[Senate Hearing 111-266]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-266
VOICE OF VETERANS OF THE AFGHAN WAR
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 23, 2009
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
----------
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
54-698 PDF WASHINGTON : 2010
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800;
DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC,
Washington, DC 20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin Republican Leader designee
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
JIM WEBB, Virginia JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
David McKean, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Bacevich, Andrew, Colonel, U.S. Army (Ret.), Professor of
International Relations and History, Boston, University,
Boston, MA..................................................... 20
Prepared statement........................................... 22
Chase, Genevieve, Veteran, Staff Sergeant, U.S. Army Reserve,
Recipient of the Purple Heart, American Women Veterans,
Alexandria, VA................................................. 4
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 3
McGurk, Christopher, Staff Sergeant, U.S. Army (Ret.), Recepient
of Combat Infantryman's Badge, Two Bronze Stars, and the Purple
Heart, New York, NY............................................ 13
Prepared statement........................................... 15
Moore, Westley, Captain, U.S. Army (Ret.), Baltimore, MD......... 16
Prepared statement........................................... 19
Reyes, Rick, Corporal, U.S. Marines (Ret.), Los Angeles, CA...... 9
Prepared statement........................................... 12
(iii)
VOICE OF VETERANS OF THE AFGHAN WAR
----------
THURSDAY, APRIL 23, 2009
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:18 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Kerry, Feingold, Cardin, Shaheen,
Kaufman, Lugar, and Corker.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
The Chairman. This hearing will come to order. Delighted to
welcome our witnesses and my colleagues to this important
hearing.
Earlier this week, I was invited by a group of Harvard
Business School about-to-be graduates and first-year students,
but all of whom are veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan. And I was
struck by what a smart and accomplished, capable, as we used to
say, squared-away group of young people I was talking to, with
strong opinions, strong views about policies, about life. And
they had earned it. And it underscored my personal belief about
the degree to which military service instills strong leadership
skills.
What also struck me was the fact that we are living the
lessons learned over the past 40 years about how we regard
veterans. We're all standing on common ground now. We're saying
thank you to the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines who
have served. We are not confusing a war with the warriors. And
I want to thank each and every one of you for your service to
our country and for those who are still serving.
Today, we want to hear your views of the conflict in
Afghanistan. We are, as you all know, just completing a review.
We're going through a process of trying to fine-tune this
policy, if it is fine-tunable. And that's something we need to
examine. We want to understand the challenges from the
perspective of the men and women who have been fighting there,
risking their lives, and suffering the losses that come with
war.
We want you to help us understand the definition of what is
achievable, and perhaps even help us to define the notion of
success and victory. We want to honor your service and
demonstrate our appreciation for the sacrifices that you and
other families have made.
History proves that soldiers on the ground have an intimate
knowledge that is vital to their commanders and to us, as
policymakers. Most recently, it was soldiers who sounded the
early warnings that our mission in Iraq had some problems. It
was soldiers in Anbar province who saw the major political
opportunity to reconcile with the sheikhs, because they found
that on their patrols and in their dealings and interactions on
a firsthand basis. Soldiers know the challenges, up close and
personal, and we're eager to hear and to learn from the
insights of this generation of young warriors who have served
with honor and professionalism in Afghanistan and elsewhere.
I made a promise to myself long ago that I would not
compare all conflicts to the Vietnam war. And that sort of
analogy by history can be very unproductive. More importantly,
it can divert us from developing the right policy for a current
conflict.
What we need to do, and the reason the witnesses are here
today, is address the intricacies and nuances of Afghanistan
from every angle. That does not mean, however, that there
aren't some parallels between wars. Once again we are fighting
an insurgency in a rural country with a weak central
government. Our enemy blends in with the local population and
easily crosses a long border to find sanctuary in a neighboring
country. Our efforts to win the loyalty of the locals are
hampered by civilian casualties and an inability to deliver the
security that we promised more than 7 years ago. We ignore
those similarities at our peril.
There are also fundamental differences. We have a
responsibility to the men and women fighting in Afghanistan to
understand those differences and to adapt to them. First and
foremost, North Vietnamese never posed a direct threat to our
country. The extremists we are fighting today, however, in
Afghanistan and across the border in Pakistan, do represent,
and have, in fact, implemented, a direct threat to the security
of the United States. They planned the attacks on New York and
Washington that killed 3,000 Americans. They have killed
hundreds of other innocents in terrorist attacks worldwide
since then, and they are preparing new attacks on the United
States and our interests even as we sit here today.
Our original goal in Afghanistan was to go after those
individuals. We were determined to capture or kill Osama bin
Laden and eliminate al-Qaeda's base of operations so that they
could never again attack the United States. Our attention
strayed from that goal, and our enemies took advantage of our
mistakes. Now the Obama administration is attempting to
redefine and narrow the mission, embracing objectives closer to
those original goals. We are bolstering the American forces in
Afghanistan to protect the citizens and to train the Afghan
police and army.
We recognize that no solution is possible without a strong
alliance with Pakistan. In some ways, Pakistan represents an
even greater threat today, so we will increase aid to Pakistan
and support its democratic government. But, obviously we've
seen, in recent days, the challenges to that government are
growing. And, in the end, the fight there is not ours to
determine the outcome; it is theirs. The Pakistanis have to
determine how deeply they are committed to their own
government; their own country.
We are no longer offering either country a blank check. We
will set strict standards for measuring progress against al-
Qaeda and the Taliban, and we will do our best to see that they
are met.
So, let me be clear, there is much still to be done in
Afghanistan and Pakistan. But, our new focus creates a sense of
determined optimism for us and for our coalition allies,
though--and that is part of the purpose today--that strategy
has to be put to the test. And we look forward to your
evaluations. Better defined objectives should lead to a better
battle plan for our troops, but this remains an immensely
complicated task, one that leaves our troops simultaneously on
the front lines of the struggle against extremists and in the
absolute middle of nowhere.
Sitting on a mountain ledge in a helicopter during a
snowstorm in Afghanistan last year with then-Senator Biden and
Senator Hagel drove that home to all three of us. We are asking
our young men and women to be warriors at one moment, but then
mayors, dispute/conflict-resolution experts, anthropologists,
and builders, and then warriors again. You and your colleagues
have carried out these difficult and contradictory tasks with
remarkable competence and courage, and our job this morning is
to listen and learn from your perspective.
Senator Lugar.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Lugar. Well, I join you, Mr. Chairman, in welcoming
this distinguished panel of members of the armed services who
have served our country in combat.
As President Obama launches a new initiative in Afghanistan
and the Congress prepares to consider his request for funding
operations in the region, it's important that we hear from many
different perspectives about the way forward.
I've benefited enormously from talking to many Hoosiers who
have served in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2001, both in the
regular military and as members of the National Guard and
Reserves.
Since September 11, 2001, 13,000 Hoosier National Guard
personnel have been deployed in defense of our country.
Currently, more than 100 Guardsmen from Indiana are mobilized
in Afghanistan alone. Some 20 Hoosiers have lost their lives in
that conflict.
President Obama has elevated the priority of the
Afghanistan mission, and the September 11 attacks were planned
in Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda still operates there. The fate of the
country remains both strategic and symbolic.
As the Obama administration devotes more resources and
troops to Afghanistan, however, many details need to be fleshed
out. Eyewitness accounts of battlefield conditions may be very
valuable in evaluating the administration's plans. Equally
important are insights about the views and capabilities of the
Afghan people, who ultimately will have to rebuild their
country and provide for political stability.
I think that Americans across the political spectrum agree
that the situation in Afghanistan cannot be solved by military
means alone. Multiple reviews of our policy have concluded that
up to 80 percent of the activities necessary in post-conflict
and counterinsurgency situations are civilian tasks. Success in
Afghanistan may depend on the attitudes of the people, progress
of reconstruction, the development of the economy, as much as
it depends on battlefield victories. In the end, sustainable
peace and progress is dependent upon Afghan determination to
achieve for themselves a cohesive society.
I look forward to hearing the testimony of our honored
witnesses, and I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this
hearing.
The Chairman. Thank you so much, Senator Lugar.
Let us turn now to our witnesses. And again, let me say how
much we appreciate your willingness to come here and share your
experiences and your insights. Some of you have come a long
way; in the case of Rick Reyes, you've come all the way from
Los Angeles, and we appreciate that.
The first person to testify will be Genevieve Chase, a
staff sergeant in the U.S. Army Reserve, who spent 3 years on
Active Duty and received a Purple Heart in Afghanistan.
Following Ms. Chase will be Rick Reyes, a former corporal in
the Marine Corps, who was one of the first American soldiers
into Afghanistan in October 2001, and he also served in Iraq.
Mr. Reyes will be followed by Chris McGurk, whose 10 years of
service in the Army included tours in Afghanistan and Iraq, and
earned him two Bronze Stars and the Combat Infantryman Medal.
And Wes Moore is a former paratrooper and Army captain, who
served as an information and special operations officer with
the 82d Airborne in Afghanistan, and he will round out the
veterans of Afghanistan who will testify.
Then, finally, we will hear from one of my constituents, a
distinguished student of conflict and war and of the region,
and a professor. He is Andrew Bacevich. Andrew is a professor
at Boston University. He's a prolific writer on war and issues
of foreign policy. He is also a veteran of Vietnam, himself.
And I should add that his son, Andrew, gave his life for our
country in service in Iraq in 2007.
So, we are deeply grateful for all of you being here today.
Thank you.
Genevieve.
STATEMENT OF GENEVIEVE CHASE, VETERAN, STAFF SERGEANT, U.S.
ARMY RESERVE, RECIPIENT OF THE PURPLE HEART, AMERICAN WOMEN
VETERANS, ALEXANDRIA, VA
Sergeant Chase. Senator Kerry, Ranking Member Lugar, and
members of the committee, thank you for allowing me the
opportunity to share with you my testimony.
My name is Genevieve Chase, and I served with the U.S. Army
in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom in 2006 as a
Pashto-language-trained soldier. During my 40 weeks of cultural
and language training, our teacher made it very clear to us
what his hopes and goals were for his students; namely, that we
utilize our knowledge and skills for the good of the Afghan
people.
Afghans remember their history well, and have not forgotten
that we left their country without any foundation following the
defeat of the Soviet Army. The Afghans fully believe we, the
Americans, will do it again.
It is not too difficult to ascertain why, despite our
intentions and efforts, fiercely nationalistic Afghans continue
to believe that we are an occupying force. We went boldly in
their country, planned and carried out our operations, and then
retreated to the safety of our fortified and guarded compounds
before sundown.
Along with our coalition partners, we threw billions of
dollars at civil affairs and reconstruction projects that we
thought would win the ``hearts and minds'' of the Afghans while
we empowered a local government in which many local Afghans
believed contained nepotistic and corrupt officials.
With the help of these same embezzling officials, we
supported, and continue to support, the eradication of their
rival tribe's poppies while failing to provide alternative
crops to the poorest of farmers. We forced the farmers and drug
lords to align with the Taliban and al-Qaeda in order to
protect their livelihoods while we surged in and out of
volatile areas. We continue to make hollow promises and put
those that would assist us, at risk of death by the hands of
the enemy, for the very act of agreeing to work with us. We
provide them with little, if any, security against those that
would oppress them.
The best of the Afghan village elders and leaders have
three choices. One, voice and defend the interests of their
constituents and face beheading or worse. Two, flee their homes
and country in order to live and protect their families. Or,
three, play to the interests of whomever is in their village at
the moment, hoping to play both sides and not be killed by
either.
I will never forget speaking to a respected village elder,
one of the few we trusted in the remote area of Helmand
province, who felt that there was nothing more he could do to
save his people but make the dangerous trip from the mountains,
under the fear of Taliban reprisal, to appeal to the Americans
and ask for assistance in pushing the Taliban out from his
village. He left our Provincial Reconstruction Team, defeated
and without hope.
How do we create the stability that will allow for
legitimate elders and leaders to govern without fear? The
answer to this question lies in yet another: What have we done
wrong, and what lessons have we learned from our mistakes? Just
as Lieutenant Backsight Forethought in the classic military
text, ``The Defence of Duffer's Drift,'' had seven dreams in
which he was able to analyze each tactical battle, we have had
8 years in which to do the same.
Unfortunately, due to the strains on our forces, we not
only rotate out divisions and brigades, but we piecemeal units
that have not trained together and have little to no
operational experience in the Afghan theater. Most
significantly, in a culture where a man's trust and respect is
earned with time, loyalty, and devotion to the cause, we rotate
out units every 6 to 12 months. We then ask our Afghan
counterparts to give the same hard-won trust we earned and
nurtured over time, to perfect strangers.
With each rotation, just as Lieutenant Forethought did with
his reoccurring dreams, we have had to start from the beginning
to build and cultivate those working relationships again, but
not always with the same amount of background experience and
knowledge of the complexities and intricacies of the Afghan
culture.
The question is not whether an influx of troops will be
effective or seen as an occupation, but how do we effectively
utilize those additional troops? The way in which we do so will
cultivate how the Afghans perceive our intentions. The concept
of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams was altruistic, but
their application has been hindered by a number of issues, all
secondary to the lack of security.
Why build schools, provincial centers, bridges, and wells
when there is no support or security provided for the villagers
to utilize them? They become little else but targets for the
opposition.
My first recommendation is that we push our troops out to
an even more local level. Rather than Provincial Reconstruction
Teams, we establish District Security and Reconstruction Teams
(DSRT) within and among the villages, working in conjunction
with village elders. These DSRTs would provide a safe haven for
the people, rather than the enemy, and in turn, Afghans would
maximize the information operations campaign through the
development and sustainment of progressive and prosperous
communities.
In order to do this, we start as we did in 2001, supporting
the Afghans with centralized strategic victories, then
spreading out from there while maintaining our ground and
assisting the Afghans in providing their own security by living
and serving among them.
Second, we allow individual troops to extend their tours,
if requested, so that we may apply expertise and continuity to
rotating troops. At the very least, we rotate out cohesive
divisions and brigades within, not only the same theater, but
the same area of operations.
Furthermore, we cultivate our own organic assets to include
our linguists, analysts, and soldiers with Afghanistan,
asymmetric, and/or counterinsurgency experience, and engage
them in a focused and concentrated force, armed not just with
weapons and ammunition, but the power of knowledge, experience,
and wisdom.
Third, we support the Afghans in rooting our corruption and
establishing secure and stable environments for which they can
regain the pride they have for their country rather than
supporting corrupt officials as they work their own agendas and
line their own pockets. We should encourage our coalition
partners to purchase poppy yields, giving the money directly to
the farmers rather than to corrupt district government
officials, while providing alternative crops to grow and safe
markets in which to facilitate commerce.
These thoughts are just the beginning of what must a
multifaceted and enduring effort on the behalf of all involved.
As I stated previously, Afghanistan's diversity in culture and
geography demand that we embrace a comprehensive and intimate
understanding of the nation's issues. Broad and generalized
tactics, as we have applied in the past, will not work in every
village of Afghanistan. Cultivating our homegrown experts by
allowing them to provide continuity and confluence of
operations through their learned knowledge, and, moreover, in-
depth network of interpersonal relationships, are tantamount to
mutual respect and eventual success.
Just as the enemy has adapted to our tactics, we must get
away from the big-army mentality and do the same. In time and
within an environment in which schools will not be burned and
bridges blown up, the Afghans will have safe access to
employment and education. When this happens, we will begin to
see the possibilities of a country free from radical and
rampant extremism, where adults will be able to provide for
their children, and their children will be free to attend
schools.
One day, this generation of children in Afghanistan will be
better prepared to take the reins of their country from their
parents, and will grow with the memory of war rather than the
daily reality of it.
I thank you for the opportunity to testify here before the
committee today, and look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Sergeant Chase follows:]
Prepared Statement of Genevieve Chase, Staff Sergeant, U.S. Army
Reserve, Recipient of the Purple Heart, American Women Veterans,
Alexandria, VA
Senator Kerry, Ranking Member Lugar, and members of the committee,
thank you for allowing me the opportunity to share with you my
testimony. My name is Genevieve Chase and I served with the U.S. Army
in Afghanistan during Combined Joint Task Force-76, Operation Enduring
Freedom, 2006. I deployed as a member of a military intelligence team
and was trained in the Pashto language. Forty weeks of Pashto language
training was not merely about learning the language but involved
gaining an understanding of the history, culture, and the people of
Afghanistan. Our teacher made it very clear to us what his hopes and
goals were for his students; namely that we would utilize our knowledge
and skills for the good of the Afghan people. He believed in the
mission that we had set out to accomplish in Afghanistan and he hoped
for a peace in his former homeland. He not only taught us language and
history, he provided a window into the heart of one Afghan man. Afghans
remember their history well and have not forgotten that we left their
country without any foundation in which to rebuild their devastated
land following the defeat of the Soviet Army. When I had the unique
opportunity to speak with the Afghans in their language, they were
grave in telling me that we, the Americans, would do it again.
I had great hopes when I left for Afghanistan, some of which were
entrusted to me by my Afghan teacher. Of these was the possibility that
one day I would see the children of Afghanistan live without knowing
suffering, fear, and death. What I saw, heard, and felt when I got
there was a palpable desperation of a people living in abject poverty
and indescribable fear. I returned home with memories that will haunt
my dreams for a lifetime and with the harsh and sobering realization
that to the Afghan people and their children, my nightmares are their
daily reality. It is because of my unwavering hope for the Afghan
people that I feel compelled to ask some very important questions of
the leaders in my country, questions that were asked of me, an American
soldier, by the Afghans with which I had the honor to serve with.
If we say that we are there to help the Afghans and we want them to
believe us, why do we not truly listen to them? Afghan culture is by
far one of the most complex that I have ever been exposed to.
Understanding it requires more than a
45-minute briefing from someone who may have read about it. Even a 40-
week, full-time language course taught by a native Afghan is not going
to give one a comprehensive understanding of what it means to work
among and with Afghans, especially when considering the vast
differences in tribal cultures. In my opinion, this is one area in
which I believe that we have wavered in our commitment to the Afghans
and to the future of their country. In so doing, we have also failed
every American and coalition soldier that has given his/her life in
Operation Enduring Freedom. By not honoring the Afghan culture and
acknowledging their history, we have not only failed in laying the
foundations for a secure and stable environment but we have failed in
building sustainable economic growth, both ideal end-states necessary
so that we may bring all of our troops home. In nearly 8 years of this
conflict, we have failed to fully assess and evaluate the culture of
the Afghans which will prevent us from winning this conflict.
It is not too difficult to ascertain why, despite our intentions
and efforts, that some Afghans continue to believe that we are an
``occupying force.'' We went boldly into their country, planned and
carried out our operations and then retreated to the safety of our
fortified and guarded compounds before sundown. The very basics of all
human needs, according to unadulterated common sense and supported by
the theory of Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs, consists of the
physiological needs that all humans must fulfill in order to survive:
Food, water, and shelter. On the next level exists the need for
security and community, a sense of safety. A society cannot flourish
without those basic foundations with which to build structural supports
that encourage the growth of a stable and viable economy. Along with
our coalition partners, we threw billions of dollars at civil affairs
and reconstruction projects that we thought would win their ``hearts
and minds'' while we empowered, supported, and protected a government
in which many local Afghans believed contained nepotistic officials and
corrupt provincial governments. With the help of these same embezzling
officials we supported and continue to support the eradication of their
rival tribe's poppies while failing to provide alternative crops to the
poorest farmers.
We forced the farmers and ``drug lords'' to align with the Taliban
and al-Qaeda in order to protect their livelihoods while we surge in
and out of volatile areas. We have continued in making promises, asking
and sometimes demanding cooperation only to leave those that would
assist us to the fate of death by the hands of the enemy for the very
act of agreeing to work with us.
The best of the Afghan village elders and leaders have three
choices:
1. Voice and defend the interests of their constituents but
face beheading or worse;
2. Flee their homes and country in order to live and protect
their families; or
3. Play to the interests of whomever is in their town at the
moment hoping to play both sides and not be killed by either.
I am not speculating about what may occur in Afghanistan; these
assessments are based on my firsthand observations and those of my
comrades. I will never forget speaking to a respected village elder,
one of the few we trusted in the remote area of Helmand province, who
felt that there was nothing more he could do to save his people but
make the dangerous trip from the mountains under fear of Taliban
reprisal, to appeal to the Americans and ask for assistance in pushing
the Taliban out from his village. However, he left our Provincial
Reconstruction Team defeated and without hope.
How do we create this stability that will allow for legitimate
elders and leaders to govern without fear? The answer to this question
lies in yet another, ``What have we done wrong and what lessons have we
learned from our mistakes?'' Just as LT Backsight Forethought, in the
classic military text--``The Defense of Duffer's Drift'' had seven
dreams in which he was able to analyze each tactical battle, we have
had 8 years in which to do the same. Currently, we not only rotate out
units but divisions and brigades. In Vietnam, we rotated in smaller
replacement troops which at least gave a bit more continuity to the
battlefield. Unfortunately, due to the strains on our forces, we
piecemeal units that have not trained together and have little to no
operational experience in the Afghan theater but most significantly, in
a culture where a man's trust and respect is earned with time, loyalty,
and a devotion to the cause, we rotate out units every 6 to 12 months.
We ask our Afghan comrades and leaders to place the same trust in
perfect strangers, that we spend priceless time earning. With each
rotation, just as Lieutenant Forethought did with his reoccurring
dreams, we have had to start from the beginning to build and cultivate
those working relationships again.
In addition, we put ourselves at a serious disadvantage when we
send trained Pashto, Dari, and Farsi linguists to units going to Arabic
speaking Iraq or put them into nondeploying units in Germany or Korea.
These are our linguistic experts--they should deploy to their
respective theaters. Likewise, we often send troops with two previous
tours in one area of operations in which they are ``subject matter
experts'' to work in areas of the world with which they are unfamiliar,
and thus we lose not only their mentorship and training for junior
soldiers, but their relevant and pertinent knowledge of the enemy.
The question is not whether an influx of troops will be effective
or be seen as an ``occupation'' but how do we effectively utilize those
additional troops. The way in which we do so will cultivate how the
Afghans perceive our intentions. Adding another 17,000 boots on the
ground or even doubling that number has the potential to be as one
fellow comrade put it, ``like applying a Band-Aid to a sucking chest
wound.'' It is not how many more troops we add, but how we utilize
those troops effectively. Afghanistan's population of over 33 million
is dispersed throughout the country with concentrated areas in which
International Security Assistance Forces and coalition troops hold
large bases. In the more remote areas, we have established small
Forward Operating Bases and even smaller Provincial Reconstruction Team
compounds and firebases. Although the concept of the PRTs was
altruistic, their application has been hindered by a number of issues,
all secondary to the lack of security. What good sense does it make to
build schools, provincial centers, bridges and wells when there is no
support or security provided for villagers to utilize them?
My first recommendations are that we push our troops out to an even
more local level. Rather than Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT), we
establish, at the minimum, District Security and Reconstruction Teams
(DSRT) within and among the villages, working in conjunction with the
village elders. These DSRTs would provide a safe haven for the people
rather than the enemy and in turn, Afghans would maximize the
information operations campaigns through the development of progressive
and prosperous communities. In order to do this, we start as we did in
2001, supporting the Afghans with small, strategic victories and from
there spread out while maintaining our ground and assisting the Afghans
in providing their own security by living and serving alongside them.
Second, we allow individual troops and units to extend their tours
if requested so that we may apply expertise and continuity to rotating
troops. At the very least, we rotate out cohesive divisions and
brigades within not only the same theater, but the same area of
operations. Furthermore, we cultivate our own organic assets to include
our linguists, analysts, and soldiers with Afghanistan, asymmetric and/
or counterinsurgency experience and engage them in a focused and
concentrated force armed not just with weapons and ammunition, but the
power of knowledge, experience, and wisdom.
Third, we support the Afghans in rooting out corruption and
establishing secure and stable environments for which they can regain
the pride they have for their country rather than supporting corrupt
officials as they work their own agendas and line their own pockets. We
should encourage our coalition partners to purchase poppy yields giving
the money directly to the farmers rather than to corrupt district and
government officials, while providing alternative crops to grow and
safe markets in which to facilitate commerce.
These are not all of the answers but merely an evaluation of how we
can leverage our assets, experiences, and capabilities in the theater.
These thoughts are just the beginning of what must be a multifaceted
and enduring effort on the behalf of all involved. As I stated
previously, Afghanistan's diversity in culture and geography demand
that we embrace a comprehensive and intimate understanding of the
nation's issues. Broad and generalized tactics as we have applied in
the past will not work in every corner of Afghanistan. Cultivating our
``homegrown experts'' by allowing them to provide continuity and
confluence of operations through their learned knowledge and moreover
in depth network of interpersonal relationships are tantamount to
mutual trust, respect, and eventual success. In addition, keeping
subject matter experts and experienced commanders within the same area
of operations while applying a flexible methodology will allow for a
more tailored and applicable mission. Just as the enemy has adapted to
our tactics, we must get away from the ``Big Army'' mentality and do
the same.
In time and within an environment in which schools will not be
burned or bridges blown up, the Afghans will have safe access to
employment and education. When this happens, we will begin to see the
possibilities of a country free from radical and rampant extremism
where adults will be able to provide for their children and their
children will be free to attend schools. One day, this generation of
children in Afghanistan will be better prepared to take the reigns of
their country from their parents and will grow with the memory of war
rather than the daily reality of it and they will carry within
themselves the hope for enduring prosperity and peace for the future of
Afghanistan.
I thank you for the opportunity to testify here before the
committee today and look forward to your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you so much for your thoughtful
testimony.
Next is Rick.
STATEMENT OF RICK REYES, CORPORAL, U.S. MARINES (RET.), LOS
ANGELES, CA
Corporal Reyes. First off, I want to thank Senator Kerry
for giving me the inspiration of being here today. I sit here,
38 years after you were expressing your opinions on the Vietnam
war, and, similarly, want to express my opinions about this
occupation.
I also want to thank the members of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee for having me here.
I also want to say that I love my country, and that is why
I'm here today.
My name is Rick Reyes. I am a veteran of both Operation
Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. I served with the
United States Marine Corps as an infantry rifleman. We took an
oath to defend this country, and that doesn't stop when we
check in our rifles into the armory. We keep our country safe
by telling people the truth. And doing that is just as scary as
any ambush or mortar attack.
I come from very humble beginnings. I am a son to both an
immigrant father and mother from Mexico. I grew up in East Los
Angeles in one of the roughest parts of town, known as Boyle
Heights. Later, my family moved to southeast Los Angeles to
escape the violence, but that wasn't far enough. As a kid, I
always envisioned myself of one day fighting for my country and
ensuring justice.
Like most of my peers, when I was younger I got involved
with the wrong crowd. After escaping a serious tragedy in my
life, I knew the Marine Corps could provide me the opportunity
to, not only serve my country, but to also straighten out my
life by doing something honorable.
On the night of the September 11 attacks, my battalion sat
in port in Australia. It was sometime around midnight, and we
were enjoying our off time at the local bars, when all of a
sudden the music stopped and, over the PR systems, an
announcement, heard that the United States was being under
attack. We were all ordered to head back and aboard the ships.
That night, we were told we were going to war with the Taliban
and al-Qaeda forces.
The next morning, we pulled out of port and for the next
month, while the administration formulated a plan, we prepared
to go to war, with the conviction of fighting for justice and
the American way.
Our mission was to locate and capture suspected members of
the Taliban and al-Qaeda forces. Through my experience as an
infantry rifleman, implemented past and current policy had
found almost impossible to locate and capture the Taliban
because there isn't any effective way to separate them from the
innocent civilian population. Patrols were conducted through
populated neighborhoods. The populations on those neighborhood
streets weren't any different from the population on my street.
There were kids running around and playing while we occupied
their streets, mothers running behind after those kids, making
sure they stay out of trouble and out of our way, and fathers
trying to make a living for the little that they have.
U.S.-hired translators would tell us where suspected
Taliban or al-Qaeda would be found. We would follow their lead,
often planning attacks and breaking into people's homes. Due to
our training in fighting wars and killing enemy, we wouldn't
enter these homes or situations quietly, but instead trained to
fight with the vigilance of encountering death at every turn.
Although we were on the hunt for suspected Taliban forces,
at the end--at the end of it, we found that these dangerous
missions resulted with very poor consequences by destroying
innocent lives. We weren't fulfilling our objective of
capturing terrorists, but instead creating enemies out of
civilians.
As a Marine trying to ensure justice, I began losing sight
of why I was there, and the conviction began to fade. Because
our mission was to capture suspected Taliban, and had no
successful way of being able to distinguish them, we had no
other choice but to suspect the entire civilian population,
innocent or not.
One day, we stopped at gunpoint, detained, beating and
nearly killing an innocent man, only to find out he was just
traveling down the road to deliver milk to his children.
Because of that, that day those kids went without a father.
There were hundreds of incidents like this one. Almost 100
percent of the time, we would find that suspected terrorists
turned out to be innocent civilians. We began to feel we were
chasing ghosts, fighting an enemy that we could not see or that
didn't allow itself to be seen. How can you tell the difference
between the Taliban and Afghan civilians? The answer is that
you can't. It all stopped making sense.
Later, I found out that these translators were being
compensated on the amount of intelligence they were able to
provide. So, it was their incentive to provide as much
intelligence as possible, without any way to know if the
information being provided was false. It was such a flat
system, but who was I to question authority?
When I returned home, I felt that occupying Afghanistan and
Iraq was a mistake. I strongly feel that the military
occupation and intervention is not the answer. If it didn't
work back in 2001, when we had all the energy, all our
resources, but, most important, a very high troop morale, I
asked myself, How could it work now?
A lot of these men and women serving our country in the
Armed Forces have been desperately worn and stretched out too
thin by having them serve up to four tours overseas. If we
aren't killing them on the ground due to a flat policy, we are
definitely killing them in spirit, and that is--and that also
has a very serious indirect consequence, when the fight is
brought back home.
I love my country. I never once, while I--while serving,
did I feel I was protecting America. But, instead, we were
harboring the worst of sentiments in these foreign Middle
Eastern countries. We were creating more enemies.
As a kid, I envisioned myself serving my country and
fighting for freedom. But, when the opportunity presented
itself, it was stripped from me, and, instead, I was forced to
become a tyrant. I have--as I have experienced, our troops are
also experiencing a very low morale, which oftentimes
translates into high suicide rates.
These are just a few of the issues. There is just a huge
array of reasons why, at the minimum, this occupation needs to
be rethought. We should not be sending any more troops into
Afghanistan. As a combat troop, we are trained to isolate and
destroy the enemy, cut off its resources. As an indirect
consequence, we impose our Western views and alienate their
culture and traditions. In some respects, this entire
occupation has become counterproductive. As a Marine, I was
willing to give my life for my country, and still am. But,
invading and occupying Afghanistan, sending more troops to stop
what is a political problem, is not the answer.
I urge the Senators to rethink Afghanistan while there is
still time. I can almost guarantee that sending more troops
will mean more civilian and U.S. troop casualties, not for war,
but for occupation. Sending more troops will not make the U.S.
safer, it will only build more opposition against us.
I urge you, on behalf of truth and patriotism, to consider
carefully and rethink Afghanistan. More troops, more occupation
is not the answer.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Corporal Reyes follows:]
Prepared Statement of Rick Reyes, Corporal, U.S. Marines (Ret.), Los
Angeles, CA
First, I want to begin by thanking the members of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee for having me here today. Second, I want to
say that I love my country and that is why I am here today. My name is
Rick Reyes. I was a corporal in the U.S. Marines and served both in
Afghanstan and Iraq. I grew up in east Los Angeles, in rough part of
town. As a young man like many of my friends at the time, I got
involved with gangs. Signing up for the military seemed a logical step
for me to help straighten out my life, so I enlisted in the Marines.
On the day of the U.S. attacks, September 11, I was stationed in
Australia. That night my fellow marines and I were at the bars. All of
a sudden the music stopped and over the PR system we heard the
announcement that the U.S. was under attack. We were all ordered to get
back on the ship. We were told a couple of days later that we were
going to Afghanstan to fight the Taliban. All the marines, including
myself were totally ready to fight the enemy.
Our mission was to locate and capture suspected members of Taliban.
Missions were all done at night. U.S.-hired translators would tell us
where suspect Taliban or al-Qaeda would be found. We would follow their
lead, often by breaking into people's homes. Because we were so pumped
to find Taliban we would often rough up suspected terrorists. Sometimes
we would break their hands, arms, legs, and mess up people's homes
scaring women and children. Those missions were very dangerous because
at times, family members would shoot us from the back. We lost several
marines because they were shot in the back by scared Afghans. At the
end, we found out that suspected terrorists were innocent civilians who
were protecting their families, their homes--from us. In retrospect, if
someone was breaking into my home, I would probably fire at us as well.
We began creating enemies out of innocent civilians. I saw how Afghans
began hating us. As a marine, I began loosing sight of why I was there.
I remember one day, we stopped an Afghani civilian who was taking
milk to his kids because he was suspected of being a terrorist. We beat
him to submission to where he dropped his milk. God only knows if that
was the first or last time his kids had milk in a long time or if his
children were all hungry and waiting for him. Later we released him
after finding out he was innocent. That day his kids went without
milk--because of us. There were hundreds of incidents like this one.
And they all tore at me over time.
Almost 100 percent of the time, we would find that suspected
terrorists turned out to be innocent civilians. I started to feel like
we were chasing ghosts. How can you tell the difference between members
of the Taliban from an Afghan civilian? The answer is that you can't.
No one can. As marines, we did not know who was a civilian or a
terrorist. It all stopped making sense. We were destroying people's
homes and hurting Afghan civilians for no reason. Later I found out
that translators were paid on the number of tips they provided, so it
was their incentive to give us as many tips as possible, even if they
were false. It was such a flawed system. This was not the American way.
We were not fighting for justice. This was not the freedom I signed up
for.
By the time I left Afghanistan, I felt that the U.S. being there
was a big mistake. I joined the military because I wanted to be a hero,
and I feel that I was stripped of that opportunity and instead was sent
to fight an enemy that we could never see. The entire time we were
there, we were chasing ghosts. I feel strongly that military
intervention is not the answer. I love my country and never once while
serving duty in Afghanistan did I feel that we were protecting America.
Instead we were harboring the worst of sentiments in a foreign country,
we were creating more enemies. This is why I strongly believe that we
should not be sending more troops to Afghanistan.
As a marine, I was willing to give my life for this country; I
still am. But invading Afghanistan, sending more troops to solve what
is a political problem is not the answer: I urge the senators to
rethink Afghanistan while there is still time. I can almost guarantee
that sending more troops will mean more civilian and U.S. troop
casualties, more homes being broken into, more children without food,
more women without husbands. I encourage you to think of the cost of
war on their country as well as ours. We have to rethink our mission.
Sending more troops will not make the U.S. safer, it will only build
more opposition against us. I urge you on behalf of truth and
patriotism to consider carefully and rethink Afghanistan. More troops,
more war, is not the answer.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Reyes. I appreciate it.
[Applause.]
The Chairman. Please, everybody.
Mr. McGurk.
STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER McGURK, STAFF SERGEANT, U.S. ARMY
(RET.), RECIPIENT OF COMBAT INFANTRYMAN'S BADGE, TWO BRONZE
STARS, AND THE PURPLE HEART, NEW YORK, NY
Sergeant McGurk. I want to thank Chairman Kerry, Senator
Lugar, and members of the committee, for inviting me here today
and testify on behalf of my fellow veterans. I'm both honored
and humbled.
I'd like to say, first and foremost, that I believe, beyond
a shadow of a doubt, that the United States should renew its
commitment to Afghanistan and its people. I believed in this
mission in 2004, and I firmly believe in it as I sit here
today.
Some pundits will argue that we may no longer be able to
achieve any real measure of success in Afghanistan. I say to
those critics that we must try and help stabilize a country
that has been, for the most part, ignored ever since combat
operations began in Iraq in 2003. Our continued inattention to
Afghanistan, our drifting foreign policy in the region, and the
fact that we have done little to stop the reemergence of the
Taliban may very well solidify the resentment that the Afghan
people have for the United States and the central Government of
Afghanistan.
We have one chance to get this right or face those--a real
possibility of more terrorist attacks that rival those of 9/11
on U.S. soil.
I realize that many of the goals that we set forth for
ourselves at the onset of the war may no longer be fully
achievable, but we must try to stabilize and secure Afghanistan
before it slips further into violence. My experience in these
matters does not come from writing foreign policy; rather, the
firsthand experience I gained while leading men in combat in
two different countries and the interactions I had on a daily
basis with those people of those countries.
I'd like to illustrate, through personal experience, the
two main reasons I believe that we should continue our mission
in Afghanistan. These reasons are very different, but they
serve to capture the complexity of issues taking place on the
ground.
The first reason was an interaction that took place while
my platoon was conducting security operations for a Provincial
Reconstruction Team. The PTR operated out of a firebase in
Gardez, in Paktia province, and helped to build several schools
in the areas. They were encouraging many of the local villagers
to attend the opening ceremonies of all the different schools.
On one particular mission, my squad was in charge of manning a
checkpoint on the main road leading up to one school. The
morning went by without incident, and were in the process of
getting ready to return to the firebase when a village elder
came up to me with a serious expression on his face. I prepared
myself for potentially antagonist conversation, but was
surprised when he began speaking softly in English.
The conversation I had with him was short, but it was one
that I will never forget. The man was a commander in the
Mujahadeen and was wounded several times fighting the Russians.
He lost both of his brothers to Soviet helicopter gunship raids
and walked with a severe limp. He told me that he was worried,
at first, when the Americans came to Afghanistan, but soon
realized that we were here to help the Afghan people, not
exploit them, and he expressed to me that we would not abandon
Afghanistan again. He shook my hand and touched his heart out
of respect, and was turning to leave, when he stopped, gave me
the thumbs-up, and said America was good and just. He then
turned and slowly walked away.
I found myself at a loss for words as I stared at him. Here
was a man, hardened by fighting the Soviet Army, who seemed to
have lost everything in life, and yet had the faith--excuse
me--had faith in a country and a people he did not know. He
believed in the mission of the United States and the hope it
gave to the Afghan people.
This experience also served to compound the anger I felt
when the mission in Afghanistan was neglected in favor of the
mission in Iraq. Schools like the one built by the PRT stood
empty and idle through what seemed to be a lack of funding for
teachers, books, and other supplies. I felt as though the true
objective of the mission was forgotten, and that the half-
completed school was one giant photo opportunity. The
commitment to men like the village elder was forgotten, the
promise only half fulfilled.
The second and most personal reason took place on September
29, 2003, while my company was stationed at a firebase in
Shkin, in Paktia province, right on the Pakistani border. One
mission my platoon had been--one afternoon, my platoon had been
sent on a mission to reinforce another platoon currently under
enemy small-arms and mortar fire. Upon reaching the platoon in
contact, my squad dismounted to locate and destroy the enemy
mortar tube. As my squad swept through the area, my lead team
triggered a violent ambush that turned into a sustained
firefight of more than 10 hours in duration. During the
firefight, a 19-year-old, PFC Evan O'Neil of Haverhill, MA, was
mortally wounded by an enemy sniper while protecting the
squad's exposed flank. As a trained EMT, I moved to assist the
medic while continuing to direct the fire of my squad.
Upon reaching PFC O'Neill, he said to me, ``Sergeant, is
the squad OK?'' I told him that the squad was hanging in there,
and I told him not to worry, that I was going to get him out of
there. He then said to me, ``I am sorry for letting you down.''
I told him that he didn't, and to hold on. The last words
O'Neill ever spoke were, ``I'm sorry for letting you down.'' He
was only 19 years old, yet he understood the mission was larger
than himself. His last words were entirely selfless. I held
Evans' hand and said the ``Our Father'' as he died.
Excuse me.
As I think back to that day, I understand the memory and
courage of men like PFC O'Neill must be honored with a clear
and coherent strategy to help the people of Afghanistan. We
must defend the original mission, the one that was abandoned in
favor of a misled strategy in Iraq, to protect the American
people from terrorist threats and to ensure that O'Neill and
others like him did not die in vain.
I strongly believe in the mission in Afghanistan, combined
with our efforts in Pakistan, was and is the true front on the
war on terror, something I did not believe while fighting in
Iraq.
Senator Kerry, to this very committee in 1971, you spoke of
men who have returned with a sense of anger and a sense of
betrayal which no one has yet grasped. My own anger and sense
of betrayal comes from the possibility that we may not come to
a resolution in Afghanistan and that the blood that has been
shed by the victims of 9/11, the Afghan people, and men like
PFC O'Neill would be forgotten.
Once again, I'd like to thank you for inviting me here to
testify, and I truly am happy to see that troops are finally
being listened to.
[The prepared statement of Sergeant McGurk follows:]
Prepared Statement of Christopher McGurk, Staff Sergeant, U.S. Army
(Ret.), Recipient of Combat Infantryman's Badge, Two Bronze Stars and
the Purple Heart, New York, NY
I want to thank Chairman Kerry, Senator Lugar, and the members of
the committee for inviting me here today to testify on behalf of my
fellow Veterans; I am both honored and humbled. I would like to say
first and foremost that I believe beyond a shadow of a doubt that the
United States should renew its commitment to Afghanistan and its
people. I believed in my mission then and I firmly believe in it as I
sit here today. Some pundits will argue that we may no longer be able
to achieve any real measure of success in Afghanistan. I say to those
critics that we must try and help stabilize a country that has been,
for the most part, ignored ever since combat operations began in Iraq
in 2003. Our continued inattention to Afghanistan, our drifting foreign
policy in the region, and the fact that we have done little to stop the
reemergence of the Taliban may very well solidify the resentment that
the Afghan people have for the United States and the central government
of Afghanistan. We have one chance to get this right or face the real
possibility of more terrorist attacks that rival those of 9/11 on U.S.
soil.
I realize that many of the goals that we set for ourselves at the
onset of the war may no longer be fully achievable, but we must try to
stabilize and secure Afghanistan before it slips further into violence.
My experience in these matters does not come from writing foreign
policy; rather the firsthand experience I gained while leading men in
combat in two different countries and the interactions I had on a daily
basis with the people of those countries.
I would like to illustrate through personal experience the two main
reasons I believe that we should continue the mission in Afghanistan.
These reasons are very different, but serve to capture the complexity
of issues taking place on the ground.
The first interaction took place while my platoon was conducting
security operations for a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). The PRT
operated out of a firebase in Gardez, Paktia, province and had helped
to build several schools in the area. They were encouraging as many of
the local villagers to attend the opening ceremonies of the different
schools. On one particular mission my squad was in charge of manning a
checkpoint on the main road leading up to a school. The morning went by
without incident and we were in the process of getting ready to return
to the firebase when a village elder came up to me with a serious
expression on his face. I prepared myself for a potentially
antagonistic conversation, but was surprised when he began speaking
softly in English.
The conversation I had with him was short but it was one that I
will never forget. The man was commander in the Mujahadeen and was
wounded several times fighting the Russians; he lost both of his
brothers to Soviet helicopter gun-ship raids and walked with a severe
limp. He told me that he was worried at first when the Americans came
to Afghanistan, but soon realized that we were here to help the Afghan
people, not exploit them. He hoped that we would not abandon
Afghanistan again. He shook my hand and touched his heart out of
respect and was turning to leave when he stopped, gave me a thumbs up,
and said that ``America was good and just'' He then turned and slowly
walked away. I found myself at a loss for words as I stared at him.
Here was a man hardened by fighting the Soviet Army, who seemed to have
lost everything in life and yet he had faith in a country and a people
he did not know. He believed in the mission of the United States and
the hope it gave to the Afghan people.
This experience also served to compound the anger I felt when the
mission in Afghanistan was neglected in favor of the mission in Iraq.
Schools like the one built by the PRT stood empty and idle through what
seemed to be a lack of funding for teachers, books, and other supplies.
I felt as though the true objective of the mission was forgotten, and
that the half-completed school was one giant photo op. The commitment
to men like the village elder was forgotten; the promise only half
fulfilled.
The second and most personal experience took place on September 29,
2003, while my company was stationed at a firebase at Shkin in Paktika
province, right on the Pakistani border. One mission my platoon had
been sent to reinforce another platoon currently under enemy RPG and
mortar fire. Upon reaching the platoon in contact, my squad dismounted
to locate and destroy the enemy mortar tube. As my squad swept through
the area, my lead team triggered a violent ambush that turned into a
sustained firefight of more than 10 hours in duration. During the
firefight, 19-year-old PFC Evan O'Neill of Haverhill, MA, was mortally
wounded by an enemy sniper while protecting the squad's exposed flank.
As a trained EMT, I moved to assist the medic while continuing to
direct the fire of my squad. Upon reaching PFC O'Neill, he said to me,
``Sergeant, is the squad OK?'' and ``I'm sorry for letting you down.''
I told him that the squad was hanging in and I told him not to worry,
that I was going to get him out of there; those were the last words he
ever spoke--``I am sorry for letting you down.'' He was only 19, yet he
understood that the mission was larger than himself. His last words
were entirely selfless. I held his hand and said the ``Our Father'' as
he died. As I think back to that day, I understand that the memory and
courage of men like PFC O'Neill must be honored with a clear and
coherent strategy to help the people of Afghanistan. We must defend the
original mission--the one that was abandoned in favor of a misled
strategy in Iraq--to protect the American people from terrorist threats
and to ensure that O'Neill and others like him did not die in vain.
I strongly believe that the mission in Afghanistan was and is the
true front in the war on terror, something I did not believe while
fighting in Iraq. Senator Kerry--to this very committee in 1971, you
spoke of ``men who have returned with a sense of anger and a sense of
betrayal which no one has yet grasped.'' My own anger and sense of
betrayal comes from the possibility that we may not come to a
resolution in Afghanistan, and that the blood that has been shed by the
victims of 9/11, the Afghan people, and men like PFC O'Neill would be
in vain.
The Chairman. Thank you so much. I appreciate your
testimony very, very much.
Mr. Moore.
STATEMENT OF WESTLEY MOORE, CAPTAIN, U.S. ARMY (RET.),
BALTIMORE, MD
Captain Moore. Thank you very much. And I'd like to thank
the entire committee for this time. And, Mr. Chairman, I'd like
to specifically thank you for acknowledging the importance of
hearing from junior officers and NCOs. I believe I speak for
everyone on the panel, and the soldiers with whom we served,
when I say that we appreciate the audience.
In early 2005, I was working as a banker in London, and,
less than a year later, I was deployed with the 1st Brigade of
the 82d Airborne Division in Eastern Afghanistan. My good
friend and a hero of mine, LTC Michael Fenzel, deputy brigade
commander of a unit that I later joined, asked me if I'd be
willing to leave the world of finance and to serve. A sense of
duty to my oath as an officer, a sense of commitment to the
troops I would lead, and a sense of loyalty to my friend who
asked me to join him propelled me to leave my comfortable
existence and spend 9 months in the border region of
Afghanistan.
Now, before deploying, I read extensively about the history
of the region and sought counsel from those who I thought had
any insight on the area. And within days of arriving in our
area of operations, I realized nothing could have prepared me
for some of the most trying, exhilarating, and heartbreaking
days of my life.
Iraq dominated the news cycle at the time. However, what I
immediately learned was that the fight in Afghanistan was just
as crucial and precarious, if not more, than Iraq. The terrain,
the economic and educational conditions, its neighbors, two of
which are nuclear-armed, the tribalism and Pashtunwali law that
reigned supreme over any inclination of nationalism, the lack
of basic services, such as electricity and clean water
resources, and a plethora of other realities, make this
conflict more complex than I could have ever imagined. But, my
time in Afghanistan also made this war very real to me, and
made getting it right very personal.
The fighting was tough, and the kinetic operations are all-
encompassing. But, the main reason I was asked to serve as the
director of information operations was to address the American
strategic support plan for Program Takhim e Sol, which is the
Afghan reconciliation program, which is also known as PTS. The
Afghans, followed by the lessons of South Africa and Chile
before them, aim to create a reconciliation program that
allowed Afghans who were involved with al-Qaeda, HIG, the
Haqqani network, and the Taliban, to turn in their weapons,
pledge allegiance to the new Afghan Government, and return home
to their families without fear of retribution or imprisonment.
When my team arrived, eight people had PTS'd, or
reconciled. Lieutenant Colonel Fenzel and the other senior
leaders of my unit got it. They understood the basic premise
that the more insurgents that we can convince to peacefully
reconcile meant the fewer that we needed to make submit via
force. We reevaluated our strategies and techniques to support
the Afghans in this initiative. We created a program called the
Afghan Public Relations Officers, or APROs, who are Afghans who
worked with us to better tailor our messages and our reaction
to the day's events. We stopped using broadcasts written by
United States solders and simply read by translators, and
altered, not only the messages, but the messengers, and
recruited respected leaders, such as President--former
President Mujadidi to better reach our targets. We stopped
using leaflet drops in order to spread the word, because, with
a population that has a literacy rate in the single digits,
written materials were utterly ineffective. We broadcasted PTS
success stories so that people who were on the fence knew that
a safe alternative awaited them, and that the option of waiting
for our forces to find them was a losing proposition. By the
time we redeployed, 533 people had PTS'd and rejoined Afghan
society, and the initiative still runs, to this day.
Now, I say that, not just to pat our team on the back about
the work that they did, because our effects were not perfect
and there were some significant flaws to that initiative, but
to say that many important lessons were learned during that
experience, and I'll highlight three.
The first. Unlike Iraq, Afghanistan is a very rural fight
and cannot be fought out of Kandahar or Kabul. The reason we
were effective is because we spent time out in the field, days
at a time. We were talking to locals, building trust, and
gaining insight. But, we need more, and it needs to be with a
distinct local focus. In Iraq, the saying was, ``As goes
Baghdad, so goes the rest of the country.'' This is not the
case in Afghanistan, and, in many ways, it's the antithesis of
the truth.
No. 2. We are underfunded and undermanned in Afghanistan.
We have fought this war on the cheap. And I say that, not only
in a military side, but particularly on the civilian support
side and the reconstruction side. But, in the military angle,
specifically, we have asked two brigades to cover over a 1,600-
mile area that is known as Eastern Afghanistan, much of it in
the most dangerous terrain in the world. Now, we've just
announced that we're adding another 17,000 troops. But, even
when those troops come online this summer, it is still a paltry
number needed to fulfill the troop-to-task demands required for
persistent engagement with people in the rural areas.
And No. 3. Many of the attacks we sustained were not
conducted by ideologues, they were conducted by people who
simply had no economic options and felt the pull of a monetary
reward for supporting insurgents. I personally dealt with
insurgents who told me that they were not Taliban for cause,
but essentially Taliban for hire. This number is now smaller,
and that dynamic is now changing, but we need to help--we need
to help provide jobs, education, security, and a viable future
for the Afghans and their families in order to avoid the
Taliban's campaign of ruthless intimidation and their
significant information operations platform.
Right now an American soldier is ending another long day
patrolling the mountain ranges of Kunar province. And under
sweat-soaked Kevlar and burdened by the 40-pound rucksack he's
been carrying for the past 12 hours, he looks over his shoulder
and he sees a group of Afghan children playing in the distance.
And at that very moment, he's again reminded of what's at
stake. And that same soldier's thinking about his own family
and loved ones back at home, constantly being reminded of why
he's there.
Let me be clear, I, like many of my fellow soldiers and
citizens, want this war to end, and we want this war to end,
badly. I've lost friends, I've lost colleagues, both Afghan and
American. And I understand the burden that sits on your
shoulders, as decisionmakers, because it is similar to the
burden that sat on mine as an officer who led troops in combat.
But, the Taliban is executing a doctrine based on exhaustion,
where their entire strategy depends on our political and
national will faltering. Many of them are fond of saying, ``The
Americans have the wristwatches, but we have the time.'' You
have the wherewithal in this committee to make that an illusion
by committing the resources, support, and political will to
ensure this war is brought to an effective close.
Thank you for your time and commitment to getting this
right. I welcome your questions.
[The prepared statement of Captain Moore follows:]
Prepared Statement of Westley Moore, Captain, U.S. Army (Ret.),
Baltimore, MD
Thank you all for this opportunity and your service.
Mr Chairman, I want to specifically thank you for acknowledging the
importance of hearing from junior officers and NCOs. I believe I speak
for everyone on the panel and the soldiers with whom we served when I
say we appreciate the audience.
In early 2005, I was working as an investment banker in London.
Less than a year later, I was deployed with the 1st Brigade of the 82d
Airborne Division in Eastern Afghanistan. My good friend and a hero of
mine, LTC Michael Fenzel, deputy brigade commander of the unit I later
joined, asked me if I would be willing to leave the world of finance
and serve. A sense of duty to my oath as an officer, a sense of
commitment to the troops I would lead, and a sense of loyalty to my
friend who asked me to join him propelled me to leave my comfortable
existence to spend 9 months in the border region of Afghanistan.
Before deploying, I read extensively about the history of the
region and sought counsel from those who I thought had any insight on
the area. Within days of arriving in our area of operations, I realized
nothing could have prepared me for some of the most trying,
exhilarating, and heartbreaking days of my life.
Iraq dominated the news cycle at the time. However, what I
immediately learned was that the fight in Afghanistan is just as
crucial and precarious if not more than the fight in Iraq. The terrain,
the economic and educational conditions, its neighbors, two of which
are nuclear armed, the tribalism and ``pashtunwali'' law that reigns
supreme over any inclination of nationalism the lack of basic services
such as electricity and clear water resources, and a plethora of other
realities make this conflict more complex than I could have ever
imagined. But my time in Afghanistan also made this war very real to
me, and made getting this right very personal.
The fighting was tough, and the kinetic operations are all-
encompassing, but the main reason I was asked to serve as the director
of Information Operations was to address the American strategic support
plan for Program-Takhim e Sol, or the Afghan Reconciliation Program.
The Afghans, following the lessons of South Africa and Chile before
them, aimed to create a reconciliation program that allowed Afghans who
were involved with al-Qaeda, HIG, the Haqqani Network, and the Taliban
to turn in their weapons, pledge allegiance to the new Afghan
Government, and return home to their families without fear of
retribution or imprisonment. When my team arrived, 8 people had PTS'd,
or reconciled. LTC Fenzel and the other senior leaders of my unit ``got
it.'' They understood the basic premise that the more insurgents we can
convince to peacefully reconcile, meant the fewer we needed to make
submit via force. We reevaluated our strategies and techniques to
support the Afghans in this initiative. We created a program called
``Afghan Public Relations Officers, or APROs,'' who were Afghans we
worked with us to better tailor our messages and reaction to events. We
stopped using broadcasts written by U.S. soldiers and simply read by
translators, and altered not only the messages but the messengers, and
recruited respected leaders like former President Mujadidi, to better
reach our targets. We stopped using leaflet drops in order to spread
the word because with a population that has a literacy rate in the
single digits, written materials were utterly ineffective. We
broadcasted PTS success stories so that people who were on the fence
knew that a safe alternative awaited them, and that the option of
waiting for our forces to find them was a losing proposition.
By the time we redeployed, 533 people had PTS'd and rejoined Afghan
society. The initiative still runs to this day. I say that not to pat
our team on the back, or to say the effects were perfect, because there
were some significant flaws in the initiative, but to say many
important lessons were learned during that experience.
(1) Unlike Iraq, Afghanistan is a rural fight, and cannot be fought
out of Kandahar or Kabul. The reason we were effective is because we
spent time out in the field. Days at a time, we were talking to locals,
building trust, gaining insight. But we need more, and it needs to be
with a local focus. In Iraq, the saying was ``As goes Baghdad, so goes
the rest of the country.'' This is not the case in Afghanistan, and in
many ways that is the antithesis of the truth.
(2) We are underfunded and undermanned in Afghanistan. We have
fought this war on the cheap and I say that not only on the military
side, but on the civilian support side as well. But on the military
angle specifically, we asked two brigades to have coverage over a
1,600-mile area that is known as Eastern Afghanistan, much of it in the
most dangerous terrain in the world. We just announced we are adding
17,000 troops but even when those troops come online, it is still a
paltry number needed fulfill the troop-to-task demands required for a
persistent engagement with the people in rural areas.
(3) Many of the attacks we sustained were not conducted by
ideologues. They
were conducted by people who simply had no economic options and felt
that pull of monetary reward for supporting insurgents. I personally
dealt with insurgents who told me they were not Taliban for cause, but
Taliban for hire. This number is now smaller, and the dynamic is now
changing, but we need to help provide means to jobs, education,
security, and a viable future for the Afghans and their families in
order to avoid the Taliban's campaign of intimidation and their
significant information operations platform.
Right now, an American soldier is ending another long day of
patrolling the mountain ranges in the Kunar region. Under his sweat-
soaked Kevlar, and burdened by the 40-pound rucksack he has been
carrying for the past 12 hours, he looks over his shoulder and sees a
group of Afghan children playing in the distance. And at that very
moment, he's again reminded what's at stake. And that same soldier is
thinking about his own family and loved ones back at home, constantly
being reminded why he's there. Let me be clear; I, like many of my
fellow soldiers and citizens, want this war to end. I have lost friends
and colleagues, both American and Afghan. I understand the burden that
sits on your shoulders as decisionmakers because it is similar to the
burden that sat on mine as an officer who led troops in combat. But the
Taliban is executing a doctrine based on exhaustion, where their entire
strategy depends on our political and national will faltering. Many of
them are fond of saying, ``The Americans have the wristwatches, but we
have the time.'' You have the wherewithal to make that an illusion by
committing the resources, support, and political will to ensure that
this war is brought to an effective close.
Thank you all for your time and commitment to getting this right. l
welcome your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Thank you very much,
Captain. Very important testimony.
Colonel Bacevich, you get to be the wrap-up.
STATEMENT OF ANDREW BACEVICH, COLONEL, U.S. ARMY (RET.),
PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND HISTORY, BOSTON
UNIVERSITY, BOSTON, MA
Colonel Bacevich. Well, thank you for the privilege of
presenting my views to this committee. And I am particularly
honored to do so alongside these veterans of the Afghanistan
war.
Members of this generation have come to know war well, and
I certainly would not presume to comment on their experience.
My own generation had its own intimate relationship with a
different war; one that has now become a distant memory. As
with many who served in Vietnam, my own views, even today, are
perhaps too colored by that experienced. Still, in getting some
perspective on the predicament we currently face, Vietnam may
retain some lingering relevance.
In one of the most thoughtful Vietnam-era accounts written
by a senior military officer, GEN Bruce Palmer once observed
that, ``With respect to Vietnam, our leaders should have known
that the American people would not stand still for a protracted
war of an indeterminate nature and with no foreseeable end to
the U.S. commitment.'' General Palmer thereby distilled, in a
single sentence, the central lesson of Vietnam. To embark upon
an open-ended war lacking clearly defined and achievable
objectives was to forfeit public support, thereby courting
disaster. And his implication was clear: Never again.
General Palmer's book, which he titled ``The 25-Year War''
appeared in 1984. Today, exactly 25 years later, we once again
find ourselves mired in a protracted war of an indeterminate
nature with no foreseeable end to the U.S. commitment. How did
this happen?
In the wake of Vietnam, the United States military set out,
quite consciously, to develop a new way of war intended to
preclude any recurrence of protracted indeterminate conflict.
Yet, events since
9/11, in both Iraq and Afghanistan, have now demolished such
expectations. Once again, as in Vietnam, the enemy calls the
tune, obliging us to fight on his terms. Once again, decision
has become elusive; and, as fighting drags on, its purpose
becomes increasingly difficult to discern.
American soldiers are now said to face the prospect of
perpetual conflict. We find ourselves in the midst of what the
Pentagon calls ``The Long War,'' a conflict global in scope, if
largely concentrated in the Greater Middle East, and expected
to last even longer than General Palmer's 25-year war.
Yet, there's one notable difference today between today and
the day 38 years ago, when the chairman of this committee
testified against the then-seemingly endless Vietnam war. At
that time, when the young John Kerry spoke, many of his
contemporaries had angrily turned against their generation's
war. Today, most of the contemporaries of those fighting in
Iraq and Afghanistan have simply tuned out the long war. The
predominant mood of the country is not one of anger or anxiety,
but of dull acceptance.
In other words, Americans today do appear willing to stand
still, to use General Palmer's phrase, when considering the
prospect of endless war.
Now, there are many explanations for why Americans are so
disengaged from the long war, but the most important, in my
view, is that few of us have any personal stake in that
conflict.
When the citizen-soldier tradition collapsed under the
weight of Vietnam, the post-Vietnam military rebuilt itself as
a professional force. The creation of this all-volunteer
military was widely hailed as a great success. Only now are we
beginning to glimpse its shortcomings; chief among them the
fact that it exists at some remove from American society.
The upshot is that, with the eighth anniversary of the long
war now approaching, fundamental questions about this
enterprise continue to be ignored. My purpose today is to
suggest that members of this committee have a profound duty to
take these questions on.
In his testimony before this committee, the young John
Kerry, famously, or infamously, in the eyes of some, asked,
``How do you ask a man to be the last man to die for a
mistake?'' What exactly was that mistake? Well, there were
many, but the most fundamental lay in President Johnson's
erroneous conviction that the Republic of Vietnam constituted a
vital United States national security interest, and that
ensuring that country's survival required a direct United
States military intervention. Johnson erred in his estimation
of South Vietnam's importance, and he compounded that error
with a tragic failure of imagination, persuading himself that
there existed no alternative to a massive United States troop
commitment and that, once in, there was no way out.
My own view is that today we are, in our own way, repeating
LBJ's errors. Recall that in his testimony before this
committee, speaking on behalf of other antiwar veterans, the
young John Kerry remarked that ``We are probably angriest about
all that we were told about Vietnam and about the mystical war
against communism.'' The mystical war against communism finds
its counterpart in the mystical war on terrorism. As in the
1960s, so, too, today. Mystification breeds misunderstanding
and misjudgment. It prevents us from seeing things as they are.
As a direct result, it leads us to exaggerate the
importance of places like Afghanistan, and, indeed, to
exaggerate the jihadist threat, which falls well short of being
existential. It induces flights of fancy so that, for example,
otherwise sensible people conjure up visions of providing clean
water, functioning schools, and good governance to
Afghanistan's 40,000 villages, with expectations of thereby
winning Afghan hearts and minds. It causes people to ignore the
consideration of cost. With the long war already, this Nation's
second most expensive conflict, trailing only World War II, and
with the Federal Government projecting trillion-dollar deficits
for years to come, how much can we afford, and where is the
money coming from?
Now, for political reasons, the Obama administration may
have banished the phrase ``Global War on Terror,'' yet even
today the conviction exists that the United States is called
upon to dominate or liberate or transform the Greater Middle
East. Methods may be shifting, but the emphasis on pacification
giving way to militarized nation-building, priorities may be
changing, AfPak now supplanting Iraq as the main effort.
The urgent need is to demystify this project, which, from
the outset, was a misguided one. Just as in the 1960s, we
possessed neither the wisdom nor the means needed to determine
the fate of Southeast Asia, so today we possess neither the
wisdom, nor the means necessary, to determine the fate of the
Greater Middle East. To persist in efforts to do so will simply
replicate, on an even greater scale, mistakes and misjudgments
comparable to those that young John Kerry once rightly decried.
Thank you.
[Applause.]
The Chairman. Please, folks, we will have no demonstrations
of any kind--for, against, in the middle, either way.
[The prepared statement of Colonel Bacevich follows:]
Prepared Statement of Andrew J. Bacevich, Colonel, U.S. Army (Ret.),
Professor of International Relations and History, Boston University,
Boston, MA
Thank you for the privilege of presenting my views to this
committee. I am particularly honored to do so alongside these veterans
of the Afghanistan war.
Members of this generation have come to know war well and I would
not presume to comment on their experience. My own generation had its
own intimate relationship with a different war, one that has now become
a distant memory. As with many who served in Vietnam, my own views even
today are perhaps too colored by that experience. Still, in gaining
some perspective on the predicament that we currently face, Vietnam may
retain some lingering relevance.
What strikes me most about that war is the extent to which its
lessons have been forgotten and in some cases even inverted.
In one of the most thoughtful Vietnam-era accounts written by a
senior military officer, GEN Bruce Palmer once observed that ``With
respect to Vietnam, our leaders should have known that the American
people would not stand still for a protracted war of an indeterminate
nature with no foreseeable end to the U.S. commitment.''
General Palmer thereby distilled into a single sentence the central
lesson of Vietnam: To embark upon an open-ended war lacking clearly
defined and achievable objectives was to forfeit public support,
thereby courting disaster. The implications were clear: Never again.
General Palmer's book, which he titled ``The Twenty-Five Year
War,'' appeared in 1984. Today, exactly 25 years later we once again
find ourselves mired in a ``protracted war of an indeterminate nature
with no foreseeable end to the U.S. commitment.''
How did this happen?
In the wake of Vietnam, the United States military set out to
develop a new way of war intended to preclude any recurrence of
protracted, indeterminate conflict. The expectation was that by
emphasizing technology and superior skill U.S. forces would achieve
victory quickly and at acceptable costs, thereby protecting themselves
from the possibility of public abandonment. In 1991 Operation Desert
Storm seemingly validated this new paradigm.
Yet events since 9/11, in both Iraq and Afghanistan, have now
demolished such expectations. Once again, as in Vietnam, the enemy
calls the tune, obliging us to fight on his terms. Decision has become
elusive. As fighting drags on, its purpose becomes increasingly
difficult to discern.
American soldiers are now said to face the prospect of perpetual
conflict. We find ourselves in the midst of what the Pentagon calls
``The Long War,'' a conflict global in scope (if largely concentrated
in the Greater Middle East) and expected to last even longer than
General Palmer's ``Twenty-Five Year War.''
To apply to the Long War the plaintive query that GEN David
Petraeus once posed with regard to Iraq--``Tell me how this ends''--the
answer is clear: No one has the foggiest idea. War has become like the
changing phases of the moon: It's part of everyday existence. For
American soldiers there is quite literally no end in sight.
Yet there is one notable difference between today and the day 38
years ago when the chairman of this committee testified against the
then seemingly endless war in Vietnam. At that time, when the young
John Kerry spoke, many of his contemporaries had angrily turned against
their generation's war. Today, most of the contemporaries of those
fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan have simply tuned out the Long War.
The predominant mood of the country is not one of anger or anxiety, but
of dull acceptance.
In other words, Americans today do appear willing to ``stand
still'' when considering the prospect of endless war. There are many
explanations for why Americans are so disengaged from the Long War, but
the most important, in my view, is that few of us have any personal
stake in that conflict.
When the citizen-soldier tradition collapsed under the weight of
Vietnam, the post-Vietnam military rebuilt itself as a professional
force. The creation of this all-volunteer military was widely hailed as
a great success. Only now are we beginning to glimpse its shortcomings,
chief among them the fact that it exists at some remove from American
society. Americans today profess to ``support the troops'' but that
support is a mile wide and an inch deep. It rarely translates into
serious public concern for whether the troops are being used wisely or
well.
The upshot is that with the eighth anniversary of the Long War now
approaching, fundamental questions about this enterprise continue to be
ignored.
My purpose today is to suggest that the members of this committee
have a profound duty to take those questions on.
In his testimony before this committee, the young John Kerry
famously--or infamously, in the eyes of some--asked: ``How do you ask a
man to be the last man to die for a mistake?''
What exactly was that mistake? Well, there were many, but the most
fundamental lay in President Johnson's erroneous conviction that the
Republic of Vietnam constituted a vital U.S. security interest and that
ensuring that country's survival required direct U.S. military
intervention.
Johnson erred in his estimation of South Vietnam's importance. He
compounded that error with a tragic failure of imagination, persuading
himself that there existed no alternative to a massive U.S. troop
commitment and that once in there was no way out.
My own view is that we are, in our own day, repeating LBJ's errors.
Recall that in his testimony before this committee, speaking on behalf
of other antiwar veterans, the young John Kerry derisively remarked
that ``we are probably angriest about all that we were told about
Vietnam and about the mystical war against communism.''
The mystical war against communism finds its counterpart in the
mystical war on terrorism. As in the 1960s so too today: Mystification
breeds misunderstanding and misjudgment. It prevents us from seeing
things as they are.
As a direct result, it leads us to exaggerate the importance of
places like Afghanistan and indeed to exaggerate the jihadist threat,
which falls well short of being existential. It induces flights of
fancy, so that, for example, otherwise sensible people conjure up
visions of providing clean water, functioning schools, and good
governance to Afghanistan's 40,000 villages, with expectations of
thereby winning Afghan hearts and minds. It causes people to ignore
considerations of cost. With the Long War already this Nation's second
most expensive conflict, trailing only World War II, and with the
Federal Government projecting trillion dollar deficits for years to
come, how much can we afford and where is the money coming from?
For political reasons the Obama administration may have banished
the phrase ``Global War on Terror,'' yet even today the conviction
persists that the United States is called upon to dominate or liberate
or transform the Greater Middle East. Methods may be shifting, with the
emphasis on pacification giving way to militarized nation-building.
Priorities may be changing, AfPak now supplanting Iraq as the main
effort. Yet by whatever name the larger enterprise continues. The
President who vows to ``change the way Washington works'' has not yet
exhibited the imagination needed to conceive of an alternative to the
project that his predecessor began.
The urgent need is to demystify that project, which was from the
outset a misguided one. Just as in the 1960s we possessed neither the
wisdom nor the means needed to determine the fate of Southeast Asia, so
too today we possess neither the wisdom nor the means necessary to
determinate the fate of the Greater Middle East. To persist in efforts
to do so--as the Obama administration appears intent on doing in
Afghanistan--will simply replicate on an even greater scale mistakes
and misjudgments comparable to those that young John Kerry once rightly
decried.
The Chairman. But, thank you for the testimony. Very, very
important statement, and, I think, a wonderful mix of views
here that really pose to the committee the heart of this
dilemma. And I'm grateful to each and every one of you for the
testimonies that you've given here today. And our job now is to
sort of probe and see if we can figure out the answers to some
very provocative questions that have been posed in the
testimonies that we've heard today.
I'm very grateful to you, Colonel Bacevich, for posing this
fundamental dilemma about resources and strategy, though I'm
not sure if I'm grateful for the reminders that I'm now the
``older John Kerry.''
But, the--sort of cutting to the rub of this, I guess--you
talked about the tragic failure of imagination. Each of you, I
think, in your own way--Sergeant McGurk, Captain Moore--you've
each talked about the shift of resources to Iraq and the fact
that we haven't had resources. And I'm very sympathetic to what
I heard from you about when I was up in Kunar province, I saw
the outstanding work of one of the PRTs, and their
extraordinary ability to have forged very personal
relationships with people in that particular village, where
they clearly made a difference. But, as Colonel Bacevich is
mentioning, there are 40,000 such villages and countless
numbers of people. And the question, to some degree, is posed
in your own statements about the support--about the task as you
saw it, to try to have a more engaged kind of personal
relationship--and really, Mr. Reyes, it sort of plays off your
sense of frustration at what you were trying to do, because
you've articulated the frustration of going out there and not
being able to discern who's Taliban, who isn't, and being able
to figure out how you put the pieces together. In other places,
where they had a different set of resources or maybe a better
definition of the mission, they were able to put those pieces
together. But, in the end, the question is, Do all the pieces
add up to putting it together in the way that Colonel Bacevich
is asking?
So, I think the review process that's gone on, where
General Petraeus and others have tried to measure, How do you
recalibrate this?--the question now that we have to ask is, Is
this calibration accurate? Is it sufficient? Is it going to be
able to undo the negatives that you ran into, Mr. Reyes? Is it
going to be able to reinforce the positives that you both
talked about, and you talked about, Genevieve? But, are they,
in the end, going to be adequate to meet the challenge that
Colonel Bacevich talks about, which is the sufficiency overall
of this larger strategy to actually work? And that's what we've
got to figure out. I think that's a fair statement of the
challenge.
It seems to me that the administration is trying to narrow
that mission, Colonel, and they're trying not to get into a
place where they are talking about an internal rebuilding, but,
rather, defining the mission in its original terms, which was
to get al-Qaeda and prevent al-Qaeda from using it as a base to
be able to attack the United States.
Now, is that, or is that not, in your judgment, Colonel, a
sufficient recalibration of the strategy--an achievable
calibration of the strategy, maybe I should say?
Colonel Bacevich. You know, my preliminary report card of
the Obama administration would give the administration very
high marks, in the sense that some of the, bluntly speaking,
ideological fantasies that seemed to inform thinking during the
Bush era have now been set aside, and the approach now seems
much more grounded in reality, and pragmatic. And, you know,
one would have to applaud them. And I think that that statement
does apply to this administration's perspective on Afghanistan,
that, to a degree, the expectations and objectives are being
ratcheted down. I would still say those objectives are not
clearly defined.
But, my complaint with regard to the administration is
that, at least as best I can tell, I haven't heard a clear
statement of how Afghanistan fits in this larger context of
``the long war.''
Now, the administration has abandoned, best I can tell, the
phrase ``Global War on Terror,'' but what is the larger
enterprise, and how does Afghanistan relate to that larger
enterprise? And if you focus on the larger enterprise rather
than strictly on Afghanistan, it seems to me you confront
questions of purpose and duration and resource requirements
that demand attention. Otherwise, the long war--and I emphasize
that phrase, because it seems to me that it's very--it is
descriptive, in the sense that the only thing we can say about
this war is that it's going to go on for a long, long time. It
seems to me we need--we just urgently need to ask ourselves
whether or not the purposes of the long war are achievable,
necessary, and affordable. And Afghanistan is a subset of that
larger set of questions.
The Chairman. Well, I understand that. I agree with that.
And the question then becomes, Do you define the challenge
today, not just in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but in other
places, as a kind of global counterinsurgency effort that we
have to wage--not a global war on terror, but a
counterinsurgency? And, as you know better than anybody,
there's a distinction between counterterrorism and
counterinsurgency. Is it fair to say that you could have a
footprint that is calibrated to the task of protecting the
United States from what we already know, by 2001 September
experience, is the ability of this group of people to organize
and plot against us, some other attack from an open territory?
In other words, if we're not there in some way preventing them
from the freedom to do that, isn't it pretty clear they're
going to do that?
Colonel Bacevich. I think this is one of the areas where
Vietnam--the Vietnam comparison is relevant, because those
who--the architects of that war insisted that, once we made the
commitment of Americanizing the war, that there really was no
alternative except to follow through. That's the tragic failure
of imagination. And I would want to argue that we needn't--we
should not fall into that trap again. We should at least be
willing to consider the possibility--examine the possibility--
of alternatives to the long war.
If the long war--this effort to reduce the jihadist threat
to the level in which it would be tolerable, if you will--to do
that by invading and occupying and transforming countries--
that's, in essence, what U.S. strategy has been since 9/11,
focused on Iraq and Afghanistan--is there another fundamentally
different approach? And I think there is. I mean, it seems to
me there are workings of an alternative approach, an approach
that does not require us to invade and occupy countries in the
establishment of very robust defenses. I mean, 9/11 happened,
not because al-Qaeda was so smart, it happened primarily
because we were so stupid and we allowed it to happen.
So, an alternative strategy begins with the creation of
robust defenses. It includes an effort to deny to the jihadists
the resources, and primarily the financial resources, that they
need to plot against us. And we provide those resources, in
large part because of our dependence upon oil, that comes from
the Persian Gulf, which funnels billions of dollars, some
portion of which gets diverted to the jihadists.
What that says is, a serious alternative strategy makes an
energy policy an urgent priority. It's--an alternative strategy
is one that says--that views the terrorist threat, not as the
equivalent of Nazi Germany, but, in a sense, as an
international criminal conspiracy, a religiously motivated
mafia, and that the way you deal with that is through a
sustained, well-resourced, multilateral police effort to
identify and root out terrorist networks--again, something that
is accomplished, not through invading and occupying countries.
Now, I'm not trying to sell you, at this particular moment,
on every aspect of this alternative strategy; I'm simply trying
to--I am trying to sell you on the idea that perhaps it is
possible to conceive of an alternative to the long war which
will enable us to accomplish our national security objectives
more effectively and more cheaply.
The Chairman. What do you, as the troops who are on the
ground trying to implement this strategy, feel about what
you've just heard? But also, is there time, in your judgment,
given the shift that you've heard articulated in this
recalibration of our policy--do you believe that that is
adequate to be able to allow you to do the things that you were
talking about and make sufficient progress, or do you get
trapped in the place that Colonel Bacevich was talking about?
Captain Moore, Sergeant, and Corporal.
Captain Moore. Thanks, sir. And actually, in listening to
the comments, I actually wholeheartedly agree that there needs
to be--we need to holistically approach how we're going to look
at this. We need to look at alternative energy resources. We
need to look at economic resources and all the other factors
that play into this, that play into the conflict. But, we can't
do it to the exclusion of providing security to Afghanistan,
and we can't do it to the exclusion of providing an opportunity
for the NGOs and the State Department and USAID to be able to
go in and do the work, because the challenge of them being able
to do the work in Afghanistan has not--in some cases, has been
the lack of resources that have been--has been targeted toward
them, but, in many cases, it's been security. They haven't had
the security measures in place that would allow them to
actually further the advancement of development causes and
development cures.
But, going back to something that you mentioned earlier, I
think, is a very important point----
The Chairman. My question is, Captain, can we ever provide
adequate security without the kind of commitment that digs you
into the hole that takes you beyond your resources, beyond your
capacity? That's the balance.
Captain Moore. Yes, sir. Well, it's not the, ``Can we
provide the adequate security.'' It's that, Can we put together
the resources to help the Afghans provide adequate security?
And the answer to that is ``Yes.''
The Chairman. You believe we can.
Captain Moore. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. So, on the ground, you sense that with an
adequate amount of focus now on the tribal level, more local
anticorruption and other kinds of efforts, you have confidence
in the ability to make progress.
Captain Moore. Sir, when you look at the progress that the
ANP and the ANAs, or the Afghan National Police and the Afghan
National Army, has made, even just over the process of the past
3 to 4 years, it's quite significant. They have more people on
rolls, they're more competent, they're more efficient. So, I
think--and especially if we can tailor our--not only
development funds, but then also our training, in terms of
looking at a more local level, better understanding Pashtunwali
and the Pashtun understanding of the eastern border of
Afghanistan, then I think we absolutely can build those forces.
The Chairman. Sergeant Chase.
Sergeant Chase. Sir, I just would like to back up what Wes
said, and also, I do agree with some things that the Colonel
has said, except I would like to take us back a minute to the
Soviet invasion and when they left, and the point that was made
to me several times by Afghans who lived during that time
period: Nobody provided them with infrastructure, with
security, or with a stable government. That's where the issues
were. That's how al-Qaeda was able to get into Afghanistan and
use it as a safe haven, because that country was so volatile
and so desperate. Al-Qaeda did attack us on our soil and were
harbored by the Taliban and now that we've gone in and
essentially, for the most part, have worked to get rid of the
al-Qaeda in--I'm sorry, I'm so nervous----
The Chairman. No, you're doing great.
Sergeant Chase. In the beginning, we focused so much of our
efforts on getting rid of the al-Qaeda and this idea of getting
rid of Osama bin Laden--as far as we know, he hasn't been in
Afghanistan for quite some time; however, we are now dealing
with homegrown and very much internally developed Taliban,
supported and facilitated by al-Qaeda. The local Afghans I
spoke to were only concerned with issues like losing their
livelihoods and other things I've mentioned. However, if we
leave without providing security, propping up a stable
government, and giving the local villages and the people that
are there some sense of structure and some sense of safety and
security, we'll be back. If we don't do this now, we'll be
back. We belong to an all-volunteer military, and the three of
us are sitting here before you, telling you that we need to do
this right and we need to do it now. I have many friends who
have said that they would go back to Afghanistan--many of us
will do what needs to be done now because we don't want to have
to go back in the future--we don't want our children to have to
go back.
Afghanistan's a very different country, it's a very
different fight. And to say that we have invaded Afghanistan is
highly inaccurate. In fact, we haven't done enough,
effectively, to help them. Understanding their culture more
intimately and working with Pashtunwali code, as well as the
culture of the Afghans, we would be better able to assist them
in taking care of themselves, as opposed to where in an
invasion as we go in, very much like the Russians did, and tell
them how to live.
Essentially, yes, if we worked smarter and allocated our
resources more appropriately, as well as truly worked with and
among the Afghans. I have every confidence that we can
accomplish what we need to in order for Afghanistan to be safe
and viable without external and internal influence from
extremists.
The Chairman. I've exceeded my time. Sergeant McGurk and
Mr. Reyes, why don't you come in, with an answer to Senator
Lugar perhaps, so that we can get around the dais here, and you
answer that. Is that fair enough, Senator Lugar?
Senator Lugar. Why don't they go ahead.
The Chairman. All right.
Would each of you, then, respond to that? And as you do,
remember that when we went in, in 2001, in the aftermath of
that we had 100-percent of the Afghan people behind us,
supportive, ready to roll. And obviously that has now dropped.
I've seen some numbers that are perilously low at this point in
time. So, part of the question is, Do we have time to turn that
around, and the capacity at the same time?
Sergeant McGurk. And then Mr. Reyes.
Sergeant McGurk. Sir, I'd have to say we don't have any
choice but to make the time. I think we made our bed, and now
we have to lie in it. We went into Afghanistan to try to defeat
the Taliban, try to prevent al-Qaeda from reemerging within
Afghanistan and building more bases. And then we just left. We
left the Afghan people to themselves. We half propped up a
government and then left. We started building trust, we started
building really good rapport with the local Afghan people, and
we just left. It's as plain as that, sir.
I'm not a policy wonk, I'm not an expert when it comes to
foreign policy. I can tell you, the sense on the ground when I
was there was, they were happy we were there.
I also served in Iraq, and I can tell you, I never got that
sense, once, when I was in Iraq. I was in Baghdad, Al Shualah,
and different areas on the western fringes of Baghdad. I was
out even by Abu Ghraib Prison. I never once saw the same
support from the Iraqis that I saw from the Afghan people.
And as I said in my testimony, when that--the village elder
came up--and here's a man who was fighting the Russian Army--
was basically thanking me. You know, I'm not the entire mission
in Afghanistan at the time, but I am representative of the
Army, and they were happy that--he was happy, and I know that
many of the people we dealt with were extremely happy that we
were there, and they asked us not to leave. I mean, it's no big
secret that, you know, when the Russians were defeated in
Afghanistan, we took our funding and left. And a lot of the
resentments were carried over until then. And there were some
older generation of Afghan that were kind of a little leery of
us. And I think that if we don't make the effort, we don't
take--make the time, we're going to be facing more terrorist
attacks.
To say that, you know, Afghanistan was an invaded country--
kind of what Genevieve said, it wasn't an invaded country. And
unlike Vietnam, the Vietnamese didn't attack us on United
States soil.
So, to answer your question, sir, in a general term, is, we
have to make the time to at least try and stabilize, as best we
can.
The Chairman. Thank you. Never let anybody tell you you're
not an expert. You are. That's why you're here.
Corporal Reyes.
Corporal Reyes. The way we defeat these terrorist networks
is by seizing recruitment. We need to remove the motive of why
these terrorist organizations are growing. Once we remove that
motive, we need stronger intelligence. With that stronger
intelligence, we create a more isolated situation, versus
taking a shot in the dark by sending 17,000 more troops
sweeping the landscape, leaving a lot of destruction behind,
and just giving them more motive to have these--the Taliban
grow.
The Chairman. There's really a difference of opinion here,
obviously, between those who feel that, given the right
strategy, given the right resources and mission definition, you
can avoid the negative effect that you're talking about,
Corporal, and wind up actually creating a positive response.
Certainly, we've seen that in PRTs and other places where we've
had that adequate ability. But, I understand what you're
saying, also, that where we have collateral damage, where you
have civilian destruction, where you have those other things,
you have recruitment. I don't disagree with that at all. It's a
dilemma.
Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Now, let me just say--and I suspect each one of us has
similar feelings--that we were deeply moved by your testimony
this morning. This was important to hear.
And I appreciate, having testified as you have, that now
you've engaged and been stimulated by the chairman in vigorous
debate of sorts about what our policy ought to be.
I have come to this hearing from an equally vigorous
debate, over breakfast. We had GEN Brent Scowcroft, and I will
not ascribe to him any particular views, but there were 16
Members of Congress sitting around the table with as diverse a
set of opinions as we've heard in this hearing, but they really
come down to a fundamental problem that you've illustrated so
well, and that is, in terms of your own feelings, the emotions
generated by the service you've given, the people that you have
worked with in Afghanistan, at least some of you feel that, in
fact, we must take the time, we must, in fact, rebuild, or
build, from the beginning, a country that is very complex, that
some would say has really almost only been a semi-country made
up of tribes, various divisions, various crosscurrents in life.
And many people, whether they are for or against that
policy, evaluate that this is likely to be very expensive;
maybe not in terms of American lives perpetually, or Afghan
lives, maybe just in terms of the resources. As we've already
said, this is in the context of a country presently that is
running a trillion-dollar deficit, may have that sort of
predicament for several years to come, in a world that is
similarly troubled.
Now, you could make the case that life is unfair in this
respect. The Afghans, after all, didn't create the world
economic crisis, nor our trillion-dollar deficit, nor our
problem, really, in recruiting Armed Forces, or even in
building our own capacity. But, this is one set of facts.
Another, however, more constructive thought is that al-
Qaeda is not just an Afghan-Pakistani problem, that there are
currently
al-Qaeda in Yemen, in Somalia, in various other countries where
attacks have occurred on our Embassies in Africa in the past.
And therefore, in fact, the configuration of our response, in
terms of the Armed Forces or the intelligence forces that we
have, ought to be our objective. In other words, be on the
ground in a whole host of countries, not simply Afghanistan and
Pakistan, ferreting out where the trouble is, informing
ourselves, either working with resident governments or, where
there isn't much of a government, to take action to make
certain that we are not attacked or that these folks are not
effective. Not an impossible task. And when General Petraeus
visited with our committee, at the chairman's direction, we
discussed, really, a number of things which are occurring which
I found reassuring, and are not a part of the Afghan-Pakistan
situation, but are a part of the al-Qaeda predicament, as we
see it, as a group of organized terrorist cells.
I, finally, would just say that I found at least the
Professor's thoughts important with regard to the oil import
business. This is an issue that's come before the committee
perennially. The fact is, we have financed, in a great way, not
just the Afghan-Pakistan problem, but other sources of grave
foreign policy difficulty.
Now, you can say, ``Well, after all, supply and demand
works. The American motorists wanted SUVs, wanted vans. Why all
the worry about economy with regard to oil? First things first
back here.'' But, our inability, I think, in the leadership of
the country, to illustrate the predicament we've had is, in
large part, our fault, and we all have to do better. We will
have to be thinking together, because the energy situation--not
just the oil, but in other facets in which we have seen cutoffs
to NATO allies and problems of this sort--are very real, and
will remain that way.
Likewise, the multilateral police situation has been
difficult, thus far, to sell to Europeans, who are loyal to
NATO, some loyal to us, but never really believed in the
conflict and have a good number of other views, even now, in
their Parliaments, as expressed in their low defense budgets,
their lack of available transportation for their forces
anywhere.
So, we have work to do if we're going to go that route, but
it's not an improbable task for the future. If we're talking
about whether it's a short war or a long war, the threat of al-
Qaeda or other terrorists probably is going to exist for us and
for others in alliances that we have.
So I don't really have questions of the panel; I just
express appreciation that you've brought forward dilemmas that
we've got to wrestle with. And I appreciate the thoughts about
the President, about the fact that he and his advisers are
strenuously debating these issues. In my judgment, although I'm
not a part of the inner circle, they've not come to
conclusions. They are proceeding pragmatically, sort of working
day by day.
And as the chairman just visited Pakistan, and others
likewise, returned from that country, they find a very troubled
state, that, leaving aside whatever has been occurring with
regard to the war or the conflict thus far, may create enormous
dilemmas for the world, quite apart from the United States,
vis-a-vis India or surrounding countries, leaving aside where
we started, with Afghanistan. And that's going to require, on
the part of our President, the Secretaries of State, Defense,
and maybe others of us who have supported and advised on this,
some extraordinary dilemmas.
But, thank you for coming, thank you for your testimony.
I thank you, again, Mr. Chairman, for calling us together.
The Chairman. Thank you so much, Senator Lugar.
Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
historic hearing.
It's very important, as we chart our way forward in
Afghanistan and Pakistan, we talk to those who have served on
the ground and who will live with the aftereffects of this war
for the rest of their lives. We must also recognize the family
members, including Colonel Bacevich, who have lost their loved
ones during these difficult times. I also want to thank all the
witnesses for being here today and for their selfless service
to our country. We are indebted to all of you.
I voted in favor of the authorization to use military force
in Afghanistan, because that was where al-Qaeda, which had
planned and carried out the attacks of September 11, was based.
The previous administration's mismanagement of that war,
however, was tragic, and it has left us in a very difficult
position.
The situation in the region remains explosive, and the
current administration's decision to increase the United States
military presence in Afghanistan may have no lasting positive
impact, so long as there are safe havens for militants in
Pakistan. Indeed, the escalation may further destabilize the
situation in Pakistan, to the detriment of United States
national security. So, while the President is certainly right
to focus on this region, I am somewhat concerned that we may be
sending our troops right into the eye of the storm with an
insufficient strategy for addressing the greatest threat to our
national security, which, of course, lies on the Pakistan side
of the border.
As to some questions, General McKiernan requested
additional troops in Afghanistan for the purpose of providing
security for the Afghan population, yet recent polling
indicates that the overwhelming majority of Afghans oppose an
increase in troop levels. My sense is that there are mixed
feelings among the Afghan population and that our status as a
party to the conflict can make it difficult, if not impossible,
for our troops to serve a peacemaking function. What was your
experience, Corporal Reyes, on this matter?
Corporal Reyes. The troop escalation is very unnecessary.
With better intelligence, we can create a more isolated
situation, where we're not going to risk innocent civilian
lives and create more resentment toward us. With that, you
create a motive for these terrorist groups to become larger.
So, it's counterproductive to escalate the troops right now
in----
Senator Feingold. But--so, your first sentence was what,
again? It is not necessary?
Corporal Reyes. A troop escalation isn't necessary, no.
Senator Feingold. Isn't necessary.
Corporal Reyes. No.
Senator Feingold. OK.
Corporal Reyes. It's not.
Senator Feingold. Thank you.
Colonel Bacevich, what are the prospects for defeating the
insurgency by increasing the number of United States troops in
Afghanistan, given some concerns that many, if not most,
Afghans in the south oppose the presence of United States
troops?
Colonel Bacevich. Well, several people have made the point
that this is not a problem that has a military solution, that,
to the degree that there is a solution, the solution in
Afghanistan is going to be found in what is going to be a
massive and protracted and tremendously costly exercise in
nation-building. I think that the likelihood of that exercise
producing success, 10 or 15 years downstream, is not great.
But, I think the larger point to be made--and, I mean, you
made it in your introductory remarks, and Senator Lugar, I
think, alluded to the same thing--is, even if we could
magically wave our wand and, tomorrow, have the Afghanistan
problem be solved--the country would be stable, that the
government would be legitimate--what exactly would we have
achieved, in a strategic sense? And, I think, in a strategic
sense, the gains would be very limited, because, as you
suggested, and as this--as this administration, I think, has
acknowledged in its creation of this term ``AfPak''--it is a
mistake to view Afghanistan in isolation, and, in many
respects, the larger problem is in neighboring Pakistan. So----
Senator Feingold. And----
Colonel Bacevich. So, to invest enormous resources in
Afghanistan, I think, is allowing tactical considerations to
take precedence over strategic thinking.
Senator Feingold. Well, this is precisely what's been
bothering me since I spent 4 or 5 days in Pakistan in this
region less than a year ago and after the thoughtful remarks of
the chairman, after his recent visit there. I want to follow on
this interrelationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan. What
about the possibility that an escalation in Afghanistan could
actually be more destabilizing to Pakistan? In other words, in
terms of militants spilling back over into that border--is that
a fair concern, or not?
Colonel Bacevich. I think it's a very real concern. You
know, there's a--it's a wonder--there's a very interesting--I
think, flawed--new book out by David Kilcullen, the
counterinsurgency specialist, called ``The Accidental
Guerrilla.'' There's a lot about that book I disagree with, but
there's one core truth, I think, that he gives us, and that is
the notion that most of the people who fight against us in
places like Afghanistan are fighting against us because we're
there. Now, we may not believe that we are invading and
occupying countries, but the people on the other end viewed--
view themselves as being invaded and occupied. So, to some
degree, to some measurable degree, in places like Afghanistan,
increasing the United States presence actually increases the
dimensions of the problem.
Senator Feingold. And, Colonel, Admiral Mullen has
acknowledged that the Pakistani Security Services maintain
relations with militants in Pakistan. There are reports that--
press reports that this includes the provision of fuel and
ammunition for Taliban operations against United States forces
in Afghanistan. If these allegations are correct, what is the
likelihood that we can stabilize the region or deny al-Qaeda
safe havens there, so long as these sorts of activities
continue?
Colonel Bacevich. Next to none.
Senator Feingold. All right.
And then, Sergeant Chase, in your experience, can we trust
the Afghan Army and police? Are they motivated or do they have
a different perception of what is needed in Afghanistan?
Sergeant Chase. Well, sir, I was in Afghanistan in 2006,
and my experience in working with the Afghan National Army and
Afghan National Police is limited, but I will say that, having
been there and spoken to Embedded Training Teams that do work
amongst these units, the Afghan National Police, because of the
tribal affiliations and preexisting familial rivalries that
they have, because of their locality in their districts, and
the fact that they come from those areas, tend to be a little
less effective than, say, the Afghan National Army, where the
people come from all over Afghanistan. The ANA have less local
tribal ties and are able to make more objective decisions
within the areas where they operate.
In my experience, my observation and what I've heard from
other people, the ANA is a bit more effective than the ANP. The
locals don't trust the ANP, a lot of times, in their own
districts.
Senator Feingold. Thank you all.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold. Good
questions.
Senator Corker.
Senator Corker. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
And, while I value what I do here in the public arena, and
think that it's important, I want all of you to know that I
think our service pales to what each of you have done, and do,
and I thank you so much for being here. I thank you for your
sincere presentations and for everything that you've done on
behalf of our country, and will do. I thank you very much for
this presentation.
So, as I listened to the presentation, on the heels of
presentations by Mr. Holbrooke and others regarding what our
mission is, I'm confused. I have heard--first of all, let me
say that I think that we have fought Afghanistan on the cheap.
I do think that Iraq affected everything that we did in
Afghanistan. I absolutely believe that's true. I said that as
soon as I came back from Afghanistan, and I think that goes--I
don't think anybody will even debate that. I think that is
true, and I think it has led us into a very complex situation.
On the other hand, as I hear, especially when someone
speaks with such assuredness--and I'm speaking of Mr.
Holbrooke--I get nervous when anybody is that sure of
themselves. And I hope the other side of that isn't the often-
wrong component that sometimes comes with that phrase. OK?
So, I listened. I thought Colonel Bacevich's presentation
was most interesting. The fact is that al-Qaeda exists in many
countries--many, many countries around the world. The stated
mission is, we're going to, in Afghanistan, make sure that it's
not a safe haven for al-Qaeda. And yet, in Pakistan we use
drones and Hellfire missiles and intelligence to counter that,
not troops on the ground.
I hear each of you speak about the relationships that
you've developed, and I absolutely understand fully why a sense
of a lack of commitment or followthrough, to you, would be
failure and letting people down that you've gotten to know, and
certainly people who have died in your presence. I understand
that.
But, let me just ask Captain Moore and Sergeant McGurk, Do
you think that the mission of making Afghanistan--which has
been stated, and hopefully not stated just to win stripes for
people, thinking that, you know, our administration is willing
to be strong on defense--but, the stated mission to make it so
that it's not a safe haven for al-Qaeda--is that the right
stated mission? Because it doesn't seem that that so much is
what is driving the two of you in your testimony. It seems to
me to be more that we shouldn't let the Afghanistan people down
again, like we did when Russia was there. I'd just like to
understand what motivates much of your testimony.
Sergeant McGurk. Sir, I just want to clarify one point.
When I say ``renewing a commitment,'' I'm not saying to send
60,000 combat troops into Afghanistan. What I mean is more of a
civil component.
And this holistic approach, you need to get--or, we need to
get human intelligence within Yemen, within Egypt, Syria, all
the places where the madrassas are that these people are
actually, you know, learning this hatred for the West.
I think that Afghanistan, in the terms that I'm referring
to as being the front where the war on terror is, this is where
everybody is coming to fight. This is the--this is back before
9/11, when Osama bin Laden enacted the planes mission. That's
when he decided, with the help of some of his other
counterparts and some of the other cells, decided to take down
the Twin Towers. He said he wanted to draw the United States
into fighting on his home turf, because, ``We beat the
Russians, we can beat the United States.''
I think we need to have more of a civil component within
Afghanistan, along with using smart power, diplomatic
approaches in addressing issues like the Swat Valley within
Pakistan, but, at the same--same sense, like I said, we need to
develop more of a robust human intelligence capability, because
you're not going to--we could fight it all day long for the
next 20 years in Afghanistan, and we're not going to--we're not
going to defeat the Taliban or
al-Qaeda, because they're being recruited--they're being
trained in other places and coming to fight us there.
So, I would say, sir, that it needs to be a mix of a civil/
military operation. We need to somehow help the Afghan
Government start something like a job corps program. I mean,
you have, in the northeastern part of the country, the Afghan--
central Afghan Government banned any type of timber operations,
because they were afraid of getting rid or stripping the
country of its timber resources. And the southern part of the
country, that's where you have, you know, 90 percent of the
poppy crops being grown. We spend more time, along with the
ANA, burning these crops. So, when you take two lifestyles away
from a large group of the Afghan population, what's the next
thing they're going to do, and what they know how to do? That's
fight us.
So, I think we need to get a larger civil component in
there, less of a combat-troops component. Maybe they can act as
a quick-reaction force or go into certain areas where there are
hotbeds, like along the border with Pakistan, and try to root
out the insurgency that way.
I just think it needs to be a well-rounded and well-
thought-out mission with a mix of civil and military
operations.
Senator Corker. Thank you.
Captain Moore. Thank you, sir. And I agree with much of
what Sergeant McGurk said. And the idea that I also--I also
don't feel that it's--these are isolated ideas of providing
safety and security for the Afghan people and trying to make
sure that Afghanistan is not a hotbed for al-Qaeda. I think
those are actually very complementary ideas, because, without
the safety and security being provided within Afghanistan, and
without safety and security that--not only that we can help
provide, but that the Afghans are really going to provide for
themselves--not only will that be an area for al-Qaeda, to be
able to grow and to flourish, but then, also, it's never going
to provide any type of security or any type of growth for the
Afghan people.
I think part of my frustration, which has been throughout--
and I'm actually--I'm happy to see that it seems like the
administration is really starting to take a new approach to
it--is, for a while, we never had a clear mission about
Afghanistan. You know, we weren't sure whether it was
democracy. We weren't sure whether it was nation-building. We
weren't sure if it was stability. We never had a clear belief
as to why we were there. And that was also, not only
frustrating for the American people, but also very frustrating
for the soldiers. And it's very tough to build morale and help
to keep morale up when you're not quite sure exactly what the
mission is.
I think we're starting to clarify that now. I think there's
a much better understanding; whereas, as President Obama has
clearly said, we're going to provide security, and then we're
going to leave.
So, I think understanding that, and then helping to kind of
fill that in--so, What exactly does that mean? How exactly
we're going to bolster development efforts? How are we going to
get the State Department and USAID more involved in what's
happening, particularly in the eastern and northeastern part of
Afghanistan--is the way we're really going to add color to that
larger statement.
Senator Corker. Well, I'm glad you have a--with all due
respect, a clear idea of what the strategy is, because I have
no idea what it is, other than sending additional troops. So,
if you could help me, I'd appreciate it. I have to tell you,
I--what I've heard is that Afghanistan is not going to be a
safe haven for al-Qaeda, and that's--so, we're going to double
down with troops and resources. I don't know, I don't know that
that clears up anything for me. So, since you have a clear
idea, I'd love for you to expand on that some.
Captain Moore. With--the clear idea is this, sir, is that,
without--security needs to be tantamount to everything, because
you cannot implement anything else within that region unless
you can provide better security.
Senator Corker. So, it sounds a lot like Iraq.
Captain Moore. Well, no, no. It's not like--especially in
this case. First of all, the parallels between Iraq and--I
mean, sorry--the difference between Iraq and Afghanistan are
stark. We're talking very different countries, very different
regions, with very different histories.
In Afghanistan, we're talking about a country that has
literally been in a constant state of war for decades, and a
sporadic state of war for centuries, an area that--and this is
where the whole idea of understanding that clarity of mission,
because this is an area that we've had Alexander the Great and
Genghis Khan and the British Empire and the Russians all being
involved. And there's two things that the Afghans believe--
firmly believe--about anytime foreign forces will enter their
country. The first thing is that they're going to try to
convert them and they're going to disrespect Islam. That's one.
And the second thing they firmly believe is that soon they will
be gone. And regardless of what is left behind, and regardless
of what type of power vacuums are left behind, the foreign
forces will leave.
The point is this. By showing a commitment to that country,
by showing a commitment--and, again, I think Sergeant McGurk
made a great point--is that it's not just a military-component
commitment; the military-component commitment is important,
because providing that security is important, but it needs to
be complementary with, What exactly is that going to do?
Because if we can increase security aspects and increase
security apparatus within the country, and get the extra, not
only 17,000 troops, but 4,000 trainers, inside of the area, and
allow the ANA and the ANP to build up, then we can actually
start allocating other resources to make Afghanistan not a safe
haven for al-Qaeda, but then also provide the security and
safety and the future for the Afghan people, which will prevent
Afghanistan from becoming a safe haven for
al-Qaeda.
Senator Corker. I want to thank all of you again.
And, Colonel, I thought your testimony was exceptionally
good, and I really didn't have a lot of questions, as a result
of that.
And, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for having this hearing. And
I hope that--I know that, you know, sometimes partisan issues
end up coming into play on major issues like this, but I really
appreciate your willingness to look at this issue. I hope we
will dig a whole lot deeper. I just have to tell you, I'm--I
have a--say, an average intelligence--I'm having difficulty
connecting the dots, and I hope that we'll have additional
hearings to help us do so more fully.
The Chairman. Well, Senator Corker, let me just say to you
that the testimony has been excellent, and I think the
questions have been excellent, and it underscores this dilemma.
I am so sympathetic, more so than many people may
understand, because of the experience that many of us had in
our generation, Colonel Bacevich, which was torn apart over a
war that lacked leadership and definition and clarity and
reality and truth and a whole bunch of things. And when I hear
Sergeant McGurk say, ``We want to make sure that the honor that
should be afforded us for our sacrificed service is there in
the policy decisions you've made,'' that is exactly what
brought me to that table, years ago.
And when I flew into Iraq, a number of years ago, I won't
forget the captain who was a pilot in the aircraft, a C-130, as
we were going in, turned to me, and he said, ``Look, Senator,
no matter what, just one thing I ask you, just make sure that,
20 years from now, all of this was worth it for us.'' And I
understand that sentiment.
But, Colonel Bacevich has raised some very fundamental,
larger questions that are almost bigger, in a sense, than your
individual ability to want that relationship you built with
somebody, that old man you met on the street. I understand
that. You want that to be meaningful. And, they thought that we
would just leave again, and so forth. Fact is, we are going to
leave again, and they do know that--at some point. And the test
here is how much can you achieve for them, and do you have to
sometimes measure whether or not part of the reason they fight
us is that we are there. And so, you have to balance this
somehow and find a way to deal with some very tricky issues,
including the intelligence piece of this. If you could get a
different footprint somehow, so you had good intel, there are
plenty of ways for the United States to prevent al-Qaeda from
attacking us. And the question is, Do you have to have this
massive expenditure and footprint and input in order to be able
to achieve that goal, if that is the limit of your goal? If
your goal is larger than that, in terms of nation-building and
otherwise, that's a much more expensive and longer term
proposition, but it also runs up full score against the
propositions the Colonel put to us, appropriately, and others
have written about, which is, Is it achievable?
So, we've got some hard work to do, and we've got to do a
lot of careful analysis here. And I know the administration is
approaching this very carefully. Nobody's suggesting they're
offering a guarantee here, but they're trying to make first
steps to see if it is possible, needless to say, to transition
to an ANP and an ANA that can stand up for themselves and take
on that responsibility and sustain your rightful hope that that
outcome will honor your sacrifice, which is what we want.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you all
for being here.
The Chairman. Let me just say to everybody, we have a vote
that is on; because it just started, we will have time to be
able to conclude.
Senator Shaheen. I will be very quick.
But, I do want to thank you for being here, for your
insights, and for your sacrifices for our country.
You know, I--there's been a lot of discussion about the
conduct of the war in Afghanistan, but I guess the real
alternative is United States withdrawal. And what I'd like to
ask you is what you think the impact of unilateral withdrawal
from Afghanistan would be. And I guess I would ask you if you
would begin, Colonel Bacevich.
Colonel Bacevich. I think that the--there are
alternatives--there are more alternatives than ``more of the
same and then abject withdrawal.'' I think that there are
courses that we could follow that would enable us to achieve
what Senator Corker said was the purpose of the exercise, make
sure that Afghanistan is not a safe haven for al-Qaeda, that
would not necessarily entail the kind of investment of troops
and resources that we've already undertaken and we're about to
expand. There are other ways to achieve our purposes; it's not
simply ``do what we're doing'' or ``abandonment.''
And I think that the--an example of what might be an
alternative would be that we recognize the tribal nature of
Afghan politics, acknowledge that their tradition is not one in
which authority is effectively exercised from Kabul, but it's
effectively exercised, basically, in the outback, and to
provide incentives to the tribal chiefs to govern their patch
of earth in ways consistent with their interests. In other
words, just don't let al-Qaeda in. Provide them incentives to
do that. And where those incentives don't work, then perhaps it
may be necessary for us to engage in some kind of a punitive
action, not unlike what we're doing in Pakistan, to eliminate
any elements of al-Qaeda that do find a way, whether working in
the seams or not, to establish bases.
So, I don't think the alternative is either ``do what we're
doing'' or ``abandon the country.''
Senator Shaheen. OK. Thank you. If I can ask each of you to
respond to that.
Sergeant Chase. With all due respect, sir, if you have
suggestions on what could be done more in-depth, I think that's
kind of what we're all here for, is to find out what are our--
what are our--what are the alternatives.
Senator Shaheen. Right.
Sergeant Chase. Personally, a blanket withdrawal from
Afghanistan would be devastating to Muslim extremism in the
world. It would send a message very clearly to the rest of the
world and the rest of the extremists that they have not only
won and defeated us in Afghanistan, but they've now--they would
now gain momentum for their cause. That would be my fear.
I'm not a policy person. I'm also not a scholar. But,
pulling out of there would devastate Afghanistan, and, I think,
the entire region. And just an example of that was when we left
after the Soviets.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Sergeant McGurk. It's kind of what I've been saying all
along and what I said in my initial remarks. I think that, just
to not even try, just a unilateral withdrawal, and then say,
``Sorry,'' it's just not going to cut it. I honestly think that
the type of vacuum that would be created, you would have more
insurgents, more Taliban going across the Pakistan border. I
think you'd have--you--to a degree, I think that you would kind
of take away any legitimacy that the Pakistan Government has,
currently; it would be completely gone. Pakistan is a nuclear
state. And I think you would have a people that would be more
prone--or, excuse me, more apt to allowing a regime like the
Taliban into their country, because at least they provide a
measure of security; whereas, we just decided to leave, and
leave them to their own devices.
As you can tell, I'm very passionate about this, from my
experiences in Afghanistan.
Senator Shaheen. I appreciate that.
Sergeant McGurk. To not at least try--and I understand that
many people say that we can't achieve any measure of success,
or the type of success that we wanted to achieve when we
initially went into Afghanistan, I completely understand that--
but, having been on the ground and seen firsthand the people
and the culture--and, you know, granted it is a tribal culture
that doesn't trust a central government--but, being on the
ground, you--they're not a number to me; it's not, ``Oh, it's
the Afghan people.'' It's not, ``This is just Afghanistan.''
These are real people I dealt with on a daily basis. And to
just leave them and say, ``You know, we're really sorry. We
screwed up by going into Iraq. We really can't afford to try to
at least, to some measure, fix what we did in Afghanistan.
We're leaving. Sorry.''--to me, that's very unacceptable.
I grew up in a military family. I love this country
wholeheartedly. I joined the military, not to become a weapon
of war, but to be a deterrent to it. And I really think that we
should--and I don't want to keep repeating myself, but I really
think we should at least try to do something to help the Afghan
people before we leave.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Captain Moore.
Captain Moore. I believe that an abrupt withdrawal from
Afghanistan would not only be a tactical mistake, but also,
more importantly, a strategic mistake. It would be primarily a
tactical mistake because, again, you're giving up a primary
front to a place that we committed to, to a people that we
committed to, to a culture that we committed to. And primarily,
on the strategic side, it would also send a message to the rest
of the world that the United States can't stick, that, once the
wave of any type of political pressure or any type of political
will begins to wane, that, regardless of whatever commitments
have been made, regardless of whatever intentions have been
sought out, regardless of whatever speeches have been done,
that the United States is not going to commit to seeing
something through.
Now, again, we need to be strategic about how we do that.
And, again, I agree with Dr. Bacevich, where he said it's not,
you know, ``more of the same'' or ``complete withdrawal.'' But,
at the same time, we need to understand, not only the short-
term, but the long-term ramifications of the message that that
sends to the rest of the world about where we are as a nation.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Corporal Reyes.
Corporal Reyes. I keep going back to my earlier statements.
I don't think a complete withdrawal would be the answer, but I
know a troop escalation's a huge mistake. You want to talk
about a country with that many troops, that's a sign of poor
intelligence. With stronger intelligence, there's no reason to
occupy the country with that massive amount of troops. So, we
need to strengthen our intelligence and then plan and then
execute.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, to each of you, for your very
compelling testimony.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
I want to thank everybody on this panel enormously. And let
me just say, quickly, I completely agree with what Colonel
Bacevich just said. As the conclusion of the panel, the option
here is not, in my judgment, ``throw up your hands'' and
``complete withdrawal,'' which would invite all kinds of
repercussions and have significant negative consequences on our
policy, in any number of ways. But, in addition to that, nor is
it ``more of the same'' for the Obama administration, with whom
we've been trying to work very closely.
I completely agree with the observation about the
tribalism. This is something that I have become more and more
tuned into, the more I'm traveling now in the Middle East and
in North Africa and so forth; it is just definitional, in terms
of how we need to approach things. And we have not been
thoughtful enough and sensitive enough in the past.
We have to remember that the Soviets attacked and destroyed
some of that infrastructure. They killed a lot of tribal
chiefs. And the strength that used to be there has been
somewhat diminished.
But, of this I am convinced, the vast majority of Afghans
do not want to be Taliban, and they don't buy into the
extremist Taliban. There are a lot of Taliban for hire right
now. And we need to understand that as we think through our
approach. But, it has to be very thoughtful, very sensitive. I
think the administration is working overtime to tune that in.
We've met with General Petraeus, we've met with Ambassador
Holbrooke, and others. There's a lot of thinking going on about
how you empower entities outside of Kabul, how you deal with
corruption, how we get around this and, frankly, heed a lot of
the wisdom that was in Colonel Bacevich's testimony.
So, there's a balance here, and that's what we're going to
try to strike. I agree with Senator Corker, it has been
woefully fought on the cheap, and stupidly in many ways, not
from a military point of view, but the civilian leadership
guidelines and possibilities were so constrained and predefined
that the military folk on the ground have been operating under
an unbelievable handicap, and we've lost enormous headway as a
consequence of that.
So, we're going to try to be as thoughtful as we can, as
smart as we can. This is not the only hearing we're going to
have on this, by far. And we have a lot of distance yet to go.
This committee will exercise its oversight authority, and I
will certainly do all I can to live up to the responsibility,
as chair, to see that we thoroughly vet all of the
possibilities and try to come up with the smartest policy
possible.
Colonel, I have to run and vote. I wanted to catch you for
a moment, but I hope I can sit down with you when we get back
to Massachusetts.
Colonel Bacevich. Yes, sir, I'd enjoy that.
The Chairman. We really appreciate everybody's testimony,
each of you. I know this was not the first thing you trained
for, so we're just hugely appreciative of the fact that you
came here today. Each of you expressed your candid personal
opinions. I know that's not always easy and, particularly in
the case of several of you, very difficult on an emotional
level. So, we're grateful to you. Thank you for your service,
thanks for your testimony, thanks for your continued service.
And we look forward to continued relationships with all of you.
Thank you.
We stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:03 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]