[House Document 107-93]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
107th Congress, 1st Session - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 107-93
A REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON EXECUTIVE ORDER 12938
__________
MESSAGE
from
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
transmitting
A REPORT ON EXECUTIVE ORDER 12938, AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 204 OF THE
INTERNATIONAL EMERGENCY ECONOMIC POWERS ACT AND SECTION 401(c) OF THE
NATIONAL EMERGENCIES ACT, PURSUANT TO 50 U.S.C. 1703(c) AND 50 U.S.C.
1614(c)
July 10, 2001.--Message and accompanying papers referred to the
Committee on International Relations and ordered to be printed
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
89-011 WASHINGTON : 2001
To the Congress of the United States:
Enclosed is a report to the Congress on Executive Order
12938, as required by section 204 of the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1703(c)) and section
401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1641(c)).
George W. Bush.
The White House, June 28, 2001.
Report to Congress on the Emergency Regarding the Proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction
Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) (nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapons) and their missile delivery vehicles are
among the top threats to U.S. security in the post-Cold War
world. In the hands of countries like Iran, Iraq, Libya, and
North Korea, these weapons pose direct threats to U.S. forces
and citizens overseas and to our friends and allies abroad. WMD
already poses a threat to U.S. territory via terrorism and
unconventional delivery means, and some countries of concern
are already working on intercontinental-range missiles that
would be able to deliver WMD against our territory directly.
Since taking office in January 2001, my Administration has
given high priority to dealing with the threat of WMD and
missile proliferation. These issues figure prominently in a
number of policy reviews (e.g., concerning North Korea), as
well as in the Administration's reexamination of U.S.
deterrence strategy and force posture.
WMD and missile nonproliferation measures undertaken by the
United States between November 2000 and May 2001 are the
subject of this report. In November 1994, in light of the
dangers of the proliferation of WMD and of the means of
delivering such weapons, President Clinton issued Executive
Order No. 12938, declaring a national emergency under the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et
seq.). Under section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50
U.S.C. 1622(d)), the national emergency terminates on the
anniversary date of its declaration unless, within the 90-day
period prior to each anniversary date, the President publishes
in the Federal Register and transmits to the Congress a notice
stating that such emergency is to continue in effect. The
national emergency was extended on November 14, 1995; November
12, 1996; November 13, 1997; November 12, 1998; November 10,
1999; and November 12, 2000.
The following report is made pursuant to Section 204(c) of
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C.
1703(c)) and Section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50
U.S.C. 1641(c)). It reports actions taken and expenditures
incurred pursuant to the emergency declaration during the
period November 12, 2000 through May 15, 2001. Additional
information on nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons (CBW)
and missile nonproliferation efforts is contained in the most
recent annual Report on the Proliferation of Missiles and
Essential Components of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical
Weapons. This report was provided to Congress pursuant to
Section 1097 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (Public Law 102-190), also known as
the ``Nonproliferation Report.'' Additional information in this
regard is also contained in the most recent annual report
provided to the Congress pursuant to Section 308 of the
Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination
Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-182), also known as the ``CBW
Report.''
On July 28, 1998, in E.O. 13094, President Clinton amended
section 4 of E.O. 12938 to broaden the type of proliferation
activity that can subject entities to potential penalties under
the Executive Order. The original Executive Order provided for
penalties for contributions to the efforts of any foreign
country, project or entity to use, acquire, design, produce, or
stockpile chemical or biological weapons; the amended Executive
Order also covers contributions to foreign programs for nuclear
weapons and for missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass
destruction. Moreover, the amendment expands the original
Executive Order to include attempts to contribute to foreign
proliferation activities, as well as actual contributions, and
broadens the range of potential penalties to expressly include
the prohibition of United States Government assistance to
foreign persons, and the prohibition of imports into the United
States and United States Government procurement. In sum, the
amendment gives the United States Government greater
flexibility in deciding how and to what extent to impose
measures against foreign persons that assist proliferation
programs.
nuclear weapons
Since their May 1998 nuclear tests, India and Pakistan have
openly pursued their respective nuclear weapon programs. They
have continued production of fissile material for nuclear
weapons and have flight-tested nuclear-capable ballistic
missiles. Their continued production of weapons-grade fissile
material coupled with possession of fighter aircraft capable of
delivering nuclear weapons gives both India and Pakistan the
ability today to conduct a nuclear exchange. Flight testing of
nuclear capable ballistic missiles by both countries raises the
prospect that more sophisticated and possibly destabilizing
capabilities will be fielded in the coming years. We have
sought to persuade New Delhi and Islamabad that open-ended
nuclear and missile competition in South Asia would adversely
affect both the subcontinent and other regions. We have
pressedfor restraint, especially to not deploy nuclear weapons or
nuclear-capable ballistic missiles.
Since the mandatory imposition of U.S. statutory sanctions,
we have worked unilaterally, with other P-5 and G-8 members,
with the South Asia Task Force (SATF), and through the UN to
urge India and Pakistan to move toward the international
nonproliferation mainstream. Support for international
sanctions by other countries continues to attenuate, however.
We have supported calls by the P-5 and G-8, and UN Security
Council on India and Pakistan to take a broad range of concrete
actions designed to prevent a costly and destabilizing nuclear
arms and missile race, with possible implications beyond the
region. During the Clinton Administration, the United States
focused most intensely on several objectives that it thought
could be met over the short and medium term: an end to nuclear
testing and adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT); constructive engagement in negotiations on a
Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) and, pending its
conclusion, a moratorium on production of fissile material for
nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices; restraint
in the development of nuclear-capable missiles, particularly
non-deployment; and adoption of controls meeting international
standards on exports of sensitive materials and technology.
Intensive high-level U.S. dialogues with Indian and
Pakistani officials yielded only modest progress, principally
on export controls. Indian and Pakistani leaders reaffirmed
their countries' testing moratoria, declared in the wake of the
tests. Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee announced during his
visit to Washington in September 2000 that India would maintain
its moratorium until CTBT entered into force. Pakistan's
leaders have said Pakistan will not be the first to test.
India and Pakistan both withdrew their opposition to
negotiations on an FMCT in Geneva at the end of the 1998
Conference on Disarmament session, and negotiations got
underway for a brief time. However, these negotiations were
unable to resume in 1999 or 2000 due to a deadlock over the
negotiating mandate.
Some progress was achieved in bringing Indian and Pakistan
export controls, while non-specific, but generally effective,
into closer conformity with international standards. In April
2000, India instituted new, more specific regulations on many
categories of sensitive non-nuclear equipment and technology,
and has said that nuclear-related regulations will be
forthcoming. In July 2000, Pakistan publicly announced
regulations restricting nuclear exports and has indicated that
further measures are being prepared. Both countries' steps
still fall short of international standards, however. We have
begun with India a program of technical cooperation designed to
improve the effectiveness of its already extensive export
controls, and to encourage further steps to bring India's
controls in line with international standards. Similar
assistance to Pakistan is prohibited by coup-related sanctions.
The summer 1999 Kargil conflict and the October 1999
military take-over in Pakistan resulted in the suspension of
the Indo-Pakistani bilateral dialogue begun at Lahore. Tensions
remain high, particularly over insurgent attacks in Kashmir.
India unilaterally suspended offensive military operations in
Kashmir in November of 2000, and India and Pakistan have all
but ceased artillery barrages across the line of control.
My Administration has an active review underway of U.S.
nonproliferation related sanctions policy toward South Asia.
The results of that review will be discussed in the November
2001 version of this report.
In October 1994, the United States and the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) signed an
Agreed Framework which, if fully implemented, will ultimately
result in Pyongyang's full compliance with the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreement, Under the
Agreed framework, as it has been interpreted to date, the DPRK
is not required to come into full compliance with its IAEA
safeguards agreement until a significant portion of the light
water reactor project is completed, but must do so before the
delivery of key unclear components. As a first step, North
Korea froze construction and operations at its declared nuclear
facilities at Yongbyon and Taechon. The freeze remains in place
and is monitored by the IAEA, which has maintained a continuous
presence at the Yongbyon site since 1994.
The United States and DPRK have also cooperated in the
canning of spent fuel from the North's 5 megawatt nuclear
reactor. Canning of all accessible spent fuel rods and rod
fragments was completed in April 2000. The IAEA continues to
monitor the canned fuel and has confirmed that any remaining
rod fragments, which are currently inaccessible, do not
represent a proliferation concern. The U.S. spent-fuel team
regularlyreturns to the DPRK to continue clean-up operations
and to look at maintenance.
The Agreed Framework bars the DPRK from constructing any
new graphite-moderated reactors or related facilities,
including reprocessing plants. United States identification in
mid-1998 of an underground site near Kumchang-ni in North
Korea, which was suspected of being nuclear-related, led to an
arrangement providing for U.S. access to the site as long as
U.S. suspicions remained. On the basis of visits to the
facility in May 1999 and May 2000, the United States concluded
that the site as then configured was not suited to house a
nuclear reactor or reprocessing operations and therefore was
not a violation of the Agreed Framework. The U.S.- DPRK Joint
Communique issued in October 2000, following the visit of DPRK
Special Envoy Jo Myong Rok to Washington, stated that ``U.S.
concern'' about Kumchang-ni had been ``removed.'' In that
document, both sides pledged to ``redouble their commitment and
their efforts to fulfill their respective obligations in their
entirety under the Agreed Framework.'' The DPRK also reaffirmed
its ballistic missile flight test moratorium.
In March 2001, I met with ROK President Kim Dae-Jung. The
resulting joint statement reaffirmed the commitment of the
United States and the ROK to continue the 1994 Agreed
Framework, while calling on North Korea ``to join in taking the
needed steps for its successful implementation.'' Subsequently,
in March 2001, My Administration began a full review of U.S.
policy toward North Korea, with the purpose of determining the
nature of any future U.S. dialogue with North Korea. My
Administration is taking into account the views of key allies
as it proceeds with the ongoing review. The results of the
review will be discussed in the November 2001 version of this
report.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the
cornerstone of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. The
April-May 2000 NPT Review Conference (REVCON) concluded
successfully and provided an important boost to the NPT and to
nuclear nonproliferation goals in general. In the Fall of 2000,
the REVCON outcome was reinforced at the UN General Assembly
and at the General Conference of the IAEA. The United States
continued to pursue policies aimed at advancing the goals of
the NPT, particularly those related to compliance with the
Treaty's nonproliferation obligations. In March 2001, the
United States met with other NPT Depository Governments (UK and
Russia) in Geneva to discuss the procedural steps necessary to
begin the review process leading to the next Conference of NPT
Parties in 2005.
The IAEA attempts to verify states' compliance with their
safeguards agreement pursuant to their NPT obligations. The
discovery at the time of the Gulf War of Iraq's extensive
covert nuclear activities led to an international consensus in
favor of strengthening the IAEA safeguards system's ability to
detect undeclared nuclear material and activities. The United
States and a large number of like-minded states negotiated in
the mid-1990s substantial safeguards strengthening measures,
including the use of environmental sampling techniques,
expansion of the classes of nuclear activities states are
required to declare, and expansion of IAEA access rights.
Measures requiring additional legal authority are embodied in a
Model Additional Protocol approved in 1997. This Protocol has
now been signed by 55 states and has entered into force for 19
countries. Provided the IAEA is given the resources and
political support it needs to implement its new safeguards
measures effectively, proliferators who have ratified the
Additional Protocol will likely find it harder to evade the
system. However, to date, no country of concern/proliferator
has adopted the Protocol.
The purpose of the 35-nation Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) Exporters (Zangger) Committee is to harmonize
implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty's requirement to
apply IAEA safeguards to nuclear exports. Article III.2 of the
Treaty requires parties to ensure that IAEA safeguards are
applied to exports to non-nuclear weapon states of (a) source
or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material
especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or
production of special fissionable material. The Committee
maintains and updates a list (the ``Trigger List'') of
equipment that may only be exported if safeguards are applied
to the recipient facility. The relative informality of the
Zangger Committee has enabled it to take the lead on certain
nonproliferation issues that would be more difficult to resolve
in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).
As its October 2000 meeting, the Committee discussed the
results of the 2000 NPT REVCON. The Committee agreed to form
two informal ``Friends of the Chair'' groups to: (1) consider
preparations for the 2005 NPT REVCON; and (2) continue
consideration of possible future adoption of a policy of
requiring full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply to
non-nuclear weapon states. At the meeting, members also agreed
that the materials americium and neptunium fell outside the
scope ofNPT Article III.2 for inclusion on the Trigger List,
but no agreement was reached on the consideration of adding plutonium
enrichment equipment to the Trigger List.
All of the NPT nuclear weapon states, including China, are
members of the Zangger Committee. However, unlike all of the
other nuclear weapon states, China is not a member of the NSG,
which requires its members to adhere to a policy of requiring
non-nuclear weapon states to accept IAEA full-scope safeguards
as a condition of supply. China has been reluctant to agree to
this policy.
With 39 member states, the NSG is a widely accepted and
effective export-control arrangement, which contributes to the
nonproliferation of nuclear weapons through implementation of
guidelines for control of nuclear and nuclear-related exports.
Members pursue the aims of the NSG through adherence to the
Guidelines, which are adopted by consensus, and through
exchanges of information on developments of nuclear
proliferation concern.
Slovenia became the newest member of the NSG in October
2000. NSG members sometimes allow non-member nations deemed
eligible for NSG membership to participate in Plenary meetings
as observers. While not a NSG member, China has taken a major
step toward harmonization of its export control system with the
NSG Part 2 Guidelines by the implementation of controls over
nuclear-related dual-use equipment, material, and related
technology.
A special meeting was held in Vienna in December 2000 on
the issue of Russian nuclear supply to India. The United States
and more than 30 other NSG members expressed strong concern
over the proposed Russian supply of fuel to the Tarapur
reactors. NSG members overwhelmingly agreed that such supply
clearly does not qualify for the safety exemption to the NSG
full scope safeguards policy and thus not only would seriously
undercut the NSG Guidelines but also the global nuclear
nonproliferation regime. Despite this, the Russians have made
clear that they intend to proceed with the Tarapur transfer
anyway, and we anticipate this issue will continue to be
discussed at future NSG meetings.
In April 2001, the NSG Implementation Working Group reached
ad referendum agreement on proposed procedures including
responsibilities of the Plenary, Chair, Consultative Group, and
Point of Contact as well as procedures for consideration of new
members, consultations, and amendment of the guidelines. Russia
introduced a proposal to accord ``associate membership'' to
certain countries which have not accepted IAEA full-scope
safeguards but have nuclear weapons programs. Discussion has
been deferred until the May 2001 Plenary.
chemical and biological weapons (cbw)
The export control regulations issued under the Expanded
Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI) remain fully in force
and continue to be administered by the Department of Commerce,
in consultation with other agencies, in order to control the
export of items with potential use in chemical or biological
weapons or unmanned delivery systems for weapons of mass
destruction.
Chemical weapons (CW) continue to pose a very serious
threat to our security and that of our allies. On April 29,
1997, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on
Their Destruction (the Chemical Weapons Convention or CWC)
entered into force with 87 of the CWC's 165 States Signatories
as original States Parties, including the United States, which
ratified on April 25, 1997. Russia ratified the CWC on November
5, 1997, and became a State Party on December 8, 1997. As of
the end of this reporting period, 143 countries have become
States Parties.
The implementing body for the CWC, the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), was established on
April 29, 1997. The OPCW, located in The Hague, is comprised of
States Parties and international civil servants that are
responsible for implementing the CWC. The OPCW consists of the
Conference of the States Parties, the Executive Council (EC),
and the Technical Secretariat (TS). The TS carries out the
verification provisions of the CWC, and presently has a staff
of approximately 500, including about 200 inspectors trained
and equipped to inspect military and industrial facilities
throughout the world. To date, the OPCW has conducted over 940
routine inspections in some 48 countries. No challenge
inspections have yet taken place. The OPCW maintains a
permanent inspector presence at operational U.S. CW destruction
facilities in Utah and elsewhere. Accordingly, approximately 70
percent of the inspection days have been at U.S. declared
facilities.
The United States is determined to seek full implementation
of the concrete measures in the CWC designed to raise the costs
and risks for states or other entities attempting to engage in
chemical weapons-related activities. Receiving accurate and
complete declarations from all States Parties will improve our
knowledge of possible chemical weapons-related activities. The
CWC's inspection provisions provide for access by international
inspectors to declared and potentially undeclared facilities
and locations, thus making clandestine chemical weapons
production and stockpiling more difficult, more risky, and more
expensive.
The Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998
was enacted into U.S. law on October 21, 1998, as part of the
Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriation
Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (P.L. 105-277). The Clinton
Administration issued Executive Order 13128 on June 25, 1999,
and Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-70 on December 17, 1999
to facilitate implementation of the Act and the Convention.
Regulations regarding declarations and inspections of
industrial facilities were published on December 30, 1999. The
United States commenced its submission of industry declarations
at the end of April 2000, and hosted its first industry
inspection on May 8, 2000. Industry inspections continue with
excellent support from affected companies. Our submission of
the industry declarations to the OPCW and commencement of
inspections have strengthened U.S. leadership in the
organization as well as our ability to encourage other States
Parties to make complete, accurate, and timely declarations.
Countries that refuse to join the CWC are increasingly
isolated politically and denied access by the CWC to certain
key chemicals from States Parties. The relevant treaty
provisions are specifically designed to penalize countries that
refuse to join the rest of the world in eliminating the threat
of chemical weapons.
The United States agreed in 1994 to participate in an Ad
Hoc Group to negotiate a Protocol to the 1972 BWC that would
``enhance confidence in compliance.'' Negotiations continued
during the reporting period. My Administration is in the late
stages of a comprehensive review of U.S. policy toward the BWC
protocol exercise.
The United States continues to be a leading participant in
the 32-member Australia Group (AG) chemical and biological
weapons (CBW) nonproliferation regime. The United States
attended the most recent annual AG Plenary Session from October
2-5, 2000, during which the Group reaffirmed the members'
continued collective belief in the AG's viability, importance
and compatibility with the CWC and BWC. Members continue to
agree that full adherence to the CWC and BWC by all governments
will be the only way to achieve a permanent global ban on
chemical and biological weapons and that all states adhering to
these Conventions must take steps to ensure that their national
activities support these goals. At the 2000 Plenary, the Group
welcomed its newest members, Cyprus and Turkey. The regime
continued to focus on strengthening and refining AG export
controls and sharing information to address the CBW threat,
including from terrorism. The AG also reaffirmed its commitment
to continue its active outreach program of briefings for non-AG
countries, and to promote regional consultations on export
controls and nonproliferation to further awareness and
understanding of national policies in these areas. The AG
discussed ways to be more proactive in stemming attacks on the
AG in the CWC and BWC contexts.
During the last six months, we continued to closely examine
intelligence and other information of trade in CBW-related
material and technology that might be relevant to sanctions
provisions under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control
and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991. No new sanctions
determinations were reached during this reporting period. The
United States also continues to cooperate with its AG partners
and other countries in stopping shipments of proliferation
concern.
missiles for delivery of weapons of mass destruction
The United States continues to carefully control exports
that could contribute to unmanned delivery systems for weapons
of mass destruction, and to closely monitor activities of
potential missile proliferation concern. We also continue to
implement U.S. missile sanctions laws.
On November 21, 2000, the United States determined that
Chinese entities engaged in transfers of missile-related
equipment and technology to Iran and Pakistan are sanctionable
under U.S. law. As mandated by U.S. law, the United States
imposed MTCR Category I missile sanctions on the Iranian and
Pakistani entities involved. The United States waived sanctions
against the participating Chinese entities in consideration of
China's November 21, 2000 commitment not to assist other
countries in developing nuclear-capable ballistic missiles in
any way and to put in place comprehensive export
controls.However, this waiver does not apply to any sanctionable
transfers that occur after November 21, 2000. We are continuing to
monitor this situation closely and will press China for full
implementation of its November 21 commitments.
In January 2001, pursuant to the Iran Nonproliferation Act
of 2000, the United States imposed missile sanctions on a North
Korean entity for its involvement in the transfer from North
Korea to Iran of missile equipment and technology controlled by
the MTCR Annex.
During this reporting period, the Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR) Partners (members) continued to share
information about proliferation problems with each other and
with other potential supplier, consumer, and transshipment
states. Partners also emphasized the need for implementing
effective export control systems. This cooperation has resulted
in the interdiction of missile-related materials intended for
use in missile programs of concern. In addition, the Partners
reached consensus to admit the Republic of Korea to membership
in the MTCR, effective March 26, 2001. The United States
strongly supported this decision and believes ROK membership
will strengthen the Regime. The ROK has been committed since
1995 to controlling missile-related exports consistent with the
MTCR Guidelines and Annex, and has a demonstrated track record
of implementing such controls. In addition, the ROK committed
in January 2000 not to possess MTCR Category I offensive
military missiles. With the admission of the ROK, MTCR
membership now stands at 33.
As agreed at the October 2000 Helsinki MTCR Plenary, the
MTCR Partners held a Reinforced Point of Contact (RPOC) meeting
in Paris in March 2001 to discuss next steps on the draft
International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile
Proliferation (ICOC), intended to become a new multilateral
mechanism that would complement the MTCR and eventually include
the participation of all interested countries, both MTCR and
non-MTCR. The MTCR Partners agreed to continue their national
and regional efforts to multilateralize the draft ICOC,
including by Poland holding a round table meeting for several
non-members in Warsaw in May, and to intensify their efforts to
obtain non-Partner support for, and reaction to, the draft ICOC
text. They also agreed to decide at the September 24-28 Ottawa
MTCR Plenary whether and when to hold an international
conference for the official launching of the ICOC.
In preparation for the Ottawa Plenary, the Partners also
agreed to hold a special meeting for licensing and enforcement
officers in conjunction with the Regime's annual Information
Exchange. The United States strongly supports this decision.
Having such a meeting will further strengthen the Partners'
efforts to cooperate on stopping or impeding specific shipments
of missile proliferation concern.
During this reporting period, the United States continued
to work unilaterally and in coordination with its MTCR Partners
to combat missile proliferation and to encourage non-members to
export responsibly and to adhere to the MTCR Guidelines. Since
the last report, the United States continued holding missile
nonproliferation dialogues with China and raising with Indian
and Pakistani leaders our continuing strong interest in this
issue. In the course of normal diplomatic relations, we also
have pursued such discussions with other countries in Central
Europe, South Asia, and the Middle East.
Although regular discussions with Pakistan at the expert
level have not proceeded since the Fall 1999 coup, we remain
engaged at the diplomatic level and continue to address our
nonproliferation concerns. On November 21, 2000, the United
States Government imposed missile sanctions on the Pakistani
Ministry of Defense and the Space and Upper Atmosphere Research
Commission (SUPARCO) for their knowing engagement in missile
proliferation activities with Chinese entities. We have
indicated we are prepared to discuss with Pakistan the
nonproliferation conditions under which a waiver might be
warranted.
As noted in the previous report, former Secretary Albright
met with Chairman Kim Jong-Il in Pyongyang October 23-24, 2000.
They discussed the full range of U.S. concerns on missiles,
including both the DPRK's indigenous missile programs and
exports. They also explored Chairman Kim's idea of restraining
DPRK missile capabilities in exchange for launches of DPRK
satellites on foreign boosters. Following up on the Secretary's
discussions, the United States and DPRK held the sixth round of
missile talks in Kuala Lumpur November 1-3, 2000. The talks
covered the full range of missile issues under consideration by
the two countries and were useful in clarifying positions.
However, significant issues remained to be resolved.
No further dialogue between the United States and DPRK has
taken place since the November 2000 round of talks. My
Administration is currently undertaking a thorough review of
U.S. policy vis-a-vis the DPRK on this and other key issues
related tothe Korean Peninsula. My Administration will
carefully consider its options, taking into account the views of key
allies before deciding whether and how to proceed.
In May, a European Union delegation visited Pyongyang and
met with DPRK leader Kim Jong-I1. During those meetings, Kim
informed the delegation that he would extend North Korea's
missile launch moratorium until 2003. (North Korean officials
subsequently linked continuation of the moratorium to Bush
Administration policy toward Pyongyang.) Kim also commented,
however, that North Korea would continue to export missiles and
related technology.
In response to Iranian efforts to acquire sensitive items
from Russian entities for use in Iran's missile and nuclear
development programs, the United States has pursued a high-
level dialogue with Russia aimed at finding ways to work
together to cut off the flow of sensitive goods to Iran's
ballistic missile development and nuclear weapon programs.
Russia's Government has created institutional foundations to
implement a newly-enacted nonproliferation policy and passed
laws to punish wrongdoers. It also has passed new export
control legislation to tighten government control over
sensitive technologies and continued working with the United
States to strengthen export control practices at Russian
aerospace firms.
In April 2000, the United States announced its intention to
lift the administrative penalties imposed on the Russian
entities Inor and Polyus in July 1998 for their missile-related
cooperation with Iran. They were removed on November 17, 2000.
However, penalties imposed in July 1998 against five other
Russian entities and in January 1999 against three additional
entities remain in effect.
Consistent with the Russian Government's April 2000
announcement of administrative action against the Rector of the
Baltic State Technical University (BSTU) for his involvement in
training Iranian specialists at BSTU, and following our own
assessment, the United States also announced on April 24, 2000,
plans to impose trade and administrative penalties on the
Rector for his involvement with the Iranian missile program.
However, the United States has not moved forward with these
penalties as the Russian Government has since taken its own
actions against the Rector. Specifically, the Russian Ministry
of Education initiated an investigation of the Rector. We
understand that this investigation resulted in administrative
action against the Rector and cancellation of specialized
courses for Iranian students at BSTU. (BSTU itself remains
under U.S. administrative penalties.)
However, despite the Russian Government's nonproliferation
and export control efforts, some Russian entities continued to
cooperate with Iran's ballistic missile program and engaged in
nuclear cooperation with Iran beyond the Bushehr Unit 1 nuclear
power reactor project, which could further Iran's nuclear
weapon aspirations. The United States has made clear to Russia
our strong objection to these activities. My Administration is
currently engaged in a review of U.S. nonproliferation policy
toward Russia.
On November 17, 2000, the United States Government imposed
missile sanctions on two Iranian entities, the Shahid Hemmat
Industrial Group (SHIG) and the Sanam Industrial Group, for
knowingly engaging in missile-related transfers. In addition,
on November 21, 2000, the U.S. imposed missile sanctions on the
Iranian Defense Industries Organization (DIO) and the Ministry
of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFEL) for knowingly
engaging in missile proliferation activities with Chinese
entities.
Value of Nonproliferation Export Controls
United States national export controls, both those
implemented pursuant to multilateral nonproliferation regimes
and those implemented unilaterally, play an important part in
impeding the proliferation of WMD and missiles. (As used here,
``export controls'' refer to requirements for case-by-case
review of certain exports, or limitations on exports of
particular items of proliferation concern to certain
destinations, rather than broad embargoes or economic sanctions
that also affect trade.) As noted in this report, however,
export controls are only one of a number of tools the United
States uses to achieve its nonproliferation objectives. Global
nonproliferation treaties and norms, multilateral
nonproliferation regimes, interdictions of shipments of
proliferation concern, sanctions, export control assistance,
redirection and elimination efforts, and robust U.S. military,
intelligence, and diplomatic capabilities all work in
conjunction with export controls as part of our overall
nonproliferation strategy.
Export controls are a critical part of nonproliferation
because every emerging WMD/missile program seeks equipment and
technology from other countries. Proliferators look to other
sources because needed items are unavailable within their
country, because indigenously produced items are of substandard
quality or insufficient quantity, and/or because imported
itemscan be obtained more quickly and cheaply than domestically
produced ones. It is important to note that proliferators seek for
their WMD and missile programs both items on multilateral lists (like
gyroscopes controlled on the MTCR Annex and nerve gas precursors on the
Australia Group list) and unlisted items (like lower-level machine
tools and very basic chemicals). In addition, many of the items of
interest to proliferators are inherently dual-use. For example, key
precursors and technologies used in the production of fertilizers or
pesticides also can be used to make chemical weapons; bio-production
technology can be used to produce biological weapons.
The most obvious value of export controls is in impeding or
denying proliferators access to key pieces of equipment or
technology for use in their WMD/missile programs. In large
part, U.S. national export controls, and similar controls of
our partners in the Australia Group, Missile Technology Control
Regime, and Nuclear Suppliers Group, have denied proliferators
access to the largest sources of the best equipment and
technology. Proliferators have mostly been forced to seek less
capable items from non-regime suppliers. Moreover, in many
instances, U.S. and regime controls and associated efforts have
forced proliferators to engage in complex clandestine
procurements even from non-member suppliers, taking time and
money away from WMD/missile programs.
United States national export controls and those of our
regime partners also have played an important role in
increasing over time the critical mass of countries applying
nonproliferation export controls. For example: the seven-member
MTCR of 1987 has grown to 33 member countries; the NSG adopted
full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply and extended new
controls to nuclear-related dual-use items; several non-member
countries have committed unilaterally to apply export controls
consistent with one or more of the regimes; and most of the
members of the nonproliferation regimes have applied national
``catch-all'' controls similar to those under the U.S. Enhanced
Proliferation Control Initiative. (Export controls normally are
tied to a specific list of items, such as the MTCR Annex.
``Catch-all'' controls provide a legal basis to control exports
of items not on a list, when those items are destined for WMD/
missile programs.)
The United States maintains a global program, funded by the
Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related
Activities (NADR) account and Freedom Support Act (FSA) funds
for the New Independent States, to assist other countries'
efforts to strengthen their export control systems. Assistance
world-wide is focused on helping weapons-source countries and
countries along potential smuggling routes to develop effective
export control regimes, including effective capabilities to
control illicit weapons trafficking across their borders; to
establish the necessary legal and regulatory basis for
effective export controls; to improve licensing procedures and
practices; to coordinate, train, and equip export enforcement
agencies, including customs agents and border security and
enforcement authorities; to develop and install automated
information systems to licensing and enforcement; and to foster
effective interaction between government and industry on export
controls. The program has placed over 20 advisors in countries
around the world to coordinate export control/border security
activities.
United States export controls, especially ``catch-all''
controls, also make important political and moral contributions
to the nonproliferation effort. They uphold the broad legal
obligations the United States has undertaken in the Nuclear
Non-proliferation Treaty (Article I), Biological Weapons
Convention (Article III), and Chemical Weapons Convention
(Article I) not to assist anyone in proscribed WMD activities.
They endeavor to assure there are no U.S. ``fingerprints'' on
WMD and missiles that threaten U.S. citizens and territory and
our forces, friends, and interests overseas. They place the
United States squarely and unambiguously against WMD/missile
proliferation, even against the prospect of inadvertent
proliferation from the United States itself.
Finally, export controls play an important role in enabling
and enhancing legitimate trade. They provide a means to permit
dual-use exports to proceed under circumstances where, without
export control scrutiny, the only prudent course would be to
prohibit them. They help build confidence between countries
applying similar controls that, in turn, results in increased
trade. Each of the WMD nonproliferation regimes, for example,
has a ``no undercut'' policy committing each member not to make
an export that another has denied for nonproliferation reasons
and notified to the rest, unless it first consults with the
original denying country. Not only does this policy make it
more difficult for proliferators to get items from regime
members, it establishes a ``level playing field'' for
exporters.
threat reduction
The potential for proliferation of WMD and delivery system
expertise has increased in part due to continued economic and
political instability in Russia and other Newly Independent
States. The human dimension proliferation continues to present
a serious threat and is addressed through programs that support
the transition of former Soviet weapons scientists to civilian
research and technology development activities. These programs
currently are under review by my Administration.
expenses
Pursuant to Section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act
(50 U.S.C. 1641 (c)), I report that there were no specific
expenses directly attributable to the exercise of authorities
conferred by the declaration of the national emergency in
Executive Order 12938, as amended, during the period from
November 12, 2000 through May 15, 2001.