LA, phone interview, April 11, 2006.

⁶ Brenda Maxey, Shelter Coordinator, Christway Church, Bentley, LA, phone interview, April 12, 2006.

⁷ Bill Lokey, Director, National Response Coordination Center, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Washington, DC, in-person interview with Peter Hull, March 20, 2006.

⁸ Captain Leroy Gilbert, Chaplain Corps, U.S. Navy (retired), keynote address, *Heralding Unheard Voices Conference*, June 7, 2006, Baton Rouge, LA.

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²⁵ Kip Holden, Mayor of Baton Rouge, LA, interview, *CNN Late Edition With Wolf Blitzer*, Sept. 11, 2005, <http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0509/11/le.01.html>.

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- ²⁹ Janet Fregia, Office Manager, Church of the Nazarene, Orange, TX, phone interview with Steve Bowen, April 18, 2006.
- ³⁰ Timothy Beard, Pastor, Collins United Methodist Church, Collins, MS, phone interview with Steve Bowen, April 13, 2006.
- ³¹ Jeff Wilson, Coordinator, First Christian Church, Tyler, TX, phone interview with Steve Bowen, April 6, 2006.
- ³² Judy Hawkins, Secretary, Christchurch Baptist Fellowship, Houston, phone interview with Richard Rowe, April 12, 2006.
- ³³ Robert Miller, Missions Minister, Florida Boulevard Baptist Church, Baton Rouge, LA, phone interview with Steve Bowen, April 4, 2006.
- ³⁴ Jerry Davis, President/Senior Director, Christian World Embassy, phone interview with Russell Miller, June 1, 2006.
- ³⁵ Leslie Trigg, Associate Pastor, Calvary Baptist Church, Waynesboro, MS, phone interview with Richard Rowe, April 10, 2006.
- ³⁶ Jerry Davis, President/Senior Director, Christian World Embassy, phone interview with Russell Miller, June 1, 2006.
- ³⁷ Ron Burkhalter, Senior Pastor, North Eunice Baptist Mission, Eunice, LA, phone interview with Richard Rowe, April 3, 2006.
- ³⁸ Sherri Burton, Secretary, Beech Street First Baptist Church, Texarkana, AR, phone interview with Russell Miller, April 10, 2006.
- ³⁹ Becky Reiners, Parish Outreach Coordinator, Catholic Community Services, Baton Rouge, LA, phone interview with Russell Miller, March 29, 2006.
- ⁴⁰ Charles Keese, Shelter Director, St. Mary's Catholic Church, Brenham, TX, phone interview with Russell Miller, April 3, 2006.
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- ⁴³ "Kitchens Providing Essential Aid to Hurricane Victims," Operation Blessing International website, www.ob.org/programs/disaster_relief/news/2005/dr_2005_0909_katrina.asp.
- ⁴⁴ *National Response Plan*, ESF#6-2.
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- ⁴⁹ Betty Tillman, Minister, Tills Total Ministry, Jeanerette, LA, phone interview with Russell Miller, April 18, 2006.
- ⁵⁰ Larry Lormand, Minister of Administration, North Orange Baptist Church, Orange, TX, phone interview with Richard Rowe, March 30, 2006.
- ⁵¹ Neil Bernard, Pastor, New Wine Baptist Church, New Orleans, phone interview with Russell Miller, May 4, 2006.
- ⁵² Betty Rascoe, Church Clerk, Union Springs Baptist, Converse, LA, phone interview with Russell Miller, April 17, 2006.
- ⁵³ Brenda Maxey, Shelter Coordinator, Christway Church, Bentley, LA, phone interview with Richard Rowe, April 12, 2006.
- ⁵⁴ Joe Landrum, Associate Pastor, Madison United Methodist Church, Madison, MS, phone interview with Richard Rowe, March 30, 2006.

- ⁵⁵ Glenn Jackson, Minister of Education, Poplar Springs Drive Baptist Church, Meridian, MS, phone interview with Richard Rowe, April 5, 2006.
- ⁵⁶ Meg Wilson, Secretary, Christian Life Church, Orange Beach, AL, phone interview with Richard Rowe, April 23, 2006.
- ⁵⁷ Bill Horan, President, Operation Blessing, Virginia Beach, VA, phone interview with Richard Rowe, April 3, 2006.
- ⁵⁸ Nadine Locke, Secretary, Rusk Church of Christ, Smith, TX, phone interview with Russell Miller, April 20, 2006.
- ⁵⁹ Judy Hawkins, Secretary, Christchurch Baptist Fellowship, Houston, phone interview with Richard Rowe, April 12, 2006.
- ⁶⁰ Judy Savage, Secretary, Antioch Baptist Church, Farmerville, LA, phone interview with Russell Miller, April 10, 2006.
- ⁶¹ *A Failure of Initiative*, p. 267.
- ⁶² Federal Emergency Management Agency, "Glossary of Terms," p. GLO-3, FEMA website, www.fema.gov/pdf/plan/glo.pdf.
- ⁶³ Matt Day, Pastor of Singles and Young Adults, Broadmoor Baptist Church of Shreveport, LA, phone interview with Richard Rowe, April 11, 2006.
- ⁶⁴ Bill Horan, President, Operation Blessing of Virginia Beach, VA, phone interview with Richard Rowe, April 3, 2006.
- ⁶⁵ Pat Davey, Associate Pastor, Faith Presbyterian Church of Brookhaven, MS, phone interview with Steve Bowen, March 29, 2006.
- ⁶⁶ Charlotte James, Storehouse Manager, God's Storehouse of Amite, LA, phone interview with Russell Miller, May 3, 2006.
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- ⁷⁴ Marty Wright, Pastor, Pineroft Baptist Church, Caddo, LA, phone interview with Richard Rowe, April 10, 2006.
- ⁷⁵ Personal communication with conference attendee, Breakout Group Three, *Heralding Unheard Voices Conference*, June 7, 2006.
- ⁷⁶ Steve Creech, National Director, Nazarene Disaster Response, Kansas City, MO, interview with Rich Rowe, March 30, 2006.
- ⁷⁷ Ed Gonzalez, Pastor, Linwood Baptist Mission, Shreveport, LA, phone interview with Richard Rowe, March 28, 2006.
- ⁷⁸ Charlotte James, Storehouse Manager, God's Storehouse, Amite, LA, phone interview with Russell Miller, May 3, 2006.
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- ⁸³ Personal communication with Rev. Dennis C. Flach, Central South Presbytery, Breakout Group Five, *Heralding Unheard Voices Conference*, June 7, 2006.
- ⁸⁴ Sandra Smith, Church Secretary, Pleasant Hill Baptist Church, DeRidder, LA, phone interview with Richard Rowe, April 3, 2006.
- ⁸⁵ Joe Ratcliff, Pastor, First Baptist Church, St. Francisville, LA, phone interview with Steve Bowen, March 29, 2006.
- ⁸⁶ Sherry Buresh, Assistant Director for Disaster Relief, Christian Appalachian Project, Lancaster, KY, April 13, 2006.
- ⁸⁷ Jeff Hastings, Pastor, Tapp United Methodist Church, Bowie, TX, phone interview with Russell Miller, April 20, 2006.
- ⁸⁸ Nadine Locke, Secretary, Rusk Church of Christ, Smith, TX, phone interview with Russell Miller, April 20, 2006.
- ⁸⁹ David O'Dell, Pastor, Sugar Hill United Methodist Church, Texarkana, AR, phone interview with Russell Miller, April 20, 2006.
- ⁹⁰ Suzette Austin, Secretary, St. Peter Claver Catholic Church, Houston, phone interview with Russell Miller, April 6, 2006.
- ⁹¹ Dr. George Garrison, Kent State University, Kent, OH, phone interview with Richard Rowe, April 26, 2006.
- ⁹² Joe Landrum, Associate Pastor, Madison United Methodist Church, Madison, MS, phone interview with Richard Rowe, March 30, 2006.
- ⁹³ Judy Hawkins, Secretary, Christchurch Baptist Fellowship, Houston, phone interview with Richard Rowe, April 12, 2006.
- ⁹⁴ Personal communication with Thomas Gillon, Minister of Missions, Breakout Group Five, *Heralding Unheard Voices Conference*, June 7, 2006.
- ⁹⁵ Dr. George Garrison, Kent State University, Kent, OH, phone interview with Richard Rowe, April 26, 2006.
- ⁹⁶ Robert Davis, Pastor, Smyrna Church, Rapides, LA, phone interview with Russell Miller, April 6, 2006.
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