Impact
of the War on Terror on Certain
Aspects of US Policy in the Middle East
A Medium-Term Assessment
Prepared for The National Intelligence Council
by Paul Jabber
27 December 2001
The
views expressed in this paper are those of the author
and do not represent official US Government positions
or views.
The
purpose of this analysis is to assess the likely
impact that the US campaign against global terrorism
launched in the wake of the attacks of September
11th, 2001, will have on key American
interests in the Middle East over the medium term
(next 12 months). The main focus will be on the
expected perceptions and reaction to US policy of
selected important Middle East actors, regime stability
and changing regional alignments.
To
render the analysis relevant to policy-making and policy
assessment, the approach here will be parsimonious, not
comprehensive. The United States presently maintains an
extensive and continually growing presence in the Middle
East, with diplomatic, military, commercial and cultural
dimensions. The region contains long-identified vital
US national interests, and security commitments toward
several key states, all well known to the reader. My intent
in what follows is not to parse or review all the important
sets of bilateral relationships that constitute our Middle
East policy, but to structure the analysis tightly around
two core questions:
-
How
will the region absorb and react to the USG's war
on terrorism in its regional manifestations, given
that by necessity the Middle East will turn out to
be the main theater of operations?
-
Which US policy choices are more likely to be effective
in limiting the threat of terrorist strikes against
the homeland in particular and other countries generally?
I.
General Policy Context
As
repeatedly enunciated by the President and senior Cabinet
officials in the wake of September 11th, confronting
and ultimately stamping out "terrorism with a global
reach" has become the single most important objective
of US national policy for the foreseeable future. Because
of the magnitude of the September attacks, the nature
of the targets, and the possibility that future strikes
may use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) on national
territory, the USG is now engaged in a campaign of indefinite
duration, of global scope, utilizing all instruments of
power, against states, organizations and individuals engaged
in, hosting, or otherwise supporting, terrorism. Since
the perpetrators of the September attacks acted at the
behest of and with the active training and support of
Osama bin Laden's Al-Qa'eda organization, the Al-Qa'eda
and its network of associated groups as well as the fundamentalist
Taliban regime in Afghanistan which provided it with sanctuary
and support became the targets of the first phase of the
War.
Al-Qa'eda's
explicitly stated objectives, as repeatedly articulated
by its leader and founder, include the expulsion of US
and other Western military forces from Arab lands, most
particularly Saudi Arabia, and forcing the retreat of
the Western political influence and commercial presence
from major Islamic countries, as a prelude to the overthrow
of existing regimes in favor of the creation of virtuous
Islamic systems ruled under Shari'a law. To fulfill these
goals, the stated strategy of Al-Qa'eda is to launch repeated
and escalatory acts of violence against the West and its
regional allies, and, in recent years, explicitly and
principally against US targets, both military and civilian.
These blows are intended to (a) sap the will of the USG
and the support of the American public for current US
Middle East policy; (b) provide an example and a goad
to similarly minded groups throughout the Islamic world
to join the struggle; and, (c) provoke Western countermeasures
that would further strain and ultimately rupture relations
with Islamic nations. The attacks in New York and Washington
came in the wake of earlier strikes against US diplomatic
and military targets abroad, and represented in terms
of expected number of casualties and importance of the
value targets a major step up the escalation ladder, with
higher rungs to follow. Bin Laden's declarations after
the deed clearly articulated a vanguard role for Al-Qa'eda
as the spark for an epochal conflagration between Islam
and the West.
As
it assembled a broad international coalition and mobilized
its military assets for the War against Al-Qa'eda and
the Taliban regime, the USG has strenuously sought to
draw a clear-cut distinction between odious global terrorism
on the one hand, and Islam as a benevolent major world
religion with millions of US adherents on the other. Key
US allies, including British and other European leaders,
have articulated this strongly and often as well. The
eventual coalition became very broad-based, and eventually
included most relevant Islamic countries worldwide.
In
the Middle East, most governments have long recognized
the threat to their own stability and the economic cost
to their societies represented by militant Islam. They
were quick to denounce the 9/11 perpetrators, dissociate
themselves from any support for terror tactics or strategy
and provide intelligence cooperation. They have also cooperated
in some degree with the US-led effort to drain the financial
resources of international terrorism. They generally have
refrained from vocal support for US policy in Afghanistan,
however, and, perhaps more importantly, they have done
little to discourage the expression of strong anti-Western,
anti-US and pro-militant Islamic views in the media, the
educational system or the mosques. Even in Egypt, highly
influential organs of the print media, including the most
important daily newspapers--have been stridently anti-American
in their editorial coverage. This is despite the fact
that Egypt is a top recipient of US aid, a "close
friend and ally" in the region, and one of two Islamic
countries (the other being Algeria) that has been the
most heavily affected by Islamic terrorism over the past
quarter century,
The
disconnect between the privately stated support of most
Arab governments for US policy against terror and the
lending of intelligence and other assistance out of the
public eye, on one hand, and the half-hearted, clear reluctance
to openly promote such support or act to shore up its
public foundations, on the other, does not come as a surprise,
and has antecedents in pre-9/11 behavior. It is important,
however, that familiarity not breed an under-estimation
of the dynamics that fuel this syndrome, and of the severe
limitations such dynamics could impose on the will and
ability of these governments to provide the level of cooperation
and support we may wish to see as the main focus of our
counterterrorism operations shifts to the Arab heartland.
Negative
Factors
The
tepid Arab support for US policy, likely to slide in coming
months into passive resistance, flows from five main sources:
-
Absence
of demonstrable progress toward achieving a resolution
of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict that redeems the
Palestinians' national rights in a manner minimally
acceptable to them. This point requires no belaboring
here, except to emphasize that, in the eyes of 99.9%
of all Arabs--including their heads of state and senior
officials--it is an article of faith that the USG
has ultimate power of decision over Israeli policy,
not in every nuance or detail, and not in all immediate
circumstances, but certainly in terms of drawing clear
red lines, and structuring critical outcomes with
long-term regional consequences. In other words, it
is an immutable reality of our Middle East policy
context that the USG is held responsible for Israel's
behavior and policies. While we may strenuously deny
this reality in our declarative posture and other
public fora, to overlook it when designing policy
is simply self-defeating.
-
A
stalemated Western policy toward Iraq that appears
to be of indefinite duration, has not proved effective
in weakening Saddam Hussein's hold on power, and offers
no reprieve to the awful suffering of the Iraqi population,
now in its tenth year. The attitude of Arab officials
and other influentials toward Iraq is rife with inner
contradictions and crosscurrents. Absent the very
visible, well-documented and continuing hardships
visited on the Iraqi people by the seemingly interminable
present impasse, the US policy of "keeping Saddam
in his box" might well be acceptable to them.
Caught between the Scylla of Western armies bombing
Baghdad into oblivion and then occupying the country's
heartland to uproot a despot burrowed deep in his
nuclear-proof bunkers, and the Charybdis of an unfettered
Saddam able to coerce his neighbors and give vent
to his regional leadership ambitions, Arab leaders
find the middle ground of a neutered Iraq under tight
international supervision to be considerably attractive.
But the prevailing combination of frequent air strikes,
civilian deprivation and indefinite stalemate has
generated widespread revulsion at all levels of Arab
society, particularly as undoctored independent public
media such as satellite television and the Internet
bring coverage of Iraqi suffering to public consciousness
in frequent and vivid detail. Our current policy on
Iraq is casting a pall on US ties with all friendly
Arab governments (with the exception of Kuwait), and
has done very serious damage to the American image
in the eyes of the public, for it is taken as prima
facie evidence of blatant disregard for the value
of Arab life.
-
Weak
and continuously deteriorating macro-economic conditions
in the region are limiting the regimes in their ability
to muster support from important constituencies. The
early and mid-1990's marked a period of economic promise.
Several trends and events combined to offer hope that
a much-needed regional economic takeoff was finally
under way. They included the end of the Lebanese civil
war; the onset of the Oslo peace process with its
promise of eventual peace and Arab-Israeli joint venturing
in trade and investment; relatively stable oil prices;
significant progress on the part of important Arab
economies such as Egypt's in debt-restructuring and
budgetary rationalization; and the emergence of several
viable local stock markets that encouraged private
sector capital formation and inflows of foreign investment
on the back of a promised wave of privatization of
public enterprises.
Grim
realities have reasserted themselves in recent years.
Not only have peace prospects been dealt a serious
setback; continued military confrontations and terrorist
activities throughout the Levant and in Egypt have
seriously constricted key revenues from tourism and
frightened foreign capital away; GDP growth rates
have not kept pace with population increases; educational
systems and other infrastructural components have
deteriorated (with the partial exception of telecommunications);
and, not least, the global economic slowdown has seriously
diminished oil revenues.
The
looming possibility of a major influx of Russian and
Central Asian oil and gas supplies into world markets
in the years ahead is exacerbating anxieties in the
Arab Gulf over future revenue prospects. Although
in the past it was easy to draw a clear distinction
between Arab haves and have-nots in terms of oil revenues,
per-capita income, economic growth rates and other
indicia of development, the picture has become significantly
more muddled. Saudi Arabia provides the prime example
of the deteriorating trend in regime stability. This
is not because the overthrow of the House of Saud
is in any way imminent. In relative terms, however,
of all pivotal Arab governments, in one short decade
the Kingdom has traveled the furthest down the road
from unassailable stability and unquestioned legitimacy
into a social and economic landscape fraught with
shadows and potential pitfalls.
-
Fairly
rapid and continuing deligitimization of the current
Arab political order, an order that is generally perceived
as abetted and sustained in large measure by US military
presence and economic might. An easy bet to make
at low odds: were a sorcerer's magic wand to enable
genuinely free elections in the Arab Middle East today,
the overwhelming majority of Arab regimes, and their
sustaining institutions, would be swept from office.
This was not always the case. For several decades
in the wake of decolonization, even rulers who grabbed
power by military coup were accorded broad support
as harbingers of economic modernization and champions
of independence from foreign influence. In countries
with traditional dynastic rulers, a social compact
based on ancient tribal practices and norms, whereby
allegiance was traded for pious, just governance and
fair resource distribution, undergirded the legitimacy
of the rulers. This landscape has been convulsed in
the last quarter century.
Beginning
with the disastrous performance of the leading Arab
nationalist regimes in the 1967 Six-Day War, and ending
with the sorry record tallied up by regional governance
over the past thirty years in the provision of material
comforts, satisfying jobs and improving standards
of living for the average citizen, the march of events
has turned the excitement, hope and support of early
times into sullen, resentful resignation. The litany
of bitter disappointments that is frequently rehearsed
among politically relevant elites includes the cynical
use by a multitude of Middle Eastern parties of the
fratricidal and blood-soaked fifteen-year civil war
in Lebanon as an arena for their regional power games;
the squandering of much oil wealth accruing to the
region during the petrodollar era of the 1970's in
corruption and mismanagement; the ruinous Iraq-Iran
war, soon to be followed by the invasion and despoiling
of Kuwait, and in the re-establishment of foreign
military bases on Arab soil; and the growing intolerance
of political opposition or the mere expression of
dissent by intellectuals and the media, enforced by
increasingly efficient and pervasive internal security
organs.
The
malaise has been further accelerated and magnified
in the 1990's and into the new millennium by the synergistic
impact of globalization and the information revolution
on perceptions and expectations. The average citizen
of the Middle East knows that much of the rest of
the world is gliding down the path of economic development
and political participation at a faster rate than
he is, and is increasingly pointing the finger of
blame at his own government.
-
The undiminished specter of Jihadist Fundamentalism.
Finally, despite the major setback that Jihadist fundamentalism
is suffering in Afghanistan with the demise of the
Taliban regime and of a significant portion of the
Al-Qa'eda infrastructure and leadership, the political
challenge that it poses to the legitimacy and hold
on power of current Arab officialdom is not significantly
weakened, and in fact may be growing more robust.
The complex of issues and grievances that have provided
the motivation for Al-Qa'eda's activities is likely
to persist for some time to come, and socioeconomic
conditions prevailing in much of the Islamic world
continue to deteriorate. Equally critical is the fact
that Al-Qa'eda is not the fount of Jihadist activism,
but only its most effective and successful current
manifestation.
This
needs to be stressed, as there is an inclination among
many (within the USG but also elsewhere) to believe
that Al-Qa'eda and similar radical fundamentalist
groups are a major engine--if not the key engine--fueling
anti-US sentiment. In fact, Osama bin Laden's version
of reality is derived from, and fully mirrors, the
Salafi/Wahhabi interpretation of Islamic scripture,
history, global mission and current state of relations
between Islam and the world. To the increasing dismay
of many moderate Muslim scholars and community leaders,
this version of reality is fervently accepted by a
growing segment of Muslim opinion.
Al-Qa'eda's
only distinguishing characteristic at this point--admittedly
an important one--is the willingness to resort to
mass violence against civilians, but this may prove
to be a function of opportunity and tactical choice,
not ideological differentiation. It follows that,
bin Laden's likely personal demise notwithstanding
and despite the end of the Taliban regime and the
sanctuary it represented, the threat is not significantly
diminished. Arguably, the threat is enhanced
by the success itself of the 9/11 attacks, and this
"triumph" (even perhaps embellished in the
future by the legend of bin Laden's and Ayman al-Zawahiri's
martyrdom) may serve as a paragon and motivational
tool for individual recruitment and popular proselytizing
for the cause.
Positive
Factors
Despite
the difficulties inherent in this policy context, they
are somewhat balanced by a variety of positive elements
in the picture, of which three are of primary importance:
- Existence
of a broad international coalition--inclusive of many
Middle East countries--committed to the campaign against
terror, and visibly active in it. For obvious historical
reasons, a US effort that may require significant covert
or overt operations carried out by conventional military
assets or special forces within the territory of several
Middle Eastern states in all probability will meet stiff
resistance even from our closest allies in the region
if it is attempted unilaterally, or if it is backed
only by a handful of Western countries. The broad coalition
formed prior to the Afghanistan operations, which includes
strong Russian support, China's backing and the endorsement
of many Islamic countries, will make it far easier for
the Yemeni, Somali, Sudanese, Algerian or even Syrian
governments to acquiesce in foreign operations on their
soil or, in the case of Syria--however reluctantly--on
the territory of its Lebanese client-state. This will
be particularly the case if anti-terrorism operations
are also seen to be carried out by the coalition against
some non-Islamic targets.
Inevitably,
some coalition partners will peel off as targets become
more complex and controversial. The Afghan case was
perhaps the easiest around which a global coalition
could coalesce: the Taliban regime was widely despised
and had minimal international recognition; the enormity
of the 9/11 attacks and the pervasiveness of the Al-Qa'eda
network's presence in dozens of countries created
a clear and present danger for many governments worldwide;
and the determined posture of the USG provided no
wiggle room for potential fence-sitters. In subsequent
phases, coalition management is likely to require
strenuous ongoing diplomatic efforts and the exercise
of political and economic leverage. Despite strong
rhetoric to the contrary, most regional governments
will be supportive of US military action provided
the case is carefully prepared and substantively persuasive,
collateral damage is minimal, and the host government
is cooperative.
In
the longer run, international agreement on a set of
fairly precise definitions of what constitutes "terrorist"
behavior may become a potentially critical requirement
for successful coalition maintenance. The emergence
of such broadly accepted international norms, most
likely through the United Nations, would subject any
non-complying state actor--either as perpetrator or
as supporter--to pariah status. More importantly,
it might limit the need to mount strenuous efforts
every time to build a different international coalition
among parties that may agree on branding a particular
event as an act of terror but not another.
-
The
rapid, decisive and unconditional US victory in Afghanistan
as a demonstration of US resolve and overwhelming
military supremacy. Successful conclusion of the
war against the Taliban and Al-Qa'eda's Afghan presence
will reap many subsidiary benefits for US policy in
the Middle East. Most importantly, it will erase a
record of hesitation, tepid response and rapid retreat
if faced with loss of life when confronting difficult
Middle Eastern challenges that began with the Marines'
withdrawal from Lebanon in the mid-1980's. This perceived
"loss of nerve" by an indulgent civilization
seemingly devoted to the exclusive pursuit of materialistic
creature comforts persuaded Jihadist fundamentalists
that the West could be pushed around with impunity,
and eventually pushed out of Islamic lands (just as
that other erstwhile superpower, the USSR, had been
expelled from Afghanistan). Perhaps more critically,
regional governments came to share a similar perception
of US unwillingness to pursue tough policies to their
requisite conclusion. This was a principal reason
for the vanishing support by Arab regimes for US military
activities against Iraq that "neither fish nor
cut bait." Despite public protestations to the
contrary, a US-led military effort to end Saddam's
reign will face far less resistance in the Arab world
following the Afghan victory, provided it is carefully
prepared and carried out with minimal civilian casualties.
Second,
the deterrent effect of our Afghan action will be
felt for a long time in Middle East capitals that
have in the past directly sponsored or lent varied
levels of assistance to terrorist organizations. It
is extremely unlikely that Syria, Libya, or the Sudan
will engage in any terrorist-related activities that
may be remotely traceable to their government services
in the foreseeable future.
Third,
the very positive response of the Afghan population
to their liberation from the Taliban yoke, and the
generous and rapid commitment by the international
community to rise to the challenge of rebuilding Afghan
infrastructure and economic institutions, if sustained,
will be instrumental in repairing to some degree the
battered US/Western image in the region and in countering
the appeal of those who maintain that "Islam
is the [only] solution."
- The
abhorrent nature of the 9/11 outrage and the catastrophic
loss of innocent life as a potential turning point in
the internal battle for hearts and minds within the
Islamic world community. Even a tragic event of
the magnitude of 9/11 may have its silver lining. Within
the Islamic world, it may catalyze a long-overdue reaction
on the part of modernizing; reformist forces against
the fundamentalist trend on the ascendant since the
Khomeini-led revolution in Iran a quarter-century ago.
As
already observed, the fundamentalist trend, although
representative of a minority of Muslims, remains in
an expansionary mode. In recent years, it has been
abetted by strong financial and political support
by the Saudi establishment, in a misguided efflorescence
of Wahhabi religious zeal and nouveaux riche hubris,
combined with the ruling family's imperative to guard
against the Shiite challenge for Islamic leadership
represented by Khomeini's Iran, and the need to mollify
crucial domestic religious constituencies opposed
to the continued presence of foreign military forces
and uncomfortable with the incipient cosmopolitanism
of Saudi society. This Wahhabi push reinforced and
complemented a renewed assertiveness by the Muslim
Brotherhood and similar movements long active in Egypt,
Jordan, Syria, the Sudan, Lebanon and North Africa,
as well as like-minded organizations in Turkey, Pakistan,
Indonesia and the newly independent states of central
Asia. Against this rising tide of austere Sunni religiosity
that asked for Jihad and offered up the hope of a
return to the glory days of earliest Islam when the
"Salaf" (the Predecessors) quickly forged
the most powerful and advanced empire of the age,
the mild, accommodationist, state-controlled (and
therefore compromised) religious establishments could
offer little challenge.
Jihadist
fundamentalism bred Osama bin Laden and his Al-Qa'eda
coalition, however, and their extreme interpretation
of Jihadi tactics and strategy led to the Pyrrhic
victory of 9/11, followed in short order by the threatened
use of weapons of mass destruction against the "non-believers."
As Arab opinion gradually came to terms with the reality
that Muslims indeed were the perpetrators of the 9/11
outrage, and began to tally up the costs and consequences,
a noticeable recoiling from the fundamentalist message
is taking place, even within many conservative Arab
circles. Furthermore, the Taliban regime has offered
the Islamic world a sobering vision of what an uncompromisingly
pure Sunni Islamic state true to the most literal
reading of scripture could end up like. Combined with
the increasingly vocal repudiation of clerical rule
in Shiite Iran by the younger generations and a growing
spectrum of disenchanted intellectual and economic
elites, sufficient elements are falling into place
for the emergence of an Islamic reformation movement
bent on salvaging the Muslim community from a chain
of events that could perhaps trigger an epochal confrontation
carrying untold social and economic risks, not just
with secularizing and modernizing forces within Islamic
lands, but with the rest of the world as well.
Certainly,
the probability that such a reformation movement will
emerge is much higher after 9/11 than would have been
the case in its absence. At the World Trade Center
in New York bin Laden succeeded far beyond his expectations,
but in so doing he overreached, perhaps fatally. What
he planned as the potential spark of the ultimate
Jihad by Muslims against the infidel West may turn
out to be the pivotal catalyst of a historic struggle
within the House of Islam itself for the right to
chart its future.
On
balance, the outlook for US policy on counterterrorism
is constructive. In reaching this important conclusion,
a critical distinction must be drawn between words and
deeds. At the declaratory level, evolving conditions
in the region are currently exacerbating the resistance
that an active US anti-terror campaign will elicit in
the Arab Middle East. This resistance is likely to manifest
itself not just among the vast majority of the intellectual
and religious elite that is critical in shaping mass political
opinion throughout the region, and on the part of political
parties, professional associations, trade groups and similar
mobilizational institutions, and even segments of the
officer corps. It will also affect the statements of political
leaders and senior government officials, whose hold on
power is becoming, in their own eyes, progressively less
secure in the current environment. At the action level,
however, our efforts are unlikely to meet such severe
opposition as to dissuade us from pursuing vigorously
the war against terror, or jeopardize other vital US interests
in the region. In the presence of a common stance by the
United States, the Europeans and other important international
players, and at a time of generalized economic weakness
and increased dependence on foreign financial inputs,
fear of the threat that the Islamists pose to the legitimacy
of the ruling elites will trump their concern over public
unrest or the criticism of some opinion-makers.
II.
Major Issues/Relationships Likely to Affect
US Policy in the Medium Term
- Israel/Palestine
Conflict
It
has become a truism that the regional environment for
our anti-terror operations, and US policy generally, will
become significantly more benign (defined in terms of
level of cooperation by governments and acceptance by
their populace) if a resumption of the peace process can
be achieved. An older truism that is part of the historical
lore of the Arab-Israeli confrontation, and has proven
repeatedly true, is that there is no standing still. If
we are not moving forward we are moving back, and possibly
stepping right into the void. Events since the outbreak
of the second Intifada in late 1999, the interruption
of the Oslo process, and the subsequent election of Israel's
current Prime Minister Ariel Sharon had by mid-December
2001 certainly reached the edge of the abyss.
The
factual background is well known and need not be detailed
here. No better or more pithy diagnosis of the current
impasse can be found than the Report issued on 21 May
2001 by the international Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding
Committee headed by former US Senator George Mitchell.
Based on the current state of play, the following may
be postulated:
- Palestinian
Authority/Arafat: Both the USG and Israel believe
Chairman Yasser Arafat and his PA have at their command
sufficient coercive capacity to subdue all actors
within the Palestinian arena engaged in acts of violence
against Israeli targets. Such actors include Islamist
organizations such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, and
secular organizations such as the PFLP (Popular Front
for the Liberation of Palestine) and rogue elements
within the PLO. Arafat's failure heretofore to control
these organizations is a conscious act of choice.
Equally volitional was Arafat's decision in the fall
of 2000 to tolerate first the outbreak and then the
continuation of the Intifada, despite ongoing efforts
to forge ahead with the peace process, culminating
in the Taba negotiations of January 2001. Tolerating
"armed struggle" spared Arafat the domestic
dangers and uncertainties of a crackdown on increasingly
popular forces that could potentially escalate into
a full-fledged Palestinian civil war, and simultaneously
applied wearying pressures on the Israeli body politic
that--as in South Lebanon--might produce tradeoffs
and concessions.
Should
a stable cease-fire be achieved in the medium term
and the peace process resume, terms minimally acceptable
to any viable Palestinian interlocutor (meaning
one able to negotiate a peace agreement to its conclusion
and implement it) include a Palestinian state with
control over the entire West Bank and Gaza (with
border adjustments and some territorial exchanges
that preserve large Israeli settlements near the
1967 Green Line); no Israeli military presence in
the Jordan River valley and other strategically
valuable points or IDF protection for Israeli settlements
that may remain on Palestinian territory; a capital
seat in a Jerusalem with divided (or shared) sovereignty;
and a definitive resolution to the refugee problem
implementing right-of-return provisions. On this
last, most difficult of all issues, PA negotiators
have stated that they do not seek to endanger the
demographic viability of Israel as a Jewish state,
and have described ideas for implementation that
would result in a minimal repatriation of Palestinians
to Israel proper. In essence, the terms mutually
agreed to by PA and Israeli negotiators at Taba
in January 2001--the culmination of an excruciating
eight-year long Oslo process--are, though incomplete,
a high-watermark that the PA will consider as an
irreducible starting point for any renewed peace
talks.
- Israel:
Labor-led Israeli governments have often proven willing
to forge ahead with the peace process despite periodic
Palestinian terrorist attacks on Israeli civilians.
Likud governments have not and will not. No meaningful
progress was achieved during the Netanyahu period
despite the heroics at the Wye Plantation, and Sharon's
election in February 2001 brought the process to a
complete halt. Israeli governments controlled by the
Right have no intrinsic interest in the success of
a process that will eventuate in the large-scale dismantling
of existing settlements and the surrender of most
of the West Bank. A significant portion (possibly
a majority) of the Likud constituency, representing
not less than 15-20% of the total Jewish Israeli population,
is opposed to such a solution on strongly held ideological
and religious grounds. An even larger proportion of
the population feels great ambivalence because of
deep-seated security concerns. Despite the Begin/Sinai
precedent, no Likud-led government will negotiate
terms minimally acceptable to any Palestinian interlocutor
under any currently foreseeable circumstances.
After
repeatedly voicing serious concerns about the course
of US Middle East policy post-9/11, warning that appeasement
of the Muslim world at Israel's expense would not
be acceptable, Prime Minister Sharon has responded
to the escalated Hamas campaign of violence with harsh
military counterattacks that have targeted not only
terrorist suspects but also the PA's security infrastructure,
important Palestinian assets such as the Gaza Airport,
and Arafat's own private air transportation. This
strategy is aimed at pressuring Arafat into effectively
curtailing terrorist operations, and is highly popular
among the traumatized Israeli public. It does have
the added benefit from the perspective of the Israeli
Right of decreasing chances for an early resumption
of substantive peace negotiations beyond the narrowly
defined security arena.
- US
Policy: Following a period of non-engagement after
the failure of Camp David and the change of US administrations,
the USG in the wake of 9/11 is seeking to re-start
the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. This is viewed
correctly as important for long-term regional stability
and, more immediately, as critical for maintaining
broad Arab support in the war on terror in its post-Afghan
phases. In a departure that has been well received
in the Arab World, the President has explicitly described
a "State of Palestine" as an ultimate component
of a peaceful solution, and signaled sustained future
engagement in the process with the appointment of
the Zinni mission. Secretary of State Powell has even
intimated that American proposals may be forthcoming.
But the PA must first assert its effective control
over Palestinian terror, to be followed by implementation
of the Mitchell Report.
Confounding
expectations, however, reinvigorated US engagement
has produced a paroxysm of violence. General Zinni's
mission has been engulfed in a sea of Palestinian
suicide bombings of Israeli civilians and sundry
acts of violence against settlers and Israeli military
positions, countered by heavy use of Israeli armor
and air power in incursions within Area A territories
controlled by the PA with equally heavy loss of
Palestinian civilian lives and continued assassination
of Hamas and other operatives. The survival itself
of the PA as a viable structure of governance on
the West Bank and Gaza is in jeopardy. Why?
- Hamas:
The clear reason is that a strategic decision has
been reached by Hamas to challenge the political primacy
of the PA, even if this leads to the unraveling of
the gains of Oslo and a restoration of direct Israeli
control over portions of the West Bank and Gaza. Hamas
is capitalizing on a surge in popularity that has
drawn it even with support for Arafat (at approximately
30%), and is determined to preempt a US/Israeli/PA
effort to defang it, or worse.
In
the past, Hamas and Islamic Jihad, both spawned
by the Muslim Brotherhood and animated by Islamist
Jihadist ideology, have made it abundantly clear
that they are committed to opposing any final peace
with Israel. They have only gone along with the
PA's role in the peace process as an interim step,
pending the emergence of a more favorable balance
of forces between the Arab world and Israel down
the road. With the escalation of hostilities during
the Intifada and the hard-line position taken by
the Sharon government, the defiant stance of the
Islamist groups has earned them much popular support,
even among the uncommitted. Hamas has determined
that the time has come for a fateful challenge of
the PLO's mandate to lead the Palestinian people.
USG
steps to tighten the noose on Hamas and other similar
groups in the wake of 9/11 render any further delay
unwise. The arrival of General Zinni heralded the
beginning of a determined US effort to bring about
enforcement of the Mitchell Report security provisions,
to be followed by serious peace efforts. With frustration
within the occupied territories at a peak and Israeli
countermeasures at full throttle (short of outright
invasion, which is unwanted for it could cripple
Hamas activities within the PA), conditions
may never be riper for an effective challenge. Hence
the escalation of suicide bombings and other attacks,
in the expectation that a PA clampdown will eventually
spark a broad revolutionary uprising. Part of Hamas'
calculus is that loyalty to Arafat within the PA
security establishment generally and even within
Fatah itself has been eroded significantly in the
past two years.
Against
this background, how is the US anti-terrorism campaign
likely to affect prospects for peace negotiations over
the medium term? The likely impact is mixed. On the positive
side, the need to maintain Arab support for the campaign
practically dictates a strong push by the USG and the
international community to get talks going again, if and
when the Mitchell Report recommendations are implemented.
Also, the new zero tolerance for terror will make it impossible
for Arafat to continue his two-pronged strategy. Henceforth,
he will have to drop the gun and seize the olive branch
with both hands. If he is able to prevail in taming the
Hamas opposition, the pressure on Israel to re-engage
with the PA will become intense. This, in turn, will force
the Sharon government into significant concessions on
the settlements issue (as part of the Mitchell process),
or bring about the fall of the current coalition government.
On
the negative side, the hardening of the US attitude toward
any terrorist acts is forcing the pace of the confrontation
between the PA and Hamas and other Islamist forces, to
whom anti-Arafat secular and nationalist elements also
may be tactically allied. What the outcome may be is highly
uncertain. Reliable polls indicate that fully one-third
of Palestinian opinion in the territories is presently
uncommitted, and could lean in either direction. Nor is
it possible to forecast when the situation will stabilize.
In addition to the uncertainties surrounding the actual
strength of either camp in a showdown, events such as
the assassination of Arafat (whose mantle cannot be assumed
by any one of his lieutenants) or of the founder and spiritual
leader of Hamas, Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, could have incalculable
ripple effects. Should circumstances dictate that we become
heavily engaged on several Middle East fronts at once
in the counterterrorism effort, this may trigger counter-punches
by targeted parties such as Iraq, Iran, or Syria through
aid to surrogates in the Palestinian theater. In the current
environment, it would be foolhardy to believe that the
situation in the West Bank and Gaza can be carefully controlled
or calibrated by any party, foreign or domestic.
On
balance, the highest probability (60%) medium-term projection
is as follows: under unrelenting US/European/Israeli pressure,
the PA clamps down hard on Hamas, Islamic Jihad, rogue
Fatah elements and other parties engaged in violence against
Israel. While terror operations against civilians in Israel
proper are significantly reduced, the internal confrontation
gathers strength, verging on civil war. Acts of violence
against Jewish settlers and Israeli military units beyond
the Green Line occur periodically, but the PA is held
to have curbed violence enough that implementation of
Israel's share of the Mitchell recommendations is now
required. In this volatile environment, and under strong
pressure from Arab governments and European allies, the
USG finds itself compelled to lean on the Sharon government
for a complete freeze on settlement expansion, lifting
of restrictions on movement within the territories, transfer
of PA tax revenues, and a commitment to resumption of
the peace talks. A political crisis in Israel over the
fate of the governing coalition and settlements policy
delays the onset of peace talks. In any case, deep mutual
mistrust on the part of all Palestinians and Israelis
makes progress on substantive issues extremely difficult
in a crisis environment within both societies. To keep
the lid on bubbling destabilizing forces and provide some
momentum, the USG becomes more forthcoming with American
proposals designed to put the moral and political weight
of the United States behind final status compromises both
sides need to make but are unable domestically to produce
on their own.
Under
this scenario, the primary impact of the counterterrorism
campaign on Israeli-Palestinian affairs is: (a) to force
an extended and defining showdown between the PA and Hamas
within the Palestinian camp, and (b) thrust the USG into
a leading role in the peace process for the first time
as a "definer" of final status compromise solutions.
A
less likely projection (30%) finds Hamas gradually emerging
with the upper hand in the political arena that forces
the PLO into a power/sharing arrangement with Islamist
forces. This development postpones the onset of peace
negotiations beyond the medium term, even if optimally
the Mitchell plan is unfolding as Hamas temporarily refrains
from violence against Israel proper. Intense US and Israeli
opposition to the further entrenchment of Hamas in the
power structure is expressed in a variety of ways, including
diplomatic, financial and possibly (Israeli) military
measures. Such opposition does not prove decisive, however,
as the US in particular is hampered and distracted by
the needs of higher priority theaters in the war against
terror in other parts of the Middle East and in South
Asia (e.g., the year 2002 could be dominated by a highly
dangerous Indian-Pakistani confrontation over Pakistan-supported
Mujahedeen groups that will deeply engage the USG). In
the longer run, this is clearly not a stable equilibrium
in the Israeli/Palestinian arena, but assuming a cease-fire
that holds and continuity in the current Israeli governing
coalition, an uneasy stalemate could evolve that lasts
several years. Paradoxically, from Sharon's perspective,
this may turn out to be the preferred outcome.
Finally,
a low but not negligible probability (10%) must be assigned
to a worst-case scenario, in which a combination of virtual
civil war within the PA that becomes prolonged and inconclusive,
and one or more acts of terror against Israeli civilians
resulting in a very high number of casualties prompt Israel
to cut the Gordian knot and reoccupy PA-controlled territories,
dismantle the PA and return the situation basically to
the status-quo ante 1994. Although such a drastic step
would likely prompt Egypt and Jordan to suspend diplomatic
relations and might unleash a wave of random attacks on
US property and citizens in a number of Islamic countries,
military retaliation by any Arab state would not occur.
Nor is it at all likely that the "oil weapon"
would be resorted to in any systematic fashion, in view
of the current state of oil markets and the very heavy
dependence of the oil-producing states on already reduced
export revenues. US relations with friendly Arab governments
would be severely damaged, however, as Washington will
be perceived to have given a green light for any such
far-reaching Israeli move. Egyptian, Saudi or Jordanian
participation in any joint campaign with the US against
Iraq or support for our efforts in other countries within
or outside the region would not be forthcoming, nor would
we be able to use US military facilities in the Gulf for
counterterrorism purposes. Whether the USG would be willing
to condone or condemn Israel's behavior might depend on
the nature of the terrorist action that triggered the
Israeli invasion. In light of our current global mission
and stated policy priorities, and the state of mind of
the US public and Congress, a terrorist strike that took,
say, 200-300 Israeli civilian lives in the context of
a chaotic situation within the PA, regardless of the identity
of the perpetrator, would make it very difficult for the
USG not to back the Israeli action.
- Relations
with Key Friendly States
Broadly
speaking, our counter-terror campaign is unlikely to destabilize
our ties with Egypt, Saudi Arabia or Jordan. All three
governments share a strong purpose with the US in containing
Islamist extremism, and their substantial dependence on
US financial and/or security inputs, coupled with the
convincing demonstration of American resolve in seeing
this struggle through as a vital national interest, make
any breach highly unlikely. The only contingency that
might produce serious discord would be developments along
the lowest-probability scenario (described above) in the
Palestinian/Israeli arena (particularly for Jordan, where
the spillover impact of events within the PA could be
far-reaching). For reasons both of Arab solidarity and
religious identity, the "Palestinian Cause"
historically has exerted an influence on the behavior
of all Arab governments that transcends narrowly defined
state interests. This characteristic may become even more
pronounced in the period ahead. The religious significance
of any events impinging on the current status or future
of the Muslim holy places in Jerusalem takes on particular
resonance at times of stress in relations between Islam
and the rest of the world.
Strong
rhetoric notwithstanding, a US-led move against Iraq will
not be seriously opposed by Arab allies. A persuasive
case must be made, but not for Saddam Hussein's culpability
in sponsoring terrorism. Sufficient grounds exist on the
WMD front alone to fit the bill, and no one in the Middle
East, even at the street level, harbors any illusions
about the tender mercies of Saddam toward his own people.
What Arab capitals will require is a persuasive case that
the drive against Baghdad will be carried through to successful
conclusion.
Such
a case can be made much more easily in the wake of Afghanistan,
but it must be made explicitly and in detail. Particularly
critical will be the military strategy to be pursued in
any anti-Iraq campaign, and the political formula to be
proposed for a post-Saddam Iraq, since the principal fear
of Saudi Arabia and Turkey in particular is of the emergence
of autonomous Shiite and Kurdish entities in a post-Saddam
environment that cannot be kept in check by a strong central
government.
On
the military level, the success of the Afghan model may
favor a gradual-buildup approach based on strengthening
the opposition forces within a protected northern Iraq
sanctuary in the Kurdish areas that would then be used
as a launch pad for a mixed air/ground onslaught. Any
ground offensive that relies heavily on indigenous components
would still face a formidable opponent in the Iraqi army.
Inevitably, if Saddam is to be dislodged by military force
(rather than by palace coup or revolution), a massive
air campaign will need to be mounted that will bear the
major burden of destroying Iraq's military assets, internal
security apparatus, and installations that are known or
suspected of having WMD potential. Clearly, such a campaign
runs the risk of inflicting serious collateral damage
on the civilian population and the country's economic
infrastructure. Perhaps more ominously, it may unleash
lethal biological, chemical or nuclear agents locally
and regionally in the course of destroying them. Not to
target such agents, at least partially, may prove unacceptably
risky since they may be put to use by the Iraqis. In such
circumstances, to gain the cooperation of neighboring
states, particularly if bases and military assets stationed
on their territory will be involved, will require close
prior consultation with them and even some degree of participation
in operational planning. This may be demanded by other
actively participating non-Middle East members of the
coalition as well, such as NATO countries.
As
for the political end-game, it is highly probable that
prior agreement will need to be marshaled around a mutually
agreed structure for Iraq's governance that allays regional
fears of a partitioned or highly decentralized regime
resulting from the war that would allow much room for
dangerous gamesmanship by a variety of interested parties,
especially Iran. Such prior agreement may not be realistically
achievable beyond the level of some general principles
and commitments, but a significant amount of pre-campaign
diplomacy will be required.
The
difficulties inherent in all this preparatory work, on
both the military and political levels, underscores the
challenge for the USG that confronting Iraq represents.
Nonetheless, a major upside is that the process itself
will serve the critical purpose of demonstrating incontestably
to the regional governments concerned our determination
to put an end to Saddam Hussein's rule. Such "educational"
effect will be sufficient both to ensure that opposition
to our policy will be limited and confined to traditional
critics of the US, and that our regional allies do provide
a measure of active support to the campaign. Such support
is likely to be forthcoming from both Saudi Arabia and
Egypt, while Jordan may choose to keep the lowest profile
possible in light of its vulnerability to destabilizing
pressures from its mixed demographics.
Iraq
aside, the only other theater of the anti-terror war that
may elicit a measure of coordinated opposition by our
regional friends is Lebanon. Unquestionably, the absence
of a strong authority in Beirut and the legacy of the
long civil war have allowed a variety of armed factions
and political movements to act independently of government
control. The Syrian presence has provided shelter to some
of these groups, even though they have not been particularly
active in recent years. The most important of them, however,
Hizballah, has emerged lately as perhaps the most potent
and certainly the most disciplined and effective political
force in the country. Among all the organizations that
appear on the State Department's list of terror groups,
it is the only one that has substantial political representation
in its home country's parliament and maintains an infrastructure
of social, educational, medical and charitable institutions
that are fully recognized by the state and integrated
into the structural fabric of the country. As the only
group that fought Israeli control of southernmost Lebanon
throughout the 1990's and is credited with having succeeded
in forcing Israel's withdrawal, Hizballah has acquired
a stature domestically that transcends its Shiite base.
Its role as liberator of South Lebanon has legitimized
its almost total transformation from a small, armed faction
created by a foreign entity (Iran) and using hijackings,
kidnappings and other forms of armed violence as its main
modus operandi in 1982 into a respected and full-fledged
participant in the Lebanese political system.
Hizballah
thus exhibits several unique characteristics among the
designated targets of our anti-terror campaign. This poses
some differentiated challenges in case of a decision to
move against this organization, absent a major terrorist
act attributable to it on non-Lebanese territory. For
one, strong opposition could be expected on the part of
Lebanon's government and most of the public at large,
including the leadership of non-Shiite communities. Syria
and Iran would naturally object vehemently, but there
would be considerable opposition as well among most of
our Arab allies. Their objections would be based on justifiable
concerns that the still fragile and complex Lebanese social
and political construct could be seriously destabilized,
and on the inescapable link that would be made with US
support for Israel. There would be considerable sympathy
for these arguments among our European allies as well.
Europeans have recently sought to draw a distinction between
Hizballah's political and military arms, and have engaged
in dialogue with it at official levels in an effort to
persuade the group to lay down its weapons and become
a purely political movement. Such an evolution is unlikely
in the medium term, and for as long as Syria remains deadlocked
with Israel over the disposition of the Golan Heights
and is able to dictate events in Lebanon.
On
targets other than Iraq and the Lebanese Hizballah, our
regional allies should be expected to provide meaningful
support in intelligence-sharing, tracking of financial
assets, and even military assistance where needed, the
latter particularly on the part of Egypt in areas like
the Sudan and Somalia. In Cairo and in Amman, whatever
reluctance we may encounter will be motivated not by substantive
disagreement with our policies but by concern over how
the "street" may react, a calculus that may
vary depending on the general regional political temperature
at the time, but which should not prove an impediment
to the limited and largely covert types of assistance
we may require of these two governments. Although socioeconomic
conditions in Egypt may deteriorate further over the medium
term, President Mubarak will keep any challenges from
the Islamist forces well in hand within this time frame.
Our
relationship with Saudi Arabia could face some rough patches,
however, and merits more detailed treatment. Three principal
arenas of discord can be identified, in rough ascending
order of combined sensitivity (from the Saudi perspective)
and probability of occurrence. First is oil pricing issues.
The margin of flexibility on the pricing of crude for
the Kingdom has been rapidly disappearing. Historically,
a fairly safe assumption could be made that, in situations
where an irreducible conflict existed between higher prices
for OPEC crude and vital economic interests of the United
States and its major industrial allies, Saudi Arabia would
eventually opt for an accommodative stance on production
levels that would ease price pressures. There were periods
when the Saudis would take a on a "swing producer"
role to maintain price stability, and periods when they
would produce at much higher levels than their income
needs required in order to keep prices from escalating.
The
era of bountiful revenue surpluses and large financial
reserves has now been over for quite some time. During
the second half of the 1990's, high average economic growth
rates, particularly in the industrial countries ex-Japan,
served to camouflage the Kingdom's increasingly tenuous
financial condition. Should the current economic weakness
in the United States and Europe prove longer-lived than
currently anticipated, and a relatively mild winter compound
the depressed demand for crude, the Saudis are likely
to opt for a hawkish stance on pricing that will mark
a sharp departure from conventional policies.
A
second arena for medium-term frictions may be created
by the USG's aggressive campaign to curtail financial
support for international terrorist networks. Riyadh should
be expected both to facilitate intelligence assistance
and to cooperate in opening up to inspection the records
of financial institutions on specific suspect names provided
by the USG. Of course, the Saudis profess--and clearly
believe--that this is in their own self-interest, as their
regime is indeed a primary intended target of Al Qa'eda
and similarly minded groups. Stiff resistance is likely
to be offered, however, to any demands for a more comprehensive,
blanket surveillance of and accountability for the sources
and ultimate uses of charitable contributions and other
donations by the Saudi private sector. Cultural dissonance
may leads us to expect and demand of the Saudi system
more than it can bear to provide, and we should guard
against ultimately counterproductive efforts on this front.
Western
models of accountability and transparency in financial
transactions will find limited acceptability in the context
of Saudi Arabia (or other Gulf states), even in a diluted
form and despite a foundation of good will on all sides.
The root of such ultimate intractability lies in the fact
that charitable giving, or Zakat, in Islam is one of the
five fundamental fara'ed (plural of faridah) or religious
duties that must be performed by all faithful believers,
and is second in importance only to prayer. In Saudi Arabia
and other countries governed solely by the Shari'a, where
no taxation system in the Western sense of the term exists,
Zakat is the functional equivalent of the income tax.
The amount of Zakat owed is determined by specific and
variable percentages of income and revenue provenance,
and is levied by the individual on himself/herself as
a matter of honor and religious duty.
Consequently,
for all Saudis of means, the amounts to be given away
to charitable institutions annually are very substantial,
and in the aggregate represent billions of dollars. These
large sums are donated to and distributed through a dense
network of mosques, religious societies, cultural and
educational associations and institutions, down to the
level of multitudinous individual recipients (both domestic
and foreign, since distinctions based on national citizenship
are irrelevant within an Islamic religious context) that
lies at the heart of the country's social fabric. To bring
all such activities under some form of centralized accounting
system that would make more than a token dent in the flow
of that minimal fraction of total charitable giving that
ends up in terrorist hands would be practically infeasible
and politically intolerable.
The
third and potentially most contentious set of issues is
also the most sensitive. It relates to the jarring disparity
between the official stance of the Saudi ruling family
and government toward the United States and the West,
on one hand, and the cultural values and norms that govern
Saudi Arabia's place in and relationship to the non-Islamic
world--i.e. the weltanschauung that guides and inspires
Saudi society--on the other. The official stance, and
most of its policy manifestations, has been, with very
few exceptions, one of friendship and cooperation, sometimes
bordering on outright alliance. It culminated in the course
of the 1990-91 Gulf War with the return of a long-term
US military presence to the Kingdom as part of an operation
that cemented the American role as ultimate guarantor
of the security of the Saudi State. This close relationship
is further cemented in the commercial sphere by the presence
of upwards of 20,000 US citizens who live and work in
the Kingdom within the energy industry, as advisors to
governmental bodies and financial institutions, and as
middle and senior ranking management throughout the private
sector. The recent opening of the Saudi gas sector to
participation by US and other Western energy companies,
and negotiations under way for the Kingdom's accession
to the World Trade Organization, are evidence of a growing
tolerance for openness to the outside world on pivotal
economic issues.
In
sharp contrast to the political/diplomatic and commercial
facets of the relationship stand the social and cultural
facets. In the latter, the controlling descriptive terms
would be: distancing, antagonistic, dismissive, segregative.
From the almost total social separateness of foreigners
residing in the Kingdom from Saudi nationals (residentially,
educationally, and at practically all levels of interaction
beyond the workplace and retail shopping), to the inculcation
of Wahhabi values into Saudis at home, at school and in
daily life that discourage openness to anything not strictly
Islamic, warn against fraternization with "unbelievers,"
and demand shunning of, if not active opposition to, practices
and institutions deemed incongruent with the one true
path, the Saudi system is designed to cognitively and
experientially isolate the good Muslim as much as possible
and protect him/her from the corrupting influence of the
alien Other. This strong ethos of Wahhabi exceptionalism
was nurtured for two centuries in a tribal environment
largely isolated from the outside world by the vastness
of the Arabian desert, and became enshrined in the practice
and institutions of the new state after the unification
of the Saudi kingdom by a ruling dynasty dependent for
its legitimacy on the support of venerated religious scholars.
It can become lethal when mated to politically inspired
causes that justify extreme violent action by reference
to Qoranic texts and other religious injunctions.
Propelled
by oil-generated state wealth and the charitable contributions
of the private sector, the Wahhabi worldview has been
propagated throughout the Sunni Islamic world, and continues
to gain adherents. Over the past several decades it has
breathed new life into the Muslim Brotherhood in many
Arab countries, and co-opted the Deobandi movement in
South Asia. It is what motivates the Saudi Osama bin Laden,
the Egyptian Ayman Al-Zawahiri, the Pakistani Moulana
Mazhoor Azhar, and the Philippine Salamat Hashim. Defanging
Al Qa'eda in its Afghanistan home base is a significant
step forward. But the long march against Islamic fundamentalist
violence is unlikely to make the wide strides required
to reach the goal of neutralizing this threat on a permanent
basis unless a theological battle is waged within Islam
itself that shrinks the universe of potential recruits
to a very small number that can be effectively contained
through military preemption, highly vigilant intelligence
work, and technological defenses.
In
this theological battle, the Saudi religious establishment
(along with key leading Islamic religious centers such
as Al-Azhar in Egypt), must be engaged in the front ranks
for the effort to have a reasonable chance of success.
It will be a painful and extended process of engagement.
It will require by necessity tortured theological skirmishes
among senior religious scholars on important matters of
faith. It will force fundamental soul-searching on the
part of Wahhabi 'ulama about the role of long-held doctrinal
beliefs and their impact on how Muslims will accommodate
to increasingly invasive global forces in a shrinking
and fast-changing world. In a religion where no clerical
hierarchy exists that can impose an authoritative and
mandatory version of interpretive dogma on all believers,
a laborious process of argumentation, re-education and
outright "deprogramming" will be required if
fundamentalist Islam is to succeed in casting off the
strains of violent Jihad against the infidel Other that
have been woven into its fabric
If
the presumption that such a "detoxification"
of Wahhabism and its variants is a prerequisite for effective
containment of international terrorism by Islamic Jihadists
is correct, at some point it will have to be incorporated
into the USG's strategy for waging the current struggle.
This means that we must see to it that the curricula of
religious schools (Madrassas) in certain Islamic countries
are vetted for content, that incitement to Jihad is expunged
from the Friday sermons of preachers recruited and employed
by government agencies who are sent abroad to minister
in mosques built with government or ruling family funds,
and that Fatwas issued by militant scholars are not left
unchallenged. If and when counterterrorism measures adopted
by the US-led coalition come to include such tactics,
the impact on relations between the Saudi government and
the West could be highly corrosive, since the Al-Saud
may be forced to risk a confrontation on religious grounds
with the Wahhabi establishment that has bestowed on them
the mantle of political legitimacy. This would be a dangerous
exercise even under ideal conditions, and the ruling family
will shy away from it unless confronted with overwhelming
pressures.
- Effect
of the Counterterrorism Campaign on Regional Alignments
The
Arab world today is more divided politically and its component
states are more likely to act and react to events in a
more differentiated and individualized fashion according
to narrowly defined state interests than at any time in
the past half-century. Despite the warning issued at the
recent Arab League meeting of Arab foreign ministers in
Damascus that the US would lose all support should it
expand its counterterrorism efforts to any member states,
a coordinated pan-Arab response in highly improbable.
The only likely exception would be in reaction to an Israeli
reoccupation of the West Bank and Gaza that eliminates
the Palestinian Authority.
In
fact, beyond the Palestine question, no one issue has
served as a rallying point for united action by all pivotal
regional powers since the heyday of Arab nationalism in
the 1950's. Other patterns of alignment that held sway
for certain periods of time in later years, such as Revolutionary
Radicals vs. Conservative Monarchies, or Egypt-led bloc
vs. Iraq-led bloc, or Soviet client states vs. Western
client states, are no longer relevant. As the regional
state system has matured with the passage of time, and
economic pressures and demands have come to the fore,
and particularly in the aftermath of the Soviet Union's
demise, stable regional alignments have practically disappeared.
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 dealt the coup de grace
to any remaining notions that a supra-state national solidarity
or commonality of interest overrode narrow state or regime
considerations. The integrationist pan-Arab ideal had
already been dealt a body blow by the emergence of the
Islamic republic of Iran on the ruins of the Pahlavi throne
and the impetus the Khomeini victory gave to the forces
of political Islam. For the committed fundamentalist in
particular, but also for the vast majority of Middle Easterners
who continue to find in religion their core identity,
the only Ummah that commands allegiance is the Islamic
one.
Sub-regional
blocs, such as the Gulf Cooperation Council, do provide
a forum for a limited amount of coordination. But even
within a homogeneous grouping such as the GCC, important
divisions characterize foreign and security policy. The
prime example is the split between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia
on Iraq policy. In another instance of the intense disunity
that reigns in the area today, despite continuous efforts
by Egypt to reassert its leadership role in regional affairs,
it is remarkable indeed, in light of the size, location
and historic role of this country, that it cannot count
on the secure allegiance or support of any other state
in the region at this time, except perhaps as a temporary
alignment over a specific issue.
Highly
propitious from an American perspective is the fact that
the most important matter on which a large majority of
key Arab countries have acted with synchronicity in the
past decade is the repression of domestic Islamic fundamentalism.
A tacit alliance on this matter has existed among Egypt,
Syria, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Algeria, and Tunisia. The
violent domestic terror campaigns directed at state institutions
and civilians by fundamentalist groups in Egypt first
and later in Algeria represented a challenge that could
not be tolerated. Even in "fundamentalist" Saudi
Arabia, the three-week takeover of the holiest of holies
in Mecca in 1979 by religious zealots rang an alarm in
Riyadh that continues to reverberate today. The mere presentation
of a letter of protest to King Fahd in 1994 by a group
of respected religious scholars and community leaders
resulted in their prompt incarceration and a severe tightening
of internal security and surveillance of religious activists.
It is a safe conclusion that this alignment will hold
in support of USG-led counterterrorism efforts in the
region in the medium term, and will be expanded by the
inclusion of countries such as Yemen and the Sudan where
the Jihadists have a substantial presence. Despite much
grinding of teeth by intellectuals in the media, government
support for our efforts will be accepted with general
passivity by the public at large, for reasons explained
earlier in this paper.
Most
problematic from a forecasting perspective is the question
of what regional alignments may emerge in response to
a coalition move against Iraq. As indicated above, despite
repeated rhetorical warnings against military action,
it is highly probable that most regional states will back
a carefully planned and persuasively determined campaign
to remove the Hussein regime. Turkish, Saudi and Kuwaiti
support will be essential from a military standpoint,
and we are unlikely to go forward without the participation
of these countries.
The
main questions revolve around the degree of backing to
be expected from Iran, Syria, Egypt and Jordan. To a substantial
degree, the positions they take will depend on the specific
circumstances they face domestically and internationally
at that point in time, which clearly lies at the far end
of our time frame, if not beyond it. Will Iran be consumed
domestically by the reformist-conservative struggle for
power? Will Syria's relations with the coalition have
been reshaped in the interim by counterterrorism measures
in Lebanon's Beqaa valley, and what will be the status
of peace talks/confrontation between Syria, Israel and
the PA? Will Egyptian and Jordanian anxieties over domestic
unrest prompt Mubarak and King Abdallah to opt for a neutral
stance? Will the overall international context prove to
be an overriding factor in the wake of another large-scale
terrorist attack that causes thousands of casualties,
perhaps through the use of a weapon of mass destruction?
In
the absence of clarity on any of these potentially critical
variables, any prediction on the ultimate regional makeup
of an anti-Iraq coalition would be fatuous. A more important
question perhaps is: would it matter? In the current state
of regional affairs in the Middle East, and in the wake
of the successful conclusion of the Afghan military campaign,
no regional alignment of forces can be identified that
would be expected to successfully resist the prosecution
of our counterterrorism campaign in the region or of a
military effort to remove the Iraqi regime from power.
- The
Gathering Crisis in Iran
The
evolving situation within Iran merits priority attention
by the USG. Perhaps no single event in the medium-term
could deal a more severe blow to the forces of Islamist
fundamentalism in the Middle East and beyond than the
fall of the conservative Mullahs from power in Tehran.
Clerical rule has failed resoundingly in promoting economic
development, and continues to fall further behind the
curve of Iranian population growth. Young Iranians, now
accounting for two-thirds of the total population, increasingly
chafe under a system that offers a mediocre education
and meager chances for economic advancement, while imposing
severe restrictions on personal behavior and freedom of
expression. Well into his second term, the reformist Prime
Minister Khatami and his non-confrontational strategy
are losing support as conservative repression intensifies.
It is only a matter of time before Khatami is forced into
a more aggressive stance. The only development that could
abort the eventual showdown between the Khatami camp and
the conservative forces led by Ayatollah Khamene'i is
a drastic upturn in the country's economic fortunes, an
unlikely eventuality which the USG should do nothing to
encourage.
As
the looming crisis in Iran deepens, the most worrisome
aspect from Washington's perspective may be the fall-out
effect on our interests of attempts by the conservative
camp to goad the USG into actions that might bring discredit
upon the reformist camp or cause it to fissure. The litmus
issue of relations with the US could turn out to be a
critical vector in the showdown. Timing may play an important
role, as events within Iran interact with the regional
reverberations of our anti-terror activities.
Two
tentative, and partly contradictory, projections suggest
themselves: (a) the more intense and widespread our counter-terror
campaign within the Middle East, the more ammunition will
the conservatives have to stoke anti-US sentiment within
Iran and siphon support away from the reformist camp;
(b) if Iraq becomes the target of a concerted US effort
to end Saddam Hussein's rule, and on the assumption that
such an effort will necessarily require coalition-building
among anti-Ba'th forces, including strong representation
by the Shi'as of southern Iraq, Tehran's desire to play
a role in influencing events in post-Saddam Iraq will
enhance chances for improvement in US-Iran relations and
thereby strengthen the Khatami reformist faction. It may
be counterintuitive but worthy of some consideration that
US interests in Iran may be set back by an activist campaign
against terrorism on a region-wide basis, but may be significantly
assisted by a campaign to take down the Hussein regime
in Baghdad.
III.
Summary Conclusion
As
the US-led campaign against terror shifts from central
Asia to the Middle East, we should expect to find at official
levels a political environment characterized by high
anxiety caused by growing insecurity, and at the popular
levels a pervasive sentiment of resentment and urgent
desire for change, certainly of current domestic conditions,
and failing that, of the reigning political order. Anti-American
sentiment beyond the ruling circles and the small entrepreneurially
oriented business sectors is near an all-time high, among
both traditional groups with strong Islamic religious
leanings and the more secularly oriented, urban sectors
of society. Regional socioeconomic conditions continue
to deteriorate, and are not being adequately addressed
by the current regimes, while repression is on the ascendant.
Nonetheless,
chances for viability of the anti-terror campaign are
moderately good. They have been enhanced by the decisive
victory in Afghanistan, both as a demonstration of US
resolve and for its deterrent effects; by the emerging
sense--based on the reaction of the Afghan population
and on the assumption that the peaceful normalization
and reconstruction of the country will proceed generally
well--that the US action was one of "liberation,"
not "aggression against Muslims"; and by the
potential role of 9/11 (and perhaps future major acts
of terrorism exacting large-scale civilian casualties)
as a trigger for a broad-based reformist movement within
mainstream Islam.
As
for the interaction between the campaign against terror
and the Palestinian/Israeli conflict, a Damoclean sword
hangs over the Palestinian/Israeli arena. In the absence
of an active peace process, one well struck terrorist
blow within Israel that compels the Sharon government
to retake the West Bank and Gaza, or the essentially uncontrollable
ripple effects of the civil war within the Palestinian
Authority could potentially cripple cooperative efforts
under wayagainst a variety of terrorist targets and could
undermine our relastions with countries throughout the
Middle East. Curbing terrorism directed at Israel proper
is an essential first step toward stabilization. An equally
important second step is an active peace process.
Despite
strong cautionary statements by Arab governments, a US-led
effort to eliminate the Saddam Hussein regime will not
be seriously opposed by Arab allies, provided it is carefully
prepared, US resolve is credibly demonstrated, and collateral
damage to civilians is minimized. Close consultation with
pivotal countries such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia, and
clear
prior agreement on a post-Saddam governing structure that
strongly discourages any fissiparous tendencies by Kurds
and southern Shi'as will be essential for the emergence
of a reluctant but permissive regional environment.
At
the bilateral level, paradoxically, relations with our
historically closest Arab ally, Saudi Arabia, could be
the most negatively affected by the aggressive pursuit
of a counterterrorism campaign, and deserve the most delicate
handling by US diplomacy. Demands on Riyadh for broad
accountability of private Saudi financial flows domestically
and abroad that may provide a "money trail"
to Islamic groups and fund some of their activities are
simply impractical except in limited, well-defined cases,
and ultimately counterproductive. Military cooperation
and improved exchange of intelligence information are
obtainable if kept at the lowest profile compatible with
effectiveness. On the other hand, and in a clear-cut departure
from traditional US policy, the Saudi rulers will need
to be pressed with vigor for proactive leadership in the
religious doctrinal battle between radical Jihadism and
mainstream non-violent Islam that must be waged if the
war against this particular variant of international terrorism
is to be won. In this effort, the USG would be well advised
to recruit the help of its own domestic Islamic community
and international partners, including both public and
private. Certainly, direct USG interventions with the
Kingdom on these matters should be kept completely out
of the public realm, but should be persistent and involve
the highest US levels, if they are to prove effective.
To have to delve into the realm of the religious is utterly
discomforting for any secular society, but vital national
interests are at stake, and the Al-Saud represent the
main gate on which we must knock if we are to see the
House of Islam reform itself.
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