Reserve Forces: DOD Policies Do Not Ensure That Personnel Meet Medical
and Physical Fitness Standards (Chapter Report, 03/23/94,
GAO/NSIAD-94-36).
Lax Defense Department (DOD) oversight of medical and physical fitness
programs for reserves forces allowed the deployment of thousands of Army
reservists during the Persian Gulf War who were out of shape or who
suffered from serious health problems. DOD's medical policy allows the
services to retain nondeployable reservists. As a result, the Army
retained more than 22,000 reservists with serious medical conditions,
including cancer; heart disease; double kidney failure; and, in one
case, a gunshot wound to the head. The Air Force, the Marine Corps, and
the Navy, on the other hand, do not retain reservists with serious
medical problems. The services' physical fitness testing programs assess
only general fitness and do not measure reservists' preparedness for
specific military missions. The Army, for example, does not test
whether reservists can complete a road march. DOD was unaware of these
problems because the services failed to report required fitness
information. Also, most of the services lacked controls to prevent the
alteration of test scores.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: NSIAD-94-36
TITLE: Reserve Forces: DOD Policies Do Not Ensure That Personnel
Meet Medical and Physical Fitness Standards
DATE: 03/23/94
SUBJECT: Defense contingency planning
Combat readiness
Military reserve personnel
Military training
Armed forces reserve training
Human resources utilization
Medical examinations
Mobilization
National defense operations
IDENTIFIER: Desert Storm
Desert Shield
Persian Gulf War
Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation System
Army Standard Installation/Division Personnel System
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Cover
================================================================ COVER
Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on Armed
Services, House of Representatives
March 1994
RESERVE FORCES - DOD POLICIES DO
NOT ENSURE THAT PERSONNEL MEET
MEDICAL AND PHYSICAL FITNESS
STANDARDS
GAO/NSIAD-94-36
Reserve Forces
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
DOD - Department of Defense
GAO - General Accounting Office
Letter
=============================================================== LETTER
B-252086
March 23, 1994
The Honorable Earl Hutto
Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives
Dear Mr. Chairman:
This report responds to your request that we review the adequacy of
the medical and physical fitness policies and practices for reserve
forces of the Department of Defense and the military services. A
major objective was to determine whether the Department had taken
appropriate actions to correct the problems we identified in 1992
resulting from nondeployable personnel during Operations Desert
Shield and Desert Storm. This report contains recommendations to the
Secretary of Defense to ensure that reserve forces are fit for
military operations.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce this
report's contents earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30
days from its issue date. At that time, we will send copies to
appropriate congressional committees; the Secretaries of Defense, the
Air Force, the Army, and the Navy; and the Director, Office of
Management and Budget. Copies also will be made available to others
on request.
Please contact me at (202) 512-5140 if you or your staff have any
questions concerning this report. Major contributors to this report
are listed in appendix IV.
Sincerely yours,
Mark E. Gebicke
Director, Military Operations
and Capabilities Issues
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
============================================================ Chapter 0
PURPOSE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1
Reserve forces are critical to the successful conduct of military
operations. These forces played a vital role in Operations Desert
Shield and Desert Storm and are expected to play an increasingly
important role in future military operations as the Department of
Defense (DOD) reduces the size of active forces. However, Operations
Desert Shield and Desert Storm revealed that some reservists were not
in proper medical or physical condition for war. Some reservists
could not deploy to the Persian Gulf, and others had difficulty
performing their missions while there. The Chairman, Subcommittee on
Readiness, House Committee on Armed Services, requested that GAO
determine the adequacy of DOD and service (1) medical retention
policies and practices for reservists, (2) physical fitness test
results as a measure of reservists' preparedness for military
missions, and (3) management controls to ensure the achievement of
fitness program objectives.
BACKGROUND
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2
DOD's medical retention policy identifies the diseases and medical
conditions that may make active and reserve service members unfit to
perform their military duties. Each service establishes its own
policy for making fitness determinations of active and reserve
personnel. In 1986, DOD added a deployability standard to its policy
that prohibits the services from separating members solely on their
inability to perform duties at all theaters worldwide. The sole
standard to be used in making fitness determinations is whether a
medical condition prevents a service member from performing his or
her duties.
DOD's physical fitness policy, in effect since 1981, requires the
services to develop the physical skills that members will need to
perform their missions. DOD requires the services to test the
physical fitness of all personnel annually and allows the services to
separate those who fail. DOD also requires the services to assess
and report on their physical fitness programs.
RESULTS IN BRIEF
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3
DOD has been extremely lax in overseeing the services' implementation
of its medical and physical fitness programs for reservists. DOD's
medical policy, which permits the services to retain nondeployable
reservists, is inconsistent with the current military strategy. This
strategy requires forces to be capable of responding quickly to
unexpected military contingencies anywhere in the world. DOD's
policy has allowed the Army to retain more than 22,000 reserve
component personnel with serious medical conditions that may prevent
them from deploying to a contingency. The Air Force, the Marine
Corps, and the Navy, on the other hand, separate reservists with
serious and limiting medical conditions.
The services' physical fitness testing programs assess only general
fitness levels and do not measure reservists' preparedness for
specific military missions. For example, the Army does not test
whether reserve component personnel can complete a road march--a
common task for infantry soldiers.
DOD was not aware of these problems because the services were not
reporting fitness information to it as required. If the services had
provided DOD with the required assessments, DOD might have been able
to identify and prevent the fitness problems that surfaced during
Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Also, most of the
services did not have controls to prevent the alteration of test
scores.
PRINCIPAL FINDINGS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4
DOD'S MEDICAL POLICY ALLOWS
THE RETENTION OF RESERVISTS
WITH SERIOUS MEDICAL
CONDITIONS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.1
DOD's medical policy does not require reservists to be deployable
worldwide to remain in military service. DOD permits the services to
retain personnel who can only be deployed to certain theaters where
adequate medical care is available to monitor and treat their medical
condition but might not be deployed to other theaters lacking
adequate medical care. However, DOD established the policy during
the Cold War when the U.S. force was much larger and the threat was
well defined. Today's national security strategy is based on a much
smaller force and unpredictable threats that require forces to
respond quickly to worldwide contingencies, such as the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait. In GAO's view, this strategy necessitates that
reservists be deployable to all potential theaters.
The Air Force, the Marine Corps, and the Navy have adopted more
stringent standards and separate reservists with permanent medical
conditions that limit their deployability. These services based
their policies on mission needs, which require reservists to be able
to deploy rapidly anywhere in the world. However, in 1992 the Army
retained
22,000 reserve component personnel with permanent medical conditions
that may prevent them from marching, running, crawling, or being near
gunfire. In the event of a military contingency, these soldiers may
not be deployable or may be limited only to certain theaters. The
Army has not evaluated the deployability of these personnel.
The retention of medically nondeployable reserve component personnel
can adversely affect wartime operations. In 1991, the Army's
Inspector General reported that an estimated 8,000 reserve component
personnel were called up but subsequently found to be medically
nondeployable during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The
Inspector General noted that the actual number might have been much
higher. One Army mobilization station that GAO visited found about 4
percent of the reserve component personnel mobilized had serious
medical conditions that prevented them from deploying. These
conditions included cancer; heart disease; double kidney failure;
muscular dystrophy; and, in one case, a gunshot wound to the head.
FITNESS TESTING DOES NOT
MEASURE RESERVISTS' ABILITY
TO DO MILITARY TASKS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.2
DOD does not require the services to test whether reservists possess
the physical skills to perform their military tasks. Instead, DOD
only requires the services to assess general fitness levels. Each
service's fitness testing program differs greatly in content and
difficulty. For example, the Navy tests reservists' ability to
complete four activities: a 1-1/2-mile run or walk or a 500-yard
swim, push-ups, curl-ups, and a sit-reach exercise. In contrast, the
Air Force's test includes only one activity: a 1-1/2-mile run or a
3-mile walk. The programs' lack of a mission focus and different
testing criteria make it difficult for DOD and the services to
accurately assess whether personnel possess the physical skills
required for their missions.
The lack of mission-focused programs can adversely affect military
operations. During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Army
reports noted that some reserve component personnel were not in
proper physical condition to perform their missions. The reports
recommended the adoption of mission-focused fitness programs.
Several DOD, Army, Air Force, and Navy officials said that
mission-specific fitness testing was needed. However, a DOD official
stated that the services were opposed to a requirement for
mission-specific testing.
MANAGEMENT CONTROL
WEAKNESSES PRECLUDE
DISCLOSURE OF FITNESS
PROBLEMS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.3
DOD lacks adequate management controls in two areas concerning the
services' physical fitness programs. First, the services did not
report required fitness information to DOD, and DOD did not enforce
this requirement. Even if DOD had tried to enforce the requirement,
the services lacked sufficient information to conduct adequate
assessments. As a result, DOD was not aware that the Army was
retaining reserve component personnel who repeatedly failed fitness
tests, the Marine Corps and the Navy were exempting older reservists
from testing, and many reservists might not have taken required
tests. If DOD had been aware of this information, it might have been
able to identify and prevent the problems that surfaced during the
Gulf War.
Second, except for the Marine Corps, the services did not have
controls to prevent the alteration of fitness test scores. In some
instances, fitness test scores for Army and Navy reservists had been
changed from failing to passing.
GAO believes that DOD's physical fitness program contains material
control weaknesses. However, DOD has not identified its program as
containing material weaknesses in its annual reports to the President
and the Congress, under the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act
of 1982.
RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:5
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense (1) revise DOD's medical
retention policy to require that reservists be medically able to
deploy worldwide, (2) direct the services to adopt mission-specific
physical fitness testing programs, and (3) improve controls over
physical fitness testing and reporting. Other GAO recommendations to
the Secretary of Defense are included in chapter 4.
AGENCY COMMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:6
DOD agreed with the report's overall findings (see app. I) and
agreed to take actions to correct some of the problems GAO
identified. DOD agreed to separate personnel who repeatedly fail
physical fitness tests, implement controls to prevent fitness test
scores from being inappropriately changed, and direct the Inspector
General to assess whether adequate management controls had been
established.
However, DOD's actions do not go far enough and could leave major
problems uncorrected. DOD agreed to review and clarify its medical
retention policy but did not agree to adopt a worldwide deployability
standard. Even though DOD agreed to assess the feasibility of
establishing mission-specific fitness standards, it did not agree to
adopt them. Although DOD said it would assess whether it should
require the services to submit detailed physical fitness information,
it did not believe that this information would benefit management.
In addition, DOD did not agree to identify the physical fitness
program as containing material control weaknesses in its 1994
assurance statement. GAO believes that the deficiencies are
material, and unless DOD changes its fitness policies along the lines
GAO recommended, the fitness-related problems that arose during
Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm could recur and hinder
future military operations.
INTRODUCTION
============================================================ Chapter 1
Reserve forces\1 are critical to the successful conduct of military
operations both in wartime and peacetime. The reserve components
played a vital role in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. In
January 1992, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff testified
before the Congress that the United States could not have succeeded
in the Gulf War without the reserve force. In addition, reserve
forces are expected to play an increasingly important role in
military operations as the Department of Defense (DOD) reduces the
size of active forces.
About 106,000 of the 540,000 U.S. military personnel (20 percent)
deployed to the Persian Gulf during Operations Desert Shield and
Desert Storm were from reserve forces. These reservists performed
critical combat and support tasks. For example, Marine Corps
reservists augmented active combat forces, Air Force reservists
provided nearly all of that service's strategic and tactical airlift
capabilities, and Navy reservists provided staff for hospitals in the
theater and medical support for the Marine Corps. Table 1.1 shows
the number of reserves that were deployed by each service to the
Persian Gulf.
Table 1.1
Reserve Forces' Participation in
Operations Desert Shield and Desert
Storm
Percent of
total
Number of service
personnel force
Reserve component deployed deployed
---------------------------------- ---------- ------------
Army 73,400 24
Marine Corps 14,400 15
Air Force 11,100 20
Navy 6,800 8
============================================================
Total 105,700 20
------------------------------------------------------------
In 1992, most of the Army's support forces and a substantial portion
of its combat forces were in the reserve component. In some
instances, reserve forces provided all of the military capability to
perform wartime tasks. Reserve component personnel provided 100
percent of the Army's heavy-lift helicopter capability, forces used
to provide fresh water, light infantry anti-tank missile battalions
and infantry scouts, and nearly all of its legal and civil affairs
units. Air Force reserves comprised all of that service's weather
reconnaissance capability, most of its aeromedical evacuation and
communications capability, and close to half of its tanker and cargo
crews. Reserves constituted 25 percent of the total Marine Corps
force structure, providing all of that service's civil affairs and
adversary aircraft training capability and 40 percent of its tank
battalions. Naval reserves provided 100 percent of the Navy's heavy
airlift, rescue, and harbor protection capabilities.
Even though the size of both active and reserve forces will be
decreased, the reserves will comprise a larger portion of the
projected force structure. From fiscal years 1989 to 1994, total
military strength will be reduced by about 20 percent, from 3.3
million to 2.6 million. Even though the size of the reserve force
will be reduced by about 17 percent, from 1.2 million to 1 million,
the percent of reserves in the total force structure will actually
increase from 36 to 39 percent. Table 1.2 shows the planned changes
in total military strength and the percent of total force structure
comprised by the reserve components of each service.
Table 1.2
Comparison of Reserve Personnel to Total
Force
(Number of personnel in thousands)
Active Active
and and
reserve Reserve reserve Reserve
personne personne Percen personne personne Percen
l l t l l t
------------------------ -------- -------- ------ -------- -------- ------
Total DOD 3,300 1,171 36 2,653 1,029 39
Air Force 770 199 26 625 199 32
Army 1,546 776 50 1,210 670 55
Marines 241 44 18 219 42 19
Navy 744 152 20 599 118 20
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1991 and
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994
Conference Report, November 10, 1993.
--------------------
\1 Reserve forces are comprised of members who belong to units, the
Individual Mobilization Program, and the Individual Ready Reserve.
DOD'S FITNESS POLICIES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1
DOD established its medical and physical fitness policies to ensure
that active and reserve forces would be in proper condition to
perform their military duties. The standards contained in these
policies allow DOD and the services to gauge the fitness levels of
military personnel and their readiness to be deployed. For example,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff rely on service assessments of force
capabilities and readiness to plan operations and deploy strategic
and conventional forces in response to crises worldwide. Also, this
information is used by service organizations responsible for (1)
planning operations and deploying forces, such as the Army's Forces
Command; (2) making decisions on members' retention and
deployability, such as the Air Force Military Personnel Center; and
(3) managing reserve forces, such as the Office of the Chief of Naval
Reserve.
MEDICAL POLICY
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1.1
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs is responsible
for setting DOD's medical fitness policy, and the services are
responsible for its implementation. The policy, which was last
revised in 1986, primarily identifies the diseases and medical
conditions that may render current service members unfit for military
duty.\2 It applies to active duty personnel and reservists while in
active duty status, including the 2 weeks that reservists spend in
training each year.
In making fitness determinations, the services convene military
boards comprised of medical and personnel specialists that evaluate
whether a medical condition affects service members' duty
performance. If the boards determine that a medical condition will
affect duty performance, DOD requires the services to attempt to
reclassify the member to a different position before they begin
separation procedures. For example, a service member with a medical
condition considered by the Army to be permanently disabling for
purposes of its mission such as a bad back or an inability to lift
heavy weights, cannot be assigned to a tank crew but may be able to
work in a less physically demanding position, such as an
administrative position, depending on the nature and severity of the
medical condition.
DOD's policy states that the sole standard the services are to use in
making medical fitness determinations is whether the disease or
medical condition would prevent a service member from performing
military duties. However, even if a condition adversely affects a
member's duty performance, the service cannot separate the member
unless the condition is permanent.
DOD has no medical policy applicable to reservists who incur serious
diseases or medical conditions not connected with their military
duties, such as conditions occurring while they are civilians. DOD
relies on the services to establish the policies and procedures to
make fitness determinations for these personnel. In making these
determinations, all of the services use the same medical policy for
reserve personnel as for active personnel regardless of whether the
medical condition is connected with their military duties.
--------------------
\2 Separation From the Military Service by Reason of Physical
Disability, Department of Defense Directive 1332.18, February 25,
1986.
PHYSICAL FITNESS POLICY
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1.2
The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness is responsible for setting DOD's physical fitness policy,
and the services are responsible for implementing it. The policy,
which was last updated in 1981,\3 stresses that physical fitness is a
"vital component of combat readiness and is essential to the general
health and well being of armed forces personnel." In that regard, one
of DOD's fitness objectives is aimed at developing the physical
skills military personnel will need in combat or for other types of
missions.
To evaluate fitness levels, DOD's policy requires the services to
conduct annual physical fitness tests of all personnel, regardless of
age. The tests are to be the same for active and reserve forces, and
the services are to consider separating members who fail the test.
DOD also requires the services to periodically assess their physical
fitness programs and report the results of the assessments to it.
At a minimum, fitness tests are to assess general fitness levels by
measuring cardiorespiratory endurance or stamina.\4 Some services
meet this requirement by testing members' ability to run 1-1/2 to 3
miles in a prescribed time. DOD's fitness policy also allows the
services the flexibility to test the physical ability of reserve
personnel to complete mission-oriented tasks, such as a road march
for infantry personnel or ordnance-loading exercises for artillery
personnel. However, DOD does not require mission-specific testing.
--------------------
\3 Physical Fitness and Weight Control Programs, Department of
Defense Directive 1308.1, June 29, 1981.
\4 DOD defines cardiorespiratory endurance as the capability to take
in and deliver oxygen to the muscles. It defines stamina as the
ability to persist in performing continuous physical activity without
rest.
OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND
METHODOLOGY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2
The Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness, House Committee on Armed
Services, requested that we determine the adequacy of DOD and service
(1) medical retention policies and practices for reservists, (2)
physical fitness test results as a measure of reservists'
preparedness for military missions, and (3) management controls to
ensure the achievement of fitness program objectives.
To evaluate the adequacy of medical policies and practices, we
reviewed appropriate statutes and DOD and service regulations
governing the retention and separation of personnel with medical
conditions. We determined the processes the services used to make
fitness decisions and assessed whether their policies and practices
were consistent with DOD policy. If discrepancies occurred, we
determined the services' rationale for not adhering to DOD policy.
We analyzed data from service information systems to identify the
number of reserve component personnel with serious medical
conditions. To determine how medical fitness levels affected wartime
operations, we analyzed service studies of medical fitness issues
that occurred during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm and
obtained DOD and service officials' views on medical fitness
policies.
To determine whether physical fitness testing measured reserve
component personnels' preparedness for military operations, we
reviewed DOD and service fitness and training guidance and identified
the fitness test components used by each service. We analyzed
service studies on physical fitness levels during Operations Desert
Shield and Desert Storm. We also obtained the views of key DOD,
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and service officials (see app. II) on the
relationship between fitness testing and mission performance.
To evaluate management controls, we determined whether the services
included physical fitness in their internal control programs and
assessed whether service fitness policies were consistent with DOD
directives. We evaluated the adequacy of controls by determining the
extent that fitness information was recorded and provided to key DOD
and service organizations and how the information was used for
management purposes. We determined how fitness data are used in
deployment decisions and obtained the views of DOD, service, and unit
personnel on the adequacy of current fitness standards. We also
determined the extent that reserve personnel component failed
periodic physical fitness tests and the enforcement policies and
practices for such personnel.
To test the implementation of fitness policies and procedures, we
selected 35 Reserve and National Guard units for case study analysis
(see app. III). No Air Force Reserve units were included in our
case studies because the Air Force Reserve discontinued mandatory
physical fitness testing in June 1992. Our criteria for selecting
units were designed to give a mix of combat and support units. Some
of the units participated in Operations Desert Shield and Desert
Storm. At each unit, we reviewed medical and physical fitness
records to assess unit compliance with DOD and service fitness
policies. Our reviews included determining methods to track
personnel with serious medical conditions and unit practices for
members failing to meet fitness standards.
We conducted our work from April 1992 to August 1993 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
RETENTION OF POTENTIALLY
NONDEPLOYABLE RESERVISTS CONFLICTS
WITH NEW MILITARY STRATEGY
============================================================ Chapter 2
DOD's new military strategy is based on a much smaller force
structure that must be capable of responding to many types of
military contingencies worldwide. As a result, the new strategy
requires reserve personnel to be deployable worldwide. However,
DOD's medical policy does not require reservists to be deployable to
remain in the service. This policy is outdated because it is based
on a Cold War military strategy that no longer exists.
On the basis of DOD's policy, the Army retains more than 22,000
reserve component personnel with permanent medical conditions that
may prevent them from performing many common soldier activities, such
as marching or running, or being exposed to loud noises, such as
weapons firing. Because of their medical condition, these personnel
may not be able to deploy to any theater or may be restricted to
certain theaters where their conditions can be properly monitored.
However, the Army has not evaluated the extent that these personnel
are deployable.
The Army's practice of retaining reserve component personnel with
permanent medical conditions hindered its mobilization efforts during
Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. An estimated 8,000 Army
reserve component soldiers reported for duty with serious medical
conditions, including cancer, heart disease, and amputations, and
many could not be deployed. Other Army reserve component personnel
had to return from Southwest Asia because their medical conditions
prevented them from operating effectively. The total number of Army
reserve component personnel that were not deployable during
Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm is unknown because many
were identified at their home stations and replaced with deployable
soldiers from other Army units.
The Air Force, the Marine Corps, and the Navy have more stringent
medical retention standards than those required by DOD and separate
reservists who cannot be deployed worldwide or have permanent medical
conditions that limit their duties. The services' medical officials
stated that these policies were based on mission needs, which require
the capability to provide forces quickly to respond to worldwide
contingencies. In contrast to the Army, the officials stated that
these services encountered few problems due to medically
nondeployable reserve personnel during the Gulf War.
DOD'S MEDICAL RETENTION POLICY
DOES NOT REFLECT CHANGES IN
MILITARY STRATEGY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1
DOD's medical retention policy does not require reservists to be
deployable to remain in military service. In fact, for reservists
whose medical condition occurred while on active duty, the policy
does not permit the services to separate them solely on their
inability to deploy. DOD's policy states that the sole standard to
be used in making fitness determinations is whether a reservist is
fit to perform military duties and that the inability to perform
duties in every geographic location and under every conceivable
circumstance cannot be used as the sole basis for finding a reservist
unfit for duty.\1 DOD's policy allows the services to retain
personnel who can only be assigned to theaters where adequate medical
care is available. For example, some personnel may only be
deployable to a European theater where adequate medical facilities
are available to monitor or treat their condition. However, these
personnel might not be deployable to other theaters lacking proper
medical facilities, such as Somalia.
According to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health
Affairs, before DOD adopted the policy in 1986, all of the services
used a worldwide deployability standard in making fitness
determinations for both active duty and reserve personnel. However,
DOD found that the services were inconsistently applying the
standard. The Deputy Assistant Secretary said that the services
separated some personnel because of duty limitations that prevented
them from being deployable worldwide but reassigned others with
similar limitations to positions that did not require them to deploy.
DOD believed it needed to adopt a uniform policy, and it offered the
services the choice of two deployability standards. One standard
required personnel to be deployable worldwide to be retained; the
other did not permit the services to separate personnel solely on
their inability to perform military duties in every geographic
location. To preserve the ability to retain personnel who may be
valuable to the service, even though they cannot be deployed
worldwide, the services requested that DOD adopt the more flexible
policy, according to the Deputy Assistant Secretary.
Because it continues to allow the retention of potentially
nondeployable reservists, DOD's medical retention policy has not kept
pace with recent changes in the national security strategy. The
policy was adopted when the Soviet Union posed the major threat
confronting the United States and U.S. military strength exceeded 3
million personnel. With the diminished Soviet threat, the United
States planned to reduce its military forces by 700,000 personnel and
changed its military strategy. The current strategy calls for U.S.
forces to be capable of responding to many types of military
contingencies worldwide that may arise on short notice, as
demonstrated by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the recent
peacekeeping operations in Somalia.
The less predictable threats and smaller active force structure
increase the importance of reserve force readiness and do not allow
for the retention of large numbers of potentially nondeployable
reserve personnel. As the Army's Chief of Staff stated, "there can
be no time out for readiness."
In 1992, we reported that the issue of nondeployable personnel had
received inadequate attention in the past and that the importance of
deployability would become even greater as forces are reduced.\2
We recommended that DOD give greater emphasis to assessing and
reporting on nondeployability issues. In response to our report, DOD
stated that it was reviewing its medical retention policy to decide
whether it should be strengthened. In September 1993, the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs said that DOD would
change its policy only if all of the services agreed that a worldwide
deployability standard was needed. The Army is opposed to
strengthening the policy, but the Air Force, the Marine Corps, and
the Navy were in favor of a worldwide deployability retention
standard. DOD expects to make its decision in early fiscal year
1995.
--------------------
\1 Although DOD's medical policy only applies to reserve personnel in
an active duty status, all of the services use the same medical
policies for reservists, regardless of whether a medical condition
occurred during an active duty, inactive duty, or civilian status.
\2 Operation Desert Storm: War Highlights Need to Address Problem of
Nondeployable Personnel (GAO/NSIAD-92-208, Aug. 31, 1992).
THE ARMY RETAINS POTENTIALLY
NONDEPLOYABLE RESERVE COMPONENT
PERSONNEL
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2
The Army follows DOD's medical policy for active duty personnel in
making retention decisions on reserve component personnel and,
accordingly, does not require reservists to be deployable worldwide
to remain in the service. The policy applies to all reserve
component personnel regardless of whether their medical condition was
incurred while they were in an active duty, inactive duty (weekend
drills), or civilian status. With regard to deployability, Army
medical policy states that although the ability of a soldier to
perform military duties in all geographical locations under all
conceivable circumstances is a key to maintaining an effective and
fit force, worldwide deployability will not be the sole basis used to
determine fitness.\3
The Army's policy requires that fitness determinations be made based
primarily on a soldier's ability to perform the duties required by
his or her military assignment. On the basis of this policy, the
Army retains reserve component personnel with permanent medical
conditions that limit their ability to perform many common soldier
tasks. Data from the Army Reserve and National Guard indicated that
22,282 soldiers in 1992 had permanent medical conditions. Although
these soldiers met retention standards based on their ability to
perform military duties in peacetime, the Army had not evaluated the
extent that these soldiers would be deployable in wartime or would be
available for other military operations.
Army reserve component personnel are required to have medical
examinations every 4 years. During these examinations, the
reservists are given a numerical code that describes their medical
condition. These codes range from 1, which designates a soldier as
being medically fit and having no duty limitations, to 4, which
designates a severe medical condition that would drastically limit a
soldier's duty performance. The Army also classifies the conditions
as either permanent or temporary.
Soldiers assigned codes of 3 or 4 are to have their conditions
reviewed by Army medical boards. The boards determine the severity
of the condition and decide it (1) does not affect the ability of the
soldier to perform his or her current military duties; (2) imposes
limitations on the physical ability to perform current military
duties but warrants reassignment to other, less demanding duties; or
(3) imposes severe limitations on the ability to perform any military
duty and warrants separation from the service. The soldiers that are
retained in the service are to receive assignments commensurate with
their physical capability.
Along with the medical codes, the Army assigns an alphabetic code to
indicate the specific duty that cannot be performed. For example,
code 3C designates a medical condition that limits a soldier's
ability to crawl, run, march, or stand for long periods. Code 3J
designates a condition that prevents a soldier from being exposed to
loud noises or weapons firing. Most of the 22,282 reserve component
soldiers that had permanent medical conditions in 1992 were assigned
either codes 3C or 3J. For example, of the 17,593 soldiers in the
Army National Guard that had permanent medical conditions, 13,505 had
been assigned code 3C and 1,721 had been assigned code 3J.
Our case studies of Army Reserve and National Guard units conducted
in 1993 found that the Army continued to retain reservists with
serious medical conditions. At a light infantry unit with 79
personnel, we found
2 soldiers with serious medical conditions. Although information on
the soldiers' conditions was recorded in the unit's records, unit
command personnel said that they were not aware that the soldiers had
medical conditions.
In February 1986, an Army physician diagnosed one soldier, whose
military occupation was infantryman/ranger, as having high blood
pressure. The physician concluded the soldier met Army retention
standards, but his condition precluded him from performing any
strenuous physical activity, including field training, physical
fitness testing, or assignments requiring consumption of combat
rations. The physician also limited the soldier's duty assignments
only to locations where definitive medical care was available.
Follow-up medical examinations conducted in 1987 and 1991 found that
the soldier had uncontrolled high blood pressure but was still
qualified for retention. In August 1991, the National Guard's state
surgeon requested that Army medical personnel hold a medical
consultation for the soldier. However, at the time we visited this
unit in March 1993, the soldier had not been examined, and his
records indicated that no further action had been taken since August
1991.
In February 1991, an Army physician examined another soldier, an
infantryman, in the same unit and found that he had high blood
pressure and should be further examined because of a possible heart
murmur and the potential for a cardiac arrest. The physician
recommended that the condition be evaluated and assigned a medical
limitation code that precluded any strenuous physical activity. Unit
records indicated that no follow-up actions, such as a medical
examination or review by a medical board, had been taken since the
soldier's diagnosis in 1991.
--------------------
\3 Physical Evaluation for Retention, Retirement, or Separation, Army
Regulation 635-40, September 15, 1990.
MEDICALLY NONDEPLOYABLE ARMY
RESERVE COMPONENT PERSONNEL
DISRUPTED MOBILIZATION DURING
GULF WAR
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3
The retention of nondeployable personnel hindered the Army's
mobilization efforts during Operations Desert Shield and Desert
Storm. The Army could not determine the total number of reserve
component personnel whose medical conditions prevented them from
being deployed to the Persian Gulf because of the processes used to
select reservists for the war. Some reserve component units screened
personnel at their home stations and replaced nondeployable personnel
with deployable personnel from other units. Other units did not
screen personnel at their home stations and allowed nondeployable
personnel to report to mobilization stations.
A 1991 Army Inspector General report estimated that as many as
8,000 Army reserve component personnel were found to be medically
nondeployable upon arrival at mobilization stations.\4 Even though
all but 1,100 of these soldiers eventually deployed, the report noted
that nondeployable soldiers disrupted the mobilization process.
Medically nondeployable personnel caused units to undergo extensive
efforts to replace nondeployable reservists with those that could be
deployed. However, unit commanders told the Inspector General that
as many permanently nondeployable reserve component personnel were
identified and left at their home stations as those that were
identified at mobilization stations. The report also noted that some
soldiers who had coronary bypass surgery, cancer, and amputations had
not been identified at their home stations and reported to their
mobilization station.
A 1992 report by the Sixth U.S. Army Inspector General also
addressed the problem caused by medically nondeployable personnel
during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.\5 Although the
report did not specify the number of nondeployable personnel, it
stated that many soldiers deployed to Southwest Asia had to return to
the United States because of medical conditions that had not been
previously diagnosed. The report noted that commanders were not
identifying soldiers with severe medical problems and that soldiers
with permanent medical conditions were not being evaluated by their
home units before deploying to determine if they were medically fit
to perform their duties and job assignments.
In 1991, we reported that medical screenings conducted at the
mobilization stations identified numerous problems that impaired
soldiers' ability to deploy, including ulcers, chronic asthma, spinal
arthritis, hepatitis, seizures, and diabetes.\6 In 1992, we reported
that medically nondeployable reserve component personnel delayed the
mobilization of some medical units.\7 For example, two reserve
component surgeons--one who was unable to stand for more than 30
minutes and another who had Parkinson's disease--reported for duty
but were unable to deploy due to their conditions.
Information from one Army mobilization station we visited showed that
103 reserve component personnel (4 percent of those mobilized through
that station) reported for the Gulf War with serious medical
conditions, including cancer, heart disease, and serious mental
disorders. One soldier had double kidney failure, one had muscular
dystrophy, and another had a gunshot wound to the head. None of the
103 soldiers deployed.
Unit officials at an Army Reserve command we visited said that 51
soldiers could not deploy during Operations Desert Shield and Desert
Storm because they had serious medical conditions, including mental
disorders. To compensate for nondeployable personnel, the command
replaced them with soldiers from other units. Officials stated that
this action made some marginal units good and some good units bad and
that this action might not be available in the event of a larger
mobilization.
--------------------
\4 Special Assessment of Operations Desert Shield/Storm Mobilization,
Department of the Army, Inspector General, December 1991.
\5 Sixth U.S. Army Inspector General Nondeployable Soldiers Special
Inspection, August 1992.
\6 National Guard: Peacetime Training Did Not Adequately Prepare
Combat Brigades for Gulf War (GAO/NSIAD-91-263, Sept. 24, 1991).
\7 Operation Desert Storm: Full Army Medical Capability Not Achieved
(GAO/NSIAD-92-175, Aug. 18, 1992).
THE ARMY PLANS NO CHANGES TO
ITS MEDICAL POLICY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:4
The 1991 Army Inspector General's report noted that, because of the
reduced size of the military structure, retention and deployability
policies needed to be re-examined. The 1992 Sixth Army's Inspector
General noted that during the next war, the Army would not have the
time or resources to fix all the problems experienced at the
mobilization stations and recommended that the Army identify soldiers
with permanent medical profiles and separate those soldiers that are
not deployable.
In December 1991, the Army's Vice Chief of Staff directed the Deputy
Chief of Staff for Personnel to review the Army's medical retention
policy to determine if it should be changed. The review was
undertaken in response to requests by several high-level Army
commanders, including the commander of Army forces in Europe and
National Guard officials, that the Army adopt a worldwide
deployability standard as a basis for retention. The commanders
stated that every soldier in a downsized Army must be qualified to
deploy worldwide to maintain an acceptable level of combat capability
and readiness. The National Guard requested the review because
virtually all of its units were expected to deploy in wartime and it
had no place to reassign a nondeployable soldier.
Despite the requests to strengthen medical retention standards, the
Army concluded in March 1992 that no change to the policy was needed.
The Army stated that 97 percent of the soldiers processed for
overseas deployment at mobilization stations were deployed during
Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm and that there was no basis
to believe that nondeployable reserve component personnel would cause
unacceptable readiness levels in a smaller, more austere Army.
However, the review did not consider how often nondeployable
personnel from one unit were substituted with deployable personnel
from other units before the soldiers reported to mobilization
stations. The Army recommended that the number of nondeployable
personnel could be reduced if the commands placed greater emphasis on
identifying and referring soldiers for a medical evaluation to
determine their fitness for continued duty. On the basis of data
compiled over several years, the Army found that 86 percent of the
soldiers referred for evaluations were physically unfit for continued
service.
The Army cited other reasons not to change its policy by adopting a
worldwide deployability standard. It questioned the affordability of
a policy that would separate soldiers solely on the inability to
deploy to a particular geographic location, given the substantial
investment in training soldiers and the importance of retaining
experienced personnel to unit readiness. It also said that such a
policy could undermine soldiers' confidence in the Army and make many
reluctant to choose the Army as a long-term career. However, the
Army's position fails to recognize that these soldiers, although they
may be highly trained and experienced, are of little use to their
units in wartime or during other military operations if their medical
condition prevents them from deploying.
OTHER SERVICES DO NOT RETAIN
POTENTIALLY NONDEPLOYABLE
RESERVISTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:5
Although in 1986 the Air Force, the Marine Corps, and the Navy
requested that DOD not adopt a worldwide deployability policy, all
three services continue to use such a standard in making fitness
determinations for reserve personnel. These services require the
separation of reservists who have permanent duty limitations that
prevent them from deploying worldwide. Officials from these services
stated that the worldwide deployability standard had not caused
problems in recruiting or retaining personnel. The Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs said that he was not aware
that these services were using more stringent medical retention
standards than what DOD requires.
Although these services' standards are more stringent than DOD's
requirements, service officials stated that the standards were based
on current mission needs, which require the capability to quickly
deploy forces anywhere in the world. For example, the Air Force's
policy states that its reservists are to be medically qualified for
deployment and worldwide duty and that mission capability would be
deteriorated if personnel could not (1) deploy to a military
contingency; (2) be assigned to overseas, remote, or isolated
stations; or (3) accept demanding assignments. Command surgeons in
the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve emphasized the
importance of reserve members being deployable worldwide to support a
contingency. Navy and Marine Corps officials expressed similar
views.
Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy officials said that they did not
experience any significant problems during Operations Desert Shield
and Desert Storm due to medically nondeployable reserve personnel.
An Air National Guard lessons learned report noted that 100 to 200
reservists were medically nondeployable during Operations Desert
Shield and Desert Storm but that this amount represented only 1 to 2
percent of the approximately 10,500 air guardsmen mobilized.
Navy data showed that of 20,108 reservists it attempted to activate
for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, 333 (1.7 percent) were
not activated for medical reasons. These personnel primarily had
temporary conditions, such as pregnancy and broken bones, or were
overweight.
The services did not intentionally retain nondeployable personnel.
An Air National Guard official said that its medically nondeployable
personnel had medical conditions that were diagnosed while they were
in a civilian status and were not recorded in their military medical
records. Subsequently, the Air Force changed its procedures to
prevent reservists from hiding their medical conditions. The Air
Force now requires reserve personnel to periodically complete a
detailed questionnaire to identify any medical condition that may
have developed since their last military medical examination.
Falsifying information on the questionnaire could result in
discharge.
CONCLUSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:6
DOD's medical retention policy could adversely affect future military
operations. In the future, DOD will not be able to rely on having
the time or sufficient personnel available to replace nondeployable
Army reserve component personnel with more medically fit personnel.
Most services have recognized that reservists must be ready to deploy
at any time and do not retain reserve personnel with medical
conditions that may limit their deployability or restrict their duty
assignments.
If DOD adopted a worldwide deployment standard, the Army would be the
service most significantly affected, since it might need to separate
large numbers of reserve component personnel not meeting the
standard. However, it would be easier to deal with this situation
before the commencement of hostilities than to have to contend with
it during a military operation, as was the case during Operations
Desert Shield and Desert Storm. To offset the disruption that could
occur, an option would be for the Army to phase in the new policy and
replace reserve component personnel separated for medical reasons
with the large pool of trained active forces being released due to
downsizing.
RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:7
To ensure that reserve component personnel are medically fit for
future military operations, we recommend that the Secretary of
Defense
direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs to
revise DOD's medical retention policy to require that reservists
be medically able for worldwide deployment to be retained in the
service and
direct the Secretary of the Army to make a corresponding change in
the Army's medical retention policy.
AGENCY COMMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:8
DOD generally agreed with our findings and stated that it was
currently reviewing its medical retention policy and that additional
clarity was needed. DOD expected to complete its review in early
fiscal year 1995. DOD agreed that its revised medical standards
would apply to the Total Force. In the interim, DOD stated that the
Army had (1) clarified and strengthened some of its medical standards
and (2) directed commanders to identify nondeployable soldiers for
placement in a nondeployable personnel account, as authorized by the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 (106 Stat.
2538). DOD also stated that the Army had adopted a new medical
review system to recommend disposition of personnel whose names were
placed in the account.
DOD did not commit to adopting a worldwide deployability standard as
a basis for retention in military service. As our work showed, the
Army's policy of assigning permanent medical profiles allows the
retention of thousands of reserve personnel with serious medical
conditions that could affect their duty performance and
deployability. DOD apparently will allow the Army to continue
assigning permanent profiles to reservists with serious medical
conditions, which is a practice that we believe should be
discontinued. None of the other services has such a policy, and each
has adopted a worldwide deployability standard. Unless DOD adopts
such a standard, the fitness problems that arose during Operations
Desert Shield and Desert Storm could recur.
FITNESS TESTING DOES NOT MEASURE
RESERVISTS' PHYSICAL ABILITY TO
PERFORM THEIR MISSIONS
============================================================ Chapter 3
DOD does not require that the services test whether reservists
possess the physical skills necessary for their military mission.
Instead, the services are required only to test reservists' general
fitness levels and have adopted testing programs that differ greatly
in content and difficulty. The programs' lack of mission-related
activities and the different criteria used by each of the services to
assess fitness levels make it difficult for DOD and the services to
accurately assess whether reserve personnel possess the physical
skills required for their missions.
During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, many Army reserve
component personnel did not possess the physical skills necessary to
perform their wartime mission. Other Army reservists required
extensive physical fitness training to prepare for deployment
operations. None of the other services studied the fitness levels of
their reserve forces. Thus, the extent that similar problems existed
is unknown.
Several DOD, service, and unit officials said that, even though the
current physical fitness testing was sufficient to assess general
fitness levels, additional mission-specific fitness testing was
needed. However, DOD does not plan to require the services to adopt
such tests. Therefore, the fitness-related problems that surfaced
during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm could recur.
SERVICES USE DIFFERENT
STANDARDS TO MEASURE FITNESS
LEVELS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1
DOD policy requires the services to develop fitness programs tailored
to their particular mission needs and test all active and reserve
members annually for stamina or cardiorespiratory endurance.
According to DOD policy, the services may also test strength and
flexibility.
In implementing DOD's physical fitness policy, each of the four
services has developed its own fitness test. All four services'
tests assess cardiorespiratory endurance as a measure of reservists'
general physical fitness levels, and three also test strength and
flexibility. The services developed their testing programs based on
what they considered to be the minimum acceptable levels of physical
performance. The tests are the same for active and reserve members.
Service tests differ in content and in their degree of difficulty.
For example, the Navy tests the ability of its personnel to complete
four activities that measure cardiorespiratory endurance, upper and
lower body strength, and flexibility. These include, respectively, a
1-1/2-mile run/walk or a 500-yard swim, push-ups, curl-ups (similar
to sit-ups), and a sit-reach exercise. All events, with the
exception of the sit-reach exercise, are timed. To pass the test,
service members must complete the events in the time specified or
perform the required number of repetitions of the sit-reach exercise.
In contrast, the Air Force tests the ability to complete just one
activity to measure cardiorespiratory endurance--a 1-1/2-mile run or
a 3-mile walk, both of which are timed.
In some cases, a component of physical fitness, such as upper body
strength, is judged by different events; for example, the Army
requires that personnel perform push-ups, and the Marine Corps
requires pull-ups for males or a flexed arm hang for females. In
other cases, a component is judged by a similar event with a
different degree of difficulty. Males in the Marines must complete a
timed 3-mile run, but males in the Air National Guard have an option
of completing either a timed 1-1/2 mile run or a timed 3-mile walk.
The score required to pass identical events also differs between
service tests. For example, a 27-year-old female Army soldier must
perform 40 sit-ups in 2 minutes and a 27-year-old female Marine must
perform only 19 during the same time period. Table 3.1 shows the
different components of the services' physical fitness tests.
Table 3.1
Components of Services' Physical Fitness
Tests
Physical
ability being
assessed Army Air Force Navy Marine Corps
-------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- ----------------
Cardiorespirat 2-mile run 1-1/2-mile run 1-1/2-mile run 3-mile run for
ory endurance or or walk or males/
3-mile walk\a 500-yard swim 1-1/2-mile run
for females
Flexibility Sit-ups None Sit-reach None
Upper body Push-ups None Push-ups Pull-up for
strength males/flexed arm
hang for females
Lower body Sit-ups None Curl-ups Sit-ups
strength
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a In 1994, the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard plan to
adopt a new physical fitness test consisting of 6 to 10 minutes of
exercise on a stationary bicycle. The active Air Force adopted the
bicycle test in fiscal year 1993.
SERVICES' PHYSICAL FITNESS
TESTS ARE NOT MISSION FOCUSED
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2
DOD physical fitness policy advocates that the services conduct
physical fitness programs that prepare personnel for their military
missions. Some military missions are more physically demanding than
others. Units with combat missions, such as infantry or armor units,
may require a higher level of fitness than units with a support
mission, such as administrative units. DOD does not require the
services to test either active duty personnel or reservists against
mission-oriented tasks. However, nothing in DOD's physical fitness
policy precludes the services from adopting mission-specific fitness
tests.
Officials from all of the services told us that their physical
fitness tests were designed to meet DOD's requirements but had little
correlation to individuals' military missions. None of the services
has developed physical fitness tests that evaluate the specific
physical skills individuals may need to perform their military
missions. For example, although Army training guidance indicates
that physical performance and success in combat may depend on a
soldier's ability to perform skills similar to those required on an
obstacle course and therefore recommends that obstacle course events
be used to develop basic skills, such events are not part of the
Army's fitness test.\1 Army officials told us that the test
components the Army has been using were selected because the events
could be given at any time and location with no equipment and because
performance could be easily measured and scored.
Because fitness testing lacks a mission focus and differs greatly in
content and degree of difficulty among the services, test results
provide little insight on military personnel's fitness to perform
their wartime missions. For example, Army data showed that many
reserve component personnel failed physical fitness tests from 1990
to 1992 (see ch. 4). In contrast, data we obtained from the Air
National Guard, Marine Corps Reserves, and Navy Reserves and our case
studies of reserve units showed that virtually every reservist who
took the physical fitness tests from 1990 to 1992 passed. However,
this does not necessarily indicate that these reservists are in
better physical condition than Army reserve component personnel. Air
Force officials attributed its high passing rate (e.g., 99.7 percent
in 1992 for the Air National Guard) to its nondemanding test. On the
other hand, Marine Corps officials attributed its high passing rate
(97 percent in 1992) to a pro-fitness philosophy.
--------------------
\1 Typical events in an obstacle course include jumping hurdles,
climbing a rope, scaling walls, crawling under barbed wire, and
walking across suspended planks or logs.
POOR FITNESS LEVELS AFFECTED
ARMY RESERVE COMPONENT
PERSONNEL'S PERFORMANCE IN THE
GULF WAR
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3
Several Army reports on Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm
noted fitness-related problems that hindered wartime operations. The
other services did not conduct similar studies, but officials from
these services said that they were not aware of any physical
fitness-related problems.
A 1992 report by the Sixth Army Inspector General\2 noted that poor
fitness contributed to the deaths by heart attack of eight reserve
component personnel deployed to the Persian Gulf. A 1991 Army
lessons learned report also noted that some reservists' poor physical
condition during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm hindered
them in performing their wartime missions. The report attributed
this problem to reserve component units' physical fitness training
programs, which focus primarily on successful performance of the
Army's physical fitness test rather than on developing the physical
skills needed to go to war or carry out missions. The report
recommended that reserve component units implement fitness programs
that focus on wartime skills. However, the Army has not acted on
this recommendation. Army training officials said that the Army's
existing fitness policy provided sufficient guidance to units on the
need to conduct mission-oriented fitness programs.
A September 1990 Army lessons learned report from the mobilization
group at Fort Jackson, South Carolina, found that reserve component
personnel mobilized for the Persian Gulf War required extensive
physical fitness training to prepare for military operations. The
report noted that most reserve component soldiers did not maintain
themselves at the fitness level required for sustained operations.
--------------------
\2 Functional Inspection of Physical Fitness Management, Inspector
General, Sixth U.S. Army, August 12, 1992.
DOD AND SERVICE OFFICIALS
BELIEVE MISSION-SPECIFIC
PHYSICAL FITNESS TESTING IS
NEEDED
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:4
DOD personnel and readiness and several service officials stated
that, although the current physical fitness tests were adequate to
measure military personnel's general health and wellness,
mission-specific testing was needed for those military assignments
requiring physical abilities beyond those currently evaluated. Army
Forces Command, Army Reserve Command, and Army Fitness School
personnel told us that a better assessment of physical fitness would
be to test whether reserve component personnel possess the physical
skills required by their actual mission tasks. Some officials
suggested that infantry soldiers be required to perform an extended
road march carrying their gear. Another official stated that a sand
bag lifting test be given to those whose jobs require that they bend
over and lift heavy objects (e.g., artillery personnel).
Army training guidance already has identified standards that could be
adopted for mission-focused testing. For example, the extended road
march, which is currently not part of the physical fitness test, has
been recommended by Army fitness and training officials as a good
test of infantry soldiers' preparedness and is described in Army
Field
Manual 21-20, Physical Fitness Training, as one of the best ways to
improve and maintain fitness. The manual states that road marches
provide aerobic activity, develop endurance in lower body muscles,
help soldiers acclimate to new environments, and allow leaders to
make first-hand observations of the soldiers' physical stamina.
Standards that would allow testing of soldiers' ability to conduct a
road march have already been established. Fitness guidance states
that soldiers should be able to perform their missions after marching
12 miles in 3 hours while carrying a 50-pound load.
The field manual also discusses the importance of muscular strength
on the battlefield and established standards that could be adopted
for testing. It states that infantry soldiers may be called on to
carry loads exceeding 100 pounds over a great distance, and
supporting units may have to move their equipment to other locations
many times during a conflict. If a strength activity were part of an
individual unit's mission, minimum standards could be developed and
tested. Similar to Army guidance, Marine Corps fitness training
guidance recommends long-distance, load-bearing road marches and
obstacle courses as good training methods.
Air Force and Navy training and medical officials told us that more
mission-specific physical fitness testing would be appropriate for
reserve forces who perform missions that require more advanced
physical skills than those that are currently tested. These
reservists have missions that require additional muscular strength
and stamina, such as bomb loaders; personnel who rapidly repair
bombed or damaged runways; aviators; and fire fighting and ship
damage control personnel.
Although mission-related tasks are not included in the Marine Corps'
physical fitness test, officials told us that the physical abilities
reservists need to accomplish their missions are tested under the
Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation System. For example,
infantry unit members are tested to ensure that they can complete a
road march in a specified time period. Those who are unable to meet
the stated goals have this reflected in their fitness reports, are
given remedial training, and are eventually separated if their
performance does not improve.
DOD is planning to revise its physical fitness policy by the end of
fiscal year 1994. DOD's draft policy would add requirements for
evaluating muscular strength and endurance and flexibility to the
services' general physical fitness testing programs, but it would not
require the services to conduct mission-specific fitness testing. An
official in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness told us that DOD did not include
mission-specific testing in its revised policy requirement because
the services would object to it.
CONCLUSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:5
Unless reserve component personnel are tested against
mission-specific standards, fitness testing programs will continue to
be of little value. In many cases, units with a support mission may
only require general fitness tests. However, unless the services
test whether reservists will be able to perform their specific
missions or functions, DOD will not be able to accurately determine
whether these forces are prepared for sustained military operations.
Other units with a combat mission may need more rigorous testing
standards to ensure that they are physically able to perform the more
demanding tasks required. Without such testing standards, the
fitness-related problems that occurred during Operations Desert
Shield and Desert Storm could recur and hinder future military
operations.
RECOMMENDATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:6
For key decisionmakers to accurately assess whether reserve component
personnel are in proper physical condition to perform their military
duties, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense require the
Secretaries of the Air Force, the Army, and the Navy to develop and
implement mission-specific physical fitness tests.
AGENCY COMMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:7
DOD agreed with our findings. Although DOD agreed to review the
feasibility of mission-specific fitness standards in fiscal year 1994
and identify areas in which such standards might be applied, it did
not agree to require mission-specific standards in physical fitness
testing programs. DOD said that it was concerned that applying
mission-specific standards in testing programs might not be
cost-effective or efficient.
We believe that the implementation of mission-specific fitness tests
would not be costly or inefficient. To implement our recommendation,
the services could first determine which specialties require high
fitness levels, such as infantry, ship damage control, and runway
repair personnel, and design tests to evaluate the extent that
personnel in those specialties possess the requisite fitness levels.
For personnel in less-demanding specialties, such as combat service
support positions, a general fitness test would suffice. The Marine
Corps has already developed and is using mission-specific tests for
its reserve units, and the Army already has training standards for
infantry personnel that could be applied to testing.
We also believe that mission-specific testing would not require
additional time. Reservists are now required to take an annual
physical fitness test that does not assess their physical ability to
perform their military mission. The services could substitute a
mission-specific test for the current test. Alternatively, the
services could incorporate the mission-specific test as part of
units' training programs.
DOD'S PHYSICAL FITNESS PROGRAM
CONTAINS MANAGEMENT CONTROL
WEAKNESSES
============================================================ Chapter 4
DOD lacks adequate management controls in two areas concerning its
physical fitness program. First, DOD requires that the services
periodically assess their physical fitness programs and report the
results of the assessments to it, but none of the services has
complied with, and DOD has not enforced, this requirement. Even if
DOD had tried to enforce the requirement, the services lack
sufficient data needed to adequately assess their physical fitness
programs. As a result, neither DOD nor the services know the extent
that fitness problems exist. Such problems include the Army's
retention of reserve component personnel who have repeatedly failed
physical fitness tests and the failure of many reservists in each of
the services to take fitness tests. If DOD had been aware of this
information, some of the fitness problems that surfaced during the
Gulf War might have been identified and corrected earlier.
Second, DOD requires that controls be in place to reduce the risk of
physical fitness test scores being inappropriately altered. However,
the Marine Corps is the only service that has adequate controls to
ensure the integrity of the fitness testing process. During our
review of fitness test scores, we found that some reserve component
personnel in the Army and the Navy had their test scores changed from
failing to passing. We did not find any instances of altered test
scores in the Air Force or the Marine Corps.
SERVICES DO NOT REPORT FITNESS
INFORMATION TO DOD
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1
Since 1981, DOD has required the services to assess their physical
fitness programs and provide it with the results. However, none of
the services has conducted any assessments, and DOD has not been
enforcing its requirement. DOD officials could not explain why the
requirement had not been enforced, and service officials could not
explain why no assessments were made. Even if DOD had attempted to
enforce the requirement, the services lack sufficient data to conduct
adequate assessments. The Army National Guard and Air Force Reserve
collect no fitness data at the headquarters level. The Army Reserve,
Air National Guard, Marine Corps, and Navy do collect fitness
information, but the data are not sufficient to determine the extent
that reservists are repeatedly failing physical fitness tests. This
information is needed to identify reservists who should possibly be
separated from the service in accordance with DOD and service fitness
policies.
To assess whether reserve component personnel meet DOD fitness
standards, the services need information on the (1) extent that
personnel take physical fitness tests, (2) numbers passing and
failing tests, (3) personnel who repeatedly fail tests, (4) numbers
untested and reasons, and (5) actions taken on those failing to meet
fitness standards (e.g., denials of re-enlistments or separations).
Table 4.1 shows the fitness data collected in 1993 by each of the
services for its reserve components.
Table 4.1
Fitness Information Collected by Service
Headquarters for Reserve Components
(1993)
National National Marine
Number of personnel Reserve Guard Reserve Guard Navy Corps
-------------------------- ------- -------- ------- -------- ------ ------
Tested Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
Passing test Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
Failing test Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
Failing tests repeatedly No No No No No No
Untested and reasons why Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
Actions due to test Yes No No No Yes Yes
failure
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Because of the lack of servicewide information systems to collect
fitness data, some of the units we visited had developed customized
information systems to manage their physical fitness testing
programs. Typically, these information systems included data on the
number of personnel tested, their test scores, and the number of
personnel that passed and failed the test. Although the information
contained in the units' information systems may be useful in managing
unit fitness programs, these systems are not linked to DOD or service
information systems. Thus, the data cannot be easily used by the
service or DOD management to assess fitness programs. DOD and
service officials stated that it would not be difficult for the
services to collect the data we believe are necessary to properly
monitor physical fitness. As table 4.1 shows, most of the services
currently collect some data. Although none of the services had data
on personnel who repeatedly failed fitness tests, our work showed
that the data were available at the unit level from physical fitness
tests scorecards and could be reported along with other fitness data
through existing information systems.
LACK OF REPORTING PRECLUDES
DISCLOSURE OF FITNESS PROBLEMS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:2
Because the services do not report fitness information to DOD, as
required, and DOD does not enforce this requirement, DOD has not been
aware of fitness-related problems. These problems include the Army's
retention of reserve component personnel who repeatedly failed
physical fitness tests and the failure of many reservists in each of
the services to take fitness tests.
ARMY RETAINS RESERVE
COMPONENT PERSONNEL WHO FAIL
FITNESS TESTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:2.1
DOD has not been aware that the Army has been retaining reserve
component personnel who repeatedly fail physical fitness tests. DOD
policy specifies that reservists failing the tests may be separated
from military service. Army policy states that soldiers who
repeatedly fail physical fitness tests are to be barred from
re-enlistment in the service when their current enlistment expires or
separated from the service.\1 In contrast, the Marine Corps and the
Navy have more stringent policies that require separation for those
who repeatedly fail fitness tests,\2 and the Air Force's policy
includes a wide range of actions for personnel who fail physical
fitness tests, including separation.\3
The Army does not know how many reserve component personnel have
failed its physical fitness tests. However, data obtained from
several Army sources indicate that the problem may be extensive. For
example, data that one Army mobilization station collected during
Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm showed that 50 percent of
reserve personnel could not pass the Army's physical fitness test.
Data from other Army sources indicated similar results, as shown in
table 4.2.
Table 4.2
Army Reserve Component Personnel Failing
Physical Fitness Tests
Number Percen
of t
Source of physical fitness personne failin
assessment Year l tested g test
------------------------------------ ---- -------- ------
Army Reserve service data 1992 102,977\ 10
a
Mobilization stations
Sixth Army 1991 17,500 35-
55\b
Fort Jackson 1990 N/A\c 75\d
Fort Sam Houston 1991 967 62
Operational readiness exercises data 1992 2,181 18
\e
------------------------------------------------------------
\a In 1992, there were 260,480 soldiers in the Army Reserve, but test
information had been recorded in the Army's Standard
Installation/Division Personnel System for only 102,977.
\b Data show the range of test results from various Sixth Army
mobilization stations.
\c Although 3,522 reservists were mobilized through Fort Jackson, the
number given physical fitness tests was not available.
\d This figure indicates the percent of soldiers failing the physical
fitness test on arrival at the mobilization station. Of these
personnel, 50 percent eventually passed the test before deploying,
and 25 percent deployed without passing it.
\e These exercises are used to evaluate units' preparedness for their
wartime mission. The exercises include administration of the
physical fitness test to at least 30 percent of unit personnel.
Although the Army lacked servicewide fitness data, other data should
have alerted it to the high failure rate of its reservists on
physical fitness tests. In 1989, the Army's Physical Fitness School
began a study to determine the physical condition of Army Reserve and
National Guard personnel. The study's methodology was to administer
the Army's physical fitness test to a statistically valid sample of
about 9,400 reserve personnel from several geographic locations and
analyze the results. The study was to be completed in late 1990, and
the results were to be reported to the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff
for Operations and Plans.
Initial test results on 400 reserve component personnel showed that
about 43 percent failed the physical fitness test. The study was
then discontinued. Officials of the Army's Physical Fitness School,
including the former commandant, told us that the official reason
given by the Army for not completing the study was a lack of funding.
However, the officials said the actual reason was that the Army was
embarrassed by the high failure rate. An earlier study also
conducted by the Army's Physical Fitness School on 6,022 active duty
soldiers in 1988 showed that 19 percent of those tested failed the
physical fitness test.
Commanders at reserve component units we visited told us that the
units rarely separate personnel who fail physical fitness tests and,
in some instances, do not bar them from re-enlistment. The
commanders stated that they were reluctant to take such actions
against personnel failing fitness tests because (1) the test is not
indicative of reservists' ability to perform their mission and (2)
the Army places a higher priority on maintaining unit strength than
on physical fitness. Army officials told us that they had no
information on reserve personnel who were separated in 1992 for
repeatedly failing the test.
At one National Guard unit we visited, 16 percent of the unit's
personnel had failed the physical fitness test repeatedly and were
still being retained. In one case, a soldier had failed the test 12
times in a 3-year period. The commander of that unit did not
separate reservists who failed the test because of guidance from
state headquarters emphasizing that retention was the Army's highest
priority and took precedence over all else.
Table 4.3 shows the number of Army reserve component personnel from
our case studies that failed the physical fitness test two or more
consecutive times from 1990 to 1992.
Table 4.3
Army Reserve Component Personnel Failing
Physical Fitness Test Two or More
Consecutive Times (1990-92)
Number
of
Personnel personn
failing Percent el
Unit consecuti of unit separat
Unit size ve tests strength ed
--------------------- ------- --------- -------- -------
1 79 16 20 0
2 129 10 8 0
3 217 7 3 0
------------------------------------------------------------
Recent Army Inspector General studies also found that reservists
failing fitness tests were being retained. In 1992, the Sixth Army's
Inspector General reported that personnel actions were rarely taken
on soldiers that did not pass fitness tests. Similar to our case
study findings, the Inspector General found that soldiers were not
discharged even after repeated test failures primarily because
commanders placed more emphasis on maintaining unit strength. In
1991, the Inspector General of the Army Forces Command completed an
assessment of the Army's physical fitness program in 14 Army reserve
component units in 5 commands. The Inspector General reported that
the fitness program was not being properly executed and was poorly
managed and that units did not institute any personnel actions on
reservists failing fitness tests.
None of the other services had conducted internal assessments of
their physical fitness programs, such as lessons learned reports or
Inspector General studies. However, as discussed in chapter 3, data
obtained from the Air National Guard, Marine Corps Reserves, and Navy
Reserves showed that virtually every reservist who took the physical
fitness tests from 1990 to 1992 passed. DOD officials stated that
the high passing rates in the Marine Corps and the Navy may be due to
the fact that they do not require older personnel (ages 45 and 50,
respectively) to take physical fitness tests. However, only 3
percent of Marine Corps and Navy reservists were in these age
categories in 1992; thus, the age exemption, by itself, does not
account for the higher passing rates on physical fitness tests in
these services.
--------------------
\1 The Army Physical Fitness Program, Army Regulation 350-15,
November 3, 1989. Superseded by Training in Units, Army Regulation
350-41, March 19, 1993.
\2 Marine Corps Separation and Retirement Manual, MCO P1900.16, June
27, 1989, and Physical Readiness Program, Department of the Navy,
OPNAVINST 6110.ID, January 18, 1990.
\3 Air Force Fitness and Weight Programs, Air Force Regulation 35-11,
April 10, 1985. Superseded by The Air Force Weight Program, Air
Force Regulation 35-11, February 5, 1991. The physical fitness
portion of the 1985 regulation was deleted pending issuance of a new
regulation to implement the bicycle exercise test. As of December
1993, the new regulation had not been published. In the interim, the
Air National Guard instructed its commanders to continue using the
testing guidelines contained in the 1985 regulation. The Air Force
Reserve made fitness testing optional, but if testing was conducted,
the 1985 guidelines were to be used.
MANY RESERVISTS DO NOT TAKE
REQUIRED FITNESS TESTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:2.2
The lack of fitness information also prevented DOD from knowing that
the services were not complying with its policy that requires all
reservists to take annual physical fitness tests, regardless of age.
In June 1992, the Air Force Reserve discontinued mandatory testing
for all of its 82,000 members while it transitioned to a new fitness
test consisting of a stationary bicycle exercise. As discussed in
the preceding paragraph, the Marine Corps and the Navy exempt active
and reserve personnel from taking the test after the ages of 45 and
50, respectively, for safety reasons. In 1992, these services had a
total of 8,270 personnel (5,116 reservists and 3,154 active
personnel) in these age categories.
Although the Air National Guard, Army National Guard, and Army
Reserve follow DOD's policy and require all personnel to take
physical fitness tests, we found that a large number of reservists
may not be taking the tests. Information from the Army Reserve for
1992 showed that only about 103,000 of 260,500 reserve personnel
requiring fitness tests (37 percent) had test results recorded in the
Army's personnel data base, the Standard Installation/Division
Personnel System. The data also showed that about 61,000 of these
reservists were not tested because they were excused for medical or
other valid reasons. However, Army Reserve officials could not
explain why they had no test results for the remaining 97,000
personnel.
We also found in 1992 that the Navy did not have physical fitness
test data for more than 50 percent of its reserve personnel. Navy
officials stated that this lack of information was caused by the
units not completely reporting their physical fitness test results to
Navy headquarters. However, the Navy offered no data to support its
position.
Table 4.4 summarizes the number of personnel in each reserve
component who had taken required fitness tests in 1992 and the number
of personnel who were excused from the test for legitimate reasons.
Table 4.4
Physical Fitness Test Summary Data for
1992
Marine
Army Air Navy Corps
Reserv National Reserv Reserv
e Guard e e
------------------------ ------ ---------- ------ ------
Number of total 260,48 119,068 115,34 41,974
personnel 0 4
Number tested and 102,97 104,288 45,127 33,289
recorded 7
Number excused 60,737 3,915 11,998 4,877
\a
Number not explained 96,766 10,865 58,219 3,808
Percent not explained 37.1 9.1 50.5 9
------------------------------------------------------------
Note: The Army National Guard does not aggregate data at the
headquarters level on physical fitness test results. Thus, service
officials could not determine what portion of the nearly 426,000
Guard soldiers had taken fitness tests in 1992.
\a This figure represents the total number of Army reservists who
were excused from tests because of permanent medical profiles or
another valid reason, such as being away at training or in a travel
status.
Although some service officials believed that delays in entering
testing data could explain why the services had no test results for
many reservists, our case studies showed that many reservists missed
tests for no apparent reason. At one of the three Naval Reserve
Readiness Centers we reviewed, 151 of 622 personnel (24 percent) had
not either taken or completed their physical /fitness tests in 1992.
Unit officials could offer no explanation for this situation. Our
case studies also found some personnel in units of the Air and Army
National Guards, Army Reserve, and Marine Corps who, for no apparent
reason, had not taken physical fitness tests. The 1991 Army Forces
Command Inspector General's report on physical fitness also found
Army units that were not conducting annual physical fitness testing.
SOME FAILING FITNESS TEST
SCORES WERE CHANGED TO PASSING
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:3
To reduce the risk of physical fitness test scores being altered, or
to prevent this situation from going undetected, DOD management
controls require that no one individual be responsible for all key
aspects of the testing process. Rather, duties and responsibilities
are to be assigned to a number of individuals to ensure that
effective checks and balances exist. However, none of the services
except the Marine Corps had established adequate controls to ensure
the integrity of the fitness testing process.
The problem of altered fitness test scores surfaced in May 1992 after
the death of a Connecticut National Guard soldier during the run
portion of the physical fitness test. Connecticut Guard officials
began an investigation of the scoring process after an individual
from the soldier's unit reported that test scores were being changed.
Guard officials found that eight individuals' scores on the run
portion of the test had been changed from failing to passing. The
officials told us that two unit personnel assigned to record test
results admitted to altering the scores.
An August 1992 report by the Inspector General of the Sixth U.S.
Army cited the lack of adequate controls to prevent alteration of
test scores. Specific problems noted by the Inspector General
included "buddies" scoring each other and only one person recording
the test results for soldiers completing the 2-mile run.
At one Navy unit we visited, eight reservists appeared to have failed
the most recent physical fitness test given in July 1992, but the
unit reported only five failures to its higher command. We found
that failing scores for three of the eight individuals (38 percent)
had been changed to passing scores. In these instances, the failing
score had either been erased or crossed out and a passing score was
entered. Unit personnel agreed that the scores had been changed. We
found no instances where passing test scores were changed to failing
scores.
We found a similar situation in one Army reserve component unit. Of
the 73 Army reservists who failed fitness tests from 1990 to 1992,
failing scores for 14 individuals (19 percent) had apparently been
changed to passing scores. Unit personnel told us that unit members
record test scores for other members and that the accuracy of the
scores is not independently verified.
We reviewed 351 Air National Guard records and did not find any
instances of altered test scores. However, an Air Force official
told us that since its physical fitness test is not difficult, it
would be unlikely that test scores would have to be changed for
reservists to pass it. Nevertheless, the Air Force had not
implemented any specific control mechanisms to prevent scores from
being inappropriately changed.
To ensure that scores from the Marine Corps' physical fitness test
are not altered, active duty Marines monitor the test, personnel are
located at several points during the run portion of the test to
monitor times, active duty and reserve officers separately verify
test scores, and another independent officer verifies the scores a
third time before they are reported to higher management. These
controls seem to be effective: in our review of nearly 400 physical
fitness test scores from three different Marine reserve units, we
found no instances in which failing test scores were changed to
passing scores.
PLANNED REVISIONS TO DOD'S
FITNESS POLICY WILL NOT CORRECT
CONTROL WEAKNESSES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:4
DOD's planned revisions to its physical fitness policy will not
correct the management control weaknesses we identified. DOD's
policy would require the services to provide an annual report that
describes their physical fitness programs, program strengths and
weaknesses, and any planned changes to the program. The annual
report would also include the services' views on the fitness levels
of their members.
The policy would not require the services to maintain and record any
specific fitness information for use in assessing the fitness of
their forces. The policy also would not require the services to
separate personnel who continually fail physical fitness tests,
although the services would continue to be allowed to do so.
Further, the policy would not require the services to institute any
control provisions to ensure the integrity of the physical fitness
testing process.
DOD HAS NOT IDENTIFIED ITS
FITNESS PROGRAM AS CONTAINING
CONTROL WEAKNESSES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:5
The Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act of 1982 requires heads
of agencies to make annual examinations of their internal controls
and issue annual reports to the President and the Congress that
identify areas in which material control weaknesses exist and plans
to correct these weaknesses. DOD has identified the major program
areas requiring internal control assessments (e.g., force readiness,
major systems acquisition, and supply operations), but it relies on
the services to decide the specific programs (e.g., physical fitness)
that should be subject to internal control reviews. DOD's management
control policy requires the services to decide when to review the
adequacy of controls for specific programs based on assessments of
the programs' risk of vulnerability to fraud, waste, abuse, or
mismanagement.\4 DOD requires the services to conduct risk
assessments at least once every 5 years. Programs can be categorized
as being at a high-, medium-, or low-risk level. Programs designated
as being at a high risk must have detailed reviews of their
management controls annually. Programs having a low risk are
reviewed at the discretion of program managers.
All of the services had included their physical fitness programs
under their internal control programs. The Army, the Marine Corps,
and the Navy had identified their programs as being at a low risk to
contain fraud, waste, abuse, or mismanagement. The Air Force
delegated the responsibility for making risk assessments of its
physical fitness program to its major commands, and headquarters
officials were not aware of the risk assigned by the commands to the
physical fitness program. None of the services had identified any
material control weaknesses in their physical fitness programs.
Since DOD relies on service assessments to identify control
weaknesses, DOD has not identified its physical fitness program as
containing any material control weaknesses. However, as shown by our
review and reports by Army Inspector Generals, we believe that DOD's
fitness program does contain material control weaknesses.
--------------------
\4 Internal Management Control Program, Department of Defense
Directive 5010.38, April 14, 1987.
CONCLUSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:6
DOD has been extremely lax in overseeing the services' physical
fitness programs. Because it did not enforce the services'
requirement to periodically assess and report on their fitness
programs, many of the fitness problems that surfaced during the Gulf
War were unexpected. These problems might have had serious
consequences if the Army were not able to substitute fit reserve
component personnel from other units. However, the Army may not have
the option of substituting personnel in the future as reserve forces
are drawn down. We believe that DOD can no longer afford to continue
lax oversight, permitting the retention of reservists who repeatedly
fail fitness tests, allowing large numbers of reservists to go
untested, and creating a testing environment that allows failing
scores to be changed to passing ones.
RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:7
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following actions
to improve controls over physical fitness testing and reporting:
revise DOD's physical fitness policy to require the services to
include in their annual assessments of physical fitness programs
data on (1) the number of active and reserve component personnel
taking physical fitness tests, (2) the number of personnel
passing and failing the tests and the number failing two or more
consecutive tests, (3) personnel actions taken against those who
fail tests, and (4) the number of personnel excused from testing
and the reasons why they were excused;
direct the Secretary of the Navy to discontinue exempting older
Marine Corps and Navy reservists from fitness testing;
direct the Secretaries of the Air Force, the Army, and the Navy to
separate personnel who repeatedly fail either mission-specific
or general physical fitness tests;
implement controls to prevent fitness test scores from being
inappropriately changed;
identify DOD's physical fitness program as containing material
control weaknesses in the next annual assurance statement; and
direct the DOD Inspector General to confirm that adequate
management controls have been established to correct the
fitness-related problems identified in this report.
AGENCY COMMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:8
DOD agreed with all of our findings except that it only partially
agreed that the services' lack of reporting of detailed information
to DOD precluded disclosure of fitness-related problems. However,
DOD offered no explanation for its lack of full concurrence.
DOD generally concurred with our recommendations. DOD said that it
would test all service members regardless of age, separate personnel
who repeatedly fail physical fitness tests, implement controls
designed to prevent test scores from being inappropriately changed,
and direct the Inspector General to assess whether adequate
management controls have been established.
Some of the actions DOD agreed to take in response to our other
recommendations will not do enough to correct the management control
weaknesses we identified. Concerning our recommendation for
requiring the services to provide more data in their annual fitness
assessments, DOD believes that because the services currently provide
it with readiness reports, which indicate the technical and physical
preparedness of units to perform their missions, reporting physical
fitness test results at the level of detail we recommended would not
benefit program management. However, the subjective nature of
readiness reports may not provide valid results, considering that
Army mobilization station data and Inspector General studies found
that many reserve component soldiers did not maintain themselves at
the fitness levels required for sustained operations.
We believe that instead of continuing to rely on subjective
self-reporting by the services of the fitness levels of reserve
forces, more objective data are needed. Much of the information that
is needed to provide more objective assessments is already generated
by lower levels in the services, but the data are not provided to
top-level commanders or to DOD. Our recommendation is designed to
ensure that key data are reported to higher level service
organizations and to DOD for analysis of trends and action on
potential problems. Without such data, fitness-related problems
could go undetected and not become evident until the commencement of
military operations, as was the case during Operations Desert Shield
and Desert Storm.
DOD did not agree to identify the physical fitness program as
containing material control weaknesses in its 1994 assurance
statement. Instead, DOD said that it would have the Inspector
General confirm that adequate management controls had been
established and that it would reconsider this issue in fiscal year
1995 when it assesses the progress made by the services to correct
the deficiencies we identified. However, we believe that the
widespread nature of the deficiencies that currently exist in the
program provides a compelling reason to involve top-level management
in resolving the problems now rather than later. By including the
physical fitness program in the 1994 assurance statement, top-level
DOD managers would be expected to help ensure that deficiencies were
dealt with promptly and effectively, instead of allowing them to
linger.
(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix I
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
============================================================ Chapter 4
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KEY ORGANIZATIONS CONTACTED
========================================================== Appendix II
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:1
Offices of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs,
Health
Affairs, and Personnel and Readiness, Washington, D.C.
Armed Forces Epidemiological Board, Washington, D.C.
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:2
Office of Personnel Plans and Policy, Washington, D.C.
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:3
AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:3.1
Office of the Surgeon General, Bolling Air Force Base, Washington,
D.C.
Air Force Military Personnel Center, Randolph Air Force Base, Texas
AIR FORCE RESERVE
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:3.2
Headquarters, Air Force Reserve, Robins Air Force Base, Georgia
Office of the Command Surgeon, Washington, D.C.
433rd Military Airlift Wing, Kelly Air Force Base, Texas
AIR NATIONAL GUARD
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:3.3
Air National Guard Readiness Center, and Offices of the Air Surgeon
and Directorate of Personnel, Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland
Headquarters, Maryland Air National Guard, Baltimore, Maryland
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:4
ARMY HEADQUARTERS
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:4.1
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans,
Washington, D.C.
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Washington, D.C.
Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia
Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia
Army Physical Fitness School, Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana, and
Fort Benning, Georgia
Army Surgeon General, Falls Church, Virginia
Emergency Operations Center, Fort Sam Houston, Texas
U.S. Army Soldier Support Center, Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana
First U.S. Army, Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
ARMY NATIONAL GUARD
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:4.2
National Guard Bureau, Arlington, Virginia
Headquarters, Connecticut National Guard, Hartford, Connecticut
Headquarters, Maryland National Guard, Baltimore, Maryland
Headquarters, Texas National Guard, Austin, Texas
ARMY RESERVE
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:4.3
Headquarters, U.S. Army Reserve Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia
Headquarters, 90th U.S. Army Reserve Command, San Antonio, Texas
Headquarters, 97th U.S. Army Reserve Command, Fort George G. Meade,
Maryland
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:5
NAVY HEADQUARTERS
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:5.1
Bureau of Naval Medicine and Surgery, Washington, D.C.
Bureau of Naval Personnel, Arlington, Virginia
NAVAL RESERVE
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:5.2
Commander, Naval Reserve Force, New Orleans, Louisiana
Naval Reserve Readiness Command, Region 10, New Orleans, Louisiana
Naval Reserve Readiness Command, Region 11, Dallas, Texas
Commander, Fleet Logistics Support Wing, Dallas, Texas
MARINE CORPS
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:5.3
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Arlington, Virginia
Headquarters, Marine Corps Reserve, New Orleans, Louisiana
RESERVE COMPONENT UNITS SELECTED
FOR CASE STUDY ANALYSIS
========================================================= Appendix III
AIR NATIONAL GUARD UNITS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:1
135th Airlift Group, Essex, Maryland
135th Tactical Airlift Squadron
135th Mobile Aerial Port Flight
175th Fighter Group, Essex, Maryland
104th Fighter Squadron
175th Civil Engineering Squadron
175th Mission Support Squadron
ARMY NATIONAL GUARD UNITS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:2
200th Military Police Company, Salisbury, Maryland
Company B, 115th Infantry Battalion, Olney, Maryland
ARMY RESERVE UNITS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:3
757th Light Maintenance Company, San Antonio, Texas
MARINE CORPS RESERVE UNITS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:4
Company C, 1st Battalion, 23rd Marines, Corpus Christi, Texas
Marine Light Helicopter Squadron, Belle Chasse, Louisiana
Battery N, 5th Battalion, 14th Marines, El Paso, Texas
NAVAL RESERVE UNITS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:5
Naval Reserve Readiness Center, Corpus Christi, Texas
Landing Ship Transport
Legal Service Office
Mobilization Assignment Control Group
Naval Hospital
Navy Maintenance Construction Battalion Detachment
Naval Weapons Station
Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activity
Volunteer Training Unit
Naval Reserve Readiness Center, El Paso, Texas
Fleet Hospital
Fleet Support Training Unit
Mobilization Assignment Control Group
Mobile Mine Assembly Group Detachment
Naval Communications Management Center
Navy Maintenance Construction Battalion
Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activity
U.S.S. Canopus
U.S.S. El Paso
U.S.S. Flint
U.S.S. Oakland
U.S.S. Texas
U.S.S. Yokosuka
Volunteer Training Unit
Weapons Station Seal Beach
Strike Fighter Squadron 204, Naval Air Station, New Orleans,
Louisiana
MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================== Appendix IV
NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:1
Norman J. Rabkin, Associate Director
Charles J. Bonanno, Assistant Director
Rodney E. Ragan, Evaluator-in-Charge
Carol L. Kolarik, Site Senior
Laura L. Talbott, Site Senior
David A. Michaels, Evaluator
Christina L. Quattrociocchi, Evaluator
Karen S. Blum, Reports Analyst
DALLAS REGIONAL OFFICE
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:2
Jeffrey A. Kans, Regional Assignment Manager
Kimberly S. Carson, Site Senior
Sally S. Leon-Guerrero, Site Senior