United Nations: How Assessed Contributions for Peacekeeping Operations
Are Calculated (Letter Report, 08/01/94, GAO/NSIAD-94-206).
To finance its peacekeeping operations, the United Nations relies on an
assessment formula that is based on the regular U.N. budget assessment
scale in which the nations that are permanent members of the U.N.
Security Council and industrialized nations pay more than poorer
nations. The system has led to inequities. In this report, GAO looks
at alternatives to the current system and constructs a simplified
perspective of countries' ability to pay for peacekeeping operations
based on a 1992 "snapshot" of each country's percentage of global gross
national product and a regrouping of peacekeeping assessment categories
using World Bank per capita income data.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: NSIAD-94-206
TITLE: United Nations: How Assessed Contributions for Peacekeeping
Operations Are Calculated
DATE: 08/01/94
SUBJECT: United Nations
International relations
International organizations
International cooperation
Military operations
Accounting procedures
Budget receipts
Federal aid to foreign countries
United Nations military forces
IDENTIFIER: UN Operation in Somalia
United Nations
China
France
Russia
United Kingdom
Yugoslavia
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Cover
================================================================ COVER
Report to Congressional Requesters
August 1994
UNITED NATIONS - HOW ASSESSED
CONTRIBUTIONS FOR PEACEKEEPING
OPERATIONS ARE CALCULATED
GAO/NSIAD-94-206
United Nations
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
DOD - Department of Defense
GNP - gross national product
IMF - International Monetary Fund
UNPROFOR - United Nations Protection Force
UNOSOM - United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNITAF - Unified Task Force
Letter
=============================================================== LETTER
B-257610
August 1, 1994
The Honorable Tom Lantos
Chairman
The Honorable Doug Bereuter
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on International Security, International
Organizations, and Human Rights
Committee on Foreign Affairs
House of Representatives
This report responds to your request that we (1) provide information
on how the United Nations calculates member countries' assessed
contributions for peacekeeping costs, (2) analyze proposed
alternatives to the current method of calculating peacekeeping
assessments, and (3) develop information on how the assessment
calculations might be modified. This report does not present
information on the State Department's current strategy for getting
the U.S. assessment reduced because (1) the strategy has been
classified as confidential by State and (2) State Department
officials briefed your staff on its strategy.
BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1
The United Nations Participation Act of 1945, as amended, and the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, provide authority for
appropriating U.S. funds for U.N. activities. As of June 1, 1994,
there were 18 active
U.N. peacekeeping missions around the world at an estimated cost of
$3.5 billion for 1994. Two of these missions are financed through
the
U.N. regular budget, two through a combination of voluntary and
assessed contributions, and the remainder through a special
assessment based on a system established in 1973.
The U.S. special peacekeeping assessment rate is 31.7 percent;
however, the United States has continued to pay its previous
assessment of
30.4 percent, reflecting an informal agreement with the U.N.
Controller.\1 Recent legislation requires that U.S. payment for
peacekeeping operations in fiscal years 1994 and 1995 continue to not
exceed 30.4 percent and, beginning in fiscal year 1996, not exceed 25
percent.\2 For 1993, the U.S. regular budget assessment was about
$310 million and its peacekeeping assessment was almost $830 million.
--------------------
\1 We have previously recommended that the Secretary of State
instruct the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations to
seek other members' support for reexamining the basis for, and equity
of, the special U.N. assessment scale for peacekeeping operations.
See United Nations:
U.S. Participation in Peacekeeping Operations (GAO/NSIAD-92-247,
Sept. 9, 1992.)
\2 The Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1994 and
1995 (P.L. 103-236, sec. 404).
RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2
The special assessment scale for financing peacekeeping operations is
based on the U.N. regular budget assessment scale, with peacekeeping
rates determined by member countries' placement within four
assessment groups. Group A countries are the five permanent members
of the Security Council\3 and pay at a rate of 100 percent of their
regular budget assessment rate, plus their proportionate share of the
reductions allowed for less developed countries; group B countries
are specifically named industrialized countries and pay at a rate of
100 percent of their regular budget assessment rate; group C
countries tend to be less developed and pay at a rate of 20 percent
of their regular budget assessment rate; and group D countries are
the specifically named poorest countries and pay at a rate of 10
percent of their regular budget assessment rate. The underlying
rationale for this structure was that (1) permanent Security Council
members should pay more than others to recognize their influence and
veto power over peacekeeping missions and (2) less developed
countries should be given some financial relief due to their limited
capacity to pay.
Under the special peacekeeping scale, the permanent five Security
Council members are assessed a total of 55.2 percent, the 24
industrialized countries in group B are assessed a total of 42
percent, and the remaining 153 countries are assessed a total of 2.8
percent. The special peacekeeping scale results in 168 countries,
including Austria, China, Kuwait, Norway, and Saudi Arabia, each
being assessed less than 1 percent. Fifty-seven countries are
assessed 0.001 percent each for peacekeeping costs.
The regular budget scale of assessments, upon which the peacekeeping
assessment is based, is a complex formula calculated on the basis of
national income, converted into U.S. dollars, with various
adjustments for external debt, low per capita income, and other
factors. U.N. Secretariat staff and some member country officials
stated that the regular budget assessment formula results in an
approximation of a country's capacity to pay toward U.N. expenses,
but they acknowledged that the various adjustments in the methodology
are confusing. (See app. I for further information on the U.N.
methods for calculating assessments.)
The United States often provides direct or indirect support for
U.N. operations in addition to amounts contributed on the basis of
peacekeeping budget assessments. For example, the Department of
Defense (DOD) provided over $20 million in goods and services for the
U.N. Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) from April 1992 to April 1993 for
which reimbursement was waived by the Acting Secretary of State with
the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense. When the initial
operation in Somalia failed, the U.N. Security Council accepted the
U.S. offer to lead a multinational Unified Task Force (UNITAF) to
establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations and
prepare for a transition back to a U.N. peacekeeping operation.
From December 1992 through April 1993, DOD spent nearly $700 million
for the UNITAF operations for which reimbursement from the United
Nations was not sought.\4
DOD has also provided substantial support to the U.N. Protection
Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia for activities such as
airlift and airdrop services and enforcement of the no-fly zone. DOD
will not be reimbursed by the United Nations for the cost of this
support.\5 Some have suggested that the millions of dollars the
United States spends for activities related to U.N. missions for
which it is not reimbursed either should be considered as part of the
U.S. contribution to U.N. peacekeeping assessments or, at the very
least, taken into account when calculating the assessment percentage.
Various options have been proposed by U.N. members and independent
groups to address equity issues and to simplify the methods for
calculating the U.N. regular budget and peacekeeping assessments.
These include
calculating the regular budget assessment by substituting national
income with a concept known as sustainable income--defined as
national income less expenditures essential to sustainable
development, such as for health, education, and infrastructure;
using price adjusted currency exchange rates to calculate regular
budget assessments because exchange rates currently used may not
reflect relative prices;
modifying or eliminating the regular budget ceiling;
reducing the statistical base period from 10 years to 3 years; and
establishing specific criteria for countries' placement in groups B
and C for purposes of calculating peacekeeping assessments.
There have also been some discussions about expanding the permanent
membership of the Security Council, which would reduce the amount the
current five members pay above their regular assessment rates. (See
app. II for a more detailed discussion of these options and other
proposals.) U.N. officials believe that none of these proposals are
likely to be adopted soon. Furthermore, they said that none of these
options--except changes to the ceiling--would have a significant
impact on the U.S. peacekeeping assessment rate.
As your staff suggested, we constructed a simplified perspective of
countries' ability to pay using a 1992 "snapshot" of (1) countries'
percentages of global gross national product (GNP)\6 and (2) a
regrouping of peacekeeping categories using World Bank per capita
income data. These data show that the U.S. share of global GNP in
1992 was 26.07 percent. If simple relative share of global GNP were
used as the basis for U.N. regular budget assessments, and a special
assessment scale were retained for peacekeeping budgets, but no floor
or ceiling were to be applied, the
U.S. peacekeeping assessment would be 29.213 percent. (See app.
III.) We are not advocating that this simplified approach be adopted;
rather, we are presenting this information to illustrate what
countries would pay based solely on GNP share. It should be noted
that such an approach does not take into account expenditures
countries make that contribute both directly and indirectly to the
maintenance of international peace and security, such as the size of
national forces, forward deployments, and the provision of economic
and security assistance.
State Department officials agreed that more objective economic
criteria are needed to assess countries based on current ability to
contribute toward expenses. We did not discuss our analysis with
U.N. officials, but we note that the concepts we used, such as
regrouping countries based on per capita income data and simplifying
the assessment formula, are similar to options being discussed at the
United Nations.
--------------------
\3 Permanent Security Council members are China, France, the Russian
Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
\4 Peace Operations: Cost of DOD Operations in Somalia
(GAO/NSIAD-94-88, Mar. 4, 1994).
\5 Humanitarian Intervention: Effectiveness of U.N. Operations in
Bosnia (GAO/NSIAD-94-156BR, Apr. 13, 1994).
\6 "Global GNP" is used in this report to refer to the total GNP of
all U.N. member countries.
SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3
To determine how the United Nations calculates its member country
assessments for contributions to its expenses, we met with members
and staff of the U.N. Committee on Contributions and the U.N.
Statistical Office and reviewed various U.N. documents to understand
how the regular budget and peacekeeping assessment methodologies were
developed and are applied. We met with officials from Australia,
Germany, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the United Kingdom, many of whom
are representatives to the U.N. Committee on Administrative and
Budgetary Matters, to discuss their views on the technical merits and
equity of the current assessment methodologies as well as proposed
modifications. We also discussed with officials of the Ford
Foundation and the Henry L. Stimson Center recommendations made by
these organizations concerning U.N. assessment and financing issues.
Using available information from the World Bank and the State
Department, we developed a simplified methodology for the regular
budget assessment as well as some alternatives for placement in
peacekeeping assessment categories. Our alternatives are for
illustrative purposes only and are not intended as formal
recommendations.
We conducted our review from January to April 1994 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
AGENCY COMMENTS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4
As requested, we did not obtain written agency comments on this
report. However, we discussed the report with State Department
officials. Also, portions of the report dealing with current
methodologies and
U.N. alternatives were reviewed by officials of the U.N. Committee
on Contributions and the U.N. Statistical Office for accuracy. The
comments of State and U.N. officials have been incorporated as
appropriate.
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.1
Unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further
distribution of this report until 7 days after its issue date. At
that time, we will send copies of this report to the Secretary of
State and other appropriate congressional committees. Copies will be
made available to other interested parties upon request.
Please contact me at (202) 512-4128 if you or your staffs have any
questions concerning this report. The major contributors to this
report are listed in appendix IV.
Harold J. Johnson, Director
International Affairs Issues
CURRENT ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGIES
AND RATES
=========================================================== Appendix I
U.N. peacekeeping missions are funded from three sources: regular
budget assessments, voluntary contributions, and a special scale for
peacekeeping assessments. Currently, two missions are financed from
the regular budget and two are financed from both voluntary and
assessed contributions.\1 All other peacekeeping missions--currently
numbering 14--are financed through special assessments. The special
assessment scale currently used began in 1973 with the establishment
of the second United Nations Emergency Force to deal with the
Egypt-Israeli conflict.
The current U.N. peacekeeping assessment formula is based on
percentages of the regular budget scale of assessments. The regular
budget assessment is an attempt to determine each country's capacity
to contribute toward U.N. expenses by determining its national
income, converting this figure into U.S. dollars, and making several
adjustments to convert national income into assessable income.
Peacekeeping assessments are based on a country's placement within
four assessment groups established in 1973. A significant portion of
U.N. operations is also financed through voluntary contributions,
which are not within the scope of this report.
--------------------
\1 Two long-standing operations are financed through the regular
budget--the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization in Israel and
surrounding countries and the U.N. Military Observer Group in India
and Pakistan. The U.N. Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus and the U.N.
Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission are financed through a combination of
regular budget revenues and voluntary contributions.
REGULAR BUDGET METHODOLOGY
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1
The regular budget scale of assessments is developed every 3 years by
the Committee on Contributions and approved by the General Assembly.
The Committee was established in 1946 to provide the Assembly with
expert advice on matters relating to the apportionment of U.N.
expenses. The Committee is made up of 18 members who are selected by
the General Assembly on the basis of their personal qualifications,
experience, and geographical representation. The United States has
had a member on the Committee since its inception in 1946.
The regular budget scale is based on (1) national income in member
countries' local currencies, (2) an exchange rate mechanism for
converting this income into U.S. dollars (the common currency unit
for the assessment scale), and (3) a series of adjustments to convert
member countries' national incomes into their assessable incomes.
National income has been used to measure member countries' capacity
to pay regular budget expenses since 1945. National income is
defined as gross national product (GNP) minus depreciation of fixed
capital, such as buildings, durable equipment, and machinery. GNP is
defined as the monetary value of the final goods and services
produced within a country (gross domestic product) plus net income
earned by nationals outside the country.
Since 1985 the national income data has been obtained from responses
by governments to an annual comprehensive national accounts
questionnaire prepared by the U.N. Statistical Office. Before 1985,
this data was obtained from a periodic special questionnaire
developed for assessment purposes only. According to U.N.
officials, the use of the national accounts questionnaire has
improved data collection. The U.N. Statistical Office provides
estimates for missing or incomplete national income data. Such
estimates may be based on other national income data or other
economic data compiled by international agencies such as the World
Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), or the U.N. Regional
Economic Commissions.
To convert member countries' national incomes into U.S. dollars, the
United Nations uses IMF market exchange rates. For countries that
are not IMF members, U.N. operational rates of exchange--exchange
rates used by the United Nations to conducts its operations in such
countries--are applied.
Once national income has been determined and converted to U.S.
dollars, several adjustments are made to determine member countries'
assessment rates. These adjustments, discussed below, are national
income averaging, the scheme-of-limits, low per capita income
allowance, the contribution ceiling and floor, debt relief, and the
mitigation process.
Since 1953 the United Nations has used an average of several years of
national income to determine member countries' current capacity to
pay toward regular budget expenses. The average smooths out
fluctuations in national income due to such factors as abrupt changes
in prices for major exports. In 1953, national income was averaged
over 2 years; this base period was increased to 3 years for the
1954-77 assessments, 7 years for the 1978-82 assessments, and 10
years for the 1983-94 assessments. In December 1993, the General
Assembly directed that the base period be reduced to an average of 7
and 8 years.
The scheme-of-limits was implemented in 1986 as a further means of
preventing dramatic fluctuations in assessment rates. The scheme
establishes the maximum percentages by which countries' assessment
rates may change from one assessment period to the next. Percentage
changes range from 0.75 percent for top contributors (member
countries paying at least 5 percent of the U.N. regular budget) to
zero change for the smallest contributors. At the end of 1991, the
General Assembly agreed in principle to phase out the
scheme-of-limits but at the same time to keep the lowest contribution
level fixed so that rates for the poorest countries do not rise.
The low per capita income allowance is a reduction in the national
incomes of those countries whose per capita incomes are below a
specific amount. This adjustment was initially developed in 1946 to
reflect the relationship between national income and population size
and to avoid anomalies in assessments resulting from comparative
estimates of national income. At that time, the Committee used its
judgment to determine the extent of the allowance. Since 1948, the
United Nations has used a formula based on an upper per capita income
limit for concession of relief (currently $2,600) and a maximum
percentage allowance, referred to as a gradient (currently 85
percent). The allowance reduces the national incomes of a country
with a per capita income below $2,600 by 85 percent of the percentage
difference between the country's per capita national income and the
per capita income limit.
The contribution ceiling and floor are the upper and lower limits,
respectively, on the amount member countries may contribute toward
regular budget expenses. Currently, the ceiling is 25 percent and
the floor is 0.01 percent. From 1946 through 1949, U.S.
contributions comprised 39.89 percent of the regular budget. In
1948, the General Assembly decided that in normal times no country
should contribute more than one-third of the budget to preclude
overdependence on any one country. In 1954, the General Assembly
enacted a contribution ceiling of 33.33 percent. This ceiling was
gradually reduced to 31.52 percent between the 1958 and 1973
assessments. The current ceiling of 25 percent was set in 1972 and
became effective for the 1974 assessment.
The debt relief adjustment is a reduction in the national incomes of
those U.N. members with per capita incomes below $6,000. The United
Nations uses World Bank data on the external debt for each of these
countries, assumes they repay 12.5 percent of the debt each year, and
reduces their national incomes by that amount.
During the mitigation process, the United Nations considers pertinent
factors either not reflected in the data or not captured by the
assessment methodology. Factors considered in the past include the
temporary dislocation of national economies arising out of wars,
catastrophes such as floods and earthquakes, and anomalies in the
available statistical information.
PEACEKEEPING SCALE OF
ASSESSMENT
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2
Peacekeeping assessment rates are determined by member countries'
placement within the following four assessment groups--group A, which
are the 5 permanent members of the Security Council--group B, which
are 24 specifically named industrialized countries that are not
permanent Security Council members--group C, which are 97 member
countries that tend to be less developed--group D, which are 56
specifically named poorest countries. With the exception of group A,
specific criteria for defining membership in these groups were not
formulated when the groups were initially established and none have
been developed since.
Peacekeeping assessment rates are calculated as a percentage of
regular budget assessment rates. Member countries in group D are
assessed at 10 percent of their regular rate, those in group C at 20
percent, group B members at about 100 percent, and group A at 100
percent plus their proportionate share of the reductions allowed for
less developed countries. This means that group A countries are
currently assessed at approximately 27 percent above their regular
budget contributions. The current rates of assessment for each
country for regular budget and peacekeeping expenses are given in
table I.1.
Table I.1
1992-94 U.N. Regular Budget and
Peacekeeping Assessment Rates by
Peacekeeping Category
(Rates in percent)
Regular
budget Peacekeeping
assessment assessment
rate rate
------------------------------ ------------- -------------
Group A\a
China 0.77 0.978
France 6.00 7.616
Russian Federation 6.71 8.518
United Kingdom 5.02 6.372
United States 25.00 31.735
============================================================
Total for group A 43.50 55.219
Group B
Andorra 0.01 0.010
Australia 1.51 1.518
Austria 0.75 0.754
Belarus 0.48 0.482
Belgium 1.06 1.065
Canada 3.11 3.125
Denmark 0.65 0.653
Finland 0.57 0.573
Germany 8.93 8.974
Iceland 0.03 0.030
Ireland 0.18 0.181
Italy 4.29 4.311
Japan 12.45 12.512
Liechtenstein 0.01 0.010
Luxembourg 0.06 0.060
Monaco 0.01 0.010
Netherlands 1.50 1.507
New Zealand 0.24 0.241
Norway 0.55 0.553
San Marino 0.01 0.010
South Africa 0.41 0.412
Spain 1.98 1.990
Sweden 1.11 1.116
Ukraine 1.87 1.879
============================================================
Total for group B 41.77 41.976
Group C
Albania 0.01 0.002
Algeria 0.16 0.032
Argentina 0.57 0.115
Armenia 0.13 0.026
Azerbaijan 0.22 0.044
Bahamas, The 0.02 0.004
Bahrain 0.03 0.006
Barbados 0.01 0.002
Bolivia 0.01 0.002
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.04 0.008
Brazil 1.59 0.320
Brunei 0.03 0.006
Bulgaria 0.13 0.026
Cambodia 0.01 0.002
Cameroon 0.01 0.002
Chile 0.08 0.016
Columbia 0.13 0.026
Congo 0.01 0.002
Costa Rica 0.01 0.002
Cote D'Ivoire 0.02 0.004
Croatia 0.13 0.026
Cuba 0.09 0.018
Cyprus 0.02 0.004
Dominican Republic 0.02 0.004
Ecuador 0.03 0.006
Egypt 0.07 0.014
El Salvador 0.01 0.002
Estonia 0.07 0.014
Fiji 0.01 0.002
Gabon 0.02 0.004
Georgia 0.21 0.042
Ghana 0.01 0.002
Greece 0.35 0.071
Guatemala 0.02 0.004
Guyana 0.01 0.002
Honduras 0.01 0.002
Hungary 0.18 0.036
India 0.36 0.073
Indonesia 0.16 0.032
Iran 0.77 0.155
Iraq 0.13 0.026
Israel 0.23 0.046
Jamaica 0.01 0.002
Jordan 0.01 0.002
Kazakhstan 0.35 0.071
Kenya 0.01 0.002
Korea, North 0.05 0.010
Korea, South 0.69 0.139
Kuwait 0.25 0.050
Kyrgystan 0.06 0.012
Latvia 0.13 0.026
Lebanon 0.01 0.002
Liberia 0.01 0.002
Libya 0.24 0.048
Lithuania 0.15 0.030
Malaysia 0.12 0.024
Malta 0.01 0.002
Marshall Islands 0.01 0.002
Mauritius 0.01 0.002
Mexico 0.88 0.177
Micronesia (Federated States 0.01 0.002
of)
Moldova 0.15 0.030
Mongolia 0.01 0.002
Morocco 0.03 0.006
Nicaragua 0.01 0.002
Nigeria 0.20 0.040
Oman 0.03 0.006
Pakistan 0.06 0.012
Panama 0.02 0.004
Paraguay 0.02 0.004
Peru 0.06 0.012
Philippines 0.07 0.014
Poland 0.47 0.095
Portugal 0.20 0.040
Qatar 0.05 0.010
Romania 0.17 0.034
Saudi Arabia 0.96 0.193
Singapore 0.12 0.024
Slovenia 0.09 0.018
Sri Lanka 0.01 0.002
Swaziland 0.01 0.002
Syria 0.04 0.008
Tajikistan 0.05 0.010
Thailand 0.11 0.022
The Former Yugoslav Republic 0.02 0.004
of Macedonia
Trinidad and Tobago 0.05 0.010
Tunisia 0.03 0.006
Turkey 0.27 0.055
Turkmenistan 0.06 0.012
United Arab Emirates 0.21 0.042
Uruguay 0.04 0.008
Uzbekistan 0.26 0.052
Venezuela 0.49 0.099
Vietnam 0.01 0.002
Yugoslavia\b 0.14 0.028
Zaire 0.01 0.002
Zambia 0.01 0.002
============================================================
Total for group C 13.68 2.749
Group D
Afghanistan 0.01 0.001
Angola 0.01 0.001
Antigua and Barbuda 0.01 0.001
Bangladesh 0.01 0.001
Belize 0.01 0.001
Benin 0.01 0.001
Bhutan 0.01 0.001
Botswana 0.01 0.001
Burkina 0.01 0.001
Burundi 0.01 0.001
Cape Verde 0.01 0.001
Central African Republic 0.01 0.001
Chad 0.01 0.001
Comoros 0.01 0.001
Djibouti 0.01 0.001
Dominica 0.01 0.001
Equatorial Guinea 0.01 0.001
Eritrea 0.01 0.001
Ethiopia 0.01 0.001
Gambia, The 0.01 0.001
Grenada 0.01 0.001
Guinea 0.01 0.001
Guinea-Bissau 0.01 0.001
Haiti 0.01 0.001
Laos 0.01 0.001
Lesotho 0.01 0.001
Madagascar 0.01 0.001
Malawi 0.01 0.001
Maldives 0.01 0.001
Mali 0.01 0.001
Mauritania 0.01 0.001
Mozambique 0.01 0.001
Myanmar 0.01 0.001
Namibia 0.01 0.001
Nepal 0.01 0.001
Niger 0.01 0.001
Papua New Guinea 0.01 0.001
Rwanda 0.01 0.001
St. Kitts and Nevis 0.01 0.001
St. Lucia 0.01 0.001
St. Vincent and Grenadines 0.01 0.001
Samoa 0.01 0.001
Sao Tome and Principe 0.01 0.001
Senegal 0.01 0.001
Seychelles 0.01 0.001
Sierra Leone 0.01 0.001
Solomon Islands 0.01 0.001
Somalia 0.01 0.001
Sudan 0.01 0.001
Suriname 0.01 0.001
Togo 0.01 0.001
Uganda 0.01 0.001
Tanzania 0.01 0.001
Vanuatu 0.01 0.001
Yemen 0.01 0.001
Zimbabwe 0.01 0.001
============================================================
Total for group D 0.56 0.056
============================================================
Total 99.51\c 100.000
------------------------------------------------------------
\a Peacekeeping surcharge for group A =.264022 or 27 percent.
\b Figures are the net of deductions for Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Croatia, Slovenia, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
\c Slovakia and the Czech Republic have temporarily been removed from
the scale, pending a decision on whether to place them in group B or
group C. Their regular budget assessments are 0.13 percent and 0.42
percent, respectively. Therefore, the regular budget scale totals
100.06 percent.
Source: U.S. State Department.
A separate budget is developed for each peacekeeping mission financed
through special assessments. After a peacekeeping mission is
approved by the Security Council, the Department of Peacekeeping
Operations prepares an implementation plan, and the Field Operations
Division prepares the mission's budget and deployment plan. Because
the Security Council approves a mission before the budget is
submitted, the full cost implications of a mission are not known when
it is approved. Once the Secretariat completes the budget, it is
reviewed by the U.N. Advisory Committee on Administrative and
Budgetary Questions and then by the General Assembly's Committee on
Administrative and Budgetary Matters--known as the 5th Committee.
Following 5th Committee approval, the budget is voted on by the
General Assembly. Funds for the peacekeeping operation are then
allotted, and member countries are assessed. Although mandates for
ongoing missions are to be renewed every 6 months, the increased
number of missions in recent years has led to mandate renewals at
varying intervals. The same budget and assessment procedure is
followed when mandates are renewed. Member countries are expected to
pay assessed peacekeeping costs within 30 days of receiving the
assessment letter.
As shown in table I.1, the U.S. peacekeeping assessment is now 31.7
percent of total peacekeeping costs, including the group A surcharge.
The surcharge, which is the percentage amount charged to the
permanent five Security Council members over their regular assessment
rates, is almost 27 percent. Prior to the dissolution of the former
Soviet Union, the U.S. peacekeeping assessment rate was about 30.4
percent and the surcharge for the permanent five was about 22
percent. However, following the dissolution of the former Soviet
Union, a higher surcharge was required to account for the fact that
(1) some new republics of the former Soviet Union were placed in
group C and (2) Russia assumed the seat on the Security Council but
only a portion of the former Soviet Union's rate, resulting in Russia
bearing a smaller proportion of the
group A assessment. Despite the higher surcharge, the United States
continued to pay 30.4 percent of peacekeeping costs, as agreed upon
with the U.N. Controller, until a satisfactory U.N. review of
peacekeeping assessment anomalies is conducted. The Foreign
Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 requires
that U.S. payment for peacekeeping operations in fiscal years 1994
and 1995 not exceed 30.4 percent of all assessed contributions and,
beginning in fiscal year 1996, not exceed 25 percent.\2
--------------------
\2 P. L. 103-236, sec. 404.
PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES TO THE
CURRENT ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGIES
========================================================== Appendix II
Believing that the current regular budget and peacekeeping
methodologies are complex and contain some inequities, some U.N.
member countries and other entities have proposed modifications to
simplify the assessment process, provide more stable funding, and
better measure capacity to pay expenses. U.N., U.S., and other
officials with whom we spoke indicated that changing the method for
calculating assessments would not be quick or easy.
RECENT U.N. PROPOSALS
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:1
The U.N. Committee on Contributions has considered several
alternatives to the regular budget assessment formula proposed by
member countries. For example, one suggestion is to substitute
national income with a concept known as sustainable income.
Sustainable income has been defined as national income minus the
expenditures required to sustain such income into the future through
support to sectors considered essential to sustainable development,
such as education, health, and infrastructure development. However,
the Committee has concluded that national income is the best
available measure of capacity given the availability of data.
The Committee has also considered using price adjusted rates of
exchange to address the fact that IMF exchange rates may not reflect
relative prices, particularly for countries with fixed exchange
rates. Price adjusted rates of exchange would allow the Committee to
adjust a country's exchange rate on the basis of changes in its
domestic prices. However, the Committee concluded that the concept
needed further refinement before it could be adopted. Other
proposals under consideration include (1) reducing the statistical
base period, (2) lowering the ceiling rate, and (3) adopting a new
regular budget assessment methodology based on national income with
no adjustments except a floor rate of 0.01 percent for the least
developed countries.
For the peacekeeping scale of assessments, the United Nations has
considered using per capita national income as the criterion for
defining membership in groups B and C and reserving group D for the
least developed countries. However, this scale would have a minimal
impact on the U.S. peacekeeping rate. According to a 1992 report by
the Secretary General, moving countries with a per capita income of
$5,000 or more up to group B would have a negligible effect on the
U.S. rate. The countries whose rates would be most dramatically
affected are those that would move up to a higher group.
FORD FOUNDATION AND STIMSON
CENTER RECOMMENDATIONS
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:2
The Ford Foundation in New York and the Henry L. Stimson Center, a
research firm based in Washington, D.C., have also proposed
alternatives that would affect peacekeeping assessments.\1 Both
organizations recommended that the United Nations consider modifying
its current peacekeeping assessment process by (1) establishing a
unified peacekeeping budget, financed by a single annual assessment\2
and (2) moving all member countries with above average per capita
incomes to group B, except for the permanent members of the Security
Council. The Ford Foundation also recommended that the United
Nations reduce the current 10 year statistical base period for the
regular assessment to 3 years to more accurately reflect current
capacity to pay. The Stimson Center further recommended that the
U.N. consider phasing out the special assessment rate and financing
the cost of peacekeeping operations from the regular budget,
reflecting the fact that peacekeeping has become a central function
of U.N. operations.
--------------------
\1 Financing an Effective United Nations: A Report of the
Independent Advisory Group on U.N. Financing, Shijuro Ogata and Paul
Volcker, Co-Chairmen, Ford Foundation (New York: Apr. 1993) and
William J. Durch and Barry M. Blechman, Keeping the Peace: The
United Nations in the Emerging World Order, The Henry L. Stimson
Center (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1992).
\2 This budget would include projections for the costs of ongoing
peacekeeping missions as well as an unappropriated margin for new and
unexpected missions. Individual operations would retain separate
line items, but cash from the common pool of peacekeeping funds could
be used to support start-up costs for new missions and programs
common to all peacekeeping missions, such as training,
communications, and equipment maintenance.
CHANGES TO ASSESSMENT PROCESS
LIKELY TO BE SLOW
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:3
Officials with whom we spoke noted a general and growing recognition
that inequities exist in U.N. assessments based on the changed
relative economic status of many countries and on the distortions
inherent in the regular budget assessment methodology. Although most
agree with the United States that it bears a disproportionate burden
of U.N. costs, they believe that this reflects the strength of the
United States as a permanent Security Council member as well as its
comparative economic strength. Officials also noted that the United
States has benefited for many years from the ceiling imposed on the
regular budget assessment.
The U.N. reaches decisions by consensus, and U.S. and other
officials noted that achieving this consensus will take a long time,
particularly if changes in assessment methodologies mean increases
for many countries. Various U.N. and U.S. officials and officials
of other organizations indicated that it is unlikely that the
peacekeeping assessment alone will be modified. Instead, they
believe that any agreement will likely involve changes to the method
for calculating the regular budget assessment as well. Even if
changes to the regular budget methodology were made by the General
Assembly this year, these would not affect rates until the 1998-2000
assessment period. Moreover, State and U.N. officials told us that
drastic changes would need to be adopted for the U.S. peacekeeping
assessment rate to be reduced to 25 percent. Small changes, such as
including Japan and Germany as permanent Security Council members or
moving some countries up from group C or group D, would have little
impact on the U.S. peacekeeping rate.
ASSESSMENT ISSUES ARE DISCUSSED
IN SEVERAL U.N. FORA
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:4
Several groups at the United Nations have been formed to discuss
assessment issues and develop alternatives. These include a working
group mandated by the 47th General Assembly, which is addressing the
peacekeeping assessment, but whose meetings have been inconclusive;
an ad hoc committee established by Japan to explore the regular
budget methodology; and a special envoy established by the Secretary
General to persuade wealthier group C countries to move voluntarily
to group B. A forum found helpful by the United States has been the
"Friends of the Secretary General"--known as the "F-14." Although
this group is not a negotiating body, and its influence is thus
limited, it provides a venue for discussing assessment options that
might be precluded in a more formal political setting.
Assessment issues were informally discussed at the last resumed
session of the 48th General Assembly ending May 6, 1994, but not as a
formal agenda item. Officials of the State Department and the U.S.
Mission to the United Nations told us that assessment issues will be
an important agenda item at the 49th General Assembly in fall 1994 as
well as during resumed sessions of the 48th Assembly this summer.
They added that the United States intends to be vigorous in its
efforts to promote changes.
SIMPLIFIED APPROACHES BASED ON
NATIONAL INCOME
========================================================= Appendix III
As discussed in appendix I, the regular budget assessment is based on
a complicated formula with numerous adjustments, and the peacekeeping
assessment is based on a 1973 grouping of countries according to no
specific criteria, with the exception of group A permanent Security
Council members. To provide a simplified perspective on countries'
ability to pay, we used World Bank and State Department data to
construct a 1992 "snapshot" of what a regular budget assessment might
look like based solely on a country's percentage of global GNP. Our
analysis is for 1 year, but we note that the 3-year statistical base
period currently under consideration may be a better measurement of
current capacity to pay than the current 10-year period. We then
grouped countries for the peacekeeping assessment according to per
capita national income data and revised their assessments within four
options.
REGULAR BUDGET ASSESSMENT
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:1
We illustrate this simplified national income alternative in two
ways: one eliminates the floor and other distortions in the current
formula but retains the current 25-percent ceiling as mandated by the
United Nations and the second eliminates all distortions, including
the ceiling. As shown in table III.1, the overall percentage share
toward the regular budget assessment for group A would be reduced,
while the overall share for the other three assessment groups would
also change, and differences with or without the 25 percent ceiling
are minimal.
Table III.1
Percentage Changes in Share of U.N.
Regular Budget Assessments Using GNP as
Criterion
Percent
1994 1992-94 Proposed of
number percent number Percent global
of regular of of global GNP
1994 peacekeeping assessment countrie assessmen countrie GNP (no (with
group s t s\a ceiling) ceiling)
---------------------------- -------- --------- -------- --------- --------
A 5 43.50 5 39.95 39.08
B 24 41.77 43 47.22 47.90
C 97 13.68 78 10.25 10.44
D 56 0.56 52 2.53 2.58
================================================================================
Total 182 99.51\b 178\c 99.95\d 100.00
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Based on national per capita income data.
\b Slovakia and the Czech Republic have temporarily been removed from
the scale, pending a decision on whether to place them in group B or
C. Their regular budget assessments are 0.13 and 0.42 percent,
respectively. Therefore, the regular budget scale adds to 100.06
percent.
\c Per capita income was unavailable for four countries: Andorra,
Eritrea, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Monaco.
\d Does not add to 100 percent due to rounding.
The U.S. share of global GNP in 1992 was 26.07 percent and would be
assessed this amount for regular budget contributions. Although this
is slightly higher than the current 25-percent ceiling assessed the
United States, the U.S. share of the world's production has
decreased from 31.7 percent in 1970 to 26.07 percent in 1992.\1
Furthermore, it is projected that the U.S. share could decrease to
25.28 percent by 1999.\2 Table III.2 indicates how the regular budget
assessments of the five Security Council permanent members, Japan,
and Germany would change from their current assessments. As shown,
with or without the 25-percent ceiling, China's assessment would
increase slightly, while the assessments of France, the Russian
Federation, and the United Kingdom would decrease. Japan and Germany
would see increases from their current assessments. The table also
shows that the 25-percent ceiling has minimal impact on the four
other group A members, Japan, and Germany after the calculation for
global GNP is made.
Table III.2. Current Regular Budget
Assessments and Assessments Based on
1992 Share of Global GNP for Group A
Members and Japan and Germany
Percentage
1992- Percentage of global
1994 of global GNP (25
assessmen GNP (no percent
Country t ceiling) ceiling)
----------------------- --------- ----------- -----------
China 0.77 1.96 1.99
France 6.00 5.64 5.73
Russian Federation 6.71 1.76 1.78
United Kingdom 5.02 4.52 4.59
United States 25.00 26.07 25.00
Japan 12.45 15.48 15.71
Germany 8.93 9.26 9.40
------------------------------------------------------------
Although the U.S. share of 26.07 percent is slightly higher than the
current ceiling of 25 percent, the U.S. burden could be eased if the
special peacekeeping scale were eliminated and countries paid the
same assessment for regular budget and peacekeeping costs. As noted,
the Stimson Center recommended that the special peacekeeping scale be
phased out because peacekeeping activities have become a central
function of the United Nations.\3 To ensure equity in assessments,
the Stimson Center said that a methodology should be used that
measures capacity to pay, particularly through the revision of floors
and ceilings. In spring 1993, the United States proposed the
elimination of the special peacekeeping scale to other group A
members, but received no support.
Overall, if using 1992 world GNP share with no ceiling or floor, 68
countries would be assessed at a higher rate, 79 countries would be
assessed at a lower rate, and 35 countries would pay about the same
rate. Of the 68 countries that would experience an increase, about
56 percent of the total increase would be distributed among five
countries--China, Japan, India, Italy, and the United States.
Increases in assessments for these countries are shown in table
III.3.
Table III.3
Five Countries That Would Experience the
Largest Increases in Regular Budget
Assessments Using 1992 Global GNP Share
and No Ceiling
Percent Percentage Amount
regular of global of
Country assessment GNP increase
----------------------- ------------ ----------- --------
Japan 12.45 15.48 3.03
China 0.77 1.96 1.19
United States 25.00 26.07 1.07
Italy 4.29 5.24 0.95
India 0.36 1.21 0.85
============================================================
Total 42.87 49.96 7.09
------------------------------------------------------------
If the 25-percent ceiling were retained, the United States would
experience no change, and South Korea would be added to the list of
countries experiencing the largest increases. South Korea's current
regular assessment of 0.69 percent would be raised to 1.31 percent
based on its share of global GNP in 1992.
The five countries that would experience the largest reductions using
1992 global GNP share as the criterion, in order of magnitude, are
the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Canada, the United Kingdom, and
Saudi Arabia. These decreases are shown in table III.4.
Table III.4
Five Countries That Would Experience the
Largest Decreases in Regular Budget
Assessments Using 1992 Global GNP Share
and No Ceiling
Percent
regular Percentage Amount
assessmen of global of
Country t GNP decrease
-------------------------- --------- ----------- --------
Russian Federation 6.71 1.76 4.95
Ukraine 1.87 0.38 1.49
Canada 3.11 2.50 0.61
United Kingdom 5.02 4.52 0.50
Saudi Arabia 0.96 0.56 0.40
============================================================
Total 17.67 9.72 7.95
------------------------------------------------------------
These figures are calculated on the basis of no ceiling or floor;
however, including a 25-percent ceiling, these same five countries
still experience the largest reductions. A slight surcharge of 1.44
percent is necessary with the 25-percent ceiling, which therefore
lowers the amount of decrease. For example, with the 25-percent
ceiling, the Russian Federation's assessment is 1.78 percent rather
than 1.76 percent--still a significant decrease from its current
regular assessment rate of 6.71 percent. In addition, the
elimination of a floor would mean reductions for 29 of the least
developed countries whose GNP places them below the floor.
--------------------
\1 National Accounts Statistics: Analysis of Main Aggregates,
1988-1989, United Nations (New York: 1991). Figure for 1970
represents U.S. gross domestic product as a percentage of global
gross domestic product.
\2 Calculated from World Economic Outlook, Volume 1: Developed
Economies Pre-Meeting Forecast, The WEFA Group, April 1994, p. 4.
\3 Keeping the Peace, p. xi.
PEACEKEEPING ASSESSMENT
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:2
According to the World Bank, per capita income is the main criterion
used to classify economies and distinguish among different levels of
development.\4 In constructing four options for peacekeeping
assessments, we first grouped countries according to World Bank
classification of high, middle, and low income countries based on per
capita GNP. The peacekeeping rates of assessment are based on the
regular budget assessment of global GNP share and membership in one
of three proposed groups. Groups A and B include 48 countries--the
five permanent Security Council members and high income countries
with 1992 per capita income over $4,200.\5 Group C includes the 78
middle income countries with per capita income between $651 and
$4,200, and group D includes the 52 low income countries with per
capita income of less than $650. Under all options, the peacekeeping
burden would be shared more evenly among high income countries, while
the poorer countries would generally be assessed less than their
current rates. Under two of the four options, the current floor of
0.001 percent is eliminated, which lowers the peacekeeping assessment
for many of the least developed countries.\6 We also present these
options with and without a peacekeeping cap of 25 percent to reflect
congressional intent that the United States pay no more than 25
percent of U.N. peacekeeping costs beginning in fiscal year 1996.\7
Our first two options, called 1A and 1B, represent a simplified
regular budget methodology based on global GNP with a 25-percent
ceiling and a peacekeeping rate based on per capita GNP and a 25-
percent cap. Option 1A eliminates the 0.001 percent floor for the
poorest countries and option 1B retains this floor. Groups C and D
keep their current discounts--one-fifth and one-tenth of their
regular budget assessment, respectively. Such an approach results in
a peacekeeping surcharge of slightly more than 17 percent for all
countries in groups A and B, except for the United States.\8 As shown
in table III.5, eliminating the floor has no virtual impact on the
permanent five members of the Security Council and the other
peacekeeping assessment categories. However, eliminating the floor
could help the poorest countries whose national income figures would
place their contributions below the floor. Under this approach,
97 countries would pay more than their current peacekeeping
assessment,
64 countries would pay less, and 17 countries would pay about the
same rate.
Table III.5
Options for U.N. Regular and
Peacekeeping Budget Assessments with 25-
Percent Ceilings and Caps Using Global
GNP Share and Per Capita Income
Groupings
Regular
assessme
nt
global
Countrie GNP Option Option
Group s share 1A 1B
-------------------- -------- -------- -------- --------
A and B 48 87.17 97.65 97.63
C 78 10.25 2.09 2.10
D 52 2.53 0.26 0.27
============================================================
Total 178\a 99.95\b 100.00 100.00
Group A
------------------------------------------------------------
China 1.99 2.33 2.33
France 5.73 6.71 6.71
Russian Federation 1.78 2.09 2.09
United Kingdom 4.59 5.38 5.38
United States 25.00 25.00 25.00
Surcharge on A and 17.22 17.18
B\c
------------------------------------------------------------
\a Per capita income was unavailable for four countries: Andorra,
Eritrea, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Monaco.
\b Does not add to 100 percent due to rounding.
\c Excluding the United States.
Our next alternatives, options 2A and 2B, are similar to options 1A
and 1B, except that the 25-percent regular budget ceiling and
peacekeeping caps are eliminated, raising the U.S. peacekeeping
assessment rate to slightly more than 29 percent. Option 2A
eliminates the 0.001 percent floor while option 2B retains the floor.
Groups A and B, including the United States, would pay a peacekeeping
surcharge of slightly more than 12 percent. Table III.6 indicates
the effect of this approach on the permanent five members of the
Security Council and the other peacekeeping categories. As with
options 1A and 1B, eliminating the floor has very little effect on
most countries, yet provides protection for the least developed
countries. Under this approach, 97 countries would pay more than
their current peacekeeping assessment, 46 countries would pay less,
and 35 countries would pay about the same rate.
Table III.6
Options Based on Global and Per Capita
GNP with No Regular Budget Ceiling or
Peacekeeping Cap
Number Regular
of assessmen
countrie t global Option Option
Group s GNP share 2A 2B
------------------- -------- --------- -------- --------
A and B 48 87.17 97.69 97.67
C 78 10.25 2.06 2.07
D 52 2.53 0.25 0.27
============================================================
Total 178\a 99.95\b 100.00 100.01
Group A
------------------------------------------------------------
China 1.96 2.194 2.193
France 5.64 6.326 6.325
Russian Federation 1.76 1.970 1.969
United Kingdom 4.52 5.070 5.068
United States 26.07 29.213 29.206
Surcharge on A and 12.07 12.04
B
------------------------------------------------------------
\a Per capita income was unavailable for four countries: Andorra,
Eritrea, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Monaco.
\b Does not add to 100 percent due to rounding.
We did not calculate the effects of these approaches on the actual
dollar amounts to be paid by each country. However, assuming that
1994 peacekeeping costs will likely total about $3.5 billion, the
United States would be assessed 31.7 percent, or $1.12 billion. The
approved regular budget for 1994 is slightly more than $1.234
billion, and the United States will be assessed 25 percent, or about
$309 million.\9 Table III.7 indicates the effect on the U.S. dollar
assessments under the options discussed in this appendix.
Table III.7
U.S. Assessments for 1994 Projected
Regular Budget and Peacekeeping Expenses
Using Modified Criteria
(Dollars in millions)
Regular assessment Options 1A Option 2A Option 2B
using 1992 GNP share and 1B (25 (29.213 (29.206
(26.07 percent) percent) percent) percent)
------------------------ ---------- ---------- ----------
$321.7 $875 $1,022.5 $1,022.2
------------------------------------------------------------
A complete listing of all countries and the changes in assessments
using world GNP, grouped according to World Bank per capita income
data with peacekeeping options 1A and 2A, is provided in table III.8.
Table III.8
U.N. Member Countries Grouped According
to Per Capita Income with Current
Assessments and Selected Options (in
percentages)
GNP-
based
regular
budget GNP-based
assessme peacekeepi
Current nt with ng
regular no floor Current assessment
Curren budget or peacekeepi \with no
t U.N. assessme \ceiling ng floor or
Country (GAO grouping) group nt \a assessment ceiling\a
---------------------------- ------ -------- -------- ---------- ----------
Group A
China A 0.77 1.96 0.978 2.194
France A 6.00 5.64 7.616 6.326
Russian Federation A 6.71 1.76 8.518 1.970
United Kingdom A 5.02 4.52 6.372 5.070
United States A 25.00 26.07 31.735 29.213
================================================================================
Total for group A 43.50 39.95 55.219 44.773
Group B
Antigua and Barbuda D 0.01 0.00 0.001 0.002
Argentina C 0.57 0.88 0.115 0.990
Australia B 1.51 1.32 1.518 1.481
Austria B 0.75 0.77 0.754 0.865
Bahamas C 0.02 0.01 0.004 0.016
Bahrain C 0.03 0.02 0.006 0.019
Barbados C 0.01 0.01 0.002 0.008
Belgium B 1.06 0.93 1.065 1.037
Brunei C 0.03 0.03 0.006 0.029
Canada B 3.11 2.50 3.125 2.798
Croatia C 0.13 0.11 0.026 0.121
Cyprus C 0.02 0.03 0.004 0.035
Denmark B 0.65 0.59 0.653 0.662
Finland B 0.57 0.51 0.573 0.575
Gabon C 0.02 0.02 0.004 0.027
Germany B 8.93 9.26 8.974 10.381
Greece C 0.35 0.33 0.071 0.367
Iceland B 0.03 0.03 0.030 0.031
Ireland B 0.18 0.19 0.181 0.212
Israel C 0.23 0.30 0.046 0.335
Italy B 4.29 5.24 4.311 5.871
Japan B 12.45 15.48 12.512 17.351
Kuwait C 0.25 0.17 0.050 0.186
Libya C 0.24 0.23 0.048 0.257
Liechtenstein B 0.01 0.00 0.010 0.004
Luxembourg B 0.06 0.06 0.060 0.068
Malta C 0.01 0.01 0.002 0.013
Netherlands B 1.50 1.38 1.507 1.545
New Zealand B 0.24 0.18 0.241 0.204
Norway B 0.55 0.49 0.553 0.546
Oman C 0.03 0.05 0.006 0.053
Portugal C 0.20 0.32 0.040 0.363
Qatar C 0.05 0.04 0.010 0.042
South Korea C 0.69 1.31 0.139 1.466
San Marino B 0.01 0.00 0.010 0.001
Saudi Arabia C 0.96 0.56 0.193 0.625
Seychelles D 0.01 0.00 0.001 0.002
Singapore C 0.12 0.20 0.024 0.219
Slovenia C 0.09 0.06 0.018 0.063
Spain B 1.98 2.42 1.990 2.710
St. Kitts and Nevis D 0.01 0.00 0.001 0.001
Sweden B 1.11 1.03 1.116 1.153
United Arab Emirates C 0.21 0.16 0.042 0.183
================================================================================
Total for group B 43.28 47.22 40.042 52.917
Group C
Albania C 0.01 0.01 0.002 0.003
Algeria C 0.16 0.21 0.032 0.043
Angola D 0.01 0.04 0.001 0.007
Armenia C 0.13 0.01 0.026 0.002
Azerbaijan C 0.22 0.03 0.044 0.006
Belarus B 0.48 0.13 0.482 0.027
Belize D 0.01 0.00 0.001 0.000
Bolivia C 0.01 0.02 0.002 0.005
Bosnia and Herzegovina C 0.04 0.05 0.008 0.011
Botswana D 0.01 0.02 0.001 0.003
Brazil C 1.59 1.88 0.320 0.376
Bulgaria C 0.13 0.05 0.026 0.011
Cameroon C 0.01 0.04 0.002 0.009
Cape Verde D 0.01 0.00 0.001 0.000
Chile C 0.08 0.15 0.016 0.030
Colombia C 0.13 0.19 0.026 0.038
Congo C 0.01 0.01 0.002 0.002
Costa Rica C 0.01 0.03 0.002 0.006
Cote d'Ivoire C 0.02 0.04 0.004 0.008
Cuba C 0.09 0.15 0.018 0.031
Djibouti D 0.01 0.00 0.001 0.001
Dominica D 0.01 0.00 0.001 0.000
Dominican Rep. C 0.02 0.03 0.004 0.007
Ecuador C 0.03 0.05 0.006 0.010
El Salvador C 0.01 0.03 0.002 0.006
Estonia C 0.07 0.02 0.014 0.004
Fiji C 0.01 0.01 0.002 0.001
Georgia C 0.21 0.02 0.042 0.004
Grenada D 0.01 0.00 0.001 0.000
Guatemala C 0.02 0.04 0.004 0.008
Hungary C 0.18 0.14 0.036 0.027
Indonesia C 0.16 0.54 0.032 0.107
Iran C 0.77 0.55 0.155 0.110
Iraq C 0.13 0.29 0.026 0.059
Jamaica C 0.01 0.01 0.002 0.003
Jordan C 0.01 0.02 0.002 0.004
Kazakhstan C 0.35 0.13 0.071 0.025
Korea, North C 0.05 0.13 0.010 0.026
Kyrgyzstan C 0.06 0.02 0.012 0.003
Latvia C 0.13 0.02 0.026 0.004
Lebanon C 0.01 0.02 0.002 0.003
Lithuania C 0.15 0.02 0.030 0.004
Malaysia C 0.12 0.23 0.024 0.046
Marshall Islands C 0.01 0.00 0.002 0.000
Mauritius C 0.01 0.01 0.002 0.003
Mexico C 0.88 1.30 0.177 0.260
Micronesia C 0.01 0.00 0.002 0.000
Moldova C 0.15 0.02 0.030 0.005
Mongolia C 0.01 0.01 0.002 0.003
Morocco C 0.03 0.12 0.006 0.024
Namibia D 0.01 0.01 0.001 0.002
Panama C 0.02 0.03 0.004 0.005
Papua New Guinea D 0.01 0.02 0.001 0.003
Paraguay C 0.02 0.03 0.004 0.005
Peru C 0.06 0.09 0.012 0.019
Philippines C 0.07 0.22 0.014 0.044
Poland C 0.47 0.33 0.095 0.066
Romania C 0.17 0.11 0.034 0.022
Samoa D 0.01 0.00 0.001 0.000
Senegal D 0.01 0.03 0.001 0.005
Solomon Islands D 0.01 0.00 0.001 0.000
South Africa B 0.41 0.47 0.412 0.094
St. Lucia D 0.01 0.00 0.001 0.000
St. Vincent and the D 0.01 0.00 0.001 0.000
Grenadines
Suriname D 0.01 0.01 0.001 0.002
Swaziland C 0.01 0.00 0.002 0.001
Syria C 0.04 0.07 0.008 0.013
Thailand C 0.11 0.45 0.022 0.090
Trinidad and Tobago C 0.05 0.02 0.010 0.004
Tunisia C 0.03 0.06 0.006 0.013
Turkey C 0.27 0.50 0.055 0.101
Turkmenistan C 0.06 0.02 0.012 0.004
Ukraine B 1.87 0.38 1.879 0.077
Uruguay C 0.04 0.05 0.008 0.009
Uzbekistan C 0.26 0.08 0.052 0.016
Vanuatu D 0.01 0.00 0.001 0.000
Venezuela C 0.49 0.26 0.099 0.052
Yugoslavia C 0.14 0.17 0.028 0.034
================================================================================
Total for group C 11.47 10.25 4.507 2.056
Group D
Afghanistan D 0.01 0.03 0.001 0.003
Bangladesh D 0.01 0.11 0.001 0.011
Benin D 0.01 0.01 0.001 0.001
Bhutan D 0.01 0.00 0.001 0.000
Burkina Faso D 0.01 0.01 0.001 0.001
Burundi D 0.01 0.01 0.001 0.001
Cambodia C 0.01 0.01 0.002 0.001
Central African Rep. D 0.01 0.01 0.001 0.001
Chad D 0.01 0.01 0.001 0.001
Comoros D 0.01 0.00 0.001 0.000
Egypt C 0.07 0.15 0.014 0.015
Equatorial Guinea D 0.01 0.00 0.001 0.000
Ethiopia D 0.01 0.03 0.001 0.003
Gambia, The D 0.01 0.00 0.001 0.000
Ghana C 0.01 0.03 0.002 0.003
Guinea D 0.01 0.01 0.001 0.001
Guinea-Bissau D 0.01 0.00 0.001 0.000
Guyana C 0.01 0.00 0.002 0.000
Haiti D 0.01 0.01 0.001 0.001
Honduras C 0.01 0.01 0.002 0.001
India C 0.36 1.21 0.073 0.121
Kenya C 0.01 0.04 0.002 0.004
Laos D 0.01 0.00 0.001 0.000
Lesotho D 0.01 0.00 0.001 0.000
Liberia C 0.01 0.01 0.002 0.001
Madagascar D 0.01 0.01 0.001 0.001
Malawi D 0.01 0.01 0.001 0.001
Maldives D 0.01 0.00 0.001 0.000
Mali D 0.01 0.01 0.001 0.001
Mauritania D 0.01 0.00 0.001 0.000
Mozambique D 0.01 0.00 0.001 0.000
Myanmar D 0.01 0.06 0.001 0.006
Nepal D 0.01 0.01 0.001 0.001
Nicaragua C 0.01 0.01 0.002 0.001
Niger D 0.01 0.01 0.001 0.001
Nigeria C 0.20 0.14 0.040 0.014
Pakistan C 0.06 0.22 0.012 0.022
Rwanda D 0.01 0.01 0.001 0.001
Sao Tome and Principe D 0.01 0.00 0.001 0.000
Sierra Leone D 0.01 0.00 0.001 0.000
Somalia D 0.01 0.02 0.001 0.002
Sri Lanka C 0.01 0.04 0.002 0.004
Sudan D 0.01 0.07 0.001 0.007
Tajikistan C 0.05 0.01 0.010 0.001
Tanzania D 0.01 0.01 0.001 0.001
Togo D 0.01 0.01 0.001 0.001
Uganda D 0.01 0.01 0.001 0.001
Viet Nam C 0.01 0.06 0.002 0.006
Yemen D 0.01 0.03 0.001 0.003
Zaire C 0.01 0.04 0.002 0.004
Zambia C 0.01 0.01 0.002 0.001
Zimbabwe D 0.01 0.03 0.001 0.003
================================================================================
Total for group D 1.21 2.53 0.207 0.253
No grouping\b
Andorra B 0.01 0.010
Former Yugoslav Republic C 0.02 0.004
of Macedonia
Eritrea D 0.01 0.001
Monaco B 0.01 0.010
================================================================================
Total 0.05 0.025
================================================================================
Total for all groups 99.51\c 99.95\d 100.000 99.999\d
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a As shown, some countries would be assessed virtually nothing
because their assessments fall under the current floors of 0.01
percent and 0.001 percent. To show their actual assessment would
require extending the decimal points further.
\b GNP and per capita income was unavailable for these countries.
\c Slovakia and the Czech Republic have been temporarily removed from
the peacekeeping scale, pending a decision on whether to place them
in group B or group C. Their regular budget assessments are 0.13
percent and 0.42 percent, respectively. Therefore, the regular
budget scale totals 100.06 percent after rounding.
\d Totals do not add to 100 percent due to rounding.
--------------------
\4 World Development Report, 1993, p. 233.
\5 With 1992 per capita incomes of $380 and $2,680, respectively,
China and the Russian Federation would normally qualify as low to
middle income countries. However, due to their permanent Security
Council status, we have included them in the group that has the
ability to contribute more toward peacekeeping costs than do the low
to middle income groups.
\6 The peacekeeping "floor" is not mandated as in the regular budget
assessment formula. It is derived from the regular assessment rate
because current group D countries assessed the 0.01 percent regular
assessment floor are assessed for peacekeeping expenses at 10 percent
of their regular assessment rate--0.001 percent of peacekeeping
assessments.
\7 Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995
(P.L. 103-236, sec. 404.)
\8 As discussed in app. I, the peacekeeping surcharge is the
percentage amount charged to the permanent five Security Council
members above their regular assessment rates.
\9 The approved regular budget and projected peacekeeping expenses
for 1994 were provided by the U.S. Mission to the United Nations.
MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================== Appendix IV
NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION
WASHINGTON, D.C.
LeRoy W. Richardson
Audrey E. Solis
Bruce L. Kutnick
Charles W. Perdue
Jean L. Fox
NEW YORK REGIONAL OFFICE
Eileen P. Sullivan
Michael T. Gipson
RELATED GAO PRODUCTS
U.N. Peacekeeping: Lessons Learned in Managing Recent Missions
(GAO/NSIAD-94-9, Dec. 29, 1993).
U.N. Peacekeeping: Observations on Mandates and Operational
Capability (GAO/NSIAD-93-15, June 9, 1993).
United Nations: U.S. Participation in Peacekeeping Operations
(GAO/NSIAD-92-247, Sept. 9, 1992).