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**DEFEATING THE IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE  
DEVICE (IED) AND OTHER ASYMMETRIC  
THREATS: REVIEWING THE PERFORM-  
ANCE AND OVERSIGHT OF THE JOINT  
IED DEFEAT ORGANIZATION (JIEDDO)**

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HEARING

BEFORE THE

OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

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# CONTENTS

## CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS

2009

	Page
HEARING:	
Thursday, October 29, 2009, Defeating the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) and Other Asymmetric Threats: Reviewing the Performance and Oversight of the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) .....	1
APPENDIX:	
Thursday, October 29, 2009 .....	39

### THURSDAY, OCTOBER 29, 2009

#### **DEFEATING THE IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE (IED) AND OTHER ASYMMETRIC THREATS: REVIEWING THE PERFORMANCE AND OVERSIGHT OF THE JOINT IED DEFEAT ORGANIZATION (JIEDDO)**

##### STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Snyder, Hon. Vic, a Representative from Arkansas, Chairman, Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee .....	1
Wittman, Hon. Rob, a Representative from Virginia, Ranking Member, Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee .....	2

##### WITNESSES

Metz, Lt. Gen. Thomas F., USA, Director, Joint Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat Organization .....	6
Schear, Dr. James A., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations, Department of Defense .....	3
Solis, William M., Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, Government Accountability Office .....	8

##### APPENDIX

###### PREPARED STATEMENTS:

Metz, Lt. Gen. Thomas F. ....	55
Schear, Dr. James A. ....	48
Solis, William M. ....	68
Wittman, Hon. Rob ....	43

###### DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

[There were no Documents submitted.]

###### WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING:

Mrs. Davis .....	93
------------------	----

###### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING:

Dr. Snyder .....	97
------------------	----



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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE,  
*Washington, DC, Thursday, October 29, 2009.*

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in room HVC-210, Capitol Building, Hon. Vic Snyder (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. VIC SNYDER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ARKANSAS, CHAIRMAN, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE**

Dr. SNYDER. Good morning. The hearing will come to order. Welcome, gentlemen. I think for most of you this is your first time in our temporary hearing room here, but this lovely room is here in the Capitol.

This is the second hearing that this subcommittee has had in the last couple years on the performance and oversight of the Joint Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat Organization, known as JIEDDO. This hearing follows last year's hearing, which I believe was in September of last year, and will explore the question: Is current oversight of JIEDDO within the Department of Defense (DOD) sufficient for an organization receiving funding of such considerable size, flexibility, and importance?

IEDs remain the number one cause of casualties to coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Although IEDs are not a new threat, they have been used with unprecedented frequency in Iraq and Afghanistan. While the decrease in successful attacks in Iraq is encouraging, that success has not been replicated in Afghanistan, which has seen an increase in the success and lethality of attacks with our increase in forces there.

Since former U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander General Abizaid called for a Manhattan Project-like effort 5 years ago to defeat IEDs, Congress has provided nearly \$17 billion to DOD's efforts. This effort has grown from a 12-man Army task force to the Joint IED Defeat Organization, or JIEDDO, which currently employs a staff of about 3,600 dedicated government, military, and contract personnel.

There is no doubt that despite the complexity and difficulty of its mission, JIEDDO and its predecessor organizations have made significant contributions to the counter-IED effort. But we should still

ask, is this effort as successful as it could be? Have the financial controls of oversight kept pace with an organization of this size?

One thing we want to learn today is whether DOD's own oversight over the JIEDDO functions has evolved to an appropriate level and with sufficient controls. Last year this subcommittee recommended that JIEDDO reexamine whether JIEDDO's reporting arrangement to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF) was appropriate. Has this been done and what were the conclusions?

As the subcommittee noted in last year's report on JIEDDO, having such a high-ranking, high-level senior boss can easily lead to little senior attention during this very, very busy time for our forces in the Pentagon. For this hearing, as last year, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has had difficulty deciding on a witness who could comment on OSD oversight of JIEDDO.

I look forward to this hearing today. We very much appreciate all of your efforts, appreciate the efforts of JIEDDO and all the personnel, both military, civilian, and contract, who work in this organization.

I now turn to Mr. Wittman for any comments he would like to make.

**STATEMENT OF HON. ROB WITTMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, RANKING MEMBER, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE**

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Chairman Snyder.

And good morning to our witnesses. Thank you so much for taking time out of your busy schedule to join us today.

As the gruesome events that unfolded in Baghdad earlier this week prove, improvised explosive devices, or IEDs, remain a deadly threat, especially in the Middle East and South Asia. In fact, the number and lethality of IED incidents in Afghanistan continues to grow and the nation of Pakistan is suffering frequent IED attacks also.

Even the United States is not immune to this threat and our deployed troops cannot ever let their guard down. Despite the best efforts of JIEDDO and others, it is still far too easy for evildoers to make and deploy bombs that indiscriminately kill and maim scores of innocent people.

If there were an easy human or physics problem here we would have had the solution already. I know we have made progress, but I would like to know how we can do better and what it will take to get there.

Today we are following up on the subcommittee's excellent report in November 2008, which quoted General Metz, who is here as a witness today, as saying that the IED threat would never be completely removed from the battlefield. And I am sure General Metz is correct. The enemy will always seek vulnerabilities to attack, and we cannot harden everything and still be effective in counter-insurgency operations.

Even so, I am disturbed by the negative trends in Afghanistan. A year ago this subcommittee noted that effective attacks against coalition forces were increasing compared to previous years. Since then the number of effective attacks has continued to climb, and

climb at a rate well beyond the increased number of coalition forces deployed in country.

Despite this ever-worsening operational threat to our troops, funding for JIEDDO has been significantly reduced. Maybe this funding reduction reflects better conditions in Iraq and doesn't reflect a reduced effort in Afghanistan. It is difficult to tell from here, since DOD continues to request JIEDDO funds as colorless money that can be spent as command wishes without informing Congress how the work is prioritized.

The subcommittee expressed concern with this funding mechanism in last year's report, and our concern was not addressed and as you can see has now led to real questions about JIEDDO's priorities. With attacks in Afghanistan increasing, I asked for General Metz to provide us some detail on efforts being made in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. In addition, I ask all witnesses today, as they are able, the status of the issues raised in our November 2008 report.

Mr. Chairman, thank you so much for calling this hearing, and I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wittman can be found in the Appendix on page 43.]

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Wittman.

Our witnesses today are Dr. James Schear, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations in the Department of Defense; Lieutenant General Thomas Metz, the U.S. Army director of the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, JIEDDO.

General Metz, you are leaving soon, are you not at some time? We appreciate your service.

And Mr. William Solis, the Director of Defense Capabilities and Management, the Government Accountability Office (GAO).

Dr. Schear, we'll begin with you. The clock will be for five minutes; if you see the red light and you have some more things to tell us feel free to carry on. So, Dr. Schear.

**STATEMENT OF DR. JAMES A. SCHEAR, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PARTNERSHIP STRATEGY AND STABILITY OPERATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**

Dr. SCHEAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Members of the committee—of the subcommittee, ladies and gentlemen, it is my great pleasure to testify here today about the important work that the U.S. Department of Defense is doing in countering the threat of improvised explosive devices, and it is a particular honor to be able to appear here this morning with Lieutenant General Tom Metz, who has provided superb leadership for this effort over the past two years.

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask that my written testimony be submitted—

Dr. SNYDER. Yes. All statements will be made part of the record.

Dr. SCHEAR. Thank you. Let me also begin by thanking you, and along with you Congressman Wittman and the members of this committee, and indeed the full committee, for your unwavering support for our armed forces service personnel who serve courageously in hostile environments in today's irregular warfare battle

space. The wars of the past decade have challenged our military greatly to adjust and adapt rapidly to deadly tactics devised by our enemies on the battlefield, and your unstinting support has been critical in meeting those challenges.

Clearly, as Mr. Wittman has said, sir, one of the biggest challenges we face is the IED. It remains, without question, the violent extremist's weapon of choice against U.S. armed forces. Over the past year we have seen an increase in the use of IEDs against U.S. forces in Afghanistan not only as a standalone weapon but also increasingly part of complex attacks involving more conventional direct-fire weapons. The IED is the weapon responsible for inflicting the most casualties on U.S. forces in Afghanistan.

Although we have seen on the Iraq side a decrease in the number of attacks and IEDs have become less effective against U.S. personnel there, the insurgents continue to use IEDs to attack and destabilize the Iraqi government.

Additionally, IEDs have become a major source of concern in parts of Africa, other parts of the Asia Pacific region, and Latin America. In this time of growing asymmetric threats we believe the use of IEDs will remain the most likely weapon of choice for violent groups because they are low-cost, high-impact weapons that inflict maximum casualties at minimum risk and expense.

Within the Defense Department the Joint IED Defeat Organization has the responsibility, as you know, to lead, focus, and advocate all counter-IED efforts. Secretary Gates and his leadership team strongly support JIEDDO and the institutionalization of its beneficial impact throughout our large and diverse defense community.

The unique authorities and capabilities of JIEDDO enable us to rapidly experiment, develop, and field both material and non-material solutions to the grave and persistent threat of IEDs. Perhaps most important, JIEDDO is delivering for our customers. Our combatant commanders continue to confirm that it provides a unique and vital capability to counter IEDs.

As this committee knows, JIEDDO is truly a joint organization that relies on inputs from across the Department. In my written testimony I provide more detail on JIEDDO's three-tiered governance structure, but let me summarize its key features quickly.

JIEDDO first presents its initiatives to the Joint Resource and Acquisition Board, so-called JRAB, which is composed of O-6 and senior civil service members from across the Department. After that analysis the initiative is then briefed to the Joint Integrated Process Team, the JIPT. This board includes general and flag officers as well as civilian senior executive service members.

Finally, issues that are approved by the JIPT for senior-level review go to our DEPSECDEF-chaired senior resource steering group, which includes the deputy as well as three- and four-star officers, including the vice chiefs of staff of each of the services. And it is drawn from the same organizations that support the effort at lower levels. When recommendations are teed up in a written form for the deputy he makes a final decision on whether to fund a proposed initiative.

I appreciate how complex this oversight structure may appear. It is, indeed, multifaceted. It remains a work in progress. JIEDDO ex-



pects to publish a revised governance structure by the end of November and the applicable DOD Directive 2000.19E is due for revision next year.

In terms of the distinctive role played by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, let me provide a bit more detail—and I realize I am already overstepping my time, sir. Our Under Secretary of Defense, Michèle Flournoy, serves as the principal staff assistant to DEPSECDEF and a principal advisor to JIEDDO regarding DOD policy and plans to ensure that the organization's activities are fully supportive of our larger defense and national security strategies.

When OSD Policy meets within—serves on the governance structure we typically ask six questions: First, has the combatant commander requested this specific IED capability? That is usually easy to determine but sometimes we have to do some special digging.

Secondly, has the capacity been appropriately tested for both field uses and to ensure that it will work as expected? While we are acutely conscious of the need to ensure fast fielding of systems we also want to keep defective or non-performing items out of the field.

Question three: Does the initiative fit within other DOD or U.S. Government policies? And in cases where issues do arise, how are we to resolve actual or potential conflict?

Question four: Does the initiative provide a comprehensive approach that includes a plan for acquisition, training, and sustaining the capability over time? While JIEDDO initiatives rely upon the services to take on these tasks after the first two years of funding, it is essential that the basics for those first two years be well laid out.

Question five: Is JIEDDO maintaining a balanced portfolio? That is, are we doing everything we can to balance short-term acquisition and medium-term research and development investments? And how well are we balancing high-risk, big-return efforts against lower-risk, moderate-return efforts? And are we providing defensively-focused force protection in relation to our ability to work on the offensive side, on the attack-the-network priority?

And finally, the last question: What can we do to improve our coalition counter-IED efforts, including especially with members of the coalition who operate alongside of or in lieu of our service members in today's irregular warfare environment?

I would say, sir, of all those questions I would lay special emphasis on the last one. OSD Policy works with JIEDDO to assist our partners and allies in developing compatible counter-IED technology and training. We have worked to provide the necessary authorizations and funding so that counter-IED equipment, like the SYMPHONY system, and tactics can be provided to our coalition partners.

In the future we have, regrettably, high confidence that the use of IEDs by terrorists, insurgents, and criminals will continue across the globe and probably increase. And while the need to have an organizational steward like JIEDDO for this critical mission may be affected by changes in the size of our expeditionary deployments over time, the requirement itself will not disappear.

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for this opportunity to testify. We look forward to working closely with members of this committee on this important task in the future. Thank you, sir.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Schear can be found in the Appendix on page 48.]

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Dr. Schear.  
General Metz.

**STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. THOMAS F. METZ, USA, DIRECTOR,  
JOINT IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE (IED) DEFEAT OR-  
GANIZATION**

General METZ. Chairman Snyder and Congressman Wittman, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today and report on the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, which I am indeed honored to lead.

Since our last meeting in September there have been over 10,000 IED incidents in Iraq. These incidents are diverse, and the devices that were used reflect a wide range of arming and firing switches ranging from relatively simple command wire to sophisticated radio-controlled and passive infrared switches. Yet in spite of the large volume and the diversity of the IED attacks the number that are effective against our forces continued to decline for the second straight year.

While I am pleased with the progress in Iraq, our work is not yet done. Our organization is poised to support our continuing diplomatic mission and U.S. forces as the drawdown proceeds in accordance with the security agreement.

In addition, while we have learned an enormous amount from our experience in Iraq, not all of these lessons translate to our efforts in Afghanistan. The environment and the enemy in Afghanistan pose many different and difficult challenges.

Although initially slower to develop in Afghanistan, the IED has now replaced direct-fire weapons as the enemy's weapon of choice. Furthermore, Afghanistan local insurgents, tribal faction, and the Taliban enjoy a greater freedom of action to emplace large numbers of IEDs in movement corridors such as the Ring Road, which are so vital to our success.

Our challenge is further compounded by these groups' intimidation of the local populace. To ensure the most comprehensive support to this complex theater, JIEDDO is deploying over 100 initiatives to Afghanistan.

IEDs also pose a significant threat outside of CENTCOM. Nearly 300 IED incidents every month around the globe confirm that the dangers from this weapon reach far beyond the borders of Afghanistan and Iraq. Since September of 2008 there have been more than 3,500 total IED incidents outside of Afghanistan and Iraq, and the number is growing. Able to rapidly exploit readily available commercial technology, violent extremists easily share the results of their efforts across the near real-time global communications grid.

We support all the combatant commanders as they respond to these IED threats through a rapid acquisition process that we call the Joint IED Capabilities Approval and Acquisition Management Process, the acronym JCAAMP. Congressionally-directed funding

allows us to act with a sense of urgency inside 24-month period where the Department's budget processes cannot normally operate. As a result, over the past three years the JIEDDO has evolved as the Department's premier agency for rapid development and delivery of capabilities in the hands of warfighters.

The JCAAMP is not perfect, but it allows us to bypass current cumbersome, risk-adverse processes associated with the service acquisition efforts in support of their force modernization programs. The exploitation and use of information is one of the greatest asymmetric advantages we have. The Counter-IED Operations Integration Center, or the acronym COIC, establishes this for JIEDDO by fusing near real-time information from over 100 databases and delivering requests for support back to warfighters in record time for use at the tactical level of targeting.

However, I continue to believe the ultimate key to our success has been and will always be world-class training. Unfortunately, no one anticipated the sheer amount and complexity of the training required to successfully counter IEDs.

JIEDDO's mission is to grab emerging and hard training problems and find ways for the services and our partners to overcome them. We are making great progress but much remains to be done.

Since our last meeting I have become more convinced than ever that we live in an era of persistent conflict. I agree with Secretary Gates that the clear lines that distinguish conventional and irregular forces have blurred.

We now confront complex hybrid forms of conflict ranging from near-peer competitors who will use irregular and asymmetric tactics to non-state and rogue state actors capable of generating violence across a broad spectrum. These weapons range from IEDs to weapons of mass destruction.

We have been in this fight for eight years, and I believe this enemy will continue to fight us for the foreseeable future and probably beyond my lifetime. Violent extremists will continue to wage conflict against human targets, and their weapon of choice will continue to be the IED.

As a result, we can never be satisfied with the results we have achieved until we have diminished the strategic effects of the IED, reducing their appeal for increased and global employment. We must strive for an ever greater impact on the continued aggressive developments of new, innovative ways to make this weapon system too costly to produce and too risky to employ. While we will never completely chase this weapon off the battlefield, we must continue to eliminate its ability to affect us strategically.

A permanent JIEDDO, funded in the base budget, sends a clear signal that we understand the complexities of the challenge. We must be willing to invest the money, the time, the energy, and the talent to make sure we win. This is not an easy task, but I believe that it is necessary.

In closing, allow me to point out that I have proudly worn the uniform of the United States Army for over 43 years. As I near retirement, I could not have asked for a better assignment. I could not be more proud of the men and women who are helping me defeat the IED as a weapon of strategic influence. They are passionate about our mission, and they display a sense of urgency as

they work to defeat the device, attack the networks, and train the force.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you and the Members of Congress and the subcommittee for your continued support of JIEDDO, the sincere interest in making sure that our warfighters have an agile, responsive, passionate organization focused on providing them the best counter-IED capabilities the Nation has to offer. Thank you for inviting me here today to discuss the issue I feel most passionate about, and I look forward to your questions. And I apologize for going—

Dr. SNYDER. You are fine. Thank you, General Metz.

[The prepared statement of General Metz can be found in the Appendix on page 55.]

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Solis.

**STATEMENT OF WILLIAM M. SOLIS, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CAPABILITIES AND MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE**

Mr. SOLIS. Chairman Snyder, Ranking Member Wittman, members of the subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss DOD's management and oversight of its efforts to defeat improvised explosive devices, or IEDs. As mentioned earlier, these devices continue to be the number one threat to troops in Iraq and Afghanistan.

DOD created JIEDDO in January 2006 to focus its counter-IED efforts and positioned it to report directly to the Deputy Secretary of Defense rather than through traditional lines of authority and oversight. Since that time we have issued several reports on JIEDDO's management and operations, including one we are going to issue today.

My testimony today will draw on this latest report plus ongoing work to discuss: one, steps JIEDDO and DOD have taken to improve the management of counter-IED efforts; and two, challenges affecting DOD's ability to oversee JIEDDO.

Since its creation JIEDDO has taken several steps to improve management of counter-IED efforts. These actions include developing an overarching framework for Department-wide counter-IED efforts, which delineates specific roles and responsibilities for organizations involved in those efforts, and working with the services to improve visibility over their counter-IED efforts.

While these actions represent some progress, we have identified several challenges that continue to affect DOD's ability to oversee JIEDDO. First, JIEDDO and the services lack full visibility over counter-IED initiatives throughout DOD even though many officials told us that such visibility would be of great benefit in coordinating and managing the Department's counter-IED programs.

For example, although JIEDDO was mandated to focus all DOD actions to help defeat IEDs, most of the organizations engaged in the counter-IED efforts prior to JIEDDO have continued to develop, maintain, and in some cases expand their own counter-IED capabilities. Although JIEDDO and several service organizations have developed their own counter-IED databases, there is no comprehensive database to combine this information. Further, these service databases do not capture all the counter-IED efforts, limiting their

ability to provide JIEDDO with timely and comprehensive summary of their existing initiatives.

Second, JIEDDO continues to face difficulties coordinating the transition of funding responsibilities for counter-IED efforts to the services. Transition is hindered by funding gaps between JIEDDO's transition timeline and DOD's base budget cycle. It is also hindered when JIEDDO does not fully consider service requirements in the acquisition process.

For example, in 2007 JIEDDO funded a fielded man-portable IED jammer. Although the system was developed in response to a Central Command requirement, the Army and Marine Corps have no formal requirement for it, casting doubts as to which DOD organizations will be required to pay for the continued procurement and sustainment of the system. This could delay the transition of the program, forcing JIEDDO to continue to fund it at the expense of new initiatives.

Third, JIEDDO lacks clear criteria for defining what counter-IED training initiative it will fund. As a result, JIEDDO has funded training activities that have primary uses other than defeating an IED, such as role players and simulated villages to replicate Iraqi conditions at various combat training centers.

Fourth, JIEDDO lacks the means as well as reliable data to gauge the effectiveness of counter-IED efforts. For example, we found that JIEDDO lacks key data needed to evaluate the effectiveness of its counter-IED initiatives.

Fifth, JIEDDO has not consistently applied its counter-IED initiative acquisition process, which was referred to earlier as JCAAMP. For example, we found that 48 of the 56 JIEDDO counter-IED initiatives we reviewed have been excluded from all or part of JIEDDO's review and approval process, including 16 that required approval by the DEPSECDEF or the JIEDDO director.

Sixth, JIEDDO lacks adequate internal controls required to provide DOD assurance that it is achieving its objectives. In July 2009 JIEDDO reported that a material weakness has existed in its internal controls since the organization was established. Such a weakness could adversely affect JIEDDO's ability to meet its objectives.

In conclusion, although JIEDDO has taken important steps, the Department continues to face a number of challenges that, if unaddressed, may result in the potential duplication of effort, unaddressed capability gaps, and inefficient use of resources in a fiscally-challenged environment. Further, the Department will lack the basic confidence that it has retained the necessary capabilities to address the IED threat for the long term.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I will be happy to take any answers from you or the subcommittee.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Solis can be found in the Appendix on page 68.]

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Solis.

We have been joined by some members who are not members of the subcommittee, and they will be allowed to participate in—

You will get bumped down the line if we have some other subcommittee members come in, but we will give everyone a chance to—

Mr. Solis, you said DOD concurred with your recommendations. Who specifically concurred—what person?

Your microphone is not on, sir.

Mr. SOLIS. I would have to see, but it was not—we have that? It was JIEDDO for the Department.

Dr. SNYDER. I am sorry?

Mr. SOLIS. JIEDDO for the Department.

Dr. SNYDER. JIEDDO. That is not really a person, though, is it?

Mr. SOLIS. I would have to look.

Dr. SNYDER. I was actually wondering who the individual person was.

General Metz, I want to go through some of the criticism that GAO made and give you a chance to respond, and I am going from the draft I was given a day or two ago—I am going to read from their conclusions. First, JIEDDO and the services lack full visibility over counter-IED initiatives throughout DOD. First, JIEDDO and the services lack a comprehensive database of all existing counter-IED initiatives, limiting their visibility over counter-IED efforts across the Department.

Although JIEDDO is currently developing a management system that will track initiatives as they move through JIEDDO's acquisition process, the system will only track JIEDDO-funded initiatives, not those being independently developed and procured by the services and other DOD components. What is your response to that criticism?

General METZ. Well, sir, I appreciate the report including that we are working on that database. It was obvious to me when I came in that the pace at which business had been done, that sense of urgency was needed.

When General Meiggs stood up the organization the IEDs in Iraq were about 1,500 a month and they were to grow to 2,500 a month and remain there for most—the last of 2006 and the first of 2007. So I am sure his priorities were to help the warfighter. Knowing that we needed that data, we have worked on developing our internal database effort.

Now, as it relates to us not having the visibility of the other services or agencies that are doing things, I think we do. I think there are multiple—

Dr. SNYDER. So you don't agree? You do not agree with Mr. Solis' criticism?

General METZ. I do not agree that we don't have any awareness of what is going on across the Department because there are enough forums that—

Dr. SNYDER. I think his criticism was not that you didn't have "any awareness." His criticism is you lack a comprehensive database. You agree you lack a comprehensive database?

General METZ. I agree that we lack a comprehensive database and we are working on not only ours but to work out how we interface with others to ensure that we don't have those—a duplicative effort. I think, however, that an overlapped effort may be wise to ensure gaps and seams are covered, but we do need to work to create that database.

Dr. SNYDER. To assess that you have an overlapped effort, though, implies that you would actually have a database that you

could look at and say, "Yes, they are working on that too and we are working on it, but that is okay."

Second—this is again from the GAO—the services lack full visibility over those JIEDDO-funded initiatives that bypass JIEDDO's acquisition process. With limited visibility both JIEDDO and the services are at risk of duplicating efforts. What is your comment about that?

General METZ. Sir, the services participate in our JCAAMP process, which includes "A"-level assessments of initiatives, flag-level, and if it is—and now in almost every case the cumulative efforts are above \$25 million, which our directive says I have got to go to the Secretary. So the senior resource steering committee gets a four-star and above-level look at all those initiatives.

And I think your concerns are those initiatives that don't go through the JCAAMP process—

Dr. SNYDER. This is a specific criticism that you have—that there are initiatives that are funded by JIEDDO that, in the words of GAO, "bypass JIEDDO's acquisition process." They would not come before the groups that you referred to.

General METZ. Yes, sir.

Dr. SNYDER. Do you agree that GAO's criticism is—

General METZ. Well, I agree that there are some initiatives that I have approved below the \$25 million level that I have moved quickly to the warfighters because I saw the urgency and made that decision. I believe that we have, during that process, tried to be as transparent as we possibly could, and we certainly aren't hiding data from anyone.

But we could be rightfully criticized if indeed someone says that we did not fully disclose. But my efforts to be transparent in the leadership of this organization is one of the very high priorities—

Dr. SNYDER. My time is about to run out, but I think you talk about in your—everyone wants you to have speed at moving things to the warfighter, but the criticism is that the services who oversee the warfighters directly, that they lack full visibility over things that you fund. I mean, that is their criticism. It is either accurate or it is not.

But you are saying if things move the warfighters and services do indeed know about it. Is that what you are saying?

General METZ. I think that we cross over in so many forms throughout the Department—

Dr. SNYDER. Right.

General METZ [continuing]. That I believe that the knowledge is there, and I would have to work carefully with each piece of data that the GAO has collected.

Dr. SNYDER. Yes. My time is expired.

Mr. Wittman.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Again, gentlemen, thank you for joining us today.

General Metz, I want to go back and talk a little bit about JIEDDO funding. And you had spoken about the number of attacks, and acknowledging that the threat is growing, alarmingly so, and especially here on the home front.

If you look at the funding you see in 2008 \$4.3 billion allocated for JIEDDO; in 2009 \$3.1 billion; in 2010 \$2.1 billion. As we are

seeing the attacks on our troops overseas and the worldwide threat growing my question is, why was your funding cut almost in half during that period of time?

General METZ. Sir, I think that that cut reflects the fact that we have harvested many of the low-hanging fruit efforts. For example, pushing the enemy off of radio-controlled arming and initiation devices in Iraq was a very expensive effort to proliferate those jammers—develop them, ensure that they were interoperable, get them to the force—that was a huge amount of money, in a couple of those years close to \$1 billion. Now that we have that technology and we have that capability there was no need for a continued funding line for that particular initiative, the remote control improvised explosive device (CREW) initiative.

Also, many of the material solutions that were expensive have been invested in and are being used. It is interesting to me, and it may be counterintuitive to many, but many of the non-material solutions are not as expensive, yet they have been able to allow us to aggressively attack the networks and actually cost us less. And so over time we are working on some very, very hard physics problems, but that investment has not required as much money.

So I think the energy and the focus is absolutely still there, but we have been able to maintain the pace of what we do in defeating the device, attacking the network, and training the force with less funds. And we want to be prudent with those funds, and we do not want to ask for more than would be wise for us to use in fighting the IED at the level we think we can.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you. I wanted to ask you a little bit about things going on in Afghanistan. We are looking at the rates of attacks going up; we are also looking at an increase in lethality of those attacks. Can you give me some indication about that, and then what are we doing to reverse those trends?

General METZ. Well, certainly as we—as over the past year we have pushed more soldiers and Marines into Afghanistan and into places where we had not been before the enemy was ready with a very thick array of IEDs, and so those soldiers or Marines ran into those IEDs and it was what we predicted.

I think we are seeing that the enemy is having a difficult time replacing those IEDs, and that the fight is on, and I am confident in the training and capabilities of those forces to continue to manage the level and begin to bring it down as they become accustomed to worked, especially in Regional Command (RC) South.

We have seen the enemy—and this is warfare—he looks at the solutions we have put on the battlefield, and he works to counter those. And he has really upped the total volume and explosive power of his IEDs, and that is probably the main trend that I would report to you in Afghanistan, is that his increased size of his IED increases its—well, obviously its lethality, and then challenges some of the solutions we had, mainly the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle (MRAP) and MRAP-like vehicles that we bought in order to protect our troops.

Mr. WITTMAN. One last question: I was impressed when I visited COIC about the efforts to get information back to the front in real time. And when I visited there obviously the focus was on Iraq.



Now with this growing threat of lethality in Afghanistan my question is, are you able to communicate as effectively with our Combatant Commands (COCOMs) in Afghanistan as you were in Iraq? And are you able to support the troops at the same level as we have supported them in Iraq?

General METZ. The only thing that limits us duplicating our effort in—well, there are several things—in Iraq and Afghanistan with the COIC, there are some outlying operation bases that may not have a secure internet protocol router network (SIPRNET) to them and may have limited bandwidth. That would cause us some difficulty to get the information out. But at the headquarters level I think that we have got the full capability and bandwidth to get the information there.

What is really different in the two theaters is that over time in Iraq, as we were experiencing 1,500, 2,500 IEDs a month and finding and clearing half of them we were gaining an enormous amount of forensics and biometrics information. We use that in the COIC to our advantage; it is our asymmetric advantage, as you witnessed.

The IED was not an important—was not a well-used and important weapons system for many years in Afghanistan. We have seen that increase and we are—just like Iraq we are finding and clearing about half of the IEDs.

We will continue to build the data on Afghanistan but it is just less now. And over time I am confident that our great tool of the COIC will be ever more important to the commanders in Afghanistan. In fact, I have got the director of the COIC here who is just back from Afghanistan, and we have kept that flow of leadership to ensure that we are as up to date as possible with the needs of the commanders in Afghanistan and we meet their request for support in what we call the latest time of value, just as we did in Iraq.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, General Metz. We are going to move on to Mr. Franks.

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And General Metz, thank you for your lifetime of service. You know, it is so easy, sometimes, to forget the incredible sacrifice that all of the people in uniform make, but when a person gets stars on their shoulders it really reflects a profound contribution to human freedom, and thank you very much.

And I know that your success at JIEDDO has direct results on the ground in counted and saved lives, so it is a big job that you do. I also know that the IED is at once simple and monstrously complex, and with an adaptable enemy that is always changing things and looking at what we do, and it is a very, very difficult thing to handle.

How do you stay ahead of this adaptability that the enemy has? How do you keep trying to get ahead of them and what is your mechanism to do that? It is sort of an ethereal question, I guess, but what methods do you employ to try to stay one step ahead of them?

General METZ. Well, certainly one method is to collect the data and work hard at developing the metrics so we can understand not just the inputs that we have done in this organization and not just the outputs, but what are the outcomes that we are producing?

And the only way to really know that is to spend time in the theater.

As a three-star I will cost a lot of time and energy, so I limit my trips to twice a year. My sergeant major that is with me today, as I mentioned Mr. Larkin and others, spend time in the theater so we can ensure that we are connected with the commanders and understand what their problems are and what they see coming.

On the other hand, back here inside of the Washington area, inside my headquarters we have created what we call the Competitive Strategies Group. I am a firm believer from my career that you must look at yourself through the enemies' eyes, and that is a well-defined program called red teaming.

And my competitive strategies effort is red teaming and more; in addition to red team efforts we include a technical gaming staff that are looking at the technologies that are available to the enemy that he could use. So each initiative is bounced against the red team and the technical gaming team to ensure we understand what the counters are going to be and begin already to develop the counter to the counter.

Mr. FRANKS. Yes.

General METZ. This is, I think, absolutely critical in today's warfare because there are not just good guys and bad guys on the battlefield. There is an enormous domain in between. And it is a cultural domain, it is a social domain, it is a technical domain, and you need to understand that.

For example, when I was visiting U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) I stressed to them that the telecommunications industry is not going to go into an austere environment and put copper cables and plug into my belt. The telecommunications industry—and it may be Asian—will put in the very best that they can to make money. And we need to understand those systems and be able to compete and operate inside those systems because the enemy is.

Mr. FRANKS. Yes, sir.

General METZ. And so for that reason, inside my organization the Competitive Strategies Group, in a tight link with what is going on in the theater and understanding the commanders' concerns about the future, helps us do what you ask us to do.

Mr. FRANKS. Well, General, I also read in an article just recently that it discussed how your—how JIEDDO is expanding its role to include examining the broad networks of insurgents necessary to sustain an IED campaign, like, you know, the people who finance it, and the couriers, and those who ferry the explosives, the bomb assembly technicians, all of the—sort of the upstream. And, you know, in Iraq, Iran was providing a lot of the explosive formed penetrators (EFPs), and they were some of the really most dangerous ones that we were facing.

So I guess my question is twofold. I know some criticism has come that says this perhaps diverts you from your primary purpose, but it occurs to me that if you can prevent the source and the advancement of some of these it is a very wise thing. So I would like for you to touch on that and also tell us what role Iran continues to play in any IED or explosive formed penetrator supply in Afghanistan.

General METZ. The first part of your question, I would tell you that we—I apologize, sir. I have concentrated on the Iranian part too much and——

Mr. FRANKS. No, that is all right. Just the fact that I know that you have expanded JIEDDO recently, or at least the indications are that puts kind of verbal responsibility on getting to the sources.

General METZ. Well, sir, the term that we would use in my organization would be “left of boom.” We spend a lot of time initially working to defeat the device and give the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines the protection that they rightfully deserve if they got inside that explosion.

We are constantly working more and more left of boom, and that gets into attacking the networks. That gets into getting involved in the financing of them, the supplies, the techniques of how the bomb is made and emplaced, and in some cases very unique arming and triggering devices.

We work that because the payoff is enormous to work yourself left of boom because what you are essentially doing is not just attacking an almost infinite array of ways to present the bomb and arm it and ignite it, but you are moving upstream so that you can get a bigger bang for your buck.

And we really do—as I have mentioned before, those non-material solutions to attack the network are paying significant dividends, all the way back to working with Commerce, Justice, and Treasury, and finding those that either inadvertently or directly are supplying the components to our enemies.

Most of that that I would like to talk about Iran I think we need to take to a closed session, or I can answer in a classified for the record. But we do, because of the lethality of the EFP, look very closely at where it may be coming from. Fortunately we have seen only what we think are homemade platter-charged kind of directional attacks in Afghanistan and have not seen the very sophisticated EFPs that we saw in Iraq, and the ones in Iraq have dropped in effectiveness. And so I think that the close link that we did see, there is some problem there, and fortunately our troops aren’t facing the very lethal EFPs that we faced a couple years ago.

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Rogers for five minutes.

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Last year I went down to Alabama, and we had a field hearing, and they showed us where the Marines were using off-leash canine assets that they had deployed to Iraq, and I understand they have 18 of these teams, and not one of those teams has suffered a loss that is using those. Are you familiar with that technology?

General METZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROGERS. Is it limited in what it is useful for or is it something we could expand? Because when they showed them to us the dogs went out ahead of the convoy, and they meandered around the road, and they were just great.

General METZ. Yes, sir. I have seen likewise. I visited the Army’s maneuver support center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and they are working an initiative for off-leash dogs.

I think that the combatant—I mean, the commanders know this capability. If they want more of this capability I think that that

would come to us—maybe not directly to JIEDDO, but the joint urgent operational need that they would submit for more canine support would arrive at the Joint Staff and be validated, and OSD may not give it to us but may turn that joint urgent operational need to the services.

But I do know of the capability. I do know of the success. And I am confident that the commanders know of it, so I think that we are on top of that one.

Mr. ROGERS. Great. Thank you.

That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Hunter for five minutes.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen, first off for what you do and what JIEDDO is doing. You are saving lives, and that is the most important thing.

My problem is this: If the President came to you today or Secretary Gates came to you today and said, "I want you to mobilize right now. I don't want one more IED dug into the ground, buried, between Helmand and Nangarhar, as of one week from today not a single IED to be dug in," and you were to mobilize America's industrial base, our contractor base, all the former Special Forces (SF) guys that are now doing contractor stuff for us and doing it really well—basically, if you were to mobilize this country to stop what is the number one way that the enemy is taking American lives right now, you could do it. We would not have another IED buried.

And what I have seen is as the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) exponentially increases and gets sent over to Afghanistan, as the money spent in JIEDDO goes up and up and up, and as we have great programs—and they are great programs, and I am looking forward to all of them coming to fruition—the numbers of assets, the numbers of programs, and the dollars spent is almost in an inverse proportion to the IED deaths in Afghanistan, meaning the more money JIEDDO gets, the more ISR—and the ISR, as you know, has gone up at 100 percent in Afghanistan over the last year, and it is going to go up more—so have our American deaths due to IEDs. There is no correlation right now between money spent, programs, or ISR in theater, so what we are missing is the execution.

And what I don't understand is this: You have one window—when you talk about getting left of that boom, you have one window to catch an IED emplacer, when he is bigger than the IED. When I was in Fallujah in 2004 things were going crazy, you had guys using backhoes to dig in holes to put 155 shells in; it took like 4 or 5 hours.

So we let guys use backhoes—enemy terrorists use backhoes in our area of operation (AO) because we didn't have eyes in the sky watching the roads 24/7. The only window of opportunity that you have is when they are emplacing the IEDs. You can attack the network, go after finances, and everything else, but the window where you see them putting it in, that is when you can kill them.

And if the President came to you tomorrow and said, "I don't want one more IED dug in. You need to watch every road 24/7 where our operations are," and that is a very small area. I have

seen the maps where all the IED hits are. It is a very small area. It is under 100 clicks [kilometers] if you want to put it all together where 90 percent of the IEDs go off—100-click area.

So my question is, what are we doing tomorrow—what are you going to implement tomorrow to make sure that no more IEDs go—and once more, all the different programs that we have had, that JIEDDO does, I have been briefed on them. They are all fantastic—Project Liberty, Task Force Observe, Detect, Identify, and Neutralize (ODIN), everything is going in, and it is going to be set up at some point in the near future. We have been being told that since I got into office in January, “It is going to be there soon, sir. It is going to be there soon. It is going to be there soon.”

It isn’t there now, and we are losing guys every day. So what are we going to do tomorrow to defeat IEDs so that we don’t have any more IED deaths? Where is the Task Force ODIN of Afghanistan?

General METZ. Sir, please let me take that. And first of all, I want to thank you for initiating your efforts. We are recognizing that is that indeed the loss of life that is the bottom line metric, and it is those lives and those limbs and serious burns and eyesight that I work to try to prevent every day because I think they indeed map to the strategic influence that the IED is having on us.

We are an enabling organization. We answer those needs from the commanders. We look for the gaps and seams that we can help them fill. And we fan out across industry and academia and the federal labs, the federally-funded research corporations to find those solutions.

We do our very best to get them there, but the commanders use those tools to fight their fight. And as you very accurately describe, Task Force ODIN-like efforts really have an impact on the enemy. And I think that one of the things that we do via the COIC is to show them where those hot spots are, where the enemy is concentrating, and help the commanders concentrate their own ISR capability.

Just this morning I left two days—the third day of a technical outreach conference where we are indeed tapping the capabilities of the country to look at the transportation networks and work to give those route clearance companies and the land owner commander the capabilities to keep those roads and transportation means free of IEDs. I may not go as far with you as just 100 kilometers are important, but you are right, there are hot spots we need to focus on, and we work hard to guide the commanders to that.

But having been a commander, I am not going to try to become the 12,000-mile screwdriver. I am going to give them every capability I can. I want to stay in touch with them. They have got a very tough fight to fight.

I think we can do more, and that was one of the things that I was working with industry this week on. We will work with anybody I can to improve the capability.

I think there is—we have got some excellent potential ideas, as you have mentioned, and particular initiatives. We need to net those together. We need to help the commander with the architecture that brings them together. And, sir, you make great points, and we will continue to work hard to meet your points.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, General, for your service.

And Sergeant Major, great to see you. Thank you for being here.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would just like to bring up one more thing—I thank you for that. There is an article here about the Marines in Helmand 15 in particular. I will just read from it: “But some of the Marines operating in Afghanistan’s Helmand Province say they have only seen one part of their drones in the past two or three months, leaving the fight against IEDs largely in the hands of ground troops.” This article came out today—NPR article.

The Marines frequently patrol with handheld minesweepers, a version of what people use on a beach to find coins. General Mickelson says his best weapons against the bombs is what he calls the mark-one eyeball—that is Marines being over there, soldiers being over there, being there for six months, noticing that strange carcass that wasn’t there yesterday is shaped funny with red wire coming out of it, that is the IED.

This doesn’t make me feel really comfortable that we are truly doing everything that we can right now. Once more, if Secretary Gates said, “No more IEDs to be buried”—I understand that there are tons in the ground right now in Afghanistan, and they could be turned on like that at any point in time—but we could do that. We could stop IEDs from being buried if we mobilized to do it.

And we want to talk politically about this war too—it would fall off the map if nobody was dying. Iraq is not in the paper anymore because nobody is dying. One reason is we have knocked off IEDs huge in 2007 and 2008 with ODIN by killing over 3,000 IED-emplacers.

Project ODIN, with IEDs, killed more people than every single other person in Iraq put together with all the offensive operations—ODIN killed more, and they were all bad guys, not one single civilian. They were all inputting an IED.

If we can do that—and we have done it—I don’t understand the stopping point—and you are truly the only organization whose only mission is to stop IEDs. So I understand we don’t want to meddle with what those ground commanders want to do, but it is only you. The buck has to stop with you because we don’t have anybody else; there is no other IED defeat organization in Washington or anywhere else in the U.S. Government that I know of whose sole mission is to stop IEDs.

And Congress—we will give you anything, and we have, I think—billions upon billions of dollars, as much manpower as you want, anything that you need. I just think we could do more. And if we have to say, “You are using the assets wrong, General Whoever, you are using the assets wrong. We are going to go in with an ODIN.” And one of the things about ODIN, too, it was ODIN—it was purely for IED defeat. We don’t have that in Afghanistan, meaning other ground commanders can task out those ISR assets that you send over there purely for IED defeat, they can put those into kinetic operation oversight so they can have them watching ops. Whereas you could step in maybe—I don’t know how this chain works—you could step in and say, “This is here and we are going to take back the roads in Afghanistan. That is our number one mission.”

That is the number one killer of Americans right now and maiming of Americans right now in coalition forces. It is IEDs. It is all IEDs. So let us just stop them.

Why not put 24/7 eyes in the sky? I have been approached by contractors—and I know contractors get a bad rap—from all over who say, “For \$10 million we can cover 100 clicks of road 24/7. We need night vision goggles (NVGs) and a satellite (SAT) phone. We don’t need a one-year project to make all these special things so we can intercept phone calls. We need NVGs, and we are going to call into the chain of command (COC) and say there are guys digging in 155 shells on the corner of Fifth and Main,” because they are there 24/7.

There are people out there to do it; we have the assets to do it; we have C-12s. Shoot, you could use crop dusters.

I am just not seeing what is stopping us from doing it right now, tomorrow, going out there and saying, “Let us stop them. Let us really stop them.”

Anyway, thank you, Mr. Chairman. That is all I have.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Hunter.

You see, gentlemen, I think—here is the issue that we have, and it is why I was reading through Mr. Solis’ cumbersome language, and that is what the Congress and the American people think is what is motivating you all, it is what the American people want us to work on is what Mr. Hunter is talking about. The concern of this subcommittee for the last 18 months or so is that we think there are some things going on within the processes of government that may be interfering with our ability to do exactly what Mr. Hunter wants to do.

And it seems obtuse, it seems convoluted, it seems bureaucratic that we are asking these questions, but your guys on the ground are not yet satisfied with where they are at despite all the efforts and the absolute commitment I know that you all have to doing this.

So General Metz, I will give you a chance to respond to anything that Mr. Hunter said. And then I am going to go back to the laborious nature of reading the GAO criticisms because I think that the only way we get to where Mr. Hunter wants to be is we have got to be sure everything is functioning as well as it can be in lines of authority, in funding streams. And that is how human beings get things done is to be as efficient as they can be so that the ultimate, you know, final product is what they want it to be.

So, General Metz, is there any response you have to Mr. Hunter—

General METZ. The main thing I would like to respond to Congressman Hunter’s comments and just underline his accuracy with the fact that the soldier, Marines, sailor, and airmen’s vision and sense is still the best sensor on the battlefield, and that tells me that the more realistic training we can give them the better they will be at this business. So it does give us the opportunity to underline the value of realistic training.

I think it also gives us the opportunity to underline the need to help the commanders understand how they can fuse their information, use the ISR, the abundance that we are trying to push there, to better focus it and better use the assets, and then when they

need more assets we need to supply them. But those are the main comments and——

Dr. SNYDER. One specific question with regard to Mr. Hunter's comments: You all define IED much broader than just things getting buried in the ground, correct? You include things strapped on to suicide bombers, car bombs, things thrown from windows, I mean things——

General METZ. Yes, sir.

Dr. SNYDER [continuing]. I mean, in fact the September 11th attack was an improvised explosive device. I mean——

General METZ. Yes, sir.

Dr. SNYDER [continuing]. It is much broader than that.

All right, back to the GAO comments, General Metz, quoting now, "JIEDDO faces difficulties with transitioning joint IED defeat initiatives to the military services in part because JIEDDO and the services have difficulty resolving the gap between JIEDDO's transition timeline and DOD's budget cycle. As a result the services are mainly funding initiatives with supplemental appropriations rather than their base budget. Continuing to fund transferred initiatives with supplemental appropriations does not ensure funding availability for those initiatives in future years, since these appropriations are not necessarily renewed from one year to the next."

What are your comments on that?

General METZ. Sir, there——

Dr. SNYDER. And this is a topic we talked about last year also.

General METZ. Yes, sir. And because we talked about it last year it has been up front and one that I have worked closely with men and women I have known my whole career.

We were set up in order to work inside that very quick trade space probably inside two years. Now, having said that, we do spend some money, and we do look forward to some technical efforts that we could pull forward, but basically I want JIEDDO to be in the trade space of helping warfighters.

And as you do that there will be, I think, a natural friction between the services who are operating in the normal budget cycle and we that are operating with the tremendous resources that the Congress has given us. But I believe that the process is maturing, and we are dampening out the problems of the services because they know what we are working on, they know as we do the operational assessments the initiatives that are looking good and may come to them.

Dr. SNYDER. But that relates back to the previous criticism, though, doesn't it, in my last round, which was that GAO says the services lack full visibility. When you say they know what you are doing——

General METZ. Well, sir, I think that we——

Dr. SNYDER. You are trying——

General METZ [continuing]. There are enough forums that we are—that there are not black boxes that no one knows anything about but a particular office.

Dr. SNYDER. Let me go to this next one. This transition also is hindered when service requirements are not fully considered during the development of joint funded counter-IED initiatives, as evidenced by two counter-IED jamming systems. As a result, JIEDDO



may be investing in counter-IED solutions that do not fully meet existing service requirements. What is your comment about that GAO criticism?

General METZ. Well, sir, it was interesting when I took over from General Meiggs, he said, "The good part about your tenure is you are going to be out of the jamming business." The problem is the enemy votes, and the enemy has stayed adaptive in his use of the electromagnetic spectrum. So although we thought we had done enough in the jamming business that it would then transition to the services, we needed to stay in the jamming business because the enemy decided to move to different frequencies and make things more complex.

I recognize that this was a friction point between us and the services, and so I went to my experiences, and I went to General Cartwright, the Vice Chairman, and said, "I think this needs to be a Joint Requirements Oversight Council issue." A little over a year ago we took it to that process, came out with clear definitions of what we would do, what the single manager—the Navy as a single manager for electronic warfare (EW) would do, and what the services would do.

But the enemy keeps voting, and we keep having to keep up, and we think we are the organization that needs to watch the threat. And as needed, we need to offer the technical updates. The services will continue and should continue to define their requirements out into their programs. There has been friction but I think it, especially in the CREW, is beginning to dampen out, and we are really understanding where these programs are and how they have messed with each other.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Wittman for five minutes.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Metz, I think what you are hearing today is just—is concern about coordination of efforts, effective communication, and I know that it is a very complex process. There are lots of things going on and timing this is of the issue there.

My question goes back to I guess the synthesis of what you are hearing today from Mr. Hunter and Chairman Snyder. You know, Mr. Hunter is, I think, bringing up a great point about how do you really get assets to the field that our warfighters would be effective to them, looking at that in an application setting, also some of the criticisms brought up by the GAO.

Is there a way that you can bring all those things together? And secondly, is it an issue—and I may have asked this question a little bit earlier—is it an issue of resources? Is it an issue of—and when I say resources I am talking about dollars—or is it an issue of human resources? Is it an issue of trying to coordinate things in a more timely fashion and make sure that you have those internal controls there? You are also looking externally, you are getting that information from the warfighters, from the combatant commanders in a way that you can get to the point like Mr. Hunter brings up and get out there and try to provide the assets to find these folks that are placing these IEDs, in addition to, obviously, other threats that are out there?

Is it an issue of resources or placement of those resources? Can you give us an idea about how you would collectively respond to, I think, some of the things that are coming up here?

General METZ. My first comment is that as I see the plans of Fiscal Year 2010 and the plans for 2011 I don't think that it is an issue of resources. I think it is the complexity of being able to put the architecture in place and put the sensors, the training, the entire complex spectrum of things that have to be done to really focus the force on what is the most strategic problem, which is the IED.

Having said that, the commanders in the field are facing the complexities of fighting a counterinsurgency battle inside of which the IED has probably most significantly limited their ability to work with the population and the mobility, and so counter-IED—

And General McChrystal clearly expressed to me his understanding that we have got to fight the IED when I visited him in June. I think what we have got to do is continue to use the resources that come together in the Joint IED Defeat Organization to do just as Congressman Hunter says, focus the effort so that that focus turns out to reduce the loss of life. You map that back to the—you force the enemy to have less wherewithal, less supplies, less money to do it.

Congressman Hunter is right—the last time you really get to affect it is when he is putting it in. And so commanders make decisions whether or not they kill the person putting it in, which they have got the rules of engagement to do, or they follow him to understand his leadership or understand where his cache is, or understand where the bomb maker is. So we can help in that because we can sit back in the comfort of—and the protection of where we are and work for the commanders to help them produce the net-centric capability that I think our Nation can offer to fight this weapons system.

Mr. WITTMAN. One follow-up: How capable is JIEDDO of responding to suggestions from our warfighters and combatant commanders that may be outside of what—the stock set of conditions that we have been used to dealing with? So in other words, if somebody came up and said, “Hey, why don't we do this?” and it is something outside of what we normally look at about countering these devices, jamming them, trying to stop their placement, I just want to make sure that that adaptability and flexibility is there within JIEDDO.

So if you have something that is sort of outside the box it can be incorporated or is at least looked at with an open mind to say, “Yes, maybe that is something we haven't thought of. We ought to incorporate that in our thought about how we look at the overall threat.” How capable is JIEDDO of considering those suggestions and then putting them into place as far as defeat measures?

General METZ. Sir, I think that that is one of our real strengths. We have enough expertise now, having a couple years at it, to understand what has worked and what has not worked. And I think the passion and sense of urgency that my workforce has, we are constantly seeking those new and good ideas.

Having said that, there are some that come to us with to them what is a new and good idea that we have tried before. So I think

we have got a good pulse of the technology that will work and we need to pursue.

But as I mentioned before, much of the low-hanging fruit has been harvested so we are left with some real tough physics problems. In order to build a radar that can look underneath the ground as you are traveling 40 miles an hour down the road in your MRAP and do it with a low false positive rate in order soon enough for you to stop is a tough physics problem. But I do think that we—that is what we can offer.

Now, we also have enough tentacles out in the force to understand what their needs are. And the advantage to having the Joint IED Defeat Organization is that we can begin to work the solutions to the problems they are seeing as the process begins to take place.

We are working in tandem and not in sequence so that we are not waiting for everything to come through out of Afghanistan, through CENTCOM, to the joint staff and OSD, and finally maybe get to us. We know what they need, and we are working on those gaps and seams, and we will certainly marry-up the joint urgent operational needs statement as it comes, but I think what you have touched upon is one of the things I am very proud of the organization.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Franks.

Mr. FRANKS. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to associate myself profoundly with Mr. Hunter's previous comments and yield back.

Dr. SNYDER. See, it is easier for us to associate ourselves with this Mr. Hunter since he was in the Marine Corps than the previous Mr. Hunter since he was an Army Ranger. So I associate—

Mr. Hunter?

General Metz, continuing the GAO summary questions—by the way, I am just reading from kind of their key one. They go in quite detailed in some other—quoting again from GAO, “JIEDDO's lack of clear criteria for the counter-IED training initiatives it will fund has impacted its counter-IED training investment decisions. As a result, JIEDDO has funded training initiatives that may have primary uses other than defeating IEDs.

“In March 2009 JIEDDO attempted to update its criteria for joint training initiatives by listing new requirements. However, these guidelines also could be broadly interpreted. Without specific criteria for counter-IED training initiatives, DOD may find that it lacks funding for future initiatives more directly related to the counter IED mission.”

That is the end of the GAO comment. Do you have a response to that?

General METZ. First of all, sir, I would say that upon arriving at the organization it was clear to me that—and I have talked with General Abizaid, and I know him well—that the Manhattan-like Project effort, which was initially focused on the device that General Meiggs had worked up to ensure that it was broad, and we were fighting the networks, and I came with the experience that told me I needed to make sure the force was trained to do both.

And I have worked hard to ensure that the Joint Center of Excellence out at Fort Irwin, California, and the Services Center of Ex-

cellence—the Marines, for example—at 29 Palms are as aggressively helping the force train as possible.

And as those training initiatives can be, in my mind, linked with winning the IED fight I have been in full support of them. And an example would be that realistic training that I think we owe our young men and women we have invested in and have transferred to the—in the larger case—to the Army and the Marine Corps insurgents on the battlefield.

And in some cases you don't need just a role player; you need someone that is technically and culturally educated to the position. For example, when a young Marine company commander or an Army company commander has got to work with a village, he needs to train working with someone that is replicating the mayor, the senior imam, the tribal leaders, the police, the army, so that he gets that experience before he goes.

Now, that is not razor sharp focused on counter-IEDs, but that training will help him with the network—the fight of the IED network in that training environment. So that is one of the examples, I think, that we developed insurgents on the battlefield and have now handed that off to the Army.

Does that put a burden on the Army? Yes, sir, it does. And the Army has got to decide how much of that insurgent on the battlefield funding that they will accommodate.

Dr. SNYDER. Dr. Schear and Mr. Solis, we have let you off pretty easy so far this morning.

But Dr. Schear, we appreciate you being here, and as I alluded to briefly in my opening comments, it is our understanding that the Defense Department was scrambling a little bit to figure exactly who on the civilian side should come, that there—was that your impression, I mean, that the lines of authority were perhaps not as clear and defined as maybe they would like, given how mature the JIEDDO organization is now? Do you have any comments on the DOD structure with regard to the management and oversight of JIEDDO?

Dr. SCHEAR. Sir, you raised a fair question. Oversight is a challenge because of how broadly this effort draws from almost every stakeholder constituency in this Department, from the acquisition community to the intel community, policy community, cost and program evaluation communities. That is, in part, the reason why this effort plugs in at such a high level.

Now, there is a span of control challenge for our deputy, and even farther down the echelon. The problem we face is that if the oversight plugs in at a lower level than we have fractionated oversight, and there is a cost associated with working those problems out.

So, sir, in particular response to your question, I don't think there was an issue about identifying the individuals involved; it was just a question of schedules and here-and-now priorities, given other challenges.

But I obviously cannot carry the full portfolio that Bill Lynn would here, as the deputy, and I understand last year we offered up a range of views and a very large panel from these various constituencies, which probably sort of symbolized how broad-gauged this is. But it is a challenge, and I take your point.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Platts, would you like to be recognized for five minutes?

Mr. PLATTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. No questions, and I apologize coming from two other hearings. Challenge of being on seven subcommittees right now.

But I want to just appreciate your efforts and would echo the final question there, or the concern about the oversight and the management. For four years I had the privilege of chairing the Subcommittee on Financial Management and Overall Management under Oversight and Government Reform and worked closely with GAO, and I know in my years of chairmanship, as we worked with agencies and departments, that GAO was often seen as an adversary instead of an assistant. And I would encourage the Department and all the military, and especially in the important mission you have, to really embrace GAO as an ally, as they try to use their expertise to improve your operation. Because ultimately the beneficiary will be not just the taxpayers here at home but the men and women in harm's way. So just to encourage that partnering with GAO and their recommendations as you go forward.

So thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. SNYDER. Gentlemen, we have three votes but we will come back and have—I don't think we will keep you a long time after that, but we do have several more questions. So we are in recess.

[Recess.]

Dr. SNYDER. We will resume here. I think Mr. Wittman will be coming back, but—

I appreciate, men, you waiting.

Dr. SCHEAR, I wanted to continue the discussion we were having about complexity, and on page four, which you read, you stated, "I appreciate how complex this overall structure may appear. It is indeed a multifaceted undertaking, and it remains a work in progress. JIEDDO expects to publish a revised JCAAMP procedure by the end of November and DOD Directive 2000.19E is also due for revision in 2010," and that was the end of your statement.

That gets to it, doesn't it, I mean, how complex, and we are asking a lot out of General Metz and his organization in terms of all these different activities. Let us see, how long have you had your job now?

Dr. SCHEAR. Mr. Chairman, I have been in six months.

Dr. SNYDER. Six months.

Dr. SCHEAR. I consider myself still a newbie, sir.

Dr. SNYDER. Well, that is all right. When you were a newbie, what was your understanding at the time of what was to be your interaction with JIEDDO and how many times have you and General Metz met?

Dr. SCHEAR. I have had the pleasure to meet General Metz several times since I have been—and his staff, most notably a day-long deep dive we did a couple of months ago that Vice Chairman Cartwright appeared at. And it has been part of the—within Policy—part of the larger stability operations portfolio for some period of time within Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD SOLIC) under ASD Michael Vickers. So it has been a clear priority.

That said, as we have heard here today, sir, it is a very complicated portfolio, and it involves, from the policy standpoint, some stewardship for Title 10-like capabilities, responsibilities in addition to the operation and support. So it puts us in an interesting position with the services as well as combatant commanders.

Dr. SNYDER. The JIEDDO structure was set up—and General Metz talked about it, and I think you talk about it—to kind of go around what are perceived as some of the cumbersome processes that the normal Pentagon structure was intended to help us get things to the warfighter as quickly as possible. And this structure does fine when we think it is doing fine.

Human activities don't always go well. So GAO has made some criticisms, Mr. Hunter—perhaps it wasn't a criticism, but it was an expectation. So who within the Pentagon organization is going to say—you know, the new Duncan Hunter made a very passionate view of the perspective of an infantryman on the ground that things need to be done better. Who is the point person for the President to go to and say, "We need to do better"?

What is the line of authority? Is it clear to you what the line of authority is? Our impression was that it is not, given that there was some scrambling around to figure out who to have testify today. But I don't think it is clear. What do you think, Dr. Schear?

Dr. SCHEAR. Sir, at the level you are suggesting in your hypothetical that would come directly to the Deputy Secretary, and at that point we would pull together in a small group and decide on a course of action. It would involve—

Dr. SNYDER. This is Mr. Lynn?

Dr. SCHEAR. Yes, Yes, sir.

Dr. SNYDER. General Metz, how many times have you met with Mr. Lynn?

General METZ. Sir, I meet with Mr. Lynn in a very routine way every single month, and I have had additional particular subjects—one that comes to mind is the special access programs. But we have never missed a monthly update. And so since he has been in office I have seen him each month and there have been two or three—I can check for the record, but—times that I have met him on special projects.

May I engage in this discussion a little bit?

Dr. SNYDER. Sure.

General METZ. Because I anticipated this question I put some thought to it. And as I look back through my career this job I have now has more supervision than any that I have ever had, and I look at it maybe a different a way, because I plug into the Deputy Secretary. If the Joint IED Defeat Organization has got a coalition engagement challenge or we want to get some disclosure authority or anything in the policy arena, I have got oversight from the Under Secretary for Policy and the staff that does that business for her, Secretary Flournoy.

In all of our technical business Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (AT&L) helps foster us through that process. Dr. Keesee here, my vice director, sits with the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) and all of the service research and development councils, and therefore that is another venue that we get oversight.

In the intelligence business—we are not an intelligence organization. All I am seeking is their IED information, and I get plenty of oversight and help from OSD Intelligence and the agencies.

We have had an internal process for the Department of Defense advisory working groups. We have had several of those meetings focused at JIEDDO's business.

You know, we are coming up on our fourth birthday and we are on our fifth topic in the GAO looking at us. I have used, as Congressman Platts suggested to us, I do exactly what he suggested. I use these great eyes to help me mature this organization in the right way, and when they have been critical of our personnel accounting I took that aboard, and I think we have got a very robust and accurate accounting of people now. We have built out a comptroller organization and developed the tracking of the financial expenditures.

And I can list a number—a long list of all the different things, but I think we are well overseen. Nevertheless, we do plug into a very high level of the Department, so if the President wanted something to happen he would tell the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense and it would come directly to me, and I would execute it, but I would have plenty of very senior people watching their pieces of the Department as they relate to me.

Dr. SNYDER. My time is up. We will go another round. Let us go to Mrs. Davis for five minutes, just joined us, and then we will go to Mr. Wittman.

Mrs. Davis for five minutes.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you for being here. I am sorry I wasn't able to hear the earlier testimony, but I think one of the big questions—and excuse me if this has already been answered—but how does JIEDDO actually measure its effectiveness in achieving its mission to defeat the IED?

General METZ. I will take that down three avenues. One avenue would be that we collect for the Department the data about IEDs—location, size, switching, kinds of bombs. There is a lot of data information that once collected—and of course we are somewhat dependent on the theater forward to collect that data for us—but we are able then to understand what is happening with the IED and associate or—and understand how effective our initiative may be.

An example would be, as the enemy went away from radio-control devices to command wire, we believe the enemy did that in direct response to the fielding of jammers. And so there is a whole series of in-theater data that we collect.

Based on the GAO's earlier report, this metrics effort—we took our entire outcomes from each part of the JIEDDO, developed what those metrics would be, and I have taken two very deep dives quarterly now to look very carefully at those metrics. Are we creating the outcomes that we need to be creating?

And the third avenue would be, as we put those initiatives into the theater, putting an assessment behind those initiatives so we can measure their effectiveness in the counter-IED fight.

So those are, you know, three major ways that we have responded to the GAO report to get it metrics, but the metrics are very tough for two reasons: We have got a thinking enemy who

wants to counter us, and we are dependent on the warfighter forward to use or not use the initiative we are trying to help him with. And so there are a lot of humans in this piece and the metrics are indeed difficult to—

Mrs. DAVIS. Are there some areas in which you have actually been surprised by those results? You know, where you expected that you would have certain outcomes which just have not materialized, that whatever it is that you are doing just hasn't been effective? And how, then—where do you shift in that case, then?

General METZ. I will give an example. We felt that in East Baghdad there was a concentrated effort by the enemy to use explosively formed projectiles, so we deployed an initiative that we thought would focus on those networks. We called it FOX. It was a very robust—a number of things from canines to soldiers that were trained in detailed tracking.

We put a lot of assets into the FOX initiative. And it was very successful, we think, and we took it to the conclusion that as the tremendous off-ramp of IEDs occurred in Iraq, and the great reduction of explosively formed projectiles, that we didn't need that initiative anymore, and so I was able to terminate it.

I am trying to think of an example where we—one didn't turn out as we expected it would turn out. I can tell you that there is often a significant delta between the testing environment, for example in Yuma Range, and as it turns out in Afghanistan or Iraq. Something that can test marginally in Yuma, and you take it to the theater and it tests very well.

Copperhead is a sensor that we have deployed into Afghanistan that did not seem—that tested very well in Yuma and has had a tough time in Afghanistan. On the other hand, a sensor Desert Owl, a very similar technology that will see a changed detection, marginally tested in Yuma and has been a gangbusters success in Iraq.

So I think what I am reporting to you is this is a very dynamic and often not intuitive business that we are in, and it requires a constant alertness to what is happening and being able to shift in order to support the warfighter.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. And let me just shift for a second because I know that on National Public Radio (NPR) there have been a series of discussions about this, and I am just—have you had a chance to review any of that? Do you think that the public is getting the information that they need about this? And are there any misperceptions that are out there as a result of those reports that you have had to counter?

General METZ. I have not heard all of them. I participated in an interview for that particular program. What I have heard is accurate and beneficial to the public.

I think they are properly articulating the complexity of the IED problem, of some of the solutions, and—but I must admit I haven't listened to each one of the segments by NPR.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Wittman.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.



General Metz, I want to kind of go back to the whole issue of communications and just get your overall candid opinion. Looking at the whole system of communications within Afghanistan, within Iraq, back and forth, providing information based on the IED threats, are there any weaknesses either in the communication systems that you see within theater or the communication systems that exist within JIEDDO, the COIC, or the TCOIC, as far as how information is traded back and forth, to make sure that we are, in the best manner possible, getting these solutions to the challenges and problems that our commanders face in the theater?

General METZ. Sir, I think that we have good communication, and I think it can get better. And one of the things we are taking a new look at is our Web site that was kind of our premier outlet for information on IEDs. It was managed down at Joint Forces Command. I am taking another look at it because I think in this quick, dynamic environment we really need to have that Web capability that has got the latest deaths, and I am taking another look at how it should be managed.

I am not as concerned about where the servers are located or who necessarily the technical people that manage it, but I want to make sure that we have a very tight loop between what is happening in the theater—and quite frankly around all the world and the COCOMs—and what is posted so that our warfighters have the very latest and best information. So I am taking a look at that capability.

But nothing comes to mind very quickly that we have got a real fault in the overall flow of information and communication.

Mr. WITTMAN. It was mentioned earlier that in certain areas of Afghanistan there is lack of bandwidth, maybe even lack of capacity to be able to communicate in some of those remote areas there. It seems like to me in those situations, where there are certainly challenges there, that that lack of communications could certainly have a potential impact on the ability of the combatant commanders there to get the things they need or to get information back. Do you see that—give me your estimate or what you know about the communication system there in Afghanistan as it relates to getting information from the combatant commanders back through the chain of command back to JIEDDO.

General METZ. As I mentioned earlier, I think that there probably are some very small forward operating bases in very remote locations that probably have limited bandwidth and some limited communication. In those cases I do know that the commanders—we work hard to allow them to go in with much of the data so that they don't have to get streams of all the data, they just need to get the updates. And so there is some compression and techniques that are far beyond my information technology (IT) background.

But again, I think as the lessons are learned we are plugged in to a deep enough level that we are absorbing them and in as quick a fashion as we possibly can get them back. But there is no substitute for personally going, and so I go, and as I have mentioned Mr. Larkin here, that runs the COIC, has spent a lot of time recently in the theater. Sergeant Major just got back last night—yesterday—from the theater. So keeping the pulse is important, as is

the hardware technical communication, and I think there is the personal piece that we are trying to do too.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Dr. SNYDER. Maybe at this point—I have got several other questions—but Mr. Solis, you have been very patient there. Any comments that you have on anything you have heard, particularly about General Metz's response to your report or anything else you want to—

Mr. SOLIS. I think first off I just want to reiterate, we have had a good working relationship with JIEDDO. I mean, I think they have been very open and transparent with us, and I think they are listening. That being said, I think a number of things that you have mentioned in our report and that we were reporting today as well as our testimony are significant issues that are going to have to be dealt with as JIEDDO goes forward.

JIEDDO was created because of the growing IED problem in Iraq, as everybody has mentioned. That was created back in 2006, and it was put at the DEPSECDEF level to lead, advocate, and coordinate all activities at the Department.

I think, again, it is important to note that it is not only JIEDDO that is doing IED countermeasures. I think if you look at some of the programs of record, most notably like MRAP, some of these other things that have been brought to the floor because of the—problem are not necessarily within the confines of JIEDDO, which fits into what we were saying before in terms of our very first point.

In terms of understanding all the different things that the Department is doing so that the warfighter, at the end of the day, and the Department has assurances that what is being fielded is the best in terms of the problem set that is being faced by the warfighter out in the field. And I think to understand all the different solutions that are out there, all the different things that folks are working on in different organizations are critical.

I think the other thing—and you have talked a little bit about the transition issues—I think there are close to almost 500 different initiatives out there. At some point they are going to have to be transitioned and funded, and asked for funding. If there is still a disconnect between what the services want, what the COCOMs want, I think it is going to be a problem in terms of transition. And as I pointed out, more of these staying with the sustainment under JIEDDO, that is potentially less dollars that they may have for other new or creative solutions to the problem in the field.

But I think, again, this is going to take not just JIEDDO. It is going to take a Department effort to really address the things that we are doing here. And I think it is also important—and we haven't talked a lot about institutionalization—and I think all these things are important to deal with before we think about institutionalization of JIEDDO, because I think until these issues are dealt with it is going to be very hard for this organization to continue in the vein that it is.

Dr. SNYDER. Then you have also made the point if you don't deal with institutionalization as we move away from supplementals as being a primary funding source for what goes on in Afghanistan

and Iraq then JIEDDO is at risk of being left out somehow. Is that a fair statement?

Mr. SOLIS. That is a fair statement. That is a fair statement.

Dr. SNYDER. Dr. Schear, you went into some detail about the three-tier system, the Joint Resource and Acquisition Board, you say JRAB, and then the second part was the Joint Integrated Process Team, and then the third, chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Senior Resource Steering Group (SRSG). That is for funding decisions.

What kind of advisory process, decision process is used for decisions other than funding decisions—decisions about what to do about a new approach in Afghanistan, decisions about organizational structure, discussions of how to respond to GAO? Who makes those kinds of—what is the process for decision-making aside from funding decisions? And maybe I am reading it wrong but I think in your statement you very clearly said this is the mechanism set up for funding decisions—

Dr. SCHEAR. Right.

Dr. SNYDER [continuing]. But don't refer to other decisions.

Dr. SCHEAR. You are absolutely right, Chairman. The three-tiered structure is programmatically focused in on funding. The larger corporate issues you have identified work within a small leadership group that covers the range of issues that the Deputy Secretary, Mr. Lynn, would feed into that, given his role as the steward for JIEDDO.

But that is not a—there is no designated structure—and General Metz may correct me if I am wrong on this—but there is no corporate structure that provides that focused guidance that you are referring to outside the programmatic vein that I described.

Dr. SNYDER. General—

General METZ. Well, as I said a year ago I had the quick opportunity to make a decision if I was going to take this job or not, and I obviously did. And I think the first thing is that the Department looks to me and the experiences I brought to this directorship as one that is responsible for the whole effort. And therefore, I don't do this effort in a vacuum. And I really have the entire Secretary's staff to help me make sure.

So yes, what was articulated were funding decisions. But I will give you an example: We realized as we have made our shift and focus into Afghanistan that, given a coalition fight, we really needed to share the information with the coalition in a much more transparent way.

That required me to go to Dr. Schear's boss, Secretary Flournoy, and ask for the disclosure authorities to begin to train a contracting officer's technical representative (COTR) that can do the disclosures properly in order to release information to the coalition. So there was a non-funding decision that I had tremendous help from the Secretary's staff to allow me to get the job done. And those kind of things, outside of the funding, are frequent but it allows me to take my experience and not have to bother the Deputy Secretary of Defense to go work in action with one of his major staff officers.

They certainly cascade the problem to the level at which the work gets done with my staff, but I think we get tremendous over-

sight that way and ensure that we are moving forward in those non-financial decisions that have to occur as we do this holistic fight.

Mr. Wittman.

Mrs. Davis.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I thought perhaps you had dealt with this issue, but maybe not. Could you help us understand, where are you in terms of inter-agency work and coordination on these issues? How many other agencies are involved? Where is there a lack of that involvement where there should be? What can you tell us that can push this further on?

General METZ. Well, let me use a couple examples. One example would be, we help chair a supply chain working group for the purposes of understanding with all the forensics information we get out of IEDs that we find and clear, and so we bring together much of the interagency—for sure Commerce, Justice, and Treasury—in order to take that forensics information—

Mrs. DAVIS. Department of Homeland Security? FBI?

General METZ. Yes, ma'am. And inside of the organizations like the Counter-IED Operations Integrations Center there is a long list of liaison officers that the interagency has given us to ensure that we are in sync with many of the activities that they are doing.

Mrs. DAVIS. Is there an area that, you know, you have been a little frustrated feeling that we need to bring them along to a greater extent, or some piece of this that—

General METZ. My initial reaction—

Mrs. DAVIS [continuing]. Where there is so much duplication it is not helpful?

General METZ. Well, I think my initial reaction is not only in the Department of Defense but across the government the IED is recognized as that weapons system of choice of the enemy now. They recognize its strategic impact and we have good coordination.

Homeland Security is very concerned about the IED in the homeland. They know that we are the nexus of information about the IED. We use U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) as our military link back into Homeland Security, but we work closely with a number—with FBI because they are doing some of that forensics, tearing down and allowing that to be evidential data and information. So we are close to a number of the interagency, and to my knowledge it is a pretty smooth, good working relationship.

Mrs. DAVIS. Dr. Schear, do you agree?

Dr. SCHEAR. Yes, ma'am, very much. We have heard good things about the give and take, especially on the Homeland Security side, and now that is actually a very explicitly stated concern in terms of the DOD directive and how that apportions responsibility to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. So the link to Homeland Security is very—

Mrs. DAVIS. And you think it has improved—by what degree would you say it has improved?

Dr. SCHEAR. Ma'am, I am not in a position to give you a good answer on that, but I would be happy to take that and provide a response.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 93.]

Mrs. DAVIS. Okay.

Mr. Solis, would you—

Mr. SOLIS. We haven't looked at that issue. We are aware that there are interagency efforts going on but we have not looked at that as of yet.

Mrs. DAVIS. Yes, okay. Great. Thank you.

Is there any area in terms of rapid acquisition that you feel you don't have the authority to move forward?

General METZ. No, ma'am. I think that the DOD Directive 2000.19E that governs us, and as we hope to update it in 2010, we have the authorities we need to support the warfighter in a very rapid way. As the GAO has indicated, we are not perfect. We can learn; we can get better.

But I think that especially in the use of the funds that the Congress has given us to rapidly produce solutions we are getting pretty good at that. We have gained a lot of experience.

It is keeping that workforce passionate is one of the leadership challenges I have got, to have a sense of urgency. We have got to get this done. And that is my challenge as a leader to do.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you very much. I appreciate that because, you know, we can talk here about the physics of it but the reality is to thousands of families and our men and women serving in theater this is very personal.

Thank you.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Solis mentioned at some point the institutionalization of some of these activities and at some point within the budget structure of your whole process or organization, General Metz.

Dr. Schear, your last sentence in your written statement is: We look forward to working closely with your committee and with Congress more generally to develop "an enduring structure," which is yet undefined.

Let me ask both you, General Metz, as at some point we will be leaving this duty, what is your advice as we look forward to what the enduring structure should be for JIEDDO?

And any comment, Dr. Schear, that you might have, too.

General METZ. Sir, in the almost two years I have been the director it has become very clear to me that the weapon of choice of the violent extremists is the IED and will remain the IED for some time. I think that we need to continue to work to develop the Joint IED Defeat Organization as a permanent organization. I think that the amount of funding will certainly, as Congressman Wittman brought up, will go down somewhat because we have harvested the low-hanging fruit, but we will still need to be able to react to the changes the enemy makes and work hard to move into that domain of being proactive instead of reactive.

I think the size of the organization is heavily dependent on the number of initiatives we have out and the pace at which we are doing business. So as that ebbs and flows over the next decade or so we will be able to reduce the numbers of people based on the energy and efforts that we have.

But because the threat is—I don't think is going to go away, and because we will want—in my opinion we will want to deter it in other combatant commander areas, we should institutionalize and make permanent for the Department, and then that would call upon us to place in the base budget funding for those enduring things and then recognize that there will be operational needs that will come with inside the budget cycle. And there will be some historical knowledge, and it will dampen out to a more and more accurate figure over time. But there will be those things that occur on short notice that we will need to be able to react to.

But I just see the enduring nature of the threat and the need to counter that and bring the Department together in a joint way for joint solutions.

Dr. SNYDER. Dr. Schear.

Dr. SCHEAR. Sir, I would strongly subscribe and support—subscribe to and support what General Metz has just said. One of the big challenges in any transition—institutional one—is to maintain that sense of urgency. We don't want to simply rely on the enemy to convey that; we want to be anticipatory and look ahead where we need to be, you know, making our investments.

My leadership would certainly want to look holistically at this to take the insights that our senior officers who have been directly involved in JIEDDO could bring to this as well as our combatant commanders to assess, collectively, their input as we chart a way ahead. It is a challenge.

Advocacy organizations convey urgency; they are also a constructive irritant in the larger system, which I think is valuable. But how you sustain that over time is an open question, and we would certainly seek opportunities to draw in your views and comments as we proceed.

Dr. SNYDER. Isn't the goal of having an enduring structure to guarantee that all the good things that we want to have done will continue so you have the agility to respond, but we want to do it in such a way that you have—you know you are going to have a funding stream, you don't depend on supplementals, that there is the appropriate oversight when things go wrong? But because we talk about an enduring structure doesn't mean that somehow it has to take on kind of all the dark side of what we think about when we think about government funding streams or government approval processes, or one of your words, cumbersome.

I mean, we want to maintain your agility but have the good things that come from being part of a more institutionalized structure. Isn't that the goal?

General METZ. Absolutely, sir. I think we—again, as we approach our fourth birthday we have learned a lot, and I think a year from now and four years from now we will have learned more, we will have continued to mature and settle in, but settle in—as I talk with my workforce, settle in for a marathon run but not settle in for being a slow, bureaucratic, not responsive to the warfighter.

We have got to settle in for the marathon because I think it is a long fight against IEDs in a world that is going to have a lot of instability, but settle in to understand what are the techniques that can really move an idea to the warfighter in a rapid way and be transparent with the Congress and with everybody involved—

except the enemy—and ensure that we all understand how we are moving and the value of that quick movement against a very agile enemy.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Wittman, I have used another five minutes—

One of the comments, General Metz, in your written statement you say no one could have anticipated the sheer amount and complexity of the training required to successfully counter IEDs. I always get a little bit jumpy when I hear someone say “no one could have anticipated.” It takes me back to when the 9/11 Commission issued their report and in their—a lot of the public discussion that went on after they issued their report, the phrase “a failure of imagination.” A failure of imagination that anyone could have—no one could have foreseen this.

In fact, Floyd Spence, who is now dead, and I mean for months before he was, here in our committee hearings, was saying, “This can happen right now.” Now, he didn’t say there were going to be people in the airline pilot programs and they were going to get on planes and hijack them, but he was very much a believer that we were at risk as a country right then.

And in fact, I suspect we could find people who could have anticipated that. I mean, we have had wars for a long time in which people have had improvised devices, whether it is punji sticks or other kinds of things Duncan Hunter’s—Congressman Hunter’s dad had to deal with as an Army Ranger. I mean, it is not a surprise that people take what is laying around and make weapons out of it.

But I appreciate your comment, but we should not be surprised that enemies are agile also. Is that a fair comment?

General METZ. Sir, that is a very fair comment and maybe I was—went too far in that statement because, as you have already articulated, our definition of an IED has been—that thing has been around for a long time. I think what was surprising to us was the enemy recognizing its strategic value. I think the ambush and lethal ambush has been around the battlefield for a long time, and it is certainly very effective in a tactical sense.

And the enemy moved it to the operational sense because he knew that he could counter the—our strategies and doctrine for counterinsurgency by limiting our mobility. And he also realized that it had the strategic effect—and I think that I would hold to the argument that that was probably a surprise that the enemy would use a weapons system like the IED to try to get back to the homeland to try to affect our coalition partners from a strategic point of view.

Dr. SNYDER. The last question I wanted to ask is with regard to—Mrs. Davis talked about how do you measure success? And I think for a year or two or maybe even a little bit longer we were seeing the drop in IED attacks go down perhaps as a reflection of both your work and also the improvement of the security situation in Iraq, and—in fact, I think we talked about that some last year during the hearing, that that was a sign of success.

Well, if we say that then we also have to say, don’t we, as we see the attacks go up in Afghanistan, that maybe things aren’t going the direction we want with regard to JIEDDO? It is probably fair to say that we shouldn’t look at either one of those as how we measure. I mean, we are not satisfied—as Mr. Hunter so passion-

ately and eloquently pointed out, we can't be satisfied with what is going on now.

But I think we do have to have, perhaps, some better metrics for measuring, do we think we are doing the right thing by our men and women in uniform? What are your thoughts about metrics? Is it a bottom line business—as long as we see one attack in Afghanistan and Iraq as too many, or what do you think is a fair way of measuring how the American taxpayer should be putting these resources?

Should we ever make decisions about more drones, less drones, more sniper teams, less sniper teams—what should be the things by which we measure your success?

General METZ. Sir, as I lead this organization the real bottom line is the loss of life or limb, serious burns, the loss of eyesight. And I think each day that I pull up the data and I see that loss, I know that there has been some failure somewhere along the line because we lost that soldier, that sailor, that airman, or Marine.

Having said that, when a commander comes out of the theater and we do our back briefs and that commander says that the training you gave me better enabled me to fight the IED, to me that is an outcome affirmation or metric that we were successful. When, for example, we shut down a company and indict someone for sending components through Iran to the enemy in Iraq to bomb our—IED our forces, that, to me, is a measurement of success.

And there are a number of those, and the problem in this—the other bottom line is, how many lives and limbs were saved? And I don't think we will ever be able to measure that.

And so this metric business is very difficult. It eludes us in some ways, and in others may work against you when you talk about life or limb. In other words, last year when I was here I was praising our movement from when I was the corps commander and every IED caused a casualty to going in Iraq now to—we are up 9 or 10. We forced the enemy to put a whole lot more out. That is a whole lot of effort.

But when you have to put the colors of the Nation into the next of kin's hands because of an IED that is—to that person, to that family we didn't make it. We didn't meet the bar well enough. As Congressman Hunter said, we let an IED get through the system.

And so I admit that this metric business is tough, and it doesn't let me off the hook. We are constantly looking for ways to measure how well our initiatives supported the warfighter, what are the outcomes that my staff is producing, what are the assessments of those initiatives, so we can guarantee, or to the very best of our ability, that the resources the Nation gives us are properly used for the force.

Dr. SNYDER. And that probably is a good place to stop today.

I know that you are interested, I know the Administration is interested, and the Congress is certainly interested in making sure our men and women have everything that they need and that we can give to them. And all of this discussion about lines of authority and funding sources and institutionalization—it is ultimately about achieving what Mr. Hunter wants to achieve and what you just—well, what we talked about, which is to help people stay alive and



keep from getting injured while they are pursuing the national security objectives of this country.

We will continue this discussion.

Thank you all for being here today. I apologize for the votes. We are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:42 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]



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# **A P P E N D I X**

OCTOBER 29, 2009

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**PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD**

OCTOBER 29, 2009

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**Statement of Ranking Member Rob Wittman  
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations  
House Armed Services Committee**

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**Hearing on Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization  
(JIEDDO)**

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**October 29, 2009**

Thank you, Chairman Snyder, and good morning to our witnesses – we appreciate your being here today.

As the gruesome events that unfolded in Baghdad earlier this week prove, improvised explosive devices, or IEDs, remain a deadly threat, especially in the Middle East and South Asia. In fact, the number and lethality of IED incidents in Afghanistan continues to grow, and the nation of Pakistan is suffering frequent IED attacks. Even

the United States is not immune to this threat, and our deployed troops cannot ever let their guard down.

Despite the best efforts of JIEDDO and others, it is still far too easy for evil doers to make and deploy bombs that indiscriminately kill and maim scores of innocent people.

If this were an easy human or physics problem, we would have the solution already. I know we've made progress, but I would like to know how we can do better and what it will take to get there.

Today, we are following up on the subcommittee's excellent report of November, 2008, which quoted General Metz, who is a witness today, as saying that the



IED threat could never be completely removed from the battlefield. I am sure General Metz is correct—the enemy will always seek vulnerabilities to attack, and we cannot harden everything and still be effective in counter-insurgency operations.

Even so, I am disturbed by the negative trends in Afghanistan. A year ago, this subcommittee noted that effective attacks against coalition forces were increasing compared to previous years. Since then, the number of effective attacks has continued to climb, and climb at a rate well beyond the increased number of coalition troops deployed in country.

Despite this ever worsening operational threat to our troops, funding for JIEDDO has been significantly reduced.

Maybe this funding reduction reflects better conditions in Iraq and doesn't reflect a reduced effort for Afghanistan. It is difficult to tell from here, since DOD continues to request JIEDDO funds as "colorless" money that can be spent as the command wishes without informing the Congress how the work is prioritized.

The subcommittee expressed concern with this funding mechanism in last year's report. Our concern was not addressed, and as you can see, has now led to real questions about JIEDDO's priorities. With attacks in Afghanistan increasing, I ask for General Metz to provide

us some detail on efforts being made in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. In addition, I ask all witnesses to address, as they are able, the status of the issues raised in our November 2008 report.

Mr. Chairman, thank you calling this hearing and I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses.

**STATEMENT BY**

**Dr. James Schear**

**Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability  
Operations**

**Before the**

**House Armed Services Committee  
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations  
U.S. House of Representatives**

**29 October 2009**

Chairman Snyder, Congressman Wittman, distinguished Members of the Sub-committee, Ladies and Gentlemen, it is my pleasure to testify today about the important work the Department of Defense is doing in countering the improvised explosive device threat. It's also a particular honor to be able to appear with LTG Metz, who has provided superb leadership for this effort over the past two years. Let me begin by thanking this Subcommittee and the full Committee for your unwavering support for protecting our men and women in harm's way. The wars of this past decade have challenged our military to both grow quickly and to rapidly adapt to deadly tactics from new enemies. Your unstinting support has been critical to meeting those challenges.

Clearly, one of the biggest challenges has been Improvised Explosive Devices, or IEDs. They remain, without question, the violent extremist's weapon of choice against U.S. forces. Over the past year we have seen an increase in the use of IEDs against U.S. forces in Afghanistan, not only as a stand-alone weapon but also, increasingly, as part of complex attacks involving more conventional direct-fire weapons. The IED is the weapon responsible for inflicting the most casualties on U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Although we have seen a decrease in the number of IED attacks in Iraq and IED's have become less effective against U.S. personnel there, the insurgents continue to use IEDs to attack and de-stabilize the Government of Iraq. Additionally, IEDs have become a major source of concern in parts of Africa, the Pacific Region, and South America. In this time of growing asymmetric threats, we believe the use of IEDs will remain the most likely weapon of choice for violent extremist groups because they are low-cost, high-yield weapons that inflict maximum casualties at minimum risk and expense.

Within the Defense Department, the Joint IED Defeat Organization has the responsibility to “lead, focus and advocate” all counter-IED efforts. Secretary Gates and his leadership team strongly support JIEDDO as an organization and the institutionalization of its value-added capabilities throughout our large and diverse defense community. The unique authorities and capabilities of JIEDDO enable us to rapidly experiment, develop, and field both materiel and non-material solutions to the grave and persistent threats posed by IEDs. Perhaps most important, JIEDDO is delivering for its customers. Our combatant commanders continue to confirm that JIEDDO provides a unique and vital capability to counter IEDs and the insurgent networks that employ them.

As this Committee knows, JIEDDO is a truly Joint organization and relies on inputs from across the Department. DoD’s Directive 2000.19E from February 14, 2006 established JIEDDO as an organization that “operates under the authority, direction and control of the Deputy Secretary of Defense.” To accomplish its responsibilities, JIEDDO has developed the Joint IED Capability Approval and Management Process (JAACAMP). This process consists of a three-tiered structure of advisory boards that review, evaluate and coordinate on specific initiatives prior to a final decision on funding. This governance structure, much like the IED threat itself, cuts across institutional lines to provide a broad and balanced look at JIEDDO initiatives. Let me summarize its key features:

- JIEDDO first presents initiatives to the joint resource and acquisition board (JRAB), an advisory board composed of O6/GS-15 members from across the Department, including representatives from the Services, various sections of the Joint Staff, and Office of the Secretary of Defense. This board meets weekly to review initiatives and highlight any issues that need to be resolved.

- After JRAB analysis, an initiative is then briefed to the Joint Integrated Process Team (JIPT).  
The JIPT is a board of military flag officers or civilian senior executive service members from the same organizations; it meets weekly. The members of this board provide written recommendations to the Director of JIEDDO. If the proposed initiative costs less than \$25 million, the JIEDDO Director can approve funding the initiative. If the total cost of the initiative is over \$25 million the initiative is staffed through the Senior Resource Steering Group (SRSG).
- The SRSG is chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and consists of three and four star military officers (including the Vice Chief of Staff for each military service) and equivalent senior executive service personnel, again from the same organizations as the JRAB and JIPT. These high ranking defense officials provide written recommendations to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, who then makes the decision on whether to fund the proposed initiative.

Within DoD more broadly, there are, as you know, a number of key offices that provide essential expertise to the deliberations of the advisory boards. Within Secretary Gates' staff, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence ensures that specific initiatives conform to intelligence policy and are closely coordinated with the intelligence community. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics provide critical input on the technological feasibility of the initiative. Meanwhile, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation provides input on budget and programmatic issues. For their part, the Military Departments provide input on where a particular initiative might fit within their future capabilities planning. And the Joint Staff -- within Chairman Mullen's J8 directorate -- provides input on where the initiative might fit within

Joint capabilities. I appreciate how complex this overall structure may appear; it is indeed a multi-faceted undertaking and it remains a work in progress. JIEDDO expects to publish a revised JAACAMP procedure by the end of November. And DOD Directive 2000.19E is also due for revision in 2010.

Let me provide a bit more detail regarding the distinctive role of the Office of the Under Secretary for Defense for Policy. Under Secretary Michele Flournoy acts as the principal staff assistant to the Secretary of Defense and provides an overall assessment of policy that affects IED defeat activities within DoD. She also serves as a principal advisor to JIEDDO regarding DoD policy and plans to ensure that JIEDDO activities are not in conflict with national security objectives. OSD Policy also provides advice, guidance, and oversight of the policy, technology, and operational realms in several areas linked to JIEDDO's mission -- Combating Terrorism, Explosive Ordnance Disposal, and Special Operations Forces.

As a member of the various JIEDDO governance boards, OSD- Policy poses the following questions when reviewing a given initiative:

1. Has a combatant commander requested this specific counter-IED capability? This is usually evident if there is a Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statement (JUONS), but in cases where there is no JUONS we dig deeper to ensure that we are promoting needed capabilities and research within JIEDDO's specific purview.

2. Has the capability been appropriately tested for both operational field uses and to ensure that it will work as expected? We are acutely conscious of the imperative to ensure the fast fielding of specific systems while also keeping defective or non-performing items out of the field.



3. Does the initiative fit within other DoD or U.S government policies, and how do we resolve potential or actual conflicts?

4. Does the initiative provide a comprehensive approach that includes a plan for acquiring the equipment, training the users, and sustaining the equipment in the field to deliver a real capability to the warfighter? While JIEDDO initiatives rely on the Services to take on these tasks after the first two years of funding, it is essential that the basics for those first two-years be well-laid out. We try to avoid “drive-by” fielding situations that make it harder for commanders in the field to do their missions.

5. Is JIEDDO maintaining a balanced portfolio of initiatives? That is, are we balancing short-term acquisition and medium-term research and development investments? Are we balancing high-risk, big return efforts with lower-risk moderate return efforts? Are we providing both force protection and offensive abilities to attack IED networks?

6. Finally, what can we do to improve our coalition partners’ counter-IED efforts, including especially those who are operating alongside or in lieu of our service members in today’s irregular warfare environments?

Of all of those questions, I would lay special emphasis on the last. OSD-Policy works with JIEDDO to assist our partners, allies, and coalition forces in developing compatible counter-IED technology and training. We have worked to provide necessary authorizations and funding so that counter-IED equipment (like the SYMPHONY system) and tactics can be provided to our coalition partners.

As we look to the future, we have – regrettably – high confidence that the use of IEDs by terrorists, insurgents, and criminals across the globe will continue to increase. And while the need to have an organizational steward like JIEDDO that leads, focuses, and advocates for DoD’s efforts to counter IEDs may be affected by changes in the size of our expeditionary deployments over time, the requirement itself will not disappear. Mr. Chairman, we look forward to working closely with your committee and with Congress more generally to develop an enduring structure that will continue to deliver these critical capabilities to our forces.

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STATEMENT BY

LIEUTENANT GENERAL THOMAS F. METZ  
DIRECTOR, JOINT IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE  
DEFEAT ORGANIZATION

BEFORE THE

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS  
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

COUNTERING THE GLOBAL CHALLENGE OF IEDs TODAY  
AND IN THE FUTURE

SECOND SESSION, 111<sup>TH</sup> CONGRESS  
29 OCTOBER 2009

Chairman Snyder, Congressman Wittman, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to report on the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO). Following a short update on the improvised explosive device (IED) threat and JIEDDO's response to that threat over the past year, my testimony will discuss our ongoing efforts and vision for the future.

### **Afghanistan and Iraq**

In the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) Area of Responsibility the single most effective weapon employed by our enemies and the predominant killer in both Afghanistan and Iraq continues to be the IED.

To counter the potential strategic impact of this threat, the Department of Defense (DoD) established JIEDDO with a great sense of urgency in 2006. Congress quickly followed suit by enacting special funding for JIEDDO operations in 2007. With these special operating authorities and our direct reporting chain to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, JIEDDO rapidly matured to accomplish its mission to focus DoD actions in support of all 10 United States' Combatant Commands (COCOM) in their efforts to defeat IEDs as a weapon of strategic influence. With four specified mission areas—strategic planning; rapid acquisition; near real-time information fusion delivered to warfighters as knowledge; and operations and training support to the force— JIEDDO continues to make great strides in our evolution as an effective, high impact organization operating in support of warfighters. Though our challenges have been great, results during our short history have been dramatic, especially in CENTCOM.

Since our last meeting in September of 2008, there have been over 10,000 IED incidents in Iraq. These incidents are diverse, consisting of the following: explosively formed projectiles commonly known as EFPs, underbelly devices, homemade explosives, suicide IEDs, victim-operated IEDs using pressure switches, and radio controlled anti-armor IEDs, among others. These devices employ a wide range of arming and firing

switches, from relatively simple command wire to sophisticated radio-controlled and passive infrared switches. Yet, in spite of this high volume and wide range of IED attacks over the past 12 months, the number of attacks that were effective against our forces continued to decline for the second straight year.

While I am pleased with our progress in Iraq, our work is not yet done. Our organization is poised to support our continuing diplomatic mission and United States' forces as the drawdown proceeds in accordance with the Security Agreement. In addition, while we have learned an enormous amount from our experience in Iraq, not all of these lessons translate to our efforts in Afghanistan.

The environment and the enemy in Afghanistan pose an altogether different challenge. Although initially slower to develop in Afghanistan, the IED has now replaced direct fire weapons as the enemy's weapon of choice. Our enemies in Afghanistan also use IEDs in combination with conventional direct and indirect fire weapons as a part of complex attacks.

Furthermore, Afghanistan local insurgents, tribal factions, and the Taliban enjoy a greater freedom of action to emplace large numbers of IEDs in movement corridors vital to our success. Our challenge is further compounded because these groups intimidate local populaces, preventing their cooperation with the often suspiciously viewed Afghan government and, in turn, with us.

To ensure the most comprehensive possible support to this complex theater, JIEDDO has undertaken an ongoing Afghanistan support planning process that has so far generated more than 100 counter-IED initiatives for this theater. Continually refined as we move forward, this planning effort provides an ongoing assessment which guides department-level decision makers on critical counter-IED investments and resource allocations.

**Confronting a Global Threat**

Outside of CENTCOM, nearly 300 IED incidents every month around the globe confirm that the dangers from this weapon also reach far beyond the borders of Afghanistan and Iraq. Since September 2008 there have been over 3,500 total IED incidents and the number is growing. Enabled by the ability to rapidly exploit readily available commercial technology, violent extremists can easily share the results of their efforts across real-time global communications networks.

This toxic mix allows potential enemies to forge international relationships and to migrate IED technology and techniques accordingly. As a result, we see a growing and dangerous global IED threat beyond CENTCOM, especially in Africa Command, Pacific Command, and Southern Command. You may be familiar with some recent incidents.

On 17 July 2009, Islamic extremists linked to a faction of the Indonesian terrorist group Jemaah Islamiya conducted two successful person-borne IED suicide attacks against two Western hotels in Jakarta, killing nine and wounding dozens more. The incident illustrates the ability of al-Qaeda to successfully inspire IED attacks by like-minded groups around the globe.

On 17 September 2009 in Somalia, al-Qaeda linked al-Shabaab insurgents detonated two suicide vehicle-borne IEDs inside the African Union Mission in Somalia headquarters compound in Mogadishu. The attack claimed the lives of 14 African Union Soldiers, including the former Deputy Commander of that mission.

As recently as 29 September 2009, two American military personnel attached to Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines were killed by an IED on Jolo Island as they traveled in an armored high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle with Philippine military personnel to support a humanitarian project. The attack is attributed to local Islamist militants. Though likely not specifically targeting United States personnel, this

incident highlights the global IED threat faced by American forces when operating with foreign partners. These were the first United States military fatalities in the Philippines since 2002.

There have been two recent high-profile arrests highlighting the fact that the IED threat is not just a distant problem, but one that sits on our doorstep:

On 21 September 2009, the FBI arrested a 24-year old Afghan immigrant, Najibullah Zazi, for plotting to emplace IEDs at New York Fashion Week venues and at sports stadiums. Zazi received training in the construction of IEDs from al-Qaeda operatives in Pakistan and had enlisted the assistance of several others, including his father, a shuttle bus driver at a New York airport, in the plot.

On 25 September 2009, the FBI arrested 19-year old Hosam Maher Husein Smadai, a Jordanian national, for attempting to destroy a 60-story glass office building in downtown Dallas, Texas. During an undercover operation, the FBI provided Smadai with an inert IED, which he then placed in a vehicle that he parked near the structure. His intent was to bring the fight back to United States soil and further the Islamic extremist agenda.

Our allies in the war against extremism continue to face the IED threat on a daily basis. Pakistan has been rocked on a nearly continuously by a Pakistani Taliban IED campaign waged against governmental and security infrastructures. This campaign of terror has led the Government of Pakistan to commit nearly 30,000 troops to regain control of the Taliban safe havens in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and the Northwest Frontier Province.

**Ongoing JIEDDO Efforts: JIEDDO's Lines of Operations (LOO)**

JIEDDO organizes all of its efforts across three LOOs—defeating IEDs in whatever form they take; enabling attacks on IED networks wherever they arise; and training our warfighters to survive and succeed against both.

**Defeat the Device.** During our first two years of operations we were in a race against time to defeat the effects of IEDs on the battlefield. As casualties mounted we quickly learned that we must innovate faster than a ruthless, agile enemy capable of rapidly adapting commercial off-the-shelf technologies and IED tactics an estimated three times inside of one of our budget cycles. With Congressionally-directed funding we were able to counter these rapid innovation cycles by creating a unique, transparent, and analytically driven rapid acquisition process that allows us to deliver risk-tolerant solutions to warfighters in months versus the years associated with the conventional acquisition system that manages force modernization programs.

This process, called the Joint IED Defeat Capability Approval and Acquisition Management Process (JCAAMP), accommodates a high degree of uncertainty. Operating within a 0-24 month window, as opposed to the much longer DoD budget process that cannot respond to the current urgency of warfighter needs, JIEDDO has quickly evolved as DoD's premiere agency for rapid invention, and rapid development and delivery of those inventions into the hands of warfighters. Highlights of our current efforts include: the suite of technical forensics programs known as weapons technical intelligence, counter radio-controller electronic warfare commonly referred to as CREW, various signatures programs, and more than 90 other enduring counter-IED capabilities, that resulted from 240 materiel solutions delivered to warfighters during the past three years.

JCAAMP also manages the counter-IED technology development portfolio. In conjunction with the Services and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, JIEDDO is responsible for integrating all of DoD's counter-IED technology efforts. Efforts that



show promise include potential new sensors, data exploitation, sensor and information fusion to detect IEDs, blasting cap neutralization, and formal collaboration with the medical community to prevent and mitigate traumatic injuries.

JCAAMP is not perfect, but it is valuable because it allows us to bypass existing cumbersome, risk-adverse processes in order to respond to warfighters in time to have an impact. As we continue to refine JCAAMP and the Services more fully participate in their roles within the process, the natural friction that currently exists between us will continue to diminish. What is most important is that JIEDDO continues to demonstrate every day that DoD can respond to urgent warfighter needs in a collaborative process with transparency and comprehensive oversight.

**Attack the Network.** Despite our technology successes we know that defeating devices is not enough and that we need to better enable offensive operations by developing capabilities to support attacks against IED networks. We must exploit the use of information as one of our greatest asymmetric advantages. To that end, JIEDDO created the Counter-IED Operations Integration Center (COIC) in 2006. The COIC gives warfighters unprecedented capability to attack enemy networks by delivering near real-time fused information, especially for forces at brigade, or regimental, through corps level.

Key Attack the Network efforts include support to sniper teams by enabling observation and targeting in all weather, day or night, to defeat IED emplacements along routes with significant IED activity. JIEDDO has also funded a nonmateriel counter-IED capability that actively geo-locates and targets communications devices, allowing our forces to find, fix, and finish IED-related command and control nodes. Finally, JIEDDO continues to lead efforts in developing change detection capabilities with proofs-of-concepts currently underway in CENTCOM.

**Train the Force.** None of these efforts will generate the desired impact without providing the best possible counter-IED training support to our warfighters. JIEDDO constantly strives to raise the bar by rapidly adapting and infusing our cutting edge programs, such as signatures and social dynamics, into counter-IED training programs across DoD.

Additionally, JIEDDO Headquarters, in conjunction with our Joint Center of Excellence at Ft. Irwin California, rapidly incorporates feedback from JIEDDO-deployed field teams, unit debrief teams, and in-theater surveys into Service training programs. By funding substantial modifications to combat training centers and home station training programs, JIEDDO has enabled world-class counter-IED training for warfighters and units at the tactical level.

Our contributions to predeployment battle staff training for brigade and regimental combat teams, as well as division and corps headquarters is equally impressive. This leader training has been significantly enhanced with the development of the Joint Training Counter-IED Operations Integration Center (JTCOIC) located in Norfolk, Virginia. Within the past year, the JTCOIC has built both physical and virtual partnerships of government, industry, and academic experts who focus on predeployment training that replicates the most complex and difficult circumstances that our leaders and their units will face on battlefield. In 2008 and early 2009, JTCOIC constructed its physical facility, expanded its architecture, acquired access to critical databases, and developed relationships with the training communities across all of the Services.

JIEDDO is currently working closely with the Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, to publish capstone counter-IED doctrine for Joint Forces. Once published, this doctrine will bridge the gap in what our forces have learned at the tactical level over the past seven years. Our goal is to provide both the tactical and operational level commanders with the requisite knowledge to train, organize, and resource their forces for the counter-IED fight.

The key to our success has been, and always will be, world-class training. Unfortunately, no one could have anticipated the sheer amount and complexity of the training required to successfully counter IEDs. JEDDO's mission is to grab those emerging, hard training problems and find ways for the Services and our partners to overcome them.

To guarantee our continued success in this area, we are in the process of developing a comprehensive DOD-wide counter-IED training architecture that will give us an evolutionary jump forward by federating all ongoing counter-IED training across the Services the interagency, and our partner nations. By sharing our resources, insights, and best of breed practices we plan to achieve a level of training synergy never seen before.

#### **Collaboration and Partnerships**

In recent testimony to Congress, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen, indicated that, absent a broader international and interagency approach to the problems there, no amount of troops in no amount of time can ever achieve the objectives we seek in Afghanistan. This is certainly true in the fight against IEDs.

JIEDDO was designed to function as a catalyst working across DoD, interagency, international, and commercial domains in order to identify and leverage the best resources we can bring to bear against IEDs. As a result, JIEDDO has developed a vast array of collaborative relationships. Our unimpeded access to the COCOMs, Services, the interagency, and allies, coupled with our National Capitol Region presence, has allowed us to leverage large networks comprised of industry, academia, laboratories, federally funded research and development corporations, and government agencies to pursue solutions to the IED challenge.

### **Stewardship of Resources**

JIEDDO operates with special authorities as outlined in DoD Directive 2000.19E. These authorities and special Congressional funding enable us to operate efficiently and effectively in ways that other DoD entities cannot. We have been fortunate to operate with the confidence of the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Congress, both of whom have given us tremendous support and guidance as we have grown in capability and in our role of bringing together the entire enterprise to rapidly develop counter-IED capabilities.

JCAAMP is our capstone process to make this happen. Sensitive to our mandate to be good stewards, JCAAMP is designed to bring the Department's most senior stakeholders, including the Services, together in a validation and funding decision process. The formal collaboration directed by JCAAMP helps us avoid unnecessary duplicative efforts and provides early visibility to the Services on initiatives that will transition or transfer to them in the future. We're able to accomplish these objectives while ensuring we can respond rapidly to support the COCOMs. JIEDDO continues to improve and refine our JCAAMP processes and will publish a revised version of the JCAAMP governing instruction in November 2009.

JIEDDO is making steady progress in establishing internal control processes to provide assurance that managers execute effective stewardship of resources. Based on our own internal review and with the help of the Government Accountability Office we determined the need to increase our government workforce to provide better control procedures. Over the past year, JIEDDO has been actively recruiting and hiring top-notch government civil servants to address this need.

### **Living in an Era of Persistent Conflict**

Since our last meeting a little over a year ago, I have become more convinced than ever that we live in an era of persistent conflict. To echo Secretary Gates, the clear lines that distinguished conventional and irregular warfare have blurred. We now confront a complex, hybrid form of conflict ranging from near-peer competitors who will use irregular or asymmetric tactics, to non-state or rogue state actors capable of generating violence across a broad spectrum of weapons ranging from IEDs to weapons of mass destruction.

Whether we choose to call it a Global War on Terror, a Long War, or an era of persistent conflict makes no difference. We have been at it for eight years and I believe this enemy will continue to fight us for the foreseeable future; certainly for the rest of my lifetime, and probably beyond. Violent extremists will continue to wage conflict against human targets and the weapon of choice will continue to be the IED-- we can never be satisfied with the results we achieve.

We must further diminish the strategic effects of IEDs, reducing their appeal for increased global employment. We must strive for an ever greater impact through the continued aggressive development of new, innovative ways to make this weapon too costly to produce and too risky to employ. While we will never completely chase this weapon off the battlefield, we must continue to eliminate its ability to affect us strategically.

### **JIEDDO's Vision for the Future**

The enemy we face for the foreseeable future knows how to exploit our vulnerabilities. Possessing a very long view, time is unimportant to this enemy—they don't need it, and they hope we will waste it. They believe our resolve will weaken with the passage of years. Now, more than ever, we must understand that and stay the course.

Looking forward, IEDDO is on the cusp of some potentially game changing developments in the areas of command wire, signatures, weapons technical intelligence, and biometrics. Unfortunately, we have already harvested most of the mature technologies available to us. As we move forward, our technology development may require longer term commitments of both time and money.

We also have several long-term collaborative efforts underway that will greatly inform our evolving approach to IED networks and how to defeat them. In addition to a robust interagency working group focused on the social dynamics of human networks, we have also initiated a series of red team and competitive strategies gaming efforts that will hopefully allow us to leap frog the enemy and break the endless cycles of IED measures, counter measures, and counter-countermeasures that have characterized this conflict.

We have not yet completed the necessary, difficult work of developing a common counter-IED military doctrine or defining the requirements for the establishment of comprehensive, coherent expeditionary counter-IED units. We also have a long way to go in building the standards and scope for counter-IED training, both for specialized units and across the joint force.

We have barely paved a path of formal partnerships with our allies. These relationships are vitally important to our success but remain fragile in execution. We have made some inroads but still need to remove the many obstacles that hobble our ability to conduct information sharing critical to our success. We need to strengthen our commitment and forge the bonds necessary to beat this enemy.

A long term commitment on the part of our nation's most senior leaders is required to win this fight. JIEDDO sits at the center of that commitment. A permanent JIEDDO – funded in the base budget – is the clear signal that we understand what we are up against for the foreseeable future and that we are willing to invest the money, the time, the energy, and the talent to make sure we win. I recognize this will not be easy, but I believe it is necessary.

I have proudly worn the uniform of the United States Army for over 43 years. As I near retirement, I could not have asked to be in a better assignment, and I could not be more proud of the men and women who are helping me defeat the IED as a weapon of strategic influence. They are passionate about our mission, and they display daily a sense of urgency as they work to defeat the device, to attack the networks and to train the force to do both. We can count the numbers of those killed in action and wounded in action, but we will never know the number of lives, limbs, and eyesight that have been saved by our actions. However, I know they have been and will continue to be saved by the efforts of the wonderful men and women who work for the Joint IED Defeat Organization. Countering the IED is at the heart of the war we now find ourselves fighting. My experience tells me to be optimistic because of Soldiers, Marines, Sailors, Airmen and civilians who sacrifice daily to accomplish the missions we give them.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you and your Subcommittee for inviting me here today to discuss an issue that I feel most passionate about.

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United States Government Accountability Office

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GAO

Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Oversight  
and Investigations, Committee on Armed  
Services, House of Representatives

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## WARFIGHTER SUPPORT

### Challenges Confronting DOD's Ability to Coordinate and Oversee Its Counter- Improvised Explosive Devices Efforts

Statement of William M. Solis, Director  
Defense Capabilities and Management




GAO

Accountability \* Integrity \* Reliability

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GAO-10-186T





### Why GAO Did This Study

Improvised explosive devices (IED) are the number-one threat to troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, accounting for almost 40 percent of the attacks on coalition forces in Iraq. Although insurgents' use of IEDs in Iraq has begun to decline, in Afghanistan the number of IED incidents has significantly increased. The Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) was created to lead, advocate, and coordinate all DOD efforts to defeat IEDs. Its primary role is to provide funding to the military services and DOD agencies to rapidly develop and field counter-IED solutions. Through fiscal year 2009, Congress has appropriated over \$16 billion to JIEDDO. In addition, other DOD components, including the military services, have devoted at least \$1.5 billion to the counter-IED effort—which does not include \$22.7 billion for Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles.

This testimony is based on a report that GAO is issuing today as well as preliminary observations from ongoing work that GAO plans to report in early 2010. In the report being issued today, GAO is recommending that JIEDDO (1) improve its visibility of counter-IED efforts across DOD, (2) develop a complete plan to guide the transition of initiatives, and (3) define criteria for its training initiatives to help guide its funding decisions. DOD generally concurred with GAO's recommendations and noted actions to be taken.

View GAO-10-186T or key components. For more information, contact William Solis at (202) 512-8365 or SolisW@GAO.gov.

October 29, 2009

## WARFIGHTER SUPPORT

### Challenges Confronting DOD's Ability to Coordinate and Oversee Its Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Efforts

#### What GAO Found

Since its creation, JIEDDO has taken several steps to improve its management of counter-IED efforts. For instance, GAO's ongoing work has found that JIEDDO has been improving the management of its efforts to defeat IEDs, including developing and implementing a strategic plan that provides an overarching framework for departmentwide efforts to defeat IEDs, as well as a JIEDDO-specific strategic plan. Also, as noted in the report GAO is issuing today, JIEDDO and the services have taken steps to improve visibility over their counter-IED efforts, and JIEDDO has taken several steps to support the ability of the services and defense agencies to program and fund counter-IED initiatives.

However, several significant challenges remain that affect DOD's ability to oversee JIEDDO. Some of these challenges are identified in GAO's report being released today along with recommendations to address them. For example, one challenge is a lack of full visibility by JIEDDO and the services over counter-IED initiatives throughout DOD. Although JIEDDO and various service organizations are developing and maintaining their own counter-IED initiative databases, JIEDDO and the services lack a comprehensive database of all existing counter-IED initiatives, which limits their visibility over counter-IED efforts across the department. In addition, JIEDDO faces difficulties coordinating the transition of funding responsibility for joint counter-IED initiatives to the services, due to gaps between JIEDDO's transition timeline and DOD's base budget cycle. JIEDDO's initiative transitions also are hindered when service requirements are not fully considered during JIEDDO's acquisition process. JIEDDO also lacks clear criteria for defining what counter-IED training initiatives it will fund and, as a result, has funded training activities that may have primary uses other than defeating IEDs. Additionally, GAO's ongoing work has identified other oversight challenges. For example, JIEDDO lacks a means as well as reliable data to gauge the effectiveness of its counter-IED efforts. GAO's work has identified several areas in which data on the effectiveness and progress of IED-defeat initiatives are unreliable or inconsistently collected. In some cases, data are not collected in-theater because the initiatives may not be designed with adequate data-collection procedures. Another challenge facing JIEDDO is its inconsistent application of its counter-IED initiative acquisition process, allowing initiatives to bypass some or all of the process's key review and approval steps. Further, JIEDDO lacks adequate internal controls to ensure DOD that it is achieving its objectives. For example, in July 2009, JIEDDO reported that its internal controls system had a combination of deficiencies that constituted a material weakness. Such a weakness could adversely affect JIEDDO's ability to meet its objectives. Finally, JIEDDO has not developed a process for identification and analysis of the risks it faces in achieving its objectives from both external and internal sources, and it has not assessed its performance over time or ensured that the findings of audits and other reviews have been promptly resolved. As GAO completes its ongoing work it expects to issue a report with recommendations to address these issues.

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Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss Department of Defense (DOD) management and oversight of its effort to defeat improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Such devices continue to be the number-one threat to troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. During 2008, IEDs accounted for almost 40 percent of the attacks on coalition forces in Iraq. In 2009, insurgents' use of IEDs against U.S. forces in Iraq declined for the second straight year since 2003, while in Afghanistan the number of monthly IED incidents reached more than 800 in July 2009. Due to the magnitude of the IED threat, DOD created the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) in January 2006 in an effort to focus its counter-IED efforts. JIEDDO is responsible for leading, advocating, and coordinating all DOD efforts to defeat IEDs. A primary role for JIEDDO is to provide funding to the military services and DOD agencies to rapidly develop and field counter-IED solutions. Through fiscal year 2009, Congress has appropriated over \$16 billion to JIEDDO to address the IED threat. In addition, other DOD components, including the military services, have devoted at least \$1.5 billion to the counter-IED effort, not including \$22.7 billion for Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles. Along with the escalation in Afghanistan, the IED threat is increasingly expanding throughout the globe with over 300 IED events per month worldwide outside of Iraq and Afghanistan, according to JIEDDO. There is widespread consensus that this threat will not go away and that the IED will continue to be a weapon of strategic influence in future conflicts.

In response to congressional direction,<sup>1</sup> GAO has issued a series of reports on JIEDDO. This work has examined a broad spectrum of JIEDDO's operations including its ability to lead, advocate, and coordinate counter-IED efforts across DOD as well as establish itself as an accountable organization that can effectively manage billions of dollars in funding. As DOD looks to the future in deciding the appropriate role, organizational placement, and degree of Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) oversight for JIEDDO, addressing these types of issues will be critical. My testimony today will discuss our observations in two main areas. First, I will describe the steps that JIEDDO and DOD have taken to manage counter-IED

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<sup>1</sup>S. Rep. No. 109-292 (2006) (Senate Appropriations Committee report on Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2007), and H.R. Rep. No. 110-477 (2007) (conference report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008).

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efforts. Second, I will highlight the challenges that affect DOD's ability to oversee JIEDDO.

In preparing this testimony, we relied on the report we are issuing today regarding actions needed to improve visibility and coordination of DOD's counter-IED efforts.<sup>2</sup> We met with officials from several DOD organizations including JIEDDO, the Army Asymmetric Warfare Office, the Army National Training Center, the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, the Training Counter-IED Operations Integration Center, Joint Forces Command, the JIEDDO Joint Center of Excellence, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), the Technical Support Working Group, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. We also examined documentation including DOD Directive 2000.19E, which established JIEDDO, other documentation and briefings relating to JIEDDO's evolution, and JIEDDO Instruction 5000.01,<sup>3</sup> which established JIEDDO's rapid acquisition process, as well as other documents and briefings from JIEDDO, the Services, and other DOD entities. This work was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. In addition, we are providing preliminary observations from our ongoing work regarding JIEDDO's management of its internal processes, its strategic planning, initiative development, and internal controls. For this ongoing work, we conducted case studies of 56 of the 497 counter-IED initiatives listed in JIEDDO's financial records as of March 30, 2009, covering the top 20 initiatives in each of the three categories of operations.<sup>4</sup> We compared historic documentation to criteria specified in the JIEDDO directive and instructions. We collected, reviewed, and analyzed JIEDDO and DOD counter-IED strategic plans and guidance as well as documentation of JIEDDO actions for its counter-IED initiatives. We met with officials in the office of the DOD Comptroller, the OSD Office of the Director of Administration and Management, and JIEDDO. In addition, to further evaluate JIEDDO's initiative development we reviewed its oversight and internal control processes. We are

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<sup>2</sup>GAO, *Warfighter Support: Actions Needed to Improve Visibility and Coordination of DOD's Counter Improvised Explosive Device Efforts*, GAO-10-95 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 29, 2009).

<sup>3</sup>Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization Instruction 5000.1, Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat (JIEDD) Capability Approval and Acquisition Management Process (JCAAMP) (Nov. 9, 2007). Hereinafter cited as JIEDDOI 5000.1, (Nov. 9, 2007).

<sup>4</sup> JIEDDO manages its counter-IED efforts by placing its counter-IED initiatives into one of three categories: initiatives to defeat IEDs, initiatives to attack IED networks, and initiatives to train warfighters how to recognize and deal with IEDs.

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conducting this work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards, and we expect to issue a report in early 2010.

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## Background

With the escalation of the IED threat in Iraq dating back to 2003, DOD began identifying several counter-IED capability gaps including shortcomings in the areas of counter-IED technologies, qualified personnel with expertise in counter-IED tactics, training, dedicated funding, and the lack of an expedited acquisition process for developing new solutions to address emerging IED threats. Prior DOD efforts to defeat IEDs included various process teams and task forces. For example, DOD established the Joint IED Defeat Task Force in June 2005, which replaced three temporary organizations—the Army IED Task Force; the Joint IED Task Force; and the Under Secretary of Defense, Force Protection Working Group. To further focus DOD's efforts and minimize duplication, DOD published a new directive in February 2006,<sup>5</sup> which changed the name of the Joint IED Defeat Task Force to JIEDDO. This directive established JIEDDO as a joint entity and jointly manned organization within DOD, directly under the authority, direction, and control of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, rather than subjecting JIEDDO to more traditional review under an Under Secretary of Defense within the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

DOD's directive further states that JIEDDO shall focus all DOD actions in support of the combatant commanders' and their respective Joint Task Forces' efforts to defeat IEDs as weapons of strategic influence. Specifically JIEDDO is directed to identify, assess, and fund initiatives that provide specific counter-IED solutions, and is granted the authority to approve joint IED defeat initiatives valued up to \$25 million and make recommendations to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for initiatives valued over that amount. Beginning in fiscal year 2007, Congress, has provided JIEDDO with its own separate appropriation, averaging \$4 billion a year. JIEDDO may then transfer funds to the military service that is designated to sponsor a specific initiative. After JIEDDO provides funding authority to a military service, the designated service program manager, not JIEDDO, is responsible for managing the initiatives for which JIEDDO has provided funds.

Since 2004, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-123 has specified that federal agencies have a fundamental responsibility to

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<sup>5</sup>DOD Directive 2000.19E (Feb. 15, 2009).

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develop and maintain effective internal controls that ensure the prevention or detection of significant weaknesses—that is, weaknesses that could adversely affect the agency's ability to meet its objectives.<sup>6</sup> According to OMB, the importance of internal controls is addressed in many statutes and executive documents. OMB requires agencies and individual federal managers to take systematic and proactive measures to develop and implement appropriate, cost-effective internal controls for results-oriented management. In addition, the Federal Managers Financial Integrity Act of 1982 establishes the overall requirements with regard to internal controls.<sup>7</sup> Accordingly, an agency head must establish controls that reasonably ensure that (1) obligations and costs are in compliance with applicable law; (2) all assets are safeguarded against waste, loss, unauthorized use, or misappropriation; and (3) revenues and expenditures applicable to agency operations are properly recorded and accounted for to permit the preparation of accounts and reliable financial and statistical reports and to maintain accountability over the assets. Specific internal control standards underlying the internal controls concept in the federal government are promulgated by GAO and are referred to as the Green Book.<sup>8</sup> The DOD Comptroller is responsible for the implementation and oversight of DOD's internal control program.

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#### JIEDDO and DOD Have Taken Steps to Improve the Management of Counter-IED Efforts

Since its creation, JIEDDO has taken several steps to improve its management and operation of counter-IED efforts in response to our past work as well as to address congressional concerns. For example, in our ongoing work, we have noted that JIEDDO has been improving its strategic planning. In March 2007, observing that JIEDDO did not have a formal written strategic plan, we recommended that it develop such a plan based on the Government Performance and Results Act requirement implemented by the OMB circular A-11 requirement that government entities develop and implement a strategic plan for managing their efforts. Further, in 2007, Congress initially appropriated only a portion of JIEDDO's requested fiscal year 2008 funding, and a Senate Appropriations Committee report directed JIEDDO to provide a comprehensive and detailed strategic plan so that additional funding could be considered. In

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<sup>6</sup>OMB Circular No. A-123, *Management's Responsibility for Internal Control*, sec. I (2004).

<sup>7</sup>Codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3512 (2007).

<sup>8</sup>GAO, *Internal Control: Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government*, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: November 1999).

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response, JIEDDO, in November 2007, issued a strategic plan that provided an overarching framework for departmentwide counter-IED efforts. Additionally, JIEDDO continues to invest considerable effort to develop and manage JIEDDO-specific plans for countering IEDs. For example, during the second half of 2008, the JIEDDO director undertook a detailed analysis of three issues. The director looked at JIEDDO's mission as defined in DOD guidance, the implicit and explicit functions associated with its mission, and the organizational structure needed to support and accomplish its mission. The effort resulted in JIEDDO publishing its JIEDDO Organization and Functions Guide in December 2008, within which JIEDDO formally established strategic planning as one of four mission areas.<sup>9</sup> Actions taken in 2009 included developing and publishing a JIEDDO-specific strategic plan for fiscal years 2009 and 2010, reviewing JIEDDO's existing performance measures to determine whether additional or alternative metrics might be needed, and engaging other government agencies and services involved in addressing the IED threat at a JIEDDO semiannual conference.<sup>10</sup> As a result of these actions, JIEDDO is steadily improving its understanding of counter-IED challenges.

Additionally, as we note in our report being issued today, JIEDDO and the services have taken some steps to improve visibility over their counter-IED efforts. For example, JIEDDO, the services, and several other DOD organizations compile some information on the wide range of IED defeat initiatives existing throughout the department. JIEDDO also promotes visibility by giving representatives from the Army's and Marine Corps' counter-IED coordination offices the opportunity to assist in the evaluation of IED defeat proposals. Additionally, JIEDDO maintains a network of liaison officers to facilitate counter-IED information sharing throughout the department. It also hosts a semiannual conference covering counter-IED topics such as agency roles and responsibilities, key issues, and current challenges. JIEDDO also hosts a technology outreach conference with industry, academia, and other DOD components to discuss the latest requirements and trends in the counter-IED effort. Lastly, the services provide some visibility over their own counter-IED

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<sup>9</sup>The four mission areas are: Strategic Planning, Rapid Acquisition, Operations and Intelligence Fusion, and Enable Operations and Training Support.

<sup>10</sup>Gauging counter-IED effort effectiveness was one of several purposes for which JIEDDO convened its semiannual event to coordinate, educate, and influence stakeholders in the counter-IED mission.

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initiatives by submitting information to JIEDDO for the quarterly reports that it submits to Congress.

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### Several Challenges Affect DOD's Ability to Oversee the Management of JIEDDO

While JIEDDO has taken some steps toward improving its management of counter-IED efforts, several significant challenges remain that affect DOD's ability to oversee JIEDDO. Some of these challenges are identified in the report we are issuing today and include a lack of full visibility by JIEDDO and the services over counter-IED initiatives throughout DOD, difficulties coordinating the transition of funding responsibility for joint IED defeat initiatives to the military services once counter-IED solutions have been developed, and a lack of clear criteria for defining what counter-IED training initiatives it will fund. Additionally, our ongoing work has identified other challenges including a lack of a means to gauge the effectiveness of its counter-IED efforts, a lack of consistent application of its counter-IED initiative acquisition process, and a lack of adequate internal controls required to provide DOD assurance that it is achieving its objectives. I will discuss each of these challenges in more detail.

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### JIEDDO and the Services Lack Full Visibility over Counter-IED Initiatives throughout DOD

DOD's ability to manage JIEDDO is hindered by its lack of full visibility over counter-IED initiatives throughout DOD. Although JIEDDO and various service organizations are developing and maintaining their own counter-IED initiative databases, JIEDDO and the services lack a comprehensive database of all existing counter-IED initiatives, which limits their visibility over counter-IED efforts across the department. JIEDDO is required to lead, advocate, and coordinate all DOD actions to defeat IEDs. Also, JIEDDO is required to maintain the current status of program execution, operational fielding, and performance of approved Joint IED Defeat initiatives. Despite the creation of JIEDDO, most of the organizations engaged in the IED defeat effort in existence prior to JIEDDO have continued to develop, maintain, and in many cases, expand their own IED defeat capabilities. For example, the Army continues to address the IED threat through such organizations as the Army's Training and Doctrine Command, which provides training support and doctrinal formation for counter-IED activities, and the Research, Development & Engineering Command, which conducts counter-IED technology assessments and studies for Army leadership. Furthermore, an Army official stated that the Center for Army Lessons Learned continues to maintain an IED cell to collect and analyze counter-IED information. The Marine Corps' Training and Education Command and the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned have also continued counter-IED efforts beyond the creation of JIEDDO. At the interagency level, the Technical

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Support Working Group continues its research and development of counter-IED technologies.

Despite these ongoing efforts and JIEDDO's mission to coordinate all DOD actions to defeat improvised explosive devices, JIEDDO does not maintain a comprehensive database of all IED defeat initiatives across the department. JIEDDO is currently focusing on developing a management system that will track its initiatives as they move through its own acquisition process. Although this system will help JIEDDO manage its counter-IED initiatives, it will track only JIEDDO-funded initiatives, not those being independently developed and procured by the services and other DOD components. Without incorporating service and other DOD components' counter-IED initiatives, JIEDDO's efforts to develop a counter-IED initiative database will not capture all efforts to defeat IEDs throughout DOD.

In addition, the services do not have a central source of information for their own counter-IED efforts because there is currently no requirement that each service develop its own comprehensive database of all of its counter-IED initiatives. Without centralized counter-IED initiative databases, the services are limited in their ability to provide JIEDDO with a timely and comprehensive summary of all their existing initiatives. For example, the U.S. Army Research and Development and Engineering Command's Counter-IED Task Force and the service counter-IED focal points—the Army Asymmetric Warfare Office's Adaptive Networks, Threats and Solutions Division; and the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab—maintain databases of counter-IED initiatives. However, according to Army and Marine Corps officials, these databases are not comprehensive in covering all efforts within their respective service.<sup>11</sup> Additionally, of these three databases, only the U.S. Army Research and Development and Engineering Command's database is available for external use. Since the services are able to act independently to develop and procure their own counter-IED solutions, several service and Joint officials told us that a

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<sup>11</sup>The U.S. Army Research and Development and Engineering Command's Counter-IED Task Force maintains an online counter-IED technology interface that provides a search and organization tool of counter-IED technologies, studies, signatures, and requirements. The Army Asymmetric Warfare Office's Adaptive Networks, Threats and Solutions Division maintains a listing of all initiatives that have gone through JIEDDO's acquisition process. The Marine Corps Warfighting Lab maintains a listing of all counter-IED solutions the Marine Corps uses in-theater.



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centralized counter-IED database would be of great benefit in coordinating and managing the department's counter-IED programs.

Furthermore, although JIEDDO involves the services in its process to select initiatives, the services lack full visibility over those JIEDDO-funded initiatives that bypass JIEDDO's acquisition process, called the JIEDDO Capability Approval and Acquisition Management Process (JCAAMP). In this process, JIEDDO brings in representatives from the service to participate on several boards—such as a requirements, resources, and acquisition board—to evaluate counter-IED initiatives, and various integrated process teams. However, in its process to select counter-IED initiatives, JIEDDO has approved some counter-IED initiatives without vetting them through the appropriate service counter-IED focal points, because the process allows JIEDDO to make exceptions if deemed necessary and appropriate. For example, at least three counter-IED training initiatives sponsored by JIEDDO's counter-IED joint training center were not vetted through the Army Asymmetric Warfare Office's Adaptive Networks, Threats, and Solutions Branch—the Army's focal point for its counter-IED effort—before being approved for JIEDDO funding. Service officials have said that not incorporating their views on initiatives limits their visibility of JIEDDO actions and could result in approved initiatives that are inconsistent with service needs. JIEDDO officials acknowledged that while it may be beneficial for some JIEDDO-funded initiatives to bypass its acquisition process in cases where an urgent requirement with limited time to field is identified, these cases do limit service visibility over all JIEDDO-funded initiatives.

In response to these issues, we recommended in our report that is being issued today that the military services create their own comprehensive IED defeat initiative databases and work with JIEDDO to develop a DOD-wide database for all counter-IED initiatives. In response to this recommendation, DOD concurred and noted steps currently being taken to develop a DOD-wide database of counter-IED initiatives. While we recognize that this ongoing effort is a step in the right direction, these steps did not address the need for the services to develop databases of their initiatives as we also recommended. Until all of the services and other DOD components gain full awareness of their own individual counter-IED efforts and provide this input into a central database, any effort to establish a DOD-wide database of all counter-IED initiatives will be incomplete. We are also recommending that, in cases where initiatives bypass JIEDDO's rapid acquisition process, JIEDDO develop a mechanism to notify the appropriate service counter-IED focal points of each initiative prior to its funding. In regard to this recommendation, DOD also

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concurrent and noted steps it plans to take such as notifying stakeholders of all JIEDDO efforts or initiatives, whether or not JCAAMP processing is required. We agree that, if implemented, these actions would satisfy our recommendation.

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**JIEDDO Faces Difficulties  
Coordinating the  
Transition of Funding  
Responsibility for Joint  
IED Defeat Initiatives to  
the Military Services**

Although JIEDDO has recently taken several steps to improve its process to transition IED defeat initiatives to the military services following the development of new capabilities, JIEDDO still faces difficulties in this area. JIEDDO's transitions of initiatives to the services are hindered by funding gaps between JIEDDO's transition timeline and DOD's budget cycle as well as by instances when service requirements are not fully considered during JIEDDO's acquisition process. JIEDDO obtains funding for its acquisition and development programs through congressional appropriations for overseas contingency operations. JIEDDO typically remains responsible for funding counter-IED initiatives until they have been developed, fielded, and tested as proven capabilities. According to DOD's directive, JIEDDO is then required to develop plans for transitioning proven joint IED defeat initiatives into DOD base budget programs of record for sustainment and further integration into existing service programs once those initiatives have been developed. As described in its instruction, JIEDDO plans to fund initiatives for 2 fiscal years of sustainment. However, service officials have stated that JIEDDO's 2-year transition timeline may not allow the services enough time to request and receive funding through DOD's base budgeting process, causing DOD to rely on service overseas contingency operations funding to sustain joint-funded counter-IED initiatives following JIEDDO's 2-year transition timeline.

According to JIEDDO's latest transition brief for fiscal year 2010, the organization recommended the transfer of 19 initiatives totaling \$233 million to the services for funding through overseas contingency operations appropriations and the transition of only 3 totaling \$4.5 million into service base budget programs. The potential need for increased transition funds will continue given the large number of current initiatives funded by JIEDDO. For example, as of March 30, 2009, JIEDDO's initiative management system listed 497 ongoing initiatives.<sup>12</sup> In addition to the small number of transitions and transfers that have occurred within DOD

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<sup>12</sup>Some of these initiatives may terminate and therefore not transition or transfer to the service; however JIEDDO has not determined the rate of transition/transfer.

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to date, the services often decide to indefinitely defer assuming funding responsibility for JIEDDO initiatives following JIEDDO's intended 2-year transition or transfer point. According to JIEDDO's fiscal year 2011 transition list, the Army and Navy have deferred or rejected the acceptance of 16 initiatives that JIEDDO had recommended for transition or transfer, totaling at least \$16 million.<sup>13</sup> Deferred or rejected initiatives are either sustained by JIEDDO indefinitely, transitioned or transferred during a future year, or terminated. When the services defer or reject the transition of initiatives, JIEDDO remains responsible for them beyond the intended 2-year transition or transfer point, a delay that could diminish its ability to fund new initiatives and leads to uncertainty about when or if the services will assume funding responsibility in the future.

Furthermore, JIEDDO's initiative transitions are hindered when service requirements are not fully considered during the development and integration of joint-funded counter-IED initiatives, as evidenced by two counter-IED radio jamming systems. In the first example, CENTCOM, whose area of responsibility includes both Iraq and Afghanistan, responded to an urgent operational need by publishing a requirement in 2006 for a man-portable IED jamming system for use in theater. In 2007, JIEDDO funded and delivered to theater a near-term solution to meet this capability gap. However, Army officials stated that the fielded system was underutilized by troops in Iraq, who thought the system was too heavy to carry, especially given the weight of their body armor. Since then, the joint counter-IED radio jamming program board has devised a plan to field a newer man-portable jamming system called CREW 3.1. According to JIEDDO, CREW 3.1 systems were developed by a joint technical requirements board that aimed to balance specific service requirements for man-portable systems. While CENTCOM maintains that CREW 3.1 is a requirement in-theater, and revalidated the need in September 2009, officials from the Army and Marine Corps have both stated that they do not have a formal requirement for the system. Nevertheless, DOD plans to field the equipment to each of the services in response to CENTCOM's stated operational need. It remains unclear, however, which DOD organizations will be required to pay for procurement and sustainment costs for the CREW 3.1, since DOD has yet to identify the source of funding to procure additional quantities.

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<sup>13</sup>According to the Army's Adaptive Networks, Threats, and Solutions Division, 9 of these initiatives were training initiatives or medical initiatives later rejected by the Army for transition or transfer in fiscal year 2011. The 3 training initiatives were not included in the \$16 million figure cited above.

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In the second example, Army officials stated that they were not involved to the fullest extent possible in the evaluation and improvement process for a JIEDDO-funded vehicle-mounted jamming system, even though the Army was DOD's primary user in terms of total number of systems fielded. The system, called the CREW Vehicle Receiver/Jammer (CVRJ), was initiated in response to an urgent warfighter need in November 2006 for a high-powered system to jam radio frequencies used to detonate IEDs. The development of this technology ultimately required at least 20 proposals for configuration changes to correct flaws found in its design after contract award. Two of the changes involved modifying the jammer so it could function properly at high temperatures. Another change was needed to prevent the jammer from interfering with vehicle global positioning systems. Army officials stated that had they had a more direct role on the Navy-led control board that managed configuration changes to the CVRJ, the system may have been more quickly integrated into the Army's operations. As this transpired, the Army continued to use another jamming system, DUKE, as its principal counter-IED electronic warfare system. Not ensuring that service requirements are fully taken into account when evaluating counter-IED initiatives creates the potential for fielding equipment that is inconsistent with service requirements. This could later delay the transition of JIEDDO-funded initiatives to the services following JIEDDO's 2-year transition timeline.

To facilitate the transition of JIEDDO funded initiatives, our report issued today recommended that the military services work with JIEDDO to develop a comprehensive plan to guide the transition of each JIEDDO-funded initiative, including expected costs, identified funding sources, and a timeline including milestones for inclusion into the DOD base budget cycle. We also recommended that JIEDDO coordinate with the services prior to funding an initiative to ensure that service requirements are fully taken into account when making counter-IED investment decisions. In response to these recommendations, DOD concurred with our recommendation to develop a comprehensive plan and noted steps to be taken to address this issue. DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that JIEDDO coordinate with the services prior to funding an initiative, noting the department's concern over the need for a rapid response to urgent warfighter needs. While we recognize the need to respond quickly to support warfighter needs, we continue to support our recommendation and reiterate the need for the integration of service requirements and full coordination prior to funding an initiative to ensure that these efforts are fully vetted throughout DOD before significant resources are committed.

### JIEDDO Lacks Clear Criteria for Defining What Counter-IED Training Initiatives It Will Fund

JIEDDO's lack of clear criteria for the counter-IED training initiatives it will fund affects its counter-IED training investment decisions. JIEDDO devoted \$454 million in fiscal year 2008 to support service counter-IED training requirements through such activities as constructing a network of realistic counter-IED training courses at 57 locations throughout the United States, Europe, and Korea. DOD's directive defines a counter-IED initiative as a materiel or nonmateriel solution that addresses Joint IED Defeat capability gaps. Since our last report on this issue in March 2007, JIEDDO has attempted to clarify what types of counter-IED training it will fund in support of theater-urgent, counter-IED requirements. In its comments to our previous report, JIEDDO stated that it would fund an urgent theater counter-IED requirement if it "enables training support, including training aids and exercises." JIEDDO also stated in its comments that it would fund an urgent-theater, counter-IED requirement only if it has a primary counter-IED application.<sup>14</sup>

Although JIEDDO has published criteria for determining what joint counter-IED urgent training requirements to fund and has supported service counter-IED training, it has not developed similar criteria for the funding of joint training initiatives not based on urgent requirements. For example, since fiscal year 2007, JIEDDO has spent \$70.7 million on role players in an effort to simulate Iraqi social, political, and religious groups at DOD's training centers. JIEDDO also spent \$24.1 million on simulated villages at DOD's training centers in an effort to make steel shipping containers resemble Iraqi buildings. According to Army officials, these role players and simulated villages funded by JIEDDO to support counter-IED training are also utilized in training not related to countering IEDs. As a result, JIEDDO has funded training initiatives that may have primary uses other than defeating IEDs, such as role players and simulated villages to replicate Iraqi conditions at various service combat training centers. Without criteria specifying which counter-IED training initiatives it will fund, JIEDDO may diminish its ability to fund future initiatives more directly related to the counter-IED mission. DOD also could hinder coordination in managing its resources, as decision makers at both the joint and service level operate under unclear selection guidelines for which types of training initiatives should be funded and by whom. We have therefore recommended in the report being issued today that JIEDDO

<sup>14</sup>GAO, *Defense Management: A Strategic Plan is Needed to Guide the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization's Efforts to Effectively Accomplish Its Mission*, GAO 07-377C (Washington, D.C.: March 2007).

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evaluate counter-IED training initiatives using the same criteria it uses to evaluate theater-based joint counter-IED urgent requirements, and incorporate this new guidance into an instruction. In commenting on our recommendation, DOD partially concurred and expressed concerns regarding our recommendation noting that JIEDDO's JCAAMP and the development of new DOD-wide guidance would address the issues we note in our report. In response, while we recognize the steps taken by DOD to identify counter-IED training gaps and guide counter-IED training, these actions do not establish criteria by which JIEDDO will fund counter-IED training.

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**JIEDDO Lacks a Means to Gauge the Effectiveness of Its Counter-IED Efforts**

JIEDDO has not yet developed a means for reliably measuring the effectiveness of its efforts and investments in combating IEDs. The OMB circular A-11 notes that performance goals and measures are important components of a strategic plan and that it is essential to assess actual performance based on these goals and measures. JIEDDO officials attribute difficulty in determining the effectiveness of its initiatives to isolating their effect on key IED threat indicators from the effect of other activities occurring in-theater at the same time, such as a surge in troops, changes in equipment in use by coalition forces, local observation of holidays, or changes in weather such as intense dust storms, which may cause a decrease in the number of IED incidents.

JIEDDO has pursued performance measures since its inception to gauge whether its initiatives and internal operations and activities are operating effectively and efficiently, and achieving desired results. In December 2008 JIEDDO published a set of 78 specific performance measures for its organization. The list included, for example, metrics to evaluate JIEDDO's response time in satisfying urgent theater requirements, the quality and relevance of counter-IED proposals JIEDDO solicits and receives in response to its solicitations, and the ratio of initiatives for which JIEDDO completes operational assessments. However, JIEDDO has not yet established baselines for these measures or specific goals and time frames for collecting, measuring, and analyzing the relevant data.

Further, we have found several limitations with the data JIEDDO collects and relies upon to evaluate its performance. Our ongoing work has identified three areas in which the data JIEDDO uses to measure effectiveness and progress is unreliable or is inconsistently collected. First, data on effectiveness of initiatives based on feedback from warfighters in-theater is not consistently collected because JIEDDO does not routinely establish data-collection mechanisms or processes to obtain

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useful, relevant information needed to adequately assess the effectiveness of its initiatives. JIEDDO officials also said that data collection from soldiers operating in-theater is limited because the process of providing feedback may detract from higher priorities for warfighters. In response to this data shortfall, JIEDDO managers began an initiative in fiscal year 2009 to embed JIEDDO-funded teams within each brigade combat team to provide JIEDDO with an in-theater ability to collect needed data for evaluating initiatives. However, because this effort is just beginning, JIEDDO officials stated that they have not yet been able to assess its effectiveness. Second, data on the management of individual initiatives, such as data recording activities that take place throughout the development of an initiative, are not consistently recorded and maintained at JIEDDO. Officials attribute the poor data quality to the limited amount of time that JIEDDO staff are able to spend on this activity. JIEDDO staff are aware that documentation of management actions is needed to conduct counter-IED initiative evaluations and told us that they plan to make improvements. However, needed changes—such as routinely recording discussions, analysis, determinations, and findings occurring in key meetings involving JIEDDO and external parties and coding their activities in more detail to allow differentiation and deeper analysis of activities and initiatives—are yet to be developed and implemented. Third, JIEDDO does not collect or fully analyze data on unexpected outcomes, such as initiatives that may result in an increase in the occurrence or lethality of IEDs. However, we believe that such data can provide useful information that can be used to improve initiatives. For example, in response to a general officer request in Iraq, the Institute for Defense Analysis collected and analyzed IED incident data before and after a certain initiative to determine its effect on the rate of IED incidents. JIEDDO officials intended the initiative in question to result in the reduction in IED attacks. However, the data collected contradicted the intended result because the number of IED incidents increased in areas where the initiative was implemented. These data could provide lessons learned to fix the initiative or take another approach. We expect to provide further information and recommendations, if appropriate, on JIEDDO's efforts to gauge the effectiveness of its counter-IED efforts—including issues involving data collection and reliability—in the report we will be issuing in early 2010.

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**JIEDDO Has Not  
Consistently Applied Its  
Counter-IED Initiative  
Review and Approval  
Process**

Although JIEDDO has established JCAAMP as its process to review and approve proposals for counter-IED initiatives, JIEDDO excludes some initiatives from that process. JCAAMP was established in response to DOD's directive,<sup>15</sup> which stated that all of JIEDDO's initiatives are to go through a review and approval process. This requirement is consistent with government internal control standards, which identify properly segregating key duties and responsibilities—including responsibility for authorizing and processing transactions—as a fundamental control activity.<sup>16</sup> In reviewing 56 initiatives for case studies, we found that JIEDDO excluded 26 of the 56 counter-IED initiatives from JCAAMP. For example, JIEDDO excluded one initiative to enhance the counter-IED training experience by funding role players who are to help create a realistic war environment. However, another initiative with similar purpose and objective was included in the JCAAMP process. As a result, when initiatives are excluded from JCAAMP, internal and external stakeholders do not have the opportunity to review, comment on, and potentially change the course of the initiative in coordination with competing or complementary efforts.

Additionally, although the remaining 30 of 56 initiatives we reviewed went through JCAAMP, according to JIEDDO officials, we found that 22 of those 30 initiatives did not comply with some of the steps required by applicable DOD guidance. Applicable guidance includes JIEDDO's directive, instruction, and standard operating procedures, which together identify a set of various decision points and actions, collectively intended to control JIEDDO's use of resources. For example, we found that, for 16 initiatives among the 22, JIEDDO released funding to the services without obtaining required funding approval from either the Deputy Secretary of Defense—as is required for initiatives over \$25 million—or from the JIEDDO Director, for initiatives up to \$25 million.

The exclusion of initiatives from JCAAMP, coupled with noncompliance with steps of the process required by applicable guidance, reduces transparency and accountability of JIEDDO's actions within JIEDDO, as well as to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the services, and other DOD components. Without management oversight at important milestones in the approval and acquisition process, some funds appropriated for

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<sup>15</sup>DOD Directive 2000.19E. (February 14, 2006).

<sup>16</sup>GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1., *Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government*, Nov.1, 1999.



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JIEDDO may be used to support efforts that do not clearly advance the goal of countering IEDs.

According to JIEDDO officials, systematic compliance with its process and documentation has been a weakness that JIEDDO has attempted to correct, and it continues to pursue improvements in this regard. During the course of our work, officials from different JIEDDO divisions—including its accounting and budgeting, acquisition oversight, and internal review divisions—said they saw significant improvement in discipline and compliance with JIEDDO's process for managing counter-IED initiatives beginning in the last quarter of fiscal year 2009. As JIEDDO officials point out, the improvements they cite have occurred relatively recently and have not had time to demonstrate their full effect. Nonetheless, the findings in our ongoing review, and in prior GAO reports, confirm that JIEDDO has not had a systematic process in place to manage or document its activities and operations for the majority of its operating life. In the report we plan to issue in early 2010, we will present a more detailed assessment of JIEDDO's review and approval process and will make recommendations as appropriate.

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**JIEDDO Lacks Adequate  
Internal Controls Required  
to Provide DOD Assurance  
That It Is Effectively  
Achieving Its Objectives**

While JIEDDO has affirmed the importance of addressing shortcomings in its internal control system and is taking action to this end, it still lacks adequate internal controls to ensure that it is achieving its objectives. An adequate system of internal controls supports performance-based management with the procedures, plans, and methods to meet the agency's missions, goals, and objectives. Internal controls serve as the first line of defense in safeguarding assets and preventing and detecting errors and fraud, and they help program managers achieve desired results through effective stewardship of public resources. However, in July 2009 JIEDDO reported to the OSD Comptroller that a material weakness exists in JIEDDO's internal control system and has existed since it was established in January 2006. OMB defines a material weakness as a deficiency or combination of deficiencies that could adversely affect the organization's ability to meet its objectives and that the agency head determines to be significant enough to be reported outside the agency. For example, in our ongoing work we have identified, and JIEDDO officials have confirmed, that JIEDDO's internal controls system has not: (1) provided for the identification and analysis of the risks JIEDDO faces in achieving its objectives from both external and internal sources; and (2) assessed its performance over time and ensured that the findings of audits and other reviews have been promptly resolved. Consequently, JIEDDO has not developed a set of control activities that ensure its directives—and

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ultimately its objectives—are carried out effectively. Without assurance from JIEDDO that it has identified and addressed its control weaknesses, OSD does not monitor JIEDDO's progress and effectiveness and therefore is unable to detect the extent to which JIEDDO has weaknesses.

Given the longstanding weaknesses in JIEDDO's system of internal controls, it is unable to assure the DOD Comptroller that the program is achieving its objectives. The DOD Comptroller is responsible for the development and oversight of DOD's internal control program. In carrying out its responsibilities, DOD Comptroller officials told us that they relied solely on JIEDDO to internally develop and implement effective internal control systems that address key program performance risks and monitor effectiveness and compliance, and to report deficiencies or weaknesses in its internal control system through a report called the annual assurance statement, which is provided each year to the OSD Office of the Director of Administration and Management.<sup>17</sup> DOD uses additional techniques in its general oversight of JIEDDO, such as the Deputy Secretary of Defense's review and approval of certain high-dollar counter-IED initiatives. However, JIEDDO's annual assurance statement is the key mechanism DOD relies upon to comprehensively and uniformly summarize and monitor internal control system status within its organizations—including JIEDDO—and, more importantly, to report and elevate unresolved deficiencies to higher levels within and outside of DOD for awareness and action. However, DOD's limited oversight system for JIEDDO has not fully addressed control weaknesses present at JIEDDO since its first year of operation. Further, JIEDDO did not detail these control weaknesses in either of its first two annual statements of assurance in 2007 and 2008 or in its third and most recent statement of assurance completed in July 2009. The 2009 assurance statement established a 3-year timeline with incremental milestones to develop and implement a complete internal management control program by the end of fiscal year 2012. In our report we plan to issue in early 2010, we will present a fuller assessment of JIEDDO's management control processes, and will make recommendations as appropriate.

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## Concluding Observations

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, while JIEDDO has taken important steps to improve its management of DOD's counter-IED efforts, DOD continues to face a number of challenges in its effort to gain full visibility over all

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<sup>17</sup>DOD Instruction 5010.40, *Managers Internal Control Program Procedures* (Jan 4, 2006).

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counter-IED activities, coordinate the transition of JIEDDO initiatives, and clearly define the types of training initiatives it will fund. Additionally, JIEDDO's approval process for counter-IED initiatives poses significant challenges to its ability to provide full transparency and accountability over its operations. All of these challenges highlight the need for DOD to evaluate the effectiveness of its current oversight of all counter-IED efforts across the department, yet the consistent collection of reliable performance data is one of JIEDDO's greatest challenges. With improved internal controls, JIEDDO will be in a better position to ensure that it is in compliance with applicable law and its resources are safeguarded against waste. If these issues are not resolved, DOD's various efforts to counter IEDs, including JIEDDO, face the potential for duplication of effort, unaddressed capability gaps, integration issues, and inefficient use of resources in an already fiscally challenged environment, and the department will lack a basis for confidence that it has retained the necessary capabilities to address the IED threat for the long term.

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Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I will be pleased to answer any questions you or members of the subcommittee may have at this time.

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## Contacts and Acknowledgments

For future questions about this statement, please contact me on (202) 512-8365 or SolisW@GAO.gov. Individuals making key contributions to this statement include Cary Russell, Grace Coleman, Kevin Craw, Susan Ditto, William Horton, Richard Powelson, Tristan To, Yong Song, and John Strong.

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**WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING  
THE HEARING**

OCTOBER 29, 2009

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## **RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MRS. DAVIS**

Dr. SCHEAR. During my testimony on 28 October 2009 on oversight of the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), Representative Davis requested additional information on actions taken by the Department of Defense and JIEDDO to increase cooperation among the other Departments of the U.S. government with respect to homeland defense.

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security and America's Security Affairs (OASD (HD&ASA)) and JIEDDO are working with other U.S. government agencies to ensure a whole of government approach both to support deployed forces and homeland defense.

Specific examples of recent and ongoing partnerships between JIEDDO and the interagency include:

- Coordination with Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Bombing Prevention (OBP) and Department of Justice's Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), to fulfill the Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-19 requirement to create a Joint Program Office (JPO) for Combating Terrorist Use of Explosives (TUE) in the homeland. JIEDDO will continue active participation in this JPO to ensure implementation of tasks directed within HSDP-19.
- The OASD(HD&ASA) and JIEDDO attend the monthly TUE Joint Program Office meeting at FBI HQ where they continue to work with DHS, FBI, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF), and others to make progress on the various tasks and actions assigned to federal departments and agencies in the HSPD-19 Implementation Plan.
- Establishment of a memorandum of agreement (MOA) formalizing partnership with Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) for the use of contacts, data bases, and industry expertise to help interrupt the supply chain necessary to create IEDs and to assist industrial partners with the rapid deployment of emerging counter-IED technologies and systems.
- Establishment of a MOA to deploy ATF bomb specialists to Iraq and Afghanistan to assist DoD in exploiting IEDs, enable ATF explosive forensics experts to train DOD personnel in explosive-related crime scene procedures, and put ATF Liaison Officers at the DoD Counter-IED Joint Center of Excellence (JCOE) and JIEDDO HQ.
- DoD has worked with the FBI's Terrorist Explosive Device Analytic Center (TEDAC) to create a weapons technical intelligence process. All IED components, after in country exploitation by DoD, are evacuated to the TEDAC at Quantico, for additional exploitation.
- The JIEDDO Science Advisor chairs the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDRE) C-IED Science & Technology (S&T) Working Group which brings together S&T representatives from the Services and several agencies including DARPA and DHS. The working group's objective is to coordinate and de-conflict counter-IED S&T programs across the interagency.
- JIEDDO's Counter-IED Operations Integration Center (COIC) Interagency Partnership Team (IAPT) includes a senior executive council of full-time government liaison officers (LNO) who work on-site to coordinate and integrate relevant C-IED information. These LNOs provide rapid access to both time-critical information and long-term analysis that the JIEDDO COIC uses to tailor C-IED support for forward deployed units. Participating agencies include the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Department of Justice (DOJ), National Security Agency (NSA), National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA), Department of Energy (DOE), and the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC).

Please let me know if I may be of any additional assistance in this matter. [See page 33.]



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**QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING**

OCTOBER 29, 2009

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### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. SNYDER

Dr. SNYDER. Is the level of oversight appropriate for an organization of this size, with this level of funding, and with such unique flexibility in its funding and mission? Specifically, can the Deputy Secretary of Defense provide sufficient management oversight of JIEDDO?

Dr. SCHEAR. The fact that JIEDDO reports directly to the Deputy Secretary is indicative of the importance the Department of Defense places on this mission. The Joint IED Defeat Capability Approval and Acquisition Management Process assists the Deputy Secretary in his oversight role through its three-tiered structure of advisory boards that review, evaluate, and coordinate on specific initiatives prior to a final decision on funding. This governance structure cuts across institutional lines to provide a broad and balanced look at JIEDDO initiatives. It consists of:

- A Joint IED Defeat Requirement, Resources, and Acquisition Board (JR2AB) composed of O6/GS-15 members from across the Department, including representatives from the Services, various sections of the Joint Staff, and Office of the Secretary of Defense. The JR2AB meets weekly to review initiatives and highlight any issues that need to be resolved.
- A Joint Integrated Process Team (JIPT), composed of military flag officers or civilian senior executive service members from the same organizations as the JR2AB, that also meets weekly. The members of the JIPT provide written recommendations to the Director of JIEDDO. For proposed initiatives costing less than \$25 million, the JIEDDO Director can approve the funding. For those costing more than \$25 million, the initiative is staffed through the Senior Resource Steering Group.
- The Senior Resource Steering Group is chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and consists of three and four star military officers (including the Vice Chief of Staff for each military service) and equivalent senior executive service personnel, again from the same organizations. These high ranking defense officials provide written recommendations to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, who then makes the decision on whether to fund the proposed initiative.

The Deputy Secretary is able to provide the appropriate level of oversight for JIEDDO. In fact, it would be difficult for anyone at a less senior level to provide adequate oversight given that JIEDDO's work touches components throughout the Department. The Joint IED Defeat Capability Approval and Acquisition Management Process ensures that the Deputy Secretary's decisions take into account concerns from across the Department.

Dr. SNYDER. How effective are the coordination mechanisms between JIEDDO, the Services, Defense Agencies, and geographical combatant commands? What might be done to improve coordination?

Dr. SCHEAR. JIEDDO works across the Department to support our deployed warfighters against the IED threat.

- The Joint IED Defeat Capability Approval and Acquisition Management Process, a three-tiered structure of advisory boards composed of representatives from across the Department, provides for senior departmental stakeholder participation in the validation and funding decisions that JIEDDO executes in responses to urgent warfighter needs.
- This same process also helps manage the counter-IED technology development portfolio; in conjunction with the Services and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, JIEDDO ensures the integration of DoD's counter-IED science and technology efforts.
- JIEDDO's Counter-IED Operations Integration Center draws both on in-house expertise and, through liaison officers from various federal agencies, expertise across the U.S. Government to give warfighters unprecedented capability to attack networks by delivering near real-time fused information in support of tactical unit targeting of human networks.

- In conjunction with the Joint Center of Excellence at Ft. Irwin, JIEDDO rapidly incorporates feedback from its deployed field teams, unit debriefing teams, and in-theater surveys into Service training programs. In addition to funding substantial modifications to combat training centers and home station training programs, JIEDDO provides pre-deployment battle staff training for brigade and regimental combat teams, as well as division and corps headquarters.
- JIEDDO is working with the United States Joint Forces Command to publish capstone counter-IED doctrine for Joint Forces.

JIEDDO continues to identify further steps it can take in improving these processes and supporting the warfighter. DoD Directive 2000.19E, *Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization*, is scheduled for revision next year. The review process will provide the opportunity for Departmental review, coordination, and consideration of modifications to C-IED authorities and processes.

Dr. SNYDER. When and how (through what mechanism) did OSD approve the expansion of JIEDDO's charter, mission, and organization?

Dr. SCHEAR. JIEDDO's charter, roles, and missions are established in DoD Directive 2000.19E. There has been no expansion of its charter. JIEDDO continues to focus on its core mission areas of rapid acquisition, operations and information fusion, training support, and strategic planning to defeat the IED threat. While JIEDDO's charter and mission have not changed, its organizational structure has changed to increase JIEDDO's effectiveness and efficiency.

Dr. SNYDER. What is unique about JIEDDO for rapid acquisition, as opposed other rapid acquisition authorities DOD has?

Dr. SCHEAR. There are three elements that distinguish JIEDDO from the Department's other rapid acquisition organizations.

- First, dollars appropriated through the Joint IED Defeat Fund are three-year, "uncolored" funds. This flexibility allows JIEDDO and its supporting solution developers the flexibility to commit funds quickly in response to rapidly emerging requirements.
- Second, JIEDDO reports directly to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, allowing for timely interaction with senior leadership and greater responsiveness to the warfighter.
- Finally, JIEDDO staff includes a number of individuals with first-hand knowledge of the dangers posed by IEDs, including coalition officers who bring their unique perspectives to the organization's efforts.

Dr. SNYDER. Some think that some JIEDDO capabilities such as the COIC might be redundant with in-theater capabilities, and that its training initiative runs counter to Title X authorities of the Services and COCOMs. What will you do about duplicative capabilities?

Dr. SCHEAR. JIEDDO works with both theater commanders and the Intelligence Community (IC) to fuse their intelligence products in near real time and deliver the knowledge the warfighter needs for tactical targeting against IED networks.

Several intelligence working groups, liaison officers embedded in the COIC, and formalized working relationships keep all C-IED organizations aware of each other's efforts. Fusion cells in Afghanistan under the command of GEN McChrystal include COIC representatives who work with in-theater members of the Intelligence Community.

All training eventually becomes a Title X authority issue. However, no one anticipated the sheer amount and complexity of the training required to counter IEDs. JIEDDO's mission is to capture those emerging, hard training problems and find ways for the Services and partners to overcome them. The Services still retain their basic Title X training role. JIEDDO provides a capability to adapt training rapidly across DoD in order to counter changing enemy technologies, tactics, techniques, and procedures.

Dr. SNYDER. What actions have been taken to address any of the findings and recommendations that this committee made in its report on JIEDDO from November 2008?

Dr. SCHEAR. JIEDDO has taken, and continues to take, steps to improve, streamline, and build accountability into its operations and processes. It has undertaken several actions that address the recommendations from the November 2008 committee report.

JIEDDO is streamlining its budget estimation process and has implemented procedures that will provide a better analysis capability in building future requests. JIEDDO is working to establish the appropriate budget for JIEDDO along with the necessary contingency funds to meet our operations and development initiatives.

As the November 2008 House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations report indicates, our tolerance for risk is a function of urgency. JIEDDO uses the Joint IED Defeat Capability Approval and Acquisition Management Process to manage and mitigate risk, with the expectation that not all initiatives will bear fruit. JIEDDO has recently revised this process to address issues of risk tolerance, risk assessments, areas of oversight, and coordination with Services and DoD components.

JIEDDO has improved its transition, transfer, or terminate process. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council is now briefed on initiatives requiring transition or transfer to the Services, adding a critical oversight function to the process. What is most important is that JIEDDO continues to demonstrate that DoD can respond to urgent warfighter needs collaboratively with transparency and comprehensive oversight.

DoD Directive (DoDD) 2000.19e, *Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, February 2006*, is scheduled for its periodic update by February 2010. DoD began review and coordination of this directive in October 2009. The review process will provide the opportunity for departmental review, coordination, and consideration of modifications to C-IED authorities and processes.

Although measuring effectiveness is challenging, evidence clearly suggests that JIEDDO has had a positive impact on the IED fight by saving lives. JIEDDO measures its effectiveness by continuing to publish DoD metrics that monitor overall trends in the C-IED fight; by dedicating analytical assets to explore new techniques to isolate and link JIEDDO's contribution to these DoD metrics; and by implementing a set of component-based performance measures within the organization focused on outcomes.

Dr. SNYDER. Should we use the Joint IED Defeat Capability Approval and Acquisition Management Process (JCAAMP) as the model for rapid acquisition throughout DOD?

Dr. SCHEAR. Although JIEDDO was established to address a particular wartime threat, many of its attributes and authorities are applicable to rapid acquisition organizations within DOD, particularly those responding to Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statements or other urgent wartime requirements.

Dr. SNYDER. Who is the chair of the Joint Resource and Acquisition Board? Does it consider initiatives other than JIEDDO?

Dr. SCHEAR. The Joint IED Defeat Requirement, Resources and Acquisition Board is co-chaired by the Chief, Technology & Requirements Integration Division, Captain Brian Brakke, and the JIEDDO J8/Comptroller, Captain Douglas Borrebach. The board considers only initiatives requesting JIEDDO dollars. Although the board receives information on other initiatives and programs related to counter-IED, it does not formally endorse or manage those initiatives or programs.

Dr. SNYDER. Who is the chair of the Joint Integrated Process Team? Does it consider initiatives other than JIEDDO?

Dr. SCHEAR. Dr. Robin Keese, JIEDDO's Vice Director, is the chair of the JIPT, the higher approval level for those initiatives approved by the JR2AB. The board receives and reviews information on initiatives and programs related to counter-IED. It formally endorses those initiatives costing less than \$25 million; those costing more \$25 million must be approved by the Senior Resources Steering Group, a Deputy Secretary of Defense-level advisory board.

Dr. SNYDER. What process is being used to examine and decide on what enduring structure(s) will host/house which enduring C-IED capabilities?

Dr. SCHEAR. JIEDDO transitions those initiatives that are expected to provide an enduring capability for the joint force to a Service, Combatant Command or agency to be established a program of record funded through the President's budget. Those initiatives that are serving the current conflict but not expected to fulfill a longer term requirement are transferred to a Service or Combatant Command and sustained through that components Overseas Contingency Operations supplemental request.

JIEDDO's Transition Working Group, whose members include Service representatives, meets monthly to present initiatives when approved for funding and again as they reach subsequent transition points. The group's members provide input to JIEDDO's transition and transfer recommendations, and forward these recommendations to their respective leadership. In this manner, the Services and agencies have visibility over the initiatives moving through the rapid acquisition process and can assess the enduring potential of each initiative.

JIEDDO updates the Joint Staff's Protection Functional Capabilities Board quarterly on initiatives that it plans to transition and transfer. It informs the Joint Capabilities Board, Joint Requirements Oversight Council, and Senior Resource Steering

ing Group of its final recommendations to the Deputy Secretary of Defense on an annual basis.

Dr. SNYDER. How does JIEDDO measure its effectiveness in achieving its mission to defeat the IED as a weapon of strategic influence? How can this be demonstrated?

General METZ. We measure our impact in three distinct ways. First, we continuously examine, analyze and publish the approved Department of Defense (DoD) metrics that monitor overall trends in the Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) fight. These metrics are intended to evaluate trends in the use of IEDs by type, location, effectiveness and other characteristics of concern and, when possible, to correlate trends in IED use to efforts and capabilities of the deployed forces.

Second, we continue to implement and mature a set of component-based performance measures that are focused on outcomes and are designed to measure the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization's (JIEDDO) effectiveness as an organization. For example, these measures attempt to evaluate how rapidly we meet warfighter requirements, how efficiently we utilize our resources to develop new solutions, and how effective JIEDDO-funded training prepares deploying forces. To date, JIEDDO has completed two thorough performance reviews, and we continue to refine our measures after each one.

Finally, we continue to conduct focused operational assessments of individual C-IED capabilities to evaluate how well those proposed solutions support the deployed warfighter in the face of an adaptive threat.

Clearly demonstrating JIEDDO's effectiveness is no simple task and defining the clear causal linkage from a JIEDDO-funded initiative to a measureable outcome in the C-IED fight has proven to be elusive. JIEDDO is an enabling organization and the employment of its deployed initiatives is a function of the decisions made by the recipient unit in the face of tactical demands and operational requirements. But even more challenging, those units face an aggressive and adaptive threat that has quickly recognized and understood the capabilities of the fielded C-IED initiatives and has rapidly modified their techniques and procedures to minimize or neutralize those deployed capabilities.

Certain trends do, however, suggest that JIEDDO has made an impact and have reinforced my confidence that JIEDDO is constantly making a difference. When unit commanders report that their pre-deployment training has postured them to be effective in the C-IED fight, then JIEDDO has had an impact. When the enemy abandons a particular technique in the face of a JIEDDO-provided capability, for example the enemy's migration from Radio-controlled IEDs to command wire initiated IEDs in the face of JIEDDO's C-IED Radio Controlled Electronic Warfare capability, then JIEDDO has had an impact. When the number of IEDs that the enemy must employ in order to generate one United States casualty increases, then JIEDDO has had an impact. When specific initiatives are cited for their ability to defeat IEDs and save warfighters' lives, for example vehicle mounted rollers, then JIEDDO has had an impact. When warfighters report that the fused information provided by the JIEDDO Counter IED Operations Integration Center enabled them to eliminate a threat IED cell, then JIEDDO has had an impact. When JIEDDO's efforts have enabled the detection and elimination of actions by commercial companies who are inadvertently or intentionally supplying the enemy with IED components, then JIEDDO has had an impact.

Dr. SNYDER. In your letter of 15 Sept 2009 to Sen. Carl Levin, you urged the Senate to oppose a provision in the FY2010 NDAA passed by the House that would have moved \$100M from JIEDDO to the Irregular Warfare Support Program. In this letter you note that, "...specifically on the rise in Afghanistan, IED incidents have more than doubled from August 2008 to August 2009 and are now at the highest levels that we have experienced to date." After \$17B over more than five years and still we're seeing a doubling of IED incidents in Afghanistan, why shouldn't we give what amounts to less than 5% of JIEDDO's FY2010 funds to another organization and see if they can provide effective solutions?

General METZ. The doubling of Improvised Explosive Device (IED) incidents in Afghanistan is based on several factors. In Afghanistan, local insurgents, tribal factions, and the Taliban enjoy a greater freedom of action to emplace large numbers of IEDs in movement corridors vital to our success. Our challenge is further compounded because these groups intimidate local populations, preventing their cooperation with the often suspiciously viewed Afghan government and, in turn, with us. This is why the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) is focused on attacking the enemy's network. Diverting \$100 million away from Attack the Network Counter-IED (C-IED) solutions at this time would have a detrimental impact on the C-IED fight.



In response to last year's National Defense Authorization Act authorizing \$65 million out of the Joint IED Defeat Fund to support Irregular Warfare Support Program (IWSP), my staff diligently worked with IWSP for more than 11 months to vet C-IED focused proposals. Out of the dozens of proposals initially vetted, and the final 11 submitted to the Social Dynamics Awareness Broad Agency Announcement, five were funded. At the end of FY09, there was only \$35.33 million of C-IED programs in the IWSP portfolio. While JIEDDO is eager to partner with IWSP on C-IED solutions, the majority of submitted proposals were not C-IED focused, and were therefore outside of JIEDDO's mission and charter.

Dr. SNYDER. Are there C-IED activities that should be funded but aren't, for example Gen. Stanley McChrystal recently requested money for the Irregular Warfare Support Program (IWSP), which seems involved in many of your same mission areas. How is the IWSP mission distinct from JIEDDO's?

General METZ. The Irregular Warfare Support Program's (IWSP) mission is to support Joint, interagency, and international partners who conduct irregular warfare. This mission is not counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) focused. They seek to do this primarily by supporting the Theater Special Operation Commands. As the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), our mission is to focus (lead, advocate, coordinate) all Department of Defense actions in support of Combatant Commanders' and their respective Joint Task Forces' efforts to defeat improvised explosive devices as weapons of strategic influence.

IWSP submitted 12 proposals to JIEDDO's Social Dynamics Analysis Broad Area Announcement (BAA), five of which were found to be C-IED in nature and were funded by JIEDDO in fiscal year 2009. Of these five projects, only one operates in Afghanistan, while none operate in Iraq. The remaining seven proposals submitted to the BAA were not funded by JIEDDO and to JIEDDO's knowledge, none operated in Iraq or Afghanistan.

JIEDDO is not aware of a request by General McChrystal to specifically support the IWSP. JIEDDO has received one request for an IWSP program from the Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan. That program has been funded and is now being assessed for effective application in Theater.

Dr. SNYDER. What actions have been taken to address any of the findings and recommendations that this committee made in its report on JIEDDO from November 2008?

General METZ. The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) continually seeks to improve, streamline, and build accountability into our operations and processes. We benefit from the numerous and ongoing audits and reviews of JIEDDO's operations and I think the oversight level of JIEDDO as it currently stands is effective and appropriate. As a maturing organization we continue to develop a greater understanding of our capabilities and those areas where improvement is required. Reports provided to JIEDDO by the Government Accountability Office, Department of Defense Inspector General, and other oversight entities provide a context for JIEDDO to evaluate our progress. We have undertaken several actions that address the recommendations from the November 2008 committee report.

Currently, our budget authorities allow JIEDDO the freedom to execute our programs and achieve rapid acquisition. We face an extremely agile and adaptive enemy who would love nothing more than for us to be pulled into the normal budgetary process. The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Fund's three-year colorless money provides us great flexibility in supporting our Combatant Commanders' Joint Urgent Operational Needs.

We are working with the Department to establish an appropriate base budget for JIEDDO along with the necessary contingency funds to rapidly develop and deliver Counter-IED (C-IED) initiatives to the warfighter. We have improved our budget estimation process to provide a more accurate forecast of budget requirements as well as implemented procedures that will provide a better analytic capability to develop future budget submissions.

As the November 2008 House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations report indicates, our tolerance for risk is a function of urgency. JIEDDO is willing and able to assume a high level of risk on initiatives that show promise in the early development process. We do not underwrite undue risk, but conduct assessments on initiatives to rapidly appraise system maturity and effectiveness. JIEDDO mitigates risk during the development and delivery process through assessments that involve key stakeholders in the Department of Defense (DoD), including the warfighter. We use the Joint IED Defeat Capability Approval and Acquisition Management Process (JCAAMP) to manage and mitigate risk, with the expectation that not all initiatives will bear fruit. A revised version of JCAAMP, signed on 6 November 2009, addresses the issues of risk tolerance, risk assessments,

areas of oversight, and coordination with services and DoD components. The JCAAMP also provides a transparent, collaborative, analytically driven set of processes that operate at the Department's most senior level to oversee the process.

JIEDDO is the only organization in the United States government solely focused on IEDs by supporting all 10 Combatant Commands with rapid development and delivery of C-IED capabilities. JIEDDO operates across many domains—both in the DoD, across government agencies, and with our international partners. While this may cause some of our efforts to overlap with other organizations pursuing other missions, they don't have our focus and don't deliver our results. Some duplication is healthy in time of war to ensure the seams are always covered. This is not an area where we want to assume too much risk by seeking efficiencies that may put men and women in harm's way.

JIEDDO is responsible for integrating all of DoD's C-IED technology efforts—we accomplish this with regular meetings of working groups that conduct horizontal integration on a vast array of efforts. However, further improvement is required to develop a comprehensive Department-wide data base to better inform these efforts.

JIEDDO has improved its transition, transfer, or terminate process. Beginning in 2009, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council is now briefed on initiatives requiring transition or transfer to the Services, adding a critical oversight function to the process. What is most important is that JIEDDO continues to demonstrate that DoD can respond to urgent warfighter needs collaboratively with transparency and comprehensive oversight.

Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 2000.19E, *Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, February 2006*, is scheduled for its periodic update by February 2010. DoD began review and coordination of this directive in October 2009. The review process across DoD will provide the opportunity for departmental review, coordination, and determination of modifications to C-IED authorities. The proposed updates to our authorities laid out in DoDD 2000.19E will result in process refinements intended to reduce the inherent tensions between rapid acquisition and capability development and DoD programming requirements, which have been identified since JIEDDO's inception.

Defining success in the IED fight is dependent on the adaptive enemies we face. Although measuring our effectiveness is challenging, evidence clearly suggests that JIEDDO has had a positive impact on the IED fight by saving lives. We measure our effectiveness through DoD metrics that monitor overall C-IED trends; by dedicating analytical assets to explore new techniques to isolate and link JIEDDO's contribution to these DoD metrics; and most recently by implementing a set of internal performance measures within my organization focused on outcomes. These performance measures cover key efforts of the organization. To date, JIEDDO has completed two thorough performance reviews, and we continue to refine our measures after each one.

Regarding the recommendation to consider expanding JIEDDO's portfolio to other asymmetric threats, when I first arrived in JIEDDO I may have had a different answer, but I am more convinced than ever that we need to keep a laser focus on IEDs. We live in an era of persistent conflict where violent extremists will continue to wage conflict against human targets and the weapon of choice will continue to be the IED. We need to make an enduring commitment to this effort. JIEDDO sits at the center of that commitment. A permanent JIEDDO—funded in the base budget—is the clear signal that we understand our challenges for the foreseeable future and that we are willing to invest the money, the time, the energy, and the talent to make sure we win.

Dr. SNYDER. How is the Counter-IED Operations Integration Center (COIC) different from other intelligence gathering and fusion entities?

General METZ. The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization Counter-IED Operations Integration Center (JIEDDO COIC) focuses on the Counter-IED (C-IED) problem at the tactical level. This focus is complementary to, but substantially different from, other organizations in the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Intelligence Community (IC) that also may focus on parts of the C-IED network structure. The JIEDDO COIC possesses capabilities that no other United States government entity provides with regard to the coordination and rapid dissemination of C-IED information to deployed forces at the tactical level of battalion and below within the broad spectrum of C-IED capabilities and analyst tools. The capabilities that reside solely at the JIEDDO COIC include focused data fusion efforts that draw on information and expertise from across the spectrum of military, IC, and interagency partners.

One of the most unique aspects of the JIEDDO COIC is its focus on providing tactical-level C-IED products to deployed forces that meet rigid Latest Time of Value (LTOV) requirements from local commanders. The LTOV is the latest time

when crucial data can be effectively integrated into a commander's planning and execution cycle. LTOV is a crucial aspect of tactical operational planning. Without meeting the LTOV time parameters, C-IED information would not be integrated into operational plans, heightening the threat to forces on the ground. While many organizations within the IC and Combatant Commands (COCOMs) have the capability to produce detailed analytical products, there is no other organization in the United States government focused on time-sensitive C-IED tactical support to deployed forces engaged in ongoing combat operations.

The advanced all-source data fusion and network analysis is also a unique JIEDDO COIC capability that has the ability to access all-source intelligence, human terrain (i.e. environmental, ethnic, social factors, etc) and other C-IED data at one location using resident C-IED Subject Matter Experts. This is unmatched anywhere else in the IC, Services, or COCOMs.

The Advanced Network Analysis attacks IED networks with three unique analytical teams. First, the Network Analysis Cell is a National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) entity collocated with the JIEDDO COIC, representing a single IC focal point for maintaining the IED network knowledge base. Second, the Network Dynamics Analysis (NDA) cell is a unique analytical team focused on effects-based targeting of IED networks. The NDA cell integrates traditional intelligence analysts supplemented by social network analysis, former law enforcement professionals, a psychologist, and a center of gravity analyst. Third, the Social Network Analysis (SNA) Cell applies a unique methodology that addresses shortfalls in typical network analysis by combining mathematical and qualitative assessments to multi-intelligence discipline datasets collected by military units deployed globally. Current IC assessments typically focus on first-order relationships between enemy combatants without regard for second- and third-order factors such as social-cultural dynamics of the networks, similarities between node profiles, and the impact of friendly operations on the importance of nodes within the network. The SNA Cell addresses these unique variables and applies them to IED networks.

The JIEDDO COIC is committed to limiting duplication of its capabilities through effort coordination with partners across the IC, the military Services, and governmental organizations. Currently, the JIEDDO COIC has 19 Liaison Officers from various agencies and organizations including the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Security Agency (NSA), NGIC, National Reconnaissance Office, Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center, Joint Training COIC, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. In addition to these agencies, the Department of Energy has an embedded staff officer performing a liaison function between the JIEDDO COIC and the National Labs.

Additionally, the Director of JIEDDO conducts quarterly Senior Intelligence Leader Advisory Board (SILAB) meetings with senior leaders from across the IC to focus on technical solutions; identify tactical gaps, methodologies, and analytical approaches; and address policies and governance in an effort to foster communication between participating organizations regarding C-IED and Attack the Network issues.

The SILAB provides a forum for leaders to discuss topics relevant to C-IED efforts, including ongoing initiatives at the JIEDDO COIC. The JIEDDO COIC benefits from SILAB executive-level discussions and forums to gain information on other agency C-IED programs and initiatives, as well as share the JIEDDO COIC efforts with the IC. Members of the SILAB are leaders (e.g. Directors and Deputies) from across the IC, military, and interagency partners including the CIA, DIA, NSA, NGIC, Service Intelligence Divisions, and the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence.

Creating C-IED support products is a process that inherently minimizes redundancy and duplication due to the origin of the requests coming directly from the field to the JIEDDO COIC. Units deployed through Iraq and Afghanistan submit Requests For Support (RFS) that drive the JIEDDO COIC workload. Products are requested from the JIEDDO COIC directly by warfighters for use immediately in the field. The JIEDDO COIC teams forward in Iraq and Afghanistan ensure the highest support and least redundancy possible.

The JIEDDO COIC currently provides 106 support professionals embedded with units across the Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) battlespaces. In OIF there is a total of 55 personnel, 22 of which make up seven teams serving at the Division and Brigade Combat Team (BCT) levels. There are 51 JIEDDO COIC personnel deployed in OEF. Of these 51 personnel, 24 are serving 12 teams at the Division/Regional Command and the BCT levels. These critical support positions ensure that warfighters receive the requested information, clarify the JIEDDO COIC questions regarding the requests, and serve as a direct link to JIEDDO in theater. In addition, JIEDDO conducts after action reports with

returning BCTs and Regimental Combat Teams to discover how adequately the JIEDDO COIC support products reach the field, and further ensure that critical information has been provided and filtered down to appropriate levels. Finally, quality is indicated by the prevalence of units that have used the JIEDDO COIC support in the past and continue to request additional support over time. Since January 2007, the JIEDDO COIC has answered 5,334 RFSs.

Dr. SNYDER. The GAO noted that transfer of initiatives to the Services was an ongoing problem. How are you working to solve this problem?

General METZ. With few exceptions such as Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Radio Controlled Electronic Warfare (CREW) 3.1 and CREW 3.2, every JIEDDO effort slated to transfer to the Services has transferred when planned. We conduct monthly Transition Working Group (TWG) meetings to vet the proposed initiatives for transition, transfer, or termination. The TWG is comprised of action officer-level Service representatives. In addition, we conduct quarterly briefings to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Protection Functional Capabilities Board, and an annual brief to the Joint Capabilities Board, Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), and Senior Resource Steering Group of our final transfer proposals prior to forwarding the recommendations to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for a decision. Endorsement from the JROC in the form of a JROC memorandum adds weight to our transfer recommendations, and our decision to advance the process by six months greatly increased the opportunity for the Services to consider these initiatives during their Program Objective Memoranda developmental cycle. Through these various boards consisting of members from the Services, JCS, and offices of the Under Secretaries of Defense, we have improved coordination and transparency of our processes and initiatives.

Further, I recently updated our JIEDDO Capability Approval and Acquisition Management Process (JCAAMP) that ensures JIEDDO-funded efforts do not bypass this process. Furthermore, in early 2009 I instituted requirement to brief all development efforts to our Joint IED Defeat (JIEDD) Requirements, Resources & Acquisition Board and the JIEDD Integrated Process Team.

These measures will ensure Service visibility on JIEDDO-funded efforts as early as possible and will provide updates as efforts mature into proven capabilities. These measures increase the time available to the Services to assess the enduring nature of the initiative and develop a funding strategy to integrate the capability represented.

Dr. SNYDER. How does JIEDDO work with other agencies to get a comprehensive view of Counter IED challenges and solutions? Give specific agency (domestic and international) examples.

General METZ. The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) continues to expand contact with a myriad of United States government agencies to ensure a whole of government approach to support our deployed warfighters in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), as well as homeland defense and, by extension, the broader global Improvised Explosive Device (IED) threat. JIEDDO is both enabling and leveraging other federal agencies to meet Counter-IED (C-IED) capability requirements. JIEDDO's Counter-IED Operations Integration Center's (COIC) Interagency Partnership Team program embeds Liaison Officers (LNO) from federal agencies to help the JIEDDO COIC access information, supply warfighters with multi-source C-IED support packages, and minimize any duplication of effort with the rest of the Department of Defense (DoD), the Intelligence Community (IC), and the interagency. Additionally, JIEDDO headquarters has established formal partnerships with several federal agencies in direct support of the warfighter, including the Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (DoCBIS); Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF); and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center (TEDAC).

A recent example of ongoing partnerships between JIEDDO and the interagency is JIEDDO and ATF's Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to deploy ATF bomb specialists to the Central Command theater to assist DoD warfighters exploit IEDs, enable ATF explosive forensics experts to train DoD personnel in explosive-related crime scene procedures, and put ATF LNOs at the JIEDDO Joint Center of Excellence and JIEDDO headquarters. Additionally, the FBI's TEDAC processes Level III cases supporting theater exploitation efforts in OEF and OIF.

Another example is JIEDDO's coordination with the Homeland Defense Combatant Commander, North American Air Defense-Northern Command, to assist with Federal prevention, protection, response, and recovery operation efforts concerning potential use of IEDs in the North American Area of Responsibility (AOR).

A third example of partnering is the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Bombing Prevention (OBP) and FBI's coordination with JIEDDO in the cre-

ation of a Joint Program Office (JPO) for combating terrorist use of explosives in the homeland. JIEDDO will continue active participation in this JPO to ensure implementation of tasks directed within the Homeland Security Presidential Directorate-19.

JIEDDO has also partnered with DoCBIS to create a MOA that formalized the use of contacts, data bases, and industry expertise to help interrupt the supply chain necessary to create IEDs and to assist industrial partners with the rapid deployment of emerging C-IED technologies and systems.

JIEDDO has also encouraged the United States Agency for International Development to collaborate on efforts that would defeat IEDs through nongovernment organization (NGO)-run early education programs. This relationship has connected several NGOs with appropriate JIEDDO divisions and teams, including the JIEDDO Science Advisor as Chair of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering C-IED Science & Technology (S&T) working group. This working group enabled JIEDDO to share understanding of gaps and broader S&T efforts in C-IED S&T programs with key S&T representatives from Services and several agencies, including the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and DHS.

Finally, JIEDDO's Weapons Tactical Intelligence Task Force is currently involved in multiple material and non-material solution initiatives to solve current information sharing gaps and a lack of standardized reporting both within the United States Joint Force/Interagency environment, as well as with our Coalition Partners operating throughout Afghanistan. Our goal is to achieve a streamlined approach to information sharing, with coalition partners within the Afghanistan theater of operation to communicate on one system.

Dr. SNYDER. How does the COIC work with the U.S. Air Force Intelligence Wing at Langley Air Force Base?

General METZ. The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) Counter-IED Operations Integration Center (COIC) installed two Federated Nodes (FEDNODEs) at 480th Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Wing's Distributed Ground Stations (DGS) at Langley Air Force Base (AFB) (DGS-1) in Langley, VA and Beale AFB in Sacramento, CA (DGS-2) to increase the ability to share ISR across all Combatant Commands (COCOMs) and with specific elements in Iraq and Afghanistan. Installation of FEDNODEs at Ramstein AFB in Germany (DGS-4) and Hickman AFB in Hawaii is underway. The JIEDDO COIC plans to begin installation of a FEDNODE at Osan AFB in the Republic of Korea (DGS-3) during fiscal year 2010.

The FEDNODE architecture provides a significant increase in web-based data access, information sharing, and analysis capabilities for operations against IED networks and other asymmetric threats world-wide. With each additional site added to the federation, the additional architecture enhances the combined situational awareness, timely decision making, and collaborative analysis for all users that can gain access through any standard computer connected to a Secure Internet Protocol Router or Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System.

The JIEDDO COIC uses the 480th Intelligence Wing's Imagery Access Server to download imagery for Defense Common Ground System (DCGS) platforms as well as the 480th Intelligence Wing's Unicorn target database which is an end-to-end mission, collection, and dissemination management system that automates the entire processing, exploitation and dissemination cycle for DCGS platforms including Global Hawk, U2, and Predator. The data from these servers are layered with the JIEDDO COIC's other data sources to build products for COCOMs related to ISR optimization.

Dr. SNYDER. Specifically which agencies or organizations have liaison offices at JIEDDO headquarters, at COIC, or in theater? Do they include the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms; state and local law enforcement; FBI; or the Joint Terrorism Task Force?

General METZ. The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) Counter-IED Operations Integration Center (COIC) Interagency Partnership Team includes full-time government liaison officers (LNO) who work on-site to coordinate and integrate relevant Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) information. Participating agencies include the Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Justice Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center (TEDAC), National Security Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, Department of Energy, and the National Ground Intelligence Center. The JIEDDO COIC LNO from TEDAC is an Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives agent who informally links with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF). There are currently no formal FBI or ATF LNOs at the JIEDDO COIC; however, there are LNOs from ATF and Joint Forces Command located at JIEDDO's head-

quarters. When certain military units are deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan an LNO from that unit is located at the JIEDDO COIC. Currently, there are six LNOs from deployed military units located at the JIEDDO COIC.

While there is no Joint Terrorism Task Force liaison at JIEDDO COIC, both the Joint Interagency Task Force for Counterterrorism and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency have offices co-located with the JIEDDO COIC. The Army Law Enforcement Program has an element embedded at the JIEDDO COIC that performs liaison with Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies.

JIEDDO is working to establish one North American Air Defense-Northern Command Integrator. Additionally, efforts to locate one ATF LNO at the JIEDDO Joint Center of Excellence in Ft. Irwin, CA are underway. In theater, representatives from several United States government agencies other than the Department of Defense (DoD) are committed to the C-IED effort and work with JIEDDO elements; however, none are assigned as LNOs to JIEDDO.

Dr. SNYDER. Which office at NORTHCOM is lead for IEDs?

General METZ. The North American Air Defense-Northern Command (NORAD-NORTHCOM) NC34, Office of Current Operations, is involved in most of the Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) tasks, but is not designated as the C-IED lead. All C-IED tasks are directed to the NORTHCOM Chief of Staff, who delegates them to the appropriate staff sections.

Dr. SNYDER. How "joint" is the Joint Training COIC (JTCOIC), specifically which Services/organizations have a presence or which send people for training? What is TRADOC's role? Do any other Services/organizations have training COICs?

General METZ. The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization's (JIEDDO) Joint Training Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Operations and Integration Center (JTCOIC) was formed in early 2009, with JIEDDO serving as its parent organization and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) as its executive agent. As executive agent, TRADOC provides the facilities and personnel required to execute the mission. The proof of concept phase will last for two years, concluding at the end of fiscal year 2010. As such, JTCOIC is still evolving in its efforts to best support the warfighter.

The "jointness" of the JTCOIC derives from the support it provides to Service and Joint Forces in the use of COIC tools. JTCOIC's specific mission is to support Army, Marine Corps, Navy and Air Force on Service-identified, COIC-related training requirements. JTCOIC provides support to service institutional training with teams in support of the Marine Corps' Training and Education Command, the Air Force's Air Education Training Command, the Navy's Expeditionary Training Command, and the Army's Training and Doctrine Command. Through these teams, the JTCOIC is now working with all of the Services to institutionalize Attack the Network methodology at their centers and schools. The JTCOIC has training teams working for each of the services and Special Operations Command preparing Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines for deployment. JTCOIC also provides direct support to the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) for exercise support to units deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan. As part of this support, JTCOIC plays an important role in the Joint Event Life Cycle process that prepares units for deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan. JTCOIC also participates in JFCOM scenario development for Counter-IED (C-IED) exercise planning for units that are deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan. JTCOIC's use of operational data to provide each of the Services and JFCOM with modeling, simulation and gaming solutions that are the most accurate and current representations of enemy tactics, techniques and procedures is a unique and highly beneficial contribution to C-IED training.

The individual Services do not maintain their own training COIC. The JTCOIC is the only organization that trains the COIC's Attack the Network tools. Its training support teams tailor the training to fit the unique needs of each Service. For example, a Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal unit might use COIC specific tools for trend analysis, while Marine combat engineers might use those and others for their Attack the Network situational awareness prior to a route clearing operation.

Dr. SNYDER. How joint is the Joint Center of Excellence (JCE) at Ft. Irwin? Specifically which Services/organizations have a presence or send people for training? What is TRADOC's role? Why is the JCE not at the Joint Readiness Training Center in Ft. Polk?

General METZ. The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) Joint Center of Excellence (JCOE) is joint in its organizational structure, personnel complement, execution of funds, and execution of training. Its headquarters, located at Fort Irwin, is supported by four distributed Centers of Excellence (COE): Air Force COE at Lackland Air Force Base (AFB), TX; Army COE at Fort Irwin, CA; Marine Corps COE at Twentynine Palms, CA; and Navy COE at Indian Head, MD. These centers link various Counter-Improvised Explosive Device

(C-IED) training support programs such as electronic warfare, biometrics, and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) across the Services. There are total of 32 Service members, representing all four Services assigned to the JIEDDO JCOE and subordinate COEs.

Coalition partners and United States Federal Law Enforcement have representatives at the JCOE. A Sergeant Major from the United Kingdom trained in Tactical Site Exploitation/Search, and a Senior Special Agent from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives gives a depth of knowledge and expertise required to face the C-IED training support challenge. Military personnel assigned to the JIEDDO JCOE are not service specific to their posted location. As an example, the Air Force COE has representatives from all four services at their Lackland AFB location.

JCOE funds initiatives benefitting all Services in its support to C-IED training. In fiscal year 2009 it provided \$38 million to Marines, \$99 million to Army, \$5 million Navy, and \$5 million to the Air Force.

When the Services send their troops to the Combat Training Centers (CTCs) for pre-deployment training the JIEDDO JCOE has personnel and courses of instruction in place to execute. In addition, home station pre-deployment training for Joint forces is conducted with assistance from the JIEDDO JCOE Mobile Training Teams. The JIEDDO JCOE also provides an in-theater training support presence with seven man teams in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The total number of service members trained this year is: 63,000 Army; 3,188 Marines; 1,317 Navy; and 47,306 Air Force.

The JIEDDO JCOE is aligned with the service training commands, such as the Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), USMC Training and Education Command (TECOM), USAF Air Education and Training Command (AETC), and the Navy School Explosive Ordnance Disposal, which is a joint service command. The JIEDDO JCOE has a liaison representative at TRADOC. Additionally, members from the JCOE attend the TRADOC Integrated C-IED Development Team General Officer Steering Committee and other quarterly meetings. The JIEDDO JCOE also has a contractor representative at TECOM and has a relationship similar to that of TRADOC. JCOE's other liaison locations include: 1st Army in Ft. Gillem, GA; the Maneuver Support Center in Ft. Leonard Wood, MO; and at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas.

The AFCOE is located at the same AFB as the headquarters for AETC. This has resulted in C-IED training improvements to Air Force Basic Military Training as well as predeployment training for Security Forces and Individual Augments. The NCOE actively coordinates with the Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) School and the Navy EOD Technical Division for development, test, and fielding of Radio Controlled IED and EOD training equipment.

The JIEDDO JCOE was headquartered at Ft. Irwin in 2006 because of the large throughput of military personnel trained, existing training support infrastructure and desert terrain. The Commanding General of the National Training Center (NTC) at Ft. Irwin also serves as the Director of the JIEDDO JCOE.

The relationships between the JCOE and the Services are enhanced through its component locations: ACOE is at the NTC, the Army's leading Combat Training Center; MCOE is located at Twentynine Palms CA, where Marine units undergo predeployment training; AFCOE is at Lackland AFB for coordination with AETC; and the NCOE is located at Indianhead MD, where it has daily interaction with the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command.

JCOE has also established C-IED training teams at the Joint Readiness Training Center in Ft. Polk, LA, as well as the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels, Germany.

Dr. SNYDER. It seems the term "IED" is becoming all inclusive. Discuss what the definition of an IED should be—road, house (booby trap), person (suicide bomber), vehicle (car bomb), airborne (9/11), ship borne (U.S.S. Cole), etc. What have we learned from the British (mail borne IEDs, etc.) and the Israelis?

General METZ. The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) Weapons Tactical Intelligence (WTI) Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Lexicon defines an IED as: "A device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals and designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass, or distract. It may incorporate military stores, but is normally devised from nonmilitary components. Refers to a type of IED incident that involves a complete, functioning device."—WTI IED Lexicon, Second Edition (Dec 2008)

Additionally, there are definitions within the Lexicon for water-borne IED, person-borne IED, under vehicle IED, aerial-borne IED, vehicle-borne IED, and large vehicle-borne IED. While these further refine the methods of employment of the IED

weapons system, they are considered ‘tactical design’ designators of a device, and are not included in one overarching definition for an IED.

All of the examples cited have been improvised devices that explode, and JIEDDO is actively pursuing a defeat of those devices. More specifically, JIEDDO’s mission is to eliminate the strategic effect of such devices. Thus, a letter bomb probably does not have substantial strategic effect as there are extensive mail handling facilities that have been effective at stopping letter bombs.

JIEDDO is in ongoing consultation with all of our allies, and conducts extensive discussions with the British and Israelis multiple times throughout the year. We regularly meet with Israelis to discuss ongoing issues and have worked with them to share technology that they have found helpful in the past and improved upon it for current uses in the field.

JIEDDO’s information sharing with our British partners is constant and ongoing. In addition to regular working group meetings, conversations and conferences, JIEDDO has a number of expert British officers embedded within JIEDDO to ensure constant sharing of best practices and lessons learned.

Dr. SNYDER. Your testimony focuses on brigade and regiment through corps level. Is this what is meant by the tactical level rather than battalion and below?

General METZ. At the tactical level, operations are planned and conducted by Brigade (Army) and Regiment (Marine Corps) and below. In the current conflict, Division and Corps headquarters link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events.

We differentiate between Division and above and Brigade and below because they have distinctly different employment mission sets and therefore require different training.

Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization’s (JIEDDO) training has a powerful impact on Counter-IED (C-IED) success at both the tactical and operational levels. The training provided by the JIEDDO Joint Training Counter Operations Integration Center (JTCOIC) focuses on Division and Corps staffs. A Division is a tactical headquarters while the Corps serves as the seam between tactical and operational level warfare. Training provided at the JIEDDO Center of Excellence focuses on training at the Brigade and Regiment level and below—the tactical level.

Tactical level training by the JCOE is further supported by the various Service Centers of Excellence: the Marine Corps at Twentynine Palms, CA; Army at Fort Irwin, CA; Navy at Indian Head Naval Surface Warfare Center, MD; and Air Force at Lackland AFB, TX. Training at the tactical level also takes place at the 57 home station training lanes located at 55 military installations throughout the United States, and in Germany and Korea.

Dr. SNYDER. Your testimony for “Train the Force” mentions “signatures and social dynamics.” Please describe and explain. Which agencies and organizations are trained by JIEDDO or through JIEDDO funding—State, USAID, contractors, NGOs, UN, or foreign partners?

General METZ. There are basically two types of “signatures” training. The first type deals with Homemade Explosives (HME). The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) Joint Center of Excellence (JCOE) funded a HME Mobile Training Team (MTT) that provides home station training support to teach troops at the Brigade Combat Team and below level on how to identify HME observables. The HME MTT also provides training to Combat Training Centers and Home-station Train-the-Trainer personnel. The JIEDDO Joint Training Counter-IED Operations Integration Center does the same at the Division and above level, concentrating on training leadership and staff planners. HME detection packages are being deployed to the field to assist ground forces institute this signatures training. JIEDDO is working with Central Command to begin training collection managers and analysts on the use of HME signatures. The JIEDDO JCOE also teaches HME detection and signatures to Explosive Ordinance Disposal and Engineer units via mobile training teams. These courses of instruction emphasize HME indicators, precursors and ingredients, explosive hazards and immediate actions. They are “train the trainer” focused and have had participation from all services, as well as the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Department of Homeland Security.

The second type of “signatures” training focuses on the scientific research being conducted in the area of visual detection of IEDs. As assessed by our criterion measures, both inherent traits and experience-related characteristics proved essential to IED detection performance. Our results suggest that IED detection is largely a cognitive task, relying on visual, attentional, and memory processes. One significant finding that emerged indicates certain hobbies are relevant to successful IED detec-



tion. Specifically, participation in hunting, puzzles, art, and music predicted superior performance, as did time in service, deployment experience, and age.

JIEDDO is currently reviewing proposals and ideas which would address the issue of cultural and social dynamics in training, but none have reached the implementation stage yet. A social dynamics trainer, or training program, will probably never be a stand-alone initiative. It will more likely be incorporated into other Counter-IED efforts, particularly for the intelligence capability within battle staffs for HME signature detection and for maneuver units for visual detection of IEDs.

Dr. SNYDER. What percentages of the JIEDDO workforce are military, reserve component military, contractors, and government civilians?

General METZ. As of 1 October, the JIEDDO workforce requirements totaled 3,685 military, government civilians and contractors. Of the 3,685 personnel, 134 are military personnel (comprising 3.6% of the total JIEDDO workforce), 135 are government civilian personnel (comprising 3.6% of the total work force), 0 reserve component military personnel, and 3,416 contract personnel (comprising approximately 92.7% of the total JIEDDO workforce). In addition to the current JIEDDO workforce, JIEDDO has received approval from the Department of the Army for 119 additional Army reserve component military positions; however, these 119 positions were not included as part of the 1 October 2009 personnel numbers. On 6 November 2009, the Department of the Air Force approved 13 Air Force reserve component military positions. The additional 119 Army reserve and 13 Air Force reserve positions brings the total JIEDDO approved manpower requirements to 3,717 (3,685 plus 119 Army reserve and 13 Air Force reserve positions). As of 6 November, the JIEDDO reserve component military positions comprise 3.5% of the JIEDDO total workforce. JIEDDO has requested an additional 23 reserve component military positions from the USMC and 30 reserve component military from the USN. If these are approved, the JIEDDO will have a total reserve component military of 185 (all Services), increasing the total JIEDDO workforce requirements to 3,770 (3,717 plus 23 USMC reserve and 30 USN reserve positions), and the total JIEDDO reserve component military personnel requirements will comprise 4.9% of the total JIEDDO workforce. These personnel calculations are based on JIEDDO's 1 October 2009 baseline personnel numbers.

Dr. SNYDER. Describe some specific instances or examples of how the Deputy Secretary of Defense has provided management oversight to JIEDDO.

General METZ. The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization's (JIEDDO) high impact is due to its direct reporting chain to Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF) and to special Congressional funding. Both are vital—they give JIEDDO unimpeded access anywhere it needs to go to solve the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) problem.

Through my reporting chain I have a direct line of communication to the DEPSECDEF and I am updating the Deputy Secretary on the IED threat and JIEDDO's countermeasures on a monthly basis. As our force strength migrates to Afghanistan where the IED threat is on the rise, this JIEDDO reporting chain should be retained to interact with our most senior leaders in the Department.

I meet with the DEPSECDEF at least monthly on JIEDDO matters to ensure that he has a complete understanding of our requirements and activities. Furthermore, all JIEDDO initiatives that are equal to or above \$25 million require approval from the DEPSECDEF prior to the obligation of those funds.

Additional oversight is provided to proposed JIEDDO Counter-IED efforts by Flag or SES-level representatives from the Offices of the Under Secretaries of Defense, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration, the Department's General Counsel, and Director Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation Office (CAPE) through their participation on our Joint IED Defeat (JIEDD) Integrated Process Team. Efforts requiring funding that exceeds \$25 million are reviewed by the JIEDD Senior Resource Steering Group (SRSG), an advisory body to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. SRSG membership consists of the Principal Deputies of the Under Secretaries of Defense, the Principal Deputy ASD, Principal Deputy General Counsel, the Deputy Director CAPE, and Director Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, as well as the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff J-8.

Finally, since JIEDDO's establishment there have been five Deputies Advisory Working Group meetings at the Deputy Secretary of Defense level to grapple with key problems requiring a decision from the Department.

Dr. SNYDER. Some think that some JIEDDO capabilities such as the COIC might be redundant with in-theater capabilities and that its training initiative runs counter to Title X authorities of the Services and COCOMs. How will you integrate acquisition plans with the Services and COCOMs?

General METZ. The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) works with both theaters and the Intelligence Community (IC) by fusing their intelligence products in near real time and delivering the results as knowledge to the warfighter, enabling tactical targeting against Improvised Explosive Device (IED) networks. It is a highly refined use of intelligence products.

Several intelligence working groups, Liaison Officers embedded in the JIEDDO Counter-IED Operations Integration Center (COIC), and formalized working relationships keep all involved organizations situationally aware of each other's efforts. Fusion cells in Afghanistan under the command of GEN McChrystal include COIC representatives who work with other in-theater members of the IC.

JIEDDO constantly strives to raise the bar on behalf of the Services by rapidly countering changing enemy technologies tactics, techniques, and procedures and infusing our cutting edge responses into our training base across the Department of Defense (DoD). Home Made Explosive training at the Joint Center of Excellence is a perfect example of this.

Unfortunately, no one could have anticipated the sheer amount and complexity of the training required to successfully counter IEDs. JIEDDO's mission is to capture those emerging, hard training problems and find ways for the Services and our partners to overcome them. To guarantee our continued success in this area, we are in the process of developing a comprehensive DoD-wide Counter-IED (C-IED) training architecture that will give us an evolutionary jump forward by federating all ongoing C-IED training across the Services, the interagency, and our partner nations. Proven training capabilities will transition or transfer (T2) to the Services for sustainment and further integration. Six such initiatives T2'd this fiscal year and 13 more are currently slated to T2 during both FY11 and FY12. These numbers are subject to modification pending the FY10 Appropriations bill. By sharing our resources, insights, and practices, we plan to achieve a level of training synergy never seen before. The key to our success has been, and always will be, world-class training.

