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AUDIT REPORT

OFFICE OF AUDITS

## NASA IMPLEMENTED THE PROJECT MANAGEMENT INFORMATION IMPROVEMENT (PMI<sup>2</sup>) INITIATIVE BUT CROSSWALK AND TRAINING NEED TO BE COMPLETED

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL



National Aeronautics and Space Administration

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Final report released by:

 $\mathcal{O}$ Evelyn KKlemstine

Assistant Inspector General for Auditing

### Acronyms

AWCS	Agency-wide Coding Structure
BPA	Blanket Purchase Agreement
CRR	Center Readiness Review
FAR	Federal Acquisition Regulation
FY	Fiscal Year
IEM	Integrated Enterprise Management
IEMP	Integrated Enterprise Management Program
NSM	NASA Structure Management
OCFO	Office of the Chief Financial Officer
OIG	Office of Inspector General
ORR	Operational Readiness Review
PMI <sup>2</sup>	Project Management Information Improvement

### IN BRIEF

### NASA IMPLEMENTED THE PROJECT MANAGEMENT INFORMATION IMPROVEMENT (PMI<sup>2</sup>) INITIATIVE BUT CROSSWALK AND TRAINING NEED TO BE COMPLETED

#### The Issue

In fiscal year (FY) 2005, NASA initiated the Project Management Information Improvement (PMI<sup>2</sup>) initiative to expand the functionality of the Core Financial system to better meet the needs of the Agency. PMI<sup>2</sup> was to accomplish that goal by aligning NASA's many technical work breakdown structures<sup>1</sup> with the financial work breakdown structures in the Core Financial system. NASA expected the alignment of the work breakdown structures to result in a more consistent historical data set on which to base future cost estimates. Through PMI<sup>2</sup>, which cost \$16.5 million, NASA implemented the new financial structure, NASA Structure Management (NSM), and linked NASA's project data from the prior Agency-wide Coding Structure (AWCS) to NSM. Since NASA submitted its FY 2006 budget in the NSM format, it was critical that NASA implement PMI<sup>2</sup> by the start of FY 2006 so that the Agency could distribute funds and record financial transactions in the new structure. The Office of Inspector General (OIG) performed a review to assess Centers' readiness to implement PMI<sup>2</sup> and to ensure that all appropriate personnel received the requisite training. Details of the review's scope and methodology are in Appendix A.

### Results

NASA implemented PMI<sup>2</sup> on schedule and our review disclosed no material discrepancies related to the implementation. Specifically, we found that NASA successfully implemented the new NSM work breakdown structures on October 11, 2005, and established all mission-critical project financial structures in NSM for FY 2006; the Centers communicated basic information regarding PMI<sup>2</sup> implementation to Center personnel through various media; and the implementation of PMI<sup>2</sup> provided NASA with a standardized data structure for ongoing and new projects. As of October 2006, however, NASA had not completed crosswalking projects from 2005 and prior years, for which the Agency did not plan any obligations in FY 2006, to the new NSM structure. This crosswalking project is over 10 months behind schedule, and its anticipated completion

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> A work breakdown structure is a product-oriented hierarchical division of the hardware, software, services, and data required to produce a program or project's end product, structured according to the work that is performed.

date has slipped twice. Compounding this issue is the fact that NASA has not established a new schedule for completing the crosswalk. Also, NASA has no assurance that its project and resource managers have been adequately trained to correctly run and analyze financial reports in the new PMI<sup>2</sup> format necessary to effectively manage their projects.

In addition, in performing our work, we identified an internal control weakness. We found that NASA procedures allow some individuals to have active Core Financial system accounts for up to 180 days after separating from NASA. That weakness was previously reported by NASA's financial statement auditors who reported the condition in the last two financial statement audits and made recommendations for corrective action. We referred this issue to the OIG Information Technology and Financial Statement Directorates in the OIG's Office of Audits (see Appendix A).

### Management Action

We recommended that the NASA Chief Financial Officer provide us with a schedule for completing the crosswalk of project data from AWCS to NSM and notify us when the crosswalk is complete. In addition, we recommended that the Director of the Marshall Space Flight Center (Marshall) ensure that all future contract deliverables required under the Integrated Enterprise Management Program (IEMP) contain accurate and reliable data. We also recommended that the Integrated Enterprise Management (IEM) Program Director solicit each Center Director to determine the status of the training, take appropriate action to ensure that all employees who require training are targeted, and that all targeted employees complete the necessary PMI<sup>2</sup> training courses.

In response to a draft of this report, the IEM Program Director, with input from the Headquarters and Marshall Offices of the Chief Financial Officer and the Marshall Office of the Chief Information Officer, concurred with the first and second recommendations but nonconcurred with the third (see Appendix E). The Headquarters Office of the Chief Financial Officer (OCFO) concurred with the first recommendation, stating that the remaining 1.5 percent of the crosswalk will be completed by the end of the second quarter of FY 2007. The Director of the Marshall Space Flight Center concurred with the second recommendation; the response addressed clarification of roles and responsibilities with regard to contract deliverables. The IEM Program Manager nonconcurred with the third recommendation concerning targeted employees and necessary training. He stated that the need and original goals for PMI<sup>2</sup> training have been overcome by the planned SAP Version Update<sup>2</sup> training.

We consider management's comments responsive to Recommendations 1 and 3, and both recommendations are resolved. Recommendation 1 will remain open pending our receipt

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Systems Applications and Products (SAP) R/3 is the software foundation for NASA's Core Financial system. The IEM Program Office initiated the SAP Version Update in September 2005 to update the SAP R/3 software.

of notification that the crosswalk has been completed. We will close Recommendation 3 upon issuance of this report.

We consider management's comments to be nonresponsive to Recommendation 2 because the response does not address content or accuracy of contract deliverables. We request that Marshall provide additional comments to the final report addressing how it will ensure that all future deliverables under the IEMP implementation contract contain (1) specific requirements for form and content and (2) accurate information. We request the additional commendation 2 by December 20, 2006.

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### **INTRODUCTION**

### Background

NASA has a long, well-documented history of financial management issues. The Agency has been on the Government Accountability Office's high-risk list for ineffective contract management since 1990 due primarily to a nonintegrated financial management system that has weakened NASA's ability to oversee its procurement dollars, which make up approximately 74.9 percent of NASA's FY 2007 budget. In June 2003, NASA implemented the Core Financial system as NASA's Agency-wide, integrated financial system.

NASA Reorganization. In June 2004, NASA's Program Management Committee and Strategic Planning Council approved the reorganization of NASA to streamline the Agency and position it to implement the President's Vision for Space Exploration. The reorganization restructured NASA's Strategic Enterprises into Mission Directorates, restructured Headquarters' support functions, clarified NASA's organizational roles and responsibilities, and revised the NASA financial structure. At the time of the June 2004 reorganization, NASA used its Agency-wide Coding Structure (AWCS) to identify and classify all NASA financial activity for planning, budgeting, accounting, and reporting, captured by cost codes called unique project numbers. However, unique project numbers were not standardized throughout NASA. For instance, while several Centers may have worked on different aspects of the same project, each Center developed its own coding structure, using various Center-specific project numbers to record and report financial information. Using a variety of Center-specific numbers to identify one multi-Center project made it difficult to accumulate total project costs across Centers.

**PMI<sup>2</sup> Project**. In December 2004, NASA approved the initiation of PMI<sup>2</sup> to implement a standard work breakdown structure across all NASA Centers. The IEM Program Executive Officer had overall responsibility for implementation of PMI<sup>2</sup>, which cost \$16.5 million, according to IEMP estimates. The PMI<sup>2</sup> Project Team, located in Huntsville, Alabama, was responsible for planning, managing, and implementing PMI<sup>2</sup>. Through PMI<sup>2</sup>, NASA executed a new Agency-wide budget structure—NASA Structure Management (NSM)—to align the technical and financial work breakdown structures in the Core Financial system to provide better project management information and aid in decision making. NASA had originally planned a second phase of PMI<sup>2</sup> to expand the capability of cost data to meet project management requirements and support earned

value management.<sup>3</sup> After we started our audit, NASA incorporated the second phase of PMI<sup>2</sup> into the update of the Core Financial system scheduled for the start of FY 2007.

**PMI<sup>2</sup> Contract Support.** Accenture LLP of Reston, Virginia (Accenture), was NASA's primary Agency-wide support contractor for the implementation of PMI<sup>2</sup>. In February 2004, Marshall awarded Blanket Purchase Agreement (BPA) NNM04AA17Z to Accenture, with a not-to-exceed value of \$200 million, for the implementation of administrative systems related to IEMP. On June 21, 2005, Marshall issued the task order for Job 12, "PMI<sup>2</sup> Phase I," a firm-fixed-price task order under BPA NNM04AA17Z that included travel costs and an incentive fee for an estimated total of \$3,438,998. This task order required Accenture to submit 22 deliverables and covered eight general activities necessary to implement PMI<sup>2</sup>, including

- system integration testing,
- communicating key information to stakeholders,
- training Core Financial users on changes brought about by PMI<sup>2</sup> implementation,
- supporting PMI<sup>2</sup> technical architecture activities, and
- providing stabilization support following the commencement of "go-live" activities.

We reviewed the work that Accenture performed related to training Core Financial system users on changes brought about by PMI<sup>2</sup> implementation.

#### **Objectives**

The overall objective of our review was to evaluate NASA's readiness to implement PMI<sup>2</sup>. Specifically, we determined whether the NASA PMI<sup>2</sup> staff had

- adequately trained PMI<sup>2</sup> implementers and users,
- adequately planned and performed the Center Readiness Reviews (CRRs),
- included sufficient internal controls to prevent and detect data mapping errors,
- included sufficient internal controls to prevent and detect upload errors, and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Earned value management is an integrated management control system for assessing, understanding, and quantifying what a project is achieving with program dollars. This system integrates technical, cost, and schedule elements with risk management; allows an objective assessment and quantification of current project performance; and helps predict future performance based on trends.

• gained NASA-wide acceptance for the new coding structure.

This report addresses the first two objectives. Because of the timing of our audit fieldwork in relation to a continuing resolution, we did not address the third and fourth objectives regarding the controls over data mapping. We addressed the last objective in September 14, 2005, memorandums to the NASA Administrator and the NASA Chief Financial Officer (see Appendix B).

See Appendix A for details of the review's scope and methodology, our review of internal controls, and a list of prior audit coverage.

### NASA SUCCESSFULLY IMPLEMENTED PMI<sup>2</sup>, BUT CROSSWALK AND TRAINING ARE STILL INCOMPLETE

NASA implemented PMI<sup>2</sup> on schedule and our review disclosed no material discrepancies related to the implementation. This success was due to the following:

- The Headquarters OCFO took timely action in response to a September 14, 2005, OIG memorandum on PMI<sup>2</sup>, pointing out several issues that needed immediate attention to ensure the successful implementation of PMI<sup>2</sup>.
- The PMI<sup>2</sup> Project Team ensured that every Center was prepared to implement PMI<sup>2</sup> through well-planned CRRs and an Agency-wide Operational Readiness Review (ORR).

While NASA successfully implemented PMI<sup>2</sup>, the Agency still needs to complete two major post-implementation activities—crosswalking data from AWCS to NSM, which had not been completed as of October 16, 2006, and training all targeted employees. Completing those tasks will improve the standardization of financial data throughout the Agency and will allow NASA staff to efficiently produce reports on both current and prior projects in a standard format.

### Transition from AWCS to NSM Required Restructuring Financial Data

The implementation of PMI<sup>2</sup>, and thereby NSM, necessitated that project codes be transitioned from AWCS to NSM to align the technical and financial work breakdown structures in the Core Financial system, which would result in a more consistent historical data set on which to base future cost estimates across the Agency. NSM organized NASA's financial data in a hierarchy of appropriation, mission, theme, program, and project.<sup>4</sup> The following figure shows an example of a project hierarchy, based on the NSM hierarchy, for a project within NASA's Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> A project is a specific investment identified in a program plan having defined goals, objectives, requirements, life-cycle costs, a beginning, and an end.




Figure 1. A Project Hierarchy Based on the NSM Hierarchy

As shown in Figure 1, the NSM hierarchy divides NASA's work into work breakdown structures. Beginning at the project level, NSM replaces the unique project numbers under AWCS with project numbers. The NASA Office of the Chief Engineer establishes work breakdown structure Levels I and II, which are used throughout NASA for projects and general project activities. Project managers establish Levels III through VII for project-specific activities that vary according to the needs of each project. In anticipation

of implementing PMI<sup>2</sup> by October 1, 2005, NASA submitted its FY 2006 budget in that format.

Data Mapping and Crosswalking. NASA's change from AWCS to NSM created the challenge of having to maintain two different financial structures during the transition period. To ensure a smooth transition between AWCS and NSM from FY 2005 to FY 2006 so that the Agency could distribute funds and record financial transactions in the new structure, the PMI<sup>2</sup> Project Team had to electronically link data related to ongoing projects<sup>5</sup> from AWCS to NSM. The PMI<sup>2</sup> Project Team referred to that process as data mapping and needed to complete the activity before the start of FY 2006 because NASA submitted its FY 2006 budget in the NSM format. For the sake of consistency and to facilitate reporting, the PMI<sup>2</sup> Project Team also planned to link pre-FY 2006 data from old projects<sup>6</sup> to the new NSM structure. The PMI<sup>2</sup> Project Team referred to that activity as crosswalking to distinguish it from data mapping. The PMI<sup>2</sup> Project Team originally planned to complete the crosswalking before the start of FY 2006, but due to their unanticipated workload, the PMI<sup>2</sup> Project Team decided that it was not necessary to finish the crosswalk before FY 2006 and planned to complete the crosswalk after FY 2006 began. For financial information related to new projects,<sup>7</sup> the data was simply entered into the NSM format; no data mapping or crosswalking was required. Figure 2 further delineates the difference between data mapping and crosswalking.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Ongoing projects include projects for which NASA anticipated obligating funds before and after the onset of FY 2006.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Old projects include projects for which NASA obligated funds prior to FY 2006 but did not anticipate obligating additional funds in FY 2006 or later fiscal years.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> New projects include projects for which NASA anticipated obligating funds beginning in FY 2006 or later fiscal years.

Old Projects	Cross- walking	For these projects, NASA anticipated obligating funds price
	waiking	to FY 2006, before the recording of obligations shifted from AWCS to NSN
Ongoing Projects	Data Mapping	For these projects, NASA anticipated obligating funds price to and after the beginning of FY 2006, during the shift from AWCS to NSM
New Projects	None Required	For these projects, NASA anticipated obligating funds afte the beginning of FY 2006, meaning that all obligations could be entered in the NSM format.
	rojects	rojects Mapping

# Figure 2. Timelines and Project Differentiation between Crosswalking and Data Mapping

### Implementation of PMI<sup>2</sup> Was Successful

NASA implemented PMI<sup>2</sup> on schedule and our review disclosed no material discrepancies related to the implementation. We validated the status of PMI<sup>2</sup> by conducting discussions with staff from the IEMP, PMI<sup>2</sup> Project Team, Headquarters and Center OCFOs, Mission Directorate resource management offices, and Center Project resource management offices. In addition, we received several demonstrations of the PMI<sup>2</sup> functionality from Headquarters and Center personnel. We concluded the following:

• NASA successfully implemented the new NSM work breakdown structures on October 11, 2005, and established all mission-critical project financial structures

in NSM for FY 2006. Staff we interviewed demonstrated the new structure and stated that the new structure was sufficient for them to do their jobs. No material discrepancies were brought to our attention.

- The Centers communicated the changes expected to result from implementation of PMI<sup>2</sup> and their importance to Center personnel through town hall meetings, posters, e-mails, and Web sites.
- By October 11, 2005, the PMI<sup>2</sup> Project Team had completed data mapping for 584 of 648 projects. The 64 projects that were not mapped were reimbursable projects omitted from the process because of policy disagreements and questions. In January 2006, the Headquarters OCFO established a policy for mapping these reimbursable projects. According to Center financial management personnel interviewed who work with reimbursable projects, the lack of policy and reimbursable work breakdown structures initially caused a lot of extra work; but that was resolved in January 2006 when the Headquarters OCFO provided clarification and the PMI<sup>2</sup> Project Team completed mapping the reimbursable projects.

### The Headquarters OCFO Acted Quickly to Resolve Implementation Issues Reported by the OIG

Contributing to the successful implementation of PMI<sup>2</sup> was the Headquarters OCFO's timely action in response to a September 14, 2005, OIG memorandum on PMI<sup>2</sup>. This memorandum pointed out several issues that needed immediate attention to ensure the successful implementation of PMI<sup>2</sup>. Specifically, we noted the following:

- With less than 6 weeks before the scheduled implementation of PMI<sup>2</sup>, the overall workforce from Headquarters and Goddard Space Flight Center (Goddard) had received little or no communication or training about the changes expected to take place under PMI<sup>2</sup>.
- Some senior NASA managers had not received sufficient information about PMI<sup>2</sup> or about what actions their staff needed to take to prepare for PMI<sup>2</sup> implementation.
- The Science Mission Directorate was significantly behind in its data mapping.
- Under the new financial structure, NASA did not have a plan for addressing a continuing resolution.

We made recommendations to the Headquarters OCFO to increase PMI<sup>2</sup> communications, provide Mission Directorate managers with a thorough briefing on PMI<sup>2</sup>, ensure that the Science Mission Directorate applied the necessary resources to data

mapping to prevent any slippages in PMI<sup>2</sup> implementation, and determine how a continuing resolution would be addressed under the new structure (see Appendix B).

On September 28, 2005, the Headquarters OCFO provided the OIG with a positive and detailed response to the September 14, 2005, memorandum. Headquarters OCFO stated that the Agency had increased its PMI<sup>2</sup> communications effort by holding several PMI<sup>2</sup> town hall meetings and establishing an Agency-wide PMI<sup>2</sup> Web site that included a "frequently asked questions" page. In addition, Headquarters OCFO advised us that data mapping for the Science Mission Directorate had subsequently been completed and the Agency had obtained guidance from the Office of Management and Budget on working with its new budget structure under a continuing resolution (see Appendix B).

Subsequent to our September 14, 2005, memorandum, as we continued to conduct audit work, the IEM Program Director, PMI<sup>2</sup> Project Manager, and the Headquarters PMI<sup>2</sup> lead told us that our memorandum was widely accepted by the NASA PMI<sup>2</sup> community and resulted in increased participation in the various PMI<sup>2</sup> training and communications efforts.

### **CRRs and ORR Were Successfully Completed**

The PMI<sup>2</sup> Project Team, by reviewing and resolving obstacles to implementation through well-planned CRRs and an Agency-wide ORR, ensured that every Center was prepared to implement PMI<sup>2</sup>. These reviews improved the likelihood of successfully implementing PMI<sup>2</sup>.

**Readiness Review Process.** NASA's primary tools for ensuring the Centers' readiness to implement PMI<sup>2</sup> were the CRRs and the Agency-wide ORR. Center preparation for the CRRs began in June 2005 when the PMI<sup>2</sup> Project Team provided a comprehensive schedule of steps to take to implement PMI<sup>2</sup> by October 2005 to the Centers and Mission Directorates. To prepare for the CRRs, the PMI<sup>2</sup> Project Team provided each Center with templates to be completed by the Centers to help assess their progress in the following areas:

- ensuring overall Center readiness to implement PMI<sup>2</sup>,
- data mapping,
- testing of legacy systems' interfaces with the new structure, and
- communicating and providing training on PMI<sup>2</sup> issues (change management).

The ORR was to be performed at the conclusion of the CRRs. The purpose of the ORR was to perform a final assessment of each Center's and the Mission Directorates' readiness for PMI<sup>2</sup>. In addition, the ORR included an assessment of each Center's

corrective actions taken as a result of the CRRs to determine whether they were ready for PMI<sup>2</sup> go-live. The PMI<sup>2</sup> Project Team successfully conducted CRRs with Headquarters and each Center from September 20 through October 7, 2005,<sup>8</sup> and conducted the Agency-wide ORR on October 6, 2005.

**CRRs.** All Centers successfully completed the CRRs. During the CRRs, each Center rated its readiness to implement PMI<sup>2</sup> in each of these five areas: overall Center readiness, data mapping, legacy systems interface testing, transaction testing, and change management. For each area, Centers rated their performance based on completion of steps to achieve readiness. Through PMI<sup>2</sup> Project Team instruction, the Centers assessed themselves using the following rating scale:

- Green: Ready for go-live. Activities were complete or were proceeding according to schedule.
- Yellow: Work remained to be done prior to go-live. Activities were proceeding but were behind schedule. Those areas were anticipated to be ready for go-live, and did not represent a significant risk.
- Red: Work remained to be done and there was a risk of work not being complete prior to go-live. Activities were proceeding but were behind schedule and uncertain for being ready for go-live, and represented a significant risk.

The Centers, in conjunction with the PMI<sup>2</sup> Project Team, developed specific correction or mitigation plans to correct deficiencies in each step or area rated as red or yellow prior to go-live.

We attended each CRR and observed that each review was attended by representatives from each Center's Director's office, the Center OCFO, major programs, and the PMI<sup>2</sup> team. We observed that all of those representatives were actively involved in the discussions and took actions to ensure that any yellow or red areas were timely resolved. For example, at the Goddard CRR, we observed that the Deputy Center Director directed the PMI<sup>2</sup> team to develop an action-items list as a result of the CRR.

**ORR.** NASA successfully completed the ORR. The PMI<sup>2</sup> Project Team and representatives from the IEMP, Center PMI<sup>2</sup> teams, Mission Directorates, the Headquarters OCFO, and the OIG attended the ORR. The staff described in great detail the corrective actions taken by all Centers and concluded that all areas that had been rated yellow or red during the CRRs were resolved. At the conclusion of the ORR, all parties agreed that PMI<sup>2</sup> go-live would proceed on schedule.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> The CRR for Stennis Space Center was delayed until October 7, 2005, because of Hurricane Katrina.

### **Crosswalk Was Not Completed**

While NASA successfully implemented PMI<sup>2</sup>, NASA had not completed crosswalking data from AWCS to NSM. Completing that task should improve the standardization of financial data throughout the Agency and allow NASA to produce reports on both current and prior projects in a standard format. The PMI<sup>2</sup> Project Team decided that completion of the crosswalk was not necessary for go-live because, although the crosswalk functionality would enable better reporting, the existing Business Warehouse reporting functionality was sufficient to provide a workaround for project personnel to perform their jobs until the crosswalk was complete. Mission Directorate and project personnel we interviewed confirmed that completion of the crosswalk was not essential for them to perform their jobs effectively. However, after completing the crosswalk, NASA should be able to extract data from old, ongoing, and new projects in one place within the same structure. Thus, completion of the crosswalk would enhance the standardization of financial data throughout the Agency and allow NASA to produce reports on both current and prior projects in the same format.

Headquarters OCFO had not completed the crosswalk as of October 16, 2006. The Agency's team leader for the crosswalk estimated, at that time, that less than 1 percent of the crosswalking task still needed to be completed. The remaining effort consisted of NASA Mission Directorate staff reviewing the crosswalked data to detect errors. There was no schedule of when the remainder of the task would be completed. The OCFO initially planned to complete the crosswalk by January 19, 2006. When that date slipped, the team leader for the crosswalking effort informed us that this work would be completed by March 31, 2006. Because the planned completion date has continually slipped and the crosswalk is still not completed, the OCFO should establish a definitive milestone for the completion of that work and ensure that it dedicates appropriate resources to meet that deadline.

### **Training Was Not Completed**

NASA does not have assurance that all targeted employees have received the requisite PMI<sup>2</sup> training. Shortly after commencing this audit, we recognized the urgent need for training throughout the NASA workforce to support the implementation of PMI<sup>2</sup>. Our September 14, 2005, memorandum to the NASA Administrator emphasized the criticality of PMI<sup>2</sup> training and noted that NASA had not yet developed training milestones to ensure that all employees who needed PMI<sup>2</sup> training received it. The OIG recommended that staff from the Mission Directorates receive the proper PMI<sup>2</sup> training to prepare for PMI<sup>2</sup> implementation. In their September 28, 2005, response to the OIG memorandum to the Headquarters CFO, the OCFO agreed that training was critical to the success of PMI<sup>2</sup> (Appendix B). The Administrator issued a memorandum on September 16, 2005, directing officials in charge of Headquarters offices and Center Directors to ensure that Core Financial users were properly trained (Appendix C).

To help meet its training needs, the IEMP Competency Center<sup>9</sup> issued to Accenture the task order for Job 12, which included in the statement of work a requirement that, "The Contractor shall develop a Training Metrics Report." In November 2005, Accenture submitted the Training Metrics Report. We contacted Headquarters' and each Center's PMI<sup>2</sup> team, to verify the statistics from Accenture's Training Metrics Report, and requested the names of people who were targeted for and completed PMI<sup>2</sup> training. Our review disclosed that the report was inaccurate and unsupported.

- The November 30, 2005, Training Metrics Report overstated the number of targeted Core Financial users who had completed training by 361 percent. Although Accenture reported that 4,753 targeted users had completed the training, Center records indicated that only 1,316 targeted users had been trained. An additional 1,296 individuals did complete training; however, the Centers had not targeted them as key PMI<sup>2</sup> users. We therefore did not include those individuals in the total number of targeted end users trained, as shown in Table 1.
- According to the PMI<sup>2</sup> Project Manager, the PMI<sup>2</sup>/Agency Labor Distribution System Information Delivery, Funds Distribution Processing, and Month End Cost Allocation courses provided hands-on instruction and were the courses most critical to the success of PMI<sup>2</sup>. However, compared with the Center's training records, Accenture overstated the number of targeted users who had completed those courses by 233 percent. Accenture reported that 1,548 targeted users had completed the training; however, supporting data provided by the Centers showed that 663 targeted end users had been trained.
- The lists of targeted users and/or users who completed PMI<sup>2</sup> training contained duplicates for Goddard, Glenn Research Center (Glenn), Headquarters, and Johnson Space Center (Johnson), resulting in reporting inaccuracies. Duplication was the result of users completing the same course twice, users printing multiple certificates of completion after completing on-line training, and Centers combining a variety of user lists that overlapped each other to determine users who completed training.
- Ames Research Center (Ames), Goddard, Headquarters, Johnson, and Marshall were unable to provide lists of users targeted for training for each PMI<sup>2</sup> course. Without comparing the list of users targeted for training with those who actually completed it, neither NASA nor Accenture could ensure the accuracy of the training statistics.

The Headquarters and Center PMI<sup>2</sup> leads could not provide any evidence supporting how and when the targeted employees were notified that they needed to take the necessary PMI<sup>2</sup> training courses. However, those PMI<sup>2</sup> Center leads stated that they as well as the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> NASA manages all IEMP applications at a central location in Huntsville, Alabama, referred to as the Competency Center.

employees targeted for training were made aware of the need to take the necessary PMI<sup>2</sup> training courses through NASA senior management announcements, town hall meetings, posters, e-mails, and Web sites. In addition, the Center PMI<sup>2</sup> leads stated that they notified every targeted employee of the need to attend training through direct e-mail, both e-mail and telephone calls, or telephone calls. One member of the Glenn PMI<sup>2</sup> team told us that she personally contacted each targeted employee.

Table 1 shows, Agency-wide, the differences between the training metrics reported by Accenture and the training metrics supported by Headquarters and Center documentation. The "Other Individuals Trained" column refers to staff who completed PMI<sup>2</sup> training but were not targeted for training. When Centers could not provide a list of targeted users, we included all individuals trained because we could not determine whether they were targeted end users. Appendix D contains detailed training metrics by Center.

	Reported by Accenture as of November 30, 2005		Supporte Cente	quarters and Records	
PMI <sup>2</sup> Course	Targeted End Users	Targeted End Users Trained	Targeted End Users	Targeted End Users Trained	Other Individuals Trained
PMI <sup>2</sup> Overview	5,052	2,911	2,868	509	981
PMI <sup>2</sup> /ALDS Information Delivery*	2,818	1,298	1,077	546	149
PMI <sup>2</sup> Overview for Procurement Personnel	627	294	213	144	105
Funds Distribution Processing*	117	134	52	51	46
Month End Cost Allocation*	141	116	66	66	15
Totals	8,755	4,753	4,276	1,316	1,296

The IEM Program Director needs to ensure that the remaining 2,960 end users who were targeted for training complete the courses that they were targeted to take.

The Marshall contract administration team did not properly review the Training Metrics Report prior to accepting the report and paying Accenture. Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 46.5, Acceptance, states that acceptance constitutes acknowledgment that the delivered supplies or services conform to applicable contract quality and quantity requirements and that such acceptance is the responsibility of the contracting officer. Marshall did not comply with the FAR for acceptance. The contracting officer's technical representative, the Job 12 monitor, and the PMI<sup>2</sup> Change Management Lead<sup>10</sup> stated that they did not question the accuracy of the Training Metrics Report. We obtained an e-mail from the Job 12 monitor referencing the Training Metrics Report that simply stated, "Approved as submitted," and we found no documented evidence that the report was actually reviewed.

In addition, the contracting officer's technical representative did not develop a contractor surveillance plan for BPA NNM04AA17Z, including Job 12. FAR 37.6, Performance-Based Acquisitions, and FAR 46.4, Government Contract Quality Assurance, require agencies to prepare surveillance plans for service contracts. FAR 46.401 requires that these plans specify all work requiring surveillance and the method of surveillance. A well-thought-out surveillance plan would have included specific procedures to test the accuracy of the Training Metrics Report prior to Marshall's acceptance.

Because the task order for Job 12 did not specify the form and content requirements for the Training Metrics Report, and the Marshall contract administration team accepted the report without question, the Agency has no recourse against Accenture and no basis to recoup the \$25,313 it paid for the deliverable. The contracting officer for BPA NNM04AA17Z should have taken the necessary action to ensure that all deliverables required under the BPA contained accurate and reliable data prior to their acceptance.

Without accurate training metrics, NASA has no assurance that its project and resource managers have the ability to correctly run and analyze financial reports necessary to effectively manage their projects. For example, without the appropriate training, project managers might not be able to set new bookmarks in Business Warehouse<sup>11</sup> and might not understand Business Warehouse data that they are receiving. Bookmarks save the fields used to create the most frequently needed, customized reports, eliminate the need to reselect several different fields each time users create the same report, and reduce the potential for human error. As stated in the July 7, 2005, PMI<sup>2</sup> Project Plan, the IEM Program Director is responsible for establishing the PMI<sup>2</sup> change management framework including training. Thus, to promote sound financial management and the success of PMI<sup>2</sup>, the Program Director should ensure that all targeted users complete the necessary PMI<sup>2</sup> training.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> The PMI<sup>2</sup> Change Management Lead participated in the Technical Interchange Meetings with the monitor.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Business Warehouse is NASA's Web-based reporting tool that enables data analysis from the Core Financial system.

### Management Comments on the Finding and Audit Response

**Management Comments.** The IEM Program Director noted that the statement that the crosswalk had not been completed as of June 2006 misrepresented the status of that activity but also noted that some prior-year codes do not have a crosswalk solution because of differences in accounting. As regards the Agency's acceptance of the contractor's Training Metrics Report, the IEM Program Director stated that the Marshall contract administration team followed the established methodology for deliverables review and that the scope of the task order did not require Accenture to validate the data in the training metrics report.

Audit Response. We do not agree that the status of the crosswalk activity was misrepresented because, in his response, the IEM Program Director confirmed that the crosswalk is not yet complete.

Concerning acceptance of contract deliverables, as of October 23, 2006, the Marshall contract administration team has been unable to provide any documentation showing that they followed the established methodology for review of deliverables or that they actually reviewed the training metrics report before accepting it. The IEM Program Director is correct in his assertion that the scope of the task order did not require the contractor to ensure that the training metrics report was accurate before submitting it for approval. However, we question the rationale in procuring a training metrics report, or any type of report, if its usefulness is suspect because the task order did not require that the information provided must be accurate.

#### Recommendations, Management's Response, and Evaluation of Management's Response

**Recommendation 1.** The NASA Chief Financial Officer should establish milestones for completing the crosswalk of project data from AWCS to NSM.

**Management's Response.** Headquarters OCFO concurred, stating that the Agency has completed the crosswalk to the greatest extent possible. There are approximately 200 (1.5 percent) out of approximately 13,000 prior-year project codes that do not currently have a crosswalk solution due to various difficulties. The Headquarters OCFO will work with the IEMP Competency Center and the affected mission offices to complete the crosswalk by the end of the second quarter of FY 2007.

**Evaluation of Management's Response.** Headquarters OCFO's comments are responsive to the recommendation. We consider the recommendation to be resolved, but it will remain open until management completes crosswalking the remaining 200 project codes and notifies us of that completion.

**Recommendation 2.** The Director, Marshall Space Flight Center, should direct the contracting officer for Accenture BPA NNM04AA17Z to ensure that (1) all contract deliverables contain specific and accurate requirements for form and content, and (2) all report deliverables required under the BPA contain accurate and reliable data before accepting them and approving payment.

**Management's Response.** Marshall Space Flight Center concurred. The response noted that the roles and responsibilities of the contracting officer's technical representative concerning contract deliverables and invoice review have been clarified. The clarification is to ensure that, when invoices are submitted for approval and payment, the contracting officer's technical representative verifies and approves the items on the invoice and the contracting officer verifies that the amount on the invoice is in agreement with the contract Milestone Payment Schedule.

**Evaluation of Management's Response.** Management's comments are not responsive. Marshall does not address the issue of ensuring that, before acceptance, all contract deliverables under BPA NNM04AA17Z contain (1) specific and accurate requirements for form and content and (2) accurate and reliable data. We request that Marshall provide comments to the final report addressing content and accuracy of BPA NNM04AA17Z deliverables.

**Recommendation 3.** The IEM Program Director should solicit each Center Director to reassess the targeted end users who truly require PMI<sup>2</sup> training to take appropriate action to ensure that those employees complete the necessary PMI<sup>2</sup> training courses.

**Management's Response.** The IEM Program Director nonconcurred, stating that the need and original goals for PMI<sup>2</sup> training have been overcome by implementation of the SAP Version Update training courses and events, and the Agency's time and resources are being focused on delivering the SAP Version Update.

**Evaluation of Management's Response.** We accept the IEM Program Director's response that the need and original goals for PMI<sup>2</sup> training have been overcome by the SAP Version Update Project training courses and events. This recommendation will be closed for reporting purposes.

The fact that PMI<sup>2</sup> training has been overcome by the events of the SAP Version Update does not resolve the fact that the IEM Program Office, PMI<sup>2</sup> Project Office, and the support contractor did an inadequate job of tracking and reporting PMI<sup>2</sup> training. NASA specifically tasked and paid Accenture to

provide guidance and oversight for Center training logistics including planning for rooms; scheduling training; registering end-users for training courses; conducting courses; tracking and reporting end-user course completions; and conducting end-user course evaluations. The Contractor shall develop a Training Metrics Report.

NASA was responsible for determining which Core Financial users needed PMI<sup>2</sup> training. Accenture was required to register individuals for training and track and report the number of users who had completed training. However, we found that Accenture did not provide the required oversight to support PMI<sup>2</sup> training throughout NASA and submitted a Training Metrics Report that overstated the number of targeted Core Financial users who had completed training by 361 percent.

### **APPENDIX A**

### Scope and Methodology

We performed fieldwork at NASA Headquarters, the IEMP Competency Center, and all Centers. Our fieldwork consisted of the following phases: obtaining an understanding of the PMI<sup>2</sup> process, evaluating Center readiness to implement PMI<sup>2</sup>, evaluating and monitoring the data mapping process, evaluating and testing PMI<sup>2</sup> training statistics, evaluating Accenture's performance in support of PMI<sup>2</sup>, and monitoring the PMI<sup>2</sup> crosswalk.

**Understanding the PMI<sup>2</sup> Process.** To understand PMI<sup>2</sup> and the PMI<sup>2</sup> implementation process, we reviewed PMI<sup>2</sup>-related documents including

- "Core Financial Implementation Assessment Executive Presentation," June 5, 2005;
- "PMI<sup>2</sup> Framework Agreement," February 10, 2004;
- "PMI<sup>2</sup> Critical Design Review," June 28, 2005;
- "PMI<sup>2</sup> Project Plan," July 7, 2005; and
- NASA Procedural Requirement 7120.5C, "NASA Program and Project Management Processes and Requirements," March 22, 2005.

In addition, we interviewed NASA officials associated with PMI<sup>2</sup> including the IEM Project Manger; the IEMP Business Manager; the PMI<sup>2</sup> Project Manager; Center PMI<sup>2</sup> points of contact, PMI<sup>2</sup> implementers, trainers, and budget maintainers; Mission Directorate resource managers; and Headquarters and Center OCFO officials.

**Center Readiness.** To evaluate Center readiness to implement PMI<sup>2</sup>, we attended all CRRs and the ORR either in person or via teleconference. Also, to clarify information (e.g., training metrics, data mapping, crosswalking, system security) and to respond to issues raised during the CRRs, the audit team conducted follow-up meetings as necessary with the IEM Program Director; the IEMP Business Manager; the PMI<sup>2</sup> Project Manager; Center PMI<sup>2</sup> points of contact; PMI<sup>2</sup> implementers, trainers, and budget maintainers; Mission Directorate resource managers; and Headquarters and Center OCFO officials.

**Data Mapping.** To evaluate and monitor the data mapping process, we participated in the weekly data mapping teleconferences and reviewed associated data mapping documents and presentations.

**Training Documentation.** To evaluate the extent of PMI<sup>2</sup> training and to test the accuracy of Accenture's Training Metrics Report, we interviewed PMI<sup>2</sup> training leads at Headquarters and all Centers, obtained lists maintained by the Centers of users who were targeted for and had completed PMI<sup>2</sup> training, and compared those lists with Accenture's Training Metrics Report.

**Crosswalk.** To monitor the status of the crosswalk, we conducted several discussions with the Headquarters OCFO officials who were the leads for the crosswalk, the Competency Center crosswalk lead, Mission Directorate resource management staff, and Center Project resources management staff.

**Scope Limitations.** Because of the timing of our audit fieldwork in relation to a continuing resolution, we did not address the controls over data mapping. Also, we did not address NASA-wide acceptance of the new coding structure because we addressed that issue in September 14, 2005, memorandums to the NASA Administrator and the NASA Chief Financial Officer (see Appendix B).

We performed this project from August 2005 through September 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

**Use of Computer-Processed Data.** We analyzed training metrics, or statistics, we obtained from Accenture, the contractor that gathered and summarized the training results from NASA Headquarters and the Centers. That information was contained in Microsoft Excel spreadsheets and Power Point charts. To test the validity of that data, we contacted Headquarters and each Center and obtained lists of Core Financial users who had been targeted for and had completed the five PMI<sup>2</sup> training courses that Accenture developed for NASA. That information consisted of hard-copy documentation such as course registration sheets, course sign-in sheets, and Center-prepared Excel spreadsheets based on course sign-in sheets. After comparing that information with Accenture's Training Metrics Report, we determined that the Training Metrics Report was unreliable and largely inaccurate. See Appendix D.

#### **Review of Internal Controls**

We reviewed internal controls related to contract oversight, PMI<sup>2</sup> training, and user access to the Core Financial system.

**Contract Oversight.** We reviewed Marshall's procedures for contract oversight related to BPA NNM04AA17Z in accordance with FAR. We found that the Marshall contract administration team, which consisted of the contracting officer's technical representative, the Contracting Officer, and the task monitor did not thoroughly review the Training Metrics Report prior to accepting the report and paying Accenture. FAR 46.5 states that acceptance constitutes acknowledgment that the delivered supplies or services conform to applicable contract quality and quantity requirements and that such acceptance is the responsibility of

the contracting officer. Marshall's standard procedure for reviewing Accenture's contract deliverables was to review and comment on the deliverable draft, provide coordinated feedback on the deliverable during Technical Interchange Meetings, and approve the deliverable by way of a sign-off memorandum. However, the contracting officer's technical representative, the monitor, and the PMI<sup>2</sup> Change Management Lead<sup>12</sup> did not question the accuracy of the Training Metrics Report. We obtained an e-mail from the monitor referencing the Training Metrics Report that simply stated, "Approved as submitted."

The OIG recently issued report, "Integrated Enterprise Management Program Contract Oversight Needs Improvement" (IG-06-003, February 6, 2006). Implementation of the recommendations made in that report, to which the Marshall Director concurred, will improve IEMP contract oversight and correct the weakness noted above.

**PMI<sup>2</sup> Training.** We reviewed NASA's controls over targeting NASA employees for PMI<sup>2</sup> training courses, verifying that they completed appropriate training and ensuring that training statistics were accurately reported. Although we did not identify any explicit guidance requiring training on PMI<sup>2</sup>, through our review of the PMI<sup>2</sup> Project Plan and interviews with PMI<sup>2</sup> implementation officials, we determined that Agency-wide training was necessary to support PMI<sup>2</sup> implementation and maintain the integrity of the Core Financial system. We found a weakness in reporting training statistics, as detailed in Appendix D. Management's implementation of Recommendations 2 and 3 will correct that weakness.

**User Access to the Core Financial System.** As part of our evaluation of internal controls over training, we identified a management control weakness regarding user access to the Core Financial system. We found that Headquarters did not have an effective process for terminating former employees' and contractors' access to the Core Financial system and Business Warehouse upon separation from NASA, which skewed the Headquarters PMI<sup>2</sup> training data.

According to NASA Procedural Requirements 2810.1, "Security of Information Technology," August 26, 1999, Appendix A, section A.6.2.6, management is responsible for the disposition of user accounts assigned to employees who no longer need system access due to resignation, change of job, or retirement. According to section A.6.2.4, if users do not change their passwords, their accounts should be suspended after 90 days and removed from the system after 180 days. However, the NASA Headquarters Business Process Lead informed us that some users who no longer worked for NASA continued to have Core Financial system and Business Warehouse accounts because 180 days had not passed since their separation from NASA. Those employees continued to be targeted for training. This problem not only skewed the PMI<sup>2</sup> training data but also creates a risk of unauthorized access to the Core Financial system for up to 180 days.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> The PMI<sup>2</sup> Change Management Lead participated in the Technical Interchange Meetings with the monitor.

This risk persists even though NASA's financial statement auditors reported the condition in the last two financial statement audits. In FY 2005, the auditors found that NASA did not timely terminate Core Financial system user accounts in 3 of 30 total employee separations at Kennedy. Those accounts were eventually removed from the system 1, 3, and 4 months after the employees left. Kennedy management took corrective action in response to that finding. In FY 2004, the auditors noted that Goddard did not have a process in place to track employee separations and could not determine if any open accounts belonged to employees who no longer worked for NASA.

We referred this issue to the OIG Information Technology and Financial Statement directorates in the OIG's Office of Audits.

#### **Prior Coverage**

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the NASA OIG have issued reports of particular relevance to the subject of this report. Reports may be accessed over the Internet at <u>http://www.gao.gov</u> (GAO) and <u>http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/oig/hq/audits/reports/FY07/index.html</u> (NASA).

Government Accountability Office

"The National Aeronautics and Space Administration's Fiscal Year 2004 Management Representation Letter on Its Financial Statements" (GAO-05-591R, June 23, 2005)

"National Aeronautics and Space Administration: Significant Actions Needed to Address Long-standing Financial Management Problems" (GAO-04-754T, May 19, 2004)

"Information Technology Management: Government-wide Strategic Planning, Performance Measurement, and Investment Management Can Be Further Improved" (GAO-04-49, January 12, 2004)

"Business Modernization: NASA's Challenges in Managing Its Integrated Financial Management Program" (GAO-04-255, November 21, 2003)

"Business Modernization: NASA's Integrated Financial Management Program Does Not Fully Address Agency's External Reporting Issues" (GAO-04-151, November 21, 2003)

"Business Modernization: Disciplined Processes Needed to Better Manage NASA's Integrated Financial Management Program" (GAO-04-118, November 21, 2003) "Business Modernization: Improvements Needed in Management of NASA's Integrated Financial Management Program" (GAO-03-507, April 30, 2003)

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

"Integrated Enterprise management Program Contract Oversight Needs Improvement" (IG-06-003, February 6, 2006)

"Synopsis of Management Issues Associated with NASA's Integrated Financial Management Program" (IG-05-020, June 3, 2005)


"Summary Report on Audit of Integrated Financial Management Program Core Financial Module" (IG-03-028, September 29, 2003)


"Integrated Financial Management Program Core Financial Module Conversion to Full Cost Accounting" (IG-03-015, May 30, 2003)

### MEMORANDUMS ON PRELIMINARY PMI<sup>2</sup> Observations

National Aero Space Admin	nautics and listration
Office of ins Washington, (	Dector General DC 20546-0001 SEP 1 4 2005
TO:	Administrator
FROM:	Inspector General
SUBJECT:	Preliminary Observations on the Review of NASA's Readiness to Implement Project Management Information Improvement, Phase I (Assignment Number A-05-026-00)
We began or believe, base	a memorandum summarizing our preliminary observations on NASA's implement Project Management Information Improvement (PMI <sup>2</sup> ) Phase I. Ir review of progress made toward implementation of Phase I in August and d on our review, that this project is suffering from the lack of a marketing warrants your attention.
They also we financial man employees w have been se Further, whil	r issues, we found that the overall workforce, and some directorate officials, ormation about what changes to expect with implementation of Phase I. are not fully aware of the importance of those changes to NASA's improved hagement. With regard to training, although courses had been developed for ho will be working with the new process, no milestone dates or other details t to ensure that all courses would be taken before implementation of Phase I. e some outreach activities were planned to inform staff about the upcoming of September 8, 2005, no activities had taken place and most had not been
implementati of the Core F with the begi that the changes are a	and to improve project information management by aligning technical and k breakdown structures, allowing migration to a single data management Al <sup>2</sup> will change the entire NASA budget structure, so it is critical that the on of Phase I should avoid the mistakes that occurred after implementation inancial Module. Implementation of PMI <sup>2</sup> Phase I is scheduled to coincide ming of FY 2006 in less than 6 weeks. The Agency needs to make certain ges expected from PMI <sup>2</sup> Phase I and the benefits resulting from those idequately communicated to NASA senior management and to all personnel affected by those changes.
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Robert W. Ce	


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	spector General NA SA DC 20546-0001
	SEP 1 4 2005
TO:	Chief Financial Officer
FROM:	Assistant Inspector General for Audit
SUBJECT	Preliminary Observations on the Review of NASA's Readiness to Implement Project Management Information Improvement, Phase I (Assignment Number A-05-026-00)
implement mid-Octobe an approach The purpose technical ar managemer financial ma implemente entire NAS, start of FY the FY 2000 in August 2 successful i The NASA Systems Im about the in successful i implementa changes exp been adequa will be affect the successf	of Inspector General is performing a review of NASA's readiness to Project Management Information Improvement (PMI <sup>2</sup> ) Phase I in er 2005. PMI <sup>2</sup> is a data management process—the result of a study to develop a and strategy to expand the functionality of NASA's Core Financial Module. e of PMI <sup>2</sup> is to improve project information management by aligning both difinancial work breakdown structures, <sup>1</sup> thus migrating to a single data at structure. Such an alignment is needed for managers to exercise sound anagement of their programs and projects. PMI <sup>2</sup> is planned to be d in three phases. Because implementation of PMI <sup>2</sup> Phase I will change the A budget structure, NASA plans to implement Phase I in conjunction with the 2006. Thus it is critical that NASA implement Phase I so that it can execute 6 budget. We began our review of PMI <sup>2</sup> Phase I implementation preparations 005. In conducting our review, we identified concerns that, to ensure mplementation of PMI <sup>2</sup> Phase I, warrant your immediate attention. manager, Integrated Enterprise Management Program's Administrative plementation of PMI <sup>2</sup> Phase I. Specifically, she stated that to ensure mplementation of PMI <sup>2</sup> Phase I and avoid the mistakes that occurred after the tion of the Core Financial Module, the Agency needs to make certain that the sected from PMI <sup>2</sup> Phase I and the benefits resulting from those changes have tely communicated to NASA senior management and to the personnel who ted by those changes. In addition, the NASA manager stated that to achieve il implementation of PMI <sup>2</sup> Phase I in October 2005, it is critical that the PMI <sup>2</sup> ce provide Headquarters and the Centers with clear and definitive tion steps and milestones that must be met. The NASA manager requested ce in determining whether those steps are being taken.
mplemental	
unplemental our assistanc	wyn structure is a management tool to help NASA track project costs more accurately.







If you would like to discuss this matter further please contact Catherine Schneiter, Director of Financial and Institutional Management audits, at (202) 358-3789, or <u>catherine.schneiter@nasa.gov</u>, or Karl Allen, Project Manager, at (202) 358-2595, or karl.m.allen@nasa.gov. A. Dahrelle Payson for Evelyn R. Klemstine ee: NASA Executive Officer, Integrated Enterprise Management Program Director, Management Systems Division PAGE 4 OF 4

	National Aeror Space Admini Headquarters Washington, D	stration						
		September 28, 2005						
Reply to Alth of	Office of the	Chief Financial Officer						
	TO:	Inspector General						
	FROM:	Chief Financial Officer						
	SUBJECT:	Response to Your Memorandum, "Preliminary Observations on the Review of NASA's Readiness to Implement Project Management Information Improvement, Phase I (Assignment Number A-05-026-00)," dated September 14, 2005						
	"Preliminary Management dated Septem	r your continued interest in NASA's Project Management Information (PMII) Project, as evidenced in your recent memorandum titled, Observations on the Review of NASA's Readiness to Implement Project Information Improvement, Phase I (Assignment Number A-05-026-00)," ber 14, 2005. I agree with each of the five recommendations you have and offer the following responses.						
	Recommendation #1 (Hold town hall meetings) You have correctly noted the importance of a broad communication strategy for the PMII implementation. Center "town hall" meetings have already occurred in multiple locations, and others are scheduled throughout September and October. Many of these gatherings have successfully updated hundreds of users on the basic overview of the PMII Project, including background and criticality of PMII. Personnel are told what they can expect during the PMII implementation process, and the training in which they must							
	participate to make the event a success. Center Implementation Leads are reporting healthy attendance at all their gatherings. They have worked tirelessly, along with their teams, to touch all communities affected by PMII to keep them informed. In many cases, the PMII Center Implementations teams have provided NASA employees comprehensive Project literature. The Center PMII Project teams have also taken care to punctuate their communication efforts with regular e-mails that frequently detail training dates, and provide consistent dialogue with the affected NASA communities at their Centers.							








# Administrator's Memorandum

National Aeronautics and Space Administration Office of the Administrator Washington, DC 20546-0001 September 16, 2005 TO: Officials-in-Charge of Headquarters Offices Center Directors FROM: Administrator SUBJECT: Preparing for Project Management Information Improvement (PMI<sup>2</sup>) NASA's implementation of PMI<sup>2</sup> in October is designed to improve project management information by establishing an Agency-standard structure to uniquely and consistently identify our programs and projects and by aligning technical and financial work breakdown structures. NASA's program year 2006 budget was submitted to Congress in the new NASA Structure Management (NSM) format and, therefore, PMI<sup>2</sup> is replacing the current financial coding structure in the Core Financial system. New codes will also be reflected in other Agency systems such as WebTads and Travel Manager. PMI<sup>2</sup> will affect every NASA employee, from budget distribution personnel responsible for distributing funds under the new coding structure, to project engineers who will be setting up project work breakdown structures to align with the new coding structure, to all employees who will be charging their work hours to new codes on time and attendance reports. Therefore, successful implementation will require you to emphasize participation, at all levels of NASA, in programs and activities designed to familiarize employees with PMI<sup>2</sup> and to ensure proper training of Core Financial users who will be most affected by these changes. NASA Headquarters and Centers each have a Center Implementation Manager who is preparing for the upcoming PMI<sup>2</sup> implementation. I encourage you to contact the Implementation Manager at your workplace and to involve yourself personally in efforts to prepare the NASA workforce for PMI<sup>2</sup>. The Center Implementation Managers are: ARC - Luis Mederos DFRC - John Wonacott GRC - Julie Scheneman GSFC - Tamara Laster HQ/NMO/NSSC - Nadine Tremper JPL - Charlene Hazelton JSC - Carol Harvey KSC - Debbie Clarke LaRC - Amy Radford MSFC - Gary Gray SSC - Gigi Hackford



# **CENTER TRAINING DATA**

We contacted Headquarters and each Center to request lists of Core Financial users who had been targeted for and had completed the five core PMI<sup>2</sup> training courses. After comparing this information with Accenture's Training Metrics Report, we determined that the Training Metrics Report was unreliable and largely inaccurate. Table 1 (p. 13) shows, Agency-wide, the differences between the training metrics reported by Accenture and the training metrics supported by Center documentation. The "Other Individuals Trained" refers to staff who completed PMI<sup>2</sup> but were not targeted for training. When Centers could not provide a list of targeted users, we included all individuals trained because we could not determine whether they were part of the targeted end users.

**Ames.** Because of Ames' incomplete training records, we could not determine whether targeted end users completed training or whether Accenture's training statistics were accurate. Although the PMI<sup>2</sup> Change Management Lead at Ames provided an overall list of users targeted for PMI<sup>2</sup> training, the Center did not delineate which users it targeted for each of the PMI<sup>2</sup> training courses listed below.

Number of T	Table 2. Num argeted End U	ber of Target Jsers and Othe	ed End Users a er Individuals 7	nd Frained at Ame	es
	Reported by	y Accenture	Supported	by Ames Train	ing Records
PMI <sup>2</sup> Course	Targeted End Users	Targeted End Users Trained	Targeted End Users	Targeted End Users Trained	Other Individuals Trained
PMI <sup>2</sup> Overview	230	193	Not supported*	Not supported*	42
PMI <sup>2</sup> /ALDS Information Delivery	192	120	Not supported*	Not supported*	0
PMI <sup>2</sup> Overview for Procurement Personnel	45	45	Not supported*	Not supported*	0
Funds Distribution Processing	6	6	Not supported*	Not supported*	27
Month End Cost Allocation	10	10	Not supported*	Not supported*	10

they needed to complete.

**Dryden Flight Research Center (Dryden).** Dryden's records generally supported Accenture's training statistics for four of the five PMI<sup>2</sup> training courses; however, due to Dryden's incomplete training records, we could not determine whether targeted end users completed training or whether Accenture's training statistics were accurate for the PMI<sup>2</sup> Overview course. According to the PMI<sup>2</sup> Training Coordinator at Dryden, the Center restricted user access for targeted users who did not complete the applicable PMI<sup>2</sup> training courses, likely resulting in Dryden's high course completion rate. In spite of this policy, Dryden could not provide us with a list of targeted users who completed the PMI<sup>2</sup> Overview course.

Table 3. Number of Targeted End Users andNumber of Targeted End Users and Other Individuals Trained at Dryden								
	Reported by	Accenture	Supported I	by Dryden Traii	ning Records			
PMI <sup>2</sup> Course	Targeted End Users	Targeted End Users Trained	Targeted End Users	Targeted End Users Trained	Other Individuals Trained			
PMI <sup>2</sup> Overview	1,167	1,167	1,164	Not supported*	0			
PMI <sup>2</sup> /ALDS Information Delivery	67	62	67	67	6			
PMI <sup>2</sup> Overview for Procurement Personnel	21	21	21	21	0			
Funds Distribution Processing	6	6	6	6	0			
Month End Cost Allocation	6	6	6	6	0			

\*The "Not supported" notations in this table are a result of Dryden not being able to provide a list of targeted end users who completed the course.

**Glenn.** Glenn's training records did not support Accenture's PMI<sup>2</sup> training statistics for two of the five courses and revealed that a number of end users had not completed training. According to Glenn's records, only 72 of 222 targeted users, or 32.4 percent, completed the PMI<sup>2</sup>/Agency Labor Distribution System Information Delivery course, a mandatory, hands-on PMI<sup>2</sup> training course. Our review of Glenn's training records was complicated by the fact that Glenn customized its own PMI<sup>2</sup> courses that did not exactly align with the five courses developed by the Competency Center. While we did not compare the curriculum of the Glenn and Competency Center courses, the Glenn Mission Support and Integration Chief provided a crosswalk from the Center's courses to the corresponding PMI<sup>2</sup> courses listed below. We constructed the Glenn training statistics based on his assertion that Glenn's courses included the entire original PMI<sup>2</sup> curriculum.

Table 4. Number of Targeted End Users and           Number of Targeted End Users and Other Individuals Trained at Glenn									
	Reported by	Accenture	Supported b	y Glenn Train	ing Records				
PMI <sup>2</sup> Course	Targeted End Users	Targeted End Users Trained	Targeted End Users	Targeted End Users Trained	Other Individuals Trained				
PMI <sup>2</sup> Overview	320	209	222	125	76				
PMI <sup>2</sup> /ALDS Information Delivery	165	108	222	72	10				
PMI <sup>2</sup> Overview for Procurement Personnel	0	2	2	2	1				
Funds Distribution Processing	7	7	3	3	4				
Month End Cost Allocation	4	4	4	4	0				

**Goddard.** We found that Accenture overstated the number of targeted end users at Goddard who completed the PMI<sup>2</sup> Overview course, that a large number of targeted users still have not completed that course, and that Center training records were incomplete for four of the five PMI<sup>2</sup> courses. Goddard PMI<sup>2</sup> staff could not provide names of users who completed the PMI<sup>2</sup>/Agency Labor Distribution System Information Delivery course or who had been targeted for the PMI<sup>2</sup> Overview for Procurement Personnel, Funds Distribution Processing, or Month End Cost Allocation courses. During Goddard's PMI<sup>2</sup> Operational Readiness Review, the Goddard Deputy Director emphasized the importance of ensuring that all targeted end users received the proper training. Our review also revealed that some Goddard users requested multiple certificates of completion for the PMI<sup>2</sup> Overview course offered on NASA's Site for On-Line Learning and Resources and, as a result, were counted multiple times in Goddard's records. We made appropriate adjustments to the training statistics noted below.

Number of Ta	Table 5. Numargeted End Use	ber of Target ers and Other	ted End Users an Individuals Tra	ld ined at Godda	rd
	Reported by	Accenture	Supported by	Goddard Train	ing Records
PMI <sup>2</sup> Course	Targeted End Users	Targeted End Users Trained	Targeted End Users	Targeted End Users Trained	Other Individuals Trained
PMI <sup>2</sup> Overview	1,000	230	997	39	205
PMI <sup>2</sup> /ALDS Information Delivery	528	330	151	Not supported*	0
PMI <sup>2</sup> Overview for Procurement Personnel	230	3	Not supported*	Not supported*	3
Funds Distribution Processing	13	20	Not supported*	Not supported*	0
Month End Cost Allocation	18	22	Not supported*	Not supported*	0

**Headquarters.** We found that Accenture overstated the number of targeted end users at Headquarters who completed the PMI<sup>2</sup> Overview and PMI<sup>2</sup>/Agency Labor Distribution System Information Delivery courses, that a large number of targeted users still have not completed those courses, and that Headquarters training records were incomplete for three of the five PMI<sup>2</sup> courses. The Headquarters PMI<sup>2</sup> Point of Contact for the Business and Administrative Systems Branch provided us with a list of end users for all PMI<sup>2</sup> courses who had completed training. However, although a number of individuals completed the PMI<sup>2</sup> Overview for Procurement Personnel, Funds Distribution Processing, and Month End Cost Allocation courses, Headquarters could not provide us with a list of users targeted for those courses. Therefore, we could not determine whether the users who most needed the three courses actually completed the training.

		rted by enture	Sı	pported by Hea Training Rec	
PMI <sup>2</sup> Course	Targeted End Users	Targeted End Users Trained	Targeted End Users	Targeted End Users Trained	Other Individuals Trained
PMI <sup>2</sup> Overview	500	233	226	86	84
PMI <sup>2</sup> /ALDS Information Delivery	500	146	226	106	65
PMI <sup>2</sup> Overview for Procurement Personnel	3	2	Not supported*	Not supported*	7
Funds Distribution Processing	34	50	Not supported*	Not supported*	36
Month End Cost Allocation	12	13	Not supported*	Not supported*	9

**Jet Propulsion Laboratory.** Although the Jet Propulsion Laboratory's records did not support Accenture's training statistics, we found that all end users targeted by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory completed the PMI<sup>2</sup> Overview course. According to the Manager for the Jet Propulsion Laboratory's Business Management Integration Office, Ames has responsibility for many of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory's financial management functions. Therefore, no Jet Propulsion Laboratory employees have direct, hands-on access to financial management systems affected by PMI<sup>2</sup>. Nevertheless, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory targeted a small group of employees for the PMI<sup>2</sup> Overview course who have responsibilities for reporting costs and for the receipt, monitoring, and control of funds. The Jet Propulsion Laboratory also encouraged business operations management and program business managers and analysts to attend the PMI<sup>2</sup> Overview course, although these employees were not formally targeted for training.

Table 7. Number of Targeted End Users andNumber of Targeted End Users and Other IndividualsTrained at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory								
	Reported by	Accenture	Supported by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory's Training Records					
PMI <sup>2</sup> Course	Targeted End Users	Targeted End Users Trained	Targeted End Users	Targeted End Users Trained	Other Individuals Trained			
PMI <sup>2</sup> Overview	161	111	32	32	129			

**Johnson.** We found that Accenture overstated the number of targeted end users at Johnson who completed the PMI<sup>2</sup> Overview and PMI<sup>2</sup>/Agency Labor Distribution System Information Delivery courses, that all targeted users still have not completed those courses, and that Center training records were incomplete for two of the five PMI<sup>2</sup> courses.

Number of T	Table 8. Numlargeted End Use	ber of Targete ers and Other	ed End Users a Individuals Tr	nd ained at Johns	on
	Reported by	Accenture	Supported b	y Johnson Trai	ning Records
PMI <sup>2</sup> Course	Targeted End Users	Targeted End Users Trained	Targeted End Users	Targeted End Users Trained	Other Individuals Trained
PMI <sup>2</sup> Overview	484	44	Not supported*	Not supported*	236
PMI <sup>2</sup> /ALDS Information Delivery	290	75	48	38	44
PMI <sup>2</sup> Overview for Procurement Personnel	90	95	Not supported*	Not supported*	94
Funds Distribution Processing	9	9	9	9	0
Month End Cost Allocation	7	7	7	7	0

\* The "Not supported" notations in this table are the result of Johnson's records being incomplete for two of the five courses.

**Kennedy.** According to the Kennedy PMI<sup>2</sup> Manager, on the basis of guidance from the PMI<sup>2</sup> Project Office, the Kennedy PMI<sup>2</sup> team made an initial determination that 245 employees needed PMI<sup>2</sup> Overview training. As the project progressed and the requirements were refined, it was determined that the initial estimate was incorrect and that the target population was actually 128.

Table 9. Number of Targeted End Users and           Number of Targeted End Users and Other Individuals Trained at Kennedy								
	Reported by	Accenture	Supported b	y Kennedy Tra	ining Records			
PMI <sup>2</sup> Course	Targeted End Users	Targeted End Users Trained	Targeted End Users	Targeted End Users Trained	Other Individuals Trained			
PMI <sup>2</sup> Overview	245	128	128	128	0			
PMI <sup>2</sup> /ALDS Information Delivery	176	93	93	93	0			
PMI <sup>2</sup> Overview for Procurement Personnel	70	1	70	1	0			
Funds Distribution Processing	11	11	11	11	0			
Month End Cost Allocation	31	31	31	31	0			

Langley. The Langley PMI<sup>2</sup> Team made a strong effort to train Center personnel. The Langley PMI<sup>2</sup> Manager stated that Langley had listings of targeted end users based on their roles in the Core Financial system, a listing of people who accessed Business Warehouse within a 6-month period, and sign-in sheets that captured who attended the courses. However, since the PMI<sup>2</sup> Project Office never asked for any of this data, Langley only reported numbers and percentages. The Langley PMI<sup>2</sup> manager stated that the PMI<sup>2</sup> Overview course was offered to the entire Center. One hundred and fifty-four users completed the PMI<sup>2</sup>/Agency Labor Distribution System Information Delivery course at Langley. Additionally, Langley offered multiple workshops to end users as well as individual assistance sessions. Organization-specific presentations were provided upon request.

Ta Number of Targ	ible 10. Numl eted End Use	ber of Targete rs and Other ]	d End Users a Individuals Tra	nd ained at Langl	ey
	Reported by Accenture		Supported by Langley Training Record		
PMI <sup>2</sup> Course	Targeted End Users	Targeted End Users Trained	Targeted End Users	Targeted End Users Trained	Other Individuals Trained
PMI <sup>2</sup> Overview	230	213	*	*	
PMI <sup>2</sup> /ALDS Information Delivery	230	167	230	130	24
PMI <sup>2</sup> Overview for Procurement Personnel**	96	96	96	96	
Funds Distribution Processing	9	8	9	8	
Month End Cost Allocation	6	6	6	6	

\*The PMI<sup>2</sup> Overview course was offered to the entire Center.

\*\*Langley provided a revised version of the PMI<sup>2</sup> Overview for Procurement Personnel in addition to the on line training provided by the Agency.

**Marshall.** Due to incomplete training records at Marshall, we could not determine whether targeted end users completed training or whether Accenture's training statistics were accurate. While we did review a list of individuals who completed the PMI<sup>2</sup> Overview, Funds Distribution Processing, and Month End Cost Allocation courses, we could not determine whether those who most needed training completed it because Marshall did not have a list of users targeted for those courses.

Number of Ta	Table 11. Nun rgeted End Use	nber of Target ers and Other	ted End Users Individuals Tr	and ained at Mars	hall
	Reported by	y Accenture	Supported b	y Marshall Trai	ning Records
PMI <sup>2</sup> Course	Targeted End Users	Targeted End Users Trained	Targeted End Users	Targeted End Users Trained	Other Individuals Trained
PMI <sup>2</sup> Overview	623	312	Not supported*	Not supported*	251
PMI <sup>2</sup> /ALDS Information Delivery	623	176	Not supported*	Not supported*	0
PMI <sup>2</sup> Overview for Procurement Personnel	49	6	Not supported*	Not supported*	0
Funds Distribution Processing	8	6	Not supported*	Not supported*	6
Month End Cost Allocation	29	6	Not supported*	Not supported*	6

\*The "Not supported" notations in this table are the result of Marshall's incomplete training records.


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**Stennis.** Stennis was the only NASA Center to ensure that all of the end users targeted for PMI<sup>2</sup> training actually completed their training courses. Stennis was also the only Center to report training statistics that approximated the Accenture's training metrics.


Table 12. Number of Targeted End Users and           Number of Targeted End Users and Other Individuals Trained at Stennis								
	Reported b	y Accenture	Supported	by Stennis Trai	ning Records			
PMI <sup>2</sup> Course	End Users Targeted	Targeted End Users Trained	End Users Targeted	Targeted End Users Trained	Other Individuals Trained			
PMI <sup>2</sup> Overview	92	71	99	99	0			
PMI <sup>2</sup> /ALDS Information Delivery	47	21	40	40	0			
PMI <sup>2</sup> Overview for Procurement Personnel	23	23	24	24	0			
Funds Distribution Processing	14	11	14	14	0			
Month End Cost Allocation	18	11	12	12	0			


# **MANAGEMENT COMMENTS**


	National Aeronautics and					
	Space Administration Headquarters					
	Washington, DC	C 20546-0001				
		October 16, 2006				
Rocky to Athr C						
	Integrated Enterprise Management Program					
	TO:	And the second				
	10:	Assistant Inspector General for Auditing				
	FROM:	Director, Integrated Enterprise Management Program				
	SUBJECT:	Management Response to Office of Inspector General Draft Audit Report Entitled "NASA Implemented the Project Management Information				
		Improvement (PMI <sup>2</sup> ) Initiative but Crosswalk and Training Need to be				
		Completed." (Assignment No. A-05-026-00)				
	Thank you for the opportunity to some adde the D of the Winner of the Wi					
	Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the Draft Audit Report, Assignment A-05- 026-00, provided on September 15, 2006. Below is NASA management's response to					
	each of the re	commendations set forth in the draft report. This is a consolidated response				
	which includes inputs compiled from various members of the Integrated Enterprise Management Program (IEMP) staff, including the Project Management Information					
	Improvement (PMI <sup>2</sup> ) Initiative Project Manager and the IEMP Program Director. In addition, inputs were provided and consolidated from the Office of the HQ Chief					
	Financial Off	icer (OCFO), and the Offices of the MSFC Chief Information Officer (CIO)				
	and Chief Financial Officer (OCFO).					
	Recommendations:					
	1. The NASA Chief Financial Officer should establish milestones for completing					
	the crosswalk project data from AWCS to NSM.					
	OCFO Response: Concur. The Agency has completed the AWCS project to NSM					
	project crossy	valk to the greatest extent possible. There are approximately 200, out of y 13,000, prior year project codes that do not currently have a crosswalk				
	solution due t	tion due to difficulty in aligning prior year AWCS structures to a single NSM				
	will work wit	structure. A one-to-one relationship does not exist for this subset of projects. The OCFO will work with the IEMP Competency Center and the affected Mission/Mission				
	Equivalent O	ffices to appropriately disposition these remaining structures by the end of arter FY 2007.				
	are second qu	atter <b>F 1</b> 2007.				



3 Please contact me if you have any questions or require additional information regarding this response. Enclosure eë: **Chief Engineer** Director, Management Systems Division Director, Marshall Space Flight Center Director, Marshall Space Flight Center Deputy Director, Integrated Enterprise Management Program/Competency Center Manager Deputy, Chief Financial Officer PMII Project Manager Deputy Director for Budget Chief Financial Officer Liaison AL R Representation, Marchell Space Flight Content ALR Representative, Marshall Space Flight Center







	ASIPO DELIVERAI	BLE PROCESS			
Quick Reference Guide					
See the ASIPO Qual	ty Assurance Plan for deta	lled information.			
<ol> <li>Task Order d</li> <li>NASA Proje team represer</li> <li>NASA team deliverable.</li> <li>NASA team deliverable.</li> <li>NASA team deliverable.</li> <li>Ten business completed da forwards con</li> <li>Five busines conducts a T TIM request attending pro</li> <li>Contractor re</li> <li>Three busine submitted by Formal subm TIM Date, TI</li> <li>Remaining th conducts fina Review Coor Review Team Technical Re for the TIM. Technical Re team's comm Remaining da Project Mana</li> <li>NASA notific NASA provic for another fii</li> <li>Page 19, Appear It should be noted the previous audit report similar to those in IG</li> </ol>	eveloped and awarded. t Management and Con- tatives. and Contractor team re- provides feedback on the days before deliverable durith of deliverable to NASS pleted draft to appropriate is days before deliverable cennical Interchange Mee- sent to identified represent ide comments to Team Lei- tresentative incorporates and is days before deliverable Contractor to NASA. ssion email should included d attendees, Path in MDM ee days before deliverable deliverable review using I inator distributes final deli- and the Technical Review iew Coordinator. Technic mits and submits to Busines; y of final deliverable revie er review for approval or of Contractor in writing of t es Contractor comments for al review. ix A, Review of Internal the OIG makes reference IG-06-003). Since the deliverable the offer the oIG makes reference	ractor Management ident view objectives, approact e objectives, approach. date: Contractor represent A representative. NASA team members for comment due date: Contractor ting (TIM) with NASA ( atives on Deliverable Mat ad. ditional comments identiff e due date: final delive due date: final delive due date: NASA Manage Deliverable Review Form. verable for review to the T Coordinator. attendees and those provie urns Deliverable Review I al Review Coordinator sun s Review Coordinator.	ch, outline the and outline of intative provides a representative nts. representative team members. trix. Those not led at TIM. crable formally eliverable Title, ment Team Business feehnical ding comments Form to numarizes inator and lf disapproval, ole resubmitted rsight* C made from		

(10) Page 20, Comments related to termination processes. There is no evidence in the report that the OIG performed analysis on the terminations and linked them to the roles that required training for PMI<sup>2</sup>. It's not clear that the Revised termination issue noted by the OIG was a contributing factor in the training statistics. This issue adds little value to the report and it is recommended that it be removed from the report since termination and access processes are reviewed and included in the annual financial (FISCAM) audit report.

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Major Contributors to the Report: Catherine Schneiter, Financial and Institutional Management Director Karl Allen, Project Manager Daniel Birnbaum, Auditor

NOVEMBER 20, 2006

REPORT NO. IG-07-002



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