[Senate Hearing 111-494]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-494
OPTIONS FROM THE REVIEW OF U.S. HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT PLANS COMMITTEE
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND SPACE
of the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 16, 2009
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
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54-289 WASHINGTON : 2009
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas,
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts Ranking
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
BILL NELSON, Florida JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas GEORGE S. LeMIEUX, Florida
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
TOM UDALL, New Mexico SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
MARK WARNER, Virginia MIKE JOHANNS, Nebraska
MARK BEGICH, Alaska
Ellen L. Doneski, Staff Director
James Reid, Deputy Staff Director
Bruce H. Andrews, General Counsel
Ann Begeman, Acting Republican Staff Director
Brian M. Hendricks, Republican Chief Counsel
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND SPACE
BILL NELSON, Florida, Chairman DAVID VITTER, Louisiana, Ranking
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
TOM UDALL, New Mexico MIKE JOHANNS, Nebraska
MARK WARNER, Virginia
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on September 16, 2009............................... 1
Statement of Senator Nelson...................................... 1
Statement of Senator Hutchison................................... 1
Prepared statement........................................... 2
Statement of Senator Vitter...................................... 4
Witnesses
Norman R. Augustine, Retired Chairman and CEO, Lockheed Martin
Corporation and Chair, Review of U.S. Human Spaceflight Plans
Committee...................................................... 5
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Appendix
Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV, U.S. Senator from West Virginia,
prepared statement............................................. 31
Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Tom Udall to
Norman R. Augustine............................................ 31
OPTIONS FROM THE REVIEW OF U.S. HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT PLANS COMMITTEE
----------
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 16, 2009
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Science and Space,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:33 p.m. in
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Bill Nelson,
Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator Nelson. Good afternoon.
This is an exceptionally important topic, and I think that
buzzer might tell us that a vote is starting.
[Laughter.]
Senator Nelson. No, it is not. It is a quorum call.
Hallelujah.
We really want to peel back the onion and get into a lot of
the specifics of the extraordinary work that you have done, Mr.
Augustine. And thank you for the public service that you have
rendered to this country over a lifetime that you have in
Government and in the private sector, and then thank you for
this unpaid service, enormous public service that you have
rendered.
And we are looking forward to hearing from you, and I want
to thank the Ranking Member of the full Committee, Senator
Hutchison, for coming, and I want to turn to her for her
opening comments.
STATEMENT OF HON. KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS
Senator Hutchison. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Augustine, you have come through for our country one
more time. The Rising Above the Gathering Storm report has been
really the Bible for those of us who want to promote science
education, math, engineers to graduate from our colleges, and
we thank you for that.
And now, you have done a great study about the future of
NASA and space exploration. And I just want to commend you.
It was our Committee--it was Senator Nelson and myself--who
had the United States' part of the Space Station designated as
a national laboratory in the 2005 NASA Bill. And we did that
because we saw so many NASA research funding shortages, and we
knew that if we had it designated in that way that others could
come in and do research--universities, Federal agencies,
corporations--in the future. And in fact, that is beginning to
happen.
We are just on the cusp now of realizing the capabilities
of this enormous investment that we have been making in the
International Space Station. We are just beginning to realize
it, and yet now we are talking about shutting down the Shuttles
and not being able to fully equip and utilize the Space
Station. And I commend you for the report that says we must
utilize it in order to have the investment pay off that we have
made in this International Space Station.
But you also pointed out that without at least $3 billion,
which was the suggestion of your committee, that without that
increase, that we are facing some great shortages not only in
being able to use the Space Station correctly and allowing it
to reach its full potential, but also the gap in our ability to
put humans in space, not only for the Space Station, but also
for our national security. That gap will definitely happen
unless we are able to put the money in that will allow us to do
one of the options that you suggest.
I think I can speak for myself and say that I am hoping
that we will be able to extend the Shuttle to narrow that gap.
But I thank you for the great effort that you have put in, and
I will want to ask you questions.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing, and
also, Mr. Chairman, for your complete commitment to NASA and
space exploration. Without your commitment and the vigor that
you have shown, I think sometimes maybe Congress would have
lagged behind in making sure that we are doing what we need to
do to stay in the forefront of utilizing space.
So I thank you for calling the hearing. I thank you, Mr.
Augustine, for leading the panel. And I will look forward to
questions.
[The prepared statement of Senator Hutchison follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison, U.S. Senator from
Texas
Thank you Mr. Chairman. Mr. Augustine, you have come through for
our country one more time. The Rising above the Gathering Storm report
has been important for those of us who want to promote science
education, math, engineers to graduate from our colleges and we thank
you for that.
And now, you have done a great study about the future of NASA and
space exploration, and I just want to commend you. Know that it was our
Committee, Sen. Nelson and myself, who had the American Space Station
designated as a national laboratory.
And we did that because we saw so many funding shortages and we
knew that if we had it designated in that way, others could come in and
do research; universities, Federal agencies, and corporations in the
future. In fact, that's beginning to happen now.
We are just on the cusp of realizing the capabilities of this
enormous investment that we have been making in the International Space
Station.
Yet, now we're talking about shutting down the Shuttles and not
being able to fully equip and utilize and use the Space Station and I
commend you for the report that says we must utilize it in order to
have the investment pay off that was made in this International Space
Station.
But your report also pointed out that without $3 billion, we will
be facing some shortages, not only in being able to use the Space
Station correctly and allowing it to reach its full potential, but also
the gap in our ability to put humans in space for the Space Station.
This will also affect our national security unless we are able to
put the money in and do one of the options you suggest. I hope we will
be able to send a Shuttle to narrow that gap, but I thank you for the
great effort that you have put in.
I thank you Mr. Chairman for holding this hearing and also Mr.
Chairman, for your complete commitment to NASA and space exploration.
Without your commitment and the vigor you have shown, Congress would
have lagged behind in making sure that we are taking the right steps to
stay in the forefront of utilizing space.
So, I thank you for calling the hearing and I thank you Mr.
Augustine for leading the panel and I will look forward to questions.
Senator Nelson. As you give us this report, Mr. Augustine,
I think it is going to become increasingly apparent that the
moment of truth for the future of NASA's human spaceflight is
here. As you and others will point out, there is only one
person that can lead America's human spaceflight program, and
that is the President.
The work that your panel has done is in preparation for the
President making a decision. Kay would like to lead it. I would
like to lead the space program, but a Senator can't do it.
Charlie Bolden, the Administrator of NASA, can't lead it. The
human spaceflight program of this country can only be led by
the elected leader of this country because he sets the
priorities.
As a result of what you have said, if he is going to be
wanting to increase and continue human adventure into the
cosmos, he is going to have to pony up more money in his Office
of Management and Budget. It has been stated from this dais
over and over in the last decade that NASA was not getting
enough money to do everything that it was asked to do. That is
obvious now that we are about to complete the Space Station and
shut down the Space Shuttle, and we don't have the next rocket
ready.
If we are going to have a program, it is going to have to
be the President who is going to have to put the juice to the
program.
Second, is that the President is going to have to
articulate to the country the vision of why it is important for
us to go beyond low-Earth orbit, a subject that your panel has
broached, but only the President can articulate. A majority of
Americans don't even remember when we landed on the Moon and
what an extraordinary accomplishment that was. So, why do we
want to venture out?
Only the President can articulate as we move from here,
severely underfunded NASA that is way behind the timeline and
doesn't have another rocket ready as a follow-on to the Space
Shuttle, to whatever that vision is that the President wants us
to go on beyond low-Earth orbit. He is going to have to say how
we take care of the workforce, this extraordinary workforce
that is so talented and has so much historical memory and are
not all ready to retire.
The President is going to have to set priorities of how do
we not only keep some of them in work and able to get to the
vision that I hope the President will articulate, but providing
the means on a daily basis.
I would hope that when the President lays that vision out,
that he is going to tell what NASA has done in 50 years. Not
only the extraordinary feats in outer space, but what has
happened here on Earth as a result of America's space program.
The technologies that have been developed in health and
medicine and transportation and public safety have made the
lifestyles that we live better. Advances in our home, at the
office, and in the environment are results of NASA spinoffs and
microminiaturization. That is not even to speak of what NASA
has done for computer technology and industrial productivity.
You can say it until you are blue in the face. I can say
it. Administrator Bolden can say it, but the American people
are going to listen only to the President.
What you have laid out is a blueprint, a menu for the
President to make choices, and it is my fervent hope that he is
going to say we are going to put the juice into it. We are
going to have a vision that we are going beyond low-Earth
orbit, and in the process, we are going to nourish that
workforce so that we have them ready when we do the next huge
leap for mankind.
Senator Vitter?
STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID VITTER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM LOUISIANA
Senator Vitter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for convening this
really important hearing and thanks to you, Mr. Augustine, for
all of your work and the work of your committee. It is very,
very important. You have undertaken a big challenge, and we
appreciate all of your service and those of your committee
members.
I look forward to reviewing the full final report when it
is available, but I appreciate the summary and your testimony
today. And as you can tell, we thought it was important to
start this discussion in earnest sooner rather than later. So
that is what today is about, and I appreciate your being here.
You have made it really clear and underscored what so many
of us and others have been saying that the funding profile for
the exploration program has been inadequate, and it would be
virtually impossible to sustain under the flat line out-year
funding profile that was included with the original 2010
request. And I think that is one key point that all of us want
to underscore and amplify.
Our other challenge, of course, is to clearly define what
the Nation's human space exploration policy should be, what
programs and tools we need to implement it, and exactly what
financial resources are required to make it all work.
Another of the key messages of your committee, I believe,
is that if we intend to have a viable human space exploration
program in this country, we are going to need to step up to the
plate and provide funds necessary to make it work, and that is
a big part of the discussion.
And that is important because I believe one of the key
elements of our decisions must be having a path forward that
makes it possible to retain our highly skilled workforce and
not lose so much of that human capital and to sustain more
broadly our aerospace industrial capacity. A lot of that is
human, but it has other elements as well.
So I look forward to exploring all those key issues with
you, and thank you again for your work.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Augustine, as we discussed earlier,
your written testimony will be submitted in the record, and you
are going to share for us in a brief way some of your comments
so we can get right into the questions.
I just want to say for our audience that Mr. Augustine has
quite a pedigree. He has been a research engineer. He has been
a program manager. He served in Government in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, Assistant Director of Defense Research
and Engineering. He was Assistant Secretary of the Army, became
Acting Secretary of the Army, and then he has served in
academia on the faculty of Princeton.
Obviously, everybody knows him as a former CEO, and a
member of every advisory committee in the world. So, Mr.
Augustine, with that pedigree, indeed, we are honored that you
are here.
STATEMENT OF NORMAN R. AUGUSTINE, RETIRED CHAIRMAN
AND CEO, LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION AND CHAIR, REVIEW OF U.S.
HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT PLANS COMMITTEE
Mr. Augustine. Well, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Senator Hutchison, Senator Vitter, and the Members of the
Committee, I appreciate this chance to appear on behalf of my
colleagues on our committee and describe to you some of our
results, and I will submit for the record my prepared statement
and briefly summarize it now.
You provided the proper opening, and that is that the human
spaceflight program in America is at a tipping point right now.
Probably more so than at any time since President Kennedy took
the leadership to say that we should have such a program.
Before I begin, with your permission, I would like to
acknowledge the enormous effort and dedication of the members
of the Committee with whom I had the privilege of serving. I
have rarely worked with a group who put in the hours and the
effort that this group has.
I also would like to take note of the fact that the support
we received from NASA was extraordinary--extremely competent
people, very open and candid, very hard working, and very
responsive.
Further, we had hired as a committee The Aerospace
Corporation to work for us as a committee independently to
provide us with a separate view of programmatic issues,
technical issues, cost issues, schedule, so on. And they, too,
have been all we could have hoped.
As you know, our committee consisted of 10 members. It was
broadly constituted. It included scientists, engineers,
educators, former business executives, astronauts, former Air
Force general officers, former Presidential appointees, and so
on--all with background in space.
We were given only 90 days for our effort. The reason, of
course, being to try to match it to the budget cycle. That was
not a great deal of time to address such a difficult issue. On
the other hand, our members didn't start from zero. We did have
some background. But I call that to your attention because as a
caveat, there are limitations on what we were able to do, and
the Committee should have that in mind as you review our work.
Our committee, and I need to really emphasize this, was
asked to provide options, not to make a recommendation. That is
very important because we tried to abide by that and to be very
balanced in our assessment of the options. We have not endorsed
any particular option.
We have said that it seems clear to us that the ultimate
destination for the next major step in America's human
spaceflight program is a human landing on Mars. We have
concluded, reluctantly and with some disappointment, that, in
our judgment, it would not be safe to attempt such a mission at
this point in time.
In other words, we have concluded that the direct to Mars
mission is not something that our Nation ought to undertake for
safety reasons, let alone the financial impact that that would
have.
The various parameters we looked at made it possible to
define over 3,000 options that we could have offered to you. We
tried to narrow that down, for obvious reasons, and have
narrowed it to specifically five families, and I say
``families'' because it is possible to move an item from one
family to another and to adjust the results if people want to
do that. But they are representative families.
One member of that family is the existing program as it is
being pursued today by the Nation through NASA. Let me define
for you what we consider to be the existing program. It is the
program that is the basic NASA plan that NASA has provided, and
it is the budget that we were given by the Office of Management
and Budget.
I won't describe to you the other four integrated options.
You have them available, I am sure, and I will be pleased to
address them at any time you would like. But to save time now,
I won't do that.
Our committee, the bottom-line conclusion at which we
arrived--a disappointing one, frankly--is that pursuing that
existing program is really not executable and will not lead to
a satisfactory outcome for America's human spaceflight program.
The reason for that is the mismatch of goals and funds. There
is more work to do than there is support to carry out that
work. That is always dangerous, but it is particularly in
hazardous undertakings like human spaceflight.
If we were to continue on the path of the existing program,
which is one option--certainly, we could do that--let me cite
what a few of the outcomes would be. The first is that we would
have to launch six Shuttles in the next 12 months. One can
question whether that would be a safe thing to have to do.
Second, that there will be no funds to enhance the existing
technology program to provide the basis for a successful
program in exploration later. In addition, there will be no
substantial funds to make use of the Space Station during the
next five years that it would be in orbit.
Third, we would have to de-orbit the Space Station in
little over five years from now, after having spent over two
decades building the Space Station and putting some 900,000
pounds into orbit. We would complete the development of Ares
and Ares I, in the Committee's judgment, 2 years after the
Space Station had been splashed into the Pacific Ocean. Of
course, one of the main reasons for Ares I was to support the
Space Station.
The heavy-lift launch capability, which is the thing this
Nation really needs to get on into space, would be delayed
until the mid to late 2020's because of the lack of funds. When
we finally got the heavy-lift capability, based on an Ares V or
whatever, there would be no upper stage to put on it, nor any
lunar surface systems to use it. So, we are looking at the mid
2030's in this case before we would be able to do any real
exploration, in our judgment.
That basically is the path that we are on. Our committee
has offered other options that could give us a very exciting
program, a program that lets us, for example, circumnavigate
the Moon again, circumnavigate Mars, land on one of the moons
of Mars, to dock with an asteroid, a visit to a Lagrange point,
with a large number of events over the next 15 years.
The problem with all the other programs that we have
offered, the only programs that we have been able to find that
we think are viable is that they require, roughly speaking, an
additional $3 billion per year to carry them out. And absent
that additional funding, I am afraid our Nation is in a
position where human spaceflight substantially goes on hold.
We can develop launch vehicles. Yes, we can do that. We can
do a little technology. But there will be no really significant
human spaceflight work, and the International Space Station
(ISS), will come to an end five years from now.
I would like to close with just three observations. One is
that we have intentionally been relatively conservative in our
estimates of cost, schedule, and performance. We do that,
frankly, to reflect our dissatisfaction with our record as a
profession in that area in the past.
Second, we believe that not only are we in a current
situation where ends don't match means or means don't match
ends, but we believe NASA has been in that position for
decades, and it is time that we take NASA out of that position.
NASA is a national asset, and it is unfair to the people at
NASA and, we believe, to the American citizens to continue in
that circumstance. If we have to change the objectives to fit
the means, so be it.
And then, last, that as this Committee would know so well
and, Mr. Chairman, you would, human spaceflight inherently
involves risk. We should do all those things we can possibly
think of to make human spaceflight safe. And indeed, we have
tried to propose those things. But at the end of the day, there
still remains nontrivial safety risk, and any nation that hopes
to be a space-faring nation has to face up to that situation.
And finally, I would conclude by thanking the
Administration and you for the trust that you have put in my
colleagues and myself to address an issue that affects what
really is one of the great examples of America's leadership.
And with that, Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to address
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Augustine follows:]
Prepared Statement of Norman R. Augustine, Retired Chairman and CEO,
Lockheed Martin Corporation and Chair, Review of U.S. Human Spaceflight
Plans Committee
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for this
opportunity to share with you the principal findings of the Review of
the U.S. Human Spaceflight Plans Committee. I will speak on behalf of
the members of our Committee and will do my best to reflect our
consensus views. As you are aware, our final report has not yet been
published; however, our decision-making deliberations were all
conducted in public under FACA rules so I believe what I have to say
will come as no surprise to anyone.
First, I would like to acknowledge the contributions and
extraordinary effort of each of my colleagues on the Committee. Their
names and primary affiliations are appended to this statement. I would
also like to acknowledge the forthright, responsive and highly
professional support we received from NASA as well as from the
Aerospace Corporation, the latter of which the Committee employed to
provide independent technical and cost assessments.
The Committee was comprised of ten members having highly diverse
backgrounds. It included astronauts, scientists, engineers, former
Presidential appointees, business executives, educators and an Air
Force retired General Officer--each with considerable space experience.
Due to the exigencies of the budget process we were asked to complete
our task in ninety days--which we did, with the exception of finalizing
and printing our report. The latter will be available soon.
Our assigned task was to identify alternative courses that the U.S.
might pursue in the area of human spaceflight. One such alternative, of
course, is to continue the present program. As noted in the Committee's
report, changes to ongoing programs are generally warranted only for
compelling reasons. Each alternative identified by the Committee is
accompanied by a discussion of its strengths and weaknesses.
It was agreed that at least two of the alternatives would be
compatible with the FY '10 budget plan extended through FY '20. We were
also asked to examine the current plans for the Space Shuttle and
International Space Station and, if appropriate offer alternatives
thereto. It is important to note that we specifically were not asked to
make a recommendation as to a future course of action. That decision
is, of course, the purview of the President and the Congress.
Before addressing destinations and architectures the Committee
sought to identify appropriate goals for human spaceflight. There are
many possibilities that can be cited: strengthening the economy,
conducting science, repairing and upgrading spacecraft on orbit,
promoting international ties, protecting against asteroids and comets,
encouraging science education, and more. It is, however, the
Committee's view that although each of these benefits is important in
its own right, none can, by itself, justify the cost and risk of human
spaceflight. Rather, the raison d'etre for such activity must, and in
our view can, be founded upon charting a course for the expansion of
civilization into the solar system. In so doing, one derives the
leadership benefits of being among the world's space-faring nations--a
nation that is committed to exploration, seeking knowledge, advancing
engineering capabilities, inspiring its citizens, and motivating its
young people to consider careers in science and engineering. To a not
inconsiderable degree it is intangibles that justify the human
spaceflight program, intangibles such as those that today help maintain
America as a leader among the world's nations. The Apollo Program is an
appropriate example.
In carrying out the charge to identify options the Committee
narrowed over 3,000 theoretically possible outcomes to a set of five
alternative integrated space programs. These can be thought of as
representative families, since one can interchange certain elements
among the individual alternatives. The Committee's attempt was, of
course, to keep the number of nominal options to a manageable size.
The alternatives offered include the ongoing program,
Constellation--that is, the Program of Record and the Budget of
Record--and four primary alternatives, some having derivatives or
``sub-cases.''
Two of the five alternatives were in fact constrained to the
current budget profile for human spaceflight. The first of these was
the Program of Record; that is, today's program, modified to fly-out
the Shuttle in 2011 rather than 2010 and including sufficient funds to
de-orbit the International Space Station (ISS) in 2016 according to
plan. Under this existing approach the Ares I launch vehicle and Orion
capsule are unlikely to become available until after the ISS has been
de-orbited. The heavy-lift vehicle, Ares V, would, in our judgment,
become available in the late 2020s; however, there are inadequate funds
to develop the exploration systems the Ares V is intended to support.
The Committee concludes that this is not an executable option due to
the incompatibility of the budget plan and the program plan.
The Committee's review noted that the Constellation Program has
encountered technical difficulties of the type not unexpected of
undertakings of this magnitude--problems which, given adequate funds
and engineering attention, should be solvable. This was not, however, a
significant factor in the overall conclusion with respect to the
viability of the Program of Record.
The second of the options, also constrained to the current budget
profile, flies-out the Shuttle in FY '11, but extends the use of the
International Space Station for 5 years, to 2020. This option includes
a robust technology development program--something the Committee
believes has been lacking at NASA in recent years--and relies on
commercial firms to launch cargo and crews to the ISS as soon as
demonstrated capabilities exist. It includes development of a somewhat
less capable version of the Ares V, known as the Ares V (Lite). This
option is deemed capable of execution but cannot provide the space-
borne hardware required to support a viable exploration program. In
fact, the Committee could find no program within the current budget
profile that would enable a viable exploration effort.
Given these findings, the Committee examined three options that
exceeded the present budget plan. The most defensible funding profile,
purely from a program execution standpoint, is one that linearly
increases to $3B above the FY '10 guidance by FY '14 and then increases
by an estimated annual inflation rate of 2.4 percent.
The first of these budgetarily less constrained options is termed
the Baseline Case. It is the present Program of Record with funds added
to extend Shuttle operations into 2011 and, as now provided in the
budget plan, to de-orbit the ISS in 2016. This program would permit a
human return to the moon in the mid '20s and begin laying the
groundwork for a flight to Mars.
The second of the budgetarily less constrained cases is actually a
family of variants that would extend ISS operations to 2020, provide
funds for its de-orbit, and fund a strong technology program in support
of ISS utilization and an eventual human landing on Mars. It would use
commercial launch services for new access to low-earth orbit. There
are, however, significant differences between the two variants under
this option. The first of these variants would develop the Ares V
(Lite) to support a human lunar landing in the mid 2020s--after which
focus would turn to a human Mars landing. The second variant would
extend the use of the (recertified) Space Shuttle to 2015 and be
accompanied by the development of a Shuttle Directly-Derived heavy-lift
vehicle in place of the Ares family--with the eventual possibility of
in-orbit refueling. This is the only practicable option the Committee
could find to close the at least five-year gap during which the U.S.
will, as currently planned, rely upon Russian launch services to lift
U.S. astronauts to the International Space Station.
The third budgetarily less constrained case follows a rather
different path of exploration from that heretofore pursued by the U.S.
The Committee terms this option the ``Flexible Path'' and defines it as
achieving periodic milestones prior to a Moon or Mars landing. These
initial accomplishments could include a lunar fly-by, a Mars fly-by, a
visit to a Lagrange point, an asteroid rendezvous, and possible
landings on the moons of Mars, Phobos and Demos.
In summary, with the existing budget plan it would be reasonable to
extend the use of the ISS for 5 years and to conduct a robust
technology development program. The Committee concludes that no
rational exploratory program can be funded under the existing funding
constraint and that plans for America's space exploration program would
de facto be halted and human operations limited to low earth orbit.
With the less constrained budget option, requiring approximately
$3B per year in additional funding, a sound exploration program could
be conducted. The reason for this seemingly ``dead space'' between the
two budget options is, simplistically stated, that for sixty percent of
the needed funds, one cannot go sixty percent of the way to Mars.
Each of the implementable options that was identified has its own
set of benefits and liabilities that the Committee has sought to
address. The findings of this effort are discussed in the Summary
Report. The assessment gives overarching priority to safety and, as is
noted in the Summary Report, the Committee believes considerable
caution is in order when comparing analytical results in this area with
flight results. Similarly, the Committee has sought to be conservative
in its cost estimation practices--reflecting dissatisfaction with
historical experience on a broad spectrum of programs. Finally, in
defining a ``Program of Record'' the Committee has relied upon NASA's
current program plan and the President's budget profile, the latter as
provided by the Office of Management and Budget.
In the opinion of this Committee, as well as that of most of the
persons with whom the Committee has had contact, NASA has for too long
sought to operate in an environment where means do not match ends. In
the unforgiving arena of human spaceflight this is a particularly
hazardous policy to embrace.
The Committee also notes that NASA has become a mature
organization, an organization long protected from restructuring
Centers, facilities and personnel cadres. The consequence is an
organization with high fixed costs of the type that make budgetary
options highly limited. While NASA is unarguably the finest space
organization in the world and a great national asset, it is overdue for
a thorough management assessment of the type the aerospace industry
underwent at the end of the cold war.
The Committee's report will contain more detailed information that
it hopes will prove of value. On behalf of my colleagues, I thank you
for the trust that has been placed in us to review a pursuit which for
decades has come to be a symbol of America's leadership.
______
U.S. Human Spaceflight Plans Committee Members
Mr. Norman R. Augustine
Retired Chairman and CEO
Lockheed Martin Corporation
Dr. Wanda M. Austin
President and Chief Executive Officer
The Aerospace Corporation
Mr. Bohdan I. Bejmuk
Chair, NASA Constellation Standing Review Board
Dr. Leroy Chiao
Former Astronaut, Former International Space Station Commander and
Engineering Consultant
Dr. Christopher F. Chyba
Professor of Astrophysics Sciences and International Affairs
Princeton University
Dr. Edward F. Crawley
Ford Professor of Engineering
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Mr. Jeffrey K. Greason
Co-founder and Chief Executive Officer
XCOR Aerospace
Dr. Charles F. Kennel
Director and Professor Emeritus
Scripps Institution of Oceanography
University of California, San Diego
General Lester Lyles
United States Air Force (Retired)
Dr. Sally Ride
President and Chief Executive Officer
Imaginary Lines
Senator Nelson. And since we have a vote and have 5\1/2\
minutes left, we will recess the Committee. We will come right
back and get into the questions.
Thank you. The Committee is recessed.
[Recessed.]
Senator Nelson. The Committee will resume. Please excuse
the interruption, but we were able to get two votes done on the
floor.
Let me turn to Senator Vitter.
Senator Vitter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Augustine, upon finding it impossible to identify a
viable program with the out-year budget that we have now, your
committee suggested an annual increase of roughly $3 billion in
NASA's top line, adjusted by inflation in future years at 2.4
percent. Can you give us a general sense of how you all arrived
at those numbers?
Mr. Augustine. Senator, I would be happy to do that. We,
first of all, analyzed the budget that we were given by OMB,
which is today's baseline, of course. We then ran excursions.
The first excursion we ran was one that built up from
today's budget to a $3 billion add-on by 2014 and then goes up
to 2.4 percent. We ran an excursion of $1.5 billion and found
that it really made little difference as compared with the
baseline case. We ran an excursion at $4 billion, and it gives
you somewhat more latitude--more financial conservatism, if you
will--than the $3 billion case but doesn't let you do anything
significantly new. So from the various cases we ran, the $3
billion run-out at the 2.4 percent inflation rate seemed to
give us a very sound program.
Senator Vitter. OK. One of the consistent points that has
been made up to now about the retirement of the Shuttle is
basically that you take those funds and shift them over to next
generation of vehicle development. And that has really always
seemed to be the rationale for the whole idea of a clear
retirement date for the Shuttle.
Your committee seemed to arrive at a very different
conclusion in terms of the actual amount of financial wedge
that would bring about. Can you describe the difference--this
very different conclusion, and how you reached that very
different conclusion?
Mr. Augustine. Yes, of course. First of all, our committee
believes that we need to fund enough in 2011 to continue
Shuttle launches through the first six months so that we don't
have this compression of launches and pressure that tends to
buildup, sometimes called ``launch fever'' in the vernacular.
The Committee--let us see. I lost my train of thought.
Again, the question?
Senator Vitter. Explain the very different conclusion that
you all reached versus the mindset of stopping the Shuttle by a
more or less date certain and then being able to shift that
money to next generation.
Mr. Augustine. Right. The common thinking up until now has
been that stopping the Shuttle would free a substantial sum of
money that, as you say, would let you do exploration in the
future. But there are some offsets that one has to consider
that I think probably haven't been considered adequately in the
past.
One of those offsets is that if you were to continue the
Shuttle operation, you would not presumably have to pay for the
rides on the Russian launch vehicle. So, there is an offsetting
saving.
In addition, as one looks at the costs of operating NASA,
much of the overhead today gets billed to the Space Shuttle
program just because the way the books are accounted for at
NASA. So, if the Space Shuttle program stops, unless you make a
major cut in NASA's overhead, and by overhead, I should say
fixed costs rather than overhead. Unless you make a major cut
in the fixed costs at NASA, then you have a situation where
those costs have to be transferred somewhere, and the likely
place for them to be transferred would be to the Constellation
program, and so there is not really a saving. There is just a
bookkeeping shift.
And when you go through these various nets and a few more
minor things, it looks like the savings by shutting down the
Shuttle fairly hard stop is on the order of $2.5 billion a
year, which is significantly less than some of the numbers that
others quote.
Senator Vitter. OK. I think I understand your reasons for
saying that as of now, we shouldn't plan on going to Mars in
the way that has been described. We can't do it safely in that
way based on our knowledge now.
My concern is that the way that will be interpreted is to
basically take Mars off the table and, in doing so, suck most
of the oxygen out of the room in terms of general interest in
manned spaceflight. And to the average guy on the street, we
are going to spend all this money redoing what we have already
done. What is the point in that?
Do you have a reaction to that concern about the public
discussion and how that would be interpreted, or the sort of
overarching political reaction to it?
Mr. Augustine. We very much shared that exact same concern
and discussed it at some length. The report, when it is
released, I think you will find puts a great deal of emphasis
on the fact that Mars is to be the destination that we are
aiming at and that there is some homework that has to be done
on the way to Mars. And that homework includes such things as
effects of long-term zero Gs on humans that then go into a less
than one-G environment, the effects of galactic cosmic rays on
humans, information you can't get from the Space Station,
various operational things that one might need to do to go to
Mars. So, our message has been to make very clear that Mars is
still the goal, but we are just not ready to go directly there
today. But we do intend to get there.
Senator Vitter. Well, I would really underscore that
concern. And again, I am not arguing with either your analysis
or what you intend to communicate. I am arguing about how it
may come across.
Let me go at the same issue another way. What, short of
Mars, in this list of possibilities, is there that is new and
different and that can really excite a lot of people that we
haven't done before?
Mr. Augustine. To the point of your question, we defined a
``Flexible Path'' option. If you happen to be following in our
report, it is, Option 5. A concern we had, even if you were to
set out for Mars today, you have about a 15-, 20-year period
during which we don't get to Mars. How do you hold the public's
interest when you say send money and in 20 years, we will put a
flag on Mars?
So we tried to define a program called this ``Flexible
Path'' program that has intermediate milestones where, as you
go along, you could have things that not only engineers could
point to, but the average citizen would look at and say was
significant. We think those intermediate milestones would
include, the most straightforward of which is circumnavigating
the Moon. Another, is possibly landing on the Moon, although we
don't think that is mandatory.
Another, would be to circumnavigate Mars, with humans I am
talking about. Another, that is of interest would be to dock
with an asteroid and not only for the scientific interest, but
to begin to learn how you conduct operations like that. And
should some day we find a large asteroid flying in the
direction of the Earth, it would be nice to know how to dock
with it, what they are made of, and so on, what role humans
might play.
Then there is a possibility of landing on a Mars moon,
Phobos or Deimos, with the notion that not only would that be
an interesting place to land from a scientific standpoint, it
is also interesting in terms of helping conduct robotic
exploration of Mars. The presumption our committee has is that
well before we go to Mars with humans, we would send additional
explorers there.
But, it is relatively difficult to operate a robot on Mars,
in part because of the transit time for communications. Even at
the speed of light, you are talking about tens of minutes to
get a signal out and get a signal back, depending where you are
in the orbit. With that, it is very hard to operate a rover or
something on Mars.
The notion has been put out that if you had astronauts on
one of the moons, where the transit time to the surface of Mars
is very small, that the astronauts on the moons could operate
explorers on the planet and learn a great deal before you
committed a human to landing on the planet Mars. This is a much
easier task probably because if you think of it, the scientists
talk about space as having gravity wells in it that once you
get into one of those wells, it takes a lot of energy to get
out of it. You are probably familiar with this. The Earth is a
very deep gravity well. Mars is a deep gravity well. The moons
of Mars are quite shallow. It offers a nice promising approach.
Another place that is of interest, is what are called
Lagrangian points that are points in space when you have two
large bodies and a small body, or three bodies, where that
point, if you put a spacecraft there, it will essentially
remain fixed in that relative position to the two large
objects--in this case, the Moon and the Earth.
Some of those points are stable in the sense that if you
put a spacecraft there, it will stay there. Others, it will
very slowly try to drift away, and you have to push it back.
Those points are interesting to put telescopes. They are
interesting for refueling stations, filling stations in space,
and we could fly to one of those.
So it is our belief there are a lot of exciting things that
one could do along the way.
Senator Vitter. OK. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I have several other questions, but let me
defer to someone else for now.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Augustine, right out of the box, the
President is going to have to answer the question whether or
not the cost of human space exploration is worth it. So I
think, as I said at your opening hearing in Washington months
ago, that the report of your committee is going to be very
decisive in influencing the White House.
Why don't you just state for the record what your committee
feels about the cost of human exploration being worth it?
Mr. Augustine. It is a question that we obviously addressed
and one that I wish I could provide an answer better than I am
able to. The reason I say that is our committee wasn't in a
position to compare--it is a question that says where would you
spend that money? There are other places you could spend it.
We don't have background in healthcare. We don't have
background in many of the other things that you face. So, I
will try to answer the question, with that caveat, that really
it is only the President, and perhaps yourselves, who can make
that judgment.
We think that the argument about human spaceflight being
worthwhile because, for example, of the science it gathers has
been an unfortunate argument to make because we don't think
that you can justify the human spaceflight cost based upon the
benefits it gives to science. Nor do we think you can justify
it purely on the basis of the impact on technology or the
impact of education.
All those things are important. It, indeed, has a positive
impact. But we think we have, to put it very bluntly, trapped
ourselves by trying to justify human spaceflight because of the
benefits to science or what have you.
We think the justification has to be an intangible
justification. It is a justification that says that the purpose
is to prepare a path to put human beings into the solar system
which shows America's leadership, the benefits of the American
system, the leadership of our technology.
It provides inspiration to our students, to our young
people to go into math and science. It can have the kind of an
impact that the Apollo 11 had during a time of some travail in
our country. These are intangibles, but we think they are not
unimportant. We think they are important. We don't diminish or
minimize these other benefits. They are real. They are there.
But they, by themselves, probably don't justify a human
spaceflight program.
The question--and I will stop in a moment here, Mr.
Chairman. The question, of course, arises perhaps should you
spend money on human spaceflight or on cancer research? I would
argue that that is an unfair question. We live in a nation
where we spent $7 billion gambling on the Super Bowl last year.
We spent $32 billion on videos and going to the movies. We
spent I think it is $65 billion on illegal drugs. It is clear
to me that this Nation could afford--I am speaking for myself
now--it is clear to me that this Nation could afford a strong
human spaceflight program. It is simply a question of priority.
Senator Nelson. As your committee discussed these
intangible benefits, no doubt you noted also some of the
tangible benefits. What do you think they are, as we continue
to push forward?
Mr. Augustine. Let me take the International Space Station
as an example, if I may? We spent over two decades constructing
the ISS, and we now are talking about using it for only 5
years. During those 5 years, we don't have much money available
to pay for the science that would produce these tangible
benefits.
There at one point was a large number of scientists who
wanted to conduct science on the Station. They have somewhat
dwindled away because of the slips in the program and the lack
of funds. Given funds, there is significant microgravity work
to be done. There is significant biosciences work to be done.
We have done some amazing things in terms of technical
operations. Extravehicular activity has become--I am not going
to use the word almost routine, but certainly more common. We
know how to do that. We know how to dock routinely, and there
are benefits like that.
In addition, there are always the spinoffs that one gets
where you develop technologies for the Space Station or for
other things in space that impact commercial products.
Senator Nelson. Senator Hutchison?
Senator Hutchison. Yes. If I understand correctly, and you
correct me if I am wrong, yesterday in the House, you indicated
that, if adequately funded, the Constellation program currently
underway is a good program and coupled with the Shuttle flight
continuation until a replacement human-rated capability is
developed, either through Ares or commercial vendor, that the
gap in human spaceflight could be closed and the International
Space Station support and utilization could be ensured.
Is that your view? And is, in your view, the $3 billion,
with the cost of living or 2.4 percent increases per year,
adequate for that kind of approach?
Mr. Augustine. Yes, let me try to be clear. It would not be
our view that you could conduct that kind of a program with the
existing budget. It would be our view that with the $3 billion
inflated profile that you, indeed, could conduct such a
program. As you know, there are no funds to take the ISS in the
current program beyond 2010. Excuse me, 2015. The Shuttle,
2010.
Senator Hutchison. And is it also your view that the
Constellation program, together with an extension of the
Shuttle flight program, would be a good approach to closing the
gap and utilizing the Space Station?
Mr. Augustine. We looked at a lot of options to try to
close the gap, and it is our view that the gap is likely to be
more like 7 years instead of the 5 years that people have
talked about. The only option we could find, viable option to
close that gap is to continue to operate the Space Shuttle.
To do that, one, of course, has to commit funds to the
Shuttle that otherwise could be spent preparing for the
exploration program. And one would certainly have to recertify
the Shuttle to be sure that safety issues were taken care of.
But the answer to the question is not only is the Shuttle a way
to close the gap, it is probably the only way to close the gap.
Senator Hutchison. So you think that option is an
acceptable--I know you didn't pick a recommendation, but that
that would be an acceptable option?
Mr. Augustine. It is a viable option, yes.
Senator Hutchison. Yes. And then on the safety issue, do
you believe that the Columbia accident investigation
recertification standards are adequate, and if those were
continued to be met that that would--you could never ensure
safety because you never know all the factors--would it give us
a solid safety assurance for continuation of the Shuttle--for
as much as you can ensure that?
Mr. Augustine. Yes. I appreciate your qualifying that. One
of the frustrating things to an engineer like myself is that 90
percent of the reliability failures that we encounter, and I
separate that from safety, but 90 percent of them come from
causes that aren't even in our models. They are a human error.
They are a design flaw.
With that caveat, it is our belief that were NASA to
complete those requalification steps that we could continue
with reasonable safety. We base that partly--of course, one of
our members, Dr. Sally Ride, was a member of the Columbia and
also the Challenger failure evaluations. But it is our belief
that that could be done.
Senator Hutchison. OK. On the issue of the commercial
development, I have been certainly a supporter of the COTS, the
Commercial Orbital Transportation System. I think that is a
viable area for private investment and also for a kind of a
fallback position where we need it.
But I do want to ask you if we pursue that private
capability, but do not also have the Orion or the Ares ready to
go and we still have a potential gap in our own NASA
capabilities, do you think that exclusive reliance on the
commercial development is justifiable in the face of the need
to utilize the Space Station, or does that concern you?
Mr. Augustine. The reason we offered options that depend
heavily on commercial development are that we are trying to
free NASA's money and talent to tackle the tough problems of
going beyond Earth orbit rather than running a trucking service
to Earth orbit.
We think we are in a situation a little like the airlines
were when the Government stepped in and awarded contracts to
carry the mail. That was the thing that made the airlines
viable.
Today, NASA has and NASA is pursuing this opportunity that
you describe. It certainly bears risk. Many of the firms that
are involved have not built major launch systems. In our
evaluations, we were particularly conservative in assessing
their capabilities.
For example, some of them claim that they can have vehicles
ready within 3 years. We think it is more like 6 years. But
certainly, there is no reason that these companies can't
produce a viable capability, given the support of NASA.
Senator Hutchison. And would you be comfortable that they
could provide that service to try to fill the gap and that that
is reliable enough?
Mr. Augustine. I think the answer is yes. But fortunately,
we don't have to answer that at this moment. But there are
other alternatives available, including French launch vehicles,
continue to use the Russian launch vehicles, none of which are
attractive to me as an American, although I believe in
international programs. I believe that if you are going to have
international programs that are meaningful, we are going to
have to get used to having other nations on the critical path.
At the same time, there is no more critical path, I think,
than being able to carry astronauts to low-Earth orbit, and
that might be the one exception where I think we should have a
capability. So my answer is there is risk, nontrivial risk. But
in our mind, it is a risk worth taking.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Nelson. Following up Senator Hutchison's question
on commercial capability, you are really looking at the cargo
capability on commercial, because the next step, the question
of safety, for human capability, what did your committee come
up with on that?
Mr. Augustine. It would be our recommendation that as NASA
develops new launch vehicles, most new launch vehicles, that it
would make arrangements so that they could be human-rated at an
appropriate time. So, we think it would be wise to begin
addressing how would you human-rate those commercial vehicles?
Senator Nelson. Did your committee have a time at which you
think that they might be ready for human-rated commercial
vehicles?
Mr. Augustine. I think, Mr. Chairman, I better provide that
for the record. We did evaluate that, and I can't remember the
time. It is not within the next 6 years or so. I will provide
that for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Committee estimated that commercial crew services could begin
approximately 6-7 years after they were initiated.
Senator Nelson. Senator Vitter?
Senator Vitter. So, to directly follow up on that, is that
to say that you would agree with ASAP in their 2008 report that
it is unlikely that COTS would be done in time, human rated, to
minimize the gap?
Mr. Augustine. That is our view.
Senator Vitter. OK. Going back to the gap and extending the
Shuttle, if you extend the Shuttle at least slightly into 2011,
as you have talked about, simply to ensure that there is no
launch fever, but not beyond that, and you accept a gap versus
extending the Shuttle beyond that to close a gap, how much--let
me put it this way--how much do you sacrifice in extending the
Shuttle beyond that to close all the gap in terms of pushing
forward next-generation activity?
Mr. Augustine. I am doing this calculation mentally, but it
would probably be about $18 billion over to close the gap by
using the Shuttle would be the incremental cost.
Senator Vitter. And what does that translate into time, in
terms of otherwise using it to pull next-generation forward?
Mr. Augustine. Well, I guess the way I would characterize
that would be if it would let you go with the $3 billion
additional profile for 6 years. These are not precise numbers,
Senator Vitter. But I think the most important thing is not so
much the time it pulls forward, but when you reach these big
milestones of having new launch vehicles, you would have money
to develop things to put on top of them to go somewhere.
Senator Vitter. Wouldn't you also presumably develop the
new launch vehicles at least somewhat sooner?
Mr. Augustine. If you have used that money, you would
probably be able to accelerate the launch vehicle some, but I
don't think it would be--certainly, if you spent the money, for
example, on the Ares V, you could clearly drive forward, and I
don't know the amount, but probably significantly.
Senator Vitter. I am not asking for a yes/no answer. How
would you suggest we analyze that difference? In other words,
extend the Shuttle and close the gap versus accept a gap, try
to minimize it, but be able to use that money toward where we
are ultimately going?
Mr. Augustine. We did do that analysis, and we will provide
it. It was our conclusion that continuing the Shuttle to close
the gap is a viable option, and it is one of the options we
offered.
The rationale, benefits, and liabilities of each of the
options put forth by the Committee, including the option that
extends Shuttle operations to 2015, are provided in the
Committee's Final Report. See pages 86 and 87 specifically for
a discussion of Option 4B which extends the operations of the
Shuttle to 2015.
I am trying very hard not to make a recommendation here.
But it runs into the problem that the more money you spend in
the near term, the less you can do in the exploratory program.
The cost of continuing to operate the Shuttle is quite high.
Senator Vitter. Well, that is where I was going. So you
would certainly agree with my reaction to those figures that
that is a lot of money----
Mr. Augustine. Indeed.
Senator Vitter.--to continue the Shuttle. You know, I
represent Louisiana, which includes Michoud. I am all for the
external fuel tanks. But my concern is once you start putting
off the next generation that much, you threaten ever getting
there. You threaten really building a consensus and a reality
that people think we are ever going to get there, and so we
don't.
Do you have a reaction to that?
Mr. Augustine. Yes, I think you are coming back to the
fundamental problem of NASA's, and that is that with the budget
constraints it has had on it, it doesn't have enough money to
develop the next-generation system while it continues to
operate the current system. So, the consequence of that today
is the gap with which most of us are not particularly happy.
There will be another problem, when we complete the Ares I,
there will be another gap. What are we going to do with the
Ares I and the Orion once we get them? When we complete the
Ares V, there will be no lunar excursion module, if you will,
lunar lander, nor a surface system to use it. So this may be
just the first of three or four gaps.
Senator Vitter. And so, just to be clear, this concern of
mine in terms of this trade-off isn't solved by the extra $3
billion? I mean, that mitigates it, but that trade-off is still
there, even at the higher funding levels you are talking about.
Mr. Augustine. The programs we have that add on the $3
billion, one of them includes the Shuttle and it has the
problems we have just discussed. The other ones did not include
the extension of the Shuttle beyond mid 2011.
Senator Vitter. OK. That is all I have right now, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator Nelson. I want to ask a series of questions around
the major themes of your report. If we are going to have a
robust human space program we are going to have to commit the
resources to it. You have specifically talked about $3 billion
a year.
Your architecture is various, and engineers such as
yourself and NASA leadership are going to have to determine
that architecture. But the goal that the Committee has set is
to get out beyond low-Earth orbit, that NASA ought to be
exploring the heavens with the human space program. In the
meantime, we have got to worry about the work force.
I want to pick up on those three themes, which I think are
going to be the major themes that the President is going to
have to make his decision on. You came up with this idea of $3
billion a year. If you had additional resources, what would you
do?
Mr. Augustine. Beyond the $3 billion? The primary things
that we think need to be done in the near future are largely
covered in the $3 billion figure. If you had additional funds,
you would be able to probably move forward somewhat some of the
work on Ares I, but I think it would be a modest amount that
you could accelerate that. You could clearly move Ares V
forward or an alternative to Ares V, which would be very
important because that really is the long pole in our space
exploration tent.
Senator Nelson. Is the Ares V?
Mr. Augustine. Is a heavy-lift capability of which----
Senator Nelson. Heavy-lift capability.
Mr. Augustine.--the Ares V is a good example.
Senator Nelson. So you have come up with the idea, a
consensus that you feel like the $3 billion is enough in order
to support a robust human spaceflight program in the near term
without having to shortchange other missions in science and
aeronautics?
Mr. Augustine. We believe that is true. We, of course,
assume good management of that additional money, which there is
every reason to believe we would have. We have also proposed
creating a firewall between the human spaceflight funding--and
I emphasize funding, not technology or mutual support--and the
science program. As we all know, the human spaceflight program
is so large that when it has problems, it tends to cannibalize
the science program.
Senator Nelson. Do you feel that the realities of this gap
are unavoidable and the fact that we are going to have this
gap, with that $3 billion, that you can keep things going by
developing the new technologies on down the line in order to
maintain the most robust human spaceflight program?
Mr. Augustine. To eliminate the gap or significantly reduce
it would have a significant negative impact on the long-term
exploration program. I think the gap is something that we are
presented with based on decisions that were made in the past,
perhaps good decisions. I don't know. But I think that we are,
to a considerable degree, stuck with a gap.
Senator Nelson. Did the committee look at taking the
Constellation program, as it has been defined, and see how much
it would cost to execute the Constellation program?
Mr. Augustine. We did. This $3 billion profile that is
added permits either the Constellation or several other options
to be carried out. So the answer is we did, and it can be done.
Senator Nelson. But according to one of your charts, which
we can show up here, in what you called the less constrained
budget, in other words, the $3 billion additional each year,
with Ares V as the heavy launch and with Ares I and Orion as
the crew to LEO, which is the Constellation program as
envisioned now, under that funding scenario, lo and behold, the
Space Station is going to go in the drink in 2015.
Your committee also said that is unacceptable. I happen to
agree with you. Why would we spend $100 billion building the
Space Station and then put it in the Pacific? But that is what
the funding profile is for that $3 billion and with an
extension of Constellation. Is it not?
Mr. Augustine. Yes. I think you are--I can't see that
chart. But I think you are referring to Option 3?
Senator Nelson. It is Option 3.
Mr. Augustine. Option 3 was intended to take the baseline
Program of Record, apply a less constrained budget to it, just
as we did in the other cases. The Program of Record, as you
say, splashes the ISS in early 2016, completes the flight, the
use of it in 2015.
Senator Nelson. Well, how is it, with what you call the
constrained budget, which is the present, and inadequate I will
say, OMB budget. I will not ascribe that to the President.
Mr. Augustine. Nor me, I hope.
Senator Nelson. Yes, what you just said I think is very
important. What you just said, ``I hope.'' From your lips to
the President's ears.
Option Number 1--constrained. You could do that. No $3
billion extra. You are still putting the ISS in the ditch in
2015, and you have got Ares V and Ares I. So what are you
buying extra from Option 1 to Option 3? In Option 3, you are
getting an additional $3 billion.
Mr. Augustine. Option 1 is the Program of Record, of
course, with the current funding, and with that, you basically
get launch vehicles with nothing to put on top of them. I am
oversimplifying here, Mr. Chairman.
With Option 3, you are able to develop the Ares V at an
earlier time. You are able to carry the International Space
Station for an additional 5 years. We have also provided the
full amount of money one needs to de-orbit the International
Space Station in that option. One gets a technology program
that is rather substantial to begin laying work for the
exploration program, and one gets funding to carry out science
and technology onboard the ISS over that 10-year period.
Senator Nelson. I think that is the answer. It is the
additional science and technology that you get under that. But
let me just point out that on the chart--and maybe the chart
needs to be refined before your final report comes out--Option
1 and 3 are a difference of $3 billion, and yet it looks like
they present the same result because in Option 3, you are
putting the Space Station in the Pacific in 2015. The
difference with Option 4 is that you have replaced Ares I and
Orion with a commercial vehicle to get to low-Earth orbit.
Mr. Augustine. Your point is a very good one. This chart is
somewhat misleading in that regard. There is also the matter
that the dates change when things become available. For
example, under Option 1, you are probably in the 2030s when you
can conduct human exploration missions. That is our view. It is
not necessarily NASA's view. Whereas, under Option 3, you could
do it considerably earlier.
Senator Nelson. Since we have a consensus of opinion that
we need to get NASA out of LEO, do you have a preference on the
architecture? I know you said you are not in the business of
recommending a specific course, but do you have any personal
feelings that you want to share with the Committee?
Mr. Augustine. Well, Mr. Chairman, we have all tried very
hard to not put you or the President in a position where we
have come out and endorsed an option and that you then, if you
don't agree with it, have to rebut that. So my answer is that I
think I could speak for the Committee that Options 1 and 2 we
deem to be just not viable. Of the remaining three primary
options, each has some advantages and some disadvantages.
Our committee has never discussed what our personal
preferences are. By intent, we have not done that. So I have no
idea what my colleagues believe. I would go so far as to say
that these flexible path options are particularly interesting
to me because I am concerned that if we commit to going to the
Moon, there is a reaction--as a primary objective, many
people's reaction is, ``Well, we did that years ago. Why do
that again?''
If we take down the ISS so you don't have things happening
between 2015 and 2020, you have the problem you just described,
Mr. Chairman. If you say we will go to Mars right after the
Moon, there is such a long period of time that how do you
excite young engineers to want to commit their career to that?
How do you excite taxpayers to want to pay for that?
There is great merit to having some interim milestones
along the way to Mars, still going to Mars ultimately. But
where you can point to significant technical engineering,
scientific, if you will, advantages and accomplishments.
What I am saying, to be more specific, is that, clearly,
Option 5 carries that opportunity. Now you can marry that
opportunity with some of the other options as well, and indeed,
we have done that with Option 5A, for example, which ties into
a version of the Ares V.
Senator Nelson. At the end of October this year, NASA is
well on the way to doing a full-up flight test of the Ares I,
what they call X. It's the four segments of existing solid
rocket boosters with a dummy fifth segment, Orion, on the top.
To fly it, see its dynamics, the avionics, et cetera.
Did your committee discuss any attitude about that
particular test that is right down the pike less than 6 weeks
away?
Mr. Augustine. The Committee did not discuss that. I did
discuss it, myself, with the Administrator of NASA, and that
is, of course, his call to make. I have enormous respect for
his ability and judgment.
Were it my call, I would fly it. The reason is we will gain
technical knowledge that we have paid a great deal to get, and
we should get it.
If we continue with the Ares I program, it is an important
step. And if we don't continue with it, it is an important
piece of information to have that relates to the Ares V and
other possible options. It is our committee's view that the
Ares I, while it has technical problems, some not
insignificant, there is no reason to believe that good
engineering and sufficient funds won't make the Ares I a very
good vehicle in time.
Senator Nelson. Let us talk about my third major category
that I think that the President is going to have to look to in
making his decision. How is he going to keep this
extraordinarily talented workforce operating? Share with us
what your committee deliberated about that.
Mr. Augustine. That is a very key part of this whole
question. Needless to say, this is a rather esoteric business.
It takes years, I have observed, to begin to understand some of
the subtleties and to gain the culture that goes with launching
rockets. One of the reasons being that this is such an
unforgiving business. We generally don't get recalls in this
business.
NASA has, without question, the largest talent base in the
world today to conduct space activities, both human and
robotic. That is a national treasure to us. The options we have
offered, beyond the two that I have suggested are probably not
viable; all have about the same overall budget, and unless one
makes a major shift in how one conducts business, the overall
NASA employment should stay about the same. However, the mix of
that employment will certainly change. We will need different
talents.
For example, if we terminate the Shuttle in 2010 or early
2011, the people who have been focusing on launching shuttles
are different people probably than some who would be needed to
build an Ares or an Ares I or an Ares V or whatever, a shuttle-
derived vehicle. So there will be changes in skill.
We looked at two kinds of asset when it comes to human
talent. One is just the overall work force, namely jobs. Not an
unimportant subject at this time. On the other hand, it is our
view that it would be tragic to view NASA as a jobs program.
NASA has so much more to offer than just creating jobs.
The other we looked at are those critical skills that only
people at NASA or in the industry are likely to have. Those we
think are very important to preserve, and we need to
consciously go out and do that. An example would be the large,
segmented solid rocket motors. It is an art, as well as a
science, to build those things safely. If we lose that
capability, it will be very hard to get back.
Ability to work with liquid hydrogen, liquid oxygen--we
would like to see us learn how to do that in space as well as
here on Earth. So those special skills we have to find a way to
preserve for sure.
And I guess, Mr. Chairman, if I could extend your question
just a little bit, one last comment, and that would be that
NASA has, as I said before, a very high fixed cost base. It
makes it extremely hard to create new opportunities and options
when you have that fixed cost base.
Part of that fixed cost base is the centers, the work
force, the facilities, and it would be our hope that the
President and the Congress would give the Administrator of NASA
a great deal of latitude to manage the resources that he is
responsible for.
Senator Nelson. I want to underscore that very important
comment so that these dislocations of the work force, albeit as
you said with the more robust funding is going to keep NASA at
a fairly level amount of employment, that is going to change
among the different centers according to what their particular
workforce does.
Needless to say, in consideration of if we are not
launching humans on an American vehicle, there are going to be
less launches at, for example, the Kennedy Space Center, even
though we might be building the new rocket with the new
technologies and the new money that you have laid out. I hope
that the President and the Congress will give the Administrator
exactly what you said, the flexibility so that he could utilize
that workforce in different places with different missions so
as to minimize the economic devastation.
In this regard, I will put on my parochial hat. The center
that is going to get hit the hardest is the Kennedy Space
Center because of the smaller number of launches of humans. If,
for example, the President were to pick the commercial option,
that would ameliorate some of the layoffs, but it is not going
to step in. We need to give the Administrator of NASA a lot of
flexibility there. So thank you for that statement.
I want to ask you, what if you had more time? You had 90
days. If you had more time, do you think the results would
change?
Mr. Augustine. Well, the first thing that would have
happened would have been my wife would have divorced me.
[Laughter.]
Senator Nelson. I understand.
Mr. Augustine. All 10 of us, of course, have regular jobs,
so to speak, and when we began, I questioned whether 90 days
was adequate to take on a task of this type. We clearly could
have done a more thorough analysis given more time.
But it is also my belief that if the differences are small
between the new options and the current program, we should
stick with the current program. I think we are not discussing
small differences. There need to be significant differences,
and those are the kinds of things we tried to identify. Our
conclusion was that it would have been easier for us and we
would have been able to get the third significant figure much
more accurately. But, in terms of the basic thrust of the
options we have offered and their assessment, I think we can
stand behind them.
Senator Nelson. You had testified earlier that your panel's
recommendations are to not rush the Shuttle fly-out and keep
safety paramount. Which, by the way, parenthetically, I assume
will be a theme that will run throughout your report once it is
produced publicly. Of these items, safety has to be paramount,
given the very tragic experience that we have had in the past.
You indicated in your testimony that you thought that it is
realistic to think that at least part, if not all, of Fiscal
Year 2011 would be consumed by the fly out of the Shuttle and
the remaining missions to supply and equip the Space Station.
Did you attach a dollar figure to 2011 in that fly out?
Since the President's budget right now, and I will refer it to
the OMB budget, and I say that sarcastically, only provides for
Fiscal Year 2010 for the fly-out of the Shuttle. Did you attach
a cost to it?
Mr. Augustine. We did, and we have spoken with OMB about
it. They are aware of the number. I can't speak for OMB,
obviously. My recollection is the number is like $1.5 billion.
But, Mr. Chairman, you should check that to be exact.
It is our view that that is very important to add that to
the Fiscal Year 2011 budget, and as you say, it is not there
today. The problem with it not being there is it introduces
pressure on getting the launch off by a given time. I referred
to that as launch fever, something we always tried to fight in
the company I used to serve.
It is a subtle pressure, and the Challenger CAIB spoke to
that pressure as one of the causes, they thought, of the
Challenger accident. Having said this, I would hasten to add we
have spent a good deal of time talking with the people who are
responsible for launching the remaining Shuttles, the six
remaining ones. They are very conscious of this. They are
taking an attitude that they won't be hurried.
I think they are doing everything right. The problem is
they are going to run off of a budget cliff 12 months from now,
and we need to fix that for them. I think if we do, they will
manage things very properly.
Senator Nelson. I have been amazed as I have watched this
entire space team knowing that the Space Shuttle is likely to
come to an end, and they haven't missed a beat with still high
morale. To me, I am just amazed and very appreciative.
Mr. Augustine. And I say, too, I never cease to be amazed
when having to close a plant, terminate a program, of the
commitment of the people to doing just what you said, and that
is particularly true in the space arena and the defense arena,
where what they are doing is more than building widgets.
Senator Nelson. That is correct. And thank you for putting
that on the record. I think it is important that the White
House and OMB hear what you just said. The Congress has
provided in its budget for the out-year 2011 an additional
budget authorization of $2.5 billion in order to fly out the
Space Shuttle in year 2011, but that is in a budget planning
document. It has to be put into reality, and only the White
House can do that with the Congress concurring.
What is your opinion about a constant source of funding and
an adherence to a defined plan once the option is chosen as a
key success for NASA's future?
Mr. Augustine. That clearly would be a key factor to
success, particularly if that number included a reserve to
account for the unforeseen--reserve in time, reserve in funds,
reserve in technology. It is almost impossible, as you know, to
manage a program that goes out to the year 2030 when you don't
know what the funding commitment is and when you have to
redesign the program each year.
This is a program that probably involves tens of thousands
of contracts and subcontractor agreements. When you change the
budget, you have to renegotiate those, and rarely do they go
down when you renegotiate. So your total costs go up.
Stability of funding would have an enormously positive
impact. Having said that, I also recognize the difficulties
that you face in your chair when you don't know that the
economy is going to collapse on us a year ago and that the
Government's receipts are going to drop. It is not clear to me
how one can guarantee a program budget for the kind of time
period it takes to undertake these major pursuits. But,
anything that can be done by the Congress and the White House
to put stability in the funding and to let the NASA leadership
know ahead of time what that funding is going to be so that
they don't have to guess would be one of the greatest
contributions you could make to the human spaceflight program
or to any spaceflight program.
Senator Nelson. Let's talk about these options in 4A
through the end, where the crew to low-Earth orbit is launched
by the commercial provider instead of a NASA vehicle. You know
the history of developing spacecraft. Do you think that you
really could have one of these commercial operators able to get
a human crew up to the Space Station in 7 years?
Mr. Augustine. I think if you were to have several paths
with several operators, several commercial firms, not
necessarily only the smaller firms that are very quick on their
feet, but also some of the larger, more experienced firms that
are probably less quick on their feet but have more scar
tissue, I think if you could have several firms involved
through a competition that the chances would be very good that
one would have a success.
I think back to earlier in my career when we had ICBMs as
launch vehicles. You are familiar. I speak to the Titan and the
Atlas. ICBMs in those days when I was involved were designed to
reliabilities that don't even approach the reliabilities we
talk about today for human-rated vehicles, and yet we did find
a way to--we called it man rating in those days, incorrectly.
We did find a way to man-rate those vehicles and to use them in
the Gemini and the Mercury program, and they performed very
well.
There is no fundamental physical reason why this shouldn't
be possible, but I would say again it is not without risk.
There are backups that one can consider that is other launch
vehicles, including foreign launch vehicles, during that period
of time.
Senator Nelson. And so, when it comes to U.S. commercial
cargo capability, your committee felt pretty confident of that
capability?
Mr. Augustine. I think that is true, and NASA has, of
course, embraced this idea, provided NASA technical oversight
and NASA help, which gives me greater assurance. These firms
have some very talented people, and I think there is every
reason to believe that they can be successful.
Senator Nelson. Do you want to talk to us about the
differences between the Ares V heavy capability and your
discussions as an alternative to an Ares V Lite?
Mr. Augustine. I would be glad to do that. The Ares V, of
course, is part of the current Program of Record, although,
unfortunately, it has not been able to be funded because to
keep the budget for the Ares I and the Orion unchanged, we have
been delayed in starting the Ares V and things that might go
with it.
The Ares V Lite is very similar to the Ares V, but it has
less payload capability, and the basic measure, as you know, it
is 150 metric tons. See, am I getting mixed--140 metric tons, I
guess, for the Ares V and 130, I think, for the--there is about
a 20-metric ton difference in terms of payload throw-weight.
The Ares V Lite basically has one less engine, has half a
segment less on the solids, and can be designed to have more
margin. That is important to us because the Ares V, even today,
many years from first launch, has very shallow margins. If
there is one thing we have learned, it is that having margins
is the blessing of the space program, to be able to de-rate
things.
The Ares V would be used in companion with an Ares I that
is referred to by NASA as ``Ares I and a half.'' Whereas, the
Ares V Lite would be used with another Ares V as its companion.
That also has the advantage that you only have to have spares
at launch facilities and so on for one launch vehicle of the
type. So you would use two Ares V, which gives you--my numbers,
for some reason, are escaping me at the moment. But let me just
check.
Senator Nelson. It is 160 metric tons for the Ares V, and
for the Lite, it is 143 metric tons.
Mr. Augustine. That is why I couldn't make it work, thank
you. So, you have 320 metric tons throw-weight with the 2 Ares
IV Lites, and you have 40 less--excuse me, you have, well,
substantially less throw-weight with an Ares I/Ares V
combination. So we think there is a good deal of merit to the
Ares V Lite approach. The disadvantage, of course, is that the
Ares I is partly developed, and the Ares V is not.
Senator Nelson. And according to your much more complicated
chart, you could have the Ares V Lite ready to go in the early
2020s, if you went the flexible path, if you went to the Moon
first. So it would be the early 2020s.
Of course, you remember that the President said in the
campaign, he wanted to be on the Moon by 2020. So that is
pretty much out the window according to your panel, isn't it?
Mr. Augustine. That is true.
Senator Nelson. So you are talking early 2020s you could
have Ares V Lite ready, and you would have a scenario by which
you could get Ares V up with a crew with a lunar vehicle and do
rendezvous perhaps in lunar orbit?
Mr. Augustine. We are speaking to the larger budget level,
of course, and the answer would be yes.
Senator Nelson. Yes. Do you want to for the record give me
any comments about the alternative on the EELVs, the expendable
launch vehicles?
Mr. Augustine. Yes, the expendable launch vehicle family,
of course, is one that has been with us for many years, traces
its history to the ICBM programs, in fact, and has been
extended by the Department of Defense. These vehicles have been
used in various forms, some not yet in the form or carrying the
full throw-weight that would be needed for this mission. The
vehicles are proven. They are not human-rated, and they would
require additional development. They offer a legitimate
alternative. They also offer the advantage that the Department
of Defense and the intelligence community might find them
useful, and we could have some savings there. That offers the
disadvantage of having to coordinate vehicles coming down the
line of who gets what and who gets first priority.
But it would be our committee's view that the EELV family
is a viable option worthy of consideration, and we have not
attempted to make specific choices here, in part because it
would require a great deal more analysis than we have done in
addition to our not wanting to take a position. It is a choice
that good engineering can make.
Senator Nelson. I am curious. One of the earlier years of
accomplishment is under using an EELV, going the flexible path,
and you are looking at the years 2015-2016. Can you comment on
that?
Mr. Augustine. Yes. The reason for that, of course, is that
the goal is changed. The goal is a much less demanding one
under this flexible path option.
Senator Nelson. So that would still get you out on things
like asteroids or one of the Martian moons utilizing an EELV?
Mr. Augustine. Yes, and human-rated.
Senator Nelson. And you could do that within the span of
2015-2016?
Mr. Augustine. No. No, it would be well beyond that. I,
unfortunately, don't have the numbers here with me, but it
would be well beyond that.
Senator Nelson. OK. I was looking from this complicated
chart.
Mr. Augustine. Yes. I don't have that chart here.
Senator Nelson. Right. Well, under that plan on this same
chart, you would be late 2020s with an actual landing on the
Moon?
Mr. Augustine. That sounds more correct.
Senator Nelson. Did your committee discuss an Atlas or a
Delta on the EELVs?
Mr. Augustine. We did. They are both certainly plausible
candidates. Oh, I do have it. Thank you.
Senator Nelson. How did your committee arrive at the cost
estimates for the different options?
Mr. Augustine. The Committee, as I mentioned, hired the
Aerospace Corporation to assist us in this regard, and we also
had a good deal of help from NASA. We obtained the NASA
estimates that they have and the probabilities of confidence
levels that go with them.
The Aerospace Corporation has some models that are based on
a large number of prior programs. I believe it is 77 prior
space programs. Those models show correction factors to account
for real-world experiences compared with estimates that were
made at various points in those programs.
We took the work--I should say ``we,'' the Aerospace
Corporation took the work breakdown structure line-by-line and
considered what was the maturity of the work under that line
item. Is this a component that exists? In which case the factor
they would add was 1.0. If it was a component that was just
beginning, depending on the kind of component, on average, they
have used a factor of about 1.5. If you go through that whole
set of items, the average is about a 1.25 factor they have used
in estimating cost.
The factors, as I say, weigh in the maturity of the item in
question, and so that tends to reduce the factor that was added
somewhat more. NASA has raised the point that they consider
that some of these factors or, in fact, many of them were
included in their original estimates and that when Aerospace
has taken this step, they have double counted.
The Aerospace Corporation and ourselves believes that is
not the case, and even if it is the case, it is unlikely that
we have been too conservative. I will give you one reason. That
if you look at the set of programs that the Aerospace
Corporation uses to derive the factors--I think it is 77
programs--for the whole set of programs, they have a given
factor.
If you take only the human spaceflight programs from that
set, you have a factor that is almost twice as great. Even if
we have double counted, chances are we have double counted on
the order of 10 percent or so, and experience would suggest
that is probably not a bad thing to do.
Senator Nelson. How do you answer this question that we
have spent $8 billion thus far on the present architecture,
which includes Ares I, and now we are going to abandon that,
having spent $8 billion?
Mr. Augustine. My answer is that we have offered a set of
five options. We have not suggested abandoning Ares I. Some of
the options do abandon it. We could continue with Ares I, no
question about it. The same thing, we could continue with the
Space Shuttle. We could have ISS longer.
It gets to be a question that if you do all of those
things, you just don't get to do some of the things in the
future like build an Ares V or a heavy-lift vehicle, which we
think is what this Nation has badly needed, frankly, since the
first of these studies I was involved in and recommended at
that time.
So Ares I, in our mind, we haven't recommended that it
either be continued or that it be abandoned. If it were to be
abandoned, we think there ought to be compelling reasons to
abandon it. One of the strong sentiments I have derived in my
career is that constantly changing programs is one of the worst
things you could do, and you should only make changes for very
compelling reasons.
We have offered the pros and cons, and it is up to the
reader to judge what the definition of compelling is in their
mind. There are liabilities to continuing with the Ares I. One
of those liabilities is that under the current program planned,
as I mentioned at the outset, we won't even get it until 2
years after the ISS is at the bottom of the Pacific Ocean, by
our estimate.
If we extend the ISS, we will only be able to use the Ares
I for about 3 years to support it. Then there won't be that
much to do with it, frankly, until we get the Ares V. But we
will get the Ares V later because we have spent the money on
Ares I.
On the other hand, the Ares I is designed to be probably
the most reliable vehicle that has ever been built, and we
think there is a good chance that will be the case. As you say,
we have spent $8 billion on it, and although that is a sum cost
issue, nonetheless, we have spent $8 billion. There are a lot
of people working on it. We are getting ready to conduct a test
of what one might call a prototype of that vehicle, and it,
too, is a very viable vehicle.
So I would like not to make a choice here, but just to
point out the pros and cons.
Senator Nelson. Well, if the President were to pick the
option of Ares V, heavy lift, or the Ares V Lite, you are
certainly going to be able to utilize the technology that you
have developed for the Ares I so that you don't lose all the
value of that $8 billion that has already been spent. Is that
what the Committee concluded?
Mr. Augustine. That is absolutely true, and similarly, if
you pick another option, you can always complete the Ares I by
adding money. As I recall, again, I don't have my data, but I
think it is a $1.5 billion or so. But pretty soon, you add up
these things--we tried very hard to scratch for money so that
our profile was $3 billion and not $6 billion or $5 billion.
Senator Nelson. What was the Committee's thinking on
promoting the development of on-orbit refueling?
Mr. Augustine. Interesting question. As a matter of fact,
Wernher von Braun, in some of his writings you may be familiar
with, pointed to the enormous advantages of on-orbit refueling.
Over the years, we have had some efforts begun to look at the
subject but have never really carried them to any great
fruition, principally for financial reasons, cost reasons.
It is our belief that on-orbit refueling will be a major
factor in space exploration one day. We clearly aren't ready to
undertake it today. We just don't know enough. It would be too
dangerous. But there is no reason that we know of from an
engineering standpoint that one can't do it.
We would like to use some of the money that we propose
spending under these Options 3, 4, and 5 to run tests first on
the ground and then in the general vicinity of the ISS of
refueling on orbit. Once that has been done, it could have a
significant impact on some of the options. For example, some of
the closely derived Shuttle options benefit substantially from
on-orbit refueling. So we think it is something that is ready
for a major technology effort today, but not anything further
beyond.
Senator Nelson. Did you have in your discussions any idea
of the time in mind as to when we should try to target for on-
orbit refueling?
Mr. Augustine. I would like to provide that for the record,
if I could?
[The information referred to follows:]
The Committee did not prepare a specific plan for the development
of on-orbit refueling. However, in some of the Committee's exploration
options, a refueling capability was assumed to be available in the
early 2020s. It was the Committee's judgment that an on-orbit refueling
capability could be developed by that time, given an appropriate amount
of funding for research and development.
Senator Nelson. OK. Does any of the staff have any
additional questions? We will keep the record open for any of
the members of the Committee.
I know Senator Pryor was trying to get here, and he was
with his father, the former Senator Pryor. So I am sure he will
have some.
Can you give us an estimate of how much it will cost to
continue flying the Shuttle until Ares I or a commercial
solution is available in that range of 2016-2017?
Mr. Augustine. That was the----
Senator Nelson. And let me just complete the Station
because it is one of your options, and that would also support
the ISS until 2020 and maintain the development of a heavy-lift
capability by the early 2020s.
Mr. Augustine. If you were to continue the Shuttle to
support the ISS through 2020?
Senator Nelson. That is right.
Mr. Augustine. You would probably have to add I think----
Senator Nelson. Just until a new commercial human-rated
vehicle would be developed.
Mr. Augustine. Human-rated, of course.
Senator Nelson. That doesn't seem to be one of the options.
Yes, what staff is pointing out, it would be the best of all
worlds. You continue to fly the Shuttle, and the question is
what is it going to cost? Until you had a human-rated
capability commercially, you keep the Station up there until
2020 so that we have the value of that, and at the same time,
you do your technology development of a heavy-lift capability
by the early 2020s.
Mr. Augustine. My estimate would be that the additional
cost would be of the order of $10 billion, probably a little
more.
Senator Nelson. Over that whole time period?
Mr. Augustine. Yes.
Senator Nelson. That is the above the $30 billion over that
10-year period, which was the $3 billion per year?
Mr. Augustine. Exactly, you would have to add that or else
take it out of the $30 billion, and if you take it out of the
$30 billion, you slip the other things we would like to be
doing.
If you did continue the Shuttle, one benefit of that,
another benefit other than closing the gap is that it makes the
closely derived Shuttle vehicle options very much more
interesting because if you still have the Shuttle operating and
in production for that period of time, then driving from the
external tank and so on becomes a much more plausible option.
The difficulty, of course, is that we only have three Shuttles
left. The launch rate will be very low, and when you go to low
launch rates, you start worrying about safety.
Senator Nelson. Well, that would be then more like Option
5C, flexible path Shuttle derived?
Mr. Augustine. It would be like that except----
Senator Nelson. Except the Shuttle life would continue to
service the Space Station until a commercial human capability
is ready?
Mr. Augustine. Yes. You have described a derivative of
Option 5C where you would continue the Shuttle operation.
Senator Nelson. Right. Any further questions from the
staff?
[No response.]
Senator Nelson. OK. The record will stay open for a couple
of days.
And again, I want to thank you for what you have done. This
was very unselfish work.
I think the President really has a major decision here.
There is nothing like a President making a bold decision to
focus the Nation on where we ought to be going technologically,
and he is at that point. You have laid out a lot of parameters
for him.
I think it is going to be up to the President. We will
certainly advise him, but it is his decision, and it is at a
tough, tough time because of what we are facing with the budget
deficit. Just look at these gyrations that we are going through
right now in the Senate Finance Committee trying to come up
with a consensus on trying to meet the healthcare problem
straight on. It is very difficult.
But I believe the President is a visionary, and I believe
that the President is going to make a bold stroke, not unlike
President Kennedy. He set this Nation on a course that was
extraordinary, and it is my belief that President Obama will do
that.
And so, with that optimistic note, thank you, Mr.
Augustine.
The hearing is adjourned.
Mr. Augustine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[Whereupon, at 4:49 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Prepared Statement of Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV,
U.S. Senator from West Virginia
I want to thank Mr. Augustine for testifying before the
Subcommittee today and I want to express my gratitude to him and the
other 9 members of the Human Spaceflight Plans Committee for their
service.
The task of examining NASA's human spaceflight plans in a mere 90
days is not an easy one. As the Committee states in its Summary Report,
it is in fact rocket science. Thank you for your commitment to the
process and its smooth progress.
I am concerned, however, that the Committee seems to have largely
accepted the value of human space exploration as an underlying
assumption without ever fully discussing it.
In this difficult budget environment where the Federal deficit sets
new records with each passing month, our country does not necessarily
have the resources to do everything that we want to do. The economy has
not yet recovered, we are fighting two major wars, and we can't even
manage to find a solution to provide healthcare for Americans.
The review committee recommends increasing NASA's budget by an
additional $3 billion by FY2014, then increasing it at an inflationary
rate of 2.4 percent. We must ask, quite simply, what are the specific
benefits to the Nation of making NASA a $22 billion agency?
Let me be clear, I am not advocating that we abandon space
exploration. The case, however, has not yet been made. And I think now
would be an appropriate time to ask those tough questions and carefully
evaluate the responses.
This is no longer the era of Apollo and the Cold War where the
payoffs for advancing the space and Moon agenda are entirely clear.
The President, I am sure, will continue to struggle with these same
questions as he reviews the Committee's findings and options. I am
committed to making sure that together we can get the answers right.
Again, I want to thank Mr. Augustine for his service and testimony
today. I look forward to the Committee's final report.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Tom Udall to
Norman R. Augustine
Question 1. Mr. Augustine, you certainly know the arguments both
for and against investing in human space exploration at a time when the
Nation has a large deficit and many unmet needs for people here on the
ground. You note that intangible benefits to the Nation will accrue
from such an investment. Yet given the billions of dollars necessary to
reach Mars, should NASA instead focus on unmanned missions?
Answer. The committee found that America is best served by a
complementary and balanced space program involving both a robotic
component and human component.
Question 2. Mr. Augustine, the summary report you provided notes
that NASA has an opportunity to spur the growth of the commercial space
industry, much like the Federal Government encouraged the development
of the aviation and commercial airline industry in the 1920s through
the ``air mail'' program.
New Mexico, for example, is building Spaceport USA and hosts the X
Prize Cup. You mention that a technology development program at NASA
could help reengage academia and private industry with NASA. How should
NASA do more to encourage such private sector involvement in space
exploration?
Answer. The committee found many ways that NASA could encourage
more private sector involvement in space exploration, namely: extending
the life of ISS and increased support for ISS utilization; making loan
guarantees or employ other mechanisms by which it could assure a market
for commercial providers; more aggressively utilizing commercial
authorities already granted to the agency; providing a potential
government-guaranteed market for fuel in low Earth-orbit; turning the
transport of crew to low Earth orbit over to the commercial sector; and
investing more heavily in technology development.
Question 2a. What NASA incentive programs for private companies
might spur inventions and innovations that would save the agency money
in meeting its space exploration goals?
Answer. Other than those listed above, the committee did not
investigate the use of any specific incentive programs.
Question 3. Mr. Augustine, your committee's report seems to suggest
that NASA could contract with commercial space companies to supply and
service the International Space Station. Some private companies already
participate in NASA's Commercial Orbital Transportation Services
(COTS). Private firms also compete in the ``Google Lunar X Prize'' to
land a robot on the moon. Did your panel consider the idea of having a
``Lunar COTS'' program for commercial companies to deliver payloads to
the moon?
Answer. The committee did not deliberate on the concept of a
``Lunar COTS'' program. However, that concept has been discussed in the
media and some committee members are undoubtedly aware of it.
Question 3a. Could competition among commercial companies for such
contracts help lower NASA's costs of returning to the Moon and other
destinations?''
Answer. The committee did not specifically analyze this situation;
but, in theory, competition among private companies for providing
lunar-based services would most likely result in cost advantages for
NASA.