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Defense Acquisitions: Opportunities Exist to Position Army's Ground Force Modernization Efforts for Success

GAO-10-406 Published: Mar 15, 2010. Publicly Released: Mar 15, 2010.
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Highlights

Since 2003, the Future Combat System (FCS) program has been the centerpiece of the Army's efforts to transition to a lighter, more agile, and more capable combat force. In 2009, however, concerns over the program's performance led to the Secretary of Defense's decision to significantly restructure and ultimately cancel the program. As a result, the Army has outlined a new approach to ground force modernization. This report (1) outlines the Army's preliminary post-FCS plans and (2) identifies the challenges and opportunities the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Army must address as they proceed with Army ground force modernization efforts. To meet these objectives, GAO reviewed key documents, performed analyses, visited test facilities where the Army evaluated FCS equipment, and interviewed DOD and Army officials.

Recommendations

Recommendations for Executive Action

Agency Affected Recommendation Status
Department of Defense In order to ensure that only technically mature and reliable capabilities are fielded to the warfighters, the Secretary of Defense should mandate that the Army correct the identified maturity and reliability issues with the Increment 1 network and systems prior to approving any additional lots of the Increment 1 network and systems for production. Specifically, the Army should ensure that the network and the individual systems have been independently assessed as fully mature, meet reliability goals, and have been demonstrated to perform as expected using production-representative prototypes.
Closed – Implemented
In written comments, DOD concurred with our recommendation, and indicated that the need to correct deficiencies had been communicated to the Army, additional testing would be conducted, and the systems evaluated before more production was authorized. Based on the subsequent testing in August 2010, independent evaluators rated several systems as less than mature, offered almost no military utility, and were still unable to meet reliability requirements. In a February 2011 acquisition decision memorandum, the USD(ATL) acknowledged the poor performance of several systems and terminated their acquisition. Despite poor test results and technical reviews, the USD/ATL initially authorized additional production and testing of the radios, which were to be a key element of the Army network. In that additional testing, however, the radios again performed poorly and the Army made a decision to terminate their acquisition and look for alternative radios.
Department of the Army The Secretary of the Army should not field the Increment 1 network or any of the Increment 1 systems until the identified maturity and reliability issues have been corrected.
Closed – Implemented
In a written response to our draft report, DOD concurred with this recommendation. Following poor test results and reviews from independent evaluators, the USD(ATL) terminated most of the Increment 1 systems in February 2011. However, he did authorize additional procurement of the radio systems (which are the major component of the Network Integration Kit) and the Small UGV's. Despite poor test results and technical reviews, the USD/ATL initially authorized additional production and testing of the radios, which were to be a key element of the Army network. In that additional testing, however, the radios again performed poorly and the Army made a decision to terminate their acquisition and look for alternative radios.
Department of Defense In order to enhance congressional visibility into the Army's plans in this area, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Army to submit a comprehensive report to the Congress before the end of fiscal year 2010 on its ground force modernization investment, contracting, and management strategies.
Closed – Implemented
Since we made this recommendation, the Army has made a number of changes in its modernization strategy. Based on recent combat experience, it has identified the types and mix of capabilities--including combat vehicle capabilities--needed to meet current and anticipated threats. The Army is now using an incremental approach to developing those capabilities that is closely aligned with its fielding and training processes. Moreover, it has adopted a portfolio review process that is intended to achieve balance within and across capability areas. Released in April 2010, the Army Modernization Strategy, and the subsequent Army Modernization Plan 2012, explains how the annual budget request moves the Army toward achieving its revised modernization strategies. While that Plan does not address all aspects of our recommendation, it clearly shows that the Army has made strides in moving away from the terminated Future Combat System program and has made key decisions in charting a viable acquisition strategy for the coming years.

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Army procurementDefense capabilitiesDefense cost controlDefense procurementEquipment inventoriesForce planningInformation managementInformation systemsLessons learnedMilitary procurementMilitary systems analysisMilitary technologyProcurement practicesRequirements definitionRisk assessmentRisk factorsRisk managementStrategic planningSystems designCost estimatesProgram implementation