Russia
in the International System
Conference Report
1 June 2001
The
views expressed in this conference summary are those
of individuals and do not represent official US
intelligence or policy positions. The NIC routinely
sponsors such unclassified conferences with outside
experts to gain knowledge and insight to sharpen
the level of debate on critical issues.
CR
2001-02
All
photographs were provided by NIMA Ground Photography.
Contents
Introduction
Executive
Summary
Panel
I - Russia's Evolution
Panel II - Russia's Foreign and
Security Policy
Luncheon Roundtable: Impressions
from Russia's Regions
Panel III - Russia Viewed From
the Outside
Panel IV - Russia Viewed From
the Outside (Continued.)
Panel V - Russia in the Global
Context
Panel VI - Concluding Session:
Highlights and Implications
for the United States
Introduction
Russia
(map)
In February 2001, the National Intelligence Council
sponsored a conference that examined Russia's evolution
and its role within the international system over
the next three to five years. The conference brought
together approximately 100 government and outside
experts. It consisted of six panels with presentations
by more than 20 US and European nongovernmental
experts, followed by question-and-answer sessions.
The purpose of the conference was not to arrive
at a consensus but to deepen understanding of Russia
and how it interacts with the outside world. The
views expressed are those of the individual participants
and do not represent in any way official US intelligence
or policy positions.
This conference report consists of the précis
of each speaker's on-the-record presentation, which
were provided by the speakers, and a summary of
the ensuing not-for-attribution discussions. The
report is intended to capture the salient points
and original arguments of the proceedings. During
the panel discussions, no attempt was made to ascertain
the general view of the panel or audience. Many
of the points highlighted in this report were noted
because they were thought-provoking or outside the
conventional wisdom. They illustrate the richness
of the discussion, but they do not necessarily reflect
accepted or prevailing views at the conference.
Executive
Summary
Russia's Foreign Policy
Russian foreign policy in the coming years will
be characterized by weakness; frustration--primarily
with the United States as the world's preeminent
power--over Russia's diminished status; generally
cautious international behavior; and a drive to
resubjugate, though not reintegrate, the other former
Soviet states.
- The international
situation affords Russia time to concentrate on domestic
reforms because, for the first time in its history,
it does not face significant external threats. But
rather than use the breathing space for domestic reforms,
Putin is as much--if not more--focused on restoring
Russia's self-defined rightful role abroad and seeking
to mold the CIS into a counterweight to NATO and the
European Union.
The Outside
World's Views of Russia
Russia does not have any genuine allies. Some countries
are interested in good relations with Russia, but only
as a means to another end. For example, China sees Russia
as a counterweight to the United States but values more
highly its ties with the United States. Some countries
see Russia as a vital arms supplier but resent Russia
also selling arms to their rivals (China-India, Iran-Iraq).
Pro-Russia business lobbies exist in Germany, Italy, Turkey,
and Israel (one-fifth of whose population now consists
of Soviet émigres), but they do not single-handedly
determine national policies.
-
Europe
is the only region that would like to integrate
Russia into a security system, but it is divided
over national priorities and institutional arrangements
as well as put off by some Russian behavior.
-
Most
CIS governments do not trust their colossal neighbor,
which continues to show an unsettling readiness
to intervene in their internal affairs, though they
know Russia well and are to a considerable degree
comfortable in dealing with it.
-
Turkey
has developed an improved dialogue and an unprecedented
number of economic ties with Russia during the post-Cold
War period, but this more positive pattern of relations
has not fully taken root, and Ankara remains suspicious
of Moscow's intentions.
-
Since
the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moscow's role
in the Middle East has been reduced, but Israel,
Syria, Egypt, Libya, and Iraq all favor good relations
with Russia. Mutual interests also override disagreements
in Russian-Iranian relations, but Tehran is wary
of Russian behavior, particularly toward Saddam
Hussein.
-
India
still trusts Russia--a sentiment that is perhaps
a residue of the genuine friendship of Cold War
days--but clearly not in the same way it once did,
and New Delhi fears that weakness will propel Russia
into doing things that could drive India further
away.
-
In East
Asia, the most substantial breakthrough has been
the resurrected relationship between Russia and
China, one that entails significant longer-term
risk for Russia. Other countries in the region value
their links with Moscow as a means to balance a
more powerful China, or as a useful component of
their larger political and economic strategies,
but Russia's role in East Asia--as elsewhere--remains
constrained by the decline in its political, military,
and economic power over the last decade.
Russia's
Weakness
Russia's weakness stems from long-term secular trends
and from its domestic structure. In essence, the old nomenklatura
and a few newcomers have transformed power into property
on the basis of personal networks and created an equilibrium
resting on insider dealings. These insiders may jockey
for position but have a vested interest in preserving
the system. The public does not like the system but is
resigned to it and gives priority to the preservation
of order. As for the economy, it is divided into a profitable,
internationally integrated sector run by oligarchs and
a much larger, insulated, low-productivity, old-style
paternalistic sector that locks Russia into low growth.
-
No solace
will be forthcoming from the international business
and energy worlds. They do not expect the poor commercial
climate to improve greatly and will not increase
investments much beyond current levels until it
does.
-
Militarily,
Russia will also remain weak. Its nuclear arsenal
is of little utility, and Moscow has neither the
will nor the means to reform and strengthen its
conventional forces.
Hope for
the Future?
The best hope for change in Russia lies with the younger
generation. Several participants reported that under-25
Russians have much more in common with their US counterparts,
including use of the Internet, than with older Soviet
generations. But there was some question over whether
the new generation would change the system or adapt to
it.
- Others
placed some hope in international institutions, for
instance the World Trade Organization, eventually
forcing Russia to adapt to the modern world.
Dissenting
Views
Some participants dissented from the overall forecast
of depressing continuity.
-
The keynote
speaker, James Billington, stated that Russia would
not be forever weak and that the current confusion
would end in a few years either through the adoption
of authoritarian nationalism or federated democracy.
-
One scholar
felt the Chechen war was feeding ethnic discord
in other areas of the Federation to which Moscow
would respond with increased authoritarianism, not
necessarily successfully.
-
Finally,
a historian observed that the patience of
Russians is legendary but not infinite, meaning
that we should not be overly deterministic.
Panel
I
Russia's Evolution
Graphic
This panel examined the current internal situation
in Russia, analyzing the political system, the economy,
ethnic nationalism, and public opinion. The panel
also explored how Russia's domestic landscape is
likely to change in the next three to five years.
George Kolt (Chairman)
National Intelligence Council
The Political System:
From Soviet Past to Post-Yeltsin Future
Geoffrey
Hosking
School of Slavonic and East European Studies,
University College London
The comparison of post-Soviet Russia with Weimar
Germany is often made, and there are good reasons
for it. But there are two overriding reasons why,
overall, it fails to convince:
-
In Germany,
national feeling long preceded the formation of
a German state; Germany was a country of super-saturated
national identity with positive attitudes toward
the state. In Russia, on the contrary, the state
long preceded the nation--if a nation can be said
to exist, even now. As a result, most Russians distrust
their state, or at least identify weakly with it.
-
Most
Russians are not interested in joining political
parties. They do not feel that their problems are
best solved through the organization or program
of a party, let alone through paramilitary squads
such as those that disfigured the late years of
Weimar Germany.
For historical
reasons, Russia has built up its state system not through
institutions and laws, but through persons. Owing to its
over-stretched and vulnerable geopolitical position, from
the sixteenth century onwards Russia's rulers have had
to improvise the mobilization of resources in situations
of emergency, and they have done so by using whatever
means lay at hand, usually the power of local strongmen,
rather than through institutions and laws. This is what
I call the statization of personal power.
In tsarist
Russia, the networks of personal power ran from the court
outwards through landed nobles, provincial governors and
police chiefs; in Soviet Russia, the networks ran through
the nomenklatura appointments system controlled by local
party committees and were directed from the top by the
Central Committee of the Communist Party. At each level
of political and professional life every employee depended
greatly on the personal power and patronage of his superior
or employer, not just for pay and conditions of work,
but also for housing, food supplies, education, medical
care and other basic facilities necessary to everyday
life. The Soviet Union was not, as planned, an egalitarian
society of abundance, but rather an unequal and shortage-ridden
society whose hierarchy was determined by the devices
needed to get around the shortages.
The political
history of the Soviet Union is the story of the attempts
of its various rulers to combat the excesses of the nomenklatura
system that they themselves had created. As a result,
certain restraints did operate: the NKVD, Gosplan, the
party hierarchy itself. Under Gorbachev and Yeltsin, however,
those restraints were finally removed. Nomenklatura
appointees, especially those at the mid- and lower levels,
were able to use their position to turn administrative
control into personal possession and to exploit the resources
of Soviet society to make considerable personal fortunes.
In the process, they allied themselves with operatives
from the old underground extra-legal "black" economy,
an alliance which helps to explain the widespread criminality
that characterizes the post-Soviet economy.
So the contours
of post-Soviet society are, literally, post-Soviet. The
economy is grouped around large corporate conglomerates,
led by individual "oligarchs," who typically have a stake
in industry, commerce, finance, and the media. The political
system revolves around loose and fluctuating coalitions
of activists, each led by an individual, rather than around
political parties. In the provinces, the elected governor
becomes his own oligarch in both the economy and politics.
Society is fragmented and poorly organized to respond
to or resist initiatives coming from above.
This political
and economic system has now become rather stable,
and it may be time to talk of the end of the "transition."
Russia has a democracy and a market economy of sorts,
even if we in the West do not approve of many of
its features.
If that were
all there was to say, then one would have to be pessimistic
about the future. But there is another side to developments
in Russia. That is that Russia is becoming a nation, which
it has never been before. Wholly contrary to the intentions
of its leaders, the Soviet Union did a great deal to advance
the cause of the national consciousness of its constituent
peoples, both Russian and non-Russian.
-
Its education system gave the great majority
of the population the elements of literacy
in their own
language, subordinated to an overall Russian
concept of culture, history and social evolution.
-
The social security system gave the population
the sense of having certain entitlements which
they had never had before--to education, health,
housing, pensions, and so on. Even if the
expectations were only imperfectly fulfilled,
nevertheless a kind of passive citizenship
was thereby established.
-
Victory
in the Second World War gave many of the nationalities,
and above all the Russians, a sense of their
own historical destiny.
However, the
sense of nationhood thereby generated is still incomplete.
Few Russians regard the present Russian Federation as
constituting what they understand as Russia, and some
of the gains of the Soviet period in education and social
security have been jeopardized.
-
Nevertheless,
there is now for the first time a state called Russia--not
the Russian Empire or USSR--with its own boundaries,
its own flag and its own national anthem.
-
Russia's
leaders and politicians are now democratically elected,
even if doubts remain about the full legitimacy
and fairness of the elections.
-
A lively
mass media exists, even though it is increasingly
under pressure from the oligarchs who own it and
from the state, which regards information as part
of national security.
Putin would
like to strengthen this new Russian state and give it
a firmer identity, but the methods he has chosen are contradictory,
as will come out later in this conference.
There are dangers
in the growth of Russian national feeling. In the
past it has tended to be imperialist rather than
national. However, I believe there are good reasons
for believing this is not necessarily the case right
now.
The Economic Transition
Pekka
Sutela
Institute for Economies in Transition, Bank
of Finland
It was always
known that Russia's economic transformation would be more
arduous than that of countries outside the former USSR.
Historical, mental, geographical and economic "distance"
from a market economy was longer. Contrary to other countries,
socialism was endogenous: it had been established, developed
and defended by the Russians themselves. What is more,
in many respects the Soviet Union was the proudest achievement
of Russia. Its geographical expansion, military might
and global position were stronger than ever before. Even
more importantly, contrary to the Central European countries,
there was no widely shared understanding of the systemic
goal to be adopted.
For the Central
Europeans, the overarching goal of "returning to Europe"
meant joining the European Union, NATO, the OECD and the
rest of the Euro-Atlantic alphabet soup as soon as possible.
Joining these clubs with their sometimes hugely detailed
membership requirements--the EU Acquis run to some hundred
thousand pages--sets a strict conditionality upon the
institution-building and policies of the applicant countries.
This conditionality may not be the best imaginable, but
it has a degree of consistency and proven applicability
in other countries. Therefore, though governments and
other decisionmakers have changed, the Central European
countries have had a high degree of policy consistency,
which may have made the most important single contribution
to their unexpectedly positive economic and social progress.
Such conditionality
was not available to Russia and the rest of the USSR.
The European nations have--perhaps unwisely, at least
after the status of Turkey as a potential member has been
reasserted--denied Russia the prospect of eventual EU
membership, usually giving the size of Russia as the reason.
By doing this, the incentives of the only unifying goal
that Russia might have had were abolished. Most Russians,
on the other hand, have been keen to emphasize that Russia
has never been and never will be a "normal European country."
But like earlier in history, they have been unable to
provide the nation with any other consistent and well-defined
goal. And like the Cheshire Cat taught Alice in Wonderland,
if one does not know where to go, any road will take one
there. The conditionality of the international financial
institutions has been almost the only one available. Even
under the best of circumstances, it will be narrow and
technical. In Russia's case, the circumstances were not
the best ones, as the IFI's have been under much unfortunate
political pressure to use money.
This is probably
the single most important explanation for the divergence
of Russia's economic performance from that of the Central
European countries. The lack of a well-defined and widely
accepted goal has tended to shorten decisionmaking horizons
and has facilitated the frequent capture of policies by
established interests. On one hand, the state has been
weak in the sense of lacking a strategy and being unable
to act in a consistent way. On the other, it has remained
the major route toward power and privilege, disposing
of even the seemingly most entrenched persons and groups
when their services are no longer needed. Still, Russia
has not chosen "any road." The return to the previous
regime was never an alternative seriously supported by
a major political force. Russia was always in a transition
to something new, but it remained unclear what this "something
new" would be. Also, the Russian elites have been able
to learn from their mistakes. It was possible to argue
in the early 1990ís that large budget deficits
and high inflation were a means to provide jobs and welfare.
Such arguments have lost all credibility. This was shown
by the chasm between the rhetoric and actual policies
of the Primakov-Maslyukov government. The set of possible
policies has shrunk over time. Most talk of some specific
Eurasian system has died away. There is a wide consensus
on basic macroeconomic policies, but a clear-cut model
of institutions and legislation is still missing.
Clearly, this
is not a situation where piecemeal social engineering
should be attempted. But quite as clearly, arguments about
the weakness of the Russian state have been used to justify
the lack of consistency and comprehensiveness. This still
remains the case. The attempt to combine economic market
orientation and political authoritarianism, together with
the actual weakness of the presidency hidden behind rhetoric
and symbolism, produce hesitancy, a lack of decisions,
and a tendency to balance conflicting interests. Equaling
the restoration of Russia's might with an unchallenged
prestige of the president adds the dimension of attempted
"verticalization" of the society, with little room left
for an independent society and media. In the economic
sphere, the outcome is an almost complete lack of meaningful
structural reform.
Russia has
become a market economy, but a market economy that is
unique in many respects.
-
The Russian
large-scale privatization was based on two explicit
considerations. First, it was (probably wrongly,
given that a return to the past was not an alternative)
asserted that there was a need to secure irreversibility
by creating a wide class of property owners. Second,
there was need for political compromise with the
Duma. These considerations combined to produce Option
Two of the privatization program, in fact making
wide insider ownership inevitable. As some two-thirds
of Russian industry was privatized, in about two-thirds
of the cases about two-thirds of the stock ended
up being owned by insiders--that is, managers and
employees. The dilution of insider ownership has
since been much less than expected by the optimists,
and in many cases the presumed outsiders are acting
for the managers.
-
Most
Russian enterprises are manager-dominated, with
employees still an important though usually silent
group of owners. Managers often claim to speak for
the "work collective" and take a very cautious view
of outside investors or even bank credit, as those
are deemed to limit their power. Investment, structural
change and growth suffer. Economic theory suggests
that an insider-dominated economy fails to reach
the dynamism connected with more usual distributions
of property rights.
-
Insider
privatization partly explains the low degree of
monetization of the economy. Meager financial intermediation
and the relative lack of financial institutions--including
proper banks--are also due to a history of high
and variable inflation and the policy mistakes leading
to the financial crisis of 1998. Though the role
of money as a means of exchange strengthened much
in 1999-2000, about a fifth of industrial production
is still based on barter, and there is little evidence
of financial deepening. Modern growth theory argues
that financial depth is a major contributor to growth
and welfare. Financial sector reform seems to have
little priority in Russian policymaking. Real investment
grew strongly in 2000 from a low level, but as most
of it is financed from retained earnings, the investment
pattern tends to strengthen the inherited structure
of production. New enterprises, in particular, remain
constrained by the availability of finance.
-
The relative
lack of new private activities separates Russia
(and other states of the former Soviet Union) from
the Central European countries. The number of legally
registered enterprises has not grown for several
years; nor is there evidence of an ever-growing
share of the second economy. New activities are
not only hindered by the lack of finance, but also
by the neglect or hostility of local authorities.
On the average, Russian regions are small entities,
often dominated by a single plant or a few large
plants, usually in alliance with the authorities.
Quite often, such powers see new entrepreneurs either
as a milking cow or as an alien element to be suppressed.
If Putin's campaign to cut the regional barons down
to size indeed brings about a more unified economic
space with a more level playing field for entrepreneurs,
it should be welcomed on economic grounds. So far,
Russian regionalization has tended more to worsen
economic behavior than to make room for local initiative.
-
The border
between legal and not legal has remained fuzzy.
This is another defining feature of Russia's economic
environment. Putin's regime promises political stability
and greater clarity of rules across the country.
There are also the well-known cases of political
misuse of the legal system. The poor performance
of Russia's capital markets shows that the investors
do not trust Putin to deliver a working combination
of political authoritarianism and economic liberalism.
-
GDP growth
since 1999 has been fueled by a stiff undervaluation
of the ruble, responsible macroeconomic policies,
the adaptation of many enterprises, and by high
commodity prices that have not been fully reflected
in domestic markets, thus generating a huge implicit
subsidy to domestic users. Following a tremendous
export surplus, the economy has been partly monetized,
fiscal revenue has ballooned and the greatly improved
enterprise profitability has translated into investment,
settling of arrears and higher wages and consumption.
Net exports are bound to diminish, but still the
economy should be able to grow for a year or two
more. After that, growth depends much more on necessary
structural reform. This need is generally recognized,
but in 2000 only tax reform had some success.
-
In spite
of the currency undervaluation, Russia has no new
export commodities. Most growth has been in import
substitution. Only traditional Soviet goods are
exported. This suggests the probability of a traditional
dual economy in Russia. Most export revenue would
be earned by selling resources and other basic commodities
abroad, primarily to the European markets. Most
employment would be generated by home market industries
producing low quality commodities for poor consumers.
Such an economy would be sustained either by currency
undervaluation or other restrictions of trade. The
lack of market-based policy instruments makes the
latter alternative more probable.
These peculiarities
of the Russian market economy may well be systemic and
not just the unfortunate consequences of the macroeconomic
circumstances of 1985-1998. They do seem to characterize
an economic system of some consistency and, therefore,
staying power, but one that is badly suited for efficiency,
equity, growth and welfare. If so, Russia would tend to
remain what it is today: an economy the size of a smallish
European nation; a factor in the global economy much weaker
than, say, Sweden; and a country of large welfare gaps
and little dynamism. It would sustain itself by exporting
basic commodities and by subsisting on goods and jobs
created by protected home market industries. The outward
capital flow might well continue to dwarf the inward flow,
as is the case now. There would be links between domestic
and world financial systems, also some necessary inward
productive investment, but as a whole Russia's economic
marginalization would continue. Only the most optimistic
spokesperson of globalization would argue that this is
an impossible outcome. A nation can still step aside from
the great change underway.
This is an
outcome that the Russian authorities fear. Economic marginalization
cannot support great power ambitions. Vladimir Putin has
been very explicit on this, but the track record of 2000
tells of an inability to make and implement the needed
reforms. The Russian economy may in a sense be less virtual
than a couple of years ago, but Russian economic policies
remain very much so. The Putin regime had in 2000 a great
chance to create the foundations of Russia's future growth.
After 2001, that chance may not come again.
The final downside
of Russia's economic transition is the inability
to address the underlying trends that have been
there for so long. The list of these ills is all
too long and well-known. Current forecasts for medium-term
growth are coming down to three percent annually.
If at best the economy will grow quite modestly,
the struggle over the meager additions to available
resources will to a great extent determine Russian
politics in the coming years and decades. As the
increase available will in any case be insufficient
to cover all urgent needs and there is little reason
to expect highly rational decisionmaking and implementation,
the probability of ruptures, disconnects and fissures
increases alarmingly. The international community
has already learned that the possibilities of making
a crucial difference in Russia's development do
not exist. If the arguments outlined above have
any value, then the question will increasingly become
one of damage control and limitation.
Ethnic Nationalism and Russia's Republics
Graphic
Emil Pain
The Kennan Institute
The problem of ethnic separatism is undoubtedly
of primary significance among the ethnic problems
that directly influence Russia's political stability.
The main reason for this is the interrelation between
federal authorities and the non-Russian-majority
republics. If there is a probability of the dissolution
of Russia, it is related to these republics.
Accepted public opinion would have us believe that
under President Yeltsin, anarchy grew between Moscow
and the republics of the Russian Federation, while
President Putin has brought order and stability
to the situation. An examination of Putin's relations
with the republics shows that this is not true.
Yeltsin became president of Russia at a very critical
period in its history. Russia was feeling the consequences
of, and the inertia resulting from, the disintegration
of the USSR. He managed, however, to stabilize the
situation by making concessions to the republics
in exchange for their cessation of separatist agendas.
This stability has begun to unravel since Putin
began to exert pressure on the leaders of the republics.
In response to this pressure, they have revived
their nationalist and separatist tendencies. The
leaders of the republics do not exhibit their negative
sentiments toward Putin's policies openly. Instead,
they secretly allow nationalistic movements in their
republics to develop.
The creation of the seven federal regions has already
created new tensions in the governmental structures
of the country. Federal ministers are suspicious
of attempts by the President's regional representatives
to control the flow of finances from the center
to the regions and refuse to cooperate with Moscow's
efforts to coordinate the activities of the regional
offices of their ministries.
This kind of competition during Nikita Khrushchev's
leadership in the USSR led to the collapse of his
favorite brainchild, the sovnarkhoz--the
prototype of the present-day administrative region.
The sovnarkhozy were comprised of 3-4 oblasts,
republics, or krays and were often very large territories
that were poorly governed. The present-day administrative
regions are even bigger (comprising 12-13 regions)
and more poorly governed due to the disappearance
of the Soviet command hierarchy that had previously
provided discipline through the Communist party.
This alone condemns Putin's administrative system
to failure. The power of regional leaders should
be limited. However, this should be done
from below, through the development of municipal
self-government, rather than from above, at the
risk of concentrating even more power in the Kremlin.
Putin's reforms aim to compensate regional leaders
for a loss of power on the federal level by giving
them more control over the municipalities. This
could lead to a further weakening of the already
insignificant role that municipal authorities play.
The situation of local self-government is worsening
as a result of the changes Putin has made in the
proportion of revenue going to federal and regional
budgets. Before the changes, the proportions were
almost equal: 51 percent went to the center and
49 percent to the region. That 49 percent included
32 percent that went to the municipalities. Today
the federal share has increased to 63 percent and
the regions' has dropped to 37 percent. But it was
the municipalities that got hit the hardest, with
their share cut in half, to only 17 percent. At
the same time, the municipalities' expenses did
not decrease--they retain responsibility for almost
three-quarters of the entire housing and municipal
infrastructure. As a result, local budget deficits
are growing, and many cities have no money to pay
for electricity, gas, and coal. It is mainly because
of these financial difficulties that many Russian
cities and villages (especially in the Urals, Siberia,
and the Far East) spent months without electrical
lighting and heat this past winter. Municipalities
do not have sufficient means to make needed repairs
to heating and ventilation systems, and as a result
the number of accidents is growing.
Concentration of resources in the federal budget
destroys commercial spirit and stifles initiative
on the part of regional leaders. The Russian government
is fooling itself into believing that regions thus
controlled will be easier to rule as they become
more pliant. In reality, the opposite is true--less
money for regional and municipal budgets means less
responsibility on the part of their leaders, and
so less can be demanded of them. It should be expected
in the near future that the residents of the provinces
will increasingly direct their displeasure toward
the Kremlin. For the non-Russian peoples, that means
a growth of anti-Russian sentiment because federal
rule is seen as
Russian rule.
Such feelings were seen in the results of an opinion
poll taken in January 2001. Only 5 percent of respondents
thought that relations between different nationalities
in Russia had improved since Putin's reforms, while
37 percent thought that they had worsened.
The war in Chechnya has contributed significantly
to the perception that center-region relations have
worsened. Since the beginning of the war, solidarity
with Chechnya has grown among non-Russian populations.
Practically all Caucasians, including those who
traditionally do not like the Chechens, are experiencing
some of the same pressures as the Chechens: for
the majority of the Russian people, all Caucasians
have one face--they are all "dark" and "terrorists."
Even in a strictly military sense, there is little
probability of a victory for Moscow in Chechnya,
and there is even less probability of an economic
victory there. The history of colonial wars in the
20th century shows that when a war drags on for
a long time the intervening party will not win for
the following reasons:
-
The army
cannot be located for long--more than
5-7 years--in a hostile occupied territory before
it will begin to become demoralized.
-
As the
war drags on, a larger part of the home country
population becomes dissatisfied with it.
-
The economic
burdens of the war increase.
-
Perhaps
most importantly, the rebels stop being afraid of
an army that for a long time has failed to achieve
victory--in this case encouraging not only the Chechens
but other nationalities. The loss of the army's
ability to induce fear could be a factor in accelerating
the breakup of Russia.
The changing
ethnic composition of the population is the biggest challenge
facing Russia. In almost all of the republics of the North
Caucasus, Russians are already in the minority. In the
Far East and in Siberia, Russians are in the minority
only in Tuva, but they will soon become the minority in
Buryatiya and Yakutiya. According to some projections,
within 10-15 years, there will be about 10 million Chinese
living in Siberia and Russia's Far East. This would make
them the predominant nationality in this--the largest--area
of the federation. But the main danger lies in the Povolzh
regions, where Russians already are in the minority in
Chuvashiya and soon will be in the minority in Tatarstan
and Bashkortostan. The Tartars and Bashkirs increasingly
speak of uniting to create one federation. If they were
to form such a federation--in the very middle of the country--Russia
could split into two poorly connected pieces.
The threat
of the disintegration of the country could lead the Russian
government to adopt one of two fundamentally different
political doctrines. The first is consolidation based
on a multicultural society. Unfortunately, I can say
that the idea of a multicultural society is absolutely
foreign to the present Russian authorities. For this reason,
the government probably will use the second doctrine--consolidation
based on the growth of Russian nationalism. The last
gubernatorial elections left no doubt that the Kremlin
is exploiting Russian nostalgia for the Soviet Union and
nationalist sentiments in hopes of receiving support in
the regions from former Soviet officials and generals.
Current trends
in the development of Russia's economy--in particular,
the protection of national industry, overdependence on
oil and gas, and the arms trade--will also lead to the
strengthening of nationalism and imperialist sentiments.
These trends, especially in the arms trade and arms production,
increase the role of social groups that are the main carriers
of the Soviet imperialist mentality and foster a confrontational
attitude toward the West. These sources of economic development
are unstable, and Moscow may be tempted to explain away
a worsening of the economic situation as interference
by external enemies, thereby inflaming Russian nationalism
to support the consolidation of society.
-
This
is the current situation in Russia: xenophobia,
suspicion toward the West, and imperialist sentiments
are growing. Therefore, for nationalist consolidation
there needs to be an image of an external enemy--"worldwide
Islamic terrorism" or "world imperialism."
-
If
nationalism and imperialist militarism become
firmly established in Russia, it could be
catastrophic for the country. Moreover, past
examples of doomed regimes suggest that such
a Russia could present a serious threat to
the surrounding states.
Russian Society: The View From Below
Vladimir
Shlapentokh
Michigan State University
Before the
collapse of the USSR, there was a consensus among Soviet
sociologists about the opinions of the masses. Over the
last decade, the situation has changed significantly.
Today, there is a broad range of views among Russian politicians
and intellectuals about public attitudes. These images
are determined to a great extent by two questions. First,
in view of the success of democratic reforms in the Baltic
states, who is to blame for Russia's failure to build
a new democratic society--the masses, or the ruling elite?
Second, considering the character of these actors, what
are the prospects for Russian democracy and liberal capitalism
in the future?
There are at
least three very different models for describing the Russian
masses. Each is based on at least some empirical data.
The first--the
"eclectic model"--suggests that post-Soviet Russians have
an extremely eclectic mind, bordering on schizophrenia.
Its most eloquent advocate is Boris Grushin, a famous
Russian sociologist. According to various polls, it is
true that the Russians maintain opinions that seem, to
some degree, contradictory. They reject the Western model
of life, but do not want to lose their political and economic
freedoms. They accept the idea of having a market economy,
yet they favor regulations on prices and upper income
levels. They see America as an enemy, but they "like"
Americans. They look to the Communist past as a Golden
Age, but do not advocate its return. No more than 25 percent
of the population votes for the Communists. Almost all
Russians despise Yeltsin, yet they support Putin, who
was Yeltsin's chosen successor. Furthermore, while they
approve of Putin's first year in power, they complain
about the rise in prices and the persistent problems of
crime and corruption.
The second
model--the "uncivilized model"--was developed by Lev Gudkov,
a sociologist from the All Russian Center of Public Opinion
Studies (VTsIOM) polling firm. This model describes the
Russians as uncivilized people who are unable to live
under democracy and whose opinions have no value for those
who are trying to build a normal society. The masses are
said to be lazy drunkards and thieves, who refuse to work
hard and honestly but constantly complain about their
salaries. They are seen as passive individuals, weary
of change, unaccustomed to lofty motives, and prone only
to deviant and deeply individualistic actions. Their vision
of themselves borders on fantasy. They believe, for instance,
that sobornost (collectivism) plays a central role in
the life of the people. They suppose, without grounds,
that the Russian people are highly spiritual, hospitable,
and ready to make sacrifices for others.
Most of the
data used to support these two models cannot be disputed,
but the interpretation of this information is problematic.
A third model is needed to better describe Russian public
opinion. Labeling it the "rational model," I suggest that
in general the behavior of the masses has been rational
in view of the given historical context.
There is no
doubt that Russians live in troubled times. Their country
is faced with a deeply corrupt and immoral ruling class,
to an extent unprecedented in its history. All levels
of the bureaucracy--from the Kremlin to the local police--regularly
ignore the law. The economy is said to be a free market,
when in fact it is dictated by monopolists and criminal
structures. The political system allows the Kremlin to
prearrange, or even fake, the results of elections. It
also allows local authorities to wield arbitrary power.
What is more, considering the historical memory of most
Russians, they are not prepared to counteract these forces.
They see major political protests, such as riots and revolutions,
as acts that will only make matters worse.
Under these
conditions, the hierarchy of values in the Russian mind
looks quite rational. It is only normal for people to
value, first and foremost, order in society (in the Hobbesian
sense). It is no less rational to sacrifice democracy
for this end, especially when the country faces chaos
and disintegration (at the same time, most Russians want
both order and freedom). According to a VTsIOM survey
conducted in 2000, the vast majority of Russians--80 percent--were
ready to make such a sacrifice. The yearning for order
explains why the people support Putin, even though he
is the heir of despised former President Yeltsin. Russians
are more concerned about a smooth transition of power
and the avoidance of crisis than the leadership's adherence
to democratic procedures. This is also why Putin has become
known as the "Teflon" president. Any weakening of his
authority generates political instability and heightened
fear in society, which prompt the reinforcement of his
power.
Russians understand
that life under the Communist regime was better for most
of them, but they realize that a return to the old system
is impossible and that any attempt to do so would make
life much worse. What is more, they appreciate and are
fearful of losing the freedoms that came when the old
system collapsed. In the same way, the Russians bemoan
the collapse of the Soviet empire, but believe that it
belongs only to the past and are against any attempt to
use force to control Ukraine and other republics.
Russian attitudes
toward the present economic system are quite rational.
The majority of the people subscribe to the social-democratic
ideals that hold sway in Western Europe and, to some extent,
in the United States. They want both economic freedoms
and state intervention. They favor a moderate level of
inequality as long as there are social guarantees for
those who are less successful.
At the same
time, Russians would deem it utopian to believe that their
society can develop along the same lines as the West.
For this reason, they hope it is still possible to maintain
some political and economic freedoms, combined with strong
authoritarian power. They see this combination as "the
Russian road to the future."
Of course,
Russians are exposed to the official propaganda. As developments
during the Yugoslavian crisis in March-April 1999 showed,
anti-Americanism increased dramatically under the influence
of this propaganda. However, a few months later the Russians
returned to their semi-friendly, semi-hostile attitudes
toward America, which are almost mirror reflections of
American attitudes toward Russia.
There is no
question that the process of desocialization--the
rejection of social norms--is taking place in the
country. Alcoholism is a growing problem, particularly
in the countryside, as are drug abuse and the decline
of morals. However, these problems are strongly
exaggerated by the ruling elite, who try to shift
the blame for their failures onto the masses. Putin
is regarded by the people as a strong and reasonable
leader, which sharply distinguishes him from the
former president. Barring an economic or technological
disaster, he should feel confident that the masses
will remain eager to preserve order in society,
and having no alternative (he and his retinue are
sure to quash all competitors), they will support
his reelection in 2004--this being the primary goal
of the Putin regime.
Highlights From the Discussion
Stability
Putin is popular because of the perception that
he has brought stability. This may be, however, a
false sense of stability. Putin has been in power for
only one year, and while he is enjoying widespread support
at present, Yeltsin became a hated figure after three
years in power.
The economic
constraints and growing geopolitical threats to Russia
may be indications of future instability. The conditions
are ripe for the emergence of an authoritarian regime.
Not even a dictator, however, can fix Russia's domestic
situation, make Russia more attractive to foreign investors,
and attract the massive investment needed for real economic
growth.
Elites and
Masses
The level of patience among the Russian people
is extraordinarily high. In general, Russians do not
protest. They understand the reality of their situation
but fear that any action to ameliorate it could result
in worsening it. To them, it is not worth the risk.
The masses
do not have leaders, per se. They allow the elite
to rule, even though the masses are aware of their corruption.
At the same time, the masses are dependent upon the elites
to keep what little order Russia currently has--they have
no one else to turn to.
Economy
Progress toward a market economy in Russia seems
to be at an impasse. The economy could improve if
Russia were to attract massive foreign investment. Though
it is difficult to imagine Russia accomplishing significant
improvement to attract the necessary foreign investment,
one can imagine a peaceful society. Living in the post-Cold
War era has lent some air of stability--a peace dividend--to
life in Russia. This may have a positive effect on the
development of the economy and democratic institutions.
Russia
missed the technological revolution, and, as such,
has missed the opportunity to join the global economy.
It has few finished goods to offer commercial markets,
leaving only raw materials for export. Russia's
natural resources and raw materials are currently
the only incentive Russia can offer for foreign
investment, but they may not be enough. Foreign
investors are also looking for stability, rule of
law, protection of property rights, and a predictable
tax system--all of which Russia is lacking.
Panel
II
Russia's Foreign and Security Policy
Graphic
This panel
examined the factors affecting Russia's foreign and security
policy as well as the possible progression of Russian
policy in the next three to five years and implications
for the West.
Stephen
Maddalena (Chairman)
Defense Intelligence Officer for Russia and
Eurasia
Russia's Current Trajectory
James
Sherr
Conflict Studies Research Centre, Royal Military
Academy Sandhurst
If we seek
to influence Russia's foreign policy trajectory, then
changes in our thinking as well as our priorities are
unavoidable. The collapse of the world system of socialism
might have delegitimized geopolitical thinking in the
West, but the scale of the process and the traumas engendered
by it have relegitimized it in Russia. If the mnogogolosiye
(multi-voicedness) of the Yeltsin era camouflaged this
fact, it should now be apparent. The new leadership is
acutely conscious of power relations, extremely conscious
of Russian weakness, but determined to use Russian power
where it exists and use it toughly.
In two other
respects Putin is challenging patterns to which we have
grown accustomed and comfortable. During the Gorbachev
era and the first half of the Yeltsin era (when a Yeltsin
policy was plainly discernible), Russia sought to create
the international conditions necessary, in former Soviet
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's words, "to bring about
change inside the country." Putin has reverted
to a much older pattern established by Stalin and, with
modifications, continued by Khrushchev. By means of change
inside the country--by addressing internal weaknesses
and restoring "the vertical of power"--Putin would restore
Russia to its rightful position as a "great power." Internal
change (not least of all Chechnya) is now "Russia's business."
And our joint business, foreign policy, is not Putin's
main priority.
The third discomfiting
change is that the area of foreign policy that does have
priority is the area closest to internal policy: relations
with the "near abroad."
The "Near
Abroad:" Antecedents and New Departures
The principle that Russia must be the leader of stability
and security on the entire territory of the former USSR
is not a new principle, and on more than one occasion
it has been applied by means of force. Nevertheless, during
the Yeltsin era, there was also a record of accommodation:
to the emergence of normal state-to-state relations with
neighbors (e.g., the May 1997 "Big Treaty" with Ukraine),
to the right of these neighbors to draw closer to NATO
(but not join it), and to the appropriateness (on a limited
basis) of involving external powers and bodies in regional
security arrangements (e.g., the US-Russia-Ukraine Trilateral
Agreement, OSCE missions in Moldova, Armenia, etc).
The emergence
of a tougher, more active and more aggressive Russian
policy is directed not toward integration of Russia's
neighbors, but rather their subordination in three areas
that the Foreign Policy Concept deems essential to Russian
interests: security and combating "extremism," "joint
rational use of natural resources," and the "rights and
interests of Russian citizens and fellow countrymen."
The means to this end are as much transnational as interstate;
they also include a more intense and focused active measures
component. To Russian security elites, Western conduct
virtually mandates such a course:
-
Kosovo.
In military terms, Operation Allied Force is seen
as a rehearsal for more ambitious exercises in "coercive
diplomacy" and, in political terms, a
testing ground for using human rights as a flag
of convenience for breaking up "problematic states."
This perception has greatly sharpened the geopolitical
stakes for Russia in the Caucasus and in Central
Asia (where US sponsorship of the Taliban's precursors
is never forgotten).
-
NATO
enlargement. If not a military threat, the Alliance
is viewed as a means of excluding Russia from Europe
and delegitimizing its interests.
-
EU
enlargement. Despite strong hopes for "strategic
partnership," there is now recognition that the
EU is not, in essence, a counterbalance to US dominance,
but a mechanism of integration. The unspoken, but
widespread, perception is that Russian integration
with this entity is, at best, a distant prospect.
Set against
these developments, the transformation of the CIS into
a bloc and an internationally recognized Russian sphere
of interest is seen not only as a defensive measure but
as a precondition for giving Russia equality in the international
system. Determination to exclude the OSCE "east of Vienna"
suggests that there even might be areas outside the former
USSR--Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania--where the future
is deemed open.
Policy Toward
the "Far Abroad"
To a significant degree, the policy emerging toward the
"far abroad" supports the "near abroad" priority. Russian
strategic partnership with the European Union, which many
Americans fear is intended to distance Europe from the
United States, also has more compelling, eastern dimensions:
developing lucrative but also geopolitically driven gas
and pipeline projects, which in themselves consolidate
influence in the CIS; and securing European allies in
keeping the former USSR off limits to further NATO expansion.
The Shanghai Forum directly engages China--a state as
resolutely opposed as Russia to overriding state sovereignty
"on the excuse of protecting...human rights"--as co-guarantor
of a brittle and repressive status quo in Central Asia.
In rattling the saber against the Taliban, the intended
audience is probably wayward Uzbekistan rather than this
putative enemy (with whom, to judge from Russian initiatives
in Pakistan, Russia might be seeking a form of accommodation).
Yet even if
we exclude the self-evident, there are other issues which
have saliency in their own right. It is now clear (contrary
to some speculation in early 2000) that promoting "multipolarity"
remains a transcendental cause. But unlike issues closer
to home, Russian policy lacks the focus and sureness of
touch that Primakov imparted to it. Relations with NATO
(a more accurate term than "cooperation") are
not a high priority. The proposition that relations between
Russia, a single state, and NATO, an alliance of 19 states,
should be based upon equality would be difficult for NATO
to accept even if, contrary to its own undertakings, it
were willing to recognize Russia as leader of the CIS.
Yet in the absence of such acceptance, Russia treats the
44-member Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council as a theater
of diplomatic struggle. Russia has not allowed dialogue
to extend beyond platitudes, it has not permitted participation
to affect mindsets, and in drawing up and implementing
agreements--e.g., reopening the NATO liaison office in
Moscow--it has been determined to keep the devil in the
details. Determined for their part to get the relationship
back on track, many NATO representatives have been more
concerned about having meetings attended, programs submitted,
deadlines met, and boxes ticked than using the Permanent
Joint Council (PJC) and other forums to address issues
of genuine substance.
An issue of
high saliency to the United States and United Kingdom--the
growing menu of relationships, open and concealed, between
Russia and Iran and Iraq--is an example of promoting multipolarity
not only outside Europe but within it, bearing in mind
French opposition to, and German and Italian ambivalence
about, the Anglo-American approach. But it also makes
a more generic point: that in the absence of countervailing
costs, enterprises that weaken US positions, disrupt Western
unity, and bring commercial reward to Russia will be seen
by Moscow as intrinsically worth pursuing. An issue of
growing anxiety, Russo-Chinese strategic partnership--founded
on joint views about the UNSC and excluding the US from
"zones of interest," as well as on a vigorous
inventory of defense cooperation--remains constrained
by issues endemic to the Russo-Chinese relationship: Russia's
primordial distrust of China and China's determination
not to be shackled by Russia in its relationship with
the United States. And on the key issue, Russia-US relations,
one may doubt whether Putin has a policy at all.
Russian policy
since late 1999 poses opportunities and dangers.
The opportunities arise because the new Russian
leadership is fatigued and irritated by the pieties
of "partnership," the mechanics of "cooperation,"
and the courtesies that in the PJC and other forums
have made it difficult to raise and pursue specific
issues of substance. The lesser danger arises because
after a period of romanticism, Russia became a variable
in Western policy rather than a focus of policy.
The greater danger arises because nine years of
Western platitudes have left Russians profoundly
confused about the extent and limits of Western
interests and about what the West wants from Russia.
Both opportunity and danger are present in the possibility--whether
the issue be Iraq or Ukraine--that the West will
react early, toughly, and in ways that focus Russian
minds. At that point, President Putin is bound to
ask us, "What do you want?" Let us hope we have
answers.
Moscow's Perceptions of the Outside World
Celeste
Wallander
The Council on Foreign Relations
To address
Russian perceptions of its external environment, I would
like to begin by outlining Russia's main threat perceptions
in connection with the international system. From there,
I will outline how this perception will affect Moscow's
actual foreign policy in the next few years and then close
with an assessment of the implications for American policy.
The current
Russian leadership perceives five types of threats to
its interests that involve the outside world. Four of
these are familiar from discussions throughout the 1990s:
national economic and military weakness, American hegemony
or unilateralism, exclusion from the most influential
political and economic circles in the international system,
and instability and regional conflicts around Russia's
Eurasian borders. A fifth perceived threat has moved into
the main rank only in the last year and was articulated
with the government's Information Security Doctrine, signed
by Putin in September 2000: information can destabilize
Russia's social and political scene, undermine the government's
policies, or reveal security secrets of the country.
The first three
threats, though distinct, are closely related in assessing
how the outside world is perceived in Russian foreign
and security policy. Various official documents--including
the National Security and Foreign Policy Concepts--state
unambiguously that the primary threat to Russia's national
interests is its internal economic situation, as well
as the failure to undertake serious and responsible reform.
Nonetheless, they also state clearly that opportunities
to participate in international security, political, and
economic forums in the international system affect whether
Russia will be able to achieve its objectives for renewal
and growth.
This is why,
for example, Russian relations with China, India, and
Iran are not merely about trading in arms-for-influence
but about sustaining and modernizing its defense industry
as a component of building the post-Soviet economy. International
trade--even the arms trade--is an important engine for
internal economic modernization and growth. Given the
link between the economy, national power, and security,
Russian access to the international system is a matter
of security.
Therefore,
the current Russian leadership views obstacles to access
as at best indifference to Russian national interests
and at worst a deliberate policy to undermine the country's
efforts to establish a sound economy on the path to consolidating
its power and place in the international system. So, for
example, American pressure to limit sales to Iran is not
merely about loss of a given sale but about undermining
Russia's defense industries, military reform, modernization,
and so on. Even Russia's emerging problems with the European
Union, especially how enlargement will extend trade restrictions
and visa regimes to Central and Eastern Europe, is not
merely about trade but about security and national power.
In this context,
it is impossible to escape the reality that one of the
main features of the international system in all its dimensions--military,
political, and economic--is that American unipolarity
coexists with a system of multilateral institutions (such
as the World Trade Organization), regimes (such as nonproliferation),
and groupings (such as the G-8) that are overwhelmingly
influenced, if not quite determined, by American power
and preferences.
This very modern
package of national interests and the elements of globalization
coexist with the perceived threat of instability, primarily
in Central Asia and the Caucasus, and the concrete reality
of armed conflict in Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Chechnya,
Abkhazia, and Nagorno-Karabakh. Without doubt, Russian
policy in the 1990s contributed to these threats through
the use of force and interference to maintain Russian
influence and presence in the region.
That misguided
policy was largely a result of the Russian leadership's
inability to distinguish between two variants of the threat
and to prioritize them: the threat posed by weak, underdeveloped,
and even failing states in the Caucasus and Central Asia,
and that posed by the erosion of Russian influence and
presence that attended the breakup of the Soviet Union.
Despite its liberal and reformist credentials, the Yeltsin
leadership never quite repudiated the latter, although
it sought to meet the perceived threat posed by the loss
of its southern sphere only half-heartedly. The Putin
leadership has clearly rejected disentangling the two
and more firmly links this regional instability with Russian
weakness.
In addition,
two new dimensions to this threat perception complicate
Russia's policy in the region: Islam and international
terrorism. The Chechens' separatist war, in this context,
is just one manifestation of Islamic radicalism with international
ties and terrorist means stretching from Afghanistan to
the Black Sea. It is crucial to understand how instability,
Russian weakness, Islam, and international terrorism are
linked in the Russian perception, precisely because it
means that the policies and attitudes of the outside world
are perceived as directly affecting Russian interests.
So far, the Putin leadership distinguishes between the
regional external influence (which it views as primarily
negative because it is the source of Islamic anti-Russian
sentiment and the methods by which Russia itself is attacked
in the terrorist campaign) and the broader international
context. On the latter, the Russian perception is that
the West is a potential ally against this threat, because
it too has been a target. This perception is the reason
Russian officials have suggested joint operations against
Usama bin Laden in Afghanistan. However, this could change
quickly, as evidenced by the suspicion with which Western
support for Georgia is held (given that in the Russian
view Georgia contributes to terrorists' access to Chechnya).
All this is
recognizable in foreign policy analysis. The new threat--information
security--adds a new and troublesome dimension. The Russian
perception that information has a strong effect on politics
and that in our globalizing world international information
influences can play a large role in security is astute.
However, the lesson learned appears not to be that a state
cannot control information, but rather that it is all
the more important to control information, especially
that which complicates government policies. Instead of
learning that it cannot lie about the Kursk, the Russian
leadership appears to believe that you have to lie louder
and more consistently and cast aspersions on the sources
of alternative information.
This perspective
sets up an intrinsic conflict of interest between Russia
(or at least the state) and external influences. Good
information is necessary for good policy of all sorts,
including those central to international economics and
investment. Western firms do not want to invest in Russia
without access to good information on economic performance
and corporate governance. The US Congress does not want
to spend more money on CTR without good information about
how the money is being spent and what effects the programs
have. By establishing a presumption that seeking good
information about Russia is a threat to Russian security,
the information security doctrine could insinuate an assumption
of hostility and conflicting interests in Russia's engagement
with the international system.
The result
of these perceptions is an ambitious Russia that seeks
access and engagement for the right reasons from the American
perspective--that is, for economic reform and prosperity--but
from presumptions that do not quite fit with the realities
of the modern international system in an era of a globalizing
economy and the information age. The Russian leadership's
fundamental presumption that the United States would prefer
to keep Russia weak leads it to assume ill-intent and
deliberate policy when problems or obstacles arise, such
as desultory progress on WTO accession or criticism of
Russian trade with Iran. The very real threat of instability,
armed conflict on its borders, and transnational terrorism
reinforces the tendency to see larger forces at work that
can be met only by force and toughness rather than by
long-term political and economic development.
Central to
this leadership's perception is that engagement
with the international system and practical cooperation
with the United States are inescapable realities
for achieving national interests. The United States
is likely to be faced, in consequence, with a Russian
foreign policy that is activist and assertive. It
will be pragmatic in its readiness to make deals
and to accept compromise in pursuit of its primary
economic objectives. However, because these deals
are likely to come in areas of Russian weakness
relative to the United States and the international
system it strongly influences, agreements will be
perceived to favor the United States (or West) disproportionately,
and therefore are unlikely by themselves to serve
as the building blocks of a general improvement
in relations.
Russia's Foreign and Security Policy Goals
Mikhail
Alexseev
San Diego State University
Whose Goals
Matter?
From the perspective of elites in Russia's executive branch,
the legislature, leading businesses, state-run industries,
science and the media, the goals of Russian foreign and
security policy reflect the interests of a three-tiered
hierarchy of actors. According to an opinion survey of
these elites conducted by the ROMIR polling agency in
September 2000, the upper tier is comprised of the Foreign
Ministry (named as the principal actor by 92 percent of
the 500 respondents) and the administration of President
Putin (named by 86 percent of respondents), which incorporates
the Security Council and oversees Russia's intelligence
services. The second, lower tier of goalsetters is represented
by Russia's business leaders (named by 56 percent of respondents)
and the Defense Ministry (named by 42 percent of respondents).
Regional leaders and the State Duma comprise the third
tier, with 35 percent of the elites polled by ROMIR saying
these actors exert influence over Russian foreign policy.
What Motivates
the Principal Actors?
Delegitimation of ideology. Russia's key decisionmakers
were politically socialized and advanced their careers
in the context of wholesale corruption of Marxist-Leninist
ideology in the Brezhnev era, the delegitimation of Leninism
in the Gorbachev era, and rapid disillusionment with free
market liberalism in the Yeltsin era. Delegitimation of
ideological commitments weakens constraints on power-maximizing
behavior. The arrival of President Putin enhanced the
political legitimacy of predominantly functional, instrumental
approaches to policymaking. In the words of one observer
at the East-West Institute in Moscow, "Putin has no mission
and is all about function."
"Effectiveness,"
"pragmatism," and "feasibility" have become buzzwords
in formal and informal policy discourses in Russia. One
of the central tenets of Russia's Foreign Policy Concept,
adopted in June 2000, is that "a successful foreign policy
of the Russian Federation must be based on maintaining
observance of a reasonable balance between its objectives
and possibilities for attaining these objectives."
According to Sergey Ivanov, Secretary of Russia's Security
Council, the Council used "the standard integrated 'effectiveness
- cost - feasibility' criterion" when choosing among
five armed forces development programs for the period
up to 2010.
Institutional
uncertainty (arising from persistent dependency of
laws and institutions on individual preferences of the
chief executive). Since his arrival in power, Putin has
introduced significant changes in key government institutions,
such as the Federation Council, that amount to de facto
constitutional changes. Some reports suggest he has been
considering rewriting Russia's 1993 Constitution.
In the absence
of ideological prescriptions and institutional constraints,
Russian policymakers have strong incentives for short-term,
rent-seeking behavior resulting in what the economists
call "institutional traps," or the emergence of small
groups of actors with high stakes in preserving the uncertainty
and inefficiency. Such traps make manipulative, deceptive
behavior a rational norm.
"Reversed
anarchy" (a situation arising when chiefs of government
facing strong domestic challenges to sovereignty interact
with increasingly interdependent international actors,
as has been the case with post-Soviet Russia). The collapse
of the Soviet bloc and the Soviet Union meant that Russia
found itself without in-group identity at the international
level. Moreover, Moscow's hold on power at home was challenged
by separatist movements in the North Caucasus and the
Volga region as well as by regional fragmentation of the
domestic economy. In contrast, since the late 1980s key
international actors outside Russia have become increasingly
integrated economically and institutionally, especially
with the enlargement of NATO and the EU. These contrasting
trends have keyed perceptions in Moscow that Russia faces
a twin threat of being marginalized internationally and
of having its domestic weaknesses exploited by other actors.
In line with such perceptions, Moscow is likely to assess
the costs and benefits of international interactions with
regard to their effect on the president's capacity to
centralize and consolidate political power domestically.
In the context
of a persistent and intractable military conflict in Chechnya,
Moscow is acutely sensitive to international influences
that may undermine decisionmaking centralization at home.
Russia's Foreign Policy Concept denounces "attempts to
introduce into the international lexicon concepts such
as 'humanitarian intervention' and 'limited sovereignty'."
The Principal
Actors' Goals in the Global Arena
Ideological delegitimation, institutional uncertainty,
and reversed anarchy provide powerful incentives for decisionmakers
to keep their commitments to policy goals fluid, flexible,
and fungible. These motivations are likely to make the
Kremlin seek quick political and economic gains by maximizing
returns on Russia's existing strengths in the military,
industrial, and science and technology sectors. At the
same time, these motivations prompt Moscow to seek quick
symbolic gains to build a positive image in the global
arena. The pursuit of status enhancement warrants a strong
preference for multipolarity, associated with a reduced
capacity of the United States to influence other international
actors and enforce rules constraining Russia's quick-gain
strategies. Bilateral relations and ad hoc coalitions
and alliances are likely to be preferred over longstanding
commitments to international institutions and norms, especially
those that may undermine the domestic agenda of centralization
of political power.
Moscow's principal
goals in foreign and security policy are 1) centralization
of foreign policy decisionmaking, 2) synergy between political
influence and economic gain, and 3) promotion of Russia's
great power identity.
Centralization
of foreign policy decisionmaking. Moscow currently
seeks to reduce the number of competing foreign policy
goals and agendas, especially in Russia's constituent
regions and republics, seeing this effort as essential
to both domestic power consolidation and Moscow's capacity
to project influence outside Russia's borders. In a telling
example, Russia's Foreign Ministry held a special meeting
on January 30, 2001, attended by President Putin and a
group of governors, at which the President criticized
the Ministry for not doing a better job in coordinating
foreign policy. Responding to the criticism, Foreign Minister
Igor Ivanov warned the governors that they should not
pursue foreign relations without prior approval from Moscow.
Moreover, Ivanov criticized the governors for friendly
ties with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, stressing
that "the national interests of Russia and Belarus are
not identical," thus suggesting that decisionmaking centralization
supercedes the stated goal of CIS integration.
Synergy
between political influence and economic gain. Specifically,
Moscow has sought to:
-
Attract
foreign investment into Russia, seen by Foreign
Minister Ivanov as "crucial for resolving the central
strategic task of our diplomacy, i.e., to ensure
that Russia becomes one of the poles in the emerging
multipolar world capable of actively influencing
world affairs."
-
Reestablish
influence in the former Soviet republics--especially
in Ukraine, the Caucasus, and Central Asia--with
the view to securing energy export outlets, most
of which are located in the Western CIS and in the
former Soviet bloc states of Eastern Europe. (In
a new development vis-á-vis the Yeltsin era,
Putin emphasized the need to increase support of
the Russian diaspora, especially ethnic Russians
in the former Soviet republics.)
-
Use energy
resources, nuclear and space power status, and military
capabilities to enhance political influence and
economic gains.
-
Increase
economic benefits from new weapons system applications
and sales regardless of security concerns of other
players, as well as boost payoffs from arms reduction
and conversion.
-
Intensify
economic and political interactions with major states
in Europe and Asia as a counterbalance to US power
and influence in the global arena. (In the September
2000 ROMIR survey of Russian elites, 94 percent
of respondents said Russia's foreign policy priorities
should be in Asia, 92 percent in Europe, 57 percent
in North America, and 53 percent in South America.)
-
Advertise
Russia's capacity to combat international terrorism
and Islamic fundamentalism, to lead peacekeeping
operations in the former Soviet space, to contribute
to theater missile defense systems, and to ""boldly
engage" engage'" with states such as Iran and
North Korea as "selling points" warranting both
political respect and economic support from the
US and its allies.
Russia's elites
see economic power as crucial to forging this synergy.
Thus, in the ROMIR survey of elites, 99 percent of respondents
named economic interests as the top priority, well ahead
of defending the Russians living abroad (73 percent) and
reaching military parity with the West (68 percent). Three
times as many respondents (75 percent to 23 percent) said
that economic power was more decisive than military power
in achieving foreign policy goals. Perceptions in the
Kremlin that the Russian economy is on the rise are therefore
likely to make Russia's pursuit of its stated goals more
assertive.
Promotion
of Russia's great power identity.
Specifically, Moscow has sought to:
-
Focus
cooperation with the United States on issues that
would emphasize Russia's capacity to cooperate on
equal terms with the leading world power. Thus,
Russia's Foreign Policy Concept mandates focusing
bilateral cooperation on disarmament, arms control,
nonproliferation, and regional conflict resolution
(as opposed to, for example, economic or humanitarian
issues).
-
Maximize
political influence derived from being a permanent
member of the UN Security Council, including by
pushing for extension of UN Security Council veto
power over other international organizations, most
notably NATO.
-
Demonstrate
power projection capabilities restoring the image
of Russia as a global player and enhancing a sense
of national pride and self-importance domestically
(e.g., a surprise march on Pristina ahead of NATO
forces, a dispatch of strategic bombers to Iceland,
a dispatch of nuclear submarines to the Mediterranean,
a surprise overflight of the US aircraft carrier
Kitty Hawk in the Far East, the deployment of three
Russian warships near India in early 2001, and the
development of a "high seas" naval doctrine).
-
Conduct
a global public relations campaign in support of
Russian government policies, especially in cases
where such policies may violate international law
or human rights, as in Moscow's military campaign
in Chechnya.
The Principal
Actors' Goals and Public Opinion
As long as power politics in Russia ultimately depends
on electoral outcomes, the elites need to take into
account public opinion--if only for the reason of
manipulating it. Russian public opinion is ambivalent
when it comes to supporting the foreign and security
policy goals of Putin's government. In January 2001,
a ROMIR survey found that only 1 percent of 1,500
respondents said that Putin's primary goal should
be to "recreate Russia as a strong power"at the
international level. Most respondents want Putin
to focus instead on raising their living standards
(34 percent) and on increasing efficiency of government
agencies (31 percent). My September 2000 survey
of 1,010 respondents in Primorskiy Kray found the
local public divided over reestablishing Moscow's
control over the former Soviet space. The same survey
also showed that ordinary Russians still see the
United States, Canada and Australia as the best
places to work (65 percent) and to live (71 percent).
These surveys imply that the Russian people will
ultimately judge the Kremlin's foreign policy goals
by its capacity to bring living standards closer
to those of the leading Western nations. Yet, to
the extent that the Kremlin believes that these
economic goals can be achieved without modeling
free market democratic systems, these opinions are
unlikely to persuade the Kremlin to make cooperative
and rule-abiding behavior vis-á-vis major
Western powers and their institutions one of its
principal goals.
Highlights From the Discussion
Missile
Defense (MD)
Opinions differed on whether there has been a change
in Russian policy toward MD:
-
Some
stated that there has not been a change in stated
policy and public opposition. If there has been
a change it has been in the reinvigoration of the
opposition to MD. There is a continuing failure
on Putin's part to enact real military reform. The
need to undertake military reform was driving a
deal on MD that was compatible with the Clinton
administration's ideas about what might be done
with limited interceptors in Alaska. That deal has
now disappeared. In Moscow, it would seem, the decision
has been made to bolster the nuclear deterrent over
the conventional forces.
-
Others
contended that considerations of military power
and status are very important in regard to the Russian
view of MD. Even if the United States does not succeed
in implementing MD, it is pursuing a track that
undercuts Russia's main claim as a major player
in the international arena. On the other hand, Russia
has been talking about participating in theater
missile defense. So what seems to be offensive to
Russia about MD is the national aspect of it.
-
Mr. Putin
originally flagged MD as a major issue under the
assumption that it could be used to advance multipolarity--that
European security and defense elites would accept
Russia's position and that strategic partnership
with Europe could advance in this way. Putin does
not understand the way that Western security communities
work, and he does not appreciate that every European
country is conscious of living in a highly transnational
security community. A major shift in US policy does
not produce something called European opposition;
it produces changes in power relations. Putin is
beginning to see this now and to realize that Europe
is not willing to make a cause célèbre
out of the MD issue.
Russian
Imperialism
Russia's real capabilities vis-á-vis the
West are weak, but vis-á-vis its neighbors
they are not and they are being used. Nevertheless,
Russia faces the danger of overestimating its capabilities
in the North Caucasus and Ukraine. Russia still
sees Ukraine as part of the Russian state and does
not realize the extent to which Ukraine will resist
Russian imperialism.
Luncheon
Roundtable
Impressions From Russia's Regions
Graphic
During the
lunch session, a number of recent travelers to Russia
shared their insights into life in the provinces and the
views of average Russians:
-
One participant
described life in the Russian Far East. When his
daughter was born in Vladivostok in April 1997,
Primorskiy Kray was in the midst of an extended
financial crisis. He recalled power outages that
lasted most of the day, massive gridlock caused
by powerless traffic lights, and heaping mounds
of garbage in front of every building. The rat population
exploded, and disease spread. In his apartment building,
the power was out for hours at a time, and when
it came back on, everyone immediately raced to turn
on the stove, the washing machine, and other appliances.
The sudden surge caused a short in the underground
power line leading to his building, and it took
the city three days to fix it. The follow-on surge
shorted it out again after just ten minutes, and
the building was again without power for days. After
that spring, he and his family decided to move to
Sakhalin Island, thinking that a place with its
own offshore oil reserves would be much better off.
They were mistaken, as Sakhalin was just entering
a similar crisis. The energy shortage got so bad
in parts of Sakhalin that entire villages froze
and had to be permanently evacuated.
-
According
to another, though Russians will admit among themselves
that they are a Third World nation with Fourth World
leaders, they are quick to become defensive when
a foreigner brings this up. Russians are tired of
being treated with disdain by the West (or more
commonly NATO, as they like to refer to the West),
and especially by the United States. The further
you travel from Moscow, however, the less you hear
diatribes against NATO and the United States. When
Russian people do mention the United States, it
is always in reference to the government, not the
American people. For in spite of what is commonly
written in the Western press, anti-American feeling
is rarely directed toward individuals. Mention should
also be made of the remarkable inroads American
"soft power" has made in Russia. Much has been made
of Russian pop singers and movies lambasting the
United States, but at the end of the day, the majority
of Russians in the provinces and the great cities
go home and watch American programs and movies on
their televisions or turn on their stereos and listen
to American music. The influence of American pop
and fashion culture should not be overstated, but
neither should it be underestimated.
-
Though
ashamed at Russia's loss of international significance,
ordinary Russians today worry more about their own
personal standard of living than global status.
While some unhappiness is due to greater information
about living standards in advanced industrial nations,
greater discontent has arisen as people have seen
their own fortunes decline and their lives become
more difficult than during the Soviet era.
-
Everyday
life in contemporary Russia is characterized
by instability and uncertainty. Political
events, such as presidential succession or
the Chechen war, were responsible for some
uncertainty in 1999-2000. However, political
conditions fundamental to the post-Soviet
era, including the total lack of the rule
of law, discretionary legal enforcement and
the discrepancy between written rules and
actual practices, are a greater cause of uncertainty.
Likewise, inflation, wage arrears, unemployment,
unpredictable tax laws and poverty are sources
of economic instability and are of grave concern
for ordinary Russians.
Highlights From the Discussion
Distance
Between the Government and the Governed
Average Russians feel that they cannot influence the
course of the country's affairs and that they have little
control over their personal destinies. Excessive bureaucracies
and the inability of the government to provide basic utilities
often thwart the efforts of entrepreneurs in Russia. Vague
and randomly applied trade and commerce laws hamper the
development of local business and impede access to Russian
domestic and foreign markets.
Lack of
Unifying Russian Identity
In addition to the considerable wage gap and disparate
opportunities that exist in Russia today, other social
tensions threaten to undermine the unity of the nation.
Russians have little that connects their personal fate
with that of the state. The Great Patriotic War was an
effective Soviet propaganda tool until the 1970s because
it was the sole experience that unified the nation with
the state. Now the debate over such things as the national
flag and anthem represent an attempt to rekindle that
spark in the national consciousness. Posturing against
NATO and the United States also symbolizes an attempt
to unify public opinion and build a post-Soviet national
identity. Language has been the cornerstone of Russian
culture for centuries, but the re-emergence of ethnicity
within Russia poses a serious challenge to the notion
of Russian identity in the future. For example, in Tatarstan
Russian is still the official language and is spoken by
all citizens. However, the Tatar language has gained more
prominence in schools, business, and local government.
Tatars have begun to identify themselves by ethnicity
first, rather than nationality. Most Tatars do not feel
that they are being disloyal to the Russian state, but
rather that they are returning to their culture and heritage
after decades of oppression.
Chechnya
The war in Chechnya has produced conflicting opinions.
There are segments of the population which oppose the
war because they believe that it cannot be won and that
Russian society is paying too high a price for fighting
in Chechnya. Others see the war in Chechnya as a rallying
point of national pride and a necessary effort by Moscow
to control renegade
provinces.
Patience
Versus Determinism
A debate arose over whether Russia's apparent
passivity--as evidenced by the lack of public protests
against the war in Chechnya and other hardships
and social ills--represents patience or determinism
in the national character. Some contend that
Russians are a patient people, who will suffer quietly
the transgressions of the state against its citizens.
Others maintain that Russians are determinists,
a people who have resigned themselves to an existence
of disappointment, hardships, and injustices due
to the harshness of past tsarist and Communist regimes.
Panel
III
Russia Viewed From the Outside
Graphic
This panel
examined how Russia is viewed by key outside actors. Specifically,
panelists explored how Russia fits into the foreign and
security policies of the following states and regions:
Iran/Middle East; Turkey; India; and China/East Asia.
Enders
Wimbush (Chairman)
Strategic Assessment Center, Science Applications
International Corporation
The Iran/Middle East Perspective
Geoffrey
Kemp
The Nixon Center
Key Middle
Eastern countries have different perspectives on Russia.
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union aligned itself with
radical Arab countries and provided abundant weapons,
often as grant aid or at cut-rate prices. It also provided
political support in international fora. Today, Russia's
role has been reduced, but it remains an important actor
with very different relations with a number of Middle
Eastern countries.
The Soviet
Union was extremely hostile toward Israel despite its
early support for the state at its creation. Today, with
nearly one million Russians living in Israel, the relationship
has become much more fluid. The Russian constituency in
Israel is growing in importance, politically and economically,
and this has reverberations in Moscow. Hence, despite
Israel's concern over Russian support for Iraq and Iran
and its meddling in Syria and Egypt, Israel regards Russia
as an important country that can, at times, be helpful
in both political and economic arenas. Several of the
niche markets that Israeli high-tech industry wishes to
exploit have potential outlets in countries of the former
Soviet Union--hence the frequent visits by Israeli businessmen
to Russia and vice versa. There is every indication that
Israel wishes to have good relations with Moscow and that
President Putin will sustain this relationship. The Russians
are well aware that adopting a hostile attitude toward
Israel would hurt their interests, including their relationship
with the United States. Israel also needs to cooperate
with Russia to counter the criminal activities of the
Russian mafia, which uses Israel as a base.
Syria and Egypt
both had close ties to the Soviet Union at various times
during the Cold War. They now are willing and eager to
be friends with Russia, though Egypt is in no position
to resume an arms relationship and has no interest in
doing so. Syria would like to receive further Russian
weaponry, provided that the financial dimension can be
resolved. Syria still owes Russia billions of dollars
for arms purchased from the Soviet Union. Likewise, Libya
still retains a military relationship with Moscow and
sees Russia as a supplier of weapons that it cannot get
from the West.
Russia has
retained close ties with Saddam Hussein despite the fact
that Mikhail Gorbachev and the Soviet Union supported
Operations Desert Storm and Desert Shield (though it will
be recalled that in the last days before the war began
the Soviet Union intervened diplomatically, hoping to
prevent a war). Close ties have been particularly evident
in the relationship between Yevgeniy Primakov and the
Iraqi regime. Baghdad clearly regards Russia as one of
the key powers capable of offsetting American pressure.
Russia has been a leading voice, along with France and
to a lesser extent China, at the UN Security Council to
remove sanctions, or at least dramatically reduce them.
Moscow has also been vague about condemnation of Iraq
over UNSC violations. Russia clearly has financial motives.
It is owed billions of dollars for arms that Iraq purchased
from the Soviet Union. Russian companies would benefit
greatly if sanctions were lifted, and Iraq would be in
the position to eventually rebuild its military arsenal,
if and when sanctions are removed. However, this mutual
cooperation has its limitations, and one should not assume
that a full-fledged alliance between these two countries
is possible anytime soon, so long as the Saddam Hussein
regime continues to obfuscate on the WMD issue. Yet, from
the Iraqi perspective, Russia must be high on its list
of foreign policy priorities.
Iran also sees
Russia as a strategic ally. Mutual interests override
disagreements (the latter include disputes over the ownership
of the Caspian and the potential for Russia and Iran to
be competitors in the energy field). The two countries
share common ground in opposing American policies in the
Caspian Basin. Russia is a source of military equipment
that Iran cannot get from the West. It is also providing
Iran with the nuclear technology to complete the Bushehr
nuclear reactor. Moscow and Tehran strongly object to
the American policy of promoting east-west oil and gas
pipelines in the Caspian region that would bypass both
Russia and Iran. Iran assists Russia by downplaying the
Chechnya crisis and generally being more supportive of
Armenia than Azerbaijan, which is in keeping with Russian
policy. Iran and Russia share suspicions of Turkey and
NATO, especially NATO expansion. Iran sees Russia as an
ally in the context of its worsening relations to the
east--especially with Afghanistan and Pakistan. Both Iran
and Russia regard the Taliban and its supporters in Pakistan
as being the pathfinder for dangerous, radical Sunni Islam
movements that could spread across Central Asia and ultimately
into Russia itself. Ironically, Iran, which was the object
of vehement opposition in the early days of the revolution
when it was spearheading revolutionary change, now sees
itself as a status quo power, resisting the radicalism
of the Taliban and its supporters in Pakistan. Furthermore,
both Russia and Iran have good relations with India.
Despite common
interests, Iran is wary of Russian behavior, particularly
toward Saddam Hussein. Iraq remains the most serious
threat to Iran, no matter what rhetoric it uses
to demonize the United States and Israel. As a consequence,
the rehabilitation of Saddam and the rearmament
of Iraq would be a matter of grave concern in Tehran
and would strengthen the case for both an Iranian
nuclear capability and further modernization of
its conventional armed forces. Supporting such programs
might be tempting for Russia, but doing so would
also raise problems. Russia has gotten into deep
trouble with the United States over the support
Russian entities have provided to the Iranian surface-to-surface
missile program. Iran is aware that if Russia has
to choose between the United States and Iran, it
will probably choose the former. Iran recalls that
China also supported Iran's nuclear industry a few
years back but then cut off most of the ties once
it became clear that the United States demanded
that it do so.
Turkey's Perspective
Alan
Makovsky
Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Among Turkey's
major bilateral relationships, those with Russia are probably
the most complex. There are four, often non-complementary,
dimensions to Turkish-Russian ties. Ankara simultaneously
sees Russia as a significant security threat; a rival
for political influence in the Caucasus, Central Asia,
and elsewhere in the region; an important trading partner
and market for Turkish construction companies; and a crucial
source of energy. These four dimensions overlap, clouding
Turkey's view of bilateral ties, with one element or the
other dominant at different times and for different Turkish
constituencies. Leading analysts differ over how best
to characterize contemporary Turkish-Russian relations.
One of Europe's leading Turkey scholars, Heinz Kramer,
describes it as a "cold peace;" one of Turkey's leading
Russia scholars, Duygu Bazoglu Sezer, describes it more
optimistically as "virtual rapprochement."
This complexity
is a post-Cold War phenomenon. During the Cold War and
even in the first years after it, Turkey saw Russia, almost
without differentiation, as an enemy and a threat. The
blossoming of economic ties; the easing of bilateral conflicts
over CFE, Kurds and Chechens, and the Straits; and the
reassuringly poor performance of the Russian military
in the 1994-96 war in Chechnya softened Turkey's attitude,
however. Turkish-Russian relations have not settled into
a stable post-Cold War pattern yet, and Turks remain suspicious
of Russian intentions. Nevertheless, in a post-Cold War
world that has seen numerous examples of "return to history,"
Turkey and Russia--whose imperial forebears fought over
a dozen wars--have forged hopes for manageable relations.
Indeed, defying the odds of history, there has even emerged
in Turkey a pro-Russia lobby of sorts, consisting of businessmen
who do business in Russia and are highly influential in
the Motherland Party of Mesut Yilmaz, a former prime minister
and now Deputy Prime Minister of Turkey.
Probably acting
at the behest of his pro-Russian supporters, Yilmaz was
the driving force behind a controversial project that
is emerging as the centerpiece of Turkish-Russian relations:
the so-called "Blue Stream" project, a trans-Black Sea
pipeline that would deliver some 16 billion cubic meters
(bcm) per year of natural gas to Turkey. Turkish decisionmaking
on this project, which, if realized, would probably render
Turkey energy-dependent on Russia for years to come, was
shaped by urgent national energy needs, as well as the
pecuniary motives of Turkish businessmen centered in Yilmaz's
party. However, it is also justifiable in wider strategic
terms, and it is unlikely that it would have progressed
as far as it has without the acquiescence of Turkey's
military-dominated security establishment, which presumably
views the matter strictly from a strategic viewpoint.
There is still some possibility that Blue Stream could
be derailed by technical infeasibility or by an ongoing
corruption scandal plaguing Turkey's energy ministry,
which has spearheaded the project.
Security
Turkey sees Russia as considerably weaker than it was
during the Cold War but nevertheless as the strongest
(and only nuclear-capable) power in Turkey's region and
far stronger than Turkey itself. Less intimidated by Moscow
than it was during the Cold War, Turkey is still loath
to confront Russia directly. A recent regional threat
assessment prepared in the Turkish War Academy was surprisingly
mild regarding Russia. Taking into account Russia's "important
economic, social and political internal problems," it
noted simply that "uncertainties in Russian foreign policy
need to be closely monitored."
Turkey provides
military training and other assistance to Azerbaijan and
Georgia. Yet it would not risk military confrontation
with Russia in defense of either of these states. Rather
than antagonize Moscow, and under US prodding, Turkey
accepted increased CFE ceilings for Russian troops and
armor in the Russian Caucasus in 1999 (Ankara remains
discomfited, however, by Russia's ongoing troop presence
in and arms transfers to Armenia, as well as its failure
to meet even the enhanced CFE limits).
Whereas Ankara
strongly criticized Russian actions in the first Chechnya
war of 1994-96, it has been far more restrained during
the more recent conflict, notwithstanding the considerable
sympathy the Chechen cause evokes in Turkey, particularly
among the tens of thousands of Chechen-origin citizens
there. While raising humanitarian concerns, Prime Minister
Ecevit has publicly acknowledged that the Chechen war
is a Russian "internal affair." There are several
reasons for the greater Turkish restraint. Most important
and obvious is realpolitik. Ankara wants to avoid unduly
antagonizing Moscow, which suspected Turkey of aiding
the Chechen fighters during the fighting in 1994-96. Likewise,
Turkey generally looks askance at any breakaway movement
anywhere, given its preoccupation with its own territorial
integrity. Moreover, Turkish restraint regarding Chechen
rebels is a disincentive to Russian support for Kurdish
rebels in Turkey. During Ecevit's November 1999 visit
to Moscow, Turkey and Russia signed an anti-terrorism
agreement, in which each side pledged not to harbor terrorist
opponents (read: Chechens and Kurds) of the other's regime.
But there are
other reasons for Turkish restraint on the Chechnya issue
that suggest a newly perceived commonality of interests
with Russia on Ankara's part. The aforementioned War Academy
report acknowledges that the Chechen conflict "worries
us with the possibility of a spillover into the region."
Although unstated in the report, this worry probably focuses
on the Islamic fundamentalist dimension of the current
phase of the Chechen struggle. Many critics charge that
Russia has exaggerated the Islamist threat in Chechnya,
but no issue is more sensitive for the secular Turkish
establishment than fundamentalism. Further, some Turkish
officials privately express concern that a Russian defeat
in Chechnya could inspire other breakaway movements in
the Russian Federation, leading to its unraveling and
ensuing regional chaos. Turkey prefers a Russia that is
relatively weak but also one that is intact.
Political
Rivalry
Turkey is Russia's main competitor for political influence
in the Turkic-language states of the former Soviet Union
as well as Georgia. Initiated by Turkey, six Turkic Summits
have been held since 1992. The summits generally avoid
sensitive political issues despite Turkey's initial effort
to guide them in that direction.
Turkey and
Russia also often find themselves at odds on various regional
issues, both inside and outside the former Soviet Union.
On the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute, for example, Turkey is
Azerbaijan's strongest backer, while Russia is Armenia's.
In the Balkans, Turkey strongly backed the Bosnians and
Kosovars, while Russia backed the Serbs. Ankara also sees
Russia as sympathetic to the Greek Cypriots, based on
Moscow's efforts to sell them S-300 anti-aircraft missiles
and the presence of considerable Russian off-shore banking
activity in Cyprus. Russia is also perceived as close
to Iran, Turkey's ideological foe. At one time, Turks
spoke frequently of an "Orthodox alliance"--consisting
of Greece, Serbia, Russia, and Armenia, with Iran and
Syria sometimes cited as fellow travelers--seeking to
encircle Turkey. That type of accusation has become less
common, however, as Turkish-Russian relations have improved
in recent years.
The arena of
most intense Turkish-Russian competition concerns oil
and gas pipeline routes for transporting the energy resources
of the Caspian Sea. Backed by the United States and its
concept of an "East-West energy corridor," Turkey
has advocated a pipeline that would carry Azerbaijani
Caspian Sea oil westward from Baku through Georgia to
the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan--the so-called
Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. Turkey has also supported the so-called
Trans-Caspian Pipeline (TCP), which is projected to carry
Turkmenistani gas across the Caspian and then follow the
same route as Baku-Ceyhan. Russia has sought to undermine
both of these projects, which would weaken Moscow's leverage
over its former Soviet provinces. Russia apparently wants
to monopolize the importation and distribution of Turkmenistani
gas and wants a pipeline from Baku to the Russian Black
Sea port of Novorossiysk to serve as the main export pipeline
for Azerbaijani Caspian Sea oil.
Other areas
of post-Cold War Turkish-Russian competition have eased
in intensity in recent times. Compromise, facilitated
by bilateral contacts, have brought Turkish and Russian
positions closer regarding CFE, Turkish safety provisions
in the Straits, and, as noted, the separatist threats
faced by both states.
Economic
Partnership
Russia has emerged as one of Turkey's most important economic
partners in recent years. In fact, before its 1998 economic
collapse, Russia had become the number-two consumer of
Turkish goods (after Germany). Officially recorded Turkish
exports to Russia reached $2 billion in 1997, with perhaps
another $4-5 billion in unrecorded--so-called luggage--trade.
The official figures for 1999 and 2000 were little more
than a quarter of the 1997 total, and luggage trade likewise
has dwindled, but overall trade volume remains high. Thanks
mainly to gas purchases, Turkish imports from Russia amounted
to roughly $2 billion annually from 1995 to 1999; in 2000,
with gas prices soaring, the figure surpassed $3.5 billion.
Turkish investment in Russia, mainly by the construction
sector, remains significant; estimates vary between $6
billion and $12 billion. Economic relations with Russia
mainly reflect economic interest, of course. At the same
time, it has contributed to a growing sense of economic
interdependence, which has eased somewhat Turkey's security
concerns about Russia.
It is doubtful
that Russian imports of Turkish goods will reach pre-1998
levels anytime soon. Nevertheless, Turkey and Russia are
likely to remain important trading partners for the foreseeable
future.
Strategic
Energy Resources
Of all the bilateral economic projects, none has wider
implications--nor is more controversial in Turkey--than
Blue Stream. Already the major component of Turkish imports
from Russia consists of natural gas. In fact, Turkey is
increasingly dependent on Russia for gas to meet rising
domestic energy demand. For some time, Turkey has been
receiving 6 bcm of natural gas annually from Russia. This
arrives via a pipeline that circumscribes the western
portion of the Black Sea, traversing Ukraine, Romania,
and Bulgaria on the way to Turkey. This pipeline is being
expanded and soon will carry 14 bcm of gas to Turkey.
If Blue Stream is successfully completed, Turkey's annual
natural gas imports from Russia will rise to 30 bcm, perhaps
some 80% or more of Turkish consumption. Turkish officials
say this figure would gradually decrease to approximately
35% as significant amounts of natural gas from other sources--Azerbaijan,
Iran, Iraq, and possibly Turkmenistan--come on line.
Blue Stream
critics fret that this situation will give Russia unprecedented
political leverage over Turkey, and they charge that Turkish
businessmen and officials, motivated by legal and illegal
gains, have effectively hijacked the nation's national
security interests. Proponents offer a variety of justifications.
Foremost, they cite Turkey's rapidly growing energy needs
and the fact that Blue Stream, if technically feasible,
offers a direct and legitimate gas route without the political
complications of challenging US-led sanctions (Iran, Iraq)
or arranging transit (Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan) from other
sources. Some proponents deny that the project will give
Russia leverage; a hard-currency-starved Russia, they
say, would be just as dependent on Turkish payments as
Turkey would be on Russian gas. Other advocates say that
the timing of the project mitigates its strategic risks--that
is, that Russia is likely to remain relatively weak and
preoccupied with internal affairs during the period of
greatest Turkish gas dependency. Some Blue Stream supporters
even claim to see strategic advantage for Turkey in the
project--as a means to foster Turkish-Russian economic
interdependence and thus enhance regional stability, or
as a "payoff" to Russia to encourage Moscow not to block
Baku-Ceyhan.
Conclusion
Turkish-Russian relations are generally a post-Cold
War success story. Ankara has developed an improved
dialogue and an unprecedented level of economic
ties with Russia, which gives both states an important
stake in a peaceful, stable relationship and increases
the prospect that they will pursue their political
rivalry in the Caucasus and Central Asia without
resort to overt hostilities. This more positive
pattern of relations has not fully taken root, however.
Ankara remains wary of Moscow's intentions and worries
that it will regain its former strength. With memories
of historical hostility never far below the surface,
this newer pattern of ties must prove durable before
mutual suspicions, now somewhat in abeyance, fully
abate.
India's Perspective
Enders
Wimbush
Strategic Assessment Center, Science Applications
International Corporation
Many states
along Russia's periphery have developed mutually convenient
relationships with Russia, and occasionally even strategic
alliances (for example, China several decades ago and
Iran today), while for others Russia embodies all that
their strategic cultures have evolved to resist (for example,
Poland and Turkey). In contrast, a defining element of
India's strategic culture virtually since independence
has been its relationship with Russia, a symbiosis that
yielded significant dividends to both parties.
Since the collapse
of the USSR, this symbiosis has eroded, but the relationship
has endured. However, today Indians view Russians through
a different set of prisms and filters, and the image of
Russia in the international system that comes through
to them has a very different strategic texture from only
a decade ago. One could see this clearly during Putin's
visit to India last year. He was received warmly as an
old friend, and much of the media commentary about the
visit stressed the importance of their historic cooperation
and friendship. But there was another side to the commentary
in the private remarks of policymakers and strategists.
"What can Russia do for India today?" they asked.
Most concluded that Russia would remain a friend--even
a close friend--but instead of offering a more comprehensive
sense of strategic security, Russia could now only sell
them arms.
Indians now
have different expectations of how Russia will behave
in the international system and a different way of calculating
the meaning and importance of Russian behavior for India's
own strategy making. Nowhere is this clearer than in what
has happened to the old notion of strategic equality.
During the Cold War, most Indians insisted that their
relationship with Russia was one of equals, that India
was not just a client state. Few outsiders accepted this
claim, and it is reasonably clear that the Russians did
not believe it either, no matter how ardently they proclaimed
it for the Indians' benefit. India was largely viewed
by outsiders as the junior partner. Today most Indians
insist that the relationship is no longer one of equals,
that India is preeminent because it is rising while Russia
is declining. During his recent visit to Delhi, Putin
was frequently characterized in Indian media as arriving
with his hat in his hand, the supplicant. This played
well to the Indians' sense of pride at having arrived,
or at least of being well on the way toward becoming a
serious power, but there was no sense of schadenfreude.
Russia's decline is a serious worry to Indians.
On the one
hand, Russia remains their principal supplier of high-tech
weaponry and other artifacts of national security. Evidence
from just the last 18 months demonstrates conclusively
that the armaments umbilical cord from Moscow to Delhi
is as strong as ever, perhaps even more so now that it
is loaded with cash heading north. India has signed agreements
to buy a large number of sophisticated SU-30 fighter/interceptors
and will produce several hundred more on license. The
same is true with tanks. Just this week, India signed
a multi-billion dollar commitment to buy 132 fully assembled
T-90 tanks--thought by many experts to be the equal of
any in the world--and, again, they will build many more
on license. For the navy, Russia is selling India submarines
and a second aircraft carrier, the Admiral Gorshkov.
These marquée items are in fact just part of a
substantial technology transfer from Russia to India that
covers a number of key security sectors. In this respect,
an impoverished Russia that needs to sell its best assets
is nicely in balance with an India that is expanding the
inventory of things it needs to achieve its national security
objectives and has more to spend to achieve them.
On the other
hand, India worries that its advantage is fleeting because
Russia is selling similarly sophisticated military equipment
and associated technologies to India's principal adversary,
China. Thus, while Russia remains visibly engaged in the
part of the international system that affects India most,
the strategic component of Russia's engagement, from an
Indian perspective, is eroding from being once highly
favorable to India toward uncertainty and perhaps toward
a dangerous strategic schizophrenia. While Russia is still
there for India, it is now also there for India's enemies.
Moreover, many
Indian military specialists wish to wean India from its
near total reliance on Russian hardware because Russia
often cannot provide spares or repairs (currently about
half of the SU-25 fleet is grounded for lack of spare
parts, and to renovate their aging fleet of MiG-21s India
has had to go to Israel). And while most Indian military
planners will acclaim the quality of Russian armaments,
most confide that they would prefer to develop new supply
relationships with the West, particularly with the United
States, where the technology is believed to be superior.
The sense that buying Russian is buying second-rate is
an increasingly powerful sentiment.
Russian efforts
to put a political band-aid on these apparent contradictions--for
example, by repeated offers to create a "strategic alliance"
among Russia, India, and China--are transparent to Indians,
who say privately that the only reason Russia proposes
such things is not because it is strong but because it
is so weak.
In fact, the
concern one hears most frequently expressed by Indian
strategists is that Russia will become too weak. Unlike
other states on Russia's periphery, for whom Russian weakness
is on balance a boon, for India the specter of a weak
Russia is disturbing for three main reasons. First, as
India's strategic counterweight to China in Eurasia, Russia,
as noted, is now actively upsetting the balance or even
tilting it in favor of China, which creates a new range
of challenges and threats that India has never had to
address and that it is currently ill-prepared to address.
According to a number of Indian strategists, India's decision
to become an openly nuclear power in 1998 was based in
part on Russian weakness.
Second, Russian
weakness in Central Asia compounds India's immediate and
long-term problems there. In the short term, the chaos
in Afghanistan and parts of Central Asia over which Russia
might once have exerted a strong restraining influence
is now free to spread, and most Indians believe--correctly
it appears--that it will spread southward, infecting Pakistan
and, eventually, possibly India's large northern Islamic
population. In the longer term, Russian weakness in the
core of Central Asia creates a vacuum, especially in energy-rich
Kazakhstan, into which China will expand. Among Indian
strategists, one frequently hears the term "encirclement"
by China, and they view Central Asia as part of the top
of a China-dominated circle of states that includes most
of Southeast Asia, Burma, Bangladesh, and Pakistan. In
this sense, Indian national security specialists believe
that Russia's weakness encourages India's encirclement.
Third, a weak
Russia leaves India with no conceivable strategic anchor
in Asia, a deprivation it has never had to face. When
Russia was strong, India had the luxury of not having
to develop strategies and capabilities for much more than
its frequent conflicts with Pakistan. Today, it faces
a range of challenges that formerly might have been obviated
or eased with Russian assistance--for example securing
energy flows overland from Eurasia or by sea from the
Persian Gulf, or securing a seat on the UN Security Council.
Indian strategists tend to see Russia as grasping mightily
for its slipping greatness but in fact able to provide
little more to India than what India can buy from Russia
with hard cash.
Indians still
trust Russia, which perhaps is a residue of the genuine
friendship of Cold War days, but clearly they do not trust
it in the same way they once did, and they fear that weakness
will propel Russia into doing things that could drive
India further away. For example, one finds little support
in India for Russian adventures in Chechnya or the South
Caucasus, which draw the West's ire at a time when India
seeks to explore new strategic relationships with the
West, especially with the United States. In fact, Indian
reaction to most Russian foreign policy initiatives--in
the Arab world, in Iran, in Cuba, etc.--has been muted,
if not ignored altogether.
India's view
of Russia in the international system can thus be summarized
generally as follows:
-
Russia
will continue to be a purveyor of key military
equipment and technologies on a business basis.
India's dependence on Russia as a supplier will
remain and perhaps even grow in the short term,
as it strives to address national security threats
from several directions.
-
The
strategic synergies between Russia and India
that formerly characterized the relationship
are disappearing. Indians are uncertain where
Russia is going or how it might behave, but
increasingly they see Russian behavior as strategically
contradictory for India.
-
Russian
efforts to entice China into an anti-American
relationship, driven largely by transfers of
technologies from Russia to China, are deeply
worrisome to India.
-
Russia's
weakness could upset the geopolitical balance
in Eurasia to India's disadvantage.
The China/East Asia Perspective
Jonathan
Pollack
Naval War College
Russia at present
occupies a constrained but potentially more important
role in East Asian geopolitics and economics. Its liabilities
and limitations as a major regional actor derive from
its severely degraded political, military, and economic
position within the region following the collapse of the
Soviet Union, and its inability since then to reconstitute
its power and position on an alternative and more sustainable
basis. Its most substantial breakthroughs (but also the
ones entailing the most significant longer-term risks
for Russian strategic interests) concern a resurrected
relationship with China encompassing negotiated border
settlements; security and confidence building measures
among Moscow, Beijing, and the Central Asian successor
states; and the resumption of strategic ties, including
political-military consultations and a growing arms transfer
relationship. After a partial political pause following
Vladimir Putin's assumption of power, these relations
now appear to have gained additional momentum, with Russia's
defense industries ever more dependent on Chinese purchases
and coproduction arrangements to maintain their viability.
In addition, Chinese officials proved far more prepared
to explore enhanced political-strategic understandings
with Moscow in the aftermath of NATO's intervention in
Kosovo and the US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade.
But a long-sought political breakthrough with Japan--as
distinct from the development of non-adversarial relations,
and upon which a truly consequential strategic transformation
could well depend--continues to elude Russian policymakers.
Though many
analysts assert that East Asian actors see relations with
Russia as secondary to their larger strategic calculations,
this judgment neglects or minimizes the prospective value
that various states attach to Russia, albeit for different
reasons. For the Chinese, in particular, the characterization
of Russia as "strategic partner" is more than a label,
though this should not be construed as providing Russia
with major leverage over Chinese decisionmaking. This
includes negotiations over a new political treaty that
could be signed later this year. Some of China's senior
leaders were educated and trained in the Soviet Union,
speak Russian, and acknowledge the vital role of Soviet
assistance in China's industrialization and modernization
efforts of the 1950s. They also tend to view closer ties
with Moscow as a prudent and necessary step in response
to the predominance of American global power, though a
more formal, binding coalition does not seem warranted
by either under prevailing circumstances. In addition,
Russia and China maintain shared interests in curbing
potential dangers around their periphery, including the
risks posed by ethnic and religious activism in or near
vulnerable border areas.
But Russia
has as yet been unable to vest China in a more durable
relationship premised on complementary developmental needs.
Potential development of Siberian energy resources and
the investment resources, for example, constitutes a long-sought
but still elusive goal for Russian policymakers. But longer-term
regional energy requirements (and not only in China) would
appear to favor far more meaningful Russian involvement
in East Asian development as a whole. This could include
the construction of additional Russian nuclear power plants
in eastern China as well as collaboration in petroleum
and natural gas development. Russian prospects could also
be enhanced by the large-scale infrastructure requirements
likely to be generated by China's ambitious plans for
development of its western regions. But such possibilities
have yet to be realized, and Russian officials were deeply
chagrined by their failure to win any major contracts
in the Three Gorges Project, China's most ambitious development
initiative of the last half century. In addition, bilateral
trade ties (though increasing somewhat during 1999 and
2000) constitute a pittance compared to China's links
with Japan, the United States, South Korea, and Taiwan.
Many Russian observers, therefore, see a risk that bilateral
relations will remain far too weighted toward Chinese
military modernization and potential Chinese expectations
of access to ever more sensitive technologies, to the
detriment of a more prudent, diversified set of bilateral
relationships.
Despite such
disappointments, Chinese leaders value fuller relations
with Russia for political, strategic, and developmental
reasons, and are therefore unlikely to ignore such ties.
Indeed, some Chinese seem persuaded that negotiated understandings
reached with Moscow at a time of Russian weakness could
diminish the possibilities of a resuscitated Russia challenging
Chinese interests at a future date. At bottom, a weak
or severely incapacitated Russian state does not favor
Chinese interests, though some local elites (especially
in China's northeast) might well seek opportunity in Russia's
economic and demographic vulnerabilities. Predominant
Chinese incentives would therefore appear to favor a recovering
and more authoritative Russian state, but not one able
to reassert its imperial prerogatives in the region. The
major limiting factor in this regard may be more on the
Russian than the Chinese side, inasmuch as there is a
clear wariness among Russian policymakers of an overly
encumbering relationship with China. The predominant fear
would be Russia's potential complicity in China's emergence
as a far more powerful state, which could pose a major
longer-term risk to Russian national security interests
in Asia, while limiting Russia's prospects for realizing
fuller integration with its European neighbors and (quite
possibly) endangering the prospects of credible long-term
relations with the United States. Inescapably, Russian
policy must look east as well as west (and also south),
but the balance among these alternative possibilities
still remains highly unsettled.
Looking beyond
China, states such as North Korea, Vietnam, and Mongolia
see continued links with Moscow as tacitly balancing against
a more powerful China. Major US allies such as Japan and
South Korea also see partnership with Russia as a useful
component of their larger political and economic strategies.
Officials in Tokyo readily acknowledge the abnormality
of relations with Moscow more than five decades since
the end of the war in the Pacific, though both sides have
made substantial strides in moving toward non-adversarial
ties in the absence of a peace treaty or a territorial
settlement. A fuller relationship with Moscow would clearly
be beneficial to Tokyo's desire to achieve a more credible
standing as a major power, but the Japanese as yet seem
disinclined to fully pursue such possibilities. But a
quasi-normal relationship with Japan remains a distinct
improvement over the poisonous ties of the past and could
afford Russia more opportunities in the region as Japan
moves toward a more diversified set of international strategies.
The same holds true for South Korea, which views Russia
as a selective source of weapons systems and (potentially)
as a partner in curtailing North Korea's missile and strategic
weapons programs, as well as a potential partner in enhancing
trade ties across Asia to Europe.
The possibilities
for a larger Russian breakthrough in East Asia,
however, would still appear to depend on: (1) a
major deterioration of US ties with Russia, China,
or both that provides them with incentives for a
much more interdependent relationship than either
seems prepared to pursue at present; (2) a significant
weakening of US regional alliances that opens the
door to a fuller Russian diplomatic and arms supply
role; or (3) acute instability in Central Asia and
in nearby border areas that compels much closer
Sino-Russian collaboration. Though none of these
scenarios may seem likely, neither are they wildly
implausible. But the possibilities in any area would
still depend on the fuller reconstitution of Russian
economic, scientific, and military capabilities, without which
Russia's longer-term opportunities and ambitions
cannot be realized.
Highlights From the Discussion
China and
Russia
Moscow's relationship with China is a double-edged
sword. One participant asked how, as a rational actor,
Moscow can entertain thoughts of selling weapons and military
equipment to China, given that as long as Russia shares
a border with China, it will face a threat from Chinese
imperialism. The participant added that Moscow must realize
that the United States and Europe are natural allies for
Russia against Islamic fundamentalism and China. Other
participants responded that the Chinese have been "very
mindful of not kicking the Russians while they are down"
and that Russia believes that it has enough of a technological
lead that military sales to China do not pose a threat.
Another reason offered for why, in Moscow's eyes, the
benefits of the relationship outweigh the risks is that
military sales to China have been a stable source of income
for Russia. In addressing the issue of whether military
sales to China will come back to haunt Russia in the long
term, one discussant argued that the most notable changes
associated with China's modernization of its military
have occurred in the ground forces--changes that offer
no threat to the West but could pose a threat to Russia.
Blue
Stream
Blue Stream presents numerous potential problems.
Gazprom has yet to secure the funds necessary to
begin construction of the pipeline, let alone those
needed for maintenance and operating costs. Because
the pipeline will transit across the bottom of the
Black Sea--a highly caustic body of water capable
of dissolving normal pipe materials in less than
a year--special materials must be used. Although
the Blue Stream agreement, signed by Turkey and
Russia in 1997, represents increased Russo-Turkish
cooperation, it threatens the Trans-Caspian pipeline,
an initiative supported by the United States. The
political maneuvering and power struggle over Caspian
oil is likely to have a destabilizing effect on
the entire region.
Panel
IV
Russia Viewed From the Outside
(Continued)
Graphic
This
panel continued the examination of how Russia fits
into the foreign and security policies of other
states. Specifically, panelists explored how Russia
is viewed by the following regions: Europe; the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS); and Central
Europe.
Mary Desjeans (Chairman)
Office of Russian and European Analysis,
Central Intelligence Agency
Europe's Perspective
Alexander
Rahr
Korber-Unit for Russian and CIS Studies,
German Society for Foreign Affairs
Good news is
coming from Russia. Vladimir Putin has stopped the financial
downfall of his country, has filled the state budget with
petrodollars, and presides over steady growth of the national
economy. He has installed a government of liberal-minded
professionals, has revamped the tax system, and plans
to fully legalize private ownership. The framework for
the market is set--what Russia needs next is foreign investment.
But rather than applaud these positive changes, the West
has remained skeptical.
A glance behind
the scenes indicates that real power in Russia is held
by a handful of Putin-loyalists from the former Leningrad
KGB. They have embarked on a road of building a market
economy without a civil society. Russia is developing
according to a quasi-authoritarian, managed democracy
model typical of Latin American countries.
Never before
in Russia's modern history has a leader--be it the tsar,
general-secretary or president--achieved such strong public
support after just one year in power. Putin faces absolutely
no opposition. Chechnya has been recaptured by brute force,
and other regions have been brought under firm central
control--more gently than Chechnya but nevertheless resolutely.
The two chambers of parliament, the Duma and the Federation
Council, were emasculated. Even journalists, who had for
the past decade defended press freedom, have deliberately
submitted to Putin's strong hand. A majority of Russians,
who lost faith in the state during Boris Yeltsin's confusing
reform era, applaud enthusiastically.
The West can
do little to change the mood inside Russia. It is, however,
worried about how Putin will handle all of his powers.
Is he going to translate economic stability into a civilized
market and trim Russia for globalization in partnership
with the West, or will he establish authoritarian rule
and choose confrontation? Western leaders are worried
about their loss of influence over Russian policy. Appeals
to stick to European "democratic norms" were completely
ignored during the war in Chechnya. The former Western
approach of "softening" Russia's stance during NATO enlargement
or the Kosovo conflict through IMF and World Bank credits
is gone. Russia is, at least at its current stage, rich
enough to survive on its own
capacities.
The West still
has one last tool, however, to prevent Russia from sliding
down a confrontational path: the huge $160 billion debt
that Moscow must repay. Private creditor institutions,
assembled in the London Club, already agreed to restructure
part of Russia's debt. But creditor nations in the Paris
Club, particularly Germany, have been reluctant to follow
suit. Russia's recent suggestion that it would postpone
payments due the Paris Club have provoked an outcry in
the EU and the United States. The West is not interested
in seeing Putin invest his petrodollars into the modernization
of his army, fleet and possibly in a
Russian MD system.
Putin understands
the West very well--he has studied Western policies
all his career. He wants to make Russia strong,
while carefully avoiding annoying the West. His
recovery program for Russia seeks to conquer lost
arms and energy markets. Ambitious pipeline projects
have been successfully implemented to secure Russia's
monopoly over energy flows from the Caspian region
and Siberia to Europe and Asia. The recently announced
German-Russian cooperation on modernizing Russian
MiG fighters for customers in Asia and Central Europe
is another cornerstone in Putin's skillful strategy
to involve his Western partners in a new "pragmatic
relationship."
The
CIS View of Russia: Fears, Vulnerabilities,
and Attractions
Stanley
Escudero
Former US Ambassador to Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan,
and Tajikistan
During my nearly
nine years in Central Asia and the Caucasus, I was often
asked how this or that newly independent state felt about
Russia. Circumstances vary from one CIS nation to another,
and, in fact, the differences are often substantially
greater than the similarities. As a result, some nations--Tajikistan
or Armenia, for example--might favor a close relationship
with Moscow, while others--such as Uzbekistan or Azerbaijan--might
prefer greater distance. But difficult as it is to generalize
about the attitudes of states as varied in history, language,
culture, resource base and potential as the CIS countries,
I have often thought that they probably feel about Russia
a lot like old Jonah must have felt just after he was
delivered from the belly of the whale.
There Jonah
was, in the water next to this huge whale that had just
proven that it could and would swallow him. He had to
be concerned that it might do so again. And Jonah's problem
was: how could he establish a safe perch for himself without
irritating Leviathan in the process? But Jonah had several
good cards to play: if he could reach dry land the whale
could not get him, and he knew that, in a pinch, he could
count on the support and intervention of the Supreme Being.
The CIS states are not that lucky. After all, there is
no dry land for them to escape to--geography dictates
that they remain there in the water, next to the whale.
And, while they fear the great whale, many among them
recognize that there were some advantages in being part
of the larger animal, and some of their people would not
be displeased if it were to swallow them again. Moreover,
swimming on their own is proving a challenge. The whale
is not the only large predator in the sea. If they do
not keep stroking they will sink, and, though there are
many willing to tell them how to swim, no one will stroke
for them. There are others who might keep the predators
at bay--one even more powerful than the whale--but the
price for its support is not religious worship but economic
and societal reform, a change of stroke that is proving
very daunting for the authoritarian elites of the CIS.
So, there they are--swim, sink, or be swallowed.
Weak Feelings
of Nationhood
To translate this analogy into specifics, let us begin
with feelings of nationhood and independence. There were
those among the CIS states that did not warmly welcome
independence when it was thrust upon them in 1991 with
the collapse of the Soviet Union. But, for the most part,
they adjusted readily enough. Most of the CIS states now
hark back to periods of pre-Soviet independence, or, if
their history is inconvenient in that regard, they are
busy inventing their past. Thus, government propaganda
in the countries of the South Caucasus stresses their
brief efforts at independence during the early twentieth
century and the khanates and kingdoms that preceded tsarist
conquest. Uzbekistan has elevated Tamerlane to the status
of national hero, Kyrgyzstan has Manas, Tajikistan recalls
the glories of the Soghdian empire, and so on. But the
fact is that a number of the CIS states had no prior existence
in their present form and owe their current independence,
boundaries, and in some cases their very names to their
former status as republics of the USSR. Obviously, this
makes for a weak sense of nationhood and multiplies the
tasks of the post-Soviet leaderships, which must develop
societal and political entities that can stand on their
own. As these same leaderships regard the colossus to
their north, they cannot but be concerned that a soft
commitment to nationhood and independence on the part
of their peoples--and even some of their elites--would
make things easier for Moscow, should it decide to reassert
what it regards as its traditional influence or control.
Fear of
an Aggressive Russia
Historically, fear of Russian expansion into the territory
of its neighbors has been well-founded. Some historians
argue that much of the history of Russia's relations with
its neighbors for the past 600 years can be described
as the acquisition of territories in the search for secure
frontiers. There are some in the West who believe that
Russia has changed, or is changing, and that a reformed
Moscow now seeks relations with its neighbors in keeping
with international norms. But the CIS--with the notable
exceptions of Belarus, Armenia, and Tajikistan--would
offer little support for this belief, and, privately if
not publicly, they would express concern that Russia continues
to view the "near abroad" as its particular
sphere of influence.
In support
of this interpretation, various CIS leaders have adduced
to me the following:
-
Russia
continues to regard itself as the defender of the
borders of the former Soviet Union. To this end
it maintains military bases and border guard divisions
in most CIS countries. It uses the CIS as a vehicle
to press for general adherence to such Russian military
mechanisms as the mutual air defense agreement.
It frequently presses CIS nations that successfully
engineered the departure of Russian military units,
such as Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan, to agree to their
return.
-
Russian
troops have intervened in civil conflicts in Tajikistan,
Nagorno-Karabakh, and Abkhazia. Russian peacekeeping
efforts have resolved none of the conflicts that
they addressed; at best they have frozen the disputes
and left them to fester, while at worst they have
kept the pot boiling to sustain a level of instability
sufficient to ease future Russian intervention.
In the latter regard, note the recent provision
of S-300 SAM systems and MiG-29s to largely ethnic
Armenian Russian military units stationed in Armenia.
-
There
is strong evidence that Russian intelligence services
were behind two attempts to assassinate Georgian
President Shevardnadze.
-
The second
Chechen War and related threats and warnings to
Georgia and Azerbaijan, as well as the "dash" of
a Russian armored column to Pristina Airport in
Kosovo, are evidence that Moscow has not abandoned
its reliance on the use of force to solve complex
social/political problems, especially when dealing
with non-Russian peoples of the former empire.
-
Russian
opposition to the development of Caspian Basin oil
and gas resources by non-Russian companies and to
pipeline routes that do not pass through Russian
territory shows that Moscow continues to regard
Caspian hydrocarbon resources as a Russian preserve.
Participation by Lukoil in consortia with Western
companies is dismissed as an accommodation to distasteful
current reality.
-
Russian
insistence on constraining schemes for the division
of the Caspian (first as a lake with narrow national
territorial strips and the vast bulk held in common,
and then with national sectors owning the seabed
but with the column and surface of all water located
outside national territorial seas held in common)
shows that Russia aspires to a position that would
enable it to veto any Caspian energy or other development
project not in its interest.
- Vladimir
Putin may be the strong man that Russia needs to get
its house in order (and a weak unstable Russia is
a nightmare for virtually all CIS states), but there
is a risk that he will lead a revivified Russia in
the reassertion of its traditional regional influence
or that he would subsume Russian internal problems
in an external adventure.
There is more
but that is certainly enough to convey the nature of CIS
fears, with the restated caveat that some CIS nations
feel more strongly than others on these issues and that
others, particularly the three closest to Moscow, would
likely reject some of these concerns altogether.
Seeking
Extra-Regional Support
Some CIS countries have sought--without notable success--to
convince NATO or the United States to extend them a protective
umbrella. Virtually all CIS nations, including Russia,
belong to NATO's Partnership for Peace, but those members
more desirous of a closer relationship with NATO, such
as Azerbaijan, have been especially diligent in participating
in as many joint exercises as possible. Ukraine has succeeded
in establishing a special relationship with NATO, leading
similarly inclined CIS countries to conclude that Ukraine
can one day aspire to full NATO membership, and so several
other CIS states press for special relationships for themselves.
To date no additional requests for such special relationships
have been accepted. One senior official of the Government
of Azerbaijan went so far as to call publicly for the
establishment of a NATO or American base on Azerbaijani
soil, a proposal that did not find favor either in Brussels
or Washington. However, building on its non-lethal military
assistance relationship with Turkey, Azerbaijan dispatched
a platoon as part of the Turkish battalion serving with
international peacekeepers in Kosovo.
In an attempt
to modernize some units of their armed forces and bring
them up to NATO standard, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan
formed the Central Asian Battalion (CENTRASBAT) with a
view to the creation of a multinational unit that would
be available only to the UN Secretary General for UN peacekeeping
duties. With foreign participation, including that of
Russia and the United States, CENTRASBAT conducted several
joint exercises, including one impressive affair in 1997
in which the United States flew C-17s non-stop from the
American mainland and arrived over Kazakhstan exactly
on time to drop paratroops into the exercise. However,
full development and performance of the battalion has
been weakened by rivalries between the participating Central
Asian governments.
Thinking to
create their own mutual support structure, CIS members
Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan (joined later), Azerbaijan
and Moldova established GUUAM. Though made up of the nations
that take the most independent stances within the CIS,
GUUAM members insist that the organization is not directed
against Russia or anyone else. Moving slowly through its
formative stages, the organization has accomplished little.
To my knowledge, there has been no discussion of creation
of a GUUAM-related military structure.
None of these
military arrangements or relationships are envisaged as
offering any degree of commitment from any Western nation
to protect any CIS state against Russia. But their existence
does appear to indicate that some CIS countries are sufficiently
apprehensive as to initiate processes that they may hope
might someday lead to something more concrete.
Comfortable
But Inadequate and Risky Trading Relationships
Somewhat offsetting these and other apprehensions is the
need to come to terms with life as neighbors of what is
still a major power that has had and retains extensive
and important trade, cultural, linguistic, and assistance
ties to the newly independent nations of its former empire.
Recall that,
as with the colonial economies of the European imperial
powers of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the
economies of the Soviet republics were subordinated to
the needs of the Union as a whole. Generally speaking,
this meant that the non-Russian republics produced raw
materials (as with the cotton monocultures of Central
Asia) and the bulk of the value-added manufacturing took
place in Russia proper. The transportation nets, commercial
legal codes, and personal relationships that supported
and grew out of this structure still exist. Although they
are changing and are by no means as important or exclusive
as they were even five years ago, they are still very
significant for the emerging and slowly reforming economies
of the CIS states. For example, in Azerbaijan, which prides
itself on its independence from Russia, the collapse of
the Russian economy in the late nineties so deflated the
Azerbaijani economy that the IMF and World Bank successfully
advised devaluation of the otherwise healthy Azeri manat.
There remains
a certain comfortable familiarity for the CIS nations
in trading with their traditional Russian partners. Longstanding
personal relationships--so important throughout Central
Asia and the Caucasus--are reinforced by familiarity of
products and a willingness to accommodate the corruption
that greases almost all commercial transactions in the
former Union. But Russia no longer is in a position to
serve as the primary market for CIS products, nor can
it satisfy from its own production demands for high-tech
or high-quality imports. In some areas, such as hydrocarbons
and caviar, Russia competes directly with Caspian Basin
states. Moreover, Russia lacks the financial and technical
capacities to develop Caspian Basin oil and gas resources
or to resurrect defunct Soviet-era industrial plants.
Especially for CIS countries whose immediate development
plan is based on exploitation of hydrocarbons or other
minerals, Russia is relegated to secondary status. At
the other end of the spectrum, Armenia, which has very
limited natural resources, works to balance its intimate
military and political alliance with Russia and development
assistance, which the well-organized Armenian diaspora
either provides or obtains as aid from Western governments.
Trade with
Russia often carries with it certain risks. Russian hard
currency is in short supply, and deals are often conducted
on a barter basis. Even then, as Turkmenistan learned
in its several attempts to sell gas to Gazprom at something
approaching world prices, a deal made is not necessarily
a deal paid. Another example was Azerbaijan's agreement
to ship a certain amount of its oil to market via the
Russian pipeline that passed from Baku through Dagestan
and Chechnya to the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk.
When the Chechen conflict cut off the line, Russia quickly
expended some $100 million and in only six months had
a Chechen bypass line up and running. This remarkable
achievement is an indication of the importance that Moscow
attaches to the export of Caspian Basin energy via pipelines
that pass through Russian territory. Yet before the sweet
light Azeri crude carried by this northern pipeline reaches
Novorossiysk, it is joined by another line carrying heavy
tarry Urals crude, and the combined crude is sold as Urals
Blend. As the Urals crude is worth substantially less
than that from Azerbaijan, at current oil prices the Azeris
are owed an adjustment net-back of over three dollars
per barrel. I leave it to you to imagine whether the Russians
pay this adjustment or keep it for themselves.
Finally, reliance
on Russia as a trading partner can carry with it certain
political risks. Over several years, Armenia and Georgia
ran up substantial debts, which they could not pay, for
the use of Russian gas delivered through the old Soviet-era
pipeline system. Gazprom discounted these debts to its
rather interesting subsidiary Itera, and the latter negotiated
controlling equity in the Armenian gas distribution system
in return for cancellation of the gas debt. Itera is attempting
to do the same in Georgia, so far without success. Now
it could be argued that, as no western pipeline routes
are currently planned through Armenia and as Yerevan enjoys
a close cooperative relationship with Moscow, the arrangement
with Itera is little more than a mutually beneficial convenience.
But in the case of more independent Georgia, which, along
with Azerbaijan, is the necessary route for any pipelines
carrying energy from the Caspian Basin that are not to
pass through either Russian or Iranian territory, and
which is already subject to considerable Russian pressure
via Georgia's ongoing civil conflicts, the presence of
Russian bases, and the war in neighboring Chechnya, control
by Itera of the nation's vital gas distribution system
could be politically fatal. In fairness, Russia cannot
be expected to provide free gas to Georgia, and Georgia's
economy--weak, inefficient, and riddled with corruption--is
unable to pay. The solution may lie in a combination of
trade and assistance from the West.
Unwelcome
Reforms Key to Entry into the Marketplace
That said, trade with the West poses its own set of challenges
for the officials and businessmen of the newly independent
states. The concepts of sanctity of contracts, adherence
to international accounting standards, and coherent and
consistent taxation practices, among many other common
Western business practices, were all foreign to traditional
CIS economic activity. The extensive reforms required
of the CIS economies and governments if they are to integrate
into the international marketplace are unsettling to systems
mired in Soviet methodology and to elites who benefit
personally from existing practices. This is not the place
to discuss the reforms that will be needed if these economies
are to grow out of their Soviet-era inertia, create productive
middle classes, and, in the cases of the coming petro-states,
avoid the catastrophes that plagued the newly wealthy
oil states of the 1970s, save to note that demands for
these extensive and politically difficult reforms increase
the discomfort index of doing business with the West.
Russia:
A Questionable Protector Against Islamic Activism
Anyone who has dealt at length with the peoples of Central
and Southwest Asia will have discovered that they do not
share the Western need for philosophic and intellectual
consistency. So it should come as no surprise that a number
of the nations that most fear Russian political or military
activity in the CIS also look to Russia for possible protection
against Islamic activism from Afghanistan and Iran. More
for political than religious reasons, the Islamic nations
among the CIS have been critical of Russia's military
interventions in Chechnya. The governments of the Islamic
CIS nations are quite secular, and--with the exception
of the inhabitants of areas of Tajikistan and parts of
the Fergana Valley in Uzbekistan--this is generally true
of their people as well. For some years, elements in Afghanistan
have targeted the nations of Central Asia, either to seek
revenge for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, to overthrow
what they regard as neo-Soviet successor governments that
oppress their Muslim populations, or simply to spread
the benefits of strict adherence to the faith.
The civil war
in Tajikistan lent impetus to these aspirations as defeated
fighters and civilian supporters of the losing, pro-Islamic
side in that conflict were driven in 1992--primarily by
the intervention of Russian and Uzbek forces--into Afghanistan.
There they were organized into refugee camps, some controlled
by Islamic organizations, where the fighters and military-age
men found ample opportunity for refitting, retraining
and reindoctrination into the joys of Islamic fundamentalism,
preparatory to returning to Tajikistan to renew the conflict.
A UN cease-fire
was negotiated, then violated many times. Russian border
guards were reinforced by units from Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan,
and a truly bizarre situation developed along the Afghan
frontier. At some points the border was tightly controlled,
and cross-river exchanges of fire were commonplace, while
at others opposition forces with arms crossed freely under
the noses of Russian units. Eventually much of the border
area of the remote Pamiri province of Nagorno Badakshan
was de facto ceded to the opposition. If their forces
moved too far and too openly into Tajikistan, they were
engaged by government units, but successful guerilla penetration
of most of Tajikistan became commonplace, and nominally
progovernment warlords operated in their home areas virtually
without government control. At this point the Russians
claimed that they would guard the border and protect certain
"strategic objects" inside Tajikistan but that
they would not join in battle against opposition units
inside Tajikistan away from the
borders.
Violence continued
and continues sporadically to this day despite creation
of a government of national unity (a repeat of a failed
effort undertaken in the summer of 1992). Meanwhile, elements
of the opposition, government officials, and Russian border
guards have established an alliance of convenience based
on the vast amounts of money to be made from smuggling
opium and heroin from Afghanistan. Some Tajik sources
have claimed to me that profits from the drug trade are
the primary reason for Moscow's continuation of its costly
military deployments in Tajikistan. Whether that is true
or not, it is clear that the presence of two Russian divisions
in Tajikistan, while temporarily stabilizing in the fall
of 1992, has failed to keep the peace in Tajikistan or
to prevent the return of once-exiled opposition leaders
and their armed forces to a share of power.
This cannot
be comforting to the Uzbeks, who have recently become
targets of an Islamic opposition of their own. This opposition
movement grew out of an uprising in the strongly conservative
Fergana Valley city of Namangan. When the uprising was
forcefully put down by Tashkent authorities, some of its
leaders and supporters fled to Afghanistan, where they
found the same fertile ground as did their Tajik compatriots.
By late summer of 1999, Uzbek fundamentalists had begun
operations in the upper Fergana near the Kyrgyz city of
Osh. This city, though in Kyrgyzstan, is located in a
region inhabited largely by Uzbeks; in 1990, Osh was the
scene of severe Uzbek-Kyrgyz disturbances, which were
only put down through intervention by units of the Red
Army. With Kyrgyzstan unable to cope with these new rebels,
it is interesting that the Russian high command proposed
a joint Russian, Uzbek, Kazakh, and Kyrgyz effort to reestablish
order, making it plain that the Russian direct involvement
would be minimal.
In 2000, the
focus of events shifted to Uzbekistan with five nearly
simultaneous explosions in Tashkent, followed after some
months by guerilla attacks on Uzbek territory mounted
from mountainous regions of neighboring Tajikistan. Some
Uzbek territory was occupied, and regular Uzbek troops
were killed trying to regain it. Under President Putin,
Russia's response was different. Russia, he told Uzbek
President Karimov during a visit to Tashkent, will protect
Uzbekistan from the Islamic menace. Putin scored short-term
points with a number of CIS governments via this forthright
statement. But upon consideration of the Russian track
record against Islamic guerillas in Tajikistan, Chechnya,
and, of course, Afghanistan, and in light of the strains
placed on Russian financial and military capacities by
the second Chechen War, Uzbek and other CIS leaders could
be forgiven for asking themselves what real benefits might
accrue from this proffered Russian assistance. I am not
aware of any really significant Russian military assistance
to Uzbekistan in the wake of Putin's offer, but it may
be instructive that Karimov has since acted to recognize
the Taliban as the government of Afghanistan, despite
their earlier conquest and domination of the ethnic Uzbek
sector of the country.
Not surprisingly,
the nature of the Islamic challenge in the Caucasus is
different, largely because any immediate threat would
come primarily from Iran, and Iran appears to be acting
more in support of its national interests than in furtherance
of the Faith. Iran has sided politically with Armenia
and against its Shia brethren in the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict, while it was Azerbaijan that brought in Islamic
fighters from Chechnya and Afghanistan (with limited success).
Iran has undertaken intelligence activities directed against
the Baku government. Tehran's antipathy toward Azerbaijan
appears to stem from irritation with Azerbaijani President
Aliyev for inviting American companies to help develop
the energy resources of the Caspian and from a very Persian
desire to prevent the development of a prosperous, stable
Azerbaijan that could serve as a model and magnet for
Iran's enormous Azerbaijani minority. Finally, and despite
the potential for a future clash of interests in the Caspian,
Iran presently enjoys close trade, military, and technological
relations with Russia. As earnest of the importance it
attaches to these relations, Iran withholds support from
its fellow Islamists in Chechnya.
For the Islamic
members of the CIS, principal concerns over the second
war in Chechnya are twofold, both ominous:
-
As noted
above, Putin's military occupation of Chechnya demonstrates
that he and his government have not abandoned force
as a means of resolution of political or social
disputes. Should Russia win, many in Azerbaijan
and Georgia fear that they would become the next
targets of more assertive and demanding Russian
policies in the Caspian Basin.
-
Should
Russia lose in Chechnya, the resulting Chechen entity
could resemble Afghanistan, threatening the stability
of other Islamic members of the Federation in the
North Caucasus. It could press its secular Islamic
neighbors in the South Caucasus and Central Asia
to adhere more closely to the tenets of the Sharia.
It could serve as haven to terrorist groups and
rebel movements that could be unleashed against
regional governments found to be inadequately responsive
to Chechen concerns. In this regard, it is worth
noting that at least two of those held responsible
for the Tashkent bombings were apprehended while
trying to cross into Chechnya.
The CIS
Dilemma
The CIS states are not without other friends. The scope
of this paper precludes examination of the relationships
of the nations of the South Caucasus and Central Asia
with Turkey and of Turkey with Russia. But with the possible
exceptions of Ukraine and Moldova, which benefit from
closer proximity to the EU and NATO Europe, the CIS countries
face a multi-faceted dilemma.
They live next
to a mighty nation that, even in its current and probably
temporary weakened state, could crush them if it chose
to. They do not trust their colossal neighbor, which continues
to show an unsettling readiness to intervene in their
internal affairs, though they know it well, understand
it, and are to a considerable degree comfortable in dealing
with it. But a close relationship with Russia does not
feed the bulldog! Moscow cannot offer effective protection
for friendly governments against enemies--foreign or domestic--and
it cannot offer assistance of the scope and kind needed
to enable the CIS nations to resurrect their economies
and make best use of their potential in the global marketplace.
The West will
not offer direct protection against threats either from
Russia or from Islamic nations to the south. However,
it does offer a paradigm for the prosperous development
and continued stability of at least some of the CIS countries,
stemming from a combination of government aid and foreign
business investment and leading eventually to participation
as a player in the international market system. The catch
is that the paradigm requires and depends upon successful
reforms that contravene accepted ways of doing things
that have endured for centuries. Rapid implementation
of these reforms would threaten the stability upon which
all successful reform must depend; at the very least it
would threaten the political positions and personal cash
flows of the current ruling elites. And so the elites
strive for maximum participation in Western markets and
maximum assistance levels with minimal amounts of reform.
They argue, with considerable justification, that complete
reform will take a generation. But they may not have a
generation.
From
the perspective of the CIS states of the South Caucasus
and Central Asia, the best outcome would be the
peaceful evolution of Russia into a more democratic,
free market state interested in the development
of mutually rewarding economic and political relationships
with friendly countries along its southern rim.
Such a Russia would presumably be more tolerant
of regional idiosyncrasies and less demanding than
the West about adherence to what the West regards
as universal legal and moral norms. But this rosy
outcome does not appear likely to eventuate anytime
soon, certainly not in this generation. Meanwhile,
for the current generation of CIS leaders, civil
and regional conflicts fester unresolved, reforms
demanded by the West are becoming more difficult
either to implement or defer, and even the most
firmly seated of CIS rulers cannot count on their
people to remain quiescent forever.
Central Europe's Perspective
Ronald
Asmus
The Council on Foreign Relations
What is Central
Europe and where does it begin and end? For the purposes
of this discussion, Central Europe is everything east
of France and west of Ukraine. In some ways, the most
interesting question is the difference in attitudes toward
Russia among Europeans. The old East/West divide in Europe
is an increasingly anachronistic indicator. We must develop
new ways of assessing European attitudes toward Russia,
and there are two things we should keep in mind:
-
Rule
of Thumb #1: The more secure a Central European
country feels in its relations with the West, the
more interested it is in maintaining or expanding
cooperation with Russia.
-
Rule
of Thumb #2: The basic divide is between those Central
European countries which feel secure and those which
do not; the other interesting divide is security
versus economics--Central Europeans are more conservative
in security issues and more forward and liberal
in economics than their Western European counterparts.
It is important
to understand the history of the region so as to understand
its attitudes toward Russia. The historical legacy and
instincts in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) are to distrust
Russia. Fifty years of forced occupation tends to do that
to you. Central Europeans also generally think Western
policy toward Russia is either naive or cynical. The United
States is generally seen as the former and major European
powers as the latter.
Many of the
dissidents who came to power in the CEE after the revolutions
of 1989 were committed to rejoining the West. But they
were not all anti-Russian--they were anti-Communist. Many
of them knew and admired Yeltsin and his initial reform
team. Many shared the dream of a new democratic Russia.
That hope has been gradually shaken by the results of
the December 1993 and December 1995 Duma elections, shifts
in Russian debates, and Yeltsin's move to the right.
The window
of opportunity for close cooperation with Russia is seen
as having closed around 1996--beginning with the replacement
of Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev by Yevgeniy Primakov.
This was viewed as a return to a more negative Russian
policy stance toward the West and an attempt to stop Russian
integration with the West. This hardening of Russian attitudes
has led the CEE either to give up on relations with Russia
or to assume that they cannot change this calculus. The
CEE feel that they must first strengthen their own integration
into the West, establish Russian integration with the
West, and then try to build better relations with Russia.
Actual political,
economic, and cultural ties between Russia and the CEE
have largely collapsed or atrophied. Russian policies
to isolate or to punish these countries for "going
West" have only reinforced this trend. Many in the
West do not realize how little presence Russia has in
these countries except for the large embassies and the
intelligence presence. There is no effective Russian social
or economic presence in the CEE.
Putin has been
widely viewed as a thug. The CEE feel they know his type
well from their experience with Russia and its leaders.
They see much of the (West) European fascination with
and admiration of Putin as a "modernizer" as
misplaced and bizarre.
The CEE have
found NATO enlargement and the dialogues on EU expansion
to the Baltics and the Balkans reassuring. But these countries
feel they need concrete security and economic relations
with the West soon, or else they will face the threat
of Russian imperialism once again by the middle or end
of the decade.
The CEE worry
about new opportunities for Russian mischief due to Western
policy and Putin's superior ability to exploit Western
mistakes. In the Balkans, the CEE are worried about US
withdrawal making Russia a more major player in their
backyard. The Stability Pact is seen as losing steam,
and none of the Balkan countries is on the short list
for EU enlargement. The Balkan countries themselves worry
about Russia becoming the major player in the region,
and they are eager to join Europe through EU and NATO
enlargement.
The Baltics
are on the short list for EU enlargement, but they worry
that the EU may deny them accession because of strategic
concerns. They know there is little European support for
extension of NATO membership to the Baltics. These countries
fear that the new Bush administration may not be able
to do both MD and NATO enlargement over Russian objections--and
that they may be sacrificed.
The growing
crisis in Ukraine scares the CEE. The CEE do not think
the West appreciates the importance of Ukraine. They have
gotten used to Ukraine as a buffer between them and Russia
over the last decade and assumed it was a quasi-permanent
piece of the European security landscape. The prospect
of the destabilization of Ukraine is truly scary for them.
CEE Policy
Evolution
The top priority of CEE nations was and is to secure their
place in the West--and then to reach out to Russia from
a position of security. CEE countries need to "cage the
bear" before they can "tame him." But they also know better
than anyone else that Russia is not going away and that
they have to live with Russia in the same neighborhood.
The Western stereotype of these countries as congenitally
anti-Russian and uninterested in any kind of cooperation
is often misleading. One does not have to be a strategic
genius to understand that it is much easier to be in favor
of cooperation with Russia once you feel secure and no
longer fear Russian encroachment. All the CEE countries
become much more interested in expanding cooperation once
they get into NATO or feel that the prospect of becoming
secure is very real. If they are all successfully integrated
into the West, will they all turn within a decade into
major proponents of Ostpolitik with Moscow? Probably yes,
and that would be a success.
Current
CEE Policy Preferences
The CEE countries generally still want more, not less,
security. They want more, not less, America. Whereas many
"old" West European allies may be rebelling against pervasive
US influence and real or imagined domination (the hyper-superpower
syndrome), there is almost none of this in Central Europe.
CEE policy attitudes toward key NATO and EU issues are
an interesting barometer. On NATO and NATO-Russia issues,
the CEE countries tend to be on the cautious or conservative
end of the spectrum in terms of guarding Alliance equities.
On NATO enlargement,
they are strongly in favor. They see the window of opportunity
and tend to line up with the United States. The CEE countries
worry about other European allies going soft. On ESDP,
they are solidly pro-Atlanticist and distrustful. Central
Europe does not think Europe can or will stand up to Moscow
on its own. The CEE think Russia's flirtation with ESDP
is an obvious "divide and concern" tactic, and they cannot
understand why their allies are so dumb as to fall for
it.
On NATO-Russia,
they are firm on existing NATO red lines regarding decisionmaking
but fully supportive of practical cooperation. As for
the EU, CEE countries are far more forward-leaning than
the EU or European mainstream. The reason is simple: EU
membership draws a much clearer line on their eastern
borders than NATO membership does. NATO membership makes
it easier for them to cooperate with Russia. EU membership
sometimes makes it harder.
None of these
countries have secured membership in the EU yet, but the
EU accession process is already forcing them to cut back
on bilateral and local cooperation. They are all pushing
the EU--thus far without success--to adopt more flexible
rules so that they can sustain local bilateral cooperation.
They also generally favor expansion of the EU-Russian
relationship.
The New
Dividing Line(s) Among Europeans
European attitudes on Russia today can be divided into
three overlapping categories or circles.
-
The first
group consists of those--largely West European--countries
that feel plenty secure, want somewhat more autonomy
from the United States, and have on their agenda,
among other issues, an expanded European-Russian
cooperative agenda. They tend to see Putin more
as opportunity than problem, and they worry about
US policy on Russia in general and MD in particular.
-
The second
group includes those countries--both old and new
allies--that feel largely secure but still want
to preserve and, in some cases, expand the trans-Atlantic
link because they do not think Europe can or should
pursue its own agenda with Moscow.
-
The third
group consists of those countries which do not feel
secure, which fear Russian neo-imperial revival,
and for which Western integration remains the top
priority. They have not yet transitioned to the
"let's also cooperate with Russia" agenda.
The real issue
is not the United States versus Europe versus Russia,
or even which countries fall under which group.
The crux of Central European attitudes toward Russia
can be seen in the US-European relationship, especially
in terms of the coalitions built within the EU or
within NATO for cooperation with Russia--where these
countries are lining up and what kinds of coalitions
are forming. The EU tends to be more forward-leaning,
while NATO tends to be more conservative in its
approach to dealing with Russia. It will take at
least a decade of feeling secure for the CEE countries
to be comfortable enough to reengage Russia through
normal relations.
Highlights From the Discussion
OSCE
The OSCE's future does not look good. It was a
good institution for the Cold War, but it is not really
applicable to today's international system. It needs to
be remodeled with new ideas and new visions or it will
be forgotten and pushed aside. Neither the United States
nor Europe has an interest in bolstering or even furthering
this institution. In the last five years, even Russia
has lost interest in the OSCE and its future.
The OSCE
has no real mechanisms for pushing through policies.
The Russians feel that the OSCE is being used by the West
to put pressure on Moscow. Russia does not see any role
for itself inside OSCE, nor does it see any role for OSCE
activities outside of post-Soviet states. Russia sees
the OSCE as a failed institution, as evidenced by its
inability to solve the problems in the Caspian region
and in Tajikistan.
EU Enlargement
EU enlargement is going to hurt Russian interests more
than NATO enlargement, and Russia's leaders are only
recently recognizing this fact. In terms of economic,
political, and social integration, EU enlargement is cutting
Russia out of Europe in a far more real and tangible way
than on the security side.
EU enlargement,
as presently conceived and designed, has real potential
to damage European security. There was a window in
the early to mid-1990s for US involvement in EU enlargement;
however, that opportunity is now gone. Europeans do not
believe the United States should play a role in the development
and future of the European Community.
The EU is
focused very heavily on the economy, but Europe is also
seriously considering security questions. The debate
over admitting Turkey to the EU is not only about economics,
but also about creating a European security institution
in which Turkey would become a kind of cornerstone. Europe
also is seriously thinking about how to create stability
in the Caspian Basin--a critical region with great potential
for crises. The EU thinks that it can play a role in the
economics, security, and stability of that region. Germany
and the UK have each taken steps toward more active roles
in the Caspian, and the EU as a whole has made statements
of its intent to help with stability in the region.
No
matter how much effort European countries seem to
exert toward creating a European security policy,
there are plenty of examples of their failure to
reach agreement on security issues. We have
been talking about Caspian stability, but we have
seen that Europe cannot even agree on a policy for
Balkan security. We have been talking about Europe
taking over a dialogue with Russia from the United
States, but there is no indication that Europe can
agree on how to approach or incorporate Russia.
These examples serve to remind us that Europe still
has a long way to go before it forms coherent policies
on security and Russia.
Panel
V
Russia in the Global Context
Graphic
This panel
examined the role Russia plays on the international scene.
Panelists explained Russia's importance to the energy
world, business and banking, and the international system.
John
Evans (Chairman)
Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department
of State
Russia
and the Energy World: Looking 3-5 Years Ahead
Robert
Ebel
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Attempts
to understand Russia's place in the international
energy scene are constrained by this relatively
short time period. The energy industry itself is
not likely to change much, except for continuing
price volatility and perhaps the discovery of a
commercially significant oil or gas field. For the
most part, where Russia will be in the energy world
3 to 5 years from now will not be--and cannot be--much
different from the position held today. That, of
course, presumes no change in Russian politics and
no devastating industrial accident.
Why will there
be so little change? It simply takes time to develop an
oil or gas field, build pipelines, upgrade refineries,
and generally expand or renovate the energy infrastructure.
A world recession would be reflected in oil price declines,
but would Russia cut exports because of that? No, it would
not, at least not on the basis of past practice.
On the political
side, we can expect Russia to continue to press for any
advantage it can secure in the movement of oil and natural
gas from the Caspian region to world markets. After all,
the foreign oil companies are playing in Russia's backyard,
developing oil fields that were discovered by Soviet geologists
and where some early development had been achieved.
Russia does
have a piece of the action in key projects, but it wants
more than that. By serving as a transit country for oil
and gas flows, several advantages accrue. First, there
are considerable transit fees to be earned. Second, there
will be employment opportunities along the pipeline route.
Third, and most important, the transit country holds implicit
control over pipeline operations, which carries considerable
political leverage with it.
Beyond Caspian
oil and gas issues, Russia likely will concentrate on
CIS countries, working to develop close political cooperation
in a number of ways, including through energy linkages.
Many of these countries have accumulated large debts for
energy supplied but not paid for, and Russian pressure
to repay is increasing.
The year 2000
was quite good for Russia, at least in terms of its energy
sector. Except for natural gas, all other forms of energy--crude
oil, coal, and nuclear electric power--demonstrated measurable
growth. Exports of crude oil and petroleum products, natural
gas, and even coal to Western markets were expanded, supporting
the country's economic growth.
For some years
now Russia--and the Soviet Union before it--has been exporting
about 6 out of every 10 barrels of oil produced, and about
1 out of every 3 cubic meters of natural gas. During 2000,
Russian oil exports, which approached 4 million barrels
per day (b/d), were exceeded only by oil exports from
Saudi Arabia. Russia solidified its role as the world's
leading trader in natural gas. Total natural gas exports
declined, however, which reflected reduced deliveries
to insolvent CIS markets, a reduction sufficient to more
than offset a small increase in exports to non-CIS markets.
Continued high
crude oil prices have been of particular benefit, but
there is a downside to these financial gains. The very
high export-derived income from crude oil, petroleum products,
and natural gas exports--approaching $29 billion--works
against reform and hides the many ills of the economy.
Crude Oil
Production of crude oil and condensate in 2000 totaled
roughly 6.5 million barrels per day, an increase of 5.9
percent. Growth should continue as Russian oil companies
are driven by the profit motive, and they understand that
future profits depend on investments made now, not later.
The high oil
prices of the past months have imparted a certain arrogance
to Russia, in my estimation. Why do we seek foreign investors,
they may ask themselves, if all we want is their capital?
We are accumulating capital of our own, and our performance
is such that we can borrow what we need from the world
financial markets. We can hire the technical expertise
and managerial know-how; we do not need to give up any
portion of our resource base.
Yet, in Russia's
judgment, the future of its oil sector is directly linked
to Western commitments to production sharing agreements
(PSAs), which will provide the capital and technology
that sector requires. As President Putin has said, "Money
does not smell. What difference to us if it is foreign
or Russian?"
The scale of
US and Western oil company commitments to Russia will
be determined by the availability of a workable PSA. Why
is a PSA so important? Stated simply, a PSA is a contract
between a company and a sovereign nation. If Russia fails
to honor the terms of the contract, then the matter can
be taken to international arbitration.
Future Oil
Exports
Russian oil and gas exports continue to be absolutely
essential to the federal budget. Because of that, Russia
has been careful not to play politics with the volumes
sold. There are always exceptions to the rule, but these
exceptions are rare and have not diminished Russia's reputation
as a reliable supplier.
Natural
Gas
Gazprom is the largest natural gas company in the world
in terms of annual output levels, in terms of exports,
and in terms of its reserve base, which today accounts
for almost one-third of the world total. Gazprom, despite
enduring a 22 billion cubic meter (bcm), or 4.1 percent,
decline in gas production in 2000, nonetheless was able
to marginally expand its gas deliveries to hard currency
markets, from 126.8 bcm in 1999 to 130 bcm in 2000. The
production decline has been attributed to depleting old
gas fields and to a failure to invest in the development
of new production capacity. Funds were available but were
directed elsewhere--for example, as interest-free loans
to businesses outside the natural gas industry.
Nuclear
Power
Power generation by nuclear plants increased by 7.25 percent
in 2000, totaling almost 131 billion kilowatt-hours. The
head of the Russian Atomic Ministry, Yevgeniy Adamov,
has laid out ambitious long-term goals for his Ministry.
Expanded use of nuclear fuel is to displace natural gas
for the export market. In turn, some of the revenue derived
from such exports is to be employed in the construction
of new nuclear reactors.
Minister Adamov's
ambitions extend far beyond Russia's borders. Expansion
of the nuclear electric power base will be costly. Where
will the capital come from? An investment of $14 billion
reportedly will be needed for 2000-2010 and a further
$34.5 billion for 2010-2020. The Ministry hopes to cover
some 60 percent of such financial requirements through
the export of nuclear goods and services, particularly
to markets in Iran, China, and India, and through the
processing of spent nuclear fuels from foreign sources.
However, neither such exports nor fuels reprocessing can
necessarily be viewed as a given.
Summing
Up
There is a vulnerability to the Russian energy sector
in that much of the hoped-for future prosperity appears
tied to international trade rather than to support of
a flourishing economy. This dependence makes Russia perhaps
as vulnerable to a worldwide economic slowdown or recession
as any OPEC country.
Should the
West encourage investment in the Russian oil and gas sector
to help bolster production and export levels? We certainly
would have our own self-interested reasons for doing so.
We care about the Russian oil industry because we care
about their ability to provide crude oil and petroleum
products to the world market, just as we track the natural
gas industry because of its role as the dominant player
in world natural gas trade. These exports, beyond the
importance attached to their high volumes, offer importing
countries security of supply through diversity of
supply.
Nonetheless,
expanded export levels present two drawbacks. First, Russia
becomes more exposed to the dangers of the dreaded "Dutch
disease," and second, Russia becomes more exposed to the
volatility of the world market. Can Russia respond appropriately
to these two threats to the country's economic stability?
The energy
sector as a whole awaits a massive infusion of capital,
a large portion of which must originate outside the country.
Whether this capital will be forthcoming in the required
amounts will depend on Russia's willingness to accept
the conditions that will attract the needed funds and
on whether Russia in the coming years will be viewed as
politically and economically worthy of such commitments.
Russia and International Business and Finance
Margaret
Richardson
Ernst & Young
I was asked
to discuss today how Russia is likely to fit into
the international system in the next three to five
years from the perspective of the business community.
I have had a unique opportunity to give some thought
to this issue from my work at Ernst & Young
with the Foreign Investment Advisory Council (FIAC).
The Chairman of Ernst & Young International
and the Russian Prime Minister have co-chaired the
FIAC since it was organized at the request of Viktor
Chernomyrdin in 1994, with the goal of building
relations between the foreign investment community
and the Russian government.
The FIAC's
members are major corporate investors in Russia
from the United States, Europe and Asia--companies
representing about 90 percent of foreign direct
investment in Russia. The FIAC develops recommendations
designed to improve the foreign investment climate
in Russia, although everyone recognizes that if
the climate for foreign investment is improved then
the climate will also be more hospitable for domestic
investment as well. Plenary sessions of the FIAC,
attended by CEO's of the member companies, are held
every 8-10 months; the day-to-day work is coordinated
by a Standing Committee, chaired by the Russian
Minister of Trade and Economic Development. Regular
participants at FIAC meetings are representatives
of all the government ministries, in addition to
major foreign business associations in Russia, such
as the American Chamber of Commerce, the European
Business Club, Petroleum Advisory Forum, and the
German Business Association.
I also spent
four years (from 1993-97) as the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, and during that time I had the opportunity to
work with Russian officials who were trying to improve
the Russian tax administration system--one of the keys
to improving the investment climate.
I do
not and could not purport to represent the views
of the entire business community concerning investment
prospects in Russia. Undoubtedly there are a variety
of views--many conflicting. But I believe that you
would find virtual unanimity about a few critical
points that the business community looks for when
considering investments, particularly foreign investments.
The business community, not surprisingly, looks
for stability, predictability, and transparency--in
the political climate, the economy, the legal structure,
and the overall investment climate.
Other speakers
have focused on the political climate in Russia, so I
will not dwell on it here, except to note that since President
Putin's election there have been some positive signs and
some negative ones. On the positive side, Putin and members
of his government recognize the need for reform. There
is a recognition that structural changes in the economy
and in the bureaucracy and its attitudes are needed. There
is a recognition that public and private corruption must
be addressed, and there is a recognition of the need for
transparency in government. Two of the major barriers
to reform--the oligarchs and the independent governors--appear
to have had their wings clipped somewhat.
The more
negative political signs include concerns about
what President Putin means when he says there will
be a "dictatorship of the law;" about the stifling
of free speech, particularly in light of the raids
on Media Most; and about how the Chechen conflict
has been handled ("fear" is a word some in the business
community have started to use again).
The business
community also looks for a stable economic situation--another
topic addressed in more detail by earlier panels. The
economic signs in Russia are generally positive--probably
the most positive sign was the recognition that something
serious and coherent had to be done about the economy
(Putin has said that for most of its history Russia has
been a rich country inhabited by poor people). German
Gref, Minister of Trade and Economic Development, authored
the "Gref Plan," which has been adopted as Russia's
new economic policy framework. That plan was based on
a recognition that Russia currently has a Third World
economy and is doomed to remain one unless sustainable
economic growth can be achieved.
Earlier reform
projects also called for reforming the tax structure,
providing a reasonable investment climate, and protecting
property rights. What seems promising this time is that
the role of the government is viewed as more of a "helping
hand" than a "heavy hand." It appears that economic reform
efforts have been fairly well received, and they appear
to be off to a good start. Many of the economic indicators
for 2000 appear positive. GNP increased 7.3 percent in
the first 6 months of the year; real incomes were up 9.5
percent over 1999. Average wages were up; corporate profits
were up; and tax revenues were higher in 2000. Inflation
was about 20 percent--not good, but better than the 2000
percent just a few years ago. But given the condition
of the infrastructure, a serious commitment of resources
is needed to modernize plants, equipment, and transportation
systems if the economy is to grow at a rate that will
keep Russia from remaining a Third World economy for many
years.
The 1998 banking
crisis appears to have been a significant turning point
for the Russian economy. A sharp increase in world energy
prices and a steep drop in imports that Russians could
no longer afford also have helped the economy. But there
is also a belief on the part of a number of commentators
that the Gref plan and the commitment to it have contributed
to the positive economic indicators. A balanced budget
may be in store this year, and some foreign debt repayment
looks likely, although that is still a major political
issue, especially for Prime Minister Kasyanov. In short,
there seems to be less cynicism and more optimism, especially
among Russians.
Legal reforms
have a long way to go before significant investment will
move into Russia. Again, there is a recognition that reforms
are needed, but accomplishing meaningful reforms will
be much more difficult in a country without a tradition
of private property and personal rights. There is certainly
no consensus about what should be done, but efforts are
underway to try to improve the legal system, particularly
the judiciary.
But ultimately
businesses considering investing in Russia are looking
for something more specific than political, economic and
legal stability. Foreign investors want to see the following:
1) the adoption of international accounting standards;
2) changes in the tax system to make it more transparent;
3) a major overhaul of the banking system; 4) bankruptcy
reform; 5) protection for intellectual property; 6) production
sharing agreement legislation and enabling regulations
that would make it more attractive to invest in oil and
gas ventures; and 7) last, but perhaps most important,
a corporate governance regime that would protect shareholders'
rights and promote disclosure of information. These items
top the FIAC agenda, but they are also on the agenda of
every other group wanting to invest in Russia.
Why are these
items important? Without international accounting standards,
it is very difficult for businesses and investors to assess
the financial health of an enterprise. Without a more
predictable tax administration system, companies cannot
plan transactions. The banking system in Russia is not
trusted by anyone--domestic or foreign. Production sharing
agreement legislation, as discussed earlier, is critical
to attracting investment in Russia's oil and gas sector.
Corporate governance
issues are also critical. Protection of shareholder rights,
especially the rights of minority shareholders, is critical
to attracting investment. Disclosure of information, including
disclosure of shareholder meetings, is basic but vital.
The example of RAO UES is illustrative: the company was
restructured without consultation with its shareholders,
causing a 43 percent decline in the value of the shares.
Investors want the opportunity to have a say in major
company matters.
Corporate governance
issues are actively being discussed in Russia. The Chairman
of the Federal Securities Market Commission (the Russian
SEC) and its former Chairman recognize the importance
of corporate governance issues in reducing investment
risks, and they are actively promoting reform. The Prime
Minister is also supporting reform efforts, and he has
indicated that he will be pushing for legislative changes.
What about
investment prospects for the next three to five years?
The good news is that the government recognizes that many
obstacles to investment exist and is willing to tackle
those obstacles. But the Russian bureaucracy is very entrenched,
and it will be hard to overcome more than a thousand years
of history.
On the positive
side, Russia is blessed with many natural resources and
terrific human resources. The population is very bright,
but it is shrinking, and, by all accounts, the education
system is deteriorating because of a lack of resources.
For a while it appeared that more capital was staying
in the country, at least according to some indicators.
Recently, however, that trend appears to be reversing.
What is the
outlook for the next three to five years? Business
is cautiously optimistic that the climate is improving,
but most companies are still waiting to see more
tangible signs of change. It is very unlikely that
we will see any major increase over the current
$2 billion a year in foreign investment. Investors
have too many other opportunities for their money
where the risks are less or at least perceived to
be less.
The Evolving International System and Russia's Relevance
Helmut
Sonnenfeldt
Guest Scholar, The Brookings Institution
The term "international
system" is used in these comments to connote something
both less and more than the notions of regularity, orderliness,
and deliberate arrangement that one usually associates
with the concept of a "system." The term connotes something
less in the sense that the world remains highly diverse
and the plethora of inter-state and inter-governmental
institutions that have emerged over the centuries and
continue to do so are limited in their roles by the sovereignty
and frequently incompatible purposes and needs of their
members. It connotes something more in the sense that
the interaction of states at times displays commonalties
that are not necessarily the product of deliberate commitments
and understanding. In the cultural and economic spheres,
for example, a particular society may be the source of
habits, practices, and institutions that spontaneously
spread around the world because they are found to be attractive,
useful, and rewarding. Conversely, the international system
contains antagonisms, grievances, divergent perspectives,
and adversarial individual or collective purposes despite
the existence of governmental and non-governmental arrangements
to curb such impulses. To make matters more complicated
still, the international system displays many instances
of cooperation among competitors or enemies and of suspicions,
double-dealing, and incompatibilities among friends. "Globalization"
is a pervasive phenomenon marked by such seeming contradictions.
In recent years
and for some time to come, the United States has been
and will be the single most powerful and influential actor
in the global arena. It is not, however, nor will it be,
omnipotent or invulnerable. In some respects the gaps
between the United States and other countries are still
growing. But precisely because of the far-flung interests
of the United States and its growing reliance on diverse
and rapidly changing technological devices and innovations,
the country becomes more vulnerable the more it advances.
In addition, the international system is honeycombed with
innumerable criminal groups engaged in assorted activities
injurious to the well-being, health, and safety of people
around the world. Some of these activities are targeted
against Americans and their property as well as the official
US presence in various parts of the world. Despite various
kinds of internationally organized countermeasures in
which the United States participates, these activities
are likely to increase rather than abate.
In recent years,
implicit as well as explicit coalitions have formed to
resist or at least dilute what their members see as American
hegemony within the international system. In some instances,
formal allies of the United States participate in rebellions
against what is frequently called "unipolarity" (a term
that ignores the fact that "pole" is usually defined as
either repelling or attracting another "pole"). The Russians,
along with the Chinese and French, have been most direct
in deploring "unipolarity" and in constructing, by declaratory
and sometimes operational policies, what they see as counterweights
to US dominance. There are numerous historical precedents,
not only in the international state system but also in
social groupings, for such strategies. Richard Nixon thirty
years ago spoke of an international structure of five
great powers, each balancing the other, as an effective
arrangement to maintain peace. Russians, Chinese, and
others nowadays talk of a "multipolar" system within the
global system. Modern multiple power balances, whether
directed against a single power or against each other,
on the whole have been more rather than less likely to
generate conflict.
In the case
of Russia, the quest for multipolarity results from its
dissatisfaction with an international system in which
the United States, the erstwhile principal obstacle to
Soviet global ambitions, is preeminent. In its early years,
the USSR challenged virtually all aspects of the international
system, although its physical power was inadequate to
pursue its purposes successfully. The predicted proletarian
revolutions failed to materialize. International resistance
to Soviet pursuits spawned a sense of isolation and a
siege mentality, deriving some of its characteristics
from tsarist times. Basic elements of these anxieties
as well as the Soviet Union's organizational structures
that were intended to cope with the "class enemy"--again
in part derived from tsarist precedents--persisted throughout
the Soviet period, even in the years of the Cold War,
when Soviet leaders and much of the outside world believed
the Soviet Union had acquired superpower status comparable
to the United States.
In fact, the
Soviet Union squandered its potential dynamism and maneuvered
itself into a race for preeminence with an industrialized
world led by the United States that steadily outdistanced
the USSR in virtually all measures of modern power. Even
so-called Third World countries outstripped the USSR in
accumulating wealth and improving the well-being of their
people. When Gorbachev recognized the truth and attempted
to arrest the slide it was too late, and to his credit,
instead of resorting to a suicidal effort to preserve
the Soviet power elite and indeed the Soviet Union itself,
he chose to yield to reality. In the process, both the
domestic system and the internal and external empires
of the Soviet Union were sacrificed or collapsed.
Yeltsin's transition
years were a time of ambivalence, experimentation, and
confusion. The outside world, including the United States,
saw prospects for a more "normal" Russia, both
internally and externally. Former secretiveness about
Russia's military forces and equipment gave way to greater
transparency. Police power seemed on the way to curtailment.
Interest in a more predictable judicial system developed.
Private property and entrepreneurship made their appearance.
Foreign links were cultivated. Cooperative relationships,
with caveats, developed with the United States and others
both bilaterally and multilaterally. Yeltsin himself,
as Gorbachev had done (to his eventual great personal
cost), cultivated contacts with other world leaders and
vice versa.
Various factors,
not least Yeltsin's physical and mental deterioration,
led to widespread disenchantment with the post-Soviet
shape of things in and about Russia. The dawn of the Putin
era, given birth by Yeltsin and his "family," ushered
in a new generation of leaders, one raised within the
Soviet elite and evidently committed to a new regime of
recentralization and a greater Russian say in the international
system and its regional and functional subsystems. Putin
appears to recognize that Russia cannot lay claim to great
power status solely by virtue of history, size, and the
substantial military arsenal left behind by the Soviets.
He supports economic reforms and variations of a market
economy and seeks to turn earnings from Russian energy
and military exports into capital for improving the domestic
economy. He tries to curb capital flight and corruption
and to stimulate foreign investment. But how credible
the legal system and open the Russian economy will really
become over the years remains to be seen. Whether under
Putin military and space technology will become more available
for adaptation to the civilian economy than in Soviet
times is also an open question. The culture of secrecy,
which contributed to Soviet backwardness, has not been
eliminated.
While Russia
wants to be treated as a partner by the United States,
the KGB alumni now in power seem convinced that the US
purpose is to prevent Russia from rising to the status
of a peer power. Furthermore, as was already evident in
Yeltsin's final months, they see the United States as
exploiting Russian weakness by such actions as enlarging
NATO; building missile defenses and, if necessary, scrapping
the ABM Treaty; intruding, including by military intervention,
into Russia's traditional spheres of influence; hampering
Russian relations with countries considered hostile by
the United States; and a host of other activities. Although
Russian comments suggest that Republican presidents are
seen as preferable to Democrats, their assessments for
the next few years are cautious.
Russian strategy
seems to assume that resentment against US domination
of the international system is becoming so widespread
that it will offer Russia opportunities to affiliate itself
with various groupings sharing such sentiments. However,
Putin must realize that getting into the World Trade Organization,
for example, cannot be accomplished without US support.
Russian leaders will also have to reckon with US countermeasures
if Russian arms exports contravene various sanction regimes.
Moscow and Washington in the past agreed that the threat
of proliferation was increasing, and certain joint measures
to cope with this danger have been agreed on. At some
point in the next few years, the Russians will have to
decide how far they can go in promoting proliferation
without increasing threats against themselves or jeopardizing
joint programs with the United States.
Moscow's moves
to co-opt NATO and EU members to inhibit US actions on
missile defense, military interventions, NATO enlargement,
breaking up residual Yugoslavia, maintaining sanctions,
and other matters will probably continue but will also
encounter limits beyond which the Europeans will be reluctant
to go, and Russia itself will be made to pay a price by
the United States.
Some Russians
see promise in attempting to put together some sort of
trilateral relationship with India and China. The latter
seems to toy with similar notions. While resentments against
the United States may give some life to such a configuration,
there will remain disincentives to pursuing it very far.
Each of the three suspects the other and has interests
that would be endangered by excessive hostility toward
the United States. There is little doubt that both China
and India want Russian military sales and licenses, but
the equipment involved in many cases does not match that
of the United States in sophistication. And if such equipment
were used in threatening ways against US interests, it
would almost certainly not be without response.
In sum, over
the next several years, Putin's Russia will view the international
system as an arena for inhibiting American freedom of
action and for manipulating various members of the system
to advance Russian interests, especially Russian desires
to be seen and heard as an actor to be reckoned with on
major international issues. But this kind of approach
can land Russia in the same trap as its Soviet precursor.
Besides granting satisfaction, it does relatively little
to enable the Russians to construct the political, economic,
and social base at home that is an imperative for becoming
a significant "pole" in the "multipolar world" they profess
to be eager to construct.
Russia's Capacity and its Role Within the
International System
Lt.
Gen. William Odom (Ret.)
The Hudson Institute
That the Soviet
Union occupied a central place in US foreign policy is
not surprising; that Russia has retained it is puzzling.
It no longer poses a serious military threat, and beyond
commodity exports it offers little as a trading partner.
Today Russia is not all that important because it no longer
has either the military power to pose a serious threat
or the political and economic institutions to play the
role of a constructive great power.
Critics will
object, declaring that Russia remains just as important
but in a new way. Because Russia is committed to political
and economic reform, the United States has an overriding
strategic interest in seeing it succeed. Moreover, it
is on the road to liberal democracy and a market economy,
although it occasionally suffers temporary setbacks. This
has been the mainstream view for nearly a decade, and
it goes on, following several lines of analysis.
For example,
there is the "pay-off to the West" line: if Russia succeeds
in becoming a liberal democracy, that bodes well for Western
security because liberal democracies do not fight each
other. And there is the "punishment for the West" line:
if Russia fails at reform, it will likely become another
"Weimar Germany-to-Third Reich" case, a powerful and menacing
"Brown-Red dictatorship." And there is the "cataclysm
for the West" case: while Russia may look like a Third
World country, its nuclear weapons make it different.
These weapons will fuel nuclear proliferation or be used
to intimidate the West or both. These arguments share
the assumption that Russia's weakness is temporary, that
it will soon return to great power status.
Does such reasoning
make sense? No. Most of it rests on fallacious assumptions
and misjudgments about what is happening in Russia and
how long Russia's weakness will endure. Consider the assumptions.
What if we
knew that Russia is neither on the road to liberal democracy
and a market economy nor able to get on it? If this were
the case, then a lot of the subsequent reasoning would
collapse. There is a tendency to assume that there is
only one road for political and economic change. All countries
are on it, some moving faster than others. In fact, when
the concepts of Nobel Prize economist Douglass North are
applied to Russia, focusing on institutions as the matrix
that determines economic performance, they reveal very
perverse realities (for example, no real progress toward
a liberal regime and an effective market economy). The
lack of stable property rights and the utter absence in
Russian history of limits on state power do not accommodate
Western formal political, legal, and economic institutions.
Could it be
that there are other paths than the one to liberal democracy?
Indeed, we see that there are many when we consider North's
idea of "institutional path dependence," meaning that
once institutions, formal and informal, take root, they
are extremely difficult to change. The phenomenon of "increasing
returns" takes over, and it becomes cheaper to continue
to accept poorly performing institutions than to pay the
high price of destroying them and starting over with more
effective institutions. In fact, the chance of getting
on the institutional path to liberal democracy is small.
A "lock-in" to other institutional paths is far more probable,
and Russia appears to be "locking-in" on a non-liberal
path today.
By drawing
heavily on North's theories, Stefan Hedland, a Swedish
economist, has documented compellingly how the Russian
economy got into its present trap. Leaders have little
incentive to seek a way out because the present institutional
equilibrium pays them well.
This means
that Russia cannot recover as Germany did in the 1930s.
Germany's institutions, demography, and military capacities
were dramatically different from what exists in Russia
today. The Germanies and Japans are exceptional. Most
countries in the world are caught in non-liberal "path
dependence" with poorly performing institutions and are
doomed to remain there. It also means that the West can
do little to limit Russia's contribution to nuclear proliferation.
The government is too weak to prevent it even with US
money. Moreover, wringing our hands about nuclear weapons
only encourages Moscow's illusions about Russia's real
military capabilities. Playing down nuclear weapons makes
more sense.
Other analytic
approaches encourage the same conclusion about Russia's
capacities. Applying Joel Migdal's "weak state" syndrome
suggests that Russia is in it and will remain there indefinitely.
Using Paul Pierson's variant of "path dependence" confirms
Hedland's analysis. Huntington's "political decay" versus
"political development" suggests long-term decay and little
development.
The West
cannot significantly change these realities by inclusion,
financial assistance, or other devices. Top-priority
attention to Russia is more hurtful than helpful.
We must learn to live with a Russia too weak to
play a constructive "great power" role, still able
to engage in mischief-making diplomacy, and strong
enough to cause trouble within the former Soviet
republics.
Highlights
From the Discussion
Proliferation
It is possible that Russia's weakness is precisely what
makes it important in the international system, particularly
with respect to weapons, both conventional and nuclear.
Participants did not agree on the extent to which the
West can expect Russia to cooperate in nonproliferation
efforts. One participant concluded that proliferation
was inevitable, that Iran and Iraq will acquire nuclear
weapons, and that the United States will have to adapt
to this reality. Participants also discussed the importance
of institutional analysis as a means of explaining Russian
behavior that the West finds difficult to understand.
Investing
in Russia
Russia needs to undergo serious economic reforms
to attract foreign investment. Western investors
do not shy away from other countries that need to
undergo the same economic reforms. Why do they avoid
investing in Russia? The reasons, while not entirely
known, have to do with the stability of the government,
economy, and production. Other countries often have
a more hospitable business climate for foreign investment
than Russia. The Russian bureaucracy is difficult
to deal with, and investors feel that trying to
survive in Russia is not worth the bother.
Panel
VI
Concluding Session:
Highlights and Implications for the US
Graphic
In the
concluding session, the panelists focused on the
highlights of the earlier discussions as well as
the likely implications of Russia's near future
for the United States.
George Kolt and Enders Wimbush
(Chairmen)
Blair Ruble
The Woodrow Wilson Center
What role will
Russia play in the international system in the months
and years ahead? The discussion over the past two days
has been too intense and interesting to summarize in a
few minutes. These remarks, therefore, will seek to identify
only a handful of themes for further consideration beyond
this conference.
Our deliberations
have outlined a starkly bifurcated choice of Russian futures.
On one extreme, there has been concern expressed over
the growth of an authoritarian nationalism; on the other,
hope for a possible federal democracy. Reality undoubtedly
will prove to be more complex, which may be why such polar
opposite visions of the future command our attention.
Will Russia fall back into an historic cycle of state
collapse followed by more assertively authoritarian rule?
Will it be the Russia of our fears? Will Vladimir Putin
become a Russian Milosevic? Or is this the historic moment--the
pivotal quarter century or so--when Russia will finally
break out of its mold and become the Russia of our hopes?
Will Putin become a Russian FDR, Adenauer, or DeGaulle?
One answer
to questions about Russia's future will be found in the
quality of Russian leadership. Is Putin Milosevic? Adenauer?
In fact, he most likely is neither. President Putin thus
far has not demonstrated the same capacities for leadership
of either Milosevic or Adenauer, which, in fact, may be
a significant source of his strength. Putin is a reflection
of Russia rather than a creator of it. He is the Russian
"every man," serving more than anything else as a mirror
of the contemporary Russian soul. He may grow in the job,
to be sure. Nevertheless, the Russian future--and hence
the country's place in the international system--is likely
to be shaped from below as well as from above. To emphasize
this point, it is important to explore three dimensions
of present Russian and global reality that have the capacity
to influence the outcome of Russia's post-Soviet transition:
the Russian search for identity, Russia's internal diversity,
and Russia's economic realities and capacities.
The present
moment is marked by continuing confusion over what it
means to be Russian. Russians are searching for a national
mission and identity that will help place them into the
twenty-first century international system. Like Italy
and Germany in the nineteenth century, the Russian world
and the Russian state are not coterminous. Like Italy
and Germany over a century and a half ago, Russia is only
now becoming a nation state. Such comparisons should give
pause as both Italy and Germany found national form together
with surface stability though pursuit of an expansionist
authoritarian impulse that eventually brought both states
to ruin. A similar authoritarian impulse resonates in
a contemporary Russia torn by instability, even though
excessive rule from above may only compound the country's
long-term economic and social difficulties. More profoundly,
a search for cultural identity and meaning appears to
animate Russian life more than either economic or geopolitical
forces. This is so, in part, as a consequence of the Russian
Federation's expansive diversity, which makes any definition
of Russian identity problematic.
Russia is presently
divided by as many factors as can divide human beings.
For example, no single religion can serve as a defining
characteristic of a state as religiously diverse as the
Russian Federation. Islam (both domestic and international)
inevitably will play a powerful role in Russia's clarification
of self. Neither can ethnicity delineate a state consisting
of so many different national communities; nor can shared
landscape delimit a country as geographically diverse.
Russia has no easily ascertainable niche in either Asia
or Europe. From vibrant Moscow to places in which survival
cannot be taken for granted, the Russian Federation is
full of contradictions that remain to be negotiated. Any
artificial centralization imposed from above could well
weaken rather than strengthen a state that must accommodate
the economic, geographic, ethnic, and spatial diversity
of eleven time zones.
Economic realities
will also define the Russian future. With an economy similar
in total value to that of a small European state (smaller
than that of Sweden, for example), today's Russia is hardly
an economic power regardless of the number of its nuclear
warheads. Russian elites have yet to commit themselves
to developing rules of the game compatible with market-oriented
economic life. The Russian economy requires another round
of profound, sustained, and painful economic reform and
restructuring rather than mere tinkering at the margins
of legislative and customary rules and regulations. The
growing official perception of threat from the free flow
of information will only prove counterproductive in a
global economic age. Russia must develop a vibrant and
viable economy if it is to be more than a supplicant in
the international system. Russia cannot become what its
elites want it to be--a major player on the global stage--unless
Russia evolves into something those same elites might
not want it to be--a global society. Herein lies another
contradiction that will shape the future of Russia's place
in the international system.
In conclusion,
Russia requires tranquility and time to define itself
in a post-imperial manner if any Russian future will be
one that we in the West will find congenial. Such profound
concerns press upon Russian elites and ordinary citizens
alike, with no quick and easy solutions in sight. The
United States and Europe must seek to safeguard our own
national interests in a manner that will not be perceived
as a threat within Russia. This will be no easy task,
which is precisely why meetings such as this one are so
valuable at this formative and difficult moment in Russian
history.
Michael Mandelbaum
The School of Advanced International Studies,
Johns Hopkins University
Russian-American
relations in the first post-Soviet decade hold three lessons
for the United States. The first is what we might call,
after the opening sentence of Pride and Prejudice, the
truth universally acknowledged: Russia is important but
not as important, nor important for the same reasons,
as it was during the Cold War. Russia is important because
it is a poorly guarded warehouse of dangerous materials,
some of which can reach the West and all of which are
grouped together under the name "weapons of mass destruction."
Russia is important
as well by virtue of where it is situated. An old adage
has it that the three most important things in real estate
are "location, location, and location." The same is true
of geopolitics. Russia either shares borders with, or
is near, many countries of consequence. It has been said
that Russia is no longer a global power, but rather a
regional power. No doubt this is so, but the regions in
which Russia is a power include Europe, East Asia, and
the Middle East, none of them insignificant.
For the nearby
countries, a successful Russia would be both a virtuous
model and a good neighbor. A failed Russia would affect
and perhaps infect them. From this follows a now familiar
conclusion that bears repeating: unlike in the Cold War,
the West is now as threatened by Russia's weakness as
by its strength--perhaps more threatened.
The definition
of success is straightforward. A successful Russia would
be a country with a functioning democratic political system
and effective free markets. This leads to the second lesson
of the first post-Soviet decade: building democracy and
free markets is easier said than done. Despite Western
efforts, it did not prove possible to construct either
in Russia in the first post-Cold War decade. At the outset
of that decade it was said, by way of justifying what
seemed to be radical reform, that it is not possible to
cross a chasm in two leaps. It turned out that post-Soviet
Russia could not cross this chasm in one leap either,
and as a consequence finds itself, metaphorically, at
the bottom of it.
In one way
we are better off, where Russia is concerned, for the
decade's often discouraging events: we know what Russia
needs. It needs appropriate institutions. It needs a rights-protecting
state that can administer the rule of law, a financial
system, and the combination of the two: property rights.
The absence
of all of these is the reason that schemes such as massive
American investment in Siberia never get off the ground.
Investors invest where and when they think they can make
a profit. Without property rights, they know that they
will make none.
Here two additional
points are worth noting. The first is that corruption
per se is not Russia's problem. Corruption is not an insuperable
barrier to economic growth, as demonstrated by the countries
that have experienced robust corruption and rapid growth
simultaneously. Corruption, if it is predictable and sufficiently
modest, is simply a tax. Investors are accustomed to dealing
with taxes. It is the magnitude and the unpredictability
of the corruption, and the absence of secure property
rights, that drag down the Russian economy.
The second
observation is that the principal source of desperately
needed capital investment in Russia is not the United
States or the West; it is Russians themselves. Although
the ratio of capital flight to capital inflow for Russia
in the first post-Soviet decade can never be known, a
figure of ten to one--ten dollars leaving the country
for every one coming in--seems not unreasonable. So the
Russian government does not have to persuade us that Russia
is a good place to invest; it has to persuade its fellow
Russians. So far it has failed to do so. In the one indubitably
free election that has been conducted in Russia since
the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russians themselves
have voted with their money--against the regime.
If in one way
we are better off after a decade, in another way we are
worse off: we do not know how to build institutions. Institutions
do of course get built, and cultures do change, but they
are not built or changed by the deliberate use of foreign
policy instruments at the disposal of sovereign states,
even one as powerful as the United States. And this means
that where Russia is concerned, on what is arguably the
most important foreign policy issue the United States
faces, we are in the sad position of Nathan Rothschild,
the richest man in the world in 1836, who died of an infection
that could have been cured easily a century later by commonly
available antibiotics, but from which all his wealth could
not save him because the remedy had not yet been discovered.
The West today, with its unprecedented wealth and power,
simply does not know how to solve what is perhaps its
most pressing foreign policy problem: helping Russia develop
the institutions it needs to become a normal, liberal
state.
It should not,
however, be thought that we have no influence at all over
Russia. To the contrary, the United States has had a profound
impact on Russian foreign policy, and it is that impact
that is the subject of the third lesson. The international
system is a society. It has rules and norms, which were
reset with the end of the Cold War and the beginning of
the post-Cold War order. Such rules are normally established
by the strongest power, and in the post-Cold War period
that was and is the United States. In the international
system the weak learn from the strong, just as in human
societies the young learn from the old.
The great instructional
moments for Russia in the post-Cold War era are familiar.
Despite what the Russians believed was a commitment to
the contrary by the West at the time of German unification,
NATO expanded toward their border. Despite what they thought
was a commitment to give them a full voice in deliberations
about the use of force in Europe, NATO waged war against
Yugoslavia over their objections. Now they face the prospects
of further NATO expansion toward their borders and of
the development of a ballistic missile defense system
in violation of the ABM Treaty, a thirty-year-old agreement
that they say is critical for their security. What conclusion
is it reasonable to draw, and what conclusion do the Russians
seem to have drawn, from these experiences? That conclusion
seems, unfortunately, to be one that can be stated by
paraphrasing something that Stalin said in launching his
program of forced draft industrialization in the late
1920s: we must be strong or we shall be beaten.
Despite the
lurid fantasies of some Russians, their country is not
going to be attacked, conquered, or occupied by NATO.
But it is certainly true that Russia has been and is being
ignored where its own definition of its interests is concerned,
and being ignored contrary to what Russia believes were
Western assurances to the contrary. And it is certainly
also true that none of the policies that so offend Russia
would have been carried out, or even have been contemplated,
but for Russia's unprecedented post-Soviet weakness. And
that in turn means that, whether we admit it to ourselves
or not, Russian weakness is a fundamental condition of
important aspects of post-Cold War American foreign policy.
The view of a dismayingly large number of Russians that
it has been the American aim all along to weaken Russia
is incorrect, but it is not logically inconsistent with
the observable facts.
The worth of
post-Cold War American initiatives that violate Russians'
definition of their interests must be calculated by weighing
the benefits, whatever they may be, against the costs
that have to be paid in relations with Russia and in Russia's
view of the world. The failure to make such calculations
would be, and perhaps was, a species of foreign policy
incompetence. And this leads to the third lesson of Russian-American
relations for the United States.
When public
television was established in the United States in the
1960s, it initially had another name--it was "educational
television." A member of the Federal Communications Commission
was asked what he thought of educational television. He
replied: "All television is educational television."
Similarly,
for the United States in the post-Cold War era, and in
an odd echo of a truism of the Cold War, it is well to
remember that whatever the motives behind a particular
initiative, all foreign policy is Russian
policy.
Pierre Hassner
Université Science Politiques
I will focus
on three topics: first, a summary of the points of agreement
and disagreement that have emerged in this conference;
second, a summary of the complexities of the international
system, which go a long way toward explaining the contradictions
in our observations; and third, a conclusion about what
lessons one can draw from US-Russian relations.
We all agree
that Russia is no longer a superpower but desperately
wants to be seen as one. This is a great driving force
of its foreign policy, this desire to be considered a
great power. There is great poverty in Russia and a great
gap between the elites and masses, but a system of a sort
is functioning. The economy has shown signs of improvement
that are very uneven but real. There has also been an
improvement in diplomatic relations with countries like
Iran and Turkey.
But we have
had a number of discussions in which we have been unable
to agree. There appears to be evidence that Russia is
moving toward stability, as well as some sort of authoritarian
regime. The second point of contention focused on whether
the Russian evolution is rapidly approaching either democracy
or fascism, or whether Russia is stagnating in its current
system.
Next we heard
conflicting views on geopolitics: Russia needs foreign
help and economic intervention to preclude the possibility
of Chinese intervention, yet Putin makes geopolitics a
high priority and intends for Russia to be a geopolitical
counterweight to the United States and to dominate neighbors
like Georgia and Ukraine. Yet another point on this issue
is the notion that Russia now talks about the high priority
given to geopolitics to disguise its weakness, whereas
in the Soviet era they appeared peaceful when they were
geopolitically ambitious.
These conflicting
opinions help keep the discussion of Russia's future interesting.
There is even some debate as to who should help Russia--Europe
or the United States, or both. I think that these different
opinions arise out of the dynamics of the subject: regional
versus global, and short-range versus long-range.
So, here I
would like to make several distinctions regarding the
study of the international system. First, there are three
great motivations: security out of fear, interest out
of greed, and pride or glory. Second, Russia is not a
great power, while America is a superpower. The important
point is the changes in the different dimensions of power--the
tradeoff or the rate of exchange between economic and
military power, hard power and soft power, and negative
power and positive power. Third, it is important to distinguish
three dimensions of the international system: strategic,
diplomatic interaction; economic interdependence; and
interpenetration (social and cultural) and networking
(leading to the politics of inclusion and exclusion rather
than domination). What bearing do these concepts have
on our discussions?
One lesson
is that there is an abstract concept of multipolarity
in politics that has no corresponding counterpart in tangible
economic or military matters. This means that on paper
you can have five powers, but their real power is so varied--based
on economics, politics, and military strength--that it
is impossible to compare them on a level playing field.
Yet, it is important to understand that there is power
in the ability to be a nuisance to the United States.
In the politics
of interdependence, obviously the outside world has a
great impact on what happens in Russia. However, this
interdependence and cultural exchange do not lead automatically
to improved relations between the West and Russia. The
Russians will not learn to love Americans simply because
American businessmen invest in the development of Siberia.
To keep a balance,
one must distinguish between the global and the regional.
It is interesting that everyone seems to agree that Russia
presents no major military threat today to the United
States and Western Europe and that its relations with
several of its neighbors have improved. However, as far
as the republics and Russia's smallest neighbors are concerned,
Russia still is powerful enough to constitute a threat.
Is the balance between Russia and its smaller neighbors
of any concern to the West or not? The answer will depend
on the tone of these relations in the next few years.
How do Russian
policies, the evolution of the republics and Russia's
small neighbors, and the countervailing role of the West
play in the international system? It can only be analyzed
on a case-by-case basis. It is clear that there is a delicate
balance at work here that must be maintained.
Russia's importance
in the international system seems to be found in the issues
of crime, drug trafficking, and corruption. Russia's ability
and willingness to participate in monitoring and interdicting
these activities will be a major factor in the success
of efforts to eliminate them on a global scale. Russia
is also a crucial actor in guarding against the proliferation
of weapons-grade nuclear material.
Thomas Graham
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
There was a
rich discussion at the conference, in which agreement
outweighed disagreement. There appears to be a consensus
that a stable, dysfunctional political and economic system
has emerged that will keep Russia weak for years to come.
This may be true, but we need to be on guard against intellectual
laziness that could blind us to key trends running contrary
to our assumptions. We need to test our assumptions repeatedly,
asking whether the facts as we know them might fit another
pattern or lead to different conclusions about Russia's
future.
The Nature
of Russia's Political and Economic System
The first panel concluded that the transition is over
and that a new system has taken shape. It may be dysfunctional,
but it has proven capable of reproducing itself. Despite
some surface turmoil, it is stable at the macro level.
This is a persuasive
description. Indeed, it is hard to discern any dynamic
forces that could push Russia in a radically different
direction, toward a tough authoritarian or a democratic
regime--the alternatives James Billington spoke of in
his keynote address--in the near future. The younger generation,
it has been suggested, could be such a force, and it is
true that it is more proreform than older generations.
But two points need to be kept in mind: (1) the overwhelming
majority of the younger generation is in fact not proreform,
although a much greater share of it might be more proreform
than in other age cohorts; and (2) life experience counts.
Will young Russians ultimately be co-opted by the system?
Blair Ruble
has suggested that Russians' fundamental European identity
will pull them in the direction of European values. This
may be true, but we should remember that Russians have
held such views for hundreds of years, and this has not
produced free-market democracy yet. Moreover, historically,
it has been massive external shocks--the Crimean War or
World War I--that have urgently posed the question of
survival and produced systematic change in Russia.
Russia has
been in decline for the past quarter of a century, and
there are vast obstacles to its recovery, including the
public health crisis, replacement of antiquated physical
plants, and building the infrastructure of the new economy.
Massive infusion of capital is needed, but not likely,
in the near- to medium-range future.
Clearly, countries
are already adjusting to Russia's weakness, but the big
question is at what point will countries be tempted or
compelled to intervene directly in Russia for their own
national interests? For example, at what point will China
be tempted to move northward for living space and resources?
There is also a question of world order. What are the
consequences of Russian weakness for the United Nations,
particularly for the Security Council, where Russia holds
a veto?
Does Russia
Have a Foreign Policy?
James Sherr made a good case for a coherent policy toward
the CIS, with the goal of resubordinating, not reintegrating,
the countries of the former Soviet Union. But farther
afield the question of Russian foreign policy becomes
more problematic. Take, for example, Putin's busy travel
schedule. National security documents talk as if Russia
were a regional--not a global--power, and Putin himself
has talked of Russia as being a European power. But Putin's
travels suggest he considers Russia's region to be the
world.
It is not clear,
however, what Putin's priorities are, or whether Russia
has the resources to sustain Putin's activist foreign
policy. The trips have not been particularly well prepared.
For instance, deals were not ready for signing in India,
as originally thought. Putin went to Austria to try to
sell jet fighters the Austrians had already clearly said
they did not want. (It is also curious that Putin is traveling
so often, given that one would think he would be spending
much of his time consolidating his power position in Moscow.
Are some people interested in having Putin out of town
so that they can solve their own political and commercial
problems, much the way they did when Yeltsin was out of
pocket in the hospital or Sochi?)
This raises
the question of the decisionmaking process. Clearly the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not playing the key role
(it is too busy preparing Putin's trips). Is the key player
really Sergey Ivanov? How are commercial and regional
interests factored in? Is there a structured decisionmaking
process?
This brings
me to the final question of whether Russia's perception
of its own role in the world is in accord with reality.
Russia is operating within a 19th-century geopolitical
or Cold War framework with Russia as a major pole. Security
is the key concern. Economics is important only as the
handmaiden of security concerns. Russia is seeking to
divide Europe from the United States, to build an anti-American
strategic triangle in Asia, and to use Iran to enhance
its position in the Persian Gulf. Its thinking is zero-sum.
But, interestingly,
the quality of Russia's relations is changing. It is not
that Russia is being marginalized, but increasingly it
is being treated as an object and an instrument, not as
an actor. Take North Korea--Kim Jong Il used Putin as
a way of opening a dialogue with the United States, after
which he had little need for Putin. India clearly sees
itself as the superior partner in its relations with Russia.
China is exploiting Russia's weakness and anxieties to
build up an arsenal and acquire technologies that could
eventually be used against Russia. Kostunica of the former
Yugoslavia has made it clear he would rather deal with
the West than with Moscow. Finally, Europe is using Russia
as a way of influencing US behavior, but it is not about
to side with Russia against the United States on any key
issue.
Asymmetry
in US-Russian Relations
Over the past decade a gaping and growing asymmetry in
power, attitudes, and fortunes has emerged between the
United States and Russia. The United States is enjoying
the longest period of economic expansion in its history.
Russia has suffered a socioeconomic collapse unprecedented
for a great power not defeated in a major war. The United
States is the world's preeminent power, with no serious
security challenge looming on the horizon. Russia is deeply
concerned about its loss of status and sees a multitude
of threats both at home and abroad. The United States
exudes optimism and wants to seize the moment to shape
the international environment in ways that will perpetuate
its prosperity and preeminence well into the future. Russia
is mired in an identity crisis and self-doubt. It wants
to delay the consolidation of a new international system
until it has recovered sufficient strength to play a major
role in shaping it. This asymmetry will have a profound
impact on the quality of US-Russian relations.
Highlights From the Discussion
Russian
Imperialism
Russian policy itself has taught states along its borders
that they had better seek security from the West or face
Russian imperialism. NATO expansion is not only the
result of Western priorities but also of Russian actions.
Examples include Russian actions in Georgia and Tajikistan.
Russia tried to destabilize Georgia by support to the
Abkhaz. When Russian border guards went into Tajikistan
to fight Islam, they became part of the narcotics trafficking
business there.
Russia's
Great Power Status
Russia is doomed to remain a great power. Russia
has complex interests on a wide scale that compel it to
pursue grand geostrategic policies and to try to maintain
the military capabilities of a "great power." Sudden decreases
in power are inescapably threats to the power of the Russian
state. Despite all that Russia has undergone, it remains
an intellectual and a diplomatic superpower. The West
must not underestimate this fact.
EU Expansion
EU expansion is not an immediate threat to Russia.
There are sharp reservations and disagreements on how
to proceed with eastward expansion that will slow the
process. There is also an increasing realization among
applicant states that qualifying for entrance into the
EU is extremely difficult, requires some sacrifice, and
cuts very deeply into the internal politics and social
fabric of countries that are not all that strong.
Asymmetry
The buzzwords now in Russia are "asymmetry" and "asymmetric
responses." There was a series of hysterical, rhetorical
attacks on NATO enlargement in the mid 1990s. Russia realized
that these attacks did not have an impact because it was
not credible that Russia would ever carry though on the
threats to mass troops on the border.
Russia and
the CIS
The Russians appear to have come to the conclusion
that although the United States claims to support
the sovereignty of the CIS it is not prepared to
provide the resources necessary to defend these
countries. Whether Russia has the resources
to dominate the former Soviet Union over the long
term is still not clear. The effort to reestablish
a presence in the region, which the Russians can
do in the short term, may come back to haunt them
in the long term, when they find out that this is
a greater drain on their resources than they expected.
Appendix
A
|
Conference
Agenda |
|
Russia
in the International System
Airlie House, Warrenton, Virginia |
|
February
21-23 2001 |
February
21 |
|
5:30-8:00 |
Opening
Reception and Dinner |
8:00 |
Keynote
Address
Reflections on Russia |
|
Introduction
John Gannon, Chairman, National Intelligence
Council |
|
Speaker
James Billington, Librarian of Congress
|
February
22 |
|
8:30-10:15 |
Panel
I: Russia's Evolution |
|
Chairman
George Kolt, National Intelligence Officer
for Russia and Eurasia |
|
The
Political System: From Soviet Past to Post-Yeltsin
Future
Geoffrey Hosking, School of Slavonic
and East European Studies,
University College London |
|
The
Economic Transition
Pekka Sutela, Institute for Economies
in Transition, Bank of Finland |
|
Ethnic
Nationalism and Russia's Republics
Emil Pain, Kennan Institute |
|
Russian
Society: The View from Below
Vladimir Shlapentokh, Michigan State
University |
10:15-10:30 |
Break |
10:30-12:15 |
Panel
II: Russia's Foreign and Security Policy |
|
Chairman
Stephen Maddalena, Defense Intelligence
Officer for Russia and Eurasia |
|
Russia's
Current Trajectory
James Sherr, Conflict Studies Research
Centre, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst |
|
Moscow's
Perceptions of the Outside World
Celeste Wallander, Council on Foreign
Relations |
|
Russia's
Foreign and Security Policy Goals
Mikhail Alexseev, San Diego State
University |
12:30-14:45 |
Luncheon
Roundtable
Impressions From Russia's Regions |
15:00-17:00 |
Panel
III: Russia Viewed from the Outside |
|
Chairman
Enders Wimbush, Science Applications
International Corporation |
|
The
Iran/Middle East Perspective
Geoffrey Kemp, Nixon Center |
|
Turkey's
Perspective
Alan Makovsky, Washington Institute for
Near East Policy |
|
India's
Perspective
Enders Wimbush, Science Applications
International Corporation |
|
The
China/East Asia Perspective
Jonathan Pollack, Naval War College |
18:30-21:30 |
Dinner |
February
23 |
|
8:30-10:00 |
Panel
IV: Russia Viewed from the Outside (continued)
|
|
Chairman
Mary Desjeans, Office of Russian and
European Analysis, CIA |
|
Europe's
Perspective
Alexander Rahr, German Society for
Foreign Affairs |
|
The
CIS View of Russia: Fears, Vulnerabilities,
and Attractions
Stanley Escudero, Former US Ambassador
to Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan |
|
Central
Europe's Perspective
Ronald Asmus, Council on Foreign Relations
|
10:00-10:30 |
Break |
10:30-12:15 |
Panel
V: Russia in the Global Context |
|
Chairman
John Evans, Bureau of Intelligence and
Research, Department of State |
|
Russia
and the Energy World: Looking 3-5 Years Ahead
Robert Ebel, Center for Strategic
and International Studies |
|
Russia
and International Business and Finance
Margaret Richardson, Ernst & Young
|
|
The
Evolving International System and Russia's Relevance
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Brookings Institution
|
|
Russia's
Capacity and its Role Within the International
System
William Odom, Hudson Institute |
12:30-13:45 |
Lunch |
14:00-16:15 |
Panel
VI: Concluding Session: Highlights and Implications
for the United States |
|
Chairmen
George Kolt, Enders Wimbush |
|
Blair
Ruble, Woodrow Wilson Center |
|
Michael
Mandelbaum, School of Advanced International
Studies, Johns Hopkins University |
|
Pierre
Hassner, Université Sciences Politiques
|
|
Thomas
Graham, Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace |
Appendix
B
Participants
Mikhail
Alexseev, San Diego State
University
Ronald
Asmus, Council on Foreign Relations
James
Billington, Librarian of Congress
Mary
Desjeans, Central Intelligence Agency
Robert
Ebel, Center for Strategic and International
Studies
Stanley
Escudero, Former US Ambassador to Azerbaijan,
Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan
John
Evans, Department of State
Thomas
Graham, Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace
Pierre
Hassner, Université Sciences Politiques
Geoffrey
Hosking, University College London
Geoffrey
Kemp, Nixon Center
George
Kolt, National Intelligence Council
Stephen
Maddalena, Defense Intelligence Agency
Alan
Makovsky, Washington Institute for Near East
Policy
Michael
Mandelbaum, Johns Hopkins University
Lt.
Gen. William Odom (Ret.), Hudson Institute
Emil
Pain, Kennan Institute
Jonathan
Pollack, Naval War College
Alexander
Rahr, German Society for Foreign Affairs
Margaret
Richardson, Ernst & Young
Blair
Ruble, Woodrow Wilson Center
James
Sherr, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst
Vladimir
Shlapentokh, Michigan State University
Helmut
Sonnenfeldt, Brookings Institution
Pekka
Sutela, Bank of Finland
Celeste
Wallander, Council on Foreign Relations
Enders
Wimbush, Science Applications International
Corporation
The National Intelligence Council
The National Intelligence Council (NIC) manages the Intelligence Community's estimative process,
incorporating the best available expertise inside and outside the government. It reports to the Director
of Central Intelligence in his capacity as head of the US Intelligence Community and speaks authoritatively on substantive issues for the Community as a whole.
Chairman (concurrently Assistant Director of
Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production) |
|
John Gannon |
Vice Chairman |
|
Ellen Laipson |
Director, Senior Review, Production, and Analysis |
|
Stuart A. Cohen |
National Intelligence Officers |
Africa |
|
Robert Houdek |
At-Large |
|
Stuart A. Cohen |
Conventional Military Issues |
|
John Landry |
East Asia |
|
Robert Sutter |
Economics & Global Issues |
|
David Gordon |
Europe |
|
Barry F. Lowenkron |
Latin America |
|
Fulton T. Armstrong |
Near East and South Asia |
|
Paul Pillar |
Russia and Eurasia |
|
George Kolt |
Science & Technology |
|
Lawrence Gershwin |
Strategic & Nuclear Programs |
|
Robert D Walpole |
Warning |
|
Robert Vickers |
TOP |