[House Hearing, 106 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
OVERSIGHT OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT: IS MANAGEMENT GETTING RESULTS?
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,
VETERANS AFFAIRS, AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 19, 2000
__________
Serial No. 106-244
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
http://www.house.gov/reform
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
73-594 WASHINGTON : 2001
_______________________________________________________________________
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250
Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland TOM LANTOS, California
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
STEPHEN HORN, California PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
JOHN L. MICA, Florida PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii
THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
DAVID M. McINTOSH, Indiana ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana DC
JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
Carolina ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
BOB BARR, Georgia DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
DAN MILLER, Florida JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas JIM TURNER, Texas
LEE TERRY, Nebraska THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois HAROLD E. FORD, Jr., Tennessee
GREG WALDEN, Oregon JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
DOUG OSE, California ------
PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
HELEN CHENOWETH-HAGE, Idaho (Independent)
DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
Kevin Binger, Staff Director
Daniel R. Moll, Deputy Staff Director
James C. Wilson, Chief Counsel
Robert A. Briggs, Clerk
Phil Schiliro, Minority Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International
Relations
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut, Chairman
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida TOM LANTOS, California
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia
JOHN L. MICA, Florida JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
DAVID M. McINTOSH, Indiana THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
Carolina BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
LEE TERRY, Nebraska (Independent)
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
HELEN CHENOWETH-HAGE, Idaho
Ex Officio
DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
Lawrence J. Halloran, Staff Director and Counsel
Thomas Costa, Professional Staff Member
Jason Chung, Clerk
David Rapallo, Minority Counsel
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on July 19, 2000.................................... 1
Statement of:
Edwards, Bert T., Chief Financial Officer and Assistant
Secretary for Finance and Management Policy, U.S.
Department of State; and David G. Carpenter, Assistant
Secretary for Diplomatic Security and Director of the
Office of Foreign Missions, U.S. Department of State....... 5
Williams-Bridgers, Jacquelyn L., Inspector General, U.S.
Department of State; and Ben Nelson, Director, National
Security and International Affairs Division, U.S. General
Accounting Office.......................................... 31
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Carpenter, David G., Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic
Security and Director of the Office of Foreign Missions,
U.S. Department of State, prepared statement of............ 18
Edwards, Bert T., Chief Financial Officer and Assistant
Secretary for Finance and Management Policy, U.S.
Department of State, prepared statement of................. 8
Nelson, Ben, Director, National Security and International
Affairs Division, U.S. General Accounting Office, prepared
statement of............................................... 54
Shays, Hon. Christopher, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Connecticut, prepared statement of............ 3
Williams-Bridgers, Jacquelyn L., Inspector General, U.S.
Department of State, prepared statement of................. 35
OVERSIGHT OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT: IS MANAGEMENT GETTING RESULTS?
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WEDNESDAY, JULY 19, 2000
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans
Affairs, and International Relations,
Committee on Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in
room 2247, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher
Shays (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Shays, Mica, and Tierney.
Staff present: Lawrence J. Halloran, staff director and
counsel; J. Vincent Chase, chief investigator; R. Nicholas
Palarino, senior policy advisor; Robert Newman and Thomas
Costa, professional staff members; and Jason M. Chung, clerk;
David Rapallo, minority counsel; Jean Gosa and Earley Green,
minority assistant clerks; and Chris Traci, minority staff
assistant.
Mr. Shays. This hearing of the Subcommittee on National
Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations of the
Government Reform Committee is now in order on a hearing
entitled, ``Oversight of the State Department: Is Management
Getting Results?'' I welcome our witnesses and our guests.
Early last year, the subcommittee heard testimony on four
critical challenges confronting the Department of State [DOS];
enhancing security of American personnel and facilities
overseas; right-sizing the U.S. presence abroad; upgrading
information technologies, including financial systems; and
complying with the planning requirements of the Government
Performance and Results Act.
We revisit these issues this morning because, despite some
progress, the Department still seems hobbled by hidebound
processes and an excuse-prone management culture reluctant to
change them.
According to the General Accounting Office and the DOS
Inspector General, the Department underestimated the near-term
feasibility and cost of urgently needed security enhancements
at U.S. facilities. Key recommendations of the Overseas
Presence Advisory Panel appear doomed to be studied to death or
ignored altogether.
The disappearance of a DOS laptop computer containing
sensitive information underscores how much the Department has
yet to accomplish in reconciling demands for flexible, but
secure, information and financial systems.
We could be more certain the Department was on a trajectory
to solve these problems if all the goals and measures required
by the Results Act were in place; but they are not.
The 1999 DOS performance report, the first required by the
act, lacks specificity. According to the IG, the plan ``does
not provide decisionmakers in the executive branch or Congress
with a clear assessment of the Department's progress . . .''
The lack of specifics stems, in part, from the apparent
belief at Foggy Bottom that much of the Department's work is
just too intangible or too important to be categorized and
quantified by the same base enterprise that counts visa
applications.
But Results Act requirements apply as fully to diplomacy as
to passport processing; so DOS leadership needs to focus on
Department-wide performance plans, goals, and measures that
demonstrate tangible progress in all aspects of their work.
As a management approach to urgent issues like Embassy
security, worldwide information systems, and the overall shape
of our national presence abroad, the Results Act offers DOS an
incremental, but inevitable, path through bureaucratic
stalemates and cultural resistance once thought intractable. It
is a path the Department must demonstrate a greater willingness
and ability to follow.
Our goal, as an oversight subcommittee, is to be a
constructive force for change at the Department of State, to
focus attention on progress and problems in achieving the
Nation's global mission. In that effort, we continue to rely on
the cooperation, the dedication, and the expertise of many,
including our witnesses this morning. We look forward to their
testimony.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Christopher Shays follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Our first panel, and we have two, is the
Honorable Bert T. Edwards, Chief Financial Officer, Assistant
Secretary for Financial Management and Policy, U.S. Department
of State; and the Honorable David G. Carpenter, Assistant
Secretary for diplomatic Security and Director of the Office of
Foreign Missions, U.S. Department of State.
I would just ask if you anticipate any of your colleagues
will be responding to a question, we would want them to stand
and swear them in, just so we do not have to do that again, if
you think that is a likelihood. So I will ask you both to
stand. If there is anyone else, they should be requested to
stand.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Shays. I will note for the record that our witnesses
responded in the affirmative.
Mr. Edwards, we will start with you. We have a 5-minute
clock. We will rotate it, and give you another 5, if you need
it. Then we will go from there.
Mr. Edwards, welcome.
STATEMENTS OF BERT T. EDWARDS, CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER AND
ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR FINANCE AND MANAGEMENT POLICY, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE; AND DAVID G. CARPENTER, ASSISTANT
SECRETARY FOR DIPLOMATIC SECURITY AND DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF
FOREIGN MISSIONS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Edwards. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of your
subcommittee who may join you, for allowing me and Assistant
Secretary Carpenter the opportunity to appear before you today
to discuss key management challenges facing the Department of
State, in particular implementation of the Government
Performance and Results Act and management of security
programs.
As you know, Patrick Kennedy, the Assistant Secretary of
State for administration, was scheduled to join us today to
help respond to your questions. But he is tied up in the Camp
David talks, and has asked me to apologize for his absence.
The Department of State cannot meet the challenges in these
management areas without the strong support and leadership of
your committee, as well as that of our authorization and
appropriations committees.
With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to give a
brief statement on Strategic Planning at State. Assistant
Secretary Carpenter will follow with a brief statement on
security management, after which we would be pleased to respond
to questions on management issues that you or your colleagues
may have.
The Department continues to make progress in building a
unified process for policy and resource management, based on
strategic planning and performance measurement.
The process begins early each calendar year with the
preparation by overseas posts of Mission Performance Plans. All
agencies at post are invited by the Chief of Mission to
participate in the preparation of these plans, which are then
reviewed in Washington by an interagency team.
The MPPs are then used by the Department's regional,
functional, and management bureaus to formulate annual Bureau
Performance Plans that set out long-term goals and short-term
objectives in their areas of responsibility for achieving the
overall strategic goals of the Department.
A formal review of each bureau's plan is conducted by the
Department's Corporate Board. This process has just started and
will extend into September.
The internal planning documents from the bureaus and
missions form a basis for the Department's Annual Performance
Plan, which is submitted as part of our budget presentation.
In response to comments from GAO, OMB, and our own
Inspector General, we significantly revised the Annual
Performance Plan for fiscal year 2001. It is a more
comprehensive plan than prior versions, and uses a template to
display goals, outcomes, strategies, and resources.
The Performance Plan follows the framework of the
Department's Strategic Plan, which was first published in
September 1997. An updated version of that Strategic Plan is
circulating in draft to all of our customers, stakeholders, and
partners, including committees of the Congress. We will
incorporate their comments and publish the revised Strategic
Plan this September. A Senior Advisory Group at the Assistant
Secretary level is leading this project.
We have recently published our first-ever Annual
Performance Report, covering fiscal year 1999. State had good
results in 1999, which range from the complex diplomacy leading
to the trials of two terrorists for the 1988 Pan Am bombing
over Lockerbie, to efforts which forged a coalition of NATO
nations to successfully stop ethnic cleansing and murder in
Kosovo.
Last month, we worked with the GAO on a review of our
fiscal year 1999 Performance Report, and our fiscal year 2001
Performance Plan. Both the GAO and the Department's Inspector
General have played a constructive role in helping us improve
the Department's planning operations.
Ideally, performance measurement and evaluation for
international affairs should be carried out on an interagency
basis but, in practice, this is extraordinarily difficult.
One way the Department attempts to coordinate with other
agencies is through the International Affairs Strategic Plan,
which we created in concert with them. The plan identifies 16
long-term goals for the entire U.S. Government not just the
Department of State. The role of the Department of State is
defined for each of the goals, as well as the lead agency for a
particular goal.
No matter how good we make our planning process, unless we
have the resources to carry out our plans, much of the planning
work will be wasted.
For too many years, the Department's budgets, except most
recently for security, have been held below current services.
As a result of these cuts, the Department is in increasing
danger of becoming a hollowed-out organization. Thus, we
strongly encourage the Congress to support the President's
fiscal year 2001 request for the Department of State.
This effort to better coordinate our planning with that of
other agencies working in the international arena dovetails
with the multi-agency effort to implement the report of the
Overseas Presence Advisory Panel.
The OPAP report was triggered by the tragic bombings of our
Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam on August 7, 1998. The
implementation report has been submitted to the Secretary of
State for her approval, and describes both the results of our
OPAP implementation efforts and what remains to be done.
As Chief Financial Officer of the Department, and with a
key focus of this testimony being on performance, I would like
to take this opportunity to mention briefly our success in
three areas of financial management.
First, the Department has reduced the number of material
weaknesses reported in response to the Federal Managers'
Financial Integrity Act from 19, at the start of fiscal year
1995, to only 4 at the close of fiscal year 1999, of which 3
will be closed this year.
Second, we are proud that, for the last 3 years, we have
received an unqualified opinion from our Inspector General and
the IG's independent contractor, who conducted the annual
audits of our agency-wide financial statements.
Finally, while our financial management systems are
currently reported as the Department's one remaining material
weakness, substantial progress has been made in bringing the
systems into compliance with the requirements of the Federal
Financial Management Improvement Act. We are already in
compliance with two of the act's three requirements.
Let me finish my remarks by describing one of the
Department's major accomplishments of the last year; the
successful integration of the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, and the U.S. Information Agency into the Department.
This massive undertaking, the largest structural change to
the U.S. Government's foreign affairs administration in
decades, has proceeded more smoothly than anyone expected.
Putting these functions under one Cabinet Secretary has already
enhanced the consistency and integrity of our foreign policy.
In the near term, we will need to invest significant resources
to maximize the benefits of this integration.
This concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Edwards follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Edwards.
Mr. Carpenter.
Mr. Carpenter. Good morning, Mr. Chairman.
I welcome this opportunity to testify before you on the
security profile of State Department facilities, both domestic
and abroad.
On August 7, 1998, our Embassies in Dar es Salaam,
Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya, were bombed simultaneously by
extremists bent on the destruction of American presence
throughout the world. These tragedies unleased a massive and
intensive effort to provide much needed security improvements
at all our posts overseas.
Although much has been accomplished, more needs to be done.
Our overseas facilities are generally more secure now than in
August 1998, but the continuing threat environment worldwide
requires that we not lose focus, that we continue to explore
new ways of protecting ourselves, and support a program for new
Embassy construction.
Our goal following the bombings was to immediately improve
the security of our threatened consulates and Embassies, and we
have done so. But at the outset, let me say that it is
important for this subcommittee to know that we still have a
very basic problem that cannot be fixed quickly.
The vast majority of our diplomatic posts fail to meet one
of the most basic security standards, namely, the 100 foot
setback standard. Until we can build Embassies meeting the
setback and other security standards, our efforts cannot
provide the degree of security all of us want for our people
and facilities.
Having recognized that we still have grave security
concerns overseas, it is also important for the subcommittee to
know that we have done a lot and that our Embassies and
consulates are more secure now than ever before. In this
regard, let me review for you what we have done throughout the
security upgrade program.
Some of these actions have been based solely on DOS
initiatives. Others were suggested by the Accountability Review
Boards chaired by Retired Admiral William J. Crowe, the report
of the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel, and the Office of the
Inspector General.
We are aggressively upgrading security at low and medium
threat level posts to standards that previously only applied to
high and critical rated posts. We no longer believe, in an era
of transnational terrorism, that we have low or medium threat
posts, nor do we believe that we will always receive tactical
intelligence of an imminent attack. Simply put, we must be
prepared to meet the most violent terrorist attacks at all of
our facilities all of the time.
The physical security upgrades we have put in place at our
Embassies and consulates include reinforced perimeter walls,
bollards, hardened guard booths, vehicle barriers, and shatter
resistant window film.
We are upgrading and deploying security equipment to
provide better lighting, cameras, and video recorders; bomb
detection equipment; armored vehicles, alarm, and public
address systems; and x-ray equipment. Where possible, we have
mitigated the lack of sufficient setback by closing streets and
providing for mandatory vehicle inspections.
We have also expanded our Anti-Terrorism Assistance
Training to aid foreign police in combating terrorism through
such appropriate programs as surveillance detection, border
security, explosive detection, crisis management, and maritime
security.
In addition, we have installed alarm systems at Embassies
and consulates to alert personnel to impending emergency
situations, and have instituted a program for the employees to
``duck and cover'' when the alarms are sounded.
We have also created a new security environment threat list
with a modified methodology and criteria for determining threat
levels. This process now addresses transnational terrorism as a
distinct category, as well as the threats from indigenous
terrorism and political violence, and the threats from
intelligence services, both technical and human and, of course,
crime.
DOS has also changed the focus of its training courses for
Regional Security Officers and Special Agents to give them
greater training on counter-terrorism methodology; explosive
ordinance recognition and disposal; chemical/biological weapons
threats and defenses; and surveillance detection techniques.
In response to a specific recommendation from the
Accountability Review Board, we are also working with the FBI
to better analyze law enforcement information, which might have
a bearing on threats to our missions overseas and to more
quickly disseminate that information to appropriate posts.
To that end, a DOS special agent has been detailed to the
International Terrorism Section at FBI Headquarters, and the
DOS special agents are participating in the FBI's Terrorism
Task Force.
DOS has also established the Office of the Coordinator for
Chemical Biological Countermeasures. That office, which is
conducting a worldwide survey to determine vulnerabilities, has
purchased and is distributing chemical biological equipment to
all posts.
As part of its educational program, it has distributed
instructional materials, including a pamphlet, videos, and a
series of cables, to alert all posts to the nature of the
threat, and to provide defensive guidance. It has also
established a comprehensive training program for security
professionals and first responders.
The newest addition to our programs and of major
significance has been the establishment of surveillance
detection programs at almost all of our overseas posts. A
critical lesson learned from the bombings is that there is
intense surveillance conducted against our facilities prior to
an attack.
Since going operational in January 1999, surveillance
detection teams, most of which work with host government's
security services, have observed over 700 suspected incidents
of surveillance against our personnel and facilities. It has,
in a sense, expanded our security perimeter and zone of control
beyond our previous limitations.
The surveillance detection program is clearly a ``work in
progress,'' but we feel that it is destined to become a major
aspect of our overseas security defenses.
Finally, and I believe most importantly, DOS has hired 200
new special agents, which has allowed for the creation of 140
new security officer positions abroad.
By the end of fiscal year 2000, we will have 420 DOS
special agents serving as security officers in 157 countries.
DOS has also hired 20 additional diplomatic couriers, 17
security engineers, 34 maintenance technicians, and 46 civil
servants in support of overseas security.
Although the African bombings necessarily caused me to
focus my attention most closely on overseas security at the
beginning of my tenure, three incidents in the Main State
building brought home to all of us the need to strengthen
domestic information security, as well.
In February 1998, an unknown male in a tweed coat carried
away classified documents from the Secretary's suite of
offices. That case, which was investigated by the FBI, is in an
inactive status at this time.
The second incident came to light on December 8, 1999, when
Russian Intelligence Officer Stanislav Gusev was arrested on
the street outside the State Department, as he listened in on a
meeting in the Department's Oceans and International
Environmental Scientific Affairs' conference room, via a bug
planted in the chair railing. Gusev, who had diplomatic
immunity preventing his prosecution in the United States, was
asked to leave the country.
The investigation by the FBI continues into, among other
things, how the bug was planted. That inquiry is still
underway.
The third incident was, of course, the disappearance of the
laptop believed to have sensitive compartmented information
material on its hard drive from a Bureau of Intelligence and
Research conference room in January of this year.
DOS had responsibility, together with the FBI, after the
fact, for investigating the security violation, but not for
protecting the information beforehand. At this time, the loss
of the laptop containing SCI material is under active
investigation by DOS and the FBI.
Mr. Chairman, we learned some valuable lessons about our
security posture domestically from these incidents. The
fundamental problem making such security lapses possible was
not an absence of proper policies and procedures, as those are
and have been in place. The problem was simply carelessness;
that is; non-compliance and/or disregard for established
regulations.
These incidents prompted us to take measures which
complement existing regulations and procedures, and are
designed to change the lax attitude toward security at the
State Department.
I believe that we have made substantial progress. We have
tightened security in the Secretary's suite of offices. We have
adopted a rigorous, comprehensive escort policy; worked to
strengthen computer safeguards; and assigned uniformed officers
to patrol specific floors inside the building.
At Main State, we have an after-hours inspection program of
department offices. We also continue our program of bringing
Marine Security Guards in training into the Department, 10
times a year, to conduct security sweeps.
We have provided security awareness briefings to over 5,000
Department personnel. In addition, we have closed D Street
outside the building to traffic, and installed cement barriers
around the entire building, thus lessening our physical
vulnerability.
Finally, and directly because of the laptop incident, the
Secretary decided, after consulting with the Director of
Central Intelligence, that DOS should take over from INR the
responsibility for protection of SCI material in accordance
with DCI requirements. We are committed to working hand-in-
glove with INR and the DCI to make this transfer as smooth as
possible.
In March, I convened an inter-agency review panel,
comprised of senior security representatives from the FBI, DOD,
the Secret Service, the CIA, and diplomatic security. The panel
was asked to review the counter measures currently in place to
protect against unauthorized access to Main State building and
classified information.
I also requested that they make recommendations to improve
security at Main State. The panel's report is complete, and has
been sent to the Secretary. Once she and the administration
have had an opportunity to review it, I will be glad to share
it with the subcommittee.
The panel confirmed our assessment of known weaknesses in
our programs, and recommended both short and long-term
solutions, that it believed will enhance security at Main
State. Their findings center on Main State's access, controls,
its physical security, information security, security
awareness, our uniform protective officer program, and the
creation of a chemical biological program.
I am convinced that the development of a strategic plan to
fund and implement these findings will result in a significant
improvement in our programs.
The Secretary's leadership in raising security awareness
has been invaluable. She has personally emphasized security at
every opportunity for the purpose of strengthening the culture
of security at State.
As you know, on May 3, she held a Department-wide town
meeting on security issues, because of the laptop incident. In
the course of that meeting, she stressed that each of our
employees must be ``our neighbor's keeper'' when it comes to
security.
The position that she has taken with respect to individual
responsibility among our diplomats, that regardless how
``skilled you may be as a diplomat . . . if you are not
professional about security, you are a failure,'' has resonated
throughout the Department.
Further, when she told the Department employees that the
press reports were accurate, and that she was, indeed,
``furious'' about our security lapses, any mistaken belief
anyone might have had that the Secretary wanted simply to let
this blow over and be forgotten was forcefully corrected.
It is also significant that Ambassador Marc Grossman, who
was sworn in as the new Director General of the Foreign Service
on June 19th of this year, is committed to working with us to
increase employee accountability with respect to security
matters.
That is important because while the Bureau of Diplomatic
Security investigates security lapses, it is the Director
General who disciplines those who commit the security
violations of infractions.
Ambassador Grossman's tough-minded position with regard to
security is certain to resonate throughout the Department.
Ambassador Grossman and I have agreed to an action plan,
which the Secretary has approved, for strengthening security
and accountability, that includes the following: require each
bureau in the Department and each mission overseas to include
in its Bureau and Mission Program Plans specific steps for
increasing security awareness; require a report on all security
incidents in the field to be reported immediately to the
Department, and ensure that an employee's permanent security
incident record is updated and available for reference from
Washington and overseas; prospectively increase the sanctions
and penalties for security incidents; link security awareness
to the promotion and tenuring process by including ``security
awareness and accountability'' in promotion and tenuring
precepts, and in all employees' work requirement statements;
and require that full field security investigations conducted
on candidates for Presidential appointments include security
incidents.
Mr. Chairman, I believe that what we have done and are
doing, combined with the stark, ugly reality of what security
failures produce, have gone a long way in raising awareness at
the Department.
I think that we have reached the point where the decided
majority of State Department employees have recognized that a
threat exists; that poor practices are unacceptable; that
security is a high priority with the Secretary, this
administration, and this Congress; and that employees will be
held accountable for lapses.
I can assure you that the Secretary, the Director General,
and I will continue to drive home those points as forcefully as
possible.
Finally, and of great significance with regard to the
future of security within the Department, the Secretary has
identified a need for the creation of a new Under Secretary for
Security, Law Enforcement and Counter-terrorism. This proposal
is currently being reviewed within the administration.
We believe that such a position will clearly establish
lines of accountability and responsibility with respect to the
Department's security, law enforcement, and threat functions.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my testimony. As I indicated,
we have been diligent in our efforts to upgrade security at our
overseas ports, and we have been successful in making those
facilities safer now than ever before. We have also worked very
hard to improve our security posture domestically.
Nevertheless, there is still much that needs to be done. We
do not intend to stop until we have completed the upgrade of
the facilities abroad and completed also our efforts to ensure
our security domestically.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Carpenter follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Thank you very much.
If you could just wait a second, please.
If it is OK with both of you, what we are going to do is,
we are going to get our next panel just to come up, and we will
exchange seats.
I have some questions, but then I would be asking questions
twice and having statements. I think we can make the hearing
shorter and more efficient.
So we are going to ask the next panel to come up. Mr.
Edwards and Mr. Carpenter will both just listen to the
presentation of Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers and Ben Nelson. So
we will swear them in next.
I think we can make this a fairly succinct hearing this
way, and I appreciate your cooperation. I will ask you both to
stand, because I will swear you in. Thank you.
Is there anyone else that you might want to respond to
questions?
Mr. Nelson. There may be, from GAO.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. That is helpful, just in case you
need to respond. You may not have to.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Shays. Thank you. For the record, all three have
responded in the affirmative. If we call on you, we will give
the transcriber your card, and we will take care of that.
Ms. Bridgers, we will start with you as Inspector General,
this time, and we will go with you, Mr. Nelson, after that.
Really, what I am looking to do is just to have you put your
statements on the record, and I will be asking you a few
questions.
I appreciate the State Department being flexible this way.
They can hear what you are saying, and it gives them an
opportunity to respond.
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. Sure.
Mr. Shays. And that is the way we will proceed. So you have
the floor.
STATEMENTS OF JACQUELYN L. WILLIAMS-BRIDGERS, INSPECTOR
GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE; AND BEN NELSON, DIRECTOR,
NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION, U.S.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the
opportunity to testify on major management challenges facing
the Department.
Today, I would like to focus my remarks first on the
Department's implementation of the Government Performance and
Results Act; and second, on the management of security
programs, both at our Embassies overseas and here at home.
The Department's strategic planning process has improved
from previous years, but it still does not fully comply with
the Results Act. The Department has not yet developed overall
priorities for its strategic goals and, consequently, has no
overall basis for allocating resources to priorities.
My office's work has also identified the need for improved
performance information in the Department's bureau and mission
level plans.
Although more comprehensive than the fiscal year 1999 to
2000 plan, the Department's 2001 Performance Plan does not
address all of the shortcomings found in last year's plan.
The revised format includes a more detailed description of
the Department's activities toward achieving its goals, but
there is minimal discussion of the inter-agency coordination,
resource allocation, data limitations, and whether or not the
data can be verified and validated.
Also, the 2000 plan does not include some of the
performance goals, indicators, and management challenges that
were identified previously, with no explanation as to why they
were excluded this year.
Beginning in 1998, the Department required that all bureaus
submit annual performance plans, organized around the
Department's 16 strategic goals and three diplomatic readiness
goals.
OIG has made recommendations to the Department on how it
can improve its bureau plans. Recently, we have made
recommendations on how strategic planning could be better used
to report the results of the Department's work in reducing
trade barriers in the telecommunications area, and the need for
better performance data to assess the Department's initiatives
on recruiting foreign service specialists.
OIG's work has also focused on the planning efforts at our
Embassies. As with the bureaus, each Embassy is asked to submit
annually a mission performance plan. Our post-inspections have
found that despite its usefulness in improving communications
at post, the process of developing the Embassy-level plans has
generally not met the objectives set by the Department's
planners.
Although the Department instructed posts to focus only on
the most important goals and objectives, rather than produce a
full mission activity inventory, lengthy mission performance
plans generally catalog each post's activities, rather than
prioritizing them. Lengthy MPPs are partially a reflection of
the Department's lack of prioritization of its overall
strategic goals.
The Department stated that it cannot prioritize its work,
because U.S. interests in any one part of the world at any one
time may reflect a different order from other parts of the
world.
In the absence of clearly stated priorities, posts will
have little incentive to prioritize their own goals and
objectives. Without a clear statement of those priorities, the
Department cannot meet the act's intent or its own goal to
align resources with priorities.
The Department's fiscal year 1999 performance report
reflects the weaknesses of its performance plan. Without annual
performance goals, the performance report generally provides a
narrative list of accomplishments under each of the 16
strategic goals, and an annex of information on the measures
for illustrative goals or performance goals.
Consequently, the report does not provide decisionmakers
with a clear assessment of the Department's progress against
its goals.
Without increased management attention to setting
priorities and developing overall performance goals that can be
used to assess its performance, the Department will be unable
to make significant progress under the Results Act.
To date, we have seen limited evidence that goals and
measures are used in the agency's decisionmaking process. Until
that happens, bureau and post officials will continue to be
frustrated with what they consider to be a paper exercise, and
decisionmakers will be limited in their ability to determine
the effectiveness of their programs.
The second major challenge for the Department that I will
address today is the need to ensure the safety and security of
U.S. personnel and facilities overseas. Security continues to
be a paramount concern for the Department.
Security lapses at Main State clearly demonstrate that the
Department must address vulnerabilities in protecting vital
information on the domestic front, as well as overseas.
By the end of this summer, OIG will have evaluated the
physical security and emergency preparedness of 68 Embassies,
since the 1988 bombings of our Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es
Salaam.
This past year, none of the 42 Embassies we inspected met
all the security standards; standards designed to protect our
personnel. The lack of a 30 meter setback, as outlined by
Ambassador Carpenter, was the most prevalent deficiency.
Addressing inadequate setback, combined with the lack of
anti-ram barrier perimeter walls and adequately protected
windows, will require a major long-term construction effort.
Actions have been taken or are underway to correct these
items that the Department can quickly fix, such as improving
the local guard force, lighting, or alarms at a chancery.
Last year, before this subcommittee, I discussed emergency
preparedness and the importance of conducting crisis management
exercises and the emergency drills at posts. Despite their
importance, OIG has found that most posts are not routinely
conducting mission-wide exercises of all the required drills.
In response, the Department has recently issued
instructions to all Chiefs of Missions to conduct these drills.
Turning my attention to Washington, following several
security incidents at Main State, my office was requested by
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, to evaluate the
effectiveness of Department policies and procedures for
protecting classified documents.
We found that the Department had programs in place to
evaluate individuals' need to handle classified information.
but that improvements to enhance security awareness and
controls to prevent unauthorized access were required.
Highly classified documents relating to intelligence
reporting were not safeguarded in accordance with Government
regulations.
Significant numbers of uncleared visitors were permitted
unescorted access to Main State. They were not always escorted
to areas where classified information was handled, processed,
and discussed.
Finally, unit security officers were not well informed
about and did not have the authority to enforce security
requirements.
The Department has taken important first steps to address
these concerns. However, administrative actions taken to
discipline employees have been and remain ineffective in
correcting poor security practices.
Some of the most difficult security issues to correct, both
domestically and overseas, deal with information security. In
many ways, improving information security may be a bigger
challenge than improving physical security, because many of the
corrections involve personal behavior, rather than technical
equipment.
Correcting identified vulnerabilities requires sustained
management attention, leadership, technically qualified people,
money, and the desire to do things differently.
Mr. Chairman, in your invitation to testify this morning,
you asked that I address the Department's implementation of the
Results Act and its management of security programs.
The Department's strategic planning process has improved
over the past 2 years. But absent a global priority setting
process, we see a need, at a minimum, to establish within
geographic regions and areas of activity a process for using
strategic planning as a basis for allocating resources to
priorities.
In security, the Department has responded well to the need
to move quickly in the aftermath of the bombings, and to
effectively use emergency funding.
The Department's success, however, is dependent on how well
and for how long it exercises disciplined attention to
effective security practices, and remains committed to the
funding, construction, maintenance, and continual improvement
of that infrastructure.
As the Department and the Congress embark on this very
expensive commitment, the requirement for the Office of
Inspector General is to continue to provide the specialized
oversight of the use of those funds for security enhancements.
The Department is now moving from the emergency response
mode to a more strategic approach for the rebuilding of our
foreign affairs infrastructure, and so must the OIG with the
sustained program of expertise in the oversight of these
initiatives.
Your continued support for the OIG in this regard is much
appreciated. I will answer questions at the appropriate time.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Williams-Bridgers follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Thank you very much, Ms. Williams-Bridgers.
Mr. Nelson.
Mr. Nelson. Good morning, Mr. Chairman.
I am pleased to be here today to provide an update on the
Department of State's progress in addressing many of the
security and other management challenges raised during a
hearing before this subcommittee last year.
These challenges arise from the Department's responsibility
to maintain operations at over 250 overseas locations to
support its mission and that of about 40 other U.S. Government
agencies, and to protect over 50,000 U.S. and foreign national
employees at hundreds of overseas facilities.
The State Department spends a substantial amount of its
$4.3 billion foreign affairs administration budget on business-
type activities that support its global operations.
These activities provide staff overseas with access to
financial and information services, security, housing,
personnel services, and more.
In making decisions on the size and capacity of the support
structure at any particular location, State must consider the
views of other U.S. Government agencies, including Defense,
Commerce, Agriculture, Treasury, and Justice.
Since last year's hearing, an independent advisory panel
has examined the U.S. overseas presence, and recommended
options for streamlining and right-sizing overseas operations,
consistent with U.S. policy priorities and a vastly changing
world, with new requirements for security, communications,
technology, and service. Many of the panel's recommendations
address concerns that we have raised over the years.
My testimony will focus on State's progress in addressing
the challenges it faces in its efforts to achieve a more
secure, efficient, and effective network of operations,
including its response to the recommendations from the
independent advisory panel.
Mr. Chairman, the major challenges that the Department
faces are the same as those identified last year, and which you
enumerated in your opening comments.
This includes better utilizing the Government Performance
and Results Act process to improve strategic and performance
planning in the pursuit of overall mission, policy, and
operational objectives; improving the security of U.S.
personnel and facilities at overseas locations in a cost
effective and timely manner; determining the right-size and
location of U.S. overseas presence to both improve the
efficiency of operations and reduce the security burden; and
finally, upgrading information and financial management systems
to further improve communications, accountability, and
decisionmaking.
State has indicated that it will need several billion
dollars in capital construction and other investments over
several years to achieve operations that can effectively
support U.S. overseas interests.
To successfully meet any of these challenges, the
Department needs to have a clearly articulated vision, a
coherent strategy, and congressional commitment and oversight
to make sure that intended results are achieved.
Let me provide a brief summary of State's progress,
remaining challenges, and obstacles in each of the four areas
that I mentioned.
The leadership team at the Department has recognized many
of these challenges, and has devoted substantial resources to
addressing them. As a result, State has made considerable
progress in many areas, but still faces significant obstacles
in achieving an efficient, effective, and secure overseas
platform to support U.S. interests.
Briefly, in the area of strategic and performance planning,
our evaluations have shown that State's strategic and
performance plans have had their strong points. However, they
have only partially met the requirements of the 1993 Government
Performance and Results Act.
State's strategic plan defined U.S. interests and clarified
U.S. foreign policy goals. Its annual performance plan for
fiscal year 2000 showed improvement over prior years' plans, in
terms of linking strategies and measures to goals.
However, the plan also fell short in a number of areas. For
example, it did not present a complete picture of baselines,
targets, and measures for some of the strategic goals, and did
not elaborate on how State plans to work with other agencies to
achieve progress on cost cutting issues such as trade policy
and stopping the flow of illegal narcotics.
State recently issued its fiscal year 1999 performance
report, the first one required under the Results Act, and its
performance plan for fiscal year 2001. Both have some of the
same weaknesses found in prior planning efforts.
In particular, the performance report does not adequately
demonstrate State's level of success in achieving desired
outcomes, or the way in which State's actions actually led to
the achievement of desired goals.
State recognizes that it needs to continue to strengthen
its strategic and performance planning as part of its overall
effort to improve management and address critical issues.
The next area is security. In light of the potential for
terrorism by groups opposed to U.S. interests, enhancing the
security of Embassies and consulates might well be the most
significant challenge facing the Department.
In the aftermath of the bombings of two United States
Embassies in Africa in 1998, State, using about $1.5 billion in
emergency supplemental funds, started to significantly upgrade
security at all of its overseas posts and build new facilities
that meet higher security standards.
However, the Department faces many challenges to its goals
in this area. State has made progress in implementing certain
emergency security upgrades, such as initiating a surveillance
detection program, and providing armored vehicles. But because
of the scope of the program, many facilities are still awaiting
enhancements such as barriers, walls, and other safeguards.
In addition, due to more stringent security requirements
and better documentation of what is needed at individual posts,
State estimates that the emergency upgrades may cost hundreds
of millions of dollars more than originally envisioned, and
will likely take several years to complete.
Moreover, State is encountering several obstacles in its
efforts to construct new and more secure Embassies and
consulates, including difficulties in purchasing suitable sites
for buildings, and gaining agreement among agencies on future
staffing levels and resulting requirements.
Another key challenge for State is to right-size its
overseas presence. State is in the early stages of examining
options to restructure overseas presence, in light of changing
needs in the post-cold war world and advances in technology.
We have recommended that State reexamine the way it
conducts overseas administrative functions, such as relocating
and housing employees.
From my work, we have also suggested that State explore the
potential for regionalizing certain functions, and making
greater use of technology and outsourcing, to achieve
efficiencies and improve performance. Actions in these areas
could potentially reduce the overseas presence.
State has established several committees to consider the
recommendations of the overseas presence advisory panel,
regarding right-sizing and greater use of information
technology, and the management of capital facilities.
The last area, Mr. Chairman, involves information and
financial management. Consistent with our recommendations,
State has made many improvements in its information and
financial management systems. State was able to successfully
meet Y2K challenges and received unqualified opinions on its
financial statements for fiscal years 1997, 1998, and 1999.
However, it faces continuing challenges in this area.
Currently, there is no common platform serving all agencies
operating overseas. Despite the success I mentioned, State
still does not have an integrated financial management system
that meets the requirements of the Federal Financial Management
Improvement Act of 1996.
Improvements in these areas would provide managers with
more timely information that they need to operate in a more
businesslike fashion, and to make cost-based decisions.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my opening remarks. I would be
happy to answer any questions that you may have.
[Note.--The GAO report entitled, ``State Department
Overseas Emergency Security Program Processing, But Costs Are
Increasing,'' may be found in subcommittee files.]
[The prepared statement of Mr. Nelson follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Nelson.
What I am thinking of doing, and I do not think this will
be awkward, is to invite the State Department to come on back,
and just have a dialog. I have listened to your presentations.
There is nothing that we all cannot deal with, collectively.
So I would invite both of our former witnesses to come. We
will kind of squeeze you all in, and we will just bring one
more chair in, too.
Let me just get one housekeeping thing out of the way. I
ask unanimous consent that all members of the subcommittee be
permitted to place an opening statement in the record. The
record will remain open for 3 days for that purpose. Without
objection, that is so ordered.
I ask further unanimous consent that all witnesses be
permitted to include their written statement in the record.
Without objection, that is so ordered.
I let your testimony, in some cases, go beyond 10 minutes,
because I just wanted your comments on the record. I am not
sure we are going to have a lot of questions. I have a more
general one.
Some of my enthusiasm has been taken away, because I felt
it almost arrogant that State somehow feels that they do not
come totally and completely under the Results Act. In other
words, somehow their mission is so different that they would
not.
I asked my staff, does the GAO and IG come under it? The IG
comes under the Results Act, I believe. Is that correct?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. Actually, Mr. Shays, the Results Act
does not specifically require the IGs to do it. But the IG
community, as a whole, has endorsed GPRA, and we think it is
good for Government, and it is good for us.
Mr. Shays. Right.
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. So almost all of the IGs do comply
with the letter and the spirit of GPRA.
Mr. Shays. And the GAO's office?
Mr. Nelson. I think, technically, we are not covered by it,
but we do fully comply with it.
Mr. Shays. Right.
Mr. Nelson. GAO is a major supporter of it, and believes
that it is an excellent tool to focus the agency's activities
to make sure that we are achieving our critical mission
objectives.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Mica and I have been strong supporters of
congressional accountability, getting Congress under all the
laws. We are not technically under it either. Although I think
probably, in our various offices, we try to comply with a lot
of it.
So I guess I just need to put that on the record. I said,
how dare the State Department feel somehow that they are
unique? This may be an assumption that is wrong.
I get the sense, from your testimony, Mr. Edwards, that
there is an attempt to deal with the Results Act, but that
somehow people that you work with feel that your mission is so
unique that you really cannot come under it. I would like you
to address that issue.
Mr. Edwards. I think that is an excellent question, Mr.
Chairman. Obviously, when part of your goals are to have things
not happen, such as the outbreak of war or pestilence and
things like that, it is difficult to measure your success. But
we have developed a multi-disciplinary team of Assistant
Secretaries, and we are working to find a way.
Just as, I might say, having spent most of my career in the
private sector, corporations find a way to measure their
effectiveness, we are going to attempt to do this.
It is relatively easy to measure output, such as number of
treaties signed, and negotiations, and so forth. The outcomes,
which is really what GPRA is all about, are daunting for us.
We are working with the Mercatus Center, George Mason
University, and as I indicated in my testimony, our IG and the
GAO, to develop methodologies so that we can do a much better
job of seeing how many arrows hit the center of the target, and
how many are in the periphery or flying into space and not
hitting the target.
I might comment in response to the IG's issue on
prioritizing strategies, we are, of course, at the mercy of
what happens out of our control.
For example, I am sure you are aware of the very severe
problems in Fiji and the South Pacific Islands places where no
one ever dreamed there would be a problem. But we went and
ordered departure in both of those posts, and worked with the
Australian and New Zealand military to get people in harm's way
out.
So we are working very diligently on what many people would
regard as a ``back water area'' to try to restore democracy and
functioning governments in those two areas.
In many cases, issues occur. Of course, as we speak,
hopefully, many of us have our fingers crossed that there will
be some agreement toward ending the Mideast crisis at Camp
David, within the next 24 or 48 hours, before those leaders
leave the country.
So prioritizing a year or 2 years ahead of time certainly
would be ideal. But geographically prioritizing some of those
to specific areas or specific countries does pose a big
challenge for us.
Mr. Shays. Let me just say, I was just trying to get a
sense of attitude. Is the State Department contending that they
somehow do not come under parts of the Results Act, or in some
way cannot come under it?
Mr. Edwards. Well, not at all; I think there are some who
would like not to be under it.
But I can assure you that the management bureaus, headed by
Under Secretary Cohen, of which Assistant Secretary Carpenter
and I are a part, are struggling and determined to find a way
that we can measure each of our approximately 30 bureaus in
terms of what they are accomplishing.
Mr. Shays. I cannot imagine the fact that outcomes cannot
be predictable as being an excuse for not being under the act.
I would think that FEMA can make the same argument. I mean, you
know, we do not know what disasters will come our way.
But they would, I would think, set goals that would be able
to respond to simply not dealing with the predictable. That
would be one of the areas, on how effectively do you respond to
what is not predictable, and how quickly can you respond. I
would think there would be ways that you could measure, dealing
with that.
Let me just ask you, Mr. Nelson or Ms. Williams-Bridgers,
what is your sense of the attitude of the State, the DOS, in
terms of trying to comply to the Results Act?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. I share Mr. Edwards' expressions
that the State Department does consider itself to be held
accountable to the Results Act. They are struggling, as many
other agencies are struggling, with clear definition of
outcomes and the measures of progress toward achieving those
outcomes.
This is why, in our full statement, we have said that,
given that the Department acknowledges the need for some
outcome-oriented goals, and given they acknowledge the need for
some flexibility in any type of priority setting process that
they establish in the Department to allow them to respond to
crisis and unanticipated events, it is imperative that they
have in place some credible process for establishing those
priorities; and then have a resource allocation system that
allows the funds to flow, according to those changing
priorities.
I do think it is a cultural attitude that will change with
some education about the importance of priority setting; the
importance of having a coordinated approach, an integrated
approach of the mission planning process with Washington.
Mr. Shays. I will come right back to you in a second. Mr.
Nelson, do you want to respond?
Mr. Nelson. Yes, I believe that the senior leadership in
the Department has a major challenge in convincing the rank and
file of the importance of strategic and performance planning.
We have seen improvements in the Department's plans. But
the plans, themselves, really are not that important.
It is the process that you go through in putting together
the plans, where you try to align activities with your
missions, to make sure that they are contributing to the
outcomes that are desired; and that you have a clear sense of
what outcomes you want to achieve. So the process itself is a
very critical and important management tool.
I believe the Department's own fiscal year 2000 plan points
out the challenge in convincing a large number of people in the
Department that performance planning is a useful exercise. I
believe there is a reference to that problem in the year 2000
performance plan.
Mr. Shays. OK, let me just have either of you, from our
second panel, just describe to me the area where you think the
State Department finds it the most difficult to deal with
strategic and performance planning.
Give me an example of something that your employees might
have told you about a dialog, or saying, my God, how do we come
under it, under this area? Can you think of any?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. I can think of it at two levels.
First, at the mission level, the Embassies, what we found
at the Embassies are some best practices, where the Embassies
will engage all other U.S. Government agencies at post, the
Chief of Mission, or the DCM, and have a good dialog about what
is your understanding of our goals here in this region, in this
country; what is your sense of priorities; and then developing
that collective understanding and shared vision of what they
are to accomplish in countries. That is very good.
What falls down for the missions is, once they send those
plans back here to Washington to the bureaus, they are not
getting the kind of clear guidance and feedback from the
bureaus that the Embassies believe is necessary in order for
them to proceed with some assurance that they are walking in
concert with what Washington believes to be the greatest sense
of priorities, and the greatest area in need of attention by
the mission.
So it is the communication that occurs at post that is very
good, but not back here to Washington. It has improved
somewhat. We have seen some improvement within the past year,
but there is much more need for clarity; there is much more
need for a dialog and very specific feedback from bureaus in
Washington.
Mr. Shays. I can think of one criticism, in my contact with
Embassy officials. They do not have the ability, or at least
did not have the ability to communicate from Embassy to
Embassy. They did not have the ability to share. They did not
have technology that would give them the latest abilities to
communicate.
It strikes me as important, and any where it is important,
within an Embassy and between Embassies and among Embassies,
and so on.
Mr. Mica. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. Shays. Yes.
Mr. Mica. I just got through reading part of the update,
here. On the point you are talking about, I cannot believe that
this is correct.
They said they are doing a little demo in the next fiscal
year, and it would be 2 to 2\1/2\ years before they can
actually install a global communication system. Is that still
correct, according to someone's testimony here?
Mr. Edwards. I am not sure which testimony, Congressman,
that you are referring to.
Mr. Mica. Well, does anybody know? I mean, I think the
chairman makes an incredible point. I am absolutely appalled,
and I have been in the Embassies around the world. It is almost
laughable. I would fire people's asses, excuse me, if this was
any kind of operation.
It is absolutely unbelievable that they cannot communicate.
They do not even have basic e-mail communication in some of
these places.
In one Embassy that we went into, they take turns using a
computer. In the report, and I just read it in here in one of
these, it says it is going to be 2\1/2\ years before they have
any kind of a communication system.
Here it is. They had a suggestion from the panel for a
single unclassified global communications network to serve all
U.S. agencies with oversized presence.
It could be billed to the cost of $200 million. That is
peanuts. It goes into the State, in its fiscal year, and this
would be 2001, for two pilot posts. It says if it is proven
workable and funded, State believes it could get operational in
about 2\1/2\ years, according to page 12 of this report.
Mr. Nelson. Is this the GAO testimony?
Mr. Mica. Yes.
Mr. Shays. Let me just comment, just as an illustration on
something.
Mr. Mica. To me, it is just mind boggling.
Mr. Shays. This is just as an illustration of something. I
would like you all to comment, and then I am going to give up
the floor.
We know that in some Embassies, they can communicate back
to DC, but they cannot communicate to another Embassy. They
cannot even communicate sometimes within the Embassy, from one
employee to another. You have State Department employees. You
have Commerce Department employees.
I guess what I am trying to say to you, Mr. Edwards, is
that it would strike me that the Department would gain
tremendously by deciding what its strategic plans are, or what
its performance goals are, because it would highlight where we
have scarce resources.
So my objective today is to hopefully learn if there is
still a cultural bias against dealing with strategic planning
and so on, point one. So that is one concern. I am going to let
you respond in a second.
Mr. Carpenter, I just want to get on the table a concern I
have. I can understand that we cannot re-do buildings.
I understand that probably the administration has asked for
less money than it needs. Then you all are in the position to
defend it. Then we have this wonderful ability to claim
ignorance, because we were not asked for what you truly need.
So one is, I would love to know more. That is not for this
hearing, but we need to know more what you really truly need.
Given that we are not going to rebuild buildings and move
them, the thing that I find of most concern is that there is
not, evidently, based on what we have heard today, the kind of
practice runs on what you do if there is an emergency; what
happens if there is a crisis with this; what happens if a bomb
goes off; what happens if a terrorist is in the building, and
what do we do?
Those are the kinds of things that I would think we would
want to be doing to compensate for what we are not doing. So
that is kind of where I am coming from. Those are my two areas.
I would love you, first, Mr. Edwards, just to respond to
the issue that I just previously raised. Then I will come to
you, Mr. Carpenter, and we will ask Mr. Nelson and Ms.
Williams-Bridgers to respond. Then we will go to you, John.
Mr. Edwards. OK, I would like to start off first of all,
with the Information Resource Management Bureau, which is,
again, one of the bureaus that Assistant Secretary Carpenter
works with. They would support accelerating that.
Our problem is that our information technology request for
2000, for example, was reduced substantially from the prior
year. A lot of that 2\1/2\ years is simply buying the hardware.
We have, within the OPAP review, one of the three
committees deal with an IT platform. We have, quite frankly, a
problem getting the tenants at our posts to agree to use a
common platform.
We have tenants that are funded by various committees.
Sometimes they come with gold plated Cadillacs, while our ALMA
program, which we have been putting into the Embassies, would
be functionally late model Chevrolets. So for all of our
tenants to work with the same equipment is not the easiest
thing in the world.
Mr. Shays. I think it is important to point this out, and
it is somewhat extraordinary, but it also is of tremendous
concern. I am just trying to illustrate another way where the
State Department could benefit tremendously by dealing with the
Results Act. You could highlight these points in a way that
could give you a tremendous amount of weight in dealing with
your tenants.
Mr. Edwards. Well, I would agree completely with that
observation, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. OK.
Mr. Edwards. We are attempting to do that through the OPAP
working groups, one of which is the IT group I mentioned; the
second is facilities; and the third is right-sizing.
We have just had an initial meeting, for example, with
Embassy in Paris. Not surprisingly, every one of the agencies
who were there objected to any suggestion that they were
overstaffed. So this is going to be very difficult. But I think
from an inter-agency point of view, a collective answer cannot
be, we cannot reduce a single person.
Mr. Shays. You see, what you may conclude is that you need
the benefits of the Results Act more than any department,
rather than less.
Mr. Edwards. Well, I think in this case, you are absolutely
correct.
Mr. Shays. Well, in this case, even when you mention that
you are bringing in some technology, if it does not fit in with
an overall plan, it just may be a waste and an expensive
effort.
Anyway, I want to let Mr. Mica respond. My goal is quite
simple today. I just want you to be enthusiasts for coming in
to the Results Act. Then I would like you to feel pain and
suffering, if you do not. [Laughter.]
Mr. Carpenter, do you want to just respond to that?
Mr. Carpenter. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman, I totally agree that
security drills are critical to any security program overseas.
We have requirements that security drills be run; whether
they be for fires, bombs, terrorist attacks. Chemical
biological seems to be the newest threat that has befallen us,
for which you have to have a plan to evacuate, or take the
appropriate action.
Our requirement currently has been to do these annually in
most posts, and semi-annually in those higher threat posts.
We just recently, in May, sent out a cable, once we were
advised by the IG that their experience was that this was not
being done, admonishing them, requiring them to do that
immediately.
Clearly, that is one of our defensive measures out there.
That is as important as having delta barriers up and all the
other equipment in place, if you are not dwelling on this.
Mr. Shays. I do not know if annually is going to be enough
for you. If it is annually, I do not think there is a sense of
urgency.
Mr. Carpenter. You are right. Certainly, annually, to have
a fire drill may not be adequate, when we have, at certain
times of the year, changes in the number of personnel at posts,
and turnover in our foreign service cadre. It has to be a
focus. We are attempting to make it a focus, along with a lot
of other programs at post.
We have been, in the course of the last 2 years, been
focusing clearly on having a plan, should something occur at
one of these Embassies, because we believe very seriously that
we will have another incident at a post overseas. At the posts
that are prepared, the casualties will be the lesser. That is
our goal.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. I have gone well over my time. I
invite Mr. Mica to continue. Just let me recognize the presence
of Mr. Tierney. We will get to you when Mr. Mica is done. Thank
you. You have the floor, Mr. Mica.
Mr. Mica. Thank you.
Well, again, I am just totally frustrated that after years
of looking at State, and finding out the very basic operational
need, which is communications, if you cannot communicate,
either within the Embassy or between Embassies, or adequately
internationally, there is a problem. So I am totally frustrated
by what I have read here, if you could not tell.
It also appears like the ``inmates are running asylum.'' On
the right-sizing overseas, what is the status of that? You are
telling me now, for example, Paris says that they cannot give
up one position. They are all essential.
Mr. Edwards. Well, the Ambassador has, as you know,
testified that he believes it could be reduced. We had our
inter-agency meeting, where the tenants disagreed; not the
State Department position.
Mr. Mica. OK, well, my question is not that. My question
is, what is the mechanism for bringing about the change? Do we
have in place, within State, or do we need congressional
action? How do you right-size these overseas operations?
Mr. Edwards. Well, we have a number of inter-agency teams.
Secretary Albright actually chaired a meeting of the Cabinet.
Mr. Mica. Well, has somebody made a decision, and we will
use Paris, as to what the right-size should be?
Mr. Edwards. That is being worked on. Some decisions have
been made. For example, in my bureau, we have filed a report
with the Congress of how we intend to reduce our financial
service center in Paris from about 120 people to 14 or maybe 10
or so, and moving them to Charleston, SC.
Mr. Mica. The right-sizing of overseas operations has been
going on for how long now?
Mr. Edwards. Well, actually, many of the right-sizing has
been going on for years.
Again, in my bureau, at one point, we had 23 financial
centers. We are now down to three. Two to 3 years from now, we
will be down to two, with two-thirds of that in the United
States and one-third still in Bangkok, which is a very
efficient, very low cost operation, housed in our former
Embassy.
Mr. Mica. Again, you know, we are trying to talk about
accountability, responsibility, and certain acts that we have
put in to try to make this all work.
Within the agency, you are telling me the Secretary has the
authority to do this. I understand the Ambassador, even, has
the authority to do this.
Mr. Edwards. Right.
Mr. Mica. Well, why is it not done?
Mr. Edwards. Well, most of the growth, Mr. Congressman, has
actually been in our tenant agencies, who have applied for
permission to increase their staffing, because of their program
mandates.
Mr. Mica. OK, well, what if we just take State personnel? I
was in one of the hearings, and I have seen testimony from the
Ambassador about this. What about handling just your balliwick;
not downsizing?
I sat with our former colleague, Tom Lantos, son-in-law,
Ambassador Dick Swett. I sat with him, and he brought in the
Ambassadors from the Baltic and some of the emerging nations up
there. They are totally inadequately staffed for some of these
new emerging posts. We have got them coming out of the walls in
Paris.
I know it is hard to get them out of Gay Paree, but how do
we make this thing work? What is wrong?
Mr. Edwards. Well, what has to work is, there are agencies
that have people at a particular post. In some posts, there may
be 25 or 30 agencies, and in other posts, there may be State
and USAID and maybe one other.
Mr. Mica. How many USAID are in Paris?
Mr. Edwards. USAID has very few in Paris, if any.
Mr. Mica. I would hope so. That was just one of those quick
questions. [Laughter.]
Mr. Edwards. Paris and London have probably the largest
list of tenants.
Mr. Mica. Well, part of the problem is here in the
Congress, because it is multi-jurisdictional. All these
agencies have their own budgets, their own turf, their own
jurisdiction. But somebody needs to get a handle on this.
Again, my question is, just to restate it, how do we get
right-sizing to work?
Mr. Edwards. Well, let me just cover a couple of the
points, and then Assistant Secretary Carpenter can chip in, and
our Inspector General, as well.
We have regionalized, for example, in Ft. Lauderdale,
service areas for Western Hemisphere Bureau, because you can
fly from south Florida to practically every one of the
countries. So we have regional specialists there, as opposed to
spreading them through 15 or 20 countries.
We have regionalized a lot of our medical personnel, so
that they can get to nearby posts relatively quickly, by
available air service.
I mentioned, in my bureau, we have gone from 23 to 3
financial service centers, and have filed a plan to get that
down to 2.
Mr. Mica. OK, so you are telling me, from a technical
standpoint and an authority standpoint, State already has the
authority to do what they need to do, at least within your
bailiwick, which is State?
Mr. Edwards. We do have that.
Mr. Mica. So it is a management decision, and either the
Secretary or one of the Assistant Secretaries or the Ambassador
is not carrying that through, for example, in Paris.
Mr. Edwards. Well, our Ambassador probably is the lead
Ambassador, in terms of right-sizing, in that particular case.
He would like to significantly reduce.
Mr. Mica. But why is that not done?
Mr. Edwards. Well, in inter-agency, we had our first
meeting.
Mr. Mica. I do not even want to fire anybody. [Laughter.]
I am just trying to move them where we need them.
Mr. Edwards. Help? [Laughter.]
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. Yes, Mr. Mica, I have comments on a
couple of different issues that you have raised.
One is, what the State Department has done. I think they
have undertaken a number of initiatives, over the years. One is
the overseas staffing model, where they try to get a concept
model in place that would help them to identify is the right
number of people to do certain work in the mission, given the
work requirements in a mission.
But that concept has lapsed, basically. It was no longer
considered to be very useful in actually assigning people or
staffing positions overseas.
The Department has also attempted efforts at
regionalization, as Mr. Edwards has mentioned, at the financial
service centers in Paris, and in Charleston, to provide
administrative services.
I think that to the extent the Department can continue to
explore how to regionalize administrative services, that will
help to address some of the growth in staffing that we have,
and then the imminent security-related concerns.
The Department has also been exploring the use of the
American presence post concept; minimal presence of American
officers. In Lyon, we just reestablished such a post, in
France, under the very wise counsel and guidance, I believe, of
Ambassador Rohatyn, there.
But then to the larger issue of what can we do to right-
size the total U.S. Government presence overseas, I think there
are tools in place. National Security Directive NSDD-38
provides the Ambassadors, the Chiefs of Missions, with the
requisite authorities to make calls on whether or not staffing
has outgrown the ability of the Department to provide security
for U.S. personnel overseas.
Unfortunately, there is not oftentimes the will by the
Chief of the Mission to exercise that authority, or the support
back here in Washington, for a Chief of Mission, who wants to
make that call, that we have reached our tolerable limits, and
we can no longer provide for safety and security of our U.S.
Government employees overseas.
ICASS is another tool that this Congress passed with
several objectives. One is not only to share the costs across
all Federal agencies for their presence overseas, but to make
them make the tough calls about whether or not the U.S.
Government can afford the cost of their presence overseas,
which has grown over time.
Unfortunately, OIG believes that ICASS has not met the full
intent of congressional legislation. That needs to be
revisited, because cost serves as a very equalizing factor,
when people are making decisions on whether or not they need
the additional 10 or 15 people.
It is not State, as Mr. Edwards has mentioned, that has
been the growth agent overseas. It is other agencies.
So we do need congressional attention from committees such
as yours, which have the broad based jurisdiction to ask the
questions of whether or not other agencies have deliberated
truthfully the cost of their presence, and whether or not they
are picking up the cost of their presence overseas, and whether
or not we can provide the security and the dollars that are
necessary to provide security for all the people that find
themselves working overseas now.
Mr. Mica. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to give everybody
a change to ask questions.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Mr. Tierney.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Mr.
Mica.
Mr. Carpenter, let me ask you, about your written
testimony, and I assume that you repeated it when you were
speaking. I apologize for being at another committee hearing
when you were talking.
You made the statement, I believe, or at least in writing
you made the statement that the fundamental problem in security
at Headquarters was with carelessness, rather than with the
Department's security policies. What exactly were you getting
at, with that?
Mr. Carpenter. That would be individual responsibility. The
Department has a lot of rules, a lot of regulations, a lot of
policies that are in place that speak to a good, positive
security program. However, people may choose to violate those,
or exceptions have been made to those.
One of the realities of what I inherited 2 years ago, we
had a security program that was a program of exceptions that
were made. They probably were good at the time. There may have
been some sound reasoning to them at the time. But over time, I
think that reasons and logic sort of dissipated, and we had
sort of swiss cheese.
What we have been in the process in the last 2 years is
trying to patch all those holes. There are no exceptions. You
will abide by these.
But what is critical to any good security program is an
ability to enforce it. We also felt that we were lacking there.
We had the program. The program was in place. We just did not
have the people to monitor and enforce it, which is critical.
Mr. Tierney. So it was a manpower thing?
Mr. Carpenter. Manpower, yes, sir.
Mr. Tierney. I mean, in May, the FBI said that foreign
spies have been unescorted and had access, by working
undercover as news correspondents. Has that been addressed?
Mr. Carpenter. Yes, it has, with the FBI.
Mr. Tierney. What have you done?
Mr. Carpenter. I would be glad, in another forum, to tell
you exactly what we have done. I would suggest that that should
not have been the subject of an open forum discussion, last
time.
But we have taken measures, and we are working very closely
with the FBI and the CIA, as a matter of fact, and have a
working agreement with them. This whole issue is well
understood, and is being well coordinated between all three
agencies.
Mr. Tierney. Well, there were reports also that there was
no screening procedure to ensure that the swipe access
identification cards that were issued to employees and visitors
were actually in the possession of their actual owners. Have
there been steps taken to remedy that?
Mr. Carpenter. Not completely; no sir, we are working on a
system that it is unacceptable to not have a redundant system;
whereby, you simply swipe a card, where no one is looking at
the picture on the card for positive identification.
We are looking at a system that will probably have a pin
number. It may have, in other parts of the department,
biometrics involved. So there are redundant systems, and that
is what we are hoping to have in place, shortly.
Mr. Tierney. Biometrics being a thumb print type of thing?
Mr. Carpenter. A thumbprint or a retina recognition.
Mr. Tierney. OK, there was also a report that none of the
140 offices handling classified material at Headquarters had
been inspected for listening devices or cameras, and there was
no policy to record the receipt or return of classified
materials. Has that been addressed?
Mr. Carpenter. One of those statements is incorrect.
Mr. Tierney. OK.
Mr. Carpenter. Following the bugging, we did a top to
bottom sweep, TSCM, on all of the conference rooms and offices
of the building. That was reported erroneously.
The second part of your questions was what?
Mr. Tierney. That people were not being inspected for
listening devices or cameras.
Mr. Carpenter. That is people coming into the building?
Mr. Tierney. Right.
Mr. Carpenter. People are run through metal detectors at
our entrances; visitors that is. That continues to be our
policy.
Mr. Tierney. But with respect to listening devices or
cameras, there are no additional steps taken in that regard?
Mr. Carpenter. Listening devices are tough. We run people
through metal detectors. We check their bags, their belongings,
when they come in. It is not, currently, against Department
regulations to bring a camera into the Department of State.
Mr. Tierney. Regarding the Marine Corps. Guards, and you
know where I am going on this one, are said to have had
practice for their overseas postings by having surprise
inspections at State Department Headquarters.
Mr. Carpenter. Yes.
Mr. Tierney. On an average, supposedly they turned up 63
problems per visit. Then those inspections were canceled,
because there was too much paperwork. Is there any accuracy to
that, or what has been done with regard to that situation?
Mr. Carpenter. There is accuracy in the numbers of
documents founds left out, from time to time. That has not been
canceled.
The program was decelerated, as the Marines did not have
training classes going on where we could bring them in. That is
a very robust program, and something that we found extremely
valuable to our building security program, to have them come in
and do a very, very thorough sweep of offices.
Mr. Tierney. I just have one last question.
We were told that a lot of contract employees, security
guards, are only subject to cursory police checks. Supposedly,
only 15 out of 100 candidates actually had security clearances.
The press, and believe me, I understand that they are not
always accurate, by any stretch of the imagination, indicate
that the CIA has been so troubled by this record that they
routinely withhold information that is classified.
That might be a potential impairment of the ability of the
State Department employees and officials to carry out their
work. Is there any truth to that?
Mr. Carpenter. I have no knowledge of the CIA withholding
any information from the Department of State, based on those
particular issues.
We have a very good working relationship with the CIA. No
one has suggested that. However, I would suggest that if we do
not get our security act together at State, that would be
something that I would expect them to broach with the
Department.
That is why we are working aggressively to get the programs
back on a level that they should have been; that they never
have been on before, I might add, so that we do not have to
face that potential inevitability.
Mr. Tierney. What is your assessment of just how far along
you are in that process?
Mr. Carpenter. It is clearly a work in progress. I would
suggest that we have made some tremendous strides in some very
major areas.
As was referred to earlier with our escort policy, the
Department of State had never had an escort policy. That was a
huge undertaking. It has paid, I think, tremendous dividends.
But there is a lot of work left to be done. As I mentioned
in my statement, only recently were we given the responsibility
for the security of SCI information. That is an incredible
undertaking. There is a lot of work to be done there, and we
are only scratching the surface. We are probably 5 percent
there, with 95 percent to go.
In other areas, we have made some tremendous strides in our
physical security, increasing the number of guards. Overseas,
our programs have raised dramatically. I think we have a real
positive story there. Domestically, we still have a lot of work
to do.
Mr. Tierney. Now is everything internal, or do you need
this Congress to do anything to facilitate?
Mr. Carpenter. We continue to be, as a lot of agencies
would tell you, resource poor.
I think in the security element, in the security realm, all
of the things that we got from the emergency supplement are
nice and much appreciated.
However, you need to have professional law enforcement
people to oversee these programs. That is the area that we are
pushing very hard for more professionals. We need more people
to enforce this.
Without an ability to enforce the good programs and
policies and procedures that we have, we will be back in front
of you, explaining another security incident state. That is why
we are in the process of trying to prepare that for the
Congress, as to what our needs will be.
Mr. Tierney. Ms. Bridgers, what are your thoughts on all of
this?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. I think that the Department has made
remarkable strides in addressing security, both overseas and in
response to the recent incidents here.
In response to your question of what more is needed, I
think it would be continued vigilance at top management levels
in the Department. I think we should be setting a tenure for no
tolerance or zero tolerance, for misconduct in the Department.
In fact, that is the only area of outstanding response from
the Department to the recommendations that we have made about
the handling of classified information. That is the need for
the Department to improve its disciplinary process to ensure
that for those people who repeatedly violate security
regulations that proper administrative action is taken.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
Mr. Nelson, I do not want to leave you out of this. I would
like you to have an opportunity to tell us your thoughts on it.
You were getting pretty comfortable sitting back there.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Nelson. Well, it is hard to have a discussion about
financial management versus one about security and spies and
notebooks being taken from the Department. I understand that.
We have been following the news reports and the hearings
that have been held regarding these issues at the Department.
It is fairly clear that there are some challenges. It seems
clear from all that I can hear that the Department is aware of
it, and is taking some steps to deal with these security
issues.
Our work at GAO, let me digress and say, has been mainly in
looking at the vulnerability of states' information systems to
unauthorized access. We have worked closely with the Department
to bring about some improvements in that particular area of
information security versus security related to access to State
Department facilities.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
Thank you all.
Mr. Shays. I do not have many more questions. But the more
I hear the responses to the questions, and also hear the
questions themselves, I am more convinced that the State
Department would benefit from being out in the forefront of
wanting strategic goals and performance goals. I would just
think it would be invaluable to the agency.
As it relates to just thinking about it, in terms of
security, is it not possible, and maybe it has happened, that
in thinking about security, you realize that you may have to
downsize a vulnerable facility, even in a not high risk area,
but clearly in a high risk area?
I guess I would want to ask Mr. Carpenter if that is
happening. I mean, if we have a facility that is truly
vulnerable, I would like to think that it is not filled with
people.
Mr. Carpenter. I would like to think that, also, Mr.
Chairman. We have been, I think, very aggressive, but I think
we need to be more aggressive in the future.
We have a set of posts, right now, where we have put them
in bands that we consider to be our most vulnerable posts, even
with the security augmentations that have taken place over the
last 2 years.
We are going back to post and suggesting either they engage
more fully with the host country to try to get the setback they
need, either through street closures or some other means,
property acquisitions, or something.
If they are unable to do that, their options then become,
you have to either dramatically downsize, or you have to
consider closing your posts and operating offshore, until those
security requirements are met.
For those posts right now, we started out with about 15 on
that list. We are down to about eight. They are aggressively
trying that. I say we are down to eight, because seven of those
were able to get host country positive responses. We had
streets closed, and so forth.
We have also looked, as the rotational period comes up this
summer, at downsizing the number of replacements going in
there. The goal being to try to mitigate the threat against the
post.
We have also, in some instances, moved our personnel from
certain locations, more vulnerable locations on a compound, to
less vulnerable. Although the setback is not there, we have
given ourselves more setback within the compound that we reside
in.
Mr. Shays. Is it not true that with the Results Act, if
your resources are limited, and you know that you are not going
to be about to make construction changes, that it gives you a
little bit more emphasis and need to realize that you have got
to do some of these low cost types of actions that can help
save lives?
Mr. Carpenter. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. We may have a few questions that we are going to
give you in writing. The questions that I was just asked to ask
you would make sense, but they are pretty standard numbers of
when you will finish construction, and so on. So we are going
to followup on that.
I am pretty much concluded with my questions. I have come
to think that, Mr. Tierney, if you end up becoming the chairman
of this committee, or I am fortunate enough to become the
chairman again, that we would have a wealth of opportunity in
just dealing with two areas, and one in particular with Mr.
Mica, on the whole issue of communication within and inter-
communication; and also, as well, the whole issue of tenants.
I mean, there is just this built-up bias, I think, for
having another agency be there in one way, because it is not
your budget, State, and I make that assumption, at least for
the personnel. But then there is a negative in the terms of the
lack of control.
If I was an ambassador, and I had all these free wheeling
people from all these different departments in the Embassy, I
would demand that I would be able to coordinate their activity
in a very strong way.
I do not have a sense that that is happening. But I will
tell you, if I was using my Results Act effectively, I could
document the need to do that.
Mr. Mica. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. Yes, I am done, so you have the floor.
Mr. Mica. I do not know if you have done this. I chair the
Drug Policy Subcommittee. You know, the drug issue runs over
probably 12 to 15 different agencies and a number of the
committees.
This might be a good project to approach, as we have done,
and I do not know if you have done it before, to ``haul them
all in,'' sit them down at a table, and then call the
appropriator staff and the authorizing staff into the mix, too.
It is very hard for them to do anything by themselves. I
find with agents, they all sort of dig their heels in. If we
get them in a closed room, we sit them down at a conference
table, and we have to try to move forward. That is what I have
tried to do on some of these.
Mr. Shays. This is as it relates to the drug effort?
Mr. Mica. Well, no, the communications would be a good one;
but the right-sizing is another one.
Mr. Shays. I see, you did this?
Mr. Mica. Oh, I have done that. In DOD, we hauled in State,
we hauled in Treasury.
Mr. Shays. He means that figuratively, ``hauled in.''
[Laughter.]
Mr. Mica. You know, I am a partisan Republican, but we
close the door, and we try to work out a solution. The ranking
members work with us and others.
Sometimes, we can get them to do things, and you do not
need a lot more legislation. But you can also say you want
some, and this takes repetitive meanings, sometimes.
Mr. Shays. That is why I felt it was next year's efforts.
Mr. Mica. Well, I think you have got an opportunity, even
to initiate that now. I know there are a lot of things on your
platter, but it might be most helpful. The communications and
then the right-sizing are particular issues that are tough for
them to solve, I think, by themselves.
Mr. Shays. I agree with that.
Mr. Mica. Thank you.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. Do you have any other questions you
want to ask?
Mr. Mica. No.
Mr. Shays. Are there any points that any of the four of you
would like to make; a question that we should have asked, that
you were prepared to answer?
Mr. Carpenter. Perhaps before Congressman Mica leaves, I
would like to say one thing. I cannot pass up this opportunity,
because I know he was either a signatory to or a member of the
Inman Commission, back in 1985, that looked at the State
Department.
Mr. Mica. That was my brother, Dan. Now you are in really
big trouble. [Laughter.]
Mr. Shays. His brother was a Democrat.
Mr. Mica. And on behalf of the family, we appreciate the
recognition. [Laughter.]
Mr. Shays. Tell me about his brother. I will listen.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Carpenter. The issue being, in 1985, the staffing size
of diplomatic security was the same as it was in 1998, for the
bombings.
It ramped up after the Inman Commission, and it came back
down, shortly thereafter. I would say that is at least a factor
in what we are experiencing, right now.
My plea or my point here is that we cannot allow what
happened after Inman to happen. I think we all have that
responsibility to ensure that that does not happen again.
I hear a lot of grumblings within my own bureau, and within
the State Department, that we are destined for that. If we are,
we are destined to fail, again. I would just ask your
assistance and help in ensuring that that does not happen,
again.
Mr. Shays. I am sorry, ``destined to fail'' in what way? I
just missed the first part.
Mr. Carpenter. I think if the commitment that appears to be
made by the Hill, to finances, more people, security things
rise up, or we take our eye off the ball, then we will be
destined to have another incident.
Mr. Shays. That is fair enough, and important to put on the
record. Thank you.
Mr. Nelson, do you have anything that you would like to say
in conclusion?
Mr. Nelson. I would just like to conclude by saying that
the problems and challenges that the Department faces, I think,
are well recognized.
I think that it will be incumbent upon this committee and
the Congress to make sure that the Department has a clear
vision and strategy for what it would like to achieve, and a
commitment that is supported by the Congress in order to avoid
what Mr. Carpenter referred to.
I think the issues of the U.S. presence, as well as the
protection of a U.S. staff and information, are a critical
national security issue for the country; not for any particular
group. Diligence will be required, as well as continued
oversight by this committee.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
I am struck by a recollection of the time I had a briefing.
As a state representative, we were invited down, the so-called
young leaders, and there were about 300 of us in a 2-day
conference. It was my total education on realizing that the
State Department thrives on ambiguity. So the Results Act must
be that cultural challenge. [Laughter.]
But I am absolutely convinced, hearing the testimony today,
how important it would be to have a clear vision, and in so
many different areas, how beneficial it would be.
Mr. Carpenter, are you all set?
Mr. Carpenter. Yes.
Mr. Shays. Yes, Ms. Williams-Bridgers.
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. Mr. Chairman, I would like to
provide some support and encouragement to this committee, to
undertake the type of initiative that Mr. Mica suggested. I
think that it is a critical issue that has to be addressed in
the short term.
Mr. Shays. Which one?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. The information sharing and the need
for inter-agency communications at post.
Mr. Shays. OK.
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. It is not only an issue of
importance to strategic planning, and being able to have open
lines of communications about what our goals and priorities
are, overseas.
But it also is important, because in this age where
information moves so very quickly, and where our knowledge is
not keeping up with the need to attend to security of
information that flows very quickly, I think it is important to
have some kind of collegial discussions with all the agencies
and the appropriators and the authorizers, who all have vested
interests in making sure that that type of communication
occurs.
Also, it is important, because in some of our critical and
national interests, border security being one which I know this
committee is concerned about, the lack of information sharing
by agencies particularly in the Justice Department and INS,
with State Department, and consulate offices, about aliens that
might bring harm to the United States, that information is not
being routinely shared with the State Department now.
It is a long standing issue, and it is one that we have
brought to the attention of many committees in the Congress in
the past.
It needs immediate attention to ensure that the type of
information is made available to State, so that as they
adjudicate visas and issue new laser visas, that carry with
them biometric data, that that will ensure better protection of
identifying people who are not intended recipients of our
visas.
But I think that type of information sharing is critical. I
would hope that that issue would be embraced in any future
discussions that this committee might lead.
Mr. Shays. Thank you very much.
Mr. Edwards, are you all set?
Mr. Edwards. Yes, and I am in general agreement with all of
my colleagues here.
I think Mr. Mica was absolutely correct. He had mentioned
with narcotics, for example, there must be 10 to 12 agencies.
One of the issues would be, if each of those 10 agencies,
let us say, have three people in an Embassy, does it make
sense, perhaps, to boil that down to two agencies? So instead
of having 20 people, maybe you can reduce that to 10 to 12, and
have a lead agency in a particular country for these multi-
agency issues.
That was discussed at the Cabinet meeting. Attorney General
Reno suggested that, for example, law enforcement might do
that. I might say that her suggestion was met with not a great
deal of concurrence with her fellow law enforcement agencies.
But that is one of the issues that we have, working
together. Mr. Tierney, you had mentioned 100 janitors, and 10
of them were cleared, or some statistic like that. As you know,
we are subject to the FAIR Act, where we have to contract out
essentially non-Government services, domestically.
When you look at a janitor force, one of the things that
baffles me, having come in from the private sector, we have
those people during working hours, because if they are not
cleared, we have to watch what they are doing.
My three colleagues at this table all have routines, when
they come into their front office, somebody has to trail these
people around. If the telephone repairman comes in, he puts all
these parts out on the floor. You do not know what in the world
they are putting into them.
We have a few Xerox repairmen and a few telephone repairmen
that are cleared. But, you know, when the back-up forces come,
that has introduced a challenge to diplomatic security, as well
as the agency.
You know, those people may be there for nefarious purposes.
Of course, in many cases, these people are in the lower income
areas. Getting people that can pass clearance, from people
coming from either immigrants to the country or lower income,
is not the easiest thing in the world.
Mr. Tierney. I guess, at least with regard to that, it
might do everybody well to examine whether it makes sense in
continuing to contract out, and run into those repetitive
problems, or to have the staff on hand, and whether that would,
in fact, save money. You would have staff on hand that was just
cleared, once and for all.
Mr. Edwards. I think that is a good observation. Of course,
if they were cleared, perhaps they could come in where they
were not underfoot, with everybody else, during the 8 busy
hours. However, my own experience is that we are 24 times 7. So
the building is never empty.
But it is discouraging, when you are there with a
conference in your conference room, and the vacuum cleaner is
going on in your front office.
Mr. Tierney. For that reason, for security, for a number of
reasons, it would seem to make sense that sometimes these
policies, while well intended, sort of wash over.
Thank you.
Mr. Shays. I wish I could think of a metaphor for ending up
with cleaners. [Laughter.]
Thank you all. It has been a very interesting hearing,
actually. I appreciate your flexibility in doing it this way. I
think it worked better.
Thank you. This hearing is closed.
[Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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