[Senate Hearing 107-310]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 107-310
THE LOCAL ROLE IN HOMELAND SECURITY
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HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 11, 2001
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Governmental Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan FRED THOMPSON, Tennessee
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii TED STEVENS, Alaska
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
MAX CLELAND, Georgia PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi
JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah
MARK DAYTON, Minnesota JIM BUNNING, Kentucky
Joyce A. Rechtschaffen, Staff Director and Counsel
Kathryn Seddon, Counsel
Michael L. Alexander, Professional Staff Member
Hannah S. Sistare, Minority Staff Director and Counsel
William M. Outhier, Minority Investigative Counsel
Darla D. Cassell, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Opening statements:
Page
Senator Lieberman............................................ 1
Senator Thompson............................................. 3
Senator Collins.............................................. 4
Senator Levin................................................ 18
Senator Domenici............................................. 29
Senator Cleland.............................................. 34
Prepared statement:
Senator Bunning.............................................. 57
WITNESSES
Tuesday, December 11, 2001
Hon. Marc H. Morial, Mayor, City of New Orleans, Louisiana and
President, U.S. Conference of Mayors........................... 6
Hon. Javier Gonzales, Commissioner, Santa Fe County, New Mexico
and President, National Association of Counties (NACo)......... 8
Jay Fisette, Chairman, Arlington County Board, Virginia.......... 11
Richard J. Sheirer, Director, Office of Emergency Management, New
York City Mayor's Office....................................... 13
John D. White, Jr., Director, Tennessee Emergency Management
Agency......................................................... 16
Chief William B. Berger, President, International Association of
Chiefs of Police............................................... 36
Michael C. Caldwell, M.D., M.P.H., Commissioner of Health,
Dutchess County Department of Health, New York, on behalf of
the National Association of County and City Health Officials
(NACCHO)....................................................... 39
Michael J. Crouse, Chief of Staff for the General President,
International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF).............. 42
Major General Joseph E. Tinkham, II, Adjutant General of Maine
and Commissioner of the Maine Department of Defense, Veterans
and Emergency Management....................................... 44
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Berger, Chief William B.:
Testimony.................................................... 36
Prepared statement with an attachment........................ 118
Caldwell, Michael C. M.D., M.P.H.:
Testimony.................................................... 39
Prepared statement........................................... 129
Crouse, Michael J.:
Testimony.................................................... 42
Prepared statement........................................... 144
Fisette, Jay:
Testimony.................................................... 11
Prepared statement........................................... 93
Gonzales, Hon. Javier:
Testimony.................................................... 8
Prepared statement with an attachment........................ 83
Morial, Hon. Marc H.:
Testimony.................................................... 6
Prepared statement with an attachment........................ 58
Sheirer, Richard J.:
Testimony.................................................... 13
Prepared statement........................................... 96
Tinkham, Major General Joseph E., II:
Testimony.................................................... 44
Prepared statement........................................... 150
White, John D., Jr.:
Testimony.................................................... 16
Prepared statement........................................... 109
Appendix
Ellen M. Gordon, Administrator/Homeland Security Advisor, Iowa
Emergency Management Division, prepared statement.............. 155
The National Association of Regional Councils, prepared statement 162
The United Jewish Communities and The Jewish Federations of North
America, prepared statement.................................... 165
THE LOCAL ROLE IN HOMELAND SECURITY
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TUESDAY, DECEMBER 11, 2001
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:06 a.m., in
room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I.
Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Lieberman, Cleland, Carper, Levin,
Thompson, Collins, and Domenici.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN
Chairman Lieberman. The hearing will come to order. Good
morning to everyone. Thanks for being here and being here a bit
early. I apologize that Washington traffic made me a few
minutes late.
It is a pleasure to welcome everyone to today's hearing on
the local role in homeland security, which is part of an
ongoing series of hearings by the Senate Governmental Affairs
Committee intended to both oversee and, hopefully, improve the
Federal Government's response to the urgent set of terrorist
threats our country and our people now face.
On September 11, as we watched the attacks with horror and
disbelief, we also, fortunately, were able to watch with
increasing appreciation and admiration as local and State
governments rose to this extraordinary occasion to protect and
serve their people. That response, I think, dramatically
demonstrated what is true no matter the nature of the emergency
or the size of the locality. In America's war against
terrorism, it is city, county, and State governments and their
workers who will bear the primary responsibility for providing
our citizens the safety and services that they need.
The local role, of course, is much deeper and broader than
emergency response. State, county, and city agencies are the
primary providers of public health, transportation, and social
support services, and as the daily law enforcement presence in
our communities, they play a lead role in helping to prevent
terrorist acts from happening in the first place.
After September 11, all of this means that in order to
fight terrorism effectively, counties, cities, and States need
not only new technology, training, and talent, they need new
funding. This morning, the U.S. Conference of Mayors is
releasing a detailed inventory of the needs it has identified.
The National Governor's Association and the National
Association of Counties have recently issued similar reports.
The governors, in fact, estimate that the cost to our States of
guarding against threats to the public health and critical
infrastructure will be approximately $4 billion in the coming
fiscal year, and county officials have suggested the need for a
new $3 billion Federal block grant for localities to meet these
challenges.
This morning, we want to talk as much about improving
methods and relationships as about providing money. This
Committee wants to learn what Federal policies, practices, and
procedures should be put in place to help States and localities
do their job better, and in what ways can we, all branches of
government, work together to meet and defeat the terrorist
threat. Our goal is to leverage the strengths of each branch
and level of government so that we are doing everything in our
power to protect our people against terrorism, and if the
terrorists do strike again, that we will be able to count on a
swift, sure, and seamless response.
From recent events, we have reason to be proud of the role
that has been played, but also reason to acknowledge that we
have some way to go in the coordination of government responses
to terrorism at the various levels. Too often in responding to
the homeland security threats we have faced so far, the Federal
and local governments have not worked hand-in-hand but have
tripped over each other's feet.
A number of local officials, for instance, have expressed
great frustration with what they perceive as a lack of
information sharing by the FBI, although I am pleased to note
and I will be interested to hear from the local officials today
that FBI Director Mueller has convened an advisory group of
State and local law enforcement officials and indicated a
willingness to speed up security clearances for local officials
and to establish more joint terrorism task forces.
Similar gaps and communication breaches were revealed
during the response to the anthrax attack. The CDC and other
Federal agencies, including the Office of Homeland Security,
the Secretary of HHS, and the Post Office seemed to send
inconsistent, certainly confusing messages to States, counties,
and cities, and, I might add, even to Members of Congress.
There was a very interesting article in yesterday's New
York Times about what we are holding the hearing on this
morning, and I quote this sentence from it: ``For all the calls
to vigilance in a domestic defense drive like no other, many
State and local governments are starting to balk because of the
costs and the frustration over what they see as the Federal
Government's confusing stream of intelligence information and
security alerts.'' Whether or not this feeling remains on the
front page, the fact is that all levels of our government need
to get on the same page and to do so without delay.
The challenge is exacerbated, I think, by the approach to
counterterrorism that is being taken at the Federal level, an
approach that I believe would be greatly improved by the
creation of a full-fledged cabinet-level Department of Homeland
Security with clear lines of authority and the power to get
things done.
Until that happens, the Office of Homeland Security under
Governor Ridge, as it is constituted now, has the primary
responsibility, and I certainly hope and believe that Governor
Ridge, because of his experience at the State level, will act
in a way that makes clear that he knows that State and local
governments have to sit as equals at the table of anti-
terrorist planning with the Federal Government. Encouragingly,
Governor Ridge, in fact, has announced his intention to form a
State and local government committee to advise the Office of
Homeland Security, and that, I think, is the first good step.
I hope we on this Committee across party lines can be
advocates here in Congress for local government efforts, so
that from the grassroots to the top of the Federal
organizational tree, we are all working together to make the
ground on which Americans live and work as safe and secure as
possible.
I will just say a final word in a historical context. Our
founders understood that the Federal Government would be better
at some things and that State and local governments, which are
closer to the people, would be much better at other
governmental functions. Because this is the first modern war
that is being fought simultaneously both abroad and on our
homefront, the war against terrorism really represents in a new
way the intersection of one traditional national Federal
responsibility, which is waging war and securing the Nation,
and one traditional local government responsibility, which is
providing for the health and safety of our communities. As a
result, this war on terrorism challenges us to rethink and, if
necessary, revise some traditional Federal and local
relationships even while we reaffirm others, with the
overriding goal of leveraging our strengths to make us a more
secure society.
But in any case, on the front lines of that preparedness
will be the State, county, and local officials, including those
we are pleased to have with us today. Senator Thompson.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR THOMPSON
Senator Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. We
have held a number of hearings on homeland security and
bioterrorism and one theme that keeps coming up is the
importance of local officials in responding to a terrorist
attack.
We have been reminded repeatedly throughout our recent
hearings that local fire fighters, law enforcement officers,
emergency management officials, public health officials, and
health care providers will be the first to respond to a
terrorist attack. Unfortunately, we have also heard that our
focus at the Federal level has been primarily on programs, some
of which overlap and are spread over 40 different agencies.
One of our witnesses at the bioterrorism hearing, Dr. Amy
Smithson, made an observation in a report that I think bears
repeating and which reflects what we will be hearing from our
witnesses today. Dr. Smithson noted that only $315 million of
the total of the $8.4 billion counterterrorism budget in 2000
went to the front lines in the form of training, equipment
grants, and planning assistance. That is a remarkably small
piece of the pie.
I am glad that we will have the opportunity today to hear
from John White, the Director of Emergency Management in
Tennessee. Mr. White has worked in emergency management for 35
years and certainly has an excellent perspective on this issue.
One point that Director White makes in his written
statement and that I think is very important and insightful is
that local and State emergency officials have, in effect, been
preparing for terrorist attacks for years. For example, many
have expressed concern about the safety of our nuclear plants
in the wake of the events of September 11. But as Director
White points out, his office has been conducting exercises to
prepare for accidents at nuclear plants for years. People are
now becoming more concerned about chemical attacks, but his
Emergency Management Agency was conducting training and
response exercises to deal with hazardous waste material spills
and accidents well before recent attacks.
So we have infrastructures in place at the State and local
levels already, at least somewhat prepared to respond to
attacks. Perhaps rather than pouring more money into more
Federal programs and response teams, the first priority should
be to determine how we can best coordinate and support training
and exercises with local officials to take advantage of the
programs that are already in existence.
As we have heard previously, and I believe that Dr.
Caldwell will testify today, the same point can be made about
our public health systems. Clearly, we need to take steps to
improve the detection, surveillance, and response capabilities
of our public health departments and our private health care
providers. We can build on systems already in place and reap
the additional benefit of strengthening our preparedness in the
health care arena overall.
Finally, I believe we will also hear today about the need
for better communications in the law enforcement area. We have
all read about some confrontations between the FBI and local
law enforcement. Both Director Mueller and Attorney General
Ashcroft have announced efforts to try to facilitate
communications between local and Federal officials, as well as
to share more information when necessary. I look forward to
hearing from our witnesses today on this subject, as well.
Again, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to our discussion today
about how best to support our very valuable local resources.
Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Thompson. Senator
Collins.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your
convening this hearing and for inviting a witness from Maine,
Commissioner Joseph Tinkham, to participate.
Our purpose to examine the local role in homeland security
is of utmost importance, for one of the lessons of September 11
is those first on the scene are local officials--police
officers, fire fighters, EMS and other medical personnel. They
are the ones who are the first responders.
We are here today to learn about the efforts of State,
county, and local officials to prepare for and respond to acts
of terrorism. We need to assess the effectiveness of
communication and coordination among Federal, State, and local
agencies, and also to evaluate the extent of assistance that is
needed from the Federal Government.
Critical to the homeland defense of our Nation as a whole
is the security of individual States, and securing a State
presents significant financial and logistical challenges. Let
me illustrate these challenges using my home State of Maine as
an example.
As Commissioner Tinkham of Maine's Department of Defense,
Veterans, and Emergency Management has noted in his written
testimony, Maine has more than 3,000 miles of coastline. It has
the longest international border with Canada in the continental
United States. The State has more than 250 air strips, military
bases, and two major shipyards, more than 800 dams, a
deactivated nuclear power plant with spent fuel rods on site,
and the second largest petroleum tank farm on the East Coast,
located in the very heart of the State's largest population
center. According to Commissioner Tinkham, the State of Maine
has identified 25 vulnerabilities that could result in a large
loss of life or environmental catastrophe.
To meet these challenges and those facing other States, we
must improve coordination among Federal, State, and local
governments as well as the private sector. We must avoid
wasteful duplication. We must have realistic plans and conduct
effective training and exercises. We also must ensure that
appropriate information about the presence of terrorists and
potential threats is shared by Federal law enforcement agencies
with their State and local counterparts.
Portland, Maine, Police Chief Michael Chibwood has
expressed many times his frustration at not being told of the
presence of individuals on the FBI's watch list. As he put it,
if there is something that impacts the public safety of a
community, the police chief ought to know.
Finally, we must have adequate funding for homeland
defense. While the responsibility for homeland security is not
the Federal Government's alone and must be shared by local and
State governments, I fully support additional Federal financial
assistance for States and communities.
For example, I recently joined with Senators Frist,
Kennedy, and several others in introducing the Bioterrorism
Preparedness Act, which not only strengthens our Federal
response, but also authorizes substantial new funding for
States, local governments, and hospitals, the people who are,
indeed, on the front lines and would be called upon first in
the event of any new bioterrorist attack. Our legislation
authorizes $1.5 billion to improve State and local preparedness
capabilities and also authorizes an additional $60 million to
improve the public health laboratory network through the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
It is important that we allow Governor Ridge the
opportunity to assess needs and priorities carefully. After
that assessment, however, I fully expect that the President
will propose billions of dollars in his next budget, which we
expect to be released in early February. In that regard, this
hearing and the testimony of Commissioner Tinkham and the other
witnesses today will be very helpful in identifying the gaps in
the system and the priorities for this additional funding.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We clearly have a lot of work to
do together.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks very much, Senator Collins.
I am delighted with the witnesses we have here this
morning. It is really a first-rate and very representative
group and I thank you for being here.
First is the Hon. Marc Morial, who is here this morning as
President of the U.S. Conference of Mayors, Mayor of New
Orleans, obviously, first elected in 1994 at the
extraordinarily young age of 35, now in his second term, and,
therefore, still very young. [Laughter.]
Mayor Morial, thanks for being here. I look forward to your
testimony.
TESTIMONY OF HON. MARC H. MORIAL,\1\ MAYOR, CITY OF NEW
ORLEANS, LOUISIANA AND PRESIDENT, U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS
Mr. Morial. Thank you. Good morning. I am Marc Morial,
Mayor of New Orleans and President of the Conference of Mayors.
I want to thank Chairman Lieberman as well as Senator Thompson
and the entire Committee.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Morial appears in the Appendix on
page 58.
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I am also very pleased to be here with fellow local
leaders, especially our NACo President, Javier Gonzales. Mayors
have always attached a high priority to preparing our cities
for the possibility of disasters.
In the wake of September 11 and the anthrax mailings,
efforts to strengthen emergency management plans have been
redoubled and there have been significant additional
deployments of local public safety resources. As I stated in a
recent meeting with Governor Ridge, we are the domestic troops,
and today, I am here representing not only mayors, but police
officers, fire fighters, public health workers who are on the
front line on the domestic side of this war against terrorism.
In October, the Conference of Mayors sponsored an
unprecedented safety and security summit which brought together
more than 200 mayors, police chiefs, fire chiefs, emergency
managers, and public health officials. Today, I am proud to
release this national action plan which emerged from the summit
which I want to briefly summarize.
First, in the area of homeland security, we have been
concerned, as each of you has mentioned, about the multiplicity
of Federal agencies which have responsibility for helping
cities, counties, and States prepare for and respond to a
possible attack, and we are extremely encouraged by our
conversations with Governor Ridge, who we think understands the
importance of intergovernmental partnership and the need for
better coordination.
To strengthen his efforts, we strongly endorse the idea
that the Office of Homeland Security be given cabinet-level
status, should be fully authorized and given budgetary
authority over Federal programs related to homeland protection.
Without this, the Office of Homeland Security will be unable to
fulfill, we believe, the mission that President Bush has so
aptly placed under the responsibility of Governor Ridge, and I
understand that you, Senator Lieberman, have introduced
legislation on this.
Second, and this is important, right now, of the
approximately $10 billion which is in the Federal budget
related to terrorism, and that has recently been identified by
OMB--only 4.9 percent is allocated for State and local first
response activities. And of this limited amount, most is
provided to States.
To ensure that heightened security can be maintained and
that traditional public safety needs do not suffer, we have
called, and our national action plan includes, a new flexible
homeland security block grant to be used for additional
deployment expenses, training, communications, rescue
equipment, and the protection of public infrastructure. We are
very pleased that such legislation, S. 1737, was introduced by
Senator Clinton, along with Senators Feinstein, Mikulski,
Durbin, and Schumer, to authorize $3 billion for a targeted
block grant, and I want to urge the Senate to pass this bill.
Unfortunately, Congress took a major step backwards
recently when it approved a $122 million cut in the local law
enforcement block grant. This 24 percent cut in funding
provided directly to local governments and which we use in most
instances for police overtime comes at the very time when our
police departments are facing extraordinary and unbudgeted
costs as a result of moving to a heightened state of alert as
requested by the Federal Government and as demanded by the
people we represent. I want to strongly urge the Members of
this Committee to work with us to help restore this cut in the
local law enforcement block grant, which program helps cities
big and small around the country.
Third, it is acknowledged that the Nation has failed to
invest adequately in local public health infrastructure.
Resources are needed for 24/7 disease surveillance, on-the-
scene investigations, local bioterrorism preparedness,
planning, increased interagency communications and surge
capacity. There must also be adequate regional stockpiles of
vaccines and a rapid response testing network must be deployed.
Let me talk a little about transportation security. Our own
task force on airport security, chaired by L.A. Mayor Jim Hahn,
has drafted detailed recommendations which are included in our
national action plan. We want to compliment the Senate and the
Congress and President Bush for embracing our recommendations
that airport screening security personnel be federalized. We
think this was an important step in the right direction and we
want to work very closely with the executive and legislative
branches to make sure that the time lines in the legislation
are met.
It is very important that baggage screening not be delayed.
It is very important that the creation of the new Federal
agency which is going to oversee aviation security not be
delayed. We continue to work very closely with Secretary Mineta
and we want to urge you to provide him with all of the
resources necessary to fully implement this legislation on
time.
Several other areas, very quickly. Transit security,
passenger and freight rail security, and port security are also
areas of great concern. My city is a major port city, as are
many coastal cities around the Nation. We must pay close
attention to port security and develop initiatives in that
regard.
Finally, I want to talk a little bit about Federal-local
law enforcement cooperation. We represent 650,000 local police
officers, a powerful force in this war against terrorism, and I
think our plea is that these local forces be fully integrated
into our national homeland defense planning. We must create a
new communications system between Federal and local public
safety officials with a 24/7 threat assessment capability.
In many meetings and discussions held on this subject since
September 11, it has become clear that many barriers still
exist at the Federal level. The Attorney General, we think,
should be complimented on initiating a number of important
steps to strengthen and alleviate these barriers through the
anti-terrorism task forces, and our discussions with Director
Ridge, Attorney General Ashcroft, and Director Mueller have
been constructive. We strongly believe that any institutional
barriers to greater intelligence sharing should be addressed.
Senators Schumer, Clinton, Leahy, and Hatch have introduced
a Federal-Local Information Sharing Partnership Act which we
believe would allow the Federal Government to increase
intelligence sharing with local and State governments and we
urge its passage.
Finally, in addition to these issues, there are many other
areas that are covered in our national action plan, including
border security, water and wastewater security, communications
interoperability, and highway security, and I want to thank the
Committee for the opportunity to testify today and I look
forward to continued discussions as together we work to
strengthen this Nation's homeland defense. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks very much, Mayor, for an
excellent statement and for the report that you have issued
today, which we look forward to reading. I look forward to the
questions and answers, too.
The Hon. Javier Gonzales is the President of the National
Association of Counties and a County Commissioner in Santa Fe
County, New Mexico. He was elected to the Board of
Commissioners in November 1994 and then reelected to serve a
second term in 1998.
I, being personal and not partisan in mentioning the great
honor and adventure that I had last year running for national
office. One of my favorite stops was in Santa Fe, where we had
a wonderful rally. Probably my favorite sign of the campaign
was a woman in the front row who held up a big hand-lettered
sign that in three words said it all for me, ``Viva la
chutzpah.'' [Laughter.]
So it is in that spirit that I welcome you this morning.
TESTIMONY OF HON. JAVIER GONZALES,\1\ COMMISSIONER, SANTA FE
COUNTY, NEW MEXICO AND PRESIDENT, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
COUNTIES (NACo)
Mr. Gonzales. Thank you, Senator Lieberman and Members of
the Committee, and we certainly enjoyed having you in Santa Fe
last year, as well. Thank you for inviting me to testify on an
issue of paramount importance to counties across the country,
securing our homeland against the threat of terrorism.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Gonzales appears in the Appendix
on page 83.
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My name is Javier Gonzales and I am an elected County
Commissioner from Santa Fe County, New Mexico. I currently
serve as President of the National Association of Counties.
As you stated in your opening comments, counties are the
first responders to terrorist attacks, natural disasters, and
other major emergencies. County public health, law enforcement,
fire, and other public safety personnel are responsible for on-
the-ground response and recovery action. Counties also own,
operate, and secure key aspects of the Nation's infrastructure,
such as airports, transit systems, water supplies, schools, and
hospitals. Elected county officials like myself, along with
emergency managers, provide the essential regional leadership,
planning, and coordination function in preventing, preparing
for, and managing our community's response to emergency events.
In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 3
months ago today, I appointed a NACo task force on homeland
security. The task force, comprised of 45 top county officials
from across the country, was formed to provide a forum for
county officials to advise the Federal Government about the
roles and concerns of counties regarding homeland security and
to identify model county programs for our colleagues as we
increase security measures and preparedness in our communities.
The task force has met twice this fall and I would like to
share a few relevant outcomes from those meetings with you.
First, the importance of coordination has been a recurring
theme. County officials believe it is critically important that
emergency preparedness plans be coordinated and rehearsed among
local, State, and Federal levels, as well as across the various
agencies with a role in emergency response.
In the event of an emergency, county officials strongly
believe that the local first responder should maintain control
of the scene at the ground level. In the case of involvement
and support at the scene by multiple Federal agencies, we
believe that the Federal Government should quickly identify the
agency that speaks for the Federal Government and that all
Federal agencies should diligently follow the lead of that
controlling Federal authority.
NACo, along with its sister State and local government
organizations, has formally requested that Homeland Security
Director Tom Ridge create a State and Local Advisory Committee
to the Office of Homeland Security. The committee, comprised of
elected officials from State, county, and city governments,
would provide input and assistance to Federal homeland security
activities and facilitate coordination among levels of
government, and we have received a commitment from Governor
Ridge that he will form such a committee and we look forward to
the committee being established as soon as possible.
NACo also has some specific recommendations in the areas of
law enforcement, public health, communications, and emergency
planning and preparedness. On law enforcement, it has been the
longstanding concern of counties that intelligence information
obtained by the Federal Government is not shared with
appropriate local officials in a timely manner. Ultimately,
this hampers our ability to track suspicious persons and
prevent crimes from being committed.
NACo has made a specific request to the Department of
Justice that the composition of its anti-terrorism task forces
specifically include elected representatives of county
governments and that security clearances be provided to county
officials for intelligence information commensurate with their
responsibilities.
We have seen some progress on this front. In a letter dated
November 13, Attorney General Ashcroft informed county
officials that he is setting up a system to share information
with State and local officials through each U.S. Attorney's
Office, and as I understand it, this system will provide a
mechanism for Federal intelligence to reach appropriate
officials at the local level and for information collected
locally to be communicated to Federal law enforcement.
In the public health area, there are two major points.
First, county officials are calling on the Congress to provide
adequate funding for the Public Health Threats and Emergencies
Act. NACo believes that an appropriation of a minimum of $1.8
billion is needed to implement the law fully and effectively
with at least $835 million dedicated to building and
maintaining local and State public health infrastructure.
The second point relates to information dissemination via
the Health Alert Network. NACo believes that the Centers for
Disease Control Public Health Practice Program, the CDC office
that best understands local dynamics, should continue to
coordinate and communicate with county health departments and
that there should be a focus on improving the Health Alert
Network and on assistance with technological upgrades for
county health departments.
To enhance coordination among local jurisdictions,
communications interoperability, the ability of one
jurisdiction to talk to its neighbor during crisis must be
increased. In this regard, NACo is requesting that the Federal
Government help improve interoperability by releasing
additional spectrum in the 700 megahertz band for public safety
and emergency management use.
Finally, as I mentioned toward the beginning of my remarks,
counties as regional governments are in the unique position to
provide the leadership, planning, and coordination function
needed to prevent, prepare for, and manage the response to
emergency events. While the survey we conducted in late
September found that 95 percent of counties have emergency
response plans, and 100 percent of large urban counties have
both plans and mutual aid agreements with surrounding
jurisdictions, there are still improvements to be made.
Since October, NACo has been calling for the authorization
of a local anti-terrorism block grant at a minimum of $3
billion. NACo believes that these funds should flow directly
from the Federal Government to local governments and that
funding decisions under the block grants should be made county-
wide as an outgrowth of an existing all hazards emergency
management planning process.
Senator Lieberman and Members of the Committee, thank you
for the opportunity to testify. Counties have a significant
role to play in our new national strategy for homeland
security. We are the public's first defense, but we do have
limited resources and will need additional support and
cooperation from the Federal Government in order to succeed. I
would be pleased to answer any questions that you might have.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks very much, Commissioner
Gonzales, for your very thoughtful testimony.
The next two witnesses in some measure represent the heroes
of September 11, coming as they do from Arlington County and
embracing the attack on the Pentagon, responding to it, and
from New York City. So we thank you both for being here and
look forward to your testimony.
First is the Hon. Jay Fisette, Chairman of the Arlington
County Board. Mr. Fisette was elected to the Board in 1997 and
became chairman in 2001. Good morning, Mr. Fisette.
TESTIMONY OF JAY FISETTE,\1\ CHAIRMAN, ARLINGTON COUNTY BOARD,
VIRGINIA
Mr. Fisette. Good morning, Senator Lieberman, Members of
the Committee. You just stated why I am here, because Arlington
County and New York City were the two targets, and as you all
know, I was not one on the front lines. I was the chief elected
official.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Fisette appears in the Appendix
on page 93.
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In the case of the Pentagon, the local government was
Arlington. This meant that our mutual aid partners came
together with us throughout the region to respond. Our fire
department was, in fact, in charge and coordinated the fire
rescue and recovery for the first full 10 days of the incident
and thereafter, and the reality is they did their work. They
are professionals. They did an outstanding job.
Over the course of the event, staff from literally every
county agency came together to respond, and I look at it as
three attacks, in fact. We had the Pentagon, we had Reagan
National Airport, and then we had the anthrax issues
thereafter. We learned many lessons from this and we have been
spending a lot of time hashing that out, and what became
extremely clear to us was the important partnership between
local government and the Federal Government and the increased
emphasis that needs to be put on that, so I would like to share
with you four recommendations that we have to put forward to
you.
One is there must be clear articulation of roles and
responsibilities among Federal, State, and local agencies in
emergencies, especially on Federal installations, such as the
Pentagon, or Congress. This includes roles for FEMA, CDC, local
fire and health departments, and others that you have already
heard about.
Arlington fought a fire at the Pentagon several weeks
before September 11 and we have also responded to two fires
since. In calendar year 2000, Arlington responded to 251 fire
and EMS calls at the Pentagon. That created a history of
respect and cooperation that was very instrumental in our
response on September 11.
We recommend, however, that the Federal Government work to
establish formal memorandum of understanding with local and
State officials for emergency responses at all major Federal
installations, an MOU. We do not have one in place now.
The second suggestion, as part of the development of these
MOUs, an assessment should be made of local capacity to respond
to different events in support of the Federal Government and to
provide financial support to fulfill that capacity. As noted
earlier, we have responded to the Pentagon continuously over
time. However, we have never received any financial support,
capital or operating, to meet those needs that go beyond the
normal needs of our community.
We are proud to serve the Pentagon and other Federal
installations in the community, as are other communities.
However, given the new reality and the new threats we face, we
feel it is appropriate for the Federal Government to accept
some role and responsibility in this, as well, and I support
the recommendation I just heard from Mr. Gonzales, that those
funds be made directly to the local governments.
The third issue is really one that focuses here in the
Washington region and that is an issue of indemnification. In
the case of the greater Washington area, Congressional action
is especially needed to approve legislation to eliminate issues
of local liability in providing mutual aid. During the
inauguration and other pre-planned events, local police are
deputized as Federal marshals in order to avoid such local
liability concerns.
In an emergency, there is no time for such action, nor has
there ever been an ability to address issues in the case of
fire mutual aid. Congress needs to put this issue to rest by
passing legislation that has since been drafted by the
Washington Council of Governments.
And finally, and, of course, the largest challenge before
all of you, is the development of a national strategy for
terrorism preparedness. As the Nation pulled together at all
levels, and I believe we responded very well to September 11
and afterwards, that may not always be the case. A major reason
we did, however, is because we did not have more casualties.
Despite the horrific nature of the attacks here in Arlington,
we did not have mass casualties flooding our limited hospital
capacity, and you have heard Senator Thompson and others refer
to this.
We would like to put some increased emphasis and believe it
needs to be placed on the hospital system's capacity and the
public health sector capacity, as well. It was a wake-up call
to the Federal Government about the limited capacity of our
hospitals that health care competition and cost containment may
have contributed to. At the same time, with the development of
antibiotics in the last century, there has been a steady
erosion of our public health capacity, those who are on the
front lines of a biological attack. These are the disease
police.
So a national strategy or standards for preparing or
responding to biological and chemical attacks needs to be put
in place. Now that we know that they are not theoretical, we
need to be able to do better. We need to address protocols for
the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile. We need to train and
practice in deployment. And we must have a way to get
consistent, accurate, and authoritative information, I think a
theme you have already heard.
So in closing, I think there is a window of opportunity we
have not had before. People's awareness is high. At the local
level, we know that we will always be the first responders and
we are working hard on our own planning and development
capacity, but no local government will be able to respond to a
major event alone, especially on Federal installations, and the
Federal Government needs to be fully engaged in the
preparedness, assessment, and planning, and in providing the
resources necessary to make that happen. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Mr. Fisette, for your
leadership and also for very interesting testimony. I had not
thought about the problem of liability and it is an important
one.
I regret to say that we are in the middle of a vote on the
Senate floor, so we are going to have to recess the hearing.
This is one of three votes. We will see if we can work it out
so that we come back in the middle for a little bit more, hear
the two witnesses, and then go back for the last one. In any
case, the Committee will stand in recess for a few moments.
Thank you.
[Recess.]
Senator Lieberman. The Committee will reconvene. Thanks
very much for your patience. We caught a break that the Senate
decided to voice vote the second two judicial nominations, so
we were able to come back a bit earlier than we might have
been.
Our next witness is Richard Sheirer, who is the Director of
the Office of Emergency Management for the City of New York. We
have all watched with tremendous admiration the city's response
to these attacks. If Mayor Giuliani has been the Commander in
Chief, maybe perhaps it is appropriate to say that Richard
Sheirer is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in this
particular response and they have had great help from the fire
commissioner and police commissioner and others, as well. Mr.
Sheirer continues to be involved in the response right to this
day, so we appreciate the time you have taken to come down and
share your experiences with us. I know they are going to be
helpful to us in the future of planning responses to what we
hope will not happen again, but we have got to plan in case
they do.
Mr. Sheirer, thanks. We look forward to your testimony now.
TESTIMONY OF RICHARD J. SHEIRER,\1\ DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, NEW YORK CITY MAYOR'S OFFICE
Mr. Sheirer. Thank you, Senator. Good morning, Chairman
Lieberman, Senator Thompson, and Members of the Committee. I am
Richard Sheirer. I am the Director of the Mayor's Office of
Emergency Management and I come with a unique background.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Sheirer appears in the Appendix
on page 96.
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I spent 28 years in the New York City Fire Department,
followed by 4 years as Chief of Staff at the New York City
Police Department, and in February 2000, I was appointed the
city's Director of Emergency Management. I think that
background gave me the opportunity to handle the situation we
faced from September 11 on with a full hand, and I think it is
important that we talk about the things that we did and how
they impact homeland security and how OEM in particular impacts
the local role of homeland security.
In 1996, recognizing the need to enhance interagency and
intergovernmental coordination for planning, preparing, and
responding during any emergency, Mayor Giuliani established the
Mayor's Office of Emergency Management through an executive
order. OEM in New York City is a multi-jurisdictional agency
comprised of personnel drawn from city agencies, including
fire, police, health, environmental protection, emergency
medical services, and other agencies. OEM was recently
described by the Mayor as New York City's Office of Homeland
Security and has been crucial in managing and coordinating the
city's response to the World Trade Center attack, the anthrax
incidents that occurred, the ongoing recovery efforts at the
World Trade Center, and the November 12 crash of Flight 587.
OEM is responsible for monitoring and responding to all
potential emergency conditions and potential incidents, whether
they be emergencies or not, where there is a multi-agency
response. We operate the city's Emergency Operations Center,
the EOC, which enables the Mayor and the city to manage any
multi-agency emergency condition and any potential incident. It
is used for weather. It is used for good events, like the new
millennium. And it was critical to our ability to address the
incidents of September 11.
We research, we compile and evaluate the contingency plans
of every agency of the city. We have drills on every type of
emergency we can possibly have and we prepare and organize and
conduct those drills with the help of every agency of the city.
And we coordinate special interagency and intergovernmental
responses.
As I said, the backbone of OEM is its Emergency Operations
Center. We activate it in times of any multi-agency incident or
the anticipation of it. Anything that affects the lives and
safety of people who live, work, or visit New York City, it is
our job to make sure that we respond to it.
During and after the World Trade Center attack, the EOC
operated on a 24-hour, 7-day-a-week basis, with representatives
of 110 local, State, and Federal agencies, the voluntary
organizations such as the Red Cross, Salvation Army, and the
public utilities which provide gas, electric, steam, and
telephone communications. These 110 agencies were represented
by anywhere from 300 to 1,000 people in the EOC at any given
time. We had to feed them. We had to provide them with rest
areas. We provided medical and mental health services. In
short, the EOC became a small town. In fact, the Mayor even
performed the marriage of a Marine who was working in the EOC
during his time there.
On September 11, after the first airplane flew into the
north tower of the World Trade Center, OEM immediately
activated its Emergency Operations Center at Seven World Trade
Center and began to coordinate the emergency operations in
conjunction with the fire department, the police department,
Port Authority police, numerous other emergency agencies, the
health department, our mutual aid plan from the surrounding
areas, and others. Despite the loss of OEM's EOC in Seven World
Trade Center at the very moment when we needed it most, we were
able to quickly reestablish an Emergency Operations Center and
continue to coordinate the emergency response to the World
Trade Center attack.
The importance of a fully equipped, technologically
advanced Emergency Operations Center to coordinate Federal,
State, and local responses to the September 11 attack was
immeasurable. It was possible to immediately share and gather
information among the various Federal, State, and local
agencies to address the issues and needs of the emergency
workers and of our citizens as they arose. It made it possible
to coordinate the various multi-agency responses. It was
possible to coordinate and assist the utilities and the various
agencies to rebuild the damaged infrastructure, while at the
same time providing resources for the rescue efforts.
The effort was critical to reestablishing the world
financial markets of the New York Stock Exchange, the American
Stock Exchange, the Mercantile Exchange, the NASDAQ as quickly
as possible to make sure that the world knew our resolve to get
back to normal as much as we could, no matter what happened.
OEM is responsible for preparing for the unexpected. We
have a very significant medical surveillance system which
monitors emergency responses by ambulances based on systems.
That system allows us to identify trends and abnormalities very
quickly and have Department of Health epidemiologists start to
work to find out what is causing it.
We also monitor purchases of over-the-counter drugs from
various pharmaceutical chains to see if there is any unusual
usage of flu medications, diarrhea medications, those
medications that could possibly indicate that the public has
been faced with an attack like we did during this time with
anthrax. We use that and we compare everything to the
historical data we have collected to see where there is an
abnormality.
From October 12 to November 9, we faced the additional
incident of the anthrax letters sent to various media locations
and outlets. We coordinated Points of Dispensing. On September
12, we were scheduled to have a drill called the TriPOD. It is
a point of dispensing to test our bio plan, our ability to
distribute medication to the public as needed. Ironically, the
location of that drill is where we now have our EOC. We took it
from one thing to another. But our plan worked. We used it at
NBC and ABC. CDC is looking at it as the model to use across
the country.
It all boils down to one thing, planning and preparation.
The old adage, how do you get to Carnegie Hall? Practice,
practice, practice. It could not hold truer for what we do.
There are times when people say, why are we having another
drill? Why are we having another planning meeting? Why are we
having another exercise? I think those questions will not be
asked again. We have learned very significantly how important
those items are, and there are a number of lessons we have
learned from the city's ability to respond to the attack.
Before September 11, as I said, the city was amongst the
best prepared in the country, with plans and exercises and
drills on every imaginable emergency. We used all those
preparations to address the issues we faced from September 11
on. We took a little piece of our coastal storm plan, a little
piece of our all hazards plan, and we were able to address the
issues as they arose.
The preparation of enhanced degree of communication that
has been spoken of before, it is critical that we communicated
with our State and Federal partners. The State Emergency
Management Agency of New York and FEMA have been our partners
from day one. They have walked with us hand in hand. They have
been supportive. They knew that New York City was one of the
major cities in this country that could handle this on a local
level and they provided the backbone of support in terms of
logistics and advice, but they have not gotten in our way,
which is very important.
Many of the officials who visited New York City before
September 11 would come to our operations center and they would
comment on how they wished they could afford to have such a
facility. If there is one thing we have all learned is that the
reality is they cannot afford not to.
I believe that you have heard this before and you will hear
it again. Mayor Giuliani and the police commissioner have said,
and I believe critically, that one of the most essential
elements in effectively protecting not only our city but every
locality from terrorist attacks is the communication of
information sharing between the Federal, State, and local law
enforcement.
In New York City, we have created a multi-agency
intelligence sharing network of the New York City Police, the
Port Authority Police, the New Jersey State Police, the New
York State Police, to share information as much as we can. But
it still is not the sharing we need and we need more of it with
the Federal agencies and we are all working towards that.
After September 11, we have increased the number of New
York City police officers in the Joint Terrorist Task Force,
the New York FBI Task Force. Those task forces are our first
line of defense in terms of terrorism, and having worked with
them in a past life in the police department, the value for
every jurisdiction that has a Joint Terrorist Task Force is
exceptional. They provide you the best information of the best
and the brightest that the Federal agents that are available
and your people become critical. We are expanding our
participation to agencies beyond the police department.
In closing, I thank you for the opportunity to speak to you
about the city's role in national and local homeland security
and that role in response to the World Trade Center attacks and
to again emphasize the crucial need of sharing intelligence
among the Federal, State, and local law enforcement
authorities. An open flow of intelligence information is vital
for us to be prepared for whatever may happen. Also, the need
for localities to have a full-functioning emergency operations
center cannot be overstated. If they have to combine resources,
they should make them multi-jurisdictional, but they need that
resource when something strikes.
And finally, I want to thank you for holding this hearing
to see what we can do to make sure that the lives of our
citizens on a daily basis are protected from the evil people
that struck New York City and Arlington and Pittsburgh on
September 11. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Mr. Sheirer, thanks for all you have
done and for very thoughtful testimony today. I look forward to
the questions.
Our final witness on this panel is John White, Director of
the Tennessee Emergency Management Agency, a real professional
in this field. He has been with TEMA since 1967 and director
since 1994. Mr. White, thanks for being here.
TESTIMONY OF JOHN D. WHITE, JR.,\1\ DIRECTOR, TENNESSEE
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
Mr. White. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Thompson, and
other Members of the Committee. I sat here and listened to the
other members of this panel and determined that my reading of
this speech will probably not do any good. They have echoed
everything that I feel that you should know.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. White appears in the Appendix on
page 109.
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I think that one of the things that we all wonder about,
and I was listening to different members here, is where we are
at and where we are going to and how we are going to get a
little further along.
Since September 11, I think that you have seen the things
that have come together, that have been practiced across the
United States for a long period of time. Since 1968, we have
had Emergency Operations Centers. We have had other types of
emergency plans and exercises. I think that Richard said
testing and exercising is so important. The funding of that is
tremendously important and there is not enough of that simply
because the funding is not available.
Since September 11, I think that the State and local
governments have just absolutely been overwhelmed by studies. I
brought a copy of just one study. This was the study that the
Department of Justice requested. That is one study. I reduced
it where it was a little bit manageable. The FBI requested
another one that we did that is actually 12 notebooks thick. We
have had the same type of studies from FEMA, which I brought a
copy, DOJ, FBI, National Guard Bureau, the Fire Association,
DOT, CDC, DOE, and NSF, every one of them different, every one
of them since September 11, and none of them asks the same
questions. None of them have the same criteria.
I am in a unique position that I got to see all the
different ones, but I doubt that anyone on this panel has ever
seen this from their locale. I do not know why we cannot do one
for everybody. I do not know why we cannot set a standard that
is there. We have done in the past all kinds of assessments on
sensitive facilities, emergency facilities, medical facilities,
evacuation shelters, but yet we redo them again. It is another
requirement.
We were talking about information going up and then
intelligence coming up and no information coming down. I hold a
``secret'' clearance. I hold a ``top secret'' clearance. I hold
a ``top secret departmental'' clearance, a ``Q'' clearance, yet
I do not hold a clearance to know anything about terrorism.
FEMA's clearances are not good with DOE. DOE's clearance is not
good with NSF. NSF is not good with the military. The military
is not good with anybody. And then DOJ is not good for any of
those.
I asked the other day--I just got through redoing my ``Q''
clearance--what does it cost to do a clearance? Initial step,
$5,000 per person. How many clearances do we have and how many
different types? Did they spend $5,000 on me on each security
clearance I have got? And nobody knows--I can give you all
kinds of things like that. I doubt there is a security
clearance you can get to see the information.
I think that you find if you do not work for the FBI, the
information is not passed down. You pass it up when you get
information. If you are lucky, when it happens, then they are
there.
You look at exercising. FEMA is really good about
exercising and the Federal Government is really good about
exercising, but they never play. You never know exactly what
you are going to get. We have two nuclear plants within the
State. We have to, every year, exercise in the nuclear plant
where they would be relicensed. That is some approximately
3,000 people play in that exercise. That is State and local
government. There has never been a Federal agency play in the
exercise. They grade it. Do we know what we would see from the
Federal Government if we had a nuclear accident? We guess at
it.
When you are looking at exercising at that level and the
exercising that is required, you must put some type of funding
for local government and for State Government to be able to do
it. They cannot afford it, to pay the overtime, to pay the
other people that are required in there just to do it.
Tabletops cost a tremendous amount of money, but the real
exercise costs a lot.
I look forward to answering some of your questions. I look
forward to helping out in this problem. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. White. You actually posed
the questions, and I think you did them very well from your
experience.
Senator Levin. Would you yield for 30 seconds, Mr.
Chairman, just to put my statement in the record?
Chairman Lieberman. You are asking a lot of me this
morning. [Laughter.]
Yes, of course, I will.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LEVIN
Senator Levin. Thank you. If I could just put this
statement in the record, and I hope to get back before the end
of the hearing. If I could take 10 seconds, one part of my
statement has to do with this intelligence sharing between
Federal and State, which I just heard these last two witnesses
talk about.
A former assistant district attorney told my office he
would rather have needles poked in his eyes than to have to
work with the FBI on an investigation. [Laughter.]
I will put the balance of my statement in the record.
Chairman Lieberman. That is pretty graphic. Thanks, Senator
Levin.
[The prepared statement of Senator Levin follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR LEVIN
In the minutes, hours and days after the terrorist attacks on
September 11, the people we saw on the front lines at the World Trade
Center in New York and at the Pentagon here in Washington--the first
responders everyone was watching around the globe--were local
firefighters, police officers, and other emergency personnel. They were
the ones charged with the responsibility of responding to the injuries,
the developing threats, and the public reaction. Nothing tells us more
clearly how important state and local governments are in our fight
against terrorism than our experience of September 11. We owe our local
personnel a great deal of thanks and respect.
But we also owe them the commitment to try to make our
intergovernmental systems work better in the future. I imagine all of
our offices have heard concerns expressed by our state and local
governments back home of communication and information problems. Local
police officials in Michigan have told my office, for example, that
they are not receiving the information they need. Our witness today,
the President of the International Association of Chiefs of Police
expresses a similar concern, particularly with respect to classified
information, and has identified several areas where state and local
police officers could greatly benefit from training, in such areas as
responding to biological, chemical and nuclear incidents. We need to
address these requests with meaningful action.
I also want to add that most importantly, our Federal agencies have
to see state and local governments as equal partners, people with whom
we are working together and collaborating to make progress against
terrorism. I have heard too many stories in the past about the
arrogance of agencies like the FBI when they interface with local
police. A former assistant district attorney recently told my office
that he'd rather have needles poked in his eyes than have to work with
the FBI on an investigation. Instead of sharing information, they
apparently often hide it. Instead of working as a team, they work as
competitors. To the extent that is still happening, and I hope it is a
thing of the past, we have to stop it. In these new times, old
practices like that have no role to play.
Communicating within a state is also key. My own state of Michigan
completed and submitted its three-year Statewide Domestic Preparedness
Strategy report to the Department of Justice in October. States were
required in 1998 to prepare a statewide assessment that shows the needs
and vulnerability assessments of the state. Each state's study will
then be used to channel future Federal assistance through state
governments to enhance state and local emergency preparedness. Every
state is either working on their own self evaluating report or has
submitted such a report. These reports will hopefully be helpful, not
only to the state, but also to Governor Ridge and his Office of
Homeland Security.
No one has more responsibility for the inter-governmental
relationships around terrorism than Governor Ridge. Governor Ridge has
done a good job so far. He responded positively when I asked that
National Guardsmen remain in place at the international border
crossings in Michigan when their funding was set to expire. I am
hopeful that he will continue to seek input, not only from Congress,
but from local entities, both private and public, in creating an
organizational structure to fight terrorism.
Although today's hearing is focusing on the role of public
officials, it is crucial that private companies are also consulted. My
staff recently met with an association based in Detroit that represents
independent pollution spill response companies across the U.S. They
offered to provide their expertise and help to train local officials in
remediation including chemical and biological hazards. Yet, they were
unsure where to go to offer their assistance. My staff directed them to
Governor Ridge's office and they are attempting to meet with his staff.
The point is: we have private resources here that should not be
overlooked. Many citizens tell me that they desperately want to help
their country in some way besides spending money, and private companies
may offer a way for citizens to help in what they may see as a more
tangible way.
It is a terrible force that we are up against--hatred always is.
But we have a lot of good people willing to help and a lot of hard work
to do. I look forward to hearing from the witnesses who can teach us a
great deal from their own real life experiences.
Chairman Lieberman. Let us talk about that one a little
bit, because we have heard that. I have heard it a lot, and
probably all the Members of the Committee have. There are real
concerns nationally, particularly from mayors and people in
local law enforcement, about the difficulty in getting
information from the FBI, and I presume here we are talking
about intelligence information that might lead you to know
about whether your local area is maybe vulnerable or subject to
attack. Even though we have heard every time Attorney General
or Governor Ridge has put out one of these national alerts that
they have notified the 18,000 law enforcement officials around
the country.
So my question is, and maybe I will start with you, Mayor
Morial, have you had that problem? Is it as widespread as the
anecdotal evidence that I have had? I did mention in my opening
statement that Director Mueller of the FBI has formed a
committee or a task force of some kind. Are you hopeful that
can solve this problem?
Mr. Morial. It is a concern by mayors and police chiefs
around the country. I think the experience is if there is a
working relationship between local government and the special
agent in charge in that jurisdiction, then based on those
relationships, those working relationships, the information may
flow. If there is no working relationship, then the information
does not flow----
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Morial [continuing]. And I think it calls out for there
to be a protocol established in terms of how and what
information is going to flow and to whom.
For example, 2 weeks ago when Governor Ridge announced his
non-specified threat, the first thing--the thing he did before
announcing the threat publicly by way of a press conference was
to convene a conference call with the Nation's 50 governors,
and those governors, I take it, were not in turn advised as to
what they should do with the information.
In my own view, the appropriate thing for the governors to
do would have been to hold a follow-up conference call with the
chief law enforcement officers of every county, or in the case
of Louisiana, the parish in their State to provide the
information to them and then they could, in turn, transfer it
to local police, chief elected officials in those areas.
I found out, because when the threat--when I saw Director
Ridge on television, I called my chief of police and asked him
if he had received the information. Lo and behold, I found out
only after asking him that the information was being
communicated to local law enforcement through their NCIC
computer hookup, which is not commonly monitored for this kind
of information by local law enforcement.
So, Senator, what it calls out for is there needs to be a
protocol established by administrative rule, by administrative
regulation, by statute, if necessary, as to what information
should flow and how it should flow and the time frame in which
it should flow.
Chairman Lieberman. That is a good recommendation. I wonder
if any of the rest of you want to comment on that, and if you
do, help us understand what the problem is. Is it that the FBI
is not sharing information in advance or is it that once there
is a crime, there is a joust for jurisdiction or cooperation?
Commissioner Gonzales.
Mr. Gonzales. I would just say, Senator Lieberman, there is
no doubt that the thousands of public law enforcement officials
around the country, public safety officials, are gathering
information. Part of the frustration we are hearing from our
sheriffs around the country is that the information is moving
up but it is not coming down, that the information becomes very
fragmented. They are gathering information. The city police
officers are gathering information. They are sending it
somewhere. Someone is making a decision as to whether there are
threats that are being accumulated and then nothing is coming
back.
And so I think it comes down to the simple relationships,
as Mayor Morial indicated, that the local FBI has with the
local law enforcement. If you have an established relationship,
you are going to share information. I was told by our own local
law enforcement officials that the FBI has indicated there is
some information that they do not know and that they cannot
pass down----
Chairman Lieberman. Yes.
Mr. Gonzales [continuing]. And so there are different
classifications that exist, and so what they are receiving may
not be the entire picture.
So it is very difficult for our local law enforcement
community to operate on fragmented information. They are doing
the best they can, but it is almost a wait and see type of
deal. And so as Mayor Morial indicated, I think it begins first
with the local relationships, but it has got to start from the
top. They need to know that there is going to be some type of
uniform effort to assure that level of communication is
occurring all across the board.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you.
I wonder if, Mr. Sheirer, if you care to remark on how
working relationships were with Federal law enforcement during
the crisis that both of your governments responded to so well.
Mr. Sheirer. We had a very good working relationship with
the New York office. Barry Mawn and the Assistant Deputy
Director, and prior to him, Jimmy Kallstrom and Lou Schlero
have had an exceptional relationship with the Police
Commissioner and the Chief of the New York City Police
Department, and the Joint Terrorist Task Force works very
closely. It is very well mixed with police officers and FBI
agents.
Our experience in this incident was that there was a lot of
information coming from a lot of different sources that was not
filtering down to us what we felt was quickly enough, and I
think you experience that in any crisis. But particularly when
it comes to law enforcement information, probably one of your
biggest sources is the street cop, whether it be a street cop
in L.A. or a street cop in Brooklyn. That information that gets
to the FBI has to be--they have to find a way to disseminate
that to the right jurisdiction.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Sheirer. It is an enormous undertaking, but it has got
to be done. It is critical that we have the information that
they know as quickly as they can possibly share it with us. It
is not something that can sit on someone's desk or someone
should be evaluating it without talking to the jurisdiction for
whom a threat is pointed at, because there are local issues
that that person in the city, in the jurisdiction, in the
county would understand maybe better than an FBI agent who is
not from that area. There are a lot of individual things and
that sharing has to improve, and I think everybody acknowledges
it. It is just the way to get it done.
Chairman Lieberman. Well said. Mr. Fisette.
Mr. Fisette. I would only agree, I think, with Mr. Sheirer
that our police department has a quite good relationship with
the FBI. On the other hand, I think the suggestion of a
protocol where you find that balance between providing
sufficient information so that we at the local level can, in
fact, fulfill our responsibilities, yet not compromise the FBI
in a way that in the long term would be detrimental.
So having that discussion, creating the protocol seems to
be--there will always be tension in any emergency situation. I
think that is inevitable. However, it can be made better.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you.
Mr. White, let me take you to another question that you
raised that I wanted to ask you is with your example of the
reports. I just have a minute or so left on my time. Obviously,
in the existing framework, you have the Department of Justice,
HHS, FEMA, a whole range of Federal agencies that deal with the
terrorism problem now that are interacting with State and
county and local governments, and your example of the various
reports that are quite similar being asked by the different
agencies is very graphic and illustrative.
What is the way, from your perspective as a State official,
to make this work better? I mean, should we be creating an
overall block grant of some kind? Should there be more
coordination in the relations on this subject of anti-terrorism
through the Department of Homeland Security? What ideas do you
have about how to make this part of it better, because it sure
seems like a waste.
Mr. White. It would seem to me that there has been an
agency established, be it Homeland Security or FEMA. FEMA is
more than the Department of Justice, more than any of the other
agencies that I know of, dealing with State and local
government every day. They have a conduit by which money can
flow to local government to produce, to abstain, to train
people, for equipment, for exercising, and other things.
Also, I think that we have done all these different types
of studies, and for some reason, they are not shared at the
Federal level. In other words, I doubt that DOJ has asked FEMA
for anything. I sure know that NGB has not asked any of them
for anything. They just do not talk.
That is alarming in that when you get to comparing the
questions, you get to looking at the answers, and remember, the
answers are kind of arbitrary, so you can make it look as bad
as you want to or as good as you want to with a number.
I kind of wish they had come to one agency in the State and
said, coordinate--this is what we want to know, coordinate this
for us, and let one group help them through it and set a
standard. But that is not the way it is happening.
Chairman Lieberman. Those are some good ideas, Mr. White,
and I thank you for them.
Senator Cleland just arrived. It reminds me that at an
earlier hearing after September 11, we had, if I am not
mistaken, your counterpart in Georgia, who is the head of
emergency management. As his illustration--no joke--of the
problems that the Federal agencies have in not communicating or
in sharing jurisdiction, apparently at the scene of the bombing
in Atlanta during the Olympics, this gentleman witnessed the
beginning of a fistfight between two representatives of two
different Federal agencies who were jousting for control over
the site, so we have got some work to do.
Senator Thompson.
Senator Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. White, thank you very much for your insight. I think
you have really put your finger on the crux of the problem that
we are facing here.
Following up on Senator Lieberman's last couple of
questions, what is your feeling as you look at the Office of
Homeland Security as it is being set up now? It is awfully
early in the game. Governor Ridge has just really had an
opportunity to get into it. He has all these agencies to deal
with, all these problems, duplication, overlap, and he is
hearing, I am sure, from all over the country some of the same
things that you have been saying.
Would you have any suggestions to him? Should the problem
be given to FEMA within his jurisdiction, under his umbrella?
Do you see anything that they are doing or not doing that you
would comment on as to whether or not you feel they are going
in the right direction with regard to some of these problems
you have just been talking about?
Mr. White. I think Governor Ridge has not been there long
enough to really get a handle on the different areas that are
going to come up by anyone new in that type of position. In
reading his charge, it's certainly an astronomical task that he
has to do. It is going to be remarkable to see him do it.
Senator Thompson. It would seem like that would be the
place where all of this has to come together, would it not, and
resolved?
Mr. White. I would probably say yes, but I do not think it
can happen, the reason being is that one State, right here,
what happens is what I call smoke and mirrors. Who is in charge
today? So we give him 50 States this thick and say, OK, now
when you get through, when you know what this means, come talk
to me, well, guess what? It will never happen. We multiply the
amount of paper and the other agencies do what they normally
do, will get another survey.
The next thing is that there are no requirements that he
can lay out for things to happen. I am exercising--for a fixed
nuclear facility plant, I am exercising all the local PDs. If
something happens, what is the difference in a release at a
nuclear plant, be it because of a failure of a piece of
equipment or because of terrorism? There is not. But that is
not impacted into what we are doing. The money that we need to
do that for the other locations are not there.
When you look at the City of Memphis, which is a wonderful,
a very robust city, we have got the urban search and rescue
task force there that came to the Pentagon. We have got
probably more resources than the entire State. But to exercise
it, there is no money. There is no criteria there except for
FEMA.
I am not sure Governor Ridge can ever get to that, and I am
not sure that the other Federal agencies will let him have that
kind of jurisdiction anyway. You are talking about turf now.
That is important.
Senator Thompson. You are addressing the same things that
we have been talking about here for a long time now. Clearly,
the President is going to have to make it clear that he has the
authority and he is going to have to exercise that authority.
Mr. White. I think FEMA has done one thing. FEMA is an
agency that is not in charge of anything when you really think
about it. What they are is a very good turf walker. We
coordinate and emergency management coordinates a lot of
agencies that have legal responsibility to do something. We
coordinate them together. We do not want what they do. I do not
want to be a fire fighter. I do not want to be a policeman. I
do not want to be a lot of things. But I coordinate what they
do in one direction.
It is a very unique thing to walk on somebody else's area
and get their help. FEMA does that well. Now we have got to
train someone else how to do that.
Senator Thompson. I am going to make sure that the people
in the Office of Homeland Security get the benefit of your
thoughts on all of this. Is this one report--did you say you
had to send several reports like that in?
Mr. White. Yes.
Senator Thompson. To all the various agencies?
Mr. White. These reports, you know, it is not only us, but
local government. There are some 10,000 questions in here. Even
once you read it, and I have read through it twice, you really
have nothing because there is no thread through it that makes
it seamless to mean anything. This was with the Department of
Justice, another one with FEMA.
Senator Thompson. And they accumulate?
Mr. White. And they accumulate and they never--I cannot let
some of my people see the National Guard Bureau's report. Some
of them cannot read this. Some of my planners cannot look at
the DOE reports. And they are dealing with----
Senator Thompson. Well, do not feel too bad. We have had,
for a decade now or more, we have accumulated reports here in
Congress, GAO reports and Inspector General reports and in some
cases intelligence community reports, laying out for us the
terrorism threat and the threat of weapons of mass destruction
and all the things that can happen and how vulnerable we are,
time and time and time again.
So something finally happens and we are still trying to
figure out how to get anthrax out of one of our buildings here
because we cannot agree on the nature of the matter. It is all
up and down the Federal Government. The FBI is now scrambling
and trying to, I think, get its arms around all this, but the
FBI is used to solving crimes after the fact. They are not used
to having to deal with threat assessments, risk assessments,
training, exercising, all these issues now that we have to deal
with. So it is a whole new culture for them. We are having to
learn how to walk again in a lot of these areas.
You mentioned these nuclear plants. Are you getting any
assistance? Are you having any communication? Are they
requiring you, for example, to make your threat and risk
assessments with regard to those plants in your reports, and if
so, are you getting any feedback? Are you getting any help or
assistance in terms of planning in case we had a disaster of
that kind with regard to those nuclear plants?
Mr. White. Not from the Federal Government. It comes from
the plant site specific to the State. That is done by the
utility. It just so happens in Tennessee it is TVA. That is
non-Federal money comes from the generation of power.
Senator Thompson. Do you need that kind of additional
assistance?
Mr. White. Yes, sir. When you look at the money that the
State and local governments around that area put in for that
plant to operate, it requires more assistance than what is
there. You do what you do with what you have. We were very
fortunate in the licensing of those plants, the first to
license after Three Mile Island, then the last plant to get a
license of that type in the United States, which was very
fortunate. But that is the type of planning that is there also
that you use for homeland security. That is what you are
looking at.
There are other things. I think that the individual
counties, we handle in the State some 3,000 to 3,600 missions
and incidents a year, in 1 year's period. That is stuff that we
respond to with the local governments. We handled 3,000 hoaxes
of anthrax. Where does that come from? We had to treat every--
where does the money for that come from? There has been no talk
of any kind of help for that.
What we are looking at we have upped the security in the
airports, yet the Governor and mayors and chief executives have
had to up the security around courthouses, overtime. We have
had to put National Guardsmen around the Capitol. This is
another security threat. Yet, there is no money there for that.
Does the State try to pay for it? I do not know. We are paying
$10 million since September 11 for extra security and for
things like this right here that we did not program, and I know
that you all did not, either.
Senator Thompson. Mr. Chairman, I think we are just
beginning to get a slight feel for what the financial impact of
all of this is going to be on the Federal Government and on the
State and local governments. We have got training and threat
and risk assessment and exercises that need to be done, and
nobody really can tell what all this is going to cost. We have
a few bills around, each one of them has a few billion here and
a few billion there, but it is going to affect our fiscal
picture here in tremendous ways that we are just beginning to
have an appreciation for.
Mr. White. I do not pretend to know, Senator, the
challenges that you all have on a day-to-day basis. Also, I was
looking at some of the bills coming out, you know, and you said
it, that we are putting a little bit of money here, a little
bit of money there. I would say to you, out of each one of
those little bit of monies, there are a lot of people that take
it off the top. And when you look at what comes off the top to
get to the bottom, by the time it gets to the bottom, there is
not any.
Senator Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Thompson. I could not
agree with you more. Hopefully, the Committee can play some
role in creating more clarity and better organization and more
efficiency in the use of Federal resources. But the reality is,
we did enter a new chapter of our history on September 11 and
we have a requirement to focus on homeland security which is
greater than we have ever had before, a whole new dimension.
And you all represent--you have said it over and over
again--the front-line troops. We do not have to create a
domestic security force, or as other countries have, an
interior department with internal security. We have got it. You
are out there. Now the question is--and you are performing a
national function and the question is how we can come to some
appropriate level of support for what the Nation is asking you
each to do and how we can better coordinate the relationship
between the various levels of government, and that is the
challenge we all have together. There is no question we can do
it, because we have got to do it.
Senator Cleland, thank you for being here.
Senator Cleland. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you for holding the hearing. Before I get into my opening
statement, which I understand I can do before the next panel--
--
Chairman Lieberman. Or if you want to do it now, go right
ahead.
Senator Cleland. Actually, I would just like to follow up
with Mr. White's observations. Mr. White, you have such a clear
and an unvarnished understanding of how things work, I wondered
where you are from. I know that you are from New Georgia, so I
think that---- [Laughter.]
Mr. White. Senator, I am from Tennessee.
Senator Cleland. I know. [Laughter.]
I was just sitting here absorbing your insight. We have an
outstanding emergency management operation in Georgia. Gary
McConnell, your counterpart there, he is the kind of person
who, when the popcorn hits the fan, or as Jeff Copeland says,
the head of CDC, when the anthrax hits the fan, he is the kind
of person you want in the foxhole with you. He has a great
sense of where things are and what ought to be done and
anticipating the command, all those things, and I have seen him
perform in the wake of tornadoes, in the wake of floods, in,
shall we say, natural disasters, natural attacks, so to speak,
on our State.
Now, in the wake of September 11, I guess we have all been
searching for a formula with which to, or a key to unlock the
secret of how we ``defend our homeland.'' We have been
struggling, quite frankly, with the things that you have
already articulated. It does seem to me that the big bugaboos
here in terms of homeland defense are not uncommon to other
areas of our defense, that is, coordination, cooperation, and
communication, none of which is rocket science.
But it does seem that, particularly at the Federal level,
there is a great inability to go outside one's turf, to share
information, to coordinate operations, to communicate, and so
forth. We see this, and I am painfully aware of it because the
CDC is located right there in Atlanta, we see this with the
whole anthrax threat here, where once the FBI gets on the
scene, they declare it a crime scene and, in effect, confiscate
the evidence, shut it down. They send their anthrax samples to
Fort Detrick, Maryland, not to the CDC, and that has put us in
several binds from time to time.
There are two cultures. Just for instance, CDC is designed
to, shall we say, communicate openly to the public all the
time, to local and State health departments, and share every
bit of information they have got and tap the great resources
there of the 8,000 people that they have and say, Professor so-
and-so or Dr. so-and-so is the expert on this and talk to him,
whereas the FBI does not share any information with anybody,
ever. I mean, there are two cultures. Both are right in their
own setting, but to try to get them both to attack the same
problem is like oil and water, and we have seen that.
Your point about turf walkers, I have never thought about
FEMA in that regard but maybe that is what we are talking about
here in terms of homeland defense. Maybe we already have an
agency with budgetary authority, with troops in the field, with
some background and training in response to emergencies and
maybe we already have basically a homeland defense agency. It
is called FEMA, expert in doing the very kind of things,
coordination, cooperation, communication, that we are so
lacking in and have struggled to bring about by other means.
I do not really want to put you on the spot, but do you
think we ought to seriously look here in Washington, all of us,
at maybe either using the FEMA model or using FEMA in some way
as an anchor or using this wonderful agency that works, and our
mayors and our governors out there all, I think, would swear
pretty much by it.
They have got a central command post. I have been down to
the central command post when a hurricane was moving onto the
Southeast coast of Georgia. I mean, I went in there and it was
like, in effect, a Pentagon war room. I mean, they had it. They
had it nailed. They were on top of it and they were
coordinating and they were cooperating and they were
communicating.
Anyway, do you think we have the kernel of a homeland
defense agency in FEMA and maybe just maybe build on that?
Mr. White. I would suggest to you that is where they came
from. It was called civil defense, and that is what that was.
Senator Cleland. Yes.
Mr. White. It was just a different time. It was just a
different, smaller threat. I just do not, and maybe it is from
being a Southern boy and just kind of being in Tennessee all
the time, I just do not see the difference between an Oklahoma
City and a New York. I do not see a difference between a
hurricane that wipes out all of Florida and New York. It is
done by somebody else. It is done by something different. But
the consequences are the same. The recovery is the same.
You still have to provide the people with funding. You have
to provide the local government the capability to do it. You
have to assist them, stand back and let them work as far as
they can. Then the State comes in and helps them. If I cannot
do it, then FEMA comes in and helps me. Then that is the way we
get things done.
It would seem to me that Governor Ridge would be very well
served by looking at some of the things that FEMA has done. I
have been around a long time with FEMA--FEMA has not always
been what it is today. But I would say to you that today is a
model of something that will work, a model of how to get money
to local governments and get it to them fast, a model of how to
respond to a disaster and how to get information to governors,
to the people on the front lines.
Do I think that you will ever solve the security problem?
No, sir. It will not happen because they are not going to tell
you.
Senator Domenici. Could you repeat that, please?
Mr. White. I said, do I think that you will ever solve the
security problems between the CIA, the FBI, or NSF? No, because
they do not talk to each other now and are not going to talk to
you. If they talk to you, then you know as much as they know
and you have got to have it for the funding. In other words,
there is always going to be a black program. That is the way
they get their money.
But you have to have a turf walker, someone that is not
going to offend or not try to take over somebody else's job and
to get the money out there, and also gently hold them
accountable. That is very important, too, because OMB is going
to send an auditor 26 years from today and want to know where
that piece of equipment is, and you say, ``I do not know where
it is at.'' Well, guess what, you are going to pay for it 17
times. [Laughter.]
So you have got to have also, then, accountability. The
Department of Justice has learned their lesson. Out of the $1
million that they gave out in Tennessee, they cannot find one
piece of equipment. They did not bother to know that it was
disposable equipment. Once you used it, you had to throw it
away. We had not figured that out yet. But they will when OMB
gets through with them.
Senator Cleland. Before we go to Mayor Morial, who wants to
say something, is it not true that in terms of this emergency
preparedness, we will call it, the old civil defense operation,
that there is an established protocol already, that when the
popcorn hits the fan, all the players of the team know exactly
what their responsibility is.
For instance, something hits the State of Tennessee or
Georgia. There is a protocol there. Ultimately, the governor
asks the President, I guess, to declare X area a disaster area.
The moment the President does that, there is an established
protocol for money, for small business loans, for emergency
assistance. I mean, people are on the plane. Things are
happening right then, and I have seen it happen.
The problem with, say, this bioterrorist attack we just
went through, we found that there was no real established
protocol. The Postmaster General testified he did not
understand the protocol about what happened when he got hit
with an anthrax scare, so I think that is something we could
look at. Mayor Morial.
Mr. Morial. Thank you, Senator Cleland. I could not agree
with Mr. White more. FEMA does an excellent job. We have had
great experiences with FEMA in connection with weather
emergencies, but I wanted to make this point. FEMA is a
response agency. Homeland defense includes prevention, working
to prevent future attacks, developing intelligence and
coordination.
FEMA's role and the role of most successors to the old
civil defense systems that exist are setting up the appropriate
response once you have an emergency situation, and I think in
your conversations, in your considerations, and in your
deliberations, we would ask you to also keep in mind the need
for a system of prevention, resources for prevention. I think
that is where I hope Governor Ridge, the Office of Homeland
Defense, will focus and will go.
Let me give you an illustration. We are preparing right now
for the Super Bowl, and in our preparations, we have, in
effect, divided our preparations into two components. One is
prevention. What do we do with traffic, with people, with
security, with special events, with deployment of police, fire,
and EMS officials? The other is, what are the protocols to
respond in the event there is X type of problem over here or Y
type of problem over there?
Both components have to be adequately addressed, and I
would think that the FEMA model, because they are an excellent
coordinator, they work with State and local government, they
try to marshal resources, might be a model that could be
employed on the prevention side, too. Whether it could be
carried out by FEMA, I do not know. Whether it needs to be
carried out by the Office of Homeland Defense with the
appropriate staffing and personnel, that would be a
consideration. But I think that local government is acutely
aware of both components of the challenge we face.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Mayor Morial, for a very good
statement. I would say, for the record, you were kind enough to
refer to the bill that Senator Specter and I have put in to
create the Homeland Security Agency, give it budget authority,
cabinet status. We are building here on a lot of work that has
been done, particularly by the commission headed by Senators
Rudman and Hart.
But in our bill, we have actually three directorates under
the Secretary of Homeland Security and it follows your model.
Prevention, in our case, we had one called protection, which
was the ongoing business of protecting critical infrastructure,
and then response, and the vision we had in the response, FEMA
is really the heart of it because it does such a great job, as
Mr. White said.
Senator Domenici, thanks for being here.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DOMENICI
Senator Domenici. Thanks very much. First, Mr. Chairman, I
really do compliment you for holding this hearing.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you.
Senator Domenici. I am not quite sure how we are going to
go beyond the hearings into changing things that are
desperately in need of change, but we have got to start
somewhere, and it seems to me that as we talk up here, it
becomes quite obvious that one of the reasons we are going to
have a hard time getting ourselves into a different management
mode on all the fronts we have been discussing is that there
are great conflicts of interest. There is no committee with
jurisdiction to solve it and come up with a bill. In a subtle
way, all the committees are going to want to keep some of their
jurisdiction even if they are not quite sure what it does for
the country.
If it is something that they are charged with doing, you
are going to have difficulty--if you perceive in this Committee
under your leadership and our good friend who used to be
Chairman, what you ought to do. I am not sure that you will not
have to go to so many committees that it is going to be hard to
get the job done. I can tell you that at every level that has
to do with security, our country is in a big muddle and we did
not do much about it before this terrorist attack.
Will we be able to do something about it? I think the
President wants to, and that is the starter. I think he put in
a governor who has obviously managed some big things. Now the
question is, what is his authority? Frankly, if we try to draw
something to set out his authority, I am very concerned that it
would take us forever to get the legislation done and the
claims on jurisdiction would be three or four committees.
But nonetheless, the President has started out right by
saying we need a new level of defense and it is homeland
defense. We should all remember that if homeland defense is
important, we ought to know how much we spent on the defense of
our Nation without due consideration to homeland. We spend over
$325 billion to defend ourselves in this world we live in.
I believe we are going to have a very large budget for
homeland defense. It may not be very large now, but we will be
spending a lot of money on homeland defense once it gets
coordinated right. I hope that the precursor is that we have
got to find out how to organize it. But we have got to spend
some money, there is no question about it.
I want to say to all of these witnesses: I very much
appreciate, as one Senator, your coming and the excellent
understanding of the problem from the local level. Sometimes we
just keep talking to ourselves. It is really good that that
stops and somebody that is out there experiencing it gets into
the loop. You all have been in that loop today and you are
going to stay in it in trying to help us get our job done.
I want to personally thank Javier Gonzales, the County
Commissioner who came up here and has a national role. I thank
you very much for the time, the effort, and what you have said.
I have a statement that is in the record, but I would like
to just talk for a minute to the Committee about some things.
In 1996, quite a while ago in terms of reference to the towers
being bombed, almost an eon before, we passed a piece of
legislation up here. Its nickname is Nunn-Lugar-Domenici. It
included a domestic homeland initiative where the U.S.
Government attempts to help first responders.
Last year, we completed 120 cities, Mr. Chairman, 120
American cities, and some of you are aware of this. Those
cities came together under Nunn-Lugar-Domenici and prepared to
communicate among themselves and organize for the eventuality
of a mass accident, either nuclear or a huge accident that
occurs because of nature. Now I think we have to decide to take
a look at that legislation and see, in light of terrorism, does
it do the right thing?
I think we did a pretty good job, considering it was so
many years ahead of things to set up a first responder
organization and communication. It just about does your three
C's. It does not do it for everything, but in a limited way.
Frankly, Mr. Chairman, it suffered after it was passed from the
typical difficulties that anything in America that is different
and that is preventative and that is ahead of the time suffers.
We could not get the administration to decide who ought to
run it, so we put the Department of Defense in the first time
through. That caused all kinds of flaps, with concerns that the
Department of Defense was going to come into cities and help
them prepare their first responders. It took 1\1/2\ or 2 years
and we finally said, let the Department of Justice do it. The
Department of Justice does not like to do it, but they do it.
Now, it is getting pretty healthy because we spent $667 million
on that legislation in the year we are in now, a pretty healthy
chunk of money to help cities and institutions prepare
themselves for communication, and for first responder
efficiency, then firemen will know what their job is and the
police will know theirs.
As a matter of fact, fellow Senators, I am not sure that we
know the impact of that program on New York City, but it is
commonly thought that they were much better prepared because
they had for 2 or 3 years been annually preparing their
responder organizations under the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act and
had trained them, got them ready, with much better
communication capacity and skills.
It might indeed be wise for our staff, bipartisan here, to
take a look at that legislation. They should see if maybe you
can build on it in a way that would expand what it does so that
it will do more of the things that Mr. White (and I greatly
appreciate your observations) and Mr. Sheirer and all of you
have given us.
Let me close by saying that Tom Ridge has one of the
toughest jobs anybody could have. How we are going to be able
to shake these organizations that have been complacent and,
when we give them money, for them to do the right thing with it
and get it spent on the right things is not going to be easy.
But I also think that this Committee under your leadership has
a rare opportunity to let people know what we do and what you
can do. You have very broad jurisdiction in this area.
I close by telling you that we were not capable in this
country, prior to this big accident of clearing Federal
employees for jobs in secret establishments. Sometimes it took
2 years. I can tell you, for the record, that in my State, for
jobs at Los Alamos National Laboratory, there are many great
scientists hired and, in a sense, put in a bullpen.
In other words, they are hired but they are not hired in
that they cannot work in secure areas of the laboratory because
they are awaiting their clearance. And sometimes, they meet me
on an airplane and they say, ``Well, I sure would like to be
working at the job I was hired to do. I am so-and-so. Here is
my expertise. But just so you will know, I am not working at
that job. I draw a paycheck, but it has already been 12 months
and they have not cleared me.'' Is that not pathetic?
Now we have reason to do a lot of these things better, just
to ask the administration, how do you fix that? What is a
reasonable time? Do you think it is 6 months? Surely if you
have machinery and equipment, you ought to find out in 6 months
whether a Ph.D. that came from Georgia Tech in research in
nuclear this, that, or the other, can be cleared as an American
to work on nuclear weapons? Why 2 years?
And this is the problem everywhere you go. All the things
we are going to try to solve are going to run into these kinds
of administrative nightmares. But now, it is life or death, so
it may very well be that we will change. If we do not change,
we are going to have another one of these events and everybody
is going to say, ``Why were we not informed?'' And somebody is
going to say, ``Well, we should have been. Why did so many
people die? Well, if we had just been able to do this, they
would not have.'' And somebody will say, ``Well, we know how to
do that. Why did we not do it?''
So I urge that you and the Ranking Member decide what your
role is going to be. I, for one, do not have a lot of time, but
I will pledge to you that I will join you if you undertake in a
major way how to put this together and challenge these other
committees who want to continue to say they have the power and
the jurisdiction. We want somebody to do something. Is that not
what you want?
Chairman Lieberman. Amen.
Senator Domenici. I do not think you want to sit around and
have hearings that people have rave reviews on because we got
the facts. I think you want a result, and we are not getting
results. In fact, it is terrible. Some would have to say, we
may get results because we were bombed in our homeland and we
will never have the same America because nobody can any longer
kid anyone. We could have--in your hometown, or in your State,
Senator--a major terrorist event within the next couple of
weeks. Who knows.
We did not think of that 2 years ago. If you brought up a
bill to spend money to prevent that, people around here would
have said we were crazy. Nobody is going to do anything to
America. Well, that is over with, is it not? I mean, they can
do anything. In fact, I am worried about just which is their
next target. I cannot believe they are not going to do
anything, except we have taught a few of them a lesson. They do
know we will fight.
Chairman Lieberman. That is right.
Senator Domenici. So I thank you, and again, I will read
your testimony and I will just close by telling you, there is a
piece of equipment manned by scientists. It is called NISAC,
National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center. I must
tell you, it is the most phenomenal production in terms of the
infrastructure of America that you would ever think we would
do.
The scientists at two nuclear laboratories took their big
computers, the ones that have more capacity than anybody ever
thought. They have put a little bit of the time into NISAC.
They now are trying to put together a center where they can
apply this equipment in a way you would not believe, Mr.
Chairman, to all of the infrastructure of America of any
significance. The NISAC computers will permit you to relate one
piece of infrastructure to another, so that if a big dam is
blown up here, what is the consequence to the country? It will
tell you now. And now it needs to be continued year by year to
be a predominant fixture for information dissemination or
prevention by doing things that this software will tell you.
I know you will wonder, where has this been, this wonderful
equipment? I would tell you, it has been rather difficult to
get it funded. Now, somebody in the administration has agreed
that it is a whopping great, great thing. Still, I am not sure
that the $20 million is going to be appropriated for it to
become part of the civilian network of America, but I think it
will. Anybody that will listen and see it will know that the
greatest scientists in the world have pulled something out of a
hat again for us. With it, we will know so much about the
relationships of one piece of infrastructure to another that it
is almost unimaginable. I am very grateful that some Senators
helped me do this and I did not come to all of you because it
was moving along.
You will know, all of you and Mr. White, when this is all
set up. If we can then establish who is entitled to the
information, it will be an incredible thing for the counties
and cities and States to be able to look at their
infrastructure and see what are the risks, which things are
really dangerous, what is the consequence if they get this, to
our State on this? I think it will be exciting for everybody.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Domenici follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR DOMENICI
Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for holding this hearing as your
Committee continues to explore issues associated with Homeland
Security. The focus of this hearing, on local roles, highlights the
critical contribution from the first responders and local jurisdictions
who represent our first line of defense against terrorist actions.
I'd like to add my welcome to Javier Gonzales, Commissioner from
Santa Fe County. Thank you for traveling here for this important
hearing.
In 1996, the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation focused on two key
issues, stopping proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and on
domestic preparedness in case these weapons are used. That bill charged
the Department of Defense with responsibility for training ``First
Responders'' for potential attacks. Later the responsibility for that
program moved to the Department of Justice.
I'm pleased that 120 cities have received this training. I'm told
that the training in New York City contributed to their ability to
respond to the events of September 11.
That 1996 legislation was a good foundation, but we in Congress
need to build upon it. In fact, the exercises--both practice ones and
unfortunately in response to real attacks--have highlighted areas that
need additional legislative focus.
For example, it is clear that better coordination is required for
all domestic preparedness efforts. I anticipate that Governor Ridge
will provide that coordination. I'm pleased to note in the testimony of
Javier Gonzales that the National Association of Counties has been
working directly with Governor Ridge toward creation of a State and
Local Advisory Committee within his Office. I support that proposal.
It is also clear that follow-up training is needed after the
initial exercises for the first responders. Certainly those exercises
are important. But, there has not been a mechanism or program for
further training and ensuring the sustainability of first responders'
capabilities.
And finally, it is abundantly clear that our public health
infrastructure needs significant enhancement to respond to the range of
risks presented by terrorism.
On a local note in New Mexico, I'm proud of the role played by New
Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology with their first responder
training program.
Mr. Chairman, the original Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation provided
the foundation for training of first responders for incidents involving
weapons of mass destruction. I stand ready to work with you and this
Committee as legislation is crafted to build on that vital foundation.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Domenici. Thanks for
your offer of help. I think we have got a job to do here and it
is an important one. The program you mentioned at the end is
exactly what we should be doing, bringing technology to bear on
this new problem.
Thanks also for the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici law, because after
September 11 when people said, why did the Federal Government
not do anything, in fact, we had done some things, thanks to
leadership like that. We did not do enough. We did not expect
the attacks in exactly that way, but it helped.
We do have to move on to the next panel, but while you were
talking, I saw Mr. Sheirer looking for recognition. I assume
that you wanted to talk about your experience under the Nunn-
Lugar-Domenici law.
Mr. Sheirer. Under Nunn-Lugar-Domenici, in May of this past
year, we had a tabletop exercise called Red X, which was a
bioterrorist incident in New York City where we had about 75
different agencies and hundreds of observers up at the EOC. The
mayor came and participated, and 5 minutes into this exercise,
you forgot it was an exercise with our mayor. We virtually
quarantined Manhattan and we went through this step by step
what we would do.
What was interesting in the critique of it right
afterwards, some people criticized us for closing the city,
Manhattan, so quickly. It was interesting to try and reach out
to them after what happened with both the bombing on September
11 and the anthrax to see if they had changed their critique in
any way.
But the second part of that same drill was the TriPOD
exercise, the point of dispensing, which had a direct impact on
our ability to deal with the anthrax situation and how we
handled those people that were exposed. Thank you very much.
That bill has done exactly what it was intended to do.
Chairman Lieberman. That is great. Go ahead, Mr. Sheirer.
Mr. Sheirer. One other observation, a very quick one. I had
fully expected that we were going to run into the turf problems
somewhere along the line as we got further and further away
from September 11 and I am happy to say, to this point, with
the help of FEMA, with the help of the State Emergency
Management Office, and with every agency, we have had a few
bumps in the road, but nothing, absolutely nothing that would
deter us from getting our job done in terms of the September 11
incident, funding all the local ones we can and recovery from
that, the anthrax incident, and Flight 587. It has just been a
tremendous cooperative effort from the agencies, and where you
had expected some problems, they have not come up.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks for that good report, Mr.
Sheirer.
You know, one of the things that I think we might most
readily do in this Committee is to lead an effort to expand
Nunn-Lugar Domenici. If we continue the military analogy, and
it is not far-fetched at all in this case, it is training
exercises that make our military what it is and helped us to
perform as successfully as we have thus far in Afghanistan. The
truth is, every State, county, and metropolitan area in the
country today ought to have the support that you got under
Nunn-Lugar-Domenici to carry out training exercises.
Mr. Sheirer. Exactly.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you all very much. You have been
an excellent panel, very helpful. I really want to ask that you
stick with us and continue to be engaged with us. We are going
to share whatever products we have of this set of hearings and
we are really going to welcome your response because we want it
to work from your level of government.
Thanks very much. Have a good day.
I will call the second panel now. I want to indicate that I
have to go off to a meeting of the Education Conference
Committee and I am very grateful that Senator Cleland has
agreed to Chair the hearing in my absence. I hope to return as
soon as I possibly can, certainly before the hearing is over.
Senator Cleland, thank you very much.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CLELAND
Senator Cleland [presiding]. Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman.
As our second panel is taking their seats, I would just
like to provide an opening statement. This hearing is, I
believe, one of the most critical hearings we can have on the
subject of homeland security because it gets at an issue that
resonates from almost every major era of our Nation's history,
the issue of integrating the role of the Federal Government
with that of State and local government.
Philosophically, I think it is fair to say that the roots
of America lie in the ideal of giving back some autonomy to
State and local governments, consistent with the efficiency,
coherence, and equity necessary to ensure a successful response
to the challenge at hand.
The issue we are here to discuss today of securing our
homeland against a diverse range of potential challenges is as
complex as any I am aware of in our Nation's history. The scope
of the attacks that are possible and that we have already
witnessed cries out for standardization and economies of scale
that are the hallmark of a strong Federal response. At the same
time, the diversity of geography, of population density, and of
infrastructure that exists in our Nation at the present time
makes it impossible to envision a one-size-fits-all solution.
For these reasons, it is critical that we accurately survey
and monitor the capabilities available at State and local
levels and tailor Federal resources to provide complementary
capabilities that ensure every region of our Nation has the
supplies, personnel, and infrastructure needed to meet an
acceptable benchmark of care for the entire population.
To this end, I am extremely proud that my home county,
DeKalb County in the State of Georgia, was the very first
county in the country to establish an independent Office of
Homeland Security. I note that several witnesses have cited the
need for additional funding to assist first responders in their
efforts to prepare for incidents involving hazardous materials.
Your testimony could not come at a better time.
I will introduce this week the Heroic Emergency Response
Operations, or HERO Act of 2001. This legislation will allow
the Department of Transportation to access $15 million in
surplus funds that have accumulated in the emergency
preparedness grants program due to appropriations restrictions.
The purpose of the bill is to disburse the surplus funds to
State and local governments for hazardous material training of
the men and women who are at ground zero during emergencies
involving hazardous materials.
The HERO Act would also authorize $1 million of the surplus
to go to the International Association of Fire Fighters to help
fund the specialized training that the IAFF provides free of
charge to local fire departments. According to the IAFF, this
will quadruple the number of fire fighters who receive this
HAZMAT training.
I call on my colleagues in this Committee and in the Senate
to cosponsor the HERO Act of 2001.
I have introduced several other measures to enhance the
coordination and integration of our response to likely attacks
and I have attempted to prioritize resources to those entities,
areas, and infrastructures that have the potential to provide
the greatest enhancements against the most likely threats.
The Public Health Emergencies Accountability Act,
introduced just last month, puts in place a procedure that
allows clear assignment of responsibility in cases where the
public health is threatened. It further mandates the exchange
of information between Federal entities primarily responsible
for public health, such as the CDC, and those primarily
responsible for countering criminal and terrorist activities. I
have and will continue to advocate for increased funding for
the CDC, an organization absolutely critical to our national
capability to sustain the integrity of our society in the event
of a significant biological attack.
I suspect this hearing will highlight once again the need
for greater coordination. Local officials in my own State have
told me that they need a better understanding of what resources
they can expect from the Federal Government in a given
situation. They have also identified the need to be buffered
from the unintentional secondary effects of Federal actions,
such as the loss of key personnel from local public health,
police, and fire organizations caused by the call-up of the
National Guard.
To provide clarity on these issues, I will solicit the
views of our witnesses, either directly or for the record,
regarding what is needed to provide an adequate level of
response capability.
I would like to thank the Chairman and Members of the
Committee for their attention today, and now I would like to
introduce our witnesses here.
Chief William Berger is President of the International
Association of Chiefs of Police. Chief Berger was named the
Chief of Police in North Miami Beach, Florida, in 1989. His
previous experience includes 15 years with the City of Miami
Police Department. He joined the board of the International
Association of Police Chiefs in 1995.
Joseph Tinkham, II, is Commissioner, Maine Department of
Defense, Veterans, and Emergency Management. General Tinkham
serves as both the Adjutant General of Maine, commanding the
Maine Army and Air National Guard, and is the Commissioner of
the Maine Department of Defense, Veterans, and Emergency
Management.
Dr. Michael Caldwell is Dutchess County Commissioner of
Health, here on behalf of the National Association of County
and City Health Officials. Dr. Caldwell became Commissioner of
the Dutchess County, New York, Department of Health in 1994.
Michael Crouse is Chief of Staff for the General President
of the International Association of Fire Fighters. Mr. Crouse
is a veteran fire fighter and former District Vice President
for the International. He is here on behalf of IAFF General
President Harold Schaitberger.
Senator Collins asked that Mr. Tinkham's introductory
statement go last so she has time to return from another
hearing, so we will go to Chief Berger now, if you will. We are
glad to have you.
TESTIMONY OF CHIEF WILLIAM B. BERGER,\1\ PRESIDENT,
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE
Mr. Berger. Good morning, Senator Cleland. How are you,
sir?
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Berger appears in the Appendix on
page 118.
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As you know, the IACP is the world's oldest and largest
organization of police executives, with more than 19,000
members, over 100 countries being represented. Our mission
throughout the history of our association has always been to
address urgent law enforcement issues, develop policies,
programs, and training, technical assistance, and to help with
whatever problem may be contemporary.
As I appear before you today, combating terrorism looms as
our most urgent issue facing the membership and, of course, all
our communities. The initial response of law enforcement and
other public safety agencies in New York, Virginia,
Pennsylvania, and throughout the United States to the terrible
incidents and events of September 11 was outstanding, and I can
assure you that the actions of the brave men and women of the
New York City area police departments would be duplicated by
any of the more than 16,000 law enforcement agencies in the
United States today because that is what we do.
After September 11, Federal, State, and local law
enforcement agencies immediately began working together in a
massive effort to respond to the attack and to prevent
additional attacks. However, in the weeks and months that have
followed, it has become apparent that the critical partnership
between Federal, State, and local law enforcement is being
hindered by difficulties in cooperation, coordination, and
information sharing. This, of course, is unacceptable.
Now at a time when communities across the United States are
turning to their law enforcement agencies for guidance and
protection, we must all do what we can to ensure that law
enforcement agencies work together and overcome those
artificial walls that sometimes divide us. The IACP is
certainly not alone in this belief. The Federal Bureau of
Investigation and other Federal law enforcement agencies have
also realized how critical working with State and local law
enforcement is to the success of their efforts and they have
taken several positive actions to make this happen.
In addition to addressing this critical information sharing
issue, there are other steps that the Federal Government can
take to ensure that State and local governments and law
enforcement agencies are active and effective partners in
homeland security. Although the primary mission of law
enforcement agencies has been to ensure public safety, the
events of September 11 have dramatically and significantly
changed the focus of law enforcement operations.
Suddenly, agencies and officers who have been trained and
equipped to deal with traditional crimes are now focused on
apprehending individuals operating with different motives, who
have different objectives and who use much deadlier weapons
than traditional criminals. As a result, law enforcement
agencies and officers will need new training, new equipment to
meet this new threat.
For example, State and local officers would be greatly
benefited from training on certain topics, which are, one,
recognizing possible threats to public safety and terrorist
tactics; two, field interrogation techniques to better enable
them to recognize and respond to terrorist attacks; three,
Federal immigration law, sources, and documentation; four, to
respond to biological, chemical, nuclear incidents; and five,
detecting false identification documents, such as driver's
licenses, passports, and visas.
As for the equipment needs, it has become clear that law
enforcement agencies will need to obtain protective clothing
and isolation equipment for those critical first responders.
Radio spectrum, I know it has been commented about here but
it is a top priority. As demonstrated on September 11 and
during the numerous other large-scale incidents that have
occurred in the last several years--Hurricane Andrew, which I
was involved in in South Florida, Hurricane Hugo--there has
been a critical need to address communications problems caused
by limited radio spectrum available for public safety use.
Because the spectrum is currently in use by public safety
agencies, it is both fragmented and limited. Agencies from
different and even neighboring jurisdictions are many times
unable to communicate with each other. This communications
failure obviously complicates the ability of law enforcement
and other public safety agencies to coordinate an effective
response in emergency situations.
The IACP urges the Congress and FCC to take immediate steps
to ensure that public safety agencies receive additional radio
spectrum allocations that is sufficient to provide for
interference-free and interoperable communications between
emergency service personnel.
Threat alert protocols need to be established. Finally, a
last area of concern I would like to address before I conclude
this matter in which the Federal Government issues terrorist
threat alerts. After having conversations with Governor Ridge
this Saturday and FBI Director Robert Mueller, it has become
apparent that the establishment of an effective notification
system is imperative. While State and local law enforcement
agencies appreciate receiving threat advisories from the
Federal Government, the vague nature of the information and the
lack of clear response protocols often leave State and local
law enforcement executives uncertain as to what, if any, action
should be taken. This uncertainty is especially troublesome at
a time when communities across the Nation are turning to their
law enforcement agencies for both guidance and protection.
Therefore, the IACP believes that the Office of Homeland
Security, in conjunction with the FBI, the Department of
Justice, and representatives of both State and local law
enforcement, should immediately address this area and develop
clear and concise protocols for issuing threat alerts and
providing guidance for law enforcement responses.
At our recently concluded annual conference in Toronto, the
IACP leadership addressed this critical issue and discussed the
creation of a national threat level and law enforcement
response protocol. This protocol concept, modeled after the
U.S. military threat alert system, calls for the development of
graduated alert systems that would categorize the threat level
confronting the United States and provide guidance as to what
law enforcement actions would be appropriate for each threat
level.
In order to facilitate the discussion of this concept, a
chart outlining the protocol framework is attached to the
record of this discussion. It is the belief of IACP that such a
system would provide State and local law enforcement executives
with a clear understanding of the threat confronting their
communities and the actions required that their agencies must
take in this response.
The events of September 11 have opened a new chapter on
terrorism for all governments and their law enforcement
agencies throughout the entire world. If we are to be
successful in our efforts to combat terrorism, we must work
together, efficiently and effectively. We can no longer let
affiliations or jurisdictional squabbles interfere with our
mission of protecting our most sacred communities, the citizens
we serve who expect in no other fashion and actually demand it
from us.
I thank you on behalf of the IACP for the opportunity to
appear here this morning, and, of course, later on be glad to
answer any questions.
Senator Cleland. Thank you very much, Chief Berger. We will
wait for questions until everybody finishes, but I cannot help
but articulate that I would like to hear you expound a little
bit more on the spectrum problem. As an old Army signal
officer, one radio not talking to another, I cannot raise you,
and the problem is always on the other end. I think probably in
metropolitan Atlanta, what have we got, 68 police departments?
I would be surprised if they were all on one frequency at any
given moment.
Mr. Berger. They are not.
Senator Cleland. That is just an example, but thank you for
that and we will get into that a little bit more. Also, I am
fascinated by the, shall we say, adopting the military model,
threat condition alpha or threat condition beta or 3-2-1 or
whatever. You are right. When a Federal official just says,
``Now you all watch out there, now, you hear. Good luck.'' I
mean, what are you supposed to do with that? You are right, so
we can get into that.
Mr. Tinkham, we are going to wait on Senator Collins, if
you do not mind.
Dr. Caldwell, welcome.
TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL C. CALDWELL,\1\ M.D., M.P.H., COMMISSIONER
OF HEALTH, DUTCHESS COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, NEW YORK, ON
BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF COUNTY AND CITY HEALTH
OFFICIALS (NACCHO)
Dr. Caldwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Cleland, and
Members of the Committee. I am Dr. Michael Caldwell. I am the
Commissioner of Health for Dutchess County in New York, the
home of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Thank you for inviting me to
speak here today on behalf of the National Association of
County and City Health Officials, which represents the 3,000
local public health departments across our country.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Dr. Caldwell appears in the Appendix
on page 129.
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Are we prepared for bioterrorism as a Nation? Not nearly
enough. Though we have made progress and learned important
lessons in the last few years, we have a long way to go to be
able to detect and respond to an act of bioterrorism quickly,
prevent the spread of disease, and save as many lives as
possible. Bioterrorism preparedness requires a combination of
the resources and skills of public health with those of other
public safety and emergency preparedness disciplines.
While public health preparedness is a shared joint
responsibility between the Federal, State, and local
governments, we believe the planning must focus at the local
level and on the local level.
We have identified four core capacities for public health
preparedness for bioterrorism. We need to increase surveillance
and epidemiologic investigation capacity. We need to increase
our laboratory capacity. We need to increase our communications
capacities. We need to increase our planning and response
capacities.
I can tell you, as a local Commissioner of Health in New
York State, that I typically get disease reports that are 2 and
3 years old. That does very little to help me in my planning
for today or the future. We need to develop new data systems
that give us real time data of emerging diseases, not just the
diseases but the surveillance of symptoms which might uncover
patterns of disease or types of diseases. Rather than just
giving me a report with the name already, I want to know what
the symptoms are, because if we see patterns across the
community, that may indicate an outbreak.
I can tell you, a couple of years ago, we dealt with the
problem of West Nile virus in crows. We had so many crows
across New York State, we just did not know what to do with
them all, and certainly when we sent them to our State lab,
they did not quite know what to do with them all, either. They
had to develop quickly a prioritization system. There was not a
reserve capacity.
We saw that again with the anthrax problem. We were quickly
overwhelmed in New York State and across the country with
environmental samples being sent, from a new pair of blue jeans
to some kitty litter to other things that you would think are
maybe not so suspicious, but yet the lab did not have a
priority process set up. They did not have capacity.
You have heard of the Health Alert Network. Well, it is in
its infancy. Only 13 States have all local jurisdictions
connected. We need to have 3,000 local Health Alert Networks so
that we can then take this Federal information and give it to
our localities. Now, do we need one in every health department?
Maybe not. We need to look at regionalization. But every local
jurisdiction must be covered.
What about our planning and response capacity? We need to
perform routine drills. We have heard this over and over again.
And once again, they need to be done from a regional
standpoint.
Local public health departments and their communities are
learning that local partnerships between agencies can be built
and are essential for further progress. But first, these
agencies must know each other and have planned together well in
advance. They should not be exchanging business cards of
introduction during a real crisis, and let me tell you,
Senator, this, unfortunately, has happened.
Local surveillance and response systems will not work
unless we have thoroughly trained professionals to use them and
those people knowing exactly what to do and knowing what the
other people do and do not do and have sufficient practice
doing it in advance. Certain agencies will say, oh, well that
department does that, and that department says, well, I think
that department does it, and so you have gaps, and then others
times you have duplication, where agencies say, no, I do that,
and the other agency will say, oh, no, I do that, too. So we
need to work through all of this.
In Dutchess County, we have been quite busy recently. Yes,
we were devastated by September 11. The spouse of our mayor,
Collette LaFuente in Poughkeepsie, was lost in the financial
district that day. But also, we have been very busy with
anthrax. Whether it was the worker at NBC Studios who lives in
Dutchess County that presented to a local doctor and the doctor
called us up and said, ``What do I do?'' or the father of the
Eagle Scout who just received a congratulatory letter from
Senator Daschle and said, ``This letter was dated on October
15, 2001, the day all the news broke. What do I do with this
letter?'' We are the natural first responders in a case of
suspected bioterrorism.
Your local public health department is on the front line
with the professionals of this distinguished panel. The local
public health system finally has emerged as a core component of
our national security. We are looked to for leadership. We
coordinate response and communication. We provide information
to the community and all involved parties. People expect us to
have action. Get that sample to the lab. What are the tests for
the lab? They want follow-up. They want to know things are
complete and accurate.
You asked me to come here today to tell you what actions
could be taken by the Federal Government to support our efforts
of local public health agencies, and I have two answers. One,
the National Association of County and City Health Officials
already recognizes that the Senate voted to provide $1 billion
for State and local public health capacity building and we
applaud you for that. Thank you. So, yes, we do need financial
resources.
But my county executive, William Steinhaus, wanted me to
send you a message. He said, ``We do not expect the Federal
Government to pay for everything. There is a fair local share
and a State share and we are willing to ante up.'' But let me
tell you that, to date, Dutchess County has not received one
penny of Federal assistance, nor have 55 of our 58 counties,
not one penny of bioterrorism or Health Alert Network
assistance.
But finally, we need technical assistance and consultation.
We do not just need a manual with money. We need someone to
help us, walk us through it. We want the planners from the
Federal Government to come sit with us at our planning meetings
and make sure that we are doing it right.
Overall, we need to strive for a seamless and coordinated
effort from local to Federal, across agencies at the Federal,
State, and local levels, and we want to make sure that everyone
is informed on a continuous basis.
Finally, my colleagues at local public health agencies
across the country know that you appreciate the funds that you
will appropriate for bioterrorism preparedness will be used to
strengthen our collective local public health infrastructure in
many other valuable ways, as well. So thank you for helping to
build a safer and healthier local community.
Senator Cleland. Thank you, Dr. Caldwell. Several images
you gave me there, that when an emergency happens, people in
the business of responding should not be just introducing
themselves at that point with, ``Here is my card. Call me when
you need me,'' that kind of thing. This protocol needs to be
established beforehand. That is a powerful point here in all
this and we want to go back to that. Thank you very much for
your testimony.
I am reading Doris Kearne Goodwin's great Pulitzer Prize
winning book, ``No Ordinary Time,'' and in so many aspects, the
book is like reading yesterday or today's headlines. In terms
of Dutchess County, New York, apparently the only paying job
Eleanor Roosevelt ever had was working for the Office of Civil
Defense in New York.
Mr. Crouse, welcome very much. Thank you.
TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL J. CROUSE,\1\ CHIEF OF STAFF FOR THE
GENERAL PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIRE FIGHTERS
(IAFF)
Mr. Crouse. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the
opportunity to appear before this Committee today. My name is
Michael Crouse and I am the Chief of Staff of the International
Association of Fire Fighters. I am here today representing the
interest and views of our General President, Harold
Schaitberger, and the 245,000 men and women professional fire
fighters, EMTs, and paramedics who are members of the IAFF.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Crouse appears in the Appendix on
page 144.
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I spent 17 years as a fire fighter employed by the Federal
Government protecting U.S. military installations. For 10
years, I was an IAFF District Vice President representing the
interests of those Federal fire fighters. Mr. Chairman, exactly
3 months ago today, our Nation lost 344 of its bravest. For
fire fighters, it is still September 11. Every time the alarm
goes off, we steel ourselves to the possibility that we are
responding to the latest act of terrorism. In the first war of
the 21st Century, the battle lines are drawn in our
communities.
Senator, your home State of Georgia has already suffered
from terrorism, and unfortunately, there are still many high-
profile targets vulnerable. In this war, we must not only
support our troops abroad, but also with equal zeal and
financial resources support our fire fighters who are our
Nation's domestic defenders.
The first thing the Federal Government must do to shore up
our homeland security is to assist local communities with the
hiring of additional fire fighters and providing all fire
fighters with specialized HAZMAT and weapons of mass
destruction training.
Second, establishing a single point of contact to help
localities access the various Federal programs can have a
positive effect on terrorism response.
The first and foremost need of the fire service is adequate
personnel. Today, two-thirds of our fire departments operate
with inadequate staffing. In your own State, Senator,
jurisdictions such as the City of Augusta and Richmond County
operate with only three fire fighters per apparatus. Responding
to a fire with only three people makes it impossible for first
responding units to comply with OSHA's ``two in and two out''
standard for safe fire ground operations and places the lives
of those fire fighters in jeopardy. Congress would never allow
our Army to engage in war with two-thirds of its divisions
understaffed. Incredibly, this is exactly what we are asking
our local fire departments to do every day.
That is why the IAFF, along with the International
Association of Fire Chiefs and several members of Congress have
strongly endorsed the Safer Fire Fighters Act, S. 1617 and H.R.
3185. The Safer Fire Fighters Act uses the procedures
established by the highly successful universal hiring program
for police officers to place 75,000 additional fire fighters in
our communities.
The second most pressing need is specialized training in
weapons of mass destruction and HAZMAT mitigation response.
From the vantage point of front-line emergency responders, the
two crucial components of any WMD or HAZMAT training program
are that training is conducted in a local jurisdiction
incorporating the unique aspects of the communities and that it
uses trainers who are both certified instructors and
professional fire fighters.
Training for a terrorism event in your own community allows
first responders to not only learn the tactics and methods of
effective response, but it also applies these theoretical
concepts to concentrated targets in their jurisdictions. The
value of qualified fire fighters teaching other fire fighters
is in the benefit gained by shared experiences. The bond of
common experiences allows fire fighter instructors to more
effectively communicate the lessons of a training course than,
say, a person from academia or the military.
I am proud to note that the IAFF offers training programs
to fire departments free of charge in terrorism and HAZMAT
response that have all the elements of a successful training
program. Our training utilizes skilled instructors who are both
HAZMAT technicians and certified instructors to train fire
departments to safely and effectively respond to weapons of
mass destruction terrorist attacks. Additionally, our program
conducts the training in the community and incorporates the
unique aspects of the localities.
The IAFF's programs were developed in partnership with the
Department of Justice, Department of Energy, the Department of
Transportation, the Environmental Protection Agency, and Health
and Human Services. We have trained tens of thousands of fire
fighters, both professionally and volunteer fire fighters,
union and unorganized departments. Especially since September
11, the demand for our training program far outpaces our
funding to deliver it. The IAFF can dramatically increase the
number of fire departments trained if our grants from these
various Federal agencies are increased.
We agree that a single point of contact will help
localities. However, clarifying the lead agency's mission is
more important than determining which agency should serve as
the point of contact. While there is unquestionably a need for
a Federal agency to coordinate the various counterterrorism
programs that exist throughout the government, we do not
believe that this lead agency should subsume the functions of
those other agencies. There is value in several agencies being
involved in terrorism response.
For instance, in the area of training, many of the so-
called duplicative programs are, in fact, specialized training
to address specific needs. EAP, DOT, and DOE all offer
hazardous material training. However, the EAP program focuses
on responding to HAZMAT incidents at Superfund sites. Likewise,
the Department of Transportation's program focuses on the
unique challenges posed by the release of hazardous materials
while in transport.
Last, the Department of Energy's program is specific to
HAZMAT issues at nuclear facilities. Each setting presents
distinct challenges and needs to be addressed in separate
training programs.
Too often, the fire service has been neglected when it
comes to planning for and devoting resources to respond to
terrorism. Our ranks are thin and reinforcements are needed
quickly. Congress must take the lead by providing the fire
service with the resources to ensure adequate staffing so that
we can operate safely and effectively and providing fire
fighters the necessary training so that we will be able to play
our role in fighting the war on terrorism.
Thank you for the time to present our views of the IAFF and
I will be available for questions.
Senator Cleland. Thank you very much, and thank you to the
fire fighters around America.
You may have heard me a little bit earlier today. I am
introducing legislation, I think, that might be of some
interest to you and maybe respond to some of the things you
just pointed out. It is called the HERO Act of 2001, which will
allow DOT, the Department of Transportation, to access $15
million in surplus funds that have accumulated in something
called the emergency preparedness grants program, accumulated
due to appropriations restrictions.
The purpose of my legislation is to disburse the surplus,
the $15 million, to State and local governments for hazardous
material training of men and women who are at ground zero
during emergencies involving hazardous materials. The HERO Act
would also authorize $1 million of the surplus to go to your
organization, the International Association of Fire Fighters,
to help fund the very specialized training programs you just
mentioned that you provide free of charge, and that now those
programs, in terms of training, are so much in demand you
cannot really afford the demand on you. But this would provide
you $1 million to provide this kind of training free of charge
to local fire departments.
This apparently, according to your statistics, will
quadruple the number of fire fighters who actually receive this
hazardous material training, is that correct?
Mr. Crouse. Yes, sir, that is.
Senator Cleland. Thank you very much.
Senator Collins is wrapped around an axle in a conference
meeting on education and she apologizes for not being able to
return right now for your statement, Mr. Tinkham. Why do we not
proceed with your statement and know that Senator Collins would
love to be here if she could and she will make it when she can.
TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL JOSEPH E. TINKHAM, II,\1\ ADJUTANT
GENERAL OF MAINE AND COMMISSIONER OF THE MAINE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE, VETERANS AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
Mr. Tinkham. Very well. Thank you, Senator Cleland. I am
Joseph E. Tinkham, II, here from the great State of Maine, and
I am honored to have been called to testify before the
Committee today.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Tinkham appears in the Appendix
on page 150.
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In my professional life, I serve as both the Adjutant
General of Maine, commanding the Army and Air National Guards,
and also as the Commissioner for the Department of Defense,
Veterans, and Emergency Management. Additionally, since the
events of September 11, I have been tasked by Governor Angus
King to coordinate Maine's governmental plans and procedures to
protect our citizens from terrorist attack.
I appear before you here today in my civilian commissioner
capacity. I would like to thank this Committee, and
particularly Senator Collins, for the opportunity to appear
here today.
The State of Maine presents those who would wish to attack
us both a variety of options for illegal entry into our Nation
and a significant number of vulnerable targets upon which to
wreak their evil intentions. Maine is virtually an open door to
the United States. She has, with her rugged, jagged shores,
over 3,000 miles of Atlantic coastline and is the State with
the longest international border with Canada after Alaska. We
have 86 Canadian-American points of entry, most of which are
unmanned and uncontrolled, save for a sign instructing the
visitor where to report for Customs processing.
Our vulnerabilities are many and diverse. Maine has several
international and domestic airports, including 250 uncontrolled
airstrips just moments from Canada. We have military bases, to
include unprotected radar and communications installations.
There are two major shipyards serving the U.S. Navy and other
national defense industry facilities in Maine. We have over 800
dams, 49 of which are large enough to produce electricity.
There are gas and oil pipelines criss-crossing the State. We
have a deactivated nuclear power plant on our unprotected shore
with its spent fuel rods stored on site, and the second largest
petroleum tank farm on the East Coast is on the shores of our
most important commercial harbor in the very heart of our
largest urban population center. The current situation in Maine
lends the phrase, rich in diversity, a whole new meaning.
On the evening of September 11, in the Emergency Operations
Center of the Maine Emergency Management Agency, Governor King
and I participated in a brainstorming session with our
emergency response team to identify possible threats from
terrorist attack. We listed literally hundreds of
vulnerabilities to terrorism within our borders.
Over the course of the next few days, I scrubbed this list,
with the concurrence of the governor, to identify just those
targets that would result in either a large loss of life or
environmental catastrophe. We have some 25 vulnerabilities in
Maine fitting that category.
We then formed a joint National Guard-Maine State Police
security team to visit these 25 sites, and in coordination with
local law enforcement, assess their specific weaknesses to
terrorist attack. We found that security measures, while
probably sufficient for any perceived threat as we understood
them on September 10, were not adequate after September 12.
We found one site, Senator, that takes some rather nasty
chemicals and stores them. They transfer them from rail cars
into a storage facility, and then when the paper industry needs
these chemicals, they call for them. The fence was downtrodden.
There was no security guard. Our security team asked the
manager, ``What do you do in an emergency,'' and he pointed to
this button on the wall. He said, ``We ring that siren. The
employees are instructed to run outside, look at the windsock,
and then run in the opposite direction.''
On many of these sites, we wish desperately to put in place
an armed security force, and while we had the manpower and the
equipment, we lacked the financial resources. We had to satisfy
ourselves with developing plans to guard these sites, were we
to receive the intelligence to do so, and regretfully, plans to
respond, to pick up the pieces and to put out the fires, if you
will, were the sites attacked without warning.
I am convinced that lack of monetary resources greatly
impedes our ability to address real security concerns in Maine.
On September 11, there was no line in the State or in the
county or in the local budgets reading ``national defense.''
And while we in the States take great pains to protect our
citizens from the natural perils which may befall us,
protection from attack by a foreign enemy upon our people in
their homes and in their places of business has for almost two
centuries been within the purview of the Federal Government.
Most of us with experience in emergency management were
convinced, wrongly thus far, as it turns out, that the Federal
Government through FEMA or through some other vehicle would
come to our assistance.
Large special appropriations were being passed, it appeared
to us, for that very purpose. The U.S. Capitol complex was
being secured, as was the Kennedy Space Center and Federal
courthouses. The airports and the airline industries and even
the concessionaires at Reagan National Airport were receiving
assistance. Surely, help for the States must be, and I hope is,
forthcoming.
What do we require? We need financial assistance, for the
most part, and the flexibility to tailor its expenditure to our
unique needs in Maine. We do not need a lot of money in the
larger scheme of things, something approximating $25 million
which we would share with local governments to strengthen our
vulnerabilities.
In conclusion, I would just like to say that, arguably, the
best American contemporary artist of the mid-20th Century was
Norman Rockwell. During the dark days of World War II, he
painted a series of works he called the Four Freedoms. Perhaps
you know them. As I recall, the first three depicted freedom of
religion, freedom of speech, and freedom from want. The last
painting has an American mother and father gazing lovingly down
upon their sleeping children tucked safely into their beds. The
father holds a folded newspaper with a headline from the war.
The children sleep blissfully, safe and unaware of the terrors
ravishing much of the world. Rockwell titled this painting,
``Freedom from Fear,'' and that, ladies and gentlemen, is the
most basic responsibility of government on every level, the
responsibility of ensuring that our citizens, our children, can
live peacefully in their homes, free from fear.
To that end, we must strive, setting all else aside until
we have done so, and to that end, we in Maine, and I am sure
other States, as well, are striving mightily. We have the will
and the ability to counter most of these terrorist threats to
our citizens and we are in the best position to do so, but we
lack the financial resources and the means to gather the
intelligence on threats from outside our borders. For that
help, we turn to the solemn and enduring contract we signed in
Philadelphia in 1787, which was, in great measure, to provide
for the common defense. It is time we dust off that most
honorable pledge.
Again, my thanks to you, Senator Cleland, and to the
Committee for affording me this opportunity to share my
thoughts.
Senator Cleland. Thank you very much, Mr. Tinkham, and we
thank you for those eloquent words. I cannot help but feel that
there is a powerful connection between you and Dr. Caldwell. It
was Franklin Roosevelt right out of Dutchess County that had
the famous four freedoms speech in 1940-1941 that so impressed
Mr. Rockwell that he did those four freedoms for the Saturday
Evening Post, and I have a copy of those in my office, so I
thank you for reiterating that.
I have often thought in the wake of September 11 about
Franklin Roosevelt's comment in 1933 that the only thing we
have to fear is fear itself, blind, unreasonable fear, and, of
course, that is what the terrorist deals in, fear, not knowing
where the next strike or incoming round or whatever might
occur. That is part of the psychology of dealing with all this,
but thank you for bringing that up.
We have Senator Levin with us today. I am glad you could
join us. We have a distinguished group of panelists here. They
have all issued opening statements, and if you would like to
issue an opening statement or make a comment, we would be glad
to recognize you. Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I made a
very brief comment before, which was relative to the lack of
cooperation between the FBI and local law enforcement. I hear a
lot of it. It was a very pungent comment, the one that I heard
before which had to do with a local law enforcement guy saying
he would rather get sticks in his eye than to work with the FBI
in an investigation, and I have heard that, I am afraid, from
many local law enforcement people.
I would like to talk to Chief Berger, perhaps, to start
with. I have a New York Times article here from November. I do
not know if you have been asked about this or not, Chief, but
you were quoted as saying this, ``that there is real
frustration relative to the cooperation level between local law
enforcement and the FBI.'' You said that even after September
11, you were still hearing complaints from fellow chiefs. ``I
do not think that we can afford to have these impediments to
information any longer. Some of these terrorists were living in
our communities.''
And there are a lot of other quotes in this article, as a
matter of fact. The chief of Portland, Maine, ``I understand
what the FBI is about. It is all about culture and elitism,''
and on and on. It is really quite an extraordinary series of
quotations from people who are frustrated in working with the
FBI, and one of them happens now to be the police chief in Ann
Arbor, Chief Oates, who I have talked to, who used to be with
the New York Police Department, who had a lot of work
assignments with the FBI and just was totally frustrated in
terms of working out joint cooperative ventures, getting
information, getting intelligence, which is important, to local
police. This is simply not shared.
Now, this may be a matter of culture. It may be a matter of
procedures being different. It may be bureaucracy. It may be--I
am not sure what all the reasons for it are, but it obviously
has been going on a long time. Again, according to this
article, it is, ``Since the days of J. Edgar Hoover, State and
local officials have complained that the Bureau is high-handed
with its local counterparts and that the FBI looks for any
excuse not to share even the most innocuous intelligence
information.''
So, Chief, if you have not already been asked about this,
let me ask you, is it still true? Are there any improvements
you see? Is there anything we can do to change that culture or
whatever it is?
Mr. Berger. I have seen drastic improvements in the area
that the director himself, Director Mueller, has been very
open. He came to Toronto for our international conference and
was very genuinely, not only embarrassed, but open to any
suggestions that we, the International, or any law enforcement
had.
As you know, he has empaneled a committee of local law
enforcement, State, Federal people to basically advise him on a
one-to-one basis. I think that is very, very important. I
believe his heart is open. I do not believe this is just
mirrors. I truly believe that he wants to improve this. I know
there are some pending changes to actually put a liaison person
specifically there. He or she would communicate with law
enforcement on a need-be basis.
Let me just say, I have been in law enforcement 28 years. I
was the commander of the Miami homicide unit for years. And I
can tell you, there has always been this culture in law
enforcement, a need to know. Homicide did not talk to robbery.
Robbery did not talk to burglary. It is not just a Federal
problem. It has been a law enforcement problem, and I wish I
could say where we could trace it back to, but there has always
been this need to know. Certainly with national security, this
ups the stakes. We certainly do not want to put critical
information for distribution.
What we talked about with the Bureau that we were very
frustrated with was the fact that, initially after September
11, there was a tremendous surgence of FBI agents going to the
communities, securing evidence--as you know, the residents
were, many of them in Florida and throughout the country. And
in this urgency to get the job done, what was happening is news
media would see the Bureau at certain locations and then mayors
and citizens would talk to their police chief and say, ``Wait a
second, why is the FBI in my neighborhood, in my building, in
my condominium?'' And, of course, the response is, ``I have no
idea,'' and that is very frustrating.
That is what we told our special agent in charge of the
Miami office, our U.S. Attorney down in the greater Florida
area. That is what my members told their special agents in
charge of the various offices. Just give us the courtesy of
telling us that we are going to be in your community and we are
effecting, whether it is a search warrant, whether an arrest,
just so that we know. We do not need to know in many cases the
particulars for that arrest. Certainly, they have the people
power to take care of that particular incident or search
warrant or whatever that needs.
But that is that frustration, and I saw the frustration
from the local special agent in charge, Hector Fitzgeros,
because, basically, after September 11, he was doing truly a
million things, trying to get the job done as quickly as he
could and the people that work for him, and many times, those
things occur where you just do not talk to people and it is
wrong. It is wrong because of the pressures that each one of us
have in our individual communities, who we have to report to,
and it is just basic information.
I think there is going to be--I know there is going to be a
tremendous change in that attitude to at least share initial
information, and then later on, as we have talked about these
security clearances, maybe more specific information regarding
operatives in individual communities.
Senator Levin. By the way, I have talked to Director
Mueller about this issue shortly after he was sworn in, because
I was so bothered by it, and even talked to local law
enforcement and they feel so strongly about this disconnect
that I felt that I just had to really meet with him on this
subject, which I did. And he, again, as you pointed out, I
think, indicated a determination to change that culture and to
improve those relationships and it is very important that
happen.
I do not know how many tips came into the FBI following the
attack on the Trade Center and the Pentagon, but it is a huge
number. I think it was over 100,000, although I----
Mr. Berger. Over 100,000.
Senator Levin. There is no way, I do not think, that the
FBI can possibly even screen these. I do not think they are
large enough. I think they have to rely on local law
enforcement to do it. Are they relying on local law enforcement
to screen, in some preliminary way, at least, the 100,000 or so
tips which have come in since the September 11 attacks, do you
know?
Mr. Berger. The answer to that is yes, but I cannot speak
nationwide. I know in Florida, that has already started. We
have developed regions, regions based on county boundaries.
Those regions are actually effecting the following up of many
of these leads that are occurring.
The one thing we do not want, though, is to be given tasks
that are just not important, just this is a preliminary task,
and I have echoed that to powers to be. It would be insulting
to use local law enforcement just to go ahead and follow up
these non-important things.
Senator Levin. Does the same problem exist in terms of lack
of sharing of information with other Federal agencies, or has
it been true with the Border Patrol, DEA, Customs, U.S.
Attorneys, or Coast Guard? Is this true generally or has it
been sort of something which is more identified with the FBI?
Mr. Berger. I certainly do not feel qualified, only because
all my experience has been at the local level. But having dealt
with task forces, having dealt with the HIDA programs down in
South Florida, certainly, there are communications problems
even between Federal agencies that work with themselves on a
regular basis, again, this kind of concept of ``need to know.''
We need to work harder. I think that is something, as you
mentioned, that is a culture. It is ingrained. It is ego. A lot
of it is ego, and that is at all levels.
Senator Levin. On these task forces, these joint task
forces, are they always chaired by a Federal official?
Mr. Berger. The answer to that is no.
Senator Levin. Are they rotating chairs? Sometimes it is a
State or local official that chairs it?
Mr. Berger. Down in South Florida, there happens to be a
Sheriff of Broward County, but there are two co-chairs, a State
officer and a U.S. Attorney is the other co-chair.
Senator Levin. I am glad to hear that. I think it is
useful. I do not know that has been true, generally, until
recently, but if it has not, I am glad to see the change and I
hope that is true across the board, because the local
contribution here is major and we have got to find a way to
coordinate better and that is what Governor Ridge's challenge
is, in part.
Just one other question. I do not know if any of you might
have information on this, and that has to do with the fact that
we have, in the private sector, companies that specialize in
responses to disasters, including pollution, biological
problems, and spills. Are any of you in a position to know
whether or not we have got good coordination between our local,
Federal agencies and the private sector which has been focused
on these issues? We talk about biological or chemical attacks.
There are spill pollution problems which have been focused on
for a long time which have a lot of similarities. They are not
exactly the same, but a lot of similarities. Would any of you
be in a position to know that or have you commented on that?
[No response.]
Senator Levin. OK. That is something, then, that, Mr.
Chairman, I will take up with the member of our first panel
that I was not able to come here to attend, and I want to thank
you, Mr. Chairman, and to thank our panel.
Senator Cleland. Thank you very much.
Chief Berger, I would like to follow up here. Mayor Morial
just sat right there in that seat less than an hour ago----
Mr. Berger. It is still warm. [Laughter.]
Senator Cleland. He said, we must not only think about
response, and we had been talking about FEMA, and I think
Senator Lieberman and Senator Specter have legislation, which I
think I am actually a cosponsor of, to maybe create an Agency
of Homeland Defense with a budget and people and so forth and
part of the core of that is the response aspect of FEMA.
And the mayor said, we must not only think about response,
we must think about prevention, and I was just sitting here
thinking, he has got the Super Bowl, a big target, all the
things that terrorists like, one particular place where a lot
of people are going to be. How do you work on prevention? It
seems to me it was the same challenge of September 11, not only
response, but intelligence to pick up the threat or threats
that might come your way.
In other words, if you are the Chief of Police in New
Orleans, it seems to me that one would love to have any
credible intelligence the FBI or any other agency of the
Federal Government might have certainly passed on to him so he
can evaluate it and take some action.
I do not see how we can prevent a terrorist attack unless
we have better intelligence. If you do not have better
communication, State and local to Federal, particularly in the
FBI's case, they are the Nation's CIA. Outside the borders of
the United States, it is the CIA, and that is a whole other
kettle of fish, whether the CIA and the FBI properly
coordinate. But if you are chief of police anywhere in America
and you have got a target, or if you are the General here and
you are sitting on miles of untended border and nuclear
installations and so forth, you have got to be looking for all
the battlefield intelligence that the FBI, particularly, could
provide you so you can put your people on alert and check out
some things.
So in terms of prevention, I think the key to that is
intelligence, but if you are not sharing information, I do not
know how we can help our chiefs of police prevent things. Is
that a view that you support?
Mr. Berger. I have a lot of experience in that. When Pope
John Paul, remember, he came to America--he has come a couple
of times, but the one he came down to South Florida, I was
responsible for his security when he had his very large mass. I
have been involved with Super Bowls of the past when they were
held at the Orange Bowl. That is how long ago it was.
I can tell you, in specific events, I think pre-planning,
we do a very good job. I have never seen Secret Service nor the
Bureau or anyone that may have intelligence information ever
share it. Of course, I would not know if it was not there, but
on those specific events, I have even run Grand Prix, those, we
have many pre-meetings before. Many things are worked out.
Escape routes are worked out. We can isolate the event and plan
specifically for it.
I was just in Salt Lake City. As you know, the Winter
Olympics will be there. The pre-planning started 2 years ago.
Those things, I think we do a very good job in coordinating
that. Certainly the World Trade Center was something that
probably, without intelligence to talk about, we could have
really never planned for something to that effect.
But I assure you that security at this upcoming Super Bowl
or any major event, as the Olympics will follow that, shortly
after, will be premium. I am convinced of that, that it will be
a very safe place for Americans to visit and a very peaceful
venue during those situations. But that is because, like I
said, we know we have the purpose, the intent has been
designed, and that is our mission, and we do very good at
creating security for missions.
Senator Cleland. Thank you. That is good to know. Mr.
Tinkham, thank you very much for being here.
Mr. Tinkham. Yes, sir.
Senator Cleland. Your description of your ``security
situation'' is quite challenging, shall we say.
Mr. Tinkham. Well, we here with a military background,
Senator, as you know, would note that when you try to guard
everything, you guard nothing, and so we must rely on
intelligence. Intelligence is one of those things that we can
gather perhaps bits and pieces of what is going on inside our
border, but we need to turn to the Federal Government for
anything outside the border and put the pieces together.
I know that while, as far as we know, there has been no
specific intelligence threats in Maine, it would be very
comforting to hear that every day. In Vietnam when we put
patrols out or we put out outposts, they would report back
periodically that things were negative. It was heartening to
know that at least they were still out there watching. That
would be helpful, if our intelligence gathering agencies could
at least on a daily basis say, hello, and by the way, we have
not forgotten you up there. We have checked and there is
currently no specific threat to Maine. I think our people would
appreciate that, more to counter that fear in their homes.
But as far as law enforcement is concerned, I have seen
barriers fall in the last 3 months that I thought would never
fall. I mean, the cooperation between many departments in both
State and Federal Government and between the various levels of
government has been much greater than it has ever been in my
experience since the events of September 11.
Senator Cleland. Thank you. That is good to know.
Dr. Caldwell, talk to me a little bit about the CDC. You
are there at the bottom of the threat, in effect.
Dr. Caldwell. Or the top.
Senator Cleland. That is right. That is one way to look at
it. You are closest to the problem and the CDC is, in effect,
the B-52s on call up there.
Dr. Caldwell. See, we look at the CDC as the foundation and
we look at ourselves as the eyes and the ears. It is the
patients who walk into doctors' offices or present to school
clinic and school nurses. There may be some unusual symptoms or
questions or anxiety or fears, and then they call the local
health department. The local health department then, if they
are lucky, can quickly go to their Internet site and look at
the Health Alert Network and immediately transmit some
information, answer a question, call somebody up from the CDC
to ask some advice.
So I think we are, in some ways, an extension of the CDC,
so we get frustrated at the local level when we see the CDC
having struggles with sister Federal agencies, because at the
local level, we try not to replicate those problems. And I
think that you will find a diverse number of good and not-so-
good relationships at the local level.
In Dutchess County, I could say we are very fortunate with
the leadership of my county executive. He has been able to put
in place a position of an epidemiologist in Dutchess County,
New York, population of 280,000. There are a number of States
that do not have an epidemiologist. So on January 1, I will
have a bioterrorism coordinator.
But even luckier than that was 2 years ago, my county
executive recognized with West Nile virus we needed a
biostatistician. We never had one before. We used that person
on September 11. We reassigned her with this capacity and said,
you are now our bioterrorism coordinator. When this other
position opens, you can go into that.
So what we need to do is try to replicate that, maybe not
at all 3,000 local health departments, but at enough of them so
that they are all covered, and we need that at the local level
because if you just, as I say, give us money or give us
guidelines and don't provide us with the staff capacity to be
able to know what to do with them, that become a real problem.
One more example. Let us say there is a problem in Dutchess
County or in New York City, since we have about 5,000 or more
commuters to and from New York City each day. Somebody comes in
with some unexplained symptoms and suddenly it turns out to be
smallpox or something horrible like that. Well, I have
confidence that the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile, these
pushpacks will be activated. They will get there in 7 hours.
But we are going to have to know what to do with them. ``Dr.
Caldwell, the pushpacks are here. Where do we put them?''
And it is not just me. It is departments of emergency
planning--fire and police. But I think for now, we have really
emerged as equals and I want to thank you for putting us on
this panel because I think, before, people did not recognize
the value of local public health. So the CDC has the beginnings
of a foundation. We are not starting from scratch.
Let me tell you one final comment about Health Alert
Network funding in the State of New York. We got a few hundred
thousand dollars, the State of New York, and in the law, it was
crafted that some of it must go to the local level. Well, I
just told you 55 out of 58 counties got nothing. But I can
understand the States' predicament. They need this much money
and they got this much.
So they said, if we take this much and give it to all of
the counties, you will basically have enough to print
pamphlets. So let us take this amount and try to create a model
in one or two counties. Let us get the State up to speed, and
that is what they have done. But now we need to replicate that
across all of New York State and across the country so that we
do not leave any jurisdiction behind.
So we have a lot of work to do, and one more quote from
Franklin Roosevelt, he said, ``Never before have we had so
little time to do so much,'' and that is, I think, the way we
all feel. We all feel a little behind in public health, but we
know we are on the right course, and with your assistance and
help, we know we are going to get there, not in a 5- or 10-year
plan, but in a 5-month plan.
Senator Cleland. It is interesting that you just said that,
because 3 years ago, a private group that supports the CDC in
Atlanta came to me and they said, ``We have got a 10-year
plan.'' This is 3 years ago. And they said, ``But we really
need to make it a 5-year plan because the CDC is vulnerable to
a terrorist attack, it is spread out in 22 different offices,
some of them date back to World War II, we have got rain coming
through the roof on million-dollar computers and on world class
scientists. This is an untenable situation.''
So I went to work on the problem and we got money each
year. But then all of a sudden comes September 11. The point
is, we cannot wait 10 years to upgrade the CDC. We cannot wait
5 years. So I have called for a Manhattan Project to, in 36
months, dramatically upgrade the CDC in every sense of the
word--facilities, labs, communication capability, and security.
So I think we are on the right track here. You are right. I
do not think we have a whole lot of time to wait.
Dr. Caldwell. And strengthening the CDC will strengthen the
local public health department, but you cannot leave us out
completely, out of the funding stream. What we have seen with
previous Health Alert Network funding, so much has been
siphoned off at the Federal and State level, just a trickle has
gotten to us. But that, as I said, is just because of the
amount that was given. I think they made the best choices that
they had available, but now they need to do it all.
Senator Cleland. Mr. Crouse, any final comment as we wrap
up the hearing here?
Mr. Crouse. No, sir. Thank you.
Senator Cleland. Dr. Caldwell, Senator Lieberman has asked
me to ask a question. You identified the need to integrate
public health experts and their activities with that of other
emergency responders. How can that best be done, and is there
an appropriate Federal role?
Dr. Caldwell. We have planning going on at the local level
all the time. I think that if local public health agencies are
not being included in those plannings, that they need to hear
the message that they should be included. I believe that they
are, and if they were not before, they are being included now.
But more importantly, I mentioned to you that we need
technical support, not just money but technical support. I find
it valuable as we go through our planning committees to have
somebody from the FBI and the CDC sitting at those planning
committees with us from time to time to help ensure that we
have a standardization, this protocol development, I think,
that Mayor Morial was speaking of earlier, so that every
community will respond in a similar way based upon its
population. But I think that we need to hear redundant messages
going back and forth from the local up to the Feds and then
from the Feds down to the locals.
Set a good example. Let us see the Federal Government have
interagency collaboration, and just like kids who see their
parents do bad things tend to follow those behaviors, maybe if
we see them do good things, it will trickle down to us. But let
us see, set by example, have some of those Federal agencies get
together, sitting at our local table helping us plan locally.
So for the Dutchess County Government's comprehensive
emergency response plan, we can have representatives from the
Department of Justice, the CDC, etc., with us, and I say not at
every meeting, but at least to have a presence so we are not
handing those business cards out the day that that disaster is
there.
Part of the problem, as well, is people do rotate over
time, positions. These personal relationships, if they are
there, as I think that Mayor Morial said before, they work. If
they are not there, they do not work. We should not have to
rely solely on personal relationships for our Nation's defense.
I need as Commissioner of Health of Dutchess County to have a
list of all the positions I need to know and who is in those
positions and make sure they have my business card, the local
FBI director, the regional Health and Human Services director,
etc.
And I think that is a beginning for us to know who we
should get to know. Then it is my responsibility if I do not.
But if we all have that list, I am not just sort of sitting
around saying, gee, I think that would be a good person to
know, or maybe I will call up my colleague in Orange, County,
New York, see if they know their person, etc.
So we need guidelines, and I think they are coming around,
but we need to hear them over and over again. It has to become
a natural way of doing business and we are a long way from
that.
Senator Cleland. Thank you very much. That is one of the
reasons we are having these series of hearings about
coordination, cooperation, and communication of Federal
agencies along with our local entities.
We thank you all very much for your patience and for coming
today to testify. The record will remain open for a week after
the close of the hearing.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:32 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR BUNNING
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am pleased to be here today as we discuss the role of state and
local governments in homeland security.
The events of the past 3 months have illustrated how important it
is for Federal, state and local governments to work together in
responding to terrorist attacks.
On September 11, our country responded to one of the worst
terrorist attacks in our nation's history. Within a month, we were
attacked again--this time by someone sending anthrax through the mail.
Since that time, this Committee has held several hearings on
security, including improving the security of our ports and airports,
combating bioterrorism, and protecting our mail.
Today we are looking at the local role in homeland security. State
and local governments have tremendous responsibility in protecting
their citizens.
Many times, their employees--the police officers, firemen and
women, and other emergency personnel--are the first to respond to a
disaster.
In light of recent events, many of our state and local governments,
along with the Federal Government, are now taking a second look at the
disaster plans currently in place to handle a terrorist attack or
disaster.
Many communities and states will need to make some changes so they
can adequately protect their citizens. The Federal Government will also
be making some changes, particularly through the new office of homeland
security.
Several of the witnesses we will hear from today will discuss ways
the government can better respond to attacks, including hiring more
personnel, providing better communications and coordination, and
providing more funding for various programs.
As we all work to strengthen our security, it is important to
remember that each level of government has an important role to play,
and that we do need to work together to make sure we get the job done.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today, and I thank
them for being here today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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