[Senate Treaty Document 107-7] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] 107th Congress Treaty Doc. SENATE 2d Session 107-7 _______________________________________________________________________ THE PROTOCOL TO THE AGREEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY REGARDING SAFEGUARDS IN THE UNITED STATES __________ MESSAGE from THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES transmitting THE PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY FOR THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, WITH ANNEXES, SIGNED AT VIENNA JUNE 12, 1998May 10, 2002.--Protocol was read the first time, and together with the accompanying papers, referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations and ordered to be printed for the use of the Senate __________ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 99-118 WASHINGTON : 2002 LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL ---------- The White House, May 9, 2002. To the Senate of the United States: I submit herewith, for Senate advice and consent to ratification, the Protocol Additional to the Agreement Between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States of America, with annexes, signed at Vienna June 12, 1998 (the ``Additional Protocol''). Adhering to the Additional Protocol will bolster U.S. efforts to strengthen nuclear safeguards and promote the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, which is a cornerstone of U.S. foreign and national security policy. At the end of the Persian Gulf War, the world learned the extent of Iraq's clandestine pursuit of an advanced program to develop nuclear weapons. In order to increase the capability of the International Atomic Energy Agency (the ``Agency'') to detect such programs, the international community negotiated a Model Additional Protocol (the ``Model Protocol'') to strengthen the Agency's nuclear safeguards system. The Model Protocol is to be used to amend the existing bilateral safeguards agreements of states with the Agency. The Model Protocol is a milestone in U.S. efforts to strengthen the safeguards system of the Agency and thereby to reduce the threat posed by clandestine efforts to develop a nuclear weapon capability. By accepting the Model Protocol, states assume new obligations that will provide far greater transparency for their nuclear activities. Specifically, the Model Protocol strengthens safeguards by requiring states to provide broader declarations to the Agency about their nuclear programs and nuclear-related activities and by expanding the access rights of the Agency. The United States signed the Additional Protocol at Vienna on June 12, 1998. The Additional Protocol is a bilateral treaty that would supplement and amend the Agency verification arrangements under the existing Agreement Between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States of America of November 18, 1977 (the ``Voluntary Offer''), which entered into force on December 9, 1980. The Additional Protocol will enter into force when the United States notifies the Agency that the U.S. statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force have been met. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the ``NPT'') requires non-nuclear-weapon states parties to accept Agency safeguards on their nuclear activities. The United States, as a nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT, is not obligated to accept Agency safeguards on its nuclear activities. Nonetheless, it has been the announced policy of the United States since 1967 to permit the application of Agency safeguards to its nuclear facilities--excluding only those of direct national security significance. The Additional Protocol similarly allows the United States to exclude its application in instances where the United States decides that its application would result in access by the Agency to activities with direct national security significance to the United States or access to locations or information associated with such activities. I am, therefore, confident that the Additional Protocol, given our right to invoke the national security exclusion and to manage access in accordance with established principles for implementing these provisions, can be implemented in a fashion that is fully consistent with U.S. national security. By submitting itself to the same safeguards on all of its civil nuclear activities that non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the NPT are subject to, the United States intends to demonstrate that adherence to the Model Protocol does not place other countries at a commercial disadvantage. The U.S. signature of the Additional Protocol was an important factor in the decisions of many non-nuclear-weapon states to accept the Model Protocol and provided significant impetus toward their early acceptance. I am satisfied that the provisions of the Additional Protocol, given our right to manage access in accordance with Article 7 and established implementation principles, will allow the United States to prevent the dissemination of proliferation-sensitive information and protect proprietary or commercially sensitive information. I also transmit, for the information of the Senate, the report of the Department of State concerning the Additional Protocol, including an article-by-article analysis, a subsidiary arrangement, and a letter the United States has sent to the Agency concerning the Additional Protocol. Additionally, the recommended legislation necessary to implement the Additional Protocol will be submitted separately to the Congress. I believe that the Additional Protocol is in the best interests of the United States. Our acceptance of this agreement will sustain our longstanding record of voluntary acceptance of nuclear safeguards and greatly strengthen our ability to promote universal adoption of the Model Protocol, a central goal of my nuclear nonproliferation policy. Widespread acceptance of the Protocol will contribute significantly to our nonproliferation objectives as well as strengthen U.S., allied, and international security. I, therefore, urge the Senate to give early and favorable consideration to the Additional Protocol, and to give advice and consent to its ratification. George W. Bush. LETTER OF SUBMITTAL ---------- The Secretary of State, Washington, April 30, 2002. The President: I have the honor to submit to you the Protocol Additional to the Agreement Between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States of America, with annexes (the ``Additional Protocol''). I recommend that the Additional Protocol be transmitted to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification. Also enclosed, for the information of the Senate, are a letter the United States has sent to the International Atomic Energy Agency (the ``Agency'') concerning the Additional Protocol; a Subsidiary Arrangement to the Additional Protocol, which specifies particular, but not all, measures that the United States intends to use to protect information of direct national security significance to the United States and to manage access under the Additional Protocol; and an article-by-article analysis of the Additional Protocol, including its annexes. The recommended legislation necessary to implement the Additional Protocol will be submitted separately to the Congress. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors of the Agency on June 11, 1998, signed by the United States and the Agency on June 12, 1998, and will enter into force when the United States notifies the Agency that the U.S. statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force have been met. The Administration intends to put in place the necessary regulatory and implementation framework before entry into force. This Additional Protocol is a bilateral treaty that supplements and amends the Agency verification arrangements set forth in the existing Agreement Between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States of America of November 18, 1977 (the ``Voluntary Offer''), which entered into force on December 9, 1980. Specifically, this Additional Protocol expands the types of nuclear and nuclear-related locations and activities the United States will declare and, by permitting access to these locations and activities in certain circumstances, expands the Agency's access rights. As is the case with the Voluntary Offer, the Additional Protocol permits the United States to exclude its application in instances where its application would result in access by the Agency to activities with direct national security significance to the United States or to locations or information associated with such activities (the ``National Security Exclusion''). Consistent with the President's authority, the decision by a Federal Agency to use the National Security Exclusion will be guided by principles developed for its application. The United States intends to provide information and access to the Agency in accordance with the terms of the Additional Protocol in order to assist it in developing the procedures, tools, and techniques that will strengthen the capability of the Agency to detect undeclared nuclear activities in non-nuclear-weapon states. The Additional Protocol contains no arms control or disarmament undertakings. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the ``NPT'') requires non-nuclear-weapon states parties to accept Agency safeguards on all nuclear material in all of their peaceful nuclear activities. The United States, as a nuclear- weapon state party to the NPT, is under no legal obligation to accept such safeguards. However, beginning with President Johnson's 1967 pledge, it has been the announced policy of the United States to permit the application of Agency safeguards to all of its nuclear facilities, except only those excluded for national security reasons. By submitting itself to the same safeguards on all of its civil nuclear facilities that non- nuclear-weapon states parties are subject to, the United States intended to demonstrate that adherence to the NPT did not place other countries at a commercial disadvantage, either because of increased costs associated with safeguards or because of the risk of the compromise of proprietary information. This offer was critical to gaining the acceptance of the NPT by countries such as Germany and Japan. At the end of the Persian Gulf War, the world learned about the extent of Iraq's clandestine pursuit of an advanced program to develop nuclear weapons. The international community recognized that the Agency's international inspection system needed to be strengthened in order to increase its capability to detect secret nuclear programs. After 4 years of work by the Secretariat of the Agency, an Agency committee agreed on a Model Additional Protocol (the ``Model Protocol'') for strengthening nuclear safeguards. The Model Protocol was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors in 1997. The Model Protocol was designed to be used to amend existing safeguards agreements to strengthen such safeguards by requiring non- nuclear-weapon states to provide, inter alia, broader declarations to the Agency about their nuclear programs and nuclear-related activities, and by expanding the access rights of the Agency. The new safeguards measures become effective in each state when it brings its protocol into force. During the negotiations of the Model Protocol, many non- nuclear-weapon states parties to the NPT urged the United States, as the strongest proponent, to accept on a voluntary basis theprovisions of the Model Protocol. Following the example of the Voluntary Offer, the United States stated during the negotiations that it would accept the provisions of the Model Protocol, subject to a National Security Exclusion. The United States took a leading role in the negotiation of the Model Protocol, and the success in achieving a strong Model Protocol was critically dependent on voluntary acceptance of Model Protocol measures by the United States. The U.S. signature of the Additional Protocol was a significant factor in the early decision by many non-nuclear-weapon states to accept the Protocol. By the end of March of this year, 61 states had signed additional protocols with the Agency based on the Model Protocol. The Model Protocol requires states to report a range of information to the Agency about their nuclear and nuclear- related activities and about the planned developments in their nuclear fuel cycles. This includes expanded information about their holdings of uranium and thorium ores and ore concentrates and of other plutonium and uranium materials not currently subject to Agency safeguards, general information about their manufacturing of equipment for enriching uranium or producing plutonium, general information about their nuclear fuel cycle- related research and development activities not involving nuclear material, and their import and export of nuclear material and equipment. Such broad-based information makes it substantially more difficult for a state planning a nuclear-weapon program to conceal the early stages of that program and provides the Agency with a critical reference base for comparison with information otherwise available to it, including information from other states. The Model Protocol also provides the Agency with certain rights of access to declared locations as well as to other locations to investigate the possibility of undeclared activities. This increased risk of early detection is intended to deter non-nuclear-weapon states that might, in the future, be tempted to undertake a clandestine nuclear weapon program. With increased transparency of non-nuclear-weapon states' nuclear programs, the Agency should be able to provide greater assurance of both the absence of diversion of declared nuclear material and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in non-nuclear-weapon states. Minimizing the burden of safeguards on inspected locations is a long-standing concern of the Agency and its member states and is reflected in a number of provisions of existing safeguards agreements, including the Voluntary Offer, and in the Model Protocol. Existing Agency safeguards agreements specify that safeguards shall be implemented in a manner designed to avoid hampering economic and technological development and to avoid undue interference in peaceful nuclear activities, that the Agency shall take every precaution to protect commercial and industrial secrets and other confidential information coming to its knowledge, and that the Agency shall require only the minimum amount of information and data consistent with carrying out its responsibilities. These provisions of existing safeguards agreements remain in force and are expanded by the Model Protocol. The overall design of the Model Protocol was shaped by the interest of states in establishing an appropriate balance between improving the effectiveness of the safeguards system and the need to avoid undue interference with legitimate nuclear or nuclear-related activities. The declaration requirements of the Model Protocol are of a general character. The Agency is precluded from mechanistically or systematically verifying the declarations. The Model Protocol defines the activities the Agency may carry out at locations of different types; provides for managed access to protect various classes of sensitive information; and provides for the negotiation of subsidiary arrangements as needed to further define how Protocol measures shall be applied, including at particular locations. The Model Protocol requires the Agency to maintain a stringent regime to ensure effective protection against disclosure of confidential information. The Department of State, the former Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, with the advice and support of the Central Intelligence Agency, were primarily responsible for the negotiation of the Additional Protocol. The responsibility for preparing for its entry into force has been undertaken by an interagency group led by the National Security Council staff and comprised of representatives of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Energy, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Based on the deliberations of this interagency group, the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Energy, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, with the advice and support of the Central Intelligence Agency, support the transmittal of the Additional Protocol to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification. Acceptance of the Additional Protocol will sustain the longstanding U.S. record of voluntary acceptance of nuclear safeguards and greatly strengthen the U.S. ability to promote universal adoption of the Model Protocol, a central goal of U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy. Widespread acceptance of the Model Protocol will contribute significantly to U.S. nonproliferation objectives, as well as strengthen U.S. and international security. I therefore recommend that you submit the Additional Protocol to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification at the earliest possible date. Respectfully submitted, Colin L. Powell.
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