[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
HOMELAND SECURITY POLICYMAKING:
HSC AT A CROSSROADS AND PRESIDENTIAL STUDY
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 2, 2009
__________
Serial No. 111-16
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
51-257 PDF WASHINGTON : 2010
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC
area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC
20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Loretta Sanchez, California Peter T. King, New York
Jane Harman, California Lamar Smith, Texas
Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon Mark E. Souder, Indiana
Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Daniel E. Lungren, California
Columbia Mike Rogers, Alabama
Zoe Lofgren, California Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas Charles W. Dent, Pennsylvania
Henry Cuellar, Texas Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida
Christopher P. Carney, Pennsylvania Paul C. Broun, Georgia
Yvette D. Clarke, New York Candice S. Miller, Michigan
Laura Richardson, California Pete Olson, Texas
Ann Kirkpatrick, Arizona Anh ``Joseph'' Cao, Louisiana
Ben Ray Lujan, New Mexico Steve Austria, Ohio
Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri
Al Green, Texas
James A. Himes, Connecticut
Mary Jo Kilroy, Ohio
Eric J.J. Massa, New York
Dina Titus, Nevada
Vacancy
I. Lanier Avant, Staff Director
Rosaline Cohen, Chief Counsel
Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Robert O'Connor, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 2
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas:
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
Witnesses
Mr. Kenneth L. Wainstein, Former Homeland Security and
Counterterrorism Advisor to the President:
Oral Statement................................................. 5
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
Ms. Frances Fragos Townsend, Former Homeland Security and
Counterterrorism Advisor to the President:
Oral Statement................................................. 9
Prepared Statement............................................. 11
Mr. Philip J. Palin, Senior Fellow, National Institute for
Strategic Preparedness:
Oral Statement................................................. 12
Prepared Statement............................................. 13
Mr. Thomas C. Frazier, Executive Director, Major Cities Chiefs
Association:
Oral Statement................................................. 16
Prepared Statement............................................. 17
Mr. Bruce Hoffman, Professor, School of Foreign Service,
Georgetown University:
Oral Statement................................................. 19
Prepared Statement............................................. 21
Appendix
Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson....................... 39
HOMELAND SECURITY POLICYMAKING: HSC AT A CROSSROADS AND PRESIDENTIAL
STUDY
----------
Thursday, April 2, 2009
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in Room
311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Bennie G. Thompson
[Chairman of the committee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Thompson, Harman, Jackson Lee,
Cuellar, Carney, Clarke, Richardson, Cleaver, Green, Himes,
Massa, King, Dent, Olson, and Austria.
Chairman Thompson [presiding]. The Committee on Homeland
Security will come to order. The committee is meeting today to
consider what the future of homeland security policymaking at
the White House should look like and whether or not the
existing National Security Council and Homeland Security
Council structures should be reconsidered.
The Homeland Security Council was stood up in 2001--in the
wake of September 11 attacks--to enhance our Nation's ability
to deter, detect, prevent, and respond to terrorism. Later that
year, when Congress authorized the creation of the Department
of Homeland Security, the decision was made to also codify--in
law--the Homeland Security Council. The language of Title IX
sets forth the composition and mission of the council.
The Homeland Security Council is responsible for providing
advice to the President on homeland security policies based on
assessments of our Nation's risks. It is also charged with
overseeing, reviewing, and making recommendations to the
President on Federal homeland security policies.
In its short history, the Homeland Security Council, by
most accounts, has been an important driver of preparedness and
response activities throughout the Nation. With the change in
administration, the timing is ripe for asking key questions
about whether how--ask key questions about whether how we have
been doing homeland security policymaking over the past 8 years
is still the right way to go.
The President is to be commended for issuing Presidential
Directive--1, which establishes a study team to examine how to
improve security policymaking at the White House. As the study
team is hard at work developing its recommendations, I thought
it would benefit the committee for us to hear from people who
know all too well about the challenges of the current homeland
security policymaking apparatus. I thank our distinguished
panel of witnesses for being here to participate in one of our
favorite Washington pastimes--the game of speculation.
For my part, I have been giving some thought to the
potential outcomes of the study--which should emerge in late
April--and see it going one of three ways. No. 1, they could
propose dissolving the Homeland Security Council into the
National Security Council; No. 2, they could propose retaining
a two-council system that is more integrated; or No. 3, they
could propose eliminating both councils in favor of creating a
new council to handle the full continuum of security issues--
everything from nonproliferation to emergency response.
There are strong cases to be made for better integration of
homeland security and national security policies. Whether a
structural merger of the two White House councils is the best
way to achieve better integration remains to be seen. However,
this committee, given our oversight responsibility, has a
vested interest in making certain that whatever comes out of
the White House review actually enhances homeland security.
Findings should be able to pass a basic three-part test.
First, will the findings enhance the Nation's security? Second,
will the Department of Homeland Security's effectiveness be
bolstered? Third, will the findings enhance the voice of State,
local, and Tribal authorities, our Nation's first preventers in
the White House? I look forward to hearing from our witnesses
today on this important issue.
I now recognize the Ranking Member of the full committee,
the gentleman from New York, Mr. King, for an opening
statement.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for scheduling
this hearing because it really is on a topic which I think many
of us probably have opinions but not fully formed opinions, and
I think it is important that we determine what the best
direction for the President to go in and the country to go in.
I just want to welcome our witnesses this morning,
especially thank Mr. Wainstein and Ms. Townsend for their
service to our country. I want to assure Ms. Townsend that I am
looking after the welfare of her mother, who is a constituent
of mine.
You said she was thinking of moving. Tell her we would
stick around for the next election. It could be close. I don't
want to lose any unnecessary votes.
Chairman Thompson. Away in New York--for the next election,
right?
[Laughter.]
Mr. King. That is right.
Mr. Chairman, as I said, I do not have a fully formed
opinion on this. My inclination right now--my belief is,
though, that we should not be separating out the Homeland
Security Council from the National Security Council. Having
said that, I don't think there is any guaranteed system which
ensures success or one which would bring about failure.
I believe, even if there were a merger and the President
had a strong working relationship with a homeland security
adviser and that adviser could go to the President in times of
emergency if they had direct access, it would work. A lot does
depend on the personalities involved; a lot does depend on the
extent of the relationship. It would depend on other people at
the council, including the head of the NSC.
My concern, though, is putting in place a system which
would work even if all of the actors, all the characters, are
not doing their job perfectly, have a system in place where if
things do go wrong, the system itself would better provide for
success. I just have a number of concerns about what would
happen if there were a merger and there were not this excellent
relationship between the President and the homeland security
adviser.
For instance, my concern is--and this is true of the
Congress and of the country--that each day we go beyond
September 11, the issue of homeland security recesses into
people's minds. They forget they significance of it--or not
forget, but they, you know, they put it away, and it doesn't
have that cutting-edge importance that I believe it should have
at all times. That is just human nature.
We are going to be having on-going conflicts, whether it is
Iraq, Afghanistan, or whatever. That is just the reality of the
world we live in, where we are going to have on-going foreign
crises and the human nature for more attention to be focused on
them.
Also, within the administration itself, I think--any
administration--people tend to go where the power is or the
influence is or what the hot-button topic of the day is, and I
just see that could more and more be foreign policy as opposed
to homeland security. I know they are overlapping; I know there
is interrelationship between the two, obviously. But on the
other hand, there are also real distinctions between the two.
So again, I would have the concern those distinctions could
run the risk of not being fully appreciated and realized as we
go forward. Also I say this--and I know that Ms. Harman
probably disagrees with me on this--but I think the
administration does make a mistake by not using the term
terrorism. I think so long as that is not used it also can
create a--among people, say, looking for positions, looking for
jobs or looking for positions of influence in an
administration, that homeland security would not have that
sense of importance that it obviously had after September 11
and the years after that.
So because of that, my inclination right now is to think
that the two should be kept separate. Having said that, I have
no doubt that President Obama and John Brennan and whatever
will have an excellent relationship, will get the job done, and
will do what has to be done. But I am thinking more of the
institutional protections we need, and I don't think that would
be fully addressed. My concern is it would not be fully
addressed if this separation occurred.
With that, I look forward to the hearing and yield back the
balance of my time.
Chairman Thompson. All the Members of the committee are
reminded that, under the committee rules, opening statements
may be submitted for the record.
[The statement of Hon. Jackson Lee follows:]
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee
April 2, 2009
Thank you Mr. Chairman. I thank Chairman Thompson for convening
this important hearing to examine President Obama's Presidential Study
Directive and to examine the possibility of a Homeland Security
Council/National Security Council Merger. I welcome our distinguished
witnesses and look forward to their testimony.
In the wake of the tragic events of September 11, 2001 and during a
global war on terror, the Department of Homeland Security has an
increasingly significant role to play. That means that the Homeland
Security Council takes on a larger responsibility.
September 11, 2001, is day that is indelibly etched in the psyche
of every American and most of the world. Much like the unprovoked
attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, September 11, is a day that
will live in infamy. And as much as Pearl Harbor changed the course of
world history by precipitating the global struggle between totalitarian
fascism and representative democracy, the transformative impact of
September 11 in the course of American and human history is indelible.
September 11 was not only the beginning of the Global War on Terror,
but moreover, it was the day of innocence lost for a new generation of
Americans.
Just like my fellow Americans, I remember September 11 as vividly
as if it was yesterday. In my mind's eye, I can still remember being
mesmerized by the television as the two airliners crashed into the Twin
Towers of the World Trade Center, and I remember the sense of terror we
experienced when we realized that this was no accident, that we had
been attacked, and that the world as we know it had changed forever.
The moment in which the Twin Towers collapsed and the nearly 3,000
innocent Americans died haunts me until this day.
At this moment, I decided that the protection of our homeland would
be at the forefront of my legislative agenda. I knew that all of our
collective efforts as Americans would all be in vain if we did not
achieve our most important priority: the security of our Nation.
Accordingly, I became then and continue to this day to be an active and
engaged Member of the Committee on Homeland Security who considers our
national security paramount.
Our Nation's collective response to the tragedy of September 11
exemplified what has been true of the American people since the
inception of our Republic--in times of crisis, we come together and
always persevere. Despite the depths of our anguish on the preceding
day, on September 12, the American people demonstrated their compassion
and solidarity for one another as we began the process of response,
recovery, and rebuilding. We transcended our differences and came
together to honor the sacrifices and losses sustained by the countless
victims of September 11.
After the events of September 11, 2001, the American people became
painfully aware of the difference between feeling secure and actually
being secure. And after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, we learned that
the Department's readiness for and response to natural disasters is
woefully inadequate. The people of Galveston, Texas are still coping
with the effects of Hurricane Ike. We cannot let our citizens languish
and question whether the Department of Homeland Security is up to the
task of disaster preparedness.
As we examine the DHS's fiscal year 2010 budget, we must take
decisive steps to ensure that adequate funds are available and
allocated so that the trust that the American people have placed in our
hands is not compromised and that we take strategic steps to ensure
their future safety from both terrorist attacks and natural disasters.
The function of the Homeland Security Council is paramount in the
national security apparatus. Protecting our Nation from terrorists is a
national priority with international implications. Every President must
be able to depend on his or her advisors to give the best possible
advice. Communication and interagency coordination from the White House
are essential to the security function.
I am pleased that President Obama immediately demonstrated the
importance of homeland security in his administration by issuing this
Presidential Study Directive.
As the Chair of the Subcommittee on Transportation Security and
Infrastructure Protection, I have a number of concerns with the
potential proposals that might be implemented that are within the
subcommittee's jurisdiction: Surface Transportation Security which
includes Mass Transit and Rail Security, Critical Transportation
Infrastructure, and Transportation Security Administration (TSA), whose
operations I have recently witnessed on the ground at LaGuardia Airport
in New York.
I have serious concerns about the prospects of combining the
Homeland Security Council and the National Security Council. I am
skeptical of the effect that this would be to our overall efforts at
having a coordinated national security policy. But like any prudent
legislator I would withhold judgment until I have seen concrete plans
which outline pragmatic and logical steps that demonstrate the efficacy
of a combination.
I eagerly look forward to your testimony and discussion today of
these issues. I thank you Mr. Chairman, and I yield back the balance of
my time.
Chairman Thompson. Again, I welcome our witnesses to
today's hearing.
Mr. Wainstein was appointed--our first witness--was
appointed by President George W. Bush as assistant for homeland
security and counterterrorism. He has previously served in
leadership positions at the FBI and a first assistant attorney
general for national security at the U.S. Department of
Justice.
Ms. Townsend served as assistant to President George Bush
for homeland security and counterterrorism from 2004 to 2008.
As of some time this week, she is now with Baker Botts L.L.P.
as a partner. Congratulations, nothing like a real job, right?
[Laughter.]
Chairman Thompson. Congratulations, as I said. Prior to her
service at the White House, she served in the U.S. Attorneys'
Office in Manhattan and as the assistant commandant for
intelligence of the U.S. Coast Guard.
Mr. Palin, welcome, is a senior fellow with the National
Institute for Strategic Preparedness and has authored major
papers in the area of emergency preparedness.
Mr. Frazier is executive director of the Major Cities
Chiefs Association, which represents the police chiefs of the
56 largest police agencies in the United States and Canada.
Welcome also, Mr. Frazier.
Mr. Hoffman is currently a professor at the School of
Foreign Service at Georgetown University. He is a thought
leader and a recognized scholar in counterterrorism and
national security affairs.
Without objection, the witnesses' full statement will be
inserted in the record.
I now recognize each witness to summarize his or her
statement for 5 minutes, beginning with Mr. Wainstein.
STATEMENT OF KENNETH L. WAINSTEIN, FORMER HOMELAND SECURITY AND
COUNTERTERRORISM ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT
Mr. Wainstein. Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King,
Members of the committee, thank you very much for the
opportunity to appear before you today. I want to thank the
committee for holding this hearing and for its invaluable work
over the years to build the homeland security infrastructure
that protects our Nation and our people.
I applaud President Obama's decision to undertake a review
of the structure of the Homeland Security Council at this time.
I also completely agree with his statement that ``homeland
security is indistinguishable from national security.'' If
there is one lesson that we learned from the attacks of
September 11, it was that the traditional distinctions between
international security and domestic security have lost much of
their meaning.
While it is true that homeland security is part and parcel
of national security, it does not necessarily follow that there
has to be a single, unified coordinating mechanism for both.
Conversely, the fact that homeland security is a priority
doesn't necessarily mean that the White House has to devote an
interagency council to that mission.
Whenever we undertake to organize or to reorganize
Government operations, there is a natural tension between the
interest in having all relevant operations in a unitary
structure and the countervailing interest in separating those
operations to ensure that each has its own identity and the
resources, support, and high-level attention that often come
with that separate identity.
I have seen this issue play out in different contexts at
other points in my career. When I served at the FBI, for
example, the 9/11 Commission and others engaged in a lengthy
debate about whether the bureau's intelligence function should
remain consolidated with its law enforcement function or be
separated out and assigned to a new agency. Similarly, several
years back, there was a debate whether Department of Justice
intelligence attorneys and national security prosecutors should
remain in separate divisions or be consolidated into a single
new division--an issue that Congress resolved by creating the
National Security Division that I had the honor to lead.
Each of these debates highlighted the tradeoffs at play
when deciding whether to separate or consolidate Government
functions. The organizational issue before the committee today
highlights the same tradeoffs.
In deciding whether to keep or to change the current
structure, it is useful to review the accomplishments that the
current structure has achieved. These include first and
foremost the fact that the very existence of the HSC sent a
clear message that homeland security was and remains a high
priority. Second, the Homeland Security Council coordinated and
oversaw the growth of myriad homeland security functions that
were underdeveloped, nascent, or simply nonexistent prior to 9/
11.
Third, the stand-up of the HSC allowed the White House to
assemble a staff with expertise in homeland security fields,
like port security, pandemic planning, and disaster response,
some of which understandably did not figure very prominently in
White House staffing prior to that time. Also, the HSC played
an important role in fostering the growth and maturation of
newly established Department of Homeland Security by helping
DHS work through difficult interdisciplinary issues with other
agencies and departments and keeping its issues and concerns on
the President's agenda. Last, the existence of the HSC relieved
the national security adviser of the responsibility of
overseeing the homeland security build-up.
I cite these benefits not to suggest that they will accrue
only if we retain the current structure, but rather to ensure
that these benefits are considered and taken into account when
deciding how to reconfigure that structure.
My experience as homeland security adviser left me firmly
convinced that the White House must exercise a strong
coordinating role among the varied players that share in that
mission. I therefore believe that any new policy coordinating
structure should meet the following prerequisites.
First, the person serving the function of the homeland
security adviser, no matter what his or her title, should be
vested with the requisite authority and stature to coordinate
and broker agreements among Cabinet officers and departments.
Second, the homeland security adviser should have sufficient
access to the President. Third, the interagency process devoted
to homeland security issues, no matter whether conducted under
the HSC or under a combined entity, should have the same status
and authority as that devoted to national security issues.
Also, those who work within the new structure will need to
work cooperatively and collegially in those areas of shared and
overlapping responsibilities that necessarily arise between the
homeland and national security portfolios. Finally, the White
House should make sure to devote the resources necessary to
build and maintain a homeland security staff with the requisite
expertise and size to handle the vast portfolio of the homeland
security mission. Any organizational model that follows these
operating principles has the potential both to maintain the
priority of homeland security and to build upon and improve the
performance of the HSC under the current structure.
I thank the committee for soliciting my views on this
important subject, and I applaud you for holding this hearing.
Your concern about this subject is a strong reminder that
homeland security is and must remain a front-burner issue, and
it helps to ensure that the homeland security coordinating
structure of the future will be strong, effective, and
recognized by all as a critically important piece of our
national security apparatus.
Thank you again, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member King, and
I look forward to answering your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Wainstein follows:]
Prepared Statement of Kenneth L. Wainstein
April 2, 2009
introduction
Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King, Members of the committee,
thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I am Ken
Wainstein, and I served as the Assistant to the President for Homeland
Security and Counterterrorism (Homeland Security Advisor) for the last
10 months of the George W. Bush administration. Prior to that, I spent
my career in various positions in the Department of Justice, where I
worked on law enforcement and national security matters.
I thank the committee for holding this important hearing and for
its invaluable work over the years to build the homeland security
infrastructure that protects our Nation and our people.
I applaud the President's decision to undertake a review of the
structure of the Homeland Security Council at this time. It is always
healthy to step back from time to time and assess whether the
organizations we establish and the policy-making mechanisms we
implement are meeting both their original purposes and the changing
needs that arise from the passage of time and new circumstances. With
the benefit of approximately 7 years' experience with the post-9/11
organizational changes, this is a particularly appropriate time for
conducting such an exercise in the homeland security context. I also
applaud those broader efforts--like that being undertaken by the
Project on National Security Reform--that are examining the overarching
structure and approach of our national security system in the 21st
century.
the choice between functional separation and consolidation
I agree with the President's statement that ``homeland security is
indistinguishable from national security . . . [that] they should be
thought of together rather than separately [and that] we must create an
integrated, effective, and efficient approach to enhance the national
security of the United States.'' If there was one lesson from the
attacks of September 11, 2001, it was that the traditional distinctions
between international security and domestic security have lost much of
their meaning, and that operations directed against external threats
must be synchronized with the effort to defend the homeland.
While it is true that homeland security is part and parcel of
national security, it does not necessarily follow that there must be a
single, unified coordinating mechanism for both. We can all cite
examples where related or overlapping Government functions have been
consciously and effectively divided among agency components or
different agencies altogether. Conversely, the recognition that
homeland security is a priority does not necessarily mean that the
White House must devote an inter-agency council to that mission, and we
can cite numerous high-priority policy matters that are effectively
handled within policy councils that have broader portfolios.
There is a natural tension in government organization between the
interest in having all relevant operations within a unitary structure
and the countervailing interest in separating those operations to
ensure that each has its own identity and the resources, support, and
higher-level attention that often come with that separate identity. I
have seen this same issue play out in different contexts at other
points in my career. When I served at the FBI, for example, the 9/11
Commission and others were debating whether to recommend keeping the
Bureau's intelligence function consolidated with its law enforcement
function or separating it from the Bureau and assigning it to a new
agency. Similarly, I participated in the debate whether DOJ's
intelligence attorneys and national security prosecutors should remain
in separate divisions or be consolidated into a single new division--an
issue that Congress resolved by creating the National Security Division
which I ultimately had the honor to lead. Each of these debates
highlighted the trade-offs at play when deciding whether to separate or
consolidate governmental functions in a unified structure. The
organizational issue before the committee today highlights the same
trade-offs.
purposes served by the current structure
In deciding whether to keep or change the current structure, it is
useful to review those areas in which the current structure has been
effective. While a more in-depth treatment of these areas can be found
in the Homeland Security Policy Institute Task Force Report that was
issued yesterday, I see the following as the most consequential
purposes served by the HSC since its inception:
Prioritization of the homeland security mission.--The stand-
up of the HSC reflected the priority placed on the homeland
security mission and sent a clear message that the President
was solidly behind the homeland security effort.
Notwithstanding the progress made over the past 7 years, that
symbolism and that message remain important, especially now
that economic concerns are capturing much of the political and
public attention.
Development of the homeland security infrastructure.--The
HSC coordinated and oversaw the growth of myriad homeland
security functions that were underdeveloped, nascent, or even
non-existent prior to 9/11. From critical infrastructure
protection strategies to disaster response preparation to
Presidential transition planning and execution, the HSC has
played a central role in coordinating the development and
implementation of new or newly-enhanced homeland security
operations.
Development of homeland security expertise within the White
House.--The stand-up of the HSC allowed the White House to
assemble a staff with expertise in those homeland security
fields (port security, pandemic planning, disaster response,
etc.), some of which understandably did not figure prominently
in White House staffing before that time.
Facilitating the development and maturation of DHS.--It was
my experience that DHS benefited from having an inter-agency
council and staff that were dedicated to its core mission. The
existence of the HSC in the White House reinforced the priority
placed on the Department's success, helped DHS work through
difficult interdisciplinary issues with other agencies and
departments, and kept its issues and concerns on the
President's agenda. While that support was necessary in the
Department's earlier years, it is conceivably less important
now that DHS is more established.
Division of labor with the NSC.--The existence of the HSC
also has served a very practical purpose--which is to relieve
the National Security Advisor of the responsibility of
overseeing the homeland security build-up and to prevent the
NSC from being distracted from its more traditional agenda
matters. This benefit has not receded in importance over the
years; if anything, it is becoming increasingly important with
the continued growth of the homeland security infrastructure.
I cite these benefits not to suggest that they will continue to
accrue only if the current HSC structure remains in place; but rather,
to ensure that they are considered in the process of deciding whether
and how to reconfigure that structure.
prerequisites for an effective structure
My experience as Homeland Security Advisor impressed me with the
vast breadth and magnitude of the homeland security mission, and left
me firmly convinced that the White House must exercise a strong
coordinating role among the varied players that share that mission. I
therefore believe that any new homeland security policy coordinating
structure should meet the following prerequisites:
The person serving the function of the Homeland Security
Advisor, no matter that person's title, should be vested with
the requisite authority and stature to coordinate and broker
agreement among Cabinet officers and departments.
The Homeland Security Advisor should have sufficient access
to the President to brief the President on threat situations on
short notice and also generally to keep the President apprised
of and engaged in homeland security matters.
The inter-agency process devoted to homeland security
issues, no matter whether conducted under the HSC or under a
combined entity, should have the same status as that devoted to
national security issues, and should be fully empowered to
secure cooperation and collaboration among agencies and mediate
the differences that inevitably arise.
Those within the new structure--and in particular the
Homeland Security Advisor and his or her NSC counterpart(s)--
will need to work cooperatively and collegially in those areas
of shared or overlapping responsibilities between the homeland
and national security portfolios.
And, the White House should devote the resources necessary
to build and maintain a homeland security staff with the
requisite expertise and size to handle the vast homeland
security portfolio.
Any organizational model that follows these operating principles
has the potential both to maintain the priority of homeland security
and to build upon the performance of the HSC under its current
structure.
conclusion
I thank the committee for soliciting my views on this important
subject, and I applaud you for holding this hearing. Your concern about
this subject is a strong reminder that homeland security is--and must
remain--a front-burner issue, and it helps to ensure that the homeland
security coordinating structure of the future will be strong,
effective, and recognized by all as a critically important piece of our
national security apparatus.
Thank you again, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member King, and I look
forward to answering any questions that you may have.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much for your testimony.
I now recognize Ms. Townsend to summarize her statement for
5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF FRANCES FRAGOS TOWNSEND, FORMER HOMELAND SECURITY
AND COUNTERTERRORISM ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT
Ms. Townsend. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I too would like to
thank you for the opportunity. It is a particular privilege for
me to appear before this committee, Mr. Chairman, because
Congressman King is my hometown Congressman. I have had the
privilege of working with not only you, sir, but a number of--
--
Chairman Thompson. I won't hold that against you, by the
way.
[Laughter.]
Ms. Townsend [continuing]. A number of Members on the
committee, including Congresswoman Harman, Congressman Carney,
so it is a real privilege for me to be here today.
There is no more solemn responsibility that the President
bears than to protect the American people. During my 4\1/2\
years at the White House, I came to believe that, for this
reason, organization should be dictated by effectiveness. How
best to maximize effectiveness will inevitably change over time
as we as a country continue to weaken al Qaeda and other
enemies and as the Department of Homeland Security gains
strength.
You will not be surprised, based on your experience with
me, therefore, that my view of this issue is a pragmatic one.
This is not one that I think lends itself to sort of an easy
assessment of an organizational chart. I would like to just
suggest to you a framework in which you might consider this
issue.
I think it really comes down to three fundamental criteria
of any organization. First, there has to be a single person who
is both responsible and accountable to the President, who
monitors threat information and who has the authority to
marshal all instruments of national power--military,
intelligence, law enforcement, economic, diplomatic, and public
diplomacy--to defeat the threat.
The individual cannot wait until threats arrive on our
shores but must have the responsibility and means to identify
those threats where they originate and to ensure a coordinated
response to them. The President's homeland security adviser
must not be constrained by geographic boundaries that our
enemies do not respect.
Second, the homeland security adviser must have direct and
immediate access to the President. Ultimately, if terrorists
successfully were to strike the United States, it is the
President and not his staff who will be rightly held
accountable by the American people for the failure. The
homeland security adviser must be able to get to the President
quickly without the clearance from his or her colleagues on the
White House staff.
Unfortunately, there will be times when American lives are
at stake and the President will need to be advised and
operational decisions taken and communicated to the relevant
Cabinet secretary in real time. These sorts of crises do not
lend themselves to normal bureaucratic process.
Third, the homeland security issues faced by our Government
are diverse and many. They range from preparedness and response
to natural disasters to pandemic planning and biological and
nuclear threats. These issues are often distinct from the more
traditional foreign policy issues faced by the National
Security Council and require experienced staff with significant
expertise.
The staff must understand State and local emergency
management policy issues and concerns. In that regard, during
my time, I had the privilege to work with Mr. Frazier and a
number of other State and local officials. The White House must
be organized not simply to facilitate the homeland security
policy process but also to anticipate and respond to State and
local political leaders in times of crisis. The homeland
security adviser requires adequate staffing to deal with both
counterterrorism and homeland security issues.
Mr. Chairman, I do believe we remain a Nation at war with a
very determined enemy. We have troops deployed in both Iraq and
Afghanistan, but the national security adviser has many
important responsibilities in addition to those two theaters.
For example, he must contend with the Middle East peace
process, counter-proliferation around the world in places like
Iran and North Korea. I worry that increasing the span of
control of the national security adviser could dilute the
homeland security mission and make it just one more item on an
already overburdened list.
That said, I wish to be clear. We should judge any
reorganization by the substance and criteria that I have
suggested above. We must be careful not to assume that a merger
means the President cares less about homeland security. We must
resist, as I have said, this easy organizational chart test and
look to the substance of how responsibilities are allocated and
how we are being protected.
Again, I would suggest that the committee look at three
fundamental questions. No. 1, is there one person responsible
and accountable to the President who looks around the world at
threats and advises the President? No. 2, does this one person
have direct and immediate access to the President? No. 3, does
this person have adequate staff to fulfill his or her
responsibilities both at a national level and to State and
local leaders? These are the questions that we should be asking
and the criteria against which we should judge this effort.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member King, I appreciate the
opportunity to be here, and I look forward to answering your
questions.
[The statement of Ms. Townsend follows:]
Prepared Statement of Frances Fragos Townsend
April 2, 2009
Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member (and hometown Congressman) King
and Members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear
before you today. I am Frances Fragos Townsend. From 2004 until 2008, I
was Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Advisor to President George
W. Bush, for whom I chaired the Homeland Security Council. I had
previously served as Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy
National Security Advisor for Combating Terrorism. It is an honor and
privilege to appear before the committee as you consider the structure
of national security and homeland security at the White House.
There is no more solemn responsibility that the President bears
than to protect American lives. During my 4\1/2\ years at the White
House I came to believe that, for this reason, organization must be
dictated by effectiveness. How best to maximize effectiveness will
inevitably change over time as we as a country continue to weaken al
Qaeda and other enemies, as the Department of Homeland Security gains
strength, and as our Government better integrates the capabilities that
have been built since the tragedy of September 11?
As you consider the most effective means of organizing the White
House structure, I respectfully submit that any structure should be
judged against three fundamental criteria. First, there must be a
single person both responsible and accountable to the President who
monitors threat information, and who has the authority to marshal all
instruments of national power (military, intelligence, law enforcement,
economic, diplomatic, and public diplomacy) to defeat the threat. This
individual cannot wait until threats arrive on our shores, but must
have the responsibility and the means to identify those threats where
they originate and to ensure a coordinated response to them. The
President's Homeland Security Advisor must not be constrained by
geographic boundaries that our enemies do not respect.
Second, the Homeland Security Advisor must have direct and
immediate access to the President. Ultimately, if terrorists
successfully strike the United States, it is the President, and not his
staff, who will be accountable to the American people for the failure.
The Homeland Security Advisor must be able to get to the President
quickly without clearance from his or her colleagues on the White House
staff. Unfortunately, there will be times when American lives are at
stake and the President will need to be advised and operational
decisions taken and communicated to the relevant Cabinet Secretary in
real time. These sorts of crises do not lend themselves to the normal
bureaucratic process.
Third, the homeland security issues faced by our Government are
diverse and many. They range from preparedness and response to natural
disasters (ice, flooding, fires, and wind) to pandemic planning and
biological and nuclear threats. These issues are often distinct from
the more traditional foreign policy issues faced by the National
Security Council and require experienced staff with significant
expertise. The staff must understand State and local emergency
management policy issues and concerns. They must be organized, not
simply to facilitate the homeland security policy process, but also to
anticipate and respond to State and local political leaders in a time
of crisis. The Homeland Security Advisor requires adequate staffing to
deal both with the counterterrorism and homeland security issues.
We remain a Nation at war with a very determined enemy. We have
troops deployed in both Iraq and Afghanistan but the National Security
Advisor has many important responsibilities in addition to those two
theaters. For example, he must contend with the Middle East peace
process and counter proliferation around the world, but most especially
in Iran and North Korea. I worry that increasing the span of control of
the National Security Advisor could dilute the homeland security
mission and make it just one more item on a list already overburdened.
That said, I wish to be clear. We should judge any reorganization
by the substance and criteria that I have suggested above. We must be
careful not to assume that a merger means the President cares less
about homeland security. We must resist this easy organizational chart
test and look to the substance of how responsibilities are allocated
and how we are being protected.
Let me suggest three questions that I would hope the committee
would ask: (1) Is there one person responsible and accountable to the
President who looks around the world at threats and advises the
President? (2) Does this one person have direct and immediate access to
the President? and (3) Does this person have adequate staff to fulfill
his or her responsibilities? These are the questions that we should be
asking and the criteria against which we should judge the effort.
Thank you again for your time and for the privilege of appearing
before you today. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have
at this time.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much for your testimony.
I now recognize Mr. Palin to summarize his statement for 5
minutes.
STATEMENT OF PHILIP J. PALIN, SENIOR FELLOW, NATIONAL INSTITUTE
FOR STRATEGIC PREPAREDNESS
Mr. Palin. Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King, Members
of the committee, as I have reviewed the plethora of reports
and recommendations on how we might reorganize Homeland
Security Council and as I have listened carefully to the rumors
emerging from the PSD-1 interview process, I have become
concerned that well-intended parties are trying to remove
politics from homeland security. This would be a serious
mistake.
I hope we can minimize partisanship in homeland security,
but in my judgment, we need more not less politics in homeland
security. The Homeland Security Council is uniquely positioned
to play a crucial role in domestic political organization for
homeland security.
The Homeland Security Council is a political creature. It
is the legitimate child of the Executive and the Legislature.
Both mother and father wanted it. The Executive has been
inclined, I think, to treat the HSC as its sole creation, but
Congress was wise enough to enshrine HSC in Title IX of the
Homeland Security Act. There is joint custody. This joint
custody gives the HSC its legitimacy and provides the
foundation for its potential coming of age as a profoundly
important political player.
I suggest three especially important roles for Homeland
Security Council: First, supporting the President's role in
prevention, mitigation, response, and recovery to catastrophic
threats of every sort--intentional, accidental, and natural;
second, supporting the President's role in working with the
governors and the homeland security leadership of the States in
framing and executing a shared strategy of prevention,
mitigation, response, and recovery; and third, fulfilling the
risk assessment role of the Homeland Security Council as set
out in Title IX.
The Congress, perhaps someone on this committee, bestowed
on your child a crucial responsibility. Section 904 of the
title states that the first function of the HSC is to assess
the objectives, commitments, and risks to the United States in
the interest of homeland security. This is precisely right.
Assessing our comparative risk is the essential foundation
of homeland security. Assessing risk is a profoundly political
process. Risk assessment can and must draw on technical
resources, but choosing which risk is most risky is a political
choice, by which I mean it is a choice that can only be made by
people of different perspectives who come together to reason
with one another.
It is especially important that the Federal Government
reason together with the States on preparedness, prevention,
mitigation, response, recovery, and other activities that will
seem exotic to specialists in the national security sphere.
Practically, the States have the local resources to prevent,
mitigate, respond, and recover. Constitutionally, the States
are where the founders meant for such power and authority
principally to reside.
This nuanced engagement in domestic politics strikes me as
ill-matched to the strengths of the National Security Council.
The NSC behaves, as it ought, to support the President's role
as commander-in-chief. The role of the President and his
administration in working with the States is an entirely
different matter.
The Federal and State governments need to reason together.
The Department of Homeland Security cannot do this alone. As a
former governor, Secretary Napolitano can do it better than
most. Juliette Kayyem, the new assistant secretary for
intergovernmental programs will contribute a great deal. But
the Department, to do its work effectively, must have an on-
going and meaningful dialogue going on between the White House
and the governors' mansions on shared homeland security policy
and strategy.
As you know so well, politics is about building coalitions
and motivating support for tough choices. When the choices are
too tough for enthusiasm, politics cultivates self-interested
compliance through a process of shared choosing. In homeland
security, we must make tough choices. The President's homeland
security adviser and his or her HSC staff should be and are
needed to be the President's trusted agents in crafting the
political compact with the States to make those tough choices.
I look forward to answering your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Palin follows:]
Prepared Statement of Philip J. Palin
Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King, distinguished Members of
the committee.
Considering how the National Security Council and Homeland Security
Council--and their respective White House staffs--relate to one another
and coordinate their roles is appropriate and important. It would,
however, be troublesome if such an examination was merely to conclude
the HSC and its staff should disappear into the National Security
Council and its staff.
The Homeland Security Council is not only a creature of the
Executive. The Council and staff were specifically authorized by Title
IX of the Homeland Security Act of 2002. Whatever proposals emerge from
Presidential Study Directive--1, I urge this committee to ensure that
the particular needs of homeland security are strengthened in any
reorganization. To advance our Nation's security a reorganization of
the HSC should:
1. Support the President's role in prevention, mitigation,
response, and recovery to catastrophic threats of every sort--
intentional, accidental, and natural;
2. Support the President's role in working with the governors and
the homeland security leadership of the States in framing and
executing a shared strategy of prevention, mitigation,
response, and recovery to catastrophic risk; and
3. Fulfill the risk assessment role of the Homeland Security
Council as set out in Title IX of the Homeland Security Act.
Some quick comments on each of these priorities:
terrorism and other threats
There is--and ought to be--particular concern that the
counterterrorism mission not be complicated by the existence of the two
Councils and separate White House staffs. Counterterrorism is ill-
served by battles over turf. Under Title IX the President can call
joint meetings of the HSC and NSC. There is well-established precedent
for dual-hatted NSC and HSC staff. Indeed, Mr. Brennan is currently
dual-hatted. In recent days the President has given joint assignments
to the HSC and NSC in regard to border security and cybersecurity. The
Executive Office of the President has wide latitude in how Presidential
personnel are assigned and managed. Where there are obvious synergies,
these collaborative and coordinative mechanisms should be utilized.
At the same time those expert in counterterrorism and other more
traditional aspects of national security are unlikely to be as adept in
addressing hyper-hurricanes, urban wildfire, once-in-a-thousand-year
flooding, city-smashing earthquakes, potential pandemic, and other
risks many of which can have intentional or accidental or natural
origins. There is a need for the Executive Office of the President to
include individuals with expertise in policy, strategy, public-private
coordination, and inter-governmental cooperation in regard to the full
range of catastrophic risks.
Whether the threat comes from a Katrina or an al Qaeda, the
President--and the Nation--requires a White House staff with sufficient
expertise to shape meaningful policy and strategy for prevention,
mitigation, response, and recovery.
working with the governors
Across this risk continuum the intergovernmental role requires
particular priority. Catastrophic risk by its very nature must be
prevented or mitigated in advance. Response and recovery to a true
catastrophe is very expensive in lives and every other way. In most
ways a catastrophe is beyond full recovery; that is what makes it a
catastrophe.
To effectively prevent and mitigate domestic sources of
catastrophic risk requires the voluntary and enthusiastic cooperation
of States and localities. The Federal Government does not have
sufficient resources or reach to prevent and mitigate on its own. The
States and localities are practically in the lead in terms of
prevention and mitigation. The States and localities have the eyes,
ears, and boots on the ground that the Federal Government does not. One
recent study noted that States and localities have 2,200,000 personnel
assigned to core homeland security functions, while the Federal
Government has about 50,000. It can also be argued that this is the
balance of responsibility that our Constitution set out for good
reason.
Secretary Napolitano, especially as a former Governor, can play an
important role here. In Judith Kayyem both the Secretary and the
President have a talented public servant as Assistant Secretary of
Intergovernmental Programs. But if we are serious about Homeland
Security there must be an on-going dialogue between the White House and
the Governors' Mansions. When the principals are not involved then the
President's Homeland Security Advisor should be in sustained
conversation and strategic engagement with the 54 State and territorial
Homeland Security Advisors. This is the way we will generate practical
strategic progress. This is the way our Constitution expects us to
behave.
political assessment of risk
Someone inserted into Title IX a very interesting role for the
Homeland Security Council supported by its staff. Section 904 of Title
IX states that the first function of the HSC is to, ``assess the
objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in the interest
of homeland security and to make resulting recommendations to the
President.''
This is a tough assignment--especially the risk assessment role. It
is also an assignment exactly right for the White House. As you have
certainly seen in testimony before this committee, risk is not a
technical decision. No detailed survey, no supercomputer, no panel of
experts can antiseptically generate a meaningful set of risk
priorities. All of these tools can make important contributions to a
risk decision. But such a judgment--truly made--is preeminently a
political judgment. Establishing risk priorities is the kind of
decision where high policy and high politics meet and fold into one
another. Without this sort of political engagement risk assessments are
just an illusory numbers game.
three priorities and the culture of the nsc
For more than 50 years, the National Security Council has ably
served the Commander-in-Chief. Every element of the NSC's
organizational DNA reflects the responsibilities and power of the
Commander-in-Chief. In foreign and defense policy--and the intelligence
agencies supporting foreign and defense policy--the President's
authority is preeminent. The NSC has been a creature of that
preeminence. Even with the legal, budgetary, and direct command-and-
control authority of the President, the NSC can have difficulty doing
what is needed to coordinate defense, foreign affairs, and intelligence
policy. But after 50 years there is an authoritative NSC institutional
ethos that well serves the President and the Nation.
This same ethos may well be counter-productive in solving Homeland
Security problems and especially in addressing the three priorities I
have set out. For the purposes of domestic counter-terrorism and
prevention, mitigation, response, and recovery the authority of the
Commander-in-Chief is not what matters. Most of the Governors will not
respond positively to a command-and-control approach. Neither will the
Adjutants General, nor County Sheriffs, nor most Mayors, nor police
chiefs, nor emergency managers, and then there is the private sector
that actually owns most of our critical infrastructure. These are
partners who must be cultivated.
Some have argued that more of a command-and-control culture is
needed to motivate sufficient attention to domestic counterterrorism.
It is true that many local jurisdictions across the United States do
not give sufficient priority to counterterrorism. But we cannot command
them to do otherwise. We cannot even pay them enough to do otherwise.
If we are serious about preventing latter-day Beslans or Mumbais--or
worse, we must do the hard work of communicating, cooperating, building
relationships, developing trust, and engaging together in meaningful
local and regional risk analysis. Only when State and local authorities
are ready--of their own volition--to invest time, energy, and their own
dollars into consistent counterterrorism work will we be closer to real
defense-in-depth regarding the terrorist threat.
Local authorities are--not unreasonably--actively engaged with
disasters that threaten with some regularity: floods, hurricanes,
tornadoes, wildfires, earthquakes--each place and each region is
different. They are not inclined to give sufficient attention to
threats that are outside the pattern. They tend to undervalue a whole
continuum of catastrophic possibilities: intentional, accidental, and
natural. Given limited financial and human resources this tendency is
understandable. Given recent financial extremities the tendency has
been exacerbated.
The Federal Government can and should play a role in helping ensure
reasonable local attention to catastrophic possibilities--including
terrorism. The Federal Government can play this role through
consulting, educating, training, making grants, and through a variety
of other mechanisms. When the Federal Government engages State and
local authorities as peers and fellow professionals, the response will
usually be productive. Ordering or even paying State and local
professionals to do something they don't believe in tends to produce
very creative avoidance behavior.
These practical issues reflect in a wonderful way our
constitutional system. We are dramatically reminded that the President
is the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, not the Nation. We are
forced to recall that we are--even now--a Federal union of sovereign
States. These are not just abstract constitutional principles. These
are very helpful realities to recognize, embrace, and use to our
advantage. As the Executive consults with the Congress on how the
Homeland Security Council might be more effective, these are realities
that should be reflected in any reorganization.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much for your testimony.
I now recognize Mr. Frazier to summarize his statement for
5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF THOMAS C. FRAZIER, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, MAJOR
CITIES CHIEFS ASSOCIATION
Mr. Frazier. Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King,
Members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
discuss the potential merger of the National Security Council
and the Homeland Security Council.
My name is Tom Frazier. I am the executive director of the
Major Cities Police Chiefs Association. MCC is the association
of chiefs of the 56 largest municipal police departments in the
United States. We are the chief executive officers of
departments located in metropolitan areas of more than a half a
million and employ more than a thousand law enforcement
officers. Collectively, these departments are first responders
to over 50 million residents in our country.
On February 23 of this year, President Obama issued
Presidential Directive--1 on organizing homeland security and
counterterrorism. The assistant to the President for homeland
security and counterterrorism was instructed to lead an
interagency review of ways to reform the organization. The
directive requires this review to be completed within 60 days.
Before discussing our specific views on the potential
merger of the NSC and the HSC, I would like to set the stage a
bit by articulating our perspective of these two organizations
and how we, as local first responders, fit into the respective
missions.
First, the NSC: Established by the National Defense Act in
1947, the NSC was originally defined as an organization dealing
in military and diplomatic issues beyond the U.S. borders. The
NSC was, and is, staffed by personnel from DOD, the State
Department and subject matter experts with an intelligence
community background.
NSPD-1, signed by President George Bush on February 13,
2001, reiterated this NSC focus by stating national security
includes the defense of the United States of America,
protection of our constitutional system of Government and the
advancement of U.S. interests around the globe. National
security also depends on America's opportunity to prosper in
the world economy.
This external focus fulfills a vital national need but has
no components with backgrounds or experience in dealing with
the vastly different needs and constitutional responsibilities
of State governments and their tribal and local partners.
Public safety leadership has only recently had their domestic
viewpoint represented in this forum.
Now the HSC: Established by HSPD-1, its mission was defined
as ensuring coordination of all homeland security-related
activities among executive departments and agencies and
promoting the effective development and implementation of all
homeland security policies.
We see the missions of these two bodies as being
fundamentally different. These differences become clear when
you look at the backgrounds of the principal decision-makers.
National security decision-makers are primarily Federal and
accustomed to working at a high level of Federal engagement.
Homeland security decision-makers include Federal but equally
and perhaps more importantly are State, Tribal, local, and
private sector partners. While the NSC deals with issues that
rarely involve State, Tribal, local, and private-sector
entities, the HSC must deal with the interests--and the
constitutional responsibilities of State governments--of these
partners on nearly every issue.
Now let us consider jurisdictions, a fundamental concept to
law enforcement. The NSC deals with military and diplomatic
issues beyond the jurisdictions of State, Tribal, and local
governments. The HSC, however, deals in an entirely different
environment where States have constitutionally defined
responsibilities over domestic incidents that the Federal
Government may not share. Response to disasters belongs with
the jurisdiction in which it occurs. The homeland security
continuum of prevent, protect, respond, recover is one in which
the Federal role is to help plan, coordinate and support
effective programs which build the collective national capacity
for implementation of the activities mentioned earlier.
Our recent experience with the new Federal entities,
specifically the National Counterterrorism Center and its State
and local analytic cell, or ITACG, is also instructive. A
presidential adviser whose sole responsibility is homeland
security is critically important to our Nation's internal
ability to identify domestic security threats. As our newly
combined efforts come to maturity, policy and funding issues
that would be lost in an international effort will still
receive the focus and importance that is required.
When viewed from these perspectives, it is clear to us at
the State and local level of government that our role in the
NSC is minimal. Our partners in the emergency management and
fire professions agree. It is equally clear that our collective
roles in the HSC are fundamental.
We do not advocate preservation of the status quo. There
are clearly areas where the HSC can be significantly improved,
which may be a good topic for a follow-on hearing. But we see a
merger of the HSC and the NSC as a bad idea, one sure to muddle
both missions while a newly created DHS absorbs change and
settles down.
There are many opportunities to streamline, to improve
communication and to meet jointly. Let us pursue these first,
while also working to improve the budget, staffing, and subject
matter expertise within the HSC itself.
On behalf of the Major Cities Chiefs Association, I want to
thank you for allowing MCC to submit its comments on the
important work that you do. We look forward to continued
interaction with the committee on strategies to address this
and future issues. I would be happy to answer any questions you
may have.
[The statement of Mr. Frazier follows:]
Prepared Statement of Thomas C. Frazier
April 2, 2009
Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King, Members of the committee,
thank you for this opportunity to discuss the potential merger of the
National Security Council and the Homeland Security Council.
My name is Tom Frazier. I'm the Executive Director of the Major
Cities Chiefs Association. MCC is the association of the Chiefs of the
56 largest municipal police departments in the United States. MCC
members are the Chief Executive Officers of police departments located
within metropolitan areas of more than 500,000 population, and which
employ more than 1,000 law enforcement officers. Collectively, these
departments are the first responders to over 50 million residents in
our country.
I'm a retired law enforcement executive, having served a career in
the San Jose, California Police Department and as Police Commissioner
in Baltimore, Maryland. I also had the honor of serving as the Director
of the COPs Office in the Department of Justice during the second
Clinton Administration.
On February 23, 2009, President Obama issued Presidential
Directive--1 on Organizing Homeland Security and Counterterrorism. The
Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism
was instructed to lead an interagency review of ways to reform the
White House organization for counterterrorism and homeland security.
The Directive requires this review to be completed within 60 days.
Before discussing our specific views of the potential merger of the
NSC and the HSC, I'd like to set the stage a bit by articulating our
perspective of these two organizations, and how we, as local first
responders, fit into their respective missions.
First, the NSC. Established by the National Defense Act of 1947,
the NSC was originally defined as an organization dealing in military
and diplomatic issues beyond the U.S. borders. The NSC was, and is,
staffed by personnel from DOD, the State Department, and subject matter
experts with an intelligence community background. NSPD-1, signed by
President George W. Bush on February 13, 2001 reiterated this NSC focus
by stating that, ``National security includes the defense of the United
States of America, protection of our constitutional system of
government, and the advancement of United States interests around the
globe. National security also depends on America's opportunity to
prosper in the world economy.''
This external focus fulfills a vital national need, but has no
components with backgrounds or experience dealing with the vastly
different needs and constitutional responsibilities of State
governments, and their tribal and local partners. Public safety
leadership has only recently had their domestic viewpoint represented
in this forum.
Now the HSC. Established by HSPD-1, signed by President Bush on
October 29, 2001, its mission was defined as, `` . . . ensuring
coordination of all homeland security-related activities among
executive departments and agencies and promoting the effective
development and implementation of all homeland security policies.''
We see the missions of these two bodies as being fundamentally
different. These differences become clear when you look at the players.
National security players are primarily Federal, and accustomed to
working at that level of Federal engagement. Homeland security players
include Federal, but equally and perhaps more important are State,
Tribal, local, and private sector partners. While the NSC deals with
issues that rarely involve State, Tribal, local, and private sector
entities, the HSC must deal with the interests--and the constitutional
responsibilities of State governments--of these partners on nearly
every issue.
Now let's consider jurisdictions--a fundamental concept to law
enforcement organizations. The NSC deals with military and diplomatic
issues beyond the jurisdictions of State, Tribal, and local
governments. The HSC, however, deals in an entirely different
environment where States have constitutionally-defined responsibilities
over domestic incidents that the Federal Government may not share.
Response to disasters belongs with the jurisdiction in which it occurs.
The homeland security continuum of ``prevent-protect-respond-recover''
is one in which Federal role is to help plan, coordinate--and support--
effective programs which build the collective national capacity for
implementation of the activities mentioned earlier.
Our recent experience with the new Federal entities, specifically
the National Counter-Terrorism Center and its State and local analytic
cell, or ITACG, is also instructive. A Presidential advisor whose sole
responsibility is homeland security is critically important to our
Nation's internal ability to identify domestic security threats. As our
newly combined efforts come to maturity, policy and funding issues that
would be lost in an international effort will still receive the focus
and importance that is required.
When viewed from these perspectives, it is clear to us at the State
and local level of government that our role in the NSC is minimal. Our
partners in the emergency management and fire professions agree. It is
equally clear that our collective roles in the HSC are fundamental.
Both the NSC and the HSC have extraordinarily important, but very
different missions. These missions are set to grow even further in
complexity, when you consider General Jones' plans to draw issues like
cyber-security, overdependence on fossil fuels, disease, poverty,
corruption, and the economic crisis into NSC's traditional mission
areas. Likewise, the HSC must now deal with a whole range of growing
threats: cross-border issues with Canada, the potential spill-over of
Mexican drug war violence into the United States, and the proliferation
of home-grown radicals.
We do not advocate the preservation of the status quo. There are
clearly areas where the HSC can be significantly improved--which may be
a good topic for a follow-on hearing. But we see a merger of the HSC
and the NSC as a bad idea--one sure to muddle both missions while a
newly created DHS absorbs change and settles down.
There are many opportunities to streamline, to improve
communication, and to meet jointly. Let's pursue these first, while
also working to improve the budget, staffing, and subject matter
expertise within the HSC itself.
One final thought while I have your collective ears. At present
there are approximately 108 different congressional committees that
provide some level of oversight to DHS. A concerted effort by Congress
to streamline this Gordian knot of often duplicative and conflicting
oversight would be a fundamental improvement.
On behalf of the Major Cities Chiefs Association, I want to thank
you for allowing MCC to submit its comments on the important work that
you do. We look forward to continued interaction with the committee on
strategies to address this and future issues.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much for your testimony.
I now recognize Professor Hoffman to summarize his
statement for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF BRUCE HOFFMAN, PROFESSOR, SCHOOL OF FOREIGN
SERVICE, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY
Mr. Hoffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member
King, for the opportunity to testify before the committee on
this important issue.
``Mom, I'm in Somalia! Don't worry about me; I'm okay,''
was how 17-year-old Burhan Hassan's worried mother discovered
where her son had gone weeks after he and five other Somali-
American youths disappeared from their homes in the
Minneapolis-St. Paul area. According to Abdisalem Adam, a
teacher and community leader, up to now, no one knows who
recruited them, but they obviously did not wake up one morning
and decide to go to Somalia.
Suspicions have focused on a largely unknown, radical
Somali organization, called al-Shabaab. Interestingly, the most
credible terrorist threat that had surrounded Barack Obama's
inauguration as the 44th President of the United States had not
come from al Qaeda or its leader, Osama bin Laden, or his
deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, but from these youths and al-
Shabaab.
Although the threat never materialized, it nonetheless shed
important light on the albeit obscure terrorist group that in
fact presents U.S. authorities with the most serious evidence
to date of a homegrown terrorist recruitment problem right here
in the American heartland. More worrisome still is the fact
that the first time authorities reportedly learned of this
potential threat was when the families of the three boys came
forward with information about their departure.
Recently, new evidence has come to light which suggests
that the six Somali-Americans were only part of a larger
contingent of U.S. citizens lured to Somalia. As many as 30
persons are believed to have left the United States to train in
terrorism and guerrilla warfare in that violence-plagued East
African country. Indications that recruitment of U.S. nationals
to train in Somalia was not a problem restricted to the
Minneapolis-St. Paul area have also surfaced.
These developments raise anew serious concerns about
America's homeland security and the threat of new terrorist
attacks. Protecting and securing the United States from
terrorism, it has long been argued, ultimately depends on
State, local, and Tribal law enforcement officers who are both
the first and last lines of homeland defense.
Their familiarity with the communities which they patrol
enables these officers to observe and detect criminal activity
that may indicate a terrorist plot and thus thwart its
commission. Hence, effectively countering terrorism is more
than a technical issue involving top-down Federal guidance,
direction, and intelligence dissemination. Rather, it requires
that State, local, and Tribal agencies have the requisite
training, education, knowledge and up-to-date intelligence to
identify and respond effectively and appropriately to these
threats.
Given that my expertise is on terrorists and their behavior
and not on the U.S. Government and its bureaucratic national
security structure, I cannot provide a definitive answer in
respect of the current proposal to fold the HSC into the NSC.
What does, though, seem clear is that this proposed
consolidation will only work provided that State, local, and
Tribal law enforcement have a strong, forceful, and credible
representative and advocate on the NSC governing all matters
pertaining to homeland security. That is not only terrorism but
disaster preparedness and response, infrastructure protection,
border security, immigration, incident management, and health
and medical planning and response.
The United States has, of course, come a long way since the
establishment of the HSC and the DHS in terms of both the
capacity and capability to defend our Nation against terrorist
attack. But as the Somali case and the surprising international
reach of a hitherto obscure and local terrorist movement
demonstrates, we are faced with a continuing terrorist threat
from al Qaeda and associated movements that is at once as
operationally durable as it is evolutionary and elusive in
character.
Accordingly, in so dynamic a threat environment, our
responses and preparations need to be equally as evolutionary,
flexible, and robust. President Obama's first Presidential
Study Directive embraces this notion in its call for a
comprehensive interagency review of our national and homeland
security architecture. Although the logic behind this statement
is indisputable, it must a priori acknowledge that homeland
security encompasses concepts and missions that do not
necessarily fit comfortably with traditionally defined national
security priorities and concerns.
Further, the President and Congress will need to be
convinced that State, local, and Tribal homeland security
authorities will have a forceful champion in any reorganization
of the HSC who can effectively serve as their advocate,
explaining their needs and expectations and ensuring Federal
responsiveness. These needs will invariably be different from
traditional national security concerns because States and
localities, not Federal agencies, will often be in the lead in
many homeland security missions.
In sum, the cop on the street may likely be the key player
in disrupting and preventing a terrorist incident. Police
officers not only need to know what to look for, but what they
are looking for may be a small piece of a larger puzzle that
may reveal broader links with terrorists either in this country
or abroad.
Thank you very much, I look forward to your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Hoffman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Bruce Hoffman*
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* This testimony incorporates parts of a report commissioned by the
SITE Intelligence Group. It appears in the April 2009 issue of InSITE,
the monthly electronic newsletter published by SITE.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
``Mom, I'm in Somalia! Don't worry about me; I'm OK,'' was how 17
year-old Burhan Hassan's worried mother discovered where her son had
gone weeks after he and six other Somali-American youths disappeared
from their homes in the Minneapolis-St Paul area. Almost without
exception, the youths who slipped away were described as good boys \1\
who were ``good students [who] had no problems with the law.''\2\ But
what especially troubled their relatives or others in the tight-knit
emigre community was the that no one could explain how the impoverished
young men were able to pay for the $2,000 airline tickets they used to
travel to Somalia.\3\ ``My nephew, he doesn't have money for a
ticket,'' the uncle of one lamented. ``None of these kids do.''\4\
According to Abdisalem Adam, a teacher and head of the local Dar al-
Hijrah Islamic Center, ``Up to now, no one knows who recruited them.
But they obviously did not wake up one morning and decide to go [to
Somalia].''\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Dina Temple-Raston, ``Missing Somali Teens May Be Terrorist
Recruits,'' National Public Radio: Morning Edition, 28 January 2009
accessed at: http://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyId=99919934.
\2\ Abdizirak Bihi, a community activist who represents the
families of the six young men quoted in Oren Dorell, ``Somalis may be
leaving Minn. for jihad,'' USA Today, 18 December 2008 accessed at:
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-12-18-somalis_N.htm.
\3\ Ibid. See also Elizabeth Mohr, ``Missing Somalis' Families
Speak Out: They Fear Males Were Brainwashed For Jihad Overseas,'' St.
Paul Pioneer Press, 7 December 2008; and, Abdi Aynte, ``Are jihadist
groups luring Minnesota Somalis back to fight?'' The Minnesota
Independent, 23 December 2008 accessed at: http://
minnesotaindependent.com/21144/did-jihadist-recruiters-lure-local-men-
home-to-fight.
\4\ Associated Press, ``Young Somali men missing from
Minneapolis,'' USA Today, 26 November 2008 accessed at: http://
www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-11-26-missing-somalis_N.htm.
\5\ Quoted in Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Suspicions, however, focused on a largely unknown, radical Somalia
organization, called al-Shabaab (Arabic: ``the youth'' or more
accurately, the ``young guys'').\6\ Interestingly, the most credible
terrorist threat that had surrounded Barack Obama's inauguration as the
44th president of the United States on 20 January 2009 \7\ had not come
from al Qaeda or its leader, Osama bin Laden, or his deputy, Ayman al-
Zawahiri but from these youths and al-Shabaab. A bulletin jointly
issued the day before the inauguration by the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the U.S.
intelligence community to State and local law enforcement had advised
that persons affiliated with al-Shabaab might attempt to stage an
attack in the United States on Inauguration Day.\8\ Although the threat
never materialized, it nonetheless shed important light on an albeit
obscure terrorist group that in fact presents U.S. authorities with the
most serious evidence to date of a ``homegrown'' terrorist recruitment
problem right in the American heartland. More worrisome still is the
fact that the first time authorities reportedly learned of this
potential threat was when the families of three of the boys came
forward with information about their departure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Al-Shabaab also has used, or is know by, the following names:
Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen; Hisb'ul Shabaad; Hizbul Shabaab; Al-
Shabaab al-Islam; Al-Shabaab al-Islamiya; Al-Shabaab al-Jihad; Harakat
Shabaab al-Mujahidin; Mujahideen Youth Movement; Mujahidin Al-Shabaab
Movement; Unity of Islamic Youth; The Youth; Youth Wing' and, Popular
Resistance Movement in the Land. See Office of Intelligence and
Analysis, Reference Aid: Foreign Groups in Focus: Al-Shabaab, IA-0110-
09, Unclassified//For Official Use Only, p. 5. Note: only material from
this DHS report marked unclassified has been cited in this testimony.
\7\ See Spencer S. Hsu, ``Threat `Uncertain': Security Alert Issued
For Inauguration Day,'' Washington Post, 21 January 2009; Paul Duggan
and Mary Beth Sheridan, ``Security Efforts Are Mostly a Success,
Officials Say,'' Washington Post, 21 January 2009; and, Temple-Raston,
``Missing Somali Teens May Be Terrorist Recruits''.
\8\ Hsu, ``Threat `Uncertain': Security Alert Issued For
Inauguration Day''; and, Duggan and Sheridan, ``Security Efforts Are
Mostly a Success, Officials Say''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Recently, new evidence has come to light which suggests that the
six Somali-American were only part of a larger contingent of U.S.
citizens lured to Somalia. As many as 27 persons are believed to have
left the United States to train in terrorism and guerrilla warfare in
that violence-plagued East African country. Indications that
recruitment of U.S. nationals to train in Somalia was not a phenomenon
restricted to the Minneapolis-St Paul area only have also surfaced.
Hence, in addition to the FBI's investigations in the Minneapolis-St
Paul area, others are reportedly being conducted in Boston and San
Diego as well. These developments raise anew serious concerns about
America's homeland security and the threat of new terrorist attack.
Protecting and securing the United States from terrorism, it has
long been argued, ultimately depends on State, local, and Tribal law
enforcement officers who are both the first and last lines of homeland
defense. Their familiarity with the communities which they patrol
enables these officers to observe and detect criminal activity that may
indicate a terrorist plot and thus to thwart its commission. Hence,
effectively countering terrorism is more than a technical issue
involving top-down Federal guidance, direction, and intelligence
dissemination. Rather, it requires that State, local, and Tribal
agencies have the requisite training, education, knowledge, and up-to-
date intelligence to identify and respond effectively and appropriately
to these threats. Effective bottom-up as well as top-down interaction
is thus a vitally important element of America's capacity to respond to
terrorist threats and attacks.
The case of the Somali youths cries out both for the intimate
knowledge and bottom-up information that community-oriented local law
enforcement is best situated to provide and the top-down big-picture
strategic knowledge and intelligence-driven guidance and direction that
only Federal authorities can furnish to their State, local, and Tribal
counterparts. The fact that the radicalization, indoctrination, and
alleged recruitment of young Somali-Americans to terrorism was
apparently missed at all levels of our national and homeland security
apparata until it had already occurred, underscores the critical
importance of this nexus of Federal, State, local, and Tribal
authorities working closely together to identify, prevent, and
interdict such threats from top-down as well as bottom-up dimensions.
Accordingly, the fundamental criteria upon which any bureaucratic
reorganization of America's homeland security must be judged is whether
it will strengthen and further support these vital Federal and State,
local and Tribal interactions; consolidate national security and
domestic law enforcement capabilities; and more effectively than any
other model or previous organization provide for the security and
safety of the United States from terrorist attack.
Given that my expertise is on terrorists and their behavior and not
on the U.S. Government and its bureaucratic national security
structure, I cannot provide a definitive answer to the above question
in respect of the current proposal to fold the Homeland Security
Council (HSC) into the National Security Council (NCS). What does,
though, seem clear is first, that this proposed consolidation will only
work provided that State, local, and Tribal law enforcement have a
strong, forceful, and credible representative and advocate on the NSC
governing all matters pertaining to homeland security (e.g., not only
terrorism; but disaster preparedness and response, infrastructure
protection, border security, immigration, incident management, and
health and medical planning and response); and second, that the Somali
case provides fresh evidence--if any more were needed--of the dynamic
and evolving threat environment that America still finds itself in
nearly 8 years since the September 11, 2001 attacks.
The United States has of course come a long way since the
establishment of the HSC and the DHS in terms of both the capacity and
capability to defend our Nation against terrorist attack. But, as the
Somali case and the surprising international reach of a hitherto
obscure and local terrorist movement demonstrates, we are faced with a
continuing terrorist threat from al Qaeda and associated movements that
is at once as operationally durable as it is evolutionary and elusive
in character. Accordingly, in so dynamic a threat environment our
responses and preparations need to be equally as evolutionary,
flexible, and robust.
President Obama's first Presidential Study Directive (PSD-1)
implicitly embraces this notion in its call for a comprehensive
interagency review of our national and homeland security
architecture.\9\ ``I believe that Homeland Security is
indistinguishable from National Security--conceptually and
functionally,'' the President explained. ``They should be thought of
together rather than separately.''\10\ Although the logic behind this
statement is indisputable; it must a priori acknowledge that homeland
security encompasses concepts and missions that do not necessarily fit
comfortably with traditionally-defined national security priorities and
concerns--at least those that have historically been within the NSC's
remit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ ``Organizing for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism,''
Presidential Study Directive--1, The White House, 23 February 2009
accessed at: www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/psd/psd-1.pdf.
\10\ Quoted in Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Not only are the key stakeholders different (involving State,
local, and Tribal jurisdictions as opposed to Federal agencies and
departments only) but the need for broad, not limited, sharing of
information with State, local, and Tribal authorities remains another
salient difference. Further, it is often forgotten that homeland
security pertains not only to man-made disasters (that is, terrorism);
but also to natural ones. Accordingly, whomever in the Executive branch
is tasked with homeland security responsibilities will likely find a
disproportionate amount of their time and attention consumed by
preparedness, planning, and response to hurricanes and floods, as well
as with the threats posed by al Qaeda and other terrorists. Further,
issues of particular immediacy today, such as border security and
immigration, have not traditionally been direct NSC concerns and, for
that matter, neither have incident management, infrastructure
protection, and heath and medical planning and preparedness.
Both the President and Congress must therefore be confident that
the bureaucratic absorption of the HCS into the NSC does not result in
the diminution of the priority given to each of the above homeland
security missions. In this respect, the President and Congress have to
be satisfied that relevant homeland security issues will be afforded
the same attention as more traditional national security ones. Further,
processes and procedures will need to be in place that assure the
timely presentation of homeland security matters to the President and
Cabinet.
Finally, the President and Congress will need to be convinced that
State, local, and tribal homeland security authorities will have a
forceful champion in any reorganization of the HSC who can effectively
serve as their advocate, explaining their needs and expectations and
ensuring Federal responsiveness. These needs will invariably be
different from traditional national security concerns because States
and localities--and not Federal agencies--will often be in the lead on
many homeland security missions. Indeed, issues like intelligence
sharing, border security, immigration, disaster management, incident
control and a wide range of planning, mitigation, and recovery missions
have hitherto not typically been the focus of NSC efforts--much less
within its specific remit.
American police departments and law enforcement agencies--and
especially their street cops and patrol officers--need more and better
information about terrorism and immediate threats. The cop on the
street, as this testimony has argued, may likely be the key player in
disrupting and preventing a terrorist incident. Police officers not
only need to know what to look for but that what they are looking for
may be a small piece of the larger puzzle that may reveal terrorist
connections (e.g., investigations into crimes involving smuggling,
human trafficking, fraud, extortion, narcotics that may also be
terrorist activities).
But to do so, America's State, local, and Tribal law enforcement
personnel need information and intelligence, training and education
that hitherto has not been a concern of, or within, the NSC's ken. This
need is especially acute now, in the wake of the Somali case, because
unlike other countries, such as the United Kingdom and Israel,
terrorism is not necessarily a daily issue for the U.S. law enforcement
officer. For that reason, American law enforcement requires information
and intelligence to keep pace with the terrorism threat and the
knowledge needed to prevent, pre-empt, or respond to a terrorist
attack.
Providing American State and local law enforcement jurisdictions
with the knowledge, training, and intelligence resources they require
to effectively pre-empt and prevent terrorist attacks endows the
homeland with enhanced layers of defense. This enables street cops not
only to better counterterrorist threats but also to become better crime
fighters. Strengthening State, local, and tribal authorities' threat
awareness enhances the country's security by enabling better and more
focused preparedness, training, planning, and response.
In sum, the revelations surrounding al-Shabaab and the Somali
emigre community emphasize the need to anchor changes in the American
national security structure that will more effectively close the gaps
in the relationship, communication, and appropriate intelligence
sharing between Federal authorities with State, local, and Tribal
jurisdictions. This necessitates that the American national and
homeland security structure be organized for maximum efficiency,
intelligence, and information sharing, and the ability to function
quickly and effectively in the face of so dynamic and evolutionary
threat environment.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
We will have a series of votes. I will try to get through
my questions and yours, Peter, if that is good. It will take
about 60 minutes to do that and then we will come back.
We appreciate the divergence of testimony of the witnesses
this morning and we got exactly what we were looking for.
I guess to the five of you, if you could, for me, if the
President ultimately decided to dissolve the Homeland Security
Council and if legislation is required going forward, what can
you tell us as to how we can best ensure State and local and
Tribal partners will be integrated into the policymaking
apparatus?
I will start with you, Mr. Wainstein.
Mr. Wainstein. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know that there
have been a number of studies done and proposals, and I think
Mr. Palin referenced them. One component of many of these
proposals has been to have either a series of liaisons within
the new entity that are liaisons to State, local, and Tribal or
an advisory committee or both.
There have been some look-backs to the HSAC advisory
committee that was instituted 7 years ago and how that faired
and the extent to which it was effective or not sufficiently
effective in keeping State, local, and Tribal linked up. My
sense is, in talking to the folks who are doing the study for
President Obama, is that they are looking at a number of
different mechanisms like that and are very focused on the
concern of keeping a tight connection with State, local, and
Tribal. So their proposal might well have some feature like
that, which I guess could, then, become a piece of any
resulting legislation that comes out of Congress.
Ms. Townsend. Mr. Chairman, my concern about liaisons and
advisory committees is that they tend not to have daily input,
sort of be part of the DNA of the new organization and bring
sufficient muscle to it. One of the things that I had tried to
do--it was very difficult at the time but I think needs to be
looked at--is actually integrated State and local officials
into the council, whatever the structure is, is actually having
them serve, so there is a daily voice and a daily reminder.
One of the most beneficial things in my background was the
fact that I had been a local prosecutor before I entered the
Federal Government, and my understanding was based on my own
experience. So bringing people like that--I worked with Ray--
Commissioner Kelly of the NYPD to have an officer assigned so
that I had somebody constantly looking at every issue and
bringing that perspective to it. I think that is important.
It is not sufficient for it just to be in the Department.
The Department does have an intergovernmental liaison. You need
somebody at the political level at the White House who is
engaging with political leaders at the State and local level,
including chiefs of police and elected officials.
Chairman Thompson. Mr. Palin.
Mr. Palin. I heard the question to relate to statutory
adjustments that might be made. I don't think this committee
will like my answer, because I think, if in fact the HSC is
done away with and the Congress agrees that that is in the
White House self-interest, I think the best way to take care of
the assurances that--and the important assurances that you have
asked about, Mr. Chairman, is for the National Security Act to
be amended.
Chairman Thompson. Well, we didn't ask for agreement by
witnesses, so you won't hurt our feelings.
[Laughter.]
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
Mr. Frazier.
Mr. Frazier. Mr. Chairman, as the ITACG brings a State and
local perspective to National Counterterrorism Center and a
valuable perspective, the traditional intelligence collection
world does not see things through the same lens that an
experienced State and local investigator or executive does. I
use that example to say that inside the NSC, it would be
necessary to have a--and I agree with Ms. Townsend--a full-time
component that can represent that point of view.
Our perpetual difficulty with Department of Homeland
Security is that there are so few law and fire practitioners in
the decision-making machinery that things occur that, when you
have to put them into practice on the ground, they just don't
make sense. The only way to, in my view, prevent those kinds of
mistakes from occurring is to have someone at a level to
provide input before decisions are made.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
Professor Hoffman.
Mr. Hoffman. Well, the benefits of going last--I agree
completely with Ms. Townsend and Mr. Frazier. I think the
stakeholders in homeland security issues are very different
than for those in stereotypical national security issues, and
there has to be that strong representation present in the White
House as well as at the DHS.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
The gentleman from New York for 5 minutes.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to ask Mr. Wainstein and Ms. Townsend, based
on their real-life experience in the White House--and I will
exclude this administration for now, but every administration
up 'til now has strong personalities, often with competing
interests, with the best of intentions, but turf battles become
a reality. Based on your experience, if the homeland security
adviser does not have that independent status, what are the
chances, with a dominant personality as, say, head of the NSC,
who does not share your concerns on homeland security, and they
could be very well intentioned, could that freeze you out or
minimize the importance of the homeland security adviser?
Ms. Townsend. Congressman King, you are absolutely right. I
mean, I enjoyed an extraordinary relationship both with
Secretary Rice when she was the national security adviser, and
you remember Steve Hadley was a deputy, an equal of mine,
before he was promoted, and then he and I were both equals as
assistants to the President. So I didn't have that problem.
I will tell you my concern about the merger is if--that is
why I said one of my fundamental criteria is direct access to
the President. If what a reorganization and a merger means is
that the homeland security has to report through the national
security adviser, yes, you do have the opportunity for that
person, if there is a conflict or if there is a personality
problem between the two, to be frozen out of the process to
influence directly the President.
I have a lot of confidence in both Jim Jones and John
Brennan, so I don't imagine that even in this administration,
but you do worry. The second point to that, I would say, is
rank actually, as you are well aware, in this town really
matters. So if you want the individual who has got
responsibility for the homeland security matters to be able to
resolve either a conflict between Cabinet members or a conflict
between Federal policy and State and locals--and, by the way,
the ITACG is the perfect example.
Here was a case where Congresswoman Harman called me, was
very exercised about ensuring that we had local representation
at the NCTC, and we were able to resolve that. But that was a
conflict at the Federal level over policy that required the
homeland security adviser to actually sit down with the Cabinet
secretary and break through it to make sure we got that done.
So you need somebody with the rank and the access to be able to
actually break through all that and get a Cabinet secretary or
Cabinet secretaries to answer the phone call and resolve it.
Mr. King. Mr. Wainstein.
Mr. Wainstein. Yes, Congressman King, appreciate the
question. Like Fran, I had the pleasure of working with Steve
Hadley, who was wonderful if anything. He bent over backwards
to include me and include HSC and to make sure that our issues
got the highest level attention.
My sense is that the folks in those positions now share
that approach. But it is a real concern, and there are a number
of different ways of addressing it or making sure that the
subordination of homeland security issues doesn't come to pass
in the future. Fran, I think, has touched on many of them.
But I can't underemphasize how important it is that the
homeland security adviser and his or her people are fully
represented in National Security Council meetings. If this ends
being in the National Security Council, the homeland security
adviser needs to be there in those meetings and very
importantly needs to have a set schedule of meetings with the
President in the Oval Office.
The national security adviser, just because of the pace and
the nature of the job, is going to spend a lot of time with the
President. The homeland security adviser won't necessarily
spend as much time but needs to have those designated times he
or she is in the Oval Office. That makes sure there is an
opportunity to get those issues on the President's plate and
make sure that the profile of those issues stays high. So that
is why, as I said in my introductory remarks, it is important
to put a structure in place that ensures high-level attention.
Mr. King. I want to make it clear, it is my experience with
the Bush administration, and I am sure it is going to--the
Obama administration too--I don't necessarily foresee a
homeland security problem, but human nature being what it is, I
do know from dealing with the Clinton administration, the Bush
administration, there certainly were some of those conflicts in
foreign policy as to who was in and who was out and who was
excluded. Human nature being what it is, there is no reason why
that also couldn't apply to homeland security, and that is the
concern I have.
My time is running out. I just would add also that, by its
nature, foreign policy is in the news. I mean, people know what
is going on in Afghanistan, know what is going on in Iraq.
Homeland security, as you well know, could be off the front
pages for weeks, months, years at a time, as we saw between
1993 and 2001, but then it happened. Again, to keep people
focused on it--what it--again, even best-intentioned people--
that is why I am leaning toward keeping that separate position
so that people's attention won't be lost.
With that, I yield back, and I thank you.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
As I indicated, we have a series of votes on the way right
now that should take about an hour. So the committee will stand
in recess for about 1 hour or as soon as the last vote is
taken.
[Recess.]
Chairman Thompson. We would like to reconvene the recessed
hearing. I apologize to our witnesses, but when we set
hearings, as you know, they don't necessarily correspond with
votes on the floor. So you have now had first-hand experience
of the conflict.
Ms. Townsend, I understand you have a previous commitment
that you can't break. I do understand that, but I think Ms.
Harman, who is our next Member to ask questions, wanted to make
a comment in addition to ask questions.
The gentlelady from California for 5 minutes.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to our
panel for your patience. Welcome to our world.
My special welcome to two of the panelists who have been
coconspirators for many years, one of whom is Fran Townsend. I
thought your service in the White House was exemplary, and you
were always available to counsel on a bipartisan basis or a
nonpartisan basis about what we ought to do to protect the
homeland. I miss you. I want you to know that. You are a reason
why I think there needs to be someone exactly like you in the
White House, whether that person works for the National
Security Council or not, someone with that level of expertise
and that level of availability. Otherwise, I worry about the--I
worry about the future.
To you, Bruce Hoffman, you have, again, been a really
invaluable counselor and continue to be on how to get some of
our legislation right, how to navigate the shoals out there,
which are sometimes difficult. Some of you tuned into
yesterday's hearing, and you got the frontal view of that. But
all of us up here think that the terrorists aren't going to
check our party registration before they blow us up.
To Peter King, who is not here right now, I do actively use
the word terrorism. I served on the National Council on
Terrorism in 1999 and 2000, then chaired by L. Paul Bremer. One
of the other members was Juliette Kayyem, whom I think is an
excellent pick for the State and local position at the Homeland
Security Department. I am very glad she is going there.
I do worry, just as Bruce does, about what is happening to
kids in Minneapolis or pick another place. When are we going to
learn about that on the front end before it is too late? So I
freely use the word. I, on the other hand, however, think we
have overplayed the fear card. What we should do is prepare,
not scare, the public in America about the real terror threats
we face. So that is the end of that little speech.
Let me put some of my thoughts out about this and invite
comments from anybody. No. 1, I agree with the testimony that
the organization should be dictated by effectiveness. I am not
sure how the boxes should line up. I am sure that we need a
Fran Townsend equivalent in the White House. Boy, is she proof
that power comes in small sizes.
So I have great regard and affection for the national
security adviser, Jim Jones. I know he is working hard at
realigning his authorities, because it is true that, in the
past, the National Security Council has operated mostly by
using detailees and it has had a tiny budget. It may not be the
most effective--it is not the most effective organization. But
we can't let it eat the homeland security function in a way
that puts homeland as number 46 on a list of 45 priorities.
That would be dreadful; that would compromise our security.
More Americans are at risk from terror attacks here than
anywhere else in the world, and so we have to keep the focus
and expertise here.
Let me just probe with you, having said all that--and one
more thing. I am disappointed, at least by reports of two
actions that Janet Napolitano may be taking. One is she has not
followed a friendly suggestion from here to name someone with a
law enforcement background as the new head of intelligence and
analysis. We think, or I think, that that would send the right
message about reorganizing that function.
No. 2, there is a Homeland Advisory Committee that has
existed and functioned well for some years headed by Bill
Webster, whom I think has impeccable credentials, which I
gather is either going to be replaced or retired. I think that
is a mistake too. I think very able people in both parties
serve on that council.
So in my 47 seconds, I would just invite reactions to what
I have said and any suggestions about the specific
qualifications of the person in the White House, regardless of
what organization box that person is in, the person who is
charged with focusing on homeland security matters for the
President.
Ms. Townsend. Congresswoman Harman, thank you very much for
your very generous remarks. It was a great privilege to me to
be able to work on a nonpartisan basis, and I had the--frankly,
I had the freedom to do that because of the authority vested in
me by the President, and so it really was--I think we got a lot
of good things done that way.
I will say that I think it is hard to come up with what the
perfect list is of qualifications, because whoever it is will
come with their own experience and then they will build their
staff around them, in some ways based on what their experience
is not because you want good, smart people around you that
cover you where you are weak. So, of course, you want someone--
look, as I mentioned earlier, I thought it was a great asset to
me to have worked at a local level. There aren't a lot of
people, as has been pointed out by my other panel members, in
senior levels of the Federal Government who have had local
experience. But, boy, it served me very well, in terms of
understanding the issues and particularly implementation at the
field level.
I will also tell you I was fortunate to have had a legal
background. I would encourage Ken to make an observation about
that. My law enforcement and legal background and time in the
Justice Department was tremendously useful. All of the
interagency experience that you bring to it is very important
because you are trying to resolve what essentially amount to
either policy disputes or turf battles. So I think all of those
things in some measure or another--and your intelligence
background--are all incredibly important.
I share your view about the Homeland Security Advisory
Committee. I think we have got to be careful about how much we
expect of it because it is not, as you know, a daily body,
daily involved, but I think that the secretary in particular
needs that sort of advice and outside counsel and on a
nonpartisan basis. As you pointed out, there are people from
both parties who served incredibly well, put in a lot of time
there, and I think it would be a mistake to do without it.
One observation on organization that hasn't really been
discussed but I think, based on conversations I have had with
John Brennan and the team doing the review, is just worth
noting: One of the ways, if you were going to merge the two
councils, you might consider is to have a deputy who
traditionally looks regionally and by country, that is the
principal deputy job--Steve Hadley occupied it before he was
the national security adviser--and to have a second deputy who
looks at issues functionally--counterterrorism, homeland
security--and has more of the functional issues--counter-
proliferation--that I had when I was at the White House.
It is a way, if you were going to merge them, you could
have two deputies, two of equal rank, that is assistant to the
President, so that they would have the gravitas to be able to
call necessary meetings, Cabinet members, and have direct
access to the President. So there is a model by which you could
do this, I think, and have the access and have the rank, if you
chose to do it that way.
I think that is one of the things they are considering.
That is why I came back to what I said about, look, let us not
worry about boxes, let us worry about effectiveness. I do
think, in fairness to the team that is doing the review, that
that is their mindset, that they want to come up with the right
answer and the question is just how to get there.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. The gentlelady's
time is expired.
The gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I think
this is an important discussion and, as well, hopefully at the
end of the 60 days of the study that the President has
authorized that we will have the right answer, and I think that
is certainly a challenge.
Ms. Townsend, I am interested in your theory about making
sure that any merger still keeps direct access to the
President. I am hoping in 60 days we will glean, from that,
that that will occur. I am not yet committed to a merger. I
think that collaboration is truly key, but there is a directive
from the White House and likely we may have that.
What would be, if a merger were to take place--and you have
said it in your testimony, but just if you can distinctly say
two factors that need to be in place for a successful merger.
Would one be access to the President, direct access?
Ms. Townsend. Yes, ma'am, and the reason for that is, as
was my experience, you will have a threat and it will be
breaking very quickly, and the President will need to
prioritize actions and it really, ma'am, does not lend itself
to having first to find the national security advisory, then to
find the chief of staff, then to get to the President.
Gratefully, these things don't come up all that often, but
when they come up, it needs to be an absolutely crystal clear--
because there is a process by which you get to the President.
If he is in the residence or you make a phone call, there are
people whose job it is to check whether or not you have direct
access, and there is a list.
Unless you have direct access, you have got to get a by-
your-leave permission from somebody else to get through. I
didn't have to use it often, but it was incredibly important
when I had to use it.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I am going to weave in and out of
terrorism and disaster, so obviously I looked at your tenure
and you are quite well known, 2004 to 2007. Help me understand
the disconnect in the notification regarding Hurricane Katrina.
You were there, direct access to the President. What went
wrong?
Ms. Townsend. Well, in fact, for one thing, there was a
whole myriad of factors that contributed to that, but at the
time of the incident, while the Homeland Security Council was
supporting and getting information from the Department of
Homeland Security, it was in fact the Domestic Policy Council
that had been tagged with responsibility for briefing in the
White House.
In fact at the time, the domestic policy adviser, Claude
Allen, was the person who went into the briefing room and
briefed the press initially. We were supporting him. So I can't
tell you exactly how that works. We----
Ms. Jackson Lee. So your name was homeland security but it
didn't connect to the Domestic Council because that was left to
them. It didn't connect that you were homeland security, which
is securing in the wake of terrorism but also FEMA is under
homeland security, but you were distinguished from what the
responsibilities of the Domestic Council, which would have
addressed the question of a tragedy or a natural disaster in
the United States. Is that what you are saying?
Ms. Townsend. We did interact with DHS; we did interact
with FEMA. But there were lots of equities going on in the
midst of that crisis. One person had to be designated. At the
time, the chief of staff had designated the Domestic Policy
Council, so there was a single place to feed things in. It was,
in the early going of that, the Domestic Policy Council.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Okay, so then I see a fracture right
there, which is seemingly that was a conspicuously wrong place
to put it because I think security equates to urgency.
Ms. Townsend. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Not a study, not a review, not a quiet
report, and I am not suggesting that maybe that was the style
of Mr. Allen, but the point is that was obviously a fractured
response, and we needed urgent response. So I am not sure if
the President's review is going to include that as well.
Let me just ask, quickly, if all of you all would comment--
say something is occurring in Pakistan, which it has occurred.
Tell me how you would see that being reported as it relates to
homeland security?
Ms. Townsend. When I----
Ms. Jackson Lee. If all the persons can answer please. As
my time has expired, I yield as my last question, thank you.
Go ahead.
Ms. Townsend. In my time there, if it was a threat
emanating that involved the United--first of all, the first
thing that would have happened was Steve Hadley and I would
have discussed how are we going integrate the information and
how are we going to brief the President? We typically briefed
him together because we had both foreign policy implications to
that--if there was an incident, it would have impacted
Afghanistan; it would have DOD implications. Steve would be
pulling that together, the national security adviser.
I would be looking at how that threat related outside the
region, outside of Pakistan, whether it was the United Kingdom
and that we were talking to intelligence services around the
world. We had the appropriate domestic law enforcement response
and so--and DHS--and so I would be bringing that piece.
Steve Hadley would be bringing the military and foreign
policy piece. Then we would be responsible for integrating that
into a single, comprehensive brief to the President.
Mr. Wainstein. Just to add to that, Congresswoman, keep in
mind that structurally the directorate for combating terrorism
over at the White House co-reported to both the national
security adviser and the homeland security adviser, so anything
having to do with terrorism would co-report, and that
information would get sent to me and to Hadley or to Fran and
to Hadley, because obviously there are homeland dimensions as
well as international military intelligence dimensions to any
terrorism incident throughout the world.
Mr. Palin. Congresswoman, the Massoud threat that came
about is, I think, a good example of where clearly there is an
international dimension that the National Security Council
would be focusing on, but there is also a domestic dimension
that the Homeland Security Council should be focused on in a
strategic way, rather than an operational or tactical manner.
The Department should certainly be pulsing the whole system
operationally and tactically on the kind of reports that need
to go out.
But the kind of threat that we have from Massoud or others,
the homeland security adviser, Homeland Security Council,
should be looking at that from a policy-strategy point of view
and using that as, frankly, an opportunity to advance the
conversation with State and locals about the implications of
that kind of event strategically for the State and locals.
Mr. Frazier. Congresswoman, the information would get out
earlier if the--I am sorry, if the information--take the London
train bombings, for example. As early as we knew about those,
and we were fortunate that a number of the largest of our city
chiefs were in one place at one time, once they became aware,
and this is in the middle of the night and the largest cities
with the subway systems had an immediate decision to make about
deployment and counter measures. Those things would happen in
real time down through that intelligence channel.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Okay.
Mr. Hoffman. Well, it obviously has to be seamless, I
think, because the Mumbai attack showed, I think, it is just as
easy to get on a boat in Karachi and sail to the Port of
Angeles or the Port of Baltimore, any other port in the United
States, as it is to sail to Mumbai.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I just want to make sure--let me just
conclude and yield back. I think what I am gleaning from the
testimony is quick response, direct response, disseminating
information should be our key--and particularly disseminating
intelligence should be our key.
Ms. Townsend, I clearly think there was a breach on
Katrina. I think that was the wrong determination to put it on
the domestic side because whenever you are in dishevel and
upheaval, it is as much vulnerable to Hurricane Katrina as it
might be to attacks on our oil processes in the Gulf. It might
be the time to come and do so, so I think it is homeland
security.
I understand the chiefs were saying that you all happen--
the idea is to have a structure to get the information to you
as quickly as possible if it has a relevance to your security
of your area.
Mr. Frazier. Yes, ma'am----
Ms. Jackson Lee. All right.
Mr. Frazier [continuing]. That is correct.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chair, I yield back, and I think we do
have some work before us in terms of ensuring that this system
works and works well. I yield back.
Ms. Carney [presiding]. Thank you.
Ms. Townsend, I know you--I will dismiss you in a moment.
But I do have a quick question, and this is for after--you can
answer first and then, you know, take your leave, thank you.
You know, you and I have worked together for quite a while.
What would you do differently now?
Ms. Townsend. I actually think that there needs to be--I
would change the personnel structure to more closely match the
NSC, where they are entitled separately. It doesn't all have
under the same White House rules; it gives them greater
flexibility in terms of who they recruit, how they get
detailees.
So, if I was going to change it, I would actually change it
to more closely mirror the NSC system. I would give it more
resources. I think, you know, the--Ken and I were talking
during the break. I don't think I ever got it to one quarter
the size at its largest of the NSC. That is a problem.
The kind of input and expertise I needed was very
different. I needed a lot of technical expertise. I had doctors
on my staff to help me with--think through bio issues and the
pandemic planning issues. So I just--I had a greater need for
real technical expertise on my staff, and I had a--and I didn't
have enough.
So it was a combination. I need more and I need real
particular expertise. You need the flexibility to get that and
then do an issue and send people back. I didn't have the sort
of personnel and budget flexibility that I found they really
did have more of on the national security----
Ms. Carney. Did you share that with the President's review
team or did you even talk to the President's review team?
Ms. Townsend. I did. I was----
Ms. Carney. Okay, good.
Ms. Townsend. I was interviewed and they asked me to share
my observations.
Ms. Carney. Great, yes.
Ms. Townsend. I was very candid.
Ms. Carney. Excellent, thank you. We appreciate your
testimony today. Thanks so much, it is good to see you again.
Gentlemen, please jump in here, first on, you know, what we
ought to do differently than the last administration. Do you
agree with Ms. Townsend's assessment that we need to make it
larger? By the way, did all of you talk to the President's
review team?
Good, very good, great.
Mr. Wainstein.
Mr. Wainstein. Okay, thank you, sir, I will go ahead and
start. I will essentially repeat what Fran said, in terms of
personnel and resources. You know, that is the mantra you hear
from every good bureaucrat: We need more resources.
But I did get the feeling that there were--I always felt
like there were matters of great importance that I really
wanted to have someone dig into more deeply, have someone with
more expertise on them so that we could push them forward. We
just didn't have the personnel. It is not as though I asked for
more personnel and got rebuffed; it is just that that is sort
of the way it was designed initially.
I think this is a good opportunity to step back a minute
and think maybe it should be designed differently. Maybe the
personnel authorization should be done differently so we can
expand it more easily. But I think it is important to keep in
mind where we are and for the homeland security mission, which
is we are still building in a way that we are not necessarily
building on the national security side.
All these efforts, whether it is from pandemic planning to
continuity planning to port security, this is stuff that is not
going to be sort of front burner, but it is going to be a
constant need. We need people who are not--you can't just throw
in to deal with an issue as it bubbles up but who are
constantly minding that issue and then checking back in and
saying here is where we are on port security and the like.
So I am with Fran, and I have passed this on to the folks
who are doing the review at the White House, that, yes, maybe
we don't need the same numbers as the National Security Council
currently has, but we do need more people with greater
expertise in more areas.
Ms. Carney. Great, thank you.
Mr. Palin.
Mr. Palin. Certainly more, but I would differ potentially
from my two colleagues in this way. It is no longer a start-up.
A lot of the work that you see prior to now was a major effort
to simply get the beast started. I think you can especially see
that in the way the HSPDs were often taken on by the Homeland
Security Council--very important work, very detailed work, work
that, in at least my judgment, should have been done probably
by the Department but couldn't be done by the Department, so
the Homeland Security Council was doing it.
I think, as we move forward, having more people that are
focused on the homeland security mission that have background
in the full continuum of risk--counterterrorism and natural
hazard--but also developing a discipline that the Homeland
Security Council staff is focused on strategy policy, and
operational, tactical management issues are the domain of the
Department.
Ms. Carney. Thank you.
Mr. Frazier.
Mr. Frazier. I think two things. One is representation from
State and local practitioners on running a big city law
enforcement agency or fire-medical service is a profession in
and of itself. It brings a different perspective than an
intelligence community professional or military professional.
I don't think that the perspective has been present in the
decision-making levels of those areas that--frankly, who you
are going to have to deal with in a domestic situation. This is
not overseas stuff. And flexibility--these issues come and go
so quickly; a budget flexibility to bring subject matter
experts in is important.
Ms. Carney. To bring them in rather than have them on
staff?
Mr. Frazier. You know, there are so many possibilities that
I think you need to have a core, but there are always going to
be things that are going to take a specialist, and I think you
need the ability to bring them when you need them.
Ms. Carney. Thank you.
Professor Hoffman.
Mr. Hoffman. I think much of what we have heard from my
fellow panelists, at least in my recollection, was part of the
vision in the HSC when it was first established. I think that
is one of the problems is that it has been an unrealized
vision. In fact, if it had been as large and as robust, if it
had had the State and local representation that was originally
planned, we wouldn't be having this discussion actually. It
would be far more difficult to fold it into the NSC.
The fact that it has been something of a Cinderella is
exactly the problem. So it either has to be plussed up and
strengthened or a new organization is found that still gives it
all these capabilities within the NSC rubric.
Ms. Carney. Thank you.
My time is over-expired.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Missouri, Mr.
Cleaver, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Cleaver. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This is kind of a general question to all of you. In my
real life, I am a Methodist minister, and I have been through
two church mergers.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Cleaver. The only thing that could be worse would be--I
don't know what could be worse. So I do have some experience in
mergers, where emotions run high.
My great fear when we talk about these departments merging
is that there will always be a department with a dominant
culture. You know, and so people will go in with war on their
minds because the dominant culture consciously or unconsciously
will try to impose that culture on the other. The chances are
homeland security will be the weaker culture, just by virtue of
its short existence. Am I analyzing this incorrectly? Is the
church a poor analogy?
Mr. Wainstein. I will take that one on initially, sir. You
are right. Any time there is a merge, same thing, you know,
whether it is a church or with government components, it can be
difficult. I actually, in my introductory remarks, talked about
a couple I have been involved in. It is tough. You have got the
human factor you have got to deal with.
I think in this case, that is going to be mitigated by
several things. For one thing--at least the possibility of
friction at the front end--one thing is, you know, they are
starting with a clean slate. There is a new administration.
They are walking in there with primarily new people, at least
in the homeland security area--obviously new homeland security
adviser and the like. So it is not as though you are going to
have to merge two long-standing bodies together with their own
cultures, et cetera. That is one thing.
Secondly, the President has made its clear he is firmly
behind this effort to do this review, and that makes a big
difference. People might have concerns about it, but the
President is the one who has dictated it and ordered it, and
that makes a huge difference.
Mr. Cleaver. Kind of like a bishop in a church--yes.
Mr. Wainstein. Yes, yes, I think so. You know, so you know
that it is coming from on high. The last thing to mention is
the process of this review that they are doing right now. I am
confident that at the end of the day, whoever disagrees with
the recommendation and the President's decision will at least
not be able to challenge the validity of the process because
the folks that I have been working with over there are being
very inclusive, are talking to everybody from all perspectives,
all sort of interest groups who might have an interest in this.
So at the end of the day, no one is going to be able to
say, ``Hey, you know, our interest in this got short shrift,''
because they all will have had some input in the process. That
will go a long way to ensuring its credibility.
Mr. Cleaver. Mr. Palin.
Mr. Palin. If it was just the merger of two churches, I
would agree with everything that was just said. I think a
better analogy is the merger of a United Methodist seminary
with a Free Methodist seminary.
Mr. Cleaver. Won't work.
Mr. Palin. Yes, sir, and the reason, for those that might
not be aware of Wesleyan theology, is that the theory, the
concepts, the practice of national security are very well
developed. Those dogmas and doctrines have a robustness that we
do not yet have in homeland security. There needs to be a
period of time to allow that new discipline to develop. I am
afraid that giving over the care of homeland security to the
big brother, national security, will stifle that potential.
Mr. Cleaver. You hit on something, Mr. Wainstein. What
happens to the national continuity coordinator, which has been
also Presidentially mandated? I mean, what happens there? Who
does the coordination?
Mr. Wainstein. That is one of the myriad functions of the
Homeland Security Council, the homeland security adviser, that
will then have to be sort of allocated if that person and that
council gets merged with the NSC. I don't know. I assume it
would be the homeland security adviser or whatever that
person's title is. The person who has the homeland security
responsibilities in this new entity would retain that because
that is very much a homeland security----
Mr. Cleaver. Yes, but of all the Federal agencies, do you
think that we can chance inside squabbling that could impede
the efficiency of homeland security or national security? I
mean, you know, if it were, you know, HUD and Commerce, we
could probably, you know, work it out and nobody is going to
get hurt, you know, but we are talking about national security
and homeland security, and if there is any chance that the
infighting, which I know for a fact exists even without a
merger in the Federal Government--is it worth the risk?
Mr. Green [presiding]. We will hear the answer, after which
my friend's time will have expired.
Mr. Wainstein. Sir, I think that is a very good--very good
point, very good question. My point is, sort of aside from
looking at the substantive question as to whether homeland
security should be separate from national security, in terms of
the prospect of friction, I think there is that prospect. For
the reasons I cited, I think that that prospect is somewhat
diminished here.
I think advocates of merger would say that is more than--
the concern about that is more than counterbalanced by the in-
fighting that already exists because of the fact that you have
two separate councils operating in the same space. I actually
don't believe that in-fighting is all that great. I never saw
it; I never felt it.
But, obviously, whenever you have two different groups or
two different sets of people working in the same area, there is
a possibility of lack of coordination. So advocates would say,
even if there might be some growing pains after the initial
merger, they are not going to be so much that it outweighs the
benefit of getting rid of this, you know, the jockeying and the
rivalry between the two different councils.
Mr. Cleaver. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Green. Thank you.
The gentleman's time has expired. I believe I am next, but
I will yield to Mr. Massa.
Mr. Massa, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Massa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
distinguished panel members. I am a freshman Member of
Congress, and so I come at this with some level of having to do
evening preparation and studying these questions before us.
As I was doing this last night, it occurred to me that
first I applaud the administration for conducting this review.
It seems very timely and it seems very appropriate. I believe,
however, that I have arrived at a conclusion that it would be
counterproductive to the missions of both councils to merge in
a way that would not understand their distinct identities. I
believe that there are some fundamental conflicts about
ensuring homeland security under civilian authority and
national security that directs a much more robust involvement
of the uniformed military services at all, things like posse
comitatus, et cetera, that goes back to the very nature of why
we have a separate United States Coast Guard with its origins
in the revenue cutters.
So, Professor Hoffman, I would like, if I could,
understanding your background, to hear your thoughts on that if
I might.
Mr. Hoffman. Well, I think--I mean, you have hit the nail
on the head as you are talking about two different cultures and
two different orientations and missions but also in many
respects two different sets of stakeholders as well. The
national security structure, which has been--outward-looking,
that hasn't had to deal with many of the domestic issues, even
when there has been overlap with terrorism. It still, I think,
it has a very different orientation.
So I think that what suggests is that--well, first, I have
trouble using the word merger, but maybe I am alone in that. It
doesn't seem like a merger to me. I mean, merger to me implies
something of parity.
Mr. Massa. Could it be a----
Mr. Hoffman [continuing]. Parity----
Mr. Massa. Could it be a hostile takeover?
Mr. Hoffman. Well, absorption or folding in, I think, was
the diplomatic phrase that I used. But I think you have
identified one of the key concerns, which underlies all of
this, is the fundamental one of civil liberties and about
Government that is able to keep us safe and secure while still
being mindful of the fundamental rights and freedoms that
United States citizens enjoy.
I think, you know, I don't have an answer to your question
about how we facilitate it, but I think your concern, though,
is well-founded, because you are talking about an agency that
hasn't had to pay attention to these things to the extent of
some of the challenges we see with the Department of Homeland
Security, for example, and even some of the challenges we see
with fusion centers who have to deal not just with the
mechanics of intelligence sharing but not least with
successfully doing all that without being seen. No one has the
intention, I think, to violate civil liberties. It is often the
perception, and that perception can undo a lot of good work.
Mr. Massa. Thank you, Professor.
I would like one last specific question, a quick follow-up,
Mr. Chairman, if I might.
I sit on the maritime security subcommittee of this full
body. There are many, many issues before us. But as we talk
about hostile takeovers and mergers and acquisitions in this
environment, it occurs to me that perhaps now is a time to ask
a question about the closer coordination between the United
States Naval Service and the United States Coast Guard, which
has always been very separate. But even today, if we are going
to review at the top-most levels, should we be discussing the
correct placement for the maritime security forces as a body?
Mr. Palin, I would like to hear from you on that. I am
sorry--I am sorry to toss the hand grenade at you, I know.
Mr. Palin. I would be inclined to see a continuation of the
sea services from the Coast Guard, for many of the same
principled reasons that I think Homeland Security Council
should remain largely separate from the National Security
Council. There is an amazing Coast Guard culture. Inside the
Government, it is a command-and-control culture; it is a
military culture. But they have developed an ability to work
with State and locals that is much more similar to the way that
cops on the beat behave than any naval officer I have ever had
the privilege of working with.
The sea services, both the Marines and the naval services,
have a very important outward-looking role to play. I think the
Coast Guard, while they are sometimes tempted--you know, they
would like to go overseas a little bit more for their own
reasons, but their real mission is here at home in our home
waters, even in Fargo last week. We want to preserve, protect,
and advance that very special culture that we have in the Coast
Guard, not lose it inside the much bigger, broader, powerful
naval services.
Mr. Massa. Well, thank you for that, and I tend to agree
with you, having spent 24 years in the Navy and having
developed an incredible respect for the Coast Guard, who,
frankly, often did much more than I was able to do on one-tenth
the budget. So they have certainly earned the admiration of all
my fellow naval officers, and I appreciate your insight into
that and actually concur with you.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman Thompson [presiding]. Thank you very much. I don't
think you will find any disagreement with your statement. We
have found that, personally, during Katrina and some other
emergencies, how the Coast Guard really serves this country and
its citizens well.
Let me thank the witnesses for their testimony and their
patience in staying around while the votes were being taken.
Let me assure you, you were invited because of your
contribution. You were not invited because you are all singing
off the same page. We got exactly what we were looking for in
your testimony, and it will ultimately, we think, go toward
some solution to exactly what we will do, based on that
testimony.
Again, I do thank you for your--the witnesses.
I will yield to the gentleman.
Mr. Green. I am okay.
Chairman Thompson. You all right? I mean, we got a little
time--okay.
Everybody--we are getting out tonight, so everybody is
feeling good.
[Laughter.]
Chairman Thompson. Again, I thank the witnesses for their
valuable testimony and the Members for their questions. The
Members of the committee may have additional questions for you,
and we will ask you to respond expeditiously in writing to
those questions. Hearing no further business, the committee
stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:54 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson of Mississippi for Kenneth
L. Wainstein, Former Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Advisor to
the President
Question 1. The 9/11 Commission Report attributed the terrorist
attacks, in part, to the failure of the intelligence and law
enforcement communities to share information, regardless of its foreign
or domestic origin: Do you believe that the integration of the National
Security Council with the Homeland Security Council or their staffs
would break down the barriers to the sharing of intelligence
information across the Federal Government? How do you think it would
impact information sharing with State, local, and Tribal partners--our
``first preventers''?
Answer. While I agree that the integration of the HSC and the NSC
and their staffs has the potential to improve information sharing to
some extent, I say that with a couple of caveats. First, to the extent
that your question asks whether the separation of the HSC and the NSC
serves to maintain the domestic/foreign divide that underlay some of
the pre-9/11 information-sharing problems, I'm not sure that is the
case in practice. In fact, it can be argued that by merging the
homeland security and counterterrorism responsibilities in the person
of the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and
Counterterrorism (the Homeland Security Advisor), the current structure
actually helps to ensure integration of domestic and foreign
counterterrorism-related information. Second, while integration of the
two councils and staffs may enhance sharing of information (especially
between the Federal intelligence establishment that works primarily
with the NSC and the State and local partners who work primarily
through the HSC), that will happen only if stovepipes are avoided
within the resulting new structure. Simply putting everyone under one
umbrella will not ensure information sharing, as structural divisions
will necessarily be built within that new entity--divisions that could
impede information sharing in the absence of procedures and systems for
regular coordination and sharing. It is my understanding that the
administration is attuned to the need for such coordination and sharing
procedures, regardless of the structure it ultimately adopts.
Question 2. As we think about enhancing State and local
participation in security policymaking, what is your view of the
possibility of moving away from an ``advisory-only'' posture to more
``direct involvement'' in the approval of homeland security policies?
Consider the prospect of creating a new hybrid committee, composed of
State Homeland Security Advisors, to meet regularly to discuss current
homeland security issues early in the policy development process and
transmit to the White House their approval or disapproval. Do you
believe that such a formulation, giving State and local authorities not
only an advisory role but the power to veto pending homeland security
policy would prove beneficial to homeland security policy making?
Answer. I agree that the administration and Congress should
consider different means of giving State and local authorities more
regular and meaningful input into the homeland security policymaking
process. I concur, for example, with the idea of creating detail
positions on the HSC staff for some number of appropriate State and
local officials. Like that provided by the current and past staff
members who have State and local experience, their input in the process
and advice to the Homeland Security Advisor would be invaluable.
While the idea of a committee of State Homeland Security Advisors
is appealing, one would have to consider its role vis-a-vis that of the
HSAC. Also, as for vesting that committee with the power to veto
pending policy, I foresee that raising serious practical and
potentially constitutional issues.
Question 3a. Some proponents of a Homeland Security/National
Security Council merger--including James Carafano from the Heritage
Foundation--have argued that a merger will help ensure that national
security is approached ``holistically.''\1\ Philip Zelikow--the former
executive director of the 9/11 commission--has asserted that the main
reason the HSC has yet to be merged with the NSC was the need to wait
``for DHS leadership to gain enough skill so that such a large White
House policy development crutch would not be needed any longer.''\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ James Carafano, a fellow with the Heritage Foundation, said
that ``having two separate councils made sense six years ago when the
department was brand new, but now it's time to think about national
security issues more holistically,'' CBS 5 News Online, ``Obama Plans
to Overhaul Counterterrorism Apparatus'' January 8, 2009.
\2\ Laura Rozen, ``More Reviews: Merging the Homeland Security and
National Security Councils'' Foreign Policy Magazine, March 6, 2009.
http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/03/06/
more_reviews_merging_the_homeland_security_and_national_security_council
s.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Do you agree structural changes to the Councils would advance the
achievement of a ``holistic national security policy''?
Question 3b. Do you agree that the Homeland Security Council has
served as a ``crutch'' for DHS?
Answer. I agree with the objective of harmonizing policy across the
national security spectrum. As I said in response to question 1
(above), however, the creation of a single council will not
automatically create a ``holistic'' policy process unless we build the
processes that force coordination across the divisions that will
inevitably develop within that council.
As for the ``crutch'' argument, I addressed that issue when I made
the following point in my testimony on April 2, 2009:
``It was my experience that DHS benefited from having an inter-agency
council and staff that were dedicated to its core mission. The
existence of the HSC in the White House reinforced the priority placed
on the Department's success, helped DHS work through difficult
interdisciplinary issues with other agencies and departments, and kept
its issues and concerns on the President's agenda. While that support
was necessary in the Department's earlier years, it is conceivably less
important now that DHS is more established.''
Question 4a. After the Homeland Security Council was established,
then-President Bush announced the creation of the Homeland Security
Advisory Council (HSAC). Bush intended this advisory council to give a
voice to State, local, and Tribal authorities in making recommendations
for homeland security policymaking. However, critics argue the HSAC
does not have any teeth or the capacity to ensure that its
recommendations are carefully reviewed or implemented by senior White
House policymakers.
From your time at the White House, what were the strengths and
weaknesses of how the HSAC collaborated with State and local
authorities?
Question 4b. Similarly, what, if any role, did State and local
authorities have in policy development for the National Security
Council?
Question 4c. Regardless of what emerges from the White House study,
should the HSAC continue to function? If so, are there any changes that
you think should be undertaken to ensure State, local, and Tribal
authorities were more readily represented?
Answer. You are right to consider how the HSAC can have a more
regular and meaningful role in the policymaking process. In the last
administration, it was decided that the HSAC should be empanelled by
and report to the Secretary of Homeland Security--a decision that is in
keeping with the Secretary's coordination role under HSPD-5. While
based on sound reasoning, that decision makes it incumbent on DHS and
the Secretary to engage regularly with the HSAC and to empower it to
play a major role in homeland security policymaking. To ensure that the
HSAC's views get factored into the policymaking process, it is
essential that the Secretary and DHS officials act as a conduit between
the HSAC and the inter-agency process.
Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson for Frances Fragos Townsend,
Former Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Advisor to the President
Question 1. The 9/11 Commission Report attributed the terrorist
attacks, in part, to the failure of the intelligence and law
enforcement communities to share information, regardless of its foreign
or domestic origin: Do you believe that the integration of the National
Security Council with the Homeland Security Council or their staffs
would break down the barriers to the sharing of intelligence
information across the Federal Government? How do you think it would
impact information sharing with State, local, and Tribal partners--our
``first preventers''?
Answer. At the Federal level, effective information sharing,
whether horizontal or vertical, is more dependent on the attention it
receives from the President and his leadership team than which office
is coordinating policy. Information sharing must be a priority at the
highest levels, and that must be unequivocally reinforced down the
chain. Unless it is ingrained in the culture of any administration,
information sharing efforts will fall short--no matter which office has
policy responsibility.
To be sure, the HSC has helped to establish and implement policies
to mandate and facilitate responsible information sharing. While there
is always room for improvement, those policies, to date, have proved
effective, and they are still in place and carried out by the relevant
Departments. If the NSC and HSC are integrated, I trust that, so long
as homeland security issues are adequately represented, the NSC will
continue to monitor information sharing issues and mediate interagency
disputes in that area.
As to our State, local, and Tribal partners, interaction with the
Federal Government, I believe that DHS and the FBI are best equipped to
disseminate, collect, analyze, and synthesize that information. Once
again, there are now mechanisms (e.g., JTTFs, fusion centers, etc.) and
policies in place to ensure that this is done effectively. As long as
those mechanisms are supported and those policies followed, then we
should continue to see improvements in so-called vertical information
sharing. That said, it remains important that local officials have
access to the White House policy process to raise issues of concern. If
there is an integration of the HSC into the NSC the White House will
have to work to ensure the continued ability of State and local
officials to appropriately influence the policy process.
Question 2. As we think about enhancing State and local
participation in security policymaking, what is your view of the
possibility of moving away from an ``advisory-only'' posture to more
``direct involvement'' in the approval of homeland security policies?
Consider the prospect of creating a new hybrid committee, composed of
State Homeland Security Advisors, to meet regularly to discuss current
homeland security issues early in the policy development process and
transmit to the White House their approval or disapproval. Do you
believe that such a formulation, giving State and local authorities not
only an advisory role but the power to veto pending homeland security
policy would prove beneficial to homeland security policy making?
Answer. The importance of State and local participation in security
policymaking cannot be overstated. With that said, it is ultimately the
President's responsibility to protect the country from terrorist
attacks, and he should have the ability to establish administrative
policies to that end. Therefore, while I would continue to encourage
and underscore the need for State and local involvement, I would not
recommend that State and locals be given a veto over administration
policy. However, I do support direct participation of State and local
officials in the policymaking process.
Question 3a. Some proponents of a Homeland Security/National
Security Council merger--including James Carafano from the Heritage
Foundation--have argued that a merger will help ensure that national
security is approached ``holistically.'' Philip Zelikow--the former
executive director of the 9/11 commission--has asserted that the main
reason the HSC has yet to be merged with the NSC was the need to wait
``for DHS leadership to gain enough skill so that such a large White
House policy development crutch would not be needed any longer.''
Do you agree structural changes to the Councils would advance the
achievement of a ``holistic national security policy''?
Answer. I tend to focus less on organizational boxes--whether they
are being created, eliminated, or folded--and more on the mission. Call
it ``holistic'' or whatever you want, but what matters most is that
effective policies and mechanisms are in place to reduce the risk of
another terrorist attack. Regardless of the organizational structure,
there needs to be adequate resources devoted to these issues and the
person on the White House staff with the responsibility needs to have
direct access to the President to advise him on these issues.
Question 3b. Do you agree that the Homeland Security Council has
served as a ``crutch'' for DHS?
Answer. I agree that the HSC has served as an effective and
important partner with all of the agencies with which it has worked,
including DHS.
Question 4a. After the Homeland Security Council was established,
then-President Bush announced the creation of the Homeland Security
Advisory Council (HSAC). Bush intended this advisory council to give a
voice to State, local, and Tribal authorities in making recommendations
for homeland security policymaking. However, critics argue the HSAC
does not have any teeth or the capacity to ensure that its
recommendations are carefully reviewed or implemented by senior White
House policymakers.
From your time at the White House, what were the strengths and
weaknesses of how the HSAC collaborated with State and local
authorities?
Answer. I believe that the HSAC's greatest weakness was its initial
project-oriented focus. The HSAC would work for several months with
State and locals to produce a substantively useful work product. The
problem was that, for most security policies, the administration had to
move fast. Consequently, policies would be established and implemented
far in advance of receiving all of the input from the HSAC. To be
clear, I do not blame anyone for that. It was just part of the learning
process of a new Department.
Secretary Chertoff turned that lesson learned into what I think now
is the HSAC's greatest strength: Its ability to impact decision-making.
HSAC members now more routinely consult with the Secretary of Homeland
Security and provide timely advice on important security issues,
including those directly implicating State and locals.
Question 4b. Similarly, what, if any role, did State and local
authorities have in policy development for the Homeland Security
Council?
Answer. State and local authorities played an active role in policy
development for the HSC. That role took on many forms. I was in
frequent personal contact with State and local officials on security
issues. Moreover, my staff consulted and routinely coordinated with
State and locals, and many times we attended State and local fora to
consider and to debate security policy issues. Finally, because I had
direct access to the President, I can attest personally that he was
routinely made aware of State and local recommendations.
Question 4c. Regardless of what emerges from the White House study,
should the HSAC continue to function? If so, are there any changes that
you think should be undertaken to ensure State, local, and Tribal
authorities were more readily represented?
Answer. Yes. The HSAC members' experience, wisdom, and intellect
alone should ensure its viability. To best ensure that State, local,
and Tribal authorities are meaningfully represented, I would encourage
increased direct contact between the Secretary of DHS and HSAC members.
In other words, instead of sliding back into the era where HSAC members
met with the Secretary every 6 months to discuss written projects,
continue to use HSAC as a sounding board for timely decision-making.
And while I would not discourage regular in-person meetings between the
Secretary and HSAC members, I would not make that the exclusive venue
for discussion. In my experience, sometimes a quick conference call on
an urgent issue is more helpful and productive.
Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson of Mississippi for Philip J.
Palin, Senior Fellow, National Institute for Strategic Preparedness
Question 1. The 9/11 Commission Report attributed the terrorist
attacks, in part, to the failure of the intelligence and law
enforcement communities to share information, regardless of its foreign
or domestic origin: Do you believe that the integration of the National
Security Council with the Homeland Security Council or their staffs
would break down the barriers to the sharing of intelligence
information across the Federal Government? How do you think it would
impact information sharing with State, local, and Tribal partners--our
``first preventers''?
Answer. In my judgment integration of the NSC and the HSC, or the
full integration of their respective staffs, could potentially
contribute to breaking down barriers to sharing intelligence across the
Federal Government. Such integration would, however, potentially
undermine progress--and delay further progress--in sharing intelligence
information between the Federal Government and its State, local, and
Tribal partners. The culture of intelligence appropriate for National
Security is in tension with the culture of intelligence most helpful to
Homeland Security. In the National Security domain there is a real need
for protecting covert sources and methods and not communicating to
possible adversaries what is known. In the Homeland Security domain
there is much greater value in sharing information more broadly and
openly. In Homeland Security there is often an advantage to self-
consciously depend on open sources of intelligence and avoid covert
operations in all but a few cases. The differences between National
Security and Homeland Security are healthy differences. Fully
integrating the HSC staff into the NSC staff would, I expect,
discourage full development of the unique approach to intelligence
gathering and analysis needed by Homeland Security.
Question 2. As we think about enhancing State and local
participation in security policymaking, what is your view of the
possibility of moving away from an ``advisory-only'' posture to more
``direct involvement'' in the approval of homeland security policies?
Consider the prospect of creating a new hybrid committee, composed of
State Homeland Security Advisors, to meet regularly to discuss current
homeland security issues early in the policy development process and
transmit to the White House their approval or disapproval. Do you
believe that such a formulation, giving State and local authorities not
only an advisory role but the power to veto pending homeland security
policy would prove beneficial to homeland security policy making?
Answer. In other settings I have recommended exploring means for
more ``direct involvement'' of State and local personnel in Homeland
Security policy making. One way to do this is implied in your question,
and the proposed empanelling of a group of State and local leaders to
be involved in the sausage making of Homeland Security policy. If this
approach is taken I would recommend a process by which the member
organizations of the Homeland Security Consortium are invited to
nominate for the President's consideration a pool of personnel three
times larger than the board or commission being formed. From this pool
the President would name at least 70 percent of the panel. For the
other 30 percent the President could appoint individuals not nominated
through this process.
The challenge here is securing sufficient and timely attention by
State and local leaders--already fully engaged--to be proactive in the
policy making process. I have worked closely with many of these
individuals. They have the intellectual capability and experiential
background to contribute a great deal. They are extremely time-
challenged.
Another approach would be to develop a rigorous Homeland Security
Fellowship program to attract State and local leadership--perhaps the
next generation of leadership--into HSC staff roles for tenures of
about 18 months. Working with the Governors, key Mayors, and the member
organizations of the Homeland Security Consortium an annual competition
could be conducted. I understand that in the last administration the
HSC staff never exceeded 32. If there were a new class of 12 Fellows
starting every 6 months, the level of State and local expertise
available to the HSC would be substantial and the level of continuity
would ensure that good work was being done. This approach would obviate
the time-challenge noted above. But even a prestigious and reasonably
compensated fellowship program will be difficult to fill. Proactive
engagement with State and local leaders will be needed.
Question 3. Do you know of any statutory or Executive prohibitions
that prevent the National Security Council from consulting and
coordinating with State, local, or private sector entities? If so,
please describe them.
Answer. I know of no such statutory or Executive prohibitions.
Question 4. Putting aside the questions of Federalism, would it be
appropriate to have representation from various levels of government
such as State and local governments in homeland security policymaking?
Answer. There is a practical necessity for various levels of
government to be involved in homeland security policymaking. In most
matters of prevention, protection, response, and recovery to natural,
accidental, or intentional threats State and local resources are more
substantial and more readily applied than those of the Federal
Government. If State and local concerns and capabilities are not
reflected in Federal policy, it is likely to be ineffective--and even
counter-productive--policy. There is a national need to cultivate the
active and enthusiastic support of State and local homeland security
stakeholders. This is most likely to be achieved by involving State and
local participants in the policy making process early and often.
Your question implies that such collaboration might be contrary to
the principles of Federalism. Depending on how such participation is
structured, that is not my understanding of the Constitution. A crucial
insight emerging from the Philadelphia convention was the potential for
dual loyalties. We may be loyal citizens of our home States and of our
Nation. It was especially Madison and his allies who established the
Federal Republic as a creature of the people, at least as much as the
States. The 14th and 17th Amendments have considerably advanced the
direct tie of the people to the Federal Government.
There would certainly be constitutional complications if we were
contemplating the imposition of Federal officials in State offices. But
instead we are inviting U.S. citizens--who happen to be officials of
State and local agencies--to participate in the policymaking process of
their National Government.
Question 5a. It is often said that the problems this country
continues to face in building an effective counterterrorism strategy
centers on our ability to integrate all aspects of the Federal
bureaucracy.
Please describe your views on whether a merger of the two Councils
or staff will help advance the promulgation and execution of policy in
an integrated fashion.
Answer. It is reasonable to expect that integration of the HSC
staff with the NSC might contribute to better coordination of Federal
plans, policies, and processes. This would, of course, not be
automatic, but could be the outcome if supported with effective
leadership and management. But I remain concerned that the efficiencies
thereby produced would come at the expense of efficacy. The National
Security domain has an intellectual coherence that the Homeland
Security domain does not yet have. National Security frameworks and
assumptions are often not conducive to effective Homeland Security
practice. Integration is likely to obscure the differences between the
domains, mostly to the disadvantage of Homeland Security.
Question 5b. Aside from structural changes, what could be done to
better ensure coordination of plans, policies, and processes?
Answer. To better ensure coordination of plans, policies, and
processes there is a particular need for the White House to assert
effective strategic leadership without descending into operations and
management. Over the last several administrations White House staff
have increasingly intervened as managers rather than shapers of policy.
This is an incredibly time-consuming task beyond the capacity (and
perhaps the competence) of any conceivably sized White House staff.
Moreover, this tendency serves to obscure and delay necessary reforms
within the cabinet departments in regard to policy implementation, even
while it distracts the White House staff from effectively conceiving,
crafting, and communicating policy/strategy. While acknowledging the
realities of political and practical urgency, there is a crucial need
for the White House staff--and especially the Homeland Security Council
staff--to step back from operations and implementation and focus
intently on policy, strategy, and coordination. This strategic
restraint would in the long-term--if carried out over the long-term--
make a very substantial contribution to improved coordination of plans,
policies, and processes. Studies of operational effectiveness in both
the public and private sector often find that poor coordination is the
outcome of poorly understood strategy. The most effective way for the
Homeland Security Council to improve coordination would be to expend
more time and effort in crafting and communicating strategic goals and
plans for achieving strategic goals.
Question 6. While we all support enhancing State and local
participation in homeland security policymaking, it is often difficult
to determine who amongst the wide array of State and local officials
would best represent these interests. Specifically, given the diversity
of voices in Governors Mansions, State houses, and local police and
fire houses, how would you recommend the White House identify the right
officials to communicate the collective views of State and local
authorities?
Answer. In terms of identifying and effectively accessing
representatives of the very diverse Homeland Security community, I
recommend the Homeland Security Council staff give priority attention
to three audiences:
1. The Homeland Security Consortium.--This is a broad-based multi-
disciplinary, public-private group that has demonstrated an
ability to effectively engage issues of policy and strategy,
especially where policy/strategy interfaces most directly with
practice.
2. The Governors.--The State Governors, most often represented by
their Homeland Security advisors, are the constitutionally
appropriate and potentially most effective partners in
development of thoughtful and practical policies and
strategies. There are helpful existing mechanisms for engaging
these parties. Examining the very active way the White House
has engaged the Governors in regard to economic recovery
efforts exposes new possibilities.
3. Congressional leadership and staff.--While this should go
without saying, I do not perceive that careful consultation
with the people's representatives has previously characterized
the development of White House Homeland Security policy and
strategy.
Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson of Mississippi for Thomas C.
Frazier, Executive Director, Major Cities Chiefs Association
Question 1. The 9/11 Commission Report attributed the terrorist
attacks, in part, to the failure of the intelligence and law
enforcement communities to share information, regardless of its foreign
or domestic origin: Do you believe that the integration of the National
Security Council with the Homeland Security Council or their staffs
would break down the barriers to the sharing of intelligence
information across the Federal Government? How do you think it would
impact information sharing with State, local, and Tribal partners--our
``first preventers''?
Answer. In my earlier testimony, I recounted law enforcement's
information sharing challenges with the Homeland Security Council
(HSC), and of our very limited contacts with the National Security
Council (NSC). While postulating on the effectiveness of a hypothetical
merger of the two is hazardous at best, we would point out that an
environment where the absorption of the HSC into the much larger and
more powerful NSC is not an environment where we feel that our
interests and needs in the information-sharing realm would
substantially improve. We feel that the potential of loss in this area
is greater than the potential for gain.
Question 2. As we think about enhancing State and local
participation in security policymaking, what is your view of the
possibility of moving away from an ``advisory-only'' posture to more
``direct involvement'' in the approval of homeland security policies?
Consider the prospect of creating a new hybrid committee, composed of
State Homeland Security Advisors, to meet regularly to discuss current
homeland security issues early in the policy development process and
transmit to the White House their approval or disapproval. Do you
believe that such a formulation, giving State and local authorities not
only an advisory role but the power to veto pending homeland security
policy would prove beneficial to homeland security policy making?
Answer. MCC is warm to the idea of a forum of State, local, and
Tribal officials that have real power in the homeland security
policymaking process. However, we feel that limiting membership to only
State Homeland Security Advisors is too narrow a focus. Most ``first
preventer'' and ``first responder'' resources are ``owned'' at the
municipal level, not the State level. Similarly, State Homeland
Security Advisors are seldom selected from the ranks of local public
safety professionals. Those who pay the bills, and who are ultimately
responsible for building and sustaining necessary capacity should have
seats at the table as well. Elected leadership of large national
organizations like Major Cities Chiefs, Major County Sheriffs, and the
International Association of Chiefs of Police are representative
examples of bodies headed by active duty municipal leaders representing
tens of thousands of key assets, personnel, and communities. They
deserve to be directly involved.
As to ``veto power''--MCC would urge caution. The current
policymaking process is already almost unfathomably complex, containing
many critical-path ``go--no go'' points. MCC would recommend a
thoughtful analysis of where the advice of such a forum would be most
beneficial, and to fit it into existing mechanisms without creating an
additional potential roadblock.
Question 3. As an advocate for State and local authorities, how
effective has the Department of Homeland Security's Assistant Secretary
for State and Local Law Enforcement been?
Answer. MCC commends the foresight and leadership shown by Congress
in creating this important position at the policy-making level of DHS.
Likewise, we commend the selection of Sheriff Ted Sexton to fill this
position. However, we feel that DHS has more tolerated than embraced
the position, as evidenced by Assistant Secretary Sexton's small staff,
limited budget, and limited organizational ``clout''. In the Washington
environment we all know that people who control people and money are
carefully listened to. People who don't are listened to. We feel
strongly that a renegotiated role for this position, specifically a
role that includes decision-making authority over law enforcement
Grants and Training money, would be very beneficial to all parties.
Question 4. One issue that has not yet abated in Washington
concerns difficulties that many State and local law enforcement
officials have receiving or retaining security clearances from the
Federal Government. Classified policy discussions at the White House
level may require additional vetting or background specifications. I
understand that some major police department unions restrict the types
of vetting and security protocols that their officers may be subject
to. Is this correct, and if so, have these police organizations
developed work-arounds to meet Federal and local requirements and
enable clearance adjudication?
Answer. The heart of this issue involves sworn State/local police
officers being required to take polygraph examinations to receive
security clearances sufficient to permit assignment to joint terrorism
task forces (JTTFs). When the polygraph policy was instituted by the
FBI, some officers questioned this new requirement. Many police
departments have policies in place limiting the use of polygraphs in
administrative investigations. When the FBI began requiring polygraphs,
some unions reviewed the policy and determined that requests for
assignment to JTTFs is a voluntary action taken by the police officer,
and as such the polygraph was considered a condition of employment.
This position has resolved the issue for most departments.
On behalf of the Major Cities Chiefs Association, I would like to
express our appreciation for the honor of the opportunity to express
our views on these important issues.
Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson for Bruce Hoffman,
Professor, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University
Question 1. The 9/11 Commission Report attributed the terrorist
attacks, in part, to the failure of the intelligence and law
enforcement communities to share information, regardless of its foreign
or domestic origin: Do you believe that the integration of the National
Security Council with the Homeland Security Council or their staffs
would break down the barriers to the sharing of intelligence
information across the Federal Government? How do you think it would
impact information sharing with State, local, and Tribal partners--our
``first preventers''?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. As we think about enhancing State and local
participation in security policymaking, what is your view of the
possibility of moving away from an ``advisory-only'' posture to more
``direct involvement'' in the approval of homeland security policies?
Consider the prospect of creating a new hybrid committee, composed of
State Homeland Security Advisors, to meet regularly to discuss current
homeland security issues early in the policy development process and
transmit to the White House their approval or disapproval. Do you
believe that such a formulation, giving State and local authorities not
only an advisory role but the power to veto pending homeland security
policy would prove beneficial to homeland security policy making?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. Do you know of any statutory or Executive prohibitions
that prevent the National Security Council from consulting and
coordinating with State, local, or private sector entities? If so,
please describe them.
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4. Putting aside the questions of Federalism, would it be
appropriate to have representation from various levels of government
such as State and local governments in homeland security policymaking?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 5a. It is often said that the problems this country
continues to face in building an effective counter-terrorism strategy
centers on our ability to integrate all aspects of the Federal
bureaucracy.
Please describe your views on whether a merger of the two Councils
or staff will help advance the promulgation and execution of policy in
an integrated fashion.
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 5b. Aside from structural changes, what could be done to
better ensure coordination of plans, policies, and processes?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 6. While we all support enhancing State and local
participation in homeland security policymaking, it is often difficult
to determine who amongst the wide array of State and local officials
would best represent these interests. Specifically, given the diversity
of voices in Governors Mansions, State houses, and local police and
fire houses, how would you recommend the White House identify the right
officials to communicate the collective views of State and local
authorities?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.