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Features

Middle East Arms Control Initiative President Announces Nonproliferation Proposals	3
Eastern Europe Defense Trade with Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia	4
Yugoslavia Embargo Imposed on Sale and Export of Defense Items	5
South Africa Arms Restrictions Remain in Force	6
COCOM Update Agreement Reached on New Strategic Commodities Core List	6
Joint Conference on Defense Trade CDT and SIA Cosponsor Briefing in Paris for Industry	7
Arms Control, Arms Transfers, and U.A.E. Helicopters Statement by Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs	8
Compliance Function at CDT Statement by Director of Center for Defense Trade	12
Identifying Defense Trade Opportunities Uses of the Advisory Opinion, Technical Data License, and Demonstration License	14
Inertial Navigation Systems Change in International Traffic in Arms Regulations	15

Departments

U.S. Customs at DTC	17
Commodity Jurisdiction Determinations	19
Personnel Updates	20
Tips and Tidbits	21
Publications for Exporters	22
Reader and Training Questionnaires	27

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MIDDLE EAST ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVE

President Announces Nonproliferation Proposals

On May 29, 1991, the President announced six proposals for the Middle East intended to counter the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons; the missiles that could carry such arms; and destabilizing transfers of conventional arms. These proposals reflected U.S. consultations with allies, governments in the region, and major suppliers of arms and technology. The President's initiative focused on the Middle East and that region's unique situation. It was also meant to complement other initiatives announced by U.S. allies.

Specifically, the President's Middle East Arms Control Initiative called for: a meeting of the five major arms supplying nations to discuss establishment of guidelines for restraints of destabilizing transfers; a freeze on the acquisition, production, and testing of surface-to-surface missiles by states in the region, with a view toward ultimate elimination of such missiles; regional application of existing international nuclear nonproliferation mechanisms; rapid completion of a worldwide chemical weapons ban; and strengthening of the treaty banning biological weapons.

On July 8-9, representatives of the United States, the Soviet Union, France, the United Kingdom, and the People's Republic of China (the five major arms supplying nations) met in Paris to discuss arms transfer and nonproliferation matters. In a communique, they noted with concern the dangers associated with excessive arms buildups and the threats to peace and stability posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons, and missiles. They undertook to seek effective weapons control measures in an equitable, reasonable, comprehensive, and balanced manner—on a global and regional basis. They also agreed to develop and maintain stringent national and, as far as possible, harmonized controls

to ensure that weapons of mass destruction-related equipment and materials are transferred for permitted purposes only and are not diverted.

Finally, the representatives of the five major suppliers expressed strong support for the objective of creating a weapons of mass destruction-free zone in the Middle East. Critical steps toward this goal would include a freeze and ultimate elimination of ground-to-ground missiles in the region; submission by all nations in the region of all their nuclear activities to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards; a ban on the importation and production of nuclear weapons-usable materials; and agreement by all states in the region to undertake to become parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention as soon as it is concluded in 1992.

The five suppliers acknowledged that Article 51 of the U.N. Charter guarantees every state the right of self defense, implying that a state also has the right to acquire the means to defend itself. However, they recognized that indiscriminate arms and technology transfer can threaten regional stability. Noting the special role they have in fostering "greater responsibility, confidence, and transparency" in this sphere and the need for close consultation with recipient states, the suppliers declared their intent to:

- observe restraint when considering defense transfers under their respective national control procedures (with a view toward developing agreed guidelines on this basis);
- develop modalities of consultation and information exchanges on arms transfers to the Middle East, as a matter of priority;
- convene a group of experts in September 1991 to develop a common approach to such transfers;
- hold another plenary meeting in October 1991 in London; and
- schedule further meetings periodically to review transfer issues. ♦

EASTERN EUROPE

Defense Trade with Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia

The Center for Defense Trade (CDT) has received numerous inquiries from U.S. industry regarding U.S. Government policy for U.S. Munitions List (USML) exports to Eastern Europe. The following is a status report on this area, as well as CDT's view of future policy directions. (For additional information on trade with Eastern Europe, order the State Department's new booklet, *Resource Guide to Doing Business in Central and Eastern Europe*, which is reviewed on page 20.)

Political Developments Affect Export Controls. Throughout the Cold War era, U.S. policy has been to deny license applications for the export of USML items to certain countries. These have included the Eastern European nations listed in Section 126.1 of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).

Because of the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and major democratic reforms in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia over the past 2 years, as of July 12, 1991, all three countries have been approved for removal from the USML list of proscribed destinations. A notice will soon be published in the *Federal Register* to notify exporters of the change in policy and amending the ITAR accordingly.

The Office of Defense Trade Controls (DTC), in consultation with other offices in State and Defense, will continue to review munitions license applications for Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia on a case-by-case basis. Prior to the approved removal of these countries from the list of prohibited destinations, DTC granted a number of exceptions for exports to these countries. Such license requests will remain subject to special scrutiny, because the effectiveness of these countries' export control systems remains untested. Applications proposing to sell USML items for civilian or nonlethal end use have the best

chance of being approved. Requests for export will be considered for ITAR-controlled commodities that may involve the following non-military sectors: public health and safety, environmental, non-nuclear energy-producing equipment and facilities, education, banking and financial services, civilian telecommunications, civil transportation, and food production and processing equipment and facilities. As of this writing, the United States will generally not consider license applications for the sale of significant military equipment (SME) or components of an offensive nature to these Eastern European nations. Similarly, large end items (e.g., tanks, military aircraft, etc.) will not be considered for direct commercial sale at this time.

Because the United States is concerned about the possibility that sensitive U.S. technologies may be diverted to unauthorized end users, it has encouraged these Eastern European nations to set up effective export control regimes and to establish retransfer safeguards in order to prevent diversion of munitions and other controlled items. The new governments have been receptive to U.S. recommendations, and there is reason to believe that they will implement improved export controls.

Security Assistance Policy. Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland remain ineligible to receive government-to-government sales of defense articles and services under the Arms Export Control Act (AECA). The Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989 [Section 2(b)(1)(E)], however, sets as a U.S. policy goal the "establishment of non-partisan military, security, and police forces" in Eastern European nations.

To support the SEED objective, the United States has initiated International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs with Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. These IMET grants are meant to encourage

institutional links between the U.S. military and the armed services of the three countries. The programs will include courses on the role of the military in a democratic society, the importance of civilian oversight of the armed services, and the protection of internationally recognized human rights. Each country was originally allocated \$50,000 of IMET funding

for FY 1991. During the middle of the fiscal year, the program levels were increased to \$200,000 for Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and to \$250,000 for Poland. For FY 1992, the Administration has requested \$75,000 in IMET funds for each of these three nations. Increased funding could become available as program development matures. ♦

YUGOSLAVIA

Embargo Imposed on Sale and Export of Defense Items

The situation in Yugoslavia remains uncertain with a danger of civil war and potential repercussions for stability in the region. The United States, in cooperation with the European Community (EC) nations, continues to seek a peaceful solution to the crisis. Toward that end, the United States and the EC have embargoed the shipment of armaments, military equipment, and related spare parts to Yugoslavia and have approached other nations to urge participation in this common effort.

On July 11, 1991, the United States imposed its embargo on the sale and export of defense articles and services to Yugoslavia. The Secretary of State formally authorized the suspension of licenses for direct commercial exports of items covered by the U.S. Munitions List (USML). He approved a policy of denial of government-to-government (Foreign Military Sales) arms exports and suspended future security assistance under the International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program. All of these actions will remain in effect until further notice.

Formal notification appeared in the *Federal Register* (Volume 58, Number 139, Friday, July 19, 1991, page 3332). The notice reads as follows:

Suspension of Munitions Export Licenses to Yugoslavia

Agency: Department of State.

Action: Notice.

Summary: Notice is hereby given that all licenses and approvals to export or otherwise transfer defense articles and defense services to Yugoslavia pursuant to section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act are suspended.

Effective Date: July 11, 1991.

For Further Information Contact:

Rose Biancaniello
Chief, Arms Licensing Division
Office of Defense Trade Controls
Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
Department of State
(703-875-6644).

Supplementary Information: Effective immediately, it is the policy of the U.S. Government to deny all applications for licenses and other approvals to export or otherwise transfer defense articles to Yugoslavia. In addition, U.S. manufacturers and exporters and any other affected parties are hereby notified that the Department of State has suspended all licenses and approvals authorizing the export of or other transfers of defense articles or defense services to Yugoslavia.

The licenses and approvals that have been suspended include manufacturing license and technical assistance agreements involving Yugoslavia. This action also precludes the use in connection with Yugoslavia of any exemptions from license or other approval requirements included in the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) (22 CFR parts 120-130).

This action has been taken pursuant to sections 38 and 42 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778, 2791) and §126.7 of the ITAR in furtherance of the foreign policy of the United States.

Dated: July 20, 1991

Richard A. Clarke
Assistant Secretary of State
for Politico-Military Affairs◆

SOUTH AFRICA

Arms Restrictions Remain in Force

On July 10, 1991, the President signed Executive Order Number 12769, terminating the major economic sanctions imposed against South Africa pursuant to Title III of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 (CAAA) (Public Law 99-440). Section 317 of the CAAA codified the preexisting arms embargo imposed by the Department of State in implementation of the mandatory arms embargo imposed by the UN Security Council in resolution 418 on November 4, 1977. Section 318 required that no State Department export license be issued without 30 days' advance notification to Congress and provided for expedited Congressional review of such licenses.

Although the aforementioned statutory provisions are no longer in force, South Africa is still subject to the arms embargo and certain policy restrictions. Exceptions to this policy may be made only if the Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs determines that (1) the item proposed for transfer is not covered by UN Security Council resolution 418 and (2) the item in question is to be exported solely for commercial purposes and not for use by the armed forces, police, or other security forces of South Africa, or for any other similar purpose.

Because the CAAA codified preexisting policy, the only legal effect of the termination of the CAAA sanctions, with respect to defense articles and services, is that the 30 days' notice to Congress is no longer required before approval of any munitions license. ◆

COCOM UPDATE

Agreement Reached on New Strategic Goods Core List

On May 23, 1991, the Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) agreed to a new system of export controls for dual-use goods and technologies. The multilateral agreement will result in significant reductions in controls on microprocessors, machine tools, aircraft, avionics, and propulsion systems as well as other areas.

The agreement reached at the May COCOM High Level Meeting culminates a year-long review of dual-use goods and technologies to reflect the dramatic political transformations that have taken place in Central and Eastern Europe since 1989. The new dual-use international Industrial List (also known as the "Core List") balances COCOM's objective to maintain a strong, coordinated Western security posture and a desire to widen access by

Eastern European countries to advanced goods and technologies they need to rebuild their economies.

The new agreement continues the trend toward reducing controls on export of dual-use technology to civilian end users in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. These three emerging Eastern European democracies are in the process of adopting U.S.- and COCOM-recommended export control measures to protect imported strategic technology. Favorable treatment to these three countries, however, does not apply with respect to the two other COCOM lists—the International Atomic Energy List and International Munitions List.

General features of the new dual-use list include nine broad product categories; greater specificity in the descriptions of the items

controlled; alignment of control parameters with current industry technical standards; decontrol of readily available "off-the shelf" items in everyday commerce; and improved harmonization within the customs tariff system.

COCOM liberalization of strategic exports represents approximately a 50 percent reduction of existing export controls following a 33 percent reduction in the list agreed to by COCOM in June 1990. Full implementation of the Core List by the COCOM members is expected by September 1, 1991.

COCOM nations have agreed that individual countries will continue controlling goods and technologies dropped from the COCOM Industrial List that could contribute to the development of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and the missiles to deliver them. ♦

JOINT CONFERENCE ON DEFENSE TRADE

CDT and SIA Cosponsor Briefing in Paris for Industry

The Center for Defense Trade (CDT), in conjunction with the Society for International Affairs (SIA), held a Joint Conference on Defense Trade at the American Embassy in Paris on June 12, just prior to the Paris Air Show. Mr. Charles Duelfer, Director of the Politico-Military Affairs (PM) Bureau's Center for Defense Trade, and Ms. Wendy Kenyon, President of SIA, cochaired the conference. The conference provided both European defense firms and representatives of U.S. defense firms operating in Europe an overview of U.S. policy and practice in defense trade, specifically in the area of international cooperation.

Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs Richard Clarke opened the conference with an assessment of the President's Middle East Arms Control Initiative and explained the U.S. intent behind the proposal. He

emphasized that, while U.S. and allied technical superiority had decisively won the day in the Persian Gulf, there was a requirement for the major suppliers—the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union, and China—to take action to prevent the sort of disproportionate military growth undertaken by Iraq.

Noting that arms transfers were not in themselves the cause of Middle East instability, Mr. Clarke focused on the need for the major suppliers to reach a common understanding of the kinds of exports that would contribute to stability in the region. He also highlighted the U.S. proposal to ban weapons of mass destruction from the Middle East. When addressing conventional arms transfers, Mr. Clarke stressed that the U.S. proposal sought to lend transparency to the sales the major suppliers make to the region; not to do away with them.

Other speakers included U.S. Ambassador Walter J.P. Curley; Mr. Ranieri Tallarigo, Chairman of the Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM); Mr. William Rudman, Director of the Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA); Mr. Glenn Rudd, Deputy Director of the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA); Mr. Michael Richey of DTSA; Mr. Scott Miller of PM's Office of Defense Trade Policy (DTP); and Ms. Rose Biancaniello of PM's Office of Defense Trade Controls (DTC).

In addition to Mr. Clarke's discussion of the U.S. proposal for arms control in the Middle East, general topics included: DOD's role in technology transfer, the arms licensing process, recent policy developments in the U.S. Government, the future of cooperative programs, and the role of the U.S. Customs Service.

The information exchanged at this meeting is intended to encourage more cooperative ventures between companies within the Atlantic Alliance and to support a robust, collective defense-industrial base that provides the best security at the lowest cost. ♦

ARMS CONTROL, ARMS TRANSFERS, AND UNITED ARAB EMIRATES HELICOPTERS

Statement by Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs

The following is a statement by Richard A. Clarke, Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs, before the Subcommittees on Arms Control, International Security and Science, and on Europe and the Middle East, House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, D.C., June 27, 1991.

I have just returned from a 2-week mission to Paris to plan for five power talks on arms control in the Middle East and to five Gulf nations to consult with them on arms control and post-war security structures. I welcome this opportunity to brief this committee on those issues and to discuss with you the sale of 20 helicopters to the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.).

First, I would like to review the President's arms control proposal for the Middle East. Second and more narrowly, I propose to focus on that element of the initiative that pertains to arms transfers. Third and most specifically, I will address the arms transfer before this committee, the U.A.E. helicopters.

Arms Control

Arms control is virtually an unknown phenomenon to governments in the region. They have sought security in secrecy, not transparency. They have sought peace through arms alone and not through limitations. Thus, while we may have ambitious plans for arms control in the region, we know that we are at the beginning of what will be a long process. It is a process that will move in parallel with the political track and can feed back and reinforce political progress.

With President Bush's Colorado Springs plan, we have started down that long path. Let me quickly review the six parts of that proposal:

First, an arms embargo on Iraq and the elimination of its weapons of mass destruction: I met with leaders of the U.N. Special Commission charged with that latter task last week in Bahrain and can report that their difficult mission is well underway.

Second, we have proposed a meeting of the five powers who are the largest exporters of arms to establish a system to prevent destabilizing exports of conventional arms, eliminate

the transfer of weapons of mass destruction and their components and precursors, bring transparency to the arms transfer process, and bring about responsible arms transfer behavior. France has offered to host those talks beginning on July 8, and all five powers (U.S., U.K., USSR, France, and China) have agreed to attend. I will return to detail this aspect of the President's proposal in a moment.

Third, the President boldly proposed the elimination of all surface-to-surface ballistic missiles in the inventories of states in the region. As a first step, he called for a freeze on production, acquisition, and testing of those missiles.

Fourth, he called for the rapid completion of the treaty to ban chemical weapons [CW] and its early application in the region. To accelerate that process, he announced several new U.S. positions including the unconditional destruction of all of our CW stocks and the renouncement of the right of retaliation upon entry into force of the treaty.

Fifth, the President declared that we would seek to strengthen the treaty banning biological weapons at a special meeting in September.

Sixth, recognizing that progress on CBW [chemical and biological weapons] will be assisted by movement in the nuclear area, the President reiterated our call for full-scope safeguards and NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty] adherence in the region. He also added a call for on-site verification to ensure that no country in the area was engaged in enriching fuel to weapons-grade material. In the long term, we seek the Mubarak plan of a region free of all weapons of mass destruction, but we know that can only come when the peace process comes to fruition.

We have been heartened by the support this package has received. The Paris five power meeting will address it further, as will the G-7 summit in London on July 15th. We have had, and will continue to have, talks with regional states on the specifics of the proposal.

Arms Transfers

As I turn to the details of the second point of the President's plan, let me put forward six propositions that frame our view of arms transfers to the Middle East.

First, we must prevent another Iraq. The Iraqi regime had procured 6,000 main battle tanks. That force was clearly in excess of Iraq's legitimate self-defense requirements and constituted an offensive threat. No international regime existed to note this build-up and address its threatening implications. No agreed standard existed to say that it was wrong. We want to fix that.

Second, arms transfers as a phenomenon are not inherently good or evil. No responsible international security analyst believes that the transfer of the Patriot missile to Israel was inherently evil or unwise. Similarly, no one would think that transferring the Tomahawk cruise missile to Libya would be anything other than criminal lunacy. These extreme examples demonstrate the point that whether to transfer arms per se is not the question, rather the policy choice is what arms go to which recipients.

Third, arms transfers should not be an end in themselves but should be an instrument to other goals. I mentioned the transfer of the Patriot to Israel: that helped keep Israel out of a war. Similarly, the arms transfers associated with the Camp David agreement helped to bring Egypt and Israel into a peace. Among the goals we seek to reinforce or achieve by arms transfers to the Middle East are:

- The deterrence of aggression against friendly states by (a) demonstrating a close military cooperation with the U.S. and (b) providing the capability to make aggression costly;
- The further integration of small militaries such as those of the GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] to achieve economies of scale, regional cooperation, and credible deterrence;

- The reduction of the likelihood of U.S. forces having to be employed, through increased deterrence by regional forces and the enhanced capability of regional states to deal with small contingencies on their own;

- The ability of U.S. forces to operate jointly with regional states (as Saudi and U.S. F-15s and AWACS [airborne warning and control system] did so well in Desert Storm) in peacetime to deter aggression and in combat to counter aggression;

- The enhancement of U.S. influence among key regional decision makers through years of experience in dealing with U.S. armed forces and politico-military officials;

- The creation of sufficient confidence in their own defensive capabilities and cooperation with us, that these key regional decision-makers are willing to engage in arms control of increasingly ambitious and effective dimensions.

Fourth, it is not U.S. arms transfers that have been the problem in the Middle East's becoming over armed and falling into wars. Patriots to Israel, AWACS to Saudi Arabia, M-60s to Egypt, F-16s to Bahrain, I-Hawks to the U.A.E.: They have not been the problem.

No Middle East state with which the United States had an ongoing military relationship at the time has been an aggressor. It was not Kuwait that invaded Iraq. It was not Tunisia that attacked Libya.

We have such relations with Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Oman. They are not the problem.

I believe the problems of aggression have come from the governments of Libya, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. Thus, U.S. arms transfers are not the problem.

Some point to Iran as an example of how U.S. arms transfers can fall into the wrong hands. Iran, however, is an example of how we can effectively ground a force by pulling the plug

on spare parts and technicians when a government changes from friend to enemy, as they rarely may.

The U.S. does not transfer arms willy-nilly to any regime that seeks them. It provides them to responsible, friendly, and peace-seeking governments.

We have an excellent record and we do not need new regulations or legislation to prevent U.S. excesses which do not exist in the first place.

Fifth, U.S. arms transfers have helped us to seek responsible goals in the region. The Congress appropriated \$3 billion for arms transfers to Egypt and Israel last year. Why did the Congress do that?

It did it because arms transfers to these two countries helped ensure their own security and, in feeling more secure, give them a real stake in peace.

Arms transfers were a key element in the good relations that the U.S. had with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey before the war. Had we refused arms to those countries we would not have had the influence with them, they would not have had the confidence in us, and they would not have had the high-quality interoperable weapons needed to participate in the coalition against Iraq.

The next time someone asks what good have arms transfers gotten us in our relations with Middle Eastern states, ask them whether they think the courageous stands taken by Presidents Mubarak [of Egypt] and Ozal [of Turkey] and King Fahd [of Saudi Arabia] would have been possible if the U.S. had denied them arms transfers.

Sixth, halting arms transfers to the region while we seek an international system to regulate them is a self-defeating meat-cleaver approach.

What would happen if we did halt arms transfers to the region while we negotiate? Probably the same thing that would have happened if we had ceased to improve and

maintain our forces while negotiating START [Strategic Arms Reduction Talks] and CFE [Conventional Armed Forces in Europe]. We would diminish our ability to influence the outcomes we seek.

North Korea, Brazil, South Africa, and others will continue to export even if we were to get the other members of the five powers to halt. We will not get the other five powers to halt pending talks or after them.

Moreover, the Administration cannot support any agreement that would prohibit such sales that are necessary for the security of our friends. I cannot imagine that the Congress would either. Therefore, holding up such sales cannot be justified on the grounds of a possible future international agreement that would prevent them. The only thing that holding up such sales will accomplish is the diminution of U.S. influence in a region that this nation thought so critical 6 months ago that we sent a half million Americans there and fought a war.

Helicopters to the U.A.E.

Now let us turn to the case at hand. The Administration began consulting Congress last October about its plans to sell 20 helicopters to the U.A.E. Now we have formally notified that sale.

The U.A.E. is not now and never will be a threat to the security and stability in the Middle East. Indeed, it is a force for peace. The U.A.E. provided support to the U.S. Navy during Operation Earnest Will in 1987. It did so despite threats of retaliation from Iran.

Before any state (including Kuwait) asked us to act against Iraq's threats of war last summer, the U.A.E. proposed combined U.S.-U.A.E. military action to deter Iraq. U.S. Air Force aircraft landed in the U.A.E. a week before the invasion of Kuwait.

I went to the U.A.E. immediately after the invasion, and they offered us anything we wanted to prosecute a war against Iraq. They did this before many of our more traditional allies.

In the war, U.S. aircraft bombed Iraq from the U.A.E. U.S. ships, including aircraft carriers, operated out of U.A.E. ports. The small Emirates air force bombed Iraqi forces. Its small army was part of the joint Arab force that punched into Kuwait City.

The U.A.E. transferred \$4 billion to the U.S. to offset our costs in the war. Even in Washington, \$4 billion is a lot of money.

Is this the kind of nation that we should snub by refusing them 20 helicopters?

Now the U.A.E. is planning with us a closer military relationship. That relationship is part of what I discussed 4 days ago in Abu Dhabi.

My opposite number there asked me, "How will I explain to my people that we should expand our military cooperation with the U.S. and fund some U.S. military activities if you refuse to sell us arms?" I had no answer to that question, nor do I think there is any good answer to explain to such a friendly, courageous country that could never threaten anyone why we will not help it defend itself.

These helicopters will help it to defend its oil platforms in the Gulf. Such platforms were attacked by Iran in 1987. They will permit the U.A.E. to contribute more effectively to the GCC's combined force to deter Iraq.

The technology involved is not new to the region. Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia already have bought the same helicopter.

Refusing to sell these 20 helicopters to the U.A.E. would be folly indeed. ♦

COMPLIANCE FUNCTION AT CDT

Statement by Director of Center for Defense Trade

The Center for Defense Trade (CDT) has received several expressions of interest from its readership about compliance issues related to defense trade. Many specific compliance matters will be discussed in future editions of Defense Trade News. In this issue, we are providing a background statement made by CDT Director Charles Duelfer before the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Oversight on May 1, 1991.

"Thank you for the opportunity to appear here today to discuss the defense trade compliance function at the Department of State.

"I will be speaking today primarily of export control or enforcement in the context of exports produced, designed, or modified for military use. I would differentiate here those articles and services covered by the United States Munitions List (USML) from those exports that, under the Export Administration Act, are also subject to certain controls to ensure consistency with our foreign policy (e.g., controls on terrorism equipment, crime equipment, chemical/biological precursors, and nuclear controls).

State's Role. "On the eve of World War II, the Congress enacted the Neutrality Act of 1939. By terms of this statute 'every person who engages in the business of manufacturing, exporting or importing any arms, ammunition or implements of war' was required to register with the Secretary of State and obtain a license, which in turn required notification to the Department of State of the purchaser and terms in each deal. Export or attempt to export without a license was made unlawful. Under this statute, the Department of State began to administer a comprehensive arms licensing program.

"The legal basis for State's current authority to control munitions is the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and its implementing regulations, the International Traffic in Arms

Regulations, or ITAR. The latter specifies, in the form of the USML, articles and services that are under State's jurisdiction as well as the requirements for licensing. The State Department's involvement in export control of defense articles and services—including enforcement—however, is fundamentally a question of foreign policy and national security.

State's Defense Trade Function. "As a result of a dramatic increase in the volume of munitions export license applications, defense trade staffing in the State Department was found to be inadequate, and system enhancements were needed to keep pace with the growing and increasingly complex workload. In order to address these needs, the old Office of Munitions Control was revamped and the Center for Defense Trade was established on January 8, 1990. The reorganization of the State defense trade function also included the injection of substantial new resources and the undertaking of a thorough workload reduction initiative. Creation of the position I now hold, Deputy to the Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs and Director of the Center for Defense Trade, was designed to provide full-time, senior-level leadership on commercial defense trade issues.

"In addition to an early emphasis on making the licensing process more effective and efficient, we were also cognizant of the fact that the ability to control the destination and ultimate use of U.S. defense goods is critical to the conduct of our foreign relations and the safeguarding of our national security interests. Therefore, in addition to revamping our licensing mechanism, we have been working to reinforce our compliance efforts. I should note that these two activities go hand-in-hand and are mutually supportive. For example, we have installed a new computer and system for licensing. This now allows us to manipulate our database in ways that are very helpful in our compliance activities.

State-Customs Cooperation. "Customs is our enforcement arm. We are two sides of the same coin. During the last year, the State Department has expanded its working relationship with the U.S. Customs Service in the area of enforcement and compliance. The relationship has grown dramatically in terms of case referrals, overall information exchanges, criminal investigations initiated, and a better integration of U.S. Customs officers into our day-to-day DTC operations.

"Currently, Customs has two full-time employees on detail to the Compliance Division of the Defense Trade Controls office (and a third will be provided shortly). One position, a Special Coordinator for Law Enforcement, provides senior-level interaction on policy and investigative enforcement matters, as well as oversight in the screening of export license applications for law enforcement concerns. The second position, a program analyst, is the main link between the Customs EXODUS Command Center and the State Department. This individual is responsible for coordinating all communications from the Customs operational field offices involving detentions, seizures, license certifications, and determinations with the two agencies' headquarters.

"Also, State and Customs are working on the development of a database interface that will enable front line personnel in both organizations to communicate rapidly about several aspects of enforcement, including the registration of persons in the defense trade business, the status of ongoing investigations, the disposition of requests for export licenses, and the shipment of articles licensed by State.

The Compliance Work Program. "Areas of particular scrutiny in State's compliance function include current and actual registration information, review (particularly in terms of indictments or convictions) of officials empowered by firms to conduct defense trade business, proper licensing to stem illegal exports, and the bona fides of stated destinations and end use of U.S. defense trade articles and services.

"Our work program reflects these concerns:

- The initial and renewed registration of the over 4,000 persons in the defense trade business.
- End-use checks of which over 150 cases have been conducted under a program initiated in September 1990. Pre- and post-shipment checks on articles and services covered by the USML are conducted by personnel assigned to U.S. diplomatic posts abroad, including Customs where available. This program has become a focal point for review/analysis by the intelligence community and Customs as well as a discussion point with friendly governments.
- Assistance rendered to U.S. attorneys in plea bargain cases, in indictment procedures, and trial preparations.
- Records investigations to assist other government agencies in documentation of controlled items and verification concerning controlled items.
- Suspensions and debarments of suspected or known violators of the AECA and ITAR.

Industry's Role. "Finally, I must note that we have been successful in raising the awareness of industry to compliance issues and concerns. I find most firms I have dealt with have taken extensive internal measures to assure their activities are consistent with munitions export regulations. I was heartened to see the following quote in a trade journal by a defense industry giant last October:

'...selling armaments should be done as an instrument of government policy. ...the world we are going to see is going to be less and less stable so I would believe that it is appropriate for governments to play a major hand in deciding where exports should be made.'

"We believe there is an industry role in compliance and are making every effort to encourage private sector interest, emphasizing vigilance, compliance, and cooperation." ♦

IDENTIFYING DEFENSE TRADE OPPORTUNITIES

Uses of the Advisory Opinion, Technical Data License, and Demonstration License

The dramatic political events of the last 2 years have created new challenges for the defense trade industry. One of the questions prospective exporters ask most frequently of the Center for Defense Trade (CDT) is, "How can a company determine if the State Department will permit it to sell and export its product to a specific country?" This article outlines three possible procedures (the advisory opinion request, the technical data export license request, or the demonstration license request) used to obtain the official State Department position on a proposed transaction.

The Advisory Opinion. One mechanism used to determine the State Department's position is a letter of inquiry called an advisory opinion request. The submitting firm composes a letter outlining the product or products proposed for export, the end use and specific end user, and the prospective buying country or countries, stating clearly in the subject line that the letter is a request for an advisory opinion. Upon receipt of the letter, the Office of Defense Trade Controls (DTC) will staff it to all appropriate Department of State offices and outside agencies. Once all comments are received, DTC will send a formal advisory opinion letter to the company, stating the official U.S. Government position in principle.

An advisory opinion request is most appropriate when evolving technical data exist for the article or service proposed for export; the item or service is in the "concept exploration" phase; the country may have had no previous defense market requirement; or the defense trade may have been tightly controlled. The advisory opinion states the official position regarding possible sales to the specific nation, but does not authorize the company to take any specific action. In other words, the

advisory opinion authorizes no export. By contrast, the methods described below authorize specific action.

Technical Data Export License. A second method a company may use to determine the U.S. Government position on a case is to complete and submit a Form DSP-5 (Application/License for Permanent Export of Unclassified Defense Articles and Related Technical Data) or a Form DSP-85 (Application/License for Permanent/Temporary Export or Temporary Import of Classified Defense Articles and Related Classified Technical Data) to export unclassified or classified technical data. This submission is in accordance with the normal procedures and practices outlined in the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), section 125.

When approved, the DSP-5 or DSP-85 license allows the company to export the technical data associated with a proposed item to a designated nation. The DSP-5 or DSP-85 license is the most practical method by which a registrant may determine the Government's position on a proposal. In addition to directly authorizing the technical data export, the approved license provides U.S. Government approval in principle to sell the actual item or service to the country in question.

Demonstration License. A registrant may also use a third avenue by submitting a Form DSP-73 (Application/License for Temporary Export of Unclassified Defense Articles) to demonstrate an item in a given country. (Submit a Form DSP-85 if the item is classified.) This application, if approved, will authorize the firm to demonstrate system capabilities in a foreign destination.

The demonstration license is most appropriate when another U.S. firm, NATO ally, or other major non-NATO ally has previously

sold a comparable item to the proposed country; the item to be demonstrated is well-developed; and the international market for the item in question is well established.

Determining Which Avenue to Use. As an end item or service matures, the type of correspondence to determine marketability may also change. For example, submitting an advisory opinion request is appropriate when a product is in the initial development stage

and its technical data are evolving. For a fully developed production item or firm technical data, a DSP-5, DSP-85, or DSP-73 application may be more appropriate. These applications, when approved, grant the authority to export hardware and technical data. The company must ultimately determine which avenue to use based on the defense trade status of the proposed market country, the developmental stage of the item or defense service, and the company's marketing position. ♦

INERTIAL NAVIGATION SYSTEMS

Change in International Traffic in Arms Regulations

The following rule change transfers to the licensing jurisdiction of the Department of Commerce FAA certified Inertial Navigation Systems regardless of destination. Commerce is in the process of taking the necessary steps to reflect this change in the Commodity Control List (CCL). We anticipate the Commerce final rule change will be available for printing in the next *Defense Trade News*.

Formal notification appeared in the *Federal Register* (Volume 56, Number 97, Monday, May 20, 1991, page 23020). The notice reads as follows:

Amendment to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)

Agency: Department of State.

Action: Final Rule.

Summary: The Department of State has determined, in consultation with the Departments of Defense and Commerce, that certain Inertial Navigation Systems (and components designed for such systems) should be transferred to the jurisdiction of the Department of Commerce for export control purposes. Accordingly, the United States Munitions List has been amended to reflect this change.

Dates: This rule is effective as of June 19, 1991.

For Further Information Contact:

Rose Biancaniello, Chief,
Arms Licensing Division,
Office of Defense Trade Controls,
Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs,
Department of State (703-875-6644).

Supplementary Information: This final rule amends the United States Munitions List, which is part of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) (22 CFR parts 120-130). The ITAR in turn implements section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778).

Section 17(c) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2416 (c)) divided export control jurisdiction over inertial navigation systems and components between the Departments of State and Commerce. Pursuant to this statute and implementing regulations, the Commerce Department assumed jurisdiction over most inertial navigation systems and components that are standard equipment in civil aircraft, including spare parts, spare units and related repair technical data to be used exclusively for the maintenance of such equipment and that are certified by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) as being an integral part of such aircraft. The Department of State retained jurisdiction over such systems, components, spares, and technical data only if they were destined for certain countries. In addition, the State Department retained jurisdiction over all inertial navigation systems and

related equipment that did not meet the criteria set forth above, as well as all technical data related to the design, development, production, or manufacture of any such equipment.

Recently, the Department of State, in consultation with the Departments of Defense and Commerce, conducted a commodity jurisdiction review of the inertial navigation systems it controlled only for export to certain countries. This review established that such systems, components and related spares are no longer appropriately considered to be inherently military in character.

Accordingly, this rule amends the U.S. Munitions List to reflect the transfer of these items to Commerce Department jurisdiction. It should be noted, however, that all other inertial navigation systems, components, spares, and related repair technical data remain subject to Department of State jurisdiction, and as such may only be exported as provided in the ITAR. In addition, all technical data related to design, development, production, or manufacture of any inertial navigation system remain subject to State Department jurisdiction. The Commerce Department is concurrently amending the Commodity Control List to reflect the addition of these items.

The following amendment deals with a foreign affairs function of the United States and is thus excluded from the major rule procedures of Executive Order 12291 (46 CFR 13193) and the procedures of 5 U.S.C. 553 and 554. Although the Department of State believes that the public should generally have an opportunity to comment on proposed ITAR amendments before they are promulgated as a final rule, this amendment simply reflects an administrative determination made in consultation with the Departments of Commerce and Defense. Therefore, it is being promulgated as a final rule. In addition, this rule affects collection of information subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.), and will serve to reduce the burden on exporters in that respect. The relevant information collection is to be reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget under control no. 1405-0013.

List of Subjects in 22 CFR Part 121

Arms and munitions, Exports.

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in the preamble, it is proposed that Title 22, chapter I, subchapter M (consisting of parts 120-130) of the Code of Federal Regulations, be amended as set forth below:

PART 121—THE UNITED STATES MUNITIONS LIST

1. The authority citation for part 121 continues to read as follows:

Authority: Sec. 38, Arms Export Control Act, 90 Stat. 744 (22 U.S.C. 2778); E.O. 11958, 42 FR 4311; 22 U.S.C. 2658.

2. In § 121.1, paragraph (g) of Category VIII is revised to read as follows:

§ 121.1 General. The United States Munitions List.

* * * * *

*(g) Inertial navigation systems and all specifically designed components, parts, and accessories, except those systems or components that are standard equipment in civil aircraft, including spare parts and spare units to be used exclusively for the maintenance of inertial navigation equipment incorporated in civil aircraft, and that are certified by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) as being an integral part of such aircraft. All exports of technical data related to the design, development, production or manufacture of inertial navigation equipment (regardless of accuracies) or its related parts, components or subsystems are subject to the requirements of the regulations contained in this subchapter. The export of technical data related to the repair of parts, components, or subsystems of inertial navigation systems (including accelerometers and gyroscopes) that are not certified by the FAA as being an integral part of civil aircraft are subject to the requirements of this subchapter. The provisions of XI(e) and XII(c) are not applicable to such exports of technical data.

* * * * *

Dated: March 22, 1991.

Reginald Bartholomew

Under Secretary of State for
International Security Affairs◆

DEPARTMENTS

U.S. CUSTOMS AT DTC



Helpful Hints to Speed Exports and Avoid Detentions or Seizures

This is the third article in a series about the export operations and programs conducted by the U.S. Customs Service. The January article presented an overview of EXODUS and the April column described the EXODUS Command Center, especially as the central reference point for the six-step detention and seizure process that EXODUS inspectors follow when identifying suspicious exports. In this article, we provide helpful hints to speed your exports and to avoid detentions or seizures.

The U.S. Customs Service, within the Department of the Treasury, as mandated by law, enforces the control and regulation of the international movement of U.S. Munitions List (USML) items exported from, temporarily imported into, or transiting the United States. In support of the Department of State, the Customs Service (specifically the Export Control Desks at the various Customs ports) processes exports against your approved DSP export licenses. The Customs Service continuously strives to provide the legitimate trade community with expedited service for regulated goods.

Establish an Internal Compliance Program.

One of the best ways to avoid export clearance problems is to institute an internal compliance program. It is important that those in a company who work in traffic, sales, or marketing understand export controls and the consequences of noncompliance.

Designated personnel should be responsible for implementing the compliance program. These personnel need to be trained and well versed in export laws and related regulations. Furthermore, company personnel should be informed about who is in charge of the program and should establish a compliance communication channel within their company.

Review Each Transaction. To prevent inadvertent violations, there must be a system to ensure that every export or import transaction is reviewed by the people responsible for internal compliance. To be effective, this review should start with four questions:

1. Is a license required for the shipment?
2. Does a special exemption apply?
3. Does the company or entity have a valid license for the shipment?
4. If required, is the proper documentation prepared and filed?

Once the broad licensing questions have been answered, compliance personnel must ask whether the details of a particular transaction match the conditions of the license. Such questions include:

1. Are the consignees listed on the application/license the ones who will ultimately receive the shipment?
2. Are the items on the application/license the ones that will be shipped?
3. Has the quantity authorized by the license already been shipped? Has the license expired?

Beyond the Compliance Program. Additional actions can enhance an active internal compliance program. For those companies that have compliance procedures implemented, three other areas may strengthen their export program.

Establish local contacts. Consult with the company's freight forwarders, brokers, or agents. Invite them to participate in your company compliance program. If you have any questions regarding export/import clearance regulations and procedures, request a meeting with Customs. Attend industry trade association meetings or conferences when your local Customs District Office presents updates. Get to know your Customs representatives.

Plan ahead. Whenever possible, coordinate your actions with your freight forwarder, broker, or agent prior to the import/export to assure proper compliance with regulations. Make each familiar with your products and the required documents. You are ultimately responsible for your representatives' actions.

When in Doubt . . . If there is a doubt about licensing requirements, ask your agent not to enter or present your freight for clearance prior to seeking a license determination from the proper government agency.

Detentions by Customs. There could be several important reasons why a shipment is detained:

- insufficient or lack of required information on documentation;
- lack of a required license; or
- late filing of documentation.

If your shipment is detained, you can help expedite the detention by providing the notifying Customs official with specific information on the detained shipment. The information you can provide may include:

- any correspondence regarding license determinations from a government agency for the item detained;

- technical and background information of the item; or
- any reasons why you believe the item does not require a license.

If the detaining officer feels that a formal license determination is required by the State Department's Office of Defense Trade Controls (DTC), the process may take approximately 14 days. This time period may vary depending upon your ability to supply the required information in a timely manner to your local Customs officers. Each detention is handled on a case-by-case basis.

Upon receiving an official written notice from DTC, the detaining Customs officer will contact you to inform you of the shipments release or seizure.


If you receive notice that your shipment is seized, you should:

- communicate with the local Customs District Office, specifically the Fines, Penalty, and Forfeiture (FP&F) officer, and
- ask the FP&F officer for advice on filing a petition for administrative relief and the early release procedure.

If your goods have been seized by Customs, and either you or your freight forwarder has obtained the necessary license, ask the FP&F officer about the "early release program," which may result in the release of the seized goods within 48 hours after a bond is established with Customs. Seizures cases under investigation by the U.S. Customs Office of Enforcement are not eligible for the early release program.

Additional questions or information can be obtained through your local District Director of Customs Office. ♦

COMMODITY JURISDICTION DETERMINATIONS



The following chart provides selected Commodity Jurisdiction (CJ) determinations. The commodity descriptions are intentionally general to ensure the confidentiality of all proprietary information related to individual cases.

These determinations apply only to the specific commodity reviewed in the CJ process. If you believe one of your products is similar to one of those listed as having been placed on the Department of Commerce's Commodity Control List (CCL), please submit a CJ request letter (ITAR 120.5). Please refer to the article "A Checklist for Preparing CJ Requests" published in the September 1990 edition of *Defense Trade News* for assistance in submitting your request.

COMMODITY	JURISDICTION	COMMODITY	JURISDICTION
A Polymer, Film and Technical Data	CCL 6799G	Aircraft Jet Engine	CCL 1460A
Aircraft Time, Events, and Fault indicators	CCL 6598F	Hot Section Technology	USML XVIII
Automatic Tracking Antenna System and Telemetry Receiver	USML XI (a)	Automated Financial Software Program	CCL *
Cargo Hooks	CCL *	Avionics Cavities	CCL *
Software (for Cat. IV items) that analyses impact and penetration against armor	USML XIX	Cathode Ray Tubes	CCL *
Computer Scrambler Chips	USML XIII (b)	Computer Software Test Program	CCL 799
Continuous High Speed Roll-Film Printer	CCL *	Computerized Firing Range Circuits	CCL *
Electronic Mail Software Program	CCL *	Exploding Bridge Wire	USML IV (c)
Fiber Optic Transceiver	USML XI (a)	Gas Turbine Aircraft Engine	USML VIII (c)
High Power Solid State Amplifiers	CCL 6598F	High Cycle Batteries	CCL 6299G
Inflatable Support System for Radar Cross Section measurement	USML XI	Infra-Red Viewers, TV Cameras, Monitors, Lenses, Accessories, Cards and Filters	USML XII (a)
Miniature Altitude Reference System	USML VIII (g)	Non-DES based software file Security Program	CCL GTDR
Non-DES Scrambling Software Program	CCL 799	Non-JAN/QPL qualified Data Bus Products	CCL 6599G
Non-Radiation Hardened Integrated Circuits	CCL *	Non-TEMPEST Ruggedized Printers	CCL *
Pallet Elevator, Dumbwaiter and Torpedo Handling Equipment	USML VI (b)	Radar Altimeter System	USML XI(a)(1)
Radiation Hardened Integrated Circuits	USML XI (e)	Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Units/Systems	
Satellite Blanket Material	USML VIII (j)	Without NBC Filters	CCL *
Water Testing Kit	CCL *	With NBC Filters	USML XIV (c)
		The NBC Filters	USML XIV (e)
		Thermal coatings	CCL *
		Wide-band Millimeter Amplifiers	CCL 1537A

* A specific Export Commodity Classification Number (ECCN) was not provided by the Department of Commerce. For the ECCN number, please file a commodity classification request with the Bureau of Export Administration (BXA), Department of Commerce, P.O. Box 273, Washington, DC 20044.

PERSONNEL UPDATES


As a regular column in each edition, the Center for Defense Trade (CDT) profiles several employees. For this edition, we have selected an attorney-adviser, a special projects officer, and a clerk.

Wolodymyr R. Sulzynsky joined the Office of the Legal Adviser (L/PM) as an attorney-adviser for Politico-Military Affairs on May 6, 1991. His previous experience in the Department of Justice, where he supervised the investigation and prosecution of national security cases involving violations of export control laws, will transfer directly to his new position. In addition to his law degree, Mr. Sulzynsky holds a Master of Arts (MA) in National Security Studies and a Master of Laws (LLM) in International and Comparative Law from Georgetown University. A Naval Reserve officer, he recently returned from an active duty assignment during Operation Desert Storm as the Naval Attache at the American Embassy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia.

Andrew P. Church began his new duties as Special Projects Licensing Officer and Special Assistant to the Chief, Arms Licensing Division (ALD), in DTC in early May 1991. In this capacity, he works on items of special interest

to DTC management. He tracks all license applications that require Congressional notification, and initiates any required action to maintain both visibility and timeliness of these specialized licenses. Mr. Church also follows up on all "special" cases assigned by the DTC licensing management team, especially cases over 30 days old and "emergency cases." His previous experience in the State Department includes service as the acting economic officer at the American Embassy in Libreville, Gabon, through the summer intern program. Having received his Master of Science (MS) from Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service, he will serve as a Presidential Management Intern (PMI) for the next 2 years.

William C. McCann returned to the Office of Defense Trade Controls (DTC) in June 1991 for his second summer as a clerk in the Compliance Analysis Division. He recently received his Bachelor's degree in International Studies from American University's School of International Service. He also was designated a distinguished graduate of the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), and received his commission as a second lieutenant in the Air Force. He will enter full-time active duty for pilot training in March 1992. ♦



CHECKLIST FOR AMENDMENTS

1. Did you submit the amendment in duplicate (two copies)?
2. Did you submit a new 126.13 statement when the amendment adds a new party to the export?
3. Did you provide a copy of the license being amended?
4. Did you provide a self-addressed mailing label?

ATTACHMENTS FOR YOUR REQUESTS

When you submit a request (CJ, amendment, DSP-5, etc.) and accompanying amendments to the Office of Defense Trade Controls (DTC), our staff initially reviews your submission for completeness and assigns a case number. Frequently, we cannot determine request completeness because the submitter has not assembled or properly collated the attachments.

Since only the company and person(s) submitting the documents can accurately determine what constitutes a "set" of attachments, we ask that you assemble, collate, and, if necessary, clearly indicate each set of attachments. Failure to do so may result in a Return Without Action (RWA).

THE MAJOR DEFENSE EQUIPMENT (MDE) LIST

The MDE List is an appendix in both the Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM) and the Foreign Military Sales Financial Management Manual (DOD 7290.3), which are published by the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM).

The MDE List is also available separately as a subscription item for \$15.00 for 3 years, prepaid. Mail orders to:

DISAM
ATTN: DISAM/DIPR
Building 125, Area B
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base,
OH 45433-5000

Call (513) 255-2994-3669 for information regarding the most recent publication date.

ADDRESSES FOR SHIPMENTS

DTC will not accept post office box addresses for any U.S. or foreign consignors, consignees, and intermediate consignees listed in the body of a license application as taking part in a shipment. Street addresses are required.

DTC REGISTRANT CODES

The DTC Registrant Code is a nine-position number with two distinct sections. The first section is composed of four numbers. The first two digits indicate the month the registration will expire (on the last day). The next two digits indicate the year in which the registration expires.

The last five positions are the company's specific identity number. Numbers may occupy all five positions or four numbers may follow a hyphen. Examples:

0991-1234 expires on September 30, 1991. The company specific identity number is "-1234".

019612345 expires on January 31, 1996. The company's specific identity number is "12345".

ENHANCING U.S. COMPETITIVENESS

Some countries and foreign entities reportedly are turning away from American suppliers to avoid U.S. export controls. The Department of State, consistent with its regulatory obligations, seeks to improve the competitiveness of U.S. defense manufacturers. Toward that end, the Center for Defense Trade (CDT) is preparing for the October issue of *Defense Trade News* an article on how to obtain approval in principle for a list of prospective third-country transfers. ♦

PUBLICATIONS FOR EXPORTERS

Department of State Publications

In this edition, we highlight publications from the U.S. Department of State that are of interest to the exporting community and international travelers.

RESOURCE GUIDE TO DOING BUSINESS IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

TYPE: Publication, booklet, paper-bound, 3 3/4" x 8 1/2" (pocket-size), approximately 40 pages.

FREQUENCY: First release, April 1991.

ISSUED BY: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs.

CONTENTS: This booklet contains useful information for businesses wanting to capitalize on the potential \$40 billion market in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. It opens with an overview of the dramatic political and economic changes in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) since 1989. The first major section, "U.S. Government Initiatives," outlines the monetary and technical assistance that the United States offers in both bilateral and multilateral channels to these emerging democratic, market-economy countries.

The next section, "Enhancing Private-Sector Opportunities," encourages U.S. companies to create market niches and compete with Western Europe in this region. The booklet offers tips on approaching the CEE market and on seeking U.S. Government assistance. It also lists U.S. Embassies in the region that can help companies make contacts with businesses and officials.

The next section offers additional contacts and information including private-sector business councils and CEE trade development offices in the United States. The last pages include a glossary of U.S. trade terms, a list of

U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service District Offices, and a list of additional publications, both from the U.S. Government and the private sector, which regularly feature articles and information about trade in Central and Eastern Europe.

ORDERING INFORMATION: Use the Government Printing Office (GPO) order form on page 25. In the PUBLICATIONS section, enter Stock Number (S/N) 044-000-12311-3. The price per issue is \$1.00.

KEY OFFICERS OF FOREIGN SERVICE POSTS: GUIDE FOR BUSINESS REPRESENTATIVES

TYPE: Subscription, booklet, paper-bound, 3 3/4" x 8 1/2" (pocket-size), approximately 110 pages.

FREQUENCY: Tri-annually in January, May, and September. ISSUED BY: U.S. Department of State, Office of Information Services.

CONTENTS: The introduction describes the duties of the key officers with whom American business representatives would most likely have contact when visiting an Embassy, mission, consulate general, or consulate abroad. The book then details the specific structure of Foreign Service posts by country, lists the positions and individuals at that post, and gives the post's current mailing address, telex, fax, and telephone numbers. This is important for finding the correct person to contact for business assistance, etc.

ORDERING INFORMATION: Use the GPO order form on page 25. To subscribe, enter List ID "KOFs" in the SUBSCRIPTION section. The price is \$5.00 per year. To order the Summer 1991 edition without subscribing, complete the PUBLICATIONS section of the order form. Enter S/N 744-006-00020-1. The single-issue price, currently \$1.75, will increase to \$2.75 in early 1992.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEPHONE DIRECTORY

TYPE: Publication, paper-bound book, 8 1/2" x 11," approximately 200 pages.

FREQUENCY: Recurring, usually bi-annual, in spring and fall. ISSUED BY: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Information Management.

CONTENTS: This telephone directory is both an alphabetical and organizational directory of the Department of State and related agencies. The short introductory section contains an alphabetical index to organizations.

The first major section contains an organizational directory of the Department of State, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), the Agency for International Development (AID), and the International Development Cooperation Agency (IDCA). This section, combined with the organizational charts in the very back of the directory, provide an overview of the Department's structures.

The second major section is an alphabetical listing of employees and their phone numbers.

The third major section is the Foreign Service Post Telephone Directory and includes Key Officers of Foreign Service Posts: A Guide for Business Representatives. (This section has proven to be very popular with industry and is also available separately in a 3 3/4" x 8 1/2" format. See the review above.) Additional information included in this section but not in the pocket edition are local holidays by country, a world time table, and worldwide weather by country and by month. This section is particularly valuable for the international marketing manager or for the frequent international traveler.

The fourth major section, General Information, contains information primarily of use to State Department employees and those conducting business in the Washington, D.C., area.

ORDERING INFORMATION: Use the PUBLICATIONS section of the GPO order form. Enter S/N 044-000-02315-6 for the Spring 1991 edition. The cost is \$11.00 per copy, available on a one-time order or standing order basis with a deposit account.

FOREIGN CONSULAR OFFICES IN THE UNITED STATES

TYPE: Publication, booklet, paper-bound, 8 1/2" x 11," approximately 75 pages.

FREQUENCY: Recurring, usually semi-annually in March and September. ISSUED BY: U.S. Department of State, Office of Protocol.

CONTENTS: This publication includes the complete and official listings of foreign consular offices in the United States, together with their jurisdictions and recognized consular officers. Compiled with the full cooperation of the foreign missions in Washington, D.C., it is offered as a convenience to organizations and persons that need to contact or work with consular representatives of foreign governments.

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