[Senate Hearing 107-263]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 107-263
HAS AIRPORT SECURITY IMPROVED?
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
and the
OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT,
RESTRUCTURING, AND THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SUBCOMMITTEE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 14, 2001
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Governmental Affairs
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________________________________________________________________________
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan FRED THOMPSON, Tennessee
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii TED STEVENS, Alaska
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
MAX CLELAND, Georgia PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi
JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah
MARK DAYTON, Minnesota JIM BUNNING, Kentucky
Joyce A. Rechtschaffen, Staff Director and Counsel
Susan E. Propper, Counsel
Hannah S. Sistare, Minority Staff Director and Counsel
Ellen B. Brown, Minority Senior Counsel
Robert J. Shea, Minority Counsel
Darla D. Cassell, Chief Clerk
------
OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, RESTRUCTURING AND THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA SUBCOMMITTEE
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois, Chairman
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey TED STEVENS, Alaska
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico
MARK DAYTON, Minnesota THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi
Marianne Clifford Upton, Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Andrew Richardson, Minority Staff Director
Mason C. Alinger, Minority Professional Staff Member
Julie L. Vincent, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
------
Opening statements:
Page
Senator Lieberman............................................ 1
Senator Thompson............................................. 3
Senator Durbin............................................... 5
Senator Voinovich............................................ 8
Senator Cleland.............................................. 28
Senator Carnahan............................................. 30
Senator Levin................................................ 34
Prepared statements:
Senator Akaka................................................ 59
Senator Bunning.............................................. 59
WITNESSES
Wednesday, November 14, 2001
Hon. Jane F. Garvey, Administrator, Federal Aviation
Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation.............. 10
Hon. Kenneth M. Mead, Inspector General, U.S. Department of
Transportation................................................. 13
Bruce E. Carter, A.A.E., Director of Aviation, Quad City
International Airport.......................................... 37
Marianne McInerney, Executive Director, National Business Travel
Association (NBTA)............................................. 39
Jacqueline Mathes, Flight Attendant, Association of Flight
Attendants, AFL-CIO............................................ 41
Captain Duane E. Woerth, President, Air Line Pilots Association,
International.................................................. 44
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Carter, Bruce E., A.A.E.:
Testimony.................................................... 37
Prepared statement........................................... 87
Garvey, Hon. Jane F.:
Testimony.................................................... 10
Prepared statement........................................... 61
Mathes, Jacqueline:
Testimony.................................................... 41
Prepared statement........................................... 93
Mead, Hon. Kenneth M.:
Testimony.................................................... 13
Prepared statement........................................... 67
McInerney, Marianne:
Testimony.................................................... 39
Prepared statement........................................... 90
Woerth, Captain Duane E.:
Testimony.................................................... 44
Prepared statement........................................... 101
HAS AIRPORT SECURITY IMPROVED?
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WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 2001
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Governmental Affairs, and the
Oversight of Government Management, Restructuring,
and the District of Columbia Subcommittee,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:33 a.m., in
room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I.
Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Lieberman, Durbin, Levin, Cleland,
Carnahan, Thompson, and Voinovich.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN
Chairman Lieberman. Good morning and welcome to this
hearing. Today, the full Committee on Governmental Affairs and
the Oversight of Government Management, Restructuring, and the
District of Columbia Subcommittee, asks the question that I
would guess millions of Americans are asking. Has aviation
security improved since September 11?
The fear and loss of life caused by the attacks that day
have focused an intense and very personal spotlight on the
question of aviation security. Since September 11, the number
of airline passengers has fallen off dramatically.
The crash just this past Monday of American Airlines Flight
587 in New York, of course, has renewed concerns in the minds
of many Americans about the safety of air travel. Our hearts go
out to the families of those who died in that crash even as we
continue to work to find ways to allay concerns about the
security of air travel. If the cause was mechanical, we need to
find out what went wrong and take steps to prevent future
accidents. If it was a terrorist act, of course, we must
urgently redouble our efforts to make our airports and
airplanes more secure.
As one airline executive told the Washington Post, ``While
it is tragic under any circumstance, the impact to the psyche
of the traveling public would be greater if it were a security-
related cause.''
Because its investigation is just beginning, I do not
intend to ask the FAA or other witnesses today questions
directly related to the Monday crash. This hearing was
scheduled well before that incident and is more broadly focused
on the measures that the FAA, the airports, and the airlines
have taken in the wake of the September 11 attacks.
We in Congress began our most recent round of
investigations on airline security immediately after September
11. This Committee held a hearing just about 2 weeks later, on
September 25. The Senate finished work a month later, October
11, on an aviation security bill that makes sweeping changes in
the way that airline and airport security is handled, including
expanding the air marshal program and federalizing passenger
and baggage screening services.
I am very proud that amendments to this bill sponsored by
Senator Durbin and me on the one hand and Senator Thompson on
the other, which emerged from our earlier hearing, were adopted
by the full Senate and are part of the bill and make it
stronger.
The House later passed a very different bill, and as we all
know, the conferees are now at work. I want to plead with the
conferees, our colleagues in both parties from both Houses, to
really stretch to quickly reach an agreement because it will be
truly outrageous if Congress leaves for Thanksgiving without
passing aviation security legislation and sending it to the
President to be signed. It is, after all, now more than 2
months since our aviation system was used by terrorists to
attack us. We have acted very rapidly on a host of other
measures in response to those attacks, including $15 billion of
aid to the airlines. It is long past the time when we should
find common ground and pass this aviation security legislation.
Remember, as Congress also struggles to find similar common
ground on an economic stimulus package for our receding
economy, that aviation security also means economic security
and economic growth. So passage of the aviation security
legislation, I think, both in direct terms and in its
psychological effect, is one of the best things we can do to
help our economy grow again.
But even if enacted today, the changes in the aviation
security legislation would not have an immediate effect. The
focus of this hearing is, therefore, on what has been done,
what is being done, and what should be done to improve aviation
security.
Since September 11, the FAA has issued a series of new
security directives to airports and airlines. Some of them are
familiar to those of us who fly frequently, like the
restrictions against anyone but ticketed passengers in sterile
areas and the conspicuous presence of uniformed National Guard
personnel at screening checkpoints. Other less visible measures
are also being undertaken, such as the use of computer programs
to pre-screen passengers and stepping up security in the ramp
areas.
And consistent with Transportation Secretary Mineta's zero-
tolerance policy, FAA is more willing today to take stronger
actions in response to perceived security breaches, such as
bringing taxi-ing planes back to the gate, evacuating a
concourse, or holding a flight, as has been done on numerous
occasions since September 11, and those are all welcome
developments.
Nonetheless, there continue to be embarrassing and
potentially dangerous lapses in security, the most egregious of
which occurred a week and a half ago with the passenger at
O'Hare National Airport.
Today, we want to explore how such incidents still occur in
spite of the heightened vigilance. We need to ask how unusual
are these incidents. Are there more such incidents today than
there were last year or are we just more aware because of
heightened public and media scrutiny? And bottom line, are
airline passengers safer today than they were on September 11?
We need to question if the new FAA requirements are
stringent enough to deter violence in our skies and if they are
being properly carried out by security personnel on the ground.
How consistently are the orders being implemented across the
Nation? Why, for instance, as we hear, does it seem that random
carry-on baggage checks are standard in some airports but not
in others?
We also want to find out how aggressively airlines are
examining checked baggage. For example, in spite of the fact
that the government has ordered that greater use be made of
explosives detection systems, passengers have reported to us
seeing these machines sitting idle in some airports. In fact,
we will hear from the Department of Transportation's Inspector
General today that a spot check conducted at nine airports
during the past weekend showed that fewer than 30 percent of
the machines are in continuous use. And it turns out that the
American Airlines terminal at Kennedy International Airport,
where Monday's ill-fated flight originated, apparently has no
bomb detection equipment at all. How can that be so?
President Bush's announcement that he will increase the
National Guard presence at airports by 25 percent over the
holidays, as well as expand their duties, is, of course,
welcome, but the Committee and I think a lot of the American
people would like to know more about the National Guard's role
and its effectiveness.
Americans who want to fly ought to be able to look forward
in this season of celebration to celebrating and not to feeling
rampant insecurity. Those are the lines of inquiry that I hope
we are going to pursue today as part of an ongoing oversight
role for this Committee in pursuit of greater aviation
security.
Let me now turn to Senator Thompson, the Ranking Member of
the full Committee.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR THOMPSON
Senator Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
for your leadership in this area, especially in crafting the
bill on the Senate side. I think we will have a bill because we
should, and we oftentimes do what we should do and I think this
is going to be one of those times.
But I want to focus in on one particular aspect of the
discussion. We are hung up right now, apparently on the
question of federalization or non-federalization, and the point
I would like to make is that it is not going to make any
difference as to where we come out on that unless we have
actual people on the ground, screeners and others, doing their
job. So what can we set up to more likely produce a good
situation on the ground?
I think we did something good in the Senate bill. It is not
in the House bill. And I would hope, above all, even above the
Federal/non-Federal discussion, that we wind up with provisions
in there that will clearly set performance goals and measures
and then hold those responsible strictly accountable for
meeting them. I think that is what has been lacking. And
whichever direction we go, surely we can have a provision like
that.
Performance subject to accountability is not yet
institutionalized within the industry as it is in many
industries, but it must be. Where are the incentives for the
top safety executives to ensure that their workforce is up to
this enormous challenge? What drives the head of security at
each airport to guarantee that his or her employees are
trained, rested, and alert? How motivated is each individual
screener to perform his job, knowing that good performance will
be rewarded and poor performance might mean the end of that
job?
Across all levels of this enterprise, accountability has
largely been missing except when the TV cameras are watching.
Instead of merely reacting to each unfortunate discovery of
dangerous items that make it through the screening process onto
an airplane, we must be proactive, making sure that the right
tools are in place from the start. Until each employee has a
clear understanding of what his job is and has a reason to do
it the right way, we will keep playing catch up.
Therefore, we must begin with a comprehensive performance
plan which gives the entire airline security sector a clear
strategic direction. We then must establish performance goals
for all levels of management, not just the screeners, that flow
from the plan, and leave no doubt about what is expected
throughout the organization. Finally, we ought to include
bonuses for superior performance as well as provisions that
allow employees who fail to meet these goals to be suspended or
terminated.
The Senate airline security bill included an amendment that
I drafted to put such a management system in place and I urge
my colleagues to consider the amendment and make that a part of
the law.
We have had a lot of discussion about the upsides and
downsides of federalizing this system, more or less. One of the
main objections to federalizing it, for lack of a better term,
has been that it is so difficult to discipline those who are
found to be not up to the job in the Federal system. The
Federal employee does have a number of appeal rights. In
addition to whatever internal appeal rights might be available
to the employee at his or her agencies, they may also appeal
through the Merit Systems Protection Board and the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission.
I found very interesting a recent review of this appeal
process by the Inspector General of the Railroad Retirement
Board. He said this. Under the current system, Federal
Government management is often reluctant to take necessary
disciplinary action to contest dubious claims filed by
employees. The result is a bureaucracy that accommodates
employees who cannot or will not perform their jobs, because at
times, management is unable to meaningfully and efficiently
deal with the problem and the ensuing burdens of litigation.
Now, that employee may be removed from the specific job while
the appeal process is going on, but this does not do much to
instill accountability.
Now, the Senate bill, I think, addressed this and allowed,
really removed screeners from any of the protections afforded
under Title V. What we did was add on to that. In the first
place, our amendment does not, as you know, does not just apply
to screeners. It applies to every employee hired under the Act.
It requires the Department to prepare a performance plan
setting out goals and objectives necessary to ensure aviation
security and that every employee who is hired must enter into a
performance agreement where they commit to being evaluated
based on their performance and achieving goals related to the
aviation industry. The head of aviation security can take
performance into account when deciding to fire screeners.
So I think it is a responsible approach. You do not want to
just fire people willy-nilly based on somebody's whim. We have
a system here. We have got performance goals. We have got a
system set up to see whether or not people are meeting those
goals and then we have got the opportunity for people to act on
that.
Now, there are certainly other reasons to believe that
federalizing the system is not going to solve all of our
problems, and I do not even want to get into that debate. The
point is, whether you have a Federal system or whether you have
a system where you contract with Federal supervision, this
provision that I just discussed can be placed within either one
of those systems so that we can have some accountability and
some motivation and reward and punishment for the people
actually on the ground doing the job, and that is what we are
going to have to wind up having in order to get this job done.
So I urge that we keep that in mind as we go along. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks very much, Senator Thompson. I
fully support your amendment and I am proud that it emerged, at
least in part, from a hearing we held on September 25, as did
the amendment that the Senate also adopted that Senator Durbin
and I worked on that would expand background checks of airport
personnel, employ more effective passenger and baggage
screening procedures and equipment, and fund some accelerated
research and development of promising new technologies.
Senator Durbin is the Chairman of the Subcommittee who is
co-chairing this hearing and has been a passionate and
persistent advocate for aviation security. Senator Durbin.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DURBIN
Senator Durbin. Thank you, Chairman Lieberman and Senator
Thompson, for this important hearing. It is an opportunity for
us to get an update on what has occurred since September 11 by
way of airport and aviation security.
I am glad that Bruce Carter, who is Director of Aviation at
the Quad City International Airport in Moline, is going to be a
witness later on. He will bring a perspective to this
discussion which is important. And Jacqueline Mathes of
Woodstock, Illinois, representing the flight attendants, will
also be here to share with us some of their feelings on the
front line of the war against terrorism on our airplanes and in
our airports.
Let me say that it is a curious situation that we now
across America are confiscating nail clippers at a time when we
learned that a man got on a plane yesterday with two meat
cleavers in Miami and made it to Chicago through the screening
process. It is odd to me that we are confiscating cuticle
scissors at a time when a man ten days ago was able to get
through the screening check at O'Hare with seven knives, a stun
gun, and a can of mace in his baggage. It is a suggestion to me
that the current system, despite the disaster of September 11
and all of the negative publicity, has been unresponsive.
And the largest private contractor, Argenbright, announced
last Friday that they got the message. Now they understand
there is a problem. Excuse me. This is a death bed conversion.
This company has known since September 11 that this is a
national crisis, and the fact that they have not responded in a
way to create peace of mind across America is an indication to
me that this system is fatally flawed as it currently exists.
I want to commend Senator Thompson for bringing out some of
the specifics of the Senate legislation, which passed on a
bipartisan roll call vote of 100-0. The critics of this
legislation have not considered the specifics, which provide
for, first, no right to strike, and second, the performance
contracts which he referred to which make it clear that if
people are hired under the Senate provision, they can be
dismissed for failure to perform in a professional manner.
That, to me, is an assurance to all the critics of our bill
that we are not creating a bureaucratic nightmare that will
protect people in positions when they are incompetent, and we
have seen clear indication and evidence of incompetence in the
current system.
Allow me to add one other point. Let me concede the
obvious. No matter who wins this debate, whether we federalize
the screeners or keep them in the private sector, there are
bound to be lapses in security in the future. That is going to
happen. But it is our responsibility in Congress to take the
most prudent course and the safest course to try to make
airports and airline travel more predictable and safer for
people across America.
There used to be an old saying, would you buy a used car
from this man? I think when we look at the current system,
American families are saying, would I trust the safety of my
family to the current system, to Argenbright and all of the
other screeners at the airports? And the answer to that
question, unfortunately, is demonstrated by the fact that
people are reluctant to get back on airplanes.
So here we are, weeks after having passed a bill 100-0. It
is now sitting in a conference committee. I hope it is resolved
this week. The people who are against the bill have made it
clear where they are coming from. Mr. DeLay has said he does
not want Federal employees. Mr. Armey has said we cannot have
people joining unions, and that seems to be the motivating
force in opposition to what the Senate has proposed.
Just for the record, let us put in a reminder that those
firefighters, those police officers, those postal employees,
those people who have given their lives on the front line of
the war against terrorism were public employees and members of
unions and we have been very proud of them as Americans. We
have called them our heroes.
Today, we are going to hear from the front line what is
going on across America. I hope that this hearing will be a
motivation for the members of the conference committee to waste
no time. Pass this bill this week. Get it in place, moving
forward. Restore confidence so that people can return to the
airlines and airports. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR DURBIN
Chairman Lieberman, I am pleased to co-chair this important hearing
with you this morning. I commend you for bringing the Committee
together to assess the progress made in securing our national aviation
system since the September 11 attacks.
First, let me express my sympathy to the families of the passengers
and crew of American Airlines Flight 587 and to those who were affected
in Queens, New York.
I would like to take this time to thank our witnesses. In
particular, I want to recognize Bruce Carter, Director of Aviation at
Quad City International Airport in Moline, Illinois. Bruce has a wealth
of aviation and airport management knowledge and has managed a number
of Illinois airports. Quad City International Airport is the third
largest commercial airport in Illinois, enplaning about 400,000 annual
passengers. I look forward to his testimony.
Jacqueline Mathes of Woodstock, Illinois is here representing the
flight attendants. By the way, Jackie is someone I met on an airplane.
She has been a familiar face on United Airlines flights from the
Washington, DC to Chicago, O'Hare market. She will testify as someone
who is on the front lines, both in airports and on board commercial
airplanes.
Mr. Chairman, today's hearing is a follow up to the joint
Subcommittee-Full Committee hearing on September 25. We want to explore
the changes that have been made since September 11 at our nation's
airports, on board airplanes, and within the Federal Government.
This hearing is not designed to point fingers or assign blame. What
has been done? What still needs to be addressed? How effective is the
Federal Government working with state and local governments and private
industry?
Before we move to the witnesses, I'd like to share a few
observations. First, it has been just over 2 months since the September
11 attacks and we still do not have an aviation security bill. This is
inexcusable. The American traveling public should not have to begin the
busy holiday travel season with anything less than the peace-of-mind
that Congress and the Administration have done everything possible to
improve aviation security. This is not the time for partisan politics.
But it's also clear that simple internal reforms at private security
firms, like Argenbright, won't do the trick. If these firms didn't get
the message on September 11, they never will.
In fact, just last night, a 76-year-old chef was being held in
Chicago after he flew from Miami to O'Hare with two meat cleavers in
his carry-on bag. These cleavers were only found when he went to board
another flight. And recently in Boston, a security guard left her post
unattended for several minutes, causing hundreds of passengers to be
cleared from the terminal. While it may be hard to make the case that
this man was a terrorist or that the Boston incident posed an immediate
threat to our national airspace, it is disturbing that these security
breaches continue to happen. Inspector General Mead has noted in his
written testimony that since October 30, approximately 90 incidents
ranging from concourse evacuations to passenger deplaning and
rescreening have occurred. In my opinion, that's 90 too many.
Second, while law enforcement officials and National Guard troops
have been deployed at our nation's airports, we need to do more to
clearly define their roles and ensure that effective communication and
coordination exists.
For example, 2 weeks ago at Chicago O'Hare International Airport, a
27-year-old man with an expired student visa was able to sneak seven
knives, a stun gun, and a can of pepper spray past a security screening
checkpoint and enter the boarding area of a United Airlines flight to
Omaha. He was able to accomplish this despite the fact that screeners
took two knives from him as he initially passed through the screening
checkpoint. His bag was not search and he was not otherwise detained.
When a United employee subjected him to a random search in the boarding
area and these additional weapons were discovered, he was simply
charged with a misdemeanor and sent home. It wasn't until the next day
that the FBI moved to arrest and hold him on more serious charges. And
this was done only after he returned to the airport to claim his bag.
Furthermore, two of his knives were stolen, allegedly by security
screeners who were later fired.
You know something is truly wrong when toe nail clippers are being
confiscated by the thousands yet someone makes it to the gate with an
arsenal of weapons.
The O'Hare incident raises some important questions. What's the
role of local law enforcement at our airports? The role of Federal
agents? The National Guard's function? If it's window dressing,
reassurance, peace-of-mind for jittery travelers, that's great. But,
let's ensure that in addition to a show of force there's also real
coordination and an effective common security strategy.
Let me again put a plug in for seamless security from curbside to
cockpit. I'm anxious to hear of the changes not only on board
commercial airplanes but in our airports--both large and small--since
September 11. While there are certainly specific challenges at O'Hare
or Washington Dulles or at Quad City International Airport, the basic
procedures and effectiveness of overall security should not be any
different in Washington, DC or Moline, Illinois. Afterall, all these
airports are also gateways to the national-international aviation
system and U.S. airspace.
Finally, I want to talk about perimeter security and employee
access to secure areas. Do we know who our airport/airline employees
are and have they been subjected to comprehensive background checks?
Are airport employees required to undergo the same scrutiny as
passengers? I know how it should work, I've read the press releases and
seen the hidden camera investigations, but my question to our witnesses
today--Is it working?
With that Mr. Chairman, I want to welcome our witnesses, including
FAA Administrator Jane Garvey and Inspector General Mead. I thank you
again for co-hosting this hearing with me.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Durbin.
Senator Voinovich is the Ranking Member of the
Subcommittee.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR VOINOVICH
Senator Voinovich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I would
like to thank you and Senator Durbin for calling today's
hearing on aviation security. I think that when you decided to
have this hearing, none of us would have anticipated the recent
tragedy of American Airlines Flight 587 that we had in New York
City. The only consolation there is that preliminarily, at
least, it has not been attributed to terrorism, but that really
does not make me feel any better, particularly if it is through
defective equipment, lack of maintenance, or pilot error that
was the cause of that tragedy.
I think we ought to understand that there is a great deal
of fear and anxiety out there today among the American people,
anxiety and fear that I have never seen before in my almost 35
years in government. People are comforted, Mr. Chairman, by the
fact that they believe the President is doing a good job and is
making his decisions based on what he feels is in the best
interest of the American people, and also because of the fact,
and this came through loud and clear when I visited the Toledo
Post Office 2 weeks ago, that it appears to them that
Republicans and Democrats in Congress are working together and
putting aside partisan politics for the betterment of the
people of this country.
I also would like to let you know that I was encouraged
that when I met with the postal workers I learned that what we
heard from the Postmaster General and the union leaders that
cooperation has filtered down to the rank and file front line
workers in our domestic war against terrorism. I made it very
clear to them that we are going to do everything that we can to
help them, to make sure that they are secure in their jobs,
because we knew that if they are secure in their jobs and the
mail is secure, that the American people would feel secure
about their postal delivery and that would help lessen this
tension that we have today out there in our country.
I have seen a large increase in the security at airports
that I travel to, and I think members of Congress know more
about this maybe than anyone else because we travel so often. I
wish that Congress had worked and moved quickly to pass
legislation to increase airport security. The fact of the
matter is that the President is right. We need to get that
legislation passed before we go home for Thanksgiving, period.
I want to say to Ms. Garvey that I have seen an improvement
in it, and I know there are the stories of the meat cleavers
and the rest of it. I am most concerned about the inconsistency
in enforcement.
For example, I was flying out of Boston. I have a little
screwdriver that I use to tighten the frames of my glasses so
that the glass does not come out. It was confiscated. Now, that
was the first time. I have had that in there time and time
again.
The other thing that bothers me is the inconsistency when
they check the luggage and how they go about doing it. There
doesn't seem to be any kind of standards that are involved.
One thing that you and I have talked about is that when I
travel within 24 hours of purchasing a ticket, I have my bags
checked. I do not know whether you have experienced that or
not, but I have almost every time now that I have traveled,
because my ticket is usually purchased within 24 hours. I get
stopped as a result of that. Last week in Boston, twice I spent
15 minutes having my bags checked.
Senator Thompson. You are suspicious looking.
Senator Voinovich. I am suspicious. A member of the U.S.
Congress, they knew it and so on and so forth, but spent all of
that time with me, and you wonder to yourself, again, is this a
mindless type of operation? I do not mind the time. That is
fine. But it seems to me that it is ridiculous that you take
all this time with members of Congress when there are greater
risks.
So there is a real problem there, and whatever kind of
legislation that passes, I agree with Senator Thompson that you
have to do a really good job in improving the standards so that
there is consistency across the country, so when I travel from
Columbus or Cleveland or wherever I am traveling from, that I
can see that it is uniform across the board.
It seems to me that we ought to be able to pass some type
of hybrid legislation. If you do not want to federalize it,
then maybe there is another solution. I would be interested in
hearing your opinion today. If government set the standards,
could we allow some private companies to do the job and then
maybe federalize those that are not getting the job done? But
there has got to be a way of getting this thing done now and
not have it drag on.
I agree with Senator Durbin that to argue that we ought not
to federalize this function because these people are going to
join the union is ridiculous. I think one of the reasons why
people want, perhaps, to federalize this is because they trust
their police department, they trust their sheriffs, they trust
their fire departments. I have high regard for those employees.
They have done a good job, and I think that if we federalize
this, they would do an outstanding job. Now, if we cannot get
an agreement on doing that, let us get on with something.
But we certainly should not demean the people who are doing
an outstanding job, we have seen it, have we not, what they
have been able to do in New York and in Arlington and right
across the country. I am very proud of them.
So I am anxious to hear what you have to say. What are your
observations? Has security improved? Do you see the traveling
public coming back?
One other thing that you need to understand is that not
only is this important for our personal safety, but this has
had a devastating impact on the economy of the United States of
America. A couple of weeks ago, I had breakfast with Alan
Greenspan and I said, what is the first thing that you would do
to get the economy off the ground? He said, get the planes in
the air, No. 1. It is having a terrible impact right across
this country today.
So this is important not only to the security of the
traveling public and the national security, but, by golly, this
is important to the economy of this country and it really needs
a boost today because it is tumbling. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Voinovich. I was
thinking as you were talking, I have had my baggage opened and
searched three or four times in the last couple of months and
one constructive result of that I have found is that it brings
great pleasure to my fellow airline passengers who watch this
happening to me, so that is a good result. [Laughter.]
We will go now to our two witnesses, and I welcome them
with thanks for their time and the leadership they have given
in a very difficult period of time.
We will begin with the Hon. Jane Garvey, Administrator of
the Federal Aviation Administration.
TESTIMONY OF HON. JANE F. GARVEY,\1\ ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL
AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Ms. Garvey. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Senator Thompson,
Members of the Committee. I appreciate very much the
opportunity to be with you this morning to discuss the steps
taken in the aftermath of September 11.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Ms. Garvey appears in the Appendix on
page 61.
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Before I begin my remarks, I would like to offer a few
words on the recent crash of American Airlines Flight 587.
Certainly, Mr. Chairman, I join with you in saying that our
thoughts and prayers are with the families of the victims of
this tragedy and also with the people of New York, who have
suffered a great deal since September 11.
The National Transportation Safety Board is leading the
investigation, and while it may be too early to theorize on the
causes of the crash, as Members of the Committee have
indicated, certainly the early signs lead us to believe that
this was a tragic accident. The FAA will support the NTSB and
lend whatever expertise is necessary, and I am confident that,
in the end, a cause to this accident will be determined.
What I would like to do this morning is to address two
critical issues. First, the security measures that we have put
in place since September 11, and second, the areas where we
will focus on in the coming days and weeks ahead.
The approach that we have taken has had one guiding
principle and that is to put in place layers of security, a
series of redundancies to significantly increase the security
throughout the Nation's aviation system. There is a recognition
that there is no one single solution, no one single approach
that will provide the complete answer. Rather, it is a layered
approach using various procedures and various technologies.
I know a number of you have mentioned some of the measures
that are in place, but I will just highlight a few. One calls
for the airlines to reinforce the cockpit doors, and I am very
pleased to report that the major airlines have completed that
work--that is good news--with a lot of support, by the way,
from Congress in terms of financial support in that area.
Chairman Lieberman. So that all the cockpit doors----
Ms. Garvey. For all the commercial aircraft, that is about
4,000, that is 100 percent complete.
Chairman Lieberman. All done?
Ms. Garvey. All done.
Chairman Lieberman. Great.
Ms. Garvey. The regional airlines are making progress, as
well. They are not fully complete yet, but making good
progress. So that is good news.
We have significantly increased the number of Federal air
marshals, again, with enormous support from Congress. We could
not have done that without Congress's help.
We are calling for more random searches throughout the
airports. We are requiring positive identification for all
passengers before they board. We are reducing the number of
access points to secure areas and we are increasing the use of
explosives detection.
I want to make a comment about the use of explosives
detection systems, because the IG and I have talked a great
deal about that. We are not where we want to be. We are calling
for continuous use. We know we need to keep on the airlines to
make sure that those are being used continuously. We have seen
an increase of about 30 percent, but we are not there yet and
we know that is a focus for us.
We are also requiring that all airports and airline
employees with access to the secured areas have their IDs
reissued, undergo background checks, and are compared to
``watch lists.''
We have also increased the number of uniformed security at
our Nation's airports. One of the most visible aspects, as you
have mentioned, is the deployment of the National Guard. Last
week, the President announced a 25 percent increase in the
numbers of National Guard troops deployed at the airports. I
want to just mention that the increase really came about as a
result of requests from governors, and from members of Congress
who said that we need more of them but we need to use them in
different places, not just at the checkpoint areas. So we have
expanded their mission. They will be patrolling the perimeters
of the airports. They will be used on the ramps. They will be
used in other locations in addition to the checkpoint areas.
In addition, as you have mentioned, we are taking swift and
immediate enforcement of all the security directives at the
Nation's airports. That was a real concern for Secretary
Mineta. When there are lapses or other deficiencies,
rescreening of passengers and baggage is ordered. In many
instances, this has resulted in closing gate concourses and
emptying planes so that passengers or baggage can be
rescreened.
In order to prepare for the holiday travel season ahead, we
are hiring an additional 225 people to augment our special
agent workforce. I want to mention that many of these
individuals have security backgrounds. They are, as a matter of
fact, a number of them laid-off airline employees and we are
going to use them to augment the work that our special forces
are doing.
Each of these steps, I believe, represent the right
measures, but they are not the only measure. In the days and
weeks ahead, there are several areas that we will continue to
be very focused on. One is to make sure that the security
directives are implemented and that they are implemented
consistently. You have raised that as an issue and I would be
happy to talk about that more in questions and answers.
Second, we have got to be ready when we transition to a new
agency. We know we are going to restructure screening. We know
it is probably going to be a new agency. How that transition
takes place is taking a great deal of our time. We have
listened carefully to the debate in Congress. We have got
screening performance measures that are ready, and that will be
put in place, and training packages that are ready no matter
what the structure is. So we want to be able to transfer that
and be able to turn that over to a new agency.
Focusing on technology. We are ordering more EDS equipment
and getting that out to the airports. I will tell you, if it is
manufactured and ready to go, we are going to be ready to get
it out there. We have received, as you can well imagine,
hundreds of proposals on technology and we have assembled a
very expert team of outside folks who are helping us evaluate
those proposals. We expect the first report by the end of this
month and I am looking forward to that.
We are continuing to ramp up on the Federal air marshal
program. We are bringing back former Federal air marshals, and
retired Secret Service agents who can help us in the training
that is needed. It is a very aggressive program and we are
working very hard on that.
We are developing and see a real need for a shared database
among all Federal agencies, including the intelligence
agencies, and I am particularly encouraged by the leadership of
Governor Ridge and the Homeland Security Office in this area.
And finally, I just want to mention that we have received
some wonderful recommendations from the flight crews. We spent
some time on Sunday with some of the flight attendants. We will
be spending some time this afternoon with the pilots. There are
some recommendations that they have that we have already put in
place, but others that we have not yet acted on. I think we
need to consider those and move forward on those very quickly.
Our goal must be an integrated and seamless security web,
one that leads to 100 percent screening of all passengers,
baggage, and airport and airline employees. I certainly look
forward to working with Congress to achieve that goal and I
would be happy to answer any questions that may arise in the
discussion today. Thank you very much.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Ms. Garvey.
Now we are very happy to have back with us, and thank him
for his continuing good work, the Hon. Kenneth Mead, who is the
Inspector General of the Department of Transportation. Mr.
Mead.
TESTIMONY OF HON. KENNETH M. MEAD,\1\ INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Mr. Mead. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to be
here with Administrator Garvey again. I would like to commend
the Committee for its persistent and comprehensive oversight of
this subject.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Mead appears in the Appendix on
page 67.
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It is difficult to believe that roughly 80 days ago, the
main debate in the aviation community was the need to lay more
runways, put out more concrete, and deal with congestion and
capacity. How times have changed.
What I would like to do today is focus on improvements that
have been made since September 11, and, of course, improvements
that still need to be made.
The observations of our auditors and investigators across
the country are that security is noticeably tighter, as I think
most of you would acknowledge. That is not just a statement to
help restore confidence. That is a fact. We are not nearly
where we ought to be, but it is our judgment that the
Department has been moving very forcefully in the right
direction, and fairly quickly, if you stop and think about the
changes that have occurred in the past 60 days.
I would add to what you say about the aviation security
legislation. This is not just any piece of legislation dealing
with a passing issue or dealing around the edges. This
legislation deals with very fundamental changes. The measures
we are speaking of today are a temporary patchwork quilt, and I
think the legislation will put the fundamental changes in place
and give a more systemic approach to it, particularly with the
points that Senators Lieberman, Thompson, and Durbin made about
the amendments that were offered. I think the performance
measures that Senator Thompson mentioned represent an area that
is ripe for that type of application.
Everybody has mentioned so far today a number of the
different security improvements. I would just like to list ten
that our auditors and investigators think are making a
difference.
Watch lists and intelligence sharing. Perhaps we do not see
100 percent improvement compared to pre-September 11, but it is
pretty close.
Intensified passenger and carry-on baggage screening,
including secondary screening at the gate. Despite the
imperfections, it has been beefed up.
Limiting access beyond the screening checkpoints to
passengers with tickets.
Greater use of explosives detection machines for checked
baggage.
Revalidating airport IDs.
Increasing the law enforcement presence.
Expanding the Federal Air Marshal program.
Deploying Guard troops.
Reinforcing cockpit doors.
Banning cargo from unknown shippers, a fairly substantial
list.
Despite those measures, Mr. Chairman, there are still
alarming lapses of security and some systemic vulnerabilities
that we think need to be addressed. You may know that the
President, the Secretary, and the Attorney General called on
the Inspector General to assist in the oversight of airport and
aircraft security, most recently Friday in his news conference.
He has instructed us to conduct undercover audits at airports
nationwide, and I want you to know that our teams will be in
place before the Thanksgiving weekend and we will be conducting
a variety of unannounced tests nationwide.
I would like to say a word about Secretary Mineta's zero-
tolerance policy, which he announced on October 30. If security
lapses are found, the Secretary authorizes concourses to be
evacuated, passengers rescreened, and flights halted, if
necessary. This is really in the best interests of aviation
security. It shows that there will be consequences when there
is a compromise of security and noncompliance with the rules.
It also demonstrates to air carriers and screening companies
that it is more cost effective and efficient to do it right the
first time.
In implementing the zero-tolerance policy, our office and
FAA have found instances where the air carriers were not
continuously using the explosives detection systems to check
baggage. Staff at screening points were frequently not
identifying dangerous items in carry-on baggage. And air
carriers were not randomly screening passengers before boarding
aircraft. These are not the general rule, but they are
instances that we noted and we need to do away with those
instances.
Actions taken by FAA included the de-planing of the
aircraft, evacuating a concourse, halting flights, and
rescreening passengers. There have been about 90 incidents
across the country that have necessitated that type of action.
I would like to turn now to five action areas that I would
recommend we pay attention to in the near term, and this will
be the case when that legislation passes, as well.
First on my list is ensuring that the air carriers maximize
the use of bulk explosives detection machines for screening of
checked baggage. During our observations this past week, most
carriers were not selecting enough passengers to supply the
machines with a constant stream of bags. These machines are
still underutilized, yet we found one carrier who was trying to
make sure that every bag went through the explosives detection
machines. So it is that inconsistency that you were referring
to earlier, Senator Voinovich.
We also observed instances where the explosives detection
machines were not adequately staffed or the staff had been
working extremely long hours on the machine--in one instance,
15 to 20 hours. In our opinion, that screener was no longer
alert. In that instance, due to the lack of available staff,
the machine was shut down.
FAA needs to issue a rule or order on screening checked
baggage and set a minimum usage level on the number of bags
screened. The current guidance of ``continual use of the
machine'' is too vague. I think we ought to be, on average,
requiring the screening of 125 to 150 bags per hour. These
machines are certified to do 225, and I think that is about the
only way to ensure continuous use. If there were 125 bags
available, we ought to be requiring that many, on average, per
hour.
They need to work towards 100 percent screening of checked
baggage and cargo, but I would like the Committee to know that
the present approach of putting these machines in lobbies of
airports is not the way that you will ever get there. The
machines will have to be integrated into the baggage systems of
the carriers, which is going to require some construction in
the basements of the terminal buildings and so forth. But just
putting the machines around the lobbies will result in an
inefficient process. I do not care how many machines we come up
with, it is like running the bags through a baggage system
twice, once through the security machine, then once through the
regular baggage system.
The second area is issue the final rule on certification of
screening companies to improve the screening of passengers,
baggage, and cargo. The rules for this should have been out in
March 1999. FAA was prepared to issue them on September 10. I
think they are still on hold, pending recommendations of the
Secretary's rapid response teams. Once issued, though, those
rules will serve as a baseline for performance, which is
exactly what Senator Thompson is referring to. Whether
screeners are Federal employees, contract employees, or some
mix of the two, you are going to need performance standards no
matter what. And if the screeners, be they Federal or contract
people, will not perform and meet those standards, they ought
to be terminated.
The third area is strengthening controls to prevent access
to secure areas of the airport by unauthorized individuals. We
will be doing testing in this area over the next several weeks.
Testing in the past, before September 11, showed weaknesses.
Since September 11, FAA has closed a lot of the access points
to the secured areas (by secured area, I am referring to access
to the runway area or to aircraft).
The fourth area is criminal history checks for everybody,
meaning all employees of all airports, not just new employees
at the top 20 Category X airports. I think there is a rule
about to come out from FAA on that particular subject.
And finally, cargo security. We recently completed a
follow-up audit of FAA's cargo security program and briefed FAA
on our results. FAA took action to strengthen that program
since September 11. I cannot go into all the details here, but
basically, they no longer allow people that are known as
``unknown shippers'' to ship cargo.
We think additional action is needed for a group of people
called ``indirect air carriers.'' Essentially, an indirect air
carrier is a freight forwarder that is known to FAA and gets
freight and packages from other people, consolidates the
shipment, and then puts it into stream of commerce into the
cargo bays of aircraft. So that is one area where I think
additional attention is needed.
I would just like to close by saying that it is very
noteworthy that the Senate bill has a reference in it to the
Government Performance and Results Act, which had its origins,
I believe, in this Committee----
Chairman Lieberman. That is right.
Mr. Mead [continuing]. And its companion committee on the
House side. This is an opportunity for the real world
application of that statute. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks very much, Mr. Mead.
We will begin the questioning now and we will give a few
extra moments to our colleagues who did not make opening
statements so they can do that during their time for
questioning.
Mr. Mead, I particularly appreciate your focus on the bomb
scanning machinery. Because of the unevenness here and your
previous statement on the House side that I have read earlier
in October, it struck me, particularly the part that the FAA's
goal, which is to screen 100 percent of the checked baggage,
seems like, obviously, a worthy goal, but at that time, it was
not going to be fully phased in until 2009. Mr. Mead, you
testified in the House that the goal assumes the replacement of
all machines deployed through 2006 with a faster, cheaper
technology.
So my question is, does this mean that the goal of 100
percent screening cannot be achieved with current technology,
and obviously more urgently, my question both to Mr. Mead and
Ms. Garvey is, how can we speed up that process now so that
well before 8 years from now, we have 100 percent screening of
checked baggage?
Mr. Mead. Well, I would counsel moving out on two fronts.
First, you are not going to get there overnight, although it
would be nice to get there overnight. In our opinion, going to
100 percent screening of checked baggage, it would be
appropriate to set a statutory target of 2004.
In the meantime, we have all these machines we have already
purchased. We still have them in line and they are still being
produced, so we want to put them in the lobbies and get them
used while we are transitioning to 100 percent checked baggage.
I alluded to what, in our opinion, was required to accomplish
that: The FAA needs to come up with a rule, and it needs to
enforce how many bags will go through screening.
As to going to the 100 percent, there are different
approaches in terms of what machines to get, but in all
scenarios, you will have to put the machine in line with the
regular baggage system. That will require a lot of work at the
nearly 400 commercial airports around the country.
There is one construct where you use two machines and you
put them in the baggage line. The first machine does sort of a
pre-screen and has a rapid flow-through.
Chairman Lieberman. Do these machines screen just for
explosives or do they also screen for weapons of other kinds?
Mr. Mead. The machines automatically detect explosives, but
they also detect metal objects such as guns and knives.
Chairman Lieberman. Let me get Ms. Garvey in here and ask,
just for information, is there any screening of checked baggage
for other dangerous material, weapons, for instance, that might
be in the baggage?
Ms. Garvey. Explosives really are the focus for the EDS
machines. Just to pick up a little bit on what Mr. Mead said, I
think there are three issues in terms of meeting a more
aggressive schedule. One is funding, and a steady stream of
funding. The second is site preparation, because these are very
heavy machines. You have to often reinforce the floors, etc.
Mr. Mead spoke about retrofitting that may need to be done. And
the third is what the manufacturers actually can produce.
Congress has answered the first question extraordinarily
well. I mean, the funding seems to be there, and from all
indications of what we have heard, it is going to be there.
Chairman Lieberman. That is true. In our amendment, we did
include authorization to use monies from the Airport
Improvement Program----
Ms. Garvey. That is right.
Chairman Lieberman [continuing]. For the acquisition and
conversion of locations for these bomb scanning devices.
Ms. Garvey. Yes. And in terms of site preparation, we have
laid out where we think they need to go, where the next most
critical machines will be needed. There is some site
preparation and work that needs to be done, but I think
airports are poised and ready with us to move very quickly in
that area.
The third is probably the most challenging of all, and that
is what can the manufacturers produce. There are currently two
manufacturers that are certified. One has machines that are
very well accepted by the airline community and they are
certainly being used and out there. But how many those two
companies can actually get into production is a challenge. They
have said they will ramp up. They have said they can meet a
schedule that would be much closer to 2004. I know yesterday,
Secretary Mineta met with one of the manufacturing companies
and was really challenging them to see if there were other ways
that we could----
Chairman Lieberman. A way to do it sooner. So right now,
the earliest we are going to get 100 percent screening will be
2004?
Ms. Garvey. If we look at what the manufacturers are
currently saying. But again, we will deploy them as quickly as
they come out. We are ordering them even in anticipation of the
money.
Chairman Lieberman. What percentage do you think we are at
now? In other words, what percentage of baggage or flights are
now covered by bomb detection equipment?
Ms. Garvey. That is a question that it probably would be
best to get back to.
Chairman Lieberman. Fine.
Ms. Garvey. I know it is certainly significantly higher
since September 11 because we have required air carriers to
apply CAPPS to all passengers, so that means the number is
higher.
Mr. Mead. You are not close to a double-digit number. You
are not close.
Chairman Lieberman. We are in single digits as to what
percentage of baggage checked on the planes is screened for
bomb detection?
Mr. Mead. Yes, sir.
Chairman Lieberman. That is really stunning. I did not
realize it was that low. Let me ask, then, what the current
requirement--for instance, I was quite surprised to see in the
news coverage of the accident on Monday that American Airlines
terminal at JFK has no bomb scanning equipment. Are they not
required to have any?
Ms. Garvey. There are EDS machines at most of, and again, I
am reluctant to give a lot of the numbers, but most of the
larger Category X airports. There are machines in those
airports. The challenge in a place like JFK is, was it at the
exact American checkpoint location. So that is one of the
challenges.
Chairman Lieberman. Is there any requirement on the
airlines now?
Ms. Garvey. We have a rule that was ready to go right
before September 11, but frankly, it was geared towards a much
later date for having EDS machines screen 100 percent of
checked baggage. We obviously are revisiting that, and the
question of whether it is 2004 or can be even sooner is
critical. But it is definitely a requirement that I think the
airlines and the public is anticipating.
Chairman Lieberman. My time is up, but how long have we had
any requirement for the bomb detection equipment?
Ms. Garvey. We have had it in place----
Chairman Lieberman. Because it is a long time, obviously,
since planes were exploding, going back to the 1970's for fear
of bombs on the planes.
Ms. Garvey. Lockerbie and then the concern over TWA really,
I think, generated the----
Chairman Lieberman. Lockerbie, I guess, was 1988, I think.
Ms. Garvey. I cannot remember the time, Lockerbie.
Chairman Lieberman. Late 1988, I believe that is right. Is
that when the requirement began?
Ms. Garvey. I think TWA generated the most interest in
really getting the equipment out there. A lot of the equipment
has been around about 10 years.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes. I mean, this is another classic
example of how we all sort of pull back after the initial
period following what we suspected and in one case certainly
knew was a terrorist attack on a plane. We pulled back from
pushing to require the airlines to put this equipment on board,
and obviously we cannot let that happen anymore.
Mr. Mead. No. That is another reason why this legislation
is so urgent, because under the current construct, it is
discretionary with the airline whether it accepts a machine or
not.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Mead. The corollary to that is one reason why there has
also been resistance to a mandatory figure on how many bags
ought to be put through the machine.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes. My last word here, but bottom
line, that is another indication that security for the airlines
for too long has been just another cost of doing business. In
other words, it has not been isolated as a priority. I say that
respectfully. So if you are pressing to produce a good
quarterly report for your shareholders, unfortunately, that is
going to be one item that is going to fall down on your
priority list unless you are required by law or regulation to
do it, and that is why I think the Senate bill moves in this
and other ways in the right direction.
I am sorry I took a little extra time. Senator Thompson.
Senator Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know, it
seems to me that what is happening in the airline industry and
what is happening with the Department of Transportation is
indicative of what is happening throughout the entire
government, two things. One, we are improving our planning, and
two, we are getting worse in our performance.
If you look at the Department of Transportation, I think
you would have agreed--we on this Committee who look at all
these things--that the Department of Transportation has some of
the best outcome-oriented goals in terms of the goals that they
set forth as required by the Results Act, GPRA, that you
mentioned, Mr. Mead, really good goals as to what we need to
accomplish. But yet we see in terms of the screeners, for
example, the results have been getting worse for a decade, have
they not?
Mr. Mead. Yes.
Senator Thompson. And with all due respect to the
compromise I understand that is being attempted, the results
for the smaller airports are worse than the results for the
bigger airports, are they not? I think I recall that. Somebody
is shaking their head affirmatively back there. We will take
their word for it. [Laughter.]
But I think the record indicates--I mean, I was struck by
that when I looked. It has been a little while since I looked
at that, but I think you will find that that is the case.
And the Department of Transportation is quite candid in its
report of the year 2000 results. It says DOT did not meet this
year's performance targets. Then you look to see what they are
doing. Well, they purchased new machines, awarded new contracts
for baggage checks, awarded grants, and conducted regional
assessments. Somebody has got to follow through in order to get
the job done. You can have good plans, good goals, and so
forth, but when you are not meeting those goals, you do not
just come back next year and say, we did not meet them again,
which is what we do up here. We watch this all the time in
every department.
There are no consequences to bad performance anywhere.
Usually, you get some kind of a budget increase. We do not do
it, but they go before the Appropriations Committee and there
is no tie-in between performance and budgeting.
So, clearly, now we have got an absolute disaster on our
hands, so maybe this is, Mr. Mead, as you say, a way to get the
foot in the door and maybe it will not take disasters in every
department in government to make some progress here. But how do
we move from having good goals and good intentions and good
ideas, and between the two of you, you have laid out an
additional 30 or 40, probably, things we need to do, but what
happens when we do not do it? All of these terrible things that
have happened in the last few days in terms of the meat
cleavers and the mace cans and all violated some rules. We had
the rules in the charge of companies that have been cited time
and time again, fined in some cases time and time again.
I guess I am touting my own pet horse here again, but
clearly, is it not clear that we have got to have some
consequences for bad performance? Somebody has got to take
responsibility. Somebody has got to hold the right people
accountable. Some people need to be promoted and rewarded and
some people need to be fired and some people need to be fined.
Mr. Mead, getting to that point, we see where some of these
security firms have been fined, some airlines have been fined
and so forth, but I am wondering in terms of aviation security
and passenger security, we all want to get along and say nice
things about each other here, but accountability has got to go
all the way to the top. How is the FAA doing? I know they are
doing better. We are all doing better since September. But over
a period of time, in terms of their relationship to the
airlines and so forth, in terms of watching the planning go up
and the performance go down, what is your assessment of the FAA
as they try to get a handle on this?
They point out in the report some of these things do not
look as good after the fact, but this report in March 2001 FAA
puts out said we have got to take into account the speed of
processing passengers and baggage through screening checkpoints
and other security measures must improve to accommodate the
rapid growth in passenger traffic. So before September 11, one
of the things we were concerned about, passenger traffic is
picking up. We have got to speed up. And these challenges must
be met while protecting civil liberties. Well, we are all
concerned about that. But those were the kinds of things that
were on our mind before September 11, and rightfully so.
But in terms of priorities and in terms of accountability,
what has the FAA been doing with regard to all of this? We hear
that sometimes the airline industry has too much influence. We
know they are all in trouble financially. Nobody wants to
unduly burden anyone. We also hear that sometimes they get
caught in negligent conduct and it takes forever to process a
claim and they continue on with the same practices while they
get their lobbyists to come up here and talk to us and the FAA
and everyone else.
Straighten us out a little bit about that. What is your
candid observation over the years as to what has been going on
there?
Mr. Mead. I think the Senate and House bills both have it
right on the security function per se. It is a tall order for
FAA, whose principal mission is the safety of aircraft, safety
of air crews, and running the air traffic system. FAA is not
fundamentally a security agency. I think there are a lot of
competing missions there, and that is why I think it is a good
idea that you have an entity that is dedicated to, focused on
security, where they do not have to balance and juggle and all
these other competing values.
Second, last year, our office with the Justice Department
did pursue the case against one of the security firms, the one
that got a $1 million fine plea, criminal plea agreement. At
the time that case came out, it got very little attention here
in the Congress, frankly, in the Department, or even in the
news media. Certainly in Philadelphia, it got pretty extensive
coverage. Now, I would wager that 90 percent of the Congress is
aware of that case, maybe 100 percent.
So, with all respect, I think it is important that Congress
take issues like this Government Performance and Results Act
and have hearings on it, on the important things. It keeps the
pressure on, keeps the focus on the important issues.
And finally, the airlines have been subjected to fines for
security violations, but I think they have been the cost of
doing business. When we go to this new system, I believe we are
going to have to be very firm. When people do not perform,
there have to be consequences, as you say, and sometimes it
takes a wake-up call like September 11 for people to realize we
have to really be firm here.
Senator Thompson. My time is up, but is what you are
saying, the FAA is not established or set up or equipped to
crack the whip in terms of security? Ms. Garvey may want to, of
course, comment on that, too.
Mr. Mead. I will defer to Administrator Garvey.
Ms. Garvey. Well, I think, Senator, the role that we have
played in terms of the screening companies is essentially
through the airlines. The airlines hire the screening company,
and frankly, from my perspective, one of the most frustrating
elements since September 11, in particular, is to see those
violations and know that legally, the only immediate things
that we can do are to close a concourse, or close down the
operation. You hate to do that for passengers. People are
traveling. You want to serve customers and serve the public.
But we can close the concourse, take an immediate action, and
we have the ability to fine. We have fined in ever single case.
But, as Mr. Mead has suggested, to some degree, that is the
cost of doing business.
So the direct Federal control and management to be able to
do just exactly what you are saying, set the standards and then
take the right action, set the pay level, and put training
programs in place. We, meaning DOT, the FAA or, more
appropriately, another agency can do all of that. I think it
does make sense, as Mr. Mead has suggested, to have an agency
who has a single combination of security and law enforcement
ability.
But I think we have taken the law as far as we can. We have
put the civil penalties in place. If it is a safety action, by
the way, and a civil penalty has to be levied, even with due
process, you can keep something shut down until that due
process continues. If it is not a safety action and we feel it
has been corrected, then it does have to go through the due
process, but it can be a very frustrating and long process, as
you have suggested.
Senator Thompson. Thank you very much.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Thompson. Senator
Durbin.
Senator Durbin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, I want to thank Ms. Garvey and Mr. Mead for being
here. You have done a great job since September 11 in your
capacity at FAA and as Inspector General in helping us to
understand the problem and to address it.
Ms. Garvey, when I met with pilots and flight attendants in
Chicago, Illinois, shortly after September 11, one of the
things they brought to my attention was the lack of dialogue
between the FAA and the pilots and flight attendants who were
on the planes and clearly on the front line when we talk about
safety in the air. Has that changed?
Ms. Garvey. I think it has changed very definitely. As a
matter of fact, as a result of our conversation, we have had a
couple of meetings that have occurred since that time. In
addition, as I mentioned, we have received some very specific
suggestions from the flight crews. Some, we have implemented.
Some, I think we really need to have even more discussions and
move out on.
The unions have also suggested, which I think is an
excellent suggestion, naming representatives from their
organizations that we can work with on a regular basis as we
move forward with some of these initiatives. I mentioned
earlier we have a meeting this afternoon with one of the
pilots' unions that we have not had a chance to meet with and I
am looking forward to that and know there will be lots of other
discussions, as well.
Senator Durbin. Thank you.
Mr. Mead, when you talked about the people who were
operating the detection devices for explosives and baggage and
working 15 to 20 hours, like the screeners, are these also
airline or contract employees of airlines?
Mr. Mead. Yes, sir, contract employees.
Senator Durbin. Let me raise an observation based on an
experience of a television station in Chicago. This television
station, the FOX station, sent one of their reporters to the
Argenbright training course. Several things occurred during the
course of her training which really raised some serious
questions.
First, they did a background check, but they did not
complete the background check until she had gone through
training. I do not think you have to go to the FBI Academy to
understand that is backwards. You would not want to put someone
through training who is a security risk so that they understand
how to defeat the system. That is exactly how Argenbright was
doing it.
Second, if I am not mistaken, the FAA rules require 12
hours of training for these screening employees at the current
time. That is being debated as to changes. Several hours of the
12 hours of training were spent on appearance and dress, as
well as trying to interest these prospective employees in
buying insurance policies and bail bond cards. That does not
strike me as really directed to the question of airline and
airport security.
This young woman came back from the experience and said
that she felt that they were woefully unprepared to take on the
responsibilities at the screening station. All of these things
occurred long after September 11. At the time, Argenbright had
been paying $6.75 an hour. I think they are up to $10 an hour
at O'Hare, but still, we find all of these lapses.
If you have the power to put the rules in place to make
this training meaningful--Mr. Mead has raised the question in
his testimony--why has the FAA not done that?
Ms. Garvey. That is a very fair question and one we have
looked at and asked ourselves since September 11. First of all,
the rule was ready last March, and as I think I have had a
chance to say to some of you, we had actually scheduled
something with the Secretary on September 21 because it was a
rule that was very important to him.
But one of the considerations for us right now is really
seeing what is going to come out of the legislation. For
example, we may not need a rule. We may be able to do these
things without putting a rule in place, but just do them as the
Federal Government. For example, we would not need a rule to
establish the right kind of training. We could just do it.
So we have got it ready. We are ready to go. Again, I think
it speaks to the urgency and the importance of this
legislation.
Senator Durbin. Let me go to another aspect and that is
background checks and let me ask you where we are today. Have
we done background checks and reissued identification to all
employees that have access to ramp as well as to any aspect of
the airplane?
Ms. Garvey. Well, right after September 11, Senator, we did
require that the airlines and airports revalidate all of their
badges, issue new badges if they needed to. We required that of
both the airlines and the airports. We also asked them to match
their employees against the watch list, and they are doing that
on a continual basis because the watch list has changed several
times since September 11, as you would expect.
But we are also, as the Inspector General indicated,
getting ready to issue a rule within the next day or so, really
within the next couple of days, to require criminal background
checks of all of those people who are within the secured area.
Congress, in 2000, passed legislation that allowed us to do
that at Category X large airports for new hires. We are sort of
pushing that a little bit further and requiring it for all
employees, not just the new hires, and also we will be
expanding that to the smaller airports. We understand from the
smaller airports, they are eager to take this on.
Senator Durbin. So currently, we do not have a background
check mandated on all employees who have access to the
airplane, on the ramp or otherwise?
Ms. Garvey. For the large airports, the legislation called
for year 2000, right, and 2003 for the smaller ones.
Senator Durbin. So it is only at the smaller airports where
the criminal background checks are not taking place?
Ms. Garvey. We are pushing for the new hires, that is
correct. It is only new hires, I want to be clear about that.
What our rule would contemplate is expanding that to not just
the new hires, but be all employees who have access to that
secure area.
Senator Durbin. Do you have any knowledge as to the cost of
these explosives detection devices that we have talked about?
Ms. Garvey. Senator, they are about $1 million a machine. I
will say that we are testing and looking right now at a machine
that is smaller that would probably be more appropriate for
some of the smaller and mid-size airports, and while it is
still just in development stage, that may be a machine that
would cost less than $1 million.
Senator Durbin. Any idea of its cost?
Ms. Garvey. I think they are anticipating it would be about
$300,000 to $500,000.
Senator Durbin. Thank you. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks very much, Senator Durbin.
Ms. Garvey, are people applying for work at the airports
and those who are there now being cross-checked with watch
lists?
Ms. Garvey. Absolutely, and that, again, is occurring
almost weekly because every time the list changed, the airports
and the airlines go back and run their employee list again for
validation and for matching.
Chairman Lieberman. So it is not just criminal backgrounds,
but anybody who turns up on an FBI or----
Ms. Garvey. Correct.
Chairman Lieberman. OK.
Mr. Mead. But there is an important clarification there.
The watch list is a list of names.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Mead. The reason the rule needs to come out that
Administrator Garvey is referring to is because with respect to
existing employees, the revalidation of ID cards that she was
referring to----
Chairman Lieberman. Yes.
Mr. Mead [continuing]. We do not presently require a
criminal background check for existing employees at the
Category X (high-risk) airports or at the smaller non-Category
X airports. That is why this rule is so important. Using the
watch lists alone is not enough, because these people do not
always go by the name on the watch list.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes, absolutely. Of course, that is
another reason why some of the support for new technology is so
important, so we can move to a point where we are using
biometrics or retinal scanning or whatever it is to make sure
the person is exactly who they say they are and then to check
whether they are on a watch list.
Senator Voinovich.
Senator Voinovich. Yes. I would like to make an
observation: One thing that I have noticed that has not changed
is the availability of personnel and machinery to do the
screening.
Ms. Garvey. A challenge.
Senator Voinovich. I know it is important. People have to
be patient. But there are people right now in this country that
are calculating the time it takes to get to the airport, wait
in line, get on a plane, get off and deplane and so on, and
they are figuring the hours out and many of them are deciding
not to fly and go by automobile.
Ms. Garvey. Right.
Senator Voinovich. I think that is something that you ought
to be concerned about and so should the industry.
Ms. Garvey. Yes, very much so, Senator. As a matter of
fact, last Thursday, we met with all of the airlines and met
with the top 20 airports in this country. They all came into
Washington and two assignments came out of it. One was to agree
to a list of accepted items that you can travel with to resolve
the consistency issue that you talked about, and we have got a
brochure that is going to be coming out with the airlines and
with the pilots, by the way, who did a lot of work on this with
us. But it is an agreed-upon list of what you can travel with,
and what you cannot travel with.
And the second most important point from my perspective was
to ask the airlines whether they have the resources to deal
with open check points, and more ticket agents on duty. They
are coming back to us with what resources they will have in
order to meet the demands for the travel. It is very
challenging, I know, to get some of the right personnel, and I
know they have, as the Senator mentioned, a lot of financial
issues. But we think opening those check points and increasing
the number of ticket agents is critical and that is why we were
so anxious to hire the 225 additional people from our
perspective.
Senator Voinovich. I have been concerned, and so have the
Members of this Committee, with the human capital crisis that
we have across the Federal Government, and Senator Thompson in
his amendment exempted the people that would be doing the
screening from Title V. Do you feel that exemption gives you
the flexibility that you are going to need in the event that we
federalize those screeners? Can you move forward and hire them
and also manage them once they are on board?
Ms. Garvey. Certainly from our perspective, it gives us the
flexibility that would be needed. I do not know if Mr. Mead has
any observations on that.
Mr. Mead. The devil is sometimes in the details on these
things, and people do say FAA has personnel reform and they
have procurement reform. In the personnel reform section of the
law, for a large group of existing FAA employees--basically,
personnel reform said, you will not be any worse off under
personnel reform.
Some of the points that have been made in the hearing today
would suggest that it is important to be able to remove people
fairly quickly if they do not perform. So rather than just
incorporating by reference the personnel reform authority for
FAA, my advice would be to directly say what we want.
Senator Voinovich. So you would go beyond that to give the
government more authority--you need more authority, you think,
to get the job done?
Mr. Mead. Yes, sir.
Senator Voinovich. OK.
Mr. Mead. And I am the Inspector General. I cannot speak
for the Secretary or the Administrator, but that would be my
opinion as Inspector General.
Ms. Garvey. Senator, I will go back and look at that
language. I thought it actually was fairly explicit, but Mr.
Mead raises a good point and we will certainly look at that.
Senator Voinovich. That is real important.
My understanding is that the airlines right now are in
charge of the screening, is that correct?
Ms. Garvey. That is correct.
Senator Voinovich. So they hire a company to do the
screening. Now, that company that they hire screws up. They do
not do what they are supposed to do and that is discovered. Do
you then have to bring that to the attention of the airlines
and the airlines then get involved and deal with the company
that they have hired to do the job? Is that correct?
Ms. Garvey. I think that is fundamentally right. If there
is an issue on site, we can take immediate action, and we have
done that even before September 11. So you correct the action
and take an action at site. But in terms of a penalty, the
penalty is levied against the airline, so you are exactly
right.
Senator Voinovich. So it is against the airlines and then
the airlines have to do something about the company?
Ms. Garvey. That is correct.
Senator Voinovich. To me, that is the primary reason why we
ought to eliminate that and go to federalized screeners,
because if they work for the Federal Government, you do not
have to go to the airlines. Then they do not have to go to the
company that is doing the work. If somebody does not do the
job, they are working directly for you and you can discipline
them and hold them responsible and not go through the Maginot
Line in order to get something done. Is that correct?
Ms. Garvey. Well, that is correct, Senator, but I do not
want to get in trouble with my Secretary, who has been up here
negotiating, I know, maybe slightly differently. But even if
there is a company, we could--as long as we are directly
controlling and directly managing, and to me, that is the
critical piece. I think that the administration would suggest
that----
Senator Voinovich. But the company is working for the
airlines.
Ms. Garvey. As it is today, yes.
Senator Voinovich. OK. And right now, we know that some of
the airlines are in financial trouble. Some of them are going
to go out of business. So we are in a situation where they are
in trouble and we are saying, add more expenses on. It seems to
me that we ought to get out from under that whole business and
guarantee to the public that we are not going to have to go
through the airlines and the companies to hold people
responsible. Would you agree with that?
Ms. Garvey. Well, I definitely would agree we need direct
Federal control, direct Federal management. You are right. We
have to eliminate the middleman, if you will.
Senator Voinovich. The issue is this, that if you do not
federalize the screeners and we go to a hybrid system, does the
legislation that was passed give you adequate power to do what
Senator Thompson talked about and hold people responsible?
Ms. Garvey. Senator, we are assuming that whichever
construct is finally voted on by the Senate, that we will and
can and are already beginning to establish the performance
standards, and the training that is necessary. If it is a new
agency that implements that, we are going to be ready to turn
that over so that that can be implemented very quickly.
Mr. Mead. Under both the House and Senate bills, the entity
that is created would have the authority to take summary action
with respect to people that do not perform. Now, unlike the
Senate bill, in the House bill, the President is given the
discretion to contract, with private firms. Under that bill,
though, those firms could also be removed if they did not
perform.
Senator Voinovich. Are they working for us or are they
working for the airlines?
Mr. Mead. They are no longer working for the airlines--the
airlines are out of it.
Ms. Garvey. They are working for the government.
Mr. Mead. The contractor would work for the government. In
other words, there would be a government contractor, not an
airline contractor. And the provisions of the House bill do
strongly suggest that you would not be in long protracted
disputes with the contractors if you wanted to get rid of them
if they did not perform.
Senator Thompson. The problem, I would interject here,
everybody agrees, whatever government you are a part of or in
private industry, if you are not performing, you ought to be
dismissed. The question is, what is lack of performance? What
are the standards? Who is going to decide? That is what our
bill does and the House bill does not do. It takes it to its
logical conclusion. It does not just say, if you do not
perform, you are gone. It sets out what the standards are and
it requires the employees to sign on to that and to agree to do
certain things, and if they do not, you have an objective
standard there that is fair to the employee and can be
determined before the event happens what is going to happen
when someone is negligent.
So I think that is the difference. We both have the same
goal, but again, everybody agrees on that goal, always has, but
we have not been getting it. I think that is what the Senate
bill carries out that the House does not.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you. I must say, I agree with my
colleagues on this question of responsibility, but as we look
back, and again, all of us were painfully awakened by September
11, the responsibility really has to go all the way up the
line.
When I go back to what you said before, Mr. Mead, that 13
years after a bomb blew up the plane over Lockerbie, that less
than 10 percent of the baggage going on airplanes in this
country is screened for bombs is really just unacceptable. All
of us are part of that mea culpa, I am afraid, including,
again, the airlines for whom I am sure these machines were
expensive, and so they are a cost of doing business and,
therefore, among the various items in their priority list, the
security of the traveling public went low.
Senator Thompson. And we have a lot of machines we are not
using, right? We are not utilizing them. Is that not correct?
Mr. Mead. You are not utilizing them enough, that is right.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Senator Voinovich. Mr. Chairman, can I just make one point?
One of the things that we have to point out in this hearing is
that, overall, things are a lot better than they were before. I
think that is very important to note, because there are people
watching us right now and that should be mentioned.
I have always understood that if I check luggage and then I
do not board the plane, that they then try to identify whose
luggage it was and remove it from the plane, and that was one
of the deterrents against bombs. Is that correct?
Ms. Garvey. That happens for many airlines. It does not
happen for all.
Chairman Lieberman. Not for all.
Senator Voinovich. It does not? Well, I always thought that
was one of the ways that you guarded against it. Now we have
got a new dimension, that people are willing to commit suicide
in order to achieve their goals.
Ms. Garvey. Right.
Senator Voinovich. But that is not a universal practice?
Ms. Garvey. And I think another point, too, as we move
forward, because as Mr. Mead says, EDS will not be in place at
all airports tomorrow, is stepped-up use of the dogs. It is
stepped up use of CAPPS. It is all of those things, more use of
the trace detectors, continuous, and making sure that the
airlines are all using the equipment that is out there. It has
got to be a multiple, many faceted approach to this, and we
have got to, I think, really hit it from several angles. Most
important of all, getting the right information from the
intelligence communities from the very beginning, can prevent
some of these folks from even getting access to the system.
Chairman Lieberman. Let us now go to Senator Cleland and
then Senator Carnahan.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CLELAND
Senator Cleland. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and Ms.
Garvey, I have a lot of respect for you and Mr. Mead.
I will say to my colleagues and to the public here that I
have sat through hours since September 11 in dealing with this
question of aviation security. I am on the Commerce Committee
and the Subcommittee on Aviation and it was out of that
subcommittee and out of that committee that came the Senate
version of how to dramatically improve the checkpoints, over
700 checkpoints at some 400 airports throughout America by
federalizing, professionalizing, upgrading, paying for
increased security on checked baggage. I will say, sitting
through this hearing now almost 2 hours of length, I am more
frustrated than ever.
I think we are just missing the point. I have this powerful
sense we are all sitting here fiddling while Rome is burning
and while the American airline industry is crashing and
burning.
Over the last 2 months, five domestic airliners crashed and
burned, killing all people on board. I think the American
people, before they start flying again, are going to want to
know that the U.S. Government is somehow guaranteeing their
security. I do not think it is going to look to the airlines. I
do not think it is going to look to a private contractor. I do
not think they are going to look to some foreign-owned company.
They are going to look to us and it is our responsibility to
get it done and that is not happening.
Now, I have heard the phrase Argenbright. I know Frank
Argenbright. But he sold his company to a foreign entity. It is
no longer owned by an American company. And that company
continues to provide baggage claim security for 17 of the 20
largest airports in America. That is unacceptable. That is a
scandal, because, clearly, they provided baggage screening for
Dulles and Newark, where two of the four hijacked planes
originated. They also provide security, if you can call it
that, for O'Hare, where we had that incredible incident happen
in Chicago. This, despite a DOT investigation into Argenbright
and fines and criminal complaints filed against them. I mean,
they have had everything done to them but shot and they are
still out there doing it.
I look at Atlanta, the largest, busiest airport in the
world. What do we have there? A Cleveland-based company called
ITS, International Total Services, cited by Federal authorities
19 times in the past 11 years, including two major violations
since September 11, and they are still there. I am still flying
in and out of there on Fridays and Mondays, God help us. They
have filed for bankruptcy. How do you think that makes me feel?
How do you think that makes all those people going through
Atlanta and Hartsfield, feel?
And what is the pay? The average is $7 an hour. They can
get $7.25 if they go work flipping burgers, which requires
substantially less training than what even they go through.
I think continuing to allow the American people to rely on
these contract baggage claim people is like letting the Boston
strangler massage your neck. I think it is ridiculous.
[Laughter.]
They have a staggering--in Atlanta, that company has a 375
percent turnover annually. You cannot even run a burger place
with that kind of turnover.
Now, let us face it. This is a scandal. It needs correcting
and we need to get it done, and I think all the things you have
said today about performance and accountability are correct. We
have it in the Senate bill passed 100-0, and I think the Nation
ought to know that it is not the U.S. Senate holding this up.
It is the House of Representatives that came back with this
God-awful contract situation one more time.
I think it is a travesty. I think it is a national scandal,
and I think that unless we get this good bill passed before
Thanksgiving, where we normally have record travel on airlines
in America, I think there is not going to be much travel on
Thanksgiving Day, I am sorry to say.
So I agree with Alan Greenspan. The best thing for our
economy is to get people back in those seats, and I intend to
be in one of them. Pray for me, because we continue to allow
these baggage claim people out there to work on a contractual
basis where nobody is accountable, where the FAA can do nothing
about them. Nobody fires anybody. They just continue right on.
I think unless we make a dramatic departure here and
federalize this system, professionalize it, instead of sending
them to charm school in Chicago, we ought to be sending all
these baggage claim people to the Federal Law Enforcement
Training Center in Georgia where all the Secret Service people
and the Customs people go anyway. That is where they get their
training. That is why they are professional and that is what we
need.
We need a domestic version of the Customs Service, and not
run out of the Department of Transportation. We need it run out
of the Justice Department, like the Senate bill says. It is a
law enforcement function that the U.S. Government ought to be
responsible for and we ought to live up to that responsibility
right now, because the American people are depending on us.
They are not depending on the airlines anymore and they are not
depending on some foreign corporation to contract out at
minimum wage. I just feel that way.
Now, I want to put you on record, Ms. Garvey. Do you or do
you not support the Senate bill?
Ms. Garvey. Oh, Senator----
Senator Cleland. Well, I mean, a thousand people have lost
their lives. They have crashed and burned in five airline
incidents over the last 2 months. Now do you not or do you
support the Senate bill which we passed 100-0?
Ms. Garvey. I know you did, Senator, and what I do support
is strong Federal management, strong Federal control, and I
certainly support passing it as quickly as we possibly can.
Senator Cleland. Mr. Mead, do you or do you not support the
Senate bill, passed 100-0 by this Senate?
Mr. Mead. I would recommend some revisions to it. I do not
want to take a position on this federalization of screeners.
That is above my pay grade. I would just say that,
categorically, whatever you do, you need to have, in my
judgment, a law enforcement presence at every screening station
at every airport in the United States. That law enforcement
presence, that person, ought to be a Federal employee.
I do not think you need to have every screener be a
policeman. If you want to make them all Federal employees or
contractor people, I just think you need to have very powerful
standards which I have tried to make in my testimony today. I
am not going to go out and substitute my judgment for yours on
that.
I think in the Senate bill, there is a big issue. In the
House bill, there is a big issue in the placement of this
function.
Senator Thompson. On what?
Mr. Mead. On the placement of this function. The Senate
bill places some functions in the Department of Transportation
and other functions in the Department of Justice. The House
bill places the functions in the Department of Transportation.
The Senate bill creates something called a Deputy Secretary for
Security, yet the function is placed in the Justice Department.
I think a good case could be made for the placement of this
entire function in the Department of Transportation, because
this is a multiple issue. It is not just an aviation issue.
That would be one area I would recommend you consider changing
in the Senate bill, Senator Cleland. But I am not going to get
into the issue on substituting my judgment for yours, sir.
Senator Cleland. Thank you very much. Thank you very much,
Mr. Chairman.
Senator Durbin [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Cleland.
Senator Carnahan.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARNAHAN
Senator Carnahan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am extremely
pleased that we are holding these hearings today because I
believe it is important that we continue to shine the spotlight
on airport security until we see that some significant
improvements are made.
I am very proud of the work that the Commerce Committee has
done, under the leadership of Chairman Hollings and Senator
McCain, to draft airline security legislation. The committee
reported a bill that I believe will greatly enhance aviation
security in this Nation. The bill ultimately passed the Senate,
as you know, unanimously.
Congress has for years been hearing about the problems that
exist in our aviation security system, and a multitude of
people, including the Inspector General of DOT, the GAO, and
others, have warned about the dangers associated with poorly
trained and underpaid baggage screeners. The Senate legislation
that we have been talking about here today addresses the
shortfalls made by making the Federal Government directly
responsible for the screening of airline passengers and their
baggage.
No Senator offered an amendment to allow private screeners
to continue operating at our Nation's major airports. The bill
passed 100-0. I believe that it is precisely this shift in
responsibility for passenger screening that will have the most
profound impact on improving the safety and security of our
aviation system.
The events of September 11 demonstrate quite convincingly
that aviation security will forever be linked with national
security. Passenger safety can no longer be left to private
screening companies who are not accountable to the American
people. The Federal Government does not contract out the work
of Customs agents, of Border Patrol, of Secret Service, or of
Capitol Police, nor should we contract out the work of
protecting the safety of the American flying public.
I hope that the conference committee will conclude its work
expeditiously so that we can meet our responsibility to provide
a safe and secure aviation system.
Administrator Garvey, I would like to return to a question
that we were talking about a little earlier, the screening of
bags. It dismays me that we are checking only 10 percent of
those, and I know you indicated that was because we do not have
the machinery to do that at this time. Between now and the time
when we can get that machinery, are there things we could do to
augment the screening of these checked bags? Would bomb
sniffing dogs be a possibility? Would you comment on that for
me?
Ms. Garvey. Absolutely, and as a matter of fact, we are
using part of the money that Congress has appropriated since
September 11, the supplemental and so forth, for more of the
bomb sniffing dogs. So that is a very important element.
Using some of the trace detection equipment that is easier
to use, more quickly implemented, is another piece of it.
Ramping up the selectee program through CAPPS so that there is
more screening, is important, as well as looking at more random
screening of passengers and bags.
So I think you have to look at a whole combination of
issues between now and when all of the machines can be put in.
And again, as the Inspector General and we rightly agree,
making sure that all the machines that are out there are in use
continuously.
Senator Carnahan. Thank you.
Mr. Mead, as you know, there have been a number of lapses
in security since September 11. What efforts has your office
undertaken in recent weeks to gauge the effectiveness of the
new security measures that have been put in place?
Mr. Mead. Well, we have sent roughly 100 of our staff to
visit 58 airports around the Nation, and they made about 250
extended observations of security. When we make these
observations, people do not know who we are. We record what we
see and we report that back to FAA. We do it in two different
ways.
One is that we sometimes see a situation where the screener
or the security people are not familiar with the new
procedures. For example, when you are wanding somebody and it
goes off when you go down by the person's shoe, it may be going
off because it is picking up something under the floor or it
may be going off because there is a knife in the shoe. We try
to make sure that the screener understands right there on the
spot what they are supposed to do, in that event--take off the
shoe or have them go somewhere else where you can screen them
without the interference from whatever might be below the
floor. So we are making a lot of on-the-spot corrections, and
we are keeping track of those.
There have been about 50 other instances that we have
referred to FAA because, in our judgment, they are the types of
things that need systemic correction. In other instances, we go
to the U.S. Attorney. We have done that most recently in a
fairly well publicized case. Right after September 11, we
caught some people in Miami who were distributing fake ID cards
for the airport, and those people were arrested. Those are the
types of actions we take. We are keeping track of them, and if
you would like me to come by your office and share the
specifics with you, I would be glad to, but I would prefer not
to do it in open session here.
Senator Carnahan. How uniformly would you say these have
been implemented?
Mr. Mead. I would say, overall, there has been much
improvement. But there are still alarming inconsistencies and
you do not want to be caught up in one of those
inconsistencies. So I think we need to aim for 100 percent.
The use of EDS machines is the exception to that remark. I
think they are woefully inadequate on the use of the explosives
detection machines. So I would not put that in the category of
greatly improved. I think there is a long way to go there.
Senator Carnahan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Durbin. Thank you, Senator Carnahan.
Before I recognize Senator Levin, can I follow up and ask
you, Mr. Mead, what is the percentage of utilization now of
these machines? You made a point in your testimony that we
could expect as many as 250 or 225 bags an hour to go through
the machines, and you said currently, the percentage that are
being checked for explosives was in the single digits.
Mr. Mead. Yes.
Senator Durbin. How much could we increase the inspection
just by utilizing current machines to capacity?
Mr. Mead. I think for the majority of machines you could
probably quadruple it, and that is probably an understatement.
Senator Durbin. Let me make sure that is clear on the
record. You think it could go up as many as four times----
Mr. Mead. Yes, for the majority of machines.
Senator Durbin [continuing]. By using current machines to
their capacity?
Mr. Mead. Let me give you one example. My staff saw one
situation where the screening company thought that they were
continuously using the machine. They were doing maybe 14 bags
an hour.
Senator Durbin. And the capacity of the machine is?
Mr. Mead. Two-hundred-twenty-five, but when you process 225
bags per hour, you are going to get a lot of false alarms. If
you take into account the time it takes to clear the false
alarms, the operational real world experience, you are looking
at around 125 or 150 bags an hour.
Senator Durbin. Administrator Garvey, can you issue an
order today or tomorrow to utilize these machines to their
capacity?
Ms. Garvey. We have already done that, and I think the
challenge is to make sure that directive is being carried out.
We have said that they must be used continuously. We have got
500 agents in the field. They are looking at a lot of security
measures. The 225 that we are hiring and in the process of
hiring right now, their primary focus is going to be EDS,
because we would agree with Mr. Mead that is an area that needs
much more focus and more attention. The great majority of them
are people with a lot of background in security, and I think
they are going to be very useful in getting that number up.
Senator Durbin. Would you agree with this conclusion that
as many as four times the number of----
Ms. Garvey. I am not sure.
Senator Durbin [continuing]. Current bags being inspected
might be inspected?
Ms. Garvey. I would like to go back to that. I am not sure
I would agree fully. I would like to look at that. I can tell
you, I did look at the numbers last week from November 1
through 7 just to see what we are getting for numbers. We are
seeing about a 30 percent increase overall. That is certainly
better. It is not, and I want to be very straight about this,
it is not where we want it to be. It is not where the Inspector
General wants it to be. It is certainly not where the Secretary
of Transportation wants it to be. We are going to stay focused
on that.
Senator Durbin. Are you still limited by the airlines and
the number of people that they will make available for this?
Ms. Garvey. Resources have been an issue. Mr. Mead spoke
about the alarm rate. If you respond to an alarm correctly, you
have got to stop the machine, take the bag off, look at it and
resolve what is in it. That may mean more resources and that
has been an issue for them in some cases. But again, we think
it is important enough that they just have to get the
resources.
Mr. Mead. Yes. Let me address the resource issue. Yes,
there is a resource issue, if the truth be told in this. When
you are putting these bags through the machine, and you get an
alarm, you do not want to just keep going. You want to clear
that alarm, which may mean that somebody has to open up that
bag to see what is in it.
If you take the person that is supposed to be watching the
screen on the explosives detection machine and say, go rummage
through this bag to find out if there is something in there,
that is what he is doing while other bags are sitting on the
conveyor belt.
Senator Durbin. So it boils down to the same question
again. How much money will the airlines put into these devices
so they can be used more effectively, when we have a capacity
to quadruple the percentage of bags that are currently being
inspected? This is a classic, your money or your life, and as
far as I am concerned, we cannot explain this any longer to the
American people. We have to put the resources in to make it
work.
Mr. Mead. In the example I used in my testimony of the
machine where the employee had been working for almost 20
hours, that is not the employee's fault, but I do not think
that employee could be alert. They did not have a replacement,
so the air carrier shut down the machine.
Senator Durbin. Senator Levin.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LEVIN
Senator Levin. This is the area that I want to explore with
you, too, of the checked baggage and EDS machines. You say you
have entered an order now that says that all resources must be
used to their full capacity?
Ms. Garvey. They have to be used continuously, so they must
always be used. Before September 11, they were used only for
CAPPS selectees and that was a smaller number. We are saying,
even if you do not have selectees, if you have got a machine
there, you have got to be using it continuously.
Senator Levin. Could you get us a copy of that order?
Ms. Garvey. Absolutely, I will.
Senator Levin. When was that issued?
Ms. Garvey. Oh, it was probably 2 weeks after September 11,
but let me double check on the date and we will get a copy of
that.
INFORMATION PROVIDED FOR THE RECORD BY ADMINISTRATOR GARVEY'S OFFICE
On September 26, 2001, the FAA issued a Security Directive
rather than an Order. A Security Directive contains sensitive
security information and therefore cannot be publicly released.
However, we can say that through this Security Directive, we
required continual use of all explosives detection systems if
available.
Senator Levin. What is the requirement on the airlines
relative to that checked luggage? What is the current rule that
you have issued?
Ms. Garvey. Right now, there is not a requirement to have
EDS. We had a rule that was ready to go, but we had as a date
something that is very far out into the future, and since
September 11, we have wanted to move that forward.
In the past, particularly since TWA, Congress has
generously appropriated $100 million every year. We have spent
that and we have gotten a number of EDS machines out to the
largest airports. The requirement for when airlines, or when we
had to have the EDS's all in place, again, is subject to how
quickly the manufacturers can move that date forward. So the
latest date that we have been given--but again, I will mention
that the Secretary has challenged the manufacturers to see if
there is a way we can speed this up even further--was 2004.
Senator Levin. And what is the date that was in the
original rule that has now been----
Ms. Garvey. Two-thousand-and-thirteen, approximately. I
think there was one discussion, and I will tell you, it was
still in discussion before September 11.
Senator Levin. And the current date? Is there a date in a
rule now?
Ms. Garvey. Well, no, there is not a date in a rule.
Senator Levin. That is what you are looking at?
Ms. Garvey. Right now, we are looking at 2004. Before
September 11----
Senator Levin. But you have not yet issued it?
Ms. Garvey. Right. We have not yet done that, no, and----
Senator Levin. And when are you going to make that
decision?
Ms. Garvey. Senator, I think, in part, it is going to
depend on what comes out in the legislation. Again, if it is a
Federal responsibility, we may not need a rule. We may just
make a determination we want to get them out as quickly as we
can. Depending on what comes out in the legislation, we may or
may not need the rule. We do know we want to get them out
there. We do know that we have as a goal 100 percent screening
for baggage and cargo.
Senator Levin. And will we get this in place faster if the
legislation requires that this be a Federal screen, a
government screen?
Ms. Garvey. I am not sure we would get it in place faster.
I think getting the legislation in whatever form will get it
moving quicker.
The other point that the manufacturers have made, and I
understand this, is the need to have a predictable stream of
funding. Congress has been very generous, both before September
11, but particularly since September 11, in making sure that
the funding is there. That is critical, as well.
Senator Levin. And this is not a requirement on the
airlines, this is a requirement for public funding?
Ms. Garvey. That is what it has been, Senator. We have paid
for the machines. The operating and maintenance of it was the
responsibility of the airlines.
Senator Levin. And the personnel to run them?
Ms. Garvey. And the personnel, that is correct, Senator.
Senator Levin. All right. And so we would look for
alternative sources of machines? We know there are only these
limited sources?
Ms. Garvey. There are two manufacturers, one that is very
well accepted by the airlines, the other one that is certified
by the FAA but has had some operational difficulties. An
Inspector General team and the FAA team have been looking at
that second manufacturer together and we have heard some
promising news this week.
Senator Levin. A final question. Are we sure that all the
checked luggage that gets into an airplane belongs to someone
on that plane?
Ms. Garvey. Whether or not it is actually matched?
Senator Levin. Yes.
Ms. Garvey. Some airlines do this. Not all airlines do, and
I know that----
Senator Levin. Should we not require that be done by all
airlines?
Ms. Garvey. Well, that has certainly been one of the issues
that we have been looking at and I know it is being debated in
Congress. There are two sides to it. Some have suggested, yes,
that would be a big help. Others have said, when you are
dealing with suicide bombers, that may no longer be an operable
assumption.
Senator Levin. Do you have the power to do that by
regulation?
Ms. Garvey. We could do that through regulation and rule,
yes, sir.
Senator Levin. Pardon me?
Ms. Garvey. Yes, we do have that power, Senator.
Senator Levin. And are you going to exercise that power?
Ms. Garvey. We are looking at that, but again, I think,
also looking at some of the discussion that is occurring on the
Hill right now.
Senator Levin. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Durbin. Senator Thompson.
Senator Thompson. Yes, just a comment in listening to the
testimony. I want to reiterate that this is not just a Federal
or non-Federal issue. In fact, that may not be even the most
important issue.
I do not subscribe to the notion that if you go the
contractor route, it is all bad, and if you go Federal, it is
all good. It is more complex than that. As bad as the picture
has been painted, it is even worse because it is more complex
and more difficult.
We need to understand, and I voted for the 100-0 bill, and
I think it contains a lot of good provisions. I think you can
make a very good case for everything Senator Cleland said,
which I could not put it more eloquently myself.
But we have been sitting here on this Committee over the
years looking at the performance of the Federal Government. I
put out a report in June 2001, when I still had access to the
Xerox machine of the Committee---- [Laughter.]
And it is called ``Government at the Brink.'' Just a
summary here of the 10 worst examples of mismanagement. The
``Big Dig'' in Boston, 525 percent increase from the original
budget. Abusing the trust of the American Indians, the
Department of Interior does not know what happened to more than
$3 billion it holds in trust for the American Indians. There is
widespread agreement that the Department of Defense finances
are a shamble, wasted billions of dollars a year. It cannot
account for that expense.
NASA mismanagement causes mission failures, spectacular
example after example. NASA has lost billions because of
mismanagement. Because of the Mars lunar polar lander failure,
for example, one team used English measurements--feet, inches,
and pounds--to design the program, the vehicle, while another
team used metric measurements.
Medicare waste, fraud and abuse, billions of dollars every
year. Security violations of the Department of Energy. The
Department of Energy does not adequately safeguard America's
nuclear secrets. In one case alone, an employee was dead for 11
months before Department officials noticed that he still had
four secret documents signed out.
IRS financial mismanagement takes up to 12 years sometimes
to record payments made by taxpayers. Veterans' affairs, put
patients' health care at risk. The Department of Veterans IG
found that a hospital food service shares the loading dock with
environmental management services hazardous waste containers
and dirty environmental management service and biohazard carts
were located next to the area where food is being transported
to the kitchen.
Bilking taxpayers out of student financial aid, billions of
dollars. A Los Angeles man collected at least $230,000 in
fraudulent unemployment payments, set up nonexistent claimants.
It was years before that was discovered, and on and on and on.
This is just a summary of this report. It is all in detail.
We have got to go past that. Whether we go Federal or non-
Federal, we have got to do things remarkably different than we
have ever done before. It is not just as simple as passing this
bill. We have got to have follow-up. We have got to have
accountability. I do not know that one person was disciplined
or fired for any of this stuff that I just mentioned. We have
got to change that in order to have more secure airline
service.
Senator Durbin. Thank you very much, Senator Thompson.
I want to thank Administrator Garvey as well as Inspector
General Mead for your testimony. It has really helped us to
understand the current state of airport security and what
progress has been made. Thank you very much for joining us
today.
Senator Durbin. I would like to invite the second panel to
come to the table at this point, Bruce Carter, who is the
Director of Aviation at the Quad City Airport, Moline,
Illinois; Jackie Mathes, a flight attendant with United
Airlines; Marianne McInerney, Executive Director of the
National Business Travel Association; and Duane Woerth, a pilot
with Northwest Airlines, Air Line Pilots Association. Thank you
for joining us.
I would like to apologize in advance, but I am presiding
over the Senate at one o'clock and I will stay with the panel
as long as I can and Senator Lieberman will be returning very
shortly.
Mr. Carter, if you would be kind enough to summarize your
testimony, which will be entered into the record in its
entirety.
TESTIMONY OF BRUCE E. CARTER, A.A.E.\1\ DIRECTOR OF AVIATION,
QUAD CITY INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
Mr. Carter. Good morning, Senator Durbin. Chairman
Lieberman, Senators Thompson, Durbin, Voinovich, and
distinguished Members of the Committee, I want to thank you for
the opportunity to testify today on the concerns of aviation
security at small hub airports.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Carter appears in the Appendix on
page 87.
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The Quad City International Airport serves the citizens of
Western Illinois and Eastern Iowa and has a cachement area of
2.5 million people within 100 miles. We have access to seven
different hubs by five different carriers. Our aircraft mix
varies from Boeing 717's to Beech 1900's. We have been one of
the fastest-growing airports in the country, with a 48 percent
growth.
One of the reasons for this is because of AirTran Airways
to their Atlanta hub. They have provided our passengers with
competitive air fares, and in turn, other carriers stay
competitive with them. In fact, all of our air carriers have
experienced growth and we were on track to enplane 400,000
passengers for 2001, until the tragic events of September 11.
What have the passenger declines done to our operating
budget, which is about $7 million? We are experiencing about a
20 percent decline in parking lot revenue, which annualized out
to a $300,000 loss. We are experiencing a 40 percent decline in
rental car activity. Rental car agencies, however, guarantee a
monthly minimum, which could adversely affect their existence.
In fact, yesterday, Alamo and National filed for Chapter 11
bankruptcy. We are also experiencing a 15 percent loss in
landed weight.
We are trying to find creative ways to further cut expenses
and can see layoffs in the near future. We just opened up our
new $18 million terminal concourse and are not hiring the
needed building maintenance and custodial personnel, and this
puts added pressure and stress on our existing staff.
What changes have we seen in airport security and what do
we expect those costs to be if the FAA requirements continue?
Before we were able to even open up our airport on September
13, we had to tow 148 vehicles from our short-term and long-
term lots and we had to cut our ready car lot for our rental
cars to abide by the 300-foot rule implemented by the FAA. We
then had to post two employees at the airport terminal curb to
ensure that no cars were left unattended. We hired a contract
employee 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, at a cost of $300 a
day. If that continues, that would cost $109,000 per year.
In order to open our much-needed short-term parking lot, we
hired another contract employee for a 12-hour shift at $204 per
day. That would be annualized out to just about $65,000 per
year.
Our public safety department and our airport staff have
accumulated $11,000 in overtime just in a 6-week period, and if
this continues, it would result in over $95,000 in overtime,
and that is assuming that there will be no more security
requirements which require additional manpower.
In late September, the National Guard was assigned to our
airport and are only allowed to be present at the security
checkpoint. It greatly disturbs me that our request for greater
flexibility was denied. I cannot stress enough the need to
allow our National Guard presence at locations other than the
screening checkpoint, and many small hubs feel the same way.
As of today, we have not been able to expand the duties of
the National Guard at our airport. However, President Bush
outlined on Friday the need for more flexibility by the
National Guard troops and that is what airports have been
waiting for and wanting for the past 8 weeks. I hope that we
see additional troops there when I get back to work tomorrow.
I am concerned with the discussions that are taking place
that will continue to cost airports more money without
additional revenue streams to offset these added expenses. As
the cost per passenger increases at smaller airports, the
airlines will consider their yield potential and profit margin,
and I am concerned that they could eliminate service to many
small communities.
There are 437 primary airports in the United States.
Primary airports are defined as an air carrier airport
enplaning over 10,000 passengers. Of these, 50 percent of the
airports enplaned less than 100,000 passengers. Smaller
airports have much smaller staffs, and one small requirement,
such as inspecting vehicles, has a much greater financial
impact and burden than on larger airports.
Requiring all airports to have explosives detection
equipment installed for checked luggage will have significant
operational and financial impacts, especially at smaller to
mid-sized airports. Who will pay these initial and ongoing
costs and who will be responsible? If the cost of the equipment
is $1 million, it would not be unreasonable to expect the
annual maintenance cost to be at 10 percent, or $100,000 per
year. What happens if the equipment breaks down and there is no
backup? Congressional leaders need to have answers for these
questions, and we could talk for hours on other important
security issues that need to be considered.
I would like to briefly discuss the personnel that we have
at our screening checkpoints. I feel our small hub airport has
the same problems as large airports in hiring, replacing, and
keeping personnel on the job. If the employees were paid a
better wage and benefits package, would this reduce turnover
and give us a better product? Does a $20 an hour employee do a
better job than a minimum wage employee? We need to have these
questions answered before we decide on screening point
jurisdiction. Constant turnover causes problems in any type of
business.
I feel that the FAA civil aviation security personnel need
to do a better job of communicating with the operators of our
Nation's airports. It is not unreasonable to have an airport
manager and their staff invited to regional headquarters to
discuss the concerns of airport security. It is a way to get
questions answered in a timely manner and helps to know what
other airports are going through to enhance security.
Communications is the key to success and it is our job to
encourage people to get back into the Nation's skies. The
airlines are doing their job in providing very reasonable fares
and making the needed safety improvements to their aircraft.
The FAA and airports need to do whatever it takes to provide
the safest environment for all citizens that choose to fly. I
hope Members of this Committee and other members of Congress
will work to ensure that airports throughout the country
receive the reimbursement they need to comply with the new
security initiatives employed by the FAA.
In closing, I would like to thank Senator Durbin for asking
me to testify today. Senator Durbin has been a great supporter
of our airports in Illinois and I have enjoyed my 10-year
relationship with him. And I would like to thank Pat Souders.
Pat has been always available to assist our airport with
aviation concerns.
Thank you again for the opportunity to let me share my
thoughts with you today, and I would be pleased to try and
answer any of the questions you might have. Thank you.
Senator Durbin. Thank you, Mr. Carter. Marianne McInerney.
TESTIMONY OF MARIANNE McINERNEY,\1\ EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
NATIONAL BUSINESS TRAVEL ASSOCIATION (NBTA)
Ms. McInerney. Good afternoon. My name is Marianne
McInerney and I am the Executive Director of the National
Business Travel Association. NBTA represents over 1,500
corporate travel managers for the Nation's Fortune 1,000
companies who are in charge of over 70 percent of all the $190
billion spent annually on business travel expenditures
domestically, 46 percent which has traditionally been spent on
air travel.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Ms. McInerney appears in the Appendix
on page 90.
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Monday's tragedy in Queens came at an already challenging
time in our Nation's history. Now more than ever, the American
public needs to be given confidence in our Nation's aviation
system. As we begin to pick up the pieces and march towards
economic and psychological recovery, it is critical for
Congress to take every necessary measure to ensure the safety
and security of our traveling public and the stabilization of
our aviation industry.
NBTA represents corporate travel managers and their
companies that operate throughout the world. They are
responsible for sending over 44 million travelers throughout
our Nation's aviation system, who are, in turn, responsible, or
at one point were, for 62 percent of all revenue to the
Nation's carriers.
By now, we all know that the terrorist attacks of September
11 have created a tremendous amount of unease among the
traveling public. Travelers have simply lost confidence in our
Nation's skies, as well as our Nation's airports. In response
to this uncertainty, immediately after the tragedy, many
businesses dramatically curtailed and in many instances have
permanently ceased employee travel. Currently, many companies
are reducing travel between 30 and 50 percent.
In an effort to represent our business travelers, we have
worked diligently to stay on top of their thoughts and their
comments as it relates to security within our Nation's
airports. Over and over, we have gotten the same response:
Please improve security before we are to get on planes.
Improvement and standardization of security measures is the
single most important factor in getting people to resume travel
and restoring confidence in our aviation system. Seventy-one
percent of our travelers have noted that federalizing the
security process is extremely important for them to resume
travel at previous levels.
We are now at the 2-month mark since the tragedy. Our
members and our travelers are still very frustrated. There is
no consistency among airports and airlines even today under new
rules. Frequent travelers are noticing different protocol at
different check-in points and security procedures vary from
airport to airport.
Two weeks ago, I myself noticed the difference. At Reagan
National Airport, I was asked to ID myself at every place
throughout the check-in point. Last week at the very same
airport, I was no longer asked for ID. My computer was not
checked. No one was wanded. Two weeks ago, every third person
on my flight was randomly checked. Last week, no one.
However, as I went through the security process and watched
my computer not being checked, a senior citizen right before me
had his toiletries kit opened, his eyeglass screwdrivers
removed, and his cuticle scissors taken away. There seems to be
a big variation.
As one traveler recently put it, I think at this point, it
is just the luck of the draw. The same traveler reported a 20-
minute check-in procedure at L.A., but a 2-hour experience at
O'Hare. Another traveler recently reported to us that the
security check-in point at Dulles was extremely stringent and
well done, although time consuming, but on her return from
Portland, she observed completely relaxed security staff.
A business traveler from Home Depot recently traveling from
Reagan National was randomly wanded three times while sitting
at the gate waiting to board a flight. She noted to us that she
observed the alertness and immediate attention to bags that
were no more than five feet away from their travelers, and at
the same time, she had noticed on her flight in no security
checks.
At some airports, identification is not required for
travelers as they pass through checkpoints while personal items
are confiscated from others. Similarly, while other airlines
are adopting the process of matching checked-in luggage to the
names of passengers on board, it is not a uniform practice, as
we have heard today. Similar inconsistent stories go on and on.
My point today is simple and concise. NBTA, our members,
and our frequent fliers are not seeing the necessary
consistency in airport security. On TV and in the newspapers
and even on the House floor, the traveling public is constantly
being reassured that tighter security is in place. However, as
we have been reminded by countless examples of inconsistency
and failure to follow procedures, such a vast nationwide task
simply cannot be coordinated and is still decentralized.
Central to this issue is returning traveler confidence and
the individual's perception of risk and behavior in light of
those perceptions. By virtue of their frequently travelers'
experience, business travelers get to witness this on a daily
basis. Often, the traveler is the one who visits multiple
cities in a single day and walks away with a completely
different experience at every airport.
Going forward in the near term, consumer confidence and
real security improvements need to be the focus of the
government. NBTA and its members feel that the only way to
accomplish this is through the federalization of the airport
screening process, implementation of new technologies, the
screening and checking of all luggage, and the institution of a
voluntary travel card to provide frequent travelers with the
screening process that would apply to 6.2 million frequent
travelers who account for 54 percent of all travel.
We believe action such as this must be done swiftly. They
must be held to a high degree of accountability. And we believe
that it is only with the federalization of this system that
travelers will return to the sky. Thank you.
Senator Durbin. Thank you very much.
Chairman Lieberman. Jackie Mathes, flight attendant with
United Airlines.
TESTIMONY OF JACQUELINE MATHES,\1\ FLIGHT ATTENDANT,
ASSOCIATION OF FLIGHT ATTENDANTS, AFL-CIO
Ms. Mathes. Good morning, Senators Durbin, Thompson, and
Voinovich, and Committee Members. My name is Jacqueline Mathes
and I have been a flight attendant with United Airlines for
nearly 29 years. I am a proud member of the Association of
Flight Attendants, AFL-CIO, and I am here today representing
AFA's 50,000 members at 26 carriers. I want to thank you for
giving me the opportunity to testify at this important hearing
on aviation security and I refer you to my written testimony
for additional details.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Ms. Mathes appears in the Appendix on
page 93.
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I know firsthand from flying after September 11 and talking
with my flying partners what aviation security is like today.
We have all heard the horrific story of the security breach in
my hometown of Chicago earlier this month. A passenger nearly
made it on board with a number of knives, mace, and a stun gun.
Luckily, a random search was conducted on this passenger, but
only after he had successfully cleared the metal detectors. His
checked luggage, which could have contained explosives, was not
pulled off the aircraft. A similar situation happened
yesterday, as Senator Durbin spoke to us about earlier.
Those who want to slip weapons through the current security
system will find a way unless we work quickly to change that
system.
Soon after September 11, the FAA issued new security
directives. We believe these changes did not improve airport or
airline security. They were merely window dressing. Flight
attendants still believe there are far too many loopholes,
large enough loopholes to allow for another terrorist attack on
our airlines.
Every day, we go to work to ensure the safety of our
passengers. In the air, we are the firefighters, the law
enforcement agents, the first aid responders, and the
comforters to our passengers. On September 11, the 12 flight
attendants on board United Flights 93 and 175 became the last
line of defense in protecting the cockpit and passengers.
Our lives and work have changed dramatically. Are we more
confident in the safety of air travel since September 11? No.
Do we believe that air travel can be safe? Yes, eventually, but
much still needs to be done.
Let me give you examples of how different life is today for
flight attendants. What is most unnerving to me is that flight
attendants now start each trip by discussing what we can use on
the aircraft for weapons. We actually talk about breaking wine
bottles to protect ourselves in case of a terrorist attack.
Without any additional training from the airlines and working
in a failed security system, flight attendants believe they
must prepare themselves for any situation.
On October 18, security screening at O'Hare found a small
hotel sewing kit in my bag. The kit contained thread, a few
sewing needles, and a small pair of sewing scissors. I had
forgotten this was in my bag. It had been there for months.
This was the first time any screener had seen it, and while I
did not fault the screener for taking it from my bag, it is
clear security screening is still inconsistent. Until this one
screener spotted it, why was this overlooked by every screener
on every flight?
Other flight attendants report finding passengers with
scissors, various knives, screwdrivers, razor blades, box
cutters, and even knitting needles. Despite the fact that small
nail clippers, and in my case a tiny sewing scissor, are being
taken from crew members, passengers are managing to get on
board with other potential weapons.
In another example, one AFA member has been terminated and
another is facing severe discipline after their flight was
canceled following the discovery of a box cutter in the cockpit
on the first flight out in the morning. When the flight
attendants reported to the aircraft, there were already one FBI
agent, five Boston police, and one representative from the
carrier on board. The flight attendants were asked to help
conduct a security inspection of the aircraft to make sure no
other weapons were hidden on board, even though they had no
prior proper inspection training.
Given that the FBI seemed concerned, the crew was
uncomfortable about taking the aircraft with the scheduled
passengers and suggested they move to another plane. The
carrier refused. The flight attendants were uncomfortable with
the entire security procedure and expressed these concerns to
their captain, who then elected to cancel the flight. The
carrier is now disciplining these flight attendants simply
because they were not confident in the security of the flight.
Flight crews have seemingly been targeted for extensive
searches by security personnel while passengers pass through
security checkpoints without a second glance. Female flight
attendants have been fondled and groped by male security
guards. A female flight attendant passing through security at
San Francisco airport was repeatedly rubbed over her body with
a screening wand wielded by a male security guard. While we
strongly recognize the importance of vigilant security
screening to keep weapons from being brought on board aircraft,
this behavior is unacceptable.
AFA believes that Congress must move forward on the
following recommendations. We must federalize the security
screeners through the Department of Justice just as the Senate
voted to do on its bill last month. Flight attendant training
and procedures must be updated and include appropriate and
effective responses to terrorism as it exists today, including
self-defense training.
Strict and defined limits for carry-on baggage must be
enforced. The FAA's current guidelines are vague and not
enforced uniformly by all carriers. Congress must take
immediate action to ensure the safety and security of on-board
supplies, carry-on baggage, and all checked bags by screening
everything that goes on an airplane. In addition, the airlines
must put 100 percent passenger baggage match in place
immediately.
While it is obvious we are screening passengers who have
access to the aircraft, all persons who have access to secure
areas and aircraft must be screened.
Security personnel should be responsible for all cabin
searches. Some airlines have given the duty to perform these
searches to their fight attendants, who are not trained for
these cabin inspections nor have adequate time.
As a flight attendant, I take pride in my role as an
aviation safety professional and I am pleased to have the
opportunity to tell you what needs to be done to make our skies
safe as we know now. While we are pleased that the carriers
have quickly fortified the cockpit doors, little has been done
to protect our passengers and flight attendants, who remain the
first and last line of defense on the aircraft. I urge you to
move swiftly on the adoption of these crucial security
procedures in order to build a truly secure and safe aviation
environment. Restoring faith in air travel is paramount.
Thank you for allowing me to testify before you and I
welcome any questions.
Senator Durbin. Thank you for your testimony. Duane Woerth,
who is a pilot with Northwest Airlines is next.
TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN DUANE E. WOERTH,\1\ PRESIDENT, AIR LINE
PILOTS ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL
Mr. Woerth. Thank you. Good morning. My name is Duane
Woerth. I am President of the Air Line Pilots Association,
International, and ALPA represents 67,000 airline pilots who
fly for 47 airlines in the United States and Canada and we
sincerely thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting ALPA to present
its views at this hearing.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Woerth appears in the Appendix on
page 101.
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I want to say as emphatically as I can, ALPA and its
safety-conscious professional pilot members believe it is safe
to fly. Our members prove this each and every day when they go
to work, and they have been proving it ever since just 2 days
after the September terrorist attacks, when they were back in
the air flying.
Unfortunately, too many passengers are still afraid to fly,
despite the aviation security advances made since that time.
They need to know what kind of improvements have been made and
are being made in order to bolster their confidence to return
to air travel. This hearing should help in that regard.
While there is still much work to be done, ALPA believes
that significant progress has been made to improve aviation
security, particularly in and around the aircraft, but it is
the old cliche. There is good news and there is bad news. I
will start with the good news.
One of the immediate safety improvements recommended by
ALPA and others was to harden and enhance cockpit doors. The
airlines have worked diligently to strengthen existing cockpit
doors and I am pleased to report that, as of last week, 100
percent of all large-passenger aircraft have been fitted with
some type of strengthening devices to make the doors, and thus
the cockpits, more secure. We must now keep the pressure on to
get the new high-technology doors installed on new aircraft
which will also withstand gunshots or other types of forced
entry.
Another short-term enhancement which the FAA has ordered to
be used for all passengers beginning September 28 is the use of
computer assisted passenger pre-screening, called CAPPS, which
the FAA ordered to be used for all passengers, as I said, after
September 28. This program uses passenger information and
airline databases to determine whether an individual poses a
security risk. While the use of CAPPS is not visible to airline
passengers, it is providing each of them with a significant
added measure of security.
The events of September 11 also created a very high level
of security awareness of pilots, flight attendants, gate
agents, and other airline personnel, as well as passengers.
That awareness translates directly into a more secure
operation. It means that pilots and flight attendants are
coordinating and communicating more than ever before to ensure
that each flight is secure.
The terrorists of September 11 were successful because of
surprise, because of security complacency, and because of a
passive response by crew and passengers. All three of these key
elements of the success of the terrorists are now gone.
However, one of the most troubling problems for our pilots
is that we have yet to see any evidence of our goal of one
level of security. In fact, what we are seeing instead is a
disturbing level of non-uniformity and security screening from
airport to airport and even from terminal to terminal within
the same airport. This is both exasperating and frustrating to
passengers and airline pilots, who may be screened several
different ways at several different airports in a single day.
In addition, and I think this is important, security
practices to protect a Boeing 747 cargo aircraft are still far
less stringent than those for a passenger-carrying 747, even
though both of those aircraft could be used as a terrorist
guided missile.
The bottom line is this: Inconsistent, even illogical
security screening practices are doing very little for security
and are, in fact, eroding the confidence the traveling public
has in the current system, which in turn makes it much more
difficult for the industry to rebound. Fortunately, this
problem is one that can be addressed, at least in part, quickly
and effectively.
What is needed is a single security checkpoint screening
standard for all screeners to help achieve one level of
security. Such a standard already exists in the Checkpoint
Operations Guide, or COG, which is used by screeners to some
extent, but it is not a regulatory document. We have
recommended to the FAA that they make the COG regulatory and
train all screener personnel, both current and future hires, to
strictly follow it. This simple action could be accomplished
within a matter of a few weeks and would begin to restore
public confidence in the system.
ALPA continues to believe that identity verification is a
critical component of aviation security that must be given top
priority. We have been urging the government and the industry
since 1987 to create an electronic universal access system to
positively identify authorized employees. In the mid-1990's,
the FAA completed successful tests of the universal access
system and standards were finalized for the system. However,
there are still no airlines that have implemented the universal
access system because the FAA's policy has been to leave it to
the sole discretion of the airlines.
Although magnetic strip technology was used as the basis of
the universal access test, there are now more advanced secure
technologies that can be used to positively identify authorized
personnel. One such technology is the new highly secure memory
chip card system being tested by the FAA to identify armed law
enforcement officers. ALPA wholeheartedly endorses the
development of this memory chip card system and recommends that
airlines use the memory chip card as the basis for the
universal access system.
One additional important area this would help in is
identification of cockpit jumpseat riders. As a result of the
September 11 attacks, the safety enhancement of a qualified
extra trained jumpseat pilot has been severely curtailed
because of the lack of certainty in positively verifying the
jumpseater's request as to his identity and his employment
status.
I have much more lengthy comments I have submitted to you,
Mr. Chairman. I would like those to be included in the record
and I would like to answer any questions you may have.
Senator Durbin. Thank you very much. I have to leave
briefly. I will just ask a question or two.
Mr. Carter, you said you would like more flexibility in the
use of the National Guard at your airport. What would you do
with the National Guard if you had that flexibility?
Mr. Carter. What would really help us tremendously would be
able to replace them on the curb of checking of the vehicles,
and the second item would be the area getting into our short-
term parking lot. Those are two expenses that have just been
hurting us terribly, and it would be great exposure, comfort
level for the people coming into our lot, coming into our
terminal space, and that is where I would like to see them.
Right now, we have six National Guard people that are
deployed to the airport. Two work on a first shift, two work on
a second shift, and then we have two at the hotel. So we could
use them out there immediately, and it frustrates me that we
cannot get this accomplished.
Senator Durbin. Thank you.
I would like to ask Ms. Mathes and Mr. Woerth this
question. Since September 11, have you seen any substantial or
dramatic changes in the people who have access to an airplane,
as to whether or not there are background checks, whether or
not there is positive identification before they can get onto
the ramp or near the airplane?
Mr. Woerth. I would say that the difference is the
awareness that I mentioned earlier. Everybody is a little more
conscious. Everybody is looking at each other's ID card. But
what we are still lacking is some form of positive electronic
identification, which we believe is the only thing that is
going to work. A little badge with a little picture on it the
size of your thumb does not give anybody any comfort, so we
need to go to the electronic system I described.
Senator Durbin. Ms. Mathes.
Ms. Mathes. I would agree with Mr. Woerth. We are checking
all the badges and we are observing everything we can, but
basically, the security system in place does not allow us to do
positive ID.
Senator Durbin. When I met with your flight attendants in
Chicago, and I am not sure if you were at that meeting, but you
could have been, but others from AFA were in attendance, they
talked about this defense question for flight attendants. If
we, as the system progresses and we move toward more air
marshals, does that increase the confidence and feeling of
safety among the people in your profession?
Ms. Mathes. Actually, I think that it does. When I flew in
this morning, one of my thoughts was that there probably was an
air marshal on board when I came from Chicago to Washington,
DC.
Senator Durbin. I might just add for the record that our
colleague, Senator Stabenow, was on the flight from Pittsburgh
the other night that ran into a problem and there were two air
marshals and an ATF agent to jump quickly to do the right
thing, so I think there are extra precautions at this airport
and I hope we will see that more in the future.
Thank you all for your testimony. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. [Presiding.] Thank you, Senator Durbin,
for co-chairing this hearing.
Senator Thompson.
Senator Thompson. Thank you. Ms. McInerney, do you think,
from talking to the people that you represent, the frequent
travelers, that they are interested in the issue of whether or
not this system ought to be federalized before them? Are they
tuned in to that issue one way or the other, do you think?
Ms. McInerney. They are extremely tuned into it.
Senator Thompson. What are you getting, and how does that
rank in terms of feedback that you are getting, that issue?
Ms. McInerney. Over 70 percent of the people that we are
talking to tell us that federalization of the system, and by
that, they mean an end-to-end solution, where the government is
not outsourcing part of the screening process but is
responsible for every piece of security from the beginning to
the end, is what they need to see.
They have felt, I think, some degree of confidence when we
have looked at military personnel and other law enforcement
personnel in the airports. That, again, is varying from place
to place, but that is what they need to see in order to resume
travel.
They very much see aviation security as national security.
They have put that equation together and are looking forward
to, I think, an answer this week.
Senator Thompson. I think we all feel better when we see
those uniforms in the airport, but I guess we also know that
once this system is geared up, those are not going to be the
kind of people who are actually going to be looking through
those screeners and making those determinations and coming to
work every day.
Ms. Mathes, do you have the same feeling among the people
you represent, do you think?
Ms. Mathes. Yes, I feel the same way. I think that the
Federal Government is in charge of it from the beginning to the
end, that people will feel more confident about the security
process.
Senator Thompson. One of the things that I think is a
legitimate point on the other side, people make the point that
Europeans seem to have done very well with a different kind of
system, that the Israelis seem to have done very well with a
different kind of system, and both of those places are more
government-oriented in terms of most of their policies than we
are. Do you know anything about that? Do any of you have any
opinion as to why that might work better? Mr. Woerth.
Mr. Woerth. Senator, I believe the Israeli airline is owned
by the government. I think the Israeli example is one that
really shows that the government took charge of this. They have
not had a hijacking since 1968, since they take it deadly
serious. It is a national security issue for Israel and that is
why they have been successful.
Certainly, my members, and I have been on record that the
Airline Pilots Association supports the Senate version. We
think that is the best bill and the sooner it gets passed, and
we think not only is it the best result, we also realize our
passengers believe it is the best result. It has a two-pronged
effect. We will have better security and the passengers will
come back quicker with the Senate bill. I really believe that.
Senator Thompson. Thank you very much for that.
On the issue of inconsistency, I do not know quite what to
think about that. That point has been made by a lot of people.
Clearly, if we go back to childhood and tell Daddy, Mama did
not make us do that, so why should we do it for you? It is not
the merits of the case, it is the fact that somebody else did
something differently.
I am wondering what our real point is when we talk about
the inconsistency. Is it aggravation, or is it that some of the
more liberal conduct is not protecting us enough? It would seem
to me like some inconsistency with regard to policies, like who
gets checked and what gets checked, might be good. I am not
sure that everybody ought to know exactly what they are going
to be faced with. It looks to me like you could have some
consistency as to what might be confiscated, for example, the
tweezers versus the meat cleaver, but the process itself,
perhaps that is not all bad.
We run into the same thing. I came back from New York and I
got both my bags gone through and my briefcase gone through
twice, I think, before I made it, so I fit the profile that
Senator Voinovich did, too, I guess.
But does that make sense? Could we make a distinction
between the kinds of things confiscated, perhaps, versus who
gets checked?
Mr. Woerth. Senator, I think this is one of the problems we
have. Because there was a sharp instrument, a razor blade or a
box cutter used in that instance, we got so focused on anything
that might be sharp. So the first security directive came out
and our security screeners are doing what they were told. Now
they are looking for every cuticle scissors, every fingernail
file, every cigar cutter, and the mind can only comprehend and
concentrate on so much. So while they are so intent on that, it
is not surprising that a meat cutter gets through or a cleaver
because they are exhausted looking for tweezers.
We have got to get some common sense back into this system,
and I think the passengers know the difference between the
weapons of mass destruction, which is not a cigar cutter and it
is not your eyeglass screwdriver. When they understand that and
they see us focusing, looking for serious weapons and not
tweezers from 84-year-old grandmothers, we will have real
security because we will have time to do real security and we
will not be just harassing passengers and crew members. That is
what we have got to get back to.
Senator Thompson. Ms. Mathes, you represent people probably
that have the most at stake because you fly more than anybody,
and even more than the pilots now, I am sure, as you see these
doors being built that nobody can get through, so you are on
your own now.
Ms. Mathes. Exactly.
Senator Thompson. What would be the most--maybe you have
prioritized this and I did not pick up on it. Is there one
thing that stands out in your mind to the people that you
represent that you think would be the single most important
thing that could be done in order to make you feel more
comfortable and, therefore, your passengers?
Ms. Mathes. Well, I think as we mentioned earlier, I think
an air marshal on board makes everyone feel comfortable. Of
course, only the crew would actually know that they were on
board.
Also, I think that flight attendants would like some line
of self-defense training so that we can protect ourselves and
have some knowledge and background training on how to deal with
a situation. At this point, we have just basic minimal training
for hijacking, and up until September 11, we always planned
that airplane would land.
Senator Thompson. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Thompson.
Senator Voinovich, do you want to go next? Are you in a
hurry?
Senator Voinovich. Yes, I do.
Chairman Lieberman. No, go right ahead. I am here. Please.
Senator Voinovich. I would just like to say this. I do not
know about you, but I feel safer traveling today than I ever
have in my entire life. I think that if you look at where we
were and where we are today, substantial improvements has been
made. Security is not perfect and there are exceptions to the
rule, including the inconsistency and so forth.
But I would like you to comment on it. What is your
appraisal of the situation today versus what it was before
September 11 in terms of the safety of flying?
Mr. Woerth. Senator, I agree with you. Before, ignorance
was bliss. We did not think we were at risk, so therefore we
were happy with the complacent security. I, probably in the
last 15 months, have testified not on security, but at least
nine times on air traffic control delays. Between the Senate
and the House, nine different testimonies. We were worried
about throughput. We were worried about time. We were worried
about efficiency. That was the focus of the Nation. After
Lockerbie, we thought if we were checking on only international
flights for bombs, everything else was fine.
The truth is, ignorance was bliss. But we are safer now.
There is more security now. Every single airline personnel, the
government, everybody is doing more now. We are as safe as we
have ever been, and that is a fact.
Senator Voinovich. Ms. Mathes.
Ms. Mathes. I think as airline employees, we definitely are
safer. I think we have the same respect and confidence in our
pilots, that they are very qualified and very trained. That was
never an issue for our security.
However, because of September 11, the security issue has
come to light. So as far as mechanics and our trained and
qualified pilots on the aircraft, as well as the flight
attendants, that is a safety issue that remains the same and I
think very highly acceptable.
Again, with the security issue and some of the elements
that get by, security and the inconsistency is a question and a
problem for a lot of us.
Ms. McInerney. If I might comment on that, Senator, I think
you are right. I think that the skies are safer and are getting
safer and that is something that the American public needs to
hear. But as we look back pre-September 11, I think that we had
left our system open to a high degree of vulnerability. In many
cases, I think our high schools had better security systems
than our Nation's airports did. We were looking at a system
that was over-capacity. We were trying to move travelers
through very quickly. There was a different focus on what their
needs were.
And I think that we, the travelers, probably assumed that
behind the scenes, the security issues were being addressed.
What we have found out is that they were not, and now, more
than ever, I think travelers are willing to give up some of the
time that they have been spending before that was precious to
them. They are now willing to compromise that. They want to see
a stronger system and they are willing to pay the price for
that.
Mr. Carter. Senator, let us look when the passenger comes
to the terminal. You never had presence of law enforcement
officers or guards or National Guard out on the curb. When a
vehicle is coming to the terminal, that vehicle is getting
checked if it is unloading something for a restaurant or a gift
shop or for the airline. Then if the passenger gets into the
line to get into the ticket counter area, you are showing your
ID. You could be a selectee to have that bag checked at that
point.
As you go out to get to the screening checkpoint, you have
only ticketed passengers now beyond the screening checkpoint.
Before, those people at the screening checkpoint were getting
stressed because you had passengers and you had the loved ones
that wanted to walk with the people to the gate. Those people
had billfolds. They had purses that had to go through that. It
stressed those people out at the screening checkpoint because
you had so many more people going through.
Once you are out to get on the airplane, you are showing
your ID once again. If you are a selectee, you are getting your
bag checked. You are getting wanded. You are constantly being
wanded, both at the screening checkpoint as well as at the
gate. And yesterday, I was surprised. When I got on the
airplane, they actually checked the boarding pass. That had
never happened to me before, also.
So I think there has been an increased presence in a lot of
the things that have happened since September 11.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks very much, Senator Voinovich.
Thanks to the witnesses on this panel. I have a few
questions. I apologize that I had to step out for a meeting. I
did get to look at your testimony and it was very helpful.
There are times at hearings like this that I wish we could call
the first panel back after the second panel to respond to some
of the things you have said, and we will definitely share your
testimony with the FAA and ask for responses to some of the
questions you have raised.
There was a fair amount of focus earlier on, and to some
extent in this panel, on the bomb detection equipment. I must
say, I was startled by the earlier testimony that less than 10
percent of the baggage goes through the bomb detection
equipment 13 years after Lockerbie. I just had another thought
that was your concern, Mr. Carter, about small airports
affording these machines, which is whether, if we are moving
toward public, that is, Federal Government, personnel doing the
screening, whether, in fact, the government ought not to be the
ones buying the equipment.
For instance, when I go through the screening device, the
magnometer or whatever it is, as I am heading up to get on a
plane? Who owns that?
Mr. Carter. Well, we are a little different than some
airports because I get very concerned about security, and
usually, the airlines own the equipment.
Chairman Lieberman. That is true?
Mr. Carter. And you know, the airlines, are we going to go
ahead and spend $35,000? No. So what I did at my airport last
year, I bought the most sophisticated piece of equipment for
$35,000 from RapiScan and then I charged the airlines back at
10 cents a passenger and I got my money back in 1 year, and I
think that made a lot of sense.
You look at an airport our size, you have that $1 million
piece of equipment. Where would you put that at so that you
could have all five of your carriers be able to funnel those
bags in, but right now, we have 400,000 passengers enplaning at
our airports. Not one of those checked bags go through a
detection device. They go through seven different hubs.
Chairman Lieberman. Very interesting. So right now, the
airlines own that equipment and the airport owns the bomb
scanning devices, generally?
Mr. Carter. I would say not the airports. It would be the
airlines, I would think.
Chairman Lieberman. Not the airports. Again, it is the
airlines.
Mr. Carter. Right.
Chairman Lieberman. So there is part of the problem. I do
not want to take on more for the Federal Government. It does
seem to me if we are going to start having Federal employees
doing the work, then we ought to have Federal money going into
purchasing the equipment. I know it is not an exact comparison,
but it would be a little like having the, I do not know, police
cars in a town privately owned while the police were obviously
paid by the public.
I was very interested in what you said, Ms. McInerney, in
your last statement, and it goes back to your earlier
testimony, which is that you are finding among your members a
willingness to have a little bit of delay, and maybe more than
a little bit of delay, in the interest of safety. Why don't you
talk about that a little bit more.
Ms. McInerney. I think prior to September 11, our system
was certainly at over-capacity and the biggest concern of a
traveler was how quickly I can get from point A to point B. Our
system being stressed, those delays were costing American
corporations billions of dollars and our company was the first
to come forward and measure those losses.
I think today, we are looking at a different type of risk
and I think that our frequent fliers, our business travelers,
and even our leisure travelers have taken a step back, and I
think that travel is not so much now about where you are going,
it is also about who you are leaving.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes, well said.
Ms. McInerney. I think as I am talking to business
travelers, they are feeling the stress of those family members
and loved ones that they leave behind. It is not unusual now
for me to talk to someone and have their child say to them,
``Mom, Dad, please do not get on that plane.'' Those are the
kind of conversations that are appearing and happening in
American households and I think it is the government's
responsibility to try and make all of those travelers and their
families and loved ones feel a little bit safer.
We simply have to be willing to put our own investment in
there, and if the investment on the travelers' part is time as
well as giving up some of their own efficiencies, I think we
are willing to pay that price. We are not willing to see
security go out to the lowest bidder and we are not willing to
have inconsistencies at airports. But where it relates to time,
we are now seeing American companies and American travelers
being willing to take on those additional costs.
Chairman Lieberman. That is very important. It is clear
that before September 11, the airlines certainly were operating
on the assumption that the public was not going to take too
much inconvenience in the interest of safety, so I hope they
are listening now and also that we are. And then as time goes
by and the pain of September 11 and the jolt and the fear
associated with September 11 recedes, as we hope it will
because airline travel will be safe and there will be no more
terrorist accidents, then it is very important to keep our
guard up, in other words, to remember the feeling that we have
now so that we do not become vulnerable.
I wanted to ask Ms. Mathes and Mr. Woerth whether the
treatment that I and some of the others here have been giving
to the airlines is fair. In other words, I am not trying to
paint them as evil, I am just saying in the normal course of a
business life or business career, if you are a CEO or chief
financial officer and you are in an industry that has ups and
downs and you are under pressure quarterly to report to your
stockholders, security becomes a lower priority than it should
be.
Ms. Mathes. Exactly. That is why we would like to see the
Federal Government take over.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes. Do you agree, Mr. Woerth?
Mr. Woerth. Yes. Besides being the president of this union,
I actually served on a corporate board of Northwest Airlines
for 5\1/2\ years and had some pretty raucous fights on the
financial committee and others, which is natural. This is a
very brutally competitive business.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Woerth. What we need to ensure is that if we want one
level of safety, and we have insisted that we do not expect
airline passengers to shop from the safety record of airlines,
if we want to have one level of security, and especially,
Senator, the last point that was made, $1 million per machine,
we do not need a few of these, we do not need a few dozen, we
need hundreds and hundreds of these machines.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Woerth. We are talking billions of dollars here. The
airlines are not going to be able to finance this. I mean, if
they wanted to and the CEO is pledged to it, he could not do
it.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Woerth. So to get the level of security with that new
equipment, we are going to need some government help. But more
than that, I think it is important that every passenger can
pick any airline they want because it is going to be the same
level of security at every airline, not just those who can
afford it and whose CEO is committed to it.
Chairman Lieberman. That reminds me of something I read in
your testimony, Captain, where you advocate the use of a single
security checkpoint screening standard to achieve security, but
also to help restore consumer confidence, and I think you
referred to a document called the Checkpoint Operations Guide
that could serve as the standard for realizing that kind of
purpose. Can you talk a little bit about how that was developed
and what difference it would make for those of us who are
passengers?
Mr. Woerth. I think that is the biggest difference. It is
already work that is accomplished. The FAA, along with the
airlines, along with flight attendants, along with pilots, put
that together some time ago and it is so every security
screener would know exactly what is expected. He would not be
taking away your pen flashlight because he knows that is not a
weapon.
Right now, we have very inconsistent training. We do not
have to invent a new guide. One is already there. We might even
improve upon that, but we at least have something that is in
print, can just be made part of the regulatory package. We
could be using it. Now, it is just gathering dust.
Chairman Lieberman. And what would be different for those
of us who are buying a ticket and going on a plane?
Mr. Woerth. Probably a lot of it may be more perception
than reality. But I know it is extremely discomforting, as all
the witnesses here have testified and the passengers that I
talk to and all of our crew members have said. Part of the
professional attitude they expect to see that we see in our
profession, certainly they want every pilot to have the same
checklist preformed the same way. The same with flight
attendants. Those standard operating procedures and practices
makes it safer and instills confidence.
Just the opposite occurs when you have a different
experience at every airport and at different terminals in the
same airport. It instills a lack of confidence.
So I think it is probably more that than in reality, but
when we see the same standard everywhere, people will be
confident again that somebody professional is in charge of the
operation.
Chairman Lieberman. Right. Ms. Mathes, I remember for me a
particularly poignant part of your prepared testimony when I
read it, if I remember it correctly, which is that since
September 11, not much has really changed for flight
attendants. That is, there has not been any additional training
or support. I do not know whether you talked about that when
you testified before, but would you talk just a little bit
about it now?
Ms. Mathes. Well, basically from what I have witnessed,
nothing really has changed besides the ID badging was changed a
little bit and updated. As far as on the airplane, the cockpit
door is secured at this point, and we witnessed the changeover
of that. We now brief so that we have a plan on board. But as
far as for flight attendants, nothing has changed for our
security. We come to work the same way. I mean, we go through
security, but that really has not changed, either.
Chairman Lieberman. What would you like to see changed, the
top one, two, or three things?
Ms. Mathes. Well, I would like to see there be some form of
a self-defense program. That should be something standard that
all of us can comply by, where you would have intact rules and
regulations for how you would handle a situation. I would like
to see more cooperation with management and possibly the
government in that area.
I have been on an aircraft where we make the rules up as
far as first class and main class using the lavatories as we
go. I want to see everything standardized, so that when we
enter that aircraft, we know what we are going to do and how we
are going to handle it.
Chairman Lieberman. So if you have not received any other
training, how do flight attendants coordinate with the larger
number of sky marshals that are on planes now? I gather there
is a meeting before the flight takes off, but are flight
attendants given instructions as to how to work with the
marshals in the event of a crisis?
Ms. Mathes. Actually, from the information I have read as
far as the sky marshal being on board, that you would be
introduced, but you are not to treat them as if they are
different from any other passenger or even acknowledge that
they are a sky marshal.
Chairman Lieberman. So in the event that a passenger or
group of passengers suddenly begins to take hostile action, are
flight attendants told what to do at that point?
Ms. Mathes. Get out of the way.
Chairman Lieberman. Get out of the way and let the marshals
deal with it?
Ms. Mathes. Yes.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes. OK, just one more question--well,
two more. The first is, what do you all see happening in the
so-called secure areas? I think one of the points of
vulnerability that has become more clear to us is that there
are so many thousands of people working at airports, not only
screening us but behind the scenes in areas where passengers do
not go, who have regular access to baggage and the airplanes,
people who service the planes, who bring food on, clean, etc.
Since September 11, have we seen standards, procedures,
protections change? Mr. Carter, do you want to start that?
Mr. Carter. Yes, I will start. The FAA did come down with
the directive to only allow vehicles through the gate into the
side area, the secure area, to be checked by a guard and have
the vehicle checked. That is the major change that we have
seen.
We have put a request in to the FAA to at least allow the
airport operator, the airport director should have an
opportunity to get on his airfield without having to have his
trunk checked. That is how I feel, and we are trying to get
that from the FAA. We put that request in on Thursday and we
still have not gotten a response from it, but that is one of
the major changes I have seen, is access to the air operations
area, the side area.
Chairman Lieberman. Does anyone want to add anything to
that?
Mr. Woerth. I would just say that is still one of the
weaker links.
Chairman Lieberman. It is.
Mr. Woerth. It is until we have, as in my testimony, those
electronic ID cards, so once you enter a secure area, everybody
is confident. You can go where you want to because everybody in
that secure area is accounted for. Just having a plastic ID
card with somebody's picture on it does not do it.
Chairman Lieberman. It is not enough.
Mr. Woerth. We have got to get that electronic
identification.
Chairman Lieberman. Ms. Mathes, did you want to add
anything to that, or Ms. McInerney?
Ms. McInerney. I would like to add an experience I just
witnessed on Friday.
Chairman Lieberman. Go ahead.
Ms. McInerney. I was at Boston Logan last Friday, taking a
U.S. Airways shuttle. It was a five o'clock takeoff time, so it
was certainly a busy screening area, staffed by MPs who were
doing a very good job, might I add, and four gentlemen just
came and began to walk around the security and they noted that
they were there and they were contractors working on the
airport. They had no IDs. They had not been discussed to. They
had a conversation. They went around the screening.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Ms. McInerney. They were then detained for about 10
minutes. I sat as an interested observer and watched while they
still could not work these things out. They kept saying that
they were there to fix something. No one could determine who
had hired these people, where they had come from. They had no
work orders. And to me, that is a little bit frightening to be
occurring almost 80 days later.
Mr. Carter. And in the real world, they should be, those
people that she is talking about should be escorted by a person
that does have that ID badge that has verification.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Carter. That should happen immediately.
Chairman Lieberman. At least they were stopped.
Ms. McInerney. They were stopped, but only barely. An
employee happened to notice them as he was changing shifts.
Certainly, we all have to have a high degree of trust, but you
cannot stop but wonder.
And what is concerning to me is that there were over 100
passengers, many of whom just were talking among each other,
because now we are almost like we were with HMOs. Back in the
day, we used to say, this is what happened to me when I went to
the doctor, this is what happened to me. Today's cocktail talk
is about experiences at airports. We might as well be trading
baseball cards. A hundred passengers, many of whom were first-
time fliers since September 11, witnessed that, and I cannot
imagine how many people they have since discussed that with. It
is a little frightening.
Chairman Lieberman. Unfortunately, I agree. I would rather
be swapping baseball cards, but Senators are swapping stories
like that, too.
Did you want to add anything, Ms. Mathes?
Ms. Mathes. I just wanted to say that, actually, we are a
little concerned by the food that is brought on the aircraft.
Even though the carts are taped with a blue tape and locks may
be on the other carts, we still have no way of knowing whether
the food was actually tampered with before it came on the
aircraft and we are not even sure if the food service workers
were screened before they went to work that day. So it is a
concern of ours.
Chairman Lieberman. Do you have any response to that, Mr.
Carter?
Mr. Carter. I have been seeing the same thing that she has
been mentioning.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes.
Mr. Carter. That was my concern when I am watching this,
because I know that if an employee is coming on that field, I
know that they are not going through a screening checkpoint.
The food service people, I have never seen a magnetometer over
in the food area.
Chairman Lieberman. That is a problem. That is a point of
vulnerability. I am going to ask that question to the FAA. I
appreciate your mentioning it.
A final question. Ms. McInerney, has the Business Travel
Association every tried to calculate the impact of business air
travel on the economy? In other words, as we look at the
extraordinary decline in air travel now, and we know that some
of it must be related to the weakening economy, some related to
fears of terrorism, but then it also has a causal effect,
negative, on the weakening economy.
Ms. McInerney. Well, we look at it from two different
perspectives. First, the travel industry net loss for 2002 is
already projected to be about $2.4 billion. That is probably a
conservative estimate.
Chairman Lieberman. Two-point-four billion dollars?
Ms. McInerney. Correct.
Chairman Lieberman. And that is overall, airlines and
tourism.
Ms. McInerney. Correct.
Chairman Lieberman. I was in Florida over the weekend and
there is really a state of unemployment numbers that are rising
rapidly and the concerns about air travel have had a very
drastic effect on tourist areas like that.
Ms. McInerney. Well, the overall loss to the GDP is
projected to be close to 10 times that much, as this has a
causal effect.
Chairman Lieberman. Ten times the $2.4 billion----
Ms. McInerney. Two-point-four billion dollars, correct. And
in line with that, as we are talking to corporations, they have
sat out the last few quarters traveling. There is a loss to
them in productivity and sales and marketing.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Ms. McInerney. So I think that we have not seen the end of
what the economic impact of this crisis will be.
Chairman Lieberman. Unfortunately, I agree with you.
I thank the four of you. You have been an excellent panel
of witnesses. To me, the hearing has shown, as I guess all of
you said before, that aviation security has been improved since
September 11 in this country, but it is obvious we have a ways
to go yet before we can have the confidence that we want air
travelers to have.
I must say, when I go back to the previous panel, and you
have augmented it, we really did let ourselves become too
relaxed about these matters. I mean, it is human nature,
unfortunately. We did an earlier hearing here on September 25,
post-September 11, and I ended up concluding--I never would
want to say that my conclusion was that if airline security was
what it should have been on September 11, we could have stopped
all those terrorist attacks, but we sure could have made them a
lot harder to have pulled off, and I think some of them
probably would have been stopped if everything we are beginning
to put in place and will if this aviation security legislation
ever gets agreed on and passed. It is going to be--you never
want to say impossible--but a lot harder for terrorists to do
what they did on September 11.
This Committee is going to stay active in this area, and we
know how important it is to the American people, how important
it is to the people who work in the aviation system, and how
important it is to our economy, so I thank each of you for the
contribution you have made to our efforts.
At this point, the hearing will be adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:29 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA
I would like to thank the Chairman of our Committee and the
Chairman of the Subcommittee on the Oversight of Government Management
for calling today's follow up hearing on airline security. I also call
on our colleagues who are debating the airline security bills to
complete their work as quickly as possible. The Senate passed its bill
a month ago, and it is wrong to delay its implementation any longer.
When the al-Qaida network turned four U.S. airplanes into guided
missiles, the vulnerabilities in our nation's air transportation
industry were revealed. In the wake of September 11, Congress and the
Administration have taken positive steps to protect the flying public
through increased security at airports and hardening commercial planes.
There is now increased information sharing among intelligence and law
enforcement agencies; mandatory criminal history background checks for
all airline and airport employees with access to secure areas; expanded
use of the Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System and
explosives detection equipment; and funding for cockpit door security.
However, more must be done to restore the public's confidence that
all passengers will reach their destinations safely. Like the railroads
that opened the American West in the 1800's, air travel has helped
define our nation. For me, it would be hard to image Hawaii without the
millions of tourists who annually enjoy the 50th state.
Hawaii, more than any other state, is economically dependent on a
vibrant tourism and airline industry. Tourism accounts for a quarter of
the state's economy and a third of its jobs. At the end of September,
tourism in Hawaii was down 40 percent and more than 11,000 people
employed in the industry were out of jobs. The October figures are
expected to be substantially higher. A delayed recovery in the tourism
industry could lead to a loss of $1 billion and 24,000 jobs.
While there have been positive steps recently, the tragic crash in
the Rockaway neighborhood of Queens--which is considered to be
unrelated to the events of September 11--has reopened wounds and
reinstated fears about flying and traveling.
On behalf of the State of Hawaii and the nation's airline and
tourism industry, we must do all that we can to ensure that air travel
is safe and secure so that we may travel our nation's airspace without
fear.
I welcome our distinguished witnesses.
__________
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR BUNNING
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Our country has taken a serious blow over the past 2 months--not
only are we coping with the terrorist attacks on September 11 and the
anthrax letters, but we now face another airline crash which occurred
on November 12.
My thoughts and prayers are with the victims of American Airlines
flight 587 and their families.
Today's hearing focuses on the security of our airports and
airplanes.
I think all of us would agree that changes need to be made to our
aviation security as soon as possible.
Since September 11, we have heard news reports of passengers trying
to enter cockpits and passengers carrying knives and other weapons past
the airport screeners.
We have also heard reports about some of the problems with the
screening companies that handle airport security, including failing to
do background checks and hiring illegal aliens.
Situations like this need to be stopped immediately and should not
be tolerated.
Congress is working on legislation to help make flying safer. Both
the House and the Senate have passed aviation security bills, and I
hope we can work out the differences between the two versions soon.
We need to get a final version of this legislation to the President
so he can sign it into law, and we can start implementing some of these
important reforms.
Let me add, however, that while we need to act as quickly as
possible, we shouldn't act rashly. We need to make sure that our
reforms will truly make our skies safer.
Americans must feel safe as they pass through airport medal
detectors and take their seats on airplanes. If they do not feel safe,
they will not fly.
I look forward to hearing from our guests today, and gaining their
perspective on this important issue.
Thank you.
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