[Senate Report 107-154]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
Calendar No. 383
107th Congress Report
SENATE
2d Session 107-154
_______________________________________________________________________
AIRMEN AGE LIMITATION
__________
R E P O R T
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
on
S. 361
together with
ADDITIONAL VIEWS
May 22, 2002.--Ordered to be printed
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
99-010 WASHINGTON : 2002
SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
one hundred seventh congress
second session
ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina, Chairman
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West TED STEVENS, Alaska
Virginia CONRAD BURNS, Montana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts TRENT LOTT, Mississippi
JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota OLYMPIA SNOWE, Maine
RON WYDEN, Oregon SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
MAX CLELAND, Georgia GORDON SMITH, Oregon
BARBARA BOXER, California PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois
JOHN EDWARDS, North Carolina JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia
BILL NELSON, Florida
Kevin D. Kayes, Staff Director
Moses Boyd, Chief Counsel
Gregg Elias, General Counsel
Jeanne Bumpus, Republican Staff Director and General Counsel
Ann Begeman, Republican Deputy Staff Director
Calendar No. 383
107th Congress Report
SENATE
2d Session 107-154
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AIRMEN AGE LIMITATION
_______
May 22, 2002.--Ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Hollings, from the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, submitted the following
R E P O R T
together with
ADDITIONAL VIEWS
[To accompany S. 361]
The Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, to
which was referred the bill (S. 361) to establish age
limitations for airmen, having considered the same, reports
favorably thereon with amendments and recommends that the bill
(as amended) do pass.
Purpose of the Bill
The purpose of this legislation, as reported, is to increase
the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) regulatorily
mandated retirement age for commercial airline pilots from 60
to 63 years of age while clearly maintaining the FAA's
authority to take steps it deems appropriate to ensure the
safety of air transportation operations.
Background and Needs
Federal aviation regulations prohibit any air carrier from
using the services of any person as a pilot, and prohibit any
person from serving as a pilot on a commercial airplane, if
that person has reached his or her 60th birthday. See 14 C.F.R.
121.383(c). The FAA adopted the regulation, known as the Age 60
Rule, in 1959 because of concerns that a hazard to safety was
presented through the utilization of aging pilots in air
carrier operations.
Prior to September 11, 2001, according to media reports and
some aviation industry representatives, there was a shortage of
qualified commercial pilots. Post September 11, 2001, the
airline industry has experienced a number of layoffs, including
many pilots. However, as the industry begins to recover, with
several airlines already having recalled pilots laid off in the
aftermath of September 11, the pilot shortages may reoccur.
While the major airlines, with lucrative pay scales, have had
little difficulty attracting pilots, regional and on-demand
carriers are typically hard hit by an evaporating labor pool.
Because regional and on-demand carriers tend to provide much of
the air service for smaller communities, individuals and
businesses in those areas would be impacted if flights by
smaller carriers are canceled due to a lack of available
pilots. In addition, congressional testimony submitted by the
Department of Transportation to the House Transportation and
Infrastructure Committee suggested that the pilot shortage
issue affects, to some extent, the ability of Essential Air
Service carriers to provide service. Given the importance of
air service to many rural and remote communities, any loss of
service, even on a short-term basis, can have a significant
negative economic and social impact.
S. 361 is intended to diminish the scope of the pilot
shortage problem. Again, prior to September 11, 2001, there
were several indicators of a shortage of regional airline
pilots. For example, regional airlines were hiring pilots with
800 hours of flight time, while several years ago, they would
not have hired a pilot with fewer than 2,000 hours.
Furthermore, the regional airlines frequently hire flight
instructors from pilot training schools. As a result, some
schools have been running out of instructors, which in turn,
affects the pipeline for future pilots. The supply of qualified
pilots has also been negatively affected by the decline in the
number of ex-military pilots seeking employment.
In the more than 40 years since the Age 60 Rule was
established, life expectancies have increased and medical
science has advanced considerably. In addition, piloting today
is a different experience than it was in 1959, especially with
the advent of modern, highly automated jet aircraft.
Nevertheless, proposals to change the Age 60 Rule have been
controversial, and there are divided opinions on the matter
among pilots, policy makers, and others within the aviation
community. Many of those who support the rule as a safety
standard believe it is still a reasonable determination of the
time when there is a general decline in health-related
functions and overall cognitive capabilities which may affect a
pilot's performance. However, the Committee also received
testimony from witnesses countering claims that there are no
reliable tests available to identify those aging pilots who
are, or will become, incapacitated or whose performance will
decline to an unacceptable level.
Opponents of the Age 60 Rule argue that it is an arbitrary
and unfair standard without substantial evidence that pilots
over the age of 60 are a safety risk. Because pilots already
must pass routine medical and competency checks, opponents of
the rule believe there is little reason to deny piloting
privileges to someone who is otherwise fit to fly according to
medical and compentency checks. Some pilots believe the rule
constitutes age discrimination.
Twenty-five European countries recently increased their
mandatory retirement age for pilots to 65. Many Asian nations
have also raised their retirement ages. Foreign airlines that
fly to the U.S. with pilots over the age of 60 must require
those pilots to relinquish command to younger pilots when they
approach U.S. airspace.
Legislative History
On February 15, 2001, Senator Murkowski introduced S. 361, a
bill to increase the mandatory retirement age for pilots from
60 to 65 years of age. The bill was cosponsored by Senators
Inhofe and Enzi. Senators Bond, Feinstein, Grassley, and Thomas
subsequently cosponsored the bill.
On March 13, 2001, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation held a hearing on S. 361 and the Age 60 Rule.
Representatives from the FAA, the Air Line Pilots Association,
the Pilots Against Age Discrimination, and the medical
community testified about the issues regarding the mandatory
retirement age for airline pilots. On March 15, 2001, the
Committee, without objection, ordered S. 361 reported with an
amendment offered by Senator McCain.
Estimated Costs
In accordance with paragraph 11(a) of rule XXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate and section 403 of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the Committee provides the
following cost estimate, prepared by the Congressional Budget
Office:
U.S. Congress,
Congressional Budget Office,
Washington, DC, April 25, 2001.
Hon. John McCain,
Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has
prepared the enclosed estimate for S. 361, a bill to establish
age limitations for airmen.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contacts are Mark Hadley
and Kathy Ruffing.
Sincerely,
Barry B. Anderson
(For Dan L. Crippen, Director).
Enclosure.
S. 361--A bill to establish age limitations for airmen
Summary: S. 361 would increase the mandatory retirement age
from 60 to 63 for pilots employed by air carriers. CBO
estimates that implementing new regulations under the bill
would cost less than $500,000 a year, subject to the
availability of appropriated funds. S. 361 would reduce outlays
for Social Security benefits in the near term if significant
numbers of pilots who would otherwise retire instead worked
until age 63. CBO estimates that such near-term savings could
total up to $5 million a year through 2011, but that those
savings would be offset by higher net Social Security costs
after 2011.
The Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) estimates that S. 361
would affect taxable pension benefits of certain pilots and
taxable income of employers of certain pilots, but that overall
there would be a negligible effect on federal revenues. Because
the bill would affect receipts, pay-as-you-go procedures would
apply. S. 361 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector
mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA)
and would have no impact on state, local, or tribal
governments.
Estimated cost to the Federal Government: By increasing the
mandatory retirement age from 60 to 63 for pilots employed by
air carriers, the bill would decrease Social Security outlays
and increase revenues. In addition, S. 361 would require the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to issue new regulations.
Spending subject to appropriation
Subject to the availability of appropriated funds, CBO
estimates that issuing new regulations would increase the costs
of the FAA by less than $500,000. Subsequent monitoring by FAA
would also cost less than $500,000 a year.
Direct spending
S. 361 would slightly reduce outlays for Social Security
benefits in the near term if significant numbers of pilots who
would otherwise retire instead worked until age 63.
Eligible people can file for Social Security retirement
benefits beginning at age 62. For each month that they delay
filing, their eventual benefit increases; that actuarial
adjustment is meant to give retirees approximately the same
lifetime benefits regardless of their age at filing.
A hypothetical pilot, because of his or her high lifetime
earnings, probably has a primary insurance amount (PIA, the
figure on which all Social Security benefits are based) at or
near the maximum. In 2002, that PIA will be about $1,800. A
pilot who reaches 62 in 2002 could collect 77.5 percent of
that, or about $1,400 a month. But if he or she delays filing
for a year, the monthly check would be 83.3 percent of PIA, or
about $1,500, even before Social Security's annual cost-of-
living adjustment (COLA). For that pilot, the first-year
savings to the Social Security program would be about $17,000
and annual costs thereafter about $1,200.
There is little information, though, with which to
determine how many of the roughly 1,400 pilots who would
qualify each year resemble that example. Many of them would
still file at 62, attracted by the combination of $17,000 in
Social Security benefits plus their airline pension. Others
would want to keep working in aviation, though not as pilots,
deferring their Social Security benefits until ``normal
retirement age,'' or NRA. (Until that age--which will be 65
years and 6 months for people who reach 62 in 2002--Social
Security benefits are reduced or erased when a worker has
substantial earnings.) Neither of those groups would have
reason to change those plans is S. 361 were enacted.
Male workers who do not face mandatory retirement
overwhelmingly file at either age 62 or NRA. Only about 20
percent file between those ages. (Research suggests that
retirees who apply at 63 and 64 were often waiting for
something--such as a company pension or a spouse's retirement--
before filing.) CBO assumes that, if S. 361 were enacted, about
20 percent of pilots would likewise delay filing until age 63.
Thus, for each group of 1,400 pilots affected, about 300 would
postpone filing for Social Security. Their total Social
Security benefits would be lower by about $5 million in the
first full year but about $400,000 higher each year thereafter.
Those amounts would increase gradually because of COLAs. Over
the 2002-2011 period, total savings would be between $3 million
and $5 million annually (see table). In the long run--well
beyond CBO's 10-year horizon--Social Security savings would be
zero, because the savings and the costs would offset each
other.
ESTIMATED EFFECT OF S. 361 ON OUTLAYS FOR SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
By fiscal year, in millions of dollars--
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHANGES IN DIRECT SPENDING
Retired-worker benefits:
Gross savings............... -2 -5 -5 -6 -6 -6 -7 -7 -8 -9
Offset cost................. 0 * 1 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Subtotal.................. -2 -5 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 -3 -3
Auxiliary benefits \1\.......... * -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 *
Total outlay changes...... -3 -5 -5 -5 -5 -5 -4 -4 -4 -4
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Benefits to eligible spouses, children, or survivors of retired workers.
* =Less than $500,000.
Note.--Components may not sum to totals because of rounding.
Revenues
As a result of small and offsetting effects, S. 361 would
have a negligible net effect on federal revenues. The taxable
pension benefits of pilots are reduced when pilots retire
before the mandatory retirement age, currently age 60. By
increasing the mandatory retirement age to 63, S. 361 would
reduce the taxable annual pension benefits for pilots who
retire before age 60 more than under current law. The reduction
in taxable annual pension benefits would result in a slight
decrease in federal revenue. However, employers' pension
liability would be reduced and employers may decrease the
amount of deductible contributions made to their defined
benefit pension plans. As a result, some employers may have a
higher taxable income under S. 361 than under current law. The
increase in employers' taxable income would result in a slight
increase in federal revenues. S. 361 also would have an
additional negligible effect on federal revenues because some
pilots may choose to postpone retirement after age 60, thereby
postponing taxable pension distributions that otherwise would
have been made under current law mandating retirement for
pilots at age 60. However, once pension distributions
commenced, the annual benefit would be greater than that made
under current law. Overall, total pension benefits would be
actuarially equivalent under current law and under the bill.
Therefore, there would be a slight reduction in federal
revenues in the early years after enactment of this proposal as
some pilots would postpone taxable pension distributions, but
there would be a small and offsetting increase in federal
revenues in the later years after enactment as those pilots who
postponed retirement would receive larger taxable pension
benefits than under law.
Pay-as-you-go considerations: The Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act sets up pay-as-you-go procedures
for legislation affecting direct spending or receipts. JCT
estimates that S. 361 would affect taxable pension benefits of
certain pilots and taxable income of employers of certain
pilots, but that overall there would be a negligible effect on
federal revenues. Spending for Social Security, however, is
specifically excluded from pay-as-you-go rules.
Intergovernmental and private-sector impact: S. 361
contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as
defined in UMRA and would have no impact on state, local, or
tribal governments.
Estimate prepared by: Federal Costs: Mark Hadley and Kathy
Ruffing; Revenues: Robert Taylor; Impact on State, Local, and
Tribal Governments: Victoria Heid Hall; and impact on the
Private Sector: Jean Talarico.
Estimate approved by: Peter H. Fontaine, Deputy Assistant
Director for Budget Analysis and G. Thomas Woodward, Assistance
Director for Tax Analysis.
Regulatory Impact Statement
In accordance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee provides the
following evaluation of the regulatory impact of the
legislation, as reported:
NUMBER OF PERSONS COVERED
Under section 1, former pilots who have been forced to retire
because of the current mandatory retirement age, but are
younger than 63 years of age, would no longer be subject to the
prohibition and would potentially be eligible to fly as a
commercial airline pilot. Pilots under the age of 60 would
eventually have the option to fly for a longer period of time.
ECONOMIC IMPACT
Due to section 1, some older pilots may decide to continue
flying beyond their expected Age 60 retirement dates, and thus
continue to earn a salary. Some younger pilots may not be
promoted as quickly if more senior pilots continue flying.
Airlines may incur the additional costs of employing some of
their most senior pilots, who have the highest pay scales, for
a few additional years. Those additional costs would be offset,
at least in part, when the airlines are able to forego the
costs of training younger pilots to replace those who otherwise
would have retired because of the Age 60 Rule. If a pilot
shortage were to affect small and rural communities, section 1
may economically benefit those communities by increasing the
supply of pilots.
Section 2 may cause air carriers to incur the costs of
additional or more stringent medical, cognitive, or proficiency
testing for pilots who have reached the age of 60 if the FAA
determines that such testing is necessary to ensure the safety
of air transportation. This section may also cause air carriers
to incur costs associated if the FAA sets crew pairing
standards that, for example, limit the number of individuals in
a flight crew who are over the age of 59.
PRIVACY
within the air transportation system, the overriding need to
ensure safety has long been settled with respect to pilots'
expectations of privacy. Pilots who choose to fly beyond their
60th birthdays may be subjected to additional certification
testing or crew pairing standards if the FAA determines that
such measures are necessary to ensure the safety of air
transportation operations.
PAPERWORK
Under section 1, the FAA would incur additional paperwork
associated with the change in the current age limit. In
addition, under section 2, air carriers and the FAA may have
additional paperwork if the FAA decides to impose crew pairing
standards or additional certification testing for pilots who
have reached the age of 60.
Section-by-Section Analysis
Section 1. Age and other limitations
Section 1 would increase the regulatory age limit imposed on
commercial airline pilots from 60 years of age to 63 years of
age. Currently, federal rules prohibit air carriers certified
under part 121 of the Federal Aviation Regulations from using
the services of a pilot who is 60 years of age or older and
prohibit pilots who are 60 years of age or older from flying
part 121 aircraft operations. See 14 C.F.R. 121.383(c). Part
121 sets the operating requirements for commercial, civil
aircraft (with more than nine seats or 7,500 pounds payload).
This section would go into effect six months after the
enactment of this Act to give the FAA time to accommodate this
change.
Section 2. Reservation of safety authority
Section 2 makes it clear that the Act does not change the
authority of the FAA to take steps to ensure the safety of
airline operations involving pilots over the age of 59. For
example, the FAA could require that pilots who have reached the
age of 60 undergo additional medical, cognitive, or proficiency
testing and that crew pairing standards are set for crews with
such pilots.
Rollcall Votes in Committee
In accordance with paragraph 7(c) of rule XXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee provides the
following description of the record votes during its
consideration of S. 361:
Senator McCain offered an amendment to change the maximum age
limit for pilots to 63 years of age and to make it clear that
the increased age limit does not change the FAA's safety
authority. On a rollcall vote of 13 yeas and 8 nays as follows,
the McCain amendment was adopted.
YEAS--13 NAYS--8
Mr. McCain Mr. Hollings
Mr. Stevens Mr. Inouye
Mr. Burns\1\ Mr. Rockefeller
Mr. Lott Mr. Dorgan
Mrs. Hutchison Mr. Wyden
Ms. Snowe Mr. Cleland
Mr. Brownback\1\ Mrs. Boxer
Mr. Smith\1\ Mr. Edwards
Mr. Fitzgerald
Mr. Ensign
Mr. Allen\1\
Mr. Kerry
Mr. Breaux
\1\By proxy
Changes in Existing Law
In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the Standing
Rules of the Senate, the Committee states that the bill as
reported would make no change to existing law.
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATORS HOLLINGS, INOUYE, ROCKEFELLER, DORGAN,
CLELAND, BOXER, EDWARDS, AND CARNAHAN
During the Executive Session on February 15, 2001, several
issues were raised during the consideration of S. 361. We would
like to state our concerns about the legislation approved by
the Committee and express our interest in working to change the
legislation prior to Floor consideration of S. 361.
The bill as drafted poses two major issues. First, should
Congress repeal the FAA regulation known as the Age 60 Rule (14
CFR 121.383(c)) and establish by law a new mandatory retirement
age of 63 for airline pilots? Second, is there an effective
protocol to determine which pilots over the age of 60 are fit
to fly given the knowledge that the aging process causes a
decline in cognitive functions that affect piloting skills?
We do not believe that Congress should repeal the FAA
regulation known as the Age 60 Rule (14 CFR 121.383(c)). The
Age 60 Rule was promulgated by the FAA pursuant to its
statutory authority to issue and enforce regulations governing
air safety. Congress has vested air safety regulatory authority
in the FAA, and over the years, the agency has exercised its
authority in a prudent and impartial manner to ensure the
safety of air transportation.
In this case, the FAA has devoted time, resources and
expertise to explore exhaustively the aeromedical issues
associated with the Age 60 Rule. For instance, in 1995, after
concluding an exhaustive rulemaking process for regional
(commuter) air carriers, the FAA applied all part 121 air
carrier safety rules, including and particularly the Age 60
Rule, to regional carriers. More recently, the Senate
Appropriations Committee directed the FAA to conduct a study
(Senate Report 106-55 on the Department of Transportation and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act for FY 2000) of all
available non-scheduled commercial (and noncommercial) data
concerning the relative accident data correlated with the
amount of flying by pilots as a function of their age for
pilots age 60 to 63 and comparing it with all 4-year groupings
of scheduled commercial (and noncommercial) pilots declining
from age 60. In addition, it directed the FAA to compare
discernable groups in their entirety and track accident
frequency as a function of age. The findings were reported to
Congress on March 7, 2001 and reaffirmed earlier conclusions
that a ``U''-shaped relationship exists between the age of
pilots and accident rate. The findings were similar to
Golaszweski's conclusions (1983, 1991, 1993) that accident
rates decrease for younger pilots as they age, then level off
in the middle years, then begin to increase as they age. In
this study, conducted by the FAA's Civil Aeromedical Institute
(CAMI), the accident rates for pilots between the ages of 60
and 63 were higher that immediately preceding age cohorts per
100,000 flight hours.
Congress should rely on the agency's safety judgement as
sound and authoritative. The action by the Committee to change
and codify this regulation only serves to undermine the
authority of the FAA to administer the air safety regulations.
The federal courts in several cases over the past two decades,
most recently in PPF v. FAA, 118 F. 3d 758 (D.C. Cir. 1997),
have upheld the FAA in its decisions regarding this particular
regulation, and have never found the agency's decision-making
process to be arbitrary and capricious.