[Senate Hearing 107-612]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 107-612
DEFENDING AMERICA'S TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME AND DRUGS
of the
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 16, 2001
__________
Serial No. J-107-44
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
81-246 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 2002
____________________________________________________________________________
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COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont, Chairman
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware STROM THURMOND, South Carolina
HERBERT KOHL, Wisconsin CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin JON KYL, Arizona
CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York MIKE DeWINE, Ohio
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
JOHN EDWARDS, North Carolina MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky
Bruce A. Cohen, Majority Chief Counsel and Staff Director
Sharon Prost, Minority Chief Counsel
Makan Delrahim, Minority Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Crime and Drugs
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware, Chairman
HERBERT KOHL, Wisconsin CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky
George Ellard, Majority Chief Counsel
Rita Lari, Minority Chief Counsel
C O N T E N T S
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STATEMENTS OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS
Page
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., a U.S. Senator from the State of
Delaware....................................................... 1
Grassley, Hon. Charles E., a U.S. Senator from the State of Iowa. 4
Schumer, Hon. Charles E., a U.S. Senator from the State of New
York........................................................... 6
WITNESSES
Beatty, Jeffrey K., President and Chief Executive Officer, Total
Security Services International, Marietta, Georgia............. 19
Brown, Donald E., Professor and Chair, Department of Systems
Engineering, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia. 17
Chrestman, Tony, President, Ruan Transport, Des Moines, Iowa..... 22
Jenkins, Brian M., Senior Advisor to the President, RAND
Corporation, Santa Monica, California.......................... 14
Parker, Hon. Mike, Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works),
Department of the Army, Washington, D.C........................ 10
DEFENDING AMERICA'S TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE
----------
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 16, 2001
United States Senate,
Subcommittee on Crime and Drugs,
Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:37 a.m., in
room SD-226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R.
Biden, Jr., chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Biden, Schumer, and Grassley.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., A U.S. SENATOR
FROM THE STATE OF DELAWARE
Chairman Biden. The hearing will come to order. I thank the
witnesses for their patience and for their willingness to be
here.
Welcome to this morning's hearing on Defending America's
Transportation Infrastructure. As you know, only the initial
part of this hearing will be open to the public. I want to
explain straight up front the reason for this for the press.
There is no classified information, there is no information
that I am aware of that any witness is about to tell us about
any imminent attack. They are not in a position to know that,
even if there were. I don't want you to think the closing of
this hearing has anything to do with the idea that we know
something is about to happen and we have decided that we have
to keep that quiet, because some press have raised that
question. It has nothing to do with that.
What it has to do with is there is going to be an open
statement, a public statement made by each of the witnesses,
but we want to get into some detail about the vulnerabilities
of the system. And although it is probable that the full-blown
terrorist organization or organizations would understand what
those vulnerabilities are and would not learn much by anything
we said publicly, what we are concerned about is the prospect
of copycat folks and screwballs out there who have not thought
of some of these vulnerabilities.
I realize it is a delicate balance here. I have been a
Senator now for 29 years. Other then the 10 years of being on
the Intelligence Committee, I don't recall closing many
hearings at all, but I don't want to make this a bigger deal
than it is in terms of why it is being closed.
The second reason that we have decided to close it,
speaking for myself, is that I think we are doing a pretty good
job unintentionally of scaring the living devil out of the
American people about things that could happen.
Our job is to determine what could happen; our job is to
look at the worst-case scenario. Many of those worst-case
scenarios are highly, highly, highly improbable. Not a subject
for this hearing today is the issue of, for example, anthrax
out of airplanes, and so on.
The way we talk about it, most Delawareans think that all
anybody would have to do is get a hold of a crop duster and
fill it up with anthrax, like grass seed, and spread it over a
large population and tens of thousands of people are going to
be affected. Putting anthrax in aerosol form is incredibly
difficult. They wouldn't be sending it in the mail if they were
able to do it otherwise.
It is the same way with smallpox. The prospect of an
individual terrorist getting access to smallpox and infecting
tens of thousands of people is highly unlikely. Is it a worst-
case? Yes. Is it possible? Yes, but it is about as possible as
your being struck by lightning twice in the same day.
Again, I think it is important that we not inadvertently,
in doing our job, which we have to do, unnecessarily alarm the
American people. I am going to say something that my staff will
be very upset that I say, but I believe very firmly that my
granddaughters are going to write about this in their school
reports as an episode in American history, not as a fundamental
shift in American history.
So I just want to sort of keep this on the straight and
narrow, be level-headed about it and put it in perspective. But
I do want to be able to ask each of the witnesses, who
collectively have a great deal of experience dealing with these
issues, some of the worst-case possibilities.
Maybe it is appropriate in the sense that it need not be
classified and it is appropriate in the sense that Americans
would have a right to know it. There is nothing in particular
that we are aware of that is about to happen anywhere, but it
just seems to me unnecessary to do that now. We may decide
after the hearing to declassify the whole hearing--not
declassify, but take it all public based on what we have
learned.
So as I said, only the initial portion of the hearing will
be open to the public. Pursuant to Senate rules, we will close
the hearing after some initial testimony to allow the expert
witnesses to speak freely to the subcommittee regarding
potential threats to the transportation infrastructure.
It has now been over a month since the tragic events of
September 11, and during that time we have heard many speeches
memorializing the losses of that day. There is nothing more
that I can say, and I suspect Senator Grassley can say, to
speak to the profound loss that those thousands now of family
members dealing with the loss that occurred on the 11th are
undergoing.
Many of us know from personal experience when you get that
phone call it is like your chest turns into a black hole and
you are being sucked inside it. And there is not much any of us
can do, except to express our sympathies and guarantee our
support, not just support but our long-term support and
commitment to those families.
What we can do and what we have been doing in the Senate
and the House, and the White House as well, is to work as hard
as we can to prevent future terrorist attacks and if, in fact,
God forbid, they occurred, to diminish the damage they can do.
We have recently passed bills to make life harder for those
who commit terrorist acts. We have passed the antiterrorism
bill that will help law enforcement suck the oxygen out of the
air that these sons-of-guns breathe. We have passed a law to
make air travel safer, and I am sure we will continue to
improve on that so that our own airlines will not again be
turned into weapons against the American people.
Now, we need to focus on the other areas of potential
vulnerability. In so doing, we need to think ahead of the
terrorists, think of the next step and not just the last
attack. The horse is out of the barn when it comes to the
airlines. We are backfilling now to prevent it from happening,
but we will hopefully get ahead of the curve here before the
horse gets out of the barn on some other means of surface
transportation. We need to stop it before it happens, if at all
possible.
We need to think of the ways terrorists can attack. Before
September 11, few people thought someone would use a commercial
airliner as a missile aimed at our buildings. But in light of
the events of September 11, much attention has been paid in the
last month to the need for enhanced security and criminal
penalties in our Nation's aviation system. But as was noted in
a recent New York Times editorial, ``airports and airplanes are
like Fort Knox when compared to other forms of transport.''
These hearings will focus on the extent to which security
vulnerabilities exist in non-aviation transportation. That is
because today we need to anticipate the threat that may come
not just in the belly of a plane, but in the hold of a ship or
in the dark of a tunnel or the span of a bridge.
Each day, tens of thousands of companies move tons of
cargo, much of it hazardous, over the Nation's railroads,
waterways and highways. Countless additional tons of cargo
arrive daily in U.S. ports of entry. More importantly, millions
of Americans use surface transportation to reach their
workplaces, visit their loved ones, and return to their homes.
Our modes of surface and sub-surface transportation may not
be keeping up with the security advances that we are seeing in
the air. For example, it has recently been reported that 98
percent of all cargo containers enter U.S. ports without any
inspection. As one commentator has noted, ``We are now
experiencing the dark side of a transport system in which
efficiency has trumped public security.''
As I recently noted on the floor of the United States
Senate, when an Amtrak Metroliner train and an Amtrak AmFleet
train are in a tunnel at the same time--and this is often the
case--there are more people in that confined space than five
full 747 aircraft.
I am not an expert on these issues and I am not prepared to
measure the extent of the problem for myself, and without
responsible inquiry I don't think it is possible. That is why I
am glad to welcome our panel of experts today to educate us,
and I will be happy to close this hearing to the public at the
appropriate time so that our witnesses may feel free to speak
about any concern they have.
I hope today's hearing will be a constructive step toward
the goal of shoring up our defenses against terrorism in all
realms of our transportation infrastructure. In the wake of
September 11, we need to reevaluate our rules of prevention
because the rules of engagement have changed.
Now, I would like to turn to Senator Grassley, the ranking
member of the subcommittee, and thank him for working so hard
in putting this together.
I look forward to hearing all the witnesses at the
appropriate time. I see my friend from New York has come in and
we will give him the opportunity to make an opening statement,
as well.
What I will do at the appropriate time, which I will warn
you about ahead of time, is I am going to read a little about
your backgrounds, more than we usually do, so people can
understand who we have before us.
Senator Grassley?
STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF IOWA
Senator Grassley. Well, Mr. Chairman, in holding this
hearing you show your concern about the safety and the economic
vitality of our ground transportation system. Our waterways,
highways, rail systems, pipelines and more, are critical to the
economy and must be protected from terrorist attack.
Americans must be able to continue to travel by car, truck,
train, whether for business or leisure, and do it without fear.
We have to increase the confidence of the American traveling
public in the safety and integrity of our transportation
system. By doing that, I think we show the terrorists that they
are not going to break the spirit of America, as they try to
put psychological trauma upon our people.
I welcome Mr. Tony Chrestman, President of Ruan Industries,
of Des Moines, Iowa. Ruan is one of America's largest trucking
companies. Mr. Chrestman has more than 30 years' experience in
logistics and transportation services. He is active in the
American Trucking Association and Council on Logistics
Management, and we look forward to his advice.
I would also join the chairman in welcoming Mike Parker,
the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works. The Corps
is heavily involved in maintaining river transportation
infrastructure. Of course, the importance of that
infrastructure is underscored, I think, by the appearance here
this morning of the Assistant Secretary.
As you know, Mr. Chairman, I have focused a great deal of
my time on the need for smaller airports, because that is how
Iowa is served. This mode of transportation is important not
only to our economy, but also to the people of Iowa and
elsewhere who need to travel. I realize that today's hearing
will not focus upon aviation, but I bring this to your
attention in hopes that maybe sometime we can do something in
that area as well.
The hearing today is about the backbone of the
transportation system, an extensive interrelated network of
public and private roads, railroads, transit routes, waterways,
terminals, ports, and pipelines. It is a system that supported
more than 2.7 trillion vehicle miles in the year 1999, with a
total tonnage miles of 3.1 trillion. Together, these modes of
transportation, without even considering airlines, make up more
than 65 percent of the value of U.S. international merchandise
trade.
Grain is Iowa's biggest commodity, and it is primarily
transported by train and river barge. Iowa is the bread basket
not just for the United States, but for the world. To hit our
means of transporting grain would be to keep food from the
hungry of the world and to devastate our own economy.
As to trucking, more than 80 percent of the value and more
than 74 percent of the weight of all goods originating in Iowa
are transported by truck. Over 64 percent of shipping
originating in Iowa is transported to other States. These forms
of transportation are important to my State, but also the rest
of the country.
Air is not the only method of travel for the general
public, obviously. In fact, in the aftermath of September 11,
those Americans who usually travel by air at least had the
option of traveling by car, train or bus.
So, Mr. Chairman, much is at stake. If we can't ensure the
safety of our transportation system, we will have an equally
difficult time sustaining the economic vitality of these
industries for our economy, as well as instilling confidence in
the traveling public.
We need to be focusing, then, on ways in which we can
address the issue of security for the trucking industry. I am
sure we will hear many recommendations here today, but I would
want to suggest looking at the trucking industry's ability to
access background checks and licensing requirements for
operators of their vehicles, tighter security and scanning
methods at the borders, and the safety concerns of the
communities and workers of this transportation network.
Although I am confident that the various trucking
industries will rapidly take the necessary measures to ensure
that operator licensing requirements are rigorously developed
and followed, I am concerned about the coordination among the
States in sharing this information.
At this time, Ruan Industries, of Des Moines, has no way of
accessing a Federal criminal database to check on the
backgrounds of potential employees. Mr. Chrestman's employees
have to rely on other time-consuming and often unverifiable
methods that usually differ from State to State. So I hope that
could change.
The other problems have to do with border and port
security, especially with regard to inspecting shipments. As I
understand it, less than 5 percent of the entries at borders
and less than 1 percent of the entries at ports are randomly
inspected. Consequently, these statistics do not generate a
great deal of confidence that our borders are secure.
I am also concerned with the safety of our locks, dams and
bridges. My State is flanked on both sides by the Missouri, on
the west, and the Mississippi on the east, which have extensive
systems of barge transport. This system carries grain from Iowa
to export on the lower Mississippi. It also transports salt,
fertilizer, petroleum products, cement and other bulk
commodities up river to Iowa. There are also numerous bridges,
obviously, over the rivers that are critical to train and truck
transportation. It is not unlikely that terrorists would target
them in an effort to disrupt transportation systems.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, one of the lessons of the tragic
events of Oklahoma City and the events of September 11 is that
terrorists find their weapons of mass destruction once they are
here. They rarely bring them with them. The tools that the
hijackers used in New York and elsewhere were box cutters and
other crude instruments, but their weapons of mass destruction
were our jets. The point is their weapons of mass destruction
are all around our country, in trucks, in cargo trailers, in
rail cars, in ports and pipelines, and even recreation boats.
What is more, as the September 11 terrorist act showed, it
had a devastating effect on the general confidence of the
public, particularly in traveling, whether for business or
leisure. Air transportation came to a grinding halt. The only
thing that allowed Americans to keep moving were our highways,
waterways and railroads. That is why this hearing is so
important, and I thank you for holding it.
Chairman Biden. Thank you.
Senator Schumer?
STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES E. SCHUMER, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF NEW YORK
Senator Schumer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I too want to
thank you for holding this hearing on the critical issue of
security of our transportation infrastructure.
Unfortunately, we have learned a lot after September 11 and
one of the things we have learned is terrorists look for the
weak pressure points in our society and then they strike.
Unfortunately, many aspects of our transportation system are
those weak pressure points. We have lived in a free and open
society, thank God, for all these hundreds of years, and the
transportation system reflects it.
But because people agglomerate at the transportation
system, because, by definition, there is movement and they have
to move things to do what they want to do--move bad things,
explosives or whatever--it is really important that we examine
our transportation infrastructure because it is one of the
places where terrorists will focus their attention. So nothing
could be more timely than holding this hearing and I thank you
for it.
We are each focusing on areas that affect our States,
although we want to look at the whole Nation. Senator Grassley
talked about truck and barge and the things that are needed in
Iowa. I would like to focus a little bit on rail transportation
because of its importance to both the Nation and to New York.
I first want to say, Mr. Chairman, your leadership on rail
transportation, and on Amtrak in particular, is just exemplary,
and I think all of us who believe in rail transportation, its
necessity and the need to make it safe and secure, just thank
you for everything that you have done.
The aftermath of the attack on September 11 has made one
simple fact clear, and that is that our Nation's rail system is
essential and has to be made secure. Last month, when our
airports were shut down, it was rail that provided one of the
only means of travel available in many parts of the country.
Amtrak added trains and provided transportation to New York
City for relief workers and military personnel and public
officials. They honored plane tickets for stranded travelers.
Amtrak proved its worth, as more and more Americans relied
on its service during this crisis. In the week following the
September 11 tragedy, rail ridership increased 17 percent
nationally, and Amtrak had to add 30 percent more seating
capacity on the Northeast corridor.
What we have learned in this brave new world in which we
live is that all our transportation systems are interdependent
and we need them all. You cannot simply say let's make one
secure in the preeminent part of the system. We have to work on
all of them, whether that be air, rail, road, or water or ship.
The Senate has already passed legislation, I am glad to
say, addressing airline security. The next item of business
must be legislation on the pressing issue of rail security. We
need both, and we need them now. That is why I am glad--and I
know Senator Biden has joined me in this in playing his
leadership and spearhead role--that Senator Hollings and
Senator McCain introduced yesterday a bill that was modeled on
the amendment that we had worked on to the airline security
bill.
The Hollings bill will fill critical gaps in our system of
security for rails by providing $1.7 billion to provide new
security equipment, training and personnel to our railway
system. Included in this package would be something of great
concern in New York, and that is the tunnels under the Hudson
River. That is also of great concern in Maryland and in
Washington, D.C.
We have, coming out of Penn Station, for instance, tunnels
that go on for more than a mile, sometimes as much as two. They
don't have good ventilation systems. They don't have good
egress if, God forbid, something were to happen. Before
September 11, nobody paid much attention to that, but now we
are, and I think that is extremely important and I am glad that
we are looking at that issue.
In addition to pressing for this legislation, I have asked
Secretary of Transportation Mineta to conduct a comprehensive
study of the Nation's rail security and report back in two
months regarding the status of current Amtrak safety standards
and procedures; the most urgently needed upgrade throughout our
rail system, freight as well as passenger; the ability of our
rail, Amtrak and others, to respond and operate in the face of
another terrorist attack; and the methods of implementation and
execution of new security and safety measures.
The information that we will receive from this study,
coupled with additional funds for railroad safety from the
Hollings bill, will allow us to put in place security measures
designed to provide the maximum security possible.
Let me say as somebody who takes the rails--and I know my
colleagues would agree with me because I know they have taken
them, or I certainly know Senator Biden has--we are more secure
today than we were before September 11. If you go ride the
trains, just as when you ride the planes, you will see much
more security personnel. But it is being done in an ad hoc way,
in light of the crisis, and we need a permanent regimen.
We may need to look at inspection of baggage and metal
detectors and things like that, which we do at airports. I am
hopeful that between the legislation that Senator Biden, myself
and a number of our colleagues have been working on, embodied
in the Hollings bill, as well as the study from Secretary
Mineta, we will get quick answers and then move without delay
to implement them.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Biden. Thank you very much.
I am going to introduce the background of each of the
witnesses all at once and then I am going to start with you,
Mike, and we will work our way down.
Mike Parker is the Assistant Secretary of the Army for
Civil Works. Since 1996, he has been the owner and president of
GFG Farms Incorporated and Wells Resources Incorporated,
companies with timber and farming and leasing operations.
In 1999, he was involved in something he would like to
forget, the closest race I think that ever existed in
Mississippi history for governor.
Is that right, Congressman?
Mr. Parker. It was close.
Chairman Biden. It was close; I mean, it was a heck of a
race.
In 1989, he was elected to the 4th District of Mississippi
and served in the House for 10 years. He is a graduate of
William Carey College, in Hattiesburg, Mississippi, with a B.A.
degree in 1970, and in 1985 he was awarded an honorary
doctorate in humanities from William Carey College. He has a
lot of experience and background here.
Mr. Brian Jenkins is one of the country's leading
authorities on terrorism and sophisticated crime. He has been
quoted in the media almost daily since September 11. He is a
senior adviser to the president of the RAND Corporation, and
serves as an adviser to both government and industry.
A former deputy chairman of Kroll Associates, a prominent
international investigative and consulting firm, Mr. Jenkins is
also currently involved with the Mineta International Institute
for Surface Transportation Policy Studies.
Previously, from 1972 to 1989, he was chairman of the RAND
political science department. In 2000, he oversaw a year-long
RAND study of security vulnerabilities in the California rail,
tunnel, waterway, highway and pipeline infrastructure carried
out for the California Office of Emergency Services. This
report was embargoed on September 11 by Governor Davis in light
of the attacks.
Mr. Jenkins served from 1996 to 1997 as a member of the
White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, and he
is the author of ``A Hundred Wars: International Terrorism, a
New Mode of Conflict,'' and ``Terrorism and Personal
Protection.''
A former captain in the Green Berets, he served in the
Dominican Republic during the American intervention, and later
in Vietnam from 1966 to 1970. He is a widely respected and
often-quoted analyst with over 25 years of experience. He comes
highly recommended by a number of people who have testified
before this committee and the Congressional Research Service
Transportation Security Section.
Also, we have Professor Donald E. Brown. He is Professor
and Chair of the Department of Systems Engineering at the
University of Virginia. He is a nationally regarded expert in
qualifying security threats to surface transportation
structures.
As such, he served as a consultant for the National
Security Administration on intelligence and threat analysis,
and he has also recently served on the National Academy of
Sciences panel which produced one of the definitive analytical
studies on security vulnerabilities in the Nation's
transportation system, entitled ``Improving Surface
Transportation Security.''
Dr. Brown has also produced several studies on the
asymmetric threat posed to transportation infrastructure by
terrorists; that is, the ability of a small cell of dedicated
radicals to inflict significant blows against unprotected U.S.
transportation targets, rather than against the overwhelming
superiority of U.S. military forces.
Prior to joining the University of Virginia, Dr. Brown
served for 9 years as an officer in the United States Army,
reaching the rank of captain, including more than 3 years as a
military intelligence officer in Berlin in the late 1970s. He
has also served as a visiting fellow at the National Institute
of Justice's Crime Mapping Research Center, and has been a co-
principal investigator in over 50 research contracts with
Federal, State and private organizations. He has published more
than 80 papers.
Dr. Brown is a graduate of the United States Military
Academy at West Point, and received his master's in engineering
and operations research from the University of California at
Berkeley and a Ph.D. in operations engineering from the
University of Michigan at Ann Arbor.
Welcome, Doctor. Thank you for being here.
Jeffrey Beatty looks too mild-mannered to fit this
description. Jeffrey K. Beatty is a former U.S. Delta Force
counterterrorism unit officer, a special agent for the FBI, and
an operations officer for the CIA. He is currently president
and CEO of Total Security Services International, in Marietta,
Georgia.
I might point out, to the best of my knowledge, no other
individual has served in all three of the most elite
counterterrorism units in the United States military. Mr.
Beatty has appeared as a commentator on CNN on terrorism and
transportation infrastructure since September 11, and maybe
before, but I have noticed him since the 11th.
From 1981 to 1983, Mr. Beatty served as a Delta Force
assault troop commander, where he led a unit on several
deployments and was commended for saving lives. Subsequently,
he became operations officer for the entire Delta Force.
From 1983 to 1985, Mr. Beatty served as a special adviser
to the Federal Bureau of Investigation Hostage Rescue Team,
with an emphasis on security for the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic.
He also flew surveillance missions for the Bureau, including a
mission involving the capturing of a Top 10 fugitive.
From 1985 to 1992, he worked at the Central Intelligence
Agency on Europe and the Middle East. In addition to
traditional intelligence operations, he developed
counterterrorism training programs for Allied troops. He also
mounted several successful intelligence and security
operations, including thwarting a terrorist attack.
In 1992, Mr. Beatty founded Total Security Services
International, a security consulting firm serving corporate and
government clients. TSSI has managed large security projects,
including the security upgrade program for Fairfax County,
Virginia. The reason for that, I might add, was because of the
trial of the gentlemen who shot two people at the CIA
headquarters in 1993.
Mr. Beatty specializes in the high-threat portion of the
security spectrum and has experience in three Olympics--Los
Angeles, Barcelona and Atlanta--not as a participant but as a
consultant. It would be kind of nice to be a participant, too,
wouldn't it?
He has also done work on terrorism prevention with regard
to the Big Dig highway excavation project in Boston. He also
developed antiterrorism procedures and training materials for
Amtrak and the Washington, D.C., Metro system. In addition, he
has studied the vulnerabilities of Boston and New York City's
tunnels, and has been a speaker at the Department of
Transportation's Conference on Land Transportation issues. Mr.
Beatty and TSSI have most recently been hired by the Boston
MBTA to beef up subway security.
TSSI warned officials at the 1996 Summer Olympics in
Atlanta that their security procedures would leave crowds open
to package bomb attacks, a prediction that soon came true. In
1999, Mr. Beatty conducted an exercise in Boston preparing for
armed terrorists seizing a subway train and a bomb detonating
in the train station. In 1998, he went on record as stating
that terrorists were aiming for an attack leading to 5,000 or
more casualties by the end of 2001, a prediction unfortunately
that has come true.
Tony Chrestman currently serves as the president of Ruan
Transportation Corporation, a business unit of Ruan
Transportation Management Systems. Mr. Chrestman has more than
30 years' experience in logistics and transportation services.
Joining Ruan in 1999, he was vice president of transportation
services with Ryder Integrated Logistics, and he is active in
the American Trucking Association and the Council for Logistics
Management. Mr. Chrestman attended Mississippi State
University, and he is extremely welcome as well.
Having said that, gentlemen, why don't we proceed with your
public statements, if you will. If any of my colleagues want to
ask a question on the record here in the public portion, we can
do that and then we will go to the closed hearing.
Mike, welcome.
STATEMENT OF MIKE PARKER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
(CIVIL WORKS), DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, WASHINGTON, D.C.
Mr. Parker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
committee. For the last three weeks, I have had the privilege
of serving as Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works.
I appreciate the opportunity to speak to you today, and also
thank you for the opportunity to provide information on Army
Corps of Engineers activities to address the infrastructure
security issues resulting from the events of September 11,
2001.
First, allow me to say how proud I am to be associated with
the Corps of Engineers, its record, and the manner in which it
has begun to move out to protect the large part of America's
infrastructure that is our responsibility. I want to assure you
that the Corps will prove itself worthy of the trust which that
responsibility conveys.
Within two hours of the terrorist attacks on the World
Trade Center, Corps employees were at Ground Zero lending
assistance. Thousands of New York City residents were evacuated
on Corps civil works vessels from Lower Manhattan in excess of
2,000. We provide expert structural assessments, emergency
power to get the stock market up and running, and provided
technical assistance for the removal of what will likely exceed
one million tons of debris.
Within hours of the attack on the Pentagon, Corps
structural engineers were on-site providing expert advice. We
are presently conducting a comprehensive force protection
analysis to make the rebuilt Pentagon safer from terrorist
intervention in the future, and we continue to support local
and military leaders with every asset the Corps can muster.
In conjunction with its military construction mission, the
Corps has developed in-depth antiterrorism force protection
expertise. The Corps serves as the Department of Defense lead
for public works under national and departmental plans. The
Corps' laboratories and technology transfer centers were
instrumental in the development of the DoD antiterrorism/force
protection standards now used by all of the military services
in military construction, major repair and other programs.
These standards and the underlying technologies are being
widely used by the State Department in their embassy program.
For example, we have world-class antiterrorism force protection
engineers at our Protective Design and Electronic Security
Centers who are supported by the best available research assets
within the Engineer Research and Development Centers six-
laboratory network.
Expertise available there to the Corps and others includes,
among other things, survivability and protective structures,
sustainment engineering, battle space environment, military and
civil infrastructure, and environmental quality. We have
hundreds of employees trained by these engineers, along with
experience born of work on the Khobar Towers, Murrah Federal
Building, World Trade Center, the Pentagon and other sites,
some well-known and others not so well-known. The Corps centers
and labs are supported by the some of the leading
antiterrorism/force protection engineering and construction
firms through effective contracting vehicles.
We are in the process of leveraging the expertise gained in
the Corp's military mission areas to protect the Corps'
critical water resources infrastructure from terrorist
activities. Fortunately, we are not starting from scratch. Over
the past few years, the Corps has been working diligently with
other agencies, including the Bureau of Reclamation, the
Department of Energy, the Tennessee Valley Authority, the
Environmental Protection Agency and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation to develop a comprehensive security assessment
process to identify risks to critical facilities, such as
locks, dams and hydropower facilities. As the security
assessments are completed, we will apply the Corps' and others'
antiterrorism/force protection expertise to critical sites to
mitigate security risks uncovered.
Today, temporary protection measures are in place,
including restricted public access, increased stand-off
distances to critical structures, increased patrol activities,
additional contract guard support, increased coordination with
local law enforcement, and establishment of early-warning
telephone procedures.
A civil works infrastructure management team has been
established at headquarters and in the field, and the Corps has
begun the task of assessing the need for more specific,
effective protective measures. The centerpiece of this effort
is the risk assessment and protection of dams methodology,
called RAM-D, developed by the Interagency Forum on
Infrastructure Protection from the efforts mentioned earlier. I
have with me a copy of the training material and workbooks that
teams will be using over the next several months to complete
this comprehensive civil works security assessment.
By using this Risk Assessment Methodology for Dams,
security risks to dams and other Corps infrastructure can be
assessed quickly in a structured, systematic manner, even
though the structures to be assessed have been built at
different times to meet a specific set of criteria and sited in
unique environments.
The Corps of Engineers has already put in place a plan to
conduct these assessments on our critical dams and other
infrastructure, and to cooperate with other agencies on still
more dams. We will also cooperate on other types of structures
as requested. The lack of standardizing tools may make for a
slower process, but the assessment should be no less accurate.
We are also actively involved with the Nation's leading
engineering and construction industry associations,
professional societies, and standards-writing organizations to
improve the security and survivability of public and private
buildings throughout the country.
Your letter of invitation asked that I testify on the
structural vulnerabilities of our Nation's surface
transportation to terrorist attacks. I must tell you that
America's water resources, including our waterborne
transportation infrastructure, locks and dams, are at risk to
terrorism.
Risk is everywhere and impossible to eliminate entirely.
However, there are many forms of risk and many ways to minimize
and manage it. The Corps of Engineers has already begun the
process of protecting the resources entrusted to it and the
people who work and visit there. We have coordinated with the
U.S. Coast Guard, the American Waterways Operators, and other
members of the marine transportation industry to address the
risk and challenges before us in ensuring the safe and
efficient movement of hazardous cargoes on our inland rivers
and waterways, while maintaining a high level of diligence and
concern for the possibility of a terrorist act. I am proud of
the Corps and confident in its ability to achieve and maintain
the results demanded by the American people and their
representatives in this august body.
The President, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Secretary of
the Army White and I are committed to providing the leadership
and resources for the Army Corps of Engineers to carrying out
its vital military and civil works missions in these difficult
times.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement and I will be
pleased to address any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Parker follows:]
Statement of Mike Parker, Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil
Works), Department of the Army, Washington, D.C.
MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE:
INTRODUCTION
I am Mike Parker, for the last three weeks, the Assistant Secretary
of the Army for Civil Works. I appreciate the opportunity to speak to
you today.
Thank you for the opportunity to provide information on the Army
Corps of Engineers activities to address the infrastructure security
issues resulting from the events of September 11, 2001. First, allow me
to say how proud I am to be associated with the Corps of Engineers, its
record, and the manner in which it has begun to move out to protect the
large part of America's water infrastructure that is our
responsibility. I want to assure you that the Corps will prove itself
worthy of the trust which that responsibility conveys.
Within two hours of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade
Center, Corps employees were at ground zero lending assistance.
Thousands of New York City residents were evacuated on Corps civil
works vessels from lower Manhattan. We provided expert structural
assessments, emergency power to get the stock market up and running and
providing technical assistance for the removal of what will likely
exceed 1 million tons of debris. Within hours of the attack on the
Pentagon, Corps structural engineers were on site providing expert
advice. We are presently conducting a comprehensive force protection
analysis to make the rebuilt Pentagon safer from terrorist intervention
in the future. We continue to support local and military leaders with
every asset the Corps can muster.
In conjunction with its military construction mission, the Corps
has developed indepth anti-terrorism/force protection (AT/FP)
expertise. The Corps serves as the Department of Defense (DoD) lead for
Public Works under national and departmental plans. The Corps
laboratories and technology transfer centers were instrumental in the
development of the DoD AT/FP standards now used by all the military
services in the Military Construction, major repair and other programs.
These standards and the underlying technologies are being widely used
by the State Department in their embassy program.
For example, we have world-class AT/FP applications engineers at
our Protective Design and Electronic Security Centers who are supported
by the best available research assets within the Engineer Research and
Development Centers six laboratory network. Expertise available there
(to the Corps and others) includes, among other things: Survivability
and Protective Structures, Sustainment Engineering, Battlespace
Environment, Military and Civil Infrastructure, and Environmental
Quality. We have hundreds of employees trained by these engineers,
along with experience born of work on the Khobar Towers, Murrah Federal
Building, World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and other sites--some well-
known and others not-so-well-known. The Corps Centers and labs are
supported by some of the leading AT/FP engineering and construction
firms through effective contracting vehicles.
We are in the process of leveraging the expertise gained in the
Corps military mission areas to protect the Corps critical water
resources infrastructure from terrorist activities. Fortunately, we are
not starting from scratch. Over the past few years the Corps has been
working diligently with other agencies, including Bureau of
Reclamation, Department of Energy, Tennessee Valley Authority,
Environmental Protection Agency, and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation to develop a comprehensive security assessment process to
identify risks to critical facilities such as locks, dams and
hydropower facilities. As the security assessments are completed we
will apply the Corps (and others) AT/FP expertise to critical sites to
mitigate security risks uncovered.
Today, temporary protection measures are in place, including
restricted public access, increased standoff distances to critical
structures, increased patrol activities, additional contract guard
support, increased coordination with local law enforcement, and
establishment of early warning telephone procedures.
A civil works infrastructure management team has been established
at headquarters and in the field, and the Corps has begun the task of
assessing the need for more specific, effective protective measures.
The centerpiece of this effort is the risk assessment and protection of
dams methodology called RAM-D developed by the Interagency Forum on
Infrastructure Protection from the efforts mentioned earlier. I have
with me a copy of the training material and workbooks that teams will
be using over the next several months to complete this comprehensive
civil works security assessment.
By using this Risk Assessment Methodology for Dams, security risks
to dams and other Corps infrastructure can be assessed quickly, in a
structured, systematic manner, even though the structures to be
assessed have been built at different times to meet specific set of
criteria and sited in unique environments. The Corps of Engineers has
already put in place a plan to conduct these assessments on our
critical dams and other infrastructure, and to cooperate with other
agencies on still more dams. We will also cooperate on other types of
structures, as requested. The lack of standardizing tools may make for
a slower process, but the assessment should be no less accurate.
We are also actively involved with the Nation's leading engineering
and construction industry associations, professional societies and
standards writing organizations to improve the security and
survivability of public and private buildings throughout the country.
You letter of invitation asked that I testify on the structural
vulnerabilities of our Nation's surface transportation to terrorist
attacks. I must tell you that America's water resources, including our
waterborne transportation infrastructure (locks and dams), are at risk
to terrorism. Risk is everywhere, and impossible to eliminate,
entirely. However, there are many forms of risk, many ways to minimize
and manage it. The Corps of Engineers has already begun the process of
protecting the resources entrusted to it, and the people who work and
visit there. We have coordinated with the U.S. Coast Guard, the
American Waterways Operators, and other members of the marine
transportation industry to address the risks and challenges before us
in ensuring the safe and efficient movement of hazardous cargos on our
inland rivers and waterways, while maintaining a high level of
diligence and concern for the possibility of a terrorist act. I am
proud of the Corps and confident of its ability to achieve and maintain
the results demanded by the American people and their representatives
in this august body.
CONCLUSION
The President, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Secretary of the Army
White and I are committed to providing the leadership and resources for
the Army Corps of Engineers to carrying out its vital military and
civil works missions in these difficult times. Mr. Chairman that
concludes my statement and I would be pleased to address any questions
that you or the committee may have.
Chairman Biden. Thank you very much, Congressman.
Mr. Jenkins?
STATEMENT OF BRIAN M. JENKINS, SENIOR ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT,
RAND CORPORATION, SANTA MONICA, CALIFORNIA
Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank
you very much for giving me the opportunity to make a few
remarks.
Let me take a cue from your opening comments, Mr. Chairman.
We must be realistic in our acceptance of risk. We know that
terrorists can attack anything, anywhere, any time. We cannot
protect everything, everywhere, all the time.
Trying to imagine all the potential scenarios that exploit
the infinite vulnerabilities in our society is not particularly
helpful in allocating security resources. Terrorists are always
going to find some vulnerability to exploit. Security to a
certain extent is always going to be reactive.
This obliges us to make choices based upon the likelihood
that terrorists will attack a certain target and the
consequences of that attack were to succeed. Fortunately,
terrorists have shown some clear preferences, although the fact
that they haven't done something in the past certainly is no
guarantee that they will not do it in the future.
We know, for example, that commercial aviation has been a
preferred terrorist target for decades. Security at airports
has been augmented since September 11, but in my view not
enough. Aviation security still requires a complete overhaul.
But for those determined to kill in quantity and willing to
kill indiscriminately, which is a trend we have seen in
terrorism over the last decade, public surface transportation
is an ideal target. Precisely because it is public and used by
millions of people daily, there is necessarily little security,
with none of the obvious checkpoints like those at airports.
Concentrations of people in contained environments are
especially vulnerable to conventional explosives and, as we
have seen in Tokyo, to unconventional weapons as well.
The threat here is real. We are not talking about
hypothetical scenarios. We have seen terrorist attacks in the
subways of Paris and London's Underground, Tokyo's subways,
Moscow's Metro and Tel Aviv's buses. In the United States, we
have seen the deliberate derailment of an Amtrak passenger
train. We have seen a thwarted plot to carry out suicide
bombings on New York subways.
Terrorists see public transportation as a killing field.
Now, it may not be so dramatic in the shadow of more than 5,000
deaths on September 11, but the statistics nonetheless are
impressive. Thirty-seven percent of all terrorist attacks on
surface transportation have involved fatalities. That is
significant when we realize that the average for terrorist
attacks in general is about 20 percent. So when they go after
public transportation, twice as many of these attacks result in
fatalities.
Indeed, two-thirds of the attacks have clearly been
intended to kill, versus 37 percent for terrorist attacks
overall. So they are twice as likely to be trying to kill
people. Twenty-three percent of the attacks with fatalities
involve 10 or more deaths. Attacks on public transportation, of
course, also cause great disruption and alarm, which are the
traditional goals of terrorism.
Security on surface transportation fortunately can be
significantly improved without disrupting operations or even
spending vast sums of money. Potential casualties can be
reduced both through the design of stations and vehicles and
through effective and rapid response.
Disruptions resulting from unnecessary shutdowns can be
minimized with technology and procedures that permit prompt
assessment, accurate diagnosis, and rapid, well-rehearsed
responses. Crisis management is a critical component of this
security.
We can apply the best practices learned from those systems
that have dealt with higher levels of threat. Fortunately, in
this country thus far we have seen only a small number of
incidents. But other countries--France, the United Kingdom,
Japan--have dealt with terrorist campaigns on their public
transportation systems and we can learn from their lessons.
This has been the focus of ongoing research by the Mineta
Transportation Institute, and I have provided members of the
committee with advance copies of an executive overview of this
ongoing research.
One final thought. Much of our country's critical
infrastructure--dams, water systems, ports, transportation
systems--is protected by private security guards, and I think
we often overlook the role played by private security in this
country. We spend over $100 billion a year on private security
in this country. The industry currently employs more than 2
million persons. That is close to the strength of the United
States armed forces at the height of the Cold War.
We can, of course, on a temporary basis, augment security
at critical facilities with police and National Guard, but that
is not a permanent solution. I think we should explore ways in
which we can better ensure high-level performance among private
sector guards, not just in airports, and ways in which we can
more effectively utilize this second line of defense in crisis
situations. This could be achieved through the certification of
those companies involved in protecting designated components of
the Nation's critical infrastructure and improved professional
training.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Jenkins follows:]
Statement of Brian Michel Jenkins, Senior Advisor to the President,
RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California
Terrorists can attack anything, anywhere, any time, while we cannot
protect everything, everywhere, all the time. Trying to imagine all of
the potential terrorist scenarios that exploit the infinite
vulnerabilities in our society is not particularly helpful in
allocating security resources. We can easily overwhelm security
planners with plausible threats. Terrorists will always find
vulnerabilities to exploit. To a certain extent, security will always
be reactive.
This obliges us to make choices based upon the likelihood that
terrorists will attack a certain target, and the consequences of that
attack were it to succeed. Our ability to protect certain categories of
targets is also a factor. Terrorists seeking to cause heavy casualties,
can always set off bombs in public places that are by their very nature
difficult to protect. We must be realistic in our acceptance of risk.
Fortunately, terrorists have shown clear preferences. However, the
fact that terrorists have not done something in the past is no
guarantee that they might not try it in the future. Our security goal
lies somewhere between ensuring adequate protection at facilities that
have been attacked by terrorists in the past and attempting to
eliminate every conceivable vulnerability to future attack.
The September 11 attack humbles any analyst attempting to forecast
what terrorists might do in the future. While a growing percentage of
attacks are clearly intended to kill (as opposed to purely symbolic
violence, sabotage, or hostage-taking), of more than 10,000
international terrorist incidents in the past three decades, prior to
September 11 only 14 resulted in 100 or more fatalities. The September
11 attack was unprecedented in the annals of terrorism, (although I
strongly suspect that the terrorists had hoped for a far greater number
of casualties). The attack did conform to the view offered years ago
that tomorrow's terrorist might not be the high-tech adversary
envisioned by many, but rather a more bloody-minded version of previous
low-tech terrorists.
Commercial aviation has been a preferred terrorist target for
decades. Security at airports has been augmented since September 11 but
not enough. In my view, aviation security requires a complete overhaul.
But our focus today is surface transportation. For those determined
to kill in quantity and willing to kill indiscriminately, public
surface transportation is an ideal target. Precisely because it is
public and used by millions of people daily, there is little security,
with no obvious checkpoints like those at airports. Concentrations of
people in contained environments are especially vulnerable to
conventional explosives and unconventional weapons.
The threat is real. We have seen terrorist bombing campaigns
against the subways of Paris, London's Underground and railways,
Tokyo's subway, Moscow's Metro, and Tel Aviv's buses. In the United
States, we have seen the deliberate derailment of a passenger train,
chemical attack scares on metro-rail systems, and a thwarted plot to
carry out suicide bombings on New York's subways.
Terrorists see public transportation as a killing field: 37 percent
of attacks on surface transportation have involved fatalities compared
to 20 percent for all terrorist incidents, and two-thirds of the
attacks clearly have been intended to kill (versus 37 percent for
terrorist attacks overall); 23 percent of the attacks on surface
transportation with fatalities involve 10 or more deaths. Attacks on
public transportation, the circulatory systems of our cities, also
cause great disruption and alarm, which are the traditional goals of
terrorism.
Security of surface transportation can be significantly improved
without disrupting operations or spending vast sums of money. Potential
casualties can be reduced both through the design of stations and
vehicles and through effective and rapid response.
Disruptions resulting from unnecessary shutdowns can be minimized
with technologies and procedures that permit prompt assessment,
accurate diagnosis, and rapid, well-rehearsed responses. Crisis
management is a critical component of security.
We can apply the ``best practices'' learned from those systems that
have dealt with higher levels of threat. This has been the focus of on-
going research by the Mineta Transportation Institute. (I have provided
committee members with advanced copies of the executive overview of
this project, which catalogues many of the security measures.)
Terrorists have carried out fewer attacks in the maritime
environment, although they have sabotaged ships and port facilities,
especially oil and gas facilities, and the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole,
indicates that this area of operations is not outside the terrorists'
field of vision.
Other components of the critical physical infrastructure including
power generation and distribution, oil and natural gas facilities, and
water systems must also be considered as potential targets. The
transport of hazardous materials is another area of concern. Power
grids and pipelines have been the targets of sabotage in guerrilla
wars. In the realm of terrorism, however, fewer than two percent of all
terrorist attacks can be categorized as traditional sabotage as opposed
to purely symbolic attacks and attacks intended to kill, which together
account for 82 percent.
One final thought: Much of the country's critical infrastructure is
protected by private security guards. This industry currently employs
more than 2 million persons, close to the strength of the United States
armed forces at the height of the Cold War. We can, on a temporary
basis, augment security at critical facilities with police and the
National Guard. It is not, however, a permanent solution. We should
explore ways in which we can better ensure high level performance among
private sector guards, and in crisis situations effectively utilize
this second line of defense. This could be achieved through the
certification of those companies involved in protecting designated
components of the nation's critical infrastructure and improved
professional training.
Chairman Biden. Thank you very much.
Professor Brown?
STATEMENT OF DONALD E. BROWN, PROFESSOR AND CHAIR, DEPARTMENT
OF SYSTEMS ENGINEERING, UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA,
CHARLOTTESVILLE, VIRGINIA
Mr. Brown. Thank you. Good morning, Chairman Biden, Senator
Grassley and Senator Schumer. Thank you very much for offering
me the opportunity to discuss the issues surrounding surface
transportation security.
As each of you have already noted, surface transportation
is critical to our Nation's economy, defense, and quality of
life. Few Americans spend even one day without enjoying the
benefits of our open and easily accessed surface transportation
system. However, there can be little question that currently
the surface transportation infrastructure is threatened by the
potential of terrorist attack, but we can take steps to address
these threats.
That our surface transportation infrastructure is
threatened can be seen by a simple three-step analysis: what
are the threats, what are the vulnerabilities, and what are the
impacts?
First, what are the threats? The events of September 11
clearly showed that global terrorist groups provide significant
threats to facilities in the United States. Their willingness
to use civilians, including even 4-year-old children and their
mothers, as human bombs provides chilling evidence of both
their lack of morality and the seriousness of their intention
as they pursue their objectives. However, we should not lose
sight of the fact that many of the terrorist groups, including
those spawned within this country, have also targeted the U.S.
infrastructure.
Second, what are the vulnerabilities? While I will not
discuss specific vulnerabilities in this forum, we need only
look at the record of accidents, natural disasters and past
terrorist incidents both here and abroad to recognize that
vulnerabilities exist within the surface transportation
infrastructure. Further, if you talk with the people traveling
and working in this infrastructure, you gain a sense of the
perceived vulnerabilities. We need to recognize and address
these vulnerabilities to ensure the continued growth and the
use of surface transportation.
Finally, what are the potential impacts of attacks on the
surface transportation infrastructure? Again, specifics are
best discussed in a closed forum, but an objective assessment
shows that the inherent decentralized, redundant and
distributed nature of much of the surface transportation
infrastructure makes it robust to many forms of attack.
Nonetheless, without going into details at this time, attacks
on this infrastructure can cause both significant loss of life
and severe economic consequences.
Given threats, vulnerabilities and impacts, what steps can
we take to improve security on surface transportation? The
answer to this question lies in our past record of success in
the face of other threats.
We have made great progress in reducing the threats from
disease, environmental hazards, natural disasters and
accidents. Clearly, there is more work that needs to be done in
each of these areas, but it is difficult to argue that we are
not measurably better off today than we were 50 years ago.
These successes derive from government actions that provide
safer environments in each area.
Additionally, many of these successes derive from one of
America's greatest strengths: its research and development
community. Forged in World II and institutionalized in the
post-war years, this alliance of industry, government and
universities provides the capability for addressing national
needs that are second to none. As we face this newest threat to
our transportation infrastructure, this community can be
mobilized to help address the needs for greater security in the
face of multiple threats.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Brown follows:]
Donald E. Brown, Professor and Chair, Department of Systems
Engineering, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia
Good morning Chairman Biden and Senator Grassley and thank you for
offering me the opportunity to discuss the issues surrounding surface
transportation security. Surface transportation is critical to our
Nation's economy, defense, and quality of life. Few Americans spend
even one day without enjoying the benefits of our open and easily
accessed surface transportation systems. However, there can be little
question that currently the surface transportation infrastructure is
threatened by the potential of terrorist attacks, but we can take steps
to address the threats.
That our surface transportation infrastructure is threatened can be
seen by a simple three-step analysis: what are the threats, what are
the vulnerabilities, and what are the impacts? First, what are the
threats? Events of September 11 clearly showed that global terrorist
groups provide significant threats to facilities in the U.S. Their
willingness to use civilians, including four year old children and
their mothers, as human bombs provides chilling evidence of both their
lack of morality and the seriousness of their intention as their pursue
their objectives. However, we should not lose sight of the fact that
many other terrorist groups, including those spawned within this
country have also targeted the U.S. infrastructure.
Second, what are the vulnerabilities? While I will not discuss
specific vulnerabilities in this forum, we need only look at the record
of accidents, natural disasters, and past terrorist incidents, both
here and abroad, to recognize that vulnerabilities exist within the
surface transportation infrastructure. Further, if you talk with people
traveling and working in this infrastructure you gain a sense of the
perceived vulnerabilities. We need to recognize and address these
vulnerabilities to ensure the continued growth and use of surface
transportation.
Finally, what are the potential impacts of attacks on surface
transportation? Again the specifics are best discussed in closed forum.
On the positive side, an objective assessment shows that the inherent
decentralized, redundant, and distributed nature of much of the surface
transportation infrastructure makes it robust to many forms of attack.
Nonetheless, without going into details at this time, attacks on this
infrastructure can cause both significant loss of life and severe
economic consequences.
Given these threats, vulnerabilities, and impacts what steps can we
take to improve security in surface transportation? The answer to this
question lies in our past record of success in the face of other
threats. We have made great progress in reducing the threats from
disease, environmental hazards, natural disasters, and accidents.
Clearly there is more work needed in each of these areas, but it is
difficult to argue that we not measurably better off today than we were
50 years ago. These successes derive from government actions that
provide safer environments in each area. Additionally, many of these
successes derive from one of America's greatest strengths: its research
and development community. Forged in World War II and institutionalized
in the post war years this alliance of industry, universities, and
government provides the capabilities for addressing national needs that
are second to none. As we face this newest threat to our transportation
infrastructure, this community. Forged in World War II and
institutionalized in the post war years this alliance of industry,
universities, and government provides the capabilities for addressing
national needs that are second to none. As we face this newest threat
to our transportation infrastructure, this community can be mobilized
to help address the needs for greater security in the face of multiple
threats.
Chairman Biden. Thank you.
Mr. Beatty?
STATEMENT OF JEFFREY K. BEATTY, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER, TOTAL SECURITY SERVICES INTERNATIONAL, MARIETTA,
GEORGIA
Mr. Beatty. Mr. Chairman, Senators and distinguished guests
of the Senate, my name is Jeff Beatty, President of Total
Security Services International, a company that specializes in
advising transportation systems on preventing terrorism. Thank
you for the opportunity to be with you today and to share some
observations and suggestions that might help improve our
Nation's security in the transportation sector, specifically in
surface and rail transportation. In this open session, I intend
to make some very brief general comments, and I will save the
details of specific vulnerabilities and remedies for the closed
session.
It is the threat that dictates the level of security
necessary for the transportation sector. We must build our
security based on the threat's capability, not on some
interpretation of intention. Intentions can change overnight
and we can't change our defenses that fast.
The current threat consists of 1 to 50 persons who either
directly or indirectly can launch a pre-planned attack or
attacks that are capable of causing mass casualties,
destruction of property and severe economic impact, using
everything from mechanical weapons to firearms to weapons of
mass destruction.
The terrorists have, in fact, at their disposal over 50
different types of weapons and special techniques. These
attacks may be pressed home by persons planning to die in the
attack. The attacks may have multiple stages, use multiple
weapons, and may take place at multiple locations.
Based on that threat, I believe that there is an immediate
need to conduct an incremental threat exposure and response
analysis for all places where people transit and travel
nationwide. This is being undertaken and done by some
organizations now, but this analysis is not an end in itself.
It must be functional and fast.
This analysis would look beyond the threat of the day, to
cover over 50 different types of weapons and special
techniques. The Federal Government can provide the guidance and
some of the tools to do this task to the tens of thousands of
State and local law enforcement professionals who have a
contribution to make in the transportation sector. When the
locals do the work, you will be improving their capabilities in
the war against terrorism. They are a hugely untapped resource
in this war and we need to get them more involved.
In the meanwhile, I urge you to continue to deploy more
security than may seem necessary in the transportation sector,
especially on tunnels, and then adjust as results of the threat
exposure and response analysis becomes available.
In the closed session, I will discuss a form of security
that is not purely defensive and reactive, but rather is an
active defense. There are training and equipment requirements
that are near-term and need to be prioritized as a result of
September 11. Much good work was underway already. It will need
your support and will need to become accelerated. There are
other technologies that frankly have not yet been considered in
this sector and they can save a significant number of lives in
the event of an incident. I hope you will support their early
adoption, also.
Public trust is key to the public continuing to use the
transportation system. To this end, we must keep the public
informed. Right now, threat information is shared with the
transit companies and airlines, but not with passengers. The
position that government knows best really does not apply. We
learned that on September 11.
We must consider requiring transportation providers to post
on a Web page or at some other location the same threat
information the Government gives those providers, providers
such as the MTA in New York, WMATA in D.C., the CTA in Chicago,
the MBTA in Boston, and Delta Airlines in Atlanta. Let the
citizens use the transportation system under the concept of
informed consent. There may be some initial reduction in
travel, but soon travelers will realize for themselves the
credibility of the threat information posted in this manner and
put it into proper perspective. They will make informed choices
about traveling and the Government will have demonstrated its
openness and fulfilled its responsibility to the citizens.
In conclusion, I must tell you that I am impressed and
encouraged by the work our Government is now doing against
terrorism. Now is the time to be bold and decisive. There is no
doubt in my mind that we will prevail in this struggle, but
what does prevail mean?
This war on terrorism is not like World War II or Desert
Storm where victory means peace. It is more like the war on
crime. You can make great progress in the war on crime, but
after your progress some lower level of crime will still exist.
So it is with the war on terrorism. We will make great
progress, but we must put in place the tools to ensure that
terror in the future, even in its most virulent form, is only
an occasional occurrence, with minimum casualties and minimum
disruption to our way of life.
The work of this committee on protecting our transportation
sector will go a long way to achieve that success for the
American people. I wish you good luck in your mission, and
thank you for the opportunity to address you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Beatty follows:]
Statement of Jeffrey K. Beatty, President and Chief Executive Officer,
Total Security Services International, Marietta, Georgia
Mr. Chairman, Senators, and distinguished guests of the Senate. My
name is Jeff Beatty and I am President of Total Security Services
International, a company that specializes in advising transportation
systems on preventing terrorism. Thank you for the opportunity to be
with you today to share some observations and suggestions that might
help improve our nation's security in the transportation sector and
specifically in surface and rail transportation. In this open session,
I intend to make some general comments, and I will save the details of
specific vulnerabilities and remedies I have identified for the closed
session.
The threat dictates the level of security necessary for the
transportation sector. We must build our security based on the threat's
capability, not on some interpretation of intention. Intentions can
change overnight, we can't change our defenses that fast.
My company, TSSI, utilizes specialized analysis to evaluate
terrorist threats to public events and transportation systems. Using
that analysis, TSSI was able to predict a major attack on the United
States by the end of 2001 in which the terrorist goal was to create at
least 5,000 casualties. We also predicted the breach of security at the
Atlanta Olympics. TSSI predicted that Atlanta would suffer a successful
package bomb attack after the 5`'' day and estimated that there would
be 120 casualties. In actuality, there were 112 casualties. TSSI's
assessment of the current threat is detailed but can be summarized as
follows:
The current threat consists of 1-50 persons who either directly or
indirectly can launch a preplanned attack or attacks that are capable
of causing mass casualties, great destruction of property and severe
economic impact using everything from mechanical weapons to firearms to
weapons of mass destruction. The terrorists have at their disposal over
50 different types of weapons and special techniques. These attacks may
be pressed home by persons planning to die in the attack. They attacks
may have multiple stages, use multiple weapons and may take place at
multiple locations.
Based on that threat, I believe there is an immediate need to
conduct Incremental Threat, Exposure and Response Analysis for all
places where people transit and travel nationwide. This is being done
by some organizations now. This analysis would look beyond the ``Threat
of the Day'' to over 50 different types of weapons and special
techniques. The Federal Government can provide the guidance and some of
the tools to do this task, to the tens of thousands of the State and
Local Law Enforcement professionals who have a contribution to make in
the transportation sector. When the locals do this work, you will be
improving their capabilities in the war against terrorism. They are a
hugely untapped resource in this war; we need to get them more
involved. In the meanwhile, I urge you to continue to deploy more
security than seems needed in the transportation sector, especially on
tunnels, and adjust as results of the Threat Exposure and Response
analysis become available.
There are training and equipment requirements that are near term
and need to be prioritized, as a result of September 11. Much good work
was underway already. It will need your support and become accelerated.
There are other technologies that frankly have not yet been considered
in this sector that can save significant numbers of lives in the event
of an incident. I hope you will support their early adoption.
Public trust is key to the public continuing to use the
transportation system. To this end we must keep the public informed.
Right now, threat information is shared with the transit companies and
airlines, and not with passengers. The position that ``government knows
best'' does not apply. We learned that on September 11. We must
consider requiring transportation providers to post on a web page the
same threat information the government gives those providers such as
the MTA in NY, WMATA in D.C., the CTA in Chicago, the MBTA in Boston
and Delta Airlines in Atlanta. Let the citizens use the transportation
system under the concept of informed consent. There may be some initial
reduction in travel, but soon travelers will realize for themselves the
credibility of threat information posted in this manner. They will make
informed choices about traveling and the government will have
demonstrated its openness and fulfilled its responsibility to the
citizens.
In conclusion, I must tell you I am impressed and encouraged by the
work our government is now doing against terrorism. There is no doubt
in my mind that we will prevail in this struggle. But what does prevail
mean? This war on terrorism is not like World War II or Desert Storm,
where victory meant peace. It is more like the war on crime. You can
make great progress in the war on crime, but after your progress, some
lower level of crime will still exist. So it is with the war on
terrorism. We will make great progress. But we must put in place the
tools to ensure that terror in the future, even in its most virulent
form, is only an occasional occurrence, with minimum casualties and
minimum disruption to our way of life. The work of this Committee on
protecting our transportation sector will go a long way to achieve that
success for the American people. I wish you good luck in your mission
and thank you for the opportunity to address you.
I will save the details of specific transportation vulnerabilities
and suggested remedies for the closed session. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Beatty.
Mr. Chrestman?
STATEMENT OF TONY CHRESTMAN, PRESIDENT, RUAN TRANSPORT, DES
MOINES, IOWA
Mr. Chrestman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Grassley,
members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to
present Ruan's perspective on transportation infrastructure
security.
As a highly diversified transportation company, Ruan is in
a unique position to address the many security issues currently
facing the trucking industry. We are a Des Moines, Iowa-based
company with operations throughout the infrastructure. Ruan
provides for-hire trucking services for a full range of
commodities, including hazardous materials. Our operations also
include dedicated truck fleets, logistic services, truck
leasing, contract maintenance services, and truck and trailer
rentals.
I want to add that Ruan worked closely with the American
Trucking Association in preparation for this hearing to make
certain that we are able to present the subcommittee with the
broadest possible picture of the many challenges the trucking
industry has had to deal with in the wake of the tragedies that
occurred on September 11.
Mr. Chairman, the trucking industry has been working to
combat cargo theft and address other security concerns for many
decades. As a result of the work that we have done in
cooperation with various Federal, State and local government
agencies, the industry has made great strides toward ensuring
that the cargo and the equipment we are responsible for does
not fall into the wrong hands.
However, recent events have caused many carriers, including
Ruan, to reevaluate the adequacy of our safety measures. We
have certainly made positive changes over the past few weeks,
and believe we are using all of the tools at our disposal.
However, there are several measures that Congress can adopt
which would help Ruan and other trucking companies to both
curtail security threats within the trucking industry and help
mitigate the impacts of a transportation system disruption
resulting from a terrorist act.
Specifically, Congress should take steps to mitigate the
impacts of a terrorist attack on the highway system: one,
facilitate trucking companies' ability to run criminal
background checks on employees; two, give the enforcement
community more and better tools to combat cargo theft; three,
direct additional resources toward land border infrastructure
to facilitate more efficient trade flows; and, last, improve
oversight of the commercial driver's license program.
I will go into more detail now. As we have witnessed, a
disruption to one part of the transportation system can have
ripple effects that impact the entire system from coast to
coast. We also discovered that a severe disruption to the
transportation system will generate negative impacts throughout
the economy.
The best way to deal with these disruptions is to build
some redundancy into the transportation system. This means
ensuring that if one bridge or one tunnel goes down, there is
enough redundancy in the highway network to ensure the
continued flow of commerce. This also means prioritizing
Federal investments to make certain that the highways that are
not critical to our military and our economy are adequately
funded.
Of course, it is better to avoid these problems in the
first place. Motor carriers have various tools at our disposal
to ensure that trucks and their cargo do not fall into the
wrong hands and are not used in a terrorist act. We are ready
and willing to do more, but we need Congress' help to get
there.
Ruan supports recent proposals by the American Trucking
Association to authorize motor carrier access to national crime
information databases, thus allowing motor carriers to conduct
nationwide criminal background checks on current or prospective
employees.
Congress has authorized such access to other industries
with employees who have a demonstrated impact on public
security or are in a position of public trust--banking, credit
unions, child care providers, nuclear facility operators, home
health care agencies, and airport operators.
While the trucking industry has dealt with cargo theft for
many decades, hijacked trucks and trailers are no longer simple
economic losses. They now present a national security threat.
Even before September 11, ATA proposed cargo theft legislation
that would increase the penalties and fines for cargo theft,
and require uniform reporting on cargo theft and provide
increased funding to local, State and Federal multi-
jurisdictional task forces that have proven effective in
combatting cargo theft.
Mr. Chairman, it will come as no surprise that the most
vulnerable part of the highway system during times of a
national security crisis is at our border crossings with Canada
and Mexico. After the terrorist attacks, the Nation's land
borders were put on a Level I alert, resulting in extreme
border crossing delays and hampering the delivery of parts and
equipment.
The Level I alert at our borders continues today. As
globalization of manufacturing continues to expand, the need
for consistently efficient border operations will grow. While
we recognize and support strong security measures, we also
believe that greater investments in technology and physical and
human infrastructure at the borders will help to alleviate
future problems.
As you know, Mr. Chairman, there has been great concern
over the fact that suspected terrorists were able to obtain
commercial drivers' licenses with HAZMAT endorsements. This
should be a wake-up call to all of us. While we believe the CDL
program is very effective, it clearly has shown deficiencies
particularly with regard to CDL testers and examiners. More
Federal personnel should be dedicated to program evaluation and
oversight, and Congress should consider directing additional
resources to States to improve their own oversight processes.
Finally, we urge Congress to reject any legislation that
would curtail the use of Social Security numbers as personal
identifiers on national drivers' licenses. While there are
legitimate concerns with Social Security numbers related to
identity theft, the inability of carriers and States to track
drivers due to the loss of Social Security numbers as a
personal identifier would compromise both security and highway
safety.
This concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. I have provided
much more detail on these recommendations in my written
statement. I thank you once more for the opportunity and I am
pleased to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Chrestman follows:]
Statement of Tony Chrestman, President, Ruan Transport, Des Moines,
Iowa
I. Introduction
Good morning Mr. Chairman and members of this Subcommittee. My name
is Tony Chrestman, and I am the President of Ruan Transport, the
trucking arm of Ruan Transportation Management Systems (hereafter
referred to as Ruan) based in Des Moines, Iowa. I sincerely appreciate
the opportunity to provide testimony today to this Subcommittee, which
I have prepared in conjunction with the trucking industry's leading
trade group, the American Trucking Associations, Inc. (ATA).
Ruan is a full service ground transportation company that operates
more than 200 service centers throughout the United States. The range
of trucking-related services Ruan provides include: common for-hire
trucking of all types of commodities including bulk transportation of
hazardous materials (hazmat); dedicated truck fleets for specific
customers; logistics services including complete supply-chain
management; full-service truck equipment leasing; contract truck
maintenance services; and truck and trailer rentals.
Mr. Chairman, in the wake of the September 11 attacks, Ruan and the
entire U.S. trucking industry have worked diligently to support
President Bush's goals of keeping our country and our economy moving
forward. I am very proud of the effort of Ruan's employees throughout
the country, and the entire trucking industry's efforts, to keep
America moving. In doing so, we at Ruan, along with most companies in
the industry, have tightened operating security measures. Below, I will
provide some examples of these increased measures.
Trucking is a critical component of the United States' economic
strength, with 9 billion tons of freight transported by inter-city and
local trucks, representing 68% of the total domestic tonnage shipped.
The trucking industry generates revenues of $606 billion annually,
equaling almost 5% of our Gross Domestic Product, and a figure that
represents nearly 87% of all revenues generated by our nation's freight
transportation industry. Our nation's transportation infrastructure, in
particular the highway system, provides the opportunity for the
trucking industry to play such a large and important role in the U.S.
economy. Preservation of and improvement to the existing infrastructure
will help to ensure a strong and vibrant economy both now and in the
future.
As in all businesses and all sectors of our country's economy, the
horrific attacks have heightened security concerns in the trucking
industry, and even more so after it was recently reported by the FBI
that some suspected terrorists had obtained commercial driver's
licenses (CDLs) to operate large trucks. It appears that motor carriers
involved in transporting hazardous materials (hazmat) may have been, or
may be, targeted for hijackings or theft for use in potential acts of
terrorism. In fact, just late last week the FBI issued a warning that
it is very possible that a new terrorist attack on U.S. soil very
likely could involve truck bombs. Obviously, this is a major concern to
Ruan and the entire trucking industry. I commend you for holding this
hearing today to identify ways to address these very real threats which
may be aimed at our transportation infrastructure.
In this testimony, I will communicate the trucking industry's
longstanding involvement in transportation security issues, and provide
examples of increased security measures the industry has taken since
September 11. I will also provide some background information on the
transportation of hazmat, since much of the trucking-related concern
stems from the fact that suspected terrorists recently obtained
commercial driver's licenses (CDLs) to transport hazmat by truck. I
will also recommend several potential legislative actions that that
would improve our infrastructure, and that would assist Ruan, and
hundreds of thousands of other trucking companies, enhance driver,
vehicle and cargo security in the industry.
II. The Trucking Industry's Involvement in Transportation Security and
Related Issues
SECURITY
Ruan and its fellow ATA members have long been actively involved in
providing safe and secure transportation of goods on behalf of
customers and their consumers. Since 1982, ATA has maintained a Council
of members, like Ruan, dedicated to advancing security and loss
prevention issues. The name of this organization has undergone numerous
changes since its inception, and today is known as the Safety & Loss
Prevention Management Council (Safety Council). The Safety Council has
numerous committees, but two in particular focus on security issues--
the Security Committee and the Claims and Loss Prevention Committee.
These Committees have addressed many trucking security issues,
including driver and vehicle security, cargo security, and facility
security. The Committees consist of security directors, many of whom
are former law enforcement personnel, from a broad array of America's
leading motor carriers. The Committees publish guidelines and
educational materials to assist motor carriers enhance the security of
their operations.
increased security measures since september 11
Ruan and other trucking companies throughout the trucking industry
took a number of measures to increase the security of operations
immediately following the attacks. Some carriers have re-evaluated
their overall security procedures for pick-up and delivery, for their
service locations, terminals and loading-dock facilities, for dispatch
operations to vehicles in cities and on the road. In addition to
requesting personnel to be extremely alert and to report any suspicious
activity to law enforcement personnel, other examples of actions taken
include:
Initiating new background checks through systems
available to motor carriers;
Designating specific drivers for specific types of
loads (particularly hazmat loads) and studying the specific
routes to be used;
Instructing drivers not to stop or render assistance
except in the case of a clear emergency, and alerting drivers
of possible ploys to obtain vehicles for hijacking purposes;
Emphasizing to all trucking company employees, not
only drivers, to stay alert and remain aware of their
surroundings at all times, especially when transporting hazmat;
Advising drivers transporting hazmat to, whenever
possible, avoid highly populated areas, and use alternate
routes if feasible to avoid such areas.
Verifying seal integrity at each and every stop.
Notifying central dispatch immediately if the seal is
compromised.
Advising drivers to notify supervisors/managers of any
suspicious shipments, and if deemed necessary, to contact local
police or law enforcement authorities to request inspection of
shipment under safe practices.
These are just a few of the measures that Ruan and many other
trucking companies around the country took to enhance their operational
security. Now, I will turn to some additional information concerning
the transportation of hazmat, since much of the security concern
involving the trucking industry stems for suspected terrorists
obtaining licenses to operate hazmat trucks.
III. Hazardous Materials Transportation
Transportation of hazmat is highly regulated by the U.S. Department
of Transportation (DOT). In addition to the requirements in the
Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMRs), the Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Regulations (FMCSRs) contain certain rules for transportation of
hazardous materials. For instance, drivers of trucks requiring hazmat
warning placards need a CDL with a hazmat endorsement. If, the hazmat
is transported in a tank truck, then the driver also needs a tank
endorsement on the CDL to show proficiency in its operation. To obtain
these endorsements, drivers must pass additional exams administered by
the state licensing agency. The HMRs also require ``hazmat employees,''
including drivers, to receive periodic training in hazmat awareness and
safety and in any specific function that the employee performs. Also,
the FMCSRs specifically deal with driving and parking of trucks that
contain certain hazmat, and highway routing requirements for both
Highway Route Controlled Quantities (HRCQ of Radioactive Materials
(RAM) and non-HRCQ RAM.
Hazardous materials are an integral part of American life and are
used in the manufacture of everything from automobiles to soap. They
include ordinary household items such as bleach and fingernail polish
remover, swimming pool chemicals, and lawn and garden fertilizers and
insecticides. Welding supplies, paint and varnishes, and gasoline are
commonplace. Radiopharmaceuticals are included, as are very highly
regulated chemicals such as chlorine gas for water purification, sulfur
trioxide for the making of soap products, and, of course, radioactive
spent nuclear fuels.
Hazmat is transported in many forms of conveyance ranging from
ocean-going supertankers to handyman vans. By highway, hazmat is
transported in tank trucks, on flatbeds, and inside van-type trailers.
These materials are packaged in drums, boxes, bags, portable tanks,
cargo tanks, and in a variety of other ways. These packages are clearly
marked and labeled, and the transport vehicles display product markings
and hazard class placards in order to warn emergency responders of
their contents. Drivers carry shipping papers and emergency response
information that clearly identifies the hazmat on board their vehicle
and provides emergency responders with immediate response information.
Annually in the U.S., there are at least 300 million hazmat
shipments totaling approximately 3.2 billion tons.\1\ The U.S.
Department of Transportation's Office of Hazardous Materials Safety
estimates the number of hazmat shipments in the U.S. at more than
800,000 per day--94% of these shipments are carried by truck.
Approximately 500,000 daily shipments involve chemical and allied
products; about 300,000 involve petroleum products; and at least 10,000
other shipments involve waste hazmat, medical wastes and various other
hazardous materials. Shipments are defined as equivalent to deliveries,
and in most instances may be distinguished from the number of
movements, trip segments, or other measures. The estimated number of
movements associated with these shipments exceeds 1.2 million per day.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Department Wide Program Evaluation of the Hazardous Materials
Transportation Programs, Executive Summary, U. S. Department of
Transportation, March 2000, p. v.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As previously mentioned, all hazmat is highly regulated; however,
certain materials demand an even higher level of oversight. For
instance, high-level nuclear wastes from power plants are closely
monitored by several federal agencies, including the Department of
Energy (DOE) and DOT. Transportation of radioactive materials is highly
regulated, and trucking companies involved in its movement are pre-
screened and approved by DOE. And, each truck is inspected prior to
transporting a specific shipment of nuclear waste. In fact, the
trucking industry played an integral role in the development of the
Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance's Level VI enhanced radioactive
transporter inspection criteria, which specifically is designed to
afford a high level of driver, vehicle, and load scrutiny prior to the
truck leaving the shipper's facility.
Type and condition of the transportation infrastructure affect
hazmat risks. For example, two-lane rural roads typically have much
higher accident rates than divided, multi-lane interstate highways. And
similarly, interstate highway segments with narrow shoulders and
damaged pavement are generally more risky than interstate segments
without these problems. One way of dealing with infrastructure concerns
is through highway routing of hazmat. Motor carrier and state
requirements for the transportation of HRCQ RAM are very detailed in
the FMCSRs, while the DOT gives more flexibility to the states on their
non-HRCQ routing provisions.
Another step that a number of states have taken to ensure the
safety of their citizens, is to implement hazmat and/or hazardous waste
transportation permit and registration programs. These programs
primarily are designed to monitor the movement of hazmat into, out of,
and through their jurisdictions. They also are designed to fund hazmat
incident emergency response training and to allow states to closely
scrutinize trucking companies involved in the transportation of hazmat
through audits of the applicants. In addition, approximately 37,000
trucking companies are registered in the DOT's Hazardous Materials
Registration Program that provides funds for grants distributed to
states and Indian tribes through the Hazardous Materials Emergency
Preparedness Grants Program.
Hopefully, with this as background, it is plain to see that the
transportation of hazmat is highly regulated, as it should be. These
controls have resulted in a very safe and secure system. Additionally,
the Subcommittee may be interested to know that, according to DOT, the
800,000 daily shipments in transportation are generally safer and more
secure today than the 500,000 daily shipments were when they moved in
transportation during the 1980s.\2\ However, these shipments can be
made even safer and more secure in the future by expanding and
improving our highway infrastructure, and through the adoption of the
additional proposals outlined below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Hazardous Materials Shipments, Office of Hazardous Materials
Safety, Research and Special Programs Administration, October 1998, p.
10
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
IV. Legislative Remedies to Increase Security in Trucking
Mr. Chairman, this hearing is both timely and necessary. We need to
re-examine the security of our nation's infrastructure, and we should
take the reasonably available steps to ensure the infrastructure will
be there to allow companies like mine to deliver goods to America's
consumers and manufacturers in a timely, efficient manner. I would now
like to suggest some specific legislative actions that would help
ensure America's motor carriers' ability to continue to supply
America's economic engine.
INFRASTRUCTURE IMPROVEMENTS
While much attention has appropriately been directed toward
aviation security, if additional terrorist attacks occur in the U.S.,
the surface transportation system is a more likely target, based on
past history. Fifty-eight percent of terrorist attacks worldwide are
directed at transportation systems. Of these attacks, the surface
transportation system is targeted 92 percent of the time. Undoubtedly,
it is an enormous challenge to safeguard 3.8 million miles of highway,
nearly 600,000 highway bridges, and some 400 highway tunnels throughout
the U.S. However, steps can be taken to protect the most vulnerable of
these assets, such as tunnels and major bridges. Ruan and the trucking
industry support reasonable measures to protect these assets. It must
be recognized, however, that any disruptions to truck travel, whether
as a result of a terrorist attack or restrictions placed on truck
travel to prevent such attacks, have economic consequences that will
ultimately spread throughout the national economy. Furthermore, because
of the military's heavy reliance on truck transportation, any
interruption to our industry also affects the military's ability to
move troops and equipment. As the interdependence of the transportation
system grows, and as more manufacturers adopt time-definite delivery
strategies, the potential impacts of surface transportation system
disruptions will increase.
We believe that long-term measures should be taken to mitigate
these potential impacts. As we have learned from natural disasters, the
key to minimizing transportation disruptions is system redundancy. In
the wake of a major earthquake that shut down several major highways,
San Francisco residents were able to adjust their travel patterns
relatively quickly due to the availability of other modes of
transportation and an extensive highway system. On the other side of
the coin, the closure of Route 93 over the Hoover Dam to trucks in the
wake of the September 11 attacks has forced truckers in the Las Vegas
area to take long detours. The closest crossing point to the Hoover Dam
is nearly 70 miles away. This is an example of a lack of redundancy in
the highway system, which is repeated throughout the nation.
Fortunately, an alternative crossing near the Hoover Dam is being
planned, but completion is not expected for several more years. Where
alternate routes to vulnerable bridges and tunnels are being
considered, or are under construction, the trucking industry recommends
that these projects be accelerated through additional funding and the
expedited approval of environmental reviews.
In addition, Congress should reassess the continuing trend toward a
federal transportation program that fails to prioritize spending on the
National Highway System (NHS). The NHS, which includes the Interstate
Highway System and other principal highways, carries 75 percent of the
nation's truck traffic. It serves 53 land borders and 242 military
installations. Despite the obvious commercial and military importance
of the NHS, one-third of the system is in poor or mediocre condition,
and one-quarter of NHS bridges are deficient. Furthermore, the lack of
system capacity expansion over the past three decades has led to severe
congestion on a large part of this system. The NHS is the backbone of
the commercial and military transportation infrastructure, and its many
deficiencies will compound any system interruptions that occur as the
result of a terrorist attack. The trucking industry recommends that
Congress should direct additional funds to the NHS and other highways
of national significance.
CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECKS
While trucking companies do not possess any authority over our
nation's highways, there are certain actions motor carriers can take to
play a role in safeguarding the roads, bridges and tunnels essential to
our doing our job. One measure to help prevent evildoers from using
trucks to purposely harm transportation infrastructure is to conduct
criminal background checks. We at Ruan currently review each driver's
employment history, and we attempt to conduct criminal background
checks on drivers. However, our ability to conduct the criminal
background checks is limited to a slow, costly and cumbersome county-
by-county search. All in the industry agree that a nationwide check
under the present scheme is simply not feasible. While Ruan and its
fellow ATA members did not envision the evil wrought on September 11
when the ATA Board of Directors in 1999 directed the ATA staff to
pursue cargo theft deterrence legislation that would enable motor
carriers to obtain criminal background information on all current and
prospective employees, such legislation would be an effective step in
addressing the threats we now know await--both to our people and our
transportation infrastructure.
The possibility of a truck being used as a weapon of mass
destruction, while unthinkable before, is now a reality. Numerous other
industries with employees who have a demonstrated impact on public
security or are in a position of public trust have been authorized by
statute to access national crime information databases to search
criminal history records corresponding to fingerprints or other
identification information. The list includes federally chartered banks
and credit unions through the American Bankers Association, child care
providers, nuclear facility operators, nursing facilities, home health
care agencies, and airports. Motor carriers are a glaring omission.
A scenario in which a truck driver or motor carrier warehouseman
could wreak a similar level of destruction to a major freight corridor
as the September 11 perpetrators wrought through air transport means is
no longer hard to imagine. Yet, although ATA has sought authorization
from Congress to allow motor carriers to conduct criminal background
checks of employees and potential employees, the trucking industry
remains without this basic tool. Ruan fully supports ATA's efforts on
behalf of the trucking industry, and I know that ATA stands willing to
work with this Congress to enact legislation that would enable motor
carriers to access national crime information databases to conduct
nationwide criminal background checks. I truly hope that this
Subcommittee and the full Committee will enact such legislation and
thus allow motor carriers to assist with the security of our nation.
Moreover, the recent events have highlighted the need to enhance
communications between the various federal databases. Ruan supports
federal efforts to enhance interoperability and communications between
various federal criminal history and immigration databases, which would
assist in screening out potential threats. There is some consideration
being given in the Congress to have state licensing agencies check
criminal history and other relevant databases prior to issuing CDLs to
truck drivers. Ruan and its fellow members of ATA would support such
requirements provided motor carriers still had the opportunity to
conduct criminal background checks at the time of employment.
CARGO THEFT
I would like to now discuss another issue that falls within the
full Committee's jurisdiction--cargo theft. Hijacked trucks and
trailers are no longer simply economic losses; now, they may be direct
threats to our security. What was once an issue of great importance to
the trucking industry before September 11 should now be an issue of
concern for this Subcommittee.
It is no secret that cargo theft losses in our country have a
severe economic impact on the trucking industry, the shipping public,
businesses of all sizes and on consumers. The losses being suffered by
our industry from pilferage, theft and hijackings continue to be
substantial, with figures ranging from $10 billion to $12 billion
annually. Therefore, for a number of years the trucking industry has
looked for various means to reduce and control the losses caused by
such illegal acts. Ruan has implemented many security measures to
combat cargo theft, but without some fundamental changes in the law,
these measures cannot be fully successful.
The lax penalties associated with, and insufficient resources
devoted to, cargo theft have made it increasingly appealing to criminal
elements as a source of funding. Further, some of the goods carried on
behalf of America's producers and manufacturers may be diverted for
sinister purposes. Therefore, Ruan respectfully requests that this
Congress enact much-needed cargo theft deterrence legislation, as
proposed by ATA. In addition to allowing motor carriers to conduct
criminal background checks, ATA's legislative proposal would: 1)
increase the criminal penalties and fines for cargo theft; 2) require
uniform statistical reporting on cargo theft; and 3) provide increased
funding local, state, and federal multi-jurisdictional task forces that
have proven effective in combating cargo theft. Further, in view of the
possible threat posed to the public by stolen commercial motor
vehicles, any cargo theft legislation should establish a mechanism
within DOT to allow for immediate, around-the-clock reporting of the
theft. DOT should establish a toll-free hotline to receive reports from
motor carriers of commercial vehicle thefts and then disseminate that
information to federal, state, and local law enforcement personnel
nationwide on a timely basis. Today, no such mechanism exists.
Now, I would like to turn your attention to two other specific
areas in which the trucking industry plays crucial roles: international
cargo movements, and commercial driver's licenses.
BORDER INFRASTRUCTURE FOR INTERNATIONAL CARGO MOVEMENTS
As the members of this Subcommittee are probably aware, on
September 11, ports of entry at our international land borders were put
on Level 1 alert, resulting in extreme border crossing delays on, and
severely hampering delivery of, parts and equipment for just-in-time
deliveries at manufacturing operations. Ruan and its fellow members of
ATA would also ask the Subcommittee to look at technologies under
development that can facilitate enforcement efforts while at the same
time expedite the movement of cargo across our borders. One such system
being designed presently by U.S. Customs is the International Trade
Data System (ITDS). The ITDS concept is simple: Traders and carriers
submit commercially based, standard electronic data records through a
single federal gateway for the import or export of goods. As a single
information gateway, ITDS distributes these records to the affected
federal trade agencies, such as U.S. Customs, INS, and the DOT, for
their selectivity and risk assessment.
I would urge the subcommittee to look at infrastructure needs of
our ports of entry, in conjunction with other Senate Committees and
Subcommittees with oversight of border agencies, to establish
appropriate levels of human resources in addition to investments in
technology infrastructure, such as the ITDS. Both Canada and Mexico,
our largest and second largest trading partners respectively, play a
critical role in our economic wellbeing through our economic
interdependence. We cannot overlook the critical link that motor
carriers play in the success of our increasing trade flows within North
America. Therefore, we must continue to find solutions that will
continue to allow us to move the legal commodity flows among our three
nations, while at the same time improve our security relationships
between the trade community and law enforcement agencies at our
borders.
COMMERCIAL DRIVER'S LICENSE ISSUES
With the full support of the trucking industry, the U.S. Congress,
DOT and the states have been instrumental in establishing a generally
successful CDL program. However, the fact that suspected terrorists
have illegally obtained CDLs with hazardous materials endorsements
should be a wake up call for all of us.
While the federal and state governments have done a good job
putting the regulations, programs, and information systems in place to
administer the program, the level of effort to actively monitor and
oversee the personnel charged with administering the program has not
been sufficient. The suspected terrorists illegally obtaining CDLs, and
the number of recent CDL related scandals in several states, is
evidence that more oversight is needed, particularly as it relates to
CDL testers and examiners. More federal personnel should be dedicated
to program evaluation and oversight, possibly including dedicated
federal CDL program personnel in each state. The states licensing
agencies should also consider increasing their program oversight
staffs, to work in greater cooperation with federal CDL oversight
personnel. Congress should consider authorizing additional DOT
positions for this function, and should also consider establishing a
dedicated (and state matching) CDL grant program to provide additional
financial assistance to states for greater program oversight.
An additional and more specific security-related issue concerning
the CDL program is the collection and use of a driver's Social Security
Number (SSN) by state licensing agencies. As part of the federally-
required and state administered CDL program, state licensing agencies
are required by DOT to collect SSNs on the CDL application. And, many
states use the driver's SSN as the driver's state license number on the
CDL document. The SSN is one of several ways that states uniquely
identify truck drivers, which is an important aspect of the CDL
program. With identity theft apparently playing a role in the recent
attacks, the industry, the states and the federal government must
consider ways to safeguard and even enhance personal identification
methods. Clearly, however, we should not make it more difficult for the
industry and the states to track the identities of truck drivers--which
is what would occur if recently sponsored legislation on SSNs was
passed by the Congress. Ruan knows that ATA stands ready to work with
DOT and the Congress to enhance truck driver identifiers, and calls
upon Members of Congress to reject legislation that would do away with
SSNs as personal identifiers on driver licenses.
V. CONCLUSION
Mr. Chairman, Ruan and its fellow ATA members understand we are
entrusted with the secure transportation of goods that keep America
moving forward. Law enforcement has frequently been a strong ally in
the industry's longstanding efforts to ensure the security of cargo, on
America's highways and across our international borders. We look
forward to continued cooperation with those authorities charged with
securing our nation against future terrorist threats. I know that ATA
understands the role trucking must play to ensure our national security
in this newly changed landscape. Ruan and the trucking industry ask
that Congress consider the proposals discussed above which will allow
the trucking industry to better fulfill its role to safely and securely
transport our nation's freight.
Chairman Biden. Thank you very much.
I would like to thank each of the witnesses for their
opening statements.
As I mentioned at the outset, we are now going to go into a
closed session. Such an act requires a motion, a second, and a
recorded vote, with a majority of the members of the
subcommittee voting in favor. The reason for my motion is that
the testimony we will be hearing will disclose matters
necessary to be kept secret in the interest of national defense
or confidential conduct of the foreign relations of the United
States, as set forth in Rule XXVI, section (b((5)(1).
I therefore move that we go into closed session. Is there a
second?
Senator Grassley. I second it.
Chairman Biden. Obviously, we are all in favor, since there
are only two of us here, and the clerk will record the aye
votes of Senator Biden and Senator Grassley.
I am told we need a roll call of the full subcommittee.
Proxies are appropriate. The clerk will call the roll.
The Clerk. Mr. Kohl?
Chairman Biden. Aye, by proxy.
The Clerk. Mrs. Feinstein?
Chairman Biden. Aye, by proxy.
The Clerk. Mr. Durbin?
Chairman Biden. Aye, by proxy.
The Clerk. Ms. Cantwell?
Chairman Biden. Aye, by proxy.
The Clerk. Mr. Grassley?
Senator Grassley. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Hatch?
Senator Grassley. We don't have a proxy.
The Clerk. Mr. Sessions?
Senator Grassley. Aye, by proxy.
The Clerk. Mr. Brownback?
Senator Grassley. Aye, by proxy.
The Clerk. Mr. McConnell?
Senator Grassley. Aye, by proxy.
The Clerk. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Biden. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, the votes are 9 yeas, no nays, and
one pass.
Chairman Biden. We are now in closed session. I ask the
staff, is everyone in here associated with the witnesses? If
not, would the staff clear the room?
[Whereupon, at 11:38, the subcommittee was adjourned, to
reconvene immediately in closed session.]