[Senate Hearing 111-482]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-482
CONTRABAND CELL PHONES IN
CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES: PUBLIC SAFETY
IMPACT AND THE POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS
OF JAMMING TECHNOLOGIES
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 15, 2009
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
----------
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas,
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts Ranking
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
BILL NELSON, Florida JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
TOM UDALL, New Mexico MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
MARK WARNER, Virginia MIKE JOHANNS, Nebraska
MARK BEGICH, Alaska
Ellen L. Doneski, Chief of Staff
James Reid, Deputy Chief of Staff
Bruce H. Andrews, General Counsel
Christine D. Kurth, Republican Staff Director and General Counsel
Brian M. Hendricks, Republican Chief Counsel
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on July 15, 2009.................................... 1
Statement of Senator Pryor....................................... 1
Statement of Senator Hutchison................................... 2
Statement of Senator Begich...................................... 26
Statement of Senator Thune....................................... 28
Letter, dated January 26, 2009, from Tim Reisch, Secretary of
Corrections--State of South Dakota Department of
Corrections to Hon. John Thune............................. 28
Witnesses
Hon. John Whitmire, Texas State Senator.......................... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Richard A. Mirgon, President-Elect, Association of Public-Safety
Communications Officials (APCO) International.................. 7
Prepared statement........................................... 9
Gary D. Maynard, Secretary, Maryland Department of Public Safety
and Correctional Services...................................... 11
Prepared statement........................................... 13
Steve Largent, President and CEO, CTIA--The Wireless Association 15
Prepared statement........................................... 16
John M. Moriarty, Inspector General, Texas Department of Criminal
Justice........................................................ 20
Prepared statement........................................... 22
Appendix
Hon. Barbara Mikulski, U.S. Senator from Maryland, prepared
statement...................................................... 35
Citizens United for the Rehabilitation of Errants (CURE),
prepared statement............................................. 36
Jay Salkini, President and Chief Executive Officer, Tecore
Networks, prepared statement................................... 38
Letter, dated July 13, 2009, to Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV and
Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison from Jim Rubenstein, Commissioner,
West Virginia Division of Corrections.......................... 40
Letter, dated August 4, 2009, to Hon. Jay Rockefeller and Hon.
Kay Bailey Hutchison from Rep. Jerry Madden, Texas State House
of Representatives............................................. 40
Letter, dated July 13, 2009, to Hon. Jay Rockefeller and Hon. Kay
Bailey Hutchison, from Jon Ozmint, Director, South Carolina
Department of Corrections...................................... 41
Letter, dated January 14, 2009, to Hon. Sam Brownback from Roger
Werholz, Secretary, Kansas Department of Corrections........... 42
Letter, dated January 21, 2009, to Hon. John F. Kerry from Harold
W. Clarke, Commissioner, The Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
Executive Office of Public Safety and Security, Department of
Correction..................................................... 42
Letter, dated January 21, 2009, to Hon. Edward M. Kennedy from
Harold W. Clarke, Commissioner,The Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, Executive Office of Public Safety and Security,
Department of Correction....................................... 43
Letter, dated January 20, 2009, to Hon. Blanche Lincoln from
Larry Norris, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction...... 43
Letter, dated January 20, 2009, to Hon. Mark Pryor from Larry
Norris, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction............ 44
Letter, dated December 17, 2008 to Hon. Mark Pryor from Larry B.
Norris, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction............ 44
Letter, dated December 17, 2008 to Hon. Blanche Lincoln from
Larry B. Norris, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction... 45
Letter, dated March 3, 2009, to Hon. Bob Corker, from George M.
Little, Commissioner, State of Tennessee--Department of
Correction..................................................... 46
Letter, dated March 3, 2009, to Hon. Lamar Alexander, from George
M. Little, Commissioner, State of Tennessee--Department of
Correction..................................................... 46
Letter, dated July 27, 2009, to Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV and
Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison from Anne Milgram, Attorney General
and George Hayman, Commissioner--Department of Corrections,
State of New Jersey, Office of the Attorney General, Department
of Law and Public Safety....................................... 47
Letter, dated July 14, 2009 to Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV and
Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison from Harold Feld, Legal Director--
Public Knowledge; Michael Calabrese, Vice President and
Director Wireless Futures Program--New America Foundation;
Sascha Meinrath, Director--Open Technology Institute; Jonathan
Lawson, Executive Director--Reclaim the Media; Joshua
Breitbart, Policy Director--People's Production House; Stephen
Renderos, Organizer--Main Street Project; Amanda Deloney,
Network Coordinator--Media Action Grassroots Network (MAG-NET);
Tracy Rosenberg, Acting Director--Media Alliance; Malkia Cyril,
Executive Director--Center for Media Justice................... 48
Letter, dated July 13, 2009, to Julius Knapp, Chief, Office of
Engineering and Technology, Federal Communications Commission
from Christopher Guttman-McCabe, Vice President, Regulatory
Affairs, CTIA--The Wireless Association........................ 51
CONTRABAND CELL PHONES IN
CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES: PUBLIC SAFETY
IMPACT AND THE POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS
OF JAMMING TECHNOLOGIES
----------
WEDNESDAY, JULY 15, 2009
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m. in
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Mark Pryor,
presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARK PRYOR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ARKANSAS
Senator Pryor. We will go ahead and call the hearing to
order. This hearing is called, ``Contraband Cell Phones
Correctional Facilities: Public Safety Impact and the Potential
Implications of Jamming Technologies.'' And I want to thank my
colleagues for being here today. And I know that we have
several other committees that are meeting right now, so we may
have some Senators coming and going.
So what I'd like to do is just give a brief opening
statement, then let the Ranking Member, Senator Hutchison, give
hers, and then maybe dispense with other opening statements,
unless Senators want to do that, and then hear from the panel,
and then we'll have a robust discussion.
Over the past two decades, the number of wireless
subscribers in the United States has grown from 3.5 million to
about 270 million. At the same time, these devices have shrunk
from the size of a brick to a little bigger than a matchbox.
These cell phones can do much more than make a call. They can
take pictures, they can surf the Internet, they can send text
and e-mail messages.
While advances in technologies have benefited consumers,
there's also a dark side. More and more, cell phones are being
smuggled into prisons. Inmates are using them to continue
criminal activity behind bars. In the worst cases, prisoners
are organizing gang activity, intimidating witnesses, and
ordering murders from their cells. This has to be stopped.
Correctional officers have stepped up efforts to find such
devices by using phone-sniffing dogs and searching prisoners,
visitors, and prison workers. In addition, there is technology
being deployed to detect and locate and monitor contraband cell
phones in prison. But the question remains, are these tools
enough?
Some have suggested that wireless jamming technology would
be effective in stopping the use of contraband cell phones. The
FCC, however, has prohibited the testing of jammers by states
as a violation of the Communications Act. In addition, groups
have voiced concern that jamming may interfere with public
safety and commercial wireless communications. There are also
questions about how well jammers work and whether other
technologies are better suited to address the problem.
We have an esteemed panel of witnesses to provide testimony
on these issues. I want to thank our panel for being here today
and making your time and testimony available to us. But before
I introduce the panel, I would like to ask the Ranking Member,
Senator Hutchison, to make her opening statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS
Senator Hutchison. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am very
pleased to be here, and I so thank you for calling this
hearing, because I will discuss the bill that I have introduced
that I hope is going to give law enforcement and prison
officials more capabilities to protect the public. And I look
forward to talking about that.
In 2008 alone, corrections systems reported startling
numbers of confiscated phones. California reported nearly 3,000
phones found with inmates. Mississippi had nearly 2,000. The
problem is not unique to just states. The Federal Bureau of
Prisons reports they confiscated more than 1,600 phones during
2008.
Cellular phones inside our Nation's penal system act as a
force multiplier for criminals. A single phone can be shared
among numerous inmates, and just a few phones inside a prison
can lead to a coordinated attack on guards and facilitate
escape attempts.
According to the Justice Center at the Council of State
Governments, three inmates, including a convicted killer,
arranged for their escape from a Kansas facility using a
contraband cell phone. In Tennessee, an inmate used a cell
phone to plot an escape that resulted in the death of a
corrections officer. And in June of last year, inmates at three
Oklahoma correctional facilities coordinated an outbreak of
violence across the system, resulting in three deaths and many
injuries.
Cell phones have been used to carry out threats and attacks
against the public. One of our witnesses today, my friend,
State Senator John Whitmire, was the target of a death row
inmate using a cell phone. In one heartbreaking case, an inmate
on trial for murder in Maryland orchestrated the assassination
of a witness against him using a smuggled cell phone in prison.
The witness was gunned down outside his home in front of his
children.
Our law enforcement officers and prosecutors have a
difficult job to do. Can you imagine how much more difficult it
is when witnesses might be afraid to testify because an inmate
inside a prison can threaten them and their family from the
comfort of their prison cell? We're seeing a dramatic rise in
the number of ongoing criminal enterprises orchestrated from
prison cells via cell phone, including drug trafficking.
So what can be done? This morning, we will hear from a
number of witnesses on the front lines. The states clearly have
an important responsibility. But, Mr. Chairman, we do too. To
be successful, our corrections officers need as many tools as
we can give them to prevent the use of phones if they evade
detection and discovery. When a single call can result in
someone's death, we have an obligation to exhaust every
technology at our disposal.
At the moment, the FCC Act, Federal Communications Act,
prohibits the use of jamming devices in all but a few cases.
The prohibition against intentional interference serves an
important purpose. Unregulated use of jamming technology could
pose significant risk to commercial wireless operations and
also public safety communications. I am mindful of those
concerns, and I believe they are legitimate. But I'm also
concerned that the efforts being made at the state level alone
are not sufficient to keep pace with the scope of this problem.
In January, I introduced Senate Bill 251, the Safe Prisons
Communications Act. I am joined in this bipartisan effort by
several members of the Committee, and my lead co-sponsor is
Senator Barbara Mikulski from Maryland. The bill preserves the
general prohibition against intentional interference with
wireless communications. However, it creates a process for
correctional facilities to seek a waiver from the FCC to
operate a wireless jamming device.
The bill does not grant this authority outright. It directs
the FCC to conduct a robust rulemaking in which it considers
whether it is in the public interest to allow waivers, and
under what circumstances. The Commission will also conduct a
device approval process that ensures that devices operate with
the lowest possible power output and include other interference
mitigating measures. Each correctional facility would have to
apply individually for the ability to deploy jamming
technology.
So, Mr. Chairman, let me say that AT&T and Verizon, the
largest providers at this time, have worked with our staff to
try to address the concerns which are legitimate of the
wireless companies. And I want to work with them and continue
to work with them. I also look forward to working with the
representative of an organization that represents the wireless
communications companies, because it's in everyone's interest
that we not interrupt service to legitimate consumers.
However, we also need to make sure that when a person is
incarcerated in prison, that the public should feel safe from
that particular criminal. And that's the way it used to be
before the sophisticated criminal and the sophisticated
technology intervened. So I'm going to continue to work with
everyone in this process, all of the public service providers,
the prison and corrections facility representatives.
But, Mr. Chairman, we do have a responsibility here, and I
hope that after this hearing and in working with all of the
people and entities involved in this, that we will learn enough
that we can move my bill and Senator Mikulski's bill and the
bipartisan support that we have in a way that walks the very
fine line to assure that service is not interrupted for
legitimate people, but when someone goes to prison, that the
public is safe from that person truly. And we need to work on
it right now. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Pryor. Thank you. You mentioned Senator Mikulski
from Maryland, and Senator Mikulski wanted to be here this
morning, but she's voting on healthcare reform in the HELP
Committee. And she and Maryland Governor O'Malley are deeply
troubled that prisoners have been able to use cell phones to
commit crimes from prison. It's a problem in Maryland and
nationwide.
And Senator Mikulski wanted to thank the Commerce Committee
for holding the hearing to try to address those troubling
problems and try to find solutions to stop it. And I know that
you and Senator Mikulski worked very hard on that.
What I'd like to do now is turn this over to our panel of
witnesses. We'd ask that witnesses keep their opening
statements to 5 minutes. And there's a light system there with
a timer for your convenience. And what I'll do is just briefly
introduce each one, and then just go down the row and let you
make your 5-minute opening statement.
First, we're going to hear from the Honorable John
Whitmire. He's a State Senator from Texas. Second, we'll hear
from Mr. Richard Mirgon. He's the President-Elect, Association
of Public-Safety Communications Officials--International. Then
it'll be Mr. Gary Maynard, Secretary, Maryland Department of
Public Safety and Correctional Services.
Next will be a very familiar face and friend here to this
committee, Mr. Steve Largent, President and CEO of CTIA. And
next we will hear from Mr. John Moriarty, Inspector General,
Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Senator Whitmire?
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN WHITMIRE,
STATE SENATOR, TEXAS
Mr. Whitmire. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members. And to
my Senator Hutchison, thank you for bringing this timely topic
to our attention. I've chaired criminal justice in the State
Senate in Texas since 1993. And every time I thought I had seen
everything, Senator, you see something else. And also, I can
say is what you don't know is what scares you the most in this
business.
In that context, last October, I received a call at the
District office in Houston, returned that phone call, and this
individual starts describing conditions on death row. Toward
the end of the conversation--I assumed I was talking to a guard
that was reporting circumstances. And I asked him, ``Who are
you and where are you?'' He said, ``I'm on death row. I'm an
inmate.'' I said, ``Well, how are you talking to me?'' He said,
``On a cell phone.'' I said, ``Well, how'd you get the cell
phone?'' He said, ``$2,100 to a guard.'' I said, ``How do you
keep it charged?'' ``Oh, I have a charger.''
That began a conversation over a period of about 2 weeks
with a convicted capital murderer on our death row, working
with the Inspector General, Mr. Moriarty. Two weeks later, his
family was arrested because they had purchased the phone, given
it to a correction officer, and this began the extreme issue of
how to remedy cell phones in the State of Texas. We have
158,000 inmates located in 112 locations.
The Governor ordered a lockdown, cell-by-cell search.
Hundreds of phones were discovered. We actually determined that
Mr. Tabler, the inmate who had called me, was sharing a death-
row phone with nine other death-row inmates. The other nine
inmates were members of very violent gangs still working on the
streets of the State of Texas: Texas Syndicate, Texas Mafia.
They had used 2,800 minutes on that one phone the month before
his placing a call to me.
I can't stress to you how serious a public safety issue I
think this is. After the arrest of his mother and grandmother,
who had assisted in acquiring and paying the time on his phone,
he threatened to have me killed. One of our conversations
consisted of his talking about my family members. Law
enforcement tells me he was threatening me, letting me know
that he had done searches on my addresses and family members.
So I can't stress on behalf of the people that I represent,
your constituents across this Nation, we've got to put a stop
to it, have zero tolerance. I'm told that the jamming is one of
the most valuable tools. We have used pat-downs, dogs, and
metal detectors. I've demanded zero tolerance within our prison
system. But we need this additional tool. And I thank you for
allowing us to discuss it.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Whitmire follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. John Whitmire, Texas State Senator
The fastest growing and most alarming development in the
introduction of contraband within the Texas prison system is the
inmate's use of cell phones. I am here today to support Senator
Hutchinson's Senate Bill 251, which would allow the jamming of
contraband cell phones within a prison setting. Based on my personal
experiences of having a death row inmate, convicted of two senseless
murders, call me several times on his cell phone while incarcerated on
Texas' death row. These calls were made from the Polunsky Unit's death
row section, which is supposed to be the securest part of the Texas
prison system.
On October 7, 2008, my office received a phone message from an
individual who claimed to be a personal friend of mine. Although I did
not recognize the name, I returned the call later that evening. During
the conversation, the individual admitted he really did not know me but
he was contacting me to ask for assistance for a death row inmate he
knew who had complaints about the conditions of his housing. Later in
our conversations he admitted that he was that death row inmate and his
name was Richard Tabler. Not being convinced or thinking it was even
possible for him to make such a call, he proved his identity by holding
the phone so that I could hear the unforgettable sounds of a prison in
the background, the clanging of steel doors and hollering of voices.
Now convinced that he was a death row inmate and using a cell phone
from prison I contacted John Moriarty, the Inspector General for the
Texas Board of Criminal Justice, who heads up the agency with police
powers to investigate crimes in prison. We agreed that I would continue
to accept these calls while his office opened an investigation to
locate and seize the phone from inmate Tabler. In subsequent cell phone
conversations inmate Tabler discussed my two daughters, where they
lived and other details that he wanted me to know he knew. Frankly,
that scared the hell out of me and convinced me that an inmate having
this ability represented a major public safety issue.
While working with John Moriarty, I continued to accept the phone
calls to gain information to assist the investigation. Soon inmate
Tabler began to ask favors, such as a special visit from his mother who
lived out of state. The issue came to a conclusion on October 20, 2008,
when a cross state police sting operation took place leading to the
arrest of Tabler's mother when she arrived at the Austin--Bergstrom
International Airport on a flight from her home in Georgia. Prison
officials found inmate Tabler in possession of a cell phone on death
row. Inmate Tabler's mother and sister were indicted with the Felony
criminal offense of assisting an inmate to obtain a contraband cell
phone in prison. As the investigation continued, a letter was received
by OIG from inmate Tabler threatening retaliation by having me
murdered.
I then found out that this was not the first cell phone confiscated
from death row, and that it was indeed the 19th cell phone that year
and that 670 cell phones had been found system wide within the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) in 2008. I became even more
concerned when it was revealed that Tabler was not the only death row
inmates using this cell phone, as many as nine death row inmates had
made over 2,800 phone calls from the same cell phone during the past
month alone. I was also alarmed that some of these inmate where
identified as members of prison gangs including the Texas Syndicate,
Aryan Brotherhood of Texas and the Crips. The potential for an inmate
to orchestrate an assortment of crimes and harass victims is a very
real and present danger.
On October 20, 2008, based on the developing investigation,
Governor Rick Perry ordered the Texas Board of Criminal Justice to take
immediate action to increase prison security by locking down the entire
system and conducting individual cell searches in all 112 prison units
and of all the 156,000 inmates.
Due to these major security breaches within TDCJ and the presence
of cell phones within the Death Row housing of the Polunsky Unit, I
called an emergency meeting of the Senate Committee on Criminal Justice
on October 21, 2008. Following the public hearing I sent a letter to
Oliver Bell, Chairman of the Texas Board of Criminal Justice, and Brad
Livingston, Executive Director of the Texas Department of Criminal
Justice. It reads:
After Tuesday's hearing concerning the overwhelming amount of
contraband in our prisons, I am convinced that an urgent,
sustained response is required to implement zero tolerance on
contraband. The prevalence of contraband is well documented and
has been widely publicized including:
May 2008 media report alleging that corrupt officers were
taking over a prison.
May 2008 KPRC news station of charges of prison
corruption.
May 2008 media reports of prison warden removed for
corruption.
May 2008 media reports of the Terrell Unit lockdown over
contraband issues.
May 2008 TDCJ commitment to investigate roadside clash
with KPRC news crew.
May 2008 TDCJ termination of prison captain due to
corruption.
June 2008 Criminal Justice Legislative Oversight Committee
held hearing on prison corruption.
I will not even attempt to list the media coverage prior to or
after the hearing held October 21, 2008, along with the
Governor's order for a statewide lockdown of the entire prison
system to search for contraband. I am totally convinced that
unless the following improvements are immediately implemented,
significant safeguards will not be in place:
A complete search of all individuals entering a prison to
include the use of electronic metal detectors (only 22
units out of 112 have these machines), searching of
property and pat down searches, monitored by law
enforcement and ranking prison officials.
Cell phone jamming blockers and monitoring systems.
Increased and constant use of drug detection dogs or
systems.
Rewards for inmates and correctional officers reporting
contraband violations.
Vigorous prosecution of alleged violators and strong
punishment.
Maximized use of surveillance cameras with the capability
to digital record the video and audio. Equipment must be in
all areas of each unit (TDCJ has 5000 old cameras among 112
unit, many not operative, while Texas Youth Commission with
14 units has 8,000 new digital cameras with recording
capability).
Long term movements to professionalize the correctional
officer positions and their supervisors, with increased
compensation and higher entry standards.
It is imperative that Mr. Livingston advise Mr. Bell, the
Legislature and the State leadership in a very detailed,
accurate, and urgent manor of the resources required to correct
the observed and documented dysfunctions within TDCJ
operations.
I understand the challenges of operating the second largest
prison system in our nation, but we must respond to these
challenges with a sense of urgency and have the will to conquer
and overcome the barriers in front of us. The citizens of Texas
deserve no less than our maximum efforts and will not settle
for less than significant, sustained, and successful actions.
I would love to report to this committee that the intensive actions
taken so far have resolved the problems of cell phones in prison;
however, that is not the case:
the additional money appropriated to TDCJ during our last
legislative session will not be enough to fix this matter in
the long term,
and the enhancements to our criminal laws to aid prosecution
of these matters and increased penalties will not in itself
solve these problems.
Our problems and those of other states in combating contraband cell
phones in our prison system continues and requires additional tools to
correct this issue. Since the system wide lockdown and searches were
completed, an additional 946 cells phones have been confiscated in the
Texas prison system this year.
The authority to jam cell phones in specified prison property, will
help render these contraband items useless. Cell phone jamming is a
required element that is needed to resolve this problem.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD A. MIRGON, PRESIDENT-ELECT,
ASSOCIATION OF PUBLIC-SAFETY COMMUNICATIONS
OFFICIALS (APCO) INTERNATIONAL
Mr. Mirgon. Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Hutchison,
and other members of the Committee, thank you for this
opportunity to be here today. I am Richard Mirgon and I
currently serve as the President-Elect of the Association of
Public-Safety Communications Officials. We're widely referred
to as APCO International. APCO International was established in
1935 and is the largest public safety communications
organization in North America, representing nearly 16,000
members worldwide.
I come here with some unique experiences. During my career,
I've spent 14 years as a Deputy Sheriff in Jefferson County,
Colorado, where I spent my first year working at a large
correctional facility. I then spent the last 18 years as a
Director of Technology Services for Douglas County, Nevada,
until my recent retirement in 2008.
As a member--as Director of Technology Services, I managed
all public safety communications, information technology,
emergency management for the county and first-responder
agencies. Prior to that, I spent 4 years in the United States
Air Force, where I had some experience dealing with radio
frequency jamming.
All this shows that I have a full understanding of all
these issues being discussed today. As a former Deputy Sheriff,
I personally appreciate you scheduling this hearing to address
an important, yet complicated, issue. This issue is very
important to not only myself personally, but APCO
International. And we do fully believe that something needs to
be done to deal with these issues occurring in today's prisons.
However, APCO's position, as we stand today, we are in
opposition to RF jamming for a number of reasons. And I would
like to discuss five of those reasons. First, we believe it
puts our public safety radio systems at significant risk for
interference, and that puts the lives of first responders at
risk.
A petition just recently filed with the FCC incorrectly
asserts that these bands don't have interference today because
the spectrum is properly regulated and managed. Yet, as many of
you may recall, public safety is still working through
rebanding issues brought about by unintended and unforeseen
consequences from a major wireless carrier that has cost public
safety hundreds of millions of dollars to correct and could, in
the end, cost over $2 billion.
Second, we do not believe it is effective. Since the early
days of incarceration in jail, inmates have found ways to
communicate with the outside, everything from coded letters and
messages to defeating high technology inmate phone systems.
This technology will not be any different. Some very smart
inmate in a prison who has a degree in engineering or just
plain creative will devise some way, such as extending the
antenna on the cell phone, to bypass the jamming. They
potentially could take an amplifier out of another phone and
use it to amplify their signal to bypass any jamming in that
type of technology.
Third, this has been compared to how technology is used in
other countries and how well it works. The problem is, our
spectrum is not lined up as it is in other countries. In many
European countries, that spectrum for public safety is entirely
different from spectrum used for cell phones. Our spectrum is
interleaved with the commercial wireless spectrum at this time.
Fourth, as I've referred to earlier in a petition that has
been filed yesterday with the FCC, cell phones, it states, can
have multiple unintended consequences if it is not done with
adequate planning. Will every system have adequate planning?
Assuming it does, will it stay that way? Anyone who's managed a
radio system has stories about someone without proper knowledge
or experience moving an antenna, modifying an antenna, making a
change to a system, and causing unintended interference that
has shut down systems.
Finally, we believe that there are more effective methods
in dealing with cell phone use in institutions, such as here in
D.C., where they use cell phone detectors, been working
effectively. And for many years, cell phone interception was
used in Nevada in casinos for casinos to derive additional
revenue where they intercepted the signal and rerouted it. And,
from an experienced public safety person, you couldn't make a
cell phone call from inside a casino without that casino
intercepting it. So we believe that there is proven, effective
technology that would be less intrusive on public safety.
APCO fully appreciates that the sponsor and supporters are
merely attempting to find solutions to a growing problem. If
Congress should choose to move forward, we would like to make
the following regulations: ensure that there is no possibility
of interference with public safety communications; ensure that
there is no possibility of interference with cellular 911
calls; eliminate the risk of diversion of cell phone jamming
technology to illegal markets; continue to recognize the
primary of public safety communications; require priority
consideration of alternative methods in addressing this
problem; provide an acceptable level of product quality; and
potentially offer assurance bonds by the manufacturer of the
equipment to allow for funding that could be used to correct
any interference problems that may occur.
In closing, once again, APCO does not support jamming as
it's designed today and believes other methods should be used
to resolve this issue. However, we do look forward to working
with the prisons and other folks to help solve this problem and
get them a solution that is workable for everyone. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Mirgon follows:]
Prepared Statement of Richard A. Mirgon, President-Elect, Association
of Public-Safety Communications Officials (APCO) International
Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Hutchison, and other members
of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to be here today. As a
former Deputy Sheriff, I personally appreciate you scheduling this
hearing to address an important, yet highly complicated issue. I
understand first hand the importance of combating organized criminal
and gang-related networks inside and outside of our Nation's
correctional facilities, as well as inside and outside of our national
borders. Because of the established nexus between criminal enterprises
and the funding of terrorism, I also understand that this is not just a
matter of public safety or criminal justice, but of national and
homeland security.
I am Richard Mirgon, and I currently serve as the President-Elect
of the Association of Public-Safety Communications Officials
International, more widely referred to as APCO International. I come
here with some unique experiences. During my carrier, I spent 14 years
as a Deputy Sheriff in Jefferson County, Colorado where for my first
year I worked in a large correctional facility. I then spent the last
18 years as the Director of Technology Services/911 for Douglas County,
Nevada, until my recent retirement in late 2008. As Director of
Technology Services/911 for Douglas County, I managed all public safety
communications, information technology and emergency management for the
county and its first responder agencies. Prior to all this, I spent 4
years in the Air Force where I had some experience with Radio Frequency
Jamming. All this allows me to have a full understanding if the issue
that is being debated today.
For the benefit of those of you that do not know, APCO
International was established in 1935 and is the largest public safety
communications organization in North America, representing nearly
16,000 members worldwide, most of whom are state or local government
employees, who build, supply, manage and operate communications systems
and facilities for police, fire, emergency medical services and other
state and local government public safety agencies. APCO serves the
needs of more than 100,000 professionals in the public safety
communications industry with training, frequency coordination,
engineering, licensing, advocacy, and networking services and
opportunities. APCO International is the largest FCC-certified
frequency coordinator for Part 90, Public Safety Pool channels, and
appears regularly before the FCC on a wide variety of public safety
communications issues. APCO includes law enforcement, fire, EMS and
other public safety professionals, that is composed of experienced,
front line technical experts implementing and overseeing current
systems in the field, and is solely focused on public safety
communications (including voice, data and video, or radio and
information technologies). Thus, we have long provided an informed safe
haven for public safety to research, discuss, debate and come to
consensus on issues of significance to our profession. As part of the
Nation's criminal justice system, our members also interact on a daily
basis with our correctional institutions and professionals.
When a death row inmate can illegally access a cell phone to call
and threaten a state legislator and his family, something needs to be
done. When criminals in lock up awaiting trial can access cell phones
to get others to intimate or kill witnesses, something needs to be
done. When drug trafficking leaders in prison can direct international
drug smuggling operations from inside our correctional facilities,
something needs to be done. Clearly, there is a need to confront this
problem of illegal communications deriving from, among and into our
correctional facilities. The question is, what is the best, most
efficient and effective solution to realize the results we intend; and
how do we do so without unintentionally creating other, possibly more
severe problems? We look forward to working with you to help to come
closer to these answers.
As long ago as the mid-1990s, the Southern Poverty Law Center
provided extensive evidence and training to our law enforcement
community on the emerging cooperation of domestic and international
terrorists, organized crime, gangs, international criminal enterprises,
drug cartels and others, including prison-based recruitment of
extremists and ongoing criminal networks. Recent intelligence and
criminal investigations, including the emerging problems in the U.S.
Southwest Border, provide further evidence of this ongoing threat.
Still, I strongly urge Congress and this committee to move carefully,
thoroughly and comprehensively in addressing illegal communications of
prisoners with others within and beyond our correctional institutions.
APCO's position is that we do not support cell jamming until such
time that the vendors and user of this technology can prove that there
will be NO negative impact on public safety networks and access to 9-1-
1 by legitimate users and that all other viable alternative have
failed.
APCO fully appreciates that the sponsor and supporters are merely
attempting to develop a process to allow for the FCC to consider use of
cell jamming technology in the correctional setting, and that the
legislation does not intend to simply allow for acquisition and use of
such technologies without a more comprehensive rulemaking process by
the FCC. Following is a breakdown of the eight categories that APCO
suggest as the primary goals and objectives for Congress to incorporate
if it should choose to move forward with this policy area:
Ensure that there is no possibility of interference with
Public Safety Communications in or around correctional
facilities, especially during an emergency.
Ensure that there is no possibility of interference to
cellular calls to 9-1-1 outside the prison.
Eliminate the risk of diversion of cell jamming technology
to illegal markets as contraband for terrorists and other
criminals.
Continue to recognize the primacy of public safety
communications separate and apart from, as well as ahead of,
other non-emergency, commercial interests.
Require priority consideration of alternative means of
addressing illegal cell phone use in correctional facilities.
Provide for Acceptable Level of Product Quality.
Require Users to post an assurance bond for each system
deployed to insure funds are available to correct any
interference problems created.
Actively reach out, include and incorporate the experience,
knowledge and perspectives of those in the military, public
safety and national security communities (to include FBI, NTIA,
NIST, NIJ, TSWG, SPAWAR and others) that are testing,
researching and using cell jamming technology both here and
abroad to gain their cooperation, experience and insights on
this most important matter.
Interference with Public Safety Communications
The public safety community is still dealing with the interference
issues that developed with NEXTEL and the 800 MHz public safety
systems, which led to a massive, multi-billion dollar project to
relocate public safety radio systems. Thus, we must take every possible
effort to avoid similar problems from cell-jamming equipment in prisons
or elsewhere. Cellular jamming will likely not discriminate between
voice and data traffic. Many public safety agencies rely heavily on
wireless providers for their mobile computing backhaul needs. Access to
data (tactical plans, records, GIS, documents, pictures) in the field
can greatly affect the speed and efficacy responders have in dealing
with a situation. The potential of jamming outside of the environment
of a prison, even if the devices are carefully tailored to avoid public
safety frequencies, may not just disrupt 9-1-1 calls, they may also
disrupt responders who may need to use these cellular data services in
response to an issue within or around the prison campus.
Interference with 9-1-1 Calls
APCO is concerned that the use of jamming devices could block 9-1-1
calls from wireless telephones outside the correctional facility,
creating a serious threat to the safety of life and property. In many
communities, the majority of 9-1-1 calls are from wireless telephones.
We must ensure that these devices will not interfere with a cellular 9-
1-1 call to a public safety answering point.
Diversion of Cell Jamming Technology
The current legislation establishes provisions for destruction of
cell-jamming devices when no longer in use within prisons, thus
addressing the problem of cell-jamming devices falling into the wrong
hands. However, APCO encourages the committee and Congress to look at
more accountable and that a registry is kept by a third-party entity,
and that any device in use must be registered.
Primacy of Public Safety Communications
The most recent draft of the legislation continues to commingle and
equate commercial and public safety interests. APCO strongly believes
that public safety and emergency communications are a higher level
priority concern, and must be dealt with separate and apart from non-
emergency commercial communications issues.
Consider Alternative Means of Preventing Illegal Cell Phone Use in
Prisons
Correctional facilities, wireless carriers and others should be
required to explore other means of addressing this problem. For
example, could prison security be enhanced to stem the flow of
contraband into prisons? Are ``cell sniffing'' devices an option for
finding cell phones behind prison walls? Could wireless carriers
install ``microcells'' to capture calls from within prisons and nearby
areas, so legitimate calls can be separated from illicit calls?
Quality of Cell Jamming Technology
There seems to be a broad variety of equipment available to perform
jamming. Some have military precision and that are developed by the
defense industry, however others are relatively inexpensive devices
which have little control aside from an on/off switch. Careful
consideration must be given to exactly which form of device may be
approved for these environments, as allowing a ``jammer'' may be
allowing a device costing hundreds dollars to cripple a public safety
system costing millions of dollars.
Incorporate Military, Public Safety & National Security Communities
APCO understands that the same technology that is proposed for
providing cell jamming capabilities for purposes of illegal prison
communications is currently utilized by our military and law
enforcement agencies for protecting against radio controlled improvised
explosive devices (RCIEDs). As well, APCO understands that NTIA has
already approved FBI's use of cell jamming technology for domestic
capabilities against any potential RCIEDs, which often will be
incorporated into Vehicle Borne IEDs that are commonly used against our
troops and others by terrorists and insurgents in Iraq, Afghanistan and
elsewhere. Indeed, DHS is currently funding the expansion of our
domestic capabilities in this area.
APCO was recently informed that NIJ and SPAWAR have also tested
cell jamming technology for purposes of domestic use, and possibly
specifically as it pertains to correctional settings. The most recent
draft of the legislation only requires FCC to include ``at least one
outside body'' in its development of pilots and testing of such
technologies. We would encourage Congress to provide more formal
direction and assist to FCC by specifically including those entities
and associations with experience in researching, testing, implementing
and overseeing cell jamming capabilities, particularly as it relates to
potential interference with priority and emergency communications.
We at APCO look forward to continuing to work with Congress, the
FCC, and our criminal justice and industry partners to effectively and
efficiently deal with the illegal smuggling and unauthorized use of
cell phones and other means of communication into, within or deriving
from our Nation's correctional facilities. Again, I thank you for your
time, consideration and shared concern for our Nation's safety and
security from crime and terrorism, including that stemming from our
correctional facilities and occupants. As the leading association for
public safety technology professionals, we at APCO share your
unwavering belief that technology, when correctly governed, tested and
applied, and when implemented and managed in an cost effective manner,
helps us to realize significant progress in our Nation's economic
development, public safety, and national security. I am happy to answer
any questions that you may have at this time.
Senator Pryor. Our next witness, Mr. Maynard.
STATEMENT OF GARY D. MAYNARD, SECRETARY,
MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONAL SERVICES
Mr. Maynard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
Committee. I'm Gary Maynard, Secretary of the Department of
Public Safety and Correctional Services in the State of
Maryland. I've provided my testimony. I'll try to make my
remarks briefer today to allow more time for questions.
As a member of the Association of State Correctional
Administrators representing the 50 state corrections directors
around the country, and as past President of the American
Correctional Association, I am here today to support Senate
Bill 251, Safe Prisons Communications Act of 2009.
I've been involved in corrections for 39 years, working in
the Federal Bureau of Prisons, and in five states, serving in
four of those as head of the state corrections agency. For
those of us in this field, one of the most important functions
is the security of our prisons and the overall safety, not only
of the institution and the people inside, but the community at
large.
One of the leading contributors to criminal behavior has
been the increase in gang activity and the violence associated
with it. Many gangs are using the prisons as a recruiting
ground, building their numbers and jeopardizing the safety of
our institutions and the communities to which they were
returned. These groups seek out ways to continue their criminal
activity from prison to the community, and most of those,
through their use of cell phones. And the introduction of cell
phones within our prisons are growing at an alarming rate.
Senator Hutchison had mentioned that in California, over
3,000 cell phones were found. That was twice as many as they
found the previous year. Victims, witnesses, and public
officials are being threatened, harassed, and even killed by
prisoners with access to cell phones. And as was mentioned,
even in our own state, a detainee, a witness who was housed in
our pre-trial detention division, was convicted of ordering the
death of a young man in Baltimore, a witness. He made the call
from a cell phone within our facility.
We're not the only state, Maryland, that has these
problems. Senator Whitmire mentioned the threats made from
death row. Last year in Massachusetts, a maximum security
inmate threatened a medical staff person to bring in a cell
phone--bring in a gun into the prison.
In the--it was mentioned, the escape in Kansas. Even in the
State of Arkansas this past couple of months ago, an escape of
two dangerous inmates was facilitated with the use of a cell
phone.
In response to this growing problem, many states, including
Florida, New Jersey, and others, have made possession of a cell
phone in prison a felony, and we intend to do that in the State
of Maryland this next year, as it's currently a misdemeanor.
Corrections officials across the country are making every
effort to prevent phones from entering the institutions through
enhanced technology searches and other unconventional methods.
The use of canines has been mentioned. We got the idea from
Virginia and Maryland. We trained and raised our own dogs,
trained them. Several states, West Virginia, South Dakota,
Florida, and Arizona, are also following that example.
In addition, many other states like us have invested in
technology and policies to enhance our ability to control the
introduction of cell phones. Phones are smuggled into our
prison a variety of ways: on or within an inmate's body, by
visitors, by staff, tossed over fences or walls, concealed
within deliveries or shipments of food, or through contractors.
While we're able to address each of these areas, inmates
have a lot of time to think, and they are very innovative. We
need to rely on all the technology we can get. We need to fight
technology with technology. This bill would provide
correctional administrators with the opportunity to petition
the Federal Communications Commission and request the operation
of a wireless jamming device. This would allow us to evaluate
the technology and substantially improve our ability to control
criminal behavior.
We don't think that signal jamming is a total solution, but
it would just provide another option to correctional
administrators to deal with this issue. The states and the
Federal Government have an equal interest in prison security.
We think state correctional administrators should not be denied
the opportunity to use a tool already available to the Federal
Government to further secure prisons.
In order to provide safer prisons and safer communities, we
respectfully ask that you give favorable consideration to the
Safe Prisons Act of 2009. In our view, illegal cell phone use
by inmates in our Nation's prisons is an issue that directly
impacts our country's public safety. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Maynard follows:]
Prepared Statement of Gary D. Maynard, Secretary,
Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services
Good afternoon Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. My name
is Gary Maynard, and I serve as Secretary of the Maryland Department of
Public Safety and Correctional Services.
As a member of the Association of State Correctional
Administrators, I am here today to support S. 251, the Safe Prisons
Communications Act of 2009.
I have been involved in corrections for 39 years, working at the
Federal Bureau of Prisons and in five states, serving in four of those
as head of the corrections system.
I have also served as President of the American Correctional
Association.
Throughout my career I have had an opportunity to develop
successful prison management practices. For those of us in this field,
one of the most important functions is the security of our prisons and
the overall safety, not only of the institution and the people inside,
but of the community-at-large.
One of the leading contributors to criminal behavior has been the
recent spike in gang activity and the violence associated with it.
Many gangs are using the prison system as a recruiting ground,
building their numbers and jeopardizing the safety of our institutions
and the communities to which they will return.
These groups seek out ways to continue to operate their criminal
activity from prison--most often through the use of cell phones. The
introduction of cell phones within our prisons is growing at an
alarming rate.
For example, in California, prison officials reported that they
collected over 2,800 cell phones last year, two times the amount found
the previous year.
Victims and public officials are being threatened, harassed, and
even killed by prisoners with access to cell phones.
Phones can be brought into prisons in a variety of ways. They are
smuggled on or within an inmate's body, by staff, by visitors, tossed
over the fences or walls, concealed within deliveries or shipments of
food and supplies, or through contractors.
Recently, a detainee who was housed within our Division of Pretrial
Detention and Services was convicted of ordering the death of a young
man in Baltimore. He made the call from a smuggled cell phone within
our facility.
Maryland is not the only state facing these types of problems. In
Texas recently, a death row inmate used an illegal cell phone to call
and threaten a State Senator.
In West Virginia, a correctional officer at the Federal Prison in
Hazelton was indicted for smuggling a phone into the facility for an
inmate.
This past year in Massachusetts, a maximum security inmate
threatened a medical staff member with a cell phone in an attempt to
coerce her into bringing a gun or other weapon into the prison--a plan
that was prevented by quick action on the part of the Massachusetts
Department of Correction.
In Nevada, an inmate escaped through the use of a cell phone which
was introduced to the facility through a compromised staff member.
During his escape he committed three armed home robberies, a
kidnapping, and auto theft.
In Washington State, correctional officers have been terminated and
are facing criminal prosecution for their role in introducing into the
facilities cell phones that were used to support drug activity.
Cell phones were used to plan two escapes from prisons in Kansas.
In one of the cases, a cell phone was used to deliver instructions to
an accomplice outside of the perimeter of the facility in order to
avoid perimeter patrols--allowing the accomplice time to cut the fence
and deliver weapons. One escape ended in a high speed chase and the
second in a shoot out with local law enforcement. Although no one was
killed, the presence of cell phones in the prison system allowed the
threat and possibility to exist.
In South Carolina, inmates have used cell phones to coordinate
escapes, smuggle contraband, and commit credit card fraud for thousands
of dollars.
The Solutions
In response to this growing problem, many States, including Florida
and New Jersey, have passed legislation making the possession of a cell
phone within prison a felony--something we hope to do in Maryland this
year, where it is currently a misdemeanor offense.
Moreover, the corrections community has continued to expand efforts
to prevent the flow and use of cell phones within our institutions.
Increased efforts have been made in cell phone interdiction.
Corrections officials across the country are making every effort to
prevent phones from entering the institutions through enhanced
technology, searches, and other unconventional methods.
For example, in Maryland, we have established a Corrections K-9
Unit--dogs trained to sniff out cell phones. Since June 2008 our K-9
unit has detected 85 phones across the system.
This strategy has been replicated in other states, including West
Virginia, South Dakota, Florida, and Arizona.
In addition, like many other states, we have invested in technology
and policies to enhance our ability to control the introduction of cell
phones. All of these efforts will lead to increased confiscation of
cell phones and other contraband, but no matter what security measures
are put in place, we can not possibly eliminate this threat altogether.
As I mentioned earlier, phones are smuggled into our prisons in a
variety of ways--on or within an inmate's body, by visitors, by staff,
tossed over the fences or walls, concealed within deliveries or
shipments of food or supplies, or through contractors.
While we are able to implement security measures to address each of
these areas, our inmate population has time to think of ways to beat
the system, and they are innovative and imaginative.
The continued use of cell phones by incarcerated individuals to
continue their criminal behavior puts the public's safety in jeopardy.
We need to be able to rely on a better method to prevent the use of
cell phones. We need to fight technology with technology.
This bill would provide correctional administrators with the
opportunity to petition the Federal Communications Commission and
request the operation of a wireless jamming device within a prison,
penitentiary, or correctional facility.
This would allow us to evaluate the technology and substantially
improve our ability to control criminal behavior in our prisons.
We do not believe that signal jamming will be the total solution,
but it will put another option at the disposal of State correctional
administrators.
The states and the Federal Government have an equal interest in
prison security. There is no legitimate reason why State correctional
administrators should be denied the opportunity to seek a tool, already
available to the Federal Government, to further secure prisons.
Last year, the South Carolina Department of Corrections
successfully demonstrated cell phone jamming within a prison without
blocking cell phone service for people outside.
Texas, Washington, D.C., and Maryland have all asked for the
ability to pilot the same type of system. We feel certain the
technology works.
In order to provide safer prisons and safer communities, we
respectfully ask that you give favorable consideration to the Safe
Prisons Communications Act of 2009. In our view, illegal cell phone use
by inmates in our Nation's prisons is an issue that goes to the heart
of our country's public safety.
Thank you.
Senator Pryor. Thank you. Mr. Largent?
STATEMENT OF STEVE LARGENT, PRESIDENT AND CEO, CTIA--THE
WIRELESS ASSOCIATION
Mr. Largent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Hutchison, and Members of the Committee. Thanks for inviting me
to address this issue. It's an issue that CTIA and this
Committee can fight together, the problem of contraband cell
phones in prisons. We fully support your concern with this
important safety issue. As we approach this problem together,
my plea is that we find both the right policy solution and a
technological solution that won't harm the public's legitimate
cell phone use outside correctional facilities.
Our members are committed to ensuring that only those who
are legally entitled to possess and receive wireless service do
so. This means increased cooperation among Federal and state
law enforcement, corrections officials, and the industry, and
we're committed to this effort.
That's the right policy solution. What's the right
technological solution? Put simply, the right solution is one
that effectively prohibits access by those who should not have
it while ensuring that law-abiding citizens and public safety
users enjoy the most reliable service possible.
Both from a policy perspective and from a technical
standpoint, jamming is not the best option. For more than 80
years, the policy of the Federal Government and this committee
has been clear: the prevention of willful interference with
radio signals. Yet, that is what jamming would entail. Jamming
not only deprives the public of legitimate service, even more
important, it can interfere with the ability of public safety
officers, including first responders, to access their wireless
service in an emergency.
Instead, we ask you to consider other reasonable,
effective, and affordable ideas that would better solve this
problem. The first is cell detection. It identifies wireless
devices in a given geographic area, like a prison, without
causing problems for other wireless users operating in
commercial or public safety bands. Cell detection will assist
corrections officials with detection, location, and
confiscation of unauthorized devices. In turn, this can provide
law enforcement with call records and other types of
information that can assist in disciplinary actions and
criminal prosecutions.
Cell detection also is compatible with wire-tapping. A
recent high-profile case in Baltimore that was mentioned
earlier, which led to the indictments of both inmates and
correction officers, shows the results this type of
intelligence can bring. Managed access offers a second
alternative to jamming. Managed access solutions allow
commercial wireless network access only to specifically
authorized users, while blocking others.
This solution also ensures that controls apply only within
a prison and not outside of it. And because no jamming occurs,
there is no interference to other users. So, from the
industry's perspective, there are less intrusive, yet
effective, options to consider other than jamming. And these
superior technologies exist today and can be deployed quickly.
And to be clear, jamming is not a panacea. Even with over-
jamming a facility, there's no promise of complete success
inside the facility, though harmful interference with
legitimate users outside the facility is all but guaranteed,
especially in urban areas.
The Congress should therefore take great care to consider
the impact that any jamming proposal would have on both public
and public safety users. Given this wide array of technical
solutions, we believe states and industries should partner to
conduct trials of these alternatives. And we're discussing this
approach with the State of Maryland today.
CTIA strongly supports the underlying goal of S. 251. We
are, however, concerned by procedural rules it would impose on
the FCC. If Congress opts to allow the use of jammers, we
believe the proper approach would be to test first, then write
rules, and only then allow applications to jam to be
considered.
We also believe the bill should favor alternative non-
interfering technologies, such as those I discussed here
earlier, alternatives that would avoid altogether the problems
associated with jamming and preserve law enforcement's ability
to gather intelligence by way of wire taps.
Finally, we suggest the policymakers should also address
the supply and demand problem at the heart of the issue.
Congress in many states should update their contraband statutes
to impose tougher penalties for possession, provision, or
support of handsets inside correctional facilities. We commend
states such as West Virginia and Texas that have modernized
their contraband statutes and encourage others to follow.
Increased airport-style security checks of all parties
entering a correctional facility will also help this problem.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear here today. We look
forward to working with you to address this important safety
and law enforcement issue in a way that ends the use of
contraband phones in prisons while preserving reliable wireless
service for the public and public safety. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Largent follows:]
Prepared Statement of Steve Largent, President and CEO,
CTIA--The Wireless Association
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today on behalf
of CTIA--The Wireless Association.
On behalf of CTIA and its members, let me be absolutely clear from
the outset on two points: First, we understand the reason for today's
hearing and fully support policymakers' efforts to keep contraband
wireless phones out of correctional institutions. Second, our carriers
have no legitimate subscribers residing in these institutions and no
interest in seeing inmates use wireless services to conduct unlawful
activities or harass or intimidate the public. We want to work with the
Congress to develop and implement measures that will solve this problem
and preserve the ability for law-abiding members of the public to
continue to reliably access the wireless services provided by CTIA's
member companies.
Resolving this issue in a way that both protects and serves the
public will require cooperation among Federal and state policymakers
and administrators and industry, and I'm here to pledge the wireless
industry's assistance in this effort. That said, it is the wireless
industry's view that the jamming of wireless signals is not a panacea
and raises potentially serious concerns that must be taken into account
as Congress contemplates how to address this issue. While some parties
have attempted to position jamming as ``the solution'' to controlling
contraband phones in correctional institutions, we do not believe it
should be a preferred solution given the availability of superior
technological alternatives.
Foremost among the concerns we have with any jamming proposal is
the impact it could have on the ability of wireless service providers
to reliably and effectively provide critical connectivity to public
safety officers, including first responders who may have to enter a
prison to fight a fire or deal with another emergency, and other
legitimate customers. The public safety role of commercial wireless
services is well known to the American public and members of this
Committee. The industry provides access to 911 and E911 services,
offers priority access service to government officials in times of
natural or man-made emergencies, and is working to bring emergency
alert services to market as soon as the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) releases the standards under which the EAS process will
be implemented. Wireless consumers rely on their ability to use their
wireless phones as lifelines in time of need and for their daily
business and personal needs, and thus the possible authorization of
jamming without due regard for the consequences of such a decision and
the interference it may cause is of serious concern to CTIA's
membership.
Since enactment of the Radio Act, this Committee has played a vital
role in shaping wireless policy, and one of the long-standing
cornerstones of that policy has been the prevention of willful
interference with radio signals. This was reflected in the
Communications Act of 1934, and reiterated in the 1990 amendments that
added Section 333 to the Act. We believe these sound policies have
worked well, and before departing from them we urge policymakers to
consider whether there are reasonable, effective, and affordable
technological solutions that would better solve the problem. We believe
there are and want to highlight several alternative solutions that
policymakers should consider.
The first of these alternative solutions is cell detection, a
monitoring and tracking approach that allows for the identification of
individual wireless devices within a correctional environment. Cell
detection does not create interference and thus these systems can
operate without causing problems for legitimate wireless users
operating in commercial or public safety bands.
With cell detection systems, prison administrators and correctional
officers can detect, locate, and confiscate unauthorized wireless
devices found in a correctional environment. Confiscated wireless
devices can provider correctional authorities and law enforcement with
call records, address information, and even photographs that can assist
in disciplinary actions and criminal prosecutions. Alternatively, once
illicit devices have been detected, prison officials and law
enforcement may decide to leave them in place and arrange to monitor
them in accordance with the wiretap statutes. As demonstrated in the
recent high-profile case in Baltimore in which a number of inmates and
correctional officers were indicted on the basis of information
gathered by wiretaps, intelligence gathered in this way can be a
critical tool that assists law enforcement in investigations and the
prevention of criminal activity.
Cell detection technology is available today, and the United States
Department of Justice recently acknowledged the need to improve its
ability ``to detect, locate, and defeat the use of unauthorized
wireless communications devices in all operating environments,
including in, but not limited to, correctional environments,'' adding
that it also requires ``improved, unobtrusive means to accurately
detect a broad spectrum of contraband to preclude its introduction into
correctional . . . environments.'' \1\ These functionalities are not
possible with jamming, which may thwart the use of contraband phones in
some cases but will not prevent smuggling, identify the location of
unauthorized devices, or assist in their confiscation.
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\1\ U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice,
``High-Priority Criminal Justice Technology Needs,'' March 2009, at 16.
Document available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/225375.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to cell detection, another promising technological
solution to this problem involves the use of managed access. This
approach enables a corrections facility to manage wireless access in
controlled area, such as a prison. Managed access would restrict
communications on the commercial wireless networks to only a subset of
allowed users (also known as a ``white-list''). Other users are blocked
from the commercial system access in the area. Managed access solutions
also utilize location determination technologies to ensure that the
controls apply only in the geographic area of the prison. And the best
part is, because no jamming transmission occurs, there is no
interference to other users.
Just last week, CTIA convened a day-long meeting involving North
American vendors of cell detection and managed access solutions \2\ and
engineers from a number of CTIA's carrier members to discuss potential
solutions to this issue. We hope our efforts will put the industry in a
position to trial alternative solutions in partnership with various
states, including the Maryland Department of Public Safety and
Corrections, with which we have had an on-going dialogue about ways in
which we can collaborate to resolve these issues in a way that meets
the needs of the Department of Public Safety and Corrections and our
customers. We believe these efforts will be successful and serve as a
model that can be used in locations around the country.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Vendors in attendance at the meeting included Airpatrol of
Columbia, MD, BINJ Laboratories of Quincy, MA, Electronic Entities
Group or Torrance, CA, ITT of Columbia, MD, Tecore Networks of
Columbia, MD, CellAntenna of Coral Springs, FL, and Triple Dragon
Communications of Vancouver, BC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cell detection and managed-access technologies should be considered
as superior and preferred alternatives to jamming for two critical
reasons: because jamming will not guarantee that contraband wireless
devices will be rendered inoperable or that convicts won't be able to
communicate with the outside world and because jamming can cause
harmful interference to legitimate users. Regarding the first of these
points, jamming is not foolproof and, with either a direct line of
sight to a cell tower or shielding from the jammer's signal, an inmate
in possession of a phone may still be able to complete a call or send a
text message.
Regarding the second, and more serious of our concerns, for jamming
to be effective, correctional administrators will have to jam their
entire facilities, fence to fence and everything in between. Absent a
commitment to jam the entire facility, the same corrupt individuals who
smuggle contraband phones to inmates simply can point out where they
can be used outside the range of a jammer. To jam an entire facility
and deal with the constantly changing radio-frequency environment,
which is impacted by changes in network load, cell tower locations,
weather, and even the time of year, and the helical way in which radio
waves propagate (which contrasts with the linear nature of prison
boundaries), will require ``over-jamming'' in which the harmful signal
extends beyond the facility and into areas where legitimate users may
be impacted. We know this because the problem of illicit wireless usage
in prisons is not unique to the United States, and in other countries
where jammers have been employed to thwart this problem, they have
caused significant interference beyond their intended range. The laws
of physics are universal, and these same problems will occur here if we
proceed with the deployment of jamming equipment, especially in areas
where correctional facilities are located in urban and suburban
environments or adjacent to transportation corridors. This is often the
case, as shown in the screen-shots accompanying testimony.
In addition to disrupting commercial wireless service used by
persons outside a correctional facility, a system designed to jam
wireless calls emanating from within a correctional facility could also
jam important public safety communications. The 800 MHz public safety
band is adjacent to the cellular band and the 700 MHz spectrum bands
that will soon be brought into use by both commercial and public safety
entities are interleaved with one another, thus making it quite
conceivable that a system designed to jam commercial service might also
jam communications used by fire departments or other public safety
agencies that might be called upon to operate near or even at a prison.
In contemplating the authorization of jammers, the Congress should
consider these possibilities and exercise substantial care to protect
both the public and public safety users.
In our view, that care should start with a bias in favor of non-
interfering technologies. However, if jamming is to be considered, the
proper approach would be to start with rigorous FCC lab and field
testing, involving industry engineers, followed by the establishment of
rules that would govern the use of certified, tested equipment. Once
FCC rules are in place, the Commission could consider case-by-case
requests for the use of jammers. In evaluating such requests, the
Commission should consider what technical alternatives are available,
what actions have been taken to prevent the smuggling of wireless
devices into the applicant's facility or facilities, what procedures
have been employed to locate and confiscate unauthorized devices, and
why those procedures have proven inadequate, as well as the location of
the facility for which authorization to jam is being sought. In areas
where a facility is in close proximity to commercial or residential
properties, or to major transportation corridors, jamming may not be
appropriate even under tightly controlled circumstances and the
Commission must weigh the public interest in evaluating requests for
authorization to jam.
Strong post-deployment safeguards also would be necessary in the
event that jamming is authorized. Devices must be subject to strict
chain-of-custody requirements and include remote shut-down capabilities
to prevent them from falling into the wrong hands and being used
inappropriately. Additionally, aggressive post-deployment monitoring
should be employed to identify interference.
Even with these safeguards in place, interference is likely, and
public safety and wireless carriers will not know about instances of
interference until after they occur. This forces the industry and
public safety to react, and in an instance where a citizen's or public
safety official's safety or well-being is at stake, reacting after the
fact may be too late.
While CTIA strongly supports the underlying goal of S. 251, and
although the new draft of the legislation does contain several
improvements over the introduced version of the bill, we remain
troubled that the bill turns the process of testing, setting rules, and
considering applications for authorization on its head. The bill would
permit applications for authorization to deploy jammers upon enactment
and require the FCC to act on any such application within 60 days, yet
it does not require testing and the establishment of rules to be
completed for 1 year. This process must be reversed.
Additionally, the bill lacks any reference to alternative, non-
interfering technologies. The deployment of technology that includes
the possibility, in fact likelihood, of interference will impose on the
industry the burden and cost associated with regular field-testing and
monitoring near thousands of correctional facilities; a better, less
burdensome approach would be to require periodic, but unannounced
testing by the FCC. The best approach, however, would be to give
preference to non-interfering alternatives so that the problems
associated with jamming are avoided altogether and law enforcement's
ability to gather intelligence by way of wiretaps is preserved.
Finally, the bill is incomplete because it fails to address the
supply and demand problem at the heart of this issue. We urge Congress
not to lose sight of why we have this problem or, put differently, how
wireless handsets are getting in to correctional facilities.
Fundamentally, as the title of the hearing suggests, this is a
contraband issue and the Congress and many states need to update and
enforce their contraband statutes to impose tougher penalties for the
possession, provision, or support of contraband handsets.
Unfortunately, even prison officials acknowledge that ``the most common
method used by the inmate population for obtaining cell phones is
through the use of corrupted staff'' at correctional institutions.\3\
This conclusion has been repeated by others, including the Texas
inspector general, who recently told Wired magazine that ``there is no
question that corrupt officers are involved'' in the smuggling of
contraband wireless devices,\4\ and Antonio Gioia, a drug prosecutor
with the Maryland State Attorney's Office in Baltimore, who told WJZ-TV
that ``It's not a big secret. They [phones] are chiefly smuggled in by
correctional officers.'' \5\ The motive for this activity is financial,
as a recent report of the California Office of the Inspector General
found that over 1 year, one ``correctional officer received
approximately $150,000 for smuggling approximately 150 phones to
inmates.'' \6\ Remarkably, while the officer in question was
terminated, he faced no legal repercussions for his actions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Affidavit of John R. Campbell, Warden, Val Verde Correctional
Facility, Del Rio, Texas, filed August 1, 2007 in Petition of the GEO
Group, Inc. for Forbearance from Application of Sections 302, 303 and
333 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, and Sections 2.803
and 2.807 of the Commission's Rules to Allow State and Local
Correctional Authorities to Prevent Use of Commercial Mobile Radio
Services at Correctional Facilities.
\4\ Vince Beiser, ``Prisoners Run Gangs, Plan Escapes and Even
Order Hits With Smuggled Cellphones,'' Wired, May 22, 2009, available
at http://www.wired.com/politics/law/magazine/17-06/
ff_prisonphones?currentPage=all.
\5\ Mike Hellgren, ``Calling the Shots: Cell Phones & Crime Behind
Bars,'' available at http://wjz.com/local/
cell.phone.contraband.2.999932.html.
\6\ Special Report: Inmate Cell Phone Use Endangers Prison Security
and Public Safety, Office of the Inspector General, State of
California, May 2009, at 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This kind of corruption and other efforts to smuggle contraband to
prisoners must be stopped by significantly enhancing the penalties
associated with this behavior. These efforts also must extend to those
who facilitate the use of contraband handsets by paying for service.
While the threat of incarceration may not deter those who already are
imprisoned, it may cause those who provide illicit wireless devices or
enable their use by inmates to stop for fear of facing meaningful time
behind bars.
We have seen the imposition of enhanced penalties work in other
areas. Three years ago, this Committee was concerned--as we were--with
the problem of pretexting. With our full support, congressional action
imposing stiffer penalties, including criminal sanctions, helped to
quickly and effectively dry up the market for pretexting. That approach
should be tried here too, and while several states, including West
Virginia, North Dakota, Arkansas, Texas, Florida, Nevada, and Indiana,
have recently updated their contraband statutes to include specific
penalties for the possession or provision of unauthorized handsets,
many states have yet to do so. CTIA encourages other states and the
Federal Government to enact legislation to make the possession,
provision, or support of a contraband wireless device a felony.
Many states also need to implement ``airport style'' security
measures for staff and visitors who enter prison grounds. Remarkably,
not all states require even the same level of security checks to enter
a prison facility that citizens and staff routinely encounter when
entering a congressional office building. In states that do require
``airport style'' security measures as a prerequisite to entry,
officials ``consider this interdiction method effective at curbing cell
phone smuggling at the point of entry'' and the Federal Bureau of
Prisons believes the screening process ``has been a good deterrent.''
\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, in considering whether action is necessary to allow some
limited use of jamming technology, CTIA also urges the Committee to
ensure that the FCC actively and aggressively enforces the existing
prohibition on the unauthorized use of jammers. Carriers and others who
depend on the ability to use spectrum on an interference-free basis are
encountering too many cases where individuals have engaged in unlawful
``self-help'' to jam wireless signals, often with an impact that
reaches far beyond their intended target.
Just this spring, CTIA identified the use of a jammer at Mt.
Spokane High School in Mead, Washington, where school administrators
had installed an illegal jammer to prevent students from using their
phones during school hours. As it happened, the jammer also interfered
not only with communications between commercial mobile radio service
customers, but also with the county sheriff's cross-band repeater, the
key to enabling communications between the county's sheriff, local
police, and the local SWAT team. One of our carriers that serves
western Kansas and eastern Colorado experienced a similar problem when
illegal jamming equipment was deployed by the Agate School District in
Colorado. We recognize that the FCC's enforcement team is spread thin,
but increased attention to, and action against, those who market or
deploy unauthorized jammers and other devices that cause interference
is both appropriate and necessary.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear on today's panel. I
appreciate the opportunity to share the wireless industry's views on
this matter and look forward to working with you to achieve a solution
to this matter that works to put an end to the use of contraband phones
in prisons and preserves reliable wireless service for law-abiding
citizens.
Senator Pryor. Thank you. Mr. Moriarty?
STATEMENT OF JOHN M. MORIARTY, INSPECTOR GENERAL, TEXAS
DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
Mr. Moriarty. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Hutchison, and
Members of the Committee, thank you for allowing me to be
testify here today in support of Senator Hutchison's S. 251 on
the jamming of illegal wireless communications.
My office initially became aware of the severity of the
problem in 2004, and has been conducting criminal
investigations inside the Texas prison system since that time.
In March of 2004, investigators from my office were working an
organized crime case involving a violent prison gang. In the
course of the investigation, information was developed that a
Ranking Member of the gang had ordered a murder of another
member from inside one of Texas's maximum security prisons by
using an illegal cell phone.
We intervened before the murder could take place. This case
resulted in the arrest and conviction of a corrections officer
for bribery and the termination of two others.
Texas was the first in the Nation to enact legislation to
make it a felony crime to provide a cell phone to an inmate.
Despite these and many more aggressive steps, the problem has
continued to grow. Texas has 158,000 inmates incarcerated in
112 secure facilities. The larger the number of inmates
incarcerated, the larger the illegal wireless commercial device
problem.
There's a false belief that when a person is incarcerated,
they probably when a person is incarcerated, they stop
committing crime. Many state prison systems do not have state
police criminal investigators embedded within the system as
Texas does, and face an even bigger challenge to investigate
the origins of these phones.
We have identified three primary sources of these devices:
carried on the person of corrupt employees or contractors,
dropped in a specific location and smuggled into the facility
by inmates, or concealed in packages shipped in to the prison
facilities.
On October 20, 2008, a systemwide lockdown was ordered in
Texas and extensive search procedures were enacted, as
mentioned earlier by Senator Whitmire. All persons entering the
facilities, all items, were subject to searches by use of metal
detectors, x-rays.
As the search procedures became more comprehensive, the
smuggling methods also changed. The inmates--and corrupt
employees, in some cases--have changed their operational
techniques by resorting to secreting devices in their body
cavities in order to defeat the search procedures. Conducting
body cavity searches is permitted only under extreme
circumstances due to the intrusiveness of the search. This
search technique is not taken lightly, and persons involved in
smuggling also know this.
Devices have been recovered in shipments of goods delivered
to the prisons. In one case, an air compressor was intercepted
and 75 devices recovered from the tank. This is an ongoing
battle for corrections departments all across the country.
Investigations have shown that quite often, one phone may be
used by numerous inmates, as Senator Whitmire mentioned
earlier, using different SIM cards. As most of us know, a SIM
card is about the size of a postage stamp. Due to the small
size, they are very difficult to detect. Quite often, we'll
find that there's one phone, but nine SIM cards or eight SIM
cards being used by that one device.
We have tried the use of some very sophisticated
countermeasures, and it has not been successful in the prison
environment. In Texas, investigations have revealed that the
cost to have a cell phone smuggled inside of a prison ranged
between $400 and $2,000 on death row.
Since 2004, my office has aggressively investigated 2,098
illegal wireless commercial device cases and obtained over
2,000 subpoenas for wireless records. These investigations have
shown that these illegal devices have been used in organized
criminal activity involving prison gangs, drug trafficking,
homicide, and solicitation of capital murder.
As you can imagine, this is a massive drain on our
investigative resources. The drug cartels operating across the
border from Texas have a lot of assets to attempt to corrupt
correctional staff. Investigations have revealed that inmates
with Mexican drug cartel ties have been communicating through
these illegal phones. The termination of the usefulness of
these devices by permitting jamming within the confines of the
prison is the most logical solution to ensure public safety.
As the oversight authority for the system, it is my opinion
that the State of Texas has utilized all available resources to
interdict cell phones from entering and operating within the
prisons. Signal-jamming is a key component that is missing. The
current situation is a serious national threat to public safety
and can only be properly rectified by passage of this
legislation.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you again for this opportunity and
would be happy to take any questions you might have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Moriarty follows:]
Prepared Statement of John M. Moriarty, Inspector General,
Texas Department of Criminal Justice
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, thank you for allowing
me to testify here today in support of Senator Hutchinson's Senate Bill
251 on the jamming of illegal wireless communication devices in prison
facilities. My office initially became aware of the severity of the
problem in 2004 and has been conducting criminal investigations on cell
phones inside the Texas prison system since that time.
In March 2004, investigators from my office were working an
organized crime case involving a violent prison gang. In the course of
the investigation, information was developed that a ranking member of
the gang ordered the murder of another member from inside of a maximum
security prison by using an illegal cell phone. We intervened before
the murder could take place. This case resulted in the arrest and
conviction of a corrections officer for Bribery and the termination of
two others.
Texas was the first in the Nation to enact legislation to make it a
felony crime to provide a cell phone to an inmate. Despite these and
many more aggressive steps, the problem has continued to grow. I
believe that in order to fully appreciate the challenge that state
systems face, you must understand how large several of the state penal
systems are. Texas has 156,000 inmates incarcerated in 112 secure
facilities. California, New York and Florida also have large numbers of
inmates. The larger the number of inmates incarcerated the larger the
illegal wireless communication device problem.
There is a false belief that when a person is incarcerated they
stop committing crime. Criminal law enforcement investigators who
operate inside of the state prisons have a very difficult job. Unlike
free world criminal investigators, the prison criminal investigator is
dealing daily with hard-core, street-smart convicted felons, in most of
their investigations. Many state prison systems do not have state
police criminal investigators embedded within the system as Texas does,
and face an even bigger challenge to investigate the origins of these
phones.
We have identified three primary sources of these devices:
1. Carried on the person of corrupt employees or contractors.
2. ``Dropped'' in a specific location then smuggled into the
facility by inmates.
3. Concealed in packages shipped into the prison facilities.
In one undercover investigation, an investigator from my office
posed as a member of the Texas Syndicate prison gang. He arranged a
meeting with a corrupt corrections officer in a parking lot in Houston
and provided her with a cell phone, $400 and a small quantity of
Heroin. During the meeting the officer detailed that she was working
for all of the gangs smuggling cell phones. It is all about the money.
In the case involving an offender from death row contacting Senator
John Whitmire, the investigation revealed that the cell phone had
passed through a dozen inmates or their family members before it
reached its destination on death row.
The extensive search procedures enacted on October 20, 2008, for
all persons and items that enter their facilities included pat
searches, metal detectors and x-rays. As the search procedures became
more comprehensive the smuggling methods also changed. The inmates and
corrupt employees in some cases have changed their operational
techniques by resorting to secreting the devices in their body cavities
in order to get past the search procedures. Conducting body cavity
searches is permitted only under extreme circumstances due to the
intrusiveness of the search. This search technique is not taken lightly
and persons involved in smuggling also know this.
Devices have been recovered in shipments of goods delivered to the
prisons. In one case an air compressor was intercepted and 75 devices
recovered from the tank. This is an ongoing battle for all the
corrections departments in the country. Investigations have shown that
quite often one phone may be used by numerous inmates using several
different SIM cards. A SIM card is about the size of a postage stamp.
In a search of one inmate, he had 4 SIM cards placed vertically into
the heel of his shoe. Due to their small size they are very difficult
to detect. The use of some very sophisticated counter-measure devices
has been attempted and has not been very successful in the prison
environment.
The smuggling of cell phones has become a national issue in the
corrections' public corruption arena. In Texas, investigations have
revealed that the cost to have a cell phone smuggled inside a prison
range between $400 to as high as $2,000 on Death Row. We have also
developed evidence that money from foreign nationals involved in the
anti-death penalty movement was utilized to facilitate some of these
organized smuggling operations. Since 2004, my office has aggressively
investigated 2,098 illegal wireless communication device cases and
obtained 2,035 subpoenas for wireless records. On October 20, 2008,
Governor Perry ordered a system wide lockdown. 949 cell phone
investigations have been opened by my office since that time.
These investigations have shown that these illegal devices have
been used in organized criminal activity involving, prison gangs, drug
trafficking, homicide and solicitation of capital murder to name a few
of the offenses. As you can imagine this is a massive drain on our
investigative resources.
I have been dealing with this problem on a daily basis since 2004
and have conducted extensive research into the issue, and in my opinion
the solution is the targeted jamming of correctional facilities. The
drug cartels operating across the border from Texas have a lot of
assets to attempt to corrupt correctional staff to violate the law.
Texas is very aggressive in the protection of its border, and hence the
prison system ends up with cartel and gang members in custody.
Investigations have revealed that inmates with Mexican drug cartel ties
have been communicating through these illegal phones. The termination
of the usefulness of the device by permitting jamming within the
confines of the prison is the most logical solution to ensure public
safety.
As the oversight authority for the system, it is my opinion that
the state of Texas has utilized all available resources to interdict
cell phones from entering and operating within the prisons. Signal
jamming is the key component missing. The current situation is a
serious national threat to public safety that can only be properly
rectified by passage of this legislation.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you again for this opportunity. I would be
happy to take any questions you might have.
Senator Pryor. Thank you. I do have a couple of questions,
and then I'd like to turn it over to my colleagues.
First, for Mr. Largent, several states, including Arkansas,
recently filed a petition for rulemaking at the FCC to permit
wireless jamming in corrections facilities. I was wondering if
CTIA is planning on taking a position on that? Have you all
made a decision on whether to support or oppose that?
Mr. Largent. Well, I would say, Mr. Chairman, that I'm not
aware of that particular petition to the FCC. But I would tell
you that what CTIA supports is--you know, we're not here to
defend the actions of prisoners or having cell phones in
prisons. What we want to see is a way to stop the use of
prisoners using cell phones, and at the same time, protect the
ability of public safety and the public of being able to use
their cell phones outside those prison walls.
And the problem with jamming as a technique, in my opinion,
it's crude, it's unreliable, and there are better ways to do it
so that it doesn't interfere with public safety's
communications, doesn't interfere with the public's
communication ability, and yet, it stops the ability of
prisoners from using cell phones.
Senator Pryor. Senator Whitmore, let me ask you a follow-up
to your statement, and that is, you know, you support wireless
jamming. Do you think there might be other, more effective,
ways to do this and not use jamming? Do you feel like that's
the most efficient, effective way to stop this?
Mr. Whitmire. It would certainly appear--we have certainly
used every traditional, innovative measure in the State of
Texas. After the incident involving my phone call, we went to a
lockdown, systemwide. It took about 2 weeks to do a cell-by-
cell search. All employees were patted down, metal detectors,
dogs.
It's not for lack of effort by the correction officers and
their employees of trying to have zero tolerance. I can only
tell you, if you can imagine, by meeting with correction
officials and other state officials, I demanded action
immediately. They told me they did the best they could, but
we're still experiencing phones being intercepted and used in
our prisons.
What you have to realize, and I'm sure you do, is the
desire of these inmates and their parties to have these phones.
The benefits are so great. Can you imagine going to death row,
but still able to harass law enforcement, judges, prosecutors,
victims, carry out a very profitable criminal enterprise?
I think we're all in agreement, it's irrefutable that the
problem exists, it's what do you do about it? I'm going to tell
you the State of Texas has 112 mostly remote, rural locations.
Short of jamming and a complete shutting down of those phone
signals, I don't think we can remedy the problem. It is a
public safety problem. I wish I--if we had the time, but
probably not necessary, to put a name and face with these
people using the phones. It's the worst of the worst.
And if they can have cell phones on death row, which should
be the most secure area of our prison system, it just shows the
extent of the problem. And I'm just really appealing for a
common-sense approach. Untie the hands of prison officials and
let them use all available tools, and address the concerns of
the industry. But I think they can be accommodated.
And I work close with the industry, and I'm sensitive that
we not interfere with law-abiding citizens' use of these
phones. But really, public safety, as we all know, is our first
priority and our responsibility as public officials. I feel we
have to have this tool.
Senator Pryor. Thank you. Senator Hutchison?
Senator Hutchison. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me
just ask both Senator Whitmire and Mr. Moriarty, you've heard
the concerns raised by Mr. Largent and Mr. Mirgon, and also,
I'd like to ask Mr. Maynard to respond here. Why aren't the
tools that we have now--dogs, the ability to try to listen has
been mentioned. Why aren't those tools effective enough?
Mr. Whitmire. I would say, Senator, the size of the
problem. We have 158,000 inmates. Waco, Texas, we're familiar
with, is 100,000 people. We're literally locking up--
unfortunately, but necessary--one and a half Waco, Texas and
112 locations. We have 40,000 of these TDCJ employees, 26,000
guards.
When humans are involved, unfortunately, and there's a
profit motive, you're going to have corruption and the need to
apprehend these phones. And so I don't think we quit using our
available tools, but we've also----
Senator Hutchison. Tell me about the guard----
Mr. Whitmire.--got to use the next one.
Senator Hutchison. Tell me about the guard problem. I mean,
how----
Mr. Whitmire. Well, Mr. Tabler, the inmate on death row,
when I asked him how he got his phone, he said, ``$2,100 paid
to a guard.'' Most of our guards, as you know, are law-abiding,
hard-working civil servants who put their lives on the line
each and every day. They take home $1,900, a starting
correction officer. Just the sheer money alone is the
unfortunate incentive.
Then they get compromised, and the whole facility is in
danger, the community where it resides. And I'm sitting in
Houston, Texas. My family was in danger, and all citizens of
the State of Texas.
So it's just the size of the problem, and, like I said,
it's common sense. You use--it's a war, is the way I would draw
an analogy to it. You do not use available weapons if they're
going to be useful in this battle of crime.
Senator Hutchison. OK. Mr. Maynard, what do you think about
what you have available now, and why is it not enough?
Mr. Maynard. Senator, as you know, the State of Maryland is
going to host a demonstration of all the technology that might
be used in addition to jamming. And Governor O'Malley and
Senator Mikulski's also petitioned the NTIA to conduct a 30-
minute demonstration of jamming, just so we could see what
effect it has.
I think none of the things that we do--the dogs, the--we
use in Maryland x-ray machines for packages coming in. We use
secure-view scanners for inmates to pass through like metal
detectors at airports. We just--we have four of the BOSS
chairs, the body orifice scanning system, that can detect cell
phones within an inmate's body. We're getting 20 more of those,
so we'll have one for every prison.
We are using all the technology, we think. We would like to
be able to petition the FCC to try the jamming. It would still
be reviewed. We would have to ensure that it applied only to
one institution. But so far, I've never seen jamming, because
it's not legal to observe jamming unless we get permission to
do that.
Senator Hutchison. Mr. Moriarty, what about the expense of
this? Is it realistic to use the technology that we have now
for every prison throughout the United States?
Mr. Moriarty. The Texas legislature this past session
authorized me to use and possess detection equipment. Our plans
on the table right now are to--we've got budgeted over a half a
million dollars just for that one mobile set and four full-time
employees to go around the 112 prisons. I mean, it's just--it's
very difficult to utilize that detection equipment.
You know, there is no expectation of privacy in the
penitentiaries, and the State of Texas recognized that and
authorized those tracking of those cell phones without court
order. But it is very cost prohibitive. We've looked at a lot
of the methods that have been mentioned here today, and found
that with as many facilities as we have, it's not a wise use of
taxpayer dollars.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you. My time is up, and I'm going
to let others--but I would like to have a second round. And,
Mr. Chairman, I do have letters that I'd like to be submitted
for the record from the state departments of correction, from
South Carolina, Kansas, Massachusetts, Arkansas, and Tennessee.
And Senator Thune has asked also to submit a letter from South
Dakota in support of Senate Bill 251.
Senator Pryor. Without objection. Senator Begich?
[The information referred to is contained in the Appendix.]
STATEMENT OF HON. MARK BEGICH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA
Senator Begich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I have to say
in all the issues we deal with in Commerce, I never anticipated
we'd be talking about this issue, to be very frank with you.
But it does drive some questions for me. And I appreciate the
Ranking Member's effort in this area, and I actually support
this idea.
It seems like--and I'll just make a comment, and that is
for the technology we have today and the advancements we have
with wireless and many other types of technology, it seems the
concerns that I've heard from Congressman Largent, Mr. Largent,
and others that we can accomplish this.
Because I have sat in this same hearing having telecom
people here, telling me how advanced and the great
telecommunications we have and the power of technology and the
advancement in R&D, so I believe them. So I think solving the
problems that you have are not going to be a problem, in my
view.
But I want to go to the basic issue, and maybe--I'm not
sure, Mr. Moriarty, if you could answer this question. But--and
I'm also looking to Senator Whitmire. There's 20--I'm going to
use Texas--26,000 correctional officers, if I heard that number
correctly.
Mr. Moriarty. Yes, sir.
Senator Begich. We are solving a problem which is a symptom
of another problem, which is we have correctional officers--and
I agree with you, Senator Whitmire. We have an incredible--all
across this country, correctional officers are doing fantastic
work. They're usually paid less than police officers, which is
a problem, I think. That's just my own personal belief as a
former mayor. I think they should be equal for the work they
do.
But putting that all in perspective, it seems like we're
treating the symptom of a bigger problem, and that is we have a
certain amount of officers that are taking monetary or other
gain in order to supplement their own lifestyle and whatever.
How many of the 26,000 officers, or the folks that have been
dealt with with dealing with this contraband, have been
prosecuted and are serving jail time?
Mr. Whitmire. Out of--my office conducts more bribery
investigations than any law enforcement office in the State of
Texas.
Senator Begich. OK. Give me a number.
Mr. Whitmire. We aggressively--we're in the ballpark of 100
maybe a year that we lock up. And we have our own special
prison prosecution unit. We are very aggressive on dealing with
the public corruption issues, whether it be drugs, cell phones,
unlawful contact with an inmate, whatever it may be. But just
because they resign or they walk out the door doesn't mean
we're not coming after them with a warrant. We have a very
aggressive program in Texas.
Senator Begich. Let me, if I can, ask another question. I'm
not sure I totally heard what you said. In regards to this type
of investment, was it 500,000 per one prison that this is being
sampled on?
Mr. Whitmire. This is--the system that we're looking at is
a mobile system that we can go from prison to prison on,
looking, searching at different hours of the day and night for
active cell phones.
Senator Begich. And the four employees that would be part
of that?
Mr. Whitmire. They're investigators from my office that'll
be specially trained on the operation of the equipment.
Senator Begich. And reasonable pay? Good pay?
Mr. Whitmire. Well, they're state police officer's pay.
Senator Begich. OK. That's one point. I was trying to do a
little contrast there. So they're paid more than a correctional
officer?
Mr. Whitmire. That's correct.
Senator Begich. OK. That just makes my point from what I
said earlier, that we need to move those pay levels up, to be
very frank with you. And then in regards to--if you wanted to
implement this throughout the whole system--again, I'm using
Texas as an example. You had 112--if I heard that right, 112
correctional institutions?
Mr. Whitmire. Yes.
Senator Begich. You're talking at a minimum--if they were
mobile, but stationary, 50 million or more for equipment
purposes and then operational?
Mr. Whitmire. If you were to install--there are hard-wire
detection systems also.
Senator Begich. Sure.
Mr. Whitmire. But it would be quite a bit more than what
we're talking about for that one mobile system.
Senator Begich. OK. Do you think--and, again, honestly, I
support this legislation, because I do believe that the
wireless technology of today has advanced in the last 2 years
even better than it was 4 years ago, 6 years ago, and it will
advance even more in the future. And I think when challenged,
the wireless industry, situations like this, they will overcome
the obstacles that may or may not be in the way, or perceived
obstacles. So I think there's great opportunity here. So I
support the idea. I support the concept.
But I am concerned because of the other issue, and that's
that this is a symptom of the core issue. You know, I have a
hard enough time bringing a bottle of water through TSA, and it
seems that if we focus our energy in that area, figuring out
what we can do more with our correctional officers to ensure
that they have the resources they need, that the institutions
have the resources they need to ensure the highest level--when
those doors are opened, nothing passes through.
And I know it's hard, because we run a prison system also
in Alaska. But it's a difficult challenge. And so I would just
put that as more of a comment without--I'm not sure there is an
answer. But that's a great challenge. And I think you made my
point, that the people you're hiring, the four, are going to be
paid more than correctional officers, because that's part of
the equation that you get to, and that is fair and good
compensation for people who are working very hard under very
difficult situations now.
So I'll just leave it at that. But thank you very much.
Senator Pryor. Senator Thune?
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN THUNE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH DAKOTA
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank
you for holding today's hearing and thank Senator Hutchison for
her leadership on this issue. I'm glad to be a co-sponsor of
her bill. I do believe that the illicit use of wireless devices
by prisoners needs to be addressed. And, as we speak, there are
countless inmates who are using smuggled cell phones to
coordinate illegal activity and plan escapes or intimidate
witnesses.
And I think this legislation allows our correctional
facilities in this country to operate cell phone jamming
technologies upon the approval of the FCC and also set some
limits on those devices to ensure that they don't interfere
with communications outside of the prison. So I think the bill
is a step in the right direction, and it will improve the
safety of our prisons by preventing prisoners from using
wireless devices and communicating with those outside of the
prison.
And, as Senator Hutchison said, I do want to submit a
letter for the record that I received from the South Dakota
Department of Corrections, which endorses the Safe Prisons
Communications Act of 2009 and supports its timely enactment.
[The information referred to follows:]
State of South Dakota Department of Corrections
Pierre, SD, January 26, 2009
Hon. John Thune,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Thune:
I write to urge your support of the Safe Prisons Communications Act
of 2009, S. 251 and H.R. 560.
The bill would allow the FCC to grant waivers permitting
correctional institutions to jam or interfere with wireless
communications by inmates. Under the legislation, the FCC would enact
rules and require applications before authorizing the use of such a
device. The signal employed would be at the lowest, technically
feasible transmission power to avoid jamming beyond the correctional
facility perimeter.
Jamming cell phones would be a significant aid to correctional
officials in supervising inmate communications. As the Secretary of the
South Dakota Department of Corrections, I fully support this
legislation and hope you will support correctional institutions in
South Dakota and across the Nation with your vote.
Respectfully submitted,
Tim Reisch,
Secretary of Corrections.
Senator Thune. And I appreciate the panel this morning and
the insights that you're providing with respect to this issue.
And I guess I would like to maybe just ask a couple of
questions, if I might. One, to Mr. Moriarty, in your testimony,
it's--you made it clear that Texas has made it a felony to
provide cell phones to inmates. And I guess I'm interested in
knowing the results of that law. If that question's already
been asked, I apologize for repeating it. And then are inmates
still obtaining and using some of these devices? And then I
guess follow-up would be do you think that jamming is the most
effective approach to stop further use of those devices?
Mr. Moriarty. The law--we've prosecuted numerous inmates
for possession of the phone inside the facilities, as well as
some family members that have supplied the phones, as well as
some correctional staff that have smuggled the phones in.
The problem continues to grow. We think it's a useful tool
and a deterrent in some circumstances. However, they're--when
you're talking taking--receiving money between $400 to $2,000,
you know, that's quite a bit of money to these employees. And,
again, it's a small percentage, but just one of those
individuals can put lot of phones inside one of those
facilities.
Again, there has been a lot of innovation. It has been
very--in the smuggling methods, both with the inmates--and it's
morphing as we get--step up and ramp up the searches, we're
finding that they were using false bottoms in containers. Like
I said, body cavities, we're--there's no end to how important
these phones are.
We did an undercover deal in Texas where the phone was
$400, and there was also an introduction to some heroin. And if
somebody had told me 5 years ago that a phone would be $400 and
heroin $50, I'd told them they were crazy. But that's exactly
what transpired on that undercover.
So, I mean, it's--I'm not saying this is--jamming is the
total, 100 percent solution to this. Texas, 22 of the 112
facilities account for the majority of the phones, and they are
in rural, remote areas. We've also been dealing with Federal
law enforcement that jam on occasion, and have spoken with them
and consulted with them, and they said that they could narrow
that signal and jam the specified area without causing any type
of problem.
I think we need--the testing and moving forward on the
testing is critical to--I won't want to interfere with any
public safety communications also, but I think it's a very
valuable tool that we need to put in our tool kit.
Senator Thune. Mr. Largent, have any of these--I know that
the state correction facilities are looking for the
opportunities to test some of these devices. And I guess I'm
curious of knowing what your thoughts are about how the
wireless carriers--what role they ought to play in testing some
of these things. And have any of your members participated in
tests so far, of jamming technologies in some of the prisons?
Mr. Largent. No, not in jamming technologies. We are--I
think we're scheduled to do something with the State of
Maryland to test some of the other technologies that are
available, and, actually, higher-tech. And so we're in the
process right not.
Senator Thune. Good. And do your--I assume you believe that
the--the carriers ought to be involved in testing, as the
correctional facilities try to determine whether or not this is
the most effective way?
Mr. Largent. Actually, I appreciate you asking that
question, because that's one of our real concerns with S. 251
as it's currently written, and that is that the--it's
structured in such a way that the equipment is installed in the
prisons, and then you test, as opposed to testing before it's
approved. And it's sort of backward, in our opinion. I think
you need to test, make sure it works and works appropriately,
that there's no spillover effect, which is our fear, that the
spillover effect affects legitimate cell phone use in the
areas. And then you can authorize it to be used in a prison
setting once you've tested it and make sure that it works
properly.
That would be one change that I would make to S. 251 that I
think would alleviate a lot of the fears that our companies
have. And I'm really here, not to defend our companies, but to
defend our customers, because they're the ones that are going
to have the disruption of service.
And there have been cases already where the cell jamming
technology is being used in prisons in South America and India
and other places, and there are stories of up to 200,000
cellular customers, legitimate customers, whose service was
disrupted. And that's the kind of thing that we don't want to
see take place in this country. And I know nobody on this panel
wants to see that happen, or nobody in the Senate wants to see
it take place.
But that's the fear that we have in just talking about cell
jamming. We think there are other technologies that are
available today--you can buy them today and implement them--
that would be proven technologies that would be as effective
without jamming signals.
Senator Thune. Let me just ask one final question. If
jamming devices are deployed in prisons, are there--what are
the realistic chances that those devices would fall into the
wrong hands, either inside or outside of the prison, and be
used, for example, against law enforcement? Is that a concern
that any of you might have?
Mr. Largent. Well, I can tell you that--let me just speak
for just a second. There's cell jamming equipment that is out
there today that has been sold illegitimately, and some
schools, for example, I think in Colorado, were actually
deploying them. And they didn't know it was illegal. And then
they--you know, it was discovered they were using this jamming
equipment, and it was disrupting public safety's ability to use
this same spectrum. And so they quickly took it down. But it's
available illegally now. But, again, it's not a legal piece of
equipment in this country.
Mr. Mirgon. Yes, sir. And what it does is in a couple
instances where it has occurred, it shuts down what is known as
the control channel, which makes the radio system fail. So
you're not just impacting the people right in that area, you're
impacting a whole system.
But I will qualify those were illegally brought in, used
for mischievous purposes, and did not have any of the benefits
of proper engineering.
Mr. Whitmire. I was just going to follow up. If we can't do
it now--I mean, I don't know how you're giving live examples of
how it's creating problems because it's prohibited, the
measures that we're asking for. And we can speculate and
certainly work with the authorities to safeguard against the
instruments in the wrong hands, but we know for a fact today
that the cell phones are in the wrong hands of convicted,
violent offenders. And like so many things I know, unless
they--I try to do what's for the greater good.
And while we share the concerns of the industry and need to
work with them hand-in-hand to make certain that our law-
abiding citizens' reception is not interfered with, we
certainly need to address the illicit use of it. Because it is
growing, as Mr. Moriarty pointed out.
And, you know, talking about additional penalties, we've
done that. But you're already serving a life sentence or a
death sentence. It's not much of a deterrent to go ahead and
make that a felony. It has hopefully impacted the employees,
but then there, the profit motive takes over. So we've got to
address that.
But I'm just urging for a common-sense approach to untie
the hands of--you know, it's amazing. Mr. Largent mentioned
that we ought to test it before it's installed. Well, I would
suggest to Mr. Largent, he ought to talk to the Federal
officials that are already using it. That would be an
appropriate test that I think would be used.
And I would just say, as a state official, it's nuts for me
to hear that our Federal prison officers and law enforcement
can use an instrument that we're now requesting permission to
use. So it gets back to common sense, I guess.
Mr. Largent. I would like to address that. If I were the
Senator, I would be as motivated and irate as he is about not
addressing this issue. And I am totally sympathetic with what
took place in his situation. I would say, first of all, that
the jamming equipment that I referenced in my statement just a
minute ago is in place in India and South America and other
countries, but not in this country. So I would clarify that.
Mr. Whitmire. Would it be identical? Excuse me, if I
could--I mean, are you talking about the exact----
Mr. Largent. You know, jamming is a technology that's ages
old. So I don't know that it would be the same technology or
not. But--so anyway, I would like to just clarify that point.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you. The Chairman will be back in
just a few minutes. But let me ask--well, let me first state
that we have another draft. Having worked with all of the
interested parties who are willing to come to the table, we do
have a new draft of the bill that will be coming out next week.
And one addresses one of your concerns, Mr. Mirgon, that there
would be a documented process for shutting down a jamming
device completely if there is any emergency--a fire or anything
where first responders would be affected. And we would clearly
want to make that for the whole area that that particular band
would be serving. So that is a part of our next draft of the
bill.
And we also have one that addresses your concerns, Mr.
Largent, and that is that there would be inventory controls--
well, first of all, there would be tested applications required
before FCC approval. You wouldn't have the rules going forward
without the testing of the devices, which I think certainly was
a legitimate concern.
And then we also have required inventory controls for the
jammers once they're deployed so that you would know if the
jammer went into another person's hands and was then being used
for illicit purposes. And there would be a requirement that the
jamming, which does have the waiver, would be destroyed and
certified as destroyed to the FCC when the waiver expires.
So we want to work with all of you to assure that we put
every safeguard in place in the bill. And I would just ask Mr.
Mirgon and Mr. Largent if there are other areas that you would
like to see addressed, will you work with us to try to do that?
Because we don't want to in any way harm our first responders,
of course, or our public safety capabilities. But also,
considering the testimony we've heard and the experiences that
are being generated all over our country right now, we do want
to address this issue.
So, Mr. Mirgon, Mr. Largent, what other areas would you
like to see us sit down and address?
Mr. Mirgon. One of the things I--and, first off, I
appreciate your comments, and thank you for your willingness to
work with us. And clearly, our position is, we do want to work
with people to help solve this problem. As a public safety
professional, I hear these stories. I've experienced many of
them firsthand. Been there, done that. And I feel for these
people, as managers, having to try to deal with this.
But one of the things that we might want to consider is
that ensuring that these systems can only be worked on by the
manufacturer or trained technicians, and they somehow be sealed
and documented.
Because, unfortunately, I have had RF engineers work for me
who go in and work on a piece of equipment they don't know
about. They make modifications to--you know, it's like the Tim
the Tool Man type mentality. I can make this better. And they
turn up the power, and all of the sudden, you've shut down
somebody else's system. So I think that would help alleviate a
lot of concerns.
Senator Hutchison. Very good point. We'll do that. We'll
make that happen. Mr. Largent?
Mr. Largent. Well, I would just say that RF signals in
general--and I'm not an electrical engineer--but I'm told
they're erratic and they're subject to change based upon the
seasons of a year, whether trees have leaves on them or not,
and they can be erratic and unpredictable. And, you know, I
think as long as the testing could incorporate those different
scenarios, that it would probably be OK.
But our concern is that you could test in the summer when
trees have leaves and the signals may not be a problem outside
the walls of the prison. And then in the wintertime, when the
trees lose their leaves, the signals are a problem. And that's
just the nature of RF signals, from my understanding. Again,
I'm not a expert in radio signals or RF signals. But that would
be one concern that I would have, just that testing period that
you're referring to would test under all scenarios so that we
can be confident that, you know, public safety's not going to
lose a signal or the public's not going to lose the ability to
make calls in and around a prison.
Mr. Mirgon. And if may tag onto that, I think that's a
great idea. I believe there's a simple solution for that, that
the state radio shops have the ability to measure signals, and
if there was a quarterly requirement to do just a drive-by----
Senator Hutchison. To test.
Mr. Mirgon.--and test them, you could probably do that
testing in under an hour to help certify that the signals are
maintaining within those parameters.
Senator Hutchison. I think these are both very doable and
very important. And we will work with you to really put the
bill in shape so that we can pursue both purposes. Let me just
ask in the last minutes if there's anything from the three
representing the criminal justice system, anything that hasn't
been put in the record that you would like to see added as we
wrap this up?
Mr. Whitmire. No, ma'am.
Senator Hutchison. All right. Let me just say that Senator
Begich has now joined as a co-sponsor of the bill. And I want
to read the list of co-sponsors. Senator Mikulski, as we
mentioned earlier, is the lead Democrat. Also, Senator Cochran,
Senator Lieberman, Senator Thune, Senator Wicker, Senator
DeMint, and Senator Vitter are co-sponsors of the bill.
So I hope that we can work together. Oh, and, by the way,
the bill has been introduced in the House, as well, and has
upwards of 40 bipartisan co-sponsors. So it's an issue that is
very important for law enforcement in the states. And if we can
work with the FCC to give the states another tool, and our
Federal prison system, as well, I think people ought to have
the right to know that when someone goes to prison, they are
safe from that person, and particularly victims. I cannot
imagine a victim who breathes a sigh of relief that a rapist or
an attempted murderer is in prison, and all of the sudden, the
person is not safe, even though the person is behind bars.
That's unacceptable in our country, and I want to do everything
we can to stop this problem.
So, Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding the hearing. And I
look forward to working with everyone at the table to pursue
our legislation this year. Thank you.
Senator Pryor. Well, thank you. And thank you for your
leadership and your attention on this issue, because you're
making a great difference all over the country.
Let me just say that I appreciate the panel for being here.
I appreciate your input, your thoughts, your ideas. As Senator
Hutchison said, she's really wanting to work with all sides to
try to get this bill done as quickly as possible and get it
moved to the floor whenever it's appropriate. So I'd just
encourage you all to reach out to her with your ideas as
suggestions, because I know her and she's very focused on this
and wants to get this done. The last thing I was going to say
is that there were a few Senators, because of conflicts in
scheduling, that couldn't be here today. Some may want to
submit questions in writing. And we're going to leave the
record open for 2 weeks, and in the event that they do ask
questions, we would appreciate the panelists to get those back
to us as quickly as possible.
With that, we're going to adjourn the hearing. And, again,
thank you very much for being here.
[Whereupon, at 11:12 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Prepared Statement of Hon. Barbara Mikulski, U.S. Senator from Maryland
Good morning. I want to thank Chairman Rockefeller and Senator
Hutchison, for holding this important hearing today. Thank you for
inviting me to testify on the Safe Prisons Communications Act of 2009
(S. 251). This is a critical piece of legislation of which I am a proud
to be a co-sponsor. I want to talk about why we need to consider and
pass this bill now.
All Marylanders were shocked and dismayed to hear about this new
organized crime practice of using cell phones in prisons to conduct
criminal activities in communities on the outside while criminals enjoy
a lavish lifestyle on the inside. As one reporter described it, from
their prison cells and with the help of corrections staff, members of a
violent gangs feast on salmon and shrimp, sip Grey Goose vodka and puff
on fine cigars, all while directing drug deals, extorting protection
money from other inmates, and arranging attacks on witnesses and rival
gang members. And ordering a hit on a Maryland father of two.
On July 10, 2007, Carl Lackl, a 38-year-old father of two, was
executed in front of his home in Baltimore County, Maryland. Lackl was
an eye-witness to multiple murders who was supposed to testify at the
murder trial set to begin on July 18, 2007. The murder hit was ordered
on Lackl by Patrick Byers, Jr., who was incarcerated in a Baltimore
jail. The ordering of the hit was made via a text message sent to the
killers from his cell phone, which had been smuggled into prison.
Maryland's talented Governor Martin O'Malley wanted to spring into
action to jam cell phone transmissions from prison. To his dismay, he
found he needed a waiver from the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) to protect the people of Maryland. He is right to be dismayed.
In 2008, Maryland correction officers confiscated 847 illegal
phones. This is not just a Maryland problem. This is a national
problem: California correction officers confiscated 2,809 phones;
Mississippi correction officers confiscated 1,861 phones; and Federal
prison officials have found 1,623 phones. Not all phones are being
found and the crime spree continues.
For these reasons, I have joined this bipartisan effort and am
speaking for Maryland's can-do Governor, for the citizens of Maryland,
and for the law enforcement officers who work so hard to catch and
prosecute criminals to keep communities safe. They think they've
imprisoned the criminals, but the criminals continue to operate out of
jail with their smuggled cell phones.
That's why I'm a cosponsor of the Hutchinson bill. The Safe Prisons
Communications Act allows a state to petition the FCC to block the use
of cell phones from prison. It protects citizens. Current FCC law
leaves citizens unprotected because it forbids the use of cell phone
jammers in State and Federal prisons. The Hutchinson bill simply
creates a mechanism to waive this ban when cells phones are being used
illegally by prisoners. It is not a blanket waiver for all prisons.
Each prison must individually make its case to the FCC as to why the
jammer is necessary. Our bill double protects in case of any unintended
consequences so neighboring communities are not impacted by the cell
jammer. A prison can only jam if it does NOT interfere with emergency
communications or any services outside the prison.
Prison officials are trying their best to detect and locate all
illegal cell phones using canines and conducting random top to bottom
searches of jails. Their efforts have been somewhat successful and many
illegal cell phones have been found. However, enterprising criminals
have been able disassemble cell phones by hiding the parts, thus
evading detection. Prisoners are continuing to find ways to use cell
phones illegally and continuing to commit violent crimes. Prison
wardens need more options to combat illegal cell phone use. This bill
does exactly that. It provides another means to stop use of illegal
cell phones by allowing prisons on a case by case basis to use cell
jammers. I am proud co-sponsor of this legislation because it will help
make our neighborhoods safer and give prison necessary tools they need.
Speaking later today is Gary D. Maynard, the Secretary of
Corrections for my home state of Maryland. He has only been with the
State of Maryland for 2 years, but he brings 30 years of experience in
state corrections systems. He began his career as a corrections
counselor and worked his way up to serve as the warden of several
prisons. More recently, he served as the Director in the Departments of
Correction in Iowa and South Carolina. Secretary Maynard knows the
problems facing jails and what solutions work. I thank him for being
here.
Thank you, Chairman Rockefeller and Senator Hutchison, for this
opportunity to share why I think this legislation is necessary in
combating use of illegal cells phones by prisoners. I urge my
colleagues to support this legislation and move this bill swiftly
through Committee and to the floor for a vote by the full Senate. We
can't afford another tragedy like that the Lackl family had to endure.
______
Prepared Statement of Citizens United for the Rehabilitation of Errants
(CURE)
Citizens United for the Rehabilitation of Errants (``CURE''), a
nationwide grassroots prison reform organization with chapters in most
states, submits this testimony in connection with the July 15, 2009
hearing held by the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and
Transportation on S. 251, the Safe Prisons Communications Act of 2009,
introduced by Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison (R. Tex.). CURE recommends that
the Commerce Committee incorporate H.R. 1133, the Family Telephone
Connection Protection Act of 2009, into its consideration of S. 251.
The long distance telephone rates charged to prison inmates and their
families are exorbitant and make it harder for inmates to maintain
critical family and community connections that are so crucial to
rehabilitation. H.R. 1133 will ensure that the FCC addresses this issue
effectively. Lower long distance inmate telephone rates would reduce
the incentive for inmates to bring concealed cell phones into prisons
and thus would help to address the security problem that S. 251 is
designed to ameliorate.
Background: Inmate Telephone Rates Keep Rising While Other
Telecommunications Rates Have Declined
Prison inmates generally pay some of the highest long distance
rates in the country. These rates result from the exclusive service
agreements that prison administrators typically enter into with
telecommunications carriers for inmate calling services. As part of the
bidding process, competing service providers generally are expected to
offer generous commissions to the prison administrator or state
correctional agency or treasury for the right to provide exclusive
service to the facilities. The winning bidder is typically the service
provider that offers the highest commission rates, rather than the
lowest service rates, and those commission rates often exceed 45
percent and sometimes reach as much as 65 percent of gross revenues.
The winning bidder then charges excessive rates for inmate calls in
order to cover the huge commissions that it has agreed to pay.
Thus, as the FCC has recognized, this approach ``perversely'' has
the distorting effect of allowing competitive pressures to drive prices
up, rather than down, ``because the bidder who charges the highest
rates can afford to offer the confinement facilities the largest
location commissions.'' \1\ This upward trend in commission payments
and rates has continued for years. Typical long distance inmate collect
calling rates now include a per-call charge as high as 53.95 and a per-
minute charge of as much as $0.89, and CURE has seen inmate collect
rates of $4.28 plus $0.98 per-minute, when the typical long distance
rates available to residential subscribers or calling card users are a
few pennies per minute. Inmate telephone service now stands alone as
the last remaining telecommunications monopoly niche. At many prison
facilities, inmates also are limited to collect calling services and
are not offered the cheaper alternative of debit card or debit account
calling services, in which the prisoner establishes an account with the
prison commissary to pay for telephone calls.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Implementation of the Pay Telephone Reclassification and
Compensation Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Order on
Remand and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 FCC Red 3248, 3253 (2002).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The inflated rates resulting from these exclusive service
agreements, excessive commissions and ``collect call-only''
requirements make long distance telephone calls from prison inmates
unaffordable. At current rates, one hour of conversation per week can
result in a monthly telephone bill of $300, a huge financial burden for
the innocent low income families and loved ones receiving and paying
for inmate collect calls. Prisoners are forced to restrict their
calling, and their families are forced to restrict their acceptance of
collect calls, effectively depriving inmates and family members of
their most reasonable means of communication and further straining the
family and community ties necessary for released inmates'
rehabilitation.
For years, prison inmate advocates have pressed for regulatory
mechanisms that would provide relief from the exorbitant rates and
limited service options for inmate long distance calling services. CURE
and The Coalition of Families and Friends of Prisoners of the American
Friends Service Committee (``AFSC'') have stressed the need to reduce
the burden of oppressively high inmate calling rates, which is borne
largely by economically disadvantaged relatives and friends of inmates,
often located far from the facilities where the inmates are
incarcerated. Not only do these excessive rates directly injure the
non-inmates paying them, but, as studies cited by CURE and AFSC
explain, they also work to the detriment of society by weakening
rehabilitative ties that reduce recidivism, preserve families, ease
prison tensions and promote societal efforts to rehabilitate ex-
offenders. Moreover, these exorbitant rates are imposed on a captive
market that is unable to afford them, while all other consumers enjoy
the benefits of increased competition, reduced rates, and choices in
telecommunications services.
In 2000, CURE organized a nationwide campaign, the Equitable
Telephone Charges (``eTc'') Campaign, to mobilize prisoners' family
members and other concerned citizens to advocate for more reasonable
rates. The eTc Campaign has had significant success in persuading state
authorities to reduce inmate service rates, especially intrastate and
local rates, and making debit and prepaid calling options more
available to prisoners. Excessive interstate long distance inmate
rates, however, remain a substantial burden in all but a handful of
states.
The need to act on this issue is now widely recognized. In 2005,
the American Bar Association adopted a recommendation urging all levels
of government to ``afford prison and jail inmates reasonable
opportunity to maintain telephonic communication with the free
community, and to offer telephone services in the correctional setting
with an appropriate range of options at the lowest possible rates.''
\2\ The recommendation was accompanied by a report citing studies
demonstrating the importance of regular telephone communication between
prisoners and family and friends for prisoners' rehabilitation and
eventual return to the community as law-abiding citizens.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ American Bar Association, Recommendation Adopted by the House
of Delegates (Aug. 8-9, 2005). See also Catherine Anderson, Chair,
Criminal Justice Section, American Bar Association, Report (Aug. 2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On February 1, 2006, the American Correctional Association approved
an amended formal policy statement recognizing that ``offenders should
have access to a range of reasonably priced telecommunications
services.'' \3\ A report released in June 2006 by a diverse national
prison reform commission, including correctional and other public
officials, stresses the negative effects that high inmate telephone
rates have on the family and community ties necessary to prevent
violence and the need to ``smooth the process of reentry and make it
more likely that prisoners will succeed after release.'' \4\ It urges
policymakers to ``support family and community bonds . . . by
minimizing the cost of prisoners' telephone calls'' \5\ and to ``end
practices such as'' extracting huge commissions from inmate telephone
service providers and limiting inmate telephone service to collect
calling ``that interfere with the maintenance of critically important
family and community ties.'' \6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ American Correctional Ass'n., Public Correctional Policy on
Adult/Juvenile Offender Access to Telephones (Jan. 24, 2001; Feb. 1,
2006), http://www.aca.org/government/policvresolution/ (select
``Policy,'' type in ``Access to Telephones'' and click on ``Search'')
(last visited February 14, 2007).
\4\ Commission on Safety and Abuse in America's Prisons,
Confronting Confinement, 35-36 (John J. Gibbons & Nicholas de B.
Katzenbach, Comm'n Co-Chairs) (June 2006).
\5\ Id. at 36.
\6\ Id. at 36-37.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
H.R. 1133 Would Further Rehabilitative Goals
H.R. 1133 contains findings that prisoners' families and loved ones
ultimately pay for most calls from prisoners, whether collect calls or
otherwise. The bill finds that the excessive rates imposed on
``[i]nnocent citizens . . . simply due to having a family member or
loved one who is incarcerated'' are ``a burden on interstate
commerce.'' \7\ The bill also finds that the lack of competition and
the high commissions paid by service providers to administrators are
responsible for the high rates. Excessive inmate service rates ``weaken
the family and community ties that are necessary for successful reentry
into society'' by released prisoners and burden the rehabilitation that
``reduces crime and the future costs of imprisonment.'' \8\ In effect,
excessive inmate service rates generate more social and economic costs
for all of society, far beyond the excessive calling costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ See Family Telephone Connection Protection Act of 2009, H.R.
1133, 111th Cong., 1st Sess. 2(5), (10) (2009).
\8\ Id. 2(13), (14).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
H.R. 1133 reaffirms the FCC's authority to regulate inmate
telephone service and to implement the types of relief described in the
bill. It would require that the FCC consider imposing, among other
measures: maximum interstate calling rates; a requirement that inmate
telephone service providers offer debit calling as well as collect
calling services; a prohibition of call blocking by an inmate service
provider solely on the ground that the service provider has no contract
with the local telephone company serving the intended call recipient;
and a prohibition of commission payments by inmate calling service
providers to prison administrators and state correctional agencies.
The ABA has endorsed the proposed legislation, pointing out ``the
human costs'' of excessive inmate rates,\9\ as have leading
newspapers.\10\ The ABA pointed out that ``the family and friends of
incarcerated people,'' rather than the prisoners themselves,
``regularly shoulder the high cost of prison telephone services,''
which makes it more difficult to achieve ``the penological and societal
benefits that occur when incarcerated people arc able to maintain
contact with the outside world.'' \11\ The ABA also noted that entering
into exclusive service arrangements that provide commission payments of
as much as 65 percent of all telephone revenue ``creates an ethical
quagmire'' for prison administrators.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Letter from Robert D. Evans, Director, Governmental Affairs
Office, ABA, to Rep. Bobby Rush, at 2 (Jan. 31, 2006) (``ABA Letter'').
\10\ See, e.g., Editorial, Keeping in Touch With a Parent in
Prison, New York Times, Jan. 14, 2006, at A14.
\11\ ABA Letter at 2.
\12\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
H.R. 1133 Would Help To Achieve The Same Goal As S. 251
S. 251 would authorize states to petition the FCC to permit the
installation of jamming equipment to block cell phone use in
correctional facilities. The purpose of the bill is to eliminate
prisoners' use of cell phones, which has reportedly become a problem
because of some prisoners' use of cell phones for illegal purposes. It
is certainly true that some cell phones apparently have been smuggled
into prisons for illegal purposes, but CURE is not aware of any studies
or investigations demonstrating the typical intended uses of cell
phones in prisons overall.
CURE believes, based on its awareness of prisoners' and their
families' struggles to reduce their telephone bills, that most of the
smuggled cell phones are being used by incarcerated individuals to stay
in touch, at a more reasonable cost, with families and friends--the
very people they will need in order to make a successful transition to
the free world. In other words, current prison telephone policies,
particularly those that support the egregiously high rates charged for
long distance calls, may be responsible for much of the contraband cell
phone usage in prisons. While the Nation spends millions of dollars on
projects to smooth the transition to the free world, we should be
fostering the contacts that will help with those transitions. More
intelligent and humane inmate calling service rates and policies would
not only reduce recidivism by fostering prisoners' ties to the
community, but would also reduce the incentive to smuggle cell phones
into prisons.
Like the Second Chance Act passed last year, H.R. 1133 would enable
prisoners to maintain the strong family and community ties necessary
for rehabilitation. Because more reasonable long distance inmate
calling rates would reduce the incentive to bring cell phones into
prisons, CURE urges the Commerce Committee to incorporate H.R. 1133
into its consideration of S. 251. CURE would be happy to work with the
Committee to explore any and all possible solutions to making all
interstate inmate phone calls affordable for families of prisoners and
to reduce illegal cell phone use in correctional facilities.
______
Prepared Statement of Jay Salkini, President and Chief Executive
Officer, Tecore Networks
I would like to thank Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member
Hutchison and the distinguished members of the Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation for giving me the opportunity to
submit testimony on the Safe Prisons Communications Act pursuant to the
Committee hearing on July 15, 2009. I would also like to express my
appreciation for the work you are doing to address a serious public
safety issue that is truly national in its scope.
Tecore Networks is a global supplier of wireless technologies with
a proud history of doing business in the great states of Maryland,
Texas and Florida. We have served commercial mobile service providers
and government agencies since 1991. Cellular technology is
proliferating around the globe, and its growth can create unintended
consequences. However, solutions should be considered carefully and
with appropriate technical information in order to maintain the
benefits that this technology provides.
Based on our successful deployment of a proprietary and legal
technology to address contraband cell phone use in a correctional
system, we have become more aware of the scope and size of the problem
throughout the United States. In fact, our analysis shows that as many
as 27,000 cell phones might have been smuggled and used behind bars
nationwide in 2008, with each phone typically being shared among
multiple inmates.
While I am in complete agreement with the intent of S. 251, I am
concerned about the emphasis on jamming as a solution. Jamming is a
specific technology which would prevent unwanted cell phone calls by
blocking any and all cellular communications in the covered geography.
Unfortunately, due to the difficulty in effectively modulating jamming
devices, such communications would likely include some combination of
calls:
by legitimate customers of the commercial operators who
happen to be in an area covered by the jamming signal;
to 911;
from corrections personnel or other authorized individuals
inside the correctional facility; and
intended for lawful intercept, a critical tool for public
safety.
In short, jamming poses significant risks to the public which may
outweigh potential benefits. By emphasizing jamming in the legislation,
it could well become the focus of corrections officials seeking a
solution despite the availability of more effective, less invasive
technologies. I respectfully urge the Committee to expand the scope of
applicable solutions to include those which control or manage
unauthorized communications rather than simply jam them.
At the same time, I fully support the corrections officers of this
Nation in their quest for effective tools to address this problem. It
is clear that these men and women have gone to considerable lengths to
try alternative solutions, including body orifice scanners, cell-phone
sniffing dogs and cell-phone detection technologies. Evidence shared
during the hearing revealed that simply confiscating a cell phone is
not enough; the critical component allowing communication on many
phones is the subscriber identity module (SIM) card, which is the size
of a postage stamp, can easily be removed from the phone, and can be
used by an inmate on any compatible device.
An effective solution should:
prevent unauthorized communications without the need to
locate the device;
permit legitimate communications including calls from
authorized devices, to 911 or by consumers not subject to the
restrictions of the correctional facility; and
to the extent possible, provide forensic information to
assist law enforcement, such as device and SIM serial numbers,
originating and terminating telephone numbers, and--with the
appropriate warrants--capture and monitoring of communication
traffic including voice, text messaging and data.
The trials of alternative technologies have also revealed that
there are multiple stakeholders in an effective solution to the problem
of contraband cell phones in prisons. The requirements of the
correctional institution are central to any remedy. However, based on
Tecore's experience in providing communications systems, I also
recognize and support the needs of the following parties:
commercial mobile service providers must be afforded their
rights and allowed to discharge their responsibilities to serve
valid subscribers; this includes avoiding the liability of
failing to complete an emergency call for such a subscriber
public safety agencies must also be assured that frequency
bands assigned to them will be unimpeded; and
regulators must be provided clear direction and mandates in
line with the resources they have to fulfill them.
In summary, I respectfully request that you strengthen the Safe
Prisons Communications Act by broadening the scope of solutions beyond
jamming to include those which control or manage unauthorized
communications, and by addressing the needs of all stake holders
including commercial mobile service providers, public safety agencies
and regulators.
Thank you.
______
State of West Virginia
Department of Military Affairs and
Public Safety--Division of Corrections
Charleston, WV, July 13, 2009
Hon. Jay Rockefeller,
Chairman,
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison,
Ranking Member,
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Rockefeller and Ranking Member Hutchison,
I am writing to express my support for the ``Safe Prisons
Communications Act of 2009'' that has been introduced in the U.S.
Senate. I also want to thank you for holding a hearing this week on
this important legislation. Prisons are being overwhelmed by hundreds
of cell phones at this time, and this legislation will provide
correction officials across the country with the best tool to impede
the illegal use of contraband cellular phones by prison and jail
inmates.
In recent years, the number of contraband cell phones smuggled into
correctional facilities has skyrocketed. These phones represent a
threat to the security of the facility, staff, public officials, and
the victims of crime. Once in possession of a cell phone, inmates have
been able to conduct any number of crimes, ranging from intimidating
witnesses, harassing victims, threatening elected victims, and engaging
in gang activity.
Since 2006, there have been 13 incidents due to the presence of
cell phones in West Virginia correctional facilities, although
fortunately none of them resulted in high profile crimes. However, cell
phones are now one of the most sought after items of contraband by
inmates in custody. To address the serious threat that these devices
represent, the West Virginia Canine Unit is in the process of training
two dogs to detect cell phones.
Although correctional agencies make every effort to prevent the
introduction of cell phones into our prison systems, only cell phone
jamming technologies stop these dangerous phone calls. State correction
agencies should be able to go through the same process that Federal
agencies do and petition for a waiver. For these reasons, the West
Virginia Department of Correction is requesting your support for
passage of the ``Safe Prisons Communications Act of 2009.'' I look
forward to working with you to further the safety of West Virginia
correctional officials and the public.
Sincerely,
Jim Rubenstein,
Commissioner.
______
Justice Center
The Council of State Governments
August 4, 2009
Hon. Jay Rockefeller,
Chairman,
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison,
Ranking Member,
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Rockefeller and Ranking Member Hutchison,
The Council of State Governments Justice Center is writing to
express its support for S. 251, the Safe Prisons Communications Act of
2009, which is scheduled for mark up by the Committee on Wednesday,
August 5, 2009. Prisons are being overwhelmed by hundreds of cell
phones at this time, and this legislation will provide correction
officials across the country with the best tool to impede the illegal
use of contraband cellular phones by prison and jail inmates.
In recent years, the number of contraband cell phones smuggled into
correctional facilities has skyrocketed. These phones represent a
threat to the security of the facility, staff, public officials, and
the victims of crime. In Maryland an inmate on trial for murder
orchestrated the assassination of a witness against him using a
smuggled cell phone. The witness was gunned down outside his home, and
in front of his children. In Tennessee, an inmate used a cell phone to
plot an escape that resulted in the death of a corrections officer. And
in June of last year, inmates in three Oklahoma facilities coordinated
an outbreak of violence across the system, resulting in three deaths
and multiple injuries.
It has recently been brought to our attention that many of the cell
phones confiscated have been found in the possession of sex offenders.
In the past 6 months, 81 sex offenders in Texas were found with
contraband cell phones. And last year, 111 sex offenders in South
Carolina were disciplined for the possession of contraband cell phones.
Unrestricted and unmonitored communication and access to the Internet
by convicted sex offenders is high public safety risk.
The Justice Center hopes that you will support the Safe Prisons
Communications Act of 2009 and give our correctional officials the
ability to protect the public and themselves.
Sincerely,
Rep. Jerry Madden,
Texas State House of Representatives.
______
South Carolina Department of Corrections
Columbia, SC, July 13, 2009
Hon. Jay Rockefeller,
Chairman,
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison,
Ranking Member,
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Rockefeller and Ranking Member Hutchison,
I am writing to express my support for the ``Safe Prisons
Communications Act of 2009'' that has been introduced in the U.S.
Senate. I also want to thank you for holding a hearing this week on
this important legislation. Prisons are being overwhelmed by hundreds
of cell phones at this time, and this legislation will provide
correction officials across the country with the best tool to impede
the illegal use of contraband cellular phones by prison and jail
inmates.
In recent years, the number of contraband cell phones smuggled into
correctional facilities has skyrocketed. These phones represent a
threat to the security of the facility, staff, public officials, and
the victims of crime. Once in possession of a cell phone, inmates have
been able to conduct any number of crimes, ranging from intimidating
witnesses, harassing victims, threatening elected victims, and engaging
in gang activity.
The availability and use of cell phones in South Carolina
correctional facilities has had serious consequences. Inmates in South
Carolina have used cell phones to conduct tens of thousands of dollars
of credit card fraud, coordinate escapes, and to more precisely smuggle
contraband like drugs and escape tools into the state's prisons. We
have worked to raise awareness of the problems associated with cell
phone contraband by installing metal detectors, X-ray machines and
mandatory searches of all personnel entering South Carolina's medium-
and maximum-security prisons. As the techniques for smuggling cell
phones into prisons have become more creative, so too has the
Department.
Although correctional agencies make every effort to prevent the
introduction of cell phones into our prison systems, only cell phone
jamming technologies stop these dangerous phone calls. For these
reasons, the South Carolina Department of Correction is requesting your
support for passage of the ``Safe Prisons Communications Act of 2009.''
I look forward to working with you to further the safety of South
Carolina correctional officials and the public.
Sincerely,
Jon Ozmint,
Director.
______
Kansas Department of Corrections
Topeka, KS, January 14, 2009
Sam Brownback,
U.S Senator,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Brownback:
The possession and use of cell phones by inmates is becoming an
increasingly serious and significant security risk in Kansas
correctional facilities and in correctional facilities across the
country. An escape from a medium security facility at Lansing in
February 2006, and an escape from an administrative segregation unit at
El Dorado in October 2007, were both facilitated by use of cell phones
by inmates. During the period from July 1, 2007 through June 30, 2008,
a total of 86 cell phones were found within Kansas correctional
facilities, either in the possession of inmates or in areas accessible
to Inmates. From July 1, 2008 through December 31, 2008, 42 cell phones
were found.
In addition to arranging and coordinating escape plans, cell phones
can be used by inmates to arrange for the introduction of contraband,
to harass and intimidate crime victims and others in the community, and
to carry out criminal activities in the community. Possession and use
of cell phones by Kansas inmates is prohibited and is a violation of
department rules and state statute. However, cell phones have been
introduced into Kansas correctional facilities and are being used by
inmates.
To prevent inmates from being able to successfully communicate with
others through the use of contraband cell phones, the Kansas Department
of Corrections is supportive of legislation that will allow cell phones
signals in correctional facilities to be jammed. Currently the
Communications Act of 1934 and FCC rules ban the technology that can
jam cell phones signals within a targeted area. We seek amendments to
the law to allow cell phone jamming of calls made from correctional
facilities. This capability is necessary for public safety reasons. The
technology for such jamming is available and has been demonstrated at
facilities operated by the South Carolina Department of Corrections.
Your assistance regarding this issue is requested. Please let me
know if you have any questions.
Sincerely,
Roger Werholtz,
Secretary.
Cc: Governor Sebelius
Association of State Correctional Administrators
Attorney General Six
______
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts
Executive Office of Public Safety and Security
Department of Correction
Milford, MA, January 21, 2009
Hon. John F. Kerry,
United States Senator,
Boston, MA.
Dear Senator Kerry:
I am writing to relay to you my support for S. 251 the ``The Safe
Prisons Communications Act of 2009''. The passage of this legislation
would allow corrections' facilities to operate a wireless jamming
device to jam cell phones being used by individuals incarcerated in a
correctional institution and will severely curtail the use of cell
phones by inmates fox criminal and/or fraudulent reasons.
I have witnessed a sharp increase in the number of cell phones
smuggled into our prisons over the past several years. In addition to
being used by incarcerated criminal enterprises to conduct criminal and
fraudulent activities, these cell phones are used by inmates to harass
and threaten past victims, past witnesses and public officials. This
uncontrolled access to a cell phone by inmates poses a serious threat
to the safe operation of a correctional facility as well as to the
overall public safety of our citizens.
It is my opinion that this legislation, as written, provides
correctional agencies with a viable mechanism to make cell phones
useless on prison grounds and still provides safeguards that the
integrity of wireless networks outside of a prison's walk will be
maintained.
In closing, I ask your support of the passage of this legislation.
If this legislation were to become law, it would provide correctional
administrators, like me, with a valuable tool to be used to combat the
current use of contraband cell phones for criminal activity.
I thank you for your consideration in this matter.
Sincerely,
Harold W. Clarke,
Commissioner.
______
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts
Executive Office of Public Safety and Security
Department of Correction
Milford, MA, January 21, 2009
Hon. Edward M. Kennedy,
United States Senator,
Boston, MA.
Dear Senator Kennedy:
I am writing to relay to you my support for S. 251 the ``The Safe
Prisons Communications Act of 2009''. The passage of this legislation
would allow correctional facilities to operate a wireless jamming
device to jam cell phones being used by individuals incarcerated in a
correctional institution and will severely curtail the use of cell
phones by imitates for criminal and/or fraudulent reasons.
I have witnessed a sharp increase in the number of cell phones
smuggled into our prisons over the past several years. In addition to
being used by incarcerated criminal enterprises to conduct criminal and
fraudulent activities, these cell phones are used by inmates to harass
and threaten past victims, past witnesses and public officials. This
uncontrolled access to a cell phone by inmates poses a serious threat
to the safe operation of a correctional facility as well as to the
overall public safety of our citizens.
It is my opinion that this legislation, as written, provides
correctional agencies with a viable mechanism to make cell phones
useless on prison grounds and still provides safeguards that the
integrity of wireless networks outside of a prison's was will be
maintained.
In closing, I ask your support of the passage of this legislation.
If this legislation were to become law, it would provide correctional
administrators, like me, with a valuable tool to be used to combat the
current use of contraband cell phones for criminal activity.
I thank you for your consideration in this matter.
Sincerely,
Harold W. Clarke,
Commissioner.
______
Arkansas Department of Correction
Pine Bluff, AR, January 20, 2009
Hon. Blanche Lincoln,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Lincoln:
I recently sent you a letter requesting your assistance in amending
a 1934 Federal law that makes it illegal to jam radio signals,
including cellular telephone signals.
Senate Bill #S. 251 and House Bill #H.R. 560 have been entered
regarding the above matter. We would appreciate very much your support
of these bills, as cell phones are an ongoing problem and a major
security threat to correctional facilities in Arkansas. The use of a
cell phone aided an Arkansas inmate in his escape in October of 2008.
Cell phones are confiscated almost every day at our units.
Your assistance in this matter is greatly appreciated.
Sincerely,
Larry Norris,
Director.
______
Arkansas Department of Correction
Pine Bluff, AR, January 20, 2009
Hon. Mark Pryor,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Pryor:
I recently sent you a letter requesting your assistance in amending
a 1934 Federal law that makes it illegal to jam radio signals,
including cellular telephone signals.
Senate Bill #S. 251 and House Bill #H.R. 560 have been entered
regarding the above matter. We would appreciate very much your support
of these bills, as cell phones are an ongoing problem and a major
security threat to correctional facilities in Arkansas. The use of a
cell phone aided an Arkansas inmate in his escape in October of 2008.
Cell phones are confiscated almost every day at our units.
Your assistance in this matter is greatly appreciated.
Sincerely,
Larry Norris,
Director.
______
Arkansas Department of Correction
Pine Bluff, AR, December 17, 2008
Hon. Mark Pryor,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Pryor:
The Arkansas Department of Correction requests your assistance in
amending a 1934 Federal law that makes it illegal to jam radio signals,
including cellular telephone signals. As you know, cell phones are a
major security threat to correctional facilities in Arkansas and across
the country.
Recently, use of cell phone aided the escape of an Arkansas inmate
and thwarted his capture for 11 days. Cell phones are seized almost
every day at our units, and their numbers are increasing. The phones
not only further escapes, they can also lead to violence and other
crimes both inside and outside of our facilities.
At the state level, we are proposing legislation that would make it
a crime for an inmate to have and use a cell phone. It is already a
crime for someone to provide a cell phone to an inmate. While this
legislation should certainly help deter cell phone possession, it is
hardly a complete solution to the problem.
Capabilities do exist that effectively jam cell phone signals,
which in turn, renders them useless within a prison. These capabilities
do not interfere with cell phone use outside prisons walls nor do they
interfere with 911 emergency calls or law enforcement communications.
But under the Communications Act of 1934, willfully or maliciously
interfering with a radio communication is a crime. The law does not
carve out exceptions for state governments; thus, the state of Arkansas
cannot utilize a device that willfully interferes with cellular
telephone signals, even for security reasons.
This is consistent with Federal Communications Commission rulings
involving the operation of cell phone jammers. For example, the FCC
ruled in a recent decision that the Federal law does indeed prohibit
operation of devices that interfere with cellular telephone signals.
Cf.DPL Surveillance Equip., FCC Citation, No. DA 08-21202 (May 27,
2008) concluded that U.S. Code Title 47, sections 302a and 333 bar the
operation of jammers, except those operated by the Federal Government.
It is likely the FCC has not authorized licensing procedures
because section 333 criminalizes willful interference with a radio
signal and a Federal agency cannot issue rules that purport to
authorize conduct that Federal law explicitly prohibits. (See Ragsdale
v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 86 (1997), which declares
that a Federal regulation cannot stand if it is manifestly contrary to
a Federal statute.)
FCC spokesman Robert Kenny was quoted in the October 30, 2008,
edition of the Austin American Statesman as saying, ``We have no
authority to even grant it (a license permitting the operation of a
cell phone jamming device) if we thought it was worthwhile or something
that was warranted. It's likely going to take some level of action by
Congress.''
Based on the FCC's own acknowledgement, it will take Congressional
action to enable Arkansas and other states to render cell phones
nothing more than worthless contraband in state prisons. Without such
action, Arkansas is left with less effective options to protect law-
abiding citizens from the threatening, harassing or retaliatory actions
of murderers, rapists, drug dealers, thieves and other felons in its
state prisons.
I look forward to working with you on this matter. If you have any
questions about steps my office has taken on this issue, please do not
hesitate to contact me.
Sincerely,
Larry B. Norris,
Director.
______
Arkansas Department of Correction
Pine Bluff, AR, December 17, 2008
Hon. Blanche Lincoln,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Lincoln:
The Arkansas Department of Correction requests your assistance in
amending a 1934 Federal law that makes it illegal to jam radio signals,
including cellular telephone signals. As you know, cell phones are a
major security threat to correctional facilities in Arkansas and across
the country.
Recently, use of cell phone aided the escape of an Arkansas inmate
and thwarted his capture for 11 days. Cell phones are seized almost
every day at our units, and their numbers are increasing. The phones
not only further escapes, they can also lead to violence and other
crimes both inside and outside of our facilities.
At the state level, we are proposing legislation that would make it
crime for an inmate to have and use a cell phone. It is already a crime
for someone to provide a cell phone to an inmate. While this
legislation should certainly help deter cell phone possession, it is
hardly a complete solution to the problem.
Capabilities do exist that effectively jam cell phone signals,
which in turn, renders them useless within a prison. These capabilities
do not interfere with cell phone use outside prisons walls nor do they
interfere with 911 emergency calls or law enforcement communications.
But under the Communications Act of 1934, willfully or maliciously
interfering with a radio communication is a crime. The law does not
carve out exceptions for state governments; thus, the state of Arkansas
cannot utilize a device that willfully interferes with cellular
telephone signals, even for security reasons.
This is consistent with Federal Communications Commission rulings
involving the operation of cell phone jammers. For example, the FCC
ruled in a recent decision that the Federal law does indeed prohibit
operation of devices that interfere with cellular telephone signals.
CfDPL, Surveillance Equip., FCC Citation, No. DA 08-21202 (May 27,
2008) concluded that U.S. Code Title 47, sections 302a and 333 bar the
operation of jammers, except those operated by the Federal Government.
It is likely the FCC has not authorized licensing procedures
because section 333 criminalizes willful interference with a radio
signal and a Federal agency cannot issue rules that purport to
authorize conduct that Federal law explicitly prohibits. (See Ragsdale
v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 86 (1997), which declares
that a Federal regulation cannot stand if it is manifestly contrary to
a Federal statute.)
FCC spokesman Robert Kenny was quoted in the October 30, 2008,
edition of the Austin American Statesman as saying, ``We have no
authority to even grant it (a license permitting the operation of a
cell phone jamming device) if we thought it was worthwhile or something
that was warranted. it's likely going to take some level of action by
Congress.''
Based on the FCC's own acknowledgement, it will take Congressional
action to enable Arkansas and other states to render cell phones
nothing more than worthless contraband in state prisons. Without such
action, Arkansas is left with less effective options to protect law-
abiding citizens from the threatening, harassing or retaliatory actions
of murderers, rapists, drug dealers, thieves and other felons in its
state prisons.
I look forward to working with you on this matter. If you have any
questions about steps my office has taken on this issue, please do not
hesitate to contact me.
Larry B. Norris,
Director.
______
State of Tennessee--Department of Correction
Nashville, TN, March 3, 2009
Hon. Bob Corker,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Corker:
Subject: Cell Phones in Prisons
I am writing you to request your support for the ``Safe Prisons
Communications Act of 2009'' that has been recently filed by Senators
Kay Bailey Hutchinson and Jim DeMint in the Senate and by
Representative Kevin Brady in House of Representatives. The number of
cell phones in state and Federal facilities across the country is
continuing to rise at an alarming rate. These phones represent a threat
to the security of the facility, staff, and victims of crime. The act
will provide wardens and superintendents with the authority to operate
wireless jamming devices in our correctional facilities that will
greatly reduce the criminal activities that are currently being conduct
inside and outside our facilities.
During the last year, the Tennessee Department of Correction
recovered approximately 650 cellular (prepaid and contract) telephones
and that number is increasing. In addition to safety concerns, the
presence of cellular telephones generates financial obligation issues
with inmates in prison.
We believe that these phones are routinely and primarily being
utilized to engage in criminal activity, including but not limited to,
drug trafficking, Strategic Threat Group (STG) organization violence,
and credit card fraud. Inmates are also using the camera feature of the
cell phone to take pictures of security features such the location of
security cameras. We do not believe that inmates are using cellular
telephones to primarily circumvent the inmate telephone system.
There have been proven cases of STG affiliated ordered ``hits'' on
the streets from the inmates who possessed these phones inside of a
prison. There have been two (2) correctional staff homicides during
which cellular phones were used in the commission of an escape.
With the increased technology that is being attached to these
phones, inmates have Internet access capability which permits them
unlimited access and contact to continue their illegal activities. We
have received numerous complaints from crime victims that inmates are
maintaining websites such as MySpace, Facebook, etc. through their
Internet capabilities provided by these cellular phones.
Prisons are being overwhelmed by hundreds of cell phones at a time,
and simply locating and removing cell phones one by one is a difficult
and constant challenge.
For these reasons, the Tennessee Department of Correction is
requesting your support for passage of the ``Safe Prisons
Communications Act of 2009.''
Sincerely,
George M. Little,
Commissioner.
pc: George and Camille Camp--ASCA
John Morgan, Deputy to the Governor
Pat Miller, Senior Advisor and Director of Legislative Affairs
Steve Elkins, Legal Counsel to the Governor
______
State of Tennessee--Department of Correction
Nashville, TN, March 3, 2009
Hon. Lamar Alexander,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Alexander:
Subject: Cell Phones in Prisons
I am writing you to request your support for the ``Safe Prisons
Communications Act of 2009'' that has been recently filed by Senators
Kay Bailey Hutchinson and Jim DeMint in the Senate and by
Representative Kevin Brady in House of Representatives. The number of
cell phones in state and Federal facilities across the country is
continuing to rise at an alarming rate. These phones represent a threat
to the security of the facility, staff, and victims of crime. The act
will provide wardens and superintendents with the authority to operate
wireless jamming devices in our correctional facilities that will
greatly reduce the criminal activities that are currently being conduct
inside and outside our facilities.
During the last year, the Tennessee Department of Correction
recovered approximately 650 cellular (prepaid and contract) telephones
and that number is increasing. In addition to safety concerns, the
presence of cellular telephones generates financial obligation issues
with inmates in prison.
We believe that these phones are routinely and primarily being
utilized to engage in criminal activity, including but not limited to,
drug trafficking, Strategic Threat Group (STG) organization violence,
and credit card fraud. Inmates are also using the camera feature of the
cell phone to take pictures of security features such the location of
security cameras. We do not believe that inmates are using cellular
telephones to primarily circumvent the inmate telephone system.
There have been proven cases of STG affiliated ordered ``hits'' on
the streets from the inmates who possessed these phones inside of a
prison. There have been two (2) correctional staff homicides during
which cellular phones were used in the commission of an escape.
With the increased technology that is being attached to these
phones, inmates have Internet access capability which permits them
unlimited access and contact to continue their illegal activities. We
have received numerous complaints from crime victims that inmates are
maintaining websites such as MySpace, Facebook, etc. through their
Internet capabilities provided by these cellular phones.
Prisons are being overwhelmed by hundreds of cell phones at a time,
and simply locating and removing cell phones one by one is a difficult
and constant challenge.
For these reasons, the Tennessee Department of Correction is
requesting your support for passage of the ``Safe Prisons
Communications Act of 2009.''
Sincerely,
George M. Little,
Commissioner.
pc: George and Camille Camp--ASCA
John Morgan, Deputy to the Governor
Pat Miller, Senior Advisor and Director of Legislative Affairs
Steve Elkins, Legal Counsel to the Governor
______
State of New Jersey
Office of the Attorney General
Department of Law and Public Safety
Trenton, NJ, July 27, 2009
Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV,
Chairman,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison,
Ranking Member,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Rockefeller and Ranking Member Hutchison:
We are writing in support of S. 251, a bill that would allow States
to jam cell phones that inmates illegally use within State correctional
facilities. Specifically, the bill would allow States, with permission
from the Federal Communications Commission, to install devices that
prevent, jam, or interfere with wireless communications within the
boundaries of a specific prison, penitentiary, or correctional facility
within that State. This is a critical tool that law enforcement
currently lacks. We, the Attorney General and the Commissioner of the
Department of Corrections of the State of New Jersey, strongly urge the
Senate to approve this bill and provide states with the ability to end
cell phone transmissions within our prisons.
In New Jersey, our efforts to remove violent gang offenders from
our state's communities are undermined, as they are in many states, by
the ability of those same individuals to communicate with fellow gang
members and operate their criminal enterprises from within the prison
walls by using cell phones. Using contraband cell phones, incarcerated
individuals have the ability to intimidate witnesses through threats
and violence, to conduct business as usual, and to coordinate escapes
with persons on the outside. In one instance in our State, law
enforcement was able to monitor a phone call placed by a gang inmate on
a cell phone and subsequently joined by an inmate at a different prison
and a third inmate at a county jail. This conference call is notable
not only for the breadth of participation by incarcerated gang members
at different correctional institutions, but for the topic of
conversation, namely, to plot retaliation against an attack on a fellow
gang member. Although this call was monitored, countless other
conversations are not. To the contrary, much too often, the fact of the
conversation, much less its content, remains unknown and undetected by
law enforcement and corrections officials.
Communication is critical to any criminal organization's ability to
maintain its command and control of criminal activity on the streets.
Cell phones in prisons, and the communications that they facilitate,
therefore, are a prime engine of the growth and expansion of criminal
gangs both in prisons and on the streets, At the same time, public
safety is compromised because incarceration no longer thwarts the
ability of a gang member or violent offender to terrorize a community.
Given this reality, the authority to block cell phone transmissions
from within a prison is the most effective manner for law enforcement
and corrections officials to prevent an unknown quantity of calls. New
Jersey law enforcement agencies, including the Department of
Corrections, are collaboratively conducting investigations and
operations inside and outside the prison walls to identify and sever
connections between street gangs and prison gangs. Nonetheless, inmates
with cell phones are able to operate in the gaps between those efforts,
to communicate with persons outside the prison.
While detection and location technologies are legal and available,
they arc expensive and often cost-prohibitive to install on a facility-
wide basis, much less in numerous facilities across the state. More
important, they will never be as effective in addressing the problem as
the ability to simply prevent the communication from taking place.
Instead, legislative action is required to enable State law enforcement
and corrections officials to have the most effective technologies
available to tackle the problem.
We urge the Senate to give States the authority to block cell phone
transmissions from prisons. Absent tools to combat the problem of cell
phones in prisons, states will be limited in their ability to address
this problem and to effectively stop communications between criminal
organizations inside and outside of our correctional facilities.
Sincerely yours,
Anne Milgram,
Attorney General.
George Hayman,
Commissioner,
Department of Corrections.
cc: The Honorable Frank R. Lautenberg, United States Senator
The Honorable Robert Menendez, United States Senator
______
July 14, 2009
Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV,
Chairman,
Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee,
Washington, DC.
Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison,
Ranking Member,
Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee,
Washington, DC.
Re: S. 251, The Safe Prisons Communication Act (SPCA)
Dear Senators Rockefeller and Hutchison:
The undersigned organizations write to voice our strong opposition
to S. 251, The Safe Prisons Communication Act (SPCA). The proposal to
end the more than 75-year ban on deliberately interfering with
authorized radio communications in the United States would place
commercial and public safety communications in this country at needless
risk. Not only do alternative means exist to address the problem of
contraband cell phone use in prison, but the proposal to block cell
phone use in prison by jamming will not achieve its objective of
eliminating contraband cell phone use. As noted in a recent article in
Wired Magazine: ``A few layers of tinfoil can shield a phone from the
jamming signal.'' \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Vince Beiser, ``Prisoners Run Gangs, Plan Escapes and Even
Order Hits With Smuggled Cellphones,'' Wired, May 22, 2009 (``Beiser
Wired'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rather than rely on the self-serving promotions of a single company
seeking to profit from this unfortunate security issue, prisons should
work with cell phone providers to implement proven technological means
to block and/or monitor contraband cell phone use within prisons. In
addition, Congress should use this opportunity to address the real
problem of overcharges for telephone calls from prisoners to their
families and loved ones. The vast majority of contraband calls are made
by prisoners to their families because prisoner families--often among
society's poorest--must pay outrageous collect call charges.\2\ An
approach that combined existing technology used in cooperation with
cell phone companies, additional funds for prison security to fight the
problem of contraband entering prisons in the first place, and reducing
costs for authorized prisoner phone calls to reduce the need for
contraband, will prove far more successful in the long run and will
avoid putting our public safety and commercial wireless networks at
risk.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ See Beiser Wired, See also Media Justice Fund and Funding
Exchange Report, ``Criminal Charges: Excessive Criminal Phone Rates
Take A Toll on Innocent Families (2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Importance of An Absolute Ban On Jammers
Since its passage, the Communications Act of 1934 absolutely
prohibited in no uncertain terms any deliberate interference with a
signal ``licensed or authorized . . . by the United States.'' \3\ This
provision has made it possible for licensees to design our current
complex system of radio communication, cellular service, and other
wireless networks secure in the knowledge that no one will deliberately
interfere with their signals. Consumers, in exchange, have enjoyed the
use of cell phones and other wireless devices without fear that anyone
will seek to deliberately interfere with the transmission. For example,
many travelers now chose to use their own cell phones or wireless
Internet connections, rather than pay traditionally higher rates
charged by hotels. Public safety users likewise rely on the ability to
use lifesaving wireless technologies without concern for jamming, a
reliance that will continue to grow as new spectrum and new
technologies become available to public safety and commercial users
following the digital television transition and the clearing of the 700
MHz band for new public safety and commercial uses.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ 47 U.S.C. 333.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The introduction of legal cell phone jamming places this entire
system at risk. History has shown that permitting the legal manufacture
and sale of devices--even for limited purposes--will inevitably result
in their becoming available on a mass consumer basis. For example, the
use of wireless microphones in the broadcast bands is limited by FCC
rule to a small number of licensed users and--in theory--strictly
controlled to avoid possible interference with television viewing and
other uses of the band. Despite these limitations, anyone can buy these
microphones through retail stores and websites, and the number of
unauthorized wireless microphones in the broadcast bands may well
exceed 1 million.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ See Informal Complaint and Petition for Rulemaking of the
Public Interest Spectrum Coalition, WT Docket No. 08-167, at vi.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Congress should not create the risk of a similar proliferation of
unauthorized cell phone jammers. Only a complete prohibition on cell
phone jammers has successfully limited the sale and deployment of them
in this country. Despite their availability in other countries, use of
cell phone jammers in this country is forced underground and does
little to interfere with commercial or public safety wireless use.\5\
For this reason, both commercial and public safety licensees have
consistently opposed the efforts of CellAntenna to receive a Special
Temporary Authorization (STA) to test cell phone jammers in the United
States.\6\ Only a uniform ban with no exceptions will prevent the
widespread use of jammers over time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Even countries that prohibit civilian use but permit law
enforcement and military use domestically have problems with cell phone
jammers disrupting cell phone use. See, e.g., http://
www.methodshop.com/gadgets/reviews/celljammers/index.shtml.
\6\ See, e.g., Letter of Chris Fisher, President, Association of
Public Safety Officials--International, Inc., to Michael Copps, Acting
Chairman, Federal Communications Commission (March 13, 2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CellAntenna's Claims That It Can Safely Block Contraband Calls Are
Highly Suspect
CellAntenna, the private company driving the campaign to legalize
cell phone jamming in the United States, insists that it can block
commercial cell phone signals in prisons, without interfering either
with lawful cell phone use outside of prison or with public safety use
in or outside of prison. CellAntenna has provided no proof of its
claims. Rather, CellAntenna has sought to leverage a genuine public
safety concern for its own profit by conducting unscientific and
unauthorized demonstrations in various prisons. While these
``demonstrations'' allow CellAntenna to attract a fair amount of
publicity,\7\ they do nothing to demonstrate the validity of
CellAntenna's claims that it can affordably block contraband cell phone
transmissions without interfering with public safety or legal wireless
use.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Given that the FCC has unambiguously stated that the
manufacture, importation, transportation, marketing and use of cell
phone jammers violates Federal law, it would appear that CellAntenna's
numerous and highly publicized demonstrations are a felony which should
result in fines and arrests rather than appearances at a Congressional
hearing. See Public Notice, ``Sale or Use of Transmitters Designed to
Prevent, Jam or Interfere With Cell Phone Communications Is Prohibited
In The United States,'' DA-05-1776 (June 27, 2005), available at http:/
/hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-05-1776A1.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As spectrum experts have explained, jamming contraband cell phone
signals without jamming authorized communications presents an extremely
difficult engineering challenge.\8\ Cell phone signals use many bands,
often proximate to or shared with public safety operations. To achieve
its claims, CellAntenna's equipment must isolate the cell phone bands
used by contraband phones, operating at sufficient power and with
sufficient coverage to ensure that no transmissions will escape, while
simultaneously avoiding any leakage into neighboring public safety
bands, operating at sufficient power to ensure total coverage of the
prison, but limiting power so that no energy escapes to create ``dead
zones'' outside prisons or in areas used by guards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ See Letter of The American Association of State Highway and
Transportation Officials (AASHO) to Marlene Dortch, Secretary, Federal
Communications Commission, filed in WT Docket No. 09-30 (March 18,
2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Existing cell phone jammers do not engage in such delicate and
precise spectrum blocking. Cell phone jammers are relatively cheap
devices that engage in continuous transmission on the selected
frequencies, creating ``dead zones'' by overwhelming a cell phone's
receiver. These devices rely on brute force, without regard to
operations taking place on neighboring bands. CellAntenna's claims far
exceed the capabilities of existing cell phone jammers (where legal),
raising considerable doubts that they can perform under circumstances
other then the controlled demonstrations it has very publicly
conducted.
CellAntenna will no doubt excuse itself by observing that the FCC
has not granted it an authorization to conduct legal experiments--a
fact which has not prevented CellAntenna from performing its
demonstrations. But CellAntenna has neither applied for a genuine
experimental license under which it could conduct real experiments, nor
has CellAntenna conducted experiments in countries where cell phone
jamming is legal.\9\ Rather CellAntenna has preferred to engage in a
strategy of holding public demonstrations of questionable legality and
no engineering value as a means of promoting its legislative aims.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ It is useful to contrast CellAntenna's behavior with that of
advocates of unlicensed use of the broadcast white spaces. White spaces
advocates scrupulously obeyed all FCC rules and regulations, and
applied for (and received) limited experimental licenses to conduct
genuine experiments which produced meaningful engineering data. Only
after years of building on developed technologies, and supported by a
broad set of industry stakeholders, did the Commission feel confident
enough to authorize tests of prototypes in the field.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Congress should not force the FCC to create rules to authorize this
jamming technology based on the unsubstantiated claims of a single
company. At the least, Congress should not require the FCC to respond
to petitions within 60 days, and create final rules within one year, as
required by S. 251.
Finally, even if CellAntenna can jam signals with precision,
prisoners have too many ways to evade jamming. Using commonly available
materials such as aluminum foil or a roll of paper towel, a prisoner
can block jamming signals and augment a contraband cell phone's
transmission to a nearby cell tower. Furthermore, the widespread
availability of contraband cell phones indicates the possibility of
corrupt prison personnel, who could circumvent jammer technology in the
same way they have circumvented existing security measures designed to
prevent prisoner access to contraband phones.
Better Means Of Blocking Contraband Cell Phones Exist That Do Not Put
Public Safety or Commercial Services At Risk
Given the importance of maintaining security in prisons, it might
seem worth the risk to public safety and commercial services to
authorize cell phone jamming in prisons if no other way existed. But
existing cell phone technologies offer a better and safer alternative
to CellAntenna's unproven precision jamming. In addition, Congress
should address the underlying issues that make cell phone smuggling
both possible and lucrative: inadequate funding of prison security, and
the high cost to the families of prisoners when prisoners make legally
authorized collect calls.
Cell phone providers can already adjust cell phone networks so that
only authorized handsets can connect to the network. This practice,
known as ``white listing,'' will prevent any contraband phone from
functioning without causing any interference to wireless systems.
Alternatively, cell phone providers can log phone numbers of calls
originating in prisons and submit these lists daily to appropriate
prison officials to verify that no contraband hand sets are operating
in the prison. This later approach has the added advantage that prison
officials can secure warrants to monitor any calls originating from
unauthorized handsets, assisting law enforcement in any investigation
and helping to ferret out the underlying source of the contraband.
At the same time, Congress should take this opportunity to address
the underlying issues that create the problem of contraband handsets in
the first place. First, Congress should provide adequate funds for
prison security, so that contraband does not penetrate prisons in the
first place. In addition, Congress can also address the demand for
contraband phones by requiring companies that service prisons to charge
reasonable long-distance prices to the innocent families of prisoners.
As documented in a recent report by the Media Justice Fund and Funding
Exchange, it can cost the family of a prison inmate $300 a month in
collect charges to maintain minimal contact with an imprisoned father,
mother, son or daughter. As further documented in Wired Magazine, the
high cost of authorized telephone calls makes renting contraband cell
phones in prison a lucrative business for prisoners and guards alike.
While lowering the coast of legal phone calls between prisoners and
families will not entirely eliminate the incentive to smuggle in
contraband cell phones, it will help reduce the incentive and make the
existing problem far more manageable.
Conclusion
For all these reasons, the undersigned wish to make their
opposition to CellAntenna's campaign to legalize cell phone jamming in
this country a part of the public record in this hearing. For more than
75 years, the total ban on deliberate interference with authorized
wireless transmissions has allowed wireless technology to develop in
the United States in a robust and economical fashion. Allowing the
legal manufacture, importation and sale of jamming equipment will
create a loophole that history shows the FCC will find impossible to
close. Because existing means of addressing the problem offer a far
greater hope of success without the risk, Congress should refrain from
amending the ``jammer ban'' in 47 U.S.C. 333.
Sincerely,
Harold Feld
Legal Director
Public Knowledge
Michael Calabrese
Vice President and Director Wireless Futures Program
New America Foundation
Sascha Meinrath
Director
Open Technology Institute
Jonathan Lawson
Executive Director
Reclaim the Media
Joshua Breitbart
Policy Director
People's Production House
Stephen Renderos
Organizer
Main Street Project
Amanda Deloney
Network Coordinator
Media Action Grassroots Network (MAG-NET)
Tracy Rosenberg
Acting Director
Media Alliance
Malkia Cyril
Executive Director
Center for Media Justice
______
CTIA--The Wireless Association
Washington, DC, July 13, 2009
Julius Knapp,
Chief, Office of Engineering and Technology,
Federal Communications Commission,
Washington, DC.
RE: Experimental License Application of Tecore, Inc.
FCC File Number 0202-EX-PL-2009
Dear Mr. Knapp:
CTIA--The Wireless Association (``CTIA'') respectfully submits
this letter in support of the above-referenced experimental license
application of Tecore Networks, Inc. (``Tecore''). CTIA supports the
grant of this experimental license--on a fully coordinated basis with
CTIA's affected members--to better develop a record on the capabilities
of alternative technological solutions to the unlawful use of mobile
devices within prisons. The possession and use of wireless devices by
inmates in correctional facilities is a genuine and important issue,
and CTIA supports the development and real-world testing of lawful
solutions to stop the unauthorized use of these devices by inmates.
CTIA submits that the testing of Tecore's proposed solution will enable
interested stakeholders, including state and Federal corrections
agencies, other interested administrative agencies, the Public Safety
community, and wireless carriers, to gather important data on the
ability of non-jamming technologies to mitigate and resolve the illicit
use of wireless phones within prisons.
CTIA recently hosted a day-long discussion among its members and
several companies that have developed potential technologies for
lawfully addressing the use of mobile devices within correctional
facilities. Tecore was one of the presenters and indicated that its
proposed solution would allow for the denial of access to the wireless
network within a prison without the use of any jamming technology. To
enable this capability, Tecore would deploy base station technology
that would transmit a ``preferred'' signal covering the grounds of the
prison and thereby locking any unauthorized communications traffic to
its network's control. Tecore's demonstration of this capability,
however, requires operating authority to transmit in the cellular (824-
849/869-894 MHz) and Personal Communications Service (``PCS'') (1850-
1910/1930-1990 MHz) bands, which Tecore seeks in its experimental
license request.
CTIA believes there is merit to Tecore's technological proposal and
supports the grant of Tecore's experimental license request. Because
Tecore must transmit in the cellular and PCS frequency bands, CTIA asks
that the Federal Communications Commission (``Commission'') condition
the experimental grant with a requirement to coordinate all operations
with CTIA's affected members that hold cellular and PCS licenses in the
market area of the test. CTIA has discussed this effort with its
members and there is agreement that such coordination is feasible and
that the underlying experimental testing would be desirable.
CTIA expects that the proposed tests can gather significant data to
help determine whether Tecore's technology could effectively manage
cell phone usage in the prison environment. This exercise will help the
Commission, the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Corrections,
and other affected parties gauge the effectiveness of this solution.
CTIA believes that these cooperative efforts will assist in the
development of well-considered solutions and aid in the creation of a
full record of the capabilities of lawful technologies that can aid
corrections officials' efforts in combating cell phone usage within
prisons.
Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter. Please do not
hesitate to contact me or Brian Josef with any questions.
Sincerely,
Christopher Guttman-McCabe,
Vice President, Regulatory Affairs.
cc: Jim Schlichting
Ira Keltz
James Burtle
David Hu
Charles Mathias