[House Hearing, 107 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
H.R. 1367, ATLANTIC HIGHLY MIGRATORY SPECIES CONSERVATION ACT OF 2001
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LEGISLATIVE HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON FISHERIES CONSERVATION, WILDLIFE AND OCEANS
of the
COMMITTEE ON RESOURCES
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
August 2, 2001
__________
Serial No. 107-57
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Resources
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COMMITTEE ON RESOURCES
JAMES V. HANSEN, Utah, Chairman
NICK J. RAHALL II, West Virginia, Ranking Democrat Member
Don Young, Alaska, George Miller, California
Vice Chairman Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
W.J. ``Billy'' Tauzin, Louisiana Dale E. Kildee, Michigan
Jim Saxton, New Jersey Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
Elton Gallegly, California Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, American
John J. Duncan, Jr., Tennessee Samoa
Joel Hefley, Colorado Neil Abercrombie, Hawaii
Wayne T. Gilchrest, Maryland Solomon P. Ortiz, Texas
Ken Calvert, California Frank Pallone, Jr., New Jersey
Scott McInnis, Colorado Calvin M. Dooley, California
Richard W. Pombo, California Robert A. Underwood, Guam
Barbara Cubin, Wyoming Adam Smith, Washington
George Radanovich, California Donna M. Christensen, Virgin
Walter B. Jones, Jr., North Islands
Carolina Ron Kind, Wisconsin
Mac Thornberry, Texas Jay Inslee, Washington
Chris Cannon, Utah Grace F. Napolitano, California
John E. Peterson, Pennsylvania Tom Udall, New Mexico
Bob Schaffer, Colorado Mark Udall, Colorado
Jim Gibbons, Nevada Rush D. Holt, New Jersey
Mark E. Souder, Indiana James P. McGovern, Massachusetts
Greg Walden, Oregon Anibal Acevedo-Vila, Puerto Rico
Michael K. Simpson, Idaho Hilda L. Solis, California
Thomas G. Tancredo, Colorado Brad Carson, Oklahoma
J.D. Hayworth, Arizona Betty McCollum, Minnesota
C.L. ``Butch'' Otter, Idaho
Tom Osborne, Nebraska
Jeff Flake, Arizona
Dennis R. Rehberg, Montana
Allen D. Freemyer, Chief of Staff
Lisa Pittman, Chief Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
James H. Zoia, Democrat Staff Director
Jeff Petrich, Democrat Chief Counsel
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SUBCOMMITTE ON FISHERIES CONSERVATION, WILDLIFE AND OCEANS
WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland, Chairman
ROBERT A. UNDERWOOD, Guam, Ranking Democrat Member
Don Young, Alaska Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, American
W.J. ``Billy'' Tauzin, Louisiana Samoa
Jim Saxton, New Jersey, Neil Abercrombie, Hawaii
Vice Chairman Solomon P. Ortiz, Texas
Richard W. Pombo, California Frank Pallone, Jr., New Jersey
Walter B. Jones, Jr., North
Carolina
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C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on August 2, 2001................................... 1
Statement of Members:
Gilchrest, Hon. Wayne T., a Representative in Congress from
the State of Maryland, Prepared statement of............... 5
Saxton, Hon. Jim, a Representative in Congress from the State
of New Jersey.............................................. 1
Prepared statement of.................................... 2
Underwood, Hon. Robert A., a Delegate to Congress from Guam.. 4
Prepared statement of.................................... 4
Statement of Witnesses:
Donofrio, James A., Executive Director, Recreational Fishing
Alliance................................................... 55
Prepared statement of.................................... 57
Letter from Betsy Larsen, Larsen's Fish Market, Inc.,
submitted for the record............................... 77
Hayes, Robert G., General Counsel, Coastal Conservation
Association................................................ 15
Prepared statement of.................................... 16
Hobbs, J. Timothy, Jr., Fisheries Project Director, National
Coalition for Marine Conservation.......................... 64
Prepared statement of.................................... 65
Hogarth, Dr. William T., Acting Assistant Administrator for
Fisheries, National Marine Fisheries Service, U.S.
Department of Commerce..................................... 5
Prepared statement of.................................... 7
Panacek, Ernest, President, Blue Water Fishermen's
Association, and General Manager, Viking Village, Inc...... 19
Prepared statement of.................................... 23
Scott, Dr. Gerald P., Director, Sustainable Fisheries
Division, National Marine Fisheries Service, U.S.
Department of Commerce..................................... 34
Prepared statement of.................................... 36
HEARING ON H.R. 1367, THE ATLANTIC HIGHLY MIGRATORY SPECIES
CONSERVATION ACT OF 2001
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Thursday, August 2, 2001
U.S. House of Representatives
Subcommittee on Fisheries Conservation, Wildlife and Oceans
Committee on Resources
Washington, DC
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The Subcommittee met, pursuant to other business, at 10:47
a.m., in Room 1334, Longworth House Office Building, Mr. Jim
Saxton presiding.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JIM SAXTON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY
Mr. Saxton. [Presiding.] Thank you all for being here. And
we needed to get that out of the way, and we appreciate very
much your patience.
First of all, let me say that I have an opening statement
that I ask unanimous consent be placed in the record in its
entirety.
Inasmuch as we have a group of auspicious--I didn't say
suspicious--auspicious witnesses, and I want to welcome you all
here this morning. I will just say, by way of introduction,
that this is certainly not a new topic to anyone in the room;
that is, the matter of highly migratory species conservation
and the interaction of various gear types in this fishery and
the effect of various gear types on this fishery.
As everyone here knows, we have had long and very
interesting discussions and sometimes other accompanying
activities that this subject brings about. Certainly, it is a
subject that has its share of controversy associated with it.
But the fact of the matter is that there are good reasons
for us to move forward to try to understand the conservation
measures that have been put in place to date and to understand
the need which may exist for further conservation measures.
I, as a matter of fact, have introduced one bill, which is,
I believe, H.R. 1367. The bottom line is that this bill I hope
will continue to be a beacon of light to shine on this subject.
Not everybody agrees with the provisions of it. Some people
agree with some of them. Some people agree with none of them.
But it serves as a focal point for us to begin again, or
continue, I guess I should say, the discussions on this issue.
One fact that was pointed out to me here recently in the
2001 stock assessment for fishery evaluation of Atlantic highly
migratory species; I will just read this one paragraph:
The 2000 assessment for white marlin was quite pessimistic.
The total Atlantic stock is estimated to be less than 15
percent of the biomass, which is considered to be the
sustainable level.
Fifteen percent, it is down that low.
In 1996, the figures were that it was down 23 percent.
These figures show that white marlin are down to 15 percent of
what might be considered a healthy level. And current fishing
mortality is estimated to be seven times higher than the
sustainable level.
Given that the stock is severely depressed, the report
concluded that ICCAT should take steps to reduce the catch of
white marlin as much as possible.
This is what this subject is all about. And, again, I look
forward to hearing the testimony of the witnesses this morning.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Saxton follows:]
Statement of Honorable Jim Saxton, A Representative in Congress from
the State of New Jersey
Good morning Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee. Thank
you to the witnesses for joining us today. I appreciate you taking the
time out of your schedules to be here.
Thank you for continuing the process to tackle this very important,
yet controversial issue. I worked very hard, with a number of you last
year, to get a bill enacted into law, which did not happen, much to my
frustration and disappointment. I am pleased you have agreed to
continue to work with me to find a compromise solution to this
extremely difficult and complicated problem.
I am back to attack this issue again because w e still have a
fundamental problem. And I introduced HR 1367 to keep the spotlight on
it. The bottom line is longline gear is a very damaging destructive way
of fishing and it needs to come out of the water. My bill, through
closure and a buyout does just that. It also provides a means for
taking a hard look at what is happening with these species and what we
can and should do to prevent the populations from plummeting even
further, and begin the process of rebuilding the stocks. It's been done
w ith other species and it can and should be done with these species.
I would like to state, with regard to the Administration's
position, Dr. Hogarth, in reading your testimony, I am more than
willing to work with you on technical changes to my bill, but there are
5 very important components which I feel strongly about. First, It is
important to compensate those longline fishermen who have been affected
by the NMFS closure, by purchasing their permits thereby permanently
reducing .the longline effort in the US. Second, the establishment of
two time-area closures and offering a buy-out to those affected, to
reduce by catch. Third, the research program in my, bill will help to
give us a better understanding of bycatch in the US as a result of this
fishery. Fourth, in an effort to reduce bycatch in longlining, to have
the fishermen transfer their quota to another gear. And fifth, it is
important these fishemen not reenter the longline fishery.
Dr. Hogarth, with regard to the Administration's concerns to obtain
appropriations, you made a valid point last year which is still a valid
point today. We are talking about a substantial amount of money, but it
is my commitment to work with the Appropriators to secure this funding.
Priority will be given to those affected by the current NMFS closure.
My goal is to get compensation, coupled with a good piece of
conservation legislation, to permanently reduce the effort on this
fishery.
I am pleased to be able to discuss H.R. 1367, the Atlantic Highly
Migratory Species Conservation Act of 2001. This issue, as you know,
continues to be extremely important to me. We stand at an historic
crossroads for the conservation of highly migratory species (HMS). The
effective management of Atlantic HMS is one of the most complex and
difficult challenges facing the National Marine Fisheries Service.
These species range widely throughout international waters and the
jurisdictions of many coastal nations with diverse political
perspectives on how to properly utilize and manage this valuable
resource.
The fishing practices and marketing strategies are equally diverse.
Unlike most other domestic fisheries, effective multilateral management
is the goal of our nation's HMS policy. In fact, Congress placed
Atlantic HMS management authority in the hands of the Secretary of
Commerce instead of the Regional Fishery Management Councils, in
theory, to ensure that our government maintains an Atlantic-wide
perspective and vision.
It is my firm belief that this Congress, together with thousands of
concerned fisherman and conservationists, have a unique opportunity to
work together to aggressively protect and rebuild stocks of HMS such as
billfish, sharks and swordfish. I also believe it is our duty and
obligation to fight to preserve and rebuild these now vulnerable and
threatened species.
In August of 1999, I was approached by representatives of the
longline industry and three recreation/conservation fishing
organizations who suggested I sponsor legislation to: (1) permanently
close an area of U.S. waters in the South Atlantic to pelagic longline
fishing; (2) establish two time-area closures in the Gulf of Mexico to
pelagic longlining; (3) reduce billfish by catch and the harvesting of
juvenile swordfish; and (4) provide affected fishermen a buy out to
compensate them for the loss of fishing grounds and fishing
opportunities. I remain a strong supporter of this concept.
I first began work on this important issue because I feel very
strongly that a balance can be achieved. Prior to and following the
introduction of H.R. 3331, my first bill targeting these critical
needs, I met with, and spoke to, a number of pelagic longline
fisherman, recreational fisherman and their organizations, and a number
of conservation and environmental groups.
I introduced H.R. 3331, in the 106th Congress, in part, because the
National Marine Fisheries Service established the pelagic longline
fishery as a limited-entry fishery through the HMS Fishery Management
Plan. As NMFS is well aware, I have been asking them to take this
action for many years. The establishment of a limited access system is
critical to reduce harvesting capacity through attrition or a buyback
program. Hence, once pelagic longline permits for HMS are bought-out as
proposed in my bill, there would be no further vessels re-entering the
fishery.
I believe in this concept because the current management system
whereby NMFS publishes a regulatory rule that is challenged by
seemingly endless lawsuits is not an effective way of promoting sound
HMS fishery management. This system has to change.
The International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas
(ICCAT), led by the United States, approved a ten-year rebuilding plan
for North Atlantic swordfish. Although the final approved plan did not
go as far as I would have liked in reducing the annual quota
internationally, it nevertheless set an important tone for
conservation. I commend the U.S. ICCAT Commissioners for their tenacity
in getting the rebuilding plan approved.
Preliminary scientific information suggests the North Atlantic
Swordfish stock level seems to be improving slightly, according to the
landings figures form 1998 to 1999, but even if this an accurate
assessment, it is still not nearly enough to maintain a sustainable
fishery. The amounts of dead discards, meaning juveniles that are too
small to keep have gone up dramatically from 1998 to 1999.
The harvesting of so many juveniles poses a huge problem to enable
the stock to rebuild itself, if w e continue to harvest them at this
rate. The NMFS even states in their ``2001 SAFE (Stock Assessment and
Fishery Evaluation) Report for Atlantic HMS,'' that ``The Standing
Committee on Research and Statistics cautioned that the north Atlantic
recovery plan (for Atlantic Swordfish) is very sensitive to any
overharvests. If recent overharvests of 10% continue, the stock would
likely not have a greater than 50% probability of reaching biomass
levels that will support Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY).''
According to the latest stock assessments for Atlantic Yellowfin
Tuna, the stock is still overfished, meaning there are too few fish to
have a viable fishery and overfishing continues to occur, meaning we
cannot keep taking this fish without harming the stock, as it cannot
replenish itself that quickly.
The landings by the longline community for Yellowfin Tuna are up
dramatically from 1998 to 1999, as with Bigeye, Bluefin, Albacore and
Skipjack Tuna. Most alarming to me is the increase in the dead discards
of both Blue and White Marlin, w hich are both up dramatically from
1998 to 1999. This is just unacceptable for species that are on the
brink of being wiped out completely.
In evaluating the most recent data provided by the NMFS on stock
assessments, I am pleased the Swordfish landing has not increased,
however, I am disappointed in the increase in landings of other HMS,
and I want to make it abundantly clear that we are nowhere near the end
to ensure the sustainability of these species.
I reintroduced HR. 3331 in the form of H.R. 1367 on April 4, 2001.
While different from H.R. 3331, it is a strong piece of conservation
legislation. It establishes annual closures of Highly Migratory Species
Conservation Zones in the Gulf of Mexico and the Mid Atlantic Bight.
This bill establishes a voluntary commercial fishing permit
compensation program to all individuals holding a Directed Swordfish
Initial Limited Access Permit or Tuna Longline Permit with Incidental
Swordfish and shark.
Priority will be given to those permit holders, who from 1992
through 1998 fishing seasons, had significant landings of fish under
those permits from the areas closed under the NMFS August 1, 2000 final
rule.
H.R. 1367 has a Highly Migratory Species Bycatch Mortality
Reduction Research Program, which establishes a three year research
program to determine gear configurations and uses that are most
effective in reducing HMS and sea turtle mortality. It is vitally
important we explore all avenues to reduce this dramatic reduction in
species. The most recent stock assessments conducted by NMFS reinforce
what I have been saying all along - these species have been fished
practically to extinction and if we don't take action now, they may
never recover. That would be a tragedy.
This is the continuation of an arduous, yet critically important
process, and I am confident w e can provide a conservation measure that
is good for our beleaguered highly migratory species of fish. I look
forward to working together with all of you and continuing to fight
until a solid conservation measure is passed and becomes law.
Thank you. I look forward to hearing your testimony.
______
Mr. Saxton. And at this point, I will turn to Mr. Underwood
for his comment.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT UNDERWOOD, A DELEGATE TO
CONGRESS FROM GUAM
Mr. Underwood. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am in favor of conservation of our ocean resources, and I
applaud your continuing efforts to promote this goal.
I am also in favor of fair and equitable uses of these
resources, taking into account all of the stakeholders and the
services and the benefits that they provide to their
communities.
Bycatch in any fishing operation is always a concern, both
for the survival of that target fishery and the target fishery
for the fish that was caught as bycatch. Efforts to reduce
bycatch must be taken wherever necessary, but in such a manner
as to be effective as possible while causing the least amount
of harm to those interests which rely on fishing operations.
Achieving this balance is a delicate and difficult task,
and I look forward to hearing from the witnesses today on how a
successful balance can be achieved and how we can handle this
particular legislation.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the testimony.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Underwood follows:]
Statement of the Honorable Robert Underwood, A Delegate to Congress
from Guam
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am in favor of conservation of our ocean
resources and I applaud your continuing efforts to promote this goal. I
am also in favor of fair and equitable use of those resources, taking
into account all the stakeholders and the services and benefits they
provide to their communities.
Bycatch in any fishing operation is always a concern, both for the
survival of that target fishery and the target fishery for the fish
that was caught as bycatch. Efforts to reduce bycatch must be taken
wherever necessary, but in such a manner as to be as effective as
possible while causing the least amount of harm to those interests
which rely on fishing operations. Achieving this balance is a delicate
and difficult task, and I look forward to hearing from the witnesses
today on how a successful balance can be achieved.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
______
Mr. Saxton. Thank you.
And we will get right to you folks.
Dr. Hogarth, if you would like to begin?
And I am told by staff that I need to ask unanimous consent
to submit other statements for the record, and we have one here
from Mr. Gilchrest, the Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gilchrest follows:]
Statement by the Honorable Wayne Gilchrest, Chairman, Subcommittee on
Fisheries Conservation, Wildlife and Oceans
I would like to welcome our witnesses to this hearing on the
important topic of conservation of Atlantic highly migratory species.
This hearing will focus on several important issues for conserving
Atlantic highly migratory species and effectively managing the U.S.
longline fishery, including time/area closures, pelagic longline vessel
capacity reduction, a pelagic longline vessel permit holder
compensation program, research to reduce pelagic longline bycatch
mortality, and longline vessel monitoring devices.
There are significant challenges to effectively managing highly
migratory species in the Atlantic Ocean because these species range
over broad areas of the ocean, they are harvested by many other nations
outside of U.S. waters, and they are jointly managed by an
international management organization--the International Commission for
the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT).
I am particularly interested in the scientific basis and the
conservation benefits of the time/area closures in the proposed
legislation and of the existing time/area closures that the National
Marine Fisheries Service has implemented through regulations, and the
social and economic impacts to U.S. longline fishermen of these
existing and proposed closed areas.
I hope that today's hearing will provide important information and
ideas for improving highly migratory fisheries management in U.S.
waters of the Atlantic Ocean.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses.
______
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM HOGARTH, ACTING ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR
FOR FISHERIES, NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE
Dr. Hogarth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
Subcommittee.
I am Bill Hogarth, the Acting Assistant Administrator for
Fisheries for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration.
I appreciate the opportunity to testify today on H.R. 1367,
the Atlantic Highly Migratory Species Conservation Act.
Since the early 1990's, Atlantic highly migratory species
have been managed directly by the Secretary of Commerce,
primarily because the range of these species extends over five
regional fishery management councils.
Secretarial management also facilitates the U.S.
participation in the international highly migratory
conservation programs and the establishment and negotiation of
the U.S. position at the meetings of the International
Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT).
Atlantic swordfish, billfish, and some tuna species are
harvested by a large number of nations and currently are
considered by ICCAT to over-exported. The U.S. has worked
through ICCAT to foster international cooperation for the
management of highly migratory species.
The U.S. has played a key role in establishing an
international rebuilding program for bluefin tuna, swordfish,
blue marlin and white marlin. Our progress would not have been
possible without the strong support of the U.S. commercial and
recreational fisherman, environmental groups, Congress, and
others.
While our fisherman have a consistent record of compliance
with these ICCAT programs, improvements in monitoring and
enforcement by other contracting parties and nonmember parties
must be implemented.
Consistent with the ICCAT responsibilities, the Magnuson-
Stevens Act requires NOAA Fisheries to manage highly migratory
species within U.S. waters. In 1999, we completed a fishery
management plan for the Atlantic tunas, swordfish, and sharks,
and amended an existing Fisheries Management Plan (FMP) for
billfish.
These new plans include management measures to identify and
rebuild over-fished highly migratory species stocks, minimize
bycatch, limit access to the pelagic longline fisheries for
highly migratory species, and address socioeconomic impacts on
fishermen and their communities.
The longline fishery provides an important source of
seafood for the American consumer. However, it, as well as
several other commercial fisheries, unintentionally creates
bycatch, including juvenile swordfish, billfish, bluefin tuna,
and shark, and also threatened and endangered species, such as
sea turtles.
To minimize bycatch, NOAA Fisheries implemented a number of
regulations in their highly migratory species plan.
Additionally, in August 2000, NOAA Fisheries established three
additional time-area closures for pelagic longline fishing, and
prohibited use of live bait in the Gulf of Mexico.
These closures are expected to reduce swordfish, sailfish,
and large coastal shark discards.
And most recently, NOAA Fisheries closed the Grand Banks to
pelagic longline fishing to reduce sea turtle interactions and
mortality.
All of these actions are the subject of pending lawsuits.
Mr. Chairman, overall, NOAA Fisheries supports the
objectives to H.R. 1367 to reduce bycatch while mitigating
social or economic impacts. We would like to work with the
Subcommittee to clarify and amend certain provisions of the
bill that we feel are unclear or appear to conflict with other
current regulations.
Also, several of the programs outlined in H.R. 1367 require
appropriated funds that are inconsistent with the President's
budget request. And in view of overall funding constraints, we
do not intend to make a request for such funds in fiscal year
2002.
Let me say up front that one of the major concerns of the
legislation is the reallocation of total allowable catch in
section 12. Under the ICCAT rebuilding program for swordfish,
the U.S. has been allocated a 29 percent share.
Depending on participation in the pelagic longline buyout
program and the impact of all the closed areas, it may not be
possible for the U.S. to harvest the total amount of
reallocated catch of swordfish using handgear, which will lead
to an accumulated carryover of unharvested stocks. If the U.S.
fishing fleet is unable to harvest its share of the Atlantic
swordfish quota allocated by ICCAT, the quota will most likely
be reallocated to other fishing nations. If this happens, the
U.S. could lose negotiating power with ICCAT, leading to
reductions in future allocation.
The U.S. currently has more regulations to prevent bycatch
and more areas closed to fishing with pelagic longline gear
than any other nation. If the U.S. position is eroded and its
share of swordfish is reallocated, the result may be more
bycatch Atlantic-wide rather than less.
In addition, Mr. Chairman, we have conducted analysis for
the closed areas in H.R. 1367. Depending on the redistribution
of fishing effort, the closures could either have no impact on
discard rates or could increase them to a small extent.
In addition, we are uncertain that two capacity reduction
programs are necessary and recommend that one program be
developed to address capacity reduction and vessel
compensation.
Also, H.R. 1367 requires completion of the vessel
compensation program in 225 days. With the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requirements and all other
requirements we have, we feel like, without a specific
implementation process in the bill, this program would take up
to 20 months.
The bill also does not appropriate funds for either buyback
program. And given current funding constraints, we prefer not
to commit to either program until funds are appropriated.
Additionally, H.R. 1367 requires us to notify Congress of
other potential funding sources for this program. And at the
present time, we are unaware of additional sources.
Once again, I would like to state that NOAA Fisheries
supports the stated goals of H.R. 1367. I recognize the
significance of the many issues raised today and the efforts of
Congress to meet the conservation requirements that minimize
adverse impacts on displaced fisherman.
I look forward to working with Congress to address our
concerns with the proposed legislation.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to
answering any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hogarth follows:]
Statement of William T. Hogarth, Ph.D. Acting Assistant Administrator
for Fisheries, National Marine Fisheries Service, National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration U.S. Department of Commerce
Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee. I am
Dr. William Hogarth, Acting Assistant Administrator for Fisheries of
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Thank you for the
opportunity to testify today on H.R. 1367, the Atlantic Highly
Migratory Species (HMS) Conservation Act.
This bill, introduced by Rep. Saxton, would- (1) establish seasonal
closures to pelagic longline fishing for HMS in the Gulf of Mexico, the
Northern Mid-Atlantic Bight, and the Southern Mid-Atlantic Bight; (2)
limit the number of pelagic longline sets in the Mid-Atlantic Bight
during the summer months; (3) establish two capacity reduction programs
to compensate eligible vessel owners for voluntarily giving up their
pelagic longline permits; (4) establish a Pelagic Longline HMS Bycatch
and Mortality Reduction Research Program to identify and test a variety
of pelagic longline fishing gear configurations and determine which of
those configurations are most effective at reducing bycatch mortality;
(5) reallocate a portion of the total allowable catch of swordfish from
the pelagic longline fleet to the commercial handgear fleet; and (6)
require pelagic longline vessels to be equipped with vessel monitoring
systems. We note that several of these programs require appropriated
funds that are not consistent with the President's budget request and,
in view of current overall funding constraints, we do not intend to
make a request for such funds for fiscal year 2002.
As you know, Atlantic HMS, such as swordfish, tunas, billfish, and
sharks, range throughout tropical and temperate oceans and include some
of the world's largest and most valuable fish. They are sought after by
commercial fishermen and prized by many sport anglers. Since the early
1990s, Atlantic HMS have been managed directly by the Secretary of
Commerce, primarily because the range of these species extends over
five regional fishery management council areas. Secretarial management
also facilitates U.S. participation in international HMS conservation
programs and the establishment and negotiation of U.S. positions at
meetings of the International Commission for the Conservation of
Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), the 31-member organization charged with
coordinating the science and management of tunas and tuna-like species.
Atlantic swordfish, billfish, and some tuna species are harvested
by a large number of nations and currently are considered by ICCAT to
be overexploited. Consequently, we must work with other nations to
eliminate overfishing and rebuild these fish stocks. Both the United
Nations Agreement on Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks and
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea stress the need for
cooperation among nations to ensure effective conservation and
management of HMS throughout their range. Therefore, the United States
has worked through ICCAT to foster international cooperation for the
management of HMS. In recent years, the United States has played a key
role in establishing international rebuilding programs for bluefin tuna
(1998), swordfish (1999), and blue and white marlin (2000). Our
progress on the international front would not have been possible
without the strong support of U.S. commercial and recreational
fishermen, environmental groups and others. While U.S. fishermen have a
consistent record of compliance with these ICCAT programs, improvements
in monitoring and enforcement by other contracting parties and non-
members are greatly needed to ensure success.
Consistent with our ICCAT responsibilities, the Magnuson-Stevens
Fishery Conservation and Management Act (Magnuson-Stevens Act) requires
that NOAA Fisheries take action to manage HMS fisheries within U.S.
waters. With the assistance of the HMS and Billfish Advisory panels, in
April 1999 NOAA Fisheries completed a fishery management plan for.
Atlantic tunas, swordfish, and sharks (HMS Plan) and amended an
existing fishery management plan for billfish. These new plans were
among the first to be implemented under the new requirements of the
Magnuson-Stevens Act and included management measures to identify and
rebuild overfished HMS stocks, minimize bycatch, limit access to the
pelagic longline fishery for HMS, and address socioeconomic impacts on
fishermen and their communities.
Pelagic longlines are the primary commercial gear type, besides
handgear, in the HMS fisheries of the Atlantic ocean, including the
Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean. The longline fishery thus provides an
important source of seafood for the American consumer. However, like
most types of fishing gear, it unintentionally catches species and
sizes of fish that, for reason of regulation or economic choice, are
thrown back into the sea. While some bycatch is released alive, some is
also discarded dead. These dead discards in the pelagic longline
fishery have declined over the past decade; however, concerns remain
about bycatch levels, particularly of juvenile swordfish; billfish,
bluefin tuna, and sharks. In addition, NOAA Fisheries must address the
incidental catch of threatened and endangered species such as sea
turtles. To minimize bycatch to the extent practicable, as required
under the Magnuson-Stevens Act, NOAA Fisheries implemented a number of
regulations in the HMS Plan such as a time-area closure for pelagic
longline fishing in the Mid-Atlantic Bight to reduce discards of
western Atlantic bluefin tuna and a requirement for pelagic longline
fishermen to move 1 nautical mile after an interaction with a marine
mammal or a sea turtle.
Additionally, on August 1, 2000, NOAA Fisheries published a final
rule that established three additional time-area closures for pelagic
longline fishing and prohibited the use of live bait in the Gulf of
Mexico. Together, the three time-area closures implemented in this
regulation are expected, if effort is redistributed, to reduce
swordfish, sailfish, and large coastal shark discards by 31, 14, and 33
percent, respectively. While the time-area closures themselves are not
expected to reduce blue and white marlin if effort is redistributed,
NMFS expects the ban on live bait to reduce discards of these species
by approximately three percent. These regulations were also chosen,
after large amounts of public input and scientific analyses, because
they minimize economic and social impacts, to the extent practicable,
compared to the other options considered. It should be noted that these
regulations are the subject of a pending lawsuit and the outcome cannot
be predicted with any certainty. Additionally, NOAA Fisheries continues
to monitor the impact of the regulatory closures to evaluate their
effectiveness in reducing bycatch. If the bycatch reduction objectives
are not being met, we may modify those closures through rulemaking.
Most recently, NOAA Fisheries published an emergency rule,
effective until January 9, 2002, to reduce sea turtle interactions and
mortality. This emergency rule closes the Northeast Distant statistical
area, also known as the Grand Banks, to pelagic longline fishing and
requires pelagic longline gear modifications. This regulation and the
biological opinion it is based on is also the subject of a pending
lawsuit.
Overall, NOAA Fisheries supports the objectives of H.R. 1367 which,
similar to the requirements of the Magnuson-Stevens Act, is to reduce
bycatch in the Atlantic pelagic longline fishery while minimizing any
social or economic impacts. We would like to work with you to clarify
and amend certain provisions of the legislation that are unclear or
appear to conflict with current regulations. I will briefly review our
concerns at this hearing.
Regarding the seasonal closures in section 5, NOAA Fisheries has
conducted analyses for the new closed areas proposed by H.R. 1367.
Using the same analytical framework developed to evaluate the
regulatory closures previously implemented, the new area closures
described in H.R. 1367 may have little, if any, effect on. the number
of fish kept or discarded. Specifically, under a scenario which assumes
no redistribution of fishing effort due to the targeted buyback
provisions of the bill, the area closures in H.R. 1367 are estimated to
decrease the number of swordfish discards by 1.2 percent, blue marlin
discards by 1.5 percent, sailfish discards by 3.2 percent, and white
marlin discards by 3.5 percent (see Attachment). If any of the fishing
effort is redistributed because vessels fish in other areas rather than
participate in the capacity reduction program, the area closures in
H.R. 1367 could either have no impact on discard rates or could
increase discards to a small extent. Thus, while the area closures
would not have a large impact in terms of the number of fish landed by
commercial. fishermen, the results of the closures proposed appear to
be contrary to H.R. 1367's stated purpose to reduce bycatch.
NOAA Fisheries is uncertain how the pelagic longline capacity
reduction program in section 5(c) and the pelagic longline fishing
vessel permit holder compensation program in section 6 relate to one
another and whether two separate programs are needed. We recommend that
only one program be developed to address capacity reduction and vessel
compensation.
Additionally, H.R. 1367 requires completing the section 6 vessel
compensation program in 225 days (7.5 months). However, without a
specific implementation process in the legislation, this program would
require an implementing rule with an opportunity for public comment and
an environmental impact analysis under the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA). Consequently, completing the section 6 program could
require from 14 to 20 months.
While the bill does authorize the appropriation of funds for the
costs of both permit buyback programs under section 5(c) and section 6,
it does not appropriate funds for either program. Given current funding
constraints, we prefer not to commence either program before the
appropriation of adequate funds, and we do not intend to make a request
for such funds for fiscal year 2002. Additionally, the section 5(c)
program requires us to notify Congress of sources of additional funds
in case the appropriated funds are inadequate to cover the costs of the
program. We are unaware of any other sources.
H.R. 1367 requires appropriated funds for research and we note that
such funds are not consistent with the President's budget request. The
bill also requires the Secretary of Commerce to collect fees on vessel
landings to fund observers. If Congress intends to implement such a
cost-sharing mechanism, NOAA Fisheries is concerned that a one percent
fee may not fully fund this mandatory program. We are also concerned
that the scientific workshop referenced under Program Design presents a
potential conflict with the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA). An
alternative would be to exempt the scientific workshop from FACA or
legislatively require a FACA charter.
The section 5 vessel buyout program is stipulated to be a reverse
auction open to all permitted vessels, but the bids would have to be
evaluated against the priority for vessels with a fishing history in
the mid-Atlantic region. NOAA Fisheries would have to determine which
records would be accepted to demonstrate a landings history and would
have to develop a ranking scheme to establish the priority vessels.
Such a scheme will take time to implement and will increase costs over
what would normally be associated with a reverse auction.
Section 6(a) of H.R. 1367 refers to ``initial limited access
permits'' that were issued by NOAA Fisheries to qualifying vessels in
July 1999 on a temporary basis. Because most of these initial permits
have since expired and have been renewed, the text should simply
reference ``limited access permits.'' NOAA Fisheries also recommends
that the legislation clarify that pelagic longline fishing for HMS is
authorized only for vessels with all three permits (swordfish/shark/
tuna) and that the permits.be surrendered as a package.
Similarly, NOAA Fisheries believes the intent of section 6(b),
``ineligibility due to transfer,'' needs clarification. The current
text includes transfer of non-HMS federal permits and this, together
with the reference date, may result in the exclusion of more vessels
from the compensation program than is intended. Also, the reduction in
compensation for the ``fair market value'' of permits not held by the
vessel is perhaps not applicable, as a pelagic longline vessel must
have all three permits. Finally, the intent of the rules regarding
transfer of permits not surrendered after compensation is unclear. For
example, could a vessel owner be compensated by the government for not
using the permits in the pelagic longline fishery and then sell the
permits separately to individuals in the handgear fisheries for tunas,
sharks or swordfish?
If Congress intends to compensate vessel operators based on catch
history, we recommend the landing payment documentation provision in
section 6(e)(3) be deleted and that landing payments be based
exclusively on the default landing payment determination provided for
in section 6(e)(4). This would simplify and accelerate the program
process, as well as reduce both the government's and program
applicants' administrative and paperwork burdens.
Section 11(d) refers to the ``expiration of the closure of the Gulf
of Mexico Conservation zone,'' the date of which does not appear to be
specified in the legislation.
NOAA Fisheries would need more clarification on the intent of
section 12, the reallocation of total allowable catch, in order to
undertake the rulemaking that would be necessary to implement this
requirement. Under the ICCAT rebuilding program for swordfish, the U.S.
has been allocated a 29 percent share of the total allowable catch.
Depending on participation in the pelagic longline buyout program and
the impact of all the closed areas, it may not be possible to harvest
the total amount of reallocated catch of swordfish using handgear,
which will lead to an accumulated carryover of unharvested U.S. quota.
If the U.S. fishing fleet is continually unable to harvest its share of
the Atlantic swordfish quota as allocated by ICCAT, it. is possible
that the quota would be reallocated to other fishing nations. If this
happens, it is also possible that the United States would lose
negotiating power at ICCAT, leading to reductions in future
allocations. It should be noted that, currently, the United States has
more regulations to prevent bycatch and more areas closed to fishing
with pelagic longline gear than any other nation. This record of
compliance is not matched by all other fishing nations. If the U.S.
negotiating position is eroded and the U.S. share of swordfish is
reallocated, the result may be more bycatch Atlantic-wide, rather than
less.
Additionally, section 12 indicates some potential for the
commercial swordfish handgear fishing fleet to benefit from the fishing
capacity reduction associated with the vessels involved in the section
5(c) and/or section 6 programs. If this is a quantifiable potential, we
recommend that the beneficiaries repay, though post-reduction landing
fees, an appropriate portion of the programs' cost. We believe that
those who benefit from capacity reduction's effect should repay a
reasonable portion of the reduction's cost.
Regarding section 14, vessel monitoring systems, I should note that
NOAA Fisheries is currently under a court order to further consider the
costs and benefits of vessel monitoring systems in the pelagic longline
fishery. The outcome of this litigation cannot be predicted with any
certainty. Certainly, new legislative requirements will determine how
NOAA Fisheries implements a vessel monitoring program.
Once again, I would like to state that NOAA Fisheries supports the
stated goals of H.R. 1367. We recognize the significance of the many
issues raised and the efforts of Congress to meet conservation
requirements and minimize adverse impacts on displaced fishermen. I
look forward to working with Congress to address our concerns with the
proposed legislation.
Thank you for the opportunity to provide this testimony. I would be
happy to respond to questions.
______
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Mr. Saxton. Thank you, Dr. Hogarth.
Mr. Hayes?
Mr. Hayes. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I have a written statement,
which I would submit for the record, if I could, and I will
just summarize it.
Mr. Saxton. Without objection.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT G. HAYES, GENERAL COUNSEL, COASTAL
CONSERVATION ASSOCIATION
Mr. Hayes. I am Bob Hayes. I am the general counsel of the
Coastal Conservation Association.
And as I sit here today and I think about this problem and
I think about your bill, which I commend you for introducing, I
think that everyone in this room realizes that we have a
problem and that our problem is very well summed up in your
opening statement.
White marlin are now at about 15 percent of MSY, and they
are at 15 percent of MSY in an Atlantic-wide stock, and we have
an Atlantic-wide problem.
The question that your bill presents is: What should we do
about that problem domestically? And then secondly, what are
the elements of that bill which can lead to an international
solution?
And as I said, I commend you for putting the spotlight back
on this issue, because I think this is an issue that is going
to be resolved ultimately in three separate forums. That would
be this one, in the administration, and internationally.
Like you, I am not going to go through a history of the old
bill. It was an interesting exercise.
But I would like to talk about essentially the four issues
that are in this bill and essentially were in the last bill,
and talk a little bit about the need to focus in on those four
areas.
Of those four areas, the first one is to reduce effort. I
think the buyout system makes an enormous amount of sense. I
think that recreational fisherman are willing to contribute to
domestic buyouts. And I think that we ought to be thinking
about buyouts internationally and how to fund them.
The difficulty, as Bill just said in his testimony, and I
think everyone else will say, is the difficulty with buyouts is
getting the money to do them. Everyone is in favor of them. The
question is, where do you get the money?
I think one of the things that we stressed in the last
bill, which we would stress again, is that recreational
fisherman, if they see a benefit to the resource, are willing
to participate in buyouts.
The second thing is hotspots, which you have in your bill.
Frankly, the things that were in the last bill which are
identical to your bill were essentially drawn up in a room with
a couple of scientists and a little bit of information and an
enormous amount of negotiation between the parties.
They may not have been perfect. I think particularly the
one in the gulf, people criticized it as not having any impact
whatsoever.
I think we ought to look at a biological basis for these
closures. And if we did, we would be looking at a much larger
set of closed areas. Once we have done that, we can then take a
look at whether these closed areas have an economic impact.
And as I said in my testimony, there are clearly high
bycatch areas in the United States, including the mid-Atlantic,
the western gulf off of Texas, and the northern Caribbean,
essentially between the Bahamas and Cuba. Those are places that
even a nonscientist like myself can look at the data and say,
``Here's a problem.''
The question becomes balance. What do we do about that
problem? How do we go ahead and provide for conservation
without necessarily or unnecessarily impacting a commercial
entity. It seems to me that is the basis for the compromise.
The third thing, which I think was in the last bill, which
is in your bill, is research. Research is the single largest
component and, to me, one of the most attractive things in both
your bill and the bill that was filed last year, and were in
all of your bills last year.
If we can get the focus that you have put on this issue
down here to the scientists, so that they can get the kinds of
funds and structured program with the interaction of the
environmental community, the recreational community, and the
commercial community, to find ways to reduce bycatch and
longlines, we can then set a scientific precedent that allows
us to go internationally and really make some legitimate
headway on this issue.
I would ask the Chairman to consider pushing in this cycle
a separate research bill that did nothing but this issue and
got us to a point where we had the kind of information that
gave us a credibility that was irrefutable in an international
forum.
Lastly, I would like to point out, as I said, this is an
international issue. You have to deal with this issue
internationally.
That is in no way to suggest that the United States should
not take a leadership role. That means that there will be
domestic regulations. There will be impacts on domestic
fisherman. And there will be solutions, which are developed
domestically, which we carry internationally. That is all part
of leadership.
Frankly, as a person who has been to ICCAT the last 2 or 3
years, I would like to commend the commercial industry on
showing enormous leadership last year on the marlin deal and
then the year before that on the swordfish recovery plan.
Without them, we don't have those things.
I just think that there was a lot of acrimony last year.
There has been a lot of acrimony over this issue.
I think it is time for the communities to get together,
work out a solution, work with you, Mr. Chairman, work with
other interested members, and see if we can come up with a
solution that may not be a perfect legislative solution, but
will allow us to develop that leadership to take it
internationally. And we pledge to work with you and all the
parties in this room to do that. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hayes follows:]
Statement of Robert G. Hayes on behalf of the Coastal Conservation
Association
Good morning, my name is Bob Hayes; I am here today on behalf of
the Coastal Conservation Association (``CCA'') to present their views
on the issue of longline bycatch. CCA is a national organization of
sport fishermen headquartered in Houston, Texas, with chapters in
fifteen states on the Gulf of Mexico and Atlantic coasts. We presently
have 80,000 members, many of which are involved in offshore fisheries
for billfish.
As we sit here today, we must acknowledge that marlin stocks are in
terrible condition. The decline of these stocks can be correlated to
the growth of international longlining for tuna and swordfish. We have
an Atlantic-wide problem, and if we don't solve it, it will progress to
an endangered species problem. No one wants to see that. We
congratulate Chairman Gilchrist and Congressman Saxton for having this
hearing today to continue the focus on this significant resource
problem.
CCA became involved in this issue in the late 1980s as a result of
the inaction of the federal management system to address the declining
billfish populations. The thinking at the time was that conservation of
billfish only required restrictions on U.S. citizens within our EEZ to
control the decline. The underlying theory was that if the United
States controlled its market to prevent the sale and import of Atlantic
billfish and controlled the bycatch by its own fleet, the stock would
recover. Regulations were established that required our fleet to
discard all billfish caught in U.S. waters. Minimum size limits were
put in place for recreational fisherman, and billfish were declared as
the first federal marine gamefish. U.S. landings of billfish both
recreationally and commercially have dropped to a point where present
landings of marlin do not exceed 200 fish. It was a great plan, but it
did not work.
It became clear in the1990s that the level of catch by domestic
vessels was only a small percentage of the total mortality for Atlantic
billfish stocks. Recreational fishermen began to see a further decline
in abundance, especially in white marlin. This led to an outcry from
recreational groups and some discussions with the National Marine
Fisheries Service (NMFS) to address the problem. Congress intervened
with changes in the Magnuson Act in 1990 and in the Sustainable
Fisheries Act. Ultimately, NMFS organized the Highly Migratory Species
Office and progress toward a solution began in 1997.
The proposed solution was a set of regulations published in the
spring of 1999 and the summer of 2000. The regulations addressed
longline bycatch by closing large sections of the EEZ to the commercial
fleet. The theory behind the closures was based on two ideas. The first
was that there are identifiable hot spots in the ocean where the
bycatch of longline fleets is significantly higher than other places
they could fish for targeted species. The other was that it was a
worthwhile and positive conservation tool to decrease the number of
discards of small swordfish.
Unfortunately, for these ideas to work, there has to be an overlap
of the areas and displacement of vessels has to be minimized. The NMFS
rule actually increased the bycatch of marlin, sharks, turtles and
marine mammals and incensed recreational fishermen to the point where
CCA and The Billfish Foundation filed suit challenging the regulation.
The suit, which has been joined with suits by the National Coalition
for Marine Conservation and other environmental groups and a group of
longliners in Florida, is now awaiting a decision here in D.C. Federal
District Court. Every plaintiff in these suits is asking the Court to
return these regulations to NMFS to reevaluate the size and impact of
the closed areas.
In addition to the administrative efforts, there was a concerted
effort by all of the communities to accomplish some conservation
internationally. Beginning in the mid 1990s there was a realization
that growth in both the size and efficiency of international longline
fleets was having a continued detrimental effect on the health of
marlin stocks. There was no question that the fleets were becoming more
efficient. As the use of the gear type increased in both the tuna and
swordfish fisheries, so did the bycatch of marlins.
In the last five years, three international agreements have set the
framework for what could be a solution to the problem of longline
bycatch. The first is a set of agreements to hold member and non-member
countries accountable for conservation restrictions. In this regard,
the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna
(ICCAT) may be well ahead of every other international conservation
convention except the Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species (CITES). Having said that, it still has a long way to go to
make this work.
The second agreement in 1999 established a ten-year recovery plan
for swordfish. This plan was largely the result of U.S. leadership at
ICCAT. It could not have been accomplished without the sacrifices of
the domestic longline industry, which understood the need here at home
to get a recovery plan that worked. As important as a recovery plan for
swordfish is, swordfish recovery will likely only further the decline
of marlin.
Therefore, the most significant agreement from a recreational
standpoint was done last year when ICCAT agreed to begin to reduce the
mortality of marlin and develop a recovery plan for them in 2002. The
recovery plan will be the first attempt by ICCAT to develop and plan
for something of no commercial value to most of the member countries.
The challenge is to provide realistic and constructive management
measures that can be implemented by the international longline fleet
and enforced.
Finally, there was the attempt in the last Congress to put a bill
together that addressed what many people thought were the four elements
required to solve the problem. The four elements of the last bill were:
L1. Reduction of effort in the longline fleet.
L2. Closed areas to reduce bycatch.
L3. Research to modify gear and /or fishing practices to reduce
bycatch.
L4. Development of a bycatch reduction program that could be
implemented internationally.
The effort failed primarily because of the difficulty in getting
agreement on which measures were necessary and the federal funds to
complete the buyout.
What have we learned?
Federal management of billfish is only thirteen years old. In that
period we have seen a decline in the abundance of both blue and white
marlin while eliminating almost all landings of marlin by recreational
and commercial fishermen. International management of billfish has only
just begun. The ultimate results are very uncertain at this point.
Both domestic and international management entities seemed to have
agreed on the problem: longline gear is catching billfish and other
species at a rate greater than that required to keep the stock in
equilibrium. Dr. Phil Goodyear believes that the present rate of
bycatch may be so great that white marlin will be eligible for listing
as a Category 1 species under CITES unless some international action is
taken. (It has been reported that some environmental groups here in the
U.S. are considering a petition under the Endangered Species Act).
We have learned that the problem is international and cannot be
solved by simply restricting U.S. activities. That is not to say the
restrictions at home do not help internationally. They do. But, it is
to say that a domestic strategy without a clear international strategy
will only result in the further decline of marlin.
We have learned that longliners are not a monolith. Longlining in
the Gulf for yellowfin tuna is different than longlining in the
Straights of Florida or offshore in the mid-Atlantic. The boats,
economics, crew styles, what they fish for and how they fish are all
different. The only thing the same is that the gear used catches
something in addition to what it is intended to catch. The same can be
said for the international fleets. The principle difference is that the
U.S. longline industry is the international leader in conservation of
both direct and indirect species. Their foreign counterparts have not
felt the pressure of committed domestic constituencies that will not
tolerate wasteful bycatch.
We have learned that the solutions on the table today are not going
to be adequate to solve the problem. Today, the two remedies of choice
are to close high bycatch areas and require that all live bycatch be
returned to the sea. The hotspot approach is only being utilized
domestically and it is being used on a species by species basis. The
domestic longline fleet now has closed areas in the Atlantic for
bluefin tuna, sea turtles and small swordfish. These closures, without
a corresponding reduction in the fleet, only cause the fishing effort
to be shifted. Since the data is based on historic catch, there is no
way to determine the impact on the bycatch of other species. We are
simply curing today's immediate problem in the hope it will not do too
much damage somewhere else. Internationally, the U.S. is committed to
the same approach.
We have learned that the solutions to our problem are largely based
on the science at hand. Internationally, ICCAT becomes engaged because
the scientists identify a problem. Once identified, the scientific
community develops a solution, and within negotiated parameters, ICCAT
adopts a series of recommendations to address the problem. The key to
success is ICCAT's science committee. Without it, the U.S. has only its
own weight to convince others of the legitimacy of its cause.
HR 1367
Today we have a new effort at a legislative approach. This bill
addresses all of the areas of the last bill and, for the most part
includes many of the understandings reached in the last session. It is
a valuable tool to focus the Congress, the stakeholders and the
Administration on this problem. We should recognize that many of the
provisions of S-1911 were negotiated among the stakeholders and may not
be necessary or acceptable in this Congress. With that I would like to
raise a couple of issues of concern and tell the Chairman and
Congressman Saxton that we are willing to work with them to create a
bill that can be signed by the President.
LIssue 1. This bill reduces effort through a voluntary buyout and a
transfer of quota to a gear type that has no bycatch. The objective is
laudable, but the reality is that the new gear type is incapable of
harvesting the transferred quota. The problem is that foreign nations
hungry for quota are not going to agree to let that amount go to
conservation. Rather, they will push for an increase in their quota
with its accompanying bycatch, and the U.S. will have achieved little
conservation for the effort. If we leave the quota with the remaining
fleet, we can at least control them.
LIssue 2. The closed areas in the bill were negotiated last year.
They should be revisited. To get the maximum biological impact for
marlin, the current legislative effort should close the NMFS closed
areas, plus - one in the western Gulf, an area between Cuba and the
Bahamas, and an area in the mid-Atlantic. If you add these to other
areas closed to longlining, the impact on the fleet is substantial.
Therefore we should consider rolling closures that attempt to target
when the minimal bycatch will occur. As example, a three month closure
of the Western Gulf of Mexico may minimize the impact on the commercial
fleet and maximize the benefit to marlins.
LIssue 3. The research program in the bill should be expanded and
the program shortened to allow for the use of the results by the fall
of 2002. The research should focus on one issue, techniques to reduce
bycatch. They could be gear modifications, rolling closures, fishing
techniques or any combination of them so long as they reduce bycatch
domestically and internationally.
What needs to be done?
The solution of the day for longline bycatch is closed areas. These
are preferable to eliminating the gear entirely because they mitigate
the impact on the fishermen while addressing the bycatch problem. The
United States is using the method liberally, but its acceptance
internationally is very limited. As we have seen, closed areas can be
effective remedies for single problems; but since they cause
displacement and do not reduce effort, something else needs to be done.
Altering fishing techniques and practices has always been held out as a
remedy by the commercial industry. Regulations like those recently
published addressing turtle bycatch may hold some promise, but a
grander more significant research program needs to be established to
find methods of reducing bycatch.
Next year, the United States will have to take the lead in
developing a marlin recovery plan at ICCAT. If that were today's
mission, the U.S. would offer international closed areas and require
the release of all live billfish. Most U.S. scientists do not believe
such measures will be adequate to recover either white or blue marlin.
There has to be either a reduction in longline effort or a significant
improvement in bycatch reduction. The first suggests a moratorium on
the building of new longline vessels coupled with a buyout, and the
second suggests some technology or fishing practice changes. The U.S.
does not have the information necessary to sustain a proposal to
accomplish any of these proposals.
In the short term, we need a research program that focuses solely
on longline bycatch and either develops an acceptable means of
addressing it or comes to the conclusion that the bycatch is
unavoidable. All countries can then make the determination of whether
the result is acceptable.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for allowing us to present our views.
______
Mr. Saxton. Mr. Panacek?
STATEMENT OF ERNEST PANACEK, PRESIDENT, BLUE WATER FISHERMAN'S
ASSOCIATION
Mr. Panacek. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize if this
oral testimony goes for a little bit too long, but I wanted to
squeeze a lot in.
I am disappointed, however, and I hope after the testimony
and we open this up for discussion that our ICCAT commissioner
could possibly enter into the discussion. I am disappointed
that he didn't have the ability to sit beside me here to
testify because of the serious international implications of
this bill.
I don't want him to be made a scapegoat for this domestic
issue because we need to realize the total picture of the need
for international conservation.
My name is Ernie Panacek, but, by marriage, I am also a
member of the Larson family. Our family is one of several
prominent Barnegat Light families who for generations have made
our living from the sea by supplying other Americans with fresh
seafood. Presently, I am the manager of Viking Village dock, a
diversified seafood company that also owns and operates pelagic
longline vessels.
Barnegat Light fishing families are here today because we
are afraid and confused. We are afraid because this bill will
destroy our family businesses and a way of life that is built
upon sound business practices and sustainable fishing
principles. We also see our once tight-knit community of
fishing families--some commercial and some recreational--being
needlessly torn apart by this bill.
We are confused because we don't understand why this
legislation was introduced again. This bill drives a wedge into
our community that may never heal. It tells our community that
the living made by one man who sells his catch of fish to feed
Americans must be stopped so that another man can catch the
same fish for fun.
Mr. Chairman, this legislation should not become law
because it is bad for conservation. If a large part of the mid-
Atlantic Bight is closed during our most productive fishing
months, our boats will be forced to fish farther south, where
inevitably we are going to catch more billfish and small
swordfish, and that is bad for conservation.
Furthermore, the mid-Atlantic has the most productive tuna
and swordfish grounds for our fleet of smaller boats. As we are
forced further south, we will also catch less tuna and
swordfish and be forced to increase our effort in a futile
attempt to make up the difference.
This closure on top of the 3 million square miles of other
U.S. longline recent closures will prevent the U.S. from
catching its bycatch swordfish quota. ICCAT will reallocate our
unused quota to other nations like Japan, Spain, Brazil, and
Namibia, who frankly could care less about billfish
conservation and the release of juvenile swordfish bycatch.
The more quotas these other nations receive as a result of
us being forced out of our most protective fishing grounds, the
more billfish and small swordfish will be killed.
I expect that you want to know why our industry so strongly
opposed the mid-Atlantic closures this year if we agreed to
similar measures as a consequence of your arm-twisting last
year during consideration of the Breaux bill. We did so very
reluctantly, and we did so primarily because Senator Breaux had
requested a compromise to deal with your demands.
By that point, we were convinced that no matter what
compromise we offered, we would never have the benefit of your
support. Because we had worked so closely and so hard with a
coalition of commercial and mainstream recreational groups for
over 2 years, we also made that concession in order to ensure
that our industry would not be the ones blamed for killing what
could have been a great, landmark conservation bill.
Since then, NMFS has closed huge areas to our boats without
providing any relief for devastating economic impact on our
fisherman and families. Our fleet has almost nowhere left to
fish.
Today it is crystal clear that our fleet cannot survive
without the mid-Atlantic during the most productive fishing
months. We can no longer afford to look the other way on any
scientifically unjustified closure designed to appease New
Jersey sport fisherman.
Each year, despite our efforts, our fleet, using the same
hooks as the sport fisherman, incidentally catches some white
marlin in the mid-Atlantic Bight. One hundred percent of these
fish are returned to the water, almost 75 percent of them
alive.
The few white marlin that we inadvertently kill in the
areas that Mr. Saxton wants to close represent only one-half of
1 percent of all white marlin reported killed in the Atlantic
fisheries; 99.5 percent of white marlin mortality occurs
somewhere else, predominantly by the foreign fleet.
For every white marlin that our fleet incidentally kills in
the mid-Atlantic, we catch more than $50,000 worth of food
fish, mostly yellowfin, bigeye and swordfish. The total annual
ex-vessel value of our mid-Atlantic longline fishery is greater
than $8 million, which makes this a very, very productive area.
Mr. Chairman, another reason this bill should not become
law is because it will hurt our coastal fishing communities.
Several years ago, this Committee helped pass the
Sustainable Fisheries Act. This act requires striking the
balance between conservation and the preservation of our small
coastal fishing communities.
A mid-Atlantic closure would generate the least
conservation benefit in return for the greatest economic harm.
This is unbalanced, and it is unfair.
I expect that you will say that this is why this bill
provides not one but two buyouts. Mr. Chairman, 10 buyouts
still wouldn't be good for our community.
A buyout will only ensure that those who hold the mortgages
on our boats and homes get paid. Without a fishery, our
community will be transformed forever from one of self-reliant
people and a self-sustaining year-round economy to one that is
totally dependent upon the annual influx of summer tourists. A
buyout is not going to preserve our community.
A buyout does nothing good for conservation either. If the
U.S. fleet is eliminated, longline fishing and longline fishery
management will be turned over to the nations who have proven
their disregard for sustainable fisheries conservation.
If the United States unilaterally removes itself from the
fishery, it will also remove itself from the table where
international conservation measures are developed, diminishing
our influence as a conservation leader.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I ask you and the other members to
look at the chart at the end of my written testimony, and there
you will see how the catch of white and blue marlin has
increased more than 100 percent in the three largest
recreational billfish tournaments in the mid-Atlantic region in
the 4 years for which I have data. What this chart tells you is
that the longline fisherman are not degrading the recreational
fishing experience in these mid-Atlantic tournaments, nor are
they affecting the incredibly rapid growth of the recreational
fishing industry.
Our commercial and recreational fisheries can coexist and
thrive as they have for generations without these closures or
the other divisive measures in this bill. It is foolhardy for
the U.S. to adopt a policy that turns our commercial fisheries
and fisheries management over to other nations who will do a
terrible job of conservation.
It does not make sense to turn our strong U.S. market for
swordfish and tuna completely over to foreign nations to
supply, and it does not make sense to reduce our nation's
fishing industry to nothing more than a sport. It is not good
for conservation, it is not good for our fishing communities,
and it is just not good for this country.
Mr. Chairman, obviously our families have long-term
interests in the sustainability of these fisheries. We have
been doing this for generations. We are the conservationists,
and we want a sustainable fishery. The record shows that it was
U.S. pelagic longline industry that made it possible for the
U.S. to successfully negotiate the rebuilding plans for
swordfish and white and blue marlin at ICCAT over the past few
years.
We have supported all manner of scientific research on our
fishery and have provided an incredible amount of volume of
data to the government, certainly far more than our
recreational counterparts. Yet our reward for this exemplary
record of contributing to conservation is the unilateral
stepwise extermination of our industry by our government. Why?
Is it because we have been successfully demonized by a handful
of well-funded sport fishing and so-called conservation groups?
This bill would do nothing more than bring us one more step
closer to our grave. Longline vessels and the families from
many other coastal fishing communities, such as Ocean City,
Maryland, Wanchese, North Carolina, and Venice, Louisiana,
would tell you the same story.
If the best interests of America's fishermen are not to be
respected, perhaps others will be concerned that this bill also
pits the interests of commercial fishermen and their
communities from one state against the interests of sport
fishermen from another.
I urge you not to pass this legislation.
Mr. Chairman, my written testimony contains several
constructive suggestions for alternative actions this Committee
and its' members could take to contribute to Atlantic HMS
fisheries' conservation and the health of our industry. These
alternatives include support for Congressman Shaw's legislation
to provide emergency relief for Florida fisherman thrown out of
business by the National Marine Fisheries Service final rule.
Mr. Saxton. Excuse me, Mr. Panacek, we try to operate here
under a 5-minute rule, and you are now over 11 minutes. So if
you could summarize, we would appreciate it.
Mr. Panacek. Yes, Mr. Saxton. I have about 1 minute.
Mr. Saxton. Thank you.
Mr. Panacek. We recommend focusing on the huge
international conservation problems we have at ICCAT, including
the lack of foreign compliance, illegal foreign fishing, and
the continued importation of ICCAT illegal fish into the U.S.
market. We need to move away from this constant bashing of U.S.
commercial fishermen who for years have been doing everything
humanly possible and technologically possible to improve
conservation.
We are not the problem. Instead, let's start focusing on
the real problems: foreign fisheries. Achieving ICCAT
compliance would eliminate the animosities that plague our
domestic fisheries.
Thank you for your consideration.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Panacek follows:]
Statement of Ernie Panacek, General Manager, Viking Village, Inc.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to testify before your
subcommittee today. Please forgive me if much of my testimony is
directed toward my good friend and Congressman, Mr. Jim Saxton, who is
the author of the legislation that we are here to discuss.
I am very disappointed that our ICCAT Commissioner was not
permitted to testify alongside of me concerning the serious
international implications of this bill. He should not be made to be
the scapegoat for our disagreements in New Jersey. I have attached a
copy of a memo prepared by our ICCAT Commissioner at Congressman Jones'
request which includes a discussion of the negative consequences of
this legislation on the international management of highly migratory
species.
My name is Ernie Panacek, but by marriage I am also a member of the
Larson Family. Our family is one of several prominent Barnegat Light
families who for generations have made our living from the sea by
providing fresh seafood to other Americans. Presently, I am the manager
of Viking Village fish dock, a diversified seafood company that also
owns and operates pelagic longline fishing vessels that harvest
swordfish, tunas and sharks from the mid-Atlantic bight.
Barnegat Light fishing families are here today because we are
afraid and confused. We're afraid because this bill will destroy our
family businesses and way of life that is built upon generations of
sound business practices and sustainable fishing principles. We also
see our once tight-knit community of fishing families some commercial
and some recreational being needlessly torn apart by this bill.
We're confused because we don't understand why this legislation was
introduced. This bill drives a wedge into our community that may never
heal. This bill tells our community that the living made by one man who
sells his catch of fish to feed his family must be stopped so that
another man can catch the same fish for fun.
These families are also here to ensure that I do a good job of
telling you why this legislation should not become law. I'll do my
best.
This legislation should not become law because it is bad for
conservation.
There are others here today that can explain the science far better
than I, but no one is here today who knows better than I that if you
close a large part of the Mid-Atlantic Bight during our most productive
months of fishing for tuna and swordfish, that our boats will be forced
to fish further to the south. We can't go north or to the east because
most of our boats are not big or safe enough for distant water fishing.
Many can't even carry enough fuel to get to those fishing grounds.
We'll be forced to go south, and when we go south, particularly below
Cape Hatteras, we will catch more billfish and small swordfish, and
that's bad for conservation.
I can also tell you that the Mid-Atlantic Bight includes the most
productive tuna and swordfish grounds for my fleet within the EEZ. If
we have to fish further south, we will catch less tuna and swordfish on
the same number of hooks. Some boats may be able to add a few hooks to
try to make up for the difference, but overall we are sure to catch
less tuna and swordfish than we do now. Why is that bad for
conservation? A Mid-Atlantic closure, on top of the nearly 3 million
square miles of longline closures NMFS put into effect earlier this
year, will forever prevent the United States from using a substantial
portion of its north Atlantic swordfish quota allocated by ICCAT. This
quota will not go unused. It will be reallocated by ICCAT to other
nations like Japan, Spain, Brazil and Namibia who, frankly, could care
less about billfish conservation or releasing juvenile swordfish
bycatch. The more ICCAT quotas these nations ultimately get as a result
of this bill, the more billfish and small swordfish will be killed.
I expect Mr. Saxton wants to know why our industry so strongly
opposes his Mid-Atlantic closures this year if we reluctantly agreed to
similar measures because of his arm-twisting during consideration of
the Breaux Bill last year. Well Mr. Saxton, that was then and this is
now. The context is completely different.
First and foremost, Senator John Breaux, the Senate champion of our
legislation asked us to offer some compromise so that he could
accommodate Mr. Saxton's and Senator Torricelli's demands. These
demands were to close the Mid-Atlantic Bight or they would block the
bill. We very reluctantly offered a compromise for two reasons. First,
by that point in time we were all thoroughly convinced that no matter
what compromise we offered, neither Mr. Saxton nor Mr. Torricelli would
give their support to the bill. Second, because we had worked so
closely and so hard with a coalition of commercial and mainstream
recreational groups for over two years, we wanted to make sure that our
industry would not be blamed for killing what could have been a
landmark conservation bill.
Since then, our world has changed and the opportunity to achieve
the balance of the Breaux bill has been lost. Since then, NMFS has
closed nearly 3 million square miles of the Atlantic to our boats
without providing any relief for the devastating economic impact on our
fishermen and families. Today, the remaining fleet has almost nowhere
left to fish. We wonder if that is the true goal of the Saxton Bill.
Today, it is crystal clear that our fleet cannot survive without
the Mid-Atlantic during the most productive fishing months. We can no
longer afford to look the other way on any scientifically unjustified
closure designed to appease some NJ sportfishermen. Our experience last
year taught us a bitter lesson. We now know that even our own
representatives in Congress will rebuff any repeat of our constructive
attempt to promote conservation in an unprecedented coalition with the
mainstream recreational fishing industry.
Mr. Chairman, another important reason this bill should not become
law is because it will hurt our coastal fishing communities. Several
years ago this Committee helped pass the Sustainable Fisheries Act,
which made substantial revisions to the Magnuson-Stevens Act, the
cornerstone of our national fishery policy.
Among other things, the Sustainable Fisheries Act set forth the
fundamental US fishery policy that an appropriate balance must be
achieved between conservation objectives and the preservation of the
social and economic viability of our small coastal fishing communities.
Perhaps I've already said enough about just how bad this bill is for
the social and economic fabric of our small community. But, maybe just
a few more statistics will drive the point home.
Each year, despite our best efforts, our fleet incidentally catches
some white marlin in the Mid-Atlantic Bight. One hundred percent of
these fish are returned to the water, nearly 75% are returned alive.
The few white marlin that we inadvertently kill in the mid-Atlantic
closures proposed in this legislation represent less than one-half of
one percent (0.005) of all the white marlin reported to ICCAT to be
killed in the Atlantic fisheries. More than ninety-nine point five
(99.5) percent of white marlin killed in the Atlantic fisheries are
killed outside of the proposed Mid-Atlantic Bight closures, the vast
majority by foreign fishermen.
Mr. Chairman, for every white marlin that our fleet accidentally
kills in the Mid-Atlantic Bight region, our fishery catches more than
$57,061 worth of food fish, mostly yellowfin and bigeye tuna as well as
swordfish. The total annual ex-vessel value of our Mid-Atlantic
longline fishery is about $8 million. This is a very productive fishing
area with a relatively minimal amount of billfish bycatch.
Mr. Chairman, a Mid-Atlantic closure would generate the least
conservation benefit in return for the greatest economic harm a result
completely contrary to sound fisheries management. For this reason,
this bill should not become law. It does not achieve an appropriate
balance between conservation objectives and the socio-economic needs of
our coastal fishing communities. In fact, it is incredibly unfair.
I expect that my good friend, Mr. Saxton, will respond by telling
us that this is why his bill provides for not one, but two buyouts. Mr.
Chairman, ten buyouts still wouldn't be good for our community. A
buyout does nothing for fishery-based communities except make sure that
those that hold the mortgages on our boats and homes get paid. Without
our fishery, our community will be transformed forever from one
composed of self-reliant people and a self-sustaining year-round
economy, to one that is totally dependent upon the annual influx of
summer tourists and residents who come to lie on the beach or sport
fish for three months of the year. Ironically, I have personally
surveyed many of these tourists and one of the reasons they come to
Barnegat Light is to experience the atmosphere of a real commercial
fishing community. I have no idea what our community will do or become
for the remaining nine months, but a buyout does not provide an
alternative.
A buyout does nothing good for conservation either. As I've tried
to explain, if you eliminate the US fleet, the management of such
fisheries will be turned over to nations that have proven their
disregard for sustainable fishery conservation. As I'm sure our ICCAT
Commissioner would confirm, if we unilaterally remove ourselves from
the fishery, we will also unilaterally remove ourselves from the table
where international conservation measures are developed at ICCAT.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I ask you and the other Members to look at
the chart at the end of my testimony. There you will see how the catch
of white and blue marlin has increased each year in the three largest
recreational billfish tournaments in the Mid-Atlantic region. This
increase is more than 100% in the four years for which I have the data.
I hope this makes clear the point that our longline fishermen are
obviously not degrading the recreational fishing experience in these
Mid-Atlantic tournaments! I hope it also gives some indication of how
recreational fishing effort and catch is growing by leaps and bounds in
this country.
Our commercial and recreational fisheries can coexist and thrive as
they have for generations without the need for any closures. It just
doesn't make sense for the US to adopt a policy that turns our
commercial fisheries and fisheries management over to other nations who
will do a terrible job of conservation, it doesn't make sense to turn
our strong market for swordfish and tuna completely over to foreign
nations to supply, and it doesn't make sense to reduce our nation's
fisheries to nothing more than a sport. It's not good for conservation,
it's not good for our fishing communities, it's just not good for this
country.
But that is where things seem to be going, Mr. Chairman. Obviously,
our families have a long-term interest in the sustainability of these
fisheries we've been doing this for generations. We are
conservationists. We want a sustainable fishery. As our ICCAT
Commissioner will tell you, it was the US pelagic longline industry
that made it possible for him to successfully negotiate the
conservation rebuilding plans for swordfish, white marlin and blue
marlin at ICCAT over the past few years.
We have supported all manner of scientific research on our fishery
and have provided an incredible volume of data to the government on our
activities far more than any other fishery for tuna and swordfish. Yet
our reward for our exemplary record of conservation and cooperation
with US fishery conservation objectives is the unilateral stepwise
extermination of our industry by our own government. Why ? Is it
because we have been successfully demonized by a handful of well-funded
recreational and so-called conservation groups? This bill would simply
bring us one more step closer to our grave.
Mr. Chairman, in addition to our concerns with a Mid-Atlantic
closure, there are several other concerns we have with this bill.
(1) The bill would appear to impose a lifetime ban on any fishermen
who accepts a buyout under this bill from ever being a longline
fisherman again. I have never seen anything like this before. Our
fishery is already the subject of a strict limited access system. If
the longline permits and/or vessel itself are permanently retired under
a buyout, why in the world would Congress want to prevent a fishermen
from ever being a fishermen again ? If a longline fishermen with a
permit wants to sell that permit to a fishermen that accepted the
buyout so that he can get back into the fishery someday, why would that
be a problem ? It would not increase the number of permits or boats or
fishing effort in the fishery. It would not affect conservation
whatsoever. Is the idea to punish our fishermen ? Would this be
Constitutional?
(2) Another provision of this bill would appear to arbitrarily
reallocate longline swordfish quota to the ``hand-gear'' category. As I
understand it, the hand-gear category includes both harpoon fishermen
and recreational fishermen. It may not be unprecedented, but it would
certainly be unusual for Congress to preempt the normal authority and
procedures of NMFS to allocate US swordfish quota among different US
fishermen. More importantly, this provision would guarantee that more
US quota would go unused and be reallocated to foreign fishing nations.
This is because neither the old swordfish harpoon fishery nor the
recreational swordfish fishery has ever harvested more than about 10
percent of the US swordfish quota. This is unlikely to change. As I've
explained, the reallocation of unused US swordfish quota to foreign
fishing nations will have a negative impact on the conservation of
swordfish, tuna and billfish.
(3) Among the many other flawed parts of this bill is the notion
that a ``pelagic longline fishing vessel capacity reduction program''
is necessary. This fishery is not overcapitalized and is not in need of
capacity reduction. In fact, this fishery is already undercapitalized,
especially since the NMFS time-area closures put so many southern
fishermen out of business earlier this year. As a consequence, this
fishery is not able to fully utilize its ICCAT swordfish quota.
Prior to those closures, NMFS had reported the capacity in this
fishery had fallen from 250 to 140 fulltime vessels. Today, we estimate
that there are less than 100 active fulltime pelagic longline vessels
in the US Atlantic fleet. The University of Miami did a recent study
concluding that the optimal fleet size to utilize our ICCAT swordfish
quota would be approximately 160 active vessels. To reiterate, this
fishery is substantially undercapitalized. The provisions of this bill
appear to ignore this fact.
Mr. Chairman, longline vessels and the families that own and
operate them are not just from Barnegat Light, but are a fundamental
part of many coastal fishing communities in America such as Ocean City,
Maryland, Wanchese, North Carolina and Venice, Louisiana. Fishing
families from those communities could tell you the same story. I urge
you not to pass this legislation.
Fortunately, there are a number of constructive alternatives to
this legislation that our industry would like to suggest to the
Committee for their consideration. I believe these alternatives could
provide substantial benefits to conservation and our industry.
(1) LSupport the initiative of Congressman Clay Shaw and others in
the Florida Delegation to secure emergency financial assistance to
those vessel owners and shoreside enterprises that were summarily
forced out of business by the NMFS time-area closures implemented
earlier this year off the coasts of South Carolina, Georgia and
Florida, and in the Gulf of Mexico. It is rare for NMFS to take the
draconian step to completely close a substantial fishery and thereby
force fishermen completely out of business. Without getting into the
merits of these closures, it is even more unusual for Congress not to
step in and provide some form of relief to those fishermen and
businessmen whose livelihoods have been sacrificed in the name of
fishery conservation.
(2) LDevelop legislation to prohibit the importation of fish caught
by foreign fishermen in excess of ICCAT quotas or otherwise caught in
violation of ICCAT conservation regulations. Currently, with the sole
exception of undersized swordfish, the US Customs is powerless to
prevent the entry of such ICCAT illegal fish. Although many of the
necessary product-tracking capabilities are already in place, there is
apparently no US law that prohibits foreign fishermen from exporting
such fish into the US. Legislation can and should be developed that is
consistent with the extensive multilateral conservation regulations and
principles of both ICCAT and the Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO) to stop once and for all the US providing a ``black market'' for
ICCAT illegal fish. I encourage the members of this committee to find
the courage to take this step to ensure that the U.S. market cannot be
used to benefit non-compliance with international fishery conservation
and management programs. Our fishermen are responsible for only a minor
percentage of the overall Atlantic-wide harvest of these international
species. Ensuring compliance with the international conservation
program is our only hope for someday achieving the maximum sustainable
harvest level from some of these overfished resources.
(3) LA lack of compliance with ICCAT regulations is a real problem
with many ICCAT member nations. The European Union nations are among
the most problematic at ICCAT. Many of their actions have seriously
undermined the effectiveness of ICCAT, its science and its conservation
regulations. The US Commissioners have launched a large-scale emergency
initiative to deal with the EU problems at ICCAT that will lead to
better conservation. They have strong support in the Senate and within
the Department of State. They also need the strong support and
assistance of this Committee.
LThere is also a large fleet of pirate longline vessels operating
in the Atlantic that do not belong to ICCAT and are not subject to any
conservation regulations whatsoever. There is a large effort underway
through ICCAT and the FAO to combat this illegal and unreported fishing
that completely undermines ICCAT conservation goals. Our ICCAT
Commissioners, our State Department, and our Commerce Department all
need the help and support of this Committee to address this problem.
LIn fact, perhaps the most constructive contribution this
Committee could make toward solving the international conservation
issues at ICCAT would be to hold a hearing on the EU and other ICCAT
management problems. Such a hearing would help call attention to this
matter in Congress and help encourage high-level officials in the Bush
Administration to pursue diplomatic solution with the EU. Demonizing
American fishermen is a complete waste of time and is counterproductive
to solving these international problems. We need to focus on the
international issues where 95% of the fishery occurs and where nearly
all of the conservation problems originate.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for
allowing me to testify. I hope that you will find the courage to ``do
the right thing'' and not allow the Saxton Bill to move forward.
Our fishermen continue to be the world's leaders toward truly
effective international recovery of these important fish to benefit all
stakeholders and our future generations. If you have any questions or
need more information on these issues, please contact Glenn Delaney who
is our U.S. ICCAT Commercial Commissioner, Nelson Beideman who is
BWFA's Executive Director, or myself.
Thank you for your consideration.
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Mr. Saxton. Thank you very much.
Mr. Scott?
STATEMENT OF GERRY SCOTT, DIRECTOR, SUSTAINABLE FISHERIES
DIVISION, NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE
Dr. Scott. Thank you. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and
members of the Subcommittee.
My name is Gerald Scott. I am director of the Sustainable
Fisheries Division of the National Marine Fisheries Services'
Southeast Fisheries Science Center in Miami, Florida. I am also
functioning as the U.S. lead scientist to ICCAT.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on H.R.
1367, the Atlantic Highly Migratory Species Conservation Act.
I have been requested by the Subcommittee to offer views on
how the Southeast Fisheries Science Center helps manage the
pelagic longline fishery through research, data collection, and
analysis, and on the bill's new research program, on the use of
VMS and how the measures taken in the legislation will affect
stocks of highly migratory species throughout the Atlantic.
The Southeast Fisheries Science Center has lead
responsibility for scientific investigations into the biology
and fishery productivity of Atlantic highly migratory species.
These investigations are carried out in support of the U.S.
scientific commitment to the International Commission for the
Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, and in support of our domestic
highly migratory species fishery management demands.
Our primary responsibilities for highly migratory species
are to monitor catch and effort of U.S. Atlantic fisheries
affecting the stocks, to conduct stock assessments on highly
migratory species stocks, and to conduct biological research on
the stocks in support of these stock assessments. Through these
research, data collection, and monitoring activities, we
provide advice on the sustainable harvest levels, and on the
likely range of impact on the stocks of various future
management measures considered for application to highly
migratory species fisheries, including the U.S. Atlantic
pelagic longline fishery.
These tasks require collaboration and coordination with
other NMFS research and management offices, and also require
frequent interactions with other Federal, state, academic, and
private institution scientists, as well as coordination with
scientific consultants to the various U.S. HMS fishery
constituencies.
Our research direction is guided by recommendations made by
ICCAT and by the U.S. ICCAT advisory Committee. With increasing
frequency, Atlantic HMS research is also conducted through
appropriation pass-through funding and through funding of
competitive research activities.
Each year, our U.S. HMS research and monitoring activities
are reported upon in the U.S. national report to ICCAT.
Research into gear of fishing pattern modifications which
could mitigate the impact of pelagic longlines on bycatch
species while at the same time minimizing the impact on the
fishery is of high priority. The program identified within the
bill would certainly enhance our research capabilities for
evaluating bycatch mitigation measures.
Due to past reductions in research funding for billfish and
other HMS investigations within the SEFSC, the program
identified in the bill would permit reestablishing staffing to
levels that would allow fuller conduct of billfish research
within the SEFSC.
Investigations into gear modifications for reducing
billfish mortality have in fact been initiated. Preliminary
results indicate that the use of circle hooks can be a
promising means of reducing billfish and other species bycatch
mortality. However, the number of observations from which to
draw inference are low and direct experimental applications
within the fleet have not yet been conducted to permit drawing
scientific conclusions that their application by the industry
would result in lower billfish mortality while minimizing the
impact on target species catches.
Research on methods to reduce sea turtle interactions with
the U.S. pelagic longline fleet fishing on the Grand Banks has
also been initiated. The experimental design for this research
was developed in consultation and collaboration with other
scientists investigating methods of reducing sea turtle
interactions with pelagic longline vessels fishing from Hawaii
and with pelagic longline fishers involved in the Grand Banks
fishery.
From a scientific perspective, the use of vessel monitoring
systems on board pelagic longline vessels could provide for
finer spacial and temporal resolution for catch and effort data
collection than is custom or requirement.
ICCAT has in fact asked for scientific advice on times and
areas of fish concentrations that might be restricted to
fishing as a way to promote recovery for over-fished species.
Such advice has been requested for juvenile swordfish and it is
anticipated that SCRS, which is the Standing Committee for
Research and Statistics, will report its findings to ICCAT at
its 2002 meeting.
Inasmuch as the typical spatial resolution of the
international catch effort data reported to ICCAT is a 5 degree
Latitude by 5 degree Longitude level, the scientific advice
that can be provided may be at too coarse a scale for the
Commission's use in development of time-area closures. SCRS has
recommended collection and reporting of finer scale catch
effort data to support these types of analyses.
Broad-scale application of VMS in the international fleet
could promote such data collection and reporting schemes. It
should be noted, though, that the U.S. has made use of fine-
scale--that is, 1 degree by 1 degree--information from logbooks
in evaluating time-area closures for management of the U.S.
fleet in the absence of VMS.
Fishery management measures taken in the legislation that
in my view have the most direct potential effects on HMS are
the time-area closures and the vessel buyout provisions.
As indicated in Dr. Hogarth's testimony, estimates of
impact of the time-area closure provisions on U.S. catches of
various species could range from a few percentage point
reductions to the same magnitude increases, depending on the
behavior of the fleet in reaction to the time-area closure.
The odds of the closures resulting in reductions in catch
are improved if coupled with the fishing effort reduction
mechanism, such as outlined in the bill. While even slight
reductions in catch can provide conservation benefit to the
species stocks affected, it is very unlikely that the change of
magnitudes anticipated resulting from the time-area closures
described in the bill could be detected in any stock assessment
since the signal to noise would be quite small in this case.
The effort reduction measures could result in larger
impacts, which might be more easily measured in the context of
stock assessments, but those too depend on the magnitude of the
effort removed from the fleet.
Both effort reduction and time-area restrictions for
various components of that Atlantic HMS fisheries are in place
and under further consideration by ICCAT as management tools.
The time-area and effort reduction measures outlined in the
bill are consistent with management measures undertaken by
ICCAT member parties.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman for the opportunity to testify. I
look forward to answering any questions you or other members
may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Scott follows:]
Statement of Gerald P. Scott, Ph.D., Director, Sustainable Fisheries
Division Southeast Fisheries Science Center, National Marine Fisheries
Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S.
Department of Commerce
Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee. I am
Dr. Gerald Scott, Director of the Sustainable Fisheries Division of the
National Marine Fisheries Service's Southeast Fisheries Science Center
in Miami, Florida. I also function as the U.S. Lead Scientist for the
International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas
(ICCAT). Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on H.R. 1367,
the Atlantic Highly Migratory Species (HMS) Conservation Act.
I have been requested by the Subcommittee to offer my views.on how
the Southeast Fisheries Science Center helps manage the pelagic
longline fishery through research, data collection, and analysis. I
have also been requested to provide views on the new research program
and the use of vessel monitoring systems (VMS) as proposed in H.R.
1367; how the measures taken in the legislation will affect stocks of
highly migratory species throughout the Atlantic; what conservation and
management measures are currently in place through the International
Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas; and what measures in
H.R. 1367 could be used internationally to help rebuild highly
migratory species. In subsequent sections, my views are provided on
these topics.
Southeast Fisheries Science Center HMS Research and Monitorinq
The NMFS Southeast Fisheries Science Center (SEFSC) has lead
responsibility for scientific investigations into the biology and
fishery productivity of Atlantic HMS species. These investigations are
carried out in support of the U.S. scientific commitment to the
International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas and in
support of our domestic HMS fishery management demands. Our primary
responsibilities for HMS are to monitor catch and effort of U.S.
Atlantic fisheries affecting these stocks, to conduct stock assessments
on HMS stocks, and to conduct biological research on these stocks in
support of stock assessments. Our stock assessment research involves
integration of available information on the biological characteristics,
fishery harvesting, and environmental effects on HMS. populations for
the purpose of providing scientific advice on the effects and
sustainable fishing levels for these resources. The outcomes of stock
assessments are also used to project the likely impacts of different
fishery management scenarios on the HMS populations and fisheries of
concern.
These tasks require collaboration and coordination with other NMFS
research and management offices and also require frequent interactions
with other Federal, state, Academic, and Private Institution scientists
as well-as coordination with scientific consultants to the various U.S.
HMS fishery constituencies.
Our activities undertaken in monitoring the range of HMS fisheries
include collection of basic fishery catch, effort, and size frequency
statistics (via port agents and some specialized sampling programs),
within season tracking of landings (e.g., quota monitoring of
swordfish, bluefin tuna, and large coastal sharks), sampling and
estimation of recreational harvests of HMS species (through statistical
sampling programs administered from NMFS Headquarters, e.g., Large
Pelagic Survey, LPS, and Marine Recreational Fishing Statistics Survey,
MRFSS), implementation and management of fishing logbook programs
(e.g., Atlantic Pelagic Logbooks), implementation and management of the
cooperative tagging program, and collection of by-catch statistics
through logbooks and fishery observer programs.
SEFSC scientists take on lead roles for development of methods for
and the conduct of international and domestic stock assessments of
Atlantic HMS species stocks. U.S. Atlantic HMS research activities have
evolved and diversified through a process of consultative reviews and
planning discussions with scientists, fisheries managers, industry and
conservation community concerns. Our research direction is also guided
by recommendations made by ICCAT and by the U.S. ICCAT Advisory
Committee. With increasing frequency, Atlantic HMS research is also
conducted through appropriation pass-through funding and through
funding of competitive research activities.
Annually, U.S. HMS research and monitoring activities are reported
upon in the U.S. National Report to ICCAT. In the past few years, this
research has focused on multiple fronts including: methodologies to
determine the genetic discreetness of large pelagic fishes in the
Atlantic; conduct of larval surveys for bluefin tuna and other large
pelagics in the Gulf of Mexico; development of robust estimation
techniques for population analyses; approaches for characterization of
uncertainty in assessments and methods for translating that uncertainty
into risk levels associated with alternative management approaches;
continued coordination efforts for the ICCAT Enhanced Research Program
for Billfish and for the Bluefin Year Program; conduct of the
Cooperative Tagging Center which tracks tagging and recovery of tagged
billfishes (swordfish, marlins and sailfish) and tunas; application of
high technology, electronic tags for the purposes of investigating
migratory patterns and habitat use of various species; as well as
conduct of cooperative research with scientists from other nations on
development of assessment methodologies, on biological investigations
and on development of indices of abundance for species of concern to
ICCAT.
New Research Proqram
This bill would establish within the National Marine Fisheries
Service at the Southeast Fisheries Science Center, a Pelagic Longline
Billfish Bycatch and Mortality Reduction Research Program to identify
and test a variety of fishing gear configurations and uses for reducing
highly migratory species mortality and sea turtle mortality in the
exclusive economic zone of the United States in the Atlantic Ocean.
Research into gear or fishing pattern modifications which could
mitigate the impact of pelagic longlines on bycat.ch species while at
the same time, minimize impact on the fishery, is of high priority. The
program identified within the bill would certainly enhance our research
capabilities for evaluating bycatch mitigation measures. Due to past
reductions in research funding for billfish and other HMS
investigations within the SEFSC, the program identified in the bill
would be useful in reestablishing staffing to levels that would permit
fuller conduct of billfish research within the SEFSC. Some
investigations into gear modifications for reducing billfish mortality
have been initiated. For example, the use of circle hooks as a means of
reducing the mortality of marlins compared to the use of other hook
types using both direct at-sea observation and through electronic tag
applications have provided promising preliminary results. The number of
observations from which to draw inference are low and direct
experimental applications within the fleet have not yet been conducted.
to permit drawing scientific conclusion that their application in the
industry would result in lower billfish mortality, while minimizing
impact on target species catches. Research on methods to reduce sea-
turtle interactions with U.S. pelagic longline gear fishing on the on
the Grand Banks (an area, outside the U.S. EEZ, of relatively high sea
turtle interactions, but relatively low marlin interactions) has been
(in fiscal year 2001) initiated at the SEFSC. The experimental design
for this research was developed through several workshops and in
consultation and collaboration with NOAA Fisheries scientists
investigating methods of reducing sea turtle interactions with pelagic
longline vessels fishing from Hawaii, and with pelagic longline fishers
involved in the fishery. Field experiments, conduced in cooperation
with fishers active in the fishery, are scheduled to begin in late
August or September. Due to the relatively rare event nature of
interactions with sea turtles on a per day fishing basis, the number of
days fishing that need be observed to measure impacts of the gear
modifications with a reasonable degree of certainty is relatively
large, which translates into high costs for conducting this research.
Marlins are also a relatively rare event, on average, in the catch of
the U.S. pelagic longline fleet.
Use of VMS
From a scientific perspective, the use of vessel monitoring systems
on board pelagic longline vessels could provide for finer spatial and
temporal resolution for catch and effort data collection than is the
current custom or requirement. With greater resolution comes the
possibility of refining estimates of how and when fishing effort and
catch occurs. This, in turn, could lead to.greater ability to evaluate
fishing success relative to fine-scale at-sea environmental information
and investigations into the affects of these features on the
catchability and relative abundance of HMS species.
ICCAT has requested scientific advice for a number of species
stocks on times and areas of high fish concentrations that might be
restricted to fishing as a way to reduce fishing mortality rates for
overfished species. Such advice has been requested for juvenile
swordfish and it is anticipated that SCRS will report its findings to
the Commission at its 2002 meeting. In as much as the typical spatial
resolution of the international catch-effort data reported to ICCAT is
at a 5 Latitude x 5 Longitude level, the scientific advice that could
be provided may be at too coarse a scale for the Commission's use in
development of time-area closures. The Standing Committee on Research
and Statistics of ICCAT has recommended collection and reporting of
finer scale catch-effort data to support these types of analyses.
Broad-scale application of VMS in the international fleet could promote
such data collection and reporting schemes. It should be noted, though,
that the U.S. has made use of finer-scale (typically 1 x 1 catch effort
information from daily logbook set records) in evaluating possible
time-area closures for management of the U.S. fleet in the absence of
VMS.
How the measures taken in the legislation will affect stocks of highly
migratory species throughout the Atlantic and their use
internationally to help rebuild highly migratory species
In my view, the fishery management measures taken in the
legislation that have the most direct potential effects on HMS are the
time-area closures and the vessel buy-out provisions. As indicated in
Dr. Hogarth's testimony, estimates of impact of the time-area closure
provisions on U.S. catches of various species could range from
relatively small (a few percentage points) reductions to relatively
small increases depending on the behavior of the fleet in reaction to
the time-area closures. The odds of the closures resulting in
reductions in catch are improved if coupled with a fishing effort
reduction mechanism such as outlined in the bill. While even slight
reductions in catch can provide conservation benefit to the species
stocks affected, it is very unlikely that change of the magnitudes
anticipated resulting from the time-area closures described in the bill
could be detected in any stock assessments since the signal to noise
would be quite small. The effort reduction measures could result in
larger impacts which might be more easily measured in the context of
stock assessments, depending on the magnitude of effort removed.
Both effort reduction and time-area restrictions for various
components of the Atlantic HMS fisheries are in place and under further
consideration by ICCAT as management tools. The time-area and effort
reduction measures outlined in the bill are consistent with management
measures undertaken by ICCAT Member parties.
What conservation and management measures are currently in place
through the International Commission for the Conservation of
Atlantic Tunas?
ICCAT's website (www.iccat.es) maintains a current listing of the
conservation and management measures currently in place and agreed to
by the Member Parties. The conservation and management measures vary by
stock, but include management tools such as size limits, catch quotas,
time-area closures, and other measures. Attached in an appendix (pdf
from the ICCAT web site) is a summary of these measures through 1999.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to present testimony. I
would be happy to respond to questions.
______
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Mr. Saxton. Thank you, Mr. Scott.
Mr. Donofrio?
STATEMENT OF JAMES A. DONOFRIO, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
RECREATIONAL FISHING ALLIANCE
Mr. Donofrio. Good morning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
My name is Jim Donofrio, and I am the executive director of
the Recreational Fishing Alliance, also known as the RFA.
I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
Subcommittee, for inviting me here today to testify on H.R.
1367, the Atlantic Highly Migratory Species Conservation Act of
2001.
H.R. 1367, introduced by you, Mr. Chairman, is the
legislative remedy needed to reduce the number of pelagic drift
longlines in the Atlantic EEZ and Gulf of Mexico. It is
imperative that Congress makes clear its commitment to remove
this destructive gear from our nation's waters.
Under the current regulations finalized by the National
Marine Fisheries Service, the closed areas for highly migratory
species are under fire by numerous and disparate lawsuits.
These lawsuits have been filed by all sectors of the fishery:
the longliners, some recreational groups, and some
environmental groups--all looking for a different outcome.
When management by lawsuit becomes the way fisheries are
handled in this country, it is time for the Congress to take
the lead. There are many excellent provisions in H.R. 1367, and
RFA leadership, membership, and affiliated clubs applaud Mr.
Saxton for his willingness to take on this battle again.
In particular, we like the following sections and hope to
see them as part of this package when it is signed into law.
In the purposes section, we like purpose No. 4, which
strives to ensure sustainable fisheries for highly migratory
species. We like the mid-Atlantic Bight is afforded protection,
especially in light of the high interaction this destructive
gear has with marlin. Expanding this protection both to a
larger geographic area and for a longer period of time--
throughout the seasonal migration of the marlin, for example--
would afford even more protection.
We strongly urge Mr. Saxton to discuss the best approach
with affected parties.
The effort limitation provision looks workable and should
achieve its goal to limit the number of sets in the mid-
Atlantic Bight. The RFA applauds the expansion of the bycatch
mortality reduction research program to include all highly
migratory species and sea turtles. This program will be an
excellent model for other nations, which we share with our
highly migratory species.
The research that is done through this program should show
whether the gear is truly destructive, as the RFA maintains, or
simply misunderstood, as the longliners themselves claim.
The RFA members strongly believe that an observer program
that can verify the actual bycatch from these vessels while the
experiment with different gear configurations may make a huge
difference in how longliners impact nontargeted species. I will
speak more on that later in my testimony.
Section 12, which reallocates the portion of the total
allowable catch of swordfish to handgear and harpoon fisheries,
will certainly answer that argument that if a U.S. longliners
do not fish for these fish, some other nation will.
We will retain our domestic quota. And judging from the
huge swordfish being landed by harpooners from Menemsha,
Massachusetts, we will be able to fill our quota as well.
The enclosed July 20th edition of Martha's Vineyard Gazette
reports that two boats landed 47 adult swordfish that dressed
over 200 pounds, an astonishing amount of this high-value fish.
In fact, just one trip resulted in almost 10,000 pounds of
swordfish.
Why this is astonishing is, according to the NMFS
statistics, last year's entire total of harpooned swordfish was
a mere 960 pounds.
Mr. Chairman, that is less than 10 percent of these two
recent trips. I suspect the recent closure to the Northeast
distant fleet of longliners may be a factor in this dramatic
rebound of the swordfish population.
According to marine biologists, swordfish are highly
resilient fish, and if given a chance to spawn before
harvested, stocks will rebound in a very short period of time.
Another example of the swift return of swordfish, which
also shows that a localized effort makes a big difference, can
be found in a NMFS publication entitled ``Draft Amendment 1 to
the Fishery Management Plan for Atlantic Swordfish, Including
Environmental Assessment and Regulatory Impact Review.''
As you can see by the chart, when the mercury scare
occurred in 1971, the longliners had no market for swordfish
and directed their gear on other fish. The swordfish population
starts a quick and steady climb. The information in this chart
was compiled from the NMFS data that longliners themselves
reported.
But we will get back to H.R. 1367. Section 13, which
requires the Secretary of Commerce to closely monitor the
fishery on an annual basis and further requires the Secretary
to take steps to minimize bycatch, is light years ahead in
conservation, and we hope to see this section retained in its
current form.
Our main concern about pelagic drift longlines is the non-
selectivity of the gear. The longliners argue that their gear
can be managed so that bycatch does not occur. The RFA
maintains that if this were the case, longlines would not have
been thrown out of the Grand Banks for jeopardizing the
continued existence of endangered sea turtles.
The RFA offers this: If the gear is destructive, it should
be out of the water, not just in the areas that NMFS has
regulated, not just in the areas where H.R. 1367 deems
necessary, but everywhere.
In order to discover if this gear is manageable, research
needs to be conducted. We can all agree it has not been done
yet. The jury is still out on the gear, literally. However, the
record clearly shows that since the introduction of long-lining
in U.S. waters, white marlin and blue marlin swordfish
populations have been on a dramatic downward spiral.
Should NMFS be directed by Congress to implement the
comprehensive research program outlined in Mr. Saxton's bill,
all interested parties will know whether the gear should be
part of our fisheries harvesting mix or should be removed from
our waters permanently.
We strongly urge the Subcommittee to approve such a
comprehensive research program during this Congress. Our highly
migratory species are too valuable to leave to chance or to bad
science or what we have now: incomplete science, inadequate
observer coverage.
And to be candid, the RFA does not think it is possible to
fish this gear without causing appalling levels of bycatch.
Therefore, it is the goal of the RFA to help ensure that
pelagic drift longline gear will be phased out of all U.S.
waters by 2006.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify, and
I would be pleased to answer any questions you have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Donofrio follows:]
Statement of James A. Donofrio, Executive Director, Recreational
Fishing Alliance
My name is Jim Donofrio, and I am the Executive Director of the
Recreational Fishing Alliance, also known as the RFA. The RFA is a
national 501(c)(4) non-profit political action organization whose
mission is to safeguard the rights of salt water anglers, protect
marine, boat, and tackle industry jobs, and ensure the long-term
sustainability of our nation's marine fisheries. Thank you Mr. Chairman
and members of the Subcommittee for inviting me here today to testify
on H.R. 1367, the Atlantic Highly Migratory Species Conservation Act of
2001.
H.R. 1367, introduced by Congressman Jim Saxton, is the legislative
remedy needed to reduce the number of pelagic drift longlines in the
Atlantic EEZ and the Gulf of Mexico. It is imperative that the Congress
makes clear its commitment to remove this destructive gear from our
nation's waters. Under the current regulations finalized by the
National Marine Fisheries Service, the closed areas for HMS (Highly
Migratory Species) are under fire by numerous and disparate lawsuits.
These lawsuits have been filed by all sectors of the fishery - the
longliners, some recreational groups and some environmental groups -
all looking for a different outcome. When management by lawsuit becomes
the way fisheries are handled in this country, it is time for the
Congress to take the lead.
There are many excellent provisions in H.R. 1367 and the RFA
leadership, membership and affiliated clubs applaud Mr. Saxton for his
willingness to take on this battle again. In particular, we like the
following sections and hope to see them as part of this package when it
is signed into law. In the purposes section, we like purpose 4, which
strives to ensure a sustainable fishery for highly migratory species.
We like that the Mid-Atlantic Bight is afforded protection, especially
in light of the high interaction this destructive gear has with marlin.
Expanding this protection both to a larger geographic area and for a
longer period of time - throughout the seasonal migration of the
marlin, for example - would afford even more protection. We strongly
urge Mr. Saxton to discuss the best approach with affected parties.
The effort limitation provision looks workable and should achieve
its goal to limit the number of sets in the Mid-Atlantic Bight. The RFA
applauds the expansion of the Bycatch Mortality Reduction Research
Program to include all highly migratory species and sea turtles. This
program will be an excellent model for the other nations with which we
share our highly migratory species. The research that is done through
this program should show whether the gear is truly destructive, as the
RFA maintains, or is simply misunderstood, as the longliners themselves
claim. The RFA members strongly believe that an observer program that
can verify the actual bycatch from these vessels, while they experiment
with different gear configurations, may make a huge difference in how
longlines impact non-target species. I'll speak more on that later in
my testimony.
Section 12, which reallocates the portion of the total allowable
catch (TAC) of swordfish to the hand gear and harpoon fisheries, will
certainly answer the argument that if the U.S. longliners do not fish
for these fish, some other nation will. We will retain our domestic
quota and judging from the huge swordfish being landed by harpooners
from Menemsha, Massachusetts, we will be able to fill our quota as
well. The enclosed July 20th edition of the Martha's Vineyard Gazette
reports that two boats landed 47 harpooned adult swordfish that dressed
out at over 200 pounds each, an astonishing amount of these high value
fish. In fact this one trip resulted in almost 10,000 pounds of
swordfish. Why this is astonishing is that according to the NMFS
statistics, last year's entire total of harpooned swordfish was a mere
960 pounds. Mr. Chairman, that is less than ten percent of these two
recent trips. I suspect the recent closure to the Northeast distant
fleet of longliners may be a factor in this dramatic rebound of the
swordfish population. According to marine biologists, swordfish are
highly resilient fish and if given a chance to spawn before harvested,
stocks will rebound in a very short period of time.
Another example of the swift return of swordfish, which also shows
that a localized effort makes a big difference, can be found in the
NMFS' publication entitled ``Draft Amendment 1 to the Fishery
Management Plan for Atlantic Swordfish Including an Environmental
Assessment and Regulatory Impact Review.'' (see enclosed chart) As you
can see by this chart, when the mercury scare occurred in 1971, the
longliners had no market for swordfish and directed their gear on other
fish. The swordfish population starts a quick and steady climb. The
information in this chart was compiled from the NMFS data that
longliners themselves reported. But let me get back to H.R. 1367.
Section 13, which requires the Secretary of Commerce to closely
monitor the fishery on an annual basis - and further requires the
Secretary to take steps to minimize bycatch is light years ahead in
conservation, and we hope to see this section retained in its current
form.
Our main concern about pelagic drift longlines is the non-
selectivity of the gear. The longliners argue that their gear can be
managed so that bycatch does not occur. The RFA maintains that if this
were the case, longlines would not have been thrown out of the Grand
Banks for jeopardizing the continued existence of endangered sea
turtles. The RFA offers this - if the gear is destructive, it should be
out of the water - not just in the areas that NMFS has regulated, not
just in the areas where H.R. 1367 deems necessary, but everywhere. In
order to discover if this gear is manageable, research needs to be
conducted. We can all agree it has not yet been done - the jury is
still out on this gear - literally. However, the record clearly shows
that since the introduction of longlining in U.S. waters, white marlin
and blue marlin and swordfish populations have been on a dramatic
downward spiral.
Should the NMFS be directed by Congress to implement the
comprehensive research program outlined in Mr. Saxton's bill, all
interested parties will know the whether this gear should be a part of
our fisheries harvesting mix, or should be removed from our waters
permanently. We strongly urge the Subcommittee to approve such a
comprehensive research program during this Congress. Our HMS species
are too valuable to leave to chance or to bad science or what we have
now - incomplete science and inadequate observer coverage. To be
candid, the RFA does not think it is possible to fish this gear without
causing appalling levels of bycatch. Therefore, it is the goal of the
RFA to help insure that pelagic drift longline gear will be phased out
of all U.S. waters by 2006.
Thank you for this opportunity to testify. I will be pleased to
answer any questions you may have.
______
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Mr. Saxton. Thank you very much, Mr. Donofrio.
Now we will hear from Tim Hobbs, a representative of the
National Coalition for Marine Conservation.
STATEMENT OF TIM HOBBS, FISHERIES PROJECT DIRECTOR, NATIONAL
COALITION FOR MARINE CONSERVATION
Mr. Hobbs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
My name is Tim Hobbs. I am the fisheries project director
with the National Coalition for Marine Conservation.
I sincerely appreciate the opportunity to testify before
you today on H.R. 1367 and efforts to control pelagic longline
fishing in U.S. waters.
First off, I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the
tremendous amount of time and effort you have put forth to
address the issue of longline bycatch and other issues facing
our Atlantic highly migratory species.
At this time, while we support the intent of this
legislation, we do not feel, as it is currently drafted, that
it goes far enough in providing the needed level of
conservation for blue and white marlin.
H.R. 1367 would leave the existing NMFS area closures in
place and would supplement those area closures with additional
ones to achieve additional conservation benefits for blue and
white marlin. This is important because the NMFS closures
should significantly benefit certain highly migratory species.
Swordfish, large coastal sharks, and sailfish are expected to
receive substantial decreases in bycatch reduction up to or
over 40 percent.
We fully support the NMFS closures, and we would also
support additional closures targeted at reducing blue and white
marlin bycatch. However, we feel at this time that the area
closures in H.R. 1367 are not substantial enough to address the
bycatch problem adequately.
The area closures in the mid-Atlantic Bight we believe are
of such a limited scope, both spatially and temporally, as to
provide a very minimal level of conservation for white marlin.
We are concerned that displaced fishing effort concentrated on
the boundaries of these closed areas could actually negate the
conservation benefits that might be achieved by them, since
they are indeed so small.
And as Mr. Hayes pointed out earlier, the gulf closure in
the bill covers an area where there is very little longline
fishing effort. In fact, the National Marine Fisheries Service
estimated last year that this exact closure would only reduce
billfish bycatch by ``generally less than 1 percent.''
We believe that additional time-area closures in U.S.
waters should be implemented to achieve reductions in blue and
white marlin bycatch that are commensurate with the levels of
reduction achieved for swordfish, large coastal sharks, and
sailfish through the closures now in place.
My organization could support a properly structured buyout
of U.S. Atlantic pelagic longline vessels. We could support a
buyout for two reasons: One, for effort reduction, and we think
such a buyout should focus on removing the active vessels from
the fishery, as this would provide the most immediate
conservation benefit. And secondly, we could support a buyout
to compensate vessel owners that can demonstrate an adverse
economic impact resulting from the area closures--either area
closures that are currently now in place or any area closures
to be implemented in the future.
We strongly support the provisions of the bill that would
transfer the portion of the bought-out swordfish quota from the
longline categories to the handgear categories. Harpoon and
rod-and-reel gear can take swordfish--large, mature fish--with
absolutely no bycatch, thus eliminating the problems of pelagic
longline gear.
And this is an important point. As we attempt to rebuild
these fisheries, it is going to be important to shift to more
selective fishing gears, as we do not believe the HMS fisheries
can be sustainable, especially in an ecosystem context, if
pelagic longlines are the primary gear used.
For several years, there have been discussions into ways
that longline gear could be modified to reduce the levels of
bycatch. Unfortunately, to date, there has been virtually no
testing of these gear modifications to determine their
potential in reducing bycatch. We would certainly support
legislation mandating NMFS to conduct a research program to
test gear modifications. We envision a program that would test
things such as the length of mainline used, the soak time, the
types of hooks that are used, and other methods to determine if
there is any potential in reducing longline bycatch.
This is very important because we need to determine what
options are at our disposal to reduce longline bycatch. At this
time, time and area closures are the only means that we have.
And in fact, we may find that closures really are the only
means available to reduce longline bycatch, but we need to
determine through gear modification research what other options
might exist.
We also believe that vessel monitoring systems need to be
implemented quickly. We would urge the National Marine
Fisheries Service to work primarily on addressing the temporary
injunction against VMS. And if the agency wishes to secure
congressional appropriations later, it could then reimburse
fisherman who were required to purchase VMS. But VMS needs to
be implemented immediately. We have several time-area closures
currently in place, and there is virtually no means of
enforcement, so it is very important to get it in place as soon
as possible.
Thank you very much. I am grateful the opportunity to
testify before you. We are highly supportive of your efforts,
Mr. Saxton, and we thank you very much for providing the
leadership necessary to tackle these important issues. Thank
you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hobbs follows:]
Statement of J. Timothy Hobbs, Jr., Fisheries Project Director,
National Coalition for Marine Conservation
Good morning Mr. Chairman, Mr. Saxton and members of the
Subcommittee. I am Tim Hobbs, Fisheries Project Director with the
National Coalition for Marine Conservation. The NCMC is the nation's
oldest public advocacy organization dedicated exclusively to conserving
ocean fish and their environment. My organization has been involved in
fisheries management issues since 1973 and we are widely recognized as
a leading advocate for the conservation and responsible management of
highly migratory species-swordfish, billfish, tunas and sharks. I
sincerely appreciate the opportunity to testify before you on HR 1367
and efforts to control pelagic longline fishing in U.S. waters.
First of all, I would like to thank Mr. Saxton for the tremendous
amount of time and effort he has put forth to address the problems
facing our highly migratory species. These species are vital to the
health of our marine ecosystems and extremely important to U.S.
recreational and commercial fishermen and to the well being of our
coastal communities. We commend Mr. Saxton for championing this issue.
The current state of highly migratory species in the Atlantic is
deplorable, largely due to the widespread use of pelagic longline
fishing gear. Pelagic longlines are highly indiscriminate in the
number, size and type of marine species they catch, and produce high
rates of mortality, a combination that makes this gear especially
detrimental to the offshore marine ecosystem.
Since Congress made reductions in bycatch and bycatch mortality a
domestic priority under National Standard 9 of the 1996 reauthorization
of the Magnuson-Stevens Act, my organization has been calling for
measures to improve data collection and to address the documented
bycatch problems of pelagic longline gear in U.S. waters. In February
of 1998, NCMC published a report, titled Ocean Roulette: Conserving
Swordfish, Sharks and Other Threatened Pelagic Fish in Longline
Infested Waters. This report examines every conceivable management
option for its potential in reigning in longline bycatch. A lengthy
analysis reveals that the only way to effectively reduce longline
bycatch is to remove the gear from the water where and when it is doing
the most damage. More traditional management measures, such as size or
trip limits, are simply unsuited to address the bycatch problems of
such an indiscriminate fishing gear.
Since completing Ocean Roulette, my organization has urged the
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) to implement a comprehensive
bycatch reduction program to reduce longline bycatch of all impacted
species through a suite of time-area closures. At long last, NMFS
published Amendment 1 to the Highly Migratory Species Fishery
Management Plan (HMS FMP) on August 1, 2000, which closed 133,000
square miles to longline fishing, either seasonally or year-round. NCMC
fully supports the NMFS closures. Under NMFS estimates, these closures,
which are now fully implemented, will reduce longline bycatch of
juvenile swordfish by up to 42%, large coastal shark bycatch by up to
43%, and sailfish bycatch by up to 44%. These reductions are
substantial and will provide significant benefits to the rebuilding
efforts of these overfished species.
Unfortunately, blue and white marlin only receive a residual
benefit from the NMFS closures and estimates of bycatch reduction for
these species are, at best, a meager 6-12%. This fact is made worse
because blue and white marlin are by far the most overfished of the
Atlantic highly migratory species. The most recent ICCAT stock
assessment estimates blue marlin at 40% of healthy population levels
(MSY) and white marlin at a mere 15%. Clearly, more action must be
taken to stop the decline of these important species. Additional time-
area closures to longline fishing in U.S. waters should be implemented
to achieve a level of bycatch reduction for blue and white marlin
commensurate with the level of relief provided to swordfish, sharks and
sailfish from the closures now in place.
We are aware that one of the primary objectives of Mr. Saxton's
bill is, in fact, to achieve additional conservation for blue and white
marlin. We fully support this goal and we look forward to working with
Mr. Saxton and the Subcommittee towards achieving it. At this time,
however, while we support the intent of this legislation, we do not
feel the bill as currently drafted goes far enough in securing the
needed level of conservation for overfished blue and white marlin.
Time/Area Closures in HR 1367
HR 1367 would leave the existing longline closures promulgated by
NMFS (by the August 1, 2000 Final Rule) in place and would implement
additional closures to achieve a higher level of conservation. We fully
support this course of action. The NMFS closures were developed through
the established fishery management process, have been thoroughly
reviewed and commented upon by the public several times, and are based
on the best scientific data available. Previous legislation addressing
longline fishing in U.S. waters would have rescinded these area
closures, an act we feel would be entirely inappropriate. As stated
above, the conservation benefits of these closures to certain highly
migratory species are significant.
The Mid-Atlantic Bight is an area where white marlin are known to
congregate during the summer months. HR 1367 proposes two annual time-
area closures to longlining in this region: a 40-day closure covering
approximately the 100- to 1,000-fathom depth contours from the Hudson
Canyon to the Poorman's Canyon; and a 30-day closure covering
approximately the 100- to 1,000-fathom depth contours from the
Washington to the Norfolk Canyons.
NCMC concurs that white marlin are concentrated in these areas at
these times. However, we believe that both of these closures are of
such limited scope, both spatially and temporally, as to provide little
benefit to white marlin. We are concerned that displaced longline
fishing effort concentrated on the fringes of these small closures
could negate the conservation benefits achieved by them. We believe the
mid-Atlantic closures in HR 1367 must be expanded to achieve a greater
level of conservation for white marlin.
HR 1367 would also close an area in the western Gulf of Mexico from
the shore out to 500 fathoms, from the U.S./Mexico border to
approximately Cape San Blas, Florida. This is exactly the same closure
that appeared in previous legislation. Unfortunately, there is very
little longline fishing occurring in this area and, therefore, closing
it would do little for conservation. In fact, in an April 5, 2000
letter to Senator John Kerry last year, then-Assistant Administrator
for NOAA Fisheries Penny Dalton stated that this same closure would
only result in a reduction in billfish bycatch of ``generally less than
1%.'' This closure will accomplish little towards achieving the
purposes and objectives of this legislation.
There are, however, areas in the Gulf of Mexico with higher levels
of longline bycatch that should be considered for closure. NMFS
originally proposed a seasonal closure in the western Gulf of Mexico
that was expected to reduce billfish bycatch by up to 15%.
There are other documented areas of high blue and white marlin
bycatch, such as in the northern Caribbean, which should also be
considered for potential closure. I would be happy to work with Mr.
Saxton and the Subcommittee in obtaining and reviewing studies and data
showing longline bycatch in all of these areas.
Buyout
NCMC could support a properly structured buyout of U.S. Atlantic
pelagic longline vessels either to reduce longline fishing effort or to
compensate fishermen demonstrably impacted by the time-area closures,
having derived a substantial portion of their income from an area now
off-limits to fishing. A buyout for the purposes of effort reduction
should focus primarily on removing active vessels from the fishery,
with addressing latent fishing effort and preventing reinvestment into
the fishery important, but secondary, goals. Removing active vessels
from the fishery provides immediate relief to overfished stocks.
Vessels accepting a buyout for compensatory reasons must be able to
demonstrate a significant, adverse economic impact directly resulting
from recently enacted time-area closures. This can be achieved through
appropriate qualification criteria.
Quota Transfer
We strongly support Section 12 of HR 1367, which would transfer the
portion of the U.S. swordfish quota caught by bought-out vessels from
the longline to the handgear (harpoon, rod and reel) categories.
Harpooning swordfish is a traditional fishery that first started in the
late 1800s. Contrasted with longlines, fishermen using harpoons or rod-
and-reel take only large, mature fish with absolutely no bycatch, thus
avoiding the two major problems with pelagic longlines. The selectivity
of harpoon fishing is probably why this fishery was sustainable for
over 100 years.
The objectives of the Highly Migratory Species FMP implemented by
NMFS in 1999 include restoring both the traditional harpoon fishery as
well as the traditional recreational fishery, participation in both of
which has dwindled in recent years as the swordfish stock declined from
unsustainable fishing practices.
NCMC strongly supports a transition from the use of pelagic
longlines to more sustainable and selective fishing gears, such as
harpoon or rod-and-reel. Time-area closures to longlining are necessary
to protect juvenile swordfish (and other fish) while stocks recover,
but a shift to more sustainable gears is necessary as we begin to
rebuild these stocks, as we do not believe the swordfish fishery can be
sustainable, especially in an ecosystem context, if longlines (as
commonly fished) are the primary gear used.
Research
Methods of modifying the way longlines are fished to reduce bycatch
have been discussed for years, but so far, few gear modifications have
actually been tested to determine whether or not they hold any promise
for reducing bycatch. We need to determine, once and for all, whether
any modifications exist that could be adopted to reduce bycatch. We
would support legislation mandating NMFS to conduct a comprehensive
research program to test various gear modifications for their bycatch
reduction potential. We envision a research program that would test,
among other things, the duration of soak time, length of the mainline
used, or various hook types to determine potential for reducing
bycatch.
Conducting this research is essential for the future management of
these species, both in U.S. waters and internationally, for we must
fully assess all options at our disposal for reducing longline bycatch.
The value in conducting this research lies not only in finding
modifications that would presumably allow longline fishing to continue
in U.S. waters, but in finding an exportable method of bycatch
reduction that could be adopted by foreign fleets as well. This
research would also help determine whether or not we must rely upon
time-area closures as the sole method of reducing bycatch.
Future Action
As you may be aware, my organization strongly opposed previous
legislation that restricted the ability of the Secretary to take future
additional action to modify or expand the time-area closures. We see
absolutely no reason why such a restriction should ever accompany
management action with uncertain effects.
My organization fully endorses Section 13 of HR 1367, which charges
the Secretary with monitoring the effectiveness of the area closures on
an annual basis and taking additional action as necessary to reduce
bycatch and to comply with the law. As it is difficult to judge the
effectiveness of the area closures-due to shifts in fishing effort and
effort displacement, annual variations in movements of the fish and
other factors-continually analyzing their effectiveness is crucial to
maximize their success in reducing bycatch over the long term.
Vessel Monitoring Systems
There are several time-area closures in the Atlantic and Gulf of
Mexico currently in effect to reduce longline bycatch of finfish and
sea turtles, yet there is no adequate means of enforcement. The only
effective method of enforcing large-scale time-area closures, the
boundaries of which are often far out to sea, is with Vessel Monitoring
Systems (VMS). We have repeatedly urged NMFS to implement VMS to be
ready concurrent with the implementation of time-area closures, yet the
system is still not in place. Logbook entries and dockside sampling,
the means by which NMFS claims it can enforce the closures, are by no
means adequate. NMFS has dragged its feet and has failed to respond to
a Court-ordered injunction against VMS for almost a year. As there is a
dire need for timely implementation of VMS, we believe NMFS should
focus its efforts primarily on lifting the injunction, thus mandating
VMS for all Atlantic pelagic longline vessels, and secondarily to
securing congressional appropriations. If NMFS is ultimately successful
in gaining congressional appropriations for VMS, it could later
reimburse fishermen who were required to purchase it. Enforcement of
important conservation measures should not be stalled while NMFS
pursues congressional funding with no guarantee of success. VMS must be
implemented as quickly as possible.
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Saxton and members of the Subcommittee, I am
grateful for the opportunity to share my thoughts with you today on
future efforts to achieve needed conservation measures for overfished
Atlantic highly migratory species. We are highly supportive of your
efforts on this issue, Mr. Saxton, and commend you for providing the
leadership necessary to tackle these issues, which are often
contentious and difficult to find solutions palatable to all sides. We
especially look forward to working with all of you to achieve
additional conservation measures for blue and white marlin. I would be
happy to answer any questions.
______
Mr. Saxton. Thank you very much for your perspective, Mr.
Hobbs.
Are you any relation to David Hobbs, who is the President's
legislative liaison person?
Mr. Hobbs. No. No, I am not.
Mr. Saxton. We are going to go to Mr. Underwood for
whatever comments or questions he may have after hearing the
high degree of agreement between all the witnesses.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Underwood. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and
thank you for the opportunity to hear a very wide-ranging
series of opinions about this matter. This is a matter that
obviously requires congressional attention.
And I think it is certainly not limited to the Atlantic. I
think these are international issues, as well as issues that
affect an area that is closer to my own responsibility, the
Pacific.
I was struck, actually, trying to understand the
interaction between recreational fishing and fishing as a
commercial enterprise. And to some extent Mr. Panacek's
characterization that long-lining has been demonized is
probably fairly accurate. I think there is certainly not a
wide-ranging level of support for those kinds of activities.
But I did want to ask perhaps Dr. Hogarth--or others may
want to respond to this--Mr. Panacek asserts in his testimony
that by limiting the time spent by closing certain areas to
this kind of activity, that basically the quotas will simply be
reassigned to someone else, and thereby really, in effect,
undermining the conservation intent of the legislation. In
other words, it may make us feel that we are actually making a
bold strike for conservation of the species.
At the same time, Mr. Donofrio asserts in his testimony
that through skilled recreational fishing--I was reading about
the harpooning, and I asked Mr. Saxton if he had been
harpooning to see how successful that is. It would have to be,
in my estimation, pretty enormously successful in order to--
[Laughter.]
I am not doubting that is feasible or not, but I also
understand in your testimony, Dr. Hogarth, that you have doubts
that this quota could be made up in recreational fishing as
well. So could you respond to that in some way?
Dr. Hogarth. Thank you, Mr. Underwood.
Yes, it is our concern that it cannot be made up. We have
29 percent of the swordfish, for example, and the indications
are that we could not make this up with the use of handgear.
And what happens is that, when you deal with the ICCAT, there
is a very good chance that we would lose this quota to other
countries. And the handgear would not be able to harvest the
amount.
So that is a concern of ours, that we would lose quota in
the process.
And the other countries who would pick this up, they
honestly do not have the regulations and do not have the time-
area closures or the other regulations that the U.S. has on its
fleet. And so we would probably lose some conservation.
You know, that has been one of our major concerns right
now, what we have done to the longline industry, both in the
Pacific and the Atlantic, is that effort is obviously being
taken up by Spain and other countries. And they do not practice
saving turtles, for example. And the increase in the take of
turtles is something that concerns us.
So we are trying to work with industry now on gear
research, because we think if we can get some gear
modifications in through the State Department and international
avenues, we will be able to transfer that technology, such as
we have done in the shrimp industry with the turtle excluder
devices.
Mr. Underwood. We don't want to make the commercial
practices of other nations the measure of how we carry out our
own activities, and so it presents us with a little bit of a
quandary.
Is it your estimation--perhaps others would like to comment
on this--that we are doing as much as we can internationally in
order to create the kind of fishing practices climate that we
want? Are we putting enough pressure on the other countries?
Dr. Hogarth. I will take the first stab at that.
In several instances, no, we are not. When it comes to the
sea turtles, we are definitely not. We have to use the
multilateral type of agreements, bilateral agreements with
foreign countries, and we have to use the State Department. And
we plan to do that. We have already talked to the State
Department about several avenues, once we can develop
technology.
The longline industry, while right now it may appear it is
sort of under attack, we are also working in the shrimp
industry, for example, we have TEDs, or turtle excluder
devices. Foreign countries have to meet those requirements or
they cannot export shrimp to the U.S. That is something
Congress did, and it is working very effectively.
In the Southeast region, we inspect those countries at
least annually to make sure that they are abiding by the
regulations. So if we can develop the technology, I think we
have avenues in order to send this overseas.
Through ICCAT, we are having some problems there with
compliance. There is no doubt the European Union is not
complying the way we think it should. It is going to be a major
issue for the commissioners at the next meeting. It is a
continual battle that we have to get other countries in
compliance. But it is something we continue to battle with.
But we know in the U.S. that we have through the highly
migratory species management plan, we feel like the time-area
closures, we have tried to address the bycatch problem, and I
think for several species we have done that.
But, no, on an international level, particularly longline,
we have a lot of work to do.
Mr. Underwood. Go ahead Mr. Panacek, and then Mr. Donofrio
and Mr. Hobbs.
Mr. Panacek. Thank you, Mr. Underwood.
I would like to just emphasize the fact that the United
States fishermen have set the examples for all the foreign
countries. We've set unprecedented conservation measures, and
they have complied and complied and complied, to the point of
going out of business to set an example for the international
countries, the foreign countries, who are almost and
unfortunately laughing at the United States and continuing to
catch all the fish that they want, including tremendous amounts
of billfish that they catch and sell.
And if we don't get the recreational and the commercial
together in the United States and realize that ICCAT is the
only solution to this billfish problem, it won't matter that
the United States isn't fishing in the mid-Atlantic Bight or
anywhere, including the recreational boats, because there won't
be any fish left if it is up to them.
Mr. Underwood. Thank you.
Mr. Donofrio?
Mr. Donofrio. Thank you, Mr. Underwood.
I want to say I respectfully disagree with Dr. Hogarth on
this scenario. I think ICCAT is necessary, but I believe that
the National Marine Fisheries Service and the commercial
longline industry has been hiding behind it. And as far as the
perspective of looking at the Atlantic Ocean as one big pond
and that these fish are commuting back and forth like they are
on Concords, that just doesn't happen.
We have a continental shelf here that is rich in marine
life and it holds fish. There is a lot of north-south
migration. And I think it is the duty of the U.S. Congress to
step in at this time and protect the industries--both
traditional commercial industry and recreational industry--from
the ravages of this gear. Harpooning in U.S. waters indicates
that more harpoon swordfish were landed in poundage than were
caught by the U.S. longline fleet, and it can be done again.
And we may not get all the quota. And if we lose a little
bit of that quota, we are not losing it out of our EEZ. The
other countries, Spain, Japan, etc., they will take that quota,
but they are going to be catching it somewhere else in the
world. We are still protecting our 200-mile limit. And that was
the objective of that bill in 1976, and I think we need to move
forward on that.
Mr. Underwood. Okay, thank you.
Mr. Hobbs?
Mr. Hobbs. Yes, I wanted to reiterate a point that Mr.
Donofrio just made.
Harpooning might seem like a primitive gear, but I would
not underestimate the ability of harpoon fishermen to harvest
swordfish. The heyday of the swordfish harpoon fishery was
1959, and U.S. and Canadian harpoon fishermen harvested more
swordfish by harpoon in 1959 than are taken by the two
countries today with all the gears.
So I think the potential does exist to make the transfer to
more selective fishing gears. And I think that if we can make
the point at ICCAT that we are restructuring our fishery to
make it more selective, that should go a long way toward
securing the leadership that we need there.
Mr. Underwood. Go ahead, Mr. Saxton. I admire your
leadership on this issue.
Mr. Saxton. I think Mr. Underwood and I are kind of out in
the cold on the harpooning.
You know, when we think of harpooning, we think of old
sailing ships and something that is kind of archaic or old-
fashioned.
And, Mr. Hobbs, to hear your explanation, that may not
necessarily be the case. If as late as 1959 there was a
successful harpoon fishery that was economically viable, your
position is that maybe it is today as well. Is that what you
are saying?
Mr. Hobbs. Well, I think the potential certainly exists. In
1959, the fishery was much healthier than it is today.
One of the problems with pelagic longline gear,
unfortunately, is that it harvests juvenile swordfish just as
easily as mature swordfish, and that has altered the population
structure of swordfish. So it might make it difficult to
achieve a harpoon fishery that depends upon large, mature fish
if widespread longline fishing is allowed to continue without
areas to reduce juvenile swordfish bycatch.
But I think certainly the potential exists to expand these
fisheries to pick up some of the slack where we can shift away
from longline gear.
Mr. Saxton. Mr. Hayes?
Mr. Hayes. Yes, I want to get back to improving ICCAT, but
first I want to say one thing about harpooning.
The objective here is laudable.
Mr. Saxton. I am sorry?
Mr. Hayes. The objective is laudable. Essentially what the
idea is, is to find the gear that reduces the bycatch. Mr.
Donofrio and Mr. Hobbs are simply suggesting that here is a
gear that will do it, either handgear or harpoon gear.
It does have some other interesting side effects. And I
think in the short term, Mr. Hogarth is right. It would have
some very negative side effects internationally.
Mr. Saxton. Why is that, please?
Mr. Hayes. The difficulty is that if you had the ability--
let's assume that you went ahead and reduced the quota as
exactly as in your bill, and we went and reduced it by as much
as 40 percent of the catch, we don't have today a harpoon and a
handgear capability to go out and suddenly fill that in.
One of the things in my history is I ran the development
program for the National Marine Fisheries Services. I got to
develop the Alaska fishing fleet. I gained some concept of how
you do this.
It would cost us millions of dollars to train fishermen, to
develop the gear, and, as Mr. Hobbs correctly points out, the
stock structure is such that you couldn't do it anyway, not
until the stock recovered. And that is going to be some
substantial period from now.
Mr. Saxton. Why is that?
Mr. Hayes. Well, because they are not big enough.
Mr. Saxton. I have been dealing with the longline part of
this for a couple of years now, but I don't know the harpooning
end.
Mr. Hayes. It is just that, you know, what we would be
creating in a fishery development standpoint is a brand new
fishery. Now, it may be historically a fishery. There are
people out there that do it. But are there infrastructure,
boats, people trained?
What I know about the harpoon fishery is it is highly
dangerous. Do we have the appropriate safety mechanisms in
place to keep people from sitting out there on the prow of that
boat and doing that activity on the high seas? I think it is a
difficult question, frankly, as to whether you could simply
transfer it.
But my point is that we are focused on a solution that may
not be the thing that we ought to be focused on. What the
solution is, is how do we harvest tuna and swordfish and reduce
the bycatch of the things that we want to reduce the bycatch
of.
And I think what Mr. Hogarth was suggesting, and I think
what everybody on this panel has suggested, is that what we
need to be doing is accelerating a research program to do
exactly that.
Mr. Saxton. Okay, let's talk about research for a minute.
I understand that you are into kind of two areas of
research. You are interested in two areas of research.
The one area is to try to find a way to create a fishery
that has less bycatch problem, that is a general thing, and
maybe you have some ideas about how to do that.
Particularly related to the second thing that I understand
that you are interested in, and that is research relating to
the effect of water temperature on various species of highly
migratory species. Am I saying that right?
Mr. Hayes. Is that me?
Mr. Saxton. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hayes. Yes, that is correct.
I think it is a combination of essentially two things. I
refer to it as technical changes, and I had a conversation Dick
Webber, frankly, and he corrected my definition of technology.
I think the concept of hotspots probably is the right
concept, so the question then becomes: How do we avoid large
areas where this bycatch occurs? Can we do that by looking at
water temperature, the difference between temperatures that
tuna stay in and the marlin stay out of? I understand that
there may be some fairly attractive fishing practices that you
could develop which could significantly reduce the bycatch.
And that would mean that you create hotspots and you would
trade them in different places, and you might have what they
call rolling closures, which is actually what the mid-Atlantic
closure--
Mr. Saxton. That is what we were trying to do in the last
session.
Mr. Hayes. And the question I think a lot of people have
raised is whether that was effective or not. And to be
perfectly honest, as you know, that was a negotiated thing, and
maybe, as I suggested earlier, let's start going back and
taking a science look at it first, and then let's start doing
the balance on what that economics is, and then let's make an
appropriate balance and come up with something.
But I think the concept of hotspots and the concept of gear
modification together are the kinds of things that we could
take internationally and that we could do domestically that
won't have this huge negative impact that the longline
community has just suggested and which would significantly
reduce the bycatch billfish.
And the question is, where do we get that research? And
what I have been suggesting is that what we ought to do is
compel our good colleague here, Mr. Hogarth, and our good
colleague here, Mr. Scott, to develop a research program. And
maybe they could come back to the Committee and develop such a
research program for you, and then we could collectively, as a
community, go figure a way to get that done.
Mr. Saxton. And what would you think would be the specific
objectives of this research project? I mean, we don't need a
research project to tell us there is a problem.
Mr. Hayes. No, we don't need that. Absolutely do not. No.
My view is that the objective of that is to determine
specific enforceable ways of using longline gear that does
reduce the bycatch of--my interest is in marlins, but also
large sharks, turtles, all of these other things.
That is the objective. It is, how do you reduce this
bycatch? That is a scientific objective, as I see it. And then
we can start talking about the economic impacts.
Mr. Saxton. And how do you identify hotspots? How do you
think we identify hotspots?
Mr. Hayes. I am a terrible scientist, but let me at least
tell you what people have told me.
There are a number of areas out there in which you can fish
where the bycatch of marlins is more significant than if you
went someplace else and there, both by way of time and area--
the Florida Straits, that is the only one I know of that
everybody agrees to.
But everyone agrees that that is a hotspot, particularly as
it applies to marlins and sailfish.
Mr. Saxton. Doesn't everybody agree that there is a hotspot
in the Mid-Atlantic Bight July through the end of September,
which we identified?
Maybe you are saying that that hotspot was identified and
defined as being too small, but everybody agreed on those
dates, everybody agreed that that was a hotspot, and everybody
tentatively agreed to have a time-area closure there.
Now, are you saying that was too small?
Mr. Hayes. No. What I think, actually, was that that area--
since I had something to do with sort of defining those spots,
I think this is what we were trying to do. We were trying to
identify an area where we could get a maximum amount of bycatch
reduction coupled with the minimal amount of impact on the
longline fleet.
Mr. Saxton. Not everybody, but some people would like to
have a viable longline fleet that catches swordfish and that
doesn't catch other highly migratory species and turtles, et
cetera.
Mr. Hayes. This is ``Mr. Hotspot,'' I think; better than I
am.
But the hotspot theory at least, the scientists at the
outset did not come up with that as a specific area that was a
hotspot.
It was just, frankly, the gulf area that we closed. It
wasn't a hotspot either. We weren't really trying to use that
kind of an effort in the gulf anymore than, frankly, we tried
to use in the mid-Atlantic. I don't think there is any question
that there is a huge bycatch of white marlin in the mid-
Atlantic. I am not suggesting anything else.
But I don't think we were specifically looking at this
concept of hotspots when we entered into the discussions on the
mid-Atlantic. It was more trying to negotiate those two points.
Mr. Saxton. I want to ask you and others in a minute what
you think, based on the scientific information that we
currently have, what are the elements that create a hotspot.
But first, Mr. Hobbs is dying to say something.
Mr. Hobbs. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just wanted to point out something that Mr. Hayes said,
and that is to start with the science. Let's look at what kind
of reduction we want to achieve for white marlin. With
swordfish and large coastal sharks and sailfish, we have
achieved maybe up to 42, 43, 45 percent reductions in bycatch.
So I think the initial question should be, okay, let's try
to do something similar for white marlin. And then we look at
what areas could we close at what times that would achieve that
level of bycatch reduction.
I mean, we think that the area closures in the mid-Atlantic
as currently drawn might not be big enough to provide enough
conservation benefits. We don't know that because we have never
seen a scientific analysis of those areas.
But with the NMFS closures, there was detailed scientific
analysis with both effort displacement and no-effort
displacement that estimated the levels of bycatch reduction.
So I think if we can identify these hotspots with the goal
of, ``let's achieve this much bycatch reduction,'' and then
analyze them, then we have some numbers to work with and some
areas to work with that we know are going to achieve the levels
of reduction that we want.
Mr. Saxton. Mr. Panacek?
Mr. Panacek. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
It has always been my understanding that the mid-Atlantic
Bight has never been, and statistics show that it is not a
hotspot. It is one of the lowest areas of interaction of small
swordfish and billfish.
The research needs to show us that that is the case, and I
think we need to look elsewhere. It is not in the mid-Atlantic
Bight that we have that problem.
Mr. Saxton. Mr. Donofrio?
Mr. Donofrio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I don't know what data the other side was looking at, but
we have NMFS data here that clearly indicates well within our
EEZ tremendous hotspots for white marlin bycatch. And I have
provided the Committee with this data.
Mr. Saxton. Are those the maps that we used last year?
Mr. Donofrio. Yes, sir. It is NMFS data.
Mr. Saxton. Mr. Scott, hotspots--can we identify them?
Dr. Scott. I think we can identify them so long as we agree
on what the real objective is. And so far what I have heard is
that there is a multitude of objectives.
No single time-area solution I think exists to match all of
the objectives that I have heard around the table--one being
white marlin, the other being sea turtles, still another being
small swordfish.
So it is very difficult to identify specific areas, unless
they are very large and very long in time, that would meet all
of those objectives simultaneously.
I can say that there has been an evaluation of the relative
effectiveness on expected reduction in catch for the specific
times and areas that are identified in the bill, and that is
information provided in the written testimony of Dr. Hogarth.
So that information does exist.
I know I am getting off the idea of hotspots in general,
but in specific terms to what is in the bill, the magnitude of
conservation benefit is relatively small. As I tried to point
out in my testimony, the magnitudes in expected reduction in
catch here would probably not be measurable in any biological
sense from the standpoint of status of any of these stocks we
would be considering.
Yes, I believe we can identify hotspots, but I think we
first have to agree on what the primary objective is that we
want to try and manage. If it is overall bycatch, that is going
to be something I think that is better promoted gear
modifications perhaps, as a first step, then first taking
blanket time-area closures for very, very large and very, very
extensive periods of time.
Mr. Saxton. If you identified a species or more than one
species, such as white marlin and blue marlin, and you said
that because NMFS data indicates that the white marlin, for
example, stock is estimated to be less than 15 percent of
biomass, and you wanted to identify places where longline gear
would not be appropriate because you wanted to provide an
opportunity for this species to recover, could you identify
those areas?
Dr. Scott. I believe, based on the detailed catch and
effort information that we have collected from pelagic longline
fishery, those areas can be identified. And in fact, there have
been areas identified that relate to high catch rates of things
like white marlin. So, yes, in my view, it is possible, on an
international scheme.
What I tried to point out in my testimony was that the
level of detail on the data that is reported to ICCAT is much
coarser than the level of detail that we use domestically for
making these hotspot determinations. And because of that, you
end up working with much larger areas of the ocean that may not
be judged to be as appropriate for time and area closures by
international members to ICCAT.
So there is a conflict there with respect to the level of
detail that is available for making these Atlantic-wide
determinations of hotspots. The hotspots we are able to
identify very fine-scale data relate to where the U.S. fishery
operates, and that is primarily on the western side of the
Atlantic, ranging down somewhat south of the equator,
traditionally not much on the eastern side of it.
Mr. Saxton. Let me ask a series of other questions.
And let me say, before I do, I am going to have to leave
here in about 10 minutes. At 12:30, there is a meeting of the
New Jersey delegation, and we are going to vote on the
Patients' Bill of Rights this afternoon, and that may not ring
an important bell with some of you, but it is really important
right now, here, as the New Jersey delegation is pivotal in how
this moves forward. So I am going to have to attend that
meeting.
But let me just take the 7 or 8 minutes to ask a series of
questions.
Bob Hayes, Mr. Scott just mentioned a regulatory regime
aimed at different gear types. Would you comment on that?
Mr. Hayes. I think he is right. I mean, there are two
levels to this.
The first level is, what do we do domestically because we
have better information domestically. So we do hotspots when we
can identify them, and we modify the entire gear to the extent
we can with whatever technology we apply.
Mr. Saxton. Are you talking about different kinds of hooks
or different--
Mr. Hayes. It is shorter soak times. Actually, it is the
very same stuff that they are doing this research right now on
in the turtle business. They are going to do a seven boat
turtle research program. It is that kind of research. It is,
how do you modify the gear?
Now, it may well be, and I think Mr. Donofrio suggested it,
it may well be that despite the claims that you can do this, it
can't be done.
If it can't be done, then I think we have a different
choice. But if it can be done, then we ought to be requiring,
by regulation, our industry to fish in a way that will minimize
this impact.
Now, if it is gear modifications, frankly, those are things
that are much easier to take internationally than these large
closed areas, because the problem with hotspots identification
internationally is, as Gerry points out, you are talking huge
areas of the ocean. And the only place we do have data, which
we could restrict those a little bit, is from our own fleet,
which, frankly, I think will be somewhat suspect when we go
internationally.
Mr. Saxton. Mr. Donofrio, do you want to comment?
Mr. Donofrio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I disagree. I think the gear has got to go. And based on
people we have talked to--I have a letter here I would like to
enter for the record from Louis Larsen's family, Betsy Larsen
from Menemsha, who's Dad actually pioneered long-lining in
1963. He and his family were harpooners before that for three
generations.
And Mr. Larsen regrets that he ever got involved with long-
lining. And at the time, the early days, they did short sets
because there were so many fish. So the shorter soak times,
that experiment has already been conducted. When there was
fish, it was a shorter soak time. You have to get the line in
right away.
And the gear just does not work. And this comes right from
the mouths of people that have done that and now regret they
have done it.
[The information referred to follows:]
Larsen's Fish Market, Inc.
P. O. Box 172
Chilmark, MA 02535
July 31, 2001
The Honorable Wayne Gilchrest, Chair
House Subcommittee on Fisheries Conservation, Wildlife and Oceans
2245 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Please allow me to introduce myself. I am the owner of Larsen's
Fish Market and my name is Betsy Larsen. I come from a long line of
commercial fishermen. My father, Louis Larsen, was one of the great
harpooners of his time. Our homeport is Menemsha, Massachusetts.
I strongly urge you to support Congressman Jim Saxton's Atlantic
Highly Migratory Species Conservation Act of 2001. I feel this bill
would be very effective in reducing bycatch and allowing currently
overfished stocks of pelagic fish to recover.
Swordfish have been taken commercially off the Northeastern United
States for nearly 200 years. Until longlining started in 1963, all
swordfish landed were harpooned. Longliners set out 40 miles of line
and thousands of baited hooks to catch swordfish while harpooners use
traditional methods. Harpooners pick only mature swordfish that have
spawned at least once. Harpooning is clearly the best way to catch
swordfish
We feel that restricting the use of longlines in the Mid-Atlantic
and the Gulf of Mexico will contribute significantly to the rebuilding
of swordfish stocks and the overall reduction of longline bycatch We
also feel that the compensation program is a fair and reasonable way to
reduce longline effort without leaving fishermen empty handed.
It is my hope that with the passage of Congressman Jim Saxton's
Atlantic Highly Migratory Species Conservation Act of 2001, swordfish
populations will return to the Healthy levels they once were and the
traditional harpoon fishery will rebound as well.
Very truly yours,
Betsy Larsen
______
Mr. Saxton. Mr. Hobbs and then Mr. Panacek. Gear type?
Mr. Hobbs. Yes. We have been discussing potential gear
modifications for several years, and I think that has been one
reason why other measures to address longline bycatch have been
put off, because everybody thinks we can do some gear research
and find a way.
And that may be the case, and we certainly want to do gear
research, but we don't think that we should put off other
management measures that would provide conservation benefits
now while we get a research program in place and work out the
details. It is going to take, probably, several years to
conduct the research.
So it might be several years before we would actually get
any benefits from the research. And in the meantime, we think
we need some conservation measures now, because white marlin
especially are so badly off.
Mr. Saxton. Mr. Panacek?
Mr. Panacek. I would just like to comment quickly on Mr.
Donofrio's statement about the gear is bad.
The longline gear is not bad. For the number of hooks we
set in the mid-Atlantic Bight, bycatch is minimized
tremendously by the right conditions, the water conditions,
whether there are fish there, the temperature, the time of
year, and it is a highly selective, low-volume fishery. They
are looking for a high-quality fish, not a big volume. We
cannot simply go anywhere with our gear and catch highly
migratory species.
Mr. Saxton. This will have to be the last, probably,
question, and whoever wants to respond to, but let me start
with Bob Hayes, because I think he gave me the idea.
Water temperature has a lot to do with what fish are
present at any given time. And I think that is true, and you
are indicating that is true. And if that is true, is it
possible to identify the places where various species that may
be threatened are located and avoid fishing in those areas at
the appropriate time?
Mr. Hayes. actually, I think our colleagues in the
commercial community could tell you exactly where those are,
and what those temperatures are, and at what depth they are,
and I suspect, with a reasonable amount of research, that Gerry
Scott could confirm them. I don't think that is an impossible
exercise.
Mr. Saxton. Anyone else want to comment?
Okay, well, look, I am really sorry that we got started
late because of votes. I am really sorry that we have another
vote now, but that is kind of the way things happen here.
I appreciate you all coming from various parts of the
country, especially from New Jersey. I know there is a very
interested and large delegation here from the New Jersey coast,
and we appreciate all of you being here.
And we will look forward to working with all of you on this
subject as we move forward together. Thank you very much. The
hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
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