[Senate Hearing 107-388]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 107-388
UNITED STATES POLICY IN IRAQ: NEXT STEPS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, PROLIFERATION AND FEDERAL SERVICES SUBCOMMITTEE
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 1, 2002
__________
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan FRED THOMPSON, Tennessee
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii TED STEVENS, Alaska
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
MAX CLELAND, Georgia PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi
JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah
MARK DAYTON, Minnesota JIM BUNNING, Kentucky
Joyce A. Rechtschaffen, Staff Director and Counsel
Richard A. Hertling, Minority Staff Director
Darla D. Cassell, Chief Clerk
------
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, PROLIFERATION AND FEDERAL SERVICES SUBCOMMITTEE
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey TED STEVENS, Alaska
MAX CLELAND, Georgia SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico
MARK DAYTON, Minnesota ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah
Richard J. Kessler, Staff Director
Mitchel B. Kugler, Minority Staff Director
Brian D. Rubens, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
------
Opening statements:
Page
Senator Akaka................................................ 1
Senator Thompson............................................. 3
Senator Domenici............................................. 10
Senator Cochran.............................................. 21
Prepared statement:
Senator Carnahan............................................. 31
WITNESSES
Friday, March 1, 2002
Robert J. Einhorn, Senior Adviser, International Studies Program,
Center for Argument and International Studies.................. 4
David A. Kay, Vice President, Science Applications International
Corporation.................................................... 7
Richard O. Spertzel, former head of UN Special Commission
(UNSCOM) Biological Weapons Inspection, and former Deputy
Commander, USAMRIID............................................ 12
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Einhorn, Robert J.:
Testimony.................................................... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 33
Kay, David A.:
Testimony.................................................... 7
Prepared statement........................................... 43
Spertzel, Richard O.:
Testimony.................................................... 12
Prepared statement........................................... 48
Additional copy submitted for the Record
Questions and answers submitted for the record for Mr. Kay from:
Senator Domenici............................................. 57
Senator Carnahan............................................. 58
Questions and answers submitted for the record for Mr. Spertzel
from:
Senator Akaka................................................ 60
Senator Domenici............................................. 62
Senator Carnahan............................................. 63
Appendix: Background............................................. 65
UNITED STATES POLICY IN IRAQ: NEXT STEPS
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FRIDAY, MARCH 1, 2002
U.S. Senate,
International Security, Proliferation,
and Federal Services Subcommittee,
of the Committee on Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:29 a.m., in
room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Daniel K.
Akaka, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Akaka, Carper, Thompson, Domenici, and
Cochran.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA
Senator Akaka. The Subcommittee will please come to order.
This Subcommittee has held hearings over the past 5 months
on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction around the
globe and the threat they pose to the United States and our
allies. We have discussed how non-proliferation programs,
multilateral regimes, and export controls can prevent the
spread of WMD to other countries and terrorist organizations.
Today, we face the question of what to do once a nation--in
this case, Iraq--has such weapons.
The United Nations inspections between 1991 and 1998 were
successful in uncovering and reducing much of Iraq's WMD
capabilities. Economic sanctions have prevented Iraq from
acquiring materials to restore its military-industrial base and
have severely limited clandestine arms acquisition.
However, Iraq continues to pose a significant national
security threat to the United States. It continues to rebuild
its weapons of mass destruction capabilities. If UN sanctions
were completely lifted, its weapons program would accelerate.
We may have hindered or prevented upgrades to Iraq's WMD
capabilities, but what should we do about the capabilities they
already possess?
Even this may not be the case, as one of our witnesses
today will state his assessment that Iraq's biological weapons
program is stronger today than it was in 1990. These are the
facts. Iraq had a sophisticated WMD program, including a
nuclear weapons program. Iraq used chemical weapons against its
own people and its neighbor Iran. Iraq had and has a missile
program which can deliver WMD. We believe that Iraq continues
to have and develop WMD warheads.
Now, the questions are: How worried do we need to be? And
what should we do about it? Should we become more aggressive
militarily and more active in our support of Iraqi opposition
groups?
There has been considerable discussion about whether or not
the United States should invade Iraq to overthrow Saddam
Hussein. There has been less talk about invading Iran, although
Iraq, Iran, and North Korea are described by President Bush as
the ``axis of evil.'' Yet the WMD programs in Iran may be more
advanced because they have been able to proceed without the
restraint of UN sanctions.
Iran is believed to be developing nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles. We
also know that our own Department of State lists Iran as an
active state sponsor of terrorism and is systematically abusing
its own people. We hope Iran can change from within, but there
are no guarantees, and anti-American hard-liners appear to be
still in charge.
Can we attack one country and not the other? That question
is among the many I hope we will address today. For example,
another Gulf War will likely require many more troops than are
now deployed in Afghanistan and may result in chemical and
biological attacks against our forces.
My view at this time is that we should continue to push to
get UN inspectors back on the ground, both to constrain the
Iraqi WMD program and to gain a better understanding of the
scope of current Iraqi efforts. Keeping Saddam Hussein bottled
up and forcing him to confront obstacles in every direction is
not a bad outcome as we consider our long-term strategy while
rebuilding our military arsenal.
I have asked our witnesses to describe the current Iraqi
WMD threat. They will also discuss the impact sanctions have
had on the weapons programs and how international opinion of
the Iraqi WMD threat has changed. I have also asked them to
discuss policy options and their consequences.
Our witnesses are the Hon. Robert Einhorn, Dr. David Kay,
and Dr. Richard Spertzel.
Robert Einhorn, of the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, was Assistant Secretary for Non-
Proliferation in the State Department from November 1999 to
August 2001. He was responsible for non-proliferation of
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, missile delivery
systems, and advanced conventional arms. His experience will
serve us well in our discussion today.
Our second witness, Dr. David Kay, of the Science
Applications International Corporation, was the United Nations
chief nuclear weapons inspector from 1991 to 1992 and led many
inspections into Iraq to determine their nuclear weapons
production capability. He will share with us his insight and
expertise on the Iraqi nuclear weapons program.
Our final witness, Dr. Richard Spertzel, is a retired Army
colonel and former Deputy Commander of the U.S. Army Medical
Research Institute of Infectious Disease at Fort Detrick, and
is an expert on biological weapons. He has served as the head
of the United Nations Special Commission Biological Weapon
Inspections Team in Iraq from 1994 to 1998. I look forward to
hearing his views on Iraq's biological weapon prospects.
I want to thank all of our witnesses for being with us
today and helping us to make sense of the numerous reports and
speculations about Iraq's WMD capabilities.
I would like to yield to my colleague, Senator Thompson,
for his statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR THOMPSON
Senator Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
while we often thank our Chairman for holding hearings as a
matter of course, I really do thank you for having these
hearings today. I can't think of anything more timely and more
important. Although it is a Friday and some of our colleagues
are beginning to think about greener pastures, I am glad we
have this opportunity with such distinguished gentlemen here to
help enlighten us. This is clearly a situation where the status
quo is not satisfactory because while our policy might be
status quo, what is happening in Iraq clearly is not.
Iraq has used weapons of mass destruction. It has invaded
its neighbors. It has violated international arms control
obligations. It has lied and concealed at every step of the
inspection process. It has defied the United Nations. It has
continued to build up its weapons of mass destruction. It is
headed by a person who is unpredictable and will not
necessarily follow our notions of logic.
Clearly, it all makes for an extremely dangerous situation.
If Saddam obtains the weapons of mass destruction that he
apparently is working on, it is not only a threat to Israel, it
is not only a threat to oil supplies in the region, it is not
only a cause for countries like Iran to build up their
capabilities, but apparently all he lacks is sufficient fissile
material and a little more delivery capability, and he will be
able to hit the United States one of these days with nuclear
weapons.
So the threat is growing. The sanctions are a sham. We have
lost our allies in the process with regard to this matter, and
we are losing the PR battle. So, clearly, something has to be
done. We have got a situation where Russia and France and other
countries are vetoing any efforts to get any positive results
out of what the United Nations has been trying to do. Dozens of
countries fly in and out of there, violating the air ban. It is
not only bad policy, it is disrespectful. And to me, I think
the worst thing in the world that could happen is for Saddam to
let inspectors back in. I know that is what the administration
is calling for. I don't know whether they really want it or
not, but I hope not, because if, in fact, we got back in there,
it would be the same old song and dance. It would take months
and months to gear up to get people back in there. Inspections
are based on the notion that someone is not doing something and
wants to be able to prove it. We clearly know that is not the
case; therefore, it just means another cat-and-mouse game, at
which point he would run to the United Nations and get his
friends there to protect him with regard to whatever he is
doing. And by that time, months, if not years, have passed and
actually it puts off any chance for a regime change, which is
the ultimate resolution, it seems to me.
But, anyway, it is important that we understand, the
American people understand the seriousness of the issue, and we
need all of the help and wisdom we can get, and I am sure we
are going to get some today. So thank you again for holding
these hearings today.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Senator Thompson, for
your statement.
We would like to proceed now with the testimony. I just
want to apologize for the lateness. I think you know we had a
vote call at 10 a.m., and for that reason we are slightly
delayed. But we certainly welcome you and look forward to your
statements.
Mr. Einhorn, we would welcome any opening statement or
comments you may have. We will include your full statement in
our record of the hearing, and also ask you to try to summarize
your statement for us. Thank you very much, Mr. Einhorn.
TESTIMONY OF ROBERT J. EINHORN,\1\ SENIOR ADVISER,
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES PROGRAM, CENTER FOR ARGUMENT AND
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Mr. Einhorn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Senators Thompson and Domenici, for this opportunity to appear
before the Subcommittee.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Einhorn appears in the Appendix
on page 33.
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In his State of the Union speech, President Bush vowed to
prevent regimes that seek chemical, biological, or nuclear
weapons from threatening the United States and the world. He
said that he would not stand by as peril draws closer and
closer.
Most experts believe that the peril of Iraqi weapons of
mass destruction is very close, and, indeed, in some respects
it already exists. Today, or, at most, within a few months,
Iraq could launch missile attacks with chemical or biological
weapons at its neighbors. Within 4 or 5 years, it could have
the capability to threaten most of the Middle East and parts of
Europe with missiles armed with nuclear weapons containing
highly-enriched uranium produced indigenously. Within that same
period, it could threaten U.S. territory with nuclear weapons
delivered by non-conventional means.
If Iraq managed to get its hands on sufficient quantities
of already produced fissile material, these threats could
arrive much earlier.
We have an enormous stake in stopping Iraq's WMD programs.
If we fail to stop them, we will have a much more difficult
time heading off Iran's efforts to acquire comparable
capabilities. And a nuclear arms competition north of the Gulf
will certainly stimulate interests in such capabilities
elsewhere.
We must also be concerned about Iraq's links to terrorists
and about the possibility that Iraq might share WMD-related
materials and expertise with terrorist groups. But Iraq's
illegal pursuit of weapons of mass destruction capabilities is
a sufficient basis, independent of whatever role it may be
playing in global terrorism, to treat it as a dangerous threat
that must be neutralized.
But one thing should be clear. After over a decade of
effort trying to disarm Iraq, the current regime in Baghdad
will not voluntarily come clean about its current programs or
give up WMD and missile delivery capabilities for the future.
The importance it attaches to those capabilities can be
measured by the well-over $100 billion in national income that
the leadership has chosen to forego rather than to meet its
disarmament obligations and have the sanctions removed.
No inducements or blandishments, not even the growing
prospect of military action by the Bush Administration, are
likely to produce a genuine change of heart and a decisive and
credible change of behavior as far as weapons of mass
destruction are concerned.
Given these considerations, one must conclude that the only
reliable and durable way of preventing Iraq from regenerating
and enhancing its weapons of mass destruction and proscribed
missile capabilities is to replace the current regime with one
that is prepared to abide by its international obligations. A
consensus seems to be developing in Washington in favor of
regime change in Iraq. The debate is no longer over whether but
over when and how.
This hearing has not been convened to discuss the questions
of when and how, but because a strategy for regime change is
likely to take additional time to develop, to prepare for, and
to execute, anywhere from several months to perhaps a year or
even more, we should give consideration to the interim steps we
should be taking now to address the Iraqi WMD threat.
An important interim step is scheduled to be taken May 30.
It is to revise the current UN sanctions regime so as to
expedite the delivery of a wider range of civilian goods to the
Iraqi population while focusing the trade restrictions more
narrowly on dual-use items that could contribute significantly
to proscribed weapons programs. By reducing the workload for
U.S. reviewers, these smarter sanctions could enable them to
give closer scrutiny to the most sensitive cases. And by
reducing delays in the approval of goods for the Iraqi people,
they could help shore up international support for the
remaining more tightly focused restrictions on Iraqi imports.
Another interim step would be to minimize Iraq's illegal
oil sales. The proceeds from these sales go directly to Baghdad
rather than to the UN escrow account. They give Iraq the income
to purchase clandestine imports for its military programs.
Because Iraq makes these illegal sales at heavily discounted
prices, it will be hard to get the purchasers, including Syria
and U.S. friends, Jordan and Turkey, to limit them or to put
them under the Oil-for-Food Program. But it is important that
we press them to do so.
The United States should also seek to reduce Iraq's illicit
imports. It should urge Iraq's neighbors to adopt a much more
serious approach to monitoring border trade and should offer
them technical and material assistance to help them screen
cargos more effectively.
The administration should also press key states that trade
with Iraq, including Russia and China, to exercise much more
rigorous scrutiny and control over exports to Iraq. And we
should be working aggressively with other governments to
interdict sensitive cargos headed to Iraq when we receive
information about such shipments.
Another possible interim step would be the return of UN
inspectors to Iraq. In recent weeks, President Bush and his
advisers have repeatedly called on Iraq to readmit the
inspectors. But at times, including in Secretary Rumsfeld's
recent appearance on ``Face the Nation,'' administration
officials have expressed skepticism about the value of resuming
UN-mandated verification in Iraq.
Among the concerns expressed about UN inspections is that
the inspectors wouldn't have the same intrusive inspection
rights as the UN teams that operated before December 1998.
Another concern is that they wouldn't find or learn much of
value and that they would end up giving Iraq an unwarranted
clean bill of health and actually facilitating the removal of
sanctions.
Much of this concern is exaggerated. The new UN Monitoring,
Verification, and Inspection Commission, or UNMOVIC, and the
International Atomic Energy Agency, or the IAEA, would have the
same inspection rights, at least on paper, as their
predecessors. UN resolutions make clear that Iraq must
cooperate in all respects and make progress in resolving key
remaining disarmament tasks before the Security Council can
even give consideration to suspending sanctions, and sanctions
cannot be lifted altogether until all outstanding disarmament
issues are resolved.
Moreover, suspending or lifting sanctions would require an
affirmative decision by the UN Security Council, and, of
course, the United States will have a veto in any such
decision.
Now, it is true that inspectors would rarely, if ever, be
able to find anything that Iraqis have taken pains to conceal.
If they approach anything incriminating, we would expect the
Iraqis to deny them access. But even if the inspection teams
are unable to ferret out and expose hidden capabilities, they
may nonetheless be of value in terms of understanding and
constraining the Iraqi WMD threat.
In particular, the installation of sophisticated monitoring
equipment at hundreds of locations and the constant movement of
inspection teams around the country would complicate Iraq's
covert programs, making it somewhat harder and more expensive
to keep those efforts hidden and probably slowing the pace and
decreasing the scale of those programs.
Monitors would give us a better appreciation of Iraq's
missile programs and their breakout potential. They would also
provide assurance, as long as they had access and their
equipment was operating, that illicit production was not taking
place at known dual-use and other suspect facilities. But this
brings me to the most serious shortcoming of renewed UN
verification.
At their very best, the inspectors can complicate,
constrain, and slow down Iraq's clandestine efforts and give us
a better picture of what is going on in Iraq than we have
today. But they cannot compel Iraqi compliance and, therefore,
cannot put an end to the WMD threat posed by Iraq. In other
words, they can contain the problem, but they cannot solve it.
Moreover, having the inspectors in Iraq could complicate a
strategy of regime change. It would give other countries,
including the Europeans and states of the Middle East, an
excuse for arguing that military action should be deferred
while inspections are given a chance to resolve the WMD
problem.
All this said, the debate about whether the inspectors
should return is probably moot. So far, Iraq has given no
indication that it is willing to allow the inspectors to go
back on terms that the United States could conceivably support.
However, we can't rule out the possibility of a reversal by
Iraq, especially if the Bush Administration's tough posture has
made the Iraqis nervous. But we will see when the Iraqi Foreign
Minister comes to New York and speaks to UN Secretary-General
Kofi Annan next week.
If Iraq says the inspectors can return, the administration
would be hard pressed to say they shouldn't, especially in
light of the position it has been taking recently. But it would
have to insist on a clear understanding on the part of the P-5
members that UN verification activities must be carried out in
strict accordance with existing UN Security Council resolutions
rather than on the basis of any new ground rules that Iraq
could try to establish. And the P-5 should agree that there
would be a firm unified response in the face of any Iraqi
failure to give its full cooperation to the inspectors.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, as President Bush warned in
discussing the growing WMD threat, time is not on our side.
This is especially true in the case of Iraq. We should,
therefore, take interim steps to contain the threat, but such
steps, even if successful, would only buy us some additional
time. We need to use that time to prepare an effective strategy
for the only approach that can be expected to stop WMD programs
and prevent them from regenerating, and that is to change the
current regime in Baghdad.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Einhorn, for your
insights.
Dr. Kay, we invite you to give your statement.
TESTIMONY OF DAVID A. KAY,\1\ VICE PRESIDENT, SCIENCE
APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION
Mr. Kay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I will quickly
summarize my statement and, with your permission, enter the
full statement into the record.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Kay appears in the Appendix on
page 43.
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It has been more than a decade that the international
community has confronted, and unsuccessfully, a long-term
solution to an Iraq led by Saddam Hussein and armed with WMD.
In fact, as I say that statement, I realize that it has been
almost 11 years to the day since I first led an inspection team
into Iraq and spent 2 weeks running through the country to
finally identify a part of their nuclear weapons program. My
appreciation for the movie ``Groundhog Day'' is much less,
although my understanding of it is much greater as a result of
those 11 years that I did not expect this problem to be around.
I think in trying to understand where we are today with
regard to Saddam's nuclear program, it is important to
understand the assumptions that proved to be false that we
based UNSCOM's inspections on and, indeed, I would say U.S.
policy at the beginning.
The first assumption was that Saddam's rule would not
survive the disasters suffered by Iraq as a result of its
invasion of Kuwait and the Gulf War. It was hard to imagine,
certainly for those of us coming from democratically ruled
countries, that any regime could survive such a disastrous
policy.
Second was that Iraq's WMD capacities were not extensive
nor really significantly indigenous. I still remember the
intelligence briefs I received as we were ending up the nuclear
side of the inspection about what Iraq had. It was a program
that had spent a lot of money, had accomplished very little,
and most of which had been taken care of anyway by the air
campaign.
Third, it was a post-Saddam Iraq--and that was the
assumption of most people as we entered the inspection--that a
post-Saddam Iraq would declare to UNSCOM all of its WMD
capacities.
And, fourth, that UNSCOM would be able to ``destroy,
remove, or render harmless'' in terms of the UN resolution
Iraq's WMD capacity, leaving an Iraq that did not have such a
capacity. And the assumption going in was this was probably a
90-day effort or, at most, 6 to 9 months. How wrong assumptions
can be.
Let me just dwell on one of those assumptions that is still
bedeviling us today. We did not understand the impact that the
discovery of such a gigantic spread and indigenous WMD program
would have on our future efforts to, in fact, contain that
program. Iraq's nuclear program--and it is true of the BW,
chemical, and missile program as well--spanned over a decade,
spent over $20 billion, employed 40,000 Iraqis, and
accomplished much--all of the technical steps on these programs
are well understood, and most of the production steps where the
real problems arose, in fact, had been overcome.
Iraq is not like a Libya. Iraq that we face today is much
more like Germany at the end of the First World War under a
Versailles regime and inspectors. It is an indigenous
capability.
The capability to produce weapons of mass destruction that
arises from a national program on this scale is one that to
eliminate by inspection is, quite frankly, a fool's errand. We
have underestimated entirely what inspections--we have
overestimated at the beginning what inspections could
accomplish. And let me hesitate--stop here to say inspectors
accomplished a great deal. In the nuclear area, for example, UN
inspections destroyed more nuclear facilities than were
destroyed by the coalition air force during the Gulf War,
simply because we were able to find facilities that were not
known before.
But to compress a lot of history, in December 1998, when
the United States conducted military actions against Iraq, all
inspections ended. It took a year later to bury UNSCOM, but,
quite frankly, inspections had been net down to an almost
insignificant point by 1996 and 1997. The ending of UNSCOM was
almost a humanitarian effort.
The regime that replaced UNSCOM, UNMOVIC, which it took a
year to negotiate, was to be more acceptable to Iraq, led by a
commissioner that Iraq and Iraq sympathizers on the Security
Council would find acceptable. Indeed, the Secretary-General's
first choice for that job was rejected by the Russians and the
French.
Even under these more favorable inspection regimes, Iraq
has still refused to this day to allow inspections into Iraq.
Mr. Chairman, you posed a series of what I think are
critical questions about the Iraqi nuclear program, where it is
today, what impact UN sanctions have had on it, and what are
the options for dealing with this in the future. Let me try to
just quickly give you my views on that, and I think the first
and most serious point about this is to recognize that this
program is an indigenous program. It is a program where the
Iraqis understand the technology of producing nuclear weapons.
It has engaged not only in the technical side, but Iraq
really beginning in the mid-1980's engaged in a major effort of
deception and denial, of hiding their facilities, of
understanding them. They certainly studied our inspection
techniques well enough to know how we proceed and to compensate
for that.
When we got close to penetrating their web of deceptions,
they resorted to physical force and denial. I had the fortunate
privilege, I guess one would say, of spending 4 days in an
Iraqi parking lot as a guest of the state, not a hostage,
because we got close to discovering and, in fact, did seize the
basic documentation on the Iraqi nuclear program. It is a
layered program of protection, and Iraq has learned much more
about that.
Let me try, based on the very sketchy insights we have in
the more than 3 years since inspections ended and limited
number of defectors, try to give you my view of where that
program is today.
Iraq's pre-Gulf War program ensured that if they had
fissile material of a sufficient quantity and quality, they
would today be able to fabricate a nuclear device. Certainly as
Senator Domenici understands because of the state he
represents, the hard nut for any nuclear wannabe to crack is
the acquisition of fissile material. Once you have that, Iraq
knows the rest of the fabrication steps.
The German intelligence agency publicly--and it is always
easier to cite a foreign intelligence service than your own,
for those of us who continue to do professional work. The
Germans last year cited that because of major Iraqi procurement
efforts that were continuing at least through the end of last
year, in the worst case, without external assistance or new
fissile material, Iraq would have nuclear weapons in 3 to 6
years.
Second, you can have great confidence that Iraq will, in
the 3 years since inspectors were in, have carried out a major
deception campaign of hiding and scattering key nuclear
facilities. I am somewhat more fortunate than my colleagues. It
is a little harder to shield nuclear and hide nuclear
facilities, but not impossible, and we have real experience
with the Iraqis on that.
Third, Iraq understands the methods used by inspectors and
how we operated, and they also understand the methods used by
national intelligence services. These are very smart,
determined adversaries.
I had the great privilege, when I wasn't sleeping in the
parking lot, of having a hotel room in Baghdad that had 24-hour
video and audio monitoring. They looked at how we did--they use
local Iraqis to penetrate it. They penetrated the inspection
mechanism itself.
The next is that Iraq has not abandoned its efforts to
acquire WMD. Recent defectors stated that as recently as August
1998--that is while inspections were still going on--a formal
order was issued to proceed with the nuclear program at full
blast.
Finally, economic sanctions no longer play any significant
role in limiting Baghdad's nuclear ambitions. Oil prices have
gone up. Smuggling methods have increased. And in any case,
Saddam gives a priority to his WMD program. If the Iraqi
population has to do without medicine, you can be quite sure
the WMD program does not starve for material because of a lack
of money.
Let me turn to the attitude--and in many ways for me this
is, I think, the most regrettable one because I think it shapes
our possible actions and certainly shapes my negative prospects
on inspection. And that is the attitude of states in the region
and our European allies towards Iraq's WMD ambition.
By 1996, the real aim of the inspections--that is,
eliminating Iraq's WMD capacity and installing some long-term
monitoring capability--had started to slide away in the face of
absolute Iraqi determination but, more importantly, an attitude
among regional and European allies of the United States that
this was no longer as important as short-term economic and
political gain. And I am particularly speaking of the attitude
of the Russians and the French.
We also have to credit--and it is a discredit on ourselves,
I must say--a very successful Iraqi propaganda campaign which
convinced most of the world's population, including many in the
United States, that sanctions and UNSCOM inspections were
responsible for the devastation, health- and welfare-wise, of
the Iraqi population. That is simply not the case. The starving
and lack of medicine of the Iraqi population was a result of
Saddam's determination to use the money available for his
weapons of mass destruction program. It was not the result of
economic sanctions. And though, as you may tell, I believe this
with vigor, I think it is largely irrelevant. They won the
propaganda game, and Americans as well as Europeans and many in
the Middle East believe we are responsible for that suffering.
Senator Domenici. Mr. Chairman, might I ask Dr. Kay if I
might have 1 minute to comment? I have to be at another
meeting.
Senator Akaka. Certainly.
Senator Domenici. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
would ask that my statement be made a part of the record as if
read.
Senator Akaka. Without objection, it will be included in
the record.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DOMENICI
Senator Domenici. I want to comment to you and Senator
Thompson with reference to this hearing, I only wish that
millions of Americans would get to hear the testimony we are
hearing here today. There are so many that listen to our
President talk about Iraq and what must happen sooner or later
that have no idea what is being said here as the reality in
Iraq with reference to weapons of mass destruction and what
they are doing to make sure that they reach the right level to
continue to be the very major nuisance that they are. I think
the hearings are very worthwhile, and I thank you for them and
thank the witnesses. Thank you, Dr. Kay.
[The prepared statement of Senator Domenici follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR DOMENICI
I would like to welcome each of the panelists and then make just a
few brief remarks about today's subject matter.
As we all know, we have been playing a game of cat and mouse with
Iraq since the end of the Gulf War in which Saddam continually
sacrifices the welfare of the Iraqi people for his own hunger to
possess weapons of mass destruction.
While the comprehensive containment approach we have taken with
coalition partners has largely kept Saddam at bay, we remain uncertain
of the state of Iraq's weapons programs as a result of his expelling
UNSCOM inspectors in 1998.
Since the terrorist attacks of last fall, we are more alert than
ever as to the lack of any inhibitions certain factions have about
using any means necessary to strike at the heart of United States
security.
Clearly, Iraq is such a faction. Saddam has used chemical weapons
on his own people and, given the opportunity, he would use any weapon
of mass destruction against us or our allies.
The time has come for us to take this reality very seriously and
formulate a policy that will unravel the mystery of the current status
of Iraq's weapons programs. Simultaneously, we must implement concrete
means for dealing with the answers we find.
I look forward to hearing from each of you and I hope you can shed
light on the various options we have for dealing with this real threat.
Thank you.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. You may proceed, Dr. Kay.
Mr. Kay. We today face a situation where we are left with
allies in the region that really lack sufficient military power
to stand up to a rearmed Iraq and are increasingly unwilling to
provide us with the political and operational support necessary
to directly confront Iraq.
The same splintering of the alliance has occurred among our
European allies. The French are no longer willing partners. The
Russians can no longer be bribed or coerced into cooperation.
And, finally, it is a psychological war that we have lost.
What choices do we have left? And I know that is what you,
Mr. Chairman, challenged us all to think about. Let me say
there are few choices. They are mostly bad.
The easy solutions that we hear talked about--support the
opposition, contain, as we did the Soviets, or the statement of
the Secretary-General of the UN in 1998, ``I can do business
with Saddam''--these are expensive, risky, and, at best, only
partial answers.
The reintroduction of inspectors into Iraq, now under the
guise of UNMOVIC, I am afraid will result not in constraining
the Iraq WMD program but, in fact, freeing them of all
restraint. I think it is underestimated by people who have not
served as inspectors in Iraq, the difficulty of re-baselining a
program that has been free of inspection for more than 3 years.
It is a significant technical challenge that can only be done
if you have the unrestricted right to go anywhere, anytime,
with anything, and the cooperation of the world's national
intelligence establishments to help you. I do not think that is
the situation that we will find if UNMOVIC inspectors were let
in.
I think the Iraqis have, in fact, convinced a sufficient
number of the permanent members of the Security Council that
the purpose of inspection is to quickly declare compliance and
allow Iraq to be free of sanctions.
I am absolutely convinced that if the inspectors indeed
were to be given the support and were to probe Iraq, first of
all, they would face this huge web of deception they would have
to deal with; and if they got close to the truth, they again
would meet physical restraint, just like all of their
colleagues who for 10 years conducted inspections into Iraq. I
am seriously worried, however, that we could be faced with a
judgment: Iraq has allowed inspectors back in, let's get off
their back. And that, let me remind you of the German estimate:
3 to 6 years, the worst case, Iraq rearmed with nuclear
weapons.
The opposition. The best hope of the opposition in Iraq
was, quite frankly, in 1991 at the end of the Gulf War. We
stood aside and we allowed many brave Iraqis to be slaughtered
by Saddam's force. There may have been a chance in 1995, early
1996, when major coup attempts were attempted. There, again,
the U.S. attitude was, at best, not supportive.
Indeed, as I look at the history of U.S. support for
democratic opposition around the world, I am reminded of
nothing more than the dance of the black widow spider:
Attractive, but ultimately fatal to the male.
I don't think it is true that we are genetically incapable
of helping oppositions effectively. It is just that we are so
inept at it, the genetic pool of opposition is likely to be
drained before we get the lesson right. I do not view the
opposition as likely to play a major role in the goal of regime
change.
Containment I think has a nice ring. It worked in the case
of the Soviet Union. It took 40 years, well over $20 billion,
and reshaping European societies to do it. I don't think those
conditions exist in the Middle East.
I am afraid there are no alternatives but a U.S.-led--and
U.S.-led means maybe the U.S. leading itself and hopefully our
stalwart British allies--to use military force to end Saddam's
rule in Iraq. And let me be clear: As long as Saddam is in
power, the WMD aspirations and capabilities of Iraq will
continue to develop. And while you referred to it, we largely
have not today in our testimony referred to the issue of Iran.
An Iraq that is continuing to seek WMD ensures that there will
be an Iran seeking to acquire WMD. And that makes that
territory the most dangerous spot in the world.
Let me conclude, Mr. Chairman, by saying I think Iraq is
unfortunately of that class of problems where all the easy
answers seem to have been in the past and all we are left in
near-term options that aren't really answers. Now, because I
was there in the beginning, let me tell you, the answers that
were there were not easy either, and we have forgotten how
difficult they were. But there is no alternative to the
replacement of Saddam and the regime if you want to deal with
the WMD problem before, in fact, WMD weapons are used on the
United States and our allies in the Gulf.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Akaka. Thank you for your strong statement. Dr.
Spertzel.
TESTIMONY OF RICHARD O. SPERTZEL,\1\ FORMER HEAD OF UN SPECIAL
COMMISSION (UNSCOM) BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS INSPECTION, AND FORMER
DEPUTY COMMANDER, USAMRIID
Mr. Spertzel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to
start out by saying that I endorse 100 percent what Dr. Kay has
just said. I have not addressed some of those particulars
because of time constraints, but I could not have said it as
well as he did. They are absolutely true when it comes to the
whole issue of sanctions and inspections and dealing with Iraq.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Spertzel appears in the Appendix
on page 48.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Iraq's biological weapons program was among the most
secretive of the weapons of mass destruction programs. Its BW
program began in the early 1970's under the auspices of Iraq's
intelligence service and is probably presently under the
special security organization. From its inception, Iraq's BW
program included both military and terrorist application. The
terrorist component of Iraq's program was not actively pursued
by the Special Commission.
In 1991, Iraq's BW program was in an accelerating expansion
phase and was not obliterated, as has been stated, by Iraq,
including a recent submission by Iraq to the UN Security
Council. Its bacterial BW capabilities were well established,
including its ability for production, concentration, spray
drying, and delivery to produce a readily dispersable, small-
particle aerosol.
Iraq had demonstrated an anti-crop and a mycotoxin
capability and was developing a viral capability. Iraq was
developing both short-range and intermediate-range weapons
delivery capability for biological agents, including, it would
appear, a Supergun.
Agents included lethal, incapacitating, and agricultural
biological warfare agents. Iraq's interest in aflatoxin was in
its long-term carcinogenic and liver toxicity effect rather
than any short-term effects. One can only wonder what was the
intended target population.
Field tests encompassed point source releases, small-area
contamination, and large-scale line source release and were
evaluated both for tactical and strategic use. The weapons and
range of agents considered provided Iraq with a variety of
options for their use.
During the inspection and monitoring regime, Iraq continued
to expand its BW capabilities by acquiring supplies and
equipment that would enhance its BW capability. This came about
by the continued import of equipment and supplies, including a
5,000-liter fermentation plant that we have no idea where it is
located in Iraq.
Iraq also developed the capability to produce critical
production equipment and supplies such as standardized growth
media of direct importance to its BW program, as well as
fermenters, spray dryers, and centrifuges. This is the
indigenous capability that Dr. Kay talked about.
Iraq's experienced senior BW personnel remained intact as a
unit throughout the inspection period. Iraq still retains the
necessary personnel, equipment, and supplies to have an
expanded capability. We were only able to destroy the equipment
that we could identify was definitely part of the past program.
That allowed such things as a critical spray dryer and multiple
large fermenters to still remain in Iraq.
Iraq's program can be expected to be more advanced than in
1990, particularly its viral and genetic engineering
capability, because the evidence suggests that those two
efforts continued to grow in the 1990's. There is no doubt that
Iraq has a much stronger BW program today than it had in 1990.
And perhaps of most concern would be such agents as anthrax and
tularemia bacteria and smallpox virus, as well as anti-animal
and anti-crop agents. We cannot forget the economic devastation
that could be wreaked upon the United States with the import of
anti-crop and anti-animal agents.
Iraq clearly places a very high priority on its BW program,
not only the monetary cost but they considered it was vital to
their national security and, perhaps more important, the
security of the regime.
A senior Iraqi official stated that BW was perceived as a
power weapon and would influence its neighbors to see things
Iraq's way. Senior Iraqi officials have repeatedly stated that
BW was a vital armament step, at least until it had a fully
developed nuclear capability.
The continued Iraqi interest in BW terrorist research and
development would undoubtedly evolve to meet changing
situations and can be expected to be retained even after the
development of its nuclear capability.
The opinion by international experts after Iraq's program
was disclosed has not significantly changed. But at the
political-diplomatic level, some countries' experts' concerns
were not reflected in the verbiage and actions by the
respective leaders and diplomats that Dr. Kay touched upon.
In spite of the lip service that is given to getting
inspectors back into Iraq, there does not seem to be any
material change in the disparity between the experts' concern
and the diplomatic imperatives and, consequently, in the
support that an inspection regime might expect from P-5
members.
Most of the proposals for getting inspectors back into Iraq
are based on the premise that any inspectors are better than
none. To be blunt, that is pure garbage, just an illusion of
inspections.
Iraq's past behavior in restricting monitoring and
inspectors' activities is likely to be repeated. Such
limitations would make a monitoring regime a farce, which would
be worse than no inspectors at all, because it would provide an
inappropriate illusion of compliance to the world community.
I was told by a senior diplomat in 1998 that it would not
matter if a BW-laden Al Hussein warhead were placed on the
Security Council table. It would not change opinions about
lifting sanctions. He added further, if the CW and missile
files are closed, the world will not care about biology.
It appears to me that this may still be the viewpoint of
several nations. This attitude does not address the terrorist
threat posed by Iraq's WMD programs. One would think after
September 11 a more realistic appraisal of Iraq's capability
and willingness to use WMD as terrorist weapons would be
forthcoming. The public rhetoric is not encouraging.
Iraq's BW component from its inception, I would like to
remind this panel, included a terrorist component. Sanctions
had very little impact on the maintenance and expansion of
Iraq's BW capability. New equipment and supplies were
continuously being seen at sites under monitoring by both
resident as well as non-resident BW inspection teams. Such
items should have been declared to the Special Commission but
were not.
Items included bacterial growth medium, state-of-the-art
general laboratory equipment, and genetic engineering equipment
and supplies, including the appropriate restriction enzymes.
Large-volume production and safety equipment were imported, but
were never seen by the Special Commission.
Critical BW supplies and equipment are not difficult to
smuggle into a country where the country is an active
participant.
I would not expect sanctions, smart or otherwise, to have
any significant deterrent to Iraq's continued development of
its BW program. I do not expect much success from the return of
inspectors to Iraq. The success or failure of inspections and
monitoring depends too much on uncontrollable elements. What
will be the conditions under which the inspectors return? What
support will the inspection regime have given Iraq's
recalcitrance and the likely lack of unanimous support in the
UN Security Council?
Will Iraq truly cooperate and reveal or destroy all its BW
activity? Or will Iraq continue its established pattern of
deception, denial, and concealment? And like Dr. Kay, I expect
the latter to be the case.
Implementation and monitoring was predicated on Iraq fully
and willingly cooperating with UNSCOM--that did not happen; on
Iraq providing full and complete disclosure of its proscribed
BW program--that did not happen; and on Iraq making full and
accurate disclosure of all facilities containing dual-use
equipment and capability--that did not happen. It is most
unlikely that Iraq will now be any more cooperative.
A fundamental requirement for monitoring to be effective
would be full support by the UN Security Council. Even under
the best of circumstances, it would be almost impossible to
detect small-scale research, development, and production of BW
agents by a state determined to conduct such activities. Should
Iraq use mobile production facilities, several additional
magnitudes of difficulties would exist. Such laboratories were
proposed by one of the senior Iraqi officials as having been
considered in 1988. It has been recently reported by the German
intelligence service that Iraq also possesses such mobile
laboratories for their BW now.
Without a sense of certainty by Iraq that there would be
severe repercussions by a united Security Council, monitoring
does not have a chance of true success. For any chance to
succeed, there must be a harsh penalty for non-compliance that
is supported in advance by all P-5 members of the Security
Council. Should Iraq be allowed to retain its BW and other
weapons of mass destruction programs, it will remain a menace
not only to its neighbors but to the world at large because of
the concomitant instability it would create in the region. The
regime is unpredictable. The Gulf States would need to judge
all their actions in light of the Iraqi threat.
Iraq is already openly supporting the Palestinians. Would
Iraq risk using WMD on Israel? If this happened, what would be
the repercussions from such a foolhardy action? Iraq's
bioterrorism potential poses an enormous risk to any of its
perceived enemies. While much attention is focused on
bioterrorism against people, the economic devastation that
could be wreaked on the food animal or food crop industry may
be far greater in the long-term effect. Should Iraq use its BW
expertise in bioterrorist activities, it may be impossible to
find a smoking gun that would implicate Iraq.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Akaka. I want to thank you for your statements and
for the work you have done for our country to help stem the
spread of weapons of mass destruction around the world. Thank
you for that.
We have some questions for you. My first question is to Dr.
Einhorn. Both you and Dr. Kay state that the key obstacle to
Iraq constructing a workable nuclear device is access to bomb-
grade nuclear materials such as highly enriched uranium. The
National Intelligence Council in its annual report to Congress
gave a strong warning that, ``Weapons-grade and weapons-usable
nuclear materials have been stolen from some Russian
institutes.''
Is there any indication that Iraq might have been the
destination for any stolen material from the former Soviet
Union?
Mr. Einhorn. Mr. Chairman, I think we just don't know the
answer to that question. Is it possible that the Iraqis would
be interested--well, it is certain that Iraqis would be
interested in obtaining that material. Could they have? It is
possible. I am not aware of any hard evidence that they have
succeeded in obtaining fissile material.
Senator Akaka. Dr. Kay, since 1997, the International
Atomic Energy Agency has been reporting that Iraq no longer has
a nuclear weapons program. How did the agency arrive at that
assessment? And do you agree with it?
Mr. Kay. Well, the reports I am familiar with are the
result of routine safeguard inspections which go to known sites
that were known before the war, and what they are very careful
these days--they were not always before the war--to report is
that, of what they observe, they do not see any signs. The
IAEA, to the best of my knowledge, has made no general--has, in
fact, been very careful not to make a general characterization
of whether there is something there.
The continuing inspections the IAEA conducts in Iraq today
have nothing to do with the arms control inspections required
under the ceasefire resolution that ended the Gulf War.
Senator Akaka. Dr. Kay and Dr. Spertzel, Iraq and UN
officials will meet next week to discuss inspections. In the
past, Iraq declared certain facilities off limits to
inspections. If inspections are restarted, how can we be sure
that Iraq will not revert to past actions? Previously, some
observers suggested the United States strike Iraqi facilities
that Iraq refused to allow to be inspected. Would such a policy
be effective in supplementing any new inspection policy?
Mr. Kay. Let me just take a crack at the start of it. I
absolutely believe if inspections were to begin, nothing is off
the table--should be off the table. Am I confident that will be
the ground rules? No, I am not.
With regard to the use of military force as a means of
striking facilities that they deny access, I confess at times
in confrontations with Iraq I have raised that prospect. Do I
believe that is the appropriate action now? Absolutely not.
The only way to end the Iraq WMD program is to end the rule
of Saddam Hussein. The appropriate application of military
force is to achieve a regime change. You will never accomplish
limiting a WMD program by striking facilities, deception,
denial, and all. And I must say I do not think time is on our
side in this regard. I am convinced that if Saddam believes we
are going to end his rule, he will use WMD. I do not see any
advantage to giving him additional time to prepare for that use
of WMD against U.S. troops.
Senator Akaka. Dr. Spertzel.
Mr. Spertzel. I pretty much agree with what Dr. Kay said. I
believe Iraq would actually set up a confrontation just to have
the United States--if they thought the United States would do
it, end up bombing a nursery school. They have been known to do
that in the past. There is no reason to believe that they would
do otherwise in the future.
Furthermore, this requires, again, the UNMOVIC knowing that
a site needs to be inspected. And I don't see that happening.
Senator Akaka. Dr. Spertzel, UN Resolution 1284 states that
the new UN inspection team will be staffed by mostly new and,
therefore, inexperienced personnel. Under these conditions, how
effective and how reliable do you think the new team's findings
will be?
Mr. Spertzel. The new team's--I should start out by saying
that I helped to teach the first team, and it is a question
mark how new that first group of trainees were, because I knew
them all on a first-name basis.
But having said that, they have received additional new
ones, and they have gone through extensive training. The value
of that training to the real situation in Iraq, I think, is
pretty much of a moot point.
New inspectors are going to fumble in the beginning. I
think I can illustrate this best by stating what happened on
one of our inspection teams, when we got out of Iraq and a new
member who had been to Iraq for the first time said, ``Why were
you so tough as a team on Iraq? They sounded perfectly
plausible to me, the explanations they were giving.''
We had this same individual on another inspection about 2
months later, and about halfway into the second day, he turned
to me and said, ``Now I know why you were so tough the first
time.''
It takes that learning curve that is only gained by
actually on-the-ground doing it. So the simple answer to your
question is, in the beginning it is going to be a tough job for
them. This comes back to a statement that Dr. Kay made about
rebaselining. I don't think they can do it in 6 to 9 months'
time.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Einhorn, there have been reports about
Iraq developing an unmanned aerial vehicle program. How
concerned should we be at this time about this program,
especially as it relates to biological or chemical weapon agent
delivery?
Mr. Einhorn. Mr. Chairman, I think we should be concerned.
We are aware that the Iraqis have taken trainer aircraft and
sought to adapt them for unmanned use. I believe they have had
special modified spray tanks that they have tried to hook up to
such a vehicle. And the assumption is that this was for
delivery of chemical or biological weapons. I think we ought to
be concerned about that program.
Mr. Spertzel. Could I comment on that, sir?
Senator Akaka. Dr. Spertzel.
Mr. Spertzel. I would like to add that, of course, Iraq had
such a program which they claim was for bio, but it appears it
was actually for bio and chemical delivery both, and that was
with converting a MiG to an unmanned vehicle.
The continuation with the trainer aircraft that was
mentioned just a few minutes ago involved the same Iraqi
experts, engineering experts, as those involved in adapting
both the drop tank as well as attempts to modify a MiG fighter
to be an unmanned aircraft. So, absolutely, there are major
reasons for being concerned about the development of such a
weapons delivery system.
Senator Akaka. At this time I would like to call on Senator
Thompson for his questions.
Senator Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, let me ask you to--after stating that Saddam is
unpredictable and sometimes irrational, I am going to ask you
to put yourself in his shoes, and even though there seems to be
a rough sense of logic, Saddam logic, anyway, that pertains
sometimes--and you all have watched him for a long time--and
ask you what you think he is thinking about this situation
right now.
In light of the fact, if you agree, as I do--and I think
with most all of you--that the worst thing that could happen is
for us to get back in there under some idea that things are
going to be different, yes, we can slow him down a little bit,
but he knows us better, he is better at deception even than he
was before. He has gone to school on us the first time. He
knows that ultimately he can count on his friends in the UN
Security Council if things get tough or when he decides to shut
things down. Then the battle becomes over which building are
you going to be able to go into and very narrow issues. Surely
this is not worth going to war over, we will hear over and over
again. I believe this is the case. If it is the case, why would
not Saddam--and I hold my breath hoping he will not allow
inspectors back in there. But why wouldn't he? Does he feel so
secure that he does not feel any necessity to make any movement
even to engage us in this charade and cat-and-mouse game, which
you could have, it seems like, just like that and buy himself a
year or more if he wanted to, and undergo a little aggravation,
but almost guarantee, it would seem, and--well, hopefully not
guarantee, but lead him to think that with all of the support
he would get in the region, with the European support and all
of that, he could be assured that there would be no strike
against him.
Is he so secure that he doesn't feel any necessity to
engage us in what I believe would certainly inure to his
benefit in the short term? Dr. Kay, can you comment on that?
Mr. Kay. Senator Thompson, first of all, let me say I think
the first reason he will not do this is he has some
unsatisfactory experience with inspectors from his point of
view. I remember--and I had the dubious pleasure of leading
three of the more confrontational inspections with Iraq--that
at the end I had an Iraqi Foreign Minister tell me that if we
had understood that you were not going to behave like the IAEA
did before the war and a UN diplomat, we would never have
agreed to this.
With all the troubles inspectors had, people like Dr.
Spertzel and the other teams unmasked a program that was
unknown to national intelligence officials in the scope, depth,
and degree that the inspectors unmasked. So he has a positive
hate relationship with regard to the idea.
Second, inspectors were always a political threat to the
regime. We represented a failure, a visible failure running
around Baghdad in our white buses and our white Land Rovers
that he--although he can torture and cow the rest of Iraq into
submission, here are individuals who were behaving like they
were immune to Saddam's threat. For a totalitarian
dictatorship, that is a virus that you do not want to get
started. It starts people inside your own regime thinking about
changes.
And, finally, I must say, I fear that he has lost his fear
of the United States. The period in which one believed that six
or seven Cruise missiles fired into an empty building at 3 a.m.
in the morning was an appropriate response for an assassination
attempt on a former President of the United States is not one
that engenders great fear in a sadistic, fanatical dictator
like Saddam.
So those are my reasons. But I must say I have the same
worry every morning as you.
Senator Thompson. Dr. Spertzel, let me ask you to comment
on that and, in addition, whether or not you think if Saddam
was convinced that we were about to strike him in a significant
way or invade him, then do you think his calculations would
change? In other words, if he comes to the point of agreeing
for an inspection regime of some kind, does that mean he is
convinced that we are about to do that?
Mr. Spertzel. Yes, you would have found that would have
been part of my response, is that I don't think he is yet
convinced that the United States will act unilaterally in
opposition to the Europeans as well as the other Middle Eastern
countries. And certainly those countries and the Europeans are
giving ample reason to believe that he may be right.
Now, further indications of that coming into his
discussions with Kofi Annan is that the head of the Iraqi Ba'th
Party in the last 4 days made a statement in a speech in
Baghdad in which he commented something to the effect that the
United States was the real terrorist Nation because it
prevented Iraq from reclaiming its rightful territory integrity
in 1990, i.e., the march on to Kuwait.
Another senior official, an Iraq Foreign Minister, also
stated that, yes, they are flexible, but inspections would have
to include lifting of sanctions and inspections for weapons of
mass destruction of all countries in the Middle Eastern
region--clearly an indication that nothing has changed in Iraq
over the last several months.
Senator Thompson. Mr. Einhorn, would you care to comment on
this?
Mr. Einhorn. I don't think we can really predict what
Saddam Hussein would do under extreme duress. I would tend to
doubt that he is going to agree to admit the inspectors. He
knows, because he knows his own behavior, that sooner or later
if the inspectors are back, there will be a confrontation.
Things may go smoothly for a few weeks or months, but sooner or
later, I think the inspectors will be prying, will be demanding
and so forth, and Iraq will not be cooperative, and there will
be another confrontation. And Saddam recognizes that will be
used by the administration as a very good reason to use
military force to try to resolve the problem. So he can look
down the road and see that this is not going to lead anywhere
very----
Senator Thompson. Even if we can't get unanimity in the UN
Security Council.
Mr. Einhorn. I think he knows--he may be confident, as Dr.
Spertzel says, that the Bush Administration will be dissuaded
by some of the concerns of Europeans and so forth. He may feel
that now. But I think as time goes on, he will recognize that
this administration is committed to move forward, and that will
put him eventually in a pretty tight spot. And I wouldn't rule
out his making certain conditional offers to admit inspectors.
I don't think he is there yet, but I think he will make those
offers.
Senator Thompson. That is very interesting.
Could I ask the indulgence of my colleagues for one more
quick question? This is the idea, Dr. Kay, that you alluded to
or the point you made concerning the public relations battle
that I believe we are losing, if not lost, in terms of the
starving children. I have had people from Tennessee come up and
say that they have talked to Iranian officials. Some of them
have been down there and, you know, pointed out the effects of
what we are doing are having on the poor people down there. Is
there any objective thing that we can point to? Is the oil-for-
food account set aside with money in it under the auspices of
the United Nations that you can point to and say here is $1
billion he is not using? Obviously we know he is smuggling oil
in and getting a lot of money from that. I mean, maybe that is
a little bit more difficult for people to buy. But what do we
do about that? That is the mantra that you hear all the time
now in terms of our terrorist activities.
Mr. Kay. Senator, it is a very sore point. There are
factual things you can point to. The program was never--the
limitation of imports never applied to food and medicine. In
fact, sometimes I resort to pointing out what is actually
imported--a liposuction machine. One would not think that a
liposuction machine in Iraq would be a high-priority import,
although if you look at some senior Iraqi officials, you can
understand their desire for it. [Laughter.]
Mr. Kay. But, look, I confess, Senator Thompson, this is a
battle I think we didn't fight. We certainly at least didn't
fight it well. It is a battle that is lost. I think we now need
to focus on the main issue, that is, getting rid of the regime.
The thing that will improve the health and well-being of Iraqis
today more than anything else is the removal of Saddam Hussein
and his family from power.
Senator Thompson. Mr. Einhorn.
Mr. Einhorn. Yes, Senator Thompson, there are some
objective things you can point to. You are correct, the Oil-
for-Food Program allows Iraq to export oil, but the proceeds
must go into a UN escrow account, and those funds are to be
used for the civilian, humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people.
The balances have remained very high. At the beginning, the
Iraqis drew down those funds for civilian products. Now they
have let those funds sit in the escrow account rather than use
those funds for the needs of the Iraqi people. I don't have
exactly the numbers in front of me, but we were impressed--when
I was in government, I was quite impressed with the very
cynical nature of the Iraqi approach to this problem where they
continued to complain publicly about the effects of the
sanctions on the Iraqi public, but they failed to use the funds
that they could draw upon to meet those needs.
But I agree with the other witnesses. We have lost this
propaganda battle. It is very hard to change minds by showing
them this data.
Senator Thompson. Dr. Spertzel.
Mr. Spertzel. Yes, I agree with what has been said. I have
just two comments to make, because there are points of severe
irritation with me, and that is the business of medicines and
food to Iraq. At a time when Iraq was making a great deal of
progress in winning this public relations battle, the issue was
settling around medicines, vaccines for children. Well, the bio
people, we monitored the central distribution point for
biologicals to the medical community, and we were watching
donated medicines and vaccines for children sitting on the
shelves going out of date, intentionally not being distributed.
As inspectors, we couldn't do anything about it. But it became
a major sore point with us.
The other one has to do with food. Our inspectors would buy
food from the local market, and 1 day they went out to buy and
there was nothing on the shelves. Everything was gone. And they
asked why, and the person, the shop owner said, ``Tell me what
you want. I'll get it for you. We were instructed to clear
everything off our shelves because there were some foreign
newsmen coming today.''
Senator Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Akaka. Thank you for your questions and the
responses we received. Senator Cochran.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COCHRAN
Senator Cochran. Mr. Chairman, we obviously are confronted
with a very troubling situation in Iraq. I have made some notes
for an opening statement which I will ask be printed in the
record at this point, with your permission.
Senator Akaka. Without objection, it will be printed in the
record.
[The prepared statement of Senator Cochran follows:]
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COCHRAN
Mr. Chairman, we obviously are confronted with a very troubling
situation in Iraq. At the end of the Gulf War, UN Resolution 687
required Iraq to ``unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or
rendering harmless'' of its weapons of mass destruction. But, here we
are, 11 years later and we have no convincing evidence that these
weapons have been destroyed, removed, or rendered harmless.
Saddam Hussein has kept UN inspectors out of Iraq since December of
1998. Now, following pressure from the Bush Administration, Iraq's
Foreign Minister and the United Nations Secretary General are going to
meet next week to discuss the resumption of UN inspections in Iraq.
I'm concerned that even if Saddam Hussein allows UN inspection, he
will not cooperate with them. I'm also convinced sanctions have not
achieved their goals. We may be running out of time and options; so we
appreciate the opportunity to have the benefit of the thoughts and
suggestions of these distinguished witnesses.
Senator Cochran. If I could ask the witnesses about the UN
inspection situation, the key to success, as I understand, for
these UN inspections has always been the support of the
international community. We can't just do this by ourselves and
make it work. We especially need the cooperation of the
countries that make up the United Nations Security Council. But
there seems to have been considerable hesitancy among some of
these members in creating this new inspection regime, the
UNMOVIC regime. Several countries, including France and Russia,
didn't vote, didn't actively support this initiative. Can we
expect these UN inspections to have any chance of success
without the cooperation of our allies and friends?
Mr. Spertzel. At the risk of being undiplomatic, I will
take that one on. Without the full support of the P-5 members--
France, Russia, China, United States, and U.K.--the inspection
system doesn't have a chance, no matter what their authority
might be in Iraq. And I have seen nothing that would suggest
any change in the attitude and the expressions being stated
publicly in the media right now by a couple of those countries
that would indicate there is going to be any change in their
support.
Yes, France and Russia abstained in that vote because it
did not meet Iraq's satisfaction. Iraq was actively encouraging
them, requesting and pleading with them, to veto it, and they
compromised by abstaining. I don't see anything that has
changed.
Senator Cochran. Mr. Einhorn.
Mr. Einhorn. Let me go one better than that. Dr. Spertzel
says that without their support the P-5 unified, the
inspections can't succeed. If success means disarming Iraq and
forcing compliance, even with the support, the unified support
of the Security Council, they won't succeed, because it is very
difficult to compel compliance, and especially with this
regime.
So if one sets that high standard--and we must--then as all
the witnesses have said, the only way of compelling compliance
is to change the regime and get a regime that is prepared to
comply. I think that is the answer.
But I would say with strong support by the Security
Council, inspectors can do some useful things, perhaps only for
a short period of time, before confrontation sets in again.
I asked a number of my friends in the intelligence
community what they know about Iraq now and what they feel
about the inspectors not being there. And they are losing
touch. They used to have a feel for what was going on in Iraq.
They are losing that feel now.
I asked them, would you like to see the inspectors back on
the ground?, recognizing that the Iraqis are not going to give
them access to anything incriminating. They said, ``We would
still like them there. We could get some useful information. It
would update us on a number of useful things, certain
suspicious facilities we could at least get access to--that is,
the UN inspectors could get access to those facilities, and
resolve certain doubts.'' But they would have no illusions that
the inspectors would ever be able to find what the Iraqis have
worked hard to conceal. So there are limited things the
inspectors can do, but if success is disarming Iraq, forcing
compliance, they can't do that.
Senator Cochran. Dr. Kay.
Mr. Kay. Senator Cochran, could I give you a very practical
answer? Because I failed Diplomacy 101.
Talking about support from the Security Council in broad
terms does not get you very far when you are talking about
inspectors. The Iraqis will manage the individual
confrontations at points where much of the world that is not
focused on disarming Iraq--they are focused on getting rid of
sanctions and getting on with business--will not understand.
I led an inspection--because we had good intelligence that
the Iraqis were hiding documents related to their nuclear
centrifuge program--to a hospital for amputees. Now, can you
imagine how many Security Council members I would have behind
me if the Iraqis had chosen--fortunately this was on the first
inspection, and they hadn't gotten very smart. But if they had
chosen to say we can't have you traipsing through a hospital
that has amputees from the war with Iran there, I probably
wouldn't have gotten the support of my own government, quite
frankly, at that stage. And that is how they manage the
confrontations. It is not on the high ground. It is on
individual cases, access to Saddam's palace, access to a Ba'th
Party political headquarters. Well, you know, would we like UN
inspectors traipsing through the RNC or DNC?
I mean, they do it in ways that guarantee you will not
keep--now, we managed to in the early days. In this current
condition, I think it is absolutely assured that we would not
keep the Council through really tough inspections.
Senator Cochran. On another subject, I think Mr. Einhorn
and Dr. Spertzel have testified that Iraq deployed Scud
missiles with biological warheads. There are several reports
that we have received, unclassified reports, that Saddam
Hussein continues to retain interest in missiles of longer
range than those permitted under UN Resolution 687. Do you
think he is likely to try to equip long-range ballistic
missiles that he may develop with weapons of mass destruction?
Mr. Spertzel. I will start out by--yes. We found plans,
design plans for a container to fit into a missile warhead--and
I am not enough of a missile expert to tell you which one--the
size of which could have only been for bio application. It was
much too small for either chemical or nuclear devices. And
certainly all the indications we had during the inspection
period was their interest in acquiring a longer-range
capability. The intent of at least one of the two Superguns,
which was designed to hit much of Europe, or so the propaganda
said, that the smaller of those two was clearly designed to
carry a biological warhead, or missile, I guess in this case,
being fired from the Supergun.
So, yes, there was and undoubtedly is a continuing interest
in developing longer-range missiles capable of delivering a
small payload, which is easier for them to do. That would imply
bio and perhaps later on a nuclear.
Senator Cochran. Dr. Kay, could you respond?
Mr. Kay. If he had the capacity to do it, I have no doubt
that, in fact, he would do it. This is an individual who has
sought it at every stage.
For example, in the nuclear program, although they were
starting with an early program, they were already carrying out
research on how to use thermonuclear boosting to increase the
size and yield of the weapon.
The aspirations are unlimited. Given the time and the money
and Saddam still in power, they will certainly proceed along
that course.
Senator Cochran. Mr. Einhorn.
Mr. Einhorn. Just to add something, Senator Cochran, there
is no question they would like longer-range missiles. One of
the failings of Resolution 687, the ceasefire resolution, was
that it allowed the Iraqis to have missiles up to 150
kilometers in range. I think that was very unfortunate because
under the guise of permitted short-range systems, they could do
a lot of work to help them get a leg up on future, more capable
systems, and they are doing that right now.
This Al-Samoud liquid-fueled missile is supposed to be
below 150 kilometers. I have my doubts about that. They have a
tactical short-range solid-fueled missile called the Ababil
that I think is being used to develop a solid propellant
infrastructure that can then be used in the future for more
capable solid-fueled missiles. So I think they are laying the
groundwork.
But it is important to recognize the embargo, the current
sanctions, as porous as they are, do have an impact on
restricting what they can do. No doubt they are trying on the
black market to acquire ingredients for their missile program.
And they are succeeding to some extent.
But, an important aspect of a missile program is to be able
to flight test, and, sure, they are conducting short-range
flight tests that they are permitted to do, but they can't fire
a missile at long range. They know they would be detected.
Look at Iran. Iran is flight-testing this medium-range
ballistic missile, the Shahab-3, and they are making a lot of
headway on acquiring a delivery capability that can go
throughout the Middle East.
Iraq is real constrained because of the inability to have
an overt flight-test program at long range. That is an
important constraint on what they can do.
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator Akaka. Thank you, Senator Cochran.
Dr. Spertzel and Dr. Kay, on Sunday, Secretary Rumsfeld
said that international inspectors were limited in what they
could do, and that their ability to find out what was actually
taking place was minimal. He noted, `` the real information
that they were able to get--came from defectors who left the
country, provided inspectors with information and in a few
cases were able to discover some things and destroy some
capabilities.''
The question is: Were all substantial discoveries made as a
result of defectors?
Mr. Kay. Senator, in my case, that is not the case. I
hesitate to disagree with Secretary Rumsfeld, A, because I
don't want to become the subject of his afternoon press
briefing, but more importantly, I was actually flying back from
Honolulu on Sunday and so didn't hear what he said on ``Meet
the Press'' or ``Face the Nation.''
Inspectors--and Bob Einhorn referred to it. There is no
substitute for people on the ground. We certainly used
information from defectors. We used information, at least while
I was there, from any source we could. But we made genuine
discoveries. The Iraqis made stupid mistakes, and we unraveled
them. They lied and we detected those lies and pulled them
apart. It is not true that all the information was discovered
as a result, at least in the nuclear area, as a result of
defectors--although I welcome defectors, let me be clear.
Mr. Spertzel. And with all due respect to Secretary
Rumsfeld--and thank you for asking that question because I
welcome the opportunity to reply to his statement. In bio, that
absolutely is not the case. If I had to cite one single item
that may be the most important, it would have been the import
of supplies and equipment, the records that we were able to
obtain from suppliers. That became the crucial item that forced
Iraq to acknowledge their program, and the information that we
had up until July 1, 1995 when Iraq first acknowledged their
biological warfare program, none of it came from defectors.
Now, as Dr. Kay said, certainly I would welcome defector
information. Now, Hussein Kamel Hassan's defection did not add
anything to the bio program other than perhaps stimulate Iraq
to make further elaboration, but it wasn't information that we
obtained from him.
Now, there were later defectors and one very crucial one
that would have led us to a site in January 1998 that the
information received from that defector, as well as
corroborating evidence from other sources, would have indicated
an active bio research and development facility, except the
whole system came to a screeching halt in challenge inspections
in January 1998 and unfortunately got billed as a palace issue,
which it had nothing to do with palaces. We had arranged to
have three bio teams in-country at the same time, and we were
going to join the inspection team of Scott Ritter to go to that
site. But they got blocked the day before.
So, yes, defector information is valuable, but I think it
played a minor role, not a major role.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
Mr. Einhorn, an Iraqi defector said he personally worked on
renovations of secret facilities for biological, chemical, and
nuclear weapons in underground wells, private villas, and under
a hospital in Baghdad as recently as a year ago. Do you believe
that these sites are used primarily to hide activities or to
discourage military action against the sites in the future? And
what recourse does the United States have against such
facilities?
Mr. Einhorn. Mr. Chairman, I am not aware of the specific
reports. They are certainly plausible to me, given past Iraqi
behavior. They may feel that by hiding proscribed materials in
places like that, it would be difficult to inspect without
arousing public opinion, that they could have some degree of
immunity from the effects of inspection. So it is entirely
plausible to me that they would adopt that strategy. These
gentlemen (the other witnesses) are probably familiar with many
cases where they have adopted that strategy in the past.
Senator Akaka. Dr. Kay and Dr. Spertzel, UN resolutions
governing UNSCOM activities permitted on-site inspections with
full access, including no-notice inspections and sample
analysis. How frequently did you as an inspector implement
these measures?
Mr. Spertzel. In the case of bio, our resident inspection
teams, to my knowledge, always functioned on a no-notice basis.
That was the instructions to them.
They also worked on a variable schedule that was devised--
and I would prefer not to say publicly what the basis was--so
that it was sufficiently random that hopefully Iraq would not
know.
The limitation we had, however, was the minute a bio team
headed beyond Samarra, they obviously were only going to three
sites in the north, similarly in the south. And one of the
proposals that has been made for a new inspection regime is
that they have satellite inspection teams full-time in the
north and the south and elsewhere in Iraq in addition to
Baghdad, if necessary, because that essentially provided
notification to Iraq.
The non-resident teams always functioned on a no-notice
basis, whether it was revisiting a declared site or an
undeclared site.
Mr. Kay. Mr. Chairman, I conducted actually the first no-
notice inspection by any of the teams in Iraq. It was a result
of having for a week tried to give the Iraqis under
instructions notice of 24 to 12 hours. Not surprisingly, they
moved everything. And so we resorted--and after that point, no
notice became the standard.
Now, it seems it is--no notice sounds easier in theory than
it is. There are logistic opportunities, like Dr. Spertzel
referred to. There is also the fact that all your meeting rooms
were audio-bugged. I spent a number of hours jogging around
Baghdad with some fit and some not-as-well-fit inspectors as we
planned out how to conduct inspections because that was our
only privacy.
The Iraqis, we now know because of a defector, had
penetrated a number of the inspection teams and actually gained
notice. It was a constant struggle. Without no-notice
inspections, there are absolutely no hopes of finding anything.
Senator Akaka. Dr. Kay, why has the International Atomic
Energy Agency been able to continue its inspections in Iraq? Is
it due to their inspections being more narrowly defined? Or are
they seen as less political and more independent than the UN
teams?
Mr. Kay. The Iraqis from the beginning have tried to drive
a wedge between UNSCOM as the tough guys and the IAEA as the
soft technical inspection. It was always a problem, one that
was managed. The current inspections that have continued since
1998, though, are because they are more narrowly focused. They
are focused on sites which were pre-Gulf War nuclear--permitted
nuclear activity areas. They go only there. They don't go
anyplace else. It is a narrow technical, and so it gives the
Iraqis the appearance of maintaining compliance with the non-
proliferation treaty, and yet it does not threaten their hidden
program.
So under those ground rules, you could conduct biological
inspections or anything else. It is just not threatening to
their program.
Mr. Spertzel. If I could add, I believe those inspections
are also aimed at essentially recertifying that a known
quantity of nuclear material that Iraq had in 1990 is still
there and that the IAEA teams can come in and still cite, oh,
yes, there is X number of pounds of substance X, and it is
aimed at that, not whether they have accumulated anything else.
Mr. Kay. That is absolutely the case.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. Senator Thompson.
Senator Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Akaka. More questions?
Senator Thompson. Yes, sir.
Dr. Spertzel, you made reference to the fact that from the
very beginning their WMD program--perhaps you were referring
specifically to the biological program--had a terrorist
component. What did you mean by that? Could you elaborate?
Mr. Spertzel. Yes. I was referring to the bio, although at
least initially it was true for the chemical as well. When the
bio program was established by Iraq in 1973, perhaps late 1972,
under the Al-Hazen Ibn Al Haithem Institute, the program was
established totally by the intelligence organization with some
technical input as well by the military, but all funding and
guidance came through the intelligence.
The nature of the studies that they were conducting, the
types of organisms that they were evaluating and so on
indicated two types of delivery: Those that would be of
interest to the military for tactical and strategic reasons,
and those that would be only of value used in a clandestine
terrorist fashion.
And, in fact, the initial efforts with the wheat smut,
wheat cover bunt, anti-crop agent was developed to be delivered
covertly and was the initial efforts in an unmanned, albeit in
this case a very small drone as a delivery means. The initial
efforts appear to have been aimed at Iran, but later the
interest changed.
There was also a variety of interesting other agents that
are of only utility for terrorist application.
Senator Thompson. Their biological program is still under
the intelligence organization, isn't it?
Mr. Spertzel. Yes, sir. There was a period perhaps from
about 1979 to 1983--I am sorry, 1986 or 1987 when the military
piece was under DOD--Ministry of Defense, and then brought--in
1987 it was brought back under the umbrella of the intelligence
service. By that time the intelligence service had split into
two different organizations. In this time, it was under the
special security organization that is currently headed, I
believe, by Saddam's oldest son.
Senator Thompson. So you attach significance to that, the
organizational structure, and looking at it from a terrorist or
potential terrorist standpoint. That would be the main reason
you think that it would be organized that way, because it would
not strictly be military or defense usage.
Mr. Spertzel. That is right. The program, as it appears to
be designed, is for either the last-gasp, if you like,
protection of the regime as well as the second side, which
appears to be from the very beginning aimed at terrorist
application, terrorist usage, wherever the regime felt
necessary.
Senator Thompson. Could you elaborate on that a little bit?
I guess to me that issue would depend upon, of course, its
usage. Developing the biological weapons themselves, I suppose,
could be done under any structure. But is there anything that
you see in terms of their usage or their preparation that would
indicate an offensive intent? You mentioned maybe a last-gasp
situation where it is a fallback to be used in case they are
about to be overrun or something, which would be serious enough
in and of itself. But is there anything in addition to that
that would indicate to you some potential offensive usage?
Mr. Spertzel. From the military standpoint or terrorist
standpoint? The military----
Senator Thompson. From a terrorist standpoint.
Mr. Spertzel. From the terrorist standpoint, because the
Commission made almost an active effort not to delve into the
terrorist side of it, we have very little information to go on.
Senator Thompson. Why was that?
Mr. Spertzel. It was deemed that it was not part of the
mandate of Resolution 687.
Senator Thompson. So we don't know as much about potential
terrorist capability or intention as we perhaps could have.
Mr. Spertzel. Absolutely.
Senator Thompson. That leads me to something else. You
mentioned--I think, Dr. Kay, it was you who indicated that in
terms of what they were doing from a nuclear standpoint, that
our intelligence estimates were off. Would you elaborate on
that a bit, and Dr. Spertzel also, in terms of bio? How does
what we found when we were in over there or anything that we
may have determined later compare with our intelligence
estimates that we had going in? We know from the Rumsfeld
Commission, for example, that we were off quite a bit in terms
of some countries, in terms of some capabilities. Dr. Kay, I
assume that was the case that you alluded to. Could you
elaborate on that a bit?
Mr. Kay. Well, in the nuclear program, the prevailing
intelligence estimate was that the Israeli action against
Osiraq reactor, which occurred in June 1981, had substantially
derailed the Iraqi nuclear program, that the principal evidence
seen in the period from 1981 to the Gulf War was a shop-until-
you-drop mentality, that is, Iraq had a lot of money and they
were buying a lot of things and that there wasn't substantial
doubt that they were trying to pursue a nuclear program, but
that it seemed to be chaotic and not very close and not
focused.
And there were less than a dozen facilities identified as
target points during the course of the coalition air campaign
as being decisively known to be nuclear facilities or thought
to be nuclear facilities.
When we got on the ground, we found that instead of that,
what the Iraqis had done is they had pursued a systematic Iraqi
Manhattan Project designed to procure high-enriched uranium
using literally all the known methods, the Tarmiya, the
central--the first place we found the centrifuge--or, pardon
me, the calutron program, EMIS program, electromagnetic isotope
separation program, was, Senator Thompson, you will be happy to
know, an exact duplicate of a facility that exists in your
State. What the Iraqis had done is come here, and quite openly
because it was unclassified, buy the blueprints of where we
produced high-enriched uranium at Oak Ridge using calutrons,
and just built a plant. They had also had a centrifuge program
that had produced a building, what is called Al Furat, that was
not known to U.S. intelligence until inspectors discovered it.
And let me make this point: This was not as a result of a
defector. We discovered that in the course of an inspection
because an Iraqi official made a mistake in how he described
the program, and we went there. It was larger than any
centrifuge plant that exists in Western Europe or the United
States, that if the war had not intervened, right now we would
be facing an Iraq, if they had overcome the production
problems, that would be producing a very large amount of high-
enriched uranium.
They also produced a chemical enrichment program. They were
trying laser enrichment, which probably would have only
consumed a large amount of money and not produced nuclear
material. That has been our experience with it. But it was an
all-encompassing program. The scope, scale, and dimension was
much larger than was known by anyone.
Let me not throw stones at the U.S. intelligence community.
I did not receive a briefing from any other country's
intelligence community that indicated they knew that scope.
Senator Thompson. This plan with regard to the Oak Ridge
facility, was this a blueprint you discovered, or what was it,
did you say?
Mr. Kay. We actually discovered the plant, and----
Senator Thompson. They had duplicated the plant?
Mr. Kay. They had duplicated the plan. They built it to the
plan, and the way we discovered it is a testimony to actually
the knowledge in the U.S. program, although the individual has
since passed away. We brought the photos back, spread them out
on the table, asked one of the Oak Ridge designers, who was
still alive and still working there, 80 years old, in that
plant, didn't tell him what it was except a facility in Iraq.
He walked around, looked at the pictures, and said--and I will
never forget the statement--``I know this plant. I work in this
building every day of my life.'' And sure enough, as we took
the plant apart and then we discovered the blueprints later, it
had been built to a set of U.S. plans.
Senator Thompson. How do you account for that?
Mr. Kay. Well, the plans are openly available. You could go
today and buy them. We declassified--the calutron program, the
EMIS program, was one that the United States abandoned because
gaseous diffusion came on line and was far more efficient. When
we were doing calutrons during the course of the Second World
War, it took approximately one-half of the available U.S.
electric supply and all the silver that was stored by the
Treasury to use to wrap magnets in. It was a very inefficient
way. The Iraqis had improved on it. They pursued it because
they correctly guessed that no one would think anyone would be
so stupid as to use that means of enrichment.
And, in fact, the first assessment that came back to the
United States, two Nobel Prize winners were asked to evaluate
it, and their exact comment was, ``It can't be that. No one
would be so stupid to do that. There are better ways to
produce.''
There is a lesson for us here. There were some very old
ways and still are very old ways of producing weapons that are
quite destructive.
Senator Thompson. It was older but it was easier for them
to do?
Mr. Kay. It was easier to hide and disguise. They still
struggled with that process as well. That is why they were
developing centrifuges, which are genuinely easier for everyone
once you produce centrifuges.
Senator Thompson. So they have plenty of uranium, I take
it. It is just a matter of enriching it and----
Mr. Kay. That is correct. There is abundant uranium in
Iraq. It is not in the concentrations you would like to have or
you would find in Canada or other places, in the former Soviet
Union. But there is plenty of uranium. Money doesn't constrain
their program. And this was the hard lesson everyone has
learned. Just because it is expensive to do or not the best way
doesn't mean the Iraqis won't pursue it. They will spend the
money.
Mr. Spertzel. In the bio program, clearly the intelligence
was sufficient to know that Iraq was at least attempting to
weaponize botulinum toxin and anthrax, which is what prompted
the use of vaccines against those agents for the coalition
forces. But the intelligence was not good enough to know where
the production plants were because of the four sites that we
could identify as actually being involved in the production of
biological agents, not a single one of them was touched by even
one bomb.
So, yes, the intelligence----
Senator Thompson. Could that have been on purpose?
Mr. Spertzel. No. They simply didn't know.
Senator Thompson. There was no danger to the civilian
population or anything like that that would have come into
play?
Mr. Spertzel. Certainly the major production plant, which
was the Al Hakam facility out in the desert, that could have
been blown up with absolutely no qualms whatsoever,
particularly if it was a daylight strike.
Senator Thompson. So is it fair to say we knew basically
what they were doing, we just didn't know where they were doing
it?
Mr. Spertzel. We certainly had some indication that they
were investigating both botulinum toxin as well as anthrax. My
guess is a lot of that probably came from import information
because there was a basis for--would have been a basis for
questioning that. But it was believed that most of that effort
was all taking place at the Salman Pak Peninsula. And it is
true, Salman Pak was, in fact, the original site of the BW
program back in the early 1970's and stayed there throughout
the 1970's and 1980's. But it was a research site, research and
development site, not a production site. And by July 1990,
before the invasion of Kuwait, all of the bacterial piece of
the bio program had been moved out of Salman Pak and only the
terrorist application as well as the Ricin work remained at
Salman Pak.
So, actually, our information was not current in terms of
what Salman Pak was being used for by the Iraqis.
Senator Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. Do you have anything further?
Senator Thompson. I don't, unless Mr. Einhorn wants to
comment on the last--I am finished. Thank you.
Senator Akaka. Thank you, Senator Thompson.
I would ask that the statement of Senator Carnahan be
included into this hearing record.
[The prepared statement of Senator Carnahan follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARNAHAN
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I, too, want to welcome the distinguished panel we have before us
today.
You are top experts in your respective fields, and I am looking
forward to hearing your views on the dangerous situation in Iraq.
For too long now Saddam Hussein's Iraq has posed a threat to both
its neighbors and the international community.
He lost the war but his program to develop weapons of mass
destruction has not been dismantled.
He had the choice to comply with the United Nations resolutions and
rejoin the community of nations.
But he has made other choices, and those choices need to have
consequences.
While Iraq has been contained militarily in recent years, we have
not had weapons inspectors on the ground since 1998. So for years, Iraq
has been free to develop nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons with
impunity.
Saddam Hussein has raised an estimated $1 to $2 billion annually
from smuggled, illegal oil sales revenues.
This money has most likely been spent on his weapons of mass
destruction programs.
Yet he has blamed the United Nations and the United States for the
suffering of the Iraqi people, when in reality he has chosen not to use
available funds for humanitarian purposes.
Today's hearing has two important purposes.
First, it is critical that we begin the process of educating the
American people about the threat that Saddam poses:
--Labout the dangerous weapons that he is developing; and
--Labout the possibility that he could provide them to
terrorists that would use them against the United States.
Second, we need to explore the risks and rewards of the various
policy options available to the United States.
We can continue to contain him through the no-fly zone and ``smart
sanctions.'' But that would not have an appreciable impact on his
weapons of mass destruction.
We can try to topple him by supporting opposition group, but we
need a realistic analysis of the likelihood that such an effort could
succeed.
Or we could take military action.
But we need to understand the readiness of our armed forces for
such an engagement, the difficulties of eliminating Saddam's regime,
and the impact such action would have on the volatile Middle East
region.
Finally, we need to envision what a post-Saddam world would look
like and anticipate how to manage difficulties that would arise if
there were instability in the Gulf region.
So this is a difficult subject worthy of discussion and study. I
look forward to your testimony.
Senator Akaka. I would like to thank my fellow Senators for
their time and interest in this important issue.
Mr. Einhorn, Dr. Kay, and Dr. Spertzel, I thank you for
your thoughtful remarks. Your testimony has been very thorough.
To summerize your comments: We have lost the propaganda and
public relations battle with Iraq; and a solution to the threat
posed by Iraq upon the United States and the world is to
replace Saddam Hussein and his regime.
You have done the American people a great service by
providing such useful and candid statements and sharing your
experience and knowledge with us. You have painted a dark
picture. Our Nation and our allies have some difficult
decisions to make about Iraq. The deterrence effect of weapons
of mass destruction has been both a benefit and hazard to the
United States and our allies.
On the one hand, reports indicate that during the Gulf War,
Iraq resisted using chemical weapon warheads against coalition
troops and Israel out of fear of United States retaliation.
On the other hand, Iraqi leaders are convinced that their
possession of WMD was vital to their survival by keeping
American and coalition forces from getting into Baghdad in
1991.
I think we have to ask ourselves, with that mind-set, how
realistic is it to expect the current regime in Iraq to ever
give up WMD capabilities.
As Mr. Einhorn has said, the current regime in Iraq is
truly a class by itself. The United Nations credibility is
being undermined by Iraq's well-documented and clear-cut
violations of proliferation agreements. If we fail to stop
Iraq's WMD programs, how will we be able to stop other nations
with similar intentions such as Iran?
The international community must work together. The
implementation of any system to destroy Iraq's WMD capabilities
will depend on firm and active support by the international
community. We have heard a lot of very strong rhetoric about
Iraq. Now we must put action behind the rhetoric. We must state
clearly what our objectives are in Iraq. We must decide what
policies are needed to meet these objectives, and we must state
when we will use force to meet these objectives. This is the
only way to maintain our credibility with our allies and
adversaries.
Gentlemen, we have no further questions at this time.
However, Members of this Subcommittee may submit questions in
writing for any of the witnesses. We would appreciate a timely
response to any questions.
The record will remain open for these questions or further
statements from my colleagues, and, again, I would like to
express my appreciation to our witnesses for your time and for
sharing your insights with us. This has been valuable to this
Subcommittee.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:34 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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