|
GUIDANCE FROM
THE GRAPHICAL USER INTERFACE (GUI) EXPERIENCE:
What GUI Teaches About Technology
Access
March 28, 1996
National Council on Disability
1331 F Street, NW, Suite 1050
Washington, DC 20004-1107
(202) 272-2004 Voice
(202) 272-2074 TT
(202) 272-2022 Fax
The views contained in the report do not necessarily represent those of the Administration, as this
document has not been subjected to the A-19 Executive Branch review process.
NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY
MEMBERS AND STAFF
Members
Marca Bristo, Chairperson
John A. Gannon, Vice Chairperson
Yerker Andersson, Ph.D.
Larry Brown, Jr.
John D. Kemp
Audrey McCrimon
Bonnie O'Day
Lilliam R. Pollo
Debra Robinson
Shirley W. Ryan
Michael B. Unhjem
Rae E. Unzicker
Hughey Walker
Kate P. Wolters
Ela Yazzie-King
Staff
Ethel D. Briggs, Executive Director
Speed Davis, Executive Assistant to the Chairperson
Billie Jean Hill, Program Specialist
Jamal Mazrui, Program Specialist
Mark S. Quigley, Public Affairs Specialist and Editor
Brenda Bratton, Executive Secretary
Stacey S. Brown, Staff Assistant
Janice Mack, Administrative Officer
TECH WATCH
Chairperson
Bonnie O'Day
Staff
Jamal Mazrui
Members
Eric Bohlman
Judy Brewer
Debbie Cook
Roberta Cook
Norman Coombs
Tim Cranmer
Charlie Crawford
June Kailes
Debbie Kaplan
Cindy King
Paul Schroeder
Gregg Vanderheiden
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The National Council on Disability wishes to express its sincere appreciation to Bonnie O'Day and Jamal Mazrui for their leadership in technology accessibility, and to Fred Pelka for his hard work and valuable suggestions in preparing this report.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preface
Introduction
The GUI Crisis
What Is GUI?
What Is the Crisis?
Why Microsoft?
Early Awareness of the Problem
The Crisis Develops
NCD's First Involvement
Advocacy for Open Windows
ADA
Section 508
The Tech Act
NCD Efforts
Toward a Resolution
NCD: What Went Wrong, What Went Right
Recommendations
Conclusion
Appendix: National Council on Disability: A Brief Description
PREFACE
In August 1994, members and staff of the National Council on Disability (NCD) began meeting
with representatives of the disability community and officials of Microsoft Corporation to discuss
access to Windows-based software for people with disabilities, especially people with severe
visual impairments.
As part of its research agenda, NCD established Tech Watch, a community-based, cross-disability
consumer task force on technology. The 11-member task force provides information to NCD on
issues relating to emerging legislation on technology and helps monitor compliance with civil
rights legislation, such as Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended.
This report was commissioned by NCD on the advice of Tech Watch. It is a retrospective
analysis of the crisis for people with visual disabilities that was caused by the widespread adoption
of the graphical user interface in information technologies. Numerous interviews were conducted
to trace the history of the crisis and the response from the disability community in general and
NCD in particular. The report makes recommendations to NCD on how such a crisis might be
averted in the future, so that people with disabilities will benefit as much as others, from advances
in technology.
INTRODUCTION
The blind community is at the highest risk right now of being first liberated
by computers in the eighties, and now enslaved in the nineties. (Charles
Crawford, Boston Globe, October 17, 1994.)
In early January 1994, Henry Archin went for a job interview at Wellfleet Communications in
Billerica, Massachusetts. Archin, totally blind since birth, was hoping for a position in the
company's telephone customer service department. The interview went well, and Archin asked
the Massachusetts Commission for the Blind to evaluate what special equipment or software he
might need to work in Wellfleet's computer environment. That's when he heard the bad news.
Wellfleet uses Microsoft Windows, a computer program with a graphical user interface (GUI).
Office software that uses an entirely text-based interface can be made relatively accessible to a
blind user through a screen reader program that converts what is on the screen into braille or
synthetic speech; however, there is no equivalent program for Windows reliable enough to enable
Archin to do the job. A Wellfleet representative expressed his regret, but Archin did not get the
position.
Charles Crawford, commissioner at the Massachusetts Commission for the Blind, uses the folk
tale of John Henry to illustrate the situation of blind computer users in America today. John
Henry, it will be remembered, was "a steel drivin' man" who raced a mechanical rail-driver in an
attempt to save his job. John Henry won the race, but lost his life. Steel driving men passed into
history, tossed out of their jobs by changing technology.
The crisis that graphical user interfacing poses to blind computer users has been building for a
long time. Ever since the introduction of GUI (pronounced "gooey") into the software market in
the mid-1980s, software accessibility experts had warned of the potential for lost jobs and careers
as people who were blind or visually impaired were confronted by a new technology that was
impossible for them to use. By 1994, with the imminent unveiling of Microsoft's Windows 95,
this nightmare seemed on the verge of becoming reality, as more and more offices contemplated
the switch from the older, disk operating systems (DOS) to Windows. "The reality," wrote
Crawford that year, "is as cold as the unemployment lines that may soon become the home of
thousands of people who are blind."
This report was commissioned by the National Council on Disability's (NCD) Technology Watch
task force. Tech Watch was established by NCD in January 1995 and consists of Council
members, software accessibility experts, and technology accessibility advocates and consumers.
The purpose of the report is to trace the development of and community response to the GUI
crisis. How did this crisis happen? Could it have been prevented or attended to earlier, before it
began to compromise the livelihoods of people with disabilities? What was the role of NCD in
resolving the crisis? What can NCD do to prevent similar crises?
The report also examines the effectiveness of current legislation in dealing with this issue. In
particular, advocates turned to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Section 508 of the
Rehabilitation Act, and the Technology Related Assistance for Individuals with Disabilities Act in
their efforts to convince the software industry to incorporate access into their products. How
well did the language of these laws meet the needs of the day? How well are the laws being
enforced? And what can NCD do to ensure that these laws and their enforcement better serve the
needs of Americans with disabilities?
THE GUI CRISIS
What Is GUI?
A computer user interface is the place where machine and human being communicate with each
other. It is how we tell computers what we want and how they present to us the information we
request. Today, the most common user interfaces involve a keyboard, viewscreen, and, more and
more often, a mouse.
A graphical user interface is a computer-user interface that uses graphical screen images as well as
typed text, with icons on the screen replacing many of the functions of the keyboard. For
example, in a typed text interface, the command to move data from one file to another is typed
into the computer as a line of code meaning, "Send this letter from file A to file B." In GUI, a
user might send this command by placing the cursor on the letter (represented by the image of an
envelope), and moving it with a mouse across the screen from file A (represented as a rectangle),
to file B (represented as another rectangle). Click the mouse, and the transfer is complete. Many
sighted people find GUI easier to use, because they don't have to remember or to look up special
commands for each program function. Less time is spent figuring out how to get the computer to
do what you want it to do.
GUI can be used by people who are blind and visually impaired, provided they have a reliable
screen reader to translate what's on the screen into braille or synthesized speech. The
development of screen readers for the older, DOS-based systems is quite advanced, and a number
of private companies presently compete for the screen reader market.
What Is the Crisis?
GUI offers a special challenge to designers of screen reader programs. In text-based interfaces,
almost everything on the screen is a letter, a number, or punctuation, and is easily discernable by
the screen reading program. Furthermore, in these earlier systems, the information flow to and
from the screen is relatively accessible to the screen reader. In graphical user interfaces, however,
the screen can contain many symbols or icons, which are much more of a problem for screen
readers to decipher. In addition, the information that is sent to and from the screen is more
difficult for screen readers to interpret. And of course, GUI is at heart a presentation system
designed with sighted people in mind. Successive menus, pull-down windows, icons, screen
buttons, bombs, palettes--all were introduced to provide greater ease for sighted users.
Gregg Vanderheiden, director of the Trace Research and Development Center at the University of
Wisconsin-Madison, recalls, "With DOS, getting access to the contents of the screen memory was
as easy as rolling off a log so developers could focus on usability issues. Well, in Windows, it
turned out to be not so easy to find out what was on the screen. So this was a real problem."
The impact of this problem threatened to escalate dramatically in 1994, with the impending arrival
of Windows 95, the Microsoft Corporation's newest GUI operating system. Windows 95
promised to be much more competitive than previous Windows products, and its unveiling was to
be a major business event. What would happen when the business and professional worlds were
dominated by software that used GUI exclusively?
Judy Brewer, project director for the Massachusetts Assistive Technology Partnership (MATP),
remembers, "Particularly from the middle of 1994 up through the fall, there started to be an
increasing stream of phone calls from around the state, from blind computer users who were
saying things like, 'I'm terrified I'm going to lose my job; my department is switching to
Windows--how can I adapt to this?' And we'd have to say, 'Well, we're not sure.' Or they were
saying, 'I'm really frustrated--I just lost a promotion, because to move up in my job I'd have to be
able to move to Windows.' Or somebody would say, 'I just lost my job, because we've been
unable to find an accommodation.' It wasn't huge numbers, but given the low incidence of
blindness relative to other disabilities, it was very alarming. Here were people who were very
skilled computer users, and they were getting bounced out of what had been a phenomenally good
technology to use: the combination of DOS and screen readers."
As the release date for Windows 95 drew near, advocates feared that blind computer users were
about to face vocational extinction.
Why Microsoft?
It is a reflection of the company's success that the Microsoft Corporation came to be at the center
of the GUI crisis and the focus of subsequent advocacy efforts. Microsoft products dominate the
world of GUI. The advent of Windows 95 promised an enormous acceleration in the shift away
from DOS and toward GUI.
It is important to note here that disability advocates, and NCD, have expressed concerns about
GUI accessibility to companies other than Microsoft. It should also be stressed that the
management of Microsoft was by no means opposed to greater accessibility to computer products
by people with disabilities. Microsoft had, for example, worked with accessibility software
specialists to develop a variety of access aids for people with limited dexterity. According to
Greg Lowney, senior program manager for the Accessibility and Disabilities Group at Microsoft,
Windows 95 was due to arrive on the market with numerous accessibility features already written
into the basic operating system, even before the issue of GUI accessibility was raised.
Nevertheless, in terms of access for people with visual disabilities, Microsoft was seen to be
lagging. When people with disabilities called their advocates with stories of how the move to a
new operating system was suddenly limiting their opportunities, the systems they invariably
mentioned were developed by Microsoft. The irony, as Brewer points out, is that "the highly
accessible standard which screen reader users had been accustomed to was in fact an earlier
Microsoft product, MS DOS. In other words, the essential problem was not the company, but the
technology, and then...the company's failure to respond to concerns about its technology." Thus,
despite the company's success with other forms of computer accessibility, its estrangement from
blind computer users was near total.
As Charles Crawford put it, "We were using Microsoft as the primary target because they were
the biggest developer of this kind of software, and everything was going in the Windows
direction."
Early Awareness of the Problem
Although the GUI crisis seemed to develop almost out of nowhere, there had in fact been
numerous warnings. Vanderheiden was among the first to raise concerns about GUI, as early as
1985. Attempting to alert the blindness community, he took his concerns to computer users in the
major national blindness organizations. For his efforts, Vanderheiden says he was often sharply
criticized. Blind computer users, he said, told him that he could better spend his time developing
better speech readers for DOS-based systems or advocating for legislation prohibiting the
proliferation of GUI.
"I did a conference in Madison (Wisconsin) several years ago, and the question at the time was,
Why would a person who is blind want to use graphical user interface? The answer is that they
wouldn't, unless they had to. Back then nobody had to because nobody was using Windows. But
slowly, over time, Windows came in."
Another early warning voice was that of Susan Brummel, director of the Center for Information
Technology Accommodation (CITA), at that time known as the Clearinghouse on Computer
Accommodations at the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA). As early as 1988,
Brummel and her office attempted to raise GUI accessibility as an issue in federal purchases of
software, after the passage of the 1986 Rehabilitation Act Amendments charged GSA with
overseeing the implementation of Section 508 of the Act, which required that federal agencies
provide workers with and without disabilities equivalent access to electronic office equipment.
"We push as hard as we can," says Brummel, "We wrote an RFP [request for proposals] in the
early 1990s that was intended to be a model of [software] accessibility. We included language to
ensure that people with disabilities would be accommodated." Brummel stresses that CITA,
however, is "not the office that keeps track of what agencies do and don't do. We're like the
people in the information window where somebody comes for an application. We don't know
who hasn't come to our window who should have, and we don't know if they really fill out the
application or not once they take it away."
Charles Crawford sent several letters on GUI accessibility to the White House and the U.S.
Department of Justice. In September 1990, he wrote to President Bush "to share my serious and
growing concern....Simply put, developers of hardware and software are not ensuring accessibility
to their products...." Crawford believed that Microsoft and other GUI developers could facilitate
accessibility by including "hooks"--programming aids for screen readers imbedded in the
operating system itself. Failure to do so, he wrote, was a violation of the recently passed ADA.
"I ask that you refer this letter to the Department of Justice Civil Rights Division for their
attention in conjunction with the General Services Administration who have been working to
resolve it." In a letter from Justice Department dated November 26, 1990, Crawford was referred
to GSA, which "has issued guidelines in this area, and continues to work with the computer
industry on the issue." Crawford notes, however, that he saw little progress in addressing GUI
access at the source: with the manufacturers of operating systems.
The Crisis Develops
Despite the early warnings, no major national advocacy effort developed around the issue of GUI
accessibility. No national consumer organization made significant efforts to confront the problem.
The issue was, by and large, ignored by the disability press and entirely unknown to most
disability rights advocates. Why?
Gregg Vanderheiden believes that there was a certain amount of denial in the blindness
community's initial reaction. Bringing up the issue of GUI accessibility, he says, "was like telling
somebody, 'Well, you know you're going to die.' No one wants to deal with that." Nolan Crabb,
editor and system administrator for the American Council of the Blind's (ACB) World Wide Web
site and a software accessibility advocate at ACB, uses the same analogy. "When someone is
diagnosed with a terminal illness, the first stage is denial. 'Oh this can't be happening. The
experts must be wrong.' And I think the blind community went through a similar process."
Crabb reports that ACB was aware that GUI would be a problem "from the onset, as far back as
the late eighties and early nineties....We passed a variety of resolutions. Dialogue with Microsoft
was virtually impossible, because they weren't listening." Despite this awareness, ACB did not
undertake a substantial campaign around the issue. "There was talk at one time of picketing
Microsoft headquarters, [but] no serious plans were made. Microsoft began to change right about
the time we got to thinking that was a valid strategy."
The National Federation of the Blind (NFB) also had trouble coming to grips with GUI
accessibility issues. Though it invited representatives from the software industry to its
conferences, where the GUI issue was raised, there was never an effort to force a showdown. In
part, this had to do with the NFB's larger technology agenda, as explained by Curtis Chong,
president of the NFB in computer science.
"We were trying to counteract the overreliance and overdependence on technology by
rehabilitation people or people who are blind, who thought of technology as the great savior of
the blind. And what we were saying in the Federation was technology is great, but you still have
to have your basic blindness skills such as mobility and braille literacy....So for us to deal with
technology was a little difficult, because we were trying to get them to stop putting technology at
the top of their list....We were trying so hard to get people to deal with technology realistically, I
think we almost tried too hard."
The surprising speed with which Windows began to displace other software systems was also a
factor. Few anticipated that the changeover from DOS to Windows in the mid-1990s would be so
sudden and so widespread. Microsoft itself was said to have been caught by surprise. This
element of surprise was exacerbated by the fact that a parallel GUI product, the Macintosh
operating system, had not become the employment threat it had first appeared to be because of its
relatively slow acceptance in the workplace.
It was also difficult to develop a strategy that offered any chance of success. Some consumers
recognized the coming crisis (at the NFB-sponsored U.S./Canada Conference on Technology for
the Blind in 1991, for example, and in the January 1994 issue of Braille Monitor), but they were
unable to get access to the decision makers at Microsoft and the other major companies. And
whenever pressure from access advocates did begin to rise, their efforts were short-circuited by
assurances from Microsoft that better access was coming.
"Whenever there were the beginnings of sufficient pressure," says Brummel, "that would be
capped with a meeting with a Microsoft representative where they said, 'Okay, we hear you, and
this is what it's going to be, not to worry'." Speech reader programs were promised for earlier
Windows products (3.0 and 3.1), but when these were developed by independent software
developers, blind consumers complained that they were unreliable.
"What I was hearing," says Judy Brewer, regarding the screen reader situation in 1994 and early
1995, "was that of probably eight screen readers on the market for Windows 3.1, two were
definitely better than all the others. And the best rating these two got on the street was 80
percent efficiency. That's not good enough to keep your job, if your job requires much computer
use."
Within the Federal Government, CITA held workshops and training on software accessibility for
numerous government agencies. But even when RFPs were successfully negotiated with software
accessibility as a consideration, the results were discouraging. Government purchasers had no
way of verifying contractor claims of accessibility, which were often overstated. As Susan
Brummel put it, "Nobody really knew until the tools began to arrive at the employees' desks" if a
software product was truly accessible, by which time it was too late to change the order.
Finally, many people with and without disabilities, find computers intimidating. Nolan Crabb at
ACB and Curtis Chong at NFB both report a division in their organizations between those who
are comfortable with computers and those who aren't. Furthermore, in both organizations,
computer access issues were the exclusive purview of specific computer committees or
departments. These relatively small groups of computer professionals and enthusiasts tended to
work in relative isolation, which lessened their organization's ability to respond to the crisis in a
timely manner.
Ironically, this was a mirror image of the situation at Microsoft, where all access issues were
apparently relegated to one person, Greg Lowney. Both consumer advocates and software
developers saw computer access as a technical issue isolated from the concerns of the general
organization. And so advocates for information technology accessibility, in relative isolation from
the rest of their communities, brought their complaints about Windows to Lowney, who was also
toiling in organizational isolation.
NCD's First Involvement
NCD first addressed the issue of computer software accessibility in its Study on the Financing of
Assistive Technology Devices and Services for Individuals with Disabilities, issued in March
1993. Two of the recommendations were to "establish a Technology Watch program patterned
after NCD's current ADA Watch activities to monitor compliance with enforcement of federal
rights to or requirements for expanding technology access for children and adults with disability"
and to "authorize by statute universal product design guidelines for application in the
manufacturing of electronic equipment and other products to enhance accessibility by individuals
with disabilities." However, the report was not specific to information technology, but concerned
access to assistive technology in general, including such items as durable medical equipment,
adapted telephones, hearing aids, and all kinds of adaptive computing equipment for both children
and adults.
NCD had not been involved in any aspect of the GUI accessibility issue. It was new Council
member Bonnie O'Day who first brought GUI to NCD's attention in the summer of 1994. Herself
a blind consumer, O'Day was familiar with screen readers from personal use and had heard
accounts of problems with Windows from friends and other consumers. Jamal Mazrui, who had
lost a promotion at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard because of accessibility
problems with GUI, became a volunteer with NCD that summer, devoting his attention primarily
to GUI accessibility.
An NCD meeting was scheduled in Seattle in late August 1994. O'Day asked NCD send a letter
requesting a meeting among NCD representatives, high-level representatives at Microsoft, and
other concerned parties. The letter, dated August 8, 1994, and addressed to Bill Gates, Microsoft
chairman and CEO, "expressed concern that Microsoft Corporation is currently in the process of
developing Windows based software that will be inaccessible by computer professionals who are
visually impaired or blind." It asked for a meeting "to work toward an acceptable solution to this
issue."
Among those present at the meeting on August 22, 1994, were NCD representatives; and several
future members of Tech Watch, including Paul Schroeder (presently at the American Foundation
for the Blind, but at that time representing ACB) and Deborah Kaplan (vice president and director
of technology policy at the World Institute on Disability). Also present was Deborah Cook,
assistive technology program manager at the Washington State Department of Services for the
Blind. None of the Microsoft representatives present had the authority to make the policy or
budget decisions necessary to resolve the crisis. Instead, advocates were told that, although GUI
accessibility was a difficult technical problem, Microsoft did not see itself as responsible for
resolving the problems. Little was accomplished at the meeting, and advocates felt a deep sense
of disappointment.
NCD sent a follow-up letter to Bill Gates on August 29, 1994: "While we appreciate the efforts of
the programming staff who met with us...we were extremely disheartened by the lack of progress
Microsoft is making in addressing this issue. Our experience with monitoring the enforcement of
the ADA in other arenas leads us to conclude that a commitment to equal access is vital from the
very top of any organization. Therefore, we are requesting a face-to-face meeting with you in
hope that you will make this commitment to us."
It was several months before NCD received a formal reply.
Advocacy for Open Windows
The next phase of GUI advocacy evolved in Massachusetts. Charles Crawford at the
Massachusetts Commission for the Blind and Judy Brewer at the Massachusetts Assistive
Technology Partnership intensified their efforts to put pressure on Microsoft.
The goal, as articulated by Brewer, was twofold: "to convince Microsoft to develop a screen
reader applications programmer interface (API), so that screen readers could more effectively
interpret information being sent to the screen; and to convince Microsoft to incorporate that
screen reader API into their Windows logo program, which authorizes use of the Windows logo
on applications software marketing materials, so that people purchasing applications software
would know whether the software in question used the screen reader API." One of the technical
problems presented by Windows was that, without such standardization, it was virtually
impossible for any one screen reader program to work with the numerous Windows applications.
Advocates examined three federal laws that might help in their efforts to ensure GUI accessibility.
These were ADA, Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act, and the Technology Related Assistance
For Individuals with Disabilities Act (the Tech Act).
The ADA
Nothing in ADA that directly addresses the development, manufacture, or purchase of inherently
inaccessible information technologies for the private sector, and none of the provisions of the Act
proved of immediate use to advocates in the GUI crisis. Where an accessible computer might be
considered under the Act to be a reasonable accommodation, it was doubtful that ADA would
prohibit a large company from switching operating systems from an accessible to an inaccessible
interface if such a switch affected only one or two employees or potential employees in a large
workforce. Similarly, to force a company that already used Windows to switch back to a DOS or
text-based operating system would in most instances be "an undue burden" under the law.
Likewise, it was doubtful that the software used to run a business could be considered a public
accommodation.
There was some possibility of addressing GUI accessibility through Title II, which prohibits
discrimination in services provided by states or the Federal Government. For example, a state
employment office developing a data-base of job opportunities would need, under Title II, to
provide access to blind users. However, Title II was of little or no help to anyone working or
receiving services in the private sector.
The prospect of resolving the GUI crisis solely through ADA enforcement or litigation seemed
unlikely.
Section 508
Section 508 was added to the Rehabilitation Act in 1986. It states that federal agencies must
provide workers with and without disabilities equivalent access to electronic office equipment.
Theoretically, at least, Section 508 meant that federal agencies could not go forward with the
purchase of inaccessible software, including GUI.
Several federal agencies have made efforts to comply with 508, for example, the Veterans and
Social Security Administrations, but 508 has not resulted in GUI accessibility at all agencies.
Indeed, it is difficult to compile an overall picture of federal compliance. Ken Pouloumes,
director of acquisition reviews at GSA, which is the agency charged with monitoring 508
compliance, notes that "enforcement is handled at the agency level, not at the GSA level." His
office did "look at enforcement for a number of years, but we didn't get into the specifics with any
software, GUI or whatever." He reported that the only way to gather information on 508
compliance as it relates to GUI accessibility would be by "pulling specific RFPs" or calling
individual agencies "and asking them how they feel they've complied with the Act." Lawrence A.
Scadden, senior program director in Science Education for Students with Disabilities at the
National Science Foundation and the principal author of 508, says the authors were "naive, and so
we didn't write in the teeth that it obviously should have had" to adequately ensure compliance.
Under 508, a private vendor who is unsuccessful in bidding for a federal contract, can initiate
legal action to stop or undo a federal software purchase if the vendor can demonstrate that its
product was accessible, and the winning competitor's was not. Theoretically, this provision could
augment any enforcement of 508 within the Federal Government. To date, however, no such suit
has been filed. According to Brewer, legal action can also be initiated "by an individual who is
unable to obtain a reasonable accommodation in a federally or state funded entity because that
entity has not procured information technology which is consistent with Section 508."
The Tech Act
The Technology Related Assistance for Individuals with Disabilities Act was passed in 1988 and
reauthorized in 1994 to ensure that people with disabilities are able to obtain the assistive
technology they require in the settings where it is needed. Title I provides for federal grants to be
awarded to states for the purpose of setting up statewide Tech Act projects to address this
problem. Currently, more than 50 such projects are funded under the Act in the various states,
districts, and territories of the United States. These projects engage in a range of activities
including public education, information and referral, training, technical assistance, policy
development, and direct systems change advocacy.
The Tech Act mandates that state governments, before they can receive their first extension grant
for a fourth or fifth year of funding under the Act, must certify that they are in compliance or
working toward compliance with Section 508. Thus, the commitment to accessible office
technology is extended from the federal to the state level, as spelled out in a legal opinion of the
U.S. Department of Education, handed down in August 1991 to all Tech Act projects. This tie-in
was to become crucial to GUI accessibility advocacy. Through this language, the Tech Act
projects had, in effect, become enforcers of Section 508 at the state, if not the federal, level.
The Tech Act also stressed that projects must be consumer responsive, which is a principal reason
why Judy Brewer and MATP took on GUI accessibility as one of their prime concerns. "We were
hearing loudly and clearly from the blindness community that this was something that was very
important to them. As a consumer-responsive project, we felt we had an obligation to respond."
For four years, Brewer and other local advocates had tried a variety of strategies, "with little
positive outcome. The most significant piece of early work was obtaining a governor's executive
order...which reiterated the principles of Section 508 at the state level. We [MATP] also carried
out trainings of state agency ADA liaisons, provided technical assistance on development of
information technology RFPs, worked with the Governor's Advisory Council on Information
Technology on the development of accessible PC standards," and so on.
Crawford and Brewer set out in mid-1994 to convince their state government that purchasing
Microsoft's Windows 95 for its offices would be a violation of Section 508 (specifically,
Massachusetts Governor's Executive Order 348) unless Microsoft made certain changes to
increase product accessibility. To this end, they held a series of meetings with state officials, and
disability advocates from outside the blindness community, most notably from the Massachusetts
Office on Disability.
Brewer said, "We took it to the Governor's Interagency Coordinating Council on Disability
Services in Massachusetts. That group, as the heads of the various disability agencies, said this is
something serious and worth pursuing further. And they authorized a series of meetings...with
Administration and Finance, the Department of Personnel Administration, the Comptroller's
Office, with anybody who had a piece in making the decisions on major information technology
procurements....Our ability to point to a governor's executive order, with statutory weight, helped
greatly in our discussions within the state."
Crawford added, "I had the idea that we ought to use the 508 compliance combined with ADA
combined with the 508 requirement under the Assistive Technology Act. I thought that if we
combined those three and then notified every state of that requirement, we might create a
sufficient economic block to draw the attention of Microsoft."
In October 1994, Crawford wrote a resolution on GUI accessibility, approved by the National
Council of State Agencies for the Blind, that called for each agency to contact the procurement
officer for its state and insist that Section 508 be enforced. NCD published the resolution on the
Internet. Simultaneously, Brewer's efforts in Massachusetts were drawing the attention of other
Tech Act projects across the country; 15 projects contacted her expressing interest in learning
about and possibly joining in an embargo, and a representative of Massachusetts made it known
that a multimillion-dollar contract for Microsoft products would fall through if significant
progress were not made on GUI accessibility by July 1, 1995. The State of Missouri did in fact
institute an embargo on Windows 95 for several months during this period. And, at the federal
level, CITA continued to stress the importance of 508 compliance. Several major federal
agencies, including the Social Security Administration, began to examine ongoing negotiations for
the purchase of Microsoft Windows products in light of their obligation to comply with 508.
The GUI issue had also drawn international attention. The efforts of European advocates such as
Cearball O'Meadhra and Ronan McGuirk, founders of the Visually Impaired Computer Society in
Ireland, made it evident that GUI accessibility was also an issue to people who are blind and
visually impaired in Europe.
NCD Efforts
Ironically, the failure of the August 22 meeting at Microsoft and the subsequent letter from NCD
had the effect of raising the issue to the upper management level at Microsoft. Advocates had
been concerned that accessibility issues at the corporation were the exclusive purview of one
individual: Greg Lowney. While he was held in high regard and was considered to be committed
to accessibility, advocates believed that by isolating access issues in this way Microsoft ensured
that its programs would continue to cause problems for blind users. The consensus was that
accessibility in software, as in architecture or transportation, is best accomplished by
incorporating it into all facets of product design, across all departments.
The failure of the meeting also galvanized GUI advocates and brought GUI accessibility to the
attention of a much larger segment of the advocacy community. Microsoft was seen to have
"snubbed" NCD, and advocates were irked that a major corporation would treat NCD in this
manner. It also made an impression with the Massachusetts state procurement officials with
whom Crawford and Brewer were meeting, in that advocates could point to good-faith efforts by
the disability community to engage Microsoft in a dialogue; efforts that had, apparently, been
rebuffed.
NCD turned its attention to facilitating contacts between accessibility advocates in the state and
Federal governments. Crawford and Brewer were invited to Washington to meet with Barbara
Silby, chief of staff at GSA. Brewer was given a rundown of federal efforts at 508 compliance
and the history of GSA contacts with Microsoft, while GSA learned of the efforts of
Massachusetts and other states, and of the concerns of the grassroots blindness community.
The World Institute on Disability in Oakland, California, had also been involved in GUI
accessibility, having heard about the problem both from its blind employees and from consumers
in the community. Deborah Kaplan's presence at the August 22 meeting was the Institute's first
direct contact with Microsoft. In December of that year, Kaplan attended a National Information
Infrastructure (NII) Advisory Council meeting, where she "made it part of my agenda to talk with
the Microsoft representative there and to ask him why no reply had been received [to the NCD
letter of August 29]. I let him know that this was being interpreted very negatively by the
community, and that the community was getting more and more upset."
Gregg Vanderheiden too was in contact with Microsoft. "The lack of response to NCD's letter,
the way Microsoft dropped the ball at the August 22 meeting, these had an impact. I let
Microsoft know that people were angry and would get angrier unless something constructive was
done."
Meanwhile, the issue of GUI accessibility began to appear in the mainstream press. The
experience of Jamal Mazrui and other consumers with Windows appeared in the Boston Globe on
October 17, 1994. In March 1995, National Public Radio rebroadcast a story on GUI aired in
February by its local affiliate WBUR in Boston. Articles about GUI accessibility problems also
appeared in computer-oriented magazines such as Computerworld and in blindness publications
such as Tactic magazine. Microsoft, in the midst of marketing a new product, found itself the
focus of an increasing amount of negative publicity.
GUI was now also becoming a hot item on the Internet, with people who are blind and other
consumers with disabilities exchanging "war stories" and independent software developers sharing
their thoughts on what needed to happen to make Windows accessible. Some of these messages
were addressed to Microsoft directly, others to Crawford, Brewer, or NCD. NCD began
collecting accounts from computer users whose lives had been affected by the lack of GUI
accessibility and added these stories to the flow of information on the Internet.
It is of course impossible to know which of these factors, or what combination of factors, was
decisive in influencing Microsoft to change its stance in regard to GUI accessibility. Many of the
advocates interviewed believe that the threat of state and federal embargoes, with the potential
loss of tens of millions of dollars in contracts, was the crucial factor. They also point to the
growing publicity and the messages to Microsoft from advocates and consumers, explaining the
impact GUI inaccessibility had on their lives.
"In the end," says Lowney, "the message was heard, and that's really the important point."
Toward a Resolution
The first verifiable indication of a change at Microsoft came with a letter from Brad Silverberg,
senior vice president of the Personal Systems Division at Microsoft Corporation, to NCD, dated
January 25, 1995. In that letter, Microsoft made commitments that offered hope for relief for
blind computer users.
Silverberg wrote, "Personal computers are powerful tools that enable people to work, create, and
communicate in ways that might otherwise be difficult or impossible. The vision of enabling all
people can be realized only if individuals with disabilities have equal access to the powerful world
of personal computing."
The letter represented a significant, even sweeping, change in Microsoft's stance on GUI
accessibility. In it, the corporation agreed to put hooks in Windows programs "to allow
independent software vendors (ISVs) to develop third party accessibility aids, especially those
which allow blind individuals to use Windows by way of a screen reader." Silverberg said
Microsoft would develop a software tutorial for blind users and would hold an Accessibility
Summit "where software vendors would be invited to participate in an exchange of ideas and
experience creating products for people with disabilities. We won't, however, rely solely on
software vendors to do all the work. Some additional utilities we'll build ourselves." Silverberg
sent a letter to Commissioner Crawford, with the same list of commitments.
In response to the letter, NCD sponsored a conference call among Microsoft staff, disability
leaders, and access advocates. This teleconference reinforced the view among advocates that
Microsoft had indeed embarked in a new direction. In a February 21, 1995, response to
Silverberg, NCD outlined a more specific accessibility agenda for the corporation, agreed upon
during the conference call, that included issuing and then implementing a Microsoft Corporate
Accessibility Policy. Such a written policy was unprecedented in the software industry.
"I'd like to think we're making a radical shift," says Lowney, "from where accessibility is really an
afterthought to entering a mindset where it's going to be something taken into consideration in
every project."
Microsoft's Corporate Policy on Accessibility stipulates that it "is the responsibility of everyone at
Microsoft to deliver on this commitment" to access. "Microsoft will devote the time and
resources necessary to ensure that an ever greater number of users enjoy access to its products,
technologies, and services."
"Windows is more accessible now than it was a year ago," says Mazrui. "And it looks like it will
be more accessible next year."
However, the GUI accessibility issue is by no means resolved: People who are blind and visually
impaired are still experiencing job dislocation because of Windows inaccessibility. At least one
screen reader for Windows 95 and an upgraded screen reader for Windows 3.1 have appeared on
the market, but there are substantial problems with their reliability. And while advocates generally
have applauded the corporate policy statement, they note that Microsoft hasn't met some of its
own deadlines, and they stress the need for continued advocacy. For example, Microsoft has had
problems developing some of the promised accessibility components, such as the off-screen
model, and might postpone their delivery until later in 1996. It also became clear at a November
1995 meeting between a Microsoft representative and state agency heads in Massachusetts that
Microsoft had not filled the developer position for key accessibility components, which had been
open for more than 10 months. Massachusetts officials said they would review future
procurements in light of this information. Within two weeks, Microsoft not only hired the
developer but added several more developers to its accessibility team in an effort to get back on
schedule. However, the community is still waiting for Microsoft's commitment to GUI
accessibility to be realized.
NCD: What Went Wrong, What Went Right
Clearly, NCD could have been more proactive in addressing GUI accessibility earlier than it did,
although it is of course impossible to know whether an earlier effort by NCD or other advocates
might have averted the loss of jobs and opportunity that has occurred in the past two to five
years. The same factors that limited the responses of the national blindness organizations may
apply to NCD: Technology issues in general, and computer issues in particular, are often difficult
for lay people to understand. Indeed, one commonly voiced complaint is that the political
leadership of the disability community lacks computer literacy, even with the advent in the past
decade of assistive computer technology.
It is also true that an issue, whether it involves civil rights, consumer rights, technology, or any
combination thereof, generally do not receive political attention until it has affected the lives of a
large group of people. Crawford notes that "most movements of this kind sort of bubble until
they reach critical mass, if they ever do, and then they move forward. I'm not saying that [GUI
advocacy] shouldn't have happened earlier, but it's not inconsistent with political history that it
didn't. How many accidents happened before Nader wrote his book Unsafe at Any Speed? And
then how long did it take after that to get some consumer advocacy around cars?"
Nevertheless, NCD could have more aggressively tracked its own reports and recommendations.
Two of the recommendations in the March 1993 Study on the Financing of Assistive Technology
Devices and Services for Individuals with Disabilities--the establishment of a Tech Watch
project and NCD involvement in developing "by statute universal product design guidelines" for
"electronic equipment and other products"--would most likely have brought an earlier response
to the GUI problem. The report specifically mentions Section 508 as designed to "ensure that
people with disabilities can access and use the same databases and application programs as other
people." Had NCD taken steps to reach out to the Tech Act projects in this regard, it seems
likely that the potential of Section 508 and the Tech Act for use at the state level in GUI
accessibility advocacy would have been realized far earlier.
However, it is clear that once NCD became involved, it made several important contributions to
the resolution of the crisis: first the letter to and meeting with Microsoft in August 1994, and
then the follow-up letter to CEO Bill Gates. The effect of a group of community representatives,
appointed by the president, taking an interest in GUI was to raise its prominence both in the
disability community and at Microsoft. NCD then played a crucial role in facilitating the flow of
information among state and federal officials working on the issue. Its interest in 508
enforcement helped to invigorate efforts by Susan Brummel and others at GSA, and GSA action
added a national dimension to the efforts of states such as Massachusetts and Missouri. NCD's
role in bringing state advocates to meet with GSA was also very useful. According to Brummel,
"Basically, what helped our agency was to hear that [Massachusetts and] possibly other states
might move into an embargo or a partial freeze on [inaccessible GUI] products." And NCD, by
posting on the Internet technical documents, reports of software advocates and developers,
consumer comments and accounts, and its own and Microsoft's correspondence, became an
important source of information.
RECOMMENDATIONS
How can NCD help to implement GUI accessibility? How can it help to prevent a comparable
information technology crisis from happening in the future?
1. NCD should establish a mechanism to ensure follow-up on its reports and
recommendations.
The establishment of a Tech Watch project was a recommendation in NCD's March 1993 study
on assistive technology access. Almost two years passed before this recommendation was
implemented, more as a response to the GUI accessibility crisis than to NCD's report. (In fact,
this recommendation was not specific to information technology, but rather referred to access to
assistive technology of all types. In this regard, it seems the recommendation has yet to be
implemented.) NCD should consider ways to better monitor compliance with its
recommendations, especially those directed at itself. The Council might include a follow-up
mechanism in all future recommendations, with specific persons or groups designated to meet a
timetable for progress reports to NCD. Or a committee or task group could be given the
responsibility to ensure follow-up on all Council recommendations. In any event, NCD clearly
needs to better monitor its own reports and recommendations.
2. NCD should evaluate methods of ensuring Section 508 compliance.
NCD, as the federal entity charged with "reviewing and evaluating on a continuous basis the
effectiveness of all policies, programs, and activities concerning individuals with disabilities...and
all statutes pertaining to federal programs," should consider methods of ensuring 508 compliance
in the future. This review becomes particularly important considering the possibility that GSA
may be removed from the picture entirely by changes in federal procurement policy.
To this end, NCD should form links with the various Tech Act projects, which have a clear
mandate to enforce 508 at the state level, have had an enormous role in the resolution to date of
the GUI accessibility crisis, and possess a wealth of information on technology accessibility and
consumer needs and concerns. Such a linkage would also help in the implementation of
recommendations 5 and 6 below, in that the Tech Act projects, with their mandate to be consumer
responsive, are an important source of consumer input and could be of great help in gathering
data for any study of information technology accessibility issues. NCD should explore how these
links could be established, with an eye toward facilitating the Tech Act projects' ability to require
508 compliance by the states while NCD pursues strategies at the federal level.
In any case, NCD should continue to raise 508 compliance in any appropriate forum. Finally,
NCD should be aware that section 508 is due for reauthorization and might explore developing
new language for more effective enforcement.
3. Tech Watch, in consultation with other interested parties, should investigate the option of
having the National Software Testing Laboratory (NSTL) develop an accessibility
component as part of its systems testing. Efforts should be made to ensure that consumers
are integrally involved in developing accessibility standards.
Another recommendation made in the March 1993 report was that NCD "authorize by statute
universal product design guidelines" for "electronic equipment and other products." In terms of
GUI accessibility in particular and software accessibility in general, the most promising option in
this regard is an initiative by CITA to enlist NSTL, a division of McGraw Hill in Philadelphia, to
add accessibility to its testing criteria. Software developers would submit their products to
NSTL, which would test and rate the product for accessibility. State and federal agencies, when
making software purchases, would be able to use this benchmark to determine whether or not a
particular product, or combination of products, meets their Section 508 requirement. Susan
Brummel reports that the Canadian government has already decided "to start looking at user
requirements, folding them into 1996 testing, and bringing people with disabilities in to be a part
of that."
Whether or not the NSTL option is adopted, NCD Tech Watch should be an integral part of any
effort to develop software accessibility standards. No other federal agency or national disability
group is in the position to provide the wealth of consumer input needed to do the job right.
Brummel has already asked members of NCD to "help coordinate with the national organizations
of people with disabilities, to make sure that the user requirements are derived from real users."
4. Tech Watch should make it an explicit policy to serve as a conduit of information among
software consumers, advocates, researchers and developers.
Through Tech Watch, NCD can bring together the recognized experts on software accessibility,
government, industry, and consumer representatives, so that important issues can be identified and
possible solutions outlined before problems grow to crisis proportions. Through Tech Watch,
NCD can become a forum for consumers, advocates, and industry, and a way for information to
pass among them. Industry would be better able to see the impact of accessibility decisions, while
advocates would gain a better understanding of the realities and imperatives of the software
industry.
5. Tech Watch and NCD should consider how to use traditional methods of gauging
community concerns (such as public hearings), and more recently developed approaches
(such as Internet correspondence and chat groups), to gather information on technology
accessibility issues.
The fact that the major national advocacy organizations at first missed the importance of GUI
accessibility points to the need for NCD to maintain its own close connections to the community.
Besides frequent contacts with technology accessibility specialists, industry, and the
representatives of advocacy organizations, NCD also needs to hear from people with disabilities,
most of whom are not affiliated with any advocacy organization.
Charles Crawford believes that NCD "would do best to develop a database of subjects and issues
of accessibility, and have an ongoing information process whereby people with disabilities would
be able to let NCD know what's going on in their lives. If that sort of system is maintained, then
you could generate trends analysis to flag the things that need attention."
During the GUI crisis NCD solicited, on the Internet, personal stories from people who had been
negatively affected by GUI. NCD could repeat this call regarding other information technology
issues. NCD could also raise its profile with the disability community, by soliciting input on
technology issues from the readers of disability publications, thus becoming known as a place to
bring concerns about information technology accessibility. Tech Watch could schedule regular
public hearings on information access issues at various locations around the country.
6. The information gathered should be used to prepare a report on possible future crises in
software accessibility for all disability groups.
One important contribution NCD could make would be to apply the lessons of the GUI crisis and
its resolution to software accessibility issues affecting other disabilities. For example, the
accelerating proliferation of information kiosks threatens to follow the same pattern as GUI. Few
kiosk designers are currently aware of accessibility issues or Section 508, or of possible coverage
of their products under ADA as public accommodations. Kiosks using synthesized speech have
the potential to be inaccessible to deaf users; kiosks using touch-panels have the potential to be
inaccessible to people with limited dexterity, low vision, or blindness. Some information kiosks
already in place are too high to use from a wheelchair. If advocates wait until a substantial
portion of the disability community encounters problems with inaccessible kiosks, we could once
more have to play catch-up. For the same reasons, NCD should use its influence to raise
cross-disability access issues on government and private World Wide Web sites, making sure that
kiosks are accessible from their first installation.
Tech Watch should pursue a detailed study of possible future software and information access
issues. Consumers, software accessibility experts, advocates, and industry should be canvassed as
to what on the information horizon might be of concern. NCD could then repeat the role it took
with GUI: raising the issue at the highest echelons of product developers; publishing the
responses it receives; and setting up meetings among industry, government, advocates, and
consumers to resolve the problems.
7. NCD, through Tech Watch, should continue to closely monitor Microsoft's efforts to
provide access to its products. Follow-up with Microsoft and continued communication
with the corporation's top management, are a must if the GUI accessibility issue is to be
truly resolved.
CONCLUSION
The rapid proliferation of personal computing and the arrival of the information superhighway
have already had a profound impact on the lives of many people with disabilities. Continuing
technology breakthroughs have the potential for empowering people with disabilities or for
further limiting their access to the mainstream of society. To ensure access, it is imperative that
people with disabilities participate in building the NII.
Such participation will not only empower people with disabilities but will inevitably redound to
the benefit of society in general. Susan Brummel, in her white paper on NII accessibility, notes
that some of the most important information technologies in use today were developed as a direct
result of research into accessibility. The telephone came out of research on educating deaf
children. The typewriter was invented to enable people who are blind to write in print. E-mail
was developed by a computer scientist familiar with text transmission because his wife was deaf
and used a telecommunications device for the deaf (TDD). Even when research into accessibility
doesn't immediately result in such world-shaking technologies, it often expands everyone's
horizons. The NII and its attendant technologies should be no different.
"If we demand higher standards of accessibility," says Brummel, "we're not only helping our
companies to be stronger, by rewarding quality, but we're also ensuring that all our citizens are
well served."
APPENDIX
MISSION OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY
Overview and Purpose
NCD is an independent federal agency led by 15 members appointed by the President of the
United States and confirmed by the U.S. Senate.
The overall purpose of NCD is to promote policies, programs, practices, and procedures that
guarantee equal opportunity for all individuals with disabilities, regardless of the nature or severity of the disability; and to empower individuals with disabilities to achieve economic self-sufficiency, independent living, and inclusion and integration into all aspects of society.
Specific Duties
The current statutory mandate of NCD includes the following:
- Reviewing and evaluating, on a continuing basis, policies, programs, practices, and procedures
concerning individuals with disabilities conducted or assisted by federal departments and agencies,
including programs established or assisted under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, or
under the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act; as well as all statutes and
regulations pertaining to federal programs that assist such individuals with disabilities, in order to
assess the effectiveness of such policies, programs, practices, procedures, statutes, and regulations
in meeting the needs of individuals with disabilities.
- Reviewing and evaluating, on a continuing basis, new and emerging disability policy issues
affecting individuals with disabilities at the federal, state, and local levels, and in the private
sector, including the need for and coordination of adult services, access to personal assistance
services, school reform efforts and the impact of such efforts on individuals with disabilities,
access to health care, and policies that operate as disincentives for individuals to seek and retain
employment.
- Making recommendations to the President, the Congress, the Secretary of Education, the Director
of the National Institute on Disability and Rehabilitation Research, and other officials of federal
agencies, respecting ways to better promote equal opportunity, economic self-sufficiency,
independent living, and inclusion and integration into all aspects of society for Americans with
disabilities.
- Providing the Congress, on a continuing basis, advice, recommendations, legislative proposals,
and any additional information that NCD or the Congress deems appropriate.
- Gathering information about the implementation, effectiveness, and impact of the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq.).
- Advising the President, the Congress, the Commissioner of the Rehabilitation Services
Administration, the Assistant Secretary for Special Education and Rehabilitative Services within
the Department of Education, and the Director of the National Institute on Disability and
Rehabilitation Research on the development of the programs to be carried out under the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended.
- Providing advice to the Commissioner with respect to the policies and conduct of the
Rehabilitation Services Administration.
- Making recommendations to the Director of the National Institute on Disability and Rehabilitation
Research on ways to improve research, service, administration, and the collection, dissemination,
and implementation of research findings affecting persons with disabilities.
- Providing advice regarding priorities for the activities of the Interagency Disability Coordinating
Council and reviewing the recommendations of this Council for legislative and administrative
changes to ensure that such recommendations are consistent with the purposes of NCD to
promote the full integration, independence, and productivity of individuals with disabilities.
- Preparing and submitting to the President and the Congress an annual report titled National
Disability Policy: A Progress Report.
- Preparing and submitting to the Congress and the President an annual report containing a
summary of the activities and accomplishments of NCD.
Consumers Served and Current Activities
While many government agencies deal with issues and programs affecting people with disabilities,
NCD is the only federal agency charged with addressing, analyzing, and making recommendations
on issues of public policy that affect people with disabilities regardless of age, disability type,
perceived employment potential, economic need, specific functional ability, status as a veteran, or
other individual circumstance. NCD recognizes its unique opportunity to facilitate independent
living, community integration, and employment opportunities for people with disabilities by
ensuring an informed and coordinated approach to addressing the concerns of persons with
disabilities and eliminating barriers to their active participation in community and family life.
NCD plays a major role in developing disability policy in America. In fact, it was NCD that
originally proposed what eventually became ADA. NCD's present list of key issues includes
improving personal assistance services, promoting health care reform, including students with
disabilities in high-quality programs in typical neighborhood schools, promoting equal
employment and community housing opportunities, monitoring the implementation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, improving assistive technology, and ensuring that persons with
disabilities who are members of minority groups fully participate in society.
Statutory History
NCD was initially established in 1978 as an advisory board within the Department of Education
(Public Law 95-602). The Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1984 (Public Law 98-221)
transformed NCD into an independent agency.
|