Army National Guard: Officer Candidate Training Should Be Consolidated at
One Site (Letter Report, 03/22/94, GAO/NSIAD-94-1).
The Defense Department funds more than 50 schools to produce officers
for the Army National Guard. GAO reviewed the operations of these
schools to determine whether the Army National Guard could meet its
officer needs more effectively and economically. This report discusses
the (1) numbers of officers being produced by the various National Guard
commissioning sources, particularly the state officer candidate schools;
(2) recent consolidation of portions of the state officer candidate
school programs; and (3) potential for increasing economies through
further consolidation.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: NSIAD-94-1
TITLE: Army National Guard: Officer Candidate Training Should Be
Consolidated at One Site
DATE: 03/22/94
SUBJECT: Armed forces reserve training
Military training
Military officers
Army personnel
Education or training costs
Military cost control
Federal agency reorganization
Military reserve personnel
Centralization
Cost effectiveness analysis
IDENTIFIER: Georgia
Reserve Officer Training Corps
Nebraska
Alaska
Wyoming
Arkansas
Maine
Virginia
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Cover
================================================================ COVER
Report to the Secretary of Defense
March 1994
ARMY NATIONAL GUARD - OFFICER
CANDIDATE TRAINING SHOULD BE
CONSOLIDATED AT
ONE SITE
GAO/NSIAD-94-1
Army National Guard
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
ARNG - Army National Guard
DOD - Department of Defense
OCS - officer candidate school
ROTC - Reserve Officers Training Corps
Letter
=============================================================== LETTER
B-255109
March 22, 1994
The Honorable William J. Perry
Secretary of Defense
Dear Mr. Secretary:
The Department of Defense (DOD) funds the operation of over 50
schools to produce officers for the Army National Guard (ARNG). We
reviewed the operations of these schools to determine if the ARNG
could meet its officer needs more effectively and economically. We
examined the (1) numbers of officers being produced by the various
ARNG commissioning sources, particularly the state officer candidate
schools (OCS); (2) recent consolidation of portions of the state OCS
programs; and (3) potential for increasing economies through further
consolidation.
BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1
The ARNG exists in all 50 states plus the District of Columbia and
the trust territories of Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin
Islands. The National Guard has both a state and a federal mission.
In peacetime, the National Guard performs a variety of state support
roles such as riot control, disaster relief, and drug interdiction,
in addition to training for their wartime mission. In wartime, the
National Guard can be mobilized and called to active duty for
extended periods of time.
The ARNG operates OCS programs in conjunction with state military
academies in 52 states and territories. Currently, all but Guam and
the Virgin Islands offer the OCS course as a part of their state
military academy curriculum. The cost of operating the OCS programs
is supported primarily with federal dollars.
The state OCS program lasts approximately 1 year and is taught in
three phases. Phase 1, conducted in a 2-week annual summer training
period, focuses on individual- and squad-level skills. Phase 2
continues a mix of individual- and squad-level training at a
frequency of 1 weekend per month. Phase 3 is conducted during the
next summer's 2-week annual training period, and emphasizes
platoon-level training. At the end of the phase 3 training,
individuals are eligible to be commissioned in the ARNG.
Other sources of newly commissioned ARNG officers include the federal
OCS at Fort Benning, Georgia; the Reserve Officers Training Corps
(ROTC); and direct appointments (which are primarily professional
personnel such as doctors, lawyers, and chaplains). Fort Benning is
the only active Army site offering OCS training, and offers two OCS
courses--the regular active duty 14-week course and a reserve
component course, which is 10 weeks in duration.\1
From 1981 through 1992, an average of 44.4 percent of initial
accessions were from the state OCSs, 41.7 percent were ROTC
graduates, 4.4 percent received officer training at Fort Benning, and
9.5 percent received direct appointments. In addition to these
commissioning programs, the ARNG also gets officers from those
leaving active duty.
--------------------
\1 We were told those attending the 10-week class spend more hours
per week in training activities, some of the physical training
aspects are shortened, and some optional training activities are
omitted. All Army commissioning programs, active and reserve, are
required to meet the standards established in the Military
Qualifications Standards-1 manual, regardless of the length of the
training.
RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2
ARNG officer requirements and the number of officers commissioned
through the state OCS program have declined by one-third since 1988
and could decline further. The ARNG has begun consolidation of
phases 1 and 3 of the states' officer training. However, this will
not reduce the number of schools in operation. Consolidation of ARNG
commissioning training at a single site would offer additional
opportunities to enhance the quality of the program and cut costs by
closing the state programs.
In response to congressional direction, the Army considered, but
rejected, the feasibility of requiring all officer candidates to
attend the OCS program at Fort Benning. Its conclusion was based on
the following assumptions: (1) Fort Benning does not have sufficient
capacity to train the ARNG candidates, (2) candidates would not be
willing to attend a centralized program, and (3) the quality of the
consolidated program would not be superior to the state programs. We
believe the Army did not have sufficient basis to reject the
feasibility of the consolidation approach because the first two
assumptions were not sound and the third assumption is untestable
because the Army does not capture data on the quality of the various
OCS programs. However, available evidence suggests that a
centralized OCS program for the ARNG would provide equal or higher
quality commissioning training at a lower cost.
NUMBER OF OFFICERS PRODUCED BY
ARNG OCS PROGRAM HAS DECLINED
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3
The number of ARNG graduates of the state OCS program declined from
almost 1,900 to less than 1,200 between 1988 and 1993, as shown in
figure 1.
Figure 1: State OCS Graduates,
1988-93
(See figure in printed
edition.)
With the overall decline in OCS graduates, the size of the graduating
classes in individual state schools has likewise declined. Table 1
shows how the class sizes of the state academies have decreased over
the past 5 years. In 1988, California and New York graduated 143 and
128 ARNG officers, respectively. By 1992, the highest number to
graduate from any one school was California, with 70 graduates;
Nevada graduated 3, while Alaska and the District of Columbia did not
operate a class that year.
Table 1
Size of State OCS Classes Based on the
Number of ARNG Graduates 1988-92
11- 26- 51- 76-
Year 1-10 25 50 75 100 101+ Total
----------- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- =====
1988 8 15 15 11 1 2 52
1989 9 24 10 7 1 2 53
1990 7 22 19 2 2 0 52
1991 7 24 16 3 2 0 52
1992 10 22 15 3 0 0 50
------------------------------------------------------------
Despite the steady decline in the number of candidates, the number of
classes during 1988 to 1992 has remained fairly constant. Overall,
the typical state OCS program is fairly small. In fact, 64 percent
of the state OCS classes graduated fewer than 26 candidates in 1992.
The ARNG's need for new officers from its OCSs has been decreasing,
due to (1) cuts in military forces; (2) new officers commissioned via
the ROTC; and (3) the Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act
of 1992, which established an objective of increasing the percentage
of qualified prior active-duty officers in the ARNG to 65 percent by
September 30, 1997.
Anticipating an annual need for 1,500 to 2,100 lieutenants through
1996, the ARNG plans for state academies and the federal OCS together
to provide one-third of that number, with ROTC and active-duty
sources each providing another third. Of the OCS third, federal OCS
will train 35 percent (175 to 245) and the state academies will train
the remaining 65 percent (325 to 455 students). This will represent
a significant reduction from the nearly 1,200 candidates who
graduated from state academies in 1992.
ARNG IS CONSOLIDATING PARTS OF
STATE OCS PROGRAM
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4
To maintain training quality as the number of students decline, ARNG
academy officials have begun some consolidation of the annual
training periods (phases 1 and 3). In 1993, 43 states consolidated
at least one of their annual training periods. Phase 1 training was
conducted at 31 locations and phase 3 at 20 locations during 1993.
By 1995, the ARNG plans to conduct phase 1 training at only five
locations and phase 3 training at only two locations. Phase 2,
however, would continue to be taught over a year during weekend
drills at the individual state OCS academies. According to ARNG
officials, consolidation of phase 1 and phase 3 provides the
following advantages:
A sufficient number of candidates is needed to provide realistic
platoon-level training. We were told that 40 to 50 students are
needed to provide 4 full squads for this training, although some
officials believe that 24 students organized into 3
skeletally-staffed squads is sufficient. Even using this lesser
number as a criterion, in 1992 only 20 of the states had enough
students to provide realistic training.
All active and reserve component Army officer candidates would
receive the same training.
Several states are also considering consolidation of phase 2
(weekend) training, which is considered highly desirable for those
adjacent states having too few students to conduct realistic and
economical training. In 1993, for example, Alaska and Wyoming
offered a consolidated, shortened training period of 6 weeks--2 weeks
of phase 1 were taught in a consolidated session in Nebraska, then a
2-week phase 2 was held in Alaska, followed by a 2-week phase 3 in
Washington. Six-week training periods are not new to Alaska's ARNG
academy; for years, the OCS there offered its program in one 6-week
period. According to Alaska ARNG officials, a 6-week training
program fits the seasonal nature of Alaskan life styles, has been
accredited, and meets all the standards required of such schools.
A SINGLE TRAINING SITE COULD
ENHANCE QUALITY AND LOWER COSTS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5
The ARNG's consolidation efforts offer some advantages over the
current training. However, consolidating all phases of ARNG training
into a 10-week course at a single site could result in even
higher-quality training and more cost savings.
One-site training would ensure that all ARNG officer candidates
receive the same level and quality of training. A full-time faculty
and staff would provide continuity of training and counseling. The
quality of instructors could be more easily assessed at a single
location. Additionally, one-site training would allow greater
realism in training. Consecutive or uninterrupted training could
also minimize refresher training currently needed in the one drill
weekend per month training. In fact, the Air National Guard trains
its officer candidates this way. All of its candidates are trained
at one site--the Air National Guard Academy of Military Science--in a
6-week officer training program.
Consolidated training could also reduce the attrition rate for the
officer candidate schools. We found that centralized courses, such
as the National Guard OCS program offered by the Air Force and the
federal OCS program at Fort Benning, have experienced lower attrition
rates than the state academies. ARNG now averages a 38-percent
attrition rate; in comparison, ARNG officer candidates attending the
federal OCS have averaged a 27-percent attrition rate. The Air
National Guard Academy has experienced only a 2-percent attrition
rate over the last 3 years.
Training all ARNG officers at a single site offers the opportunity
for significant savings with regard to personnel. However, because
neither National Guard headquarters nor the individual states track
personnel costs associated with the OCS programs, it is difficult to
estimate the amount of such savings with precision. At the four
states we visited (Alaska, Arkansas, Maine, and Virginia), we
constructed estimates of annual personnel costs ranging from $54,000
to $155,000, averaging approximately $102,000. Assuming each of the
52 OCS programs incurred the average personnel cost, the total
personnel costs for operating OCS would be approximately $5.3
million. We believe this is a conservative estimate, as we did not
visit any of the larger schools. The limitations on the cost data
are discussed in greater detail in our scope and methodology section.
Officials at the federal OCS program at Fort Benning told us that
they currently produce approximately 400 graduates with a full-time
staff of 38. If the number of OCS candidates were increased to Fort
Benning's full capacity of 1,200--enough to train both active and
ARNG candidates--program officials said they would need 24 more
fulltime personnel. These personnel would cost about $1.4 million a
year. If all state OCS candidates were trained at Fort Benning the
cost savings could be about $3.9 million a year, depending on how
many positions were eliminated at the state academies. Eliminating
the state OCS programs would not entail closing any installations or
facilities, since the OCS schools are a relatively small part of the
state ARNG military training programs.
Neither National Guard headquarters nor the individual states track
travel expenses associated specifically with the ARNG OCS programs.
While sending all officer candidates to a single site would likely
require more travel expenses than the state programs have been
incurring, centralized training could still save money if the travel
cost experiences at the state academies we visited are indicative of
total savings.
While training all officer candidates at a single site would require
all academies to transport their candidates to that location,
candidates would only have to be transported one time to complete the
OCS course. In fact, many states have already begun transporting
their candidates to out-of-state training and anticipate doing it
more under the planned interstate consolidations of phases 1 and 3 in
the future. For example, as a result of the summer training
consolidations, 22 academies incurred transportation expenses to send
their officer candidates to one phase of training conducted in
another state. Another 14 academies incurred transportation expenses
to send candidates out of state for 2 phases. Plans for further
summer training consolidation will result in most of the state
academies having to transport their candidates twice to training
conducted outside of their resident state.
In addition, requiring all candidates to attend a single site will
eliminate the in-state transportation expenses incurred during the
phase 2 (weekend drill) training. Currently, several states are
incurring travel expenses to get their officer candidates to the
weekend drill periods of phase 2 training. Candidates attached to
local ARNG units receive travel and per diem allowances for weekend
drills. The states differ in deciding whether candidates should be
attached to the academy or left with their home units, so some states
pay travel expenses while others do not. In one of the four states
we visited, phase 2 travel costs involved in commissioning an officer
were as high as $26,000. The phase 2 travel expenses would not be
required for any officer candidates attending the 10-week
consolidated training at a single site.
ARMY REJECTED FORT BENNING FOR
ONE-SITE CONSOLIDATION BUT
DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS
ASSUMPTIONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6
Consolidating the ARNG OCS programs is not a new idea. Section 527
of the fiscal years 1992 and 1993 Defense Authorization Act (Public
Law 102-190) required the Army to evaluate the desirability of
requiring all ARNG personnel seeking a commission through OCS to
attend the OCS at Fort Benning. This requirement was prompted by a
concern over variance in quality of the state-administered OCS
courses.
The Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and
Reserve Affairs) reported in March 1993 that "... the Army believes
the current system strikes a reasonable balance between quality,
available resources, field requirements, and the needs of RC [Reserve
Component] soldiers." The Army based its conclusions on three
assumptions: (1) ARNG-OCS needs would exceed the capacity of Fort
Benning and therefore require significant investment in additional
facilities, (2) sufficient qualified candidates would not be willing
to attend OCS at Fort Benning, and (3) there was no evidence that
Fort Benning's program produced a better officer. We believe that
the first two assumptions are unsound. While the third assumption is
untestable due to the lack of data comparing alternative
commissioning programs, available evidence suggests that a
consolidated program would be of equal or greater quality to the
individual programs.
FORT BENNING HAS THE
CAPACITY TO TRAIN GUARD
OFFICERS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :6.1
The Army report stated that eliminating the state OCS program and
expanding either the federal OCS or the OCS-Reserve Component course
would require a significant expenditure of resources. Officials who
conducted the Army study told us their conclusion was based on the
assumption that Fort Benning currently had the capacity to produce
only 350 officers annually and that Fort Benning would be required to
construct additional facilities to train all the OCS candidates. Our
review, however, indicates that this is not the case.
Currently, Fort Benning offers 4 regular classes and 1 reserve
component class annually, producing about 400 new lieutenants. As
shown in figure 2, Fort Benning previously produced between 1,000 and
1,400 graduates per year during most of the 1980s. However, as of
February 1993, the Army plans to produce a maximum of only 450 OCS
officers annually through 1998. The projected OCS production
consists of 300 for the active component, 100 for the National Guard,
and 50 for the Army Reserves.
Figure 2: Number of Fort
Benning OCS Graduates, 1981-92
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Officials at Fort Benning said current facilities can produce 1,200
officers annually without overlapping classes or the need to
construct new facilities. With a capacity of 1,200 and the ARNG need
for 500 to 700 OCS officers annually, it appears that the current
facilities at Fort Benning would accommodate the needs of both the
active Army and the ARNG.
ARMY SURVEY AND AIR NATIONAL
GUARD EXPERIENCE INDICATE
CANDIDATES WOULD ATTEND A
CENTRALIZED OCS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :6.2
ARNG officials stated that a number of their candidates would not
attend a 6- to 10-week centralized OCS program because of job or
family commitments. The Army report stated that ". . . [I]t
is not clear that there would be enough qualified officers for
the National Guard if attendance at Federal OCS were required."
However, the evidence indicates that this concern is overstated.
Available data indicated that centralizing ARNG commissioning
training would not have a great impact on recruitment of officer
candidates. An Army survey of state officer candidates,\2
administered in April 1992, indicated that over 60 percent of the
candidates would have attended the 10- or 14-week federal OCS if
required, while only 17 percent said they would not become officers
if Fort Benning were the only option. Eighteen percent were
undecided, and 5 percent said they would choose ROTC as a
commissioning source.
Additionally, Air National Guard officials stated that they have had
no difficulty in obtaining candidates for their 6-week centralized
officer training program. While the past experience of Air National
Guard officials and the opinions of current officer candidates may
not be directly applicable to future ARNG officer candidates, we
believe that, with the significant reduction in officer requirements,
the ARNG will not have difficulty attracting officer candidates if
the training is conducted at Fort Benning.
--------------------
\2 Survey prepared by Army Personnel Survey Office, U.S. Army
Research Institute for the Behavior and Social Sciences.
NO EVIDENCE ON THE QUALITY
OF OFFICERS PRODUCED BY
DIFFERENT OFFICER ACCESSION
PROGRAMS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :6.3
The Army report stated that "[T]here is no convincing evidence
that the Federal OCS program produces an officer superior in
quality to the other programs."
However, Army officials responsible for the report told us they were
not able to measure quality of officers produced at either the state
academies or Fort Benning.
The Army has a core curriculum that all commissioning programs,
including the Military Academy, ROTC, and the OCSs, must follow to
ensure that all new officers meet the Army's minimum qualifications.
While each ARNG academy maintains a standard program of instruction
and tests, neither the Army nor the states have assessed the
performance of academy graduates as officers. In an earlier review
we found a similar situation for all newly commissioned officers, and
we recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct the services to
develop a means to routinely evaluate the effectiveness of the
various commissioning programs and the quality of the graduates that
they produce.\3 This project is to be implemented for the active
services by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
Each ARNG academy operates independently, with policy and funding
provided by the National Guard Bureau. Each undergoes annual
accreditation reviews by the U.S. Army Forces Command, but these are
merely checklist assessments of candidate selection, instruction,
facilities, and availability of applicable regulations. The states
we visited also use several internal quality assurance checks, but
these are not standardized and rely primarily on the discretion of
the state. The Army is planning to accredit each academy under a new
program in the future, but details on this program were unavailable
at the time of our review.
--------------------
\3 Officer Commissioning Programs: More Oversight and Coordination
Needed (GAO/NSIAD-93-37, Nov. 6, 1992).
RECOMMENDATION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7
To make the ARNG officer production system more cost-effective,
especially in light of ongoing force reductions, we recommend that
you direct the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of the National
Guard Bureau to transition toward using the officer candidate school
at Fort Benning, Georgia, to train new ARNG officers rather than
using the individual state academies. A staged transition, such as
closing the smaller academies first, could be used to capture
reliable personnel and travel cost data to provide a more conclusive
assessment of cost-effectiveness. Since closing state OCS academies
would not involve closing down installations or facilities, there is
little potential risk in moving quickly.
AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
EVALUATION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :8
DOD did not agree with our recommendation. It argued that (1) the
state ARNG OCS programs will have to produce more of the officers by
1997, (2) our estimates of cost savings at a single, consolidated
site appear to be inflated, and (3) centralized training would have a
negative impact on the ability to recruit officer candidates. DOD
comments are reprinted in appendix I.
DOD built its argument on the need for more state OCS-trained ARNG
officers by 1997 by assuming that ROTC and active duty transfers
combined would provide only 700 to 800 of the total need, in contrast
to the 500 to 700 officers from each of those sources that we cite.
We based our numbers on the latest available projections prepared by
the ARNG Readiness Center. The Readiness Center has projected the
need for state OCS-trained officer accessions to decrease from 925 in
fiscal year 1993, to 828 in 1994, to 750 in 1995, and to 700 in 1996
and 1997, based on a total need of about 2,100 to 2,300 ARNG officer
accessions per year. These ARNG-prepared projections of the number
of graduates needed from the state OCS programs are well below the
1,150 to 1,450 per year cited by DOD and they are within the capacity
of the Fort Benning OCS program to produce.
DOD's assumption also ignores the Readiness Reform Act's goal of
increasing the percentage of National Guard officers who have prior
active duty service, which should prompt more vigorous ARNG
recruitment efforts among those officers leaving the active military.
In addition, over the 12-year period from fiscal year 1981 through
1992, ROTC programs provided over 14,000 ARNG officers, or an average
of nearly 1,200 per year--well in excess of the 500 to 700 projected
to be needed annually from that source in the future. DOD's
statement that only 700 to 800 new officers could be expected from
ROTC and active duty transfers combined is at odds with this
experience.
DOD's concern about our cost estimates centered on the need to pay
per diem expenses to candidates if they attended a consolidated
training site. According to military travel regulations, this would
amount to just $2 per day (or $140 for a 10-week program). If 1,000
candidates attended the training each year, per diem costs would be
only $140,000 annually--and projected savings could still be over
$3.7 million per year. DOD also stated that candidates attending
phase 2 training do not receive any travel pay or per diem. However,
we found that some states do in fact pay travel and per diem during
phase 2 training.
DOD also stated that a consolidated training site would result in up
to 40 percent of potential officer candidates foregoing joining the
ARNG because of conflicts with employment and education programs.
The source cited for that figure was the same survey conducted by the
Army Research Institute that we referred to in our report. DOD
arrived at its 40 percent estimate by adding the 17 percent who said
they would not become officers (if the Fort Benning program were the
only option), the 5 percent who said they would choose ROTC instead
of Fort Benning, and the 18 percent who, although having the option
to say they would not become ARNG officers, only indicated they were
undecided. We can see no rationale for necessarily assuming that the
additional 23 percent that DOD included would not join the ARNG.
In addition, DOD stressed that a change to a single-site program
would be particularly risky because the ARNG was already experiencing
a shortage of approximately 3,250 captains. This is an incomplete
depiction of the situation and overstates the risk. During the same
period in which the DOD cites the shortage of captains, the ARNG also
had about 3,450 more lieutenants than authorized and, overall, the
ARNG had an excess of officers in the company grade ranks (second
lieutenant through captain).
We continue to believe that available data suggests that
consideration of officer candidate training at Fort Benning would
meet the ARNG's needs at lower cost than individual state schools.
We also maintain that a staged transition toward a single site
consolidation would provide more conclusive data while minimizing
risk.
SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :9
We reviewed guidance and regulations on the ARNG's commissioning
sources, interviewed ARNG and Air National Guard officials, and
obtained data at the ARNG headquarters and OCS programs in Alaska,
Arkansas, Maine, and Virginia. These states were judgmentally
selected on the basis of program size and geographical distribution.
We had originally selected six state academies, two each from
programs identified by ARNG authorities as small, medium, and large
in size. However, after visiting four of these states, we determined
that none collected adequate cost information and that continuing
further with this methodology was not likely to be productive. We
therefore focused the remainder of our fieldwork on reviewing the
results of the consolidated OCS programs.
We had also intended to gather cost and program quality data from all
the other state and territory programs through a pro-forma data
collection instrument, but the absence of such information would have
made this option unworkable. The cost estimates we were able to
construct for the four academies we visited were based on state ARNG
estimates of which personnel were involved in the OCS program and how
much of their time the OCS program consumed.
We visited the consolidated phase 3 training at Fort Lewis,
Washington, and interviewed representatives from the nine
participating states. In addition, we interviewed Army officials
from headquarters, the Training and Doctrine Command, and Fort
Benning. We also interviewed Air Force and Air National Guard
officials at headquarters, the Air National Guard Academy, and the
four states we visited.
We performed our review between July 1992 and December 1993 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :9.1
We are sending copies of this report to the chairmen and ranking
minority members of the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations
(Defense Subcommittee) and Armed Services, the Secretary of the Army,
the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, and the Director of the
Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies available
to others upon request.
As you know, 31 U.S.C. 720 requires the head of a federal agency to
submit a written statement on actions taken on our recommendations to
the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs and the House Committee
on Government Operations no later than 60 days after the date of the
report and to the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations with
the agency's first request for appropriations made more than 60 days
after the date of the report.
Please contact me at (202) 512-5140 if you have any questions
concerning this report. Major contributors are listed in appendix
II.
Sincerely yours,
Mark E. Gebicke
Director
Military Operations and Capabilities Issues
(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix I
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
============================================================== Letter
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================== Appendix II
NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:1
Norm Rabkin, Associate Director
William E. Beusse, Assistant Director
NORFOLK REGIONAL OFFICE
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:2
Dudley C. Roache, Jr., Regional Management Representative
Cora M. Bowman, Evaluator-in-Charge
Sharon L. Reid, Evaluator