[House Hearing, 107 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TREAD ACT: ONE YEAR LATER
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
COMMERCE, TRADE, AND CONSUMER PROTECTION
of the
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 28, 2002
__________
Serial No. 107-92
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
house
__________
77-993 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 2002
____________________________________________________________________________
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpr.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800
Fax: (202) 512�092250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402�090001
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
W.J. ``BILLY'' TAUZIN, Louisiana, Chairman
MICHAEL BILIRAKIS, Florida JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan
JOE BARTON, Texas HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
FRED UPTON, Michigan EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
CLIFF STEARNS, Florida RALPH M. HALL, Texas
PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio RICK BOUCHER, Virginia
JAMES C. GREENWOOD, Pennsylvania EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
CHRISTOPHER COX, California FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey
NATHAN DEAL, Georgia SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina BART GORDON, Tennessee
ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky PETER DEUTSCH, Florida
GREG GANSKE, Iowa BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois
CHARLIE NORWOOD, Georgia ANNA G. ESHOO, California
BARBARA CUBIN, Wyoming BART STUPAK, Michigan
JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico TOM SAWYER, Ohio
JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona ALBERT R. WYNN, Maryland
CHARLES ``CHIP'' PICKERING, GENE GREEN, Texas
Mississippi KAREN McCARTHY, Missouri
VITO FOSSELLA, New York TED STRICKLAND, Ohio
ROY BLUNT, Missouri DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado
TOM DAVIS, Virginia THOMAS M. BARRETT, Wisconsin
ED BRYANT, Tennessee BILL LUTHER, Minnesota
ROBERT L. EHRLICH, Jr., Maryland LOIS CAPPS, California
STEVE BUYER, Indiana MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania
GEORGE RADANOVICH, California CHRISTOPHER JOHN, Louisiana
CHARLES F. BASS, New Hampshire JANE HARMAN, California
JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania
MARY BONO, California
GREG WALDEN, Oregon
LEE TERRY, Nebraska
-- -- (Vacancy)
David V. Marventano, Staff Director
James D. Barnette, General Counsel
Reid P.F. Stuntz, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel
______
Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection
CLIFF STEARNS, Florida, Chairman
NATHAN DEAL, Georgia EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
Vice Chairman DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado
ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky LOIS CAPPS, California
BARBARA CUBIN, Wyoming MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania
JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois CHRISTOPHER JOHN, Louisiana
JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona JANE HARMAN, California
ED BRYANT, Tennessee HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
STEVE BUYER, Indiana EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
GEORGE RADANOVICH, California BART GORDON, Tennessee
CHARLES F. BASS, New Hampshire PETER DEUTSCH, Florida
JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois
GREG WALDEN, Oregon ANNA G. ESHOO, California
LEE TERRY, Nebraska JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan,
W.J. ``BILLY'' TAUZIN, Louisiana (Ex Officio)
(Ex Officio)
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
__________
Page
Testimony of:
Graham, Hon. John D., Administrator, Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget.... 16
Mead, Hon. Kenneth M., Inspector General, Office of Inspector
General, U.S. Department of Transportation................. 20
Runge, Hon. Jeffrey W., Administrator, National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration, U.S. Department of
Transportation............................................. 11
(iii)
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TREAD ACT: ONE YEAR LATER
----------
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 2002
House of Representatives,
Committee on Energy and Commerce,
Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade,
and Consumer Protection,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in
room 2322, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Cliff Stearns
(chairman) presiding.
Members present: Representatives Stearns, Upton, Shimkus,
Bryant, Pitts, Bass, Towns, DeGette, Markey, Gordon, and
Dingell (ex officio)
Also present: Representatives Sawyer and Barrett.
Staff present: Kelly Zerzan, majority counsel; Ramsen
Betfarhad, majority counsel; Brendan Williams, lecislative
Clerk; Jonathan Cerdone, majority counsel; and Bruce Gwinn,
minority professional staff member.
Mr. Stearns. Good morning, everybody. I welcome all and
call to order this hearing of the Commerce, Trade, and Consumer
Protection. I'm especially pleased to welcome Dr. Runge. As
this is your first appearance before the committee since your
confirmation as National Highway Safety Administration
Administrator, I look forward to a productive relationship
between NHTSA and this subcommittee, which is entrusted with
oversight responsibilities over NHTSA.
I find the subcommittee's oversight vis-a-vis NHTSA as one
of the most important responsibilities of this subcommittee. As
NHTSA's motto, ``people saving people'' suggests NHTSA can and
does save lives.
It is in this light that we are holding this hearing today
examining NHTSA's implementation of the TREAD Act.
In October 2000, Congress enacted a Transportation Recall
Enhancement, Accountability, and Documentation Act, in response
to the many deaths and injuries attributed to tread separation
observed on Ford Explorers equipped with certain Firestone
tires. The TREAD Act was enacted in large measure due to the
efforts of our full committee chairman, Mr. Tauzin, who at the
time Chaired the Commerce Committee's Telecommunications,
Trade, and Consumer Protection Subcommittee.
After establishing an extensive hearing record, Chairman
Tauzin and other subcommittee members, including myself,
recognized that Congress had to act in order to protect
American lives because in some respects NHTSA had failed.
I am even more convinced today than the day we enacted the
TREAD Act, that if implemented as Congress intended, the Act
can save hundreds, if not thousands of lives. I'm still taken
back when told that 40,000 Americans lose their lives and
countless thousands are injured in our roads every year. Most
of these deaths and injuries can be prevented if people did not
drive while intoxicated or simply wore their seatbelts. Even
today only 7 out of 10 Americans wear their seatbelts, while in
many parts of Europe over 90 percent buckle up. That's 20
percent differential in seatbelt usage between us and some
Europeans. It is estimated to cost some 4,000 to 6,000 American
lives. That should not be.
Many of the fatalities and injuries on American roads arise
from vehicle defects. The Ford Firestone case exemplifies that
fact. Just one mandate of the TREAD Act, the early warning
reporting that requires the reporting of vehicle problems to
NHTSA from a variety of sources, including warranty claims and
consumer complaints, I believe, if implemented right, can save
thousands of lives throughout the coming year.
In order for the TREAD Act far-reaching safety effects to
take hold, NHTSA must promulgate regulations that are both true
to the Congressional intent and timely.
We, the Congress, further empower NHTSA with the TREAD Act.
We increase NHTSA's funding by $9.1 million so that it could
implement the Act. Yet, without NHTSA's diligent and
expeditious efforts, we as American drivers will not fully reap
the benefits of this TREAD Act.
Therefore, I'm pleased that NHTSA has completed three final
rules in a timely manner to date. However, I am concerned that
NHTSA has yet to complete 12 final rulemakings, 6 of which are
subject to statutory deadlines, the latest being November 2002.
I recognize that to date, the Agency has issued nine Notice of
Proposed Rulemakings. Still, I agree with the Department of
Transportation Inspector General that the final rules may be
delayed at least with regard to some of the more complex and as
such contentious issues arise. Therefore, unless there are
compelling reasons to the contrary, I request that NHTSA
periodically inform this committee as to its progress on the
various TREAD Act rulemaking.
Let me emphasize that I do appreciate that Congress has
asked NHTSA to undertake a large, and in part, complicated
undertaking. So I do compliment the Agency for its efforts to
this date and in particular, I commend the Agency for its
responsiveness to concerns raised by the Department of
Transportation Inspector General's Report and the OMB.
We have the opportunity at this hearing to explore, in
detail, both the IG's Report and the OMB's evaluation of
NHTSA's tire pressure warning device NPRM.
Clearly, it is important that NHTSA complete its TREAD Act
rulemaking in a timely fashion, since at least with regard to
two rulemakings, one, early warning data reporting; and two,
rollover rating system, I would not want NHTSA to shortchange
the quality of those rules because of time limitations. I'm not
suggesting that NHTSA take its time with these two rulemakings,
but rather I find both the early warning data reporting and
rollover rating system rules extremely important as they
address critical issues and enjoy exceptional complexity.
It is imperative, for example, that NHTSA reach an optimal
rule for the early warning data reporting. NHTSA has to get it
right the first time because this rule is setting a framework.
The extent and quality of data collected and analyzed under
this rule will color all of NHTSA's work for the near future.
If this rule is done right, as I said earlier, it will save
countless lives in years to come. It's that simple.
The object of the rule is not simply to collect more data
sets. We all appreciate the raw data in itself means little. It
is estimated that if NHTSA were to collect all the nearly
warning data as contemplated today, it will become the largest
warehouse of data in the world. Warehousing data doesn't save
lives. NHTSA must carefully consider the type, quality and
relevance of the data collected, the way the data is processed
and catalogued and ultimately analyzed. Injecting the required
intelligence into the processing of each warning data is a
considerable undertaking and as such, NHTSA must be rigorous
when promulgating the early warning rule. And obviously, this
probably will take time.
The fact is that we in Congress can enact many laws such as
TREAD Act, designed to save motorists' lives, yet if such laws
are not implemented properly and enforced rigorously, our
efforts would have been in vain.
And finally, I request that NHTSA submit its study of the
use and effectiveness of booster seats to the subcommittee as
soon as possible as it was due last November.
That study is of particular interest as the committee finds
the booster seat issue of significant importance.
I thank all the witnesses who are appearing today and I
look forward to hearing your testimony and with that, the
distinguished ranking member from New York, Mr. Towns.
Mr. Towns. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. More than 15
months ago in response to the Firestone ATX Wilderness tire
recalls, as well as the thousands of people who were killed and
injured annually in highway tragedies, we came together to
address and pass bipartisan legislation, the Transportation
Recall Enhancement, Accountability, and Documentation.
This public law was enacted with the hope of saving lives
by providing as much vehicle accident information as quickly as
possible to regulators, increasing access to information for
consumers, requiring a tire pressure monitoring system in all
new vehicles, updating standards for tires, mandating child
improvement seats and developing a dynamic rollover test. In
addition, TREAD increased the resources available to the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, as my colleague
from Florida and the chairman of this committee indicated to
highly result in flood of new information that will come in.
These requirements were mandated not to make onerous new
demands on industry, but rather to save lives. Unfortunately,
while we pass this legislation with great hope, to date, 4 of
the 9 statutory deadlines have not been met and the most
difficult and complex rules await final action.
Mr. Chairman, I welcome you calling this hearing and I'm
eager to hear from the witnesses because what we're talking
about here today is saving lives. And I can't think of anything
more important than saving lives.
On that note, I yield back.
Mr. Stearns. I thank my colleague. The gentleman, the
chairman of the Telecommunications Subcommittee who is also
active with the TREAD Act, Mr. Upton from Michigan.
Mr. Upton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I applaud you for
having this hearing today to look at the implementation of the
TREAD Act. I have a full statement that I'll put into the
record, but I'd like to say just a couple of things at the
beginning. As many of you know I was the principal author of
the TREAD Act and as then chairman of the Oversight
Investigation Subcommittee, our role was to identify problems
and then to come back with legislation to make sure that they
never happen again. In the case of the Firestone tire mess, we
saw more than a hundred deaths across the country that were
directly attributable to those tires. And as we began to
examine this situation we found, in fact, that we had not seen
tire standards updated since 1968 and as a young grade schooler
then I can remember changing tires with my dad when we went to
winter tires from the summer tires in Michigan, things like
radials and those types of tires were not there, steel-belted
radials weren't known to exist at that point. And we knew that
when we found these enormous problems, in fact, we needed
legislation to correct it. And that was why we saw tremendous
bipartisan support in terms of the TREAD Act. Then Chairman
Tauzin of this subcommittee worked with us. We worked very
carefully with the Senate, was able to pass this legislation,
as I recall, without a single dissenting vote and it was done.
And now this oversight hearing to look at the implementation of
the TREAD Act and to make sure that, in fact, we don't run into
the same problems that we saw exist prior to the passage of the
TREAD Act.
So I look forward to the testimony, to the work, to make
sure that all travelers on our highways, both drivers and
passengers are going to be ensured of the safer travel and I
look forward to hearing the testimony and asking some questions
and thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and others for going
ahead with this hearing. I yield back the balance of my time.
[The prepaed statement of Hon. Fred Upton follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Fred Upton, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Michigan
During the fall of 2000, I authored the Transportation Recall
Enhancement, Accountability, and Documentation (TREAD) Act in order to
get to the bottom of what is wrong with the faulty tires and what we
need to do to fix them. Congress did this to ensure that no family
would have to endure the same pain as those who have already lost
family members due to these horrific accidents. Mr. Chairman I am very
pleased that we are holding this hearing today in order to address the
implementation of the T.R.E.A.D. Act.
I am glad to see the good work of this committee and Congress and
that the T.R.E.A.D. Act was able to expose flaws, so that in fact we
could take faulty tires away from people who might have had used them.
I believe it is important to note that this law has been both effective
and positive.
As the Administration continues the rule making process I would
like to give them my full support. I would certainly like to reiterate
the prominent issue of the law, to ensure the safety of American
consumers. In addition, I would like to take this opportunity to remind
them that this law needs be implemented fully, effectively, and
expediently. I look forward to further hearings and will personally
continue to follow this process.
Mr. Stearns. And I thank my colleague who again was the
author of the TREAD Act and for all the work that he did in the
last session.
I believe the ranking member of the full committee, Mr.
Dingell is here and is recognized for an opening statement.
Mr. Dingell. Mr. Chairman, first of all, I thank you for
holding this hearing and I commend you. The questions that lie
before us are very important. The tire safety issue that caused
this committee and the Congress to enact the TREAD Act in
November 2000 remains a real concern today. It is important
that the provisions of the TREAD Act be carried out as intended
by the Congress.
I am going to observe that I am extremely discouraged,
however, that nothing much appears to have changed in the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, NHTSA, since
the TREAD Act became law. Prior to the TREAD Act, NHTSA was
awash in information, including information about defective
Firestone tires. The information was filed away and not used.
The NHTSA appears today to be awash in information. We're not
sure whether the information has been filed away or what has
been done with it. In any event, not much does seem to have
been done in a way which would contribute to safety on the
highways. This is, was and will be a wholly unacceptable way
for NHTSA to do its business and the committee clearly said so
before at the time the TREAD Act was considered. I had hoped
that that warning would be a measure which would dictate to
NHTSA that they should do things differently and should begin a
new, vigorous and intelligent approach to their
responsibilities.
As a result, I would note the fundamental purpose of the
TREAD Act was to change the way NHTSA handled safety
investigations. It is not good enough that NHTSA has only
access to information about possible safety problems. What must
happen is that NHTSA must actually evaluate the information it
receives and see that it receives proper information. And it
then must determine what action and whether action is needed.
Nevertheless, the Department of Transportation's Inspector
General says that NHTSA continuously fails to read and react to
the information it receives. Information unused, is of course,
quite without value, quite worthless and either is a policy or
is a law enforcement matter.
In its report issued on January 3, 2002, the Inspector
General had some interesting things to say and I quote, ``the
success of the TREAD Act will ultimately rise or fall on the
quality and the usefulness of new information system and the
ODI's''--that's the Office of Defect Investigations--``ability
to identify potential defects.'' And according to the Inspector
General, NHTSA's plans for its new information system and I
here will quote from the report again to be, and I quote,
``fully operational by fall of 2002 is at risk because of the
poor project planning and management.'' The Inspector General
went on to say that NHTSA cannot identify safety defects in a
timely manner because it has, and I quote again, ``an
unstructured approach for analyzing data and determining if a
potential defect exists and warrants further investigation.''
So here we are, a year and a half after the TREAD Act was
enacted and NHTSA still has no methodology for analyzing
complaints. NHTSA is on the verge of requiring thousands of
motor vehicle and equipment manufacturers, both foreign and
domestic, to provide it with all kinds of information,
including every customer complaint and handwritten field
reports. According to some, NHTSA will be sitting on top of the
world's largest data base outside the military, and yet, NHTSA
still has not set up methods and procedures for evaluating
safety administration.
I think we can all be disappointed at this situation. I had
hoped that NHTSA would understand and appreciate the deep
concerns of the committee and the Congress. I thought NHTSA was
committed to making changes that would allow it to identify and
to respond to safety problems because they're the agency that
we have set up to address those kinds of questions.
I look forward to hearing the Administrator explain why the
Agency decided against developing a methodology for analyzing
complaints. I fully appreciate that it takes money,
sophisticated talent, a high degree of cooperation with the
manufacturers to establish a new and effective information
system to evaluate the massive quantity of new information
NHTSA will receive. In the TREAD Act hearings, I repeatedly
asked the Agency to identify for us the additional resources
they would need to do this job properly. The only response was
that it could be done with minimal new funds. I think that that
may be a little bit like the story of Cinderella. In any event,
an old adage is that you get what you pay for. It seems
appropriate here.
The Inspector General expresses concerns about NHTSA's
plans for a new system which will use off-the-shelf software
and which is only going to cost $5 million over a 3-year
period. I think that we should all share the concern expressed
by the Inspector General and this may be another fairy tale for
us and may lead us to more risk for the American public and
more trouble for the industry because NHTSA is not going to be
able to respond to its responsibilities under the law.
We need a system that works. We don't need one which is
cheap. It has to work. Without an effective data management
system and without plans to use that effective data management
system well and wisely, the TREAD Act simply cannot be fully
implemented and most importantly, injuries and fatalities will
continue to occur. And these are injuries and fatalities that
NHTSA should be able to prevent.
I urge NHTSA to give its new data system the attention and
to seek the resources necessary to make it the accident
prevention tool that Congress intended it to be.
I look forward to what the hearings develop, but I do so,
Mr. Chairman, without great comfort. Thank you.
Mr. Stearns. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from
Illinois, Mr. Shimkus.
Mr. Shimkus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you
for bringing up the child safety seat issue, Rule 14H and 14I
that were due in November. That was a provision that we had
worked on and I hope we see some rapid movement on that.
The second thing is I've always been somewhat concerned
about some bias within DOT or NHTSA with respect to motorcycle
riders and there is a feeling out there that this new--the tire
act will be used to promulgate rules and standards on
motorcycle equipment, helmets and outerwear which when Congress
has an intent to do that we will pass legislation to direct
that. This is not a time to use the regulatory power or
authority in which to manipulate Congressional intent. I was
the author of the child safety seat legislation. We
specifically put it in the legislation. There was no intent in
this legislation to address motorcycle outerwear and we will be
following that closely.
Third thing is there is a concern by the industry on the
tire identification number being required on both sides of the
tire. There is some safety implications to workers in the
facilities. I'm going to tour a facility in my District within
the next week because of removing the plates, the hot and cold
aspects of tires. There's got to be a better way and I hope
that you all look diligently to find that.
And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time.
Mr. Stearns. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from
Tennessee, Mr. Gordon.
Mr. Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Many of my concerns
have been addressed in earlier remarks, so I will make my
remarks part of the record and then would like to have some
questions to this panel at a later date.
Mr. Stearns. Okay. The gentleman also from Tennessee, Mr.
Bryant.
Mr. Bryant. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I too appreciate
you having these hearings. Certainly the last time we had
hearings along these lines in the TREAD Act it was certainly a
period in which we were experiencing some defects across the
country with our tires.
Both Mr. Gordon and I represent, or actually he represents
one of the Firestone plants and the headquarters is up in
Tennessee also and I recall vividly their role in this and
certainly their contribution in terms of the legislation itself
and their support, there are some amendments of this bill,
particularly with the collection and destruction processes
involved in some of their tires that were affected by the
recall. But I look forward to hearing from the witnesses today
about this bill and how it's worked so far.
In enacting legislation there's always kinks to be worked
out and changes that need to be made during the process. I
think once fully enacted NHTSA is going to be receiving a great
deal of data and it's important that a uniform and organized
system be utilized to organize this data.
There's also controversy over what the standard for tire
pressure monitoring systems should be. I look forward to
hearing from our witnesses regarding their thoughts on the
standard of alerting a driver of a tire pressure and possible
deflation. I also understand that NHTSA is in the process of
possibly changing the rollover resistance ratings. There are
significant differences between the static stability factor
method and the dynamic reliever test and I'd like to hear about
the benefits that these witnesses believe one method has over
the other.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on all of
these issues today.
All that said, I like many others on this committee have
other hearings also going on at the same time, so we are forced
to go in and out and will be in between these hearings so there
may be times that I will be out and won't be able to hear all
of this testimony that I'm looking forward to hearing. So I
will try to follow your written transcript of this hearing as
well and I thank you, gentlemen, for being here today and
again, I thank our Chairman for this very distinguished panel
of witnesses today.
Thank you.
Mr. Stearns. I thank my colleague and we're welcoming also
Mr. Sawyer from Ohio who is a member of the full committee, but
not a member of the subcommittee and he's welcome to have an
opening statement.
Mr. Sawyer. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the
opportunity to participate in this way. You're very generous
with the time of this subcommittee. I also want to echo what
we've heard from others commending you for your diligence in
making sure that we don't just enact bills requiring regulatory
action, but that we continue to monitor and evaluate the law's
implementation.
Let me also suggest that I share the concern that others
have expressed that NHTSA may be underestimating the time and
cost to develop the data base that will be required to handle
this enormous amount of information. It strikes me that a $5
million off-the-shelf system just does not seem adequate and
that we run the risk of what we talked about in the earlier
hearings of a data dump that undermines the value of whatever
information we have.
With regard to specific rulemakings, I have some
reservations that we may not actually be protecting consumers.
It seems to me that it has been lost in NHTSA's internal debate
about whether to use direct or indirect monitoring systems, the
question of whether allowing motorists to ride on tires that
are 25 percent under inflated is itself safe. The rule, it
seems to me would allow perhaps up to half the motorists on the
rode to operate their vehicles below safe inflation rate. The
problem is not one of immediate failure, but rather of
cumulative damage. It's a problem that over time would allow a
tire to fail catastrophically. What's more important even that
that, however, is the fact that an accurate early warning
system is critical because it may actually encourage drivers to
drive for longer periods of time on under inflated tires and
thereby risk their safety due to that cumulative damage.
I'm not so concerned about which system is chosen, but
rather that we recognize that the tolerances are not very
great.
Finally, just let me say that I share with others the
concern that they've expressed about the tire labeling rule.
The question of whether we are actually increasing safety in
any substantial way by requiring the tire identification number
on both sides of the mold is questionable. We do know, however,
that that requirement will pose substantial safety risk to
workers and/or very substantial cost and loss of productive
time to manufacturers for a minimal gain in consumer awareness.
The descriptions that Mr. Bryant offered about workers climbing
into 300 degree molds in order to change the numbers once a
week seems to me is very problematic.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the change to be
here. I will submit my full statement for the record and thank
you for the opportunity to make these comments today.
Mr. Stearns. And I thank my colleague and we also welcome
the gentle lady from Colorado, Ms. DeGette, for her opening
statement.
Ms. Degette. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Towns apologizes
for having to leave, but I'm always happy to pinch hit for him
and I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
hearing. I know a lot of the issues that I cover in my opening
statement have been covered by the panel here this morning, so
let me just say that I'm really pleased we're having this
hearing today to talk about what has happened with
implementation of TREAD Act.
I'm also concerned about child restraints and I realize
that we haven't had a full recommendation on this, but I look
forward to that recommendation in November. As the mother of
two young children who are now getting older, I know how
important child restraints are and I look forward to hearing
these recommendations.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I'll submit the rest of my opening
statement for the record and I'm eager to hear the witnesses
today.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Diana DeGette follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Diana DeGette, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Colorado
I want to thank you Mr. Chairman for holding this hearing, and I
want to thank our witnesses for being here today. I recognize that the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has worked under
considerable time pressure and appreciate their expedited review of
these critical issues.
This is an excellent opportunity to determine what has been
achieved since Congress passed the TREAD, or Transportation Recall
Enhancement, Accountability and Documentation, Act. The most important
duty of this subcommittee is to ensure consumer protection. I am
therefore glad to hear of NHTSA's progress in addressing the automobile
safety concerns that were first raised following the Firestone ATX and
Wilderness tire recalls. This is also the time to determine what
challenges remain in the implementation of the TREAD Act.
Early detection of dangerous patterns of tire and automobile
defects can save lives. With this in mind, the TREAD Act has introduced
provisions that will require vehicle and equipment manufacturers to
report information regarding warranty adjustments, injuries and
fatalities to NHTSA. By any account, these new reporting requirements
will result in an enormous amount of information. It is believed that
NHTSA's database will be the largest database in the world. In the
world. How will NHTSA manage this information? What plans are in place
to ensure that the data is thoroughly analyzed? This early warning
provision is at the heart of the TREAD Act, so it is vitally important
that NHTSA have in place information systems to handle this gigantic
influx of information.
We will also discuss the recommendations for tire pressure
monitoring systems. Underinflated tires present a significant hazard.
NHTSA was charged with examining the two types of systems for
monitoring tire pressure currently available: indirect and direct.
Which system is ultimately chosen will significantly impact the auto
industry, as well as consumers.
Obviously an issue that is of great concern to all of us here is
child restraints. I realize that you have not issued your full
recommendations on this, but I look forward to your report, which is
due this November.
And finally, there is the question of how to best test and predict
vehicle rollover resistance. NHTSA was instructed to develop a dynamic
test of vehicle rollover, again by this November. The National Academy
of Sciences' recent recommendations support this development to
supplement the current testing NHTSA performs. I know that there are
substantial hurdles to actualizing this test and I anticipate hearing
about the challenges and suggestions for overcoming them.
Again, I look forward to hearing from all of our witnesses and I
welcome the healthy debate that will ensue.
Mr. Stearns. By unanimous consent, so ordered.
[Additional statement submitted for the record follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. W.J. ``Billy'' Tauzin, Chairman, Committee
on Commerce
Thank you, Mr. Chairman for calling this important hearing today. I
would like to begin by welcoming the NHTSA Administrator, Dr. Jeffrey
Runge, to our Committee. This is your first time testifying before us,
and I find it quite fitting that your testimony here today is on the
implementation of such a significant piece of safety legislation--the
TREAD Act.
The Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability, and
Documentation Act, or ``TREAD'' Act, was one of the most important
pieces of legislation this Committee produced in the 106th Congress.
The Act revolutionized how NHTSA will collect, analyze and assimilate
data and established new safety standards that will improve protection
of the driving public.
As we evaluate the agency's compliance with TREAD, we cannot forget
why we are here, and what spawned this legislation. Our hearings in the
106th Congress confirmed that Firestone tires were de-treading at
unusually high rates, causing rollovers that injured, and in many cases
killed, the vehicle's occupants. Because of this safety defect, more
than 13 million Firestone tires were recalled at a cost of nearly $3
billion--and more than 200 people needlessly lost their lives.
During our Firestone hearings, we learned a couple of things.
First, it was clear that the data available to NHTSA regarding
Firestone's tread-separation problems were woefully insufficient.
Although testimony showed that the agency had received complaints about
the tires, both from consumers and from an insurance company, it did
not receive data about Ford's foreign recall actions or the internal
company claims data related to these accidents.
Second, it was clear that NHTSA did not effectively use the data it
did have to spot tire-failure trends. Indeed, NHTSA admitted that it
needed to review and revise its own policies for evaluating its data.
In response to these problems, we passed the TREAD Act to prevent this
kind of disaster from happening again.
So, how is NHTSA doing? As can be expected, it is doing well in
some areas, and could improve in others. One rulemaking that has
received significant attention is the tire-pressure monitoring rule. As
part of the TREAD Act, we required that NHTSA draft a regulation that
would require manufacturers to install tire pressure monitoring
systems, which that tell a driver when a tire is significantly under
inflated.
As NHTSA will tell us today, there are two different systems on the
market that can do this: direct and indirect. NHTSA's draft final rule
required the use of a direct monitoring system, after a four-year
phase-in period. While more expensive than an indirect monitoring
system, the direct system offers significant benefits. Namely, it will
alert a driver when all four tires have become under inflated at the
same rate, or when two tires on the same axel have become under
inflated at the same rate. The indirect system, at this point, does
not, and cannot, detect these kind of under-inflation situations.
According to NHTSA, there may be reason for concern about this:
2.8% of cars, and nearly 4% of light trucks had all four tires under-
inflated by at least 25% of the recommended tire pressure. Now that
doesn't sound like a lot of vehicles, but it totals approximately seven
million vehicles. That's more than the number of people who live in
entire state of Louisiana!
Allowing the use of an indirect tire pressure monitoring system
would leave these 7 million vehicles without any tire pressure warning,
which is simply unacceptable and not consistent with the TREAD Act.
The TREAD Act required this rule to be completed on November 1,
2001. NHTSA sent a draft final rule to OMB in December, but in
February, OMB sent the draft rule back to NHTSA with some concerns
indicating that perhaps OMB preferred the indirect to the direct
monitoring system. But safety has to be the number one concern at
NHTSA, and certainly when we passed the TREAD Act, the safety of the
driving public was our primary goal. Protecting some cars, but not
others, was not what we intended when we drafted the tire pressure
monitoring rule.
I understand that OMB and NHTSA may be on the verge of reaching an
agreement on the language of this rule. And I am glad this rule is
close to seeing the light of day. I do continue to have concerns,
however: OMB is not an agency with vehicle safety expertise. So I hope
that it will be cautious when it decides to wade into vehicle safety
debates.
Again, I welcome our witnesses and I look forward to hearing about
the implementation of this very important Act. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Stearns. Now we look forward to hearing from the
testimony of our witness list. Dr. Jeffrey Runge, Administrator
of National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Department
of Transportation. Welcome. The Honorable John D. Graham,
Administrator, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs,
Office of Management and Budget. I welcome you. And the
Honorable Kenneth Mead, Inspector General, Department of
Transportation, Office of Inspector General. Mr. Mead, we will
welcome you.
Mr. Runge, we'll start with you for your opening statement.
STATEMENTS OF HON. JEFFREY W. RUNGE, ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL
HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION; HON. JOHN D. GRAHAM, ADMINISTRATOR, OFFICE OF
INFORMATION AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND
BUDGET; AND HON. KENNETH M. MEAD, INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Mr. Runge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
subcommittee. I am Jeff Runge, the new Administrator of
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. I welcome the
opportunity to report on where we are with implementation of
the TREAD Act.
The TREAD Act, as you know, challenged NHTSA to do a lot of
work. It required us to complete 15 separate rulemaking
actions, 3 reports, 2 studies and 1 strategic plan. Many of
those actions had tight deadlines, some as short as 30 days,
but even so we are well on our way to accomplishing all the
TREAD Act requirements.
First I want to report on the actions we have taken under
the TREAD Act to improve our defects program and then I'll
report on actions taken to improve our safety standards and
regulations.
Within the defects program, the key TREAD Act provision
gives us the authority to establish an Early Warning Reporting
System. When the rule is final, motor vehicle and equipment
manufacturers will be required to report a wide variety of
information and relevant documents to us periodically.
In January 2001, we began gathering information about early
warning with an advance notice of proposed rulemaking. We
received numerous comments from many constituencies that needed
to be considered and many were integrated into a notice of
proposed rulemaking in December 2001. The NPRM proposed
requiring all manufacturers of motor vehicles and equipment to
submit information on the claims and notices they receive about
deaths and injuries allegedly caused by defects in their
products. Manufacturers of 500 or more vehicles annually and
all child restraint and tire manufacturers would have to submit
information about injuries and statistical data about consumer
complaints, warranty claims, property damage claims and field
reports. The NPRM's comment period closed just 3 weeks ago on
February 4. We were complimented on our responsiveness to the
early comments and expect to issue the final rule by the June
30, 2002 deadline.
The TREAD Act also requires manufacturers to notify us
about safety recalls and similar campaigns in foreign
countries. In October 2001, we issued the NPRM and the comment
period ended in December. The TREAD Act set no deadline for
this rule, but for simplicity we plan to issue it at the same
time as the early warning rule in June.
We're also working hard to restructure the process we use
for defects investigation. The TREAD Act has enabled us to hire
additional investigators, to double the number of screeners and
to establish a single point of contact for much outside
reporting.
One of Congress' primary concerns has been the Office of
Defects Investigation's information, storage and management
system. Through provisions of the TREAD Act, we are developing
a new state-of-the-art data warehouse to process early warning
information and to better manage ODI's data.
We have worked intensively thus far with the Volpe National
Transportation Systems Center to ensure that this system will
address our needs and we expect to have it online, on schedule
and under budget by the end of this year. Throughout the past
year, we have been in frequent contact with the DOT's Office of
Inspector General, Ken Mead, regarding these issues.
Senator McCain asked the IG to analyze our investigation
processes and to evaluate their effectiveness in identifying
vehicle safety problems. We also looked to the IG to provide a
review of the defects investigation process called for by the
TREAD Act. After the IG's report was released in January, we
reported on these matters to this committee and to the Senate
committee on January 31. In brief, we concur with all of the
recommendations in the IG's report. We have already implemented
many of the recommendations, including the creation of a panel
to formalize the review of the issues our screeners have
identified as possible safety defects. We've also hired a
contractor in response to the IG's recommendation for
independent review of the development of the new data
management system to augment our internal control processes.
On the tire issue, the TREAD Act directs us to conduct
several actions to improve the safety of tires. Our NPRM to
require a warning system to indicate when a tire is
significantly under inflated was published on July 26, 2001.
The NPRM drew extensive comments and we've sought to resolve
the issues raised by the comments. We sent the final rule to
OMB on December 18, 2001, and on February 12, OMB returned the
rule for reconsideration, based on some concerns it had
identified. We've been working together on agreement with OMB
and expect to have that completed within a few days.
On the issue of tire endurance and resistance, we submitted
an NPRM on performance improvements to OMB on December 17. OMB
cleared the NPRM yesterday and it is up and available on the
NHTSA website this morning.
On tire labeling, we issued the NPRM in December 2001 and
the comment period closed on February 19. There were comments
that noted worker safety hazards and we are evaluating those
comments. In fact, I have plans to visit a tire plant myself,
actually three tire plants in April. We expect to meet the June
1, 2002 deadline as well for this rulemaking.
The TREAD Act also requires us to take two other important
regulatory actions concerning vehicle rollover and child
restraints and Mr. Chairman, I see my light is red, so I have
them in my written comments or I can continue, if you like.
Mr. Stearns. Well, is it possible you can just summarize a
little bit? I'll give you 30 to 40 seconds.
Mr. Runge. Thanks. On rollover, the TREAD Act directs us to
develop a dynamic test by November 1 of this year and to
conduct rulemaking to determine the best way to inform the
public about our test results. Our request for comments, issued
last July 3, described a number of driving maneuver tests from
which we expect to select a test to compare the rollover
resistance of motor vehicles. We expect to issue a second
notice this spring describing our tentative choice of a test
procedure. After considering the comments on this notice, we
will issue a final notice in October 2002. That notice will
describe the final test procedure along with an initial set of
ratings on rollover resistance.
With respect to child restraints, TREAD Act directs us to
consider many performance elements and testing requirements. We
sent an NPRM on child safety performance to OMB for review and
we will be reporting to Congress about some elements for which
insufficient data exists. We expect to issue a final rule by
November 1 of this year.
On the matter of labeling, our NPRM for labeling
improvements was issued on October 29 and we expect to issue
the final rule again by TREAD's November 1, 2002 deadline.
On the rating system to help purchasers compare restraint
systems, we examined the rating systems developed by other
countries and some organizations and we conducted our own
performance testing. The request for comments was issued on
October 29 and we expect to have this implemented by the
November 2002 deadline.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my oral testimony. You have my
written testimony for the record.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Jeffrey W. Runge follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Jeffrey W. Runge, Administrator, National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to speak about the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration's (NHTSA) implementation of the Transportation Recall
Enhancement, Accountability, and Documentation (TREAD) Act.
The TREAD Act was enacted on November 1, 2000, as a direct
consequence of hearings before the Committee on Energy and Commerce on
the safety of Firestone tires and related matters. In the course of the
hearings, the Committee determined that NHTSA could have detected the
problems with the tires sooner if it had obtained reports about the
tires' problems in a timelier manner.
The TREAD Act therefore contains provisions requiring vehicle and
equipment manufacturers to report periodically to NHTSA on a wide
variety of information that could indicate the existence of a potential
safety defect and to advise NHTSA of foreign safety recalls and other
safety campaigns. The Act increases civil penalties for violations of
the vehicle safety law and provides criminal penalties for misleading
the Secretary about safety defects that have caused death or injury. It
authorizes the Secretary to require a manufacturer to accelerate its
program for remedying a defect or noncompliance if there is a risk of
serious injury or death, and requires that manufacturers must have a
plan for reimbursing owners who incur the cost of a remedy before being
notified by the manufacturer. It also prohibits the sale of motor
vehicle equipment, including a tire, for installation on a motor
vehicle if the equipment is the subject of a defect or noncompliance
recall. In a remedy program involving tires, the manufacturer must
include a plan that prevents replaced tires from being resold for use
on motor vehicles. The Act also directs the Secretary to undertake a
comprehensive review of the way in which NHTSA determines whether to
open a defect or noncompliance investigation.
In addition, the TREAD Act directs the Secretary to conduct
rulemaking actions to revise and update the Federal motor vehicle
safety standards for tires, to improve labeling on tires, and to
require a system in new motor vehicles that warns the operator when a
tire is significantly underinflated. The Act also directs the Secretary
to develop a dynamic rollover test for motor vehicles, to carry out a
program of dynamic rollover tests, and to disseminate the results to
the public.
An extensive provision on child restraints requires that the
Secretary undertake a comprehensive review of the safety of child
restraints, upgrade the safety standard for child restraints where
appropriate, establish a rating system for child restraints, study the
effectiveness of automobile booster seats for children, and establish a
plan for saving lives and reducing injuries through the use of booster
seats.
As this brief summary makes clear, the TREAD Act challenged us to
do a lot of work. It requires us to complete 15 separate rulemaking
actions, three reports, two studies, and one strategic plan. Many of
the required actions had tight deadlines, some as short as 30 days.
Some of these actions had not been on our agenda before the TREAD Act,
so we had to accomplish the TREAD actions without compromising our work
on other priority actions.
Thanks to the additional resources the TREAD Act gave us, we are
well on our way to accomplishing all of the goals of the Act's
requirements. First, I will report on the actions we are taking that
relate to the defects investigation program, and then on our actions to
amend and adopt safety standards and regulations.
Defects Investigation
On our actions to improve safety defect investigations, we have met
all the rulemaking deadlines in the TREAD Act and are in the final
stages of implementing other provisions that do not contain such
deadlines.
Within the defects program, the key TREAD Act provision gives us
the authority to issue a final rule that establishes an Early Warning
Reporting System. When this rule is final, motor vehicle and motor
vehicle equipment manufacturers would be required to report a wide
variety of information and to submit relevant documents to us
periodically. In the past, our decisions on whether to open defect
investigations have primarily been based on complaints we receive from
consumers. Our efforts to identify potential defects in a timely manner
have been hampered by an inability to obtain relevant information in
the possession of the manufacturers. Experience has shown that
manufacturers often obtain information suggesting the existence of a
safety-related problem months, and sometimes years, before consumer
complaints to NHTSA indicate a potential problem.
In January 2001, we issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking
to begin implementing the early warning requirement. We followed this
with a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) in December 2001. The
comment period for the NPRM closed on February 4, 2002. We are
currently reviewing the over 50 comments received on the NPRM. We fully
expect to issue our final rule by the June 30, 2002 deadline.
We have proposed to require all manufacturers of motor vehicles and
motor vehicle equipment to submit information about claims and notices
they receive about deaths and injuries that are allegedly due to
defects in their products. Manufacturers of 500 or more vehicles
annually and all child restraint and tire manufacturers would also have
to submit, with minor exceptions, statistical data about consumer
complaints, warranty claims, property damage claims, and field reports.
We believe that these submissions will help us identify potential
safety defects in a timely manner, without unduly burdening the
manufacturers.
The TREAD Act requires manufacturers to notify the Secretary of
safety recalls and similar campaigns in foreign countries. In October
2001, we issued a NPRM prescribing the contents of the notifications.
The comment period on the NPRM ended in December 2001, and we are
currently reviewing the 20 comments received on the NPRM. We have also
issued final rules to implement the civil and criminal penalty
provisions and NPRMs to implement the other defect-related provisions
noted earlier. On all these matters, we expect to issue final rules
within the next few months.
As we develop the early warning reporting requirements, we also are
working hard to restructure the process we use for defects
investigation. The TREAD Act has enabled us to hire additional
investigators, doubled the numbers of screeners, and established a
single point of contact for outside reporting. All of this information
will be entered into the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI)
database, where all screeners and investigators will have access to it.
To improve ODI's outdated information storage and management system
and to handle the large volume of information that will be submitted
under the early warning rule, we have contracted with the Volpe
National Transportation Systems Center (Volpe) to design and implement
a new state-of-the-art data warehouse. We have worked intensively with
Volpe and its subcontractors to ensure that this system will address
our needs, and we expect to have it on-line, on schedule and under
budget, by the end of this year. When the new system becomes
operational, we believe it will enable us to manage and effectively
utilize the early warning reporting data.
Throughout the past year, we have been in communication with the
Department's Office of the Inspector General (OIG), which was asked by
Senator McCain to analyze ODI's investigative processes and evaluate
their effectiveness in identifying vehicle safety problems. As
Secretary Mineta advised the Committee on January 31, 2002, we looked
to the OIG to provide the comprehensive review of ODI's work that
Section 15(a) of the TREAD Act directed us to conduct. After the OIG
released its report on January 3, 2002, we completed our reporting
requirement under Section 15 with a supplementary letter to the
chairman and ranking member of the relevant House and Senate
committees.
The Inspector General is here this morning to share his findings
with you. But I want to state that we have concurred in all of the
recommendations in his report and, in fact, have already implemented
many of them, including the creation of a panel to review the issues
our screeners have evaluated as possible safety defects. We have also
hired a contractor, in response to the OIG's recommendation for an
independent review of the project to develop the new data management
system.
Mr. Chairman, I believe we are implementing the TREAD Act
requirements in a way that will significantly improve our ability to
detect safety defects on a timely basis.
Tire-related Regulatory Actions
The TREAD Act directs us to conduct several actions to improve the
safety of tires, including rulemaking to improve the endurance and
resistance standards for tires, to improve the information labels on
tires, and to require a warning system to indicate to drivers when a
tire is significantly underinflated.
We completed the testing and preparatory work and submitted an NPRM
proposing several tire performance improvements to the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) on December 17, 2001. We received clearance
from OMB on February 22, and we are now preparing the NPRM for
issuance. Completing this rulemaking as quickly as possible is one of
my highest priorities.
NHTSA issued an NPRM on tire information labeling in December 2001.
The comment period closed on February 19, 2002. We are reviewing the
comments on the NPRM and expect to meet the June 1, 2002 deadline for
this rulemaking. The improved information resulting from this rule
should make it easier for consumers to find and understand safety
information about their tires.
The NPRM to require a warning system to indicate to vehicle
operators when a tire is significantly underinflated was published on
July 26, 2001. The NPRM drew extensive comments. We have sought to
resolve the issues raised by the comments and devise a system that will
meet the intent of the TREAD Act in a manner that best serves safety.
In the belief that we had devised such a system, we sent a final rule
to OMB on December 18, 2001. On February 12, 2002, OMB returned the
rule to us for reconsideration based on concerns it had identified.
When we received OMB's return letter, we immediately began examining
the issues it raised. Completing this rulemaking as quickly as possible
is one of my highest priorities.
Other Regulatory Actions
The TREAD Act also requires us to address two other aspects of
motor vehicle safety. Section 12 of the Act requires us to develop a
dynamic test of vehicle rollover by November 1, 2002, and to conduct
rulemaking to determine how best to disseminate test results to the
public. Section 14 of the Act contains several directives relating to
the improvement of child restraint systems.
NHTSA issued a request for comments on dynamic rollover testing on
July 3, 2001. In our notice, we described a number of driving maneuver
tests from which we expect to select a test to used to compare the
rollover resistance of motor vehicles. The notice discussed the
strengths and weaknesses of the various tests, and explained our
rationale for preferring a driving maneuver test to other types of
dynamic tests, such as centrifuge tests. We are now completing our
review of the issues raised by the comments and expect to issue a
second notice this spring describing our tentative choice of a test
procedure. After we consider the comments on this second notice, we
plan to issue a final notice in the fall of 2002 describing the final
test procedure along with an initial set of rollover resistance
ratings.
Less than two weeks ago, NHTSA received the National Academy of
Sciences' (NAS) report on dynamic testing for rollover resistance, as
required by the DOT Appropriations Act for 2001 (P.L. 106-346). The
report suggests that the agency consider supplementing the static
stability factor test for rollover consumer information with the
results of dynamic rollover tests. The National Academy concluded that
this broader look at rollover performance would give a more robust
consumer-rating program. The report had other findings not related to
dynamic rollover testing. We are currently reviewing all of the
report's findings and we will provide our formal response.
Section 14 requires us to address several issues relating to child
restraints, including improved restraint performance, better labeling,
and a rating system to enable purchasers to compare restraints. Each of
these issues was to be addressed in rulemaking actions that were to
begin by November 1, 2001, and conclude by November 1, 2002.
We issued an NPRM on October 29, 2001, proposing better and simpler
labeling for child restraints. The changes include requirements for
molding some information into the restraint's shell to improve
durability, for better placement of some labels, for a uniform font for
all labels, for white labels with black text, and for color-coded
installation information to distinguish forward-facing from rear-facing
information. We anticipate issuing a final rule to improve labels
before the November 1, 2002 deadline.
To develop a rating system for child restraints, we examined the
existing rating systems that other countries and organizations have
developed and conducted our own performance testing. In our request for
comments issued on October 29, 2001, we stated that we had tentatively
concluded that the best rating system is one that combines information
about a restraint's ease of use with information about its dynamic
performance obtained through higher-speed sled testing or in-vehicle
testing through our existing New Car Assessment Program (NCAP). We are
also considering using both higher-speed sled tests and NCAP tests. We
are reviewing the comments we received and expect to implement the
rating system by the November 1, 2002 deadline.
To upgrade the performance requirements of the Federal motor
vehicle safety standard on child restraints, we had to examine a
standard whose requirements have gone through continual review and
significant change in the last several years. In an effort to make it
easier to secure child restraints properly in motor vehicles, we
recently upgraded the standard to require uniform attachment features
and required light-duty motor vehicles to be equipped with anchorages
that will accommodate these features. We will propose to require some
of the performance elements listed in Section 14 in an NPRM. However,
on several of the elements, for which there are uncertainties about the
appropriateness of rulemaking, at least at this time, we will issue an
advance notice of proposed rulemaking requesting comments. Section 14
requires us to submit a report to Congress if we decide not to
incorporate any of the listed elements in a final rule. Before we can
decide what should be included in a final rule, we must first obtain
and carefully consider comments from the public.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my overview of our actions to
implement the TREAD Act. The Act has challenged us, but I believe that
we are meeting the challenge and that our actions will improve safety
on the nation's highways. I will be glad to answer any questions you
may have.
Mr. Stearns. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Graham.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. GRAHAM
Mr. Graham. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
members of the committee, for the opportunity to be here. Let
me introduce myself. I was a faculty member at the Harvard
School of Public Health for about 17 years before joining the
Bush Administration in the Office of Management and Budget. It
turns out during that period I had the opportunity develop a
great admiration of Dr. Runge's work in the field of trauma
care and it was a wonderful surprise for me to learn that we
were going to get to know each other a little better in a very
different capacity. I look forward to the opportunity to work
with him and we're already making some significant progress.
I'd also like to add that OMB supports the TREAD Act and
we've been working very aggressively, as Dr. Runge indicated,
for prompt implementation of the TREAD Act. I would also like
to note that my role at OMB given to me by the President is to
assure that all significant regulations by agencies, including
NHTSA, have sound science and economics behind them and that's
the review role that we play for the President.
I would like to say a few things about the process of OMB
review. First, we cover all significant regulatory actions that
are designated as such under Executive Order 12866. We have a
90-day review period. I insist that my staff give a response to
agencies within that 90-day review period. And in cases of a
statutory deadline, which is quite relevant in the TREAD Act
situation, we engage in expedited review of agency proposals.
In my written testimony to you I have provided information on
the promptness with which OMB has responded to NHTSA's request
for OMB review. There are also cases of Court ordered deadlines
and hopefully we won't get to that in the case of the TREAD
Act, but in those situations we try to respond on the order of
the days to help agencies meet the Court deadlines they face.
The outcomes of any OMB review are one of three
possibilities. We clear the rule, the agency withdraws the
rule, or we return the rule to the agency for reconsideration.
Since I was confirmed in September, I have returned 17
rules to various regulators throughout the Federal Government
because of an inadequate scientific and economic basis for the
conclusions that they have drawn. In five of those cases thus
far, the agencies have improved their analysis, improved the
rulemaking package, resubmitted it to OMB and it has been
cleared. We expect those instances will happen more in the
future.
Let me talk specifically about the tire pressure monitoring
system rule. OMB recognizes not only the statutory mandate, but
the good policy sense behind the idea of a tire pressure
monitoring system rule. So there's no disagreement about
whether there should be a rule. There are some technical issues
that we're working out.
We also have an agreement for model years 2004 to 2006 that
each vehicle that is manufactured and sold in this country
should meet either a one-tire or a four-tire pressure
monitoring standard.
The concerns we have raised in the return letter which we
shared with the committee and in my written testimony are what
we should be doing for model years 2007 and beyond. Should we
decide that now or should we gather some additional data before
we make that decision?
The concerns we have are as follows. First, we agree with
NHTSA that the four-tire standard provides better tire-related
safety than the one-tire standard. However, we assert that
there is reason to believe that the one-tire standard may
encourage more vehicles to be equipped with anti-lock braking
systems and, while the evidence on the safety of anti-lock
brakes is not definitive, there is suggestive evidence that
those systems, in fact, reduce risk of death and injury to
drivers, particularly drivers who learn how to use those
systems properly.
Second of all, we have concerns that the benefits analysis
which NHTSA has done may have some unsupported assumptions and
some questionable data that we understand NHTSA is working on
right now. In summary, we've been doing a rigorous review of
the tire pressure monitoring system rule. We did it very
promptly under the circumstances and as Dr. Runge noted, we are
very close to an agreement on that particular rule.
Thank you very much for the opportunity to be here today.
[The prepared statement of Hon. John D. Graham follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. John D. Graham, Administrator, Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget
Mr. Chairman, and Members of this Subcommittee, thank you for
inviting me to this hearing. I am John D. Graham, Ph.D., Administrator
of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in the
Office of Management and Budget. My testimony will (1) explain the role
that OMB plays in reviewing proposed and final regulations under
Executive Order (E.O.) 12866, (2) describe the role we have played in
reviewing rules issued by NHTSA pursuant to the Transportation Recall
Enhancement, Accountability and Documentation (TREAD) Act of 2000, and
(3) explain why we recently asked NHTSA to reconsider a draft final
rule on tire pressure monitoring systems (TPMSs).
I am especially pleased to testify at the same hearing as my
Administration colleague Dr. Jeffrey Runge. For years I have been an
admirer of Dr. Runge's work in the field of trauma care and I am
convinced that he will prove to be one of the finest Administrators
that NHTSA has had in the agency's 35-year history. I know how hard Dr.
Runge and his staff are working to implement the ambitious provisions
of the TREAD Act.
OMB fully supports the safety goals of the TREAD Act and is working
with NHTSA to produce the best possible regulatory actions given the
resource and statutory constraints. We appreciate that NHTSA has been
working under tight statutory deadlines and, as a result, OMB has
performed its review function in an expedited yet rigorous manner.
OMB'S REGULATORY REVIEW ROLE
Under E. O. 12866, OMB reviews all significant regulatory actions
to ensure consistency with the principles of good regulatory analysis
and policy. For those significant actions that cost the economy more
than $100 million per year, such as the tire-pressure monitoring (TPMS)
rule, E.O. 12866 requires the agency to perform a cost-benefit analysis
that is reviewed by OMB.
At both the proposed and final stages of a major rulemaking, OMB is
provided up to 90 days to review an agency's rulemaking package, which
includes the draft rule, the cost-benefit analysis and any other
supporting materials. During the 90-day review period, analysts at OMB
scrutinize the agency's work and, in some cases, collaborate with the
agency to improve the analysis and/or the draft rule. There are
ultimately three possible outcomes of OMB review: (1) clearance for
publication in the Federal Register, (2) withdrawal by the agency for
further consideration, and (3) return by OMB to the agency for further
consideration.
When a rule is returned to the agency, it is the practice of this
Administration to prepare a formal return letter that is made available
to the public as well as the agency. Since I was confirmed by the
Senate in July of last year, I have signed 20 return letters about
various draft regulations. In most cases, the reason for the return was
an inadequate regulatory analysis. The public can review these letters
on OMB's web site at www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/return--
letter.html. In five of those cases so far, the agency improved the
regulatory package and resubmitted it to OMB, which cleared it for
publication in the Federal Register.
Each year OMB performs reviews of about 600 significant
regulations, and about 60-80 are at OMB during any given month. During
my tenure as OIRA Administrator, we have treated the 90-day review
period as a performance indicator except in unusual circumstances
(e.g., when the agency requests an extension of the review period).
Agencies have a right to expect that OMB will perform rigorous yet
timely reviews. The monthly number of OMB reviews that extend beyond 90
days has plummeted from an average of 25 in calendar year 2000 to close
to zero in the last three months.
When an agency is facing statutory deadlines, such as those in the
TREAD Act, we offer the agency expedited review and rarely consume the
entire 90-day review period. When agencies are facing a court-ordered
deadline, our reviews are even swifter. In some cases, we work
informally with the agency to make sure that a regulatory package is in
good shape before it is even formally submitted to OMB.
PACE OF OMB REVIEWS UNDER THE TREAD ACT
To date, OMB has conducted three formal reviews under the TREAD Act
(including the draft final TPMS rule) under E.O. 12866. We have also
reviewed another eight TREAD Act rules informally. Our average review
time was 47 days for the formal reviews and 8 days for the informal
reviews.
In the case of the TPMS rule, NHTSA submitted the draft final
regulatory package to OMB on December 17, 2001. (The statutory deadline
for issuance of the final rule was November 1, 2001). We returned the
rule to NHTSA for reconsideration on February 12th and have worked
diligently with NHTSA since that date.
TIRE PRESSURE MONITORING TECHNOLOGY
The TREAD Act requires NHTSA ``to require a warning system in new
motor vehicles to indicate to the operator when a tire is significantly
underinflated.'' Currently, there are two different ways to measure
tire pressure: the direct system and the indirect system.
The direct system has a battery-operated measuring device on each
of the four tires and, as an optional feature, can provide a dashboard
display of the inflation levels in each tire. This system is currently
available only on certain high-priced models (e.g., the Lincoln
Continental and the Lexus SC 430) and costs $66 per vehicle to install,
plus a lifetime maintenance cost of $40.
The indirect system infers tire pressure by using information from
a computer in the car's anti-lock braking system. The difference in
rotational speeds between wheels is compared to infer tire pressure.
For vehicles with anti-lock brakes, the indirect system is inexpensive
($13 per vehicle to install with negligible maintenance costs). A
dashboard warning light indicates whether one of the tires is
underinflated. The indirect system is currently installed on almost two
million vehicles in the United States, including the Toyota Sienna and
Ford Windstar.
Given current technology, it appears that both systems could meet a
``1-tire'' performance standard (i.e., the ability to detect 30%
underinflation in one tire) while only the direct system could satisfy
a performance standard that requires information on all 4 tires
simultaneously.
THE ROLE OF ANTI-LOCK BRAKES
From a tire-safety perspective, NHTSA has valid reasons for
considering a mandatory ``4-tire'' standard for the future. This
approach would assure that consumers would be warned when any
combination of tires (1, 2, 3 or all 4) is underinflated. The 1-tire
standard will provide warnings when 1 tire is underinflated but will
not necessarily detect situations when 2 or more tires are
underinflated. A further weakness of the 1-tire standard is that
consumers may misperceive that their tires are fine (since the warning
light is off) when in fact all four of their tires are equally
underinflated. The 4-tire standard overcomes these problems.
The tire-safety advantages of the 4-tire rule may not be decisive
because the 1-tire standard encourages vehicle manufacturers to install
anti-lock braking systems in vehicles that do not currently have them.
The best available evidence, though not definitive, suggests that anti-
lock brakes reduce fatal crashes by 4 to 9%. Since these reductions
apply to all fatal crashes, not just tire-related crashes, the safety
benefits of more anti-lock brakes could easily outweigh the extra tire-
safety benefits of the 4-tire rule. About one-third of new vehicles
sold today--primarily less expensive vehicles--are not equipped with
anti-lock brakes. OMB's analysis indicates that retention of the 1-tire
standard will encourage more consumer offerings of anti-lock brakes.
If a vehicle manufacturer is considering adding anti-lock brakes to
vehicles that do not currently have them, the cost to consumers of
purchasing anti-lock brakes will be smaller under a 1-tire standard
than a 4-tire standard. NHTSA has estimated that adding anti-lock
brakes costs an average of $240 per vehicle. The cost of a direct tire-
monitoring system plus anti-lock brakes would be about $306 ($240+$66).
The cost of an indirect system plus antilock brakes is about $253
($240+$13). (Note that these comparisons ignore maintenance costs).
Thus, the option of complying with an indirect system reduces the cost
of adding anti-lock brakes by about $53 per vehicle ($306-$253), or by
about 20%. The basic principles of economics suggest that these cost
savings will induce more vehicles to be equipped with anti-lock brakes
than would be equipped under a 4-tire standard. According to NHTSA, one
large vehicle manufacturer intends to install anti-lock brakes in more
vehicles if indirect TPMS are permitted.
Many of the indirect TPMS now on the road are very crude and will
need to be improved to meet NHTSA's 1-tire standard. It is also likely
that technological advances will permit indirect systems to detect
moderate underinflation in 1, 2 or 3 tires. However, a purely indirect
system cannot meet the 4-tire standard because the system works by
sensing the differences in pressures between wheels.
OMB believes that a technology assessment should be conducted
before making a final decision about whether the 1-tire standard should
be retained or replaced by a 4-tire requirement. OMB has requested that
NHTSA gather the following information: (1) an empirical study of
actual tire pressure levels in vehicles with indirect systems and, if
feasible, other types of TPMSs, (2) a cost analysis of alternative
TPMSs that accounts for probable economies of scale of mass production,
(3) an updated analysis of the sales of anti-lock brake systems and
their safety impacts, and (4) an assessment of technological progress
in development of improved TPMS. The results of these analyses could
inform the decision as to whether a new rulemaking should be conducted
for model years 2007 and beyond.
SHOULD ANTI-LOCK BRAKES BE REQUIRED?
Since OMB's analysis indicates that the safety benefits of anti-
lock brakes may be substantial, it has been suggested that NHTSA should
mandate anti-lock brakes in all new vehicles. This idea is worthy of
consideration and would need to be addressed in a separate rulemaking.
A good time to consider this option would be two years from now, when
the real-world database on the safety benefits of anti-lock brakes may
be large enough to draw definitive statistical conclusions.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear today.
Mr. Stearns. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Mead, for your opening statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. KENNETH M. MEAD
Mr. Mead. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to commend you on
having this hearing. I think it's important for oversight
committees to hold hearings from time to time on matters as
important as this. In fact, the implementation of the TREAD Act
requirements is on our list of the top 10 management challenges
facing the Department. We have issued our report as is noted in
my prepared statement. Our testimony mirrors that report. And I
would have to say that overall, I think NHTSA has been very
responsive to the recommendations and findings in that report.
I group our findings into three categories: first,
completing the TREAD Act rulemaking. No. 2 is modifying the
process that's used to make decisions and whether or not to
open a defect investigation. And third is the information
management system. It could well be that you have an excellent
rule. All the manufacturers comply with that rule. And that you
have volumes and volumes of data. You need a system that is
fairly sophisticated to synthesize that information on
something approaching a real time basis.
First, I'd like to cover the TREAD Act rulemakings. I think
the early warning system rule is certainly one of the
centerpieces of that legislation. NHTSA has stayed on track in
issuing the notices of proposed rulemakings. That's quite
different though from actually issuing the final rule. And in
the case of the TREAD Act, the first three statutory due dates
were missed by about 6 months. One that's now pending is the
tire pressure monitoring rule, I think it was due out on
November 1.
I ought to say that we did a review, a separate review a
couple of years ago of the rulemaking process at DOT. We found
that only about 10 percent of the statutory due dates for
issuing regulations were met. The average cradle-to-grave time
for a rule was about 4 years, 3.8 to be precise. Secretary
Mineta is strongly committed to changing that process and
certainly the TREAD Act offers a good test tube environment for
doing that.
No doubt about it, Mr. Chairman, the heavy lifting on the
rulemaking lies ahead. NHTSA has issued the notice of proposed
rulemaking on the early warning system, and the due date for
that is this summer. There are 12 final rulemakings required
and six have statutory deadlines.
I believe the tire pressure monitoring rule shows the
importance not only of meeting time lines, but ensuring the
quality and substance of the rule. What's going on right now
are discussions about the quality and substance of the rule and
how best to resolve those issues. On the early warning rule, I
expect that too will be controversial. The Alliance of
Automobile Manufacturers has already weighed in on that and has
expressed some reservations about how quickly it can be done
and the resources required to implement the early warning
requirement.
I'd like to move to a recommendation we had in our report
on a peer review panel process. We found that one was needed to
ensure consistency when opening investigations. What we saw at
NHTSA is that if a complaint comes in it gets assigned to a
screener and essentially that screener and one other person
make the decision as to whether or not to open an
investigation. Without going into details of individual cases,
we found a number of instances where NHTSA really couldn't
explain why they made a decision to open an investigation or
not open an investigation. It's an incredibly subjective
process to begin with. So we recommended that they create a
panel of senior NHTSA people so they all come together, and
make decisions as to whether or not an investigation should be
opened.
Since we issued our report, 38 cases have appeared before
this panel and in 34 of them NHTSA opened an investigation. We
think a couple of steps still need to be taken. One is that if
a screener decides that he or she will not recommend a
potential defect for investigation, it falls into a hole and
will not go before the panel. We think it should go before the
panel at a certain point in time. We also think the panel,
particularly on a negative decision, in other words, no
recommendation that an investigation not go forward, ought to
document its decision. So we have a trail to go back to and
it's archived appropriately.
Finally, I'd like to say a word about the defect
information management system which several of the members have
alluded to. The TREAD Act will rise or fall on how good a
system that is. Two factors currently hamper NHTSA's ability to
successfully implement a new defect information management
system. The first is the quality of data in the current defect
data base. I think you probably know from your deliberations in
passing the TREAD Act, that the ratio of complaints that a
manufacturer gets to those that consumers notify NHTSA in about
is extraordinarily disparate. In fact, in one case we found
during our audit that the manufacturer received over 1400
complaints about a potential defect and when you look at the
data base, there's 32 consumer complaints in there.
We also found instances where the data base contains
inaccurate and incomplete data. The specific example had to do
with complaints that came in about accidents where brakes
failed and the air bag didn't deploy. Well, if it's not
properly coded what shows up in the data base is failed air
bags, and nothing about the brakes. Or it could also be the
converse. That's an illustration of the things that the new
information management system will have to correct.
The second factor is the risks associated with developing a
data base of this type. This is going to have to be a
sophisticated data base. We found that the project is in danger
of not meeting its timeframes and quality goals within budget.
Actually, I'm not sure that a data base of this type can be
done within the budget that NHTSA has estimated.
We audit the entire Department of Transportation and we see
software intensive systems under development throughout the
Department. You're probably familiar with some the FAA has
undertaken and the track record there has not always been
something to write home about. Software-intensive systems
typically have overruns, both in schedule and budget. That's
why we recommended here that NHTSA bring in an outside third
party independent of the contractor to validate and verify the
systems contractor's progress. NHTSA has said that they will do
that and we're going to monitor the scope of the contract to
make sure that that gets done properly.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Kenneth M. Mead follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Kenneth M. Mead, Inspector General, U.S.
Department of Transportation
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: We appreciate the
opportunity to discuss the implementation of the Transportation Recall
Enhancement, Accountability, and Documentation (TREAD) Act. We have
identified the implementation of the TREAD Act as one of the 10 most
important management challenges faced by the Department. Also, on
January 3, 2002, we issued a report on the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration's (NHTSA) implementation of the TREAD Act.
Our report included several recommendations to ensure the timely
completion of the Act's requirements and to improve the operations of
NHTSA. Specifically, the recommendations focused on adhering to
rulemaking deadlines, improving the process for identifying potential
defects and opening investigations, improving the quantity and quality
of data on potential defects, and mitigating the risks associated with
developing a new defect information system.
In October 2000, Congress passed the TREAD Act to establish, in
part, early warning reporting requirements for manufacturers so NHTSA
is aware of potential defects as soon as possible. In its September
2000 hearings, Congress questioned why NHTSA, Firestone and Ford did
not act sooner to prevent the 103 deaths and over 400 injuries
associated with the defective tires. These numbers have since increased
to over 200 deaths and 800 injuries. Congress found the following: (1)
NHTSA had insufficient data regarding the problems with Firestone
tires, and (2) NHTSA did not use data it already had to spot trends
related to tire failures.
Since the Act was passed, NHTSA has made progress toward completing
the TREAD Act requirements, but more work remains to achieve the goals
of the Act.
First, completing the TREAD Act rulemakings, most
importantly the early warning reporting requirements rule, in a timely
and comprehensive manner. NHTSA has already completed three final
rulemakings including the rule requiring individuals to report to NHTSA
the sale or lease of defective tires. NHTSA has been on track in
issuing 9 notices of proposed rulemakings; but it still needs to
complete 12 final rulemakings including 6 with statutory deadlines. One
of the final rules, the tire pressure warning device rule, was due on
November 1, 2001. However, the rule has yet to be issued. We understand
that NHTSA and OMB are very close to resolving the issues associated
with the proposed final rule.
Several other rules are also complex and controversial, and have
statutory deadlines for completion on or before November 1, 2002. These
rules include establishing early warning reporting requirements for
vehicle and equipment manufacturers; updating the tire standards; and
improving child safety restraints. The rules will be controversial
because there are differing views among the affected parties and
interest groups on the substance of NHTSA's proposals. The status of
the TREAD Act rulemakings and other actions are presented in Exhibits
A, B, and C.
We noted that factors such as differing views on the substance of a
proposed rule, requirements for cost/benefit analysis, and the need to
have other entities, such as the Department and the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB), review a proposed rule, influenced the
time required to issue a rule. Further, in our July 2000 report on the
Department's rulemaking process, we noted that the Department met only
10 percent of statutory deadlines and missed the statutory deadlines by
an average of 3.8 years. However, Secretary Mineta has made the timely
completion of rules a departmentwide priority.
Issuing the early warning final rule by June 30, 2002, will be a
significant challenge for NHTSA. Significant disagreements are likely
between NHTSA and automobile manufacturers over the scope and
parameters of the reporting requirements in the proposed rule. Late
last year, NHTSA issued its notice of proposed rulemaking specifying
the early warning data that manufacturers will be required to report.
As proposed, the rule requires manufacturers to report data quarterly
starting in April 2003. The data include deaths, injuries, property
damage claims, warranty claims, field reports, and consumer complaints
related to potential defects in various systems or components, such as
electrical systems and air bags. Also, by April 2003, manufacturers
will be required to submit, on a one-time basis, 3 years of historical
early warning data.
In commenting on the proposed rule, the Alliance of Automobile
Manufacturers, an association of 13 domestic and foreign automobile
manufacturers, stated that NHTSA ``has substantially underestimated the
burden imposed by the proposed rules, and the resources in terms of
staff time, the cash outlays and the efforts that will be required to
develop systems that can reliably generate the reports proposed in the
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.'' Further, the Alliance stated that
``NHTSA also underestimated the lead time that will be needed to
prepare the new systems before the automatic reports can begin.''
A current example illustrating how differing views between
interested parties over the substance of a proposed rule can contribute
to delays in the time required to issue final rules is the draft tire
pressure warning device final rule. On February 12, 2002, OMB returned
the draft final rule to the Department for reconsideration. NHTSA's
draft rule proposed a standard under which all new vehicles would
require a tire pressure monitoring system. NHTSA proposed a phase-in
period lasting until 2006 which generally allows for the use of a
direct system or an indirect system. A direct tire pressure monitoring
system has a tire pressure sensor in each tire. The sensors transmit
pressure information to a receiver. According to NHTSA officials, a
direct tire system would alert a driver when a tire or any combination
of tires is underinflated.
In contrast, an indirect system does not actually measure tire
pressure. Instead it relies on the wheel speed sensors in an antilock
braking system to detect and compare differences in the rotational
speed of a vehicle's wheels. Underinflated tires have smaller diameters
and thus rotate faster. The indirect system relies on the anti-lock
brake system which uses existing technology and is less costly than the
direct system. However, according to NHTSA officials current indirect
systems cannot detect when two tires on the same axle or two tires on
the same side are equally underinflated.
After the conclusion of the phase-in period in 2006, NHTSA's
approach would require a system that alerts the driver when the
pressure in 1 to 4 tires is 25 percent below the recommended level.
According to NHTSA officials, current indirect systems can only alert
the driver when the tire pressure has fallen to 30 percent or more
below the recommended level. To meet the standard proposed by NHTSA
would require vehicle manufacturers to install a direct tire pressure
monitoring system.
OMB requested that NTHSA provide a stronger analysis of the safety
issues and benefits, including a formal analysis of a regulatory
alternative that would permit indirect systems after the phase-in
period. OMB stated that NHTSA could analyze an option that would defer
a decision about the ultimate fate of indirect systems until the
potential impact on installation of anti-lock brake systems is better
understood. We understand that NHTSA and OMB are very close to
resolving issues associated with the proposed final rule.
In January 2002, we recommended that NHTSA begin reporting to
Congress on a routine basis the milestone dates, budget estimates, and
actions required to complete the TREAD Act rules. In December 2001,
NHTSA provided Congress with a TREAD Act follow-up report, as required
by the Act. NHTSA told us that they will provide additional reports
when specifically requested by Congress. Given the heavy lifting that
lies ahead for the TREAD Act rulemakings, NHTSA should begin reporting
on a routine basis, the status of its rulemakings to Congress.
Second, a peer review panel process is needed to ensure
consistency when opening investigations. NHTSA agreed with our
recommendation and has already begun using a peer review panel. We
consider this a very positive step. The principal reason we recommended
NHTSA establish a peer review panel and process is because we found
instances where NHTSA did not open an investigation although the number
of complaints, period of time, alleged defect, and potential
consequences were similar to investigations that were previously
opened. Further, the decision to open or not open an investigation was
made by one or two persons, the basis for their decision was not
readily apparent, and there was no documentation to support the
decision. For example,
Over a 4-month period, NHTSA received six complaints alleging
airbags failed to deploy in a 1998 sedan after a frontal crash.
All of the complaints noted injuries and one complaint stated
the driver was seriously injured. An investigation was not
opened, despite a recommendation by the defects analysis staff.
Within 1 year the number of complaints quadrupled from 6 to 24
complaints, but NHTSA still did not open an investigation.
In another example, NHTSA received three complaints over a 4-
month period alleging front suspension torsion bar breakage in
1993-1994 minivans. This alleged defect could cause the driver
to lose control of the vehicle and increase the risk of a
crash. Although the defects analysis staff recommended an
investigation; one was not opened. In contrast, NHTSA opened an
investigation of three complaints received over a 1-year period
alleging front suspension coil spring breakage in a different
vehicle that could pose a potential compromise to the driver's
ability to control the vehicle.
To ensure consistency and transparency in NHTSA's processes, we
recommended the use of a peer review panel to discuss potential defects
as a group, make decisions as to whether or not an investigation should
be opened, and to document the decision. We recommended that the panel
consist of the Chiefs of the Defects Analysis and Investigation
Divisions, as well as defects analysis and investigative staff.
NHTSA agreed to implement this recommendation and we consider this
a very positive step. We recognize that it is not possible to define
criteria that will identify every potential defect. But a panel of
experts drawing on the institutional knowledge of the staff and
bringing management together to identify cases for investigation will
ensure consistency in NHTSA's decision making process.
Since November 2001, NHTSA has held six peer review panel meetings.
According to NHTSA officials, the use of the panels has increased the
percent of investigations opened. Of the 38 cases of potential defects
considered for investigation, the peer review panel approved the
opening of 34 investigations.
Establishing a peer review panel is a significant step forward;
however, it is not an end state. In addition to the steps already taken
we recommend the NHTSA Administrator should ensure that (1) protocols
for the panel process are written, (2) decisions are documented, and
(3) the panel receives and reviews information when the defects
analysis staff determine that an investigation should not be opened.
Third, developing a new defect information management
system to replace the currently flawed system. This is important
because the success of the TREAD Act will ultimately rise or fall on
the quality and usefulness of the early warning data and the capacity
of the new system to process the high volume of data. Two factors
currently hamper NHTSA's ability to successfully implement a new defect
information system: (1) the quality of the data in the current defect
database and (2) the risks associated with NHTSA's systems development
efforts.
We reported that NHTSA's existing defect database, the primary tool
it uses to identify potential safety-related defects in vehicles and
equipment, significantly understates the number of potential safety
defects. For example, NHTSA's database contains substantially less
complaints than consumers make to manufacturers. In one case, we found
that the manufacturer received 1,411 complaints regarding transmission
failures resulting in the loss of fluid and increasing the risk of
fire, while NHTSA received 32 complaints.
Further, the defect database contains incomplete and incorrectly
recorded information regarding potential defects. For example, we found
complaints in which consumers described problems with failed brakes
that led to accidents where the airbags did not deploy. However, only
the airbags and not the brakes were recorded as problems in the
database.
The existing data in the defect database will serve as the
foundation for the new information system. Therefore, it is
particularly important that NHTSA review and edit the existing data in
the defect database, including the descriptions of complaints, for
accuracy and completeness before transferring the data to the new
information system. In response to our recommendation, the NHTSA
Administrator stated that the data will be reviewed for improperly or
inconsistently recorded data and corrected before being transferred to
the new system.
We also reported that NHTSA's project with Volpe National
Transportation Systems Center (Volpe) to replace its current database
with a new information system by the fall 2002 was significantly at
risk of not meeting quality, cost, and schedule goals. Historically,
the Department's systems development projects, including those using
commercial off-the-shelf software as a basis, have been plagued by cost
overruns and implementation delays. While the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) problems in developing software intensive systems
are well known, the Department and NHTSA have experienced their share
of problems with software development as well.
For example, DOT had incurred contract costs of at least $26
million to develop a new financial management system using commercial
off-the-shelf software. However, 1 year after the original
implementation date, the system was still not fully operating as
intended. Also, the costs of NHTSA's National Advanced Driving
Simulator, which involved software development, grew to almost twice
the original estimate and the simulator was completed 3 years later
than originally estimated.
NHTSA describes its new information system efforts as an
acquisition of commercial off-the-shelf software. However, the software
will require modifications and involve systems development work. The
National Institute of Standards and Technology outlines procedures to
ensure that software development efforts are successful. One of these
procedures includes having an independent third party validate and
verify that the system will meet the user's needs. We recommended that
NHTSA obtain the services of an independent third party to assess the
contractor's progress, reduce development risk, and advise NHTSA of its
findings.
In response to our recommendations to ensure that the new defect
information system is completed on time and within budget, NHTSA
recently hired a third party contractor to validate and verify that the
new system will meet its needs and reduce development risk. The
contractor will provide NHTSA with weekly status reports and monthly
assessment reports. We will monitor the contractor's findings and the
corrective actions taken by NHTSA.
This concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer any
questions.
Exhibit A
TREAD Act Completed Rulemakings--As of February 12, 2002
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Statutory
TREAD Act Section Purpose Deadline Action to Date
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sale or Lease of Defective Tires......... Requires individuals to 01/29/01 Completed: Final Rule
report to the Secretary issued
when knowingly and 07/23/01.
willfully selling or
leasing for use on a
vehicle a defective or
noncompliant tire when
having actual knowledge
that the manufacturer has
notified dealers of such
defect or noncompliance.
Safe Harbor.............................. Precludes individuals from 01/29/01 Completed: Final Rule
receiving criminal issued
punishment if the person 07/24/01.
(1) at the time of the
violation, did not know
that the violation would
cause death or serious
injury and (2) corrects
the improper report or
failure to report within a
reasonable time. The
Secretary shall establish
by regulation what
constitutes reasonable
time and sufficient
correction.
Civil Penalties.......................... Amends the regulations to None Completed: Final Rule
reflect changes in the issued
National Traffic and Motor 11/14/00.
Vehicle Safety Act
regarding civil penalties.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Exhibit B
TREAD Act Rulemakings to Be Completed--As of February 12, 2002
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Statutory
TREAD Act Section Purpose Deadline Action to Date
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Early Warning............................ Requires manufacturers to 06/30/02 Notice of Proposed
report claims data, Rulemaking (NPRM) issued
warranty data, customer 12/21/01.
satisfaction campaigns and
recalls, and any incidents
of serious injuries or
fatalities (allegedly or
proven to be caused by a
possible defect in systems
or components) for which
the manufacturer receives
actual notice.
Tire Pressure Warning Device............. Requires a warning system 11/01/01 NPRM issued
in new vehicles to 07/26/01. OMB returned
indicate to the driver final draft rule to NHTSA
when a tire is for reconsideration on
significantly 02/12/02.
underinflated. Requirement
becomes effective 2 years
after the completion of
the rulemaking.
Tire Standards........................... Requires the Secretary to 06/01/02 NPRM sent to OMB on 12/14/
update the tire standards 01.
(Standards 109 and 119).
Improved Tire Information................ Requires the Secretary to 06/01/02 NPRM issued
improve the labeling of 12/19/01.
tires to assist consumers
in identifying tires that
may be subject to a recall.
Safety of Child Restraints............... Requires the Secretary to 11/01/02 NPRM sent to Office of the
draft regulations for Secretary (OST) on
improving the safety of 12/03/01.
child restraints,
including minimizing head
injuries from side impact
collisions. The Secretary
must consider several
criteria, therefore
resulting in multiple
rulemakings.
Ratings Program.......................... Requires the Secretary to 11/01/02 NPRM issued
establish by regulation a 11/06/01.
child restraint safety
rating consumer
information program.
Report on Defects in Foreign Countries... Requires manufacturers to None NPRM issued
report within 5 working 10/11/01.
days when conducting a
safety recall or other
safety campaign in a
foreign country for an
identical or substantially
similar vehicle as a
vehicle offered for sale
in the United States.
Acceleration of Remedy................... Permits the Secretary to None NPRM issued on
require manufacturers to 12/11/01.
accelerate the remedy
program if the Secretary
finds that there is a risk
of serious injury or death
and that the acceleration
can be reasonably achieved
by expanding the sources
of replacement parts,
authorized repair
facilities, or both.
Reimbursement Prior to Recall............ Requires manufacturers to None NPRM issued on
include in their remedy 12/11/01.
programs a plan for
reimbursing owners who
incurred the cost of the
remedy within a reasonable
time in advance of the
manufacturers'
notification of recalls.
The Secretary may
establish by regulation
what constitutes a
reasonable time and other
reasonable conditions for
the reimbursement plan.
Sale of Replaced Tires................... Requires manufacturers to None NPRM issued on
include in remedy programs 12/18/01.
a plan for how
manufacturers will prevent
replaced tires from being
resold and how to limit
disposal of replaced tires
in landfills. Manufacturer
will include information
about the implementation
of the plan in each
quarterly report to the
Secretary.
Sale of Replaced Equipment............... Prohibits the sale or lease None NPRM issued
of any vehicle equipment 07/23/01.
(including tires) for
installation on vehicles
when the equipment is
subject to a recall. An
exception exists if the
defect or noncompliance is
remedied before delivery.
Certification Label...................... Requires intermediate or None Drafting Rulemaking Support
final stage manufacturers, Paper.
for vehicles built in more
than one stage, to certify
that they complied with
specifications provided by
the first manufacturers or
that they have elected to
assume responsibility for
complying with the Federal
Motor Vehicle Safety
Standards.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Exhibit C
TREAD Act Non-Rulemaking Actions--As of February 12, 2002
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Statutory
TREAD Act Section Purpose Deadline Action to Date
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Insurance Study.......................... Requires the Secretary to 03/01/01 Completed: Report issued on
determine the capability 03/05/01.
and benefits of obtaining
aggregate information
regarding insurance claims.
Follow-Up Report......................... Requires the Secretary to 11/01/01 Completed: Transmitted to
report to Congress on the Congress 12/14/01.
implementation of the
TREAD Act and provide
recommendations for
additional amendments.
Recall Criteria.......................... Requires the Secretary to 11/01/01 Completed: Transmitted to
review and update all Congress 01/31/02.
standards, criteria,
procedures, and methods
for determining whether to
open a defect or
noncompliance
investigation. The
Secretary shall report
findings to Congress.
Education Program........................ Requires the Secretary to 11/01/01 Draft plan to OST on 02/04/
develop a 5-year strategic 02.
plan to reduce deaths and
injuries, caused by
failure to use booster
seats, by 25% among 4 to 8
year olds.
Booster Seat Study....................... Requires the Secretary to 11/01/01 Draft report within NHTSA.
study the use and
effectiveness of booster
seats and submit the
results to Congress.
Rollover Tests Rating Program............ Requires the development of 11/01/02 Request for Comments
a dynamic test on published on 07/03/01.
rollovers by 11/01/02 and
creation of a consumer
information program. The
Secretary shall conduct a
rulemaking to determine
how best to disseminate
the test results.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Stearns. I thank the gentleman.
Let me start with questions. For legislators who are
involved with the testimony which we used to develop the TREAD
Act and then when we had the mark-up and it went to full
committee and then to the House floor and the Senate and
finally passed, everybody thinks something is going to happen
immediately. And I think constituents, as well as the public
feel that there will be answers and there will be lives saved,
but it's all dependent, as you mention, Mr. Mead, this TREAD
Act is going to rise and fall on this data base and how the
criteria is set up so that we can accurately come up with an
implementation to prevent these problems.
One of the things we all talked about with this tire
pressure monitoring system and Dr. Runge, we are aware that
NHTSA and OMB have had a difference of opinion in the direction
of this tire pressure monitoring system rule, but continue to
discuss this issue. I think the first question I would have is
what is the status of this on-going discussion because for many
of us this would be helpful and we could save lives if we had
this implemented and show the public how to use it.
Mr. Runge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me point out, first
of all, that this is a late one and we are very sensitive to
that. I also wanted to point out that OMB has been working very
diligently with us and in fact, very quickly, to my surprise,
on all of our TREAD rules.
Indeed, there has been a great level of discussion and some
debate between NHTSA and OMB, but I want to point out that this
is a normal part of the decisionmaking process that certainly
is not unique to us or unique to this Administration. It's been
going on for a long time. And that discourse, I believe, leads
to truth. Certainly, we have no corner on the market on brains
and neither do they. Working together, we can finally achieve
what will be a great rule to implement for the American people
which will have safety as its No. 1 priority.
So the goal of this process is to develop those policies
that have a balanced perspective and the final result will be
consensus. So we have over the course of a few months reached a
general agreement.
Mr. Stearns. So you now have produced an agreement between
you and OMB?
Mr. Runge. We have some details to work out. The lawyers,
in fact, are working on it. Dr. Graham and I have had numerous
discussions on this. We both have an academic background. We
enjoy the exchange of ideas and we believe that we do have a
substantive agreement.
Mr. Stearns. Is there a date when you can say you'll have a
final date when this will be obtained?
Mr. Runge. I'm hesitant to give you a final date because
that's out of my hands. We met with our attorneys last night
who are talking about how to structure it. In fact, as Dr.
Graham told you earlier, it will be a rule in which we have a
phase-in period which allows either system and then a gathering
of additional data to decide what to do.
Mr. Stearns. Let's say the year 2004, will the tire
pressure monitoring system be in place by the year 2004?
Mr. Runge. The year 2004 is when the phase-in would begin.
Mr. Stearns. Would begin.
Mr. Runge. Yes.
Mr. Stearns. And it will be complete 2000 when?
Mr. Runge. We got comments on the docket from the equipment
manufacturers saying that it would be virtually impossible for
them to ramp up production within the 2-year timeframe. So we
talked to the manufacturers, talked to the equipment
manufacturers and have come up with a 3-year interim period in
which they will be phasing in----
Mr. Stearns. The problem for many of us are these type of
discussions that OMB and the Inspector General, you have, go on
and on and on and yet I think the public and we as legislators
expect this to be implemented in less than a decade, in less
than 4 or 5 years. Most of these automotive companies probably
could implement this thing immediately.
Have you ever had a workshop or has it ever been suggested
that you sit down with all the manufacturers both on the
automobile side and the part side and have a big technical
workshop to explore these issues and how to implement them
quickly and then this information be brought back to the
Inspector General and OMB and say this is what industry can do
right now. Let's get on it and let's do it, instead of the
government agencies continuing to discuss and negotiate and go
back and forth and look at the data. Maybe industry can have an
input. So my question is, has there been a technical workshop
and if not, do you think that's a good idea?
Mr. Runge. I will say that our staff has gotten lots and
lots and lots of input on all sides of this issue, both
formally and informally. And I believe that we are very
knowledgeable at this point about what the capabilities of
industry are to ramp up production and in fact, to install
either type of monitor, either the 1-tire or the 4-tire
standard.
Mr. Stearns. Mr. Mead had mentioned this information
system. Perhaps industry could help you interpret this data and
could say to you okay, this is important, this is not important
and could expedite streamline your interpretation analysis of
this. So I think bringing in the industry into this mix and
having them discuss with you in a technical workshop would be a
great idea, not just for their ideas in implementing, but also
how to get this data base that Mr. Mead had talked about so
that it's meaningful because as I mentioned in my opening
statement, we're going to have data pouring into you and unless
you have the people, the time, the materials and the
credibility and criteria, nothing is going to happen. We'll be
negotiating here for a decade on this stuff because if there's
a slip today, and there's a slip tomorrow, this slip will go
for 10 years. And here we pass this bill and then 5, 6, 10
years later, we're still talking about a phase in.
Mr. Mead?
Mr. Mead. Can I reinforce one element of what you said? We
found in our audit on this information system that one of the
areas of shortfall were the interfaces that NHTSA was going to
have with the manufacturers information system. They have to
talk to each other.
Mr. Stearns. So right now they're not compatible?
Mr. Mead. No. In fact, we're not sure what NHTSA's system
is going to look like, so it's very timely to start developing
this interface for the information management system.
Mr. Stearns. Mr. Runge, just before I finish, is there
anything you'd like to add?
Mr. Runge. Well, yes. In fact, if I could sort of frame out
the estimated finish date for some of these things. Keep in
mind that the final rule is not complete yet and the comment
period is closed. We have a lot of comments. We actually have
more comments for the advance notice of proposed rulemaking.
These comments will be incorporated; and by the way, this is a
very transparent process. Industry has lots and lots of input
into this as well. Many people in this room have weighed in
heavily on this issue. When the rule is finished, we plan to
have the data system completed during this summer and during
that time we plan technical workshops with the IT people in
industry to make sure that they are constructing their systems
so that they can get the proper amount and type of data into
our data system. So we are fully aware of the need to integrate
technology. Believe me, the last thing we want is a van-load of
paper backing up to the back door of the DOT building. We are
keenly aware of the need to make this as easy as possible for
us to accumulate and analyze the data. Mr. Mead's zeal about
this issue has been infectious and I've caught the disease. I
promise you and the rest of the subcommittee that we will be on
top of this to the max.
Mr. Stearns. Okay. My time has expired. The gentle lady
from Colorado, Ms. DeGette.
Ms. Degette. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Well, I think
everybody agrees that the TREAD Act is going to, as Mr. Mead
said, rise and fall on the quality and usefulness of the new
information system and ODI's ability to identify potential
defects. And he said that today in his testimony and also in
his report. But then the Inspector General went on to say that
``to be fully operational by fall 2002 is at risk because of
poor project planning and management.'' And furthermore he said
that NHTSA can't identify safety defects in a timely manner
because it has an unstructured approach for analyzing data and
determining if a potential defect exists and where there's
further investigation.
So I want to ask a few questions about this information
management system because I think this is the pressure point
for the whole success of the TREAD Act.
First of all, Dr. Runge, the Inspector General reports that
less than 10 percent of the complaints made by consumers to
manufacturers are contained in the current ODI data base. Is
that correct?
Mr. Runge. I certainly can't dispute that.
Ms. Degette. So you think it would be correct?
Mr. Runge. One of these guys probably knows the exact
percentage, but I would say that's----
Ms. Degette. The Inspector General also found that the
current database often ``contains incomplete and incorrectly
reported information regarding potential defects.'' Do you
agree with that assessment?
Mr. Runge. Well, keep in mind that this was part of the
purpose of the TREAD Act.
Ms. Degette. Right. So you would agree that it does contain
this kind of information?
Mr. Runge. Sure.
Ms. Degette. Thank you. Is it fair to say that the old
system is probably inadequate and doesn't work properly?
Mr. Runge. I think the new system will be lots and lots
better than the old system.
Ms. Degette. Yes or no, do you think that the old system
works properly?
Mr. Runge. I think the old system works fairly well,
actually.
Ms. Degette. You do? Okay. So what's the rush then, in your
mind, for the new system?
Mr. Runge. It will be better.
Ms. Degette. Okay.
Mr. Stearns. Mr. Runge, could you just move the microphone
a little closer to you?
Mr. Runge. Sure.
Ms. Degette. Now when ODI is in full compliance with the
Act, 100 percent of consumer complaints will be collected by a
new information management system. Is that right? That's the
new system you're talking about?
Mr. Runge. That's the goal.
Ms. Degette. Now, the new ODI information system, according
to the Inspector General, is projected to only cost $5 million
to be paid out over the next 3 years and will consist of
commercial off-the-shelf software, correct?
Mr. Runge. The architecture will be off-the-shelf.
Ms. Degette. And the software will be off-the-shelf, right?
Mr. Runge. The software is being designed by a
subcontractor of Volpe, right now.
Ms. Degette. In fact, what we've heard on the committee is
that the new system is going to be Excel spreadsheet software.
Is that correct?
Mr. Runge. I'm not sure which architecture it is, whether
it's Excel or another spreadsheet----
Ms. Degette. So you don't know.
Mr. Runge. That's correct.
Ms. Degette. Can you find out for me and let us know?
Mr. Runge. Sure.
Ms. Degette. Great. Now do you think that the proposed
system is going to be adequate to serve its function?
Mr. Runge. We have three layers of oversight in this thing.
I have not personally asked for the software design, nor would
I know what to do with it if I saw it. Yes, the commitment to
you guys is is that this will be adequate to do the job.
Ms. Degette. And you think $5 million is going to be
sufficient to pay for that?
Mr. Runge. We have a contractor who is currently working
under budget and believes they can get it accomplished.
Ms. Degette. Is part of your contractor's function to
ensure that the data will be secure?
Mr. Runge. Yes, security is an issue.
Ms. Degette. How big of an issue is it?
Mr. Runge. I can't answer that now. I'll be happy to answer
these technical questions later.
Ms. Degette. That would be great. Mr. Mead, what do you
think about the proposed information management system? Do you
think the funding of this system, the design of the system and
the security are going to be adequate? Do you think $5 million
is going to be enough to finance it?
Mr. Mead. No.
Ms. Degette. Could you please explain why?
Mr. Mead. As I was saying in my oral statement, we audit
information management systems throughout the Department. For
those that are being developed, people often say this system is
off-the-shelf. I have yet to see a system that is designated as
off-the-shelf as really being off-the-shelf. People think off-
the-shelf means that you go out and you buy the software, you
install it, and then you can use it. This system is going to
require substantial refinement and revisions.
Ms. Degette. And in fact, that's what Dr. Runge is saying
too. It's not really off-the-shelf.
Mr. Mead. No, it isn't. And software contracts are
typically cost plus which means that you pay depending upon how
much software development is involved. And they're rarely fixed
price and this one is not fixed price either.
Ms. Degette. $5 million is not the fixed price?
Mr. Mead. I would be very impressed if it comes in at $5
million.
Ms. Degette. Why don't you think that what they're talking
about would be adequate, if you can zero in on that?
Mr. Mead. Because I think this system is going to get
disparate data input from multiple sources and that it's going
to have to have some collocating or synthesizing abilities. In
other words, the computer is going to have to operate something
like a brain to pull all this information together so the right
person in NHTSA when they pump an inquiry about a particular
model, can get all the information about that model and they
can get it on a real time basis. This is not like a program
that you can construct at home. That is why we feel that it is
so important to have a third party come in who has software
expertise and advise Dr. Runge of how well the Volpe Center and
their subcontractor is performing and also recommend to Dr.
Runge midcourse corrections. NHTSA really does not have
software development expertise.
Ms. Degette. Dr. Runge, do you have--let me just ask one
more question, if you don't mind, Mr. Chairman. Do you have any
objection to that third party advisor coming in and helping you
develop the system?
Mr. Runge. Absolutely not. We have a third party who is
looking at the overall time lines to make sure. We just
contracted with them to make sure that the project is on time
and is paying attention to what Volpe is doing.
Ms. Degette. We need a third party----
Mr. Stearns. The lady's time has expired. The gentleman
from Michigan is recognized.
Mr. Upton. Well, thank you. Thank you, again, Mr. Chairman,
for having this oversight hearing and appreciate the testimony
and I know we've had a couple of discussions in particular with
regard to the tire pressure monitoring system. And I just want
to underscore the importance of getting that done and beginning
to see a rule implemented and I appreciate your understanding
of that issue and just want to underscore again the thought
that this was the intent of the Congress, that we work very
closely with industry. I note that on a number of higher priced
models that are available today, that there is a system that's
available. Frankly, I think we can improve on what they have in
place and I'm delighted that sound science is going to take the
underlying role here by getting an agreement and working
together. I know that the American consumers are going to
benefit in a major, major way so that all of us will know when
our tires are under pressurized and I just want to thank you
for what you're doing to make sure that we get this implemented
as fast as we can and that that science will rule the day and
begin to see the type of system installed, perhaps earlier than
what date you actually set, putting more gas on the fire to get
it done. I appreciate the chairman's work on this and if you
want to comment further, I guess you had some discussions last
week. And I had to step out momentarily, but do you think that
we'll have some idea in the next couple of months, next couple
of weeks or early summer? When do you think we're going to see
the right flags flying?
Mr. Runge. I think we're close enough that we can say it
will be a week or 2.
Mr. Upton. Terrific. Mr. Graham, do you agree with that as
well? I want to thank you also on your picture on CQ. I thought
it was--I get it at my home now since we still don't have
office deliveries here.
Mr. Graham. We must have good timing with your hearing
coming up.
Mr. Upton. That's right.
Mr. Graham. I think that Dr. Runge and I are in conceptual
agreement on the contours of the tire pressure monitoring rule
and now it is for the lawyers, frankly, to actually put it into
the words and I don't think that's going to be too long.
Mr. Upton. Have you had also some constructive input from
both the tire manufacturers as well as the industry itself, the
auto industry itself in terms of what they think is do-able?
Mr. Graham. Yes sir, I have. Both sides.
Mr. Upton. Good. Well, I just applaud you on that work and
look forward to getting it done and obviously I know this
subcommittee will continue to oversee what's going on and
appreciate your willingness to appear here this morning.
Thank you.
Mr. Upton. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Stearns. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from
Tennessee, Mr. Gordon.
Mr. Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The proposed rule on
tire labeling envisions placing a tire identification number of
both sides of the tire as has been mentioned earlier today. I'm
concerned that this does not take into account the realities of
the tire business. It's my understanding this will pose a
safety hazard to workers in these tire plants and create a
significant redesign of the current method of tire production
with hundreds of millions of dollars being passed on to
consumers.
In order for the tire identification number to be placed on
both sides of the tire, the mold press would need to be changed
midway through the production process, a practice that would
require a worker to insert himself or herself within the mold
which will be extremely hot, 300 degrees or more. Alternately,
the entire line would need to be shut down for a number of
hours, until the mold could be changed, thereby losing hours of
valuable production. This may actually even delay getting
better labeling on the tires as it takes more time to
completely rehaul the manufacturing process.
So Dr. Runge, I guess my question is, the date stamp in
question here, what about the idea that the date stamp be left
on one side of the tire, while the other markings, like the
type of the tire, where it was made, be placed on both sides
and also what about the possibility this information could be
replicated on the tire warranty brochure?
Mr. Runge. Congressman Gordon, I'm sure we'll be happy to
consider that. The making of tires is sort of new to this
doctor and I have planned to actually go to two auto tire
plants and one truck tire plant in April. This concern has been
expressed to me by people who understand the processes and the
last thing we want to do is compromise the safety of workers.
As I understand the motive for this rule in the first
place, it has been difficult when a tire recall occurs for a
consumer to find the number that would identify the tire
necessary for the recall. If there are other motives--there may
be other motives, but that's the primary one that I recall
hearing from staff.
We will listen to all comments. The comment period closed
on the 19th of February. I have not seen the comments. Mr.
Kratzke, I'm sure, has. And this has been expressed to me
personally by people from the industry and we'll be very
sensitive to that.
Mr. Gordon. I think the most important information is what
type of tire and where it's produced and the additional cost
and the safety hazard of having to weekly change both sides on
terms of the labeling of the date. Once you have a chance and I
commend you for going out and taking a real world look at this,
I think it might then give you a better idea.
A lot has been talked also about today about the tire
pressure. And it's my understanding or my concern that this
proposed rule on indirect tire pressure monitoring which I
understand is less accurate than the direct monitoring system
may not give drivers adequate warning regarding tire inflation.
Is it necessary to ensure that the tire inflation pressure
is sufficient to carry maximum load? I'd like Mr. Graham and/or
Dr. Graham or Dr. Runge to maybe address this indirect versus
the direct monitoring.
Mr. Graham. Yes, I think your point is, as we understand
it, technically correct, that the direct system that is in a
couple of the high-priced models mentioned previously does have
more accuracy and precision in providing information for
consumers on tire pressure than the existing indirect systems
now out on the road. And I think that's one of the areas where
Dr. Runge and I are in agreement.
Mr. Gordon. So what is the thought process? Is it
determining is it a cost matter or what? If it's a better
system, what would be your rationale for not going with a
better system?
Mr. Graham. As OMB has explained in the return letter from
a tire safety perspective, the direct system is a superior
system. On the other hand, the one-tire rule would allow the
indirect system, which has the benefit of encouraging the
vehicle makers that don't currently offer anti-lock brakes to
offer them in the future. And as a consequence of that, there
is an offsetting safety advantage of the one-tire system. So
the approach that we're taking is to work on this for a couple
more years in terms of the information collection before we
make a final decision on whether to go with a 4-tire or a 1-
tire standard.
Mr. Runge. If we consider this holistically also, please
keep in mind that we are proposing rulemaking for tire upgrade.
Since it's on our website now, I can tell you what's in the
NPRM and one of the things we're recommending or we are
proposing is that tires be tested at an under inflation-level
consistent with what we see in real world data, so that if, in
fact, this rule comes into place, tires will be safer even at
lesser inflation. So we're trying to consider this holistically
with the idea that ABS brakes may turn out to be a beneficial,
even though real-world data has not yet shown that to be true.
We believe that they are because they stop quicker and so
forth. So we're in harmony here.
Mr. Gordon. Thank you.
Mr. Stearns. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Pitts is
recognized.
Mr. Pitts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Sorry I'm late. I had
other meetings. You may have covered this, Dr. Runge, the early
warning system. How are you planning to use the early warning
data that you will be receiving?
Mr. Runge. If I could just back up a second and talk to you
about the process that we have. There's been some mention made
that we don't have a methodology for looking at complaints, and
that's the farthest thing from the truth. We have a formal
process that involves eight screeners and an office director
and a panel to look at the various sorts of data from consumer
complaints, from reports from industry, insurance company
reports and the like. And they decide when the number of
complaints rises to the level of an initial evaluation.
Now the difficulty with that right now is that there is a
haystack of information arriving and we are constantly trying
to find the needle. What we look forward to with the early
warning rule is some help from technology. There are computer
systems in existence that can help perform that type of
surveillance. They can find the needles a lot easier than an
individual screener can find them. So when we have access to
all of the data that we are proposing in the NPRM for the early
warning rule, in a systematized fashion that will be electronic
and not paper, and in concert with the industry, we do believe
that it will be possible to pick up problems sooner, before
they rise to the level of a huge defect involving thousands or
millions of vehicles or tires or anything else. So there will
still be a subjective element to this when the data arrive, but
very clearly, we'll have the ability to detect those problems
before they really get out of hand.
Mr. Pitts. Can you comment on the challenges that NHTSA
faces in creating and implementing a dynamic rollover test?
Mr. Runge. Yes sir, thank you. Let me just say at the
outset that as a physician who has treated numerous, numerous
crash injuries over the last couple of decades, rollover
crashes are the worst. They predict to us physicians that we
need to look and look and look and make sure that nothing is
wrong because the injuries are often not overtly severe, but
are occult in nature. Having said that, rollover is one of my
very top priorities as Administrator of NHTSA. Right now,
rollovers, even though they represent only about 4 percent of
crashes, are responsible for almost one-third of occupant
fatalities. So we have a problem. I will pledge to you that we
will be tackling rollover from a multi-faceted point of view.
With respect to the standard, I think that the subcommittee
may have had access to the NAS report that came out a couple of
weeks ago. One of the things that I was delighted to see is
that the static stability factor tracks extremely closely with
real world crashes, so we already have an excellent way to rate
vehicles with respect to their propensity to roll over.
Now the NAS report also said that a dynamic test could
offer additional benefits, so we are actively pursuing that in
compliance with the TREAD Act.
There are many opinions about how this should be done.
There are robotics methods. There are driver methods that are
much more subjective. There are J-turns and S-turns and there
are probably many other alphabetical terms out there. So
NHTSA's objective is to evaluate all of these and then narrow
them down and then select the one in time for the final
rulemaking that becomes part of our rating system and will be
published.
I am also concerned on this part of TREAD that we need to
get this information out to the broader public. We have it on
our website. We market it through printed materials. We would
love it if everyone would visit our website before they
purchase a car, but that's probably not practical. So in
addition to coming up with a dynamic standard and our static
standard which you know does track the real world very well, we
will intensively market our findings once those occur.
Mr. Pitts. Thank you. I see my time is up.
Mr. Stearns. Thank the gentleman. The gentleman from
Massachusetts, Mr. Markey.
Mr. Markey. Thank you, thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
Dr. Runge, it's good to have a physician here today. I've been
on Contact for 4 days. Do you think I should move to the Z-
pack? I can't shake this thing.
Mr. Runge. Only insofar as antibiotics do not help with
viruses, Mr. Congressman, I think you're probably fine.
Mr. Markey. I am the author of this direct/indirect ABS
provision, so I'm going to try to help you with congressional
intent here, if it's relevant over to 1B, especially. And I can
understand the balancing that you're trying to engage in, but
it's my understanding that this ABS, the antilock brake system
indirect protection works dealing with kind of the rotational
speed of the wheel. And if there's only one tire that's
underinflated, it works very well. But if there's two that are
underinflated, then it might not detect it because it might
look as though to the device that there is a perfect rotation,
that these wheels are still engaging it. So it wouldn't give
you a warning.
My own personal experience is that when I go into a gas
station and we're all a little bit, in general, behind the
curve in terms of how frequently we go over to that air pump to
check it out, it's just kind of human nature, like going to the
doctor. You always try to delay an extra day or two, maybe it
will clear up. So you don't do it as frequently as you should,
that you often find them fine after you put the air in the tire
you thought had a problem and then you walk around and go oh
yeah, look at the other one over there too. I better do the
other one as well. Now does that happen 25 percent of the time
or 50 percent of the time? It's a pretty high percentage of the
time. You do another tire as well.
And since we're trying to deal with people who are not
obsessive about filling their tires with air, it's probably
that group of people that we're most concerned with. It might
be the Mom with the three kids and all the other activities
that she's trying to have a job as well, not checking all the
tires. But waiting for that light to go on because she bought a
new vehicle that has a light that will go on when there's a
problem, but not if two tires are under inflated.
Now I'm told that there are collateral benefits of having
an antilock brake system go into place and I guess there would
be because if one of the tires did blow, when two of them were
out, you'd have a higher percentage of likelihood that the
brakes would work at that point. So you would have a good
braking system when the tires blew. But you wouldn't
necessarily get warnings that the tires were going to blow
because it would only warn you if one tire was underinflated
and you'd get deceived, in other words. You'd actually be put
into a situation where it was an attractive nuisance. It was an
invitation to keep driving, driving faster, because the light
will go on whenever you have a problem, but not if two are out,
all four are out, underinflated, which I'm afraid for too many
families, that is the case. They just don't pay attention.
That's the point of the light, to warn you. And of course, if
you inflated them all at the same time, originally, they're
probably deflating at the same rate into that dangerous
category. Makes sense to me. Maybe I'm wrong, but that's how my
human nature works.
So my concern is that we not miss an opportunity here to
get people what they really do need to deal with their real
lives, which are busy. They see a vehicle as just another
appliance. They don't pay as much attention to it, all too many
Americans as they should perhaps, but we can't assume that
they're going to. And since most of us do get surprised when we
start filling up our tires, it's not just that one that you
notice on the side as you're getting into the car, but it is
the one or the other on the other side as well, that NHTSA, I
think, is heading in the right direction here. So I'd like, if
you could, Mr. Graham, just to respond to that because I think
that's a legitimate real world concern that has to be addressed
as NHTSA tries to balance your concerns.
Mr. Graham. Congressman, you raise a number of excellent
points and I have to say in all candor that in many ways a lot
of the arguments are very familiar to me because Dr. Runge has
been making these arguments to me over the last week or so and
I think that there is a pretty clear case that direct
monitoring devices on each of the four tires is going to
provide better tire-related safety than a 1-tire standard that
uses the type of indirect measurement system that you referred
to.
However, we should keep in mind that the indirect
technology linked to the ABS system is not fixed, it's not
constant. There's effort under way now to improve the quality
of indirect systems and if we were to make a decision too early
that we're not going to be permitting those indirect systems in
the future, that has the potential to slow the rate of
technological progress in the development of indirect systems.
So the agreement that Dr. Runge and I have engineered is that
for the next 2 years we will continue to study the actual tire
pressure levels in those vehicles out there that have indirect
systems to determine whether or not they're of significant
safety benefit. And, at the same time, we shall watch the
development in the technology. It may be in the final analysis
that NHTSA is right, that we ought to go for the 4-tire system
and mandate that or it may be that we'll learn some things in
the next couple of years that would lead us to a different
conclusion. But I think our agreement is for Model year 2007
and beyond, we don't need to decide that issue today.
Mr. Markey. Here's my problem, Doctor.
Mr. Stearns. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Markey. If I may have 1 additional minute, I would
appreciate it.
Mr. Stearns. By unanimous consent, so ordered. One
additional minute.
Mr. Markey. Thank you. I am, after 26 years on this
committee, become a technological agnostic. I don't know what
the future holds and yeah, there are a lot of geniuses out
there and they're going to try to shoot down a Soviet missile
in a minute and a half after it's launched and this committee
is going to try to make sure that we can call across the
country and have video conferences with our families across the
country and it only costs 10 cents a minute. We know that that
will happen some day, but maybe not in our lifetimes. So while
all of this technologically possible, it doesn't mean that it's
ever going to be achieved. And so my message to you is this,
that unless you can put on the books a standard which
guarantees that families driving their children to school or to
vacations have a warning light that comes on that is accurate,
and timely to protect the safety of those families, then this
amendment, the Markey Amendment is not being implemented. And
we cannot delay pending industry disinterest in putting the
strongest possible standard on the books pending some
investment that they're going to make in the future. Because if
that doesn't happen, there must be some guillotine, some hammer
which comes down which mandates that it happens because 4 years
from now every new car in the United States should have a
guarantee that when there is one underinflated tire, one, that
the light comes on. Now it could be a direct or indirect, but
if they don't develop it, you can't give them an indefinite
extension of time because they will take that as a blank check
to not provide the public safety which for the past generations
these industries----
Mr. Stearns. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Markey. [continuing] have not provided to the public.
That's why we're here. We're here because these industries did
not provide the safety for these families. And we're deluding
ourselves if we believe they're going to pay the price
voluntarily. They will delay. They will stall. They will use
any scientific or technological hedge to make sure they don't
have to put this in place. And we went through too much in
here, we saw too much suffering to allow this to be delayed any
further than it absolutely has to. And there has to be a
guarantee that the hammer comes down and that they put in a
system that works in a very brief period of time.
Mr. Stearns. The gentleman's time has expired. We're going
to take a break, but the gentleman from New Hampshire has one
quick question and then we'll take a break.
Mr. Bass. Yes, thank you very much. Dr. Runge, does NHTSA
have any idea at this point what the cost of the early warning
rulemaking will be to the automobile equipment manufacturing
industry?
Mr. Runge. Congressman Bass, I do not have the answer to
that question. I'd be happy to consult my staff. They may have
it. I will get that during the break and we'll get back to you.
Mr. Bass. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Stearns. I thank the gentleman. The committee will take
a break. If you allow, indulge us, we're going to vote and
we'll be back and we'll have a second round of questioning.
[Brief recess.]
Mr. Stearns. The subcommittee will reconvene and at this
point we finished, except for Mr. Sawyer and then we'll start a
second round of questioning and so the gentleman from Ohio is
recognized for 5 minutes for his set of questions.
Mr. Sawyer. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have a
couple of observations and then a line of questioning I'd like
to ask.
First of all, I am very pleased to see Dr. Runge engaged in
the question of worker safety. It is both a question of safety
and very, very substantial cost for what I suspect you may find
is a marginal gain in consumer information. But nonetheless, I
commend you for your interest in making sure that consumers are
able to locate tires that may be at risk.
Second, I want to suggest to you that I really value
anything that you can do to make ABS and other traction
management systems more universal in automobiles. I value those
systems, but I would hope that in determining which tire
pressure monitoring system you go to, that standards for
accuracy tolerance be the way in which you measure which system
works better. I continue to believe that it is not the--it is
less frequently a matter of absolute defect in tires than it is
cumulative damage over time for marginal under inflation that
ultimately leads to catastrophic failure. It's the effect of
heat in an under inflated tire that does the damage, it seems
to me. So I was really grateful to hear the conversation that
took place.
Let me turn to a more direct question. I understand that
the labeling rule would re-order the location of the production
date in the alpha numeric sequence that identifies the tire. Am
I correct about that?
Mr. Runge. Congressman Sawyer, I've got to confess that my
knowledge of the technical details of where these numbers are,
other than on either side of the tire is very limited.
Mr. Sawyer. What I'm suggesting is that it goes from the
last item in the identification series to the first item in the
identification series and I for the life of me can't understand
why that's important? But I do know that in the course of
making the transition from older tires where it's located on
the back to newer tires where it's located on the front, that
it has a high likelihood of exacerbating consumer confusion
rather than illuminating the information it's trying to convey.
I also suspect it could affect the data base system and the
difficulty in managing huge amounts of data where you've got
different sequences of identifier.
Have you looked at those kinds of things or have your folks
looked at those kind of things? Has the IG looked at that as a
problem in consumer information and data base management?
Mr. Runge. No sir, but I can promise you that Mr. Kratzke,
my Associate Administrator for Performance Standards, has been
writing diligently behind me. He notes here that the reorder is
because consumers often give us the first four digits of the
long number that they see when they are reporting complaints.
And the comments that we receive during the comment period
mirrored yours, that we may be causing more confusion than we
are solving and this will be resolved in the rule. I do thank
you for your comment.
Mr. Sawyer. Thank you very much.
Mr. Mead. No, we have not, but the illustration of the code
reminds me of an issue with the system. Say you get a complaint
in or something from the manufacturer that does list the code.
You want your system to be able to put that in the right place.
Say somebody else writes in and doesn't have the full code, but
they're referring to the same tire. Will this system be smart
enough to be able to reconcile it or at least edit it out and
put it in a bin and say to some staffer at NHTSA this doesn't
fit in the right place. You have to figure out where to fit it.
I think it's a really good point, but the direct answer to your
question is no, we haven't looked at that issue.
Mr. Sawyer. I am grateful for your willingness to take a
look at it. I see I'm about to run out of time. Are we going to
have a second round, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Stearns. Yes, we are.
Mr. Sawyer. I'll yield back. The gentleman's time has
expired. I'll start the second round.
Mr. Mead, are there any recommendations that the Inspector
General made that NHTSA is not implementing?
Mr. Mead. They were responsive overall. I was very
encouraged, and particularly encouraged with Dr. Runge's and
our interface. Now I would hasten to add that we made two
recommendations, one dealing with the information management
system and the second dealing with the rulemakings. I do think
there is a benefit in letting this committee and other
appropriate committees know regularly the status of all these
rulemakings and not just oh, it's coming, but also kind of a
heads up that there are some very contentious issues
surrounding the early warning rulemaking and this date may not
be met.
I think that's beneficial, good interchange between the
executive branch and the legislative branch. I want to make
sure on the information management system that we get a third
party in there that knows something about software that is
verifying and validating that software to make sure that it's
going to meet NHTSA's requirements and that Dr. Runge has very
good advice on problems that are developing and what mid-course
corrections to make.
On the peer review, they've been very responsive to our
recommendation. I think that's an extraordinarily positive step
and a change, material change in the procedures. They also need
to have some procedure where a staffer, a screener of
complaints does not recommend an investigation. How does that
get on the radar screen of this panel? Because that's, in
effect, a decision not to move forward with something, made at
a low, not a low--but a middle management level.
I think NHTSA can figure out some way to implement that
recommendation.
Mr. Stearns. I think, Dr. Runge, it sounds like you got a
passing grade here.
I think that's what he gave here. He mentioned this peer
review panel to ensure consistency in decisions, whether an
investigation should be opened. I am just your response to what
he just said.
Mr. Runge. Well, in general, he's exactly right. I would
point out that when a screener chooses not to bring a series of
cases to the attention of the panel, it's not because they have
written it off, it's because they're following it along. When
these complaints come in, they are coded in certain ways, as
Mr. Mead pointed out earlier, and they're coded by individuals
who code these things all the time. So they know into what
category these complaints should go and the screeners develop
an expertise around the areas of complaints that they deal
with.
When something smells bad to them, for lack of a better
term, they bring it up. If it has not yet risen to that level,
they follow it along. So he's exactly right in that we do need
some fail safe method----
Mr. Stearns. Of peer review?
Mr. Runge. Of identifying cases that may not have risen to
that level, but a periodic look at the cases that are being
followed.
Mr. Stearns. He had mentioned that the NHTSA data base is
fraught with problems and errors. And are you folks agreed to
sort of review and edit the existing data before transferring
this new information in if it's already fraught with errors and
how are you handling that?
Mr. Runge. That's a great question. I think we have some
difference of opinion about how fraught with errors it is.
Mr. Stearns. So you're saying it's not?
Mr. Runge. Well, we can always do better. One of the
beauties of the new system coming in is that we are going to
have to incorporate a lot of our existing information into the
new surveillance system. I believe as part of that process the
cleaning up and recoding will be a natural course of events
there.
Mr. Stearns. Let me ask each of you what is the No. 1
concern toward implementing the TREAD Act today? What would you
think the most important No. 1 problem that we could leave this
hearing with an understanding from each of you that we would
have to accomplish?
Dr. Runge, I'll start with you first.
Mr. Runge. As I consult my cheat sheet of corrections
here----
Mr. Sawyer. Forty or 50 probably.
Mr. Runge. I learned the entire human body in 4 years;
after 6 months, I'm barely scratching the surface of the TREAD
Act.
Mr. Sawyer. Yes. That's a nice honest----
Mr. Runge. I would say quite honestly, this is a difficult
question to answer because so many of these things are so very
important and you have given us the resources and the
opportunity to address things that had frankly been not
addressed. I do believe personally that the early warning
system, if done the way we expect it to be done, will result in
our ability to detect problems sooner before they rise to the
problem of a national public health emergency.
Getting help from artificial intelligence will enable us to
do a better job, and I really do believe that when we look back
at this thing 10 years from now, of all these rules that have
come out, that will be the one where we will look at it and say
that really was a good investment of the taxpayer's money.
Mr. Stearns. Dr. Graham?
Mr. Graham. Yes, Mr. Chairman, there has been a lot of
attention this morning on the deadlines issues and the pace of
rulemaking and this sort of thing and I think it's perfectly
appropriate that a committee like this put that type of
constructive encouragement on both NHTSA and OMB. However, I
think like Dr. Runge suggested, 10 years down the road when we
look back, the quality of these rules in terms of the
underlying engineering and economic information behind them, is
going to influence whether or not we have saved as many lives
as we can with the resources available. In that sense, I think
the technical issues here should not be overlooked.
Mr. Mead. I think you're going to get a very good
rulemaking for the early warning system. I think the
manufacturers will largely comply and you'll have lots of
information at NHTSA and it will be important that you know how
to distill, synthesize that information, sort through it, get
rid of the junk, the garbage and hone in on the important ones.
Mr. Stearns. So the No. 1, toward implementation is getting
rid of the information that's not relevant and making sure that
the relevant information is part of the early warning system?
Mr. Mead. Yes sir. I think the advanced rulemaking that
I've reviewed for the early warning system is quite credible.
Mr. Stearns. Okay. Thank you. My time has expired. The
gentle lady from Colorado.
Ms. Degette. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. To finish the
question I was asking earlier to Dr. Runge, Mr. Mead suggested
that you need an outside person to help you, to make the
software work. And Dr. Runge, what I was simply asking was do
you have any big objection to implementing that kind of control
to make sure that your software is actually working to get the
data that you're going to need?
Mr. Runge. Absolutely no objection at all, other than the
economic barrier that we face in hiring that kind of
consultant.
Ms. Degette. I think I can speak for the whole committee,
Dr. Runge, in saying we want to make sure this is done right
and so if it costs extra money, I would not hesitate to hire an
outside individual consultant to make sure that your software
is right to begin with. If you need the money, please come and
let us know because the important thing is that the Act get
implemented right and I think you would agree with that.
Mr. Runge. Yes ma'am, thank you very much.
Ms. Degette. Let me just ask one more question. I know,
Doctor, that you testified earlier that you were coordinating
with a number of industry representatives and what the TREAD
Act says is, of course, that the suppliers and manufacturers
are going to have to comply with this early warning rule.
So I'm wondering, of these groups, how many of these
industry participants have you consulted in developing the
information management system? The 23 light vehicle
manufacturers, all heavy truck manufacturers? All recreational
vehicle manufacturers? Auto suppliers, child seat
manufacturers, school bus manufacturers and on and on? How many
of those have you consulted in developing the data base?
Mr. Runge. Thus far, I can't answer that question. I can
tell you that we are planning to have technical working groups
in the summer to get together on how to best receive the data
from them. The quality of the data will depend greatly upon on
how it's done at the front end and we recognize that.
Ms. Degette. That's right. Mr. Mead, what do you think
about the fact that none of these or few of these groups have
been consulted to date on developing the data base?
Mr. Mead. I think now is the time to consult with them.
Ms. Degette. Thank you. I would urge that that happen, too.
And Mr. Chairman, if I might, I think there's a great deal
of good will in this committee toward NHTSA and to Dr. Runge
who's recently come into the job. I think the motives are good,
but I think there's also a growing amount of concern about the
delays and implementation of the TREAD Act. And frankly, Mr.
Chairman, I'd hate to be back here in another year finding out
that implementation is once again delayed. But worse, I'd hate
to be back here in 5 years having a hearing and learn that
NHTSA did not find the needle in the haystack that Dr. Runge
talks about, that because of an inadequate database or
inadequate information management, more American lives have
been lost and so I would really urge all of you to work with
all due speed, but also with all due thoroughness, to make sure
that this Act is implemented correctly.
And I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Stearns. I thank the gentle lady. The gentleman from
Ohio.
Mr. Sawyer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As I understand it,
currently when a passenger tire is installed on an SUV or a
light truck, the tire's load rating is reduced by 10 percent.
That 10 percent reduction was omitted from the proposed rule.
Having the, I suspect, unintended consequence of permitting a
load increase of 10 percent for passenger tires used on those
kinds of vehicles seems to conflict with the intent of the Act
and I'm just inquiring whether this was an omission or whether
it's a change in policy?
Mr. Runge. Mr. Kratzke tells me that this was not omitted
from the rulemaking. They are aware that passenger car tires
are derated for load at 10 percent.
Can you ask me more specifically and I'll make sure I get
you the right answer quicker.
Mr. Sawyer. I'd be glad to. Let me, Mr. Chairman, while
I've got a little extra time, I remember last year when we
asked the great Jacques Nasser whether tires and automobiles
function together as a system and he sat just about where you
are, Doctor, and said no, they do not. And I was just
dumbfounded by that. I found something I'd like to read for the
committee, put into the record. A Ford engineer arrived, named
Jacques Beget, arrived in the United States in 1955 and found a
niche in the relatively unexplored world of quantifying tire
and suspension interaction. Beget stressed the need to analyze
tire, vehicle and road together rather than to think of the
tire alone. And he wanted hard numbers. His persistence led to
a string of SAE publications explaining numerical analyses of
skid and rolling resistance, wet traction, nonuniformity among
tires and the behavior of radial tires on American cars. In
1965, Automobile News could report ``for the first time,
Detroit auto makers are actually setting the design
requirements of the 35 to 45 million tires they purchase
annually.'' Their demands had never been truly quantifiable
before.
This is the same Jacques Nasser who when asked by William
Ford who is the highest paid employee of the Ford Motor
Company, replied well, I'm the President and you're not
compensated directly, so I guess it's me. He said no, it's a
fellow named Edward Irvine. And he said do you know who Edward
Irvine is? He says he makes $13 million a year. He had no idea
who he was. He said he's our Formula One driver with our Jaguar
Division. You should have known that. My guess is he should
have known this too.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and yield back.
Mr. Stearns. As CEO of Ford Motor Company, of course, he's
no longer there.
Mr. Sawyer. Yes, that's true.
Mr. Stearns. The gentleman from Massachusetts is recognized
for a second round of questioning.
Mr. Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I don't want to
prolong this because obviously, I made pretty clear what I was
interested in during my first round. I guess what I wanted to
say though is that whether it be a direct or indirect system,
they're fine during a transition, obviously. Makes sense. At
the time that we did the TREAD Act, this tire safety act, a
couple of years ago, there were already models out there. So we
already had a model. Early stage stuff. It was already out
there, in vehicles, proving that it could be done and done
inexpensively which is why I think my amendment was basically
something that everyone could agree on this committee should be
adopted, if it was already out there in that early stage of
development. And that was an indirect system based on ABS which
was fine, but at some point in the future we need to move to a
system that lets you know if you're at risk if two or all of
your tires are underinflated which I'm afraid is an all too
typical situation for average, busy American families. And we
just have to give them that. And that's the real intent of the
Act.
Now some day an ABS system might achieve that, but at some
point after a transition I think NHTSA is right, we have to
move to the technology that provides the safer, more accurate
warnings for American families. And we can't delay that
indefinitely waiting for a technology to arrive that might
never arrive, as much as would hope that it would. And so
that's basically my message here today, that we have to have
the goal as being firm if families are given all the
information about all their tires. And if the industry
announces they're in a crash program and that they're going to
develop an ABS based system and it's going to be there in 2 or
4 years, that's fine. But again, as I said, I'm an agnostic
technologically. I want a hydrogen-based automobile. I want
many things in life. I want nonfat strawberry shortcake, I want
many things, okay, and I'm sure there are people trying to do
it, but it's unlikely that--well, I'm not going to say it's
impossible, but Mr. Graham, Dr. Runge, all I'm saying is that
as long as your agreement gives us certitude and a deadline and
that the public at a date certain knows that their family, when
they buy a vehicle has all four wheels, whether it will be for
some system or the other that will be given the proper warning
to the driver that their family might be in danger, then we can
live with that. It can't be something that's used by the
industry to achieve a delay in installing the kinds of
protection. So as you work together that would be my one
message.
Thank you.
Mr. Stearns. Thank you, sir. I thank the gentleman, and Dr.
Runge, I want to thank you for your participation; Dr. Graham,
Mr. Mead. We have heard during this hearing some testimony
which has us concerned, obviously, because this is not being as
expedited as Members of Congress we thought it would be on a
much quicker schedule.
What I'm going to suggest, Dr. Runge, is that you--we get
together periodically and you brief us where you are at and I'm
suggesting perhaps if we see another delay, we see problems, to
your benefit it may require us to have another hearing in the
fall so that we can have a wrap up and see where we are and see
whether it's materials, resources or something that we can
provide or what we can do to help you, but you have an arduous
task. We're here to support you and we appreciate all of your
testimony and you indulged us while we took a vote and the
committee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
[The reports of the OMB and the NHTSA follow:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7993.001
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7993.002
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7993.003
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7993.004
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7993.005
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7993.006
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7993.007
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7993.008
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7993.009
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7993.010
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7993.011
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7993.012
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7993.013
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7993.014
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7993.015
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7993.016
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7993.017
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7993.018
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7993.019
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7993.020
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7993.021
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7993.022
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7993.023
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7993.024
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7993.025
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7993.026
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7993.027
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7993.028
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7993.029
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7993.030
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7993.031
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7993.032
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7993.033
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7993.034
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7993.035
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7993.036
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7993.037
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7993.038
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7993.039
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7993.040
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7993.041
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7993.042
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7993.043
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7993.044
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7993.045
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7993.046
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7993.047
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7993.048
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7993.049
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7993.050
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7993.051
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7993.052
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7993.053
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7993.054
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7993.055
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7993.056
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7993.057
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7993.058
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7993.059
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7993.060