

[H.A.S.C. No. 111-106]

**AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ: PERSPECTIVES
ON U.S. STRATEGY, PART 2**

HEARING

BEFORE THE

OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HEARING HELD
NOVEMBER 5, 2009



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

54-057

WASHINGTON : 2010

OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

VIC SNYDER, Arkansas, *Chairman*

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
JIM COOPER, Tennessee
JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania
GLENN NYE, Virginia
CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

DREW WALTER, *Professional Staff Member*
THOMAS HAWLEY, *Professional Staff Member*
TREY HOWARD, *Staff Assistant*

CONTENTS

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS

2009

	Page
HEARING:	
Thursday, November 5, 2009, Afghanistan and Iraq: Perspectives on U.S. Strategy, Part 2	1
APPENDIX:	
Thursday, November 5, 2009	37

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 5, 2009

AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ: PERSPECTIVES ON U.S. STRATEGY, PART 2

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Snyder, Hon. Vic, a Representative from Arkansas, Chairman, Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee	1
Wittman, Hon. Rob, a Representative from Virginia, Ranking Member, Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee	1

WITNESSES

Eaton, Maj. Gen. Paul D., USA (Ret.), Senior Advisor, National Security Network	2
Fair, Dr. C. Christine, Assistant Professor, Center for Peace and Security Studies, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University	4
Khan, Dr. Muqtedar, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Delaware	5
Strmecki, Dr. Marin, Senior Vice President and Director of Programs, Smith Richardson Foundation	8

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS:

Eaton, Maj. Gen. Paul D.	44
Fair, Dr. C. Christine	52
Khan, Dr. Muqtedar	69
Strmecki, Dr. Marin	77
Wittman, Hon. Rob	41

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

[There were no Documents submitted.]

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING:

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING:

[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.]

**AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ: PERSPECTIVES ON U.S.
STRATEGY, PART 2**

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE,
Washington, DC, Thursday, November 5, 2009.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:32 a.m., in room 2226, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Vic Snyder (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. VIC SNYDER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ARKANSAS, CHAIRMAN, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

Dr. SNYDER. The hearing will come to order. We appreciate you all being here today. I am interested in hearing what you all have to say. We will get to the discussion. So I am going to forego any opening statement.

You may notice we get a little musical chairs going on today. We are fortunate to have some members from the full committee that are not on the subcommittee that want to join in.

If everybody shows up at the same time who is a member of the committee, we will have them—some members sitting on the table with you all over there, but we will—we are fortunate to have this level of interest amongst other members. So Mr. Coffman and Mr. Hunter are with us today. We appreciate that.

Mr. Wittman, any opening comments you want to make?

STATEMENT OF HON. ROB WITTMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, RANKING MEMBER, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. WITTMAN. Not at this time, Mr. Chairman. I would just ask unanimous consent to enter my comments into the record.

Dr. SNYDER. Sure. Without objection.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wittman can be found in the Appendix on page 41.]

Dr. SNYDER. And the opening statements of the witnesses will also be made a part of the record. And I need to get the—here.

Our witnesses today are Major General Paul Eaton, retired U.S. Army, Senior Advisor for the National Security Network; Dr. C. Christine Fair, Assistant Professor at the Center for Peace and Security Studies, the Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University; Professor Muqtedar Khan, Associate Professor and Director of the Islamic Studies Program, University of Delaware; and Dr.—is it Marin?

Dr. STRMECKI. Marin.

Dr. SNYDER [continuing]. Marin Strmecki, Senior Vice President and Director of Programs, the Smith Richardson Foundation.

We will make all of your written statements a part of the record. We will turn the clock on for five minutes. You will see the red light go on here at five minutes. Do not look on that as a hard stop. If there are things that you want to tell us beyond that, feel free to do so. I know members will have plenty of questions.

So we will begin with you, General Eaton. You are recognized.

**STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. PAUL D. EATON, USA (RET.),
SENIOR ADVISOR, NATIONAL SECURITY NETWORK**

General EATON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Snyder, Ranking Member Wittman, members of the subcommittee, ladies and gentlemen, thank you for the invitation to join you today to discuss a topic that is at once very important to the Nation and is very personal to the thousands of families who send their soldiers and Marines to prosecute the Nation's wars.

To put it into context, over 200,000 American families wake up and look outside to see if there is a government vehicle out to give them their worst news possible. It happens every day. So I support this Administration's prudent review of our options in Afghanistan.

Now, I am not going to read the entire statement submitted, but I will highlight a few points.

Andrew Bacevich, a retired Army colonel, now professor of international relations at Boston University and author of *The Limits of Power*, wrote for "Harper's" magazine this month, "Among Democrats and Republicans alike, with few exceptions, Afghanistan's importance is simply assumed, much in the way 50 years ago otherwise intelligent people simply assumed that the United States had a vital interest in ensuring the survival of South Vietnam. Today, as then, the assumption does not stand up to even casual scrutiny."

I don't buy Mr. Bacevich's comments exactly, but it certainly tempers the argument. So before we begin the debate about numbers of soldiers and Marines in Afghanistan and subsequent impact on mission there and our mission in Iraq, it would be helpful to answer the questions, "Why do we continue operations in Afghanistan," or, "What do we want Afghanistan to look like in so many years," or, "What differentiates Afghanistan from Yemen, or Somalia, or Sudan, or any other failed or failing states capable of harboring al Qaeda?"

So the mission statement will inform the commander's intent from which the real campaign will be known. If you don't know where you are going, any road will take you there.

So the primary rationale I see for continuance in Afghanistan is 60 or so nuclear weapons in Pakistan, the link to regional stability and the extremist groups operating there.

There is an argument, unfortunately hearkening back to Vietnam-era domino theory, that as goes Afghanistan and its internal fight against extremists, so can go Pakistan. But I will leave the answer to why to the experts.

Now, from a military perspective, the—we are not going to get to the 600,000-plus that we need by our own math to execute counterinsurgency operations. So by definition, whatever number sol-

dier option the President elects to pursue, we are going to have a kind of COIN—counterinsurgency operation—lite. It will probably not be rural. It will be urban.

And it will be along the lines of what my—one of my smarter classmates, Andrew Krepinevich, talks about, the oil spot approach, where you establish a zone of security and derive from that a zone of prosperity, which will ultimately spread out and include greater parts of the country.

Now, reviewing the components of U.S. projection power, I am going to insist that there are three components, not just the military. As I told then-candidate Obama when I had an opportunity to meet with him more than a year ago and he asked me what the Army wanted, I responded, “Senator, we want your Secretary of Agriculture to be at least as interested in the outcome in Afghanistan and Iraq as is your Secretary of Defense.”

The United States is in serious need of a review and revision of its national security architecture. We prosecuted the Cold War with the National Security Act of 1947 and did so brilliantly, but the world is very different now.

Every colonel who goes to the Army War College gets the components of national power—economic, military, diplomatic, political. And I am not going to go through the list of questions that—that I proposed that you ask the Administration for the military component, but I would like to emphasize the so-called civilian surge that we are embarking upon.

It is not illustrated well enough. I don’t understand, from what I can find out, what the components of the civilian surge are. I don’t know who is in charge of the economic program. And as a citizen, I think it prudent that we find that out. So I expect that we be informed relatively soon on what the civilian surge looks like, what the economic program is going to be, who is in charge.

From a diplomatic perspective, there is an internal—a micro-diplomatic program, and an external—a macro-diplomatic program, internal to develop the—from district to province to—to national and alignment with political operators inside the country to shoulder the counterinsurgency warfare program, and then there is the macro, our allies in Europe and the surrounding countries on what they will do to assure and to assist us in establishing the security that we need to in Afghanistan.

So this preoccupation with the number of soldiers is secondary, I believe, to the greater issue of economic engagement and political engagement.

And I will end with a quote from Richard Clarke in his book “Your Government Failed You.” “If we stop denigrating government and using its instruments as partisan punching bags, if we work in a bipartisan way to rebuild our institutions of national security, your government will fail you much less. It could even make you proud once more.”

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of General Eaton can be found in the Appendix on page 44.]

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, General Eaton.

Dr. Fair.

STATEMENT OF DR. C. CHRISTINE FAIR, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR, CENTER FOR PEACE AND SECURITY STUDIES, EDMUND A. WALSH SCHOOL OF FOREIGN SERVICE, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY

Dr. FAIR. Thank you, Chairman Snyder and Ranking Member Wittman as well as your esteemed colleagues for the opportunity to speak today.

I have actually been asked to address how U.S. strategy and objectives in Afghanistan affect the U.S.'s ability to prosecute its interests in Pakistan. The Afghanistan-Pakistan (Af-Pak) strategy suggests that to stabilize Afghanistan you must stabilize Pakistan.

I argue that this formulation critically inverts the primacy of U.S. interests. Pakistan is the epicenter of the most intense U.S. national security concerns, including regional, conventional and nuclear stability, terrorism and nuclear proliferation.

I submit that focusing resources upon Pakistan will greatly enable a pacification of Afghanistan. Karzai's electoral malfeasance and continuance as president has prompted reflection about the next step forward in Afghanistan.

On the one hand, some argue for a more robust counterinsurgency strategy to be resourced with additional troops, and other in financial resources, while others argue for a separation of the counterinsurgency effort with greater focus upon the counterterrorism effort.

Proponents of increasing military efforts in Afghanistan argue that failure in Afghanistan will spell out grave outcomes in Pakistan. This formulation reverses cause and effect.

Pakistan's behavior and policies in many ways determine the events and outcomes in Afghanistan as well as the rest of South Asia, in part because of its continued support of the Afghan Taliban.

This year, Pakistan commenced so-called anti-Taliban military operations. This terminology confuses, because it suggests that Pakistan has turned its guns on the Afghan Taliban when, in fact, the Afghan Taliban operate freely there. Pakistan is, in fact, limiting its war on terrorism to those elements that undermine the Pakistani state, and those elements are not comprehensively the enemies of the United States. They are specifically the enemies of Pakistan.

Pakistan, with some justification, blames the U.S. presence in the region for the country's degraded internal security, rather than viewing their insecurity specifically as blow-back from their country's own dangerous policies.

While militants have targeted the Pakistani state since 2004, in part because of its cooperation with the United States in the war on terrorism, Pakistan has used militants in India since 1947 and in Afghanistan since the early 1970s. Unfortunately, the Pakistani Taliban have connections with these longstanding proxies and this fundamentally limits Pakistan's efforts to defeat their own enemies decisively. Worse, these proxies have ties to the Afghan Taliban and al Qaeda.

Yet having received \$13 billion, if not more, from the United States, to participate in the war on terrorism, Pakistan continues to support the Afghan Taliban. This means that Pakistan is under-

mining the very war on terrorism that it has received handsome reward allegedly to support.

Success in Afghanistan requires effective partners in Kabul as well as Islamabad, yet such partners are unlikely to materialize any time soon. I recommend a realistic reformulation of U.S. interests in Afghanistan and Pakistan to identify Pakistan as the most critical locus of U.S. national security interests. Washington needs to ask how it can protect its regional interests, perhaps without decisively defeating the Taliban in the near term, while compelling Pakistan to stop interfering in Afghanistan over the long term.

This may require greater focus upon counterterrorism rather than counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan. This would allow the U.S. over time to decrease its kinetic footprint in Afghanistan and lessen its logistical dependence upon Pakistan which seriously degrades Washington's options to be harsher with Pakistan.

To stabilize the region, Washington needs to create space to compel Pakistan to cease supporting all militant groups operating on and from its territory over a reasonable time frame. And to state the obvious, this includes coercing or compelling Pakistan to abandon its continued support of the Afghan Taliban.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Fair can be found in the Appendix on page 52.]

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Dr. Fair.

Dr. Khan.

STATEMENT OF DR. MUQTEDAR KHAN, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, UNIVERSITY OF DELAWARE

Dr. KHAN. Well, I want to thank members of the committee for inviting me to testify.

I want to begin by discussing the impact of the war in Iraq on our ability to prosecute the war in Afghanistan. I believe that the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan was fatally undermined by the decision of the previous Administration to wage an unnecessary and bigger war in Iraq, even before our goals and objectives were realized in Afghanistan.

The war in Iraq has exhausted our resources. It has cost \$700 billion in direct costs, led to 4,355 American military fatalities, nearly 250 civilian fatalities, 31,000 wounded, caused a global pandemic of anti-Americanism, and undermined the legal and moral underpinnings of the global order that the United States had constructed and nourished since 1945.

For many Iraqis, too, it has been proven to be devastating, causing hundreds of thousands of deaths and refugees. It also diverted resources and focus away from Afghanistan.

Most importantly, the unnecessary war in Iraq has sapped the American resolve to wage long wars that involve insurgencies and nation-building. The war in Iraq has made it very difficult for our President to go to the American people and say that we must.

We need to stay in Afghanistan for a long time. We need to spend billions of dollars and perhaps lose many more American lives in order to finish in Afghanistan what we started eight years ago.

I have bad news for this committee. I believe that the U.S. at the moment does not have the political will nor the public understanding and commitment to do what is necessary in Afghanistan.

At the moment the public support for the war in Afghanistan stands at 40 percent. With the current spike in casualties, the growing political crisis that started with the malpractices in the presidential elections, I suspect public support will decline further. It will become very difficult for both the White House and the Congress to do what is necessary.

What is necessary? To win at all in Afghanistan, the United States will need to control the Af-Pak border and completely eliminate the ability of the Taliban to cross borders when things get tough on either side, undermine their ability to recruit and fundraise, win the hearts and minds of the Afghan people to such an extent that they are motivated to stand up with the United States against the Taliban and take risks to realize the dream of a democratic Afghanistan.

We also hope to create significant positive change on the ground, that progress can seduce the Afghans away from war and hate. But to realize these objectives with minimum civilian casualties the U.S. will need more troops, more civilians and far more commitment to Afghanistan.

We will have to convey the intent, the resolve, that the United States is there to do the right thing and to do it right. Half measures will cause more damage and make it impossible for the U.S. to achieve even its minimal goals.

The stated goal of the Bush Administration for invading Afghanistan was to capture or kill Osama bin Laden, destroy al Qaeda, and make sure that Afghanistan was no more a safe haven for terrorists.

We think these goals have been partially achieved. There is no al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Al Qaeda is everywhere else but Afghanistan. It is in Pakistan. It is in Yemen. It is in Somalia. And it is in Iraq. But not in Afghanistan.

Bin Laden is still at large. The Taliban have—sorry, al Qaeda has succeeded in reconstituting itself in different forms, in different locales and using different modus operandi.

Bin Laden is still not in our custody. Anti-Americanism and overall discontent with political realities will have to decrease significantly before the demand for organizations such as al Qaeda diminishes in the Muslim world.

To make matters worse, the Taliban, in a hydra-like fashion, have reproduced themselves. Now we have two Talibans: Taliban in Afghanistan and Taliban in Pakistan. And both of them are operating brazenly either side of the border.

They have attacked the Indian embassy. They have attacked the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). They have attacked U.S. bases in Kamdesh, for example. They have killed civilians and soldiers on both sides of the border. They have grown four times in size, from roughly 7,000 to 25,000. But the number of attacks that they make have grown a hundred times.

The British intelligence reports that now the British army fights the Taliban seven times a day. This is exponential growth. If you look at the casualty figures of the U.S. Army and allies in the re-

gion, it clearly suggests that it is rapidly approaching the numbers that we saw in the last two or three years in Iraq.

What are our options in Afghanistan?

The first option is to accept the recommendations of General Stanley McChrystal and send a second surge of 40,000 to 100,000 troops and civilians to Afghanistan to escalate both war and nation-building activities simultaneously. We should remember that this would be the second surge, again, under the Administration of President Obama. We have already sent 30,000 additional troops a few months ago.

The second option is to scale down U.S. strategy from counter-insurgency and counterterrorism to counterterrorism only, meaning forget Afghanistan and the Taliban and focus on al Qaeda, wherever they are.

The third option is to partially answer General McChrystal's request, which means that we give him half or one-third of what he is asking for. In my humble opinion, the third option is not worthy of consideration at all.

General McChrystal's strategy does not have a global perspective to it. Anti-Americanism in Afghanistan is not contingent on what the U.S. does in Afghanistan alone. It is affected by what the U.S. does in Palestine, what the U.S. does in Iraq, what the U.S. does in Pakistan and other parts of the Muslim world.

It is conceivable that the U.S. could invest a lot of blood and treasure in Afghanistan while still lose if it fails in other theaters in the Muslim world. So we could spend billions of dollars in Afghanistan developing it, materially developing it successfully, but if you do not pull off the peace process in the Arab-Israeli conflict, then there will be anti-Americanism in Afghanistan still.

Additionally, the U.S. military presence itself is a provocation in itself. Many Afghans will support and fight with the Taliban as long as there are foreign troops occupying their land. A major surge will inevitably cause many civilian deaths which incite hatred against the U.S., garner support for extremists, and generate more recruits for them.

I like the second option with additional caveats. The U.S. must fight only those who directly threaten U.S. interests and security. Global wars have serious costs and consequences that even a superpower cannot afford. A poor country like ours that agonizes for months over whether we can pay for the health care of poor and underprivileged Americans cannot afford to fight wars indefinitely which require unlimited resources.

Al Qaeda has brought devastation and violence to the very societies that have hosted it. For the past two years, Pakistan has been the biggest victim of terrorism by al Qaeda and Taliban. If some Pakistanis, due to misguided and unwise anti-Americanism, choose to support them, then they should be left to deal with the consequences. We can pray for them.

We should not embark on imperial adventures without strong commitment by those we seek to rescue. If the Afghans want to help to fight the Taliban, they must prove their resolve by first standing up to them. If the Pakistanis want to help to fight their extremists, then they, too, should show the necessary commitment

and stop running with the hare and hunting with the hound at the same time.

In the age of unmanned drones, I think long-distance relationships are not a bad idea. If the U.S. can make its war against its enemies invisible, it will have a better chance of winning.

Simultaneously, you must continue to maintain wide-ranging dialogue with the Muslim world and seriously seek to resolve key issues that undermine U.S.-Muslim relations.

Any and every diplomatic blow against anti-Americanism is worth many military surges that inevitably kill civilians and undermine the main goal: to improve U.S. security through better U.S.-Muslim relations.

Thank you for considering my thoughts.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Khan can be found in the Appendix on page 69.]

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Dr. Khan.

Dr. Strmecki.

STATEMENT OF DR. MARIN STRMECKI, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR OF PROGRAMS, SMITH RICHARDSON FOUNDATION

Dr. STRMECKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I welcome the opportunity to discuss U.S. strategy in Afghanistan and how it relates to the situation in Iraq.

The challenges we face in Afghanistan today are largely a product—

Dr. SNYDER. Is your microphone on, Dr. Strmecki?

Dr. STRMECKI. The light is on.

Dr. SNYDER. Well, that is a good sign. You must have much less volume than Dr. Khan did. But go ahead.

Dr. STRMECKI. Okay. The challenges we face today in Afghanistan are largely the product of an escalation by the enemy that began in late 2005 and then dramatically increased in the subsequent years until today.

It is difficult to remember now, but there were several months back in late 2004 and early 2005 where there were virtually no security incidents for several months in Afghanistan. The contrast between the violence that attended the 2004 presidential election, which was minimal at best, and the 2009 election, which was an all-time peak, is dramatic.

Now, for a variety of reasons, the Afghan government and the United States and NATO did not adequately respond to this escalation. Afghanistan was an economy of force theater vis-a-vis the situation in Iraq. NATO partners were unwilling to send additional forces. There was a reluctance on the part of supporters of Afghanistan to massively increase Afghan national security forces, though some steps were taken both in 2006 and 2008. And President Karzai did not do enough to improve governance though, again, he did some measures such as appointing a better minister of interior.

The result of this response and the escalation by the enemy is that security conditions deteriorated, particularly in southern Afghanistan. And this is the situation that President Obama inherited.

Now I would like to make six quick points about his response.

In its white paper on Afghanistan and Pakistan issued in March 2009, I believe the Obama Administration demonstrated a correct understanding of the problem. There is a single enemy that is located in western Pakistan. It is a syndicate of extremist and terrorist groups that includes al Qaeda, but it is not limited to al Qaeda, and that receives support from certain elements in Pakistan.

That is the enemy that has to be defeated. But the enemy's threat radiates in three directions. It comes at us as a transnational terrorist threat. It crosses the border of Afghanistan as an insurgency. And then violent armed groups are operating against the Pakistani government.

And the white paper stated quite clearly that you can't separate out your actions against one aspect of the threat rather than the other. If you work against one part of the problem, it is going to migrate to the other. If you are going to defeat that enemy, you have to work at all parts of the problem simultaneously.

My second point is that the McChrystal report, at least the portions that were made public, is a good first round implementation concept for the security-related aspects of President Obama's strategy. There need to be more specific questions answered, and those are probably answered in parts of the report that were not made public.

But the very important fact that there was a shift to a population security counterinsurgency approach for Afghanistan and also, for the first time, realistic levels for the Afghan national security forces—240,000 for the Afghan national army, over 100,000 for the Afghan national police—were put on the table, so that there is a—there is an end point where Afghans can be securing Afghanistan.

Regarding the question—third, regarding the question of the requested number of troops, I believe the Congress should ask a simple question, “What is the amount of troops that are necessary to decisively reverse the deteriorating security condition and start a virtuous cycle of improving security and governance?” One can't in one sweep solve the problems of Afghanistan, but changing the trends should be what we are measuring the troop request against.

Fourth, the Obama Administration has correctly placed emphasis on the need for the Karzai administration to improve governance. President Karzai has badly underperformed in recent years. But I don't think the confrontational approach that some urge vis-a-vis Karzai is the right way to approach it. I have seen, when I was involved in policy toward Afghanistan, that a smart engagement with Karzai can lead him to take risks for reform and manage those risks jointly with his partners.

Fifth, turning to Iraq, I would say that the continued stabilization of Iraq is a precondition for shifting the additional forces that are needed in Afghanistan. And therefore, it is vitally important that we continue to build on the political reconciliation process that started in 2005 and that culminated during and after the military surge. We should not be playing a heavy-handed role in Iraqi politics, but we should remain willing to engage and use our influence to catalyze constructive politics if that is needed by the Iraqis or when opportunities arise.

And finally, sixth, as we look to the future of the region as a whole and the imperative to constrain the destabilizing activities of Iran, the value of our relationships with Iraq and Afghanistan rises substantially. And we should start to think about how these partnerships might be used in a broader regional sense. And we should look at our relationships with these countries as opportunities, not as burdens.

And let me end there. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Strmecki can be found in the Appendix on page 77.]

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Dr. Strmecki.

What we will do is we will put ourselves on the five-minute clock. Well, I think the etiquette is to go with the subcommittee members first, and then we will go to Mr. Coffman and Mr. Hunter in whatever order—in some order. And we will probably have time for more than one round, if not more than two rounds. We will see how it goes.

I want to begin with the question I have asked a couple times before both at the full committee level and at the subcommittee level, and I phrased it as, you know, what is our moral responsibility in this, and I am not sure that is the best way to phrase it.

But where I am coming from is we made some very strong statements back in 2001 that we would not forget about Afghanistan, that we would not—I don't know if the words at that time were abandon, but we made some very strong statements, while it was in our national security to go in and take out the Taliban with the help of Afghan allies, that we would not forget Afghanistan.

Some members have returned from visits and where they have met with women legislators who—members have heard independently from them—use the phrase, “Please don't abandon us again.”

And I thought of that, Dr. Khan, when I read your statement, which is—you say option two, which you favor with caveats, is meaning forget Afghanistan and the Taliban. You recommend that as a policy decision we should forget Afghanistan. Those are your words, which, of course, conflicts with Dr. Strmecki, who says, “We must send a strong statement of resolve.” Obviously, those are in great conflict.

So my question is how do we respond to women, women legislators, those who have aligned themselves with us over the last seven or eight years in Afghanistan—how do we reconcile doing what is in our national security interest with whatever commitments we have made to Afghans who have been helping us?

And I think, in fairness to General Eaton, we will start at this end this time.

Dr. Strmecki.

Dr. STRMECKI. I agree very much with your first phrasing in terms of a moral responsibility. The Afghan people have made a common cause with us in two dramatic cases—one, when we supported their effort to liberate their country when the Soviets occupied it, and the Afghans gave a million and a half lives in that struggle, and five million Afghans were refugees. And we abandoned them after that conflict without taking even a strong political attempt to create a post-war order.

And yet after 9/11, both Afghans in the north and Afghans in the south rose up to join us. We would have never been able to overthrow the Taliban with the handful of troops that we sent there. It was the catalytic role that those troops had in enabling the Afghans to join us in fighting Taliban and al—the Taliban-al Qaeda regime.

So I believe that that creates a—not only a relationship but a moral debt that we should vindicate.

Moreover, your second point in terms of our national security interests—I think our security interests are still at stake in that region. The enemy that is just across the border in western Pakistan is real, and there is nothing more that they would like than to move back into Afghanistan and restore that period where they had sanctuary there.

Further, the people of Afghanistan are with us, as you have spoken about. So I think that the key operating concept is let's make a sufficient commitment now so that we can stabilize the situation while we build up Afghan capability to defend themselves in the long term.

Our goal should be to move from being the combat force in Afghanistan to an enabling force that supports Afghan capability—police, military, intelligence—to secure their countryside and to secure their cities. That has really been the model where we have been—that we have used to be successful in—around the world. I mean, think of South Korea—completely dependent on us at the end of the Korean War. But now, with a military force it really can stand on their own, but we remain in an engagement in a supporting way.

So I would urge you to take that model.

Dr. SNYDER. I might say we each have five minutes, and I appreciate your answer, Dr. Strmecki. Maybe you want to err on the side of brevity so—in fairness to all members so we can get around.

Dr. KHAN.

Dr. KHAN. I am convinced that the Taliban is not a national security threat to the United States. Taliban, unlike al Qaeda, is a regional—

Dr. SNYDER. No, I want you to respond to—you want us to forget Afghanistan after—

Dr. KHAN. Yes.

Dr. SNYDER [continuing]. For seven or eight years we have had our soldiers and our civilians encouraging—

Dr. KHAN. My—

Dr. SNYDER [continuing]. Afghan people to align themselves with us—

Dr. KHAN. My—

Dr. SNYDER [continuing]. Security, and you want us—

Dr. KHAN. My—

Dr. SNYDER [continuing]. To forget it.

Dr. KHAN. My recommendation is based on these two premises—one, the Taliban is not a national security threat. Number two is also based on the judgment that we will not be able to do what is absolutely necessary for us to do there, which is to make a commitment that we will be there until the job is finished, and we will do the job right and send enough number of troops to fight the in-

surgency, enough number of civilians to build the infrastructure and commit to building a democracy.

The amount of money and efforts that are required—I am convinced that there isn't the political will in this country to do that. And I fear that in the absence of a political commitment to fulfill the moral obligation that we owe not just to the Afghans who are our allies but to all the Afghans to help build their nations, not kill civilians, and the insurgencies—insurgency strategies.

We will do more harm if we were to pull out later than now. The decision to stay is impossible because you could have the next presidential candidate running on this—on this agenda that we need to pull out of Afghanistan in 2011.

And so if we were to escalate war now and then create more havoc in Afghanistan for the next two or three years, and then a new candidate gets elected on the agenda to pull out of Afghanistan, and we pull out in 2012, then we will be doing to the Afghans again what we did to them in 1989—leave a devastated nation helpless again. That is my genuine fear.

If—

Dr. SNYDER. We will move to Dr. Fair.

As an Afghan patriot who had aligned myself with the United States troops, I would be a bit apprehensive about a political analysis based on the 2012 presidential reelection discussing what our moral responsibility is, but I appreciate your comments.

Dr. Fair.

Dr. FAIR. Of course, I don't see this in moral terms. I don't think we should make current and future decisions based upon sunk costs, but I also think it is a fake binary that not forgetting Afghanistan somehow means an increased troop commitment. Quite the contrary. You can imagine scaling up troops to build up Afghan national security forces in the preparation of eventually downscaling our kinetic footprint.

And I am skeptical of this comprehensive counterinsurgency (COIN) approach, not because it is not the right thing or the optimal outcome, but because I don't believe that we have the troop capabilities to do it.

I don't believe that Afghans are entirely receptive to more troops. The polling data pretty much buttresses that opinion. And we can't be more committed to Afghanistan than Afghanistan's leadership.

All of our efforts are undermined by the ineptitude and the corruption both in Kabul and the strategy to find sub-national partners are completely undermined by the—Karzai takes the district as well as provincial officials.

So I have a somewhat different formulation, and I also disagree with some of the panelists here. The Pakistani Taliban are not the same as the Afghan Taliban. They share networks, but they are certainly not the same.

And so this idea of conflating entirely these two theaters I think is really misguided, and we should really be served by asking ourselves what, strictly speaking, is our national security interest, leaving aside the moral issues, in both of these countries and how best do we prosecute those interests.

Dr. SNYDER. General Eaton.

General EATON. Mr. Chairman, 60 nuclear weapons are a vital national interest. Regional stability to protect those weapons from extremists—our moral responsibility is a subset of that mission but an important subset.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Wittman.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank the panelists for being with us today. I want to look at this issue maybe in a little bit broader perspective, because I think there is a lot of interrelationships there in the region, and I think we all agree, at least what I am hearing from you, that strategically a stable South Asia is in this nation's interest.

And we see there is animosity between a nuclear-powered Pakistan and a nuclear-powered India. We also see Afghanistan as one of the top producers of heroin. We see instability and terrorist activities in Pakistan increasing. We also see a hostile and emerging nuclear threat in Iran. We see transition in Iraq—lots of dynamic situations in that region.

I just want your overall thoughts about what do we do in that particular scenario to increase stability in South Asia? And obviously there is a lot of interconnectivity there.

But, General Eaton, we will begin with you.

General EATON. Thank you, Congressman. I think General McChrystal's comprehensive plan is a—from a military perspective is a very good plan. I would like to see the rest of the executive branch, all departments, support the general in the prosecution of his mission.

He has got to provide the security with the military. I believe that the rest of the executive branch needs to fall in and support in providing the prosperity that we need to see derived from the security.

So his approach to take whatever number of extra force structure he gets to go after an urban counterinsurgency to create prosperity zones with a security zone I think is a very prudent approach to military operations in Afghanistan.

Dr. FAIR. I appreciate your regional take on this. But I want to point out that our inability to compel Pakistan to decisively cease supporting all militant groups is actually the crux of this.

Let's remember that it was a Pakistan-based and -backed terrorist group, Jaish-e-Mohammed, that attacked the Indian parliament in 2001–2002 which brought the largest mobilization of those forces, brought the country—both of them to a near-war crisis with the specter of nuclear escalation.

Everyone that studies South Asia agrees that a militant attack, say, akin to that which happened in Mumbai will be the most likely precipitant of an Indo-Pakistan conventional crisis with potential escalation.

I might also add that Pakistan's own domestic problems again stem from its support of militant proxies. The Pakistan Taliban, the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), shares overlapping membership with those very same groups that target India and, obviously, the Afghan Taliban operating in Afghanistan.

So it can't defeat its own internal security threats, which brings into the question of Pakistan's national integrity and, obviously, its

strategic assets until it is compelled to strategically abandon militancy as foreign and domestic policy tools.

Dr. KHAN. There are two things that I would like to point out, and I want to work on—build on what my colleague here said.

I think, first of all, we need to really honestly ask the question, “Are we the force of stability in the region or not?” It is my understanding that the United States presence in South Asia contributes to the instability in South Asia.

Before we went there, there was no suicide bombing in Afghanistan. Before we went there, there were no two Talibans. And the level of violence was not this level. And we have been there for eight years and things have got continuously and steadily worse.

So I think we need to ask a question that the major military presence of the United States in South Asia—does it contribute to stability?

I consider major U.S. presence, military presence, there as a provocation. It is a provocation not only to the militants but it is also a provocation to the population, which will align itself with the militants.

This concern that we have for nuclear weapons in Pakistan is read entirely differently in Pakistan. It is seen as an attempt by the United States to neuter the Islamic world, which is to deprive the only Islamic country with nuclear weapons of that capacity. So Islamists, radical extremists and even those elements in the Pakistani government which see the U.S. threat to Pakistani nuclear capability continue to play with the extremists.

The Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and others who support the Taliban in Afghanistan do it for two reasons—one, because they sympathize with the geopolitical view which is anti-Americanism and see America as an enemy of the Muslim world, and number two, they also see these as instruments to pursue their geopolitical interests in the South Asia vis-a-vis Kashmir, et cetera.

But I believe that the United States military presence will not contribute to stability. Sending more troops into Afghanistan will provoke more violence. There will be more civilian deaths, which will mean that the extremists will continue to get more support monetarily as well as in terms of recruits.

So we engage for moral purposes or for strategic purposes, the way to do that is not through increasing military presence.

Mr. WITTMAN. Dr. Strmecki.

Dr. STRMECKI. The violence and chaos in that region for the past 25 years has stemmed in large part from Afghanistan being a zone of proxy warfare among the regional powers—Russia, Iran, India, and Pakistan.

And so if we are able to stabilize Afghanistan, to enable it to build institutions so it can defend itself and that it assumes a neutral posture vis-a-vis regional rivalries, then you have kind of put a keystone in an arch of regional stability.

And in fact, if you look back over the history of the last 50 years, a stable Afghanistan produces greater stability in the region.

Moreover, once you have that, you can unlock regional trade. The stable Afghanistan would be a land bridge that would unlock—or it would create an economic zone of more than a billion people and a trillion dollars of aggregate gross domestic product (GDP). Al-

ready you see intrepid truck drivers transiting Afghanistan to start stitching together the old Silk Road routes.

But if Afghanistan is stabilizing and we become engaged with the regional countries in planning the infrastructure to allow regional trade, you could create some win-win situations.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Wittman.

Mr. Nye.

Mr. NYE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to start with one question focusing on Pakistan. I am going to ask this of Dr. Fair and Dr. Khan. And I agree a hundred percent that what happens in Pakistan as that plays out is critical to our ability to have success in tackling the number one U.S. national security objective in the region, which is defeat of al Qaeda in the region.

And what I would like to have your comments on is, Dr. Fair, you suggested very clearly today we need to compel Pakistan to abandon its support of the Afghan Taliban and start to focus on helping us defeat them in Pakistan.

What I would like to ask is for your ideas of how to accomplish that. I suspect that somewhere in the grand scheme our relationship with India, and India's relationship with Pakistan plays a large role in that, but I would like to get both of your thoughts on how would we compel or get the Pakistani government to change their approach, to be more helpful to us in achieving the goal that we are trying to achieve in Pakistan.

Dr. FAIR. I am going to sound like a crazy woman, but let me put a few things on the table nonetheless.

The Kerry-Lugar legislation I think actually rightly identifies that the Pakistan army is as much a part of the problem as it is any solution. And I think it is right to condition security assistance—in fact, I favor a stronger conditionality than that which eventually appeared in that legislation. The problem is it is subject to a waiver.

And as long as we need Pakistan to facilitate the massive logistical support in our—to support our effort in Afghanistan, which will only increase as we increase the troops, you can bet that waiver is going to be applied.

So I think that we need to be much more creative in thinking about negative inducements—sticks, if you will—much more targeted and really increase the political will here in Washington to apply those negative inducements. And obviously, our dependence upon them diminishes that will.

At the same time, I think we need to be much more creative about positive inducements. It is very clear that money alone does not fix Pakistan's chronically neuralgic sense of insecurity vis-a-vis India.

I don't think that what India does or does not do in Afghanistan is going to make Pakistan stop supporting the Taliban. I think we need to think very hard about what is Pakistan's genuine source of insecurity and put some things on the table that might be out-of-the-box.

Let me put one on the table, and it will probably engender snickering. What is wrong with a conditions-based civilian nuclear deal

for Pakistan, a highly conditions-based? They will probably never make any of those conditions.

But in the process of trying, we gain more visibility into their nuclear program, which I think everyone would want to make sure that its command and control is as reasonable as it can possibly get. And some of those conditions could even involve its support for non-state actors.

You could also even imagine working with the Indians and the regional partners to put a security guarantee. If Pakistan really engages in these policies because of fundamental insecurity, let's call their bluff.

So I am not going to sit here and say I have all the answers, but what I can say—a genuine compellence campaign needs much more clever positive inducements and greater political will to apply more clever negative inducements.

Mr. NYE. Thank you.

Dr. Khan, you also suggest in your testimony that we need to incentivize Pakistan to stop pursuing two countervailing tactics at the same time. Do you have ideas of how to do it?

Dr. KHAN. There is one thing that we need to understand. Our interests are not fully in sync with that of Pakistan. There are two threats there, the Taliban and al Qaeda.

Taliban in Pakistan are a threat to Pakistan, not so much as a threat to us. But al Qaeda, who are also in Pakistan, are more of a threat to us than they are a threat to Pakistan.

So what happens is that when we target al Qaeda, we can be indifferent to Pakistani Taliban, and when Pakistan targets Pakistani Taliban, it can be indifferent to al Qaeda. So that is something that we need to understand, that there is a—the lack of sync. We are not fully synchronized in terms of our threats from extremism.

I mean, strangely, our best friends right now are the Pakistani Taliban. By killing civilians in Pakistan, they are generating public opinion against them which is empowering the army to act strongly against the extremists in Pakistan. So the only reason why the military is now operating in Waziristan is because there is public support in Pakistan now.

The U.S. relations with India, the continuing bettering of U.S. relations with India, is a continuing source of increasing insecurity of the Pakistanis, and Pakistanis will not be able to be full allies of the United States if they continue to perceive that India is closer to the United States.

So there are several things that we can do. One of the things that we need to do is to—to provide long-term guarantees to Pakistan, to say that we will never abandon Pakistanis when it comes to India-Pakistan relations, we will not allow a situation in South Asia which will undermine Pakistani interests and advantage India.

We have not convinced the Pakistanis on this score, especially on our deal with the F-16s. The deals are not compatible with India and Pakistan and our nuclear issue. We are favoring one country over the other.

So I think if we can somehow shore up Pakistani insecurity vis-a-vis India and we also convince Pakistan that we will not allow

India to gain the other side of Pakistan, which means allow India to have significant strategic presence in Afghanistan—right now, Pakistanis feel that just as we feel that Pakistan has a—is playing on both sides with the Taliban in Afghanistan, Pakistan feels that America, too, is doing the same thing by allowing India significant strategic presence in Afghanistan, which by—thereby surrounding Pakistan.

So basically, the key is the insecurity of Pakistan, especially the military and the political elite.

Mr. NYE. Okay. Thank you.

Dr. SNYDER. Mrs. Davis for five minutes.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I am sorry I wasn't able to hear everyone's presentations, but let me try and just follow up with that a little bit.

Part of my understanding—and please correct me if I am wrong—is that some of the insecurity would be further increased in Pakistan if we did not try and bring about stability in Afghanistan, that the—that there is a great concern about our leaving, essentially, or not engaging incrementally now in a way that would change the situation on the ground.

And I wonder if you could comment on that, because it—part of it—the real difficulty here is trying to, in an Af-Pak way, understand whether or not it really matters, and the extent to which it matters, what happens now in Afghanistan rather than in Pakistan, where we know a lot of the efforts, a lot of that relationship-building, has to occur given the situation on the ground.

And the follow-up to that, really, is to the extent to which we are—we are secure in the belief that if, in fact, a lot of help occurred in Afghanistan today whether that would really make a difference in terms of the ability of the Afghan army, the law enforcement and the government to be able to actually be a counter to Pakistan in a way that would be meaningful and helpful.

Anybody want to comment on that? Dr. Fair.

Dr. FAIR. Anyway, first, let me just step back regionally. India is over the long term our strategic ally. India doing what it wants and needs to do in the region basically prevents China from consolidating its hegemony. So this is what is motivating the long-term strategic interest with India—is opportunity.

Our engagement with Pakistan is largely framed because we are scared of it, and it actually turns its frightening-ness into an asset, because it says “We are too dangerous to let you fail.”

I don't believe that sending them F-16s or conventional armaments in any way diminishes their security apprehensions about India. It has much more to do with the way in which the region was cleaved. So sending more F-16s, buttressing Pakistan's conventional capabilities against India, isn't going to fix the problem.

And their distrust of the United States doesn't go back to 1989. It goes back to 1962 when we basically armed the Indians vis-a-vis the Chinese.

And I think Americans need to stop this narrative “If we abandon Pakistan.” The fact is we were aligned with Pakistan in the 1980s because of national security interests. They were cut off because they chose to proliferate, and that was more important than F-16s.

Incidentally, they probably made the right decision to go for nuclear weapons over a batch of F-16s. But we need to hold Pakistan accountable for its actions. We didn't simply walk away from the region.

Similarly, India is an actual regional power. We cannot say to India, "Stop being involved in Afghanistan." In fact, to step back, I would argue that India, even Iran, has a lot more in common with us and our interests in Afghanistan than does Pakistan.

Now, it is true that there are probably two camps in Pakistan. There are those that fear the U.S. withdrawing, that there will be greater insecurity. But I assure you the strategic elite in Pakistan would prefer a stable, chaotic Afghanistan than a stable Afghanistan which will most certainly have greater ties to Iran and, in particular, with India.

General EATON. From a military perspective, you isolate the objective. We have not done that in Afghanistan. The free flow across the borders is creating a terrific problem for all military units operating in Afghanistan.

And I really like what I heard Dr. Fair comment on as far as Pakistan and India are concerned.

Dr. KHAN. For a long time Pakistan has used the chaos in Afghanistan as a strategic asset. Pakistan is not interested in stability in Afghanistan because instability in Afghanistan has been a source of tremendous military and financial aid from the U.S. during the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s and once again.

But in the fight with the Soviet Union, Pakistan has benefitted financially and militarily because of instability in Afghanistan, and they continue to do so.

The Pakistani military and the Pakistani political elite genuinely believes that it can manage Afghanistan on its own, and that is why they created Taliban. And they believe that ISI, with its control and links with extremists and the various military groups in Afghanistan, can manage Afghanistan. And if you talk to them now, they will tell you, "We kept Afghanistan very much under control before you came, and it is after the U.S. adventure in Afghanistan that we see that the chaos has been escalating."

So in spite of the fact that Afghanistan produces tremendous amount of refugees who go into Pakistan and are having an impact on Pakistan's social fabric, Pakistan elite believe that Afghanistan is their regional sphere where they would like to have influence. Even though Pakistan has had good relations with Iran, they have not tolerated Iranian interference in Afghanistan.

But what they fear now is that the United States, when it leaves Afghanistan, it will hand over the management of Afghanistan to forces other than Pakistan. It could be Iran. It could be Pakistan. Or it could even bring in other international players such as China and other players.

So Pakistan will continue to agitate Afghanistan in order to have global leverage. Without Afghanistan, they have no leverage.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Hunter for five minutes.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and——

Dr. SNYDER. Incidentally, I should point out——

Mr. HUNTER [continuing]. The opportunity to be here.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Hunter, I should point out, this is former-Marine day on the subcommittee, with Mr. Coffman, yourself and me. You know, we have got them outnumbered, so——

Mr. HUNTER. Semper fi. [Laughter.]

Thanks for letting us be here today to—really appreciate it. I had a lot of specific questions, but I want to get into one. We are not at the ground floor in this debate anymore. We are kind of talking like we are. And my question—one, is we are over there. We are committed. We are on the 50th floor. So what now?

And I don't think that our commanders over there are ignorant of anything you all are saying. I think they all—do you think they are ignorant of this? I think that they have heard probably every point of view.

And the State Department involvement—I was stationed in Afghanistan for my third deployment in 2007, and I just went back over this last weekend. It was fun.

The State Department involvement and the civilian and smart person involvement now with the military in Afghanistan is unprecedented—never happened before. It has quintupled since July, the number of State Department, United States Agency for International Development (USAID) personnel.

And there is a—there is a two-star civilian for every two-star military person now. There is a whole chain of—of command for the civilian side, along with the military side.

Everybody is confident that if they are asking for a troop surge—I mean, that is what everybody is asking for. My question is so what now, then? I mean, there is—we are talking a lot. We are at the 50th floor, not the ground floor anymore.

We are over there. We are committed. Dr. Khan might have us pull out, but not on the basis that we can't win, on the basis that you don't think we will stay.

Dr. KHAN. Yes.

Mr. HUNTER. Right?

Dr. KHAN. Yes, exactly.

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. So what now? That is all I got. And that is the big—what do you recommend if we do want to—so that we can leave at a certain point in the next two to five years and leave it relatively stable, not abandon it totally? We probably will leave troops there like we will in Iraq. But so what now?

Dr. STRMECKI. My view is the end state is you want Afghans defending Afghanistan with us enabling them in the way you spoke.

And so the way to get there is to give General McChrystal a surge that allows him to reverse the deteriorating trajectory of security, particularly in the east and south, and to put the Afghan national security force buildup on a—on a trajectory that allows the build-out of local security to be done by Afghans.

In his report, he didn't give us a timeline in the sense of how long does the surge have to be, so do you get the handover——

Mr. HUNTER. He gave us metrics, though.

Dr. STRMECKI. That is right, he did——

Mr. HUNTER. Right.

Dr. STRMECKI [continuing]. And I think in the portions that weren't made public there probably is more of a timeline.

But I think that is the right template. And so I would give him the resources to execute that if in asking him about the—his template and about his timelines you find that compelling.

Mr. HUNTER. Pro-surge.

Dr. STRMECKI. Yes.

Mr. HUNTER. Okay.

And, Dr. Khan—and caveat your answer with we are not going to abandon Afghanistan—

Dr. KHAN. Okay. I am going to abandon that—

Mr. HUNTER [continuing]. And leave them—

Dr. KHAN [continuing]. Assumption. I am going to abandon my—fear that we will abandon. Based on that, I think we need to look at Afghanistan not as a source of security threat but to look at it as a failed state that we are trying to fix.

And once that whole perspective changes—okay, we are here, we are going to do what is necessary to be done, then you look at Afghanistan as a failed state that needs to be done. So basically our problem here is building state mechanisms so that Afghanistan can become a self-governing unit—very simply it can stand up on its feet.

For that, the last—the first criteria is to be able to secure it, which means being able to isolate Afghanistan from Pakistan. Our ability to seal the border—that the threats from Pakistan do not come back into Afghanistan, and then we can go after all the problems. If we can secure Afghanistan, isolate it from all other threats coming from the Middle East, foreign fighters and Taliban coming in—and then you build. You build state institutions.

And it is not enough to just build the police and the military. But you also simultaneously build confidence in governance.

And if we are there for five, six years, and the population now begins to hope that, “Okay, A, Americans are not going to abandon us and go away, let’s take the risk with the American, we can see things improving, we can see things improving in Kabul, we can see things improving in some parts of Afghanistan”—that success can be replicated in other—I have spoken to people who are fascinated by the changes that have taken place in Kabul.

Kabul has improved significantly. If that can be replaced in other places—but there is one more point that I do want to make about this, and it is—this is to understand that this is not about a security. This is not a war anymore. We are essentially reconstructing a failed state. That would be the other way of thinking about this.

Mr. HUNTER. In interest of—time, I want to get everybody else to answer. So you are pro-surge, too, but not necessarily for counterinsurgency but for isolating Afghanistan—

Dr. KHAN. And then building state.

Mr. HUNTER. Okay, so two pro-surges. Okay.

Dr. Fair.

Dr. FAIR. I am somewhere in the middle. And I think—I—my—

Mr. HUNTER. I am sorry, Dr. Fair, I didn’t hear what your preliminary comment was.

Dr. FAIR. I am somewhere in the middle between these guys.

Mr. HUNTER. Somewhere in the middle, thank you.

Dr. FAIR. I mean, I think we do need to think about a surge, mostly because the training billets for training the Afghan police

and the Afghan national army are massively understaffed. Leaving aside the numbers, we can also talk about the quality.

However, I am not a fan of increasing kinetics. If you were to ask—answer the question that Dr. Strmecki posed, do we have enough troops to meet the kinetic mission, I don't think we do.

Mr. HUNTER. General McChrystal doesn't want more kinetics.

Dr. FAIR. No, no, exactly. So I am certainly of the belief that Afghans have to stand up.

But let me say very clearly this is where the rubber hits the road, with this Afghan government. I am sure you are aware of the Focused District Development Plan, which is a program that is meant to train police to deal with local corruption. So we take the police out, we hose them off, give them eight weeks of training. You can question whether that is adequate, and certainly the people who are training even question their capabilities.

But then we put them right back into the district where you have the same corrupt district governor, the same corrupt provincial governor, and then we are surprised by recidivism.

So this is a really good example of our inability to produce quality Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) because of the corruption in Kabul. So we can't fix that with troops. We simply can't make Karzai do a good job. That is not fixed by troops.

Finally, I do want to raise this issue that never gets discussed. The Afghan government cannot pay for any of the institutions that we are building. It can't even pay for a fraction of it. In fact, it couldn't even pay for its election.

So my concern is that we have—we are essentially building a country that is ever more a rentier state than it has ever been. And I am a realist. Americans are going to stop paying for this. NATO and its contributing countries are going to stop paying for this. And we build a state which is absolutely unsustainable.

And so looking down the 10-year time horizon, that is when it becomes vulnerable again to all of its predatory neighbors. And let's be clear, all of its neighbors are predatory.

So at some point in these discussions, we really need to enter in some discussion of sustainability, unless you are going to make poppy a biofuel.

Mr. HUNTER. But your answer is slight surge. You are——

Dr. FAIR. Yes, but focus on Afghan capabilities, but we have to get the corruption in governance issue. Otherwise we will fail.

Mr. HUNTER. Civilian surge, which is helping with that quite a bit.

Dr. FAIR. Can a civilian surge make Karzai be anything but a corrupt kleptocrat who——

Mr. HUNTER. It could help.

Dr. FAIR. I am skeptical.

Mr. HUNTER. General. I am really short on time, General. I am sorry.

General EATON. Afghanistan can exist as a pretty nice country. It did so in the 1970s. Not a bad place. A whole lot of my generation cruised through there in bell-bottom jeans. So it can be a pretty nice place.

So it can get back there. And if we resource General McChrystal's plan to the degree to moderate risk—and this is a

discussion between the Chief of Staff of the Army and the commandant of the Marine Corps on what those two services can provide General McChrystal.

It is that tension between a plan not established in a constrained fashion, which is General McChrystal's plan, which—and that is his job, to plan in an unconstrained fashion. He has put a bill on the table, and between Department of the Army and Department of the Navy that plan will be resourced. At the same time, the surge in a civilian arena—the rest of the executive branch has to match his appetite for civilian support.

Mr. HUNTER. [Off mike.]

General EATON. Correct.

Dr. KHAN. I just want to add—caveat a reminder to you—remember when Karen Hughes was hired to talk about public diplomacy as an important part of—we are going to win the hearts and minds of the Muslim world?

That year, U.S. defense budget was over \$700 billion, and the public diplomacy budget was \$500 million, and most of it was pulled away for Katrina relief, and she literally had no money to do her job.

And that is my consistent fear, that we might spend hundreds of billions of dollars on the war effort, but we will not commit that kind of same parallel effort in institution-building and state-building.

And given our past record of last eight years in Afghanistan, I really don't feel confident. That is why if you take my word for surge, I want you to have this on record that a surge only on the condition that we are committed to doing the right thing and doing it right.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Coffman for five minutes, and then we will go vote.

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Eaton, when we—we just lost eight soldiers from my state out of Fort Carson recently in north—in a forward operating base in northeastern Afghanistan, a very remote area, very little population in that area.

Ironically, they were ordered to be pulled back prior to the Taliban assault on their position. Where would you draw the line between—given the resources that we have, between what is a counterterrorism strategy versus what is a counterinsurgency strategy?

General EATON. Thank you, Congressman. And I regret every casualty that we are sustaining over there, and—because it is pretty personal from my family perspective.

As I understand General McChrystal's plan, he is going to establish a counterinsurgency approach to operations and he is going to focus on urban areas. If you cannot provide 600,000 soldiers to do a country-wide, by our doctrine, counterinsurgency operation, then you are driven to something less than that, a COIN-lite is the phrase being tossed around out there, where you perform our counterinsurgency doctrine but in smaller places—specifically, urban areas—Kabul, Jalalabad, Kandahar.

So you have got that approach, and I would like to just make one short comment about a letter that was written by the translator for

the New York Times reporter who was rescued and the translator killed in the operation the Brits conducted a few months ago.

He writes from Germany, and he says, "I look forward to returning to my country, Afghanistan, and to leave the manicured parks of Germany and the concrete and the asphalt. I look forward to returning to my village, which is miles from the closest road, where it is natural, where I can once again have the dust of Afghanistan on my boots."

Now, that is a different guy from what General McChrystal is focused on in the urban areas, and I think that the urban areas are a doable approach to counterinsurgency warfare and—or operations—counterinsurgency operations.

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you.

In looking at Iraq, drawing a parallel to Iraq, there was a turning point that certainly involved the surge but a number of other factors that created an environment that brought the Sunni Arab insurgency on board with coalition forces.

In looking at Afghanistan, is there enough outreach to the Pashtun population to be in the Afghan army? And I talked to a Marine Corps general a couple weeks ago in Helmand Province who said that—and granted, there was nobody down there prior to his brigade going down there, but that there was yet to be an effort to create—to recruit the Pashtuns in that particular province.

Is that an issue, anybody?

Dr. STRMECKI. When I have looked at the data, the Afghan national army is relatively ethnic—ethnically balanced at the recruit levels or sort of the enlisted level. There is a little bit of a tilt toward the Tajik community in the officer corps.

But the challenge, really, for the Afghan national army has been scale. We undersized it because there was an assumption when it was designed that there would be a relatively benign security environment, and we were slow to react in increasing the end strength of the Afghan national army as the security situation deteriorated.

I think the kind of outreach that is needed to sort of replicate the Sunni Awakening is really in every locality to understand what is driving the—any support for the insurgency. Is it bad governance? Is it intertribal rivalry that pushes one tribe toward the Taliban? Is it the need to make money?

And if you do that kind of analysis—and General McChrystal's report suggests that this is the kind of thing that he will do—then you can form political strategies to peel people away, peel away what might be called the soft outer layers of the Taliban.

There will be a hard core that you can't change and you will have to target, but I am convinced in many of these areas there are, as Kilcullen wrote, accidental guerillas or incidental guerillas that can be pulled out of the fight.

Mr. COFFMAN. Yes?

Dr. FAIR. One caveat—it is true when you look at the composition it does generally look ethnically distributed. The problem with the Pashtuns is they are mostly coming from the north. There really is inadequate reach of Pashtuns in the south. And obviously, that is where so much of the problem resides.

In addition, it is so easy to focus upon the army, but we have really come across the police as a major issue somewhat late in the

game. For example, I was up in Kunduz as an election monitor. You will have districts there that only have 30 police officers, and—and who knows what those police officers are actually doing.

So while the army is certainly important, I really would like to drive home that it is actually going to be the police that are going to be the element of this strategy that actually does the whole—

Mr. COFFMAN. Well, let me interject with another question on that, because what I noticed when I was in Iraq with the United States Marine Corps is that there were real—that the army—we had a lot more confidence in the army than the police because the army tended to be from another province that came in there.

At night, you know, they would go back to their forward operating base that was separate from the civilian population.

The police tended to be from the community. The insurgents knew where they lived. They could be targeted. Their families could be targeted. They had a tendency not to do their job, and—unless there was adequate security.

But in that interim period, it was very tough, and so I think that—have we overemphasized the police at the expense of the army—

Dr. FAIR. I—

Mr. COFFMAN [continuing]. At this part?

Dr. FAIR. See, I would actually say the opposite.

Dr. SNYDER. Okay, Mr. Coffman, we better let this be your last answer here, since we have got votes.

Dr. FAIR. No, actually the opposite, that we started building the Afghan army, which has actually been relatively successful, and we came to the police too late. The Germans had responsibility for the police and they were a complete disaster.

So I think we can't forget the police, but one interesting side effect was observed as a part of the Focused District Development Plan. When we pull the police out of the district, the Afghan national civil order police go in, and they are a national police.

And interestingly enough, the locals in the district didn't want the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) to leave because they were, in fact, not corrupt. Because of the reason that you noted, they were not embedded in this political web of corruption.

So when I look at Focused District Development (FDD), one of the really interesting lessons learned is that ANCOP has been really successful.

Dr. SNYDER. We have to go vote. We have a series of three votes, two if we walk slow. [Laughter.]

And we will be back. Thank you.

[Recess.]

Dr. SNYDER. We will go ahead and resume. I am sorry that took longer than I thought it was going to. You have been patient. One of the new members was sworn in.

I wanted to ask about the issue of the Taliban in Afghanistan themselves.

Dr. Khan, in your written statement, you say, "To make matters worse, they are proving to be very resolute, cunning, resourceful and brazen." And you know, obviously, they have had some successes. The level of violence has gone up over the last months.

But we can also overstate, can we not, their resources, skills—you know, while they can obviously hurt a lot of people and do violence, I mean, they have some disadvantages, too, compared to other insurgencies.

So I mean, I will address that to you, General Eaton, and then let the rest of the panel—where does the—well, how do you respond to that statement about resolute, cunning, resourceful, brazen and what we think of the fighting force of the Taliban in Afghanistan, what their pluses and minuses are?

General EATON. Mr. Chairman, thank you. From my perspective and talking to soldiers who have been in the theater, all of that is true. Some of the abilities to mass forces and conduct significant operations, 150 to 200 strong, albeit lightly armed, the ability of Taliban to mass—to produce that kind of number without our intelligence systems picking up on it, is worrisome.

And it shows a far more sophisticated Taliban offensive capability than we have seen in the past.

Dr. SNYDER. Anybody else?

Dr. FAIR.

Dr. FAIR. The problem is they have a different bar for success than we do. They don't have to beat us. They only have to keep us from decisively winning.

And I think we would be remiss if we didn't understand that the Taliban, at the very local level, actually do confer certain benefits to their community, albeit at a very high price.

So for example, they do adjudicate disputes. And we are not talking about complicated disputes, but in a rural, agrarian society, family disputes and land disputes are very important. And they resolve them very expeditiously. And of course, the Afghan government has no ability to do that at the national, much less sub-national, level.

They also provide some ballast or some counterweight to corrupt officials, so when you want to get something done, and you have got an official—a corrupt official—a corrupt official getting in your way, you go to the Taliban commander. No one really disputes what the Taliban commanders have to say.

And they also have a jobs and development program called “poppy”. So in some ways, if we could replicate what the Taliban do at the local level, we might be in a position to win.

The problem is we don't have—and I don't just mean we the internationals, I also mean the Afghan government doesn't have the presence at the district level where the Taliban seem to be so effective.

Dr. SNYDER. Yes, Doctor.

Dr. KHAN. A couple of things that I want to point out to you. For example, the amount of money that we give Afghans or the Afghan government pays those who join the Afghan military—is way more than what the Taliban pays those who fight for them. Yet the degree of motivation that is demonstrated by the Taliban in the fight is significantly higher.

There are some analysts who believe that there is a soft core and there is a hard core to the Taliban, and then that not everybody is just as motivated as the hard core of the Taliban, and the less

motivated ones can be peeled away by giving financial incentives and others.

But what is amazing is the amount of motivation that they show—an extremely powerful fighting enemy like either the NATO forces or U.S. forces. I sense that they take their legitimacy for granted, which is something very interesting. When they operate in areas which they control there is no question of whether they are legitimate or not, because they conduct the business of—to tribal rights. They do business as Afghans are used to doing business.

But when they resolve disputes or when they govern there is no question of legitimacy, but when this government sponsored by the United States, Hamid Karzai's government, comes to govern, then it has first got to establish legitimacy in the various areas.

And it finally—I am repeating this, but I think it is important for us to understand that for many Afghans U.S. military presence is a provocation and they see that as an occupation. Taliban driving around in trucks with guns is normal. That is not a provocation. That is not a reason for them to become a fighting force.

But the Americans driving around in tanks with guns is a provocation, and that is difficult for us to overcome. We could have 100,000, 500,000 American civilians there doing various civilian projects. That is not a problem.

Dr. SNYDER. My question is about the capability of the Taliban.
Dr. Strmecki.

Dr. STRMECKI. I think it is possible to overstate the capabilities of the Taliban, though they may be able to mass on a limited basis on some—for some operations or conduct some sophisticated commando operations as a few attacks in Kabul have shown.

Their dominant tactic is the improvised explosive device along the road, and that is a sign of weakness rather than strength, because it is essentially—if you are caught doing it, you are finished.

And so I would say the—what Chris said about the mismatch of their strategy versus our counter strategy up to now, before we move into a more population-centered strategy, is really magnified.

They have gotten everything they can out of their strategy, because they are in the villages. They can intimidate the population. We are—we haven't been. As we move to a COIN approach based on population security, then I think we will see their advantage diminish.

Dr. SNYDER. I wanted to ask on a different question, though—several of you have mentioned NATO either in your written statement or in the conversation today.

I was talking to a European diplomat in the last few days who said that, in fact, he may share some of you all's concerns that—about what is going on but expressed a view that whatever happens, this does not need to be perceived or it be in reality a—seen as a defeat for NATO.

We will start with you, Dr. Strmecki—comment on that, how much of a factor and in what way should that be a factor in our thinking and in the President's thinking?

Dr. STRMECKI. If we were to fail in Afghanistan, I think it would be impossible to insulate NATO and its reputation from such a defeat.

The limitations of other NATO partners in Afghanistan has been a problem with a constant fight over caveats. And so my view has always been that the United States needs to do with the Afghan government what is necessary to succeed.

Any NATO partner that comes along with any capability that they can offer, let's find a niche role in which that country can succeed with its own capabilities. And we have done this well in Regional Command (RC) East.

And it fashions a kind of a soft landing for NATO, which has not shown itself able to operate with the kind of quality and robustness that is necessary to take on this security environment.

So I would look to fashion our own strategy first and then find a way to make NATO succeed as part of it.

Dr. KHAN. [Inaudible] on behalf—the United States. The fact that we are talking about a surge in American troops right now—that NATO has already failed in Afghanistan.

[Inaudible.] They are looking for soft—the United States. They are also—General Stanley McChrystal's report, but—any commitment of additional troops—it is a half-hearted effort—we will not—suggest that NATO is going to fail eventually.

[Inaudible.] The key question—region. If NATO succeeds in Afghanistan—successful or not. But Afghanistan then—then, of course, the failure will be shared by NATO.

Dr. SNYDER. Dr. Fair.

Dr. FAIR. Oh, I very much agree with the comments of Dr. Strmecki, and I would add a further problem. I have visited many of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan, and what is absolutely frustrating about them is that they actually tend to do more what their domestic constituents want rather than what the locals need.

And there is a massive problem with coordination across the PRTs because they are driven by these national actors. So for example, if there is a large infrastructure project that spans multiple provinces, there is really no way of getting all of the PRTs in those provinces to work together. So apart from the caveats, the lack of coordination and synchronization of the international actors are very disturbing.

I am also concerned about some of the specific actors. For example, the security environment in Kunduz has degraded tremendously since 2007, and the Germans still think that they are in a peacekeeping mission, but for those of you who have been following Kunduz, it is—it is really hard to argue that some of the districts in Kunduz actually have peace to keep.

Dr. SNYDER. General Eaton.

General EATON. NATO was established to conduct combined arms, high-intensity warfare. It was not designed—and everybody understood the rules. What we have asked NATO to do now—all the contributing nations—is to line up on the United States' rules of engagement. And the respective political environments in every country frustrate that. So NATO as monolith in the operations that we are trying to conduct in Afghanistan is simply not computing.

Dr. SNYDER. Mrs. Davis.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you again all for being here and for waiting for us to come back. One of the comments that we hear often is that they, meaning the Iraqis or Afghanistan, have to want them—this more than we do.

What do you think are the indications for that if we go forward? What would you suggest is something that is a firm indicator that that bridge is being built?

Dr. FAIR. Corruption. Karzai has his own family members that are deeply involved, allegedly we have to say, in the counter-narcotics trade—or in the narcotics business.

So it seems very strange that we are putting so much money in counternarcotics effort and we know that to some extent, although one can debate to which extent that is, the narcotics are funding the Taliban which, in turn, are targeting our troops.

So I think there is some very specific things that we can expect from Karzai—at a very least—at the very least, cleaning up some of the individuals that he knows personally, governors that he has appointed that have been involved in the narcotics racket.

That would be one example of a very concrete step. So for example, when he pardoned five narcotics traffickers because of tenuous connections to his reelection campaign, that should actually be a pretty strong signal that he doesn't want it as badly as we do.

That being said, at the district level, folks don't want the Taliban around. The problem is, as Dr. Strmecki noted, the Taliban have coercive power, and even if they do confer some benefit, and the high risk of confronting the Taliban and the lack of security for them provided by the state, why wouldn't they simply, you know, acquiesce to what the Taliban is up to?

So what I would like to see is much more leadership coming out of Kabul to deal with issues like corruption, the deep involvement of Afghan officials at the national and sub-national level in narcotics trafficking. These are important steps that they can take to show us that, in fact, they do care about providing a competent government and one that can provide safety for its citizens.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you.

Dr. Strmecki, if I could just—just in counter to that, I thought when you were talking about what we can do to work with President Karzai, it is—I think I picked up that you didn't necessarily see the kinds of actions that Dr. Fair mentioned as good leverage, that that is only, you know, kind of pummeling him but not necessarily trying to engage on a different level. Is that correct?

Dr. STRMECKI. Karzai is a difficult actor to play, because he has some good qualities and some very bad qualities.

And in the time I spent in Afghanistan working with Ambassador Khalilzad, I saw that the ambassador was able to form a relationship where he could move Karzai to do things that Karzai saw as highly risky or potentially against his interest, but he did so in a way by creating confidence in Karzai that the United States was standing behind him and was working with him to manage those risks.

Now, that was several years ago, and Karzai was essentially untethered and didn't have that kind of relationship with subsequent ambassadors and underperformed as a result.

Karzai may have changed and that previous model may not be able to be resurrected, but I saw sufficient promise in that model that I would still test it today.

Mrs. DAVIS. Dr. Khan.

Dr. KHAN. [Inaudible] that both Afghanistan and Pakistan—but the question—talking about—Pakistan or Afghanistan is to fight for American national security—Pakistan and Afghanistan is to fight for a democratic Pakistan and Afghanistan which may—security.

What is interesting is that because of our presence there, it has—there is so much anti-Americanism that even ordinary civilians and citizens who are not affected—for example, Pakistanis who live in Karachi, Pakistanis who live in the United States, in Europe—who are not directly affected by the Taliban and al Qaeda—have this strong desire to see the United States fail.

And anti-Americanism—see the United States fail. They understate the threat to their own society from the extremists. And any place the extremists are operating you will find that there is general perception among people that there are certain benefits that these extremists can provide because the so-called secular governments are all very corrupt.

Hamid Karzai is very corrupt. He is like the mayor of Kabul. He has no leverage outside Kabul. He has no authority and legitimacy unless he is backed by the United States. And now Abdullah Abdullah has completely destroyed his legitimacy.

For the next four years we are going to have somebody there as president who tried to rig the elections, and I don't think he is ever going to be able to redeem that loss of legitimacy.

So across the Muslim world you will see this pattern of secular, pro-Western leaders who are corrupt engaging with Islamist who may be violent and very anti-West in their rhetoric, but when they are in charge they are less corrupt, and they are quick to dispense justice and manage things.

If you are living in a village in—or if you are living in a small village in southern Afghanistan, you might find that the Taliban provide security as well as quick justice and solutions to your problems and the West does not. And the West is working with leaders who they do not like, who are either anti-Islamic or corrupt. And that is a challenge.

So for us to be able to win the partnership of the population in Pakistan and Afghanistan is very difficult. It is further undermined by the death of civilians during the various counterterrorism operations that we conduct.

Mrs. DAVIS. I would like to actually follow up—I don't know, Mr. Chairman—General Eaton, did you have—did you want to comment at all?

General EATON. Only that the military will provide a feedback loop on grading the leadership at every level, and that that will inform the President's decision on how long he is going to tolerate this.

So the best feedback loop that you are going to get is out of General McChrystal's headquarters.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you.

I wanted to just follow up for a second, because part of, I think, the metrics that we think about and going back to the comment that the chairman made earlier about our opportunity to meet with actually women in Afghanistan who are very interested in nation-building—I mean, they are very interested in helping to build a civil society, and educate their children, and have health care and all the things that everybody else in the world wants.

And it seems to me that—I mean, this is a tremendous tension between trying to work with some of those groups that you mentioned, which may, in fact, provide some of that security but yet have absolutely no interest in having half the population participate. How do we deal with that?

Dr. KHAN. Well, there is lot of things that are complicated there. For example—this—called Taliban in Pakistan. But for example, the group that was fighting in Swat has been fighting for what they call—since 1970s—that we now call them Taliban. This problem was separate from the Taliban.

So it is important for us, if we are going to get in there to try to make social change and cultural change and engage with this, to really understand the terrain that we are operating in. And I think we still fully do not understand these groups because we tend to—to clump them together.

I don't think that the Taliban in Afghanistan are the same as the Taliban in Pakistan. And even what they call—

Mrs. DAVIS. Those fighting against the government—

Dr. KHAN. Yes.

Mrs. DAVIS [continuing]. Essentially, right?

Dr. KHAN. But still, the groups which we call Taliban in Pakistan are very different groups with very different goals. Some want to establish Islamic state in Swat and some want to drive America out of Pakistan. Some want to punish the Pakistani government for aligning with the U.S. Some want to fight against India, so there are—different goals that we need.

But to give one example, there are hundreds of thousands of Pakistanis, American citizens of Pakistani origin. There are also, I am sure, thousands of Afghanis who live—in the U.S. We have never mobilized these people to go back and do social work, this non-military work.

They would have lot more credibility. Every time there is an earthquake in Pakistan, we have Pakistanis in our mosque donating thousands of dollars. And I ask them well, why don't you donate thousands of dollars—go there, make a difference.

And if you can have educated Pakistani women who have lived in America, who are—in America, going back there and doing credible social work—I can tell you that if—a western-looking person running a non-governmental organization (NGO) in Pakistan, especially in an area where there are cultural—very tribal—someone who actually belongs to their tribe. And I think that is one thing that we have ignored.

Dr. FAIR. As a woman, I don't want to downplay this, but the lack of rights that women have in Afghanistan is a subset of a lack of rights that everyone enjoys.

And I also have a big problem with this reduction of the problems that women face to that of the Taliban. The fact is women

were liberated only in Kabul. What the Taliban did—they didn't invent this. They simply mobilized this from the societal base from which they themselves emerged.

So simply having Karzai sitting there in Kabul doesn't make everything okay for women. So I mean, I kind of prefer sort of stepping back and looking at this as a problem of human rights writ large for the country, as opposed to making this a women's issue.

I might also add, with the exception of those women that you are engaging, for the most part this discussion about women's rights in Afghanistan is a non-starter. It actually alienates some of our other partners that are otherwise interested in a much larger discourse on human rights in Afghanistan.

So I think there is a peril in reducing this to another fake binary—if the Taliban are there, it sucks to be a woman. It sucks to be woman in Afghanistan, period.

Dr. KHAN. Period. I fully endorse Professor Fair's statement.

Dr. SNYDER. Sorry? All right. Did you want to respond—

Mrs. DAVIS. I think my only response is I think—and it is really not so much women's rights or even human rights. I think it is having people at the table to be part of the solution. And I think that is what has not occurred.

And part of the question is how do we—how do we facilitate that, how do we move that along, so that you don't have, you know, a woman in Afghanistan, for example, at the—in a ministry who has no power, really, with—within the ministry to exact any changes.

And I think that is what we are—what people are searching for there.

Dr. FAIR. Do any of the ministers in any of the ministries have the ability to affect change? There is such a—dependency and I would argue the ones that do have the power are doing the wrong things in those ministries.

Dr. KHAN. I think you should read the letter written by Pakistani woman parliamentarian to Hillary Clinton. I don't know whether you saw that. It is an open letter.

And it will tell you that even those empowered women there will respond probably very similarly, because they don't like this condescending attitude that—especially the empowered women that—okay, first you separate women's rights from everybody else's right, and it sucks to be [inaudible] Saudi Arabia, too, if you have—you know, if you want—right.

So what happens is that we ignore these women who stand up for local rights, like the women who stood up against Karen Hughes in Turkey. We don't talk about them anymore. Or Muslim women who insist on wearing hijab in—either in France or in Turkey.

So what happens is that we look hypocritical on this issue when we ignore men's rights and push women's rights, and then we push women's right only—who are willing to play ball on Western terms and not those who want to stand up for local interests.

Dr. SNYDER. I think that Members of Congress are responding to what they heard from women Afghan legislators. I don't think this should be perceived as American women in positions of power pushing something. I mean, they are reporting back what they heard from Afghan women.

I appreciate your patience. I am going to ask one final question, if I might. My previous question was about the importance of having an unvarnished view of who the enemy is. I think we also need to have an unvarnished view of what attributes and strengths we have. And you all talked about resources, some of those issues.

But I was struck, Dr. Khan—in one of your statements, “In the age of unmanned drones, long-distance relationships are not a bad idea.” I think that we need to be very careful, don’t we, about thinking that somehow because we have the ability of flying drones that that can somehow substitute for human intelligence on the ground or feet on the ground?

I was trying to—I was trying to think about something that would be comparable here, and I guess I go back to the early 1990s when so many cities in the United States had problems with gangs in the streets, and none of us would have felt good to think, “Oh, good news, they pulled all the police cars out, but we got police helicopters overhead at night. Don’t you feel safe now?”

I mean, I think we should be very careful about not—you know, maybe your premise is right, what you advocate that we do, but we shouldn’t kid ourselves, should we, in thinking that we have some drones that we can fly and control—that that is a substitute for General McChrystal’s tactical assessment?

Dr. KHAN. My bigger point there is to make America and its presence invisible, because I think that America’s visible presence, aggressive military visible presence, is a major provocation. It upsets a lot of people. It generates a lot of support for the extremists.

People are more willing to—you know, women are more willing to take off their [inaudible] and donate to al Qaeda in Pakistan because they have seen civilians die and their country is being occupied by a foreign army.

We can talk about this in many ways, but a majority of Afghans and Pakistanis think of us as occupiers.

Dr. SNYDER. But I mean, I will take your premise as—I mean, I suspect that military commanders would love to be able to fight an invisible war. I don’t think that is practical or possible.

You may be able to do an action that would, you know, take out one outpost or one house with a missile attack or a drone and have an event occur that people really didn’t know where it came from. But when you are talking about actually—you are—you know, an—

Dr. KHAN. Well, I am talking only about—

Dr. SNYDER [continuing]. If the U.S. can make its war—I mean—

Dr. KHAN [continuing]. Against al Qaeda.

Dr. SNYDER [continuing]. I don’t see—I don’t foresee how you could conduct a war somehow invisibly, and we would say, “No, that wasn’t us. Those last 27 attacks in the last three hours, that wasn’t us.”

Dr. KHAN. Well, the war I am talking about is only against al Qaeda. And if you notice, my whole argument was that we—we support the Afghans if they want to stand up to the Taliban, because I don’t see Taliban in the long run as—the Taliban were in charge of Afghanistan and—and Afghans did not stand up to them when the Taliban were controlling it.

If bin Laden was not—in Afghanistan and 9/11 had not happened, maybe the Afghans would have been living with the Taliban even today.

That is the point I am trying to stress, is that the Taliban—are very regional—very regional. And they are fighting the U.S. because the U.S. is in their region.

Dr. SNYDER. I am responding to this issue. I mean, we have heard that argument made that—

Dr. KHAN. Yes.

Dr. SNYDER [continuing]. That because we have the ability now technically to fly drones that—

Dr. KHAN. I think that that is the only way we can fight al Qaeda, by locating them and pointing them and destroying their capabilities.

Dr. SNYDER. Dr. Strmecki.

Dr. STRMECKI. I respectfully disagree on a number of points. I do not think that the Afghan people in the majority view us as occupiers. They see us as their indispensable partner to creating a normal country.

I would hate for the United States to come to a point where the symbol of our presence in that region is a Hellfire missile fired from a Predator drone.

And the correct approach to defeating these extremists is with the Afghans and with the Pakistanis to find a positive vision that we hope to achieve in collaboration with them. And a subset of that is the marginalization of the extremism and the defeat of violent extremists.

So you talk to Afghans and—and at the village level and others—and their great aspiration is, “We want to live in a normal country.” So I would embrace that, and I would say, “The purpose for us being here is to help you build a normal country.”

And one of the subsidiaries of that is to create the security forces that enable a normal life to exist. A parallel could exist in terms of what Pakistanis want.

But I think defining that positive vision—and I think that relates also to what—what Congressperson Davis was saying—is, I think, the key.

Dr. KHAN. But what do Afghans mean when they say “a normal country” is a question we need to understand. What is a normal country, where women and—women live according to Islamic principles or they live according to Western principles?

Dr. SNYDER. Dr. Fair.

Dr. FAIR. I have a list of a whole lot of capabilities that we don’t do well, and that I would argue that success, however defined in Afghanistan—we actually need to do better.

You say it is broken. We have all heard the figure, be it 80, 90, or 70 percent, of dollars that are allocated for Afghanistan come back here, so it truly is USAID. The layered contract approach—and it is not just USAID—almost all the national aid programs suffer from the same thing.

A colleague of mine on the Senate Intelligence Committee opines that we don’t have any linguists, which is amazing, and there are a number of reasons for that. Namely, we have the National Security Education Program that actually educates linguists, but they

actually can't get cleared by the government agencies that need linguists.

With respect to the civilian surge, we don't have a Team A. I don't know where the Team A civilians are actually going to be coming from.

The international community, including the United States, has tolerated all sorts of malfeasance and corruption from Karzai and other ministries without consequences.

The PRT model is deeply broken, for the reasons that I have already mentioned. The NATO partners, as we all know, also have a number of problems.

And I am also concerned that over the last eight years we have actually focused too much on building Afghan national security forces. We had this pillared program of vertically integrated activities, and building the ANSF really got the bulk of the political and financial resources.

So we are in a position of, for example, training police, but there is no functioning rule-of-law mechanism. So without a functioning district court, without a prison where you can remand individuals, we have built a security service. We actually haven't built a police service.

I respectfully disagree on the drone issue. The drone issue is not because it is the best option—

Dr. SNYDER. Disagree with who?

Dr. FAIR. With virtually everyone that has talked about the drone issue. This is not the best option, but it is the least worse option, so the Pakistanis lack the capability and the will to deal with the characters that are operating in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).

There are actually multiple advantages of drones. Conceding that it is the—not the optimal option, it does disrupt the al Qaeda cells. It has driven people out of FATA and into the rest of Pakistan, where conceivably they could be arrested.

Of course, the problem in FATA is there are no police. The paramilitary organization, the Frontier Corps, is deeply—how shall I put this?

Dr. SNYDER. I don't think anyone here is arguing that we should not be having that—

Dr. FAIR. Yes, so—

Dr. SNYDER [continuing]. Kind of effort in—to go after al Qaeda. But it was the general statement talking about long-distance relationships as a principle is what I am getting at.

Dr. FAIR. Oh, yes, absolutely.

Dr. SNYDER. You could make a mistake by saying that drones are a substitute for—it would be a lot cheaper.

Dr. FAIR. No—

Dr. SNYDER. It was just—if a drone solves all your problems—but that won't work.

Dr. FAIR. There are, as I said, all these other capabilities we are simply lacking.

Dr. SNYDER. I think that was a good point.

Dr. FAIR. And so how do we win without fixing this laundry list of deficiencies?

Dr. SNYDER. Yes, I think those are very important points. Probably Secretary Gates has been the leading spokesman here the last three years or so about that.

General Eaton, you get the last word.

General EATON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, a total reliance on violence is Mr. Rumsfeld's approach to warfare, and we have seen what that left us. So the use of drone attacks in concert with ground forces, the cop-on-the-beat approach, is prudent.

The presence of ground forces provides the human intelligence that we need to be able to prosecute the counterinsurgency operations that we need.

The feedback that I am getting from soldiers who have served in theater is we are not toxic to the environment, that we provide a service—security—which is the first role of government, and that those who find life in a secure fashion in Afghanistan are appreciative of our soldiers.

And finally, with respect to the civilian surge and some of Dr. Fair's comments on the PRT, there is a failure in this city on our ability to do what the Pentagon does by its nature.

When you go to the Pentagon mission, they take all the assets available to the Pentagon, create a coordinated and integrated plan with a unity of command, and they are able to execute very efficiently.

We are not able to do that with the rest of our departments, so there is no agency that is designed to take command of all the President's assets, all the executive branch assets, in an expeditionary approach so that you task the different departments to provide assets that they respond to an integrated plan that is thoroughly coordinated and deployable.

That is something new since 11/9/89 that the Nation needs to be able to render influence, not just military influence, but to render American influence with everything that we can bring to bear.

Dr. SNYDER. I share your concerns. All right. And I think you stated that well.

Thank you all. I apologize for the prolonged voting period, but we appreciate your time here today, appreciate your service.

We are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:58 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

NOVEMBER 5, 2009

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

NOVEMBER 5, 2009

**Statement of Ranking Member Rob Wittman
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
House Armed Services Committee**

Hearing on Afghanistan and Iraq: Perspectives on U.S. Strategy

November 5, 2009

Thank you, Chairman Snyder, and good morning to our witnesses
– we appreciate your being here today.

Two weeks ago, we heard well reasoned, thoughtful testimony from a panel of four national security experts on this same subject. While they agreed on many aspects of the situation in Afghanistan, there was hardly a unanimous view of what the United States should do next. Today, we have an equally distinguished panel of four witnesses. Given the recent events in Afghanistan, I expect we again will hear thoughtful, but divergent opinions about the best way ahead. That is not surprising; one of the wonderful qualities of our democracy is our free speech and tolerance of divergent views.

National foreign policy however, needs to be clearly stated and firmly executed so that friends and foes alike understand and believe

what the United States is likely to do, and our military commanders and foreign service officers are empowered with a clear sense of mission. When a fundamental shift occurs, strategy should be reevaluated. Has such a change occurred in Afghanistan?

The events in Afghanistan in recent weeks have been dramatic. Within four weeks, the August 20 national election was invalidated, then in effect revalidated, by the withdrawal of President Karzai's principal opponent and the cancellation of the runoff election. Despite the drama, the fundamentals have not changed. We still have a weak central government and a local populace in desperate need of security, the rule of law, and a legitimate economy. In short, fertile ground for the existing insurgency and an effective counterinsurgency campaign.

Even though the basics of Afghanistan have not changed, we still do not have an approved national strategy for the conduct of the war in Afghanistan, despite our deployment of 68,000 US troops; our leading role in the international coalition; and new, experienced military and civilian leadership who have proposed a coherent campaign plan. We cannot continue on this meandering course with 68,000 Americans

deployed in harm's way. We cannot continue to search for a politically expedient compromise or an elusive magic bullet.

Two weeks ago I noted that the President seemed to be in no rush to decide. His spokesman has been saying for weeks that a decision will come within weeks.

I don't pretend to know the right answer. I do know that indecision is the wrong answer. In international affairs, unwavering resolve is at least as important as the details of the plan. The election is over. President Karzai has five more years. Let's figure out a plan to make it work and stick with it.

I look forward to the discussion today.

Major General Paul Eaton

**WHAT DO A LEADER'S OPERATIONS TELL YOU
ABOUT HIS STRATEGY?**

Chairman Snyder, Ranking Member Wittman, members of the subcommittee, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you for the invitation to join you today to discuss a topic that is at once very important to the Nation and is very personal to the thousands of families who send their Soldiers and Marines to prosecute the Nation's wars. To put it into a context, over 200,000 American families wake up and look outside to see if there is a government vehicle with the worst news possible. Every day. So I support this Administration's prudent review of our options in Afghanistan.

It may be best today to be more Socratic than didactic. Detailed analysis and answers to your requests for information are the purview of the Executive Branch, over which you have oversight. I want to suggest to you a number of questions of both operations and strategy which you should be asking, and which I hope and believe the White House is asking during the Administration's review.

Andrew Bacevich, a retired Army Colonel, now Professor of International Relations at Boston University and Author of The Limits of Power wrote for Harper's Magazine this month, "Among Democrats and Republicans alike, with few exceptions, Afghanistan's importance is simply assumed – much in the way fifty years ago otherwise intelligent people simply assumed that the United States had a vital interest in ensuring the survival of South Vietnam. Today, as then, the assumption does not stand up to even casual scrutiny."

So before we begin the debate about numbers of Soldiers and Marines in Afghanistan and subsequent impact on mission there and our mission in Iraq, it would be helpful to answer the questions, "Why do we continue operations in Afghanistan?" or "What do we want Afghanistan to look like in 'X' years?" or "What differentiates Afghanistan from Yemen or Somalia

or Sudan or any other failed or failing states capable of harboring al Qaeda (if al Qaeda is in fact part of the mission)?"

The mission statement will inform the commander's intent, from which the real campaign plan will be known. If you don't know where you are going any road will get you there.

The Administration has to answer the question 'why' before it should answer the 'how'.

The primary rationale I can see to continue in Afghanistan is 60 or so nuclear weapons in Pakistan, the link to regional stability, and the extremist groups operating there. There is an argument, unfortunately harkening back to Vietnam era domino theory, that as goes Afghanistan and its internal fight against extremists, so goes Pakistan. I will leave the answer to the 'why' to the experts.

So if we are convinced that there is a satisfactory answer to the why, then the 'how' is informed by the answer to the second question, "What do we want Afghanistan to look like in 'X' years?" If we are interested in regional stability, then we are talking about counter-insurgency(COIN) vice counter-terrorism. And since we cannot generate the doctrinal 600,000 + troops to take a COIN approach, we are now pursuing what Andrew Krepinevich calls the oil-spot approach – you do what you can, where you can with what you have. That oil-spot will create its own legacy and expand over time, a security zone creating its own prosperity zone. The United States cannot generate the force structure to meet our own doctrinal requirements for COIN in Afghanistan driving us by default, to go to COIN light. Regardless the option our CINC picks, it will be COIN light.

Let's review the components of US projection power. I am going to insist that there are three components, not just the obvious military one. As I told then-candidate Obama when I had the opportunity to meet with him more than a year ago, and he asked me what the Army wanted:

Senator, we want your Secretary of Agriculture to be at least as interested in the outcome in Afghanistan and Iraq, as is your Secretary of Defense." The United States is in serious need of a review and revision of its National Security Architecture. We prosecuted the Cold War with the National Security Act of 1947 and did so brilliantly. The world, however, is now

very much different and we need to bring to bear the enormous talent our government can bring to the battlefield.

With your oversight responsibility, you can help us get there by always insisting that this or any Administration explain the total package. With that said, let me begin with the military piece.

Military:

1. What is your main effort – Afghanistan or Iraq? Once declared, when it comes to sending a limited resource, the main effort gets it. The economy of force gets an alternative.

-Two years ago, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mullen said before this committee, “In Afghanistan, we do what we can. In Iraq, we do what we must. Are we comfortable with a full reversal of that prioritization?”

2. What are the force providers – Army and Marine Corps – capable of providing at what level risk? 10K, 20K, 40K, 80K. Each troop level generates a level of risk to the force. Consider dwell time (Army is 24 months desired). The Chief of Staff Army or Commandant of the Marine Corps needs to respond with the level of risk based on number.

-Marine Corps Commandant Gen. James Conway has said that he cannot add more than 18,000 Marines to current levels in Afghanistan without cutting into their dwell time -- recovery time between deployments.

-The Army, for its part, seeks a balance of 24 months at home for every 12 months a soldier is deployed. The Army has said it can sustain this balance if it has no more than 10 brigades in Afghanistan and Iraq combined. But sending 40,000 or more new troops to Afghanistan will take us to 11 brigades in Afghanistan, and probably more, plus whatever level we retain in Iraq.

3. That risk includes operational and strategic reserves to respond to an in-theater and out theater requirement. Remember, Gen McChrystal’s job is to plan in an unconstrained manner. Adjudication occurs in the Departments.

-What are the contingencies elsewhere in the world that could change the strategic calculus? Specifically, what events in Iraq – and remember, Iraq has elections early next year – could slow or halt the flow of troops, surveillance equipment and other combat support assets from Iraq to Afghanistan?

4. What are the roles and missions of the additional troops? The Commander prioritizes. What do you get with 10K, 20K, 40K, 80K? Risk must get assessed at each troop level.
5. Tell us how you are to reach the necessary troop levels in ANA and ANP.
-Secretary Gates said in September that “the reality is that, even if the president did decide to approve additional combat forces going into Afghanistan, the first forces couldn’t arrive until January.”
6. What is the role of our NATO allies? Are we expecting the British, Canadians, Dutch, and others who have made significant commitments, and sustained significant losses, to keep troops on the ground? If so, how do their troops fit into our new strategy?

The outcome of all this is we can establish zones of security (and zones of prosperity) along Andrew Krepinevich’ oil-spot approach in ‘X’ urban areas. But, without the 600,000 troops that doctrine says would be needed to implement full COIN across the country, it appears that the Administration is headed for an approach that fuses a COIN approach in strategically-chosen urban regions with a less ambitious counter-terrorism approach in large segments of the country that are rural, less populous and of less strategic value.

Economic:

1. What is your master economic development plan? How does it connect to the hopes and priorities of Afghans?
2. How are you resourcing this plan? What and who are the executive branch players? Who is adjudicating challenges? What is the role of our NATO allies, Japan, India and other nations which have offered to assist?
3. Who is in charge?

Political:

1. Macro: What is your plan of engagement with Iran, Pakistan, India, China, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan? What will each provide and why?
2. Micro: If Karzai government is an issue, what is your back-up plan to establish the viable links with a political partner COIN demands. Bottom up (district – province – state) or top down – or both simultaneously? I understand we are doing a province by province and district by district

‘stress test’ to determine where we can anticipate some level of return on our soldier investment.

Bottom line, we have a great preoccupation with the numbers of Soldiers to deploy, without understanding the risks to the Nation this involves or the roles and missions our men and women will undertake.

Every pundit pontificates on 40K or some other number. And has a dogmatic support for his recommendation. We must ask the administration to explain the mission, what it wants Afghanistan to look like at the end of the day – and what the tradeoffs are for our military and our broader strategic goals.

I will end on a positive note from Richard Clarke in his 2008 book, Your Government Failed You:

“If we stop denigrating government and using its instruments as partisan punching bags, if we work in a bipartisan way to rebuild our institutions of National Security, your government will fail you much less; it could even make you proud once more.”

[illegible]

FISCAL YEAR 2008

federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant
N/A entire matrix			

Federal Contract Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government:

Current fiscal year (2010): 0 _____;
 Fiscal year 2009: 0 _____;
 Fiscal year 2008: 0 _____.

Federal agencies with which federal contracts are held:

Current fiscal year (2010): 0 _____;
 Fiscal year 2009: 0 _____;
 Fiscal year 2008: 0 _____.

List of subjects of federal contract(s) (for example, ship construction, aircraft parts manufacturing, software design, force structure consultant, architecture & engineering services, etc.):

Current fiscal year (2010): 0 _____;
 Fiscal year 2009: 0 _____;
 Fiscal year 2008: 0 _____.

Aggregate dollar value of federal contracts held:

Current fiscal year (2010): 0 _____;
 Fiscal year 2009: 0 _____;
 Fiscal year 2008: 0 _____.

Federal Grant Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has grants (including subgrants) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of grants (including subgrants) with the federal government:

Current fiscal year (2010): _____ 0 _____;
 Fiscal year 2009: _____ 0 _____;
 Fiscal year 2008: _____ 0 _____.

Federal agencies with which federal grants are held:

Current fiscal year (2010): _____ 0 _____;
 Fiscal year 2009: _____ 0 _____;
 Fiscal year 2008: _____ 0 _____.

List of subjects of federal grants(s) (for example, materials research, sociological study, software design, etc.):

Current fiscal year (2010): _____ 0 _____;
 Fiscal year 2009: _____ 0 _____;
 Fiscal year 2008: _____ 0 _____.

Aggregate dollar value of federal grants held:

Current fiscal year (2010): _____ 0 _____;
 Fiscal year 2009: _____ 0 _____;
 Fiscal year 2008: _____ 0 _____.

0

**The U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan: Impacts upon U.S.
Interests in Pakistan**

Testimony presented before the United States House of Representatives, Armed Services
Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations on November 5, 2009.

C. Christine Fair

Assistant Professor, Georgetown University, Security Studies Program in the Edmund A.
Walsh School of Foreign Service.

Introduction

After many years of viewing the Afghanistan and Pakistan theatres as distinct if not competing for priority, the Obama administration has inextricably linked the two when it unveiled its White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group's Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan.¹ (This policy has come to be known as the “Af-Pak” strategy.) While this phrase is a useful mnemonic to remind all that the two theatres are in fact deeply linked, the term also—albeit inadvertently—suggests erroneously that U.S. interests in the two countries are symmetric. Yet, U.S. interests in both states vary in important ways.

Contemporary thinking about the “Af-Pak” theatre fostered what Steve Cohen has called a “transitive property of security” which suggests that to stabilize Afghanistan, you must stabilize Pakistan. To stabilize Pakistan, the United States must encourage India to undertake actions in Afghanistan and in Kashmir that will attenuate Pakistan’s strategic anxiety. Ostensibly, this would allow Pakistan to focus away from its conventional Indian threat and focus its attention and resources upon its internal security challenges as Pakistan claims. Proponents of this “regional approach” contend that once Pakistan feels at ease with its larger neighbor, it can abandon its long-standing policy of relying upon militant groups to prosecute its interests in Afghanistan and in India.

In this testimony, I argue that this formulation is flawed and indeed critically inverts the primacy of U.S. interests.

Arguably Pakistan—not Afghanistan—is the epicenter of the most intense U.S. national security interests including regional conventional and nuclear stability, terrorism, and nuclear proliferation. This suggests that, to a great degree, focusing resources upon Pakistan will greatly enable a pacification of Afghanistan and dampen the Indo-Pakistan security competition.

Securing US Interests in the Wake of the Flawed Afghan Elections?

At last, Afghanistan’s electoral fiasco has been resolved. As is well-known, incumbent President Karzai engaged in massive electoral fraud with as many as one million votes “stolen.” The Electoral Complaints Commission disqualified enough ballots that Karzai fell below the 50 percent threshold, precipitating a run-off election against his main competitor Abdullah Abdullah. After Karzai’s initial refusal to accept this outcome and following successful lobbying by the United States, Karzai finally acceded to a run-off election scheduled for November 7. In the past week, Abdullah withdrew citing that the structural features that permitted the fraud in the first instance remained in place. (No doubt his decision was also motivated by the fact that he would lose and, in the process of participating, legitimize a process that would have been deeply flawed.)

Thus, Karzai will remain Afghanistan's president for the next five years having retained his power through a dubious process. The election was symptomatic of the pervasive corruption and impunity that has come to characterize the Afghan government under Karzai.

Karzai's electoral malfeasance and continuance as president despite the fact that he has virtually no credibility throughout country have brought into focus serious cleavages in U.S. domestic political opinion about the next steps forward in Afghanistan. On the one hand are those proponents who argue for a robust counter-insurgency strategy to be resourced with additional troops and other human and financial resources. On the other are those who argue for an increased separation of the counterinsurgency effort from the counter-terrorism effort with the Afghans taking up the primary responsibility for the former while the United States retains its commitment to the latter.

One of the most controversial elements of this debate is the request for additional troops for the Afghan theatre. While the debate over scaling up or scaling down troops has seized the public's attention, reconfiguring the footprint or mission of US and international troops alone cannot address the problem. Commander ISAF General Stanley McChrystal, in his Commander's Initial Assessment of August 30, 2009, lays out the joint problem clearly:

The ISAF mission faces two principal threats and is subject to the influence of external actors. The first of which is the existence of organized and determined insurgent groups working to expel international forces, separate the Afghan people from GIRoA [Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan] institutions, and gain control of the population. *The second threat.... is the crisis of popular confidence that springs from the weakness of GIRoA, the unpunished abuse of power by corrupt officials and power brokers, a widespread sense of political disenfranchisement and a longstanding lack of economic opportunity.* ISAF efforts have further compounded these problems. These factors generate recruits for the insurgent groups, elevate local conflicts and power-broker disputes to a national level, degrade the people's security and quality of life, and undermine international will.²

While analysts and policy makers focus upon the footprint and mission of US troops in Afghanistan because it is *one* of the few things that the United States can directly control, increasingly skeptics of the U.S. ability to win the COIN fight argue that Washington has very little influence over the government in Kabul and lacks the political will and capabilities to persuade Karzai to provide better governance.

Thus if one considers what *can* be done—as opposed what would be ideal to do—victory in Afghanistan is unlikely if “winning” means establishing a competent, reasonably transparent government capable of providing even limited services and increasingly able to pay for itself.

The international community, while it has made numerous missteps, cannot succeed without real reformers at the central, provincial and district levels. General McChrystal, while maintaining that the war is “winnable” conceded the importance of governance and his new strategy calls for a more intense focus upon diminishing corruption among local officials among other course corrections. For this reason, the administration is increasingly looking at sub-national partners and finding ways to “side-step” Kabul and Karzai. However, since Karzai has enormous influence over the appointment of provincial and district-level officials, the success of this approach remains in doubt.

Proponents of scaling up U.S. military efforts in Afghanistan often argue that failure in Afghanistan will spell out a grave future for Pakistan. However, I contend that this formulation reverses cause and effect: Pakistan’s behavior and policies in many ways determine the events and outcomes in Afghanistan and the rest of South Asia.

Pakistan’s Problems: Sources or Results of Instability in Afghanistan?

In 2009, the Pakistan military seemed to embrace vigorous military action to oust Islamist militants who seek to undermine the Pakistani state and who have attacked Pakistani military, paramilitary, intelligence and governance targets. These operations are often characterized as “anti-Taliban.” This terminology confuses because it suggests that Pakistani state has turned its guns on the “Taliban,” when in fact the Afghan Taliban operate freely in the country. Pakistanis, with considerable degrees of justification, blame the U.S. presence in the region for the country’s precipitous internal security situation rather than viewing their insecurity as blow-back from their country’s own national security policies.

Without doubt, the current challenges in Pakistan stem from a number of long-standing policies that have been exacerbated by the post-9/11 events and the onset of military operations in Afghanistan against the Taliban and Al Qaeda.

To fairly assess the significant degree to which post 9-11 events have contributed to the instability in Pakistan, one first has to forthrightly address the long-standing sources of insecurity that have very little—if anything—to do with the events of 9-11 and their sequelae. This section first lays out these long-standing sources of insecurity. Next it identifies new sources of insecurity that have stemmed from post-9/11 developments in the region. Importantly, as the third section notes, these new dynamics are deeply influenced by other enduring sources of insecurity.

Militancy and Pakistan Before 9/11

First, while the militants that have targeted the Pakistani state since 2004 have focused the attention of the world, Pakistan’s reliance upon militants is not of recent vintage. Most contemporary media and even analytical accounts of Pakistan assume that Pakistan first engaged in using militants as a tool to prosecute its foreign policy objectives during

the anti-Soviet “jihad” when Pakistan, along with the United States, Saudi Arabia and others, helped build a massive Pakistan-based infrastructure to produce Islamist insurgents generally known as the “mujahadeen.” In most standard accounts, Pakistan subsequently redeployed these battle-hardened operatives to Kashmir in 1990 when the Soviets formally withdrew from Afghanistan. In fact, Pakistan has relied upon non-state actors to prosecute its foreign policy objectives in Kashmir and India arguably since its inception in 1947 when it backed a tribal lashkar to invade Kashmir, bringing about the first Indo-Pakistan war of 1947-48.³ Following the failed effort to seize Kashmir in 1947, Pakistan supported numerous covert cells within Indian-administered Kashmir.⁴

Second, contemporary accounts suggest that Pakistan began using Islamist proxies to shape events in Afghanistan in 1979 when the United States—along with Saudi Arabia among other states—provided Pakistan with handsome allurements. Pakistan perennially opines that when the Soviet Union left, the United States abandoned Pakistan to contend with a horrific security environment characterized by a massive proliferation of weapons, militancy, an enormous Afghan refugee problem, and a burgeoning narcotics problem among other serious threats.

While Pakistan has paid a heavy price for the Afghan jihad, Pakistan chose to participate in this policy because of the benefits that it accrued rather than altruism. Moreover—and equally important—Pakistan’s interference in Afghanistan did not commence with the December 25, 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Rather, Pakistan began employing those dissident religious leaders who fled Afghanistan during President Daoud’s tenure. Thus from at least 1973 onward, Pakistan began a policy of instrumentalizing Islamist Pashtun militias to prosecute its foreign policy objectives in Afghanistan.⁵ Throughout both periods (pre and post-Soviet invasion), Pakistan preferred militant factions that were outwardly Sunni Islamist (rather than Shia or secular) in orientation and Pashtun in ethnicity. This was a deliberate effort to ensure that Pashtun political aspirations would be channeled through religious—not ethnic—terms. This was motivated by Pakistan’s long-standing discomfiture with Kabul’s irredentist claims to Pakistan’s Pashtun areas and by the activities of Pashtun nationalists demanding a separate Pashtun state (Pashtunistan).⁶

The purported military success of using “mujahadeen-cum-guerillas” in Afghanistan to defeat a nuclear-armed super-power buoyed Pakistan’s confidence in the utility of such war in India. In addition, the “jihad” in Afghanistan produced many battle-hardened jihadis and a sprawling infrastructure to produce jihadis. Thus, with the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, Pakistan redeployed many of those “mujahadeen” to the Kashmir front. Many of those Pakistan and Afghanistan-based groups directly competed with Pakistan’s previous client proxies which tended to be more ethnically Kashmiri in composition. By the early 1990s, some of these proxies (e.g. the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Force) were no longer supporting unification with Pakistan and were espousing ethno-nationalist demands for independence. After the introduction of “foreign fighters,” many indigenous, pro-independence Kashmir insurgents were eliminated by Pakistan-based group such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and a raft of Deobandi groups (e.g. Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, Harkat-ul-Jihad Islami, etc). By the mid-1990s, the conflict had

been over-run by several Pakistan-based militant groups (referred to by the misnomer “guest militants”) who were prosecuting Pakistan’s agenda of weakening India and wresting Kashmir from it.⁷ At present, only one set of militant groups are largely Kashmiri in ethnicity (Hizbol-Mujahideen and related factions such as al Badr). All of the other groups are dominated by Punjabis and Pashtuns.⁸

While Pakistan has had a long history of using Islamist militants as proxies, the determination that Pakistan had crossed nuclear red lines in the 1980s (as evidenced by the fact that aid could be delivered only by waiving nonproliferation sanctions), likely further emboldened Pakistan to act with impunity. Thus it is likely *not* a coincidence that it began spreading the “jihad” with Pakistani militants after having been designated as a covert nuclear power in 1989 when the United States finally applied proliferation-related sanctions (e.g. the Pressler Amendment). (India essentially became an overt nuclear power following its first explosion of devices in 1974). However, following the 1998 tests, Pakistan extended further its policy of proxy war by launching a limited incursion in Indian-administered Kashmir to seize a small amount of territory in the Kargil-Dras sectors.⁹

These long-standing policies are responsible for a variety of regional threats that persist to date including Pakistan’s ongoing support for the Afghan Taliban as well as a number of other Islamist militant groups that continue to operate in India as well as Afghanistan.¹⁰ However, as will be described below, these long-standing policies exacerbate more recent developments.

9/11 and Operation Enduring Freedom: Transformative Events¹¹

While these historical tendencies cannot be denied, nor can the adverse affects of regional events after 9/11. First and foremost, 9/11 and the concomitant U.S.-led military effort (Operation Enduring Freedom or OEF) required Pakistan to both abandon the Afghan Taliban—even if that U-turn was imperfect and temporary—under consistent U.S. pressure. Pakistan was also pressed to provide wide-spread logistical and other support to OEF. In the end, Pakistan contributed to OEF in two major ways. First, it permitted over-flight and landing rights for U.S. military and intelligence units; allowed access to some Pakistan bases; provided intelligence and immigration information; cut off most logistical support to the Taliban; and broke diplomatic relations with the Taliban. Second, Pakistan using military, paramilitary and intelligence assets conducted operations along infiltration routes from Afghanistan to Pakistan in support of U.S. actions across the border.¹² Pakistan is generally credited with cooperating against al Qaeda and supporting U.S. efforts in Afghanistan, even though it adamantly demurred from operating against the Afghan Taliban, whose leadership still enjoys sanctuary in Pakistan.

As is well known, during the course of military operations in Afghanistan, Afghan Taliban, al Qaeda operatives and other “foreign fighters” fighting in Afghanistan along side the Taliban (e.g. Uzbeks among others) made their way to Pakistan where they

ensconced themselves in Pakistan's tribal areas. There, they benefited from Afghan Taliban redoubts such as that of Jalaluddin Haqqani, an ally of the Afghan Taliban.

Under U.S. pressure, Pakistan began a series of operations in the tribal belt as early as 2002 in the north without significant consequence. When the army along with the paramilitary force, the Frontier Corps, began operations in South Waziristan in 2004, it found strong resistance from al Qaeda and other foreign elements there. Those operations ended in defeat, ratified by the first deal with militants, the Shakai Accord.¹³

From 2004 onward, several Islamist militant groups emerged who attacked security forces, ousted local administration officials and successfully established micro-emirates of *sharia* within their areas of operation. This occurred first within the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).

This nascent "Pashtun insurgency" gained more momentum as Pakistan launched more offensives in FATA and as the United States struck targets in FATA using un-manned aerial vehicles. The 2006 U.S. drone strikes in Damadola, Bajaur to eliminate Ayman al-Zawahiri and the October 2006 drone strike against an al Qaeda-affiliated madrassah in Chingai village in Bajaur were widely seen as the catalyst for the suicide attacks against security forces in FATA and NWFP. This madrassah in Chingai was run by the Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), a Sunni militant outfit founded by Sufi Mohammad. Mohammad dispatched 8,000 volunteers into Afghanistan to fight the Americans and Northern Alliance in support of the Taliban during Operation Enduring Freedom. While Sufi Muhammad was jailed, his militant son-in-law, Mullah Fazlullah took over the organization. Sufi Mohammad's deputy, Maulvi Liaquat, died in the Chingai attack.¹⁴

In late 2007, several of these commanders coalesced under the banner of the Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan (TTP) under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsood. (Mehsood was killed by a U.S. drone strike in August 2009.) Mehsood claimed many allies, all of whom he sought to establish in various degrees *sharia* across the Pashtun belt. Following the death of Baitullah Mehsood, TTP leadership announced amidst some discord that Hakimullah Mehsood would succeed him. It remains to be seen how cohesive the TTP will be under his leadership.¹⁵

While the so-called Talibanization of the tribal areas was initially limited to North and South Waziristan, the phenomenon next spread to Bajaur. The Pakistan Taliban next emerged in areas that had previously been peaceful, such as Mohmand agency, Orakzai, and Kurram. They also emerged in the settled Pashtun areas of Bannu, Tank, Kohat, Lakki Marwar, Dera Ismil Khan, and Swat.¹⁶

There are several reasons that account for the successes of the TTP. Militant groups associated with the TTP effectively exploit weakness of the Pakistani state and governance at the local level, mobilize specific socio-economic grievance in their areas of operation; and gain legitimacy by countering—often violently—those officials who perpetuate the corruption-riven governance structures in the FATA and elsewhere. The

TTP's spread has also come about due to the complete failure of the state to provide a modicum of security to those who resist the Taliban, coupled with the excessive use of force by the Pakistan army against the Pakistani Taliban. Local populations may choose to acquiesce to the local Taliban in part because of the benefits they confer and in part due to the high cost incurred by confronting or opposing them.

Convergence of New and Old Islamist Militant Groups¹⁷

In April 2009, news reports asserted the arrival of the "Punjabi Taliban," referencing the various militant groups ensconced in the Punjab, the most populated province.¹⁸ While it is tempting to view this as a new theatre or even as a future locus of Talibanization in the heartland of the Punjab, these sites of militancy are inter-related. Punjab-based groups such as the Deobandi Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JM) are allies of the TTP, the Afghan Taliban and al Qaeda. These groups have conducted suicide attacks in Pakistan on behalf of the TTP and have served as al Qaeda outsourcers in numerous attacks in Pakistan since 2001. JM leader Masood Azhar was also close to the Taliban. JM, which shares considerable membership and infrastructure with LeJ, was the first South Asian Islamist group in to use suicide attacks in the region. In that 2000 attack, Mohammad Bilal (a British Pakistan) attacked the Indian Army headquarters in Srinagar.¹⁹

Since late 2001 and 2002, many of Pakistan's militant groups – particularly those of Deobandi background – have splintered or have reoriented in terms of targets and tactics. Many of the Deobandi groups are tightly allied to the Afghan and Pakistan Taliban as well as al Qaeda and are increasingly aiming their resources at the Pakistani state even though some elements within these same groups continue to enjoy various levels of formal and informal state support.

These networked relationships underscore the deeply vexing problems with Pakistan's variegated approach towards the elements of its militant landscape. Pakistan cannot truly eliminate even those groups it views as the enemy because it still insists that other militant groups are assets. Pakistan has demonstrated considerable willingness to tolerate near-term risks associated with using militant proxies for the anticipated future battle against India, be it in India or Afghanistan. Pakistan's efforts to maintain some militant groups while pursuing others is a near impossible path to take because many of the Deobandi groups, as noted above, have overlapping membership.

Compelling Pakistan

The United States should continue to support Pakistan's efforts to counter its own enemies. Indeed, Pakistan's operations *do* advance U.S. interests in key ways because these militants provide sanctuary to and otherwise assist both al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban. However, it should be noted that these are "positive externalities" rather than deliberate outcomes of Pakistan's operations. However, Pakistan does not share U.S.

interests vis-à-vis the Afghan Taliban and a host of other militant groups operating in and from Pakistan. As noted above, Pakistan can safely rely upon militant proxies because its nuclear umbrella raises the cost of conventional military action against it.

Pakistan has not and likely will not abandon these policies in any policy-relevant future principally because it views these policies as the best option, given its neuralgic security concerns regarding India's intentions and capabilities. This understanding has given rise to the notion that India can undertake actions that can mitigate Pakistan's apprehensions.²⁰ However, as India sees itself as an extra-regional power and an emerging global power, India is unlikely to take steps that, from its optic, would reward Pakistan for using terrorism. Moreover, this formulation misdiagnoses the problem. The two states' inability to resolve the Kashmir impasse is symptomatic not causal of the deep distrust that exists between the two states. Moreover, Pakistan's beliefs about India transcend the Kashmir issue. These fears are likely to become more acute as India continues its defense modernization buoyed by its economic growth, deepens ties with Pakistan's neighbors, and continues to enjoy strategic ties with the United States, Israel, and Russia among other countries. In contrast, Pakistan's economic woes, its concatenation of governance crises, past nuclear proliferation, and other dangerous policies threaten to again isolate Pakistan as a continuous source of international insecurity.

A hard assessment of Pakistan's behavior suggests a compellence problem whereby the United States must recondition Pakistan's perceptions of the costs and benefits of its current policies both through the development of new political and financial allurements as well as new negative inducements. U.S. abilities to engage in a compellence campaign against Pakistan are highly restricted by its reliance upon Pakistan to prosecute the war in Afghanistan. The logistical supply lines move through Pakistan and this dependence upon Pakistan will deepen as more troops enter the Afghan theatre.

Pakistan's preference that Afghanistan remains unstable rather than strong and allied to India prompts Pakistan to pursue those very policies that foster the current security situation. Perversely, Pakistan has been handsomely rewarded to facilitate the war on terror while dramatically undermining the same.²¹ Admittedly, the insurgency in Afghanistan is sustained by numerous problems with the Afghan government as well as with the international military presence there. However, it is also undeniable that Pakistan's continued support to insurgents contributes to the deepening security crises in Afghanistan that continue to absorb U.S. and international financial and human resources.

Conclusions: What Are the Options?

While the United States government and public reconsiders the modalities of U.S. commitment in Afghanistan due to severe shortcomings in its partnership with Karzai, U.S. commitments in Afghanistan continue to be undermined by a wider suite of Pakistani policies despite Pakistan's military commitments to eliminate the Pakistan Taliban.

Arguably, to be successful in Afghanistan, the United States needs real partners in Kabul and Islamabad. If the past is any predictor of the future, such partners are unlikely to materialize any time soon. Moreover, Panglossian assessments of what the United States *should* do to influence political will in these capitals overshadow what *can* be done in practice.

I recommend reformulating and repositioning U.S. interests in Afghanistan and Pakistan to identify Pakistan as the most critical locus of grave U.S. national security challenges. This likely requires one to consider how United States can protect its interests in the region without a decisive defeat of the Afghan Taliban in the near-term while hoping to persuade Pakistan to cease interfering in Afghanistan over the long-term. This is surely a necessary if insufficient condition for Afghanistan to stabilize. Such reorientation may involve greater focus upon counter-terrorism rather than counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan while continuing to focus upon building Afghan national security forces. This would allow the United States overtime to decrease its kinetic footprint in Afghanistan and lessen its requirement for Pakistan for logistical support.

Second, securing Afghanistan and stabilizing the region will require the United States, working with international partners, to create space to compel Pakistan to cease supporting all militant groups operating on its territory over a reasonable timeframe. Surely, this will require the United States to diminish its reliance upon Pakistan to fight the war in Afghanistan. Without doing so, Washington will be unlikely muster the political will to apply negative inducements. Negative inducements alone will not succeed: Washington must also consider new positive inducements. The last six decades demonstrate the financial and military assistance is unlikely to change Pakistan's cost benefit calculus away from supporting Islamist militants. This will also require the United States to seriously invest in Pakistan's civilian institutions to improve the likelihood that rule of law has any future in Pakistan.

The presence of U.S. and international military and civilian personnel in Afghanistan focuses policy upon that theatre. However, Pakistan-based militants have precipitated a near war situation in 2001-02 and stoked fears of a conventional Indo-Pakistan conflict with possible nuclear escalation. The international community worried that the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attack would precipitate a similar crisis. Few are confident that India will countenance a future attack on the scale of Mumbai. Moreover, Pakistan's militant groups pose threats not only to the region but also to the international community. Recall that Pakistan was also a key state in the perpetration of the 9/11 attacks. And Pakistan has been the source of significant nuclear technology proliferation, the fruits of which are evident in the proliferation crises in Iran and North Korea.

In conclusion, the United States should realistically reconsider its prioritization of the Afghan and Pakistan theatres in light of the limits of U.S. resources and capabilities. Certainly, successfully prosecuting a counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan is no doubt preferable to any other outcome. However, given that this may not be possible, Washington should consider finding a realistic way of jointly optimizing the need to

secure its paramount interests in Afghanistan and in Pakistan even if this means scaling down its commitments in Afghanistan to permit greater clarity of policy and action in Pakistan.

Biography

C. Christine Fair has a PhD from the Department of South Asian Languages and Civilization in 2004 and an MA in the Harris School of Public Policy. Prior to joining the Center for Peace and Security Studies (CPASS), within Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, she has served as a senior political scientist with the RAND, a political officer to the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan in Kabul, and as a senior research associate in USIP's Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention. Her research focuses upon political and military affairs in South Asia. She has authored, co-authored and co-edited several books including *Treading Softly on Sacred Ground: Counterinsurgency Operations on Sacred Space* (OUP, 2008); *The Madrassah Challenge: Militancy and Religious Education in Pakistan* (USIP, 2008), *Fortifying Pakistan: The Role of U.S. Internal Security Assistance* (USIP, 2006); among others and has written numerous peer-reviewed articles covering a range of security issues in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. She is a member of the International Institute of Strategic Studies, the Council on Foreign Relations, serves on the editorial board of *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, and served as the Managing Editor of *India Review* from January 2007 to November 1, 2009.

¹ See U.S. White House, *White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group's Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan*, March 27, 2009. Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Afghanistan-Pakistan_White_Paper.pdf.

² Commander NATO International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, *Commander's Initial Assessment*, August 30, 2009. Redacted version available at http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf.

³ For various accounts, see Shuja Nawaz, *Crossed Swords* (New York: OUP, 2008); Shuja Nawaz, "The First Kashmir War Revisited," *India Review*, Vol. 7, No. 2 (2008), pp. 115-54; Robert G. Wirsing, *India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir Dispute: On Regional Conflict and its Resolution* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994).

⁴ The most detailed account of this is given by Praveen Swami, *India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad: The Covert War in Kashmir, 1947-2005* (London: Routledge, 2007). Swami used a number of classified Indian documents (which were subsequently declassified) obtained in his capacity as a journalist. See also Sumit Ganguly, *The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes of Peace* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

⁵ See Barnett R. Rubin, *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002) and Rizwan Hussain, *Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Democracy in Afghanistan* (Burlington VT: Ashgate, 2005).

⁶ See Rubin, *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan* and Hussain, *Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Democracy in Afghanistan*.

⁷ See *inter alia* Swami, *India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad*; Alexander Evans, "The Kashmir insurgency: As bad as it gets," *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Vol. 11, No. 1, Spring 2000, pp. 69-81; Ahmed Rashid, *Descent into Chaos* (New York: Viking Penguin, 2008). See also Sumit Ganguly, "A Mosque, A Shrine, and Two Sieges," in C. Christine Fair and Sumit Ganguly Eds. *Treading on Hallowed Ground: Counterinsurgency in Sacred Spaces* (New York: Oxford, 2008), pp. 66-88.

⁸ See C. Christine Fair, "Who Are Pakistan's Militants and Their Families?" *Terrorism and Political Violence* (2008) and C. Christine Fair, "Militant recruitment in Pakistan: Implications for Al-Qa'ida and Other Organizations," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 27(6) (November/December 2004).

⁹ See Ashley J. Tellis, C. Christine Fair, and Jamison Medby, *Limited Conflicts Under the Nuclear Umbrella* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2002).

¹⁰ Both LeT and several Deobandi militant groups have also been operating in Afghanistan against U.S., NATO, and Afghan forces. See C. Christine Fair, "Antecedents and Implications of the November 2008 Lashkar-e-Taiba Attack Upon Mumbai," testimony presented before the House Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection on March 11, 2009.

¹¹ This section draws from two publications, Christine Fair, "Pakistan's Own War on Terror: What the Pakistani Public Thinks," *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 63, No. 1, Fall/Winter 2009 and Christine Fair and Seth G. Jones, "Pakistan's War Within," *Survival*, forthcoming November 27, 2009.

¹² For a detailed account of Pakistan's contributions, see in C. Christine Fair, *The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with India and Pakistan* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2004). For a detailed account of Pakistan's varied operations against militants since 9/11, see Fair and Jones, "Pakistan's War Within."

¹³ For details about this and the other deals, see Fair and Jones, "Pakistan's War Within."

¹⁴ While drone strikes were at first infrequent, they have become more routine. Between August 2008 and April 1 2009, there were at least 30 drone strikes which may have killed as many as 300 people. While the political leadership complain about this, it is widely believed that the targeting of militants in FATA is done with the tacit knowledge and input from the Pakistan army. public displays of outrage notwithstanding. See "Many killed in 'US drone Attack,'" *BBC News*, April 1, 2009. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7975871.stm. Also see Tom Coghlan, Zahid Hussain, Jeremy Page, "Secrecy and denial as Pakistan lets CIA use airbase to strike militants," *The Times*, April 17, 2009. Available at <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article5755490.ece>.

¹⁵ Long-time observer of militancy in Pakistan, Mariam Abu-Zahab, strongly discounts the claims that the TTP is a coherent alliance. She argues that the constituent parts of this inchoate alliance are driven by local factors and constrained, in good measure, by tribal boundaries and leadership circumscribed by this boundary. Thus she discounts the most capacious claims that the TTP is a coherent organization running the length and width of the Pashtun belt. This view has been buttressed by field interviews in Pakistan in February and April, 2009. A number of commanders operate in specific agencies, such as: Mullah Nazir (South Waziristan), Hafiz Gul Bahadur (North Waziristan), Mangal Bagh (Khyber) Mullah Fazlullah (Swat), Faqir Mohammad (Bajaur), Sufi Mohammad (Lower Dir), and Hakimullah Mehsood (South Waziristan, successor to slain Baitullah Mehsood). In addition, foreign fighter networks are also active, including al Qaeda and several of its key commanders (such as Ayman al-Zawahiri and Mustafa Abu al-Yazid) and the recently killed Uzbek fighter Tahir Yuldashev.

¹⁶ C. Christine Fair, "Pakistan Loses Swat to Local Taliban," *Terrorism Focus*, 4(37) (2007).

¹⁷ This section draws from two publications, Fair, "Pakistan's Own War on Terror: What the Pakistani Public Thinks," and Fair and Jones, "Pakistan's War Within."

¹⁸ See Sabrina Tavernise, Richard A. Oppel Jr. And Eric Schmitt, "United Militants Threaten Pakistan's Populous Heart," *New York Times*, April 13, 2009. Available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/14/world/asia/14punjab.html>.

¹⁹ Author interviews with Pakistani journalists and terrorism analyst in February 2009. Also see Emma Brockes, "British man named as bomber who killed 10," *The Guardian*, December 28, 2000. Available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2000/dec/28/india.kashmir>.

²⁰ This argument has been elaborated by Barnett R. Rubin and Ahmed Rashid, "From Great Game to Grand Bargain: Ending Chaos in Afghanistan and Pakistan," *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 87, No. 6 (November/December 2008)

²¹ See U.S. Government Accountability Office, "Combating Terrorism: U.S. Oversight of Pakistan Reimbursement Claims for Coalition Support Funds," GAO-08-932T, June 24, 2008, <http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-932T>; U.S. Government Accountability Office, "The United States Lacks Comprehensive Plan to Destroy the Terrorist Threat and Close the Safe Haven in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas," GAO-08-622, April 2008, <http://nationalsecurity.oversight.house.gov/documents/20080417120235.pdf>; Craig Cohen, *A Perilous Course: U.S. Strategy and Assistance to Pakistan* (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 2007); Craig Cohen and Derek Chollet, "When \$10 Billion Is Not Enough," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Spring 2007); Greg Miller, "Pakistan Fails to Aim Billions in U.S. Military Aid at al Qaeda," *Los Angeles Times*, November 5, 2007, p. A1.

[illegible]

FISCAL YEAR 2008

federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant

Federal Contract Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government:

Current fiscal year (2010): _____;
 Fiscal year 2009: _____;
 Fiscal year 2008: _____.

Federal agencies with which federal contracts are held:

Current fiscal year (2010): _____;
 Fiscal year 2009: _____;
 Fiscal year 2008: _____.

List of subjects of federal contract(s) (for example, ship construction, aircraft parts manufacturing, software design, force structure consultant, architecture & engineering services, etc.):

Current fiscal year (2010): _____;
 Fiscal year 2009: _____;
 Fiscal year 2008: _____.

Aggregate dollar value of federal contracts held:

Current fiscal year (2010): _____;
 Fiscal year 2009: _____;
 Fiscal year 2008: _____.

Federal Grant Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has grants (including subgrants) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of grants (including subgrants) with the federal government:

Current fiscal year (2010): _____;
Fiscal year 2009: _____;
Fiscal year 2008: _____.

Federal agencies with which federal grants are held:

Current fiscal year (2010): _____;
Fiscal year 2009: _____;
Fiscal year 2008: _____.

List of subjects of federal grants(s) (for example, materials research, sociological study, software design, etc.):

Current fiscal year (2010): _____;
Fiscal year 2009: _____;
Fiscal year 2008: _____.

Aggregate dollar value of federal grants held:

Current fiscal year (2010): _____;
Fiscal year 2009: _____;
Fiscal year 2008: _____.

**WRITTEN TESTIMONY TO HOUSE ARMED SERVICES
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS**

US Strategy in Afghanistan and its relation to Iraq
210 House Visitors Center, November 5th, 2009 at 10.30 AM

Dr. M. A. Muqtedar Khan
Director of Islamic Studies, University of Delaware

Introduction: The Iraq War undermined US efforts in Afghanistan.

I want to begin by thanking Chairman Vic Snyder and other members of the committee for inviting me to testify to this august body once again. It is always an honor to participate in the deliberations that shape our national policies.

I believe that US strategy in Afghanistan was fatally undermined by the decision of the previous administration to wage an unnecessary and bigger war in Iraq even before our goals and objectives were realized in Afghanistan. The war in Iraq has exhausted our resources – it has cost seven hundred billion dollars in direct costs – lead to 4355 American military fatalities, nearly 250 civilian fatalities, 31,000 wounded, caused a global pandemic of Anti-Americanism and undermined the legal and moral underpinnings of the global order that the United States had constructed and nourished since 1945. For many Iraqis it has proven to be devastating; causing hundreds of thousands of deaths and refugees.

It also diverted resources and focus away from Afghanistan. Most importantly, the unnecessary war in Iraq has sapped the American resolve to wage long wars that involve insurgencies and nation building. The War in Iraq has made it very difficult for our President to go to the American people and say what he must: “We need to stay in Afghanistan for a long time. We need to spend billions of dollars and perhaps lose many more American lives in order to finish in Afghanistan what we started eight years ago.”

The US at the moment is spending about 8 billion dollars a month in Iraq and we are maintaining about 120,000 troops in Iraq. We will sustain this level of American military presence until the elections in January next year. President Obama’s promise to reduce our presence there significantly will depend on the outcome of the elections and the resolution to the political crisis that is still unresolved in Iraq. Needless to say the commitment to Iraq impacts our ability to increase spending and our military footprint in Afghanistan.

Surely a poor country like ours that needs to debate and agonize for months over whether we can afford to pay for the health care of our poor and underprivileged brethren cannot afford to fight two wars of indefinite duration and unlimited costs.

Assessing the Status of the War in Afghanistan

I have bad news for this committee. I believe that the US at the moment does not have the political will nor the public understanding and commitment to do what is necessary in Afghanistan. At the moment the public support for the war in Afghanistan stands at 40%. With the current spike in casualties, the growing political crisis that started with the malpractices in the Presidential elections, I suspect public support will decline further. It will become difficult for both the White House and the Congress to do what is necessary.

To win it all in Afghanistan, the US will need to (1) control the Afpak border and completely eliminate the ability of the Taliban to cross borders when things get tough on either side, (2) undermine their recruitment and fund raising (3) win the hearts and minds of the Afghan people to such an extent that they are motivated to stand up to the Taliban and take risks to realize the dream of a democratic Afghanistan (4) and create significant positive changes on the ground that progress can seduce the Afghans away from war and hate. But to realize these objectives with minimal civilian casualties the US will need more troops, more civilians, and far more commitment to Afghanistan. We must convey the intent and resolve that the US is there to do the right thing and to do it right. Half measures will cause more damage and make it impossible for the US to achieve even its minimal goals.

The stated goal of the Bush administration for invading Afghanistan was to capture or kill, Osama Bin Laden, destroy al Qaeda and make sure that Afghanistan was no more a safe haven for terrorists. In a sense these goals have been achieved partially. Al Qaeda is no more in Afghanistan. It has significantly diminished in its capacity and it is difficult to expect it to pull off another major attack on the US soil. But on the other hand Al Qaeda has relocated to Pakistan and has operational bases in Iraq, Yemen and Somalia from where it can launch attacks albeit with limited range but nevertheless it continues to reconstitute itself in different forms, in different locales and also using different *modus operandi*. Bin Laden is still not in our custody. Anti-Americanism in the Muslim world and overall discontent with political realities will have to decrease in great measure before demands for groups such as al Qaeda and its affiliates completely ceases in the Muslim World.

The goal to destroy the Taliban and make Afghanistan safe for us and safe for democracy has really failed. Afghan democracy is a joke and the Taliban in a hydra like fashion have reproduced themselves in Pakistan and rejuvenated themselves in Afghanistan. We now have two Talibans.

The Taliban in Afghanistan have in the last one year nearly quadrupled their numbers, going from 7000 to over 25000, according to US intelligence. The Taliban fighters have also become more aggressive and effective in their ability to engage western forces. They are using IEDS more effectively and are getting better at making and hiding them. While their numbers have increased four times, their military activities have increased hundred times. British sources reveal that now British forces have to fight the Taliban seven times a day!

To make matters worse, they are proving to be very resolute, cunning, resourceful and brazen. In the past few weeks, they have attacked the Pakistani army's national head quarters, they have blown up the Indian mission in Kabul, attacked an Italian Patrol, attacked a NATO patrol in Kabul, and attacked a US military base in Kamdesh causing heavy casualties and eventual closure of the base. They have killed hundreds of soldiers and civilians on both sides of the borders. The year 2009 has become the deadliest for US and for Pakistani soldiers and citizens.

The only good news is that the election of President Obama has softened Muslim attitude towards the US in general – which may not last long if he completely succumbs to Israeli pressures and fails to make sure that Israel also lives up to its obligations under the peace process and international law. In Pakistan the public opinion has turned against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, which has emboldened the army to take tougher measures against them, but anti-Americanism remains high in Pakistan and the incessant violence has made this nuclear power very unstable.

What Options does the US have in Afghanistan?

There are broadly three options that are being discussed in academic and policy circles.

The first option is to accept the recommendations of General Stanley McChrystal and send a second surge of 40,000-100,000 troops and civilians to Afghanistan and escalate both war and nation building activities simultaneously. This means more expenditure, more American and Afghan casualties and without a guarantee of victory.

The second option is to scale down US strategy from counter insurgency and counter terrorism to counterterrorism only. Meaning forget Afghanistan and the Taliban and focus on Al Qaeda, wherever they are.

The Third Option is to partially answer General Chrystal request.

In my humble opinion the third option is not worthy of consideration and the first one is a one-way street to a long-term quagmire that serves neither US, nor Afghan interests. General McChrystal's strategy does not have a global perspective to it. Anti-Americanism in Afghanistan is not contingent on what the US does in Afghanistan alone. It is affected by what the US does in Palestine, in Iraq, in Pakistan and other parts of the Muslim World. The US could invest a lot of blood and treasure in Afghanistan but still lose if it fails elsewhere.

Additionally the US military presence is a provocation in itself. Many Afghans will support and fight with the Taliban as long as foreign troops occupy their land. A major surge will inevitably cause many civilian deaths, which incite hatred against the US, garner support for the extremists and generate more recruits for them.

I like the second option with additional caveats. The US must fight only those who directly threaten US interests and security. Global wars have serious costs and

consequences that even a super power cannot afford. As long as Al Qaeda threatens the US we must fight it, wherever it is. We do not even have to destroy it. All we need to do is maintain enough pressure on it so that it cannot attack our homeland and our interests.

Al Qaeda has brought devastation and violence to the very societies that have hosted it. For the past two years Pakistan has been the biggest victim of terrorism by Al Qaeda and the Taliban. If some Pakistanis due to misguided and unwise anti-Americanism choose to support them then they should be left to deal with the consequences. We can pray for them.

We should not embark on imperial adventures without strong commitment by those who we seek to rescue. If the Afghans want our help to fight the Taliban, they must prove their resolve by first standing up to them. If the Pakistanis want our help to fight their extremists then they too should show the necessary commitment and stop running with the hare and hunting with the hound at the same time.

In the age of unmanned drones, long distance relationships are not a bad idea. If the US can make its war against its enemies invisible it will have a better chance of winning. Simultaneously we must continue to maintain a wide-ranging dialogue with the Muslim world and seriously seek to resolve key issues that undermine US Muslim relations. Any and every diplomatic blow against anti-Americanism is worth many military surges that inevitably kill civilians and undermine the main goal – to improve US security through better US-Muslim relations.

Thank you for considering my thoughts.

**DISCLOSURE FORM FOR WITNESSES
CONCERNING FEDERAL CONTRACT AND GRANT INFORMATION**

INSTRUCTION TO WITNESSES: Rule 11, clause 2(g)(4), of the Rules of the U.S. House of Representatives for the 111th Congress requires nongovernmental witnesses appearing before House committees to include in their written statements a curriculum vitae and a disclosure of the amount and source of any federal contracts or grants (including subcontracts and subgrants) received during the current and two previous fiscal years either by the witness or by an entity represented by the witness. This form is intended to assist witnesses appearing before the House Armed Services Committee in complying with the House rule.

Witness name: _____ Professor Muqtedar Khan _____

Capacity in which appearing: (check one)

☒ Individual

☐ Representative

If appearing in a representative capacity, name of the company, association or other entity being represented: _____

FISCAL YEAR 2009

federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant
Faith and Community Grant Expires Dec 31, 2009.	State Department, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs	\$498, 368	Dialogue on Faith and Community between American society and Egyptian and Saudi Arabian scholars and community leaders.

FISCAL YEAR 2008

federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant
Faith and Community Grant Expires Dec 31,	State Department, Bureau of Educational and	\$498, 368	Dialogue on Faith and Community between American society and

2009.	Cultural Affairs		Egyptian and Saudi Arabian scholars and community leaders.

FISCAL YEAR 2007

Federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant
Faith and Community Grant Expires Dec 31, 2009.	State Department, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs	\$498, 368	Dialogue on Faith and Community between American society and Egyptian and Saudi Arabian scholars and community leaders.

Federal Contract Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government:

Current fiscal year (2009): _____ None _____;
 Fiscal year 2008: _____ None _____;
 Fiscal year 2007: _____ None _____.

Federal agencies with which federal contracts are held:

Current fiscal year (2009): _____ None _____;
 Fiscal year 2008: _____ None _____;
 Fiscal year 2007: _____ None _____.

List of subjects of federal contract(s) (for example, ship construction, aircraft parts manufacturing, software design, force structure consultant, architecture & engineering services, etc.):

Current fiscal year (2009): _____;
 Fiscal year 2008: _____;
 Fiscal year 2007: _____.

Aggregate dollar value of federal contracts held:

Current fiscal year (2009): _____;
 Fiscal year 2008: _____;
 Fiscal year 2007: _____.

Federal Grant Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has grants (including subgrants) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of grants (including subgrants) with the federal government:

Current fiscal year (2009): Faith and Community grant 2007-2009;
 Fiscal year 2008: _____;
 Fiscal year 2007: _____.

Federal agencies with which federal grants are held:

Current fiscal year (2009): _____ State Department, 2007-2009 _____;
 Fiscal year 2008: _____;
 Fiscal year 2007: _____.

List of subjects of federal grants(s) (for example, materials research, sociological study, software design, etc.):

Current fiscal year (2009): _____;
 Fiscal year 2008: _____;
 Fiscal year 2007: _____.

Aggregate dollar value of federal grants held:

Current fiscal year (2009): _____ \$498,368 _____;
 Fiscal year 2008: _____;
 Fiscal year 2007: _____.

PREPARED TESTIMONY BY MARIN STRMECKI
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
HEARING ON U.S. STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN
November 5, 2009

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the subcommittee, I welcome the opportunity to discuss our strategy in Afghanistan and its relationship to our efforts in Iraq. I have closely followed events in Afghanistan since the 1980s. From early 2003 through the middle of 2005, I served as the Afghanistan Policy Coordinator and a Special Adviser on Afghanistan in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, in which capacity I worked on Afghanistan policy in the interagency process and also deployed periodically to Kabul to provide policy support to Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad. In 2005 and 2006, I provided similar support to Ambassador Khalilzad in Baghdad. The subject of today's hearing – thinking through the strategies for success in both countries – is vitally important.

To begin, I wish to make six principal points, which I elaborate upon at greater length in the course of my statement:

First, in its white paper on Afghanistan and Pakistan issued in March 2009, the Obama administration demonstrated a correct understanding of the threat posed by the syndicate of violent extremists and their supporters in western Pakistan. It stated that the only way to defeat this threat is to stabilize Afghanistan through a proper counterinsurgency and state-building strategy, to strengthen Pakistan and cooperate in efforts to pin the extremists down in a limited geographic area, and work into western Pakistan by a variety of means to eliminate these groups.

Second, the portions of the McCrystal report that were leaked to the public represent a sound implementation plan for security-related aspects of President Obama's strategy, though the version made public lacks some elements that the Congress should inquire about in order to come to complete judgment. Specifically, the subcommittee should inquire about the geographic priorities or starting points for the counterinsurgency campaign, the template for creating and expanding local security in the rural areas, and the initial expectations for the rate at which contested areas will be secured as additional international and Afghan security forces are deployed.

Third, regarding the number of requested troops, I believe the subcommittee should press the administration on a simple question: What is the level of forces that will decisively turn around deteriorating security trends and create the basis for a virtuous cycle of improving security and governance? The challenges we face in Afghanistan arise in part because of an inadequate and incremental response to the escalation of enemy activity in 2006. The subcommittee should press the administration on what is the decisive force needed to respond to the current situation.

Fourth, the Obama administration has correctly placed emphasis on the need for the Karzai administration to improve governance. However, progress in this regard will not come through blandishments and hectoring. Instead, it will come by engaging with President Karzai in ways that show an understanding of the dilemmas and risks that he faces and coming to an agreement with him to take step-by-step improvements in governance while jointly managing the risks of reform.

Fifth, turning to Iraq, the stabilization of Iraq is a precondition for shifting additional forces to Afghanistan. It is therefore vitally important that we build on the successes in political reconciliation that has taken place among Iraqi groups, starting with the constitution drafting process in 2005 and culminating during and after the surge in 2007 and 2008. While we should not play a heavy-handed role, we should remain engaged and be willing to use our influence to catalyze constructive politics if needed or when opportunities arise.

Sixth, as we look to the future of region and the imperative to constrain the threat posed by Iran, the value of our relationships with Iraq and Afghanistan rises substantially. If one of the main challenges in the region is Iran's destabilizing actions, we need to think about our partnerships with these governments as opportunities, not burdens. This, in turn, requires us to develop longer-term and more ambitious plans for our relationships.

I would like to say a little more about the nature of the threat we face in Central and South Asia. It arises from what might be called a syndicate of violent extremist groups located in western Pakistan and supported by elements in Pakistan. It includes al Qaida, which seeks to target the United States and our friends and allies. However, the syndicate also includes groups that target Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and Central Asia. This is best thought of as a single constellation of enemies that produces three threats: an insurgency seeking to destabilize Afghanistan, armed groups that act against Pakistan, and transnational terrorists and violent political movements based in western Pakistan but operating against distant targets.

The key point is that this threat is not divisible. We cannot work against just one element of the problem. If we were to focus only on the threat to Pakistan and abandon Afghanistan, as some advocate, the enemy will simply migrate across the border into Afghanistan, recreating the terrorist safe havens of the 1990s. If we were to focus only on stabilizing Afghanistan, we would leave ourselves open to the risk that the extremists could make gains against Pakistan, potentially destabilizing a nuclear weapons state. If we were to focus only on countering the transnational aspect of the threat, the footprint of the extremist groups would quickly spread into both Afghanistan and Pakistan. It has been an achievement of U.S. policy that the principal base of the threat is confined to a limited part of western Pakistan. The right approach is to keep it bottled up and to find ways to work into these sanctuaries, using local groups and other Pakistani and U.S. capabilities.

To defeat this multifaceted threat, U.S. strategy for Afghanistan in the widest sense requires five components. I would like to describe each component and to provide a brief assessment of our efforts to date and proposed plans, as embodied in the statements of the Obama administration and the public portions of the report from Gen. McCrystal.

Rebuilding political legitimacy. Because insurgency and counterinsurgency constitute armed political struggle, it is vitally important that we work in partnership with Afghan leaders to build the legitimacy of the political order we seek to support. The legitimacy gained through the Bonn Process, which led to the adoption of an enlightened constitution and the election of a national government, created a sound political foundation. It ensured that Afghans are in charge of governing Afghanistan and that the United States and the international community are seen as friends, not occupiers. Though polls still indicate that Afghans support their government, its legitimacy has eroded, principally because it has not met expectations in terms of providing security and good governance.

There is no substitute for working with President Karzai and other national leaders. Those who argue that we should work around the national government and focus only on dealing with local actors or delivering services or development at the local level ignore two risks. First, if we do not help Afghans build an effective state, we are consigned to an indefinite engagement in Afghanistan. Second, if we substitute ourselves for the Afghan state, we will become deeply enmeshed in local politics that we do not understand and will risk being viewed as an occupier. While we should have aid efforts directed at the local level, a major focus of our engagement at the national level should be to build up the sovereign capabilities of the Afghan state. An effective state existed in Afghanistan for much of the twentieth century. There is no reason we cannot help Afghans restore it.

In this regard, President Karzai has strengths and weaknesses. He has significant political knowledge and skills in an Afghan context. He knows his country and his people at a profound level. He has an acute sense of the internal balance of political power in the Afghan system. His network of relationships reaches deeply into the society. However, he is often inconsistent and nonsystematic in decision making. He does not have a facility for the strategic thinking and follow through needed to be a state-builder. Thus, a key to developing a more productive relationship with President Karzai is for the United States to take advantage of his abilities and compensate for his shortcomings.

In the past, he has been most successful when four conditions obtained. First, Karzai has to have confidence in his relationship with the United States, thereby rendering him willing to take on difficult internal political actors. Second, senior U.S. leaders in the field need to be deeply engaged with him in a process I would call collaborative problem solving, which entails working together to define the nature of major challenges, appropriate options, and optimal courses of action. Third, he needs to be supported by a team of senior Afghan officials, in the presidential office and key ministries, who can enable him to turn policy into programs and actions. Fourth, the international community, and particularly the United States, should be engaged in systematic programs to build key institutions, working with effective ministers and compensating for weaknesses in Afghan human resources resulting from more than two decades of conflict.

When these conditions have been absent, President Karzai has faltered, often badly. If he lacks confidence in the United States, his default approach is to manage the balance of power within the Afghan system. In part, this entails minimizing the potential threat posed by bad actors or spoilers by accommodating them, typically by allowing their patronage networks to control or take root in state institutions. This is one of the principal sources of the problem of corruption. At the same time, he seeks to create his own patronage networks to strengthen his own position in the internal balance of power.

For several years, the United States has pressed for reform and Karzai took some important actions. Yet, these have not been adequate. Going forward, Karzai must do more. However, it is counterproductive to engage him in adversarial confrontations. If you push him in this way, he will rely more, not less, on seeking support from problematic political actors or other regional powers. Instead, the administration needs to reset the relationship with Karzai. Our relationship should be based on the four-part formula noted above that creates the conditions for Karzai to be effective. It should be designed to align the goal of improved governance with Karzai's own definition of his personal political success. And in this way we can work the problem of corruption and governance jointly, ministry by ministry and province by province.

Securing contested areas. In terms of strategy for Afghanistan, the most significant positive step by the Obama administration was the decision in March 2009 to pursue a fully resourced counterinsurgency effort. At several points, a classic counterinsurgency approach has been tried – based on the formula of “shape, clear, hold, and build” – and it has worked. During 2003 and 2004, the Coalition command created an enduring security presence in contested areas and stabilized the country for the October 2004 election, resulting in several months with virtually no security incidents. In 2006 and 2007, U.S. officers in Regional Command East implemented this approach in parts of their area of operations. Even today, much of this area is “green” or “yellow,” rather than “red,” on maps showing security conditions. Also, in recent press reports, there are encouraging signs that this approach is working in places like Nawa, in Helmand province, where U.S. forces recently deployed. Now, the key is to fully resource such an approach to have a decisive effect on security trends in Afghanistan.

In a wider sense, the McCrystal report represents a major advance in terms of our strategic thinking in Afghanistan. It adopts the proven approach of making the security of the population the focal point of our efforts and the measure for our success. It recognizes that certain priority areas need to be secured first and that over time, as more Afghan capabilities become available, security can be built out into contested areas. It takes seriously the need to minimize civilian casualties and proposes concrete approaches to do so. For the first time, a U.S. commander has set forth a realistic estimate of the needed end strength of Afghan National Security Forces, including 240,000 troops for the Afghan National Army. It recommends partnering with Afghan forces at every level, which will enable the Afghans to move up the learning curve rapidly because they will see what “right” looks like and which will allow us to learn from the Afghans about the political and social context in which we are operating. It makes improved governance a political-military priority. It insists on the need to synchronize civil and military effects as part of the security campaign. It foresees a process by which the United States and its

NATO partners shift from playing the role of the principal fighting force to that of an enabling force supporting Afghan National Security Forces.

It is disappointing to see the Obama administration re-deliberate its strategy in response to this report. Though President Obama should certainly examine the underlying assumptions, he should avoid the risk of incrementalism. He should choose an option that provides a decisive force. It is easy to select a less-than-decisive option and seek to wait and see whether it works. However, the timelines for implementing major adjustments of force levels, programs, and policies are so long that this approach risks falling behind the pace of events.

Improving governance and development. It is a cliché that in counterinsurgency the task is not to outfight the opponent but to “out govern” him. Since 2001, the effort to support the development of Afghan governmental institutions has been uneven at best. The Bonn Process itself was a great success. The division of responsibilities among donor states to support security sector reform led to notable successes, such as the restructuring of the Ministry of Defense and the building of Afghan National Army, but also shirking of responsibilities by lead donor nations in the judicial and other sectors. The Afghans themselves build some effective ministries, while others languished. At this point, a strategy should be build around four lines of action.

First, the Afghan leadership and its international partners should systematically evaluate the performance of senior ministry personnel, provincial governors, and district administrators. This information is available from a variety of sources, even for local officials. It can be collated and vetted. The Afghan government should then trade out poor performers. At the same time, an outreach effort through traditional social networks and other means should be undertaken to develop a pool of qualified personnel from which to draw replacements. There is more talent in Afghan society than is widely recognized. We need to build a system to tap into it.

Second, the United States should devote part of any increase in force deployments to creating a system comparable to the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program that was used in Vietnam to improve governance and economic development at the district and hamlet levels. This system created parallel advisory offices to support each level of the Vietnamese government. This gave U.S. personnel the ability to see where bottlenecks or other problems were hampering delivery of resources or other support to localities. Also, because we had this transparency, the system allowed U.S. funds to flow through Vietnamese government agencies. It fostered effective delivery of civil programs at the local level and improved the functionality of vertical links in the Vietnamese government. Though Provincial Reconstruction Teams were loosely modeled on this approach, they are designed principally to deliver reconstruction program themselves, not to enable better performance by the Afghan government.

Third, donor countries should support and build upon the successful national programs of the Afghan government. In the social and economic sphere, these include National Accountability and Transparency Program (which provided the government with an effective public finance system), the National Emergency Employment Program (which has administered projects that generated 14 million

labor days of employment since 2002), the National Solidarity Program (which has funded more than 47,000 local development projects selected by 22,000 community development councils), the National Health Program (which has provided basic health services for 85 percent of the population), the National Education Program (which has increased total student enrollment to more than 6.2 million in 2008-9), and the National Microfinance Investment Support Facility (which has made more than one million loans totaling more than \$600 million since 2003 with a 94 percent repayment record). These are successful, Afghan-led programs, funded through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund. The national program model is one that works and should be extended to other program areas.

Fourth, the United States should undertake a large-scale educational exchange program to develop specialized human resources in areas where skilled Afghan personnel are lacking. In previous successful state-building efforts – such as the one in South Korea – the United States significantly accelerated the development of institutions through such targeted programs.

Advancing localized stabilization. In counterinsurgency, all progress is local. It is encouraging that, in public comments, Gen. McCrystal has noted the need to diagnose the reasons why local communities are “sitting on the fence” or leaning toward the Taliban in order to develop effective strategies to win their active support. In some cases, intimidation by insurgents produces coerced support. In others, tribal or other local conflicts may be driving one group toward the enemy. In still others, weak or abusive governance may be the source of disaffection. Only when we do the hard work of analyzing such dynamics locality by locality can an appropriate, tailored approaches be put together. It is the key to facilitating the reconciliation of reconcilable elements of the armed opposition.

Normalizing regional relations. Although the Obama administration has properly defined the challenge of violent extremism in Afghanistan as part of regional challenge, it is unclear whether a concerted diplomatic strategy exists to achieve a rapprochement between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Bilateral relations at the political level have improved since the government of President Zardari took office. However, the McCrystal report notes that evidence exists that some elements of the Pakistan security establishment may be supportive of the Taliban. If Pakistan were to become fully supportive of the stabilization of Afghanistan – particularly by eliminating enemy sanctuaries and support structures on its territory – the challenge of succeeding in Afghanistan would become immeasurably easier.

To normalize Afghanistan-Pakistan relations, a U.S. diplomatic undertaking should focus on three objectives. First, the United States must persuade the Pakistani leadership of our enduring commitment to Afghanistan. Pakistani officials may believe that the United States and NATO will ultimately abandon the country. As a result, they might be reluctant to undercut forces such as the Taliban that they would use in a proxy struggle with other regional powers in the aftermath of a U.S. or NATO withdrawal. This counterproductive hedging is unlikely to end absent an unequivocal U.S. commitment.

Second, the United States should mediate a negotiation to allay or address Pakistani security concerns regarding Afghanistan. These might include setting redlines on the activities in Afghanistan of Pakistan’s regional rivals or discussions about the ultimate disposition of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. It could well be that these issues are the reasons why Pakistan is unwilling to be fully supportive of the

stabilization of Afghanistan. Only sustained diplomacy by the United States can determine the answer and potentially find solutions.

Third, the United States should launch a major initiative to open up the continental trade routes connecting Central and South Asia. The key is to open up the north-south and east-west corridors that run across Afghanistan. This would provide an enormous economic boost to all participating countries. In the first instance, the focus should be on eliminating administrative barriers to the free flow of trade by land transport. In the mid- and long-term, the United States should work collaboratively with all regional players to design, plan, finance, and build transport and transit infrastructure, including roads, railroads, and pipelines. This initiative could recreate a single economic zone that existed for centuries and that today would encompass a population of more than 1 billion people and an aggregate GDP of more than \$1 trillion. Most important, U.S. leadership in this endeavor would demonstrate commitment to the region and would create widespread benefits – particularly for Pakistan – based on the stabilization of Afghanistan as a continental land bridge.

Together, these elements constitute a mutually reinforcing strategy for security, improved governance, and economic growth. Many of the pieces are in place or could be put in place easily. As noted above, the McCrystal report offers prospects for improvements in U.S. strategy and operations in the military sphere. The renewed attention on Afghanistan can turn the situation around. It will require a sound and fully resourced strategy. Though there are reasons for optimism, it is vital that administration be urged not to fall into the trap of taking inadequate incremental steps that ultimately fail to get ahead of the power curve.

I would like to say a few words about one of the alternative strategies for Afghanistan that has been proposed in the public debate about the McCrystal report. Some analysts have called for the United States to pursue a limited counterterrorism strategy, utilizing over-the-horizon air strikes, Special Forces raids, or covert actions against terrorist targets. This would mean abandoning the effort to stabilize Afghanistan and withdrawing U.S. forces. I strongly believe that the evidence shows that this approach would not work.

It has been tried, and it has been unsuccessful. During the 1990s, the United States engaged in cruise missile strikes against al Qaida bases in Afghanistan, as well as planning potential covert actions. None of these prevented the series of attacks that culminated in the tragedy of 9/11. During the past three years, the United States has killed scores of senior and middle-level Taliban commanders in Afghanistan. Yet, this has not stemmed the rising capabilities of the Taliban. In the past two years, the United States has stepped up Predator drone strikes against terrorist leadership targets in western Pakistan. Though the enemy no doubt sleeps less well at night and some reports indicate that these strikes are having meaningful effects, it does not appear to be having a *decisive* impact on enemy operations, either in Afghanistan or Pakistan.

Also, a narrow counterterrorist strategy would likely condemn to the United States to a perpetual military engagement in this region. While a counterinsurgency campaign can culminate in the handover

of responsibilities to a partner government, a counterterrorism strategy is open ended. Moreover, the air strikes and raids will inevitably cause casualties among innocent civilians because of inherent limitations in the quality and timeliness of intelligence. This collateral damage will disaffect local populations and lead some portions to be radicalized. Unlike counterinsurgency, which seeks to produce security and progress, counterterrorism risks making more enemies than it destroys.

Mr. Chairman, you asked that witnesses comment on the relationship between our strategy in Afghanistan and the situation in Iraq. While I do not have extensive views on this subject, I believe that three brief points should be made.

First, increases in U.S. forces in Afghanistan depend on the continuing stabilization of Iraq. As the drawdown of U.S. forces proceeds in Iraq, it frees up capabilities that for Afghanistan without placing even greater pressure on the overall force.

Second, continuing progress in Iraq depends less and less on the presence of a large U.S. military force and depends more and more on a smart and active U.S. political role. It is only within the last two or three years that Iraqi political factions have begun to work out key issues. Many still remain unresolved, including the sharing of oil revenues or the future of Kirkuk. Habits of cooperation and compromise have not taken hold with all groups. We have a profound interest – accentuated by the need for additional forces in Afghanistan – in seeing continuing political progress. Therefore, our embassy in Iraq should be willing to engage Iraqi factions to catalyze progress if needed and should opportunities arise. A catalytic role of this kind is vitally important.

Third, parallel successes in Afghanistan and Iraq should provide opportunities for our efforts to constrain destabilizing actions by Iran. Iran is country with no major natural allies in the region. The United States has better relations than Tehran with virtually every one of Iran's neighbors, a fact that should facilitate containment of Iranian influence. However, the future of our partnerships with two of Iran's most important neighbors – Afghanistan and Iraq – remains in flux. As we draw down forces in Iraq and as we press to stabilize Afghanistan, we should at the same time work with these countries to fashion longer-term partnerships that will create constraints against Iran's destabilizing conduct. In this respect, our ties to Afghanistan and Iraq should be seen as opportunities, not burdens.

Mr. Chairman, the situation in Afghanistan requires renewed commitment. Although great deal has been achieved in Afghanistan, it is easier to disrupt than to build. In recent years, the enemy has gained momentum and threatens the progress we have made. Success is feasible, though it will not be easy or cheap. The Obama administration articulated a strategic concept in March 2009 to deal with the challenge of deteriorating security in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Gen. McChrystal has offered his assessment of what it will take to implement this approach. As President Obama makes his choice on force levels, I believe that the Congress has a vital role to ensure that his policy has all the components needed for success and does not contain a fatal mismatch between ends and means.

**DISCLOSURE FORM FOR WITNESSES
CONCERNING FEDERAL CONTRACT AND GRANT INFORMATION**

INSTRUCTION TO WITNESSES: Rule 11, clause 2(g)(4), of the Rules of the U.S. House of Representatives for the 111th Congress requires nongovernmental witnesses appearing before House committees to include in their written statements a curriculum vitae and a disclosure of the amount and source of any federal contracts or grants (including subcontracts and subgrants) received during the current and two previous fiscal years either by the witness or by an entity represented by the witness. This form is intended to assist witnesses appearing before the House Armed Services Committee in complying with the House rule.

Witness name: Dr. Marin Strmecki

Capacity in which appearing: (check one)

☒ Individual

☐ Representative

If appearing in a representative capacity, name of the company, association or other entity being represented: _____

FISCAL YEAR 2009

federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant

FISCAL YEAR 2008

federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant

FISCAL YEAR 2007

Federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant

Federal Contract Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government:

Current fiscal year (2009): _____;
 Fiscal year 2008: _____;
 Fiscal year 2007: _____.

Federal agencies with which federal contracts are held:

Current fiscal year (2009): _____;
 Fiscal year 2008: _____;
 Fiscal year 2007: _____.

List of subjects of federal contract(s) (for example, ship construction, aircraft parts manufacturing, software design, force structure consultant, architecture & engineering services, etc.):

Current fiscal year (2009): _____;
 Fiscal year 2008: _____;
 Fiscal year 2007: _____.

Aggregate dollar value of federal contracts held:

Current fiscal year (2009): _____;
 Fiscal year 2008: _____;
 Fiscal year 2007: _____.

Federal Grant Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has grants (including subgrants) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of grants (including subgrants) with the federal government:

Current fiscal year (2009): _____;
Fiscal year 2008: _____;
Fiscal year 2007: _____.

Federal agencies with which federal grants are held:

Current fiscal year (2009): _____;
Fiscal year 2008: _____;
Fiscal year 2007: _____.

List of subjects of federal grants(s) (for example, materials research, sociological study, software design, etc.):

Current fiscal year (2009): _____;
Fiscal year 2008: _____;
Fiscal year 2007: _____.

Aggregate dollar value of federal grants held:

Current fiscal year (2009): _____;
Fiscal year 2008: _____;
Fiscal year 2007: _____.