Central
Asia and the South Caucasus:
Reorientations, Internal Transitions,
and Strategic Dynamics
Conference Report
October 2000
The
views expressed are those of individuals and do
no represent official US intelligence or policy
positions. The National Intelligence Council routinely
sponsors such unclassified conferences with outside
experts to gain knowledge and insight to sharpen
the level of debate on critical issues.
Executive Summary
Opening Remarks
Keynote Address
Panel I
Challenges to State-Building: Internal
Fault Lines and Impediments
Highlights From
the Discussion
Panel II
Challenges to State-Building: The
Impact of Megatrends on the Regions
Highlights From
the Discussion
Panel III
Regional Dynamics
Highlights From
the Discussion
Panel IV
View From the Periphery
Highlights From
the Discussion
Panel V
Impressions From the Field
Highlights From
the Discussion
Panel VI
Concluding Roundtable: The Outlook
of the Larger Geopolitical Environment and Key Variables
Appendixes
A.
Conference Agenda
B.
Participants
Executive
Summary
In
April 2000, the National Intelligence Council sponsored
a conference that examined the strategic dynamics
of the Central Asian countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, and the
South Caucasus countries of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and
Georgia. The conference brought together approximately
100 government and outside experts, including officials
and scholars from the countries concerned. It consisted
of six panels with presentations from more than 30
academic and regional experts, followed by question-and-answer
sessions. The purpose of the conference was not to
arrive at a consensus but to deepen understanding
of the region. The views expressed are those of
the individual participants and do not represent in
any way official US intelligence or policy positions.
Keynote presenter Gen. Anthony Zinni focused on
the 10 key challenges facing Central Asia, which
ranged from creating a national identity and reconciling
the role of Islam in society to coping with political,
economic, and military reform. Dr. James Schlesinger
made a lunch presentation that cast doubt on the
realization of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline project,
given the trade-off between means and ends.
Participants and panelists made a number of salient
points during the conference that should be considered
by those who analyze developments in the South Caucasus
and Central Asia. These observations and judgments,
however, do not necessarily represent the views
of the conference participants as a whole.
Outside
Influences and Relationships
-
Central Asia and the South Caucasus are important
because their orientation will greatly affect
the power and national security planning of
large neighboring or interested states (principally,
the United States, Russia, China, Iran, Turkey,
India, and Pakistan). How these states and others
think and act strategically in Central Asia
and the South Caucasus will influence geopolitical
alignments in the region. It is also important
to grasp how these states, and others whose
interest is acute though less direct (for example,
Israel, Japan, South Korea, some Gulf Arab states),
factor Central Asia and the South Caucasus into
their strategic thinking.
-
Conversely, the states of Central Asia and the
South Caucasus are increasingly dealing with
countries other than those we tend to see as
having the most direct interest and natural
advantages--Russia, Iran, and Turkey. The states
of Central Asia and the South Caucasus are looking
to a number of other states--for example, India,
Pakistan, Israel, China, South Korea and Japan--for
new trade possibilities and security arrangements.
All of these states are increasingly active
in both Central Asia and the South Caucasus.
-
Strategic dynamics now cascade across geographic
regions. Developments in one region can have
extensive direct, and second- and third-order
consequences other regions. Analysts must broaden
their focus and not view the region as a traditionally
defined set of states. Central Asia and the
South Caucasus are a strategic crossroads. They
must be understood and analyzed in the larger
Eurasian/Asian context if analysts are to capture
all of the cross-regional dynamics that shape
these two regions as well as the broader geopolitical
landscape around them.
-
Iran is potentially the most influential near-term
variable. If a normalization of US-Iranian relations
takes place, the entire regional picture would
change dramatically by changing the strategic
calculations of all the regional actors and
the major external actors in the two region.
-
Russia's policy will not necessarily be more
coherent or benign under President Putin. Russia
probably will continue to be weak but remain
relatively stronger than its neighbors and possess
more leverage than other actors in the Central
Asian and South Caucasus regions. Several panelists
suggested considering the implications for Central
Asia and the South Caucasus of a Russia in which
power is significantly devolved to its borderlands,
or that is even fragmented politically.
-
So long as Afghanistan remains in chaos, which
it probably will for a fairly long time, it
will be a principal contributor to the most
worrisome threats facing Central Asia: the conjunction
of narcotrafficking and militant Islam, terrorism,
and political instability.
Need
for Clarification and Differentiation
-
Western policy has been, to a large extent,
uniform with respect to the states of the former
Soviet Union: encourage political and economic
reform, minimize their dependence on regional
powers, and encourage intraregional cooperation--all
with an eye to creating an independent, generally
Western-oriented, belt of stability. A number
of conference speakers argued that this policy
may be too general and too optimistic because
the political interests, economic conditions,
and security concerns of these states are diverse
and changing. Their destinies conceivably could
differ substantially as well, as their interests
pull them in different directions.
-
Regarding the internal developments of the Central
Asian and South Caucasus states, one participant
observed that analysts have had to adjust expectations
on the pace and manner in which these states
will move toward democracy and a market economy.
These two regions face a very unsteady movement
at best and great disillusionment with both
democracy and markets because of widespread
economic hardships.
-
A student of Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs)
noted that the Western tendency to focus on
the work of capital-based, English-speaking
NGOs leads to misperceptions of civil society
in these regions, because these NGOs are in
touch with only a small part of the population.
The Western models for civil society overlook
the importance of clan structures, which are
small but extremely influential in these new
states. Western-style NGOs also neglect large
segments of the population, such as industrial
workers, farmers, and pensioners, who need to
be brought into the political system.
Social
Cost of Transition
-
A panel of young scholars with recent experience
conducting research in the field gave many illustrations
of the socially debilitating and politically
destabilizing impact of economic hardship. For
example, one researcher noted how traders use
children as collateral to be left behind until
they return with the promised goods or money.
Others argued that pervasive poverty is eroding
traditional social and communication networks.
-
The long-term implications of a generation growing
up in poverty, lacking basic education, and
increasingly enmeshed in semicriminalized societies
are disturbing and run directly counter to Western
goals for the regions.
Uncertain
Outlook
-
Several participants and panelists noted the
uncertain commitment to political pluralism
and market reform of the probable next generation
of leaders in these countries. Other panelists
noted that political strongmen will continue
to hold sway for some time.
-
Participants from the regions warned that democracy
and civil societies must develop within the
existing cultural context, not as some kind
of unnatural foreign imposition.
-
Some participants questioned the long-term viability
of Central Asia's current borders, noting that
many borders could be redrawn over time.
-
This conference report consists of the precis
of each speaker's on-the-record presentation,
which were provided by the speakers, and a summary
of the ensuing not-for-attribution discussions.
The report is intended to capture the salient
points and original arguments of the proceedings.
During the panel discussions no attempt was
made to ascertain the general view of the panel
or audience. Many of the points highlighted
in these summaries of the panel discussions
were noted because they were thought provoking
or outside of conventional wisdom. They illustrate
the richness of the discussion, but they do
necessarily reflect accepted or prevailing views
at the conference.
CONTENTS
Opening
Remarks
George
Kolt,
NIO for Russia and Eurasia, National Intelligence
Council
American engagement with Central Asia and the South
Caucasus as regions in their own right began only
a few years ago. Not surprisingly, there is much
we still have to learn. This conference attempts
to gain a new and deeper understanding of changes
in the political, economic, and strategic orientations
of each of the states of Central Asia and the South
Caucasus and to explore how these states fit into
the larger regional context. The panels were designed
to examine the character and extent of these states'
internal transitions, and the effects of these transitions
on international orientation; explore how and in
what directions the states of Central Asia and the
South Caucasus could be reorientating both within
the region and beyond; and assess the new strategic
dynamics that are unfolding throughout Eurasia.
In the past we became accustomed to thinking about
Central Asia and the South Caucasus through the
prism of Russia. Today, Russia's shadow looms large
in both regions but most states have moved in new
directions. This conference seeks to move beyond
the traditional Russia-centric filter, but is not
intended to be anti-Russian in focus. Russia will
continue to have a role to play but it will be one
among many actors in these regions. Essentially,
we do want to explore each of these countries and
regions in their own right as well as the connections
between them but without equating the two regions.
Presentations are on-the-record and will be included
in a conference report. Discussions are not for
attribution, thus speakers will be identified only
as discussants, panelists, commentators, and so
forth. The views expressed by participants and panelists
are strictly their own and not necessarily the views
of the NIC or the United States Government.
CONTENTS
Keynote
Address A
US Strategic Perspective on Central Asia
Gen.
Anthony Zinni, Commander in Chief,
United States Central Command
US Central Command (CENTCOM) is a newcomer to Central
Asia. After the demise of the Soviet Union, several
of the military commands sought to bring Central
Asia into their area of responsibility. Long deliberations
ensued over whether to include the region in the
European Command or in the Atlantic Command, both
of which lobbied to take over responsibility for
the region. CENTCOM, which is largely focused on
activities in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf,
did not seek out new responsibilities, but the Department
of Defense finally decided to grant CENTCOM responsibility
for the five Central Asian states in October 1998.
My initial impressions were that the new states
in Central Asia are "fragile" but that
the region is important as a crossroads for great
powers. There are 10 key challenges that must be
addressed by the governments in the region.
Fundamentalism
and the Role of Islam in Society
The
governments must reconcile the role of Islam in
society to counter the new fundamentalism emanating
from Afghanistan and Pakistan and to mitigate the
effects of the turmoil in the North Caucasus. This
"new jihadism" that consists of
disparate, radical groups coordinating their activities
from Afghanistan and Pakistan poses the most urgent
threat to stability in Central Asia.
Military
Reform
The
Central Asian states have inherited Soviet military
capabilities--for example, heavy motorized vehicles--that
were designed to fight the United States and the
West. These systems are not compatible with the
security problems that these states face today;
the most immediate security concerns are border
security, internal security, and narcotrafficking.
To counter these threats effectively, the governments
in the region need to restructure and re-equip their
militaries with light, highly mobile units that
can operate in mountainous terrain. This reengineering
process will require support in the areas of education,
training, and leadership development.
Power
Plays in the Region
These
fragile states are pulled in all directions by China,
Russia, the West, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, and other
actors with an interest in the region. Each actor
is driven by a different combination of interests--economic,
political, strategic, cultural, religious, or social.
Energy pipelines represent an example of the external
dynamics that will fundamentally shape Central Asia
and the South Caucasus. Which direction will the
pipeline go--north, east, south, or west? All the
surrounding states seek to secure a stake in Central
Asia's energy riches.
Regional
Identity
These
states do not view themselves through the same prism
that we do. We think of them as the "stans,"
which are part of a discrete region that is defined
by various regional organizations, such as GUUAM
(Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova)
and CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States). It
is clear that each country has its own view of the
security threats in the region. If security cooperation
is to be successful, it cannot be imposed by external
actors but rather worked out together by the external
actors and the individual states in the region.
Economic
Development
The
initial euphoria about the energy riches in the
region has led to high expectations. Until now,
those high expectations have only led to disappointment
in the region.
Soviet
Legacy
The
new states in the region struggle with a love-hate
relationship with their Soviet legacy. They seek
to discard their Soviet identity, but would like
to retain the social protection that the Soviet
system provided. Artifacts, such as national borders
that poorly correspond to ethnic groups, impede
the development of new national identities.
Search
for Identity
Each
ethnic group is searching for its own identity after
years of suppression. Given the constraints within
which they must operate, ethnic groups are striving
to reestablish themselves. The ethnicity map is
a recipe for trouble for the governments in the
region as this search for identity unfolds.
Speed
of Democratization
The
United States is committed to democratization in
the region, but there are substantial obstacles.
Environment
The
region suffers from the horrific environmental legacy
of the Soviet Union. The Department of Defense (DoD)
is focusing on water-related problems in the region.
Water, not energy, probably will be the cause of
a conflict in the region within five years.
Corruption,
Crime, and Drugs
Drug
trafficking is tied inextricably to Islamic extremism.
Afghanistan, as a leading producer of opium, is
a source of revenue for extremists in Afghanistan
and Pakistan. Corruption-drug- and non-drug-related-continues
to plague all the governments across the region.
The United States must pay attention to this region
because of its centrality in Asia and its strategic
importance. This region will continue to be an area
of great power competition. The challenge for the
United States is to understand the threats and interests
in Central Asia and assimilate them in a way that
will intersect with US objectives.
CONTENTS
Panel
I
Challenges
to State-Building:
Internal Fault Lines and Impediments
This panel examined the internal conditions and
challenges that the governments across the region
face as they modernize their political and economic
institutions. The panel also explored how the history
of these countries is shaping their future direction
and what might be expected of the new generation
of leaders who will inevitably be taking control
during the next decade.
S.
Enders Wimbush (Chairman)
Hicks & Associates, Inc.
Modernizing State Institutions in Central Asia
and the South Caucasus
Gregory
Gleason
University of New Mexico
In all of the states of Central Asia and the South
Caucasus, the public sector has undergone significant
redefinition since national independence. How capable
are the new states of the region at promoting their
national interests as they approach the close of
the first decade of national independence? Have
the states accommodated international standards
of good governance and best practice? To what extent
have the public institutions of these societies
redesigned themselves so as to accommodate the emerging
challenges of the 21st century? What necessary domestic
institutional changes have been avoided or postponed
in this first decade, and what do these facts imply?
Finally, what are the dynamics at work and the boundary
conditions at play in public sector redesign in
this part of the world? How can outside actors influence
these?
Central Asia and the South Caucasus are political
concepts that refer to clusters of countries tied
together by interdependencies resulting from political,
economic, transport infrastructure, market linkages,
and cultural factors. Central Asia includes Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan,
and the South Caucasus includes Armenia, Azerbaijan,
and Georgia. A survey of the region reveals some
strong common tendencies:
-
Soviet-era political leadership remains in place
in most countries.
-
The public sector continues to dominate the
private sector.
-
Social inequality has grown substantially in
all countries.
-
Violence and lawlessness have grown substantially
within the societies.
-
Gray area transnational violence (terrorism
and extremism) is growing.
-
Regional interstate tensions are increasing.
-
Environmental problems (water and air quality,
industrial pollution) have not been addressed
in any significant measure during the past decade.
-
Narcobusiness is growing.
It should also be noted:
-
There are no interstate wars in the two regions.
-
There has been no revolutionary upheaval after
the fall of communism.
-
Macroeconomic policies in most countries are
standard or acceptable.
-
Many of the countries report nearly balanced
budgets.
-
To what extent has reform of the public sector
and the transition of the state been accomplished
and contributed to any of these outcomes?
There is a fundamental paradox in the role of the
state in a globalizing society: A state that is
powerful enough to control the instruments and mechanisms
of public affairs is also powerful enough to abuse
those instruments and mechanisms. In an effort to
discourage abuse by the state, many critics of the
modern state argue for a public sector that is reduced
in size and scope. They also argue that increased
economic efficiency is correlated with decentralization,
local control, and local responsiveness. The debate
regarding the size and scope of the "post-Communist
state" centers around the fact that the state
is both the "broker" and the principal
actor in the process of post-Communist destratification.
In terms of comparative political theory, the role
of the state has undergone substantial reconsideration
in recent decades. Forty years ago, many Keynesian
economists and public managers regarded the state
as the "engine" of development. This view,
in conjunction with the failure of markets to provide
public goods and services, to effectively regulate
the use of public utilities and natural monopolies,
and to provide protection for common resources such
as fisheries, forests, and rivers, provided a rationale
for "strong states" that would be capable
of stimulating growth or intervening in markets
to protect the public interest.
In some cases increased state intervention in markets
led to effective, and publicly oriented policies,
but in many cases governments embarked on ill-conceived,
grandiose, and fanciful, schemes that led to overextension
of the public sector while squandering public resources.
Failures of government often led to redoubled efforts
through coercion to bring about the desired outcomes.
The fusion of government and politics led to easy
opportunities for corruption and conflicts of interest.
In a globalized world (that is, post-1990), the
preferred model of the effective state is moving
away from the role of the state as producer and
provider of a wide range of goods and services to
a more circumscribed role as information manager.
This role emphasizes the provision of core public
goods and the facilitation and regulation of the
production of private services and goods, toll goods,
and common pool resources.
In societies where corruption, bribery, and abuse
of public office are commonplace, the reduction
in the arena of control of the state may be justified.
But at the same time, disestablishing the state
can be expected first of all to lead to detrimental
effects on the least powerful and least advantaged
sectors of the society. Those closest to the state
are apt to circumvent the effects of reduced size
and influence, transferring the costs of downsizing
or functional redesign to those less politically
influential. Thus, in Central Asia, reduction in
the size of the public sector is not by itself a
formula for establishing a more equitable, more
competent, less avaricious public sector.
There are a variety of approaches to measuring the
public sector vis-a-vis the private sector. The
most common are: 1) GDP comparisons; 2) work force
comparison; 3) analysis of the government regulatory
"footprint"; and 4) public spending ratios.
Using these measures, the public sectors in the
Central Asian and South Caucasus states illustrate
transformations not unlike those of the modern states
in other parts of the non-Communist world. "Post-Communist
transition" may not be significantly different
from the globalization processes we are witnessing
in many parts of the world.
Legacies of the Past and New Directions in Leadership:
South Caucasus
Audrey
L. Altstadt
University of Massachusetts-Amherst
History
History
always matters, whether or not individuals are aware
of it. Finding the relevant legacies requires looking
deeper into the past than one gets with a mere "outline"
or "background." Furthermore, "history"
is constructed on the basis of particular questions
and selected documents. Myths and memories may also
play a part. Thus the "use" of history
is neither simple nor straightforward. Sometimes
knowing a people's beliefs about the past is more
informative in understanding today's motives than
in knowing all the details of documented and verifiable
history.
In the Caucasus, history, even including remote
history, which is difficult to verify, has an immediacy
that surprises most Americans. Present-day territorial
claims and visions of sovereignty can be shaped
by beliefs about events as far back as the sixth
or second centuries.
One powerful short-term legacy is that of Russian
rule under both tsars and commissars. Russian rule
influenced not only cultural features of the Caucasus
such as the use of Russian language and the types
of schools, but also determined today's borders
(aside from the de facto change in the Karabakh
region), much of the economic division of labor,
and the basic political culture. On the last issue,
an authoritarian mentality of control is an enduring
feature, both inside and outside governing circles.
Each republic, of course, has its own legacies that
are shaped by its native culture, including religion,
language, and its history prior to the Russian conquest
early in the 19th century. On that basis, each was
treated differently under Russian and especially
Soviet rule; each today has its own configuration
of "friends" and "enemies."
Salient legacies on which democracy and the rule
of law can be constructed are profoundly lacking.
These include Western traditions seen in the Enlightenment
(though rooted more deeply in Western history) of
individualism and the belief in the ability of human
beings to think and learn rationally, and respect
for the rule of law and legality. Whether these
can be "imported" is an important and
fundamental question for all former Soviet regions.
The
New Generation of Leaders
The
new generation of leaders in each republic is, of
course, shaped by both native culture and beliefs
about history, and by the Russian-Soviet legacies.
They are also, however, affected by the changing
situation of the late Soviet era and the first decade
of independence, which thrust these republics into
greater regional and global interaction.
The oldest "new" generation includes those
leaders who led anti-Soviet or pro-independence
reform movements in the Gorbachev era. They were
generally people in their 30s in the late 1980s
who are now in their 40s. One way to view this younger
generation is to determine whether they were "insiders"
or "outsiders" with respect to the old
system. "Insiders" were not merely party
members but those who made themselves successful
within the party and old state structure. These
people tend to behave like authoritarian Soviet-era
leaders. Some "outsiders," however, are
prone also to use strong-arm tactics and intimidation
perhaps because this was the only political culture
they knew--people with power act like people with
power. They have not yet entirely integrated their
democratic ideas with their personal actions.
The political leaders now in their 30s are even
further removed from the Soviet political culture.
Consequently, their direction is harder to predict.
Some political figures in their 30s exhibit an authoritarian
streak, and societal instability seems to reinforce
this. Yet the age group is quite mixed, and each
individual must be examined separately.
Directions
The
directions they may take the Caucasian states are
rooted firmly in their own attitudinal and behavioral
tendencies, but will most likely be responsive or
"reactive." It would be hard for a new
generation to initiate innovative policy; it will
be forced simply to react to domestic and regional
(as well as broader international) pressures.
It would be hard to imagine, to take one example,
a scenario in which Armenia came to regard Russia
as an enemy or in which Azerbaijan became hostile
to Turkey. A warmer Armenian response to cautious
initiatives by Turkey (which have already taken
place), however, could open the door to improved
Armenian-Turkish political and even commercial relations.
Armenia would clearly benefit from this, as would
other states of the region. It would, however, disrupt
the current balances of political influence in the
region to Russia's (and Iran's) detriment. Russia
might respond aggressively (likely under any ruler,
but perhaps more so under Putin) to keep the region
from moving too far away from Russian influence.
Russia remains a check on such significant realignments
of any one state in the region or of all three.
Subtle internal moves could be more effective: market
reform, tax reform, and privatization as one "package,"
and greater political pluralism, institution of
the rule of law (and an independent judiciary),
and safeguarding of civil rights as a second "package."
These packages would slowly "restructure"
the Caucasian states individually and move them,
de facto, further from Russian influence. Most younger
leaders seem inclined to move in this direction
but could be derailed by unrest that seems to require
authoritarian measures.
Dynamics
of Succession
The
dynamics of succession have been and are likely
to remain stormy. Armenia has had several elections
with varying degrees of falsification and coercion.
The events of last October show that violence can
lurk just beneath the surface. Several parties contend
for dominance.
Azerbaijan and Georgia present especially thorny
cases because in each, an authoritarian "grand
old man" of Soviet and national politics will,
within the decade and perhaps in the next year or
two, be ending his rule. Each controls a single
dominant political party as others strive to gain
strength. The instabilities and unrest in each republic
in the past show that the loss of the "strongman"
can plunge a republic into chaos. A Russian role
in such a transition cannot be ruled out. This political
puzzle, more even than oil and gas production and
pipelines, should be a focal point of analysis of
this region.
Legacies of the Past and New Directions in Leadership
in Central Asia
Martha
Brill Olcott
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
In many ways the Central Asian states are frozen
in time. In every state but Tajikistan, the old
Soviet-era nomenklatura is still in control.
This is the sense in which history counts the most--those
who were on top at the time of the collapse of Soviet
rule intend to stay on top.
This history of the past is being rewritten to make
this more possible. In Uzbekistan, Timur the Lame
has become the central historical figure, helping
to justify Islam Karimov's strong rule. In Kazakhstan,
the role of the Great Horde is being emphasized,
as this is the group that long dominated the Communist
Party. Turkmenistan is creating a synthetic blend
of medieval Central Asian and modern Turkish history
around the person of Niyazov. The Kyrgyz trumpet
the democratic nature of nomadic society.
With the exception of Kyrgyzstan, none of these
models provides any basis for transfer of authority
from leader to leader or generation to generation.
The Kyrgyz model facilitated it, which is one reason
why the Kyrgyz seem to have abandoned it. President
Akayev sees that his position is threatened by these
democratic principles.
In general, the authoritarian and semiauthoritarian
nature of political rule in the region has led these
societies to be more static than in some of the
other Newly Independent States. One of the serious
consequences of heavyhanded politics is that a class
of independent entrepreneurs has been slow to develop.
This is especially true in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan,
where there has been great resistance to radical
economic reform. The lack of an economic elite with
an independent power base creates pent-up demand
in each of these countries and makes it difficult
to predict how the inevitable succession struggles
will unfold. This makes it very difficult to predict
who will come to power, when, and how.
None of the region's leaders are likely to give
up power willingly. Yet each country will become
vulnerable to interelite struggles as he physically
weakens. Tajikistan has already experienced one
such struggle, which resulted in a lengthy civil
war. The elite structure in Uzbekistan is still
complex enough, even after more than a decade of
Karimov's rule, to permit serious behind-the-scenes
power struggles. The process of coalition-building
could lead to the empowerment of a radical alternative
elite.
Kazakhstan also has a highly complex pattern of
elite relations. There is less a risk of upheaval
here, in part because the country is further along
in its economic transformation. The size of the
country and the tradition of relative isolation
of regional (and sector-specific) elites makes it
unlikely that there would ever be a coup against
President Nazarbayev. Should he try to pass power
to the younger generation, however, the "heir"
would most likely face a considerable challenge
in consolidating power. It is still too early to
know how pro-Western or pro-Russian (or pro-Chinese)
the next generation of Kazakh leaders will be. Much
depends upon the success of economic reform and
the speed with which Kazakhstan develops its natural
resources.
The pattern of elite relations is less complex in
Kyrgyzstan and seemingly so in Turkmenistan as well.
In both cases, the ruling family seems to be successfully
consolidating economic control, but is doing so
in different ways. The different economic patterns
in the two states make it difficult to generalize
across the two. In a decade or so the Kyrgyz ruling
family may decide that conditions in Kyrgyzstan
are so bleak that it prefers to move its assets
abroad, rather than risk a difficult succession
struggle. The "prize" in Turkmenistan
is definitely worth the struggle. The shape of the
struggle, though, is more difficult to predict as
traditional Turkmen society is relatively opaque
to the outside observer.
Country
Data
|
|
1994 |
1995 |
1996 |
1997 |
1998 |
1999a |
Armenia
|
GDP |
Percent
growth |
5.4 |
6.9 |
5.8 |
3.0 |
7.2 |
4.9 |
Industrial
output |
Percent
growth |
-10.3 |
5.3 |
1.5 |
1.2 |
0.9 |
-2.5 |
Average
annual inflation |
Percent |
5,273.4 |
176.9 |
18.8 |
13.8 |
8.7 |
3.1 |
Exchange
rate, end-year |
Dram
per US $ |
405.5 |
402.0 |
435.1 |
495.0 |
522.0 |
548.6 |
Consolidated
budget balance |
Percent
of GDP |
-16.9 |
-8.9 |
-8.6 |
-5.9 |
-5.9 |
-6.1 |
Current
account balance |
Percent
of GDP |
-16.0 |
-17.4 |
-18.2 |
-18.8 |
-20.7 |
-20.4 |
Georgia
|
GDP |
Percent
growth |
-10.4 |
2.6 |
8.6 |
11.3 |
2.9 |
2.4 |
Industrial
output |
Percent
growth |
-39.7 |
-9.8 |
7.7 |
8.1 |
-2.7 |
1.9 |
Average
annual inflation |
Percent |
15,605.5 |
162.7 |
39.4 |
7.1 |
3.6 |
20.1 |
Exchange
rate, end-year |
Lari
per US $ |
1.4 |
1.2 |
1.3 |
1.3 |
1.8 |
1.9 |
Consolidated
budget balance |
Percent
of GDP |
-16.5 |
-4.7 |
-5.2 |
-3.5 |
-3.6 |
-4.1 |
Current
account balance |
Percent
of GDP |
-20.9 |
-12.7 |
-7.0 |
-10.1 |
-11.0 |
-7.2 |
Azerbaijan
|
GDP |
Percent
growth |
-19.7 |
-11.8 |
1.3 |
5.8 |
10.0 |
6.5 |
Industrial
output |
Percent
growth |
-24.8 |
-21.4 |
-6.7 |
0.3 |
2.2 |
4.1 |
Average
annual inflation |
Percent |
1,663.5 |
411.8 |
19.9 |
3.7 |
-0.8 |
-5.9 |
Exchange
rate, end-year |
Manat
per US $ |
4,182 |
4,440 |
4,098 |
3,888 |
3,890 |
4,410 |
Consolidated
budget balance |
Percent
of GDP |
-10.3 |
-5.2 |
-2.9 |
-2.6 |
-2.0 |
-4.5 |
Current
account balance |
Percent
of GDP |
-6.5 |
-16.6 |
-29.3 |
-23.8 |
-33.1 |
-34.5 |
a
Projected. |
Economic
Change and Modernization: South Caucasus
Ben
Slay
PlanEcon, Inc.
Despite some common legacies in terms of history,
geography, and Soviet rule, the economies of the
South Caucasus present as many contrasts as commonalties.
Commonalties
First,
the region is at low levels of economic development.
When measured at market exchange rates in 1998,
Georgia had the highest level of per capita income
at $900, followed by Azerbaijan at $540, and Armenia
at $500.(1)
When measured via purchasing power parity (ppp)
exchange rates, 1998 per capita income was greatest
in Armenia ($2,700), followed by Georgia and Azerbaijan
($1,900).
Second, all three countries went through a transition
shock during the early 1990s, when steep declines
in output and high inflation rates were recorded.
The output shock reflected a number of factors,
including: (1) disruptions in economic activity
that accompanied the dissolution of the USSR; (2)
inflationary consequences of price liberalization
in the context of the ruble zone; (3) weaknesses
of nascent economic policy institutions; and (4)
military conflicts over Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia,
and South Ossetia. The introduction of national
currencies in 1993-1994, and the conclusion of agreements
with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World
Bank allowed these countries to sharply reduce inflation
rates. But despite the rapid growth recorded by
Georgia in 1996-1997 and by Armenia and Azerbaijan
in 1998-1999, living standards for much of the population
in all three countries probably remain well below
pre-1992 levels.
Third, Russia remains all three countries' most
important economic partner. In 1998, Georgia's exports
to other members of the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) was 54 percent, for Azerbaijan this
ratio was 38 percent, and for Armenia 37 percent.
Azerbaijan had the highest import share (38 percent),
followed by Georgia (35 percent), and Armenia (25
percent). When compared with data from 1992, these
shares reflect a sharp fall from 80 to 100 percent
of both exports and imports.
Differences
Perhaps
the largest difference among these three countries
lies in the fact that Azerbaijan is endowed with
significant hydrocarbon resources while Georgia
and Armenia are not. Although much of its potential
remains unexploited, Azerbaijan's oil sector accounts
for more than 50 percent of industrial production
and 10 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
Oil-related investment, trade, and service activities
account for additional large contributions to GDP.
The approximately $1 billion in foreign investment
that Azerbaijan is now attracting annually translates
into 33 percent of 1998 GDP. On the other hand,
the Azerbaijani economy is potentially quite vulnerable
to swings in world energy prices.
By contrast, the nonhydrocarbon economies rely more
extensively on agriculture and the service sector.
In Armenia, agriculture produces about 40 percent
of GDP. In Georgia, agriculture accounts for 26
percent of GDP, and industry and trade account for
12 percent each. Armenia and Georgia are also quintessential
small open economies with large current account
deficits that are financed by transfers and concessional
lending from abroad.
Economic trends during 1998-1999 are a third major
difference. Azerbaijan and Armenia were the only
two CIS countries to report strong GDP growth in
1998 and 1999. Oil production and oil-related construction
projects picked up in Azerbaijan, while a bumper
crop in Armenia boosted the all-important agricultural
sector. Georgia's GDP growth decelerated sharply
from 11 percent in 1997 to 3 percent in 1998, and
to about 2 percent last year.
Economic Change and Modernization: Central Asia
Boris
Rumer
Harvard University
-
As
one examines the post-Soviet economies of Central
Asia, most exhibit the following characteristics:
-
Ossification
of the ruling regimes.
-
"Primitivization"
of the economy.
-
Overreliance upon natural resources as the main
source of economic growth.
-
A lack of rational improvements in the industrial
structure.
-
The incapacity of domestic investments in the
industrial structure.
-
The increasing limitations on the ability to
attract foreign investment.
-
The worsening of the balance of payments.
-
The growth of foreign indebtedness.
-
Incompleteness of reform in the agrarian sector.
-
The use of agriculture as a "donor"
to support other sectors of the economy.
-
An excessive reliance upon import-substitution-
which is by no means always justified.
All these negative dynamics threaten to doom the
economies of Central Asia to protracted stagnation,
at least in the foreseeable future.
In assessing the current state of affairs in these
countries, it is essential to acknowledge the paucity
and unreliability of much of the statistical information
emanating from the region. Particularly important
is the lack of accurate data about the scale of
the shadow economy, which some experts estimate
to be as high as 40 percent of the GDP. Much is
also written about the enormous magnitude of the
drug business; in the apt phrase of some, the medieval
"silk route" has turned into the "narcoroute."
Despite the importance of illicit activities, it
is impossible to determine the actual scale of production
and trafficking.
During the 1990s, the countries of post-Soviet Central
Asia have had to traverse a tortuous, twisted path--ne
that has led them for a euphoria of unbounded hopes
to a mood of profound despair and disenchantment.
The exhilaration that accompanied the sudden (and
unexpected) realization of independence at the start
of the decade has given way to intense public frustration
and a pervasive economic crisis. From 1991 to 1998,
the level of economic activity plunged catastrophically--by
39 percent in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, 45 percent
in Turkmenistan, and 66 percent in Tajikistan. The
exception to this pattern was Uzbekistan, where
GDP decreased by less than 10 percent during this
period. Although that country exhibited some signs
of modest economic growth (at least according to
official statistics) those gains are highly misleading:
Uzbekistan has actually been rebuilding the Soviet
economic model, a policy that will most likely lead
only to stagnation and perhaps even a crash.
This economic crisis has been unfolding against
a background of continuous demographic growth. The
impoverishment of the broader population in the
region has reached truly menacing proportions; the
gulf between the fragile stratum of super-rich ruling
elite and the majority living below the poverty
line has reached dangerous levels.
The main factors contributing to economic growth
in Central Asian countries have been foreign trade,
foreign investment, and foreign loans and credits.
The economies of the countries of the region are
critically dependent on foreign trade. The foreign
trade turnover in these countries represents 60
to 70 percent of the GDP. In all countries, imports
exceed exports. So, the dynamics of the Central
Asian economies are totally determined by the conditions
prevailing on world raw material markets. The sharp
upturn in world prices of oil, metals, and cotton
brought about an improvement in the economic situation
in Central Asia in 2000 from the previous two years.
If one disregards the low starting point, the growth
can appear quite impressive. One should not rush
to any conclusions, however, about the stability
of this raw material model: at any moment, a sudden
decline in world prices could burst this fragile
bubble of prosperity.
It became increasingly apparent that the model of
development chosen by Central Asian governments
is in need of serious correction. To judge from
the available evidence, the opportunities for extensive
expansion of exports are diminishing. The exception
is Kazakhstan's oil: despite some delays, the Caspian
Pipeline Consortium is making progress in its project
to enable the shipping of oil through the Russian
port of Novorossiisk. Once complete, this pipeline
will permit Kazakhstan to increase its export of
crude oil to a profitable market.
Macroeconomic stabilization, together with political
stability, make it possible to begin large-scale
structural changes and to give greater attention
to the domestic market. The agrarian sector should
become the main priority of development, at least
in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. In both countries,
agriculture provides employment for about 45 percent
of the total labor force, produces between one-third
and one-half of the GDP, and accounts for a significant
part of exports that earn hard currency. In both
countries, economic policy actually discriminates
against the agrarian sector, which has been transformed
into a source of reserves for import-substitution
in industry (Uzbekistan), or which is used in the
interest of commercial intermediaries (Kyrgyzstan).
The proportion of budgetary, credit, and investment
resources for the agrarian sector does not correspond
to its role and significance in the economies of
the Central Asian states. By functioning as a "donor"
for the other sectors of the economy, the potential
is rapidly increasing for a crisis to beset the
agriculture sector itself. To a significant degree,
this discrimination against the agrarian sector
explains the depressing social and economic situation
in these countries. The eradication of poverty and
indigence is not possible without a change in economic
policy addressing the needs of the agrarian sector.
Top priority in the policy of development must also
be given to the expansion of light industry and
the processing of agricultural commodities. It is
precisely these branches of industry that have been
subjected to the greatest destruction during the
processes of transformation and that are now situated
on the periphery of attention in official economic
policy. Without a reorientation of investment resources
to these branches, the Central Asian states are
doomed to remain exporters of agricultural commodities
and products with a low level of processing--as
is to be seen at the current time.
At the dawn of the post-Soviet era, the union of
the Newly Independent States of Central Asia at
first appeared to be entirely natural and realistic.
Indeed, many regarded this unity as an important
precondition for political stability and economic
development in the region. By the end of the 1990s,
however, the hopes for any kind of unity have receded
into oblivion. As ethnic elites built their states
and consolidated the authority of their leaders,
each head of state began to play his own game and
pursue his own interests. The breakup of the Soviet
Union actually served to accelerate this regional
disintegration. The post-Soviet era has allowed
differences in the economic potential of individual
Central Asian countries to become clearly apparent.
The states of Central Asia follow economic strategies,
which are to a large degree, incompatible. Whereas
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan carried out a policy of
reducing the state's regulatory role in the economy,
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan pursued a contrary course.
It should be painfully evident that this institutional
discordance can hardly contribute to the process
of drawing these five states closer together in
the economic sphere. In this sense, 1999 became
a year of unprecedented economic confrontation among
the states of Central Asia. The disputes erupted
in those spheres where economic interests of the
different states intersected: trade, energy, transportation,
and water.
In early 1999, the states of Central Asia began
to impose severe restrictions and customs duties
on imports inside the region. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan,
and Kyrgyzstan established trade barriers against
each other. It reached the point where President
Akayev of Kyrgyzstan accused his neighbors of organizing
a trade blockade against his state. Simultaneously,
a "transportation war" erupted between
Kazakhstan on one side and Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan
on the other. Uzbekistan regularly cuts off the
delivery of natural gas to southern Kazakhstan and
Kyrgyzstan. In addition, Kyrgyzstan, as an upstream
country for all the major rivers in the region,
shuts off the delivery of irrigation water to southern
Kazakhstan in spring of 1999. It did so after Kazakhstan
failed to deliver coal, as stipulated in an agreement
between the two countries. Kazakhstan has its own
grievances.
This suggests that economic relations among the
countries of the region have been increasingly tense.
Antagonism is mounting and could lead to more severe
confrontations if these trends continue.
CONTENTS
Highlights
From the Discussion
Economic
Development
Regional
economic statistics are important but unreliable.
In addressing the presenter's point about the unreliability
of data, discussants focused on two likely reasons
for this problem. 1) Data collection by local governments
is underfunded, and as a result, it tends to be
spotty and erratic; and 2) even if data are collected
professionally, they do not accurately reflect the
economic transactions in the informal economy (for
example, the black market and drug trade), nor do
they reflect real income levels. One panelist noted,
however, that available data do reflect trends and
suggest where the country is headed in the future.
Economic
challenges lie ahead in Central Asia and the South
Caucasus. One panelist argued that the social
and economic data on the region suggest pervasive
economic stagnation in the future unless drastic
measures are taken. Even if specific sectors flourish,
their success will fail to translate into a trajectory
of growth. The discussion reemphasized a number
of economic challenges that were outlined by the
panelists. These issues include:
-
Optimism over Caspian oil and gas is waning
because of the uncertainty about the size of
reserves; political, economic, and technical
problems that complicate exploration and extraction;
and the conflicting political and strategic
interests of outside states with interests in
the region.
-
Narcotraffickers are establishing growing stakes
in the economies across the region and are attracting
an increasing number of people into the lucrative
drug trade.
-
The economies of Central Asia will be unable
to deal with demographic realities in the future.
Unemployment will be exacerbated by the high
population growth rates. Moreover, production
in the agriculture sector, where most economic
activity takes place, has stagnated, and the
capital-intensive infrastructure is unable to
meet the social needs of the population.
Foreign
direct investment and external assistance are the
most important drivers for economic growth in the
region. Panelists agreed that foreign direct
investment (FDI) is essential for growth in the
region, but the regional governments must attract
FDI to a range of sectors, not just the energy sector.
One panelist argued that economic globalization
could assist the region in two ways: 1) FDI and
foreign assistance could provide alternative sources
of economic opportunity to the drug trade; and 2)
globalization could mitigate problems associated
with the regions' ethnically and politically irrational
borders. Attracting international capital, however,
requires politically sensitive economic reform.
To boost the economic prospects in the region, Western
assistance should be focused on three areas:
-
Transportation infrastructure.
-
Communication infrastructure.
-
Education infrastructure.
A
contrarian view of Tajikistan. Conventional
wisdom holds that Tajikistan, a state plagued by
regional divisions and violence, is the most dramatic
failure among Central Asian states. Several discussants,
however, noted bright spots, including the recovering
economy and the growing political pluralism in the
country. Some panelists also expressed surprise
at how quickly economic growth started, once the
civil war ended.
Political
Reform
Democratization
is problematic. Participants who expressed their
views generally agreed that democracy was not about
to bloom in Central Asia and that current leadership
will not willingly transfer power. Even if successions
occur peacefully during the next several years,
new authoritarian leaders probably will replace
the current ones. It was noted that the Russian
model, where elections of local officials have limited
the power of central authorities, may apply in some
states, but each country is likely to follow a distinctive
path.
-
Kazakhstan.
One panelist argued that Kazakhstan is the most
pluralist of the Central Asian states and could
be quasi-democratic within a generation. The
country has highly developed state institutions,
a relatively diverse economy, and an elite group
that will contest for power over Kazakhstan's
resources. Parliament once was the training
ground for political leadership, but its power
has been stripped back so many times that the
economy will be the place that creates political
contenders for power. The panelist opined that
we could see economic power brokers--Kazakhstani
oligarchs--competing for political power. Kazakhstan
probably will not emulate the Russian center-region
power-sharing model. One panelist worried about
the danger of a "Suharto-type" democracy
emerging in Kazakhstan in which all power is
concentrated in a family.
-
Tajikistan.
Some argued that a pluralist society is developing.
Despite continued regional divisions and weak
state institutions, panelists pointed to the
nascent political civil society and the emerging
network of informal political groups who are
engaging in dialogue about their problems. One
discussant observed that only the Tajiks have
gone through the process of defending a national
identity, which strengthens the legitimacy of
the state. There was little discussion of these
arguments.
-
Kyrgyzstan.
Panelists fear Kyrgyzstan is moving backwards.
Initially it went furthest toward democracy,
with contested elections and general press freedom.
But President Akayev realized that this threatened
his hold on power and has systematically clamped
down on the opposition and the independent media
in the last four to five months.
-
Uzbekistan
and Turkmenistan. Panelists and discussants
were most pessimist about democracy in Uzbekistan
and Turkmenistan, where strongmen have a firm
grip on power. One panelist predicted that neither
country would develop into anything similar
to a Western democracy during the next 20 years,
although she has observed pockets of pluralism
developing in Uzbekistan.
States
face common political problems. Despite the
different political and economic situations in each
country, discussants raised a number of internal
and external issues that impede the development
of democracy in the region. They include the following:
-
Lack
of national identity. One discussant argued
that none of the states in the region has earned
the right to be called a nation-state, having
been thrown into independence by the breakup
of the Soviet Union, and the elites--who are
most interested in power, money, and personal
benefit--in these countries have failed to communicate
"national" visions that forge a national
identity. Consequently, the states are going
through a deep identity crisis. How do people
define themselves--state, ethnicity, religion,
or clan? Another discussant suggested that the
ethnically inconsistent borders also contribute
to the identity problem. Globalizing these states
could diminish the importance of borders.
-
Lack
of genuine opposition parties. Often, the
opposition in these regions is simply a rival
ethnic, religious, or family clique, not a broad-based
democratic opposition.
-
Western
legal traditions not easily transferable.
Imposing a Western legal approach creates a
divergence between the official system and the
real authority structure. A decentralization
of power coupled with order could be a more
effective approach. One panelist argued that
the region needed the "rule of law"
not "rule of lawyers."
-
Lack
of capable leaders to change the system.
The discussion showed that both "insiders"
of the previous system and "outsiders"
would have difficulty implementing political
reform. "Insiders," who have been
vetted by the Soviet system, do not necessarily
possess the skills to transform a country. Alternatively,
"outsiders"--leaders without prior
experience holding power, such as dissidents
or academics--often become the most autocratic
and corrupt and are usually not accustomed to
working in the system. One panelist opined that
entrenched bureaucrats may be the largest obstacle
to change and that there is often a glass ceiling
for Western-trained, young leaders who enter
the government. Younger leaders who are more
educable offer the West an opportunity to exert
more influence.
CONTENTS
Panel
II
Challenges
to State-Building: The Impact
of Megatrends on the Regions
This panel examined the impact of global and regional
trends that are shaping the region and beyond, and
explored how the states are dealing with these challenges
and opportunities.
S.
Enders Wimbush (Chairman)
Hicks & Associates, Inc.
Globalization, Economics, and Communications
Rajan
Menon
Lehigh University
There are, of course, significant variations between
and within Central Asia and the South Caucasus no
matter what the topic of comparison. That said,
if one focuses on the contours of the forest, and
not the peculiarities of the trees, it is possible
and appropriate to make generalizations that highlight
broad trends.
In virtually all eight states in these two regions,
the economic collapse reflected by plummeting Gross
National Product (GNP) values has been arrested
and recovery has begun, albeit from a very low level.
While this is good news, it is clear that it was
bound to happen: economies hit rock bottom eventually;
output does not descend to zero. In the meantime,
however, the toll taken on public welfare has been
immense, and the implications for the developmental
trajectories of these countries are staggering--and
worrisome. Inflation and budget deficits have likewise
been brought under control, due in no small measure
to the tutelage and discipline of global economic
institutions such as the IMF and World Bank. However
necessary this stabilization may be--and conceding
that it has created a better climate for growth
and investment--the hardships imposed on citizens
by cuts in expenditures for health, education, and
welfare, have worsened life for the average person.
Unless improvements are carried out, the support
for reform could dry up inasmuch as it will become
identified with penury. A backlash in the form of
instability, radical movements, and anti-Western
sentiments cannot be ruled out.
Trade patterns show that while the activities of
Turkey, Iran, and the West have reduced the role
of Russia in some post-Soviet states, the commonplace
view that Russia is an economic disaster is false.
Russia retains a significant position in the trade
profiles of the countries in Central Asia and the
Caucasus. It leads the West as a whole in trade
with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan,
and holds a position that is not significantly inferior
in the other four. The reasons are easily understandable.
The outside world is still relatively unfamiliar
with these two regions. Many of them have not made
it easy for Western firms to forge ties. The ruling
elite (regardless of the rhetoric) is a Russified
stratum forged by the Soviet system. Established
markets and communications routes lead north, not
east, south, or west. With time, Russia may yet
be displaced, but any notion that it is no longer
a player is a case of wishful thinking.
Nor is there much evidence that a flood of foreign
direct investment (given the near absence of viable
capital markets, there is no portfolio investment
to speak of) will render Russia irrelevant. As compared
to other parts of the world that qualify for the
designation "emerging markets"--say, East
Asia or Central Europe, or even South Asia, the
amount of foreign investment is pitifully small--and
smaller still if one excludes the energy sector.
Because hydrocarbons account for the bulk of investment
from abroad, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan
dominate the picture. Outside the oil and gas sector,
it is other raw materials, not manufacturing, which
attract investment. This makes for a pattern with
potentially pernicious consequences that are well
known to development economists: given that the
prices of raw materials and energy tend to be volatile,
there are significant risks to banking on growth
spurred by foreign direct investment that is so
sector specific.
Perhaps the most disturbing part of the economic
story has to do with popular welfare as indicated
by the data on unemployment, income inequality,
corruption (which primary benefits the wealthy and
powerful), and public services. As is true in most
(but not all) of the post-Soviet region, the situation
is bleak. People are poorer and less apt to be employed,
and income equality is much larger than in 1991.
To make matters worse, this reality exists alongside
severe cuts in public spending and the social safety
net, exacerbating the vulnerability of the poor.
The public health systems in these eight countries
are a shambles, the educational systems suffer from
everything ranging from unsanitary and unsafe schools
to a lack of textbooks. The bottom line is that
the human and physical capital needed for recovery
and robust growth in the new century is not being
created. This does not augur well for the prospects
for democracy (which is not particularly good, in
any event, outside Georgia and Armenia, and perhaps
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan) and civil peace.
Globalization is not an option (even for North Korea),
it is the reality, if by globalization one means
the rapid and multiple ways in which what is familiar
is shaped by what is beyond and unfamiliar. Having
been opened up to the world following the Soviet
Union's collapse, Central Asia and the South Caucasus
will experience these potentially dramatic effects
of globalization--and with little prior experience.
Some of the consequent effects will be benign (greater
access to information and assistance); others will
or could be malign--disruptive challenges to tradition,
expectations that are raised by external influences
but that cannot be fulfilled by internal authorities.
Central Asia and the South Caucasus are in a worse
position relative to much of the rest of the world
to adjust to the shocks of globalization while taking
advantage of its opportunities. They have weak polities
that are, albeit to different degrees, "overpersonalized"
and "underinstitutionalized." Moreover,
the post-Soviet transformation has already forced
them to take on a great deal without their having
to contend with the social mobilization and dislocations
that globalization could bring. Worst of all, they
may be unable to harness the many benefits of globalization.
What will be the net effect? As Zhou Enlai said
once when asked about the effect of the French Revolution:
"It is too early to say."
Civil Society: Grassroots Organizations in the South
Caucasus
Stephen
Jones
Mt. Holyoke College
An essential function of any democratic state is
the creation of a legal and economic framework for
civil society. Democracy is meaningless without
the capacity of citizens to participate in policymaking.
In the South Caucasus states, the elements of an
effective civic community--enlightened self-interest,
mutual trust, horizontal links between groups, economic
independence, and respect for the rules--are weak
or in many areas outside the capitals, nonexistent.
In Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, as in other
post-Communist societies, the obstacles to interest
and associational group development are related
to multiple factors--an absence of clear social
cleavages, a limited consciousness of common interests,
organizational inexperience, the existence of more
traditional loyalties to kin and patrons, and ignorance
of new laws.
But the Soviet legacy is only part of the problem.
The new governments have, on the whole, legislated
the formal framework for the existence of associational
and interest groups, but they cannot or will not
meet other important requirements for the establishment
of a democratic civil society. I would list those
in approximate order of importance to be: an economic
environment that serves the population's basic needs;
an effective state capable of implementing, monitoring,
and correcting mismanaged policies; a relatively
clean government, or a government that attempts
to control corruption; and the public accountability
of executive and legislative structures.
Civil society is a partnership between state and
society, but in the Caucasus, the states are no
longer partners. The states' withdrawal from their
responsibilities in major sectors of economic life
has undermined the capacity of the majority of the
population to participate in policymaking, permitted
vastly unequal access to political power, increased
the scope for corruption and the growth of powerful
unaccountable private interests, widened the gap
between state and society, and reinforced popular
cynicism. J. K. Galbraith's remark that "nothing
. . . sets a stronger limit on the liberty of the
citizen than a total absence of money" is particularly
appropriate in South Caucasus societies.
Michael Mann has pointed out that the active involvement
of the state in society--what he calls "infrastructural
power " or the state's ability to centrally
coordinate and regulate civil society--is perfectly
compatible and necessary even to effective democracy.
Such regulatory involvement with society is not
the same as "despotic power" or the state's
ability to arbitrarily exercise power over society.
Maintaining infrastructural state activity in society
rather than emphasizing its separation from society
is the best means to democracy and a functioning
civil society. This is true particularly in the
conditions of systemic collapse and political transformation
when the state has to create the authority, consensus,
and rules that sustain liberalism. A weak state
in terms of an absence of infrastructural support
for its population, which is the situation in all
three South Caucasus states, will produce the very
elements that undermine liberal ideals--economic
decline, gross inequalities, and public cynicism.
In this context, civil society exists at three distinct
levels in the South Caucasus. The tendency to focus
on one level, neglecting the other two levels, which
compose a large segment of the populations in the
South Caucasus states, leads to a misunderstanding
of the level of development of civil society in
the region and to counterproductive policies intended
to foster civil society. The three levels of civil
society are:
-
Level
one represents the local nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) that operate mainly in
the capital cities which receive support and
financial assistance from the United States
and international organizations. Their operating
language is English, and their activities promote
democracy in the region. They represent a fragile
network in the region that focuses on issues
such as improving access to information, promoting
human rights, and increasing and sustaining
public confidence in the government. Their activities
are highly visible to the international community,
but often these NGOs run amateurish operations
that have little local support and probably
will not survive without external funding.
-
Level
two embodies the average worker in South
Caucasus societies, such as the government clerks,
farmers, and factory workers, who are disconnected
from public life. This group represents a vacuum
in the middle of society that is unorganized
and cynical about the political and economic
changes, and that has no incentive to participate
in civil society. The focus of external NGOs
should be to bring these people into the political
process.
-
Level
three includes the traditional clan, kin,
and client/patron relationships that keep the
country running. These networks tend to be corrupt
and exist outside of the government. But they
are the mechanisms that support people's daily
lives in the region. These organizations can
erode the power of states, but are necessarily
inimical to the state and civil society. These
networks that affect the daily lives of all
citizens must also be accepted as an integral
part of civil society.
Civil Society: Grassroots Organizations in Central
Asia
Fiona
Hill
The Eurasia Foundation
At the end of the 1990s, the common view of the
states of Central Asia is that they have been effectively
transformed into oligarchies rather than representative
democracies and that there are few opportunities
for citizen participation in government or civic
and economic affairs. Although this view is not
inaccurate, it is certainly incomplete. During the
last decade, there also have been some significant
positive achievements in the new states of Central
Asia. Perhaps the most important development is
that as state institutions have collapsed, small
and medium-sized enterprises, business incubators,
professional associations, new and innovative educational
institutions, independent media outlets, and NGOs
all have appeared.
A decade after independence, these grassroots efforts
are in fact beginning to make their presence felt,
to engage with governments and certainly to shape
the civic and economic landscape, even if they have
not yet become a major factor in domestic politics.
They offer both opportunities and challenges to
regimes--opportunities where they provide crucial
social services that governments cannot afford on
a mass scale, thus helping to alleviate social pressures;
and challenges where they question government policies
or call for new laws or major change. Internal and
external NGO programs to strengthen the independent
media have perhaps been the most challenging to
local governments, although programs by groups such
as Internews to offer broader access to information
for mass media outlets.
The paths taken by the five Central Asian states
since independence have been very different, ranging
from relative openness and attempts at reform in
Kyrgyzstan to the maintenance of a semiclosed society
with the trappings of a command economy in Turkmenistan.
Given the growing political and economic differences
among the states, it is difficult to make general
statements about grassroots organizations in the
region, and the NGO sector and its relationship
with the state is different in each country.
In Uzbekistan, most NGOs are really what
one might call GONGOs (government-organized NGOs).
They have full government support and do not openly
challenge the government on issues. The government
also makes it very difficult to register an NGO,
especially if it has a mandate or name that might
appear potentially troublesome by mentioning the
word "reform." Many NGOs listed in Uzbekistan,
therefore, are not registered by the government.
The lines between a more conventional NGO, government,
and private enterprise are often blurred, with many
self-proclaimed NGOs operating on a fee basis. Indigenous,
traditional models of civil society have been actively
promoted by the government, including Makhallas
or grassroots neighborhood associations that existed
in pre-Soviet times as a self-organizing body for
groups of buildings and streets. Makhallas
are now seen increasingly as a source of local leadership
and a mechanism for small-scale assistance, such
as loans and microcredit as well as welfare payments,
and external NGOs, such as the Eurasia Foundation,
have begun to work with them directly. Within Uzbekistan,
at the subregional level, there are differences
in relations between government and NGOs.
In contrast to Uzbekistan, in Tajikistan,
many NGOs are truly grassroots organizations. Here
the chaotic state and fragility of the central government
in the wake of the 1992-1997 Tajik civil war, a
daunting array of social and economic problems,
and poor interregional communications, have distracted
the government and loosened controls. NGOs have
sprouted throughout the country and often joined
forces to discuss key issues of reform. Public debates
have taken place openly and regularly in Tajikistan
that would be rare elsewhere in Central Asia. The
Association of Political Scientists in Dushanbe,
for example, has become the premier organization
targeting the problems of establishing and developing
a multiparty system in Tajikistan and in discussing
the role of parties in the government.
Grassroots organizations have also stepped in to
take direct action to address the country's problems.
The Tajik Center for Entrepreneurship and Management
in Khudjand in northern Tajikistan, for example,
and other organizations like it, have created training
programs in accounting, finance, management, marketing
and basic business skills for farmers and would-be
entrepreneurs.
In Turkmenistan, grassroots organizations
are few and far between, and the number of registered
NGOs can be counted on one hand. Those that are
officially licensed all managed to slip their registration
documents past some less than attentive government
official a few years ago. Most focus on environmental
issues, although there are also a number that offer
specific resources and social services. The Turkmen
Government deals with grassroots organizations primarily
as challenges and/or threats to its authority.
In Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the growth of grassroots
organizations is slow but definitely moving forward.
In Kazakhstan, private enterprise NGOs, such
as business and professional associations, probably
have had the most success. The local government
is becoming increasingly flexible (rather than obstructionist)
in this area and open to innovation, especially
at the microlevel. For example, in Almaty, the independent
"IUS" Law Center, which is affiliated
with the Adilet Higher School of Law, has created
an arbitration center that offers an alternative
mechanism for resolving economic and commercial
disputes to the still unreformed court system. The
center also offers assistance to NGOs, small businesses,
and other professional associations in addressing
financial and legal problems and is lobbying for
the passage of a law on arbitration with the government.
In Kyrgyzstan, independent financial institutions,
NGOs, and other grassroots organizations are already
part of the political and economic landscape. The
NGO movement also seems to be finding a voice with
the government. It is not uncommon for NGOs to advocate
through the courts, parliament, or legislature.
In the Ferghana Valley, for example, the Osh-based
Fund for Legal and Economic Reforms offers legal
support for NGOs, is creating a traveling legal
clinic to address land disputes throughout the Kyrgyz
portion of the Valley, and is lobbying the government
for court reform and new legislation. This program
is a testament to the people's growing belief in
their ability to influence domestic politics.
In spite of the differences, regional NGOs share
common problems, not least of which are difficulties
in obtaining funding. Moreover, and the activities
of external NGOs are hindered by legislation and
difficulties in registration. One major problem
with NGOs across Central Asia is a lack of a constituency
base or membership. An additional problem in Central
Asia is the growing "technology divide"--not
only with the West, but also with Russia, and between
the regional capitals and provincial cities and
rural areas. A sense of information deprivation
prevails across the region, which is particularly
acute in the more remote areas of Central Asia,
and critical regions like the Ferghana Valley. Grassroots
organizations have serious difficulty in establishing
contacts with similar organizations to share experiences
and best practices. NGOs and citizens in Central
Asia are reaching out to each other at the same
time that regional governments are moving further
apart, focusing on state-building and consolidation,
and carving out spheres of influence.
In sum, in spite of the obstacles, there are numerous
new and potentially significant developments at
the grassroots level in Central Asia. Although these
are still in their infancy and it is difficult to
project just how these efforts will shape the region,
clearly authoritarian presidents, oligarchs, and
corrupt business and government elites are not the
"only show in town". In Central Asia,
the states are authoritarian, not totalitarian.
This means that there are cracks in the political
facade that civil society is able to push through.
With patience and funding, indigenous grassroots
organizations and external NGOs can work there in
the larger interests of the people of the region.
Islam and Other Ideologies
Olivier
Roy
French National Center for Scientific Research
Political Islamic movements of the 1970s and 1980s
have moved in two different and contradictory directions.
On one hand, the mainstream movements became more
moderate and integrated in national politics. On
the other hand, a more conservative Islam is emerging
that is not revolutionary, but is more militant,
supranationalist, and anti-Western/anti-United States
in its orientation.
-
Islamic
nationalism. This movement represents the
integration of Islam into the political state
as seen with the Islamic Republic in Iran, Refah
in Turkey, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Islamic
Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria, and the Tajik
Islamic Movement in Tajikistan. For example,
in Tajikistan the Tajik Islamic Movement recognizes
the role of the state and now promotes an Islamic
identity, not against secularism, but against
Uzbekistan. These Islamic parties focus on political
integration and nationalist foreign policy.
Shariat is less and less a reference
point for them, although they push for a conservative
social order.
-
Salafi-jihadist.
This movement is attracting either rootless
(Ramzi) or committed internationalist (Bin Laden)
militants. They discard state borders, fight
for the jihad, and seek to re-create the Muslim
ummah and shariat as the axis
to build an Islamic community. They are both
conservatives and radicals and are connected
to a global network that attracts Muslims from
all over the world to fight "peripheric"
jihad in Kashmir, Bosnia, Chechnya, Afghanistan,
and the Philippines.
Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia and the Caucasus
refers to the salafi-jihadist model, except in Tajikistan.
But, despite its internationalist claim, the salafi-jihadist
movement in Central Asia and the Caucasus tends
to be more localized--an expression of local identity
in areas such as Ferghana, villages in Daghestan,
and upper Gharm valley--rather than national or
even supranational movements. Generally speaking,
Islamic radicalism tends to reenforce national,
ethnic and regional divides. Sometimes the ethnic
and national faultlines match, but more often they
do not. Consequently, in Central Asia these salafi-jihadist
movements are a divisive factor and not a unifying
one.
The Central Asian states are secular. Islam shapes
society, but does not influence the politics. The
governments in the region give lipservice to traditional
Islam as a factor of social conservatism. The governments
in the region seek to control the official clergy,
which have power over the great mosques in the region.
But at the same time, we see conservative cultural
trends where Islam is blended with tradition. Polygamy
in Turkmenistan is an example of the social influences
of Islam in the region. But it does not lead to
political mobilization. In most of Central Asia
radical Islam is not a threat to the state. In Tajikistan,
Islamic nationalism has been a critical driver of
state consolidation. This has also been the case
in Iran. Uzbekistan, however, represents the only
country where political Islam may challenge the
ruling order.
Islam does not play a role in the foreign policy
of these states, except when the governments perceive
a threat, such as the salafi-jihadist threats
emanating from Afghanistan, Pakistan that is fomenting
localized instability.
Narcotrafficking and the Rise of Independent Militias
S.
Fredrick Starr
Central Asia-Caucasus Institute
In Central Asia, the traditional Western definitions
for drug dealers, mafias, and militias blur. All
three categories have become so inextricably linked
that one cannot distinguish one from the other.
The activities and support of all three categories
are far more international than ever before, particularly
in terms of funding.
Narcotrafficking
No
development in Central Asia has greater geopolitical
significance than the worldwide shift of heroin
production from Burma and the Golden Triangle to
Afghanistan between 1995 and the present. Whereas
the wholesale value per kilogram of cocaine in any
major world capital is between $10,000 and $40,000
dollars, the corresponding value for heroin is between
$150,000 and $250,000. Afghanistan (and, increasingly,
adjacent areas of Pakistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan
and Xinjiang) produces and/or processes 85 percent
of heroin consumed in Europe and also meets a rapidly
growing percentage of Asian (mainly Chinese) demand.
Ninety percent of the raw product derives from Taliban-held
areas of Afghanistan.
Central Asia is now by far the largest of four main
export routes (Iran, Pakistan-China, Pakistan-India).
The traffic is dominated by international cartels
based increasingly in Moscow but also in Nigeria,
Columbia, the Caucasus, and the Balkans. Powerful
local traders are responsible for their own territories
and are paid by the cartels "in kind."
This is leading to the rapid growth of consumption
across Central Asia.
The value of drug trafficking in Central Asia is
not known but it probably now constitutes the largest
national income stream in Tajikistan and close to
that in Kyrgyzstan. Both opposition and official
branches of the Tajik Government receive money from
this source, as do some law enforcement officers,
customs officials, and military officers in the
other countries, according to local informants.
Where is the focus of activity? It is found not
in the urban areas but principally in the mountainous
rural areas, where other economic alternatives are
scarce. The drug trade is fueled by the poverty
in the most neglected regions. The Ferghana Valley
has been a center of activity. Despite the efforts
of Uzbek authorities, interdiction hovers at about
5 percent.
Independent
Militias
Like
the drug traders, militias are almost always international
in character, formed at bases outside the former
Soviet space, and supported by Middle Eastern and
Pakistani patrons and drug dealers. Militias feed
on unemployment rather than political repression.
Interviews with dozens of former Tajik militia members
now in the Tajik army indicate that the promise
of financial rewards, often extending to their entire
families, rather than reaction against repression
or the presence of an attractive ideology, is the
main motivation for participating.
The international community can take steps to cut
back the drug traffic and militias and reduce demand
for drugs. Drug production is demand-driven and
the main consumers are in the West.
-
Stanch the flow of international funding to
militias. Support for militias not deriving
from drugs comes from several of America's closest
allies, including Saudi Arabia and the United
Arab Emirates. Address the chaos in Afghanistan.
Were some form of stability to be established
in Afghanistan, both militias and the drug trade
would be denied their essential feeding ground.
-
Provide economic alternatives to poor, mountainous
regions in Central Asia.
CONTENTS
Highlights
From the Discussion
The
Impact of Islam
Commentators
should be mindful of how they talk about Islam.
How we define Muslim states and refer to Islamic
groups or movements is constrained and distorted
by terms, which are inaccurate or is misunderstood
by the West. Several examples were raised during
the conference:
-
Islamic
and Muslim States. The difference between
Islamic and Muslim states has blurred during
the past several years, particularly as Islamic
parties emerge in traditionally secular Muslim
states, such as Egypt and Turkey.
-
Fundamentalists
versus Extremists. One discussant cautioned
the panelists that the term "fundamentalists"
carries significant derogatory baggage. Fundamentalists
in any religion hold strong views, but they
are not necessarily violent or antistate. "Extremist"
Islam may be more appropriate to describe the
dangerous Islamic movements in the region.
-
Wahabis.
In Central Asia, Wahabis refer to fundamentalists
who come from Pakistan or Afghanistan, but they
are not necessarily a political movement. For
example, Wahabis in Tajikistan do not recognize
themselves as a political alignment. However,
most Central Asian regimes use the term Wahabi
more broadly to describe Islamic religious movements
outside the states' control.
Divided
views over the role of Islam in Central Asia emerged.
There was some disagreement over whether Islam plays
a role in fomenting conflict and instability in
the region. Several panelists argued that Islam
is a moderate force in Central Asia. Others observed
that Islam strengthens national and ethnic identities
and fuels internal tensions.
There was concern that Central Asian leaders may
exaggerate the threat from Islamic extremists to
attract sympathy and aid from the West and that
in reality some of these governments are creating
their own internal stability problems by repressing
even moderate expression of Islam. One discussant,
on the basis of his time in the region interviewing
captive Uzbek and Kyrgyz Islamic militants in Afghanistan,
argued that the growing number of Islamic militants
are largely "pushed" out of their countries
to escape ethnic discrimination, police abuse, and
a lack of economic opportunity, rather than "pulled"
by the appeal of extremist Islam.
Afghanistan
Stability
and prosperity will only follow a solution of the
Afghanistan conflict. Afghanistan is the nexus
for training and staging of Islamic militants and
the narcotrafficking that sweeps across the continent
from Burma to Turkey. Instability at the core of
the region inhibits energy transportation. Russia
will continue to use instability in Afghanistan
to justify its presence in Central Asia.
Pakistan
feeds the Afghanistan problem. One discussant
highlighted the inextricable link between the Afghanistan
problem and Pakistan by detailing the involvement
of the Pakistani military in the training and funding
of the Taliban and other Islamic militants. He witnessed
the shipments of weapons and food from Pakistan
to training grounds in Afghanistan. Therefore, policy
directed at solving the Afghanistan problem will
have to contend with Pakistan's contributory influence.
A
stable Afghanistan is no panacea, While these
panelists agreed that the Afghanistan conflict must
be resolved to bring stability to Central Asia,
a multipronged approach is required to address the
drug trafficking problem. First, the demand side
of the cocaine and heroin problem must be addressed
to effectively stymie drug trafficking. Second,
international aid and development programs must
focus on creating alternative economic opportunities
for populations that are forced to live off the
drug trade, particularly in rural areas. A stable
Afghanistan will reduce the immediate Islamic threat
in Central Asia but will not eliminate Islamic militant
movements, which are international and enjoy a vast
network of supporters across Asia, from the Philippines
to North Africa.
Problems
and Opportunities in the Development of Civil Society
Central
Asia and the South Caucasus may be faced with a
"lost generation." The flight of human
capital, combined with declining resources available
for education, is a critical problem in both regions.
Education infrastructure is rapidly deteriorating,
leaving the young generation to grow up with little
or no formal education. One panelist enumerated
a number of factors contributing to the education
problem.
-
The dire poverty of many communities in the
region inhibits the schooling of children. Many
are required to stay at home to help on farms
or are put to work to earn money. Many children
lack schoolbooks or even shoes to wear to school.
-
The dilapidated school infrastructure is unsanitary
and lacks sufficient heating facilities, which
keep children away in the winter months.
-
Textbooks are scarce, and those available tend
to be poor and unbalanced.
-
Because of the regimes' inability to pay teacher
salaries, many of these countries face a teacher
shortage, particularly those qualified to teach
languages. For example, Georgia is experiencing
a shortage of instructors to teach Georgian
to non-Georgians, which exacerbates the integration
problem.
Some panelists noted that these education problems
could pose insurmountable obstacles for the economic
development in these regions and that these countries
could be left behind in the era of globalization.
Several panelists commented that private institutions
funded by a variety of international organizations
have begun to fill the vacuum created by the collapsed
public education infrastructure. But for the most
part only the elites have access to these private
institutions. One panelist disagreed, however, with
this assessment in the case of Uzbekistan, where
public education institutions have shown great resourcefulness
in managing scarce resources and in instituting
fee-paying programs under the auspices of the public
organizations. He also noted that entreprenurialism
in the education sector is fueling the establishment
of a myriad of educational institutes--for secondary
and higher education--across Uzbekistan, which are
not only available to the country's elite.
Civil society projects should focus on the microlevel.
Several panelists and discussants agreed that large-scale
change is difficult to initiate, but that significant
progress is being made at the local and microlevels
through targeted assistance and the work of NGOs-
termed the "thousand points of light"
approach by one panelist. Microlevel change can
only be achieved by working on the ground with the
local people, particularly in the rural areas. Numerous
small enterprise associations are developing in
Central Asia. However, more microcredit is needed
for such enterprises to make a larger contribution
to growth and employment in these societies. One
discussant, who is a native of the Central Asian
region, lauded the Eurasia Foundation for its dedication
to sustainable projects. Several discussants observed
that women in Central Asia are taking leadership
and decisionmaking into their own hands to improve
their situation, especially in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.
NGOs are shaping civil society but must focus on
sustainability. To be successful, the organizers
of external assistance programs must make an effort
to understand state and civil society relationships
in these regions. Much of the civil society activity
in these countries takes place among labor groups,
farmers, and pensioners that live outside the capitals
and therefore, are currently neglected by Western
NGOs. One panelist argued that international NGOs
must focus on developing local, self-sustaining
NGOs. Currently, active, international NGOs in theses
regions tend to generate resentment among the locals
because they often fail to foster a sense of equality
or partnership with domestic organizations. This
results in a growing dependency on the NGO and little
preparation for a "post-NGO" environment.
Consequently, when the advisers leave, the communities
are ill equipped to carry on by themselves, making
many civil society-building projects unsustainable.
CONTENTS
Panel
III
Regional
Dynamics
This panel examined how each new state views its
relationships with surrounding states, including
both other Newly Independent States and those outside
the boundaries of the former Soviet Union, taking
a regional approach, not an intraregional approach.
This new regional context has many new features
that also involve outside states. Speakers from
the South Caucasus and Central Asian regions were
asked to outline how each of their respective countries
is thinking about its strategic universe.
Tom
Zamostny (Chairman)
Office of Russian & European Analysis
Strategic Universe of the States in the South Caucasus
Paul
Henze
RAND Corporation
Russia's shadow hangs heavily over the entire South
Caucasus region. All the states of the South Caucasus--Armenia,
Azerbaijan, and Georgia--suffer from the effects
of two centuries of Russo-Soviet domination, a form
of colonialism more pernicious than that experienced
by most Third World countries. Seen in broad historical
perspective, Russian imperial domination enforced
peace in the region and generated economic momentum.
These were positive gains, but 70 years of Soviet
rule badly distorted Caucasian countries' evolution,
subordinating economic development to Moscow's priorities,
creating a sense of political powerlessness and
irresponsibility among the citizenry, and laying
the basis for intensified ethnic tensions once KGB
controls were relaxed.
To compound matters, Russians (with and without
varying degrees of governmental support) engaged
in irresponsible political maneuvers during and
after the collapse of Soviet power which have left
a legacy of unsettled conflicts in each of these
countries. In addition, instability in Caucasian
regions that remain within Russia--the entire North
Caucasus--continues to affect the countries on the
southern side of the mountains. Russia has been
unable to develop a coherent Caucasus policy or
to rein in military adventurers, old Communists,
and neo-imperialist nationalists. Thus it has stumbled
from one brutal intervention to another in both
North and South Caucasian affairs. It has generated
fear and distrust in Georgia and Azerbaijan. It
has exacerbated political, economic, and social
problems in its North Caucasian republics.
Strategic
Universe
Georgia
and Azerbaijan share deep distrust of Russian
neo-imperialist tendencies. Both blame Russia for
exacerbating internal ethnic strains. Both suspect
Russia of abetting assassination attempts against
their leaders. Both wish to reduce residual dependence
on Russia and reorient all their relationships in
a West-East, rather than North-South direction.
Both give high priority to good relations with Turkey.
Both desire closer relations with NATO. Both aspire
to becoming part of an economic corridor extending
from Eastern Europe through Central Asia all the
way to China.
The fact that the population of Georgia is overwhelmingly
Orthodox Christian while that of Azerbaijan is predominately
Shia Muslim has little effect on public attitudes
or on these countries' political orientation. Both
give cooperative relations with each other high
priority. Georgia values close relations with Turkey,
Ukraine, and Europe, especially with Germany. The
United States looms large in Georgia's interests
and expectations. Georgia also aspires to close
relations with the FSU states of Central Asia, particularly
Uzbekistan. It has close relations with Israel and
a fairly close relationship with Iran. Azerbaijan
has an edgier attitude toward Iran stemming from
its people's links with and interests in the much
larger Azeri population of Iran. Azerbaijan enjoys
a good relationship with Israel. In almost all other
respects, Azerbaijan's attitudes toward other countries
and peoples, including the United States and Europe,
parallel those of Georgia.
Armenia
continues to be led by men who favor Russia as a
protector. Armenia pays lip service to notions of
regional and, specifically South Caucasian, economic
cooperation but has isolated itself by its aggression
against Azerbaijan. Russia's inability to formulate
a rational, forward-looking Caucasus policy leaves
it locked into its old imperial habit of exploiting
Armenia as a base for politicking in the region.
For neo-imperialist Russians, Armenian reconciliation
with Turkey (which would bring the country many
economic advantages) is undesirable, as an Armenia
enjoying constructive relations with its geopolitical
neighborhood could no longer serve Russia as a pawn.
Armenian leaders, encouraged by diaspora extremists,
have so far been unable to extricate themselves
from this predicament.
Armenians are beset with victimization complexes.
Armenia feels tied to Russia (even though it cannot
always trust it) and distrusts Turkey; as an alternative
it is pursuing close links to Greece. Armenia looks
to Iran as a tactical friend and shares many of
the conventional attitudes of Russians toward Arab
and Balkan countries, seemingly preferring radicals
and mavericks among them. Among European countries,
Armenia feels warmest toward France, where there
is a large Armenian diaspora. Armenia wishes to
be regarded as a European/Western country, but its
close links to Russia limit the enthusiasm with
which it participates in European and NATO activities.
Armenia regards the United States as an important
friend but relies on its diaspora in America to
press the US Congress, against the desire of the
Executive and public opinion, to maintain punitive
measures against Azerbaijan.
Regional
Cooperation
The
most constructive alliance for the South Caucasian
nations would be one that brought all three together
in a common market with security and political dimensions
as well as far-reaching economic cooperation. It
would require a full settlement of differences between
Armenia and Azerbaijan. There is good reason to
believe that Russia, as presently led, would go
to considerable length to discourage and/or block
realization of any South Caucasian alliance, preferring
to deal separately with each South Caucasian country
and retain the option of encouraging rivalry and
strain among them.
What makes these alliances possible? A South Caucasus
common market would be logical from an economic
and energy viewpoint; it also makes geographic sense,
given the importance of expanding all forms of transport
through the region in coordinated fashion. Security
cooperation among the three is another important
dimension that would be mutually beneficial in controlling
smuggling, drug traffic, and terrorism.
Nature
and Future of Regional Institutions
Georgia
and Azerbaijan give great importance to all regional
organizations, arrangements for cooperation with
NATO, the European Union and the Organization for
Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); both countries
are enthusiastic about unilateral and multilateral
military training arrangements, East-West transport
schemes, Black Sea cooperation efforts, and regional
economic cooperation initiatives with Middle Eastern
countries to the south. It is too early to foresee
how GUUAM will develop, but Georgia and Azerbaijan
see it as having a significant future with the potential
for developing into a roof over other cooperation
and alliance arrangements. None of these regional
cooperation arrangements is yet fully structured;
most are dependent on meetings between presidents
and other political leaders which sometimes entail
little followthrough.
All three South Caucasian countries value membership
in the United Nations and most of its subordinate
organizations. All recognize that it provides a
framework for some degree of mitigation of territorial
disputes. All welcome the various kinds of assistance
that UN agencies can provide. None of these countries,
however, has unrealistic expectations about the
UN's ability to deal with major problems and areas
of
tension.
As long as Armenia retains close strategic links
to Russia, it is likely to be primarily a nominal
participant in most of the cooperative arrangements
that Georgia and Azerbaijan value. If the status
of Nagorno-Karabakh were to be regularized and a
formal reconciliation between Armenia and Azerbaijan
achieved, accompanied or followed by the opening
of a normal relationship between Armenia and Turkey,
a whole range of possibilities for Armenia's wholehearted
participation in regional cooperative arrangements
would open up. Russia remains the primary impediment
to cooperation in the region. Stability, consolidation
of democracy, and steady social and economic progress
in the South Caucasus will be possible only when
Russia reconciles itself to the loss of imperial
conquests in the region and adopts a constructive
concept of the future of the region.
Cascading
Effects of the Ongoing Regional Conflicts
The
conflicts between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh
adversely affect the economic and political development
of both countries. It has created a festering refugee
problem in Azerbaijan that is a serious social and
economic burden. The areas of Azerbaijan occupied
by Armenia are condemned to stagnation. The same
is true of the situation in Abkhazia. Costs of rehabilitation
of both of these areas will increase steadily the
longer the stalemates persist. The same is true
to a lesser extent of the situation in South Ossetia.
Continuing ethnic stress, political tension, and
relative economic stagnation have resulted in an
ongoing population drain from each South Caucasian
country. Loss of population is most serious in Armenia
and Georgia, and less so in Azerbaijan, the most
populous of the South Caucasian countries. This
emigration has two medium- and long-term negative
dimensions: (1) if and when economic resurgence
occurs, a labor shortage could inhibit development;
and (2) a brain-drain deprives each of these countries
of some of their best educated, talented and motivated
men, women, and youth.
Russia's brutal assault on Chechnya, compounded
by efforts to intimidate Georgia and Azerbaijan
for their sympathy with the Chechens, has reverberated
through the South Caucasus. Stability in the South
Caucasus is inevitably affected by developments
immediately to the north. The Soviet Union was never
able to devise a satisfactory political approach
to the entire Caucasus region and instead fell back
on the Tsarist habit of divide et impera.
The problem has been compounded for the rulers of
independent Russia by the independence of the South
Caucasus. So far, they have failed to meet the challenge.
Georgia's Perspective
Ghia
Nodia
Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy
and Development
Georgia views its fundamental political choices
in the system constituted by two poles: Russia and
the West. Although views of Georgian political elites
and Georgian public may have become somewhat more
complex and sophisticated as compared to the period
of pro-independence euphoria ten years ago, this
fundamental bipolar view of the political situation
in the region has not changed, and probably will
not change in the foreseeable future.
In this view, Russia mainly represents a threat
to the newly acquired Georgian independence and
symbolizes the past, while the West represents hope
of security protection and consolidating independent
statehood, but also hope for future development,
that is democracy and market economy. Georgia thinks
that the Russian threat is mainly realized through
support of internal separatist forces, such as Abkhazian
and Ossetian movements, or semiseparatist forces,
such as Ajarian leader Abashidze. Although these
two reference points may directly concern foreign
policy orientations, whose attitude to them also
strongly correlates to stands taken in domestic
politics: being pro-Western usually means supporting
democratic and market reforms at home, while being
pro-Russian more often means nostalgia for strict
governmental control over all aspects of political
and economic life. This means that in almost all
political campaigns, including parliamentary and
presidential elections in 1999 and 2000, the difference
between "pro-Western" and "pro-Russian"
forces rather than traditional ideological differences
between "left" and "right" continue
to be the most conspicuous dividing line between
political groups.
Pro-Western mood has been prevalent in Georgia both
on the level of political elites (as the analysis
of elite discourse would show) and wide public (as
is clear from public opinion polls). The exception
may be the years 1993-94, when after suffering a
humiliating defeat in a war against Russian-backed
Abkhazian separatist forces, Georgia reconciled
itself to the status of a strategic satellite of
Russia. Joining the CIS in November 1993 was considered
the first step in this direction, followed by agreements
on Russian peacekeepers in Abkhazia and on the Russian
military bases all over Georgia. Although these
decisions were considered humiliating, they were
also widely popular, because the country felt it
had exhausted its resources in resisting Russian
pressure. Georgia later stabilized and slowly but
consistently drifted away from Russia and toward
the West. This meant rapprochement with individual
Western countries (first of all the United States)
and international organizations. Competition for
pipeline routes for transporting Caspian oil to
Western consumers has been the major context in
which these policy changes occurred, but from the
Georgian point of view the geopolitical meaning
of pipeline projects far exceeded their purely economic
aspects. Building the Baku-Supsa pipeline, joining
the Council of Europe and World Trade Organization
(WTO), establishing closer cooperation with NATO
within the Partnership for Peace program, and, on
the other hand, the departure of Russian border
troops and the agreement to close of the Russian
bases, represent the most important achievements
of the Georgian Government in its pro-Western course
and represent a steady shift toward the West. President
Shevardnadze has stated that Georgia will knock
on NATO's door in 2005.
While Georgians do consider the Western option as
a generally preferable choice for their country's
development, however, actual pro-Western orientation
of the Georgian politics cannot be taken for granted.
The Georgian Government and public are not confident
about continuous commitment of Western countries
to the region. There is always a fear that the West
will change its priorities or "return"
Georgia to the Russian sphere of influence as a
part of some behind-the-scenes deal. This is why
President Shevardnadze never openly challenged Russian
leadership in the region, and there were never clear
demands for the Russian military bases to leave
Georgia. The country's political elite may be mainly
pro-Western, but it is also afraid of being left
"one on one" with Russia at a critical
moment.
Putin's ascendance to power in Russia revitalized
fears that under a more consolidated and dynamic
leadership, and having put the problem of Chechnya
behind it, Russia may again become more assertive
in the South Caucasus. There is no guarantee of
any outside protection. On the other hand, President
Shevardnadze hopes that with more rational and predictable
leadership in Russia, some acceptable deal on security
issues may be reached, which was impossible with
Yeltsin. While Putin seems to be an enigma for the
whole world, the Georgian leadership tries to keep
its options with Russia open.
Relations to all other countries are mainly secondary
to this major dilemma. Turkey is considered a counterbalance
to Russia and a door to NATO, which makes this country
the closest ally in the region. Azerbaijan is another
close ally because it has similar problems as Georgia
vis-a-vis Russia. Among different regional organizations
of which Georgia is a part, GUUAM may be based on
the most genuine interest and prove to be the most
lasting one, although all member-countries are reluctant
to make this group too conspicuous to avoid irritating
Russia too much. Armenia is a special case: Tbilisi
is suspicious of Yerevan because of its close security
ties to Russia, but good relations with Armenia
are crucial for several reasons: 1) good relations
with all neighbors will allow Georgia to present
itself as a pivotal country in matters of regional
cooperation; 2) Georgia needs stability in its Armenian-populated
regions; and 3) Georgia wants to take advantage
of being Armenia's seagate.
Today's volatile stability in the region is fully
based on a shaky balance of power between Russia,
the United States, Turkey, and local state and substate
actors. This balance has been relatively stable
for five years. Preserving existing trends in the
near future might mean changes in details (Russian
military presence in Georgia may diminish still
more, for instance) but not in the general picture:
conflicts in Abkhazia or Nagorno-Karabakh probably
would continue in their 'frozen' or deadlocked stage,
the South Caucasus will be seen as mainly an arena
of Russian-American competition, and so forth. Even
the passing of such quasi-eternal leaders, such
as Shevardnadze or Aliyev, would not change much
(of course, if these countries master orderly succession
of power), like exchanging Ter-Petrossian for Kocharian
did not bring much change. Local actors seem to
be preoccupied with internal problems and take a
wait-and-see attitude with regards to the "big
guys." There is a vague feeling in the air
that something may start to change in the region,
but nobody knows in what direction. Currently, Georgian
politics are stuck. Prodemocratic support is waning
and the direction of the country is no longer clear.
It needs a new direction. If change does occur,
the initial push probably will not come from within
the region, at least not from an intentional change
in policies.
Azerbaijan's Perspective
Leila
Alieva
Nitze School of Advanced International Studies,
Johns Hopkins University
The major challenge for the Caucasus states in the
post-Soviet era has been integrating the region
with the world community, above all with the West,
while at the same time establishing a safe and secure
regional environment for the process of state-building.
However fragmented Russian foreign policy was toward
the Caucasus, the strategic importance of the region
in the post-Soviet period put these countries under
the permanent pressure of the ambitious but economically
weak former Soviet metropole. Russian foreign policy
has been the result of complex relations among competing
institutions, internal political struggles, and
international factors. Despite its gradually shrinking
resource base, Russia did not back away from these
pressures in dealing with the Caucasus states. Instead,
Russia remained faithful to its traditional policies
of "divide and rule." Traditionally strong
Russian security agencies supported the objectives
of weakening and destabilizing the new states. Importantly,
Russia has not required a substantial resource base
to support these aims.
Two major events since 1991 have undermined Russia's
influence in the post-Soviet Caucasus: the Chechen
war of 1994-96 and President Aliyev's signing the
"contract of the century" with the major
foreign energy companies in 1994.
Since 1994, oil has played quite an important role
in the foreign policy strategies and security of
the country and in the politics of the whole region.
For president Aliyev, natural resources have been
an important tool in his consolidation of power
domestically, as well as in his foreign policy.
As in the other South Caucasus states, the initial
stages of state-building in Azerbaijan were affected
by internal and external threats. A presidential
form of government was favored over a parliamentary
government because of the weak state institutions
and Soviet institutional legacies. Revenues from
energy resources provided a strong incentive for
the government to maintain control over them as
well as use them as a means of strengthening power
through patronage.
As the external and internal threats diminished,
the new political institutions started to shape
foreign policy decisions. Strong, centralized executive
power tended to make foreign policy dependent on
personal capabilities of a few leaders, on subjective
images, and on strategies largely shaped by the
personal backgrounds of the leaders. At the same
time, strong presidential power gave the executive
branch extensive freedom in its foreign policy formulation
by protecting it from the influence of different
interest groups and the parliamentary resistance.
In this context, foreign decision-making also became
increasingly dependent on the consolidation of power
and was driven by the leader's desire to protect
his regime.
The post-Soviet leaders of Azerbaijan viewed objectives
of foreign policy similarly, but differed in their
understanding of the nature of international relations
and in their strategies for pursuing those objectives.
In spite of the predominantly Muslim population,
post-Soviet Azerbaijan's social and political elites
have formed a consensus with regard to their country's
foreign policy orientation.
The post-Soviet foreign policies of Azerbaijan have
evolved over the past decade:
-
1992
to 1993. During this initial period, an
idealistic/ideological approach to foreign policy
prevailed, particularly among young intellectuals.
-
1994
to 1999. Azeri leaders began to take a more
pragmatic approach to foreign policy. When he
became president, former Communist leader Heydar
Aliyev used Azerbaijan's strategic energy resources
as an asset to attract Western interests and
investment in the region, thereby creating alliances
to counterbalance Russian and Iranian attempts
to expand their influence in the South Caucasus.
-
1999
to the Present. The present period is characterized
by growing Western economic and security interests
in the region, which have resulted in a security
dialogue with the West and the diminishing of
external threats to Azerbaijan's security. Today,
commercial interests and individual security
concerns are becoming more salient in Azerbaijan's
foreign policy and are contributing to competition
among the Caspian states. The countries in the
region are feeling more secure and confident
and have begun to balance their interests among
the regional powers. Factors affecting these
developments include a change of leadership
in Russia, which appears more amenable to a
dialogue with the West and NATO; the liberalization
of the regime in Iran; and the prospects for
an Iranian dialogue with the United States.
These changes in the regional environment coincided
with the difficulties in lifting the 907 Section
of the Freedom of Support Act and the disrupted
Nargorno-Karabakh peace process. The latter has
been a result of Russia's meddling in the South
Caucasus and the spillover effects of Russia's incursions
in Chechnya. Both the Karabakh conflict and the
Section 907 Amendment in the United States remain
crucial issues that influence the foreign policy
behavior of the Azerbaijani leadership. Different
outcomes could either strengthen or weaken Aliyev's
regime. Putin's interest in gaining the support
of the South Caucasus states forced him to recognize,
at least verbally, the territorial integrity of
Azerbaijan and Georgia and express his willingness
to be a guarantor of the peace agreement between
Armenia and Azerbaijan. The "easiness"
of President Putin as a negotiating partner, however,
does not guarantee his ability to change Russia's
policies in the South Caucasus. Fear of losing the
South Caucasus and lack of support from his power
base will put serious constraints on the degree
to which he can fulfill his promises to leaders
in the region.
Armenia's Perspective
Gerard
J. Libaridian
East-West Institute
During the last decade there have been essentially
two opposing views in Armenia concerning regional
dynamics and future alliances. The first may be
called the ideological. Proponents of this view,
Communists and some nationalists, argue that there
are unchanging and unchangeable circumstances in
the country's interests which compel it to accept
a Russian "orientation," complemented
by close cooperation, if not an alliance, with Iran.
This would counter the East-West axis-potentially
anti-Armenia-which is perceived to be the goal of
some countries. This position was also the dominant
conventional view until 1990 and relied on the premise
that Turkey is the eternal enemy. All other foreign
policy and security considerations flow from an
alliance with Russia, including a reflexive anti-Americanism
and an "historic" antagonism with Turkey.
It is worth noting, incidentally, that by the 1980s
the basic assumptions of this position were also
shared by most organizations of the Armenian diaspora
in the United States and Europe.
The second view, the pragmatic one, was put forth
by the Armenian National Movement (ANM) and its
leader, the former President Ter-Petrossian. It
assigned no a priori and permanent functions-friend
or foe-to any of the states; it proposed normalization
of relations with all neighbors as the goal of foreign
policy and sought long-term security in resolving
problems with neighbors through diplomacy and regional
cooperation. This was the dominant view under Ter-Petrossian.
The Kocharian Administration has not, in principle,
changed the basic premises of the policy. Tactical
steps taken recently, however, have undermined its
substance.
On a practical level, conceptual approaches-especially
as they relate to Baku and Ankara-have been mitigated,
and actual relations have been determined by the
course of the Nagorno-Karabakh war and resulting
economic realities.
There are plenty of reasons for Armenia to develop
strong cooperation with all its neighbors: energy,
transport, creation of and access to larger markets,
and complementarity of economies and resources.
The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict have also made any
kind of serious regional cooperation or security
arrangement practically impossible; for Azerbaijan
to permit such a relationship would be tantamount
to aiding the enemy.
The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has undermined Turkish-Armenian
relations upon which the pragmatic policy rested.
The linkage Turkey has made between the establishment
of diplomatic relations and the opening of the border
with Armenia to the resolution of the conflict has
weakened the credibility of the pragmatic view and
de facto compelled Armenia to seek a closer association
with Russia. Instead of becoming part of the solution,
Turkey has remained part of Armenia's security problem,
real and/or perceived. Turkey's full diplomatic
support to Azerbaijan's position in the Nagorno-Karabakh
negotiations and participation in Azerbaijan's blockade
of Armenia has served only to deepen the historic
mistrust that exists between the two peoples. Furthermore,
Turkey's position stands in sharp contrast to Iran's
neutrality regarding the conflict and its full diplomatic
and economic relations with both Armenia and Azerbaijan,
despite the theocratic nature of its regime.
On a practical level, Armenia has not been able
to supplant Russia as the country that provides
the most assistance to Armenia: energy, loans, markets
for its goods and exported labor and, of course,
arms. In the absence of visible and concrete progress
in relations with Turkey, Russia will be seen as
a natural fallback country. This reinforces the
position of those with a pro-Russian orientation,
despite the clear signs that Russia does not support
Armenia's position in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
and that it has obvious interests in Azerbaijan.
Azerbaijan, in turn, relying on oil-and-gas diplomacy,
has attempted to counterbalance Russia through an
apparent rapprochement with the West, especially
the United States. One of the consequences of the
conflict has been the emergence of a neo-Cold War
in the region.
Other NIS countries outside the region are seen
largely as friendly. Relations are significant from
an economic point of view. In principle, Armenia
accepts and encourages all forms of membership in
and cooperation with regional and international
organizations and projects. The CIS was originally
seen as a necessary mechanism for the devolution
of the empire and is still useful as a mediating
institution, certainly from the point of view of
practical gains in the security dimension. GUUAM
is viewed with caution. It could become a vehicle
to antagonize Russia, which would compel Armenia
to make tough choices it cannot afford to make at
this time. European structures are viewed positively,
though not yet from the point of view of security.
Iran is seen as a friendly, though difficult, neighbor.
Geography and Iran's difficulties with the international
community, as well as Iran's trade policies, make
it difficult to develop these relations to their
potential. Armenia has resisted, nonetheless, suggestions
of a bilateral strategic cooperation and is likely
do so in the future. Armenia has taken part in multilateral
arrangements that have been proposed by Iran with
Greece, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine. Furthermore,
for both administrations since 1990, the concept
of a regional security pact would include Iran as
well as Russia and Turkey.
Much more so than the previous one, the current
administration's view of its relations with Near
Eastern, European and American states includes the
overrated supranational "Diaspora factor"
or "weapon," which some view as the equivalent
to Azerbaijan's oil.
A balanced foreign and security policy is still
a possibility for Armenia. Time is running out,
however. Armenia, like Azerbaijan, may be losing
its capacity to make sovereign decisions, particularly
with regard to the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict. That conflict remains the single-most-important
factor in the future of these two republics and
the most effective lever in Russia's policy with
regard to the region. The increase in the number
of proposals for regional "security pacts"
seems to be directly proportional to the decrease
in the ability of leaders to reach and deliver solutions
to local conflicts that would make regional cooperation
on any level possible.
The rise of Putin may change the role of the CIS.
The war in Chechnya and its spillover effect may
compel reluctant members, such as Georgia and Azerbaijan,
to accept a wider role for that organization. Putin
may be able to dampen the enthusiasm of some for
a "Western" or "NATO" orientation.
Finally, the question regarding Russian policy in
the region can no longer be whether Russia wants
peace and stability in the region or not. Russia
has imposed both in the region in the past. That,
in effect, is the substance of pax Sovietica. The
question is whether Russia has enough strength and
influence to impose a new, a pax Russica, and resist
a pax Americana.
There are three likely scenarios for the future
of the South Caucasus:
-
Some form of Western accommodation with Russia
and improved US relations with Iran that permit
economic and political competition in the region,
while allowing the three republics to cooperate
more closely and retain much of their sovereignty.
-
The region may become the arena wherein a new
Cold War is waged, given the weaknesses of the
three republics and their inability to avoid
strong external alliances. The future of the
region would be uncertain, if not chaotic.
-
The three states may gradually slide into the
Russian sphere, without necessarily losing their
independence. Russia's weaknesses are many and
serious; but these are weaknesses as compared
to the United States and other major states,
not to the South Caucasus republics. Furthermore,
Russia has more tools of influence. Finally,
Russia has the advantages of patience and proximity,
which the West may be lacking.
Strategic Universe of the States in Central Asia
S.
Fredrick Starr
Central Asia-Caucasus Institute
The southern and eastern border of the USSR was
for decades the world's longest and most tightly
sealed international boundary. In that sector of
this border, which fell within Central Asia, however,
it was a barrier that severed age-old links and
ties that embraced trade, culture, and security.
Following the collapse of the USSR and the establishment
of eight new sovereignties adjacent to or near this
boundary, the natural course of events would have
led to the reestablishment of these ties. Because
of continued concerns over Iran and especially to
fears regarding Afghanistan, this opening has not
yet occurred. Nonetheless, it is bound to happen
at some point in the coming period. These remarks
seek to characterize the regional dynamics of Central
Asia in the period before and after such a change.
More than any other state, including Russia and
China, Afghanistan has defined the regional dynamics
of Central Asia to the present. Its internal chaos
has served as justification for Russia's continuing
military presence along the former southern Soviet
border and elsewhere. It has prevented the export
of gas, oil, electricity, minerals, and raw cotton
to nearby and potential lucrative markets in South
and Southeast Asia, in the process increasing the
region's dependence on routes and markets controlled
by Moscow. Fears over radical Islamists, drug traffickers,
and terrorists based in Afghanistan have contributed
to the increasingly authoritarian character of all
the regimes and to their defensive isolation from
one another.
An opening to the South could occur under a wide
variety of regimes in Afghanistan. It requires simply
that stability be established there and that the
Afghan Government put an end to the use of its territory
for mounting attacks against its neighbors. How
would such a situation within Afghanistan alter
the regional dynamics of Central Asia? Obviously,
any answer must be highly speculative. It is useful
to try to imagine the shape of subsequent developments
in three areas: transport, investment, and security.
The fall of the USSR led to the opening of direct
air routes to many capitals and trading centers
beyond Soviet Central Asia. Three roads have been
opened to China, and broader East-West links are
on the drawing boards. But no significant road or
rail links yet exist to the South. Consequently,
China has been able to dominate the Central Asian
market for cheap goods, become a consumer of electricity
and, potentially, oil from the region, create a
strong presence throughout the area, and establish
itself at least on a par with Afghanistan and Russia
as a factor in the security dynamics of Central
Asia.
The opening of transport corridors to Iran, Pakistan,
and India will dramatically shift these dynamics.
Indian and Pakistani businessmen and traders are
quite blunt about their desire to supplant China
as a source of goods for Central Asia. Both countries
have assigned governmental commissions to explore
the development of transport to bring this about.
They see their advantage as deriving from the fact
that they would, at the same time, become markets
for Central Asian gas, oil, and electricity. On
the Central Asian side, all countries see India
and, to a lesser extent, Pakistan, as a less threatening
partner than China (or Russia) and as a means of
providing some counterweight to China's growing
presence. Conversely, groups of Indian businessmen
visiting Central Asia with this writer have declared
their readiness to invest in the region, once direct
transport routes are opened.
Central Asian leaders share a common sense of weakness--a
lack of control over their reality. They all seek
an area that they can control; this need is rooted
in a lack of power, not a sense of power. Surrounded
by great powers, Central Asians tend to pursue a
defensive strategy. The West should seek to understand
the intraregional relations and the strategic agendas
of each of the states. Despite their weakness and
the complexities of the environment, the only immediate
threat to their security is Afghanistan.
The reduction of the threat from Afghanistan (and
further positive changes in Iran) will significantly
affect other aspects of Central Asia's regional
dynamics.
-
It will undercut the rationale for Russia's
attempts to reassert a security presence in
the region and facilitate Russia's transformation
from a postcolonial threat to a normal trading
partner.
-
With the threat from Russia reduced, it will
diminish the sense of urgency with which states
in the region now look to the United States
and NATO for security.
-
The opening of South Asian markets for Central
Asian gas and oil will advance the cause of
"multiple pipeline routes" and hence
reduce Russia's control over the region's exports,
even as it complicates (but does not eliminate)
prospects for a major East-West energy corridor.
-
The establishment of stable conditions in Afghanistan
will sharply diminish the causes of tension
among the states of Central Asia, specifically
their concern to close their respective borders
against terrorists, Islamic radicals, and narcotraffickers-who
are often the same people.
What are the chances of such a positive turn of
events in Afghanistan? Experience has made fools
of most optimists on this issue. Nonetheless, a
number of recent developments, which will be reviewed
in detail in the oral report, suggest that chances
are significantly better now than at any time since
the end of the USSR. Let it be noted, in conclusion,
that every state in Central Asia now places this
as its number one security issue and the key to
improved regional dynamics and well-being.
Uzbekistan's Perspective
Rafik
Sh. Saifulin
Institute for Strategic and Regional Studies
The growing international attention to the problems
of the Central Asian region shows that the states
of Central Asia have gained considerably in geostrategic
importance following the USSR's collapse. The future
of Central Asia requires new understanding of the
region's history and an appropriate understanding
of its role and place in formation of the new world
order and both conventional norms and values.
When thinking about "Central Asia tomorrow"
it is necessary to answer the following questions:
-
How do we imagine the world tomorrow, and how
will Central Asians represent themselves in
this new world?
-
What will the Central Asian region look like
in the future, and what values and systems will
prevail in the states in the region?
-
How will Central Asia be involved in this new
world, and what principles will dominate its
development?
The answers to these questions worry not only people
of the Central Asian region, but also in many respects
are similar to those concerns, which arise in various
parts of the world regarding the future of the global
order.
The Central Asian piece of the new world mosaic
has acquired a qualitatively new character. Central
Asia does not play the main role in formation of
a new world order, but events occurring now in the
region have not only local importance, but to a
large degree are also capable of influencing neighboring
regions. For this reason, the Central Asian states
are focused on both regional and global trends of
modern development.
An essential feature of Central Asia is that it
is a multiethnic and multinational region rich with
cultures and heritage of different civilizations.
Central Asia has a rich positive experience in the
maintenance of equal conditions for all multinational
groups living in the region, and the "Central
Asian tomorrow" depends on the ability of the
present and future generations to keep and to develop
this position.
Understanding the Central Asian role in the new
multipolar world is connected with the geopolitical
importance and economic potential of the region.
But at the same time, existing standards, conventional
norms, and Central Asian values form an important
base for the future contribution that the region
is capable of bringing to Eurasia.
In Central Asia, the Islamic culture dominates,
but the region's view of development of economic,
political, legal, and social system tends to be
secular in nature. The future of the its so-called
Muslim world in many respects depends on how this
orientation will be successfully realized. Uzbekistan
does not want to repeat Russia's mistake in Chechnya,
in which Russian suppression of Islam created the
conditions for discontent and extremism in the North
Caucasus.
The Republic of Uzbekistan not only plays a dominant
role, but also for many objective reasons it bears
responsibility for how Central Asia will enter the
future world. The Republic of Uzbekistan is a focal
point for centuries-old Islamic values culture and
traditions. The important tasks of the present and
future generations include correctly preserving
these values and adapting existing traditions and
heritage to the global civilized norms and values.
Therefore, in many respects the Uzbek experience
of state construction, the spiritual updating of
a society, and the development of national identity
for a growing new nation are unique.
The purposes and the principles to which the Republic
of Uzbekistan adheres as it prepares for the future
are simple, clear, and obvious. They include:
-
Revival of its centuries-old cultural values
and traditions with its rich spiritual and historical
heritage.
-
Separation of the historical past from distortions
and tactical interpretation.
-
Continuous search of their combination and synthesis
of old norms and values with all advanced experience
and new ideas.
-
Balance of interests of various national, ethnic,
and regional groups living in the country and
maintenance of their real equality.
The revival and strengthening of Uzbekistan will
serve as a pledge for strengthening and developing
national minorities-all citizens of the Republic
of Uzbekistan, irrespective of their nationality,
ethnicity, and religion.
Each Central Asian state is unique. Despite this
fact, everyone in Central Asia speaks of regional
integration. It is too early, however, to talk about
regional integration. Each of the Central Asian
states is developing different national strategies
and is moving toward different goals and in different
directions. Civil society and democracy have developed
in different ways and at various levels. Each state
has employed a different economic strategy that
has taken it in diverse directions. The states endowed
with rich energy resources hoped these resources
would be the key to their success, but the process
is slower than expected.
The Central Asian states have been discussing a
regional security architecture, but a number of
obstacles have emerged. The obstacles include: 1)
the Central Asian states view their threats differently
and apply different approaches and levels of attention
to these threats; 2) each state possesses different
levels of readiness and military capability which
make a common security structure unrealistic in
the short term although it has been discussed.
Uzbekistan has no illusions about the internal and
external threats that it faces. The Uzbek military
seeks to increase its forces, enhance its readiness,
and broaden its military doctrine. Uzbekistan's
current focus is protecting its borders. Ultimately,
Uzbekistan's security would benefit most if the
United States and Russia could work together in
the region on areas of common interest.
Kazakhstan's Perspective
Yertmuhamet
Yertysbayev
Kazakhstan Institute of Strategic Studies
Kazakhstan cannot change its geography. Its national
security policy is dominated by the fact that it
lies between Russia and China-between two different
worlds-both of which are unstable and going through
times of great change.
Kazakhstan's geopolitical strategy consists of the
following five directions: 1) beyond the region-the
West, with an emphasis on developing a relationship
with the United States; 2) southern direction- Uzbekistan
and Afghanistan; 3) northern and north-eastern direction-Russia;
4) eastern direction- China; and 5) western direction-the
energy controversies in the Caspian Sea. In all
of these directions, Kazakhstan sees threats.
In the South, the chaos and instability in Afghanistan
will continue to spill over into Central Asia. This
conflict does not pose a direct military threat
into Central Asia, however. The more real danger
is the drug-trafficking and the flow of refugees
into the region. The Central Asian states must coordinate
their attempts to resolve this conflict and stabilize
Afghanistan. At the same time, Kazakhs are wary
of their smaller neighbor (Uzbekistan) whose population
overwhelms Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan's relations with
Uzbekistan remain tense due to disputes over land
and control over water.
To the North, the signs of a resurgent Russia, shaped
by either nationalist or imperial motivations, are
emerging. Putin's ascendance to power makes the
situation more complicated and less predictable.
Any indications of a resurgent Russia worry Kazakhstan
that it will be one of Russia's first targets. Northern
Kazakhstan is most vulnerable since Russians continue
to outnumber Kazakhs. Kazakhstan is more important
for Russia than even Belarus in terms of geopolitical
interests. Despite the sovereignty and security
guarantees given by five powerful states (the United
States, Russia, China, France and United Kingdom),
Russia poses a threat to the territorial integrity
of Kazakhstan.
To the East, Kazakhstan has established a normal
relationship with China. Although currently China
does not pose a direct military threat to Kazakhstan,
one should not ignore the possibility. The military
threat itself can be defined in different ways,
which are linked to the ethnic, demographic, economic,
and political situation in China and its regions.
For example, in Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region,
the external support of Uighur separatist tendencies
could potentially cause ethnic conflicts between
China and Kazakhstan. China will never allow the
Uighurs to create a separate nation. The Uighur
problem could cause problems for the oil pipeline
that the Chinese plan to build across the region.
The Caspian has been the gateway to the West. After
the breakup of the USSR, Kazakhstan sought alternatives
to Russia's influence. This task became a key component
of the development strategies of all the Central
Asian states. The Caspian energy resources and their
transportation to the world market became a means
for Kazakhstan to develop viable alternatives. The
"oil factor" has lead to the creation
of an East-West energy transport corridor, and Kazakhstan
intends to play a central role in this context.
This will promote not only economic development,
but also regional cooperation in Central Asia. Initial
regime pessimism about the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline
has been replaced by a belief that the East-West
corridor will strengthen the sovereignty of all
of the Newly Independent States and will build stronger
links between them. Control over its energy resources
and the transport routes is crucial to Kazakhstan's
geopolitical position. Although the pipelines will
foster cooperation, because of the variety of interests
in the Caspian, it is the "Balkans of Central
Asia."
The potential for conflict is real but does not
serve the interest of any of the littoral states,
nor the international community investing in the
region. However, a struggle for Caspian oil and
the geopolitical influence in this region between
the West and Russia cannot be ignored. The Russians
increasingly feel excluded from the Transcaucasian
region. An alliance between Baku-Tbilisi is at the
center of a larger axis of countries: Ukraine, Georgia,
Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan. This "Transcaucasian
corridor" seeks to exclude Russia from Transcaucasia
and create a conglomeration of the former Soviet
republics oriented toward the West. We may see a
new policy emerge in Russia, however, in reaction
to this Transcaucasian corridor that will lead to
direct pressure on the Central Asian states and
above all, Kazakhstan.
All the factors mentioned above, taken separately
or considered together, have the potential to threaten
the territorial integrity and the statehood of Kazakhstan.
At present, however, they are more latent than real
threats. Today in Kazakhstan internal security concerns
are the dominant threats for Kazakhstan and for
Central Asia in general. Internal insecurity will
continue until the sharp contradiction between the
economical necessity and the political possibilities
in this region are addressed. One should recognize
that the social-economic and political transformation
has caused tremendous social difficulties and destabilizing
social conditions.
CONTENTS
Highlights
From the Discussion
Russia's
Role and Regional Politics
A variety of views were expressed on how the Chechnya
conflict will impact Russia's strategy toward Central
Asia and the South Caucasus. Some panelists argued
that cooperation with the South Caucasian states
"made sense" for Russia in order to bound
the quagmire in the North with stability in the
South. In contrast, several panelists declared such
a shift in Russian policy to be unrealistic and
that Moscow is more likely to continue to exploit
opportunities to foment separatist activism, its
most effective lever over these states.
-
One discussant argued that President Putin is
looking for a way to end the impasse and that
the conflict in Chechnya had created conditions
in which cooperating with Georgia and Azerbaijan
served Russia's interests. Another regional
panelist also commented on this significant
rhetorical change in Georgia and Azerbaijan
toward Putin, but cautioned that the general
perception in the South Caucasian societies
is one of uncertainty about Putin and fear of
an increasingly vigorous Russia.
-
A second panelist from the region added that
a constructive role for Russia is highly probable.
Russia needs peace in the South Caucasus to
manage the situation in Chechnya, but the real
question is whose peace will be acceptable.
He posited that Moscow could build a stable
situation in the region through a "Pax
Russica" arrangement in which Russia would
be preeminent.
-
Among those who expressed a negative view on
this issue, a panelist noted that no constituency
exists in Russia which advocates a shift to
a more constructive policy toward the Caucasus.
Putin's rhetoric and personal desire alone cannot
shift this policy.
Panelists offered a range of views on the potential
for stability and regional cooperation in the South
Caucasus if Russia minimized its presence in the
region.
-
Several panelists opined that many of the ethnic
conflicts and separatist movements-for example,
in Abkhazia and South Ossetia-would dissipate
in the absence of external (predominantly Russian)
support. Although another panelist believed
that if left alone the South Caucasus countries
could resolve their conflicts, he cautioned
that a number of the problems-for example, Abkhazia,
Chechnya, and Nagorno-Karabakh-have been created
by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the
politics that ensued. These problems will be
difficult to 'reverse.' Another questioned whether
Russia would accept a peace between Azerbaijan
and Armenia that would minimize Russia's presence.
-
A panelist from Central Asia believed that more
conflict in the region would emerge if the Russians
withdrew. But because this instability could
have negative spillover effects in Russia, Moscow
will not pull out of the region. Therefore,
the regional actors seek to balance Russian
presence with support from the West.
Discussants raised the question of how Russia would
react if Turkey took on a more prominent role in
the South Caucasus. Several panelists noted that
Russia and Iran will be threatened by the prospect
of a larger role for Turkey in the region. A panelist
from the region opined that domestic constituencies
in Turkey and Armenia would not oppose a Turkey-Armenia
rapprochement, and that Section 907 has outlived
its usefulness, becoming more of a burden for the
region than a benefit for Armenia. Another panelist
posited that today Azerbaijan would probably support
Turkey-Armenia reconciliation, even though it had
used these hostilities to squeeze Armenia and as
a lever against Turkey.
There was also some disagreement over how the South
Caucasus states should manage their strategic options.
Several panelist agreed that these states should
focus on distancing themselves from Russia by pursuing
opportunities and relationships with each other
and with other countries, such as the United States,
Turkey, Iran, and Israel. Such a strategy would
insulate them from Moscow's attempts to destabilize
them. It was noted that Azerbaijani President Aliyev
has pursued a balanced foreign policy strategy
successfully.
Another panelist argued that none of the three South
Caucasus states could hope to play "the big
game of geopolitics" with Russia, Iran, Turkey,
or the United States. Small countries-with or without
oil-must focus on modest and defined foreign policy
objectives. This panelist noted that the region
should be thinking about how to decrease the role
of external actors, arguing that the independence
and security of the region will come through regional
cooperation not the influence of external powers.
Uzbekistan
Control
over its security and a Western orientation drives
Uzbekistan's military policy. There is a sense of
crisis on every side for President Karimov. Uzbekistan
seeks to gain more control over its foreign policy,
prevent manipulation by outside powers, and assume
more responsibility for its security. The panelist
from Uzbekistan argued that his country seeks to
develop a regional security cooperation regime that
could manage cross-border problems, but it recognizes
that its neighbors do not have the same security
concerns or control of their borders. The panelist
also warned against expecting a regional structure
to address security issues to be established in
the near term.
The Uzbek Government assumes that Russia will remain
assertive in the region, but Uzbekistan's predominate
orientation will be to the West. Uzbekistan sees
the West, specifically the United States, as a source
of technology and foreign investment, but more important,
it would like assistance for military training and
leadership development from the United States. The
Uzbek military, however, will continue to rely on
Russia for equipment because it is cost effective.
But Uzbekistan hopes to receive more assistance
from the United States. The panelist reiterated
that Uzbekistan's orientation will be increasingly
toward the West, despite the fact the population
is approximately 80 percent Muslim. The elite seek
to establish a secular Muslim state that is linked
to the West.
CONTENTS
Panel
IV
View
From the Periphery
This panel explored how the major external actors
view the new relationships that are unfolding between
and among Central Asian/South Caucasus states or
their neighbors.
George
Kolt (Chairman)
National Intelligence Council
Iran
Mohiaddin
Mesbahi
Florida International University
Iran's perception and expectations of gains in the
region are heavily tempered by its anticipation
of strategic threats and losses. The inevitable
centrality of Iran in shaping both the discursive
and policy dimensions of the region's geopolitics,
the international political economy of energy, and
the geoculture of identity and ideological preferences,
constitutes the complex web of dynamics within which
Iran's conception of its policy and its "reading"
of the key elements of the regional patterns are
developed and articulated.
Five critical factors have shaped the Iranian conceptualization
of the post-Soviet world:
-
A self-perception of Iran's centrality as the
natural political and economic actor in shaping
the key geopolitical and economic patterns of
interactions in the South Caucasus and Central
Asia, or the Caspian Basin at large. This self-perception
is derived from Iran's assets and liabilities
as an "interregional linkage state,"
and its own internally inspired "legitimate"
ambitions of being a powerful and self-respected
regional player. The belief that all key decisions
and their consequent dynamics have been and
will be affected by Iran, either deliberately
or by default, is the most important underpinning
of the Iranian conceptualization and understanding
of the regional patterns and developments.
-
The "identity" of Iran as an Islamic
revolutionary state, either real and self-described
as the Ummu'l qora' (the Islamic Metropolise),
or perceived and labeled as a "rogue state."
This ideational factor has been at the core
of the development of Iran's opportunities and
constraints, and a key ingredient of the "threat
model" employed by a host of otherwise
divergent regional and extraregional actors
in their assessment of and attitudes toward
Iran. The complicated "reward structure"
attached to this "threat model" in
this region, like elsewhere, not only affects
Iran's choices but further informs Iran's perceptions
of regional dynamics and strategic patterns.
-
The significance, if not the primacy, of relations
with Russia as a strategic balancer (regionally
and globally), if not partner, as a source of
trade and arms, and as a partner in political
and economic regional patterns. One might even
observe, in view of Iran's policy in the region,
especially in the North Caucasus and Tajikistan,
that Tehran's regional policy has become increasingly
"Russia centric." It remains to be
seen whether the longstanding historical mistrust
and the absence of real structural mutual interests,
which traditionally informed Iranian attitudes
toward Moscow, will be replaced, under the increasing
pressure of the United States and the threatening
pattern of regional "alliances," by
a solid strategic convergence of vision, interests,
and partnership with a more assertive Russia.
-
The future nature of US-Iran relations is among
the most important extra regional developments
with strategic impact on key security and economic
patterns in the South Caucasus and Central Asia
in this decade.
-
The specific historical, ethnic, ideational,
and geographical factors that determine the
nature, degree, and scope of the bilateral and
multilateral ties and interactions between Iran
and the new, independent states in the region.
Different dynamics, for example, affect Iran's
relations with Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.
These bilateral differentiations, while significant
on their own terms, nevertheless are all heavily
affected by the above-four foundational factors.
Objectives
and Perspectives
The
central Iranian foreign policy objectives are:
-
To ensure that the uncertain dynamics of the
South Caucasus and Central Asia will not undermine
Iran's national security and territorial integrity
(that is, ethno-territorial conflicts such as
Nagorno-Karabakh).
-
To be actively engaged, through bilateral and
multilateral ties, in shaping the geopolitical
environment of the region in terms most favorable
to Iran. Iran will oppose politico-military
alliances that deny Iran meaningful participation
in regional dynamics.
-
To ensure, at a minimum, the involvement of
Iran in the emerging structures of the energy
sectors in the Caspian Basin and, optimally,
to position Iran to become the key logistic
linkage of the Caspian Basin to the outside
world.
-
To avoid and bypass containment strategies through
simultaneous pursuit of bilateral ties to all
the new Central Asian states, in addition to
initiating or joining multilateral or tripartite
schemes, not only with regional states, but
also with extra regional players.
-
To desecuritize Islam and Iran's ideological
image by utilizing the presumed influence of
the Irano-Islamic cultural milieu; capitalizing
on the "new" democratic Iran, and
downplaying narrow ideological Islam, in favor
of an "intracivilizational" interaction
and dialogue.
The most seriously perceived long-term strategic
threats to Iran are the US-led or encouraged regional,
political, and economic coalitions that exclude
Iran. Iran fears that such regional schemes will
eventually lead to military alliances, organized
around what Tehran describes as the notion of "US
vital national interest in the Caspian," and
made up of Iran's contiguous neighbors such as Azerbaijan
and Turkey, possibly with an eager extraterritorial
antagonist, such as Israel. In this connection,
relations with Azerbaijan, given obvious and complicated
ethno-territorial, historical, and religious affiliations,
will remain critical. In Central Asia, Iran's main
regional antagonist is perceived to be Uzbekistan;
the champion of "antifundamentalism" whose
regional hegemonic ambitions against Iran's civilizational
kin in Tajikistan could be reinforced only by its
politico-security cooperation with the United States
in the containment of "religious extremism."
Iran's natural competitor, both unilaterally and
regionally, is Russia. Yet, the overwhelming impact
of the US role has turned Russia into a key regional
partner. A cautious close relationship with Armenia
has been designed to provide the balancing measure,
with a potential tripartite coalition with Russia
and Armenia as a response to the US-Turkey-Azerbaijan-Israel
line on the horizon.
Iran will continue to count, cautiously, on the
"positive neutrality" of Turkmenistan,
with the expectation that through both bilateral
ties and Russian pressure, Turkmenistan will not
jeopardize its relations with Iran in pursuit of
a US-centric policy. Iran's concern over the future
course of Turkmenistan has a broader South Asian
angle, as Pakistan and a Taliban-led Afghanistan
have been competing with Iran as an alternative
source of energy transport.
In Central Asia, an Uzbek-centric security arrangement--recognized
and supported by the US/NATO, and organized around
the notion of containment of religious extremism--is
being pursued by Tashkent. If the West accepts and
supports Uzbekistan as the center of a regional
coalition, it can expect a loose tripartite Russian,
Tajik, and Iranian coalition as a distinct alternative
response. The Tajik-Iranian defense treaty, though
largely symbolic, is indicative. China, already
in favor of a closer security cooperation in Central
Asia, will favor the latter to avoid a strategic
US presence on its border. Furthermore, China's
increasing political, military, and economic ties
to Iran have been underscored by Beijing-Tehran-Moscow
conceptual convergence of interests in opposing
perceived US "hegemony," not only globally,
but regionally, in Central Asia and the Caucasus.
The rationale that drives these possible patterns
of coalitions, and the glue that sustains them lacks,
with one exception, serious, meaningful and positive
ideological or identity content (that is, coalition
of "democratic," "pan-Islamic,"
or "pan-Turkic" states). The rationale
remains mostly materially motivated, but these are
also traditional geopolitical calculations in balancing
and "bandwagoning" (that is, distance
from neighboring hegemonic Russia and proximity
to the distant winner, the West and the United States),
and the political economy of access to energy, capital,
and markets.
There is thus no serious ethnic, religious, or ideological
source of identification strong enough for coalition-building
and its sustenance, except a vague, but powerful,
preference for secularism over a fundamentalist/Islamist
alternative. This dichotomous identity struggle
between "secularism" and "Islam,"
real or manufactured, has become a critical discursive
rationale not only for exclusion/containment of
Iran, but more significantly, as a conduit to connect
domestic politics and security with regional security.
Domestic repression of the opposition, especially
in Central Asia, is mostly theorized and implemented
via the "domestic-external Islamic threat,"
(at times complemented with drug trafficking), and
regional security schemes and justification for
military intervention are discussed and pursued
in the same vein.
The process of securitization of the domestic polity
through a deliberate reduction of regime legitimacy
to a fight against "internal/external extremism"
may serve the ruling elite in the short run. In
the long run, however, the enormous underdevelopment
of the region, increasing corruption, and the incredible
economic gap between the elite and the public pose
serious domestic security threats to existing regimes;
too close and uncritical identification of external
actors will inevitably lead to the unintended consequence
of sharing the blame for existing reppression, and
paying the price in wealth, security and prestige.
This dangerous reduction has camouflaged the serious
impact of absence of structural legitimacy at home
as one of the long-term security problems in the
region.
In this context, and in view of the impact of the
ideational on US-Iranian relations, the recent changes
in Iran and the relative opening in Washington-Tehran
relations may constitute the harbinger of defusion
of securitization of Islam in the region as a whole.
The reward structure attached to being distant from
or opposing Iran has been part of the foreign policy
and security socialization and calculations of the
regional actors since the collapse of the Soviet
Union. A drastic positive change in US-Iran relations
will thus be among the most dramatic structural
shifts in those calculations, and their resultant
geopolitical, geoeconomic, and geoideational patterns
of cooperation and discord in this decade.
Alternatively, the continuing or even worsening
of US-Iranian relations will lead to fluid but nevertheless
discernible rivalry in the region. What makes these
divergent scenarios more critical is their organic
connections with, and impact on, the Middle Eastern
and Southwest Asian patterns of security in which,
for better or worse, Iran, geopolitically, geoeconomically,
and ideationally constitutes the key linkage.
Turkey, Middle East, and Israel
John
C. K. Daly
The Middle East Institute
In
the emergent post-Soviet power vacuum in the Caucasus
and Central Asia, Turkey and Israel have emerged
as both trading partners and potential "models"
for development. For many emerging nations, the
two represent models to emulate and a warning to
heed. The one common thread running through both
is energy.
Turkey emerged from the collapse of Communism in
the USSR in December 1991 with both opportunities
and barriers to establishing historic linguistic
and cultural links. For Israel, the collapse of
Communism meant both an end to the Soviet tilt toward
Arab nations along with an opportunity for highly
educated Russian Jewish refusniks to reach
Israel, enriching Israeli society with their talents.
Both countries remain America's most steadfast regional
allies.
Both countries have resources that interest the
South Caucasus and Central Asia, most notably, their
military power. In the decade since the collapse
of the USSR, Turkish military academies have trained
more than 4,000 military officers from the Caucasus
and Central Asia. As these officers move into middle
management positions, former Russian influence is
being supplanted by the secular Kemalist influence.
Israel has an advantage in its infusion of emigres
since the collapse of the USSR; this influx has
given Israel an economic trading "edge"
in the CIS. Turkey, for its part, has long-established
links of language and culture stretching from the
Balkans to Xinjiang.
Some countries in the South Caucasus and Central
Asia have a resource of immense interest to both
Turkey and Israel: inexpensive energy reserves.
Both countries are energy poor, and look at these
reserves as a proximate, non-OPEC source of supply.
In this, Turkey has immense influence over two of
the four potential export routes. In the cases of
Baku-Novorossiisk and Baku-Supsa, Turkish influence
alarms Russia, which sees an American-Israeli-Turkish
"zone of influence" replacing the Soviet
one. Turkey finds itself in direct competition with
Russia for energy transit routes, and Turkey will
continue to block the use of the Bosporus Strait
for the export of Caspian oil. With a new government
in Russia, it is unclear how strongly Western inroads
into these regions will be resisted.
Last but not least, both Turkey and Israel offer
successful models to the newly emergent nations
of the Caucasus and Central Asia of how to deal
with internal insurgencies. Israel's handling of
domestic Muslim fundamentalist terrorism and Turkey's
successful suppression of its Kurdish insurrection
offer notable examples of how to control unresolved
separatist tendencies. From Georgia's Abkhazian
separatists to Uzbekistan's Hizb al-Tahrir, and
from Kazakhstan's restive Russian minority to Kyrgyzstan's
southern border troubles with neighboring Tajikistan,
these states look at Turkish and Israeli success
with admiration.
Both Israel and Turkey have great potential for
expanding their influence in the region. Their ultimate
success, however, will be determined by a complex
skein of energy and military issues within the larger
context of American-Russian bilateral relations,
as the guarantors of their respective client states.
China
Ross
Munro
Center for Security Studies
Shying
away from any neat conceptual framework, one can
argue that China's strategy toward Central Asia
is driven by five factors.
Security
Concerns
China
has an unrelenting wariness of Central Asia's potential
to serve as a base of support for Islamic extremism
and separatist movements, most notably for the restive
Uighurs of Xinjiang. But the alarm that characterized
the views of many Chinese officials in the 1989-92
period has ebbed as China has gradually and successfully
pushed for tighter restrictions by the governments
of the Central Asian Republics on domestic groups
that sympathize with dissidents inside China. For
example, a visitor to Almaty in the autumn of 1999
reported that pro-Uighur groups seemed to be led
by ineffective poseurs and, in one case, seemed
to be a creation of the Kazakh secret services.
Tiny underground groups are said to exist but seem
very limited in what they can do. Nevertheless,
China continues to keep a close eye on this potential
threat, as any official communiqué between
it and a leader of a Central Asian state will attest.
Publicly, Central Asian leaders accept China's assertions
that its long-term strategic goals vis-a-vis the
region are unambitious and benign. But, looking
just at Kazakhstan, perhaps as important to China
as all the other Central Asian states combined,
one finds that private and candid views, at least
in Almaty, are exactly opposite the official stance.
This is perhaps because of rapidly rising tensions
over oil and water during 1999. Whether the interviewees
were high-ranking Kazakh Government officials, academics
who had been anointed as "friends" of
China or hard-nosed pro-Russian strategic thinkers,
the author found two schools of thought. The first
is that China's long-term intention is to occupy
physically and militarily at least a significant
portion of southern Kazakhstan. The more "moderate"
school holds that China intends only to wrap Kazakhstan
so firmly inside its sphere of influence that it
is no longer an independent actor, particularly
vis-a-vis energy, natural resources, and other economic
issues. Interestingly, not a single interviewee
expressed any hope that the US could or would play
a significant role in helping Kazakhstan withstand
Chinese pressure.
Russia
China has been very careful about pressing its huge
advantages in Central Asia to the full. The main
reason is that China's Central Asia policy today
is in many ways subordinate to, and indeed an integral
part of, its Russia policy. With admirable adroitness,
rising China is fashioning a relationship with declining
Russia that will leave China as the undisputed senior
partner. Giving Russia "face"--treating
it as if it is not in decline--is a central part
of Chinese policy. China makes every possible effort
not to embarrass Russia and confront it with its
weakness, particularly in Central Asia, where China
is quite willing for now to acknowledge Russian
primacy. All the while, China slowly increases its
influence in the region and avoids making any significant
long-term concessions to Russia in the region.
The long-term trend is clear. Increasingly, China
has a free hand in the Russian Far East and parts
of Siberia. And, although there has not yet been
a clear test, China now seems to enjoy an effective
veto over Russia's Asia policy. Both trends can
only augment growing Chinese influence in Central
Asia in the long term.
Economics
Since
it became less concerned in the early 1990s over
potential threats from the Central Asian states,
Beijing has viewed them, especially Kazakhstan and
Kyrgyzstan, as both potential markets and sources
of imports particularly, of course, for Xinjiang.
Part of China's development strategy for Xinjiang
includes closer economic ties to Kazakhstan and
the other Central Asian states, and efforts are
even made to give Xinjiang traders a "piece
of the action" in exports of goods manufactured
on China's east coast.
For more than a decade, there has been plentiful
rhetoric about a "New Silk Road" of highways,
railways, and pipelines linking China with the Central
Asian states and ultimately, in some cases, Europe
itself. Progress has been slow but roads and rail
lines continue to be built.
China continues to see the Central Asian states
as an ideal market for the inexpensive consumer
goods that it produces, and indeed, markets in Almaty
and Bishkek are full of more Chinese goods than
modest trade data suggest. This is due in part to
smuggling, poor recordkeeping and third-country
transit (on inquiry, it turns out that many Chinese
goods on sale in Kazakhstan are imported via Kyrgyzstan,
which has a much "softer" border with
China than does Kazakhstan).
The "soft border" policy of China still
has yet to be extensively discussed. As China reached
border demarcation agreements with the Central Asian
states during the 1990s, these were rightly cited
as evidence of China's desire for stable borders.
However, what went largely unremarked was that China
demanded a quid pro quo-the drastic reduction of
restrictions on the movement of people and goods
in both directions. Naturally, this overwhelmingly
and disproportionately benefited the larger and
economically robust China. It was this new "soft
border" policy that led to an initial slew
of reports in the mid-1990s about floods of Chinese
migrants and goods. Although many countries complained,
apparently only Kazakhstan succeeded- in 1994-in
re-instituting significantly more stringent regulations.
This was probably only because China had been shaken
by disturbances in Xinjiang in 1993 and saw considerable
virtue in this particular instance in retreating
from its "soft border" policy.
Energy
Just
as China's Central Asia policy today is in many
ways subordinate to its Russia policy, China's Central
Asia policy must also be viewed as a part of its
worldwide energy strategy. Fearing that it is becoming
increasingly vulnerable strategically as its ocean-borne
imports of oil inexorably increase, China is determined
to secure at least a significant portion of its
oil supply from countries on its land borders, starting
with Kazakhstan. One need only recall the extensive
material relating to China's purchase, or right
to purchase, two major oil fields in the eastern
Caspian and its widely publicized commitment in
1997 to build a lengthy and expensive oil pipeline
to transport oil from those and other fields to
Xinjiang and then to east-central China. The conventional
wisdom continues to assert that the economics of
that pipeline are such that it will never be built.
Announcements in mid-1999 that China and Kazakhstan
had halted talks over the pipeline were universally
viewed as accurate. This was not the case. According
to extraordinarily well-informed sources in Almaty,
negotiations have never ceased. The negotiations
are tense and at times bitter, but both sides desperately
want the line to be built for both economic and
strategic reasons. I predict the pipeline will be
built and that construction will start within two
years. Already China is constructing and improving
what will be the domestic Chinese section of the
Kazakh line.
Water
Closely
related to the energy issue is water. A little-noticed
but extremely important conflict has been growing
between China and Kazakhstan over China's intentions
to divert water from the Irtysh River to irrigate
newly opened cotton fields in Xinjiang. Although
no one agrees on the exact numbers, it is generally
agreed that China has finished construction of an
irrigation canal that could potentially reduce the
water flowing into Kazakhstan by 40 to 60 percent.
The Kazakhs interviewed in the autumn of 1999, inside
and outside government, were in what could best
be described as a state of "controlled panic"
over the situation. Inside Kazakhstan, some six
to eight million Kazakhs live in the Irtysh basin
or depend on its water for drinking, irrigation,
and hydropower. The Chinese have indicated that
they will reduce the flow of the Irtysh by "only"
10 percent, a figure that few Kazakhs find reassuring.
Two knowledgeable Kazakhs argued that the Chinese,
without ever being explicit, have linked the water
issue to the pipeline issue-hinting that Kazakhstan
should make concessions on the pipeline negotiations
if it wants to be certain that China will not visit
a water crisis on the country.
Concluding
Observations
Careful
readers may have noticed the contradiction that
has crept into this presentation. The presentation
began by asserting that China takes a patient, long-term
strategic approach to Central Asia, but concluded
by describing two issues--oil and water--that are
driving China toward a short-term assertion of its
national interests. It will be interesting to observe
whether China can pursue these interests without
offending Russia. The evidence so far suggests that
China will succeed in doing so.
Pulling back the strategic focus, China may well
be at a strategic crossroads itself that will impact
its future strategy toward Central Asia as well
as Russia. There is currently a debate under way
in the Chinese media over how much of its developmental
resources China should earmark for development of
its western provinces. This seems to be part of
a larger debate or struggle that has often preoccupied
China over the centuries: the maritime school versus
the continental school, the merchants of the south
and east versus the soldiers and bureaucrats of
the north and west. This in turn relates today to
a debate over how many resources and how much political
capital should be expended on conquering Taiwan.
Russia
Robert
Legvold
Columbia University
Russia
has no single, integrated strategy toward either
the South Caucasus or Central Asia. Indeed, Russia
never has and likely never will have a single, integrated
strategy toward either region due to the different
challenges and opportunities presented by each.
The fundamental reasons for this are fourfold. First,
the number of domestic actors governing Russia limits
its ability to develop a common approach. Foreign
Minister Primakov briefly imposed a sense of order
during his tenure. Second, crosscutting purposes
also limit efforts at coordinating foreign policy.
Russia is still trying to balance its security needs
with its economic interests. Third, Russia has had
difficulty reconciling the objectives it pursues
in these two regions with its objectives in the
wider world. Fourth, relationships with these countries
have ramifications that Russia has not adequately
prepared for.
Consequently, Russia's policy is inchoate and evolving.
It is occasionally incoherent, has shifted almost
180 degrees during the past decade, and could easily
shift another 180 degrees in the near term.
From 1991 to 1993, as Russia sought to recover from
the shock of the USSR's dissolution, it reduced
the burden imposed by the struggling Newly Independent
States. Russian reformers such as Gaidar tried to
cut loose the turmoil-ridden Central Asian states
as an economic burden. Foreign Minister Kozyrev
did the same in terms of foreign relations. During
this period, "freebooters" in the Russian
Government (Parliament, regional governments, the
military) had control of Russian policy toward Central
Asia and the Caucasus.
By 1993-94, Russian policy had shifted to one of
defending Russia from potential dangers in the region
and to restoring Russian influence (though with
no desire to restore the Russian Empire). Russia
sought to ensure that no outside power would predominate
in the region and abrogated to itself responsibility
for keeping order within its limited means. This
policy had crystallized by 1994 into a dual policy
of securing economic advantage vis-a-vis the two
regions and winning the strategic competition in
the region with the West in general and the United
States in particular.
Russia's power over the region derived from its
superior strength in relative terms, from its markets,
from its control of regional pipelines and transport
networks, from its ability to simultaneously create
threats for those states that refused to cooperate
(through subversion and military aid) or reinforce
the security of the more compliant. In addition,
Russia could often benefit from the outlook and
orientation of the Soviet-era elites still holding
power in Central Asia.
Economically, Russia had the power to support and
keep truces in the conflicts in the region, but
lacked peacemaking abilities. Resentment of Russian
historical dominance also deprived Russia of its
legitimacy and capacity for leadership. Russia's
overall weakness as a state also led to growing
impotence and a lack of the means to achieve its
ends in the region.
Three conclusions follow, none of them yet much
noticed:
-
First, to the extent that Russia remains engaged
in Central Asia and the South Caucasus, it is
likely to rely on economic sticks rather than
carrots, attempting to use the leverage of pipelines,
debt, and Russian markets to secure the economic
outcomes that its seeks. For the rest and with
powers from outside the region, Russia, if it
chooses to remain engaged, is likely to compete
on security terms, offering the Central Asians,
for example, surer protection against the threat
of Islamic extremism than the West can muster.
-
Second, and notwithstanding the first point,
the greater danger is not a Russia determined
to restore its sway over these two regions,
but a Russia that begins to walk away from the
problems of these areas. There is an isolationist
mood stirring among both the public and elites
when it comes to the burdens that a constructive,
large-scale Russian role in the troubles of
Central Asia and the Caucasus would impose.
The prospect of Russia's defecting from responsibility
for peace and stability in Central Asia and
the South Caucasus goes unnoticed by most governments
in these regions, which continue to see more
coherence and malevolence in Russian policy
than is warranted.
-
Third, and somewhat in contrast with the last
point, at the moment, the strategic rivalry
stirring between Russia and outside powers in
the Caucasus and Central Asia tends to reinforce
another trend in the international relations
of the post-Soviet states: that of polarization
among them. Competitive alignments such as GUUAM
(and several others), on the one side, and Russia's
alignment with Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
and Armenia, on the other, risk creating new
sources of tension, complicating existing rivalries.
At the moment, these are only incipient strategic
alignments, but they have a destructive potential
that bears watching.
South Asia
Juli
A. MacDonald
Science Applications International Corporation
These
remarks are based largely on extensive interviews
and discussions with strategists and policymakers
in Pakistan and India during the past year. They
will focus on how India and Pakistan are thinking
about Central Asia, as I found little interest in
the South Caucasus during my research.
Central Asia is prominent in the thinking of Indian
and Pakistani strategists today, despite a tendency
in the United States to discount South Asia's role
and influence in Central Asia because of its lack
of accessible, contiguous borders to the region.
The historical and cultural ties between Central
Asia and South Asia remain strong and have a particularly
strong resonance in northern India. This year, the
two regions will celebrate their cultural affinity
with the 500th anniversary of the Moghul State in
India. Indians seeks to use this celebration to
strengthen cultural and scientific relationships
with Central Asians. Moreover, India's relationship
with Central Asia was strengthened by close ties
during the days of the Indo-Soviet relationship,
when thousands of Indians were educated and trained
in the region, particularly in Tashkent.
Both India and Pakistan squandered opportunities
to develop closer relations with the new Central
Asian states in the early 1990s. Neither state had
much to offer the new governments in the way of
technical assistance, trade, or aid, which is what
the new states needed most. However, the circumstances
have changed since the early days of the post-Cold
War era. Today Central Asia is a critical component
of Indian and Pakistani thinking as both countries
reassess the fundamental changes in their strategic
environment. I see four areas in which Central Asia
factors into India and Pakistan's thinking.
First,
Central Asia is a component of the competition in
South Asia. For both countries, Central Asia
is an extension of their strategic universe. During
my time in New Delhi, Indian policymakers repeatedly
referred to Central Asia as their "extended
strategic neighborhood" and as a region with
which they share a range of strategic interests.
For Pakistanis, Central Asia is important because
it gives Pakistan what they referred to as "strategic
depth." In this context, India and Pakistan
are competing with each other in Central Asia for
influence, for political support for their position
on issues such as Kashmir, for energy in the future,
and for access to markets.
Pakistan had hoped that a combination of Islam and
proximity would give it an advantage over India,
but Islam proved to be a liability for Pakistan
with current Central Asian governments when it began
supporting the Taliban in Afghanistan. Pakistan
is widely regarded as the training ground and supplier
of the Taliban and other nonstate militias in the
region. In this context, Pakistan's relatively favorable
geographic proximity has been neutralized by the
ongoing instability in Afghanistan and in Pakistan
itself. It is hard to see how Pakistan as a state
will project influence effectively into Central
Asia under these conditions, but it is clear that
some nonstate groups in Pakistan--particularly Islamic
groups and narcotraffickers--and even factions of
the military are and will continue to make the effort.
These activities are largely destabilizing for the
region. In contrast, Indians in many institutions
think deeply and coherently about Central Asia as
part of the emerging competition. Central Asia has
captured the attention of strategic thinkers, military
planners, energy companies, and many others. It
is not simply by chance that India today sends some
of its most seasoned diplomats to represent it in
Central Asia.
Second,
Central Asia is seen as an arena that is critical
to larger geopolitical competitions and realignments.
The Indian strategists who are looking beyond India's
borders see a number of threats and opportunities
in Central Asia. First, Indians are thinking about
how to contain China in Central Asia. They see the
Chinese threat encircling India, as China strengthens
its influence in Pakistan, Myanmar, Bangladesh,
and Central Asia, and some Indians believe that
China's growing economic and political penetration
in Central Asia, especially in Kazakhstan, must
be countered before it leads to strategic realignments,
possibly alliances, that might threaten India's
interests. In this context, Uzbekistan was referred
to as the "key to the region," and India
has taken steps to cultivate close ties to Uzbekistan.
President Karimov plans to visit India in May 2000.
Second, India and the Central Asian states share
an interest in controlling the highly unstable and
unpredictable situation in and around Afghanistan
and Pakistan from which instability could cascade
in all directions. India is looking to Iran and
to Central Asia--Uzbekistan in particular--to contain
this chaos in the center. Third, Central Asia is
considered the northern border of an emerging east-west
economic corridor that connects Israel, Turkey,
Iran, India, and East Asia, which eventually might
replace the north-south orientation that predominated
during the Cold War. Finally, Central Asia is seen
as a conduit to the United States. It is a region
where Indian and US interests have the potential
to intersect in areas such as countering Chinese
influence, containing terrorism and the drug trade,
and promoting stability. But US and Indian interests
could also come in conflict, particularly in the
area of Central Asian energy development and transport
for South Asian markets, in which, for India, Iran
almost certainly has to play a central role.
A
third aspect of South Asian interest in Central
Asia is economic. Both India and Pakistan seek
to develop stronger trade relations with the Central
Asia states. India's pharmaceutical companies and
hotels have built a strong presence in the region.
Pakistani traders are increasingly active across
the region, and they will benefit from the Economic
Cooperation Organization's efforts to lower trade
barriers among its members. Pakistan also sees itself
as a potential trade route for Central Asian states
by offering them access to the Arabian Sea.
Finally,
energy will be a major driver of relationships between
Central Asia and South Asia. India and Pakistan--with
their burgeoning demand for gas--are natural markets
for Central Asian gas, and the governments in both
states have high expectations of obtaining Central
Asian energy, from Turkmenistan in particular, but
also from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. In a decade,
India in particular will be importing energy from
multiple directions. Central Asia is considered
a key component of India's energy strategy to mitigate
its dependence on the Middle East over the long
term.
Both states seem to be realistic about the prospects
for pipelines. I found no one who felt that a pipeline
through Afghanistan is a viable option, even in
the long-term. Iran offers more promise as a transit
state for Turkmen gas. Some Indians suggest that
the Afghan pipeline be shifted a few hundred kilometers
west, so it can link into Iran's existing north-south
infrastructure. India, Iran, and Turkmenistan signed
a Trilateral Agreement in 1998, and last year a
tripartite working group with India, Pakistan, and
Turkmenistan also signed an agreement in an attempt
to pave the way for such a pipeline. But Indians
cite two problems that impede the construction of
any pipeline emanating from Central Asia or Iran:
First, the "the Pakistan problem", and
the vulnerabilities that suggests, must be addressed.
The second problem is US sanctions on Iran. If Iran
is the key transit state, which is likely to be
the case, US sanctions on Iran limit the funding
options available to build a pipeline, even if the
Indians and Pakistanis can agree to cooperate. In
this sense, Indian strategists complain that US
sanctions on Iran are a significant impediment to
a broader India-US strategic dialogue.
Indians have a late start, but they are seeking
to develop a presence in Central Asia's energy sector.
For example, several years ago it teamed with the
Chinese Natural Gas Exploration and Development
Corporation to develop a small field in Kazakhstan.
The Indians are also exploring the possibility of
importing electricity from Kyrgyzstan, which has
an excess of hydropower. This scheme would probably
involve transmitting the power across Chinese territory.
For all of these reasons--South Asian competition,
larger geopolitical considerations, economic interests
and energy--South Asia, particularly India, is likely
to be an important player in Central Asia in the
next decade. India's relationships with the Central
Asian states will be multifaceted, based on shared
strategic interests, and part of a broader Indian
strategy in Eurasia. Pakistan also will be involved,
though at this moment it is hard to see the outlines
of a coherent Pakistani strategy. Currently, Pakistan
is viewed more as a threat to Central Asian stability
than as a constructive player.
Europe
Roy
Allison
Royal Institute for International Affairs
The
focus of concern for the EU in the region has been
the South Caucasus, which is perceived to impinge
on European interests far more directly than developments
in Central Asia, and can even be viewed as the European
part of the CIS. The EU is extending its efforts
at political dialogue and support for international
measures aimed at conflict resolution and regional
cooperation in the South Caucasus. However, these
efforts are only weakly reflected in EU policy toward
Central Asia, which is more distant from direct
European concerns. The EU cannot act coherently
as a single state actor in developing a strategic
view on the region. But the EU has a considerable
agenda for the region and could go further to adopt
a common position within its Common Foreign and
Security Policy (CFSP) for at least the South Caucasus.
Three phases in EU policy and thinking may be identified:
-
1992-98.
The strategy was based on bilateral Partnership
and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs). The hope
was that the FSU countries had the possibility
and political will to follow the East-Central
European countries in the direction of Western
Europe. A European space-a network of states
bound together by contractual obligations and
common values- could be extended eastward. Regional
cooperation was emphasized through the Tacis
and Transport Corridor Europe Caucasus Asia
(TRACECA) projects.
-
1998-June
1999. In this period, the EU better understood
the difficulties of unresolved conflicts and
reform efforts in the region and developed a
much more political approach. Conditionality
began to affect policy, although the term was
not used. Interest also grew in the second pillar
of the PCAs--political dialogue--and this was
initiated with Georgia. The EU later welcomed
the accession of Georgia to the Council of Europe.
Political dialogue, as set out in the PCA treaties,
is intended to bring about an increasing convergence
of positions on international issues and to
increase security and stability in the region.
-
Since
June 1999. At the Luxembourg quadripartitite
summit for the signing of the PCAs with the
South Caucasus states, they were put on notice
by the EU that it would not support the status
quo by providing generous amounts of aid. Action
and assistance are now viewed as incentives
for positive change. EU officials are now reflecting
on what kind of dialogue is needed and whether
the EU needs more active engagement in the region.
A new approach to Central Asia is likely also
in 2000.
EU officials favoring greater priority than previously
to the South Caucasus region can argue that: 1)
The EU is expanding and the future of the South
Caucasus will affect the interests of Turkey, Bulgaria,
and Romania; 2) The prospects for the Chechnya and
Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts, particularly the danger
of broader regional destabilization, emphasize that
EU priorities must include conflict resolution;
3) Caspian gas is important for European energy
strategy. Turkey will be a major conduit of gas
onward to Europe and not just as a market for gas.
The Shah Deniz, other potential new Azerbaijani
gasfields, and established gasfields in Turkmenistan
together constitute a vital strategic interest for
gas-hungry Europe. The gasfields further reinforce
the importance of the trade and energy transport
corridor supported by TRACECA and the Inogate and
designed to bypass Russia by passing through Georgia,
despite the fact that the EU continues to declare
its support for multiple pipeline routes chosen
on a commercial basis; 4) European companies also
wish to invest strategically in the energy sector
of the Caspian states; 5) The Caucasus states are
also transit routes in a negative sense--for drugs
and illegal goods--and this has interested these
countries in the third pillar of the PCAs concerned
with justice and home affairs. This issue is of
particular interest to those European countries
affected by the drug trade.
But in fact the PCAs are not working as they were
originally intended, and it could be argued that
the EU should follow its Northern Dimension initiative
with a Southern Dimension--a wide regional policy--which
involves trade, investment, energy, transport, legislative
approximation, and counternarcotics.
EU
Policy on Conflict Resolution and Regional Cooperation
The
1999 Luxembourg declaration of the EU and the South
Caucasus states reflects the EU view that the threat
to European security posed by instability in the
Caucasus has, if anything, been increasing, and
that the root cause of many of the problems facing
the three republics is the stalemate over ethnic
conflicts. EU officials argue that the present stalemate
has aggravated humanitarian problems and has tended
to impede the development of democratic institutions
and the market economy. This has reinforced these
states' reliance on international assistance, while
at the same time rendering that assistance less
effective. It is believed that actions aimed at
enhancing regional cooperation and post conflict
reconstruction offer the best option for progress
on both confidence building and economic recovery.
The EU considers that its assistance should increasingly
be related to conflict resolution and subsequent
normalization, as well as to the political obligations
of the PCAs and economic obligations with international
financial institutions.
In practice, EU efforts at conflict resolution can
only complement and reinforce international mediation
through the OSCE and UN. The EU supports, for example,
the Minsk Group on Nagorno-Karabakh and the Friends
of Georgia group. It also has proposed specifically
that railways linking the countries (Baku-Nakhichevan,
Yerevan-Julfa, and Abkhazia-Tbilisi-Yerevan) be
re-opened to promote intraregional cooperation and
build confidence among the parties to the conflicts.
It is believed that EU assistance in the field of
regional cooperation should be coordinated with
other policies and cooperation initiatives (such
as those for the Black Sea, the Balkans and Central
Europe) and extended westwards. Energy is viewed
as an important factor for integration; the EU pays
particular attention to the promotion of international
cooperation in this domain. The EU has discussed
the US idea of a Caucasus Cooperation Forum, but
considers it problematic if the countries select
projects to be funded by donors, since these may
not be the best projects. This whole issue could
be taken up between the EU and the United States
in the transatlantic dialogue.
EU cooperation with Central Asian states varies
from state to state and is less likely to be an
active part of the CFSP than such cooperation with
the South Caucasus states. PCAs are in force with
Kazakhstan, which seems open to cooperation; Kyrgyzstan,
which is sympathetic to European affairs; and Uzbekistan,
where export and import controls create problems.
Turkmenistan's PCA is not yet in force. Tajikistan
lacks a PCA and the EU cannot work there for security
reasons. But the EU has launched projects on drugtrafficking
in Central Asia, and the Caspian states of Central
Asia are important for the overall Eurasian corridor
concept and the flow of energy, supported by TRACECA
and other EU initiatives.
CONTENTS
Highlights
From the Discussion
Iran's
Role
The
US-Iran relationship is a key driver of regional
dynamics. Panelists and Discussants explored
how the strained US-Iran relationship shapes regional
dynamics and how this would change if, following
a rapprochement, Iran is no longer treated as a
rogue state. Several panelists and discussants noted
that one consequence will be the flow of Caspian
and Central Asian energy through Iran. It is unclear
how such a shift in US-Iran relations will change
politics in the Middle East, Central Asia's views
toward Iran, and Iran's relationship with other
major powers, such as Russia, India, and China.
The discussion revealed that there has been little
attention beyond sanctions to assess the threats
and challenges of the new strategic environment
that will emerge when Iran returns as a key actor.
Iran's
relationship with Russia remains an enduring north-south
axis. The Russia-Iran relationship reflects
shared strategic, political, and economic interests
under current conditions (that is, US sanctions).
But panelists were careful to point out several
difficulties in their relationship. For example,
Iran competes directly with Russia for transport
routes for Caspian energy, and Iranian goals and
sympathies differ radically from Moscow's in Tajikistan
and Chechnya. Tehran has softened its approach toward
Tajikistan and muted its reaction to Chechnya to
gain Russian assistance with its nuclear power program.
Views were mixed about how US-Iran normalization
might affect Russia-Iran relations. Several discussants
assessed that Russia is generally nervous about
a potential US-Iran rapprochement. Panelists argued
that US-Iran normalization could deepen Russia-Iran
ties. If sanctions were lifted, Russia could pursue
a closer relationship with Iran, without worrying
about irritating the United States.
Iran's
label as a rogue and revolutionary state has hindered
its ability to be a serious actor in these regions.
A panelist argued that ideological rhetoric, which
has dominated the discourse in both regions during
the past decade, does not reflect Iran's policies
toward Central Asia and the South Caucasus. He notes
that "Iran's foreign policy toward ideology
has been fundamentally pragmatic." He cited
several explanations for this pragmatic approach:
1) geopolitical interests have prevailed in Iran's
foreign policy; 2) Iran recognized that it could
not communicate its revolutionary messages to the
large Sunni populations; and 3) Iran's flirtations
with ideological policy at the start of Tajikistan's
civil war faded away quickly, because of internal
divisions in the conservative party. A discussant
observed that Iran's policy toward Afghanistan has
evolved from a sectarian policy to a realpolitik
strategy in which Iran now supports anyone who is
anti-Taliban. He posited that Iran is pursuing a
foreign policy to guarantee its borders, not to
support Shiites.
One discussant noted that Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan
have had complicated relations, at best, with Iran
since independence, because of Iranian support for
the United Tajik Opposition and for opposition leaders
in Azerbaijan. A panelist described Iran's policy
toward Azerbaijan as a tit-for-tat approach, in
which both sides are responding to what they perceive
as threats on the other side. In terms of domestic
politics, Iran has adopted sensible policies to
deal with its sizable Azeri minority, allowing Azeris
to attend their own schools and to speak Azeri.
He noted that such policies reflect the fact that
the Azeri population control a number of industrial
sectors in Iran, but it also illustrates a coherent
and sensible policy. For Uzbekistan, Tehran's reconsideration
of its Tajik policy and a shift toward support for
anti-Taliban forces has created common objectives.
The
EU and South Caucasus
The
European Union acts tactically, not strategically,
in the South Caucasus. A panelist explained
that EU's attention has been diverted from the South
Caucasus to the Balkans, which has become the primary
foreign policy concern of the EU during the past
two years. The EU remains concerned about the ongoing
conflicts in the South Caucasus, however, and has
been brokering talks between and among the three
South Caucasus states. The European Commission is
debating whether it should attach political conditions
to its economic aid in order to push the negotiating
processes forward. One panelist argued that a policy
of conditionality would not be enough to push political
leaders in the South Caucasus to take steps toward
real progress and would undermine EU policies in
the region. He warned that EU policies that are
effective in Europe might actually undermine the
sovereignty of the weak states in the Caucasus.
South
Asia
Central
Asia is only one of a number of directions in which
India is engaged. A discussant asked where Central
Asia fit into India's strategic calculus related
to its other interests. The panelist conceded that
India has priorities in other directions. The Middle
East remains a top priority for India because of
its dependence on oil imports. India is also looking
East and engaging states in East and Southeast Asia,
such as Japan, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia.
Central Asia is important, however, not only because
of India's interest in the region's energy, but
also because Central Asia is linked to how India
thinks about other major actors, such as Iran, Pakistan,
and China. For example, the Indians worry about
growing Chinese influence in Kazakhstan.
CONTENTS
Panel
V
Impressions
From the Field
This panel features scholars
who have spent considerable time doing research
in the region. Panelists shared their insights on
how the regional and internal dynamics are changing
based on their experience on the ground, questioned
the prevailing verities about the region, and offered
an assessment of how research on the region should
be focused in the future.
Angela
Theriault (Chairman)
National Intelligence Council
Nora
Dudwick
The World Bank
What
are the prevailing verities?
The
trajectory of change is unidirectional, and will
ultimately result in democratic societies (as measured
by the establishment of electoral democracies and
"free and fair elections"). At the
beginning of the 90s, despite the war in Nagorno-Karabakh,
many Armenians and many Western observers were optimistic
that Armenia was moving in a democratic direction.
Armenians had just voted in a government untainted
by connection to the Communist Party. They took
pride in being the most stable country in the South
Caucasus, a fact they attributed to the high degree
of ethnic homogeneity in a country with a strong
sense of national identity. Most activists preferred
to characterize the "Karabakh Movement,"
which had brought the Communists to power, as a
national democratic rather than purely nationalist
movement. Aside from severely flawed national elections
and near-coups of recent years, the institutional
framework and "democratic" style of governance
(with due respect to the fact that definitions of
democracy vary considerably across cultures) are
still lacking. Armenia has lost one-third of its
population to emigration, and many of the people
remaining in the country, particularly those who
have not benefited from the economic changes, express
bitter disappointment and cynicism about "democracy"
and rampant corruption at every level of government.
Without predicting the "end point" of
the political and social changes under way in Armenia,
it seems clear that there is no reason to assume
any longer that change will necessarily be smooth,
linear, or bring Armenia toward a structure that
resembles Western democratic states.
Despite
rocky beginnings, which include widespread impoverishment,
natural catastrophe (in Armenia) and armed conflict
in both Armenia and Georgia, the presence of skilled
and educated populations, programs of privatization,
liberalization, and globalization should eventually
help restore production and alleviate widespread
poverty. Since 1994, field work on the economic
and noneconomic dimensions of poverty in Armenia,
Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan reveal that
sizable segments of the population, in urban, and
particularly rural areas, are experiencing severe
poverty. This portion of the population, many of
whom worked in agricultural or industrial enterprises,
has not particularly benefited from privatization
or liberalization; on the contrary, privatization
has meant the end of many social services and other
benefits, a loss of which has hurt low-income households.
The spread of informal payments for ostensibly free
health and education services, coupled with the
severe decline in the quality and accessibility
of health and education services also means that
low-income households, particularly those in poorly
served rural areas, are likely to be left further
behind as the economy improves. Certainly, this
portion of the population will not particularly
benefit from "globalization," which, particularly
in the form of improved communications and exposure
to the outside world, predominantly benefits the
urban and the educated.
The
strong and extensive kinship networks that characterize
society in the South Caucasus will act as "safety
nets" and soften the impact of impoverishment
for the poorest households. Sadly, one of the
most striking social phenomena of the past 10 years
has been the weakening of the seemingly durable
ties of kinship and reciprocal obligation that characterized
South Caucasian and Central Asian societies in response
to the widening gap between rich and poor. Poor
people are being excluded--and also exclude themselves--from
the many social and cultural events that traditionally
served to affirm these ties, because they can no
longer afford the expenses connected with participation.
The poor feel humiliated by the need to ask help
from richer relatives, while the newly prosperous
increasingly find their poor relatives a burden
they cannot or do not want to support. Poor people
complain that the Soviet-era economy of reciprocal
favors and services has become increasingly monetized,
and that kinship ties must now be supplemented with
cash.
What
questions should be asked?
How
do informal institutions, particularly connections
and networks, actually work on local and national
levels, and how do they affect political and economic
processes? Field studies demonstrate that whether
at the national, regional, and local level, most
respondents are convinced that politics and economics
are determined by personal ties. Even when this
is not the case, the perception itself shapes behavior.
Case studies to date, particularly of entrepreneurs,
demonstrate the extent to which personal networks
determine the flow of resources between the state
and its citizens. Likewise, fieldwork in agricultural
communities suggests that informal networks and
power relationships are highly significant in terms
of shaping policies and explaining political and
economic events. It is therefore important for research
at any level-national, regional, or local-to carefully
examine the specific history and character of the
informal and historical connections among economic
and political actors.
How
do personal experience and internalized assumptions
from the Soviet period, and new (ethnically shaped)
national identities affect how people perceive and
respond to new institutions and practices? Although
very few people in the FSU would express support
for Marxism-Leninism, clearly many aspects of "actually
existing socialism" were internalized, such
as notions of social justice (egalitarianism) and
of positive rights (to employment, for example).
Even if they verbally support the idea of a market
economy, many people still expect the state to take
primary responsibility for creating employment.
Although they criticize the government for corruption
and incompetence, more traditional rural populations
in particular still consider it the government's
responsibility to take initiative and provide direction.
When examining how new institutions and structures
are functioning, researchers need to continually
pose the question of how local populations interpret
these institutions, and in what way their functioning
results from internalized assumptions and local
experience specific to postsocialist reality.
What
are the sources and dynamics of social change at
the local level? Local formal and informal institutions
have changed considerably, and new power arrangements
and mechanisms are forming. Whether in rural villages
or urban neighborhoods, for example, local communities
have taken the initiative; in others, relationships
have become even more hierarchical than before.
What are the key ingredients and dynamics that make
some groups and/or communities change? How are local
changes affected by economic and geographic factors?
What role is played by individuals, by urban or
international organizations, by the "demonstration
effect" of guided change elsewhere? What are
the practical implications of these findings?
What
issues should regional experts focus on, and why?
Social
and economic exclusion. Even as societies and
economies are restructured and globalized, large
parts of the population (unskilled youth and unemployed
or underemployed older workers in rural areas and
depressed single-company towns, poor children, the
disabled, elderly people living alone, ethnic minorities)
are being socially excluded. Poor children and youth
have decreasing access to education and training,
which will make them less competitive if and when
growth increases. Likewise, geographic isolation
and deteriorating infrastructure has worsened the
position of rural populations. The increasing rich-poor
gap reduces social cohesion and potentially leads
to political instability (as seen recently in Armenia).
In ethnically heterogeneous countries and politically
fragile countries such as Georgia, even the perception
that exclusion is caused by discrimination based
on ethnic affiliation could be politically very
destabilizing. The economic and social marginalization
of sizable portions of the population should therefore
not be ignored.
David Hoffman
University of California-Berkeley
I have spent approximately four of the last seven
years in the former Soviet Union, in particular
in the states of what Russians term "the near
abroad." During this time, I have had the opportunity
to engage the region from a number of different
perspectives--that of journalist, energy consultant,
academic researcher, and human rights representative.
Naturally, each of these occupations brings to the
table its own insights into the region, as well
as its own set of institutional "blinders"
and biases.
This panel brings together scholars who have been
active in conducting in-country fieldwork in the
states of the South Caucasus and Central Asia, and
who thus are in a position to inject invaluable
firsthand knowledge into the larger meta-conversation
that this conference represents. In this milieu,
my contribution, as I understand it, might best
be made in the form of sober reflection, and the
juxtaposition of the salient questions and issues
raised by preceding speakers against a backdrop
of the realities of political, economic and social
life in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Thus,
I hesitate to proffer anything in the way of a concrete
thesis at this early stage. Given my experience,
not only in studying, living in, and working on
this region over the past seven years, but in interacting
with others engaged in similar activities, I think
one or two tentative comments can be made at this
point, less as definitive statements than as a way
for framing further discussion.
Regional
experts should be cautious of the sources of information
we use in crafting our understanding of the region.
The gradual penetration of new forms of electronic
information-gathering and dissemination into the
South Caucasus and Central Asia has made it increasingly
easier to gather information on the regions from
afar. Internet versions of local newspapers (Zerkalo
from Azerbaijan and the Almaty-based Delovaya
Nedelya and Panorama are particularly
good examples), e-mail listserve groups, news wire
compilations and the like are opening up the region
to outside observers as never before. And, of course,
the gradual loosening of visa regimes and intellectual
migratory patterns has enabled a quantum-leap in
personal and institutional contacts between representatives
of the Western and regional academic, government,
and business communities. The information pipeline
out of the region is clearly widening, albeit in
fits and starts (witness virtually every government's
attempts to control, in some form or another, access
to the Internet).
This trend is heartening, but it should be taken
with more than a small grain of salt. I will limit
myself to noting here two reasons, in particular,
that ought to give us pause. Of perhaps immediate
consequence to many scholars' work has been my finding,
over the course of my fieldwork, that macroeconomic
indicators in many of the countries in the region
are extremely unreliable, and in some cases represent
outright fantasy more than the real state of the
economy. Interviews with regional statistics committee
employees in one Central Asian department revealed
an office gutted by a lack of financing and eight-month
wage arrears. It should be no surprise, then, that
bureaucrats who have not been paid for nearly a
year are less than likely to enthusiastically carry
out their assigned task of collecting output, employment,
and wage data from the various economic enterprises
in their region. In fact, they had not, and thus
current figures were merely extrapolated from those
of previous years. If one is going to use macroeconomic
statistics in a serious and consistent manner, it
is imperative to investigate "where the rubber
hits the road," so to speak: employees at regional
offices of state statistical committees are but
the foot soldiers in the larger process of statistics-gathering.
Their results, I found, are often subsequently manipulated
and massaged according to prevailing political winds
at each of the higher stages of data accumulation,
culminating in, as one bureaucrat jokingly called
it, the "red-pencil stage," where undesirable
figures or numbers are banished to oblivion with
the stroke of a high-ranking official's hand. Thus,
often by the time statistics reach the Western "consumer,"
whether in government, a university, or an international
financial organization, the cumulative product can
be worth less than the paper it's printed on.
Informal
and illegal rent-seeking should be called what it
is--putting a "positive spin" on it helps
no one, least of all the governments and people.
My own work is rooted in the intersection of the
petroleum sector and state-building in Azerbaijan
and Kazakhstan, specifically in the interaction
between the intertwined processes of pursuing petroleum-led
development, while simultaneously attempting to
develop a measure of state capacity across critical
institutions-extractive, regulatory, and redistributive.
Though not a prime focus of my research, one of
my more interesting findings has been the degree
to which informal revenue channels have insinuated
themselves in the regions' oil and gas sectors.
What would I tell you if actual crude and refined
oil product output in Azerbaijan was actually almost
double the official figure? The production of private
profit and public loss damages not only these countries'
prospects for economic development, but ultimately
the perhaps more important task of developing strong
state institutions.
Short,
impressionistic visits to the field often remain
just that: short and impressionistic. Several
years ago, a group of European experts paid a working
research visit to Azerbaijan. Their purpose was
to survey the state of the oil machinery sector.
On the basis of their report, I revisited what they
had judged the "strongest" four enterprises.
My walk-through of the factory floors, interviews
with workers and management, and inspection of the
machinery, however, revealed equipment with birds
nesting in them, a work force that seemed to be
80 percent invisible or not present, and capital
stock that had not been operated in years. The difference
between my visit and the previous lay in that I
visited all of the sites, rather than conducting
telephone or remote-site interviews with the plant
managers. Short trips to the field, relying heavily
on official contacts and translators, are useful,
but their limitations should be taken into account.
What,
then, are some of the basic lessons we can learn?
Relying on the Internet, official statistics, and
a small circle of local sources (who may or may
not, in fact, be based in their home country) carries
with it a degree of risk. This, of course, varies
with the scope and goals of a given research project--certain
topics obviously lend themselves more to small-n
analysis and/or anthropological observation. In
an environment where the basic statistics-gathering
institutions of the state have withered, where local
experts and/or institutes sometimes have political
or personal axes to grind, and where new forms of
information technology add breadth, but not depth,
to our understanding of the area, we must be wary,
indeed. The first lesson, obviously, is that numbers
and statistics are malleable: on numerous occasions
I have seen economic "progress" generated
at the drop of a hat. True, economists can, to some
degree, massage meaning out of the sometimes perverse
raw data generated by state statistics committees.
But the fact remains that an overreliance on official
statistics and economic data is an invitation to
facile and flawed analysis.
This cautionary tale clearly places a heavy methodological
burden on the researcher. As mentioned, some topics
are easier to "get at" than others. The
political economy of oil, for example, tends to
be wrapped in a double cloak of political opacity
(regional, kinship, and patronage networks are insular
and tough to crack if you are an outsider) and economic
dissimulation. Nevertheless, effective research
requires first of all that we be aware of these
dangers. As the internet casts its net broader and
wider, we should be conscious of the overall lack
of depth of most of its offerings up to date: the
primary sources for many websites and listserves
are relatively few and incestuous. Another basic
lesson that follows from this discussion is that
field research ideally should: a) consist of multiple
trips, in order to facilitate the development of
deep, rather than broad, contacts; and b) benefit
from appropriate language skills, since using a
translator, while in some cases unavoidable, is,
unfortunately, often a hindrance, especially when
the topic at hand is sensitive for the interviewee.
Cynthia Werner
Pitzer College
Almost nine years have passed since the breakup
of the Soviet Union, yet the transition to a more
democratic system with free market trade seems to
be stalled in the middle of chaos. Although the
political and economic systems have definitely been
changing, they are not necessarily changing in positive
directions. One of the buzzwords that analysts repeatedly
use to explain what is wrong with the transition
process is "corruption." In Western policy
reports and popular newspapers, widespread corruption
in the former Soviet Union is often portrayed as
the leading threat to political democratization
and economic liberalization.
Journalists, for example, have published stories
on how corruption impedes political elections, media
reporting, factory production, property privatization,
and foreign trade. These perceptions of corruption,
in turn, force international development organizations
to question whether or not it is pragmatic to continue
sending foreign aid to these countries. Similarly,
foreign businesses must decide whether or not potential
profits are worth the risk of operating in an environment
with a strong "mafia" presence.
Here I would like to address the issue of corruption
by sharing my own firsthand knowledge of corruption
in post-Soviet Kazakhstan. As a cultural anthropologist
conducting research in a small Kazakh town, rather
than a Western businessman making deals in a large
Kazakh city, my knowledge of corruption is based
largely on what people have told me about corruption,
rather than my own personal experiences with the
local mafia. In the field, I was able to acquire
considerable information about the contexts in which
bribes are most frequently presented, the cash value
placed on bribes for various services, and the proper
etiquette for presenting bribes. I was also able
to gather information on the ways in which rural
Kazakhs view the morality of bribery and nepotism.
Not surprisingly, their ideas of what activities
are illegal yet morally acceptable and what activities
are illegal and morally reprehensible do not exactly
correspond to American views. In my opinion, understanding
the way people talk about corruption and the way
they think about corruption can be very important
for developing practical strategies to fight corruption.
Similar to the other former Soviet republics, Kazakhstan
is known as a place where "nothing is allowed,
but everything is possible." In other words,
despite attempts to dismantle the Soviet bureaucratic
system, laws and documents still regulate and monitor
almost all social and economic activities. Yet,
bureaucrats who control the flow of documents and
the observance or regulations are known to provide
a quick service or limited privilege to individuals
who pay bribes or call in personal favors. Everybody
knows that traffic police and customs officials
take bribes for real and imagined offenses; judges
receive bribes for favorable sentences; employers
secure bribes in exchange for available positions;
and university officials accept bribes for admission.
In addition to paying bribes, people know that personal
connections, including clan ties, can be useful
for getting around the system.
Everybody in Kazakhstan also knows that bribery
and nepotism are illegal. But, the way that corruption
is legally defined does not correspond perfectly
to the way that it is culturally or morally defined.
In other words, some crimes are morally acceptable
while others are not. Going further, people take
different positions when it comes to the morality
of such activities, which further varies depending
on the context. When it comes to the morality of
bribery, people factor in the content of the bribe,
the official's personality and generosity, his or
her regular salary, the estimated amount of income
received from bribery, and whether or not the bribes
are voluntarily presented. Similarly, the morality
of nepotism is context-specific. For example, in
southern Kazakhstan, most Kazakhs accept and even
praise bureaucrats, who are loyal to their family
and clan in hiring practices, as long as the benefactors
are somewhat qualified for the position.
For this conference, I was asked to address several
questions: What prevailing verities do you accept
or reject? What questions should be asked but are
not? And, what things should we be focused on? To
begin, I do believe that pervasive corruption is
a real problem that hinders development and democratization
in Central Asia. This is not just a local problem,
as the level of corruption in Central Asia also
affects international politics, foreign aid, and
foreign trade. Although there are no easy solutions
to this problem, the situation is not completely
hopeless. International organizations, such as the
World Bank, are already taking some initiatives
to fight corruption in Central Asia.
As these international organizations and foreign
governments take a more active role in fighting
corruption in Central Asia, it is important for
us to start asking new questions. First, we need
to think about ways to develop culturally compatible
solutions to the corruption problem. As I have already
discussed, Americans and Kazakhs do not necessarily
share the same understandings of what constitutes
"corrupt" behavior. It would be easier
to gain support for anticorruption campaigns in
Central Asia that are initially targeted against
those forms of corruption that are universally perceived
to be immoral. At the same time, local governments
could introduce educational programs that link the
anticorruption movement to notions of nationalism,
patriotism, and social justice. Second, it is important
to think about the unintended consequences that
will arise with anticorruption campaigns in Central
Asia. As Soviet history demonstrates, the introduction
of anticorruption measures often opens the door
for practices akin to witch-hunting. Individuals
who would ideally be targeted by these efforts tend
to possess both the connections and the skills necessary
to avoid being caught. At the same time, the most
corrupt individuals often use these campaigns to
root out their enemies. We need to determine whether
or not it is possible to change the system without
trying to identify and remove corrupt leaders. In
this regard, we need to study the factors, such
as low wages and excessive bureaucracy, that foster
corruption in Central Asia. By addressing these
questions, it is possible to develop more effective
anticorruption measures in Central Asia.
Kathleen Kuehnast
Mellon Foreign Area Fellow, Library of Congress
What
prevailing verities do you accept or reject?
History
is key to understanding the present is a given,
but I would add that the present may also be key
to more fully understanding the Communist past.
It is essential that we continue to reexamine the
late Communist period from new vantage points, and
if need be, to revamp our analysis of it. As we
move further away from Cold War rhetoric, new questions
must be raised. Since our orientation to date has
focused distinctly on Communism's shortcomings and
failings, we must also begin to identify what actually
worked during the socialist experiment. This additional
knowledge will give us a better framework for understanding
the fault lines and impediments of current institutional
reforms, since these institutions are based as much
on human agency as they are on
ideologies.
The
states of Central Asia will continue to maintain
their Soviet-inherited borders is an assumption
that I think will prove to be false. In my estimation,
there is a high probability that the current geopolitical
borders of Central Asia will be different in ten
years time. With a number of recent interregional
border disputes (Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan; Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan;
Ferghana Valley), reconfigurations may occur sooner
than later. Moreover, it is important to note that
Russia's President-elect Putin also appears to be
making more of an overture toward Central Asia than
did his predecessor. It is not out of the range
of possibilities that Russia could play a covert
role in destabilizing borders as a means of consolidating
further dependency on Russia's military strength
in the region. Further, another question which begs
to be answered is how will the countries of Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan maintain their independence when
economic development and sustainability appears
very uncertain at best, and where their poverty
levels are at 51 percent and 94 percent respectively?
Central
Asia's drug-trafficking problem is huge and perhaps
even insurmountable, is not only an accurate assessment
but begs for global awareness and intervention.
Drug trafficking is not going to disappear in Central
Asia. Growing rural poverty, lack of economic development,
and a general willingness by Central Asian governments
"to look the other way" makes the situation
in the region extremely vulnerable to active drug
trafficking. Not only is this a national security
issue, but it is only a matter of time before "drug
money" starts playing a public and pivotal
role in politics of the region.
What
questions should be asked?
Although
women are actively engaged in the arena of NGO development,
why have they not gained footing in the new political
arena, either in elected parliamentary positions
or appointed ministerial positions? Women today
have less of a role in public discourse than they
had during the Soviet period, in part, because most
women are coping with day-to-day survival problems.
In addition, traditionalism and resurgent religious
ideals have advocated a far more conservative position
for women in Kyrgyz society than the prior Soviet
era when Central Asian women were encouraged to
be educated and to work outside the home. The increasingly
conservative rhetoric about women's roles in society
may not only foreshadow potential human rights abuses,
but it also indicates the level of tolerance for
diversity in the social milieu.
No matter the level of literacy or work experience
Central Asian women gained over 70 years, the last
decade has seen many women mired in the new poverty
that has engulfed these countries. It is not that
women are any more poor than men, but they are more
burdened. With the collapse of socialism and the
many mechanisms of support, including child care,
pensions for the elderly, universal health care,
etc., women are not only relegated to taking care
of their own family and extended families, but also
in some regions are the primary breadwinner. There
is simply no time for most women to partake in the
public political process. Poverty undermines the
voices and participation of women. Their silence,
in fact, sounds a loud signal for the need for nation-building
efforts to address worsening social and economic
problems. As one young rural Kyrgyz mother expressed
angrily in an interview, "New democracies and
economies are of no use when people can no longer
feed or clothe their families."
Although women are actively involved in NGOs, it
is important that they are not marginalized in the
political processes under way in these nascent states.
Protecting the constitutional rights of women, as
well as developing a sound legal system, should
not be done without the active participation of
women.
What
is the long-term impact of poverty on the youth
of Central Asia? An important factor to consider
in Central Asia is the demography of the population,
since nearly 40 percent of the population is now
under 18 years of age. In spite of the many inadequacies
of the Soviet system, health and education indicators
for child development in Central Asia were high,
especially when compared to other developing countries
in the world. It is now proving exceedingly difficult
to maintain the same sort of commitment to the needs
of children in the uncertain economic and political
predicaments of Central Asia. Furthermore, with
the collapse of central planning, many of the new
states are having difficulty maintaining basic infrastructure,
such as roads and public transportation.
In the rural areas, where over half of Central Asians
reside, the repercussions of poverty are particularly
devastating. Poverty destabilizes society and creates
stress lines and fissures. As a result, many children
have experienced the abrupt diminishment in the
quality of their lives. They have also felt the
trickle-down effect of economic crises, including
such problems as the increasing rate of school dropouts,
the spread of debilitating communicable diseases
(tuberculosis, syphilis, and hepatitis), malnutrition
among younger children, unprecedented homelessness,
and an increase in youth crimes, mental depression,
and suicide among teenagers.
Although women are often singled out as a vulnerable
group, there is growing evidence that unemployed
young males are also highly vulnerable. Young males
are the most likely group to move into the illegal
drug trade, as well as the most likely candidates
for involvement in radical political or religious
groups. In various interviews over the past decade,
many villagers in Kyrgyzstan spoke of their terror
of these groups of young males. Many complained
that "the streets are no longer safe in the
evenings for women and children." Indeed, the
incidence of violence, suicide, and crime among
this age group has increased over the last decade.
Clearly, the problems of children today foreshadow
the human development issues of tomorrow.
What
things should we be focused on?
What
is the impact of poverty on democratic reforms?
Current poverty levels in Kyrgyzstan are having
an impact on national stability. Extrapolated during
the coming decade, the widespread poverty cannot
be underestimated in terms of breeding political
discontent or intensifying illegal activities that
may destabilize Akayev's government. In 1996, one
older Kyrgyz woman in Naryn foreshadowed the current
economic-political predicament in Kyrgyzstan when
she said about the next round of elections that
"I would rather vote for Communism and eat,
than vote for democracy and starve."
What
are the implications of the increasing stratification,
not only between the rich and poor, but also the
urban and rural regions? We see a rapidly disappearing
"middle class" (at least by former Soviet
levels). Using the consumption-based measurements
of the World Bank (versus an income measure), 51
percent of the population in Kyrgyzstan now lives
below the poverty line. The Gini Inequality Coefficient
(1997), which calculates the degree of class inequality,
indicates a value for Kyrgyzstan of 0.41, which
is higher than that of Kazakhstan at 0.35, although
still lower than Russia's 0.46.
The rural poverty rates in Kyrgyzstan (65 percent)
are more than twice that of urban rates (29 percent).
And extreme poverty rates in rural areas (21 percent)
are about four times those of urban areas (5 percent).
With the most onerous economic problems affecting
those who live in rural Kyrgyzstan, it is important
to explore how rural poverty can further weaken
borders that are already quite porous and potentially
dangerous. Three of Kyrgyzstan's four borders are
certainly troublesome, especially the ones with
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in the Ferghana Valley,
and of course, western China, most notably the Xinjiang
Province. In each instance, these borders are for
the most part in remote, mountainous areas, which
means that they are often poorly guarded. Where
guard posts do exist on the roadways, it is a well-known
fact that these guards are generally susceptible
to bribes, thus affording easy access for the cross-border
drugs or even arms trade.
In the past five years, two important developments
have occurred simultaneously with respect to drug
trafficking in Kyrgyzstan. First, a Russian market
for drugs has opened up. Second, Iran, once on the
drug-smuggling route, launched a strict antidrug
campaign, virtually sealing its border with Afghanistan.
This has redirected the drug trade northward through
Kyrgyzstan. It is essential to consider that as
economic conditions worsen, or even if they remain
the same, the only viable business for many of the
rural poor may be drug trafficking. Extensive rural
poverty makes gainful, albeit illegal opportunity,
appear reasonable and necessary to desperate people.
Economic disparity may significantly exacerbate
preexisting tensions between the titular group,
the Kyrgyz, and other ethnic groups. This is especially
true since agricultural resources are limited, and
there are relatively few fertile valleys in the
country. For example, Chui Valley in the North,
the Kyrgyz retain a latent resentment toward successful
Chinese and Uighur farmers. Tensions between Russians
and ethnic Kyrgyz living around Lake Issyk-Kul peaked
in 1992, during a march to commemorate Kyrgyz who
had died in the 1916 uprising against Russian settlers
who had encroached on their grazing lands. And of
course there were the now-infamous Osh riots of
1990, which erupted over land rights in the Ferghana
Valley, home to both Uzbeks and Kyrygz. Certainly,
limited access to arable lands and resources may
be a catalyst for conflicts of a regional or ethnic
nature.
What
is the impact of poverty on social networks?
The weakening of rural social networks as the result
of increasing isolation and poverty has only recently
begun to be considered as a significant social development
concern. Since many of the transactions among people
living in the rural regions pertain to survival
issues--securing food, obtaining health services,
finding fuel and water, and so forth--social networks,
as a type of informal institution, are a critical
dimension of day-today rural survival. The Kyrgyz
Republic Social Networks Study (Kuehnast & Dudwick,
2000) indicates that the ability of the social networks
of the poor to insulate them from the mounting problems
of rural life is diminishing rapidly. As a result,
the rural poor are finding themselves in a patronage
relationship in which they borrow goods, food, or
cash from their wealthier neighbor, and then become
indentured to that neighbor as a means of paying
off their debts. In Georgia and Armenia, this same
sort of predicament has been called "medieval
work conditions," denoting the feudalistic
strategies being used by the poor to survive.
Michael Thurman
The World Bank
There are many verities in the prevailing body of
research on Central Asia which I accept, for example:
-
Central Asian states and elites are dependent
upon Russia.
-
There are many factors that could lead to instability
in Central Asia, such as irredentism, economic
decline, possible conflict over transboundary
resources, and "spillover" from events
to the south.
-
Central Asia is a region in which the United
States should be actively involved.
-
Central Asians are politically passive in the
face of authoritarianism.
My research in the field, however, has led me to
some conclusions that are not shared by many scholars
of Central Asia. These include the following:
-
Central
Asian society is not overwhelmingly "traditional"
or "feudal." One often hears the
comment that you "go back to the middle
ages" when you leave the capital cities
of the region for the countryside. This is based
on a false perception that roots rural areas
in a static, "traditional" reality
where "custom," familial ties, and
religion are the predominant influences on the
population. In fact, indigenous social and political
structure and religion were greatly transformed
by collectivization and subsequent years of
rule by the "command-administrative system."
Clans and kinship ties are ultimately subservient
to Soviet modes of transmitting power through
the Party, which is closely intertwined with
both social and political structures.
-
The
view that Central Asia is a hotbed of Islamic
fundamentalism is based on Western stereotypes
and prejudices, some of which have been acquired
from Russian and local elites. The village
where I conducted my field research is predominantly
populated by self-avowed "fundamentalists."
However, their fundamentalism should be likened
more to Church of Christ fundamentalism than
to a firebrand ideology. No one rejected me
based on my Christian convictions. The imam
expressed to me his belief that "God is
the same" for all religions. The population
favors a secular government and greatly admires
the United States.
-
Although
many factors make instability a concern in Central
Asia, the region is not a "tinderbox."
My research was mainly conducted in rural areas
of the Ferghana Valley, one of the most commonly
mentioned "hotspots." Despite the
fact that socioeconomic conditions in the region
are much worse than before independence, there
has been no repeat of the conflagrations of
1989 and 1990. Many of the fears for my safety
expressed by Western, Russian, and urban Central
Asian friends proved to be entirely unfounded.
In my opinion, the rural population is, if anything,
too passive in the face of authoritarianism.
-
Political
passivity should not be mistaken for lack of
a capability to respond to incentives and changing
circumstances. Central Asians are resourceful
in adopting mechanisms for coping with the prevailing
command-administrative mode of governance. They
typically make sound decisions when involved
in the decision-making process. This is evident
in the experience of the Leninsky District Farmers
Association in Tajikistan, which has empowered
farmers to manage their own affairs and overcome
resistance from the local government.
Research
on Central Asia can be improved in several ways:
-
Micro-level studies are needed. The prevailing
body of research generalizes a fund of specific
information that is often woefully inadequate
for the purpose.
-
The Central Asian experience should be compared
with that of other parts of the world. Specific
locales of Central Asia should also be compared
with one another.
-
For a region that is predominantly rural, there
is little research on the countryside of Central
Asia. In part, this is because it is more difficult
to access rural areas, and that it is much easier
to conduct research in the relative comfort
of the capital cities.
-
By adopting an historical perspective, scholars
of Central Asia would learn more about change
in the past, thus enabling them to identify
most significant features of the present system.
There is also a great deal of room for "old-style"
history concerning the region, since we know
only the most basic facts about its past. Soviet
interpretations of the past, on which many scholars
base their opinions, are often entirely spurious
and bear a closer resemblance to pamphleteering
than serious history.
CONTENTS
Highlights
From the Discussion
Economic
Challenges
Oil
is a liability more than an asset for economic and
political development in the region. Several
panelists and discussants noted that, if the oil
sector was not managed properly, there will be wide-reaching
economic, political, and social implications. Other
discussants expressed concerns about transparency
issues.
-
Oil has the potential to overwhelm the state.
One panelist argued that success of these countries
will depend largely on how they deploy and digest
energy revenues in a meaningful way and build
institutions to support the state. Currently
the Azerbaijani Government is unable (or unwilling)
to privatize SOCAR because it is such a lucrative
source of informal revenue. At the same time,
revenues from the oil industry are not being
re-invested in other capacity-building sectors
or in other institutions.
-
Other sectors are neglected as the foreign investment
pours into the oil and gas industry. One panelist
argued that Kazakhstan is the best example of
a relatively diverse economic portfolio. Some
foreign investment has flowed into a variety
of sectors, such as light manufacturing and
metallurgy. But the energy sector will continue
to be favored unless the local government provides
incentives to attract more investment into other
sectors.
-
Poor regulatory regimes discourage investment
in many of these countries, and investment is
often squandered. Regional governments seek
to avoid transparency. Turkmenistan has the
most opaque system in the region. None of the
panelists could comment on what is happening
in Turkmenistan.
Strategies
for assessing economic data were debated. One
discussant argued that despite endemic collection
problems, data may be more accurate than we think.
First, he observed that the data reflected a sharp
fall in economic performance in the region after
the Russian crisis, which suggests that the governments
were not simply extrapolating past trends. Second,
bad data may make it difficult to assess performance
levels, but discerning economic trends remains possible.
Several panelists concurred that deliberate falsification
and simple neglect make economic data from the region
very difficult to use for purposes of assessing
needs. If the falsification is done consistently,
however, it is still possible to discern various
trends. Another discussant asserted that accurate
data can be obtained if an outside agency pays the
locals to do it properly, which is a strategy that
the United Nations employed to collect data for
its Human Development Report. Other discussants
asserted that the quality of data depends largely
on the country. For example, the quality of data
coming from Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan far exceeds
the quality and quantity of data from Turkmenistan.
Tacis and IMF economic data were mentioned as useful
as external checks on the economic data from the
region.
Social
Challenges
A
number of social problems were raised in the discussion.
While political and economic problems tend to be
country-specific, most of the states in the region
confront common social problems at the microlevel.
The issues raised during the discussion include:
-
Population
Dynamics. The population dynamics of the
former Soviet empire are in flux. Russia's population
is shrinking, and Central Asia's population
is growing. Several panelists believed that
the governments in the region will be unable
to cope with the future population pressures,
from growth rates as high as Turkmenistan's
3.8 percent. A panelist noted, however, that
this population growth must be somewhat qualified
by the fact that many women are starting to
realize that they cannot afford to raise as
many children and are employing self-imposed
birth control and having abortions. In addition,
populations are moving from rural to urban areas.
-
Unemployment.
The endemic poverty of the region, combined
with population growth, is naturally leading
to a significant unemployment problem for the
young generation in Central Asia. Forty percent
of the population is under 18. Islamic extremism
may be a direct consequence of the regional
unemployment problem.
-
Corruption.
Local and national leaders, who exploit their
positions for personal gain, are found across
both the South Caucasus and Central Asian regions.
Mafia leaders and drug traffickers also drain
resources and hurt economic productivity. There
are some cultural norms for corruption which
are socially acceptable.
-
Role
of Women. Panelists agreed the role of women
in these societies has been neglected, but they
are playing an increasingly important role in
the region. Present gender problems must be
understood in the context of the past.
-
Breakdown
of social order/networks. The collapse of
the political and economic system has also shattered
the traditional social order in these countries.
Research on the ground reveals that people are
so focused on survival that traditional informal
networks and channels of communication no longer
exist. Even traditional family structures are
breaking down. Some people are unable to give
or attend weddings or funerals, due to cost
considerations. These social events were used
to exchange news and information.
How
should the West be thinking about these problems?
An attendee noted that the picture painted by the
panelists is one of unremitting poverty among Central
Asians and a seemingly unstoppable downward spiral
in their prospects. Panelists observed that the
gap between government promises and the reality
of increasingly deteriorating living conditions
is growing, but it is unclear how long those impoverished
will accept these conditions. One panelist commented
that Central Asians do not know anything else, unless
they are presented with an opportunity. For this
reason, it is difficult to predict when a threshold
that leads to a violent reaction will be crossed.
One panelist offered four possible scenarios, observing
that there are no optimistic outcomes at this moment:
-
The young will continue to migrate to urban
areas and the elderly will be left impoverished
in the rural areas.
-
The population will continue to tolerate poor
economic conditions.
-
The young will seek alternative economic activities
which are primarily illegal, for example, drug
trafficking. A criminalized economy will have
serious political implications.
-
The population demands change from the government,
which leads to civil unrest and possibly an
overthrow of the regime.
Why
do we not see greater social unrest with such deteriorating
conditions? Panelists explained that the pervasive
lack of trust mitigates against social mobilization
of any kind. Not only have social networks broken
down, but people refuse to work together. Small
businesses are reluctant to collaborate to protect
their interests because they fear that the connections
will make them vulnerable. Another panelist, however,
had seen people unite around common causes, such
as water issues. For example, a group of Uzbeks
recently founded a water association, which could
have political implications, but it was an unlikely
vehicle to foment social unrest.
Recommendations
-
Panelists
strongly urged long-term, grassroots studies.
Only significant time on the ground in these
two regions, particularly away from the capitals,
will contribute to a greater understanding of
the problems in these regions.
-
Central Asia and the South Caucasus must be
understood on their own terms. Some discussants
argued that the West requires a better understanding
of these countries' cultures, histories, ethnic
groups, economies, and the role of Islam. Westerners
tend to arrive in the region with an agenda
and policy prescriptions that they seek to impose
on the natives. It is important to discern what
the locals want and need.
-
An understanding of political stability in other
developing countries that are undergoing structural
adjustment programs can provide lessons learned
that could be applied to Central Asia and the
South Caucasus.
CONTENTS
Panel
VI
Concluding
Roundtable: The Outlook
of the Larger Geopolitical Environment
and Key Variables
The objective of the roundtable was to reemphasize
particularly salient points that emerged during
the previous day and a half; to help establish the
architecture for debate on contentious points; and
to suggest a "research menu" for going
forward.
S.
Enders Wimbush (Chairman)
Hicks & Associates, Inc.
Central Asia is at the center or on the near periphery
of the national security interests of all states
in the region. In the view of states near Central
Asia, Central Asia is not a small, isolated group
of former Soviet colonies that is of interest only
because of its historical quaintness. Most countries
in the region have multiple interests that converge
in Central Asia. India, which seems far away, is
a case in point. It views Central Asia as its "extended
strategic neighborhood" in the competition
with Pakistan, and it has a direct interest in controlling
the political chaos in Pakistan and Afghanistan;
its interest in Central Asian energy is paramount;
and it sees Central Asia as a key piece of its effort
to contain Chinese expansion and prevent "encirclement"
by China. In this sense, Central Asia is a critical
strategic juncture point in its national security
planning for China, the Middle East, and South Asia.
Similarly, for nearby states such as Turkey, Iran,
Pakistan, China, and, of course, Russia, as well
as for some more distant states such as Israel,
Central Asia and the South Caucasus are no less
important in their strategic calculations.
Since the collapse of the USSR, strategic dynamics
now cascade across regions. Organizations that are
constrained by a focus on discrete regions will
not see many of the direct consequences that flow
from political change, and the second- and third-order
consequences of developments in one region for surrounding
regions.
Terminology matters. Western catch-phrases for desired
development such as "civil society," "economic
reform," "democracy-building," and
"globalization" all speak to Western goals
for the region, but they tend to distort both the
reality of Central Asia and thwart good judgment
for what is needed there. They tell us little about
how these peoples think about themselves, which
is the critical variable in studying any strategic
culture. The language and analytical filters used
for the region may need to be recalibrated or thrown
out all together after we have gained a better understanding
of how the people of the region think about these
problems.
Rajan Menon
Lehigh University
Many scholars continue to view Central Asia through
a post-Soviet prism. This conference has highlighted
the dangers of clinging to a "top-down"
view. A number of areas require further research
or need to be
reassessed:
-
High politics should be replaced with a "ground
floor" approach. A better understanding
of the situation in the region at the grassroots
level, and how grassroot issues could affect
Western interests in the region is necessary.
For example, Central Asia's nascent "lost
generation," unsuited to attain or accept
the benefits of or protect themselves against
the adverse effects of globalization, will be
susceptible to extremist movements.
-
Russia should be reassessed as a major player,
particularly in terms of the viability of the
Russian Federation as it is currently constituted.
We should not assume that Russia's borders will
not continue to change. What does the further
fragmentation of Russia imply for the Caucasus
and Central Asia
-
A deeper understanding of Islam and its role
in the regional context is necessary. The current
debate tends to be unidimensional and focused
on fundamentalism, which begets a phobia of
Islam. From Indonesia to Algeria, Islamic groups
play different roles in the political process.
The West should expect the same degree of heterogeneity
in the role that Islam will play in Central
Asia.
It is important to think about how US and Iranian
interests might be converging on certain issues.
It could turn out that the United States and Iran
share some strategic interests.
Ian Bremmer
The Eurasia Group
The conference focused on change in the South Caucasus
and in Central Asia and on the changing dynamics
surrounding these regions. The key areas of change
include:
-
Internal
Change. Political succession during the
next decade probably will result in significant
changes in leadership. A strongman can be a
force for positive change, as is the case with
President Shevardnadze in Georgia. But Georgia
has been a unique case in the South Caucasus
and will unlikely be replicable. Focusing on
alternative leadership scenarios and key players
who may be involved may provide a better understanding
of the direction these states may go after a
political turnover. Another key question of
interest is whether or not the post-
Communist generation will be more promarket.
-
Change
on the periphery. Central Asia and the South
Caucasus will also change because the major
actors that surround these regions are undergoing
significant change.
-- Turkey. Turkey's economic influence
in Central Asia and the South Caucasus is
underrated and tends to be overshadowed by
its cultural affinity. However, Turkey understands
how to conduct business in both regions. If
Turkey's economy changes for the worse in
the future, its influence in both regions
will probably diminish.
-- Iran. The US-Iran relationship is
evolving. This will have serious consequences
by changing the calculations of all players
in and around these regions.
-- Russia. Should Russia develop a
more coherent policy toward these states,
it would become a more pronounced and assertive
player in these regions.
-- China. China's growing demand for
energy is increasing its prominence, particularly
in Central Asia. The Chinese presence is most
clear in
Kazakhstan.
Thomas Graham
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
We must think about the potential for significant
changes in the region; it should not be assumed
that the current states will survive. Conditions
in these states lend themselves to instability.
For example, the Ferghana Valley is particularly
susceptible to Islamic extremism. What kinds of
things could cause a major change in the trajectories
for countries in the region? Will challenges be
internal or external? What can be learned from developments
at the grassroots level? One must look below the
surface in these countries to understand the linkages
and movements at the grassroots level and to assess
the possibilities for political mobilization.
Russia is the largest unknown variable. We should
not assume that Russia's policy will be more coherent
under President Putin. Instead, we should consider
a Russia that may be weaker and further fragmented.
How might regionalization in Russia affect Central
Asia? What ties are developing between southern
Russia and Central Asia?
Rafik Sh. Saifulin
Institute for Strategic and Regional Studies
For Uzbekistan and the other states in Central Asia
security and stability are the top priorities. Without
security, there can be no economic growth or Foreign
Direct Investment (FDI), no democracy, and no human
rights. Central Asian states face myriad internal
problems and regional threats that spill over the
region's highly porous borders.
George Kolt
National Intelligence Council
The conference has brought out a number of external
variables which will shape future developments in
the South Caucasus and Central Asia.
-
US-Iran
relations. Changes in the US-Iran dynamic
will affect all other relationships in the region.
Tendencies to be "romantic" about
a potential US-Iran rapprochement should be
resisted. Normalcy will not be a panacea.
-
Afghanistan.
The chaos and instability in Afghanistan complicates
everything and exacerbates all problems in Central
Asia. No solution is likely in the foreseeable
future.
-
Russia.
Russia is likely to be weaker in the future,
but this weakness could foment aggression and
anger that could be directed at the United States.
-
We will not understand Central Asia and the South
Caucasus if we view the region through one filter.
A number of different filters--the perspectives
of the major external actors--must be incorporated
into our thinking on these regions. In addition,
these external filters should be adjusted by research
at the microlevel.
Stephen Jones
Mt. Holyoke College
Only research based on experience on the ground
will enable a full understanding of the role of
Islam in Central Asia.
Scenarios based on projections of today's trends
constrain our thinking and will probably not capture
the real change in the future. Microlevel research
assists in understanding but will probably not help
us to see the range of future scenarios.
Ghia Nodia
Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy,
and Development
The most striking impression from the conference
is that Georgia has been singled out by the US research
community as such a positive model in an otherwise
grim region. Most Georgians would be surprised to
hear this assessment, which reveals a disconnect
between external perceptions of Georgia and Georgia's self-perceptions.
Gregory Gleason
University of New Mexico
Globalization is a reality in Central Asia. Anyone
on the ground in the region sees it in the pop culture
and the ubiquitous American brands. Economic aid
must be accompanied by technical assistance, so
that development can be sustained.
Paul Henze
RAND Corporation
Some countries cannot afford to take a risk on democracy,
given their current domestic situation. Scenarios
for regime changes in these regions are disturbing,
even if they are carried out democratically.
When thinking about Central Asia and the South Caucasus,
we should avoid being intellectually constrained
by narrow categories. Central Asia and the South
Caucasus consist of more than eight countries. When
they think about Central Asia, policy-makers should
include Iran, Western China, Siberia, Turkey, and
the North and South Caucasus.
Leila Alieva
School of Advanced International Studies
Some of the past prejudices about Central Asians
that existed in the early 1990s have diminished.
The level of sophistication and education of the
locals should never be underestimated. Enriching
the categories that the West uses to analyze Central
Asia and the South Caucasus will provide a deeper
understanding.
Gerard J. Libaridian
East-West Institute
It is necessary to take a long-term approach when
thinking about democracy in the South Caucasus and
Central Asia. Stability must be a precondition for
progress. Democracy is a set of values, not laws.
Laws and democracy will follow stability.
CONTENTS
Appendix
A
Conference
Agenda
Central
Asia and the South Caucasus: Reorientations,
Internal Transitions, and Strategic Dynamics
Airlie House, Warrenton, Virginia
April 5-7, 2000
5
April 2000
Airlie
Room
5:30-6:30
Opening
Reception
6:30-8:00
Dinner
Keynote Address
A US Strategic Perspective on Central Asia and
the South Caucasus
Introduction
John Gannon, Chairman, National Intelligence
Council
Speaker
General Anthony Zinni, Commander in Chief,
United States
Central Command
6
April 2000
Federal
Room
8:00-8:30
Opening
Remarks
George Kolt, NIO for Russia and Eurasia
8:30-10:30
Challenges
to State-Building: Internal Faultlines and Impediments
This panel will examine the internal conditions
and challenges these governments face as they modernize
their political and economic institutions. The panel
will also explore how the history of these countries
is shaping their future direction and what might
be expected of the new generation as it rises to
leadership positions.
Chairman
S. Enders Wimbush, Hicks & Associates
Creating/Modernizing
State Institutions
Gregory Gleason, University of New Mexico
The
Legacy of the Past versus New Leadership Generations:
South Caucasus
Audrey Altstadt, University of Massachusetts
The
Legacy of the Past versus New Leadership Generations:
Central Asia
Martha Brill Olcott, Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace
Economic
Change and Modernization: South Caucasus
Ben Slay, PlanEcon
Economic
Change and Modernization: Central Asia
Boris Rumer, Harvard University
10:30-11:00
Break
11:00-1:00
Challenges
to State-Building: The Impact of Megatrends on the
Region
This panel will examine the impact of global and
regional trends that are shaping these regions and
beyond, and explore how the states are dealing with
these challenges and opportunities. How are the
states equipped to deal with both the positive and
negative effects of globalization, the spread of
ideologies and Islam, and the growing grass roots
movements across these regions? Are the states capable
of mitigating the negative effects of religious
fundamentalism, and the emerging regional drugs
and arms markets?
Chairman
S. Enders Wimbush, Hicks & Associates
Globalization:
Economics and Communication
Rajan Menon, Lehigh University
Civil
Society: Grassroots Organizations in South Caucasus
Stephen Jones, Mt. Holyoke College
Civil
Society: Grass Root Organizations in Central Asia
Fiona Hill, The Eurasia Foundation
Islam
and Other Ideologies
Olivier Roy, CNRS
Narcotrafficking
and the Rise of Independent Militias
S. Fredrick Starr, Central Asia-Caucasus
Institute
1:00-2:30
Lunch
Presentation
Speaker: The Honorable James Schlesinger, Lehman
Brothers
The Caspian Region: Where Geopolitics and Geo-economics
Meet
Introduction
Ellen Laipson, Vice Chairman, National Intelligence
Council
2:30-5:00
Regional
Dynamics
This panel will examine how each new state views
its relationships with surrounding states, including
both other Newly Independent States and those outside
the boundaries of the former Soviet Union, taking
a regional approach, not an intraregional approach.
This new regional context has many new features
that also involve outside states (for example, common
opportunities and threats, ethnicity, trade flows).
Speakers from the South Caucasus and Central Asia
are asked to outline how each of their respective
countries is thinking about its strategic universe.
Chairman
Tom Zamostny, Office of Russian & European
Analysis
Strategic
Universe of the States in the South Caucasus
Paul Henze, RAND Corporation
Insider
Perspective: Reactions/Comments
Georgia-Ghia Nodia, Caucasian Institute for
Peace, Democracy,
and Development
Azerbaijan--Leila Alieva, School of Advanced
International Studies
Armenia--Gerard Libaridian, East-West Institution
Strategic
Universe of the States in Central Asia
S. Fredrick Starr, Central Asia-Caucasus
Institute
Insider Perspective: Reactions/Comments
Uzbekistan--Rafik Sh. Saifulin, Institute
for Strategic and
Regional Studies
Kazakhstan--Yertmuhamet Yertysbayev, Kazakhstan
Institute
of Strategic Studies
6:30-8:00
Dinner
7
April 2000
Federal
Room
8:30
- 11:00
View
From the Periphery
This panel will explore how the major external
actors view the new relationships that are unfolding
between and among Central Asian/South Caucasian
states and their neighbors. Where are strong relationships
possible and likely, and where are they impossible
or less likely, and why? What is the "glue"
that will cement these relationships (for example,
trade, ethnicity, history, culture, language, shared
threats, shared opportunities, common alliances
or third parties)?
Chairman
George Kolt, NIO for Russia and Eurasia
Turkey,
Middle East, and Israel
John Daly, Middle East Institute
Iran
Mohiaddin Mesbahi, St. Antony's College,
Oxford University
and Florida International University
China
Ross Munro, Center for Security Studies
Russia
Robert Legvold, Columbia University
South
Asia
Juli A. MacDonald, Science Applications
International Corporation
Europe
Roy Allison, Royal Institute for International
Affairs
11:00-11:30
Break
11:30-2:00
Working
Lunch
Impressions
From the Field
This panel will feature scholars who have spent
considerable time conducting research in these regions.
They will share their insights on how the regional
and internal dynamics are changing based on their
experience on the ground and will offer an assessment
of where research of the region should be focused
in the future.
Chairman
Angela Theriault, National Intelligence Council
Panelists: David Hoffman, UC Berkeley; Nora Dudwick,
World Bank;
Cynthia Werner, Pitzer College; Kathleen Kuehnast,
Mellon Research
Fellow, Library of Congress; and Michael Thurman,
World Bank
2:15-4:30
Concluding
Roundtable: The Outlook of the Larger Geopolitical
Environment and Key Variables
The objective of the roundtable is to reemphasize
particularly salient points that emerged during
the previous day and a half, to help establish the
architecture for debate on contentious points, and
to suggest a "research menu" for going
forward.
Chairman
S. Enders Wimbush, Hicks & Associates,
Inc.
Panelists : Rajan Menon, Lehigh University; Ian
Bremmer, The Eurasia Group; Thomas Graham, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace; Robert Legvold,
Columbia University; Rafik Sh. Saifulin, Institute
for Strategic and Regional Studies; and George Kolt,
National Intelligence Council
(General participation encouraged.)
4:30
Concluding
Remarks
George Kolt, NIO for Russia and Eurasia
CONTENTS
Appendix
B
Participants
General
Anthony C. Zinni, Commander in Chief,
United States Central Command
The
Honorable James Schlesinger, Lehman Brothers
Dr.
Leila Alieva, Research Fellow, School of Advanced
International Studies
Dr.
Roy Allison, Director, Russia and Eurasia Programme,
Royal
Institute of International Affairs
Dr.
Audrey L. Altstadt, Associate Professor, University
of
Massachusetts-Amherst
Dr.
Ian Bremmer, President, The Eurasia Group and
Senior Fellow
and Director of Eurasia Studies, World Policy Institute
Dr.
John C. K. Daly, Scholar, Middle East Institute
Dr.
Nora Dudwick, Social Scientist, World Bank
Dr.
Gregory Gleason, Director of the Public Finance
Consortium
and Associate Professor, University of New Mexico
Dr.
Thomas Graham, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace
Mr.
Bernard Paul Henze, Resident Consultant, RAND
Dr.
Fiona Hill, Director for Strategic Planning,
Eurasia Foundation
Mr.
David Hoffman, Doctoral Candidate, University
of California, Berkeley and Senior Associate, Cambridge
Energy Research Associates
Dr.
Stephen Jones, Associate Professor, Mount Holyoke
College
Mr.
George Kolt, National Intelligence Officer for
Russia and Eurasia, National Intelligence Council
Dr.
Kathleen Kuehnast, Research Associate, George
Washington University and Research Scholar, Kennan
Institute for Advanced
Russian Studies
Dr.
Robert Legvold, Professor, Columbia University
Dr.
Gerard J. Libaridian, Senior Research Fellow,
East-West Institute
and Senior Consultant, IREX
Ms.
Juli A. MacDonald, Program Analyst, Strategic
Assessment Center, Science Applications International
Corporation
Dr.
Rajan Menon, Monroe J. Rathborne Professor and
Chairman of the Department of International Relations,
Lehigh University and adjunct professor of Political
Science, Columbia University
Dr.
Mohiaddin Mesbahi, Professor and co-chair of
the Asian Studies Department at Florida International
University
Mr.
Ross Munro, Director of Asian Studies, Center
for Security Studies
Dr.
Ghia Nodia, Chairman, Caucasian Institute for
Peace, Democracy and Development
Dr.
Martha Brill Olcott, Senior Fellow, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace and Professor,
Colgate University
Dr.
Olivier Roy, Senior Researcher, CNRS (French
National Center for Scientific Research) and Consultant,
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Dr.
Boris Rumer, Senior Fellow, Harvard University
Dr.
Rafik Sh. Saifulin, Director, Institute for
Strategic and Regional Studies under the President
of the Republic of Uzbekistan
Dr.
Ben Slay, Senior Economist, PlanEcon, Inc.
Dr.
S. Fredrick Starr, Chairman of the Central Asia-Caucasus
Institute, Johns Hopkins University's Nitze School
of Advanced International Studies
Ms.
Angela Theriault, National Intelligence Council
Dr.
Michael Thurman, Consultant, World Bank
Dr.
Cynthia Werner, Post-doctoral research fellow,
Pitzer College
Mr.
S. Enders Wimbush, Vice President for International
Strategy and Policy, Hicks & Associates
Dr.
Yermuhamet K. Yertysbayev, Director, Kazakhstan
Institute for Strategic Studies
Mr.
Thomas Zamostnsy, Transitioning States Issue,
Office of Russian and European Analysis
Footnotes
(1)
All data in this paper come from
the relevant countries' statistical offices and
national banks, as well as from the IMF, World Bank,
Tacis, and other multilateral agencies.
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