Chemical Weapon Stockpile: Army's Emergency Preparedness Program Has Been
Slow to Achieve Results (Chapter Report, 02/22/94, GAO/NSIAD-94-91).
After 5 years of effort by the Army and nearly $200 million in outlays,
communities near chemical weapon storage sites are still not prepared to
respond to a chemical emergency. The Army now estimates that this
emergency preparedness program will cost nearly $700 million through its
target completion date of 2003. The Army has yet to identify all the
risks to civilians from a chemical accident, and the program has
experienced delays in acquiring and installing essential equipment, such
as warning sirens and automated systems. The program's management is
complicated by the need to work with various state, local, and federal
officials. The Army's overall management approach, however, has been
ineffective. The Army's practice of sharing management responsibilities
for activities such as training has led to unclear responsibility,
uncoordinated activities, and weak controls over funds. These conditions
have delayed the attainment of program objectives.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: NSIAD-94-91
TITLE: Chemical Weapon Stockpile: Army's Emergency Preparedness
Program Has Been Slow to Achieve Results
DATE: 02/22/94
SUBJECT: Army facilities
Emergency preparedness
Chemical warfare
Federal/state relations
Waste disposal
Hazardous substances
Safety standards
Funds management
Defense contingency planning
Munitions
IDENTIFIER: Army Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program
Aberdeen (MD)
Anniston (AL)
Lexington (KY)
Newport (IN)
Pine Bluff (AR)
Pueblo (CO)
Tooele (UT)
Umatilla (OR)
Illinois
Washington
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Cover
================================================================ COVER
Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Environment, Energy, and
Natural Resources, Committee on Government Operations, House of
Representatives
February 1994
CHEMICAL WEAPON STOCKPILE - ARMY'S
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM HAS
BEEN SLOW TO ACHIEVE RESULTS
GAO/NSIAD-94-91
Chemical Weapon Stockpile
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
CDC - Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
CSEPP - Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program
DOD - Department of Defense
FEMA - Federal Emergency Management Agency
GAO - General Accounting Office
Letter
=============================================================== LETTER
B-256012
February 22, 1994
The Honorable Mike Synar
Chairman, Subcommittee on Environment,
Energy, and Natural Resources
Committee on Government Operations
House of Representatives
Dear Mr. Chairman:
This report responds to your request that we review the Army's
Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program. The report
discusses problems the program is having in helping to improve the
emergency preparedness capabilities of communities near chemical
weapon storage sites. It also proposes changes in program management
to prevent additional schedule slippage. On July 16, 1993, we
testified on our interim findings. This report presents the final
results of our work.
Unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further
distribution of this report until 30 days after its issue date. At
that time, we will send copies to the Chairmen of the House and
Senate Committees on Armed Services and on Appropriations, the
Secretaries of Defense and the Army, the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget, and other interested parties. We will also
make copies available to others upon request.
This report was prepared under the direction of Donna Heivilin,
Director, Defense Management and NASA Issues, who may be reached on
(202) 512-8412 if you or your staff have any questions. The major
contributors to this report are listed in appendix III.
Sincerely yours,
Frank C. Conahan
Assistant Comptroller General
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
============================================================ Chapter 0
PURPOSE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1
The accidental release of chemical agent from a chemical weapon
storage site could pose a potentially lethal health hazard to persons
living and working nearby. In 1988, the Army established the
Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP) to help
local communities near such sites prepare to respond to such an
emergency. The Chairman of the Subcommittee on Environment, Energy,
and Natural Resources, House Committee on Government Operations,
requested that GAO evaluate (1) the progress this program has made in
developing the emergency preparedness capabilities of the local
communities and (2) the effectiveness of CSEPP's management.
BACKGROUND
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2
In 1985, Congress directed the Department of Defense (DOD) to destroy
its stockpile of obsolete chemical weapons and agents in a manner
that provided maximum protection for the general public. The
munitions to be destroyed contain nerve agents, which disrupt the
nervous system and lead to loss of muscular control and death, as
well as mustard agents, which blister the skin and can be lethal in
large amounts. DOD assigned this task to the Army, which plans to
build incinerators at the eight storage sites in the continental
United States where most of these weapons are stored. The Army
considers the likelihood of an accident during storage or destruction
to be extremely small. However, the potential effects could be
severe. More than 100,000 persons live or work within about 6 miles
of the eight storage sites.
The Army established CSEPP to enhance the capabilities of local
communities to respond to a chemical emergency. The Army sought
assistance from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to
provide federal emergency response funds and assistance to state and
local emergency management agencies. Although FEMA and the Army
provide financial and technical assistance to support local
preparedness, state and local governments, in accordance with state
law, are responsible for developing and implementing emergency
response programs for the local communities. Ten states and 38
counties participate in the program. In 1988, the Army estimated
that CSEPP would cost $114 million and be completed by 1994.
RESULTS IN BRIEF
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3
Although the Army has worked for 5 years and spent about $200
million, communities near chemical weapon storage sites are not yet
prepared to respond to a chemical emergency. The Army now estimates
that CSEPP will cost $696 million through its estimated completion
date of 2003. The Army has yet to fully identify the risks to
civilian populations of a chemical accident in which agent crosses
installation boundaries. As a result, communities lack guidance to
help them prepare. Additionally, CSEPP has incurred delays in
acquiring and installing essential equipment such as warning sirens
and automated systems. CSEPP officials originally planned to
complete the planning guidance and standards by September 1989.
Although partial planning guidance has been issued, officials
currently estimate that the guidance will not be completed until
March 1994.
The program's management is complicated by the need to work with
various state, local, and federal agency officials. However, the
Army's overall management approach has not been effective.
Specifically, its approach of sharing management responsibility for
various activities such as training has resulted in unclear
responsibility, uncoordinated activities, and at least until recently
weak controls over funds. The conditions have contributed to delays
in achieving program objectives.
PRINCIPAL FINDINGS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4
INSUFFICIENT PROGRAM
GUIDANCE IS AVAILABLE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.1
Communities are unable to complete their plans and preparations for
responding to a chemical emergency because CSEPP has not completed
all the guidance and standards they need. The remaining portions of
this guidance will not be issued until the Army completes an analysis
of the risk of chemical agent deposition beyond Army installation
boundaries. The analysis has taken more than 2 years and is only now
approaching completion. Guidance for 4 of CSEPP's 13 planning
standards is on hold awaiting the outcome of the study.
ACQUISITION AND INSTALLATION
OF EQUIPMENT DELAYED
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.2
CSEPP planning documents identify requirements for sirens to alert
surrounding communities, tone alert radios to provide instructions on
what protective actions to take, computer automation to help local
officials plan for evacuations, and sheltering in place for persons
who, because of their proximity to the Army installation, will not
have time to evacuate. However, the communities do not yet have the
equipment needed to perform these tasks. CSEPP schedules show sirens
and tone alert radios were to have been installed by October 1992,
and system automation requirements completed by September 1991.
To date, sirens have been installed at only one site. CSEPP
officials now estimate that all eight sites will have sirens by
January 1995 and six sites will have tone alert radios by October
1995. An estimated date for installation of radios at the remaining
two sites has not been determined.
Installation of the final computer automation system is not scheduled
to be completed until July 1995. CSEPP officials state they will
begin to assist communities with some sheltering-in-place
enhancements during fiscal year 1994.
According to CSEPP officials, the delays are the result of
unrealistic plans and schedules, and problems inherent in developing
state-of-the-art systems.
PROGRAM MANAGEMENT
WEAKNESSES HAVE CONTRIBUTED
TO CSEPP PROBLEMS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.3
Weaknesses in program management have contributed to the program
delays. CSEPP's committee-based management structure lacks a clear
focus of accountability and does not adequately support program
coordination and execution. Responsibility for program
decision-making and operational guidance is dispersed among the Joint
Steering Committee and its six subcommittees, each of which is
co-chaired by Army and FEMA representatives. In addition, there has
been a high turnover in CSEPP leadership. Delays in CSEPP providing
medical readiness training and automation can be attributed in large
measure to the organizational structure.
In February 1993, the FEMA Inspector General reported that FEMA had
not been providing the Army with adequate financial management
information to evaluate program progress. FEMA and Army officials
told GAO that recent actions have been taken to help resolve this
problem. GAO is reviewing this issue separately.
RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:5
GAO recommends that the Secretary of the Army determine the realism
of existing milestones, resource needs, and barriers to achieving
goals for each CSEPP initiative. Using this information, the
Secretary should establish new baseline milestones for each
initiative. GAO also recommends that the Secretary change CSEPP's
committee structure to establish a single focal point of
accountability within the Army to implement the program and to
coordinate with other agencies as needed.
AGENCY COMMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:6
As requested, GAO did not obtain official agency comments on a draft
of this report. However, GAO discussed its findings with DOD, Army,
and FEMA program officials, and they generally agreed. Their views
have been included where appropriate.
INTRODUCTION
============================================================ Chapter 1
The final Environmental Impact Statement for the Army's chemical
weapon disposal program indicates that the likelihood of a chemical
agent release during weapon storage or destruction is extremely
small. However, the potential effects of such an accident are so
severe that thorough preparation is necessary to respond in the event
of an emergency. State and local governments are responsible for
developing and implementing emergency response programs for the
communities. In 1988, the Army established the Chemical Stockpile
Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP) to help communities near
chemical weapon storage and destruction sites improve their emergency
response capability. While the Army has primary responsibility for
the program, it shares portions of CSEPP's management with the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The Army and FEMA
provide financial and technical assistance to support local
preparedness.
CHEMICAL WEAPONS STOCKPILE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1
In November 1985, Congress directed the Department of Defense (DOD)
to destroy the U.S. stockpile of obsolete chemical agents and
munitions and also directed that the disposal program provide for the
maximum protection of the environment, the general public, and the
personnel involved in the actual destruction of the munitions.\1 The
Army evaluated various techniques and, in 1988, selected on-site
incineration as the method for destroying the chemical weapons.
--------------------
\1 Public Law 99-145.
STORAGE LOCATIONS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1.1
Most of the stockpile is stored at eight Army installations in the
continental United States. The stockpile consists of nerve agents,
which can disrupt the nervous system and lead to loss of muscular
control and death, and mustard agents, which blister the skin and can
be lethal in large amounts. More than 100,000 people live or work
within about 6 miles of these sites. As figure 1.1 shows, the size
of populations near storage locations ranges from about 100 persons
near Tooele Army Depot in Utah to more than 44,000 persons near
Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland.
Figure 1.1: Storage Locations
and Population Within 6.2 Miles
of Incineration Plants
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Note: The 6.2 miles roughly correspond to the area having less than
1 hour to respond to a chemical agent release. This area, called an
Immediate Response Zone, varies by site.
ARMY PLANNING
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1.2
Communities near the chemical weapon storage sites had little
capability to respond to a chemical emergency when CSEPP funding
began in 1988. Originally, the Army scheduled emergency preparedness
improvements to support the beginning of weapons destruction at each
site. However, a 1988 Army study indicated that although the
probability of a release was very small, weapons storage posed a
greater threat of a major accidental chemical agent release than did
weapons destruction. As a result, the Army decided to provide
emergency response capability as soon as possible at all sites,
regardless of the schedule for weapons destruction.
PROGRAM OBJECTIVES AND
RESPONSIBILITIES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1.3
CSEPP's overall objectives are to provide guidance, assistance, a
variety of equipment, and training so that communities can adequately
respond to a chemical emergency. In August 1988, the Army signed a
memorandum of understanding with FEMA to obtain FEMA's assistance in
administering CSEPP in the states and counties. The Army asked for
FEMA's assistance because FEMA is the federal agency responsible for
working with state and local governments in developing and
implementing preparedness programs, and because it has the
infrastructure and experience to work with the states and counties.
Under the agreement the Army is responsible for
providing technical assistance and resources in developing
emergency response plans and related capabilities,
integrating the military installation and civilian community
planning processes,
ensuring that all emergency plans are adequate and can be readily
implemented,
conducting site-specific hazard analyses for planning, and
providing assistance if the required response is beyond the
capability of state and local governments.
FEMA is responsible for
administering CSEPP funding provided to the states and localities;
taking the lead in working with state and local governments to
develop their emergency preparedness plans, upgrading community
response capabilities, and conducting necessary training;
taking the lead in preparing, developing, and delivering training
on chemical materials emergency management, planning,
mitigation, and response techniques to state and local
governments; and
taking the lead in developing public information and education
programs.
To manage CSEPP, the Army and FEMA established a CSEPP steering
committee and six subcommittees organized by functional area:
planning, exercises, training, public affairs, reentry and
restoration, and automation.
STATES AND COUNTIES AFFECTED
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1.4
Ten states and 38 counties participate in CSEPP. Ten states are
involved because two of the storage sites--Umatilla, Oregon, and
Newport, Indiana--are close to state boundaries. Consequently, the
neighboring states of Washington and Illinois participate in CSEPP.
See appendix I for a listing of the states and counties that
participate.
PROGRAM FUNDING
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2
In March 1988, the Army estimated that CSEPP would cost $114 million
through its then estimated completion date of 1994. This estimate
has since been revised to approximately $696 million through 2003,
the current estimated completion date. The revised estimate is an
increase of $582 million over the Army's original 1988 estimate.
Program officials state that program delays beyond 2003 will result
in additional costs.
CSEPP had spent approximately $200 million through fiscal year 1993.
Funding for localities flows from the Army through FEMA to states and
counties. Data provided by the Army and FEMA show that approximately
$71 million had been spent by the Army, $29 million by FEMA, and
about $100 million by the 10 states participating in CSEPP. Specific
purposes for which funds were released to states are shown in table
1.1.
Table 1.1
Allocation of CSEPP Funds Released to
Participating States
(Dollars in millions)
Funding category
-------------------------------------------------- --------
Communications $22.8
Alert and notification devices 23.9
Automation 13.0
Emergency operations centers 9.9
State and local salaries and benefits 12.4
Other, including administration and travel 17.9
============================================================
Total $99.9
------------------------------------------------------------
OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND
METHODOLOGY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:3
The Chairman of the Subcommittee on Environment, Energy, and Natural
Resources, House Committee on Government Operations, asked us to (1)
determine if progress has been made in preparing civilian communities
to respond to potential emergencies associated with the storage or
disposal of chemical weapons and (2) examine the effectiveness of
CSEPP's management. We provided an interim assessment of this
program in July 1993, and this report presents the final results of
our work.\2
We obtained information from FEMA and the Department of the Army in
Washington, D.C., on CSEPP policy, procedures, milestones, and
status. We also visited five CSEPP sites--Anniston, Alabama; Pine
Bluff, Arkansas; Pueblo, Colorado; Tooele, Utah; and Umatilla,
Oregon--to obtain information on local response capabilities from
state and local CSEPP planners, trainers, and response personnel.
Appendix II contains a list of entities contacted during our work.
To evaluate program progress, we attended CSEPP planning, medical,
and automation conferences, as well as a quarterly regional
conference and a CSEPP annual conference. At the five sites, we
reviewed the status of preparations and equipment acquisition;
visited chemical weapon storage areas and response facilities; and
observed emergency response exercises. During the exercises, we
observed response activities at medical and emergency operations
facilities. Following the exercises, we attended sessions at which
Army, FEMA, and contractor personnel evaluated the participants'
emergency response efforts and other sessions at which they provided
feedback to exercise participants.
We performed our work between June 1992 and September 1993 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. As
requested, we did not obtain official agency comments on a draft of
this report. However, we discussed our findings with DOD, Army, and
FEMA program officials, and they generally agreed. Their views have
been included where appropriate.
--------------------
\2 Chemical Weapons Storage: Communities Are Not Prepared to Respond
to Emergencies (GAO/T-NSIAD-93-18, July 16, 1993).
COMMUNITIES ARE NOT FULLY PREPARED
TO RESPOND TO A CHEMICAL EMERGENCY
============================================================ Chapter 2
Although the Army has worked for 5 years and spent about $200 million
to help prepare CSEPP communities to respond to a chemical accident,
communities near the storage sites are not yet fully prepared for
such an emergency. The communities are unable to complete their
plans and preparations because CSEPP has not fully identified the
risks of an accidental release to nearby communities. As a result,
communities lack the guidance and standards they need for such key
areas as protective equipment, decontamination, and medical response.
Furthermore, the acquisition and installation of necessary equipment,
such as alert and notification devices and automation systems, have
not been completed.
ANALYSIS OF OFF-POST RISK
DELAYS NEEDED GUIDANCE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1
Local emergency preparedness officials lack complete planning
guidance to help them prepare for a chemical accident. The Army
originally planned to provide the communities with complete planning
guidance and standards by September 1989. However, when the guidance
manual was issued in April 1993, only about half of the standards
that support the planning guidance were included. Officials state
that the guidance and standards cannot be completed until the Army
has completed its analysis of the risk of chemical agent deposition
beyond installation boundaries.
PLANNING GUIDANCE HAS BEEN
DELAYED
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1.1
CSEPP officials originally expected to complete their planning
guidance in the form of a manual containing planning checklists,
supplemented by
13 planning standards, by September 1989. This manual was meant to
provide broad guidance and direction to local and state officials in
the development and maintenance of coordinated emergency plans for
accidents involving military chemical agents. In May 1990, we
reported that the Army was behind schedule in developing the planning
guidance but that it anticipated having portions completed by late
spring 1990 and the entire document completed by the end of fiscal
year 1990.\1 We recommended that the Army take action to ensure the
timely completion of the guidance. In September 1990, the Assistant
Secretary of the Army stated that the Army concurred with this
recommendation and that through intensive management and the personal
interaction of its staff, the Army would ensure that these actions
would be completed in a timely manner.
However, only 7 of the 13 planning standards were completed as of
April 1993, when the guidance was adopted for use in CSEPP and issued
as final by the CSEPP Joint Steering Committee. The seven completed
planning standards cover command and control, emergency operations
centers, communications support networks, public alert and
notification systems, traffic and access control, public education
and information, and evacuee support. Of the other six standards,
two--covering protective action decision-making and protective
actions and response--were issued in September 1993. The four
remaining standards, covering emergency worker operations, emergency
medical services, decontamination, and reentry, will not be issued
until the Army completes its study assessing the risk of chemical
agent deposition beyond installation boundaries. Army officials
estimated that they would be able to complete the remaining standards
by March 1994.
--------------------
\1 Chemical Weapons: Obstacles to the Army's Plan to Destroy
Obsolete U.S. Stockpile (GAO/NSIAD-90-155, May 24, 1990).
RESPONSE PLANS AND
PROCEDURES ARE INCOMPLETE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1.2
Officials in many of the CSEPP counties and states we visited said
that because of the lack of guidance and standards, they are unable
to complete their emergency response plans. For example, officials
at several locations cited problems in completing plans because there
were no standards on decontamination, protective gear for emergency
response workers, or medical response. Local officials strongly
believe that in a chemical emergency they will need to decontaminate
people who are suspected of having been exposed to the chemical agent
prior to treating them. Similarly, they believe that protective gear
is needed for civilian emergency workers who have a role in treating
casualties, directing traffic during an evacuation, and performing
other emergency response functions to ensure that they are protected
from exposure to chemical agent.
Decontamination consists of eliminating all suspected sources of
contamination, such as clothing, and treating the person with an
appropriate solution. It may be performed at the scene of the
accident, at decontamination stations prior to admission to the
hospital, and at the hospital emergency room. Protective gear
consists of clothing for skin protection and masks for respiratory
protection. However, until CSEPP finalizes guidance and standards on
these issues, local officials cannot procure the necessary equipment,
design response procedures, or complete the training needed to
develop the confidence necessary to do the job. These are
fundamental steps that must be accomplished before an effective
emergency response plan can be developed. For example, officials in
Benton County, Washington, and Salt Lake County, Utah, told us that
some hospitals and ambulance companies in their communities were
unable to be fully incorporated into CSEPP or to provide support
during emergency response exercises because of the lack of guidance
and resources needed to perform decontamination.
Officials are also concerned about the lack of guidance and
assistance, such as planning, training, and coordination, in
developing a medical response to a chemical emergency. While CSEPP
is not responsible for providing medical resources to CSEPP
communities, it is responsible for providing related guidance and
assistance. Local officials cited inadequate resources, lack of
guidance on and equipment for decontamination and protective gear,
difficulties enlisting the support of neighboring communities, and
inadequate training of medical emergency responders as some of the
factors hindering local medical readiness.
Some CSEPP communities have stated that they do not have the hospital
capability to deal with large numbers of casualties during a chemical
emergency. For example, Tooele County, Utah, officials have stated
that the county has limited capability to handle mass injuries from a
chemical accident. Like many CSEPP counties, Tooele has sought
support from hospitals in a neighboring county, but this support is
threatened by concern about the possibility of spreading
contamination if persons exposed to toxic agents are allowed into
local facilities. Further, Indiana officials have stated that
medical resources are scarce near the Newport Army Ammunition Plant.
There is only one local medical facility, and the next closest
hospital is about 30 miles away.
Our review also shows that some hospitals and other medical care
providers do not have adequate supplies of antidote should an
accident of any magnitude occur. For example, during an emergency
preparedness exercise at Tooele, the depot's supply of antidote was
found to be out of date. CSEPP officials recognize the existence of
these problems and stated that CSEPP funding would be provided during
fiscal year 1994 for antidote and decontamination equipment at some
sites to improve their medical preparedness.
ACQUISITION AND INSTALLATION OF
ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT IS BEHIND
SCHEDULE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2
In areas where guidance and standards have been provided, CSEPP has
not provided timely support and resources for implementation. Action
on identified needs for (1) alert and notification devices, (2)
automated systems to assist in protective action and evacuation
planning, and (3) sheltering in place is behind schedule.
ALERT AND NOTIFICATION
DEVICES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2.1
In a chemical emergency, the surrounding community must be alerted
and protective actions must be taken, often within minutes. Sirens
and tone alert radios can quickly alert officials, emergency response
workers, and residents and tell them what protective actions to take.
Initially, CSEPP planned that alert and notification equipment would
be installed and tested at all locations by October 1992. Yet, only
one site, Anniston, Alabama, had sirens installed by the end of 1993.
CSEPP officials anticipate that sirens will be in place at all eight
sites by January 1995, and that tone alert radios will be installed
at six sites by October 1995. The installation date for the
remaining two sites, Pine Bluff, Arkansas, and Pueblo, Colorado, has
yet to be determined.
Delays in acquiring and fielding sirens and tone alert radios have
occurred for several reasons. First, disputes between some counties
and the state or FEMA over the numbers and placement of the sirens
have disrupted attempts to field alert and notification equipment.
In March 1993, for example, Tooele County, Utah, refused to
participate in a major CSEPP exercise until high-level CSEPP
officials addressed an impasse with FEMA regarding the number of
sirens to be located in the county. Further, CSEPP officials said
that the 1990 milestone for installing alert and notification
equipment was overly optimistic and did not consider either the time
required to build consensus among the many program participants or
the complexity of building a state-of-the-art notification system.
They also noted the need to explore and resolve privacy issues before
tone alert radios can be installed in private homes. However, while
privacy may be a valid concern, radios could have been made quickly
available to those residents who wanted them and were willing to use
them.
AUTOMATED PLANNING SYSTEM
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2.2
CSEPP is acquiring automation--computer hardware and software--to
support (1) planning and managing emergency response activities and
(2) calculating, for planning purposes, the dispersion pattern of
released chemical agent. The process of determining appropriate
protective actions is considered too complex and time-consuming to be
performed at the time of an emergency. Thus, automated equipment is
considered to be essential in helping local officials determine in
advance the protective actions appropriate for a range of
emergencies. CSEPP officials estimated in March 1990 that final
requirements for the automated systems would be completed by
September 1991. An interim system had been installed in six states
by August 1993, and installation of the final automation system is
scheduled to be completed by July 1995.
The program officials have been working to overcome limitations in
the system's atmospheric diffusion model to project the path of
released chemical agent. The projection model has several known
technical limitations, including the lack of sophisticated terrain
and meteorological data in calculating dispersion and the lack of
reliability in projecting dispersion at slow wind speeds or beyond 12
miles from the source of a chemical release. CSEPP has approved
funding to refine the site-specific dispersion calculations in this
automated planning tool.
SHELTERING-IN-PLACE
ASSISTANCE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2.3
CSEPP documents state that people closest to most storage sites will
not have time to evacuate and will have to remain in place in the
event of an accidental chemical release, yet until late in fiscal
year 1993 CSEPP did not provide support to communities to develop
sheltering in place. Sheltering-in-place enhancements can be as
simple as taping doors and windows or as elaborate as installing
pressurization systems in some schools and hospitals.
While evacuation of persons endangered by a chemical release is
always preferable to sheltering in place, there may be instances
where there would not be enough time to evacuate. For example, 34
schools are located within 9 miles of Pine Bluff Arsenal, and the
closest dwellings are only about half a mile from the bunkers
containing chemical agent. According to local officials, it is
feasible that released chemical agent could pass the installation
boundary within 5 minutes. Likewise, officials of Morrow and
Umatilla counties in Oregon said that they would not have time to
evacuate many residents because of a combination of proximity to the
depot, lack of notification and alert equipment, and lack of
transportation. During an exercise at Tooele, Utah, county officials
chose to tell residents nearest the Army installation to stay inside
rather than to evacuate because of insufficient time and means to
evacuate.
CSEPP officials agree that sheltering-in-place assistance will be
needed in all CSEPP communities, but acknowledge that administering
the assistance is difficult. Even though local officials may want
the assistance, senior CSEPP officials are concerned about
overstating the threat, panicking citizens, and possibly lowering
local real estate values. They also cite concerns about controls to
ensure houses are properly sealed and about how people would respond
to a shelter-in-place order. Nonetheless, CSEPP officials said they
recently made the decision to fund sheltering-in-place studies at two
sites.
CONCLUSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3
Communities near chemical weapon storage sites are not yet prepared
to respond to a chemical accident. Although CSEPP was created to
provide equipment, guidance, and assistance to those communities,
progress in achieving program objectives has been slow. In
particular, guidance has been delayed in several areas because a risk
assessment has not been completed.
RECOMMENDATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:4
We recommend that the Secretary of the Army determine the realism of
existing milestones, resource needs, and barriers to achieving goals
for each CSEPP initiative. Using this information, the Secretary
should establish new baseline milestones for each initiative and
require periodic progress reviews by the Army official designated
with responsibility for the program.
MANAGEMENT WEAKNESSES CONTRIBUTE
TO THE PROGRAM'S SLOW PROGRESS
============================================================ Chapter 3
The overall management challenge associated with CSEPP is complex and
difficult, requiring interaction with state and local governments and
various federal agencies. While this environment has contributed to
program implementation delays, CSEPP's management weaknesses have
also significantly contributed. More specifically, CSEPP's
management structure lacks a clear focus of accountability and has
hampered timely and effective program implementation.
The FEMA Inspector General reported in February 1993 that there was a
lack of accountability over program funds released to the states.
CSEPP and Army officials told us that changes had been made in late
fiscal year 1993 to resolve the program's financial management
information problem. We are reviewing this separately.
CSEPP MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1
Although the Army is legislatively responsible for CSEPP,
responsibility for program decision-making and operational guidance
is dispersed among the Joint Steering Committee and its six
subcommittees. The Joint Steering Committee, co-chaired by Army and
FEMA representatives, sets overall policy. The subcommittees,
composed of Army, FEMA, and other agency representatives, collect and
analyze information and develop alternatives in their area of
responsibility. The management of individual activities may be
delegated to different entities, such as FEMA's Training Management
Team.
MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE IS
INEFFECTIVE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2
In September 1990, the Army stated that through intensive management
it would ensure the timely completion of emergency preparedness
plans, guidelines, studies, and manuals, as well as the acquisition
and installation of equipment. However, as discussed in chapter 2,
these problems have persisted. This has occurred in large measure
because of a lack of management accountability for carrying out the
program, meeting program goals, and controlling activities. In
addition, there has been a lack of continuity in the CSEPP
leadership, which may have also contributed to these problems.
CSEPP's experience with automation and medical readiness training
illustrates these problems.
AUTOMATION INITIATIVE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.1
CSEPP originally planned to have its final automation system
requirements identified by September 1991. However, the requirements
were not finalized until July 1993. According to an Army official
now responsible for automation, some of the problem is attributable
to CSEPP's subcommittee structure. CSEPP's automation system must
support each subcommittee's specific automation needs. However,
co-chairs responsible for identifying their area's automation needs
would sometimes not attend key automation subcommittee meetings.
Additionally, there were disagreements between the Army and FEMA over
system design and acquisition.
To resolve these problems, in November 1992, the Army took over
leadership of the automation subcommittee and most of its acquisition
efforts. The Army expects that this action will consolidate and
improve automation management.
MEDICAL READINESS TRAINING
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.2
FEMA was designated lead agency for training and established a
Training Management Team to assess training needs, conduct interim
training, and develop a training plan and training materials.
However, the Army also asked the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) to provide training in the treatment of agent
casualties. CDC surveyed physicians, nurses, and emergency medical
technicians and then designed and presented courses. At the same
time, FEMA and some communities felt a need to also train emergency
medical technicians in management of chemical casualties. Because of
the overlap, FEMA and CDC agreed that FEMA would be responsible for
training emergency medical technicians and CDC would assume
responsibility for training physicians, physician's assistants,
nurses, nurse practitioners, and other state licensed personnel.
This fragmentation of training responsibilities, however, proved
ineffective. For example, one official stated that "the current
program has not worked, having one group perform training for
physicians, nurses, and hospital personnel while another group
develops programs for pre-hospital and first response personnel."
Similarly, local emergency management officials in four other states
indicated that CSEPP training is fragmented and could be better
coordinated to improve effectiveness. In April 1993, a senior CDC
official stated that CSEPP lacked a clearly defined lead agency among
the federal organizations involved, the training process was
fragmented among the participants, and emergency medical training
suffered from a lack of financial resources. CDC concluded that its
continued participation in CSEPP was counterproductive and withdrew
from the program.
SUBCOMMITTEE LEADERSHIP
LACKS CONTINUITY
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.3
The leadership of the subcommittees lacks continuity, and until
recently, the subcommittees lacked a mechanism for regularly
communicating among one another. Each subcommittee is co-chaired by
representatives from the Army and FEMA, and some co-chairs have
changed frequently. For example, in the 7 months preceding September
1993, six of the subcommittees had one or more changes in leadership,
including three changes in leadership on the planning subcommittee
alone. Additionally, not until the spring of 1993 did all CSEPP
co-chairs begin holding combined monthly meetings as a means of
promoting communication across subcommittee boundaries.
ACTIONS TO CORRECT FINANCIAL
INFORMATION WEAKNESSES HAVE
BEEN TAKEN
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3
CSEPP funds provided to the states are covered by the Uniform
Administrative Requirements for Grants and Cooperative Agreements to
State and Local Governments (44 C.F.R., chapter 1, parts 13 and 14).
Grant accounting procedures, however, do not provide adequate
information for program management. Thus, FEMA was unable to provide
the Army full and adequate financial data on which to base program
management and associated decisions. To illustrate, in its February
1993 report, FEMA's Inspector General stated that the financial
reporting system did not provide timely, accurate,, or consistent
data and did not satisfy the management needs of either FEMA or the
Army. Specifically, although FEMA has administered 70 percent of the
allocated CSEPP funds--$130 million out of a total of $200
million--it could not accurately account for how funds were spent.
Instead, FEMA managers could provide only the amounts originally
designated for a particular purpose.
In a follow-up memo in September 1993, FEMA's Inspector General
reported that steps were being taken to resolve the financial
information problems. According to the memo, a senior FEMA official
had been made responsible for monitoring financial reports, and
reporting procedures had been modified to provide the financial
information the Army required. In December 1993, an Army official
stated that the Army and FEMA were working to improve FEMA's
financial information reporting. We did not review the actions taken
by FEMA or assess the effectiveness of these actions. We have,
however, begun a separate review of CSEPP's use of funds, at the
request of the Subcommittee.
CONCLUSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:4
Effective implementation of CSEPP requires close working
relationships among state, local, and various federal agencies. The
current CSEPP committee structure attempted to address this need.
However, the approach has not resulted in the timely implementation
of goals and objectives. The Army, since 1991, has acknowledged the
need to make management improvements. However, accountability for
specific activities remains fragmented, activities are not always
well coordinated, and key management information at least until
recently had been lacking. Taken together, these conditions have
contributed significantly to delays in implementing program
objectives and specific activities. Given these conditions,
fundamental changes to the program's management approach are needed.
RECOMMENDATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:5
We recommend that the Secretary of the Army change CSEPP's committee
structure to establish a single focal point of accountability within
the Army to implement the program and to coordinate with FEMA and
other agencies as needed.
STATES AND COUNTIES PARTICIPATING
IN CSEPP
=========================================================== Appendix I
State County
-------------------------------------------------- --------
Alabama\a Calhoun\
a
Clay\a
Cleburne
Etowah
St.
Clair
Talladeg
a\a
Arkansas\a
Arkansas
Clevelan
d
Dallas\a
Grant\a
Jefferso
n\a
Lincoln
Lonoke
Prairie
Pulaski
Saline
Colorado\a Pueblo\a
Illinois Edgar
Vermilio
n
Indiana
Fountain
Parke
Vermilli
on
Kentucky Clark
Estill
Fayette
Garrard
Madison
Powell
Maryland Harford
Baltimor
e
Kent
Oregon\a Gilliam
Morrow\a
Umatilla
\a
Utah\a Salt
Lake\a
Tooele\a
Utah\a
Washington\a Benton\a
------------------------------------------------------------
\a States and counties visited during our review.
SITES AND AGENCIES INCLUDED IN OUR
REVIEW
========================================================== Appendix II
Entities that we contacted during our work included the following:
Office of the Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization,
Aberdeen, Maryland;
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations, Logistics, and
the Environment, Pentagon, Washington, D.C.;
U.S. Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency; Springfield, Virginia;
U.S. Army Defense Ammunition Center and School, Savannah,
Illinois;
Edgewood Research, Development, and Engineering Center, Aberdeen,
Maryland;
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) headquarters and FEMA
Regions IV, VIII, and X;
Anniston, Pine Bluff, Pueblo, Tooele, and Umatilla installations
where the chemical weapons are stored and where demilitarization
facilities will be located;
states, counties, and local entities associated with the Anniston,
Pine Bluff, Pueblo, Tooele, and Umatilla installations;
contractors, including Oak Ridge National Laboratories, Oak Ridge,
Tennessee;
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia;
Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (joint Army-FEMA)
Steering Committee and subcommittees; and
Intergovernmental Consultation and Coordination Board (sponsored by
the Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization).
MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================= Appendix III
NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:1
David Warren, Associate Director
John Henderson, Assistant Director
DENVER REGIONAL OFFICE
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:2
Suzanne Macfarlane, Evaluator-in-Charge
Cynthia L. Richards, Senior Evaluator