

March 1995

FORCE STRUCTURE

Army National Guard Divisions Could Augment Wartime Support Capability



GAO	United States General Accounting Office Washington, D.C. 20548
	National Security and International Affairs Division
	B-259886
	March 2, 1995
	The Honorable Togo D. West, Jr. Secretary of the Army
	Dear Mr. Secretary:
	The Department of Defense (DOD), in its bottom-up review of the nation's defense needs in the post-Cold War era, judged that it is prudent to maintain the capability to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts. In responding to a single conflict during Operation Desert Storm, the Army had difficulty providing support units, even though it deployed only a portion of its total combat force. Because of this experience, we examined whether (1) the Army might face similar challenges in supporting the two-conflict strategy and (2) support capability in certain Army National Guard units could be used to alleviate any potential shortfalls. This report discusses our detailed findings on these issues. We reported separately on DOD's bottom-up review. ¹
Background	In October 1993, DOD reported on its bottom-up review. In particular, the review outlined an overall defense strategy for the new era, specific dangers to U.S. interests, strategies for dealing with each danger, and force requirements. Chief among the dangers was the threat of large-scale aggression by major regional powers.
	To counter regional aggression, DOD evaluated various strategy and force options. DOD selected the two-conflict strategy and determined the combat forces capable of executing the strategy. For the Army, these forces consisted of 10 active divisions and 15 Army National Guard enhanced readiness combat brigades. ² DOD also provided for other National Guard combat forces, now organized as eight divisions, that it does not envision using in a two-conflict situation. These divisions are expected to perform missions, such as providing rotational forces for extended crises and protracted peace operations. These forces are also called upon to meet domestic dangers, such as natural disasters and civil unrest.
	In addition to combat forces, the Army maintains support units to repair equipment, transport and distribute supplies, provide services, and otherwise sustain combat operations. These units are (1) divisional
	¹ Bottom-Up Review: Analysis of Key DOD Assumptions (GAO/NSIAD-95-56, Jan. 31, 1995).
	² These enhanced brigades are existing National Guard combat brigades with improved readiness.

GAO/NSIAD-95-80 Force Structure

support units, which are part of active and National Guard combat divisions and provide support to divisional units, and (2) nondivisional support units, which are separate units in the active component, National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve that support divisional and nondivisional units.³ The numbers and types of divisional support units are determined by Army doctrine. For example, all divisions are doctrinally required to have one military police company to provide security and law enforcement. For nondivisional support, the Army determines the numbers and types of units that are required for its total combat force through a biennial process, referred to as the Total Army Analysis.⁴ The Army then identifies, based on weighing its priorities, the units that will be allocated resources—personnel and equipment. In July 1994, the Army began the Total Army Analysis process to determine nondivisional support requirements for the bottom-up review force, and it expects to complete the analysis in mid-1995.

Results in Brief

The Army would be challenged to provide sufficient numbers of certain types of nondivisional support units for two major regional conflicts. The Army had difficulty providing such units in the Persian Gulf War—a single regional conflict. In addition, after completing its most recent Total Army Analysis in March 1993, the Army decided not to allocate resources to some of the nondivisional support units required to support its current active force of 12 divisions and allocated resources to other areas. Army officials expect this trend to continue. Furthermore, an analysis of current war-fighting plans for responding to two specific regional conflicts revealed that the Army does not have sufficient types of certain units required for these plans.

An option for augmenting the Army's nondivisional support capability is to use existing support capability—units, personnel, and equipment—in the eight National Guard divisions that DOD did not include in the combat force for executing the two-conflict strategy. These divisions contain several support units that are functionally similar or identical to nondivisional support units that were not allocated resources during the 1993 Total Army Analysis. These divisions also have many of the same types of skilled personnel and equipment that the nondivisional support units have. By using units, personnel, and equipment in the eight divisions, the Army

³Nondivisional support units supplement divisional support units and also provide unique types of support, such as constructing facilities or providing specialized medical care.

⁴This analysis is a computer-assisted study involving the simulation of combat to generate nondivisional support requirements, based on war-fighting scenarios DOD developed.

	could create additional nondivisional support units or augment existing ones.
Army Had Difficulty Providing Support During the Persian Gulf War	During the Persian Gulf War, a single regional conflict, the Army deployed virtually all of some types of nondivisional support units and ran out of some other types of units, even though it deployed only a portion of its total active combat force—about 8 of 18 divisions. As we reported in 1992, ⁵ the specific types of units affected included
	• quartermaster units, such as water, graves registration, and pipeline and
	 terminal operation companies; transportation units, such as heavy and medium truck companies; and military police units, such as companies that handle enemy prisoners of war.
	DOD, for several reasons, was able to mitigate the potential adverse impact of shortfalls; for example, (1) U.S. forces had a long lead time to deploy before conducting a counteroffensive against Iraqi forces and the counteroffensive was of short duration; (2) Saudi Arabia provided extensive host nation support, such as transportation and water; and (3) no second conflict developed at the same time requiring a U.S. response. In a two-conflict situation, the Army may face even greater challenges than it encountered during the Gulf War. As envisioned in the bottom-up review, the Army, with little warning, may need to simultaneously support at least 10 active divisions deployed to two major conflicts in two different regions.
Army Lacks Units to Support Total Combat Force and Specific Regional Conflict Plans	The Army does not have sufficient nondivisional support units to support its current active combat force. Based on its most recent Total Army Analysis, the Army decided not to allocate resources to 838 nondivisional units required to support 12 active divisions (see table 1). Although these 838 units are a small portion of the total nondivisional support requirement, they represent important capabilities required to support combat operations.

⁵Operation Desert Storm: Army had Difficulty Providing Adequate Active and Reserve Support Forces (GAO/NSIAD-92-67, Mar. 10, 1992).

Table 1: Type and Number ofUnresourced Nondivisional Units

	Number of
Type of unit	units
Aviation	1
Chemical	6
Engineering	54
Medical	31
Ordnance	100
Quartermaster	210
Signal	12
Adjutant General	26
Finance	10
Chaplain	12
Military police	1
Military law	32
Psychological operations	10
Military intelligence	3
Maintenance	84
Headquarters ^a	16
Transportation	230
Total	838

^aThese units consist of personnel that would be assigned to augment command organizations in wartime.

Army officials participating in the ongoing Total Army Analysis anticipate that the Army, because of competing priorities, will probably not allocate resources to all of the nondivisional support units required to support the bottom-up review combat force and the two-conflict strategy. While the bottom-up review combat force includes two fewer active divisions than the current 12-division force, the two-conflict situation described in the bottom-up review is similar to the war-fighting scenario used in the 1993 analysis. In addition, mandated reductions in personnel will leave the Army with fewer personnel available to allocate to required nondivisional support units.

We analyzed the nondivisional support requirements in two U.S. plans for responding to regional conflicts for 17 types of units that were unresourced in the 1993 analysis. These plans were developed by two separate war-fighting commands, and each plan covered a specific

	regional conflict. We found that the Army is short 238 units for one of the two plans (see app. I). The largest shortfall—a total of 206 units—consisted of five types—medical, engineer, quartermaster, transportation, and military police units. In analyzing the combined requirements of the two plans for these five types of units, we found that the shortfall would increase from 206 to 338 units (see app. II). We also found that 654 of the same types of nondivisional support units were assigned to both of the regional conflict plans—dual-tasked to support combat operations in both conflicts (see app. III). ⁶ Like the shortfalls previously mentioned, the largest number of dual-tasked units—a total of 464 units—consisted of medical, engineer, quartermaster, transportation, and military police units.
Army Has the Option of Using National Guard Divisions to Augment Nondivisional Support Capability	The eight Army National Guard divisions that DOD does not envision using during a two-conflict situation contain support capability that the Army could use to fill nondivisional support needs. At our request, the Army compared the capability in support units in a typical National Guard division with the capability reflected in nondivisional support units that were not allocated resources during the 1993 Total Army Analysis. This analysis identified several examples of support units in a National Guard Division that are similar or identical to unresourced nondivisional support units (see table 2).

 $^{^6}$ These 654 units relate to only the 17 types of units covered in our analysis of the single plan and, therefore, do not equal the total number of units dual-tasked to both plans.

Table 2: Support Units in NationalGuard Divisions Identical or Similar toUnresourced Nondivisional SupportUnits

Type of unit	National Guard divisional support unit	Unresourced nondivisional support unit
Ordnance	Ammunition transfer point section	Ammunition account team
Aviation	Attack helicopter battalion	Attack helicopter battalion
Transportation	Movement control team	Movement control team
Military police	Military police company	Military police combat support company
Chemical	Chemical company	Chemical decontamination company
Signal	Signal battalion	Signal battalion
	Signal support company	Air defense artillery support company
Maintenance	Heavy maintenance company	Engineer equipment repair team or tactical fire repair team
	Engineer support team	Engineer equipment repair team
	Army repair section	Tactical fire repair team

In addition, we analyzed Army data on the personnel and equipment assigned to the eight National Guard divisions and found that these divisions have many of the same skilled personnel and equipment needed for nondivisional support units. For example, these divisions could provide 100 percent of the unresourced nondivisional support requirements for

- 321 types of skilled personnel, including helicopter pilots, communications technicians, repair personnel, military police officers, intelligence analysts, and petroleum and water specialists; and
- 407 types of equipment, including medium trucks, trailers, tractors, generator sets, chemical and biological masks, radio sets and antennas, and water supply and purification systems.

Given the previously mentioned similarities, we believe that the Army should consider using the support capability in the eight National Guard divisions to augment its nondivisional support capability in wartime. The Army has the option of using National Guard divisional support units that are identical or similar to nondivisional support units to perform the nondivisional mission. Moreover, the Army could use personnel and equipment in divisional units to either form new nondivisional support units or augment existing nondivisional support units, if that is required. The Army has not considered using National Guard divisions in this

	 manner because these divisions were planned to be used as follow-on combat forces in the event of a global war. Army officials agreed that National Guard divisions are a potential source for meeting nondivisional support requirements. They, however, emphasized that a more extensive analysis is required to determine the feasibility and cost-effectiveness of this option and the impact on the divisions of using them in this manner.
Recommendation	We recommend that the Secretary of the Army, as part of the Army's ongoing Total Army Analysis, (1) identify the specific unresourced nondivisional support requirements that could be met using National Guard divisional support units and the personnel and equipment in these units and (2) work with the National Guard to develop a plan for employing this capability.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation	DOD concurred with our recommendation but partially concurred with the report, believing that we failed to address certain concerns. Specifically, DOD noted that (1) current low resourcing of National Guard divisions, if unaddressed, would lead to degradations in personnel, equipment, and training readiness for these units; (2) nondivisional support units, while similar to divisional support units, are not trained or equipped to perform the same missions; and (3) while it may be expedient to access divisional support units to provide nondivisional capability, this alternative must be weighed against the value of these divisions for other missions.
	In making our recommendation, we recognized that the Army and the National Guard would need to further examine its feasibility, cost-effectiveness, and impact on National Guard divisions. Consequently, we agree that DOD's concerns merit further examination and expect that any analysis performed by the Army and the National Guard in accordance with our recommendation would consider these points.
	DOD disagreed that the Army lacks units to support its total combat force and specific regional conflict plans. While DOD acknowledged that support shortfalls exist for the current 12-division force, it believes that our analysis of these shortfalls, dual-tasked support units, and the Army's difficulties in providing nondivisional support units during the Persian Gulf War implies that the Army could not support the bottom-up review force and two major regional conflicts.

We did not conclude that the Army could not support the bottom-up review force and two major regional conflicts. Rather, we showed that (1) shortfalls for the current 12-division force, a single regional conflict plan, and the combined requirements of two regional conflict plans; (2) dual-tasking of units; and (3) the Army's experience during the Gulf War suggest that the Army would be challenged in meeting this requirement.

DOD stated that the planned aggregate active and reserve end strength will give the Army the flexibility to provide more support units in areas of need and that using host nation support, contractors, and other resources are available alternatives for addressing any shortfalls. DOD also stated that it is premature to draw conclusions about possible support shortfalls until the ongoing Total Army Analysis is completed.

We disagree that the planned end strength will provide the Army the flexibility to provide more support forces. The changes in end strength resulting from the bottom-up review represent a net decrease in end strength for the active component and the U.S. Army Reserve—those components that provide most of the Army's support units—and an increase in the National Guard's end strength, which will be used to retain combat positions. As a result, the Army has less flexibility for providing more support units. We believe that using Guard divisional support capability will increase the Army's flexibility to provide more nondivisional support in areas of need within the aggregate active and reserve end strength. We agree that the extent of actual support shortages will not be determined until the Army completes its ongoing Total Army Analysis. Until DOD knows the shortfalls, it cannot identify the most appropriate alternatives for addressing them.

DOD's comments are presented in their entirety in appendix IV.

Scope and Methodology

To determine whether the Army might be challenged in supporting two major regional conflicts, we interviewed knowledgeable officials and obtained documents at the Department of the Army headquarters and the National Guard Bureau in Washington, D.C; Forces Command, U.S. Third Army and U.S. Army Reserve Command, located at Fort McPherson, Georgia; and two war-fighting commands responsible for developing and executing specific U.S. plans for responding to major regional conflicts. To document specific shortfalls, we obtained Total Army Analysis data on unresourced nondivisional support requirements and compared actual requirements for selected types of nondivisional support units in two specific regional conflict plans with the inventory of available units.

To determine whether support capability in Army National Guard divisions could be used to augment the Army's nondivisional support capability, we interviewed knowledgeable officials and obtained documents at the Department of Army headquarters and the National Guard Bureau. At our request, the Army's Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations provided data on support units in National Guard divisions that had similar or identical characteristics to nondivisional support units the Army decided not to allocate resources to during its most recent Total Army Analysis, completed in 1993. Using this data and the data from our analysis of personnel and equipment authorizations for National Guard divisions, we identified specific matches of National Guard divisional units, personnel, and equipment to unresourced nondivisional support units.

We conducted this review from October 1993 to October 1994 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

As you know, 31 U.S.C. 720 requires the head of a federal agency to submit a written statement on actions taken on our recommendations to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs and the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight not later than 60 days after the date of this report. A written statement must also be submitted to the Senate and the House Committees on Appropriations with an agency's first request for appropriations made more than 60 days after the date of the report.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the Director of the Army National Guard; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and interested congressional committees. Please contact me at (202) 512-3504 if you or your staff have any questions concerning this report. The major contributors to this report are Sharon Pickup, Barbara Gannon, and Samuel L. Hinojosa.

Sincerely yours,

Richard Davis

Richard Davis Director, National Security Analysis

Shortfall of Selected Nondivisional Support Units Required in a Specific U.S. Plan for Responding to a Single Regional Conflict by <u>Number and Type</u>

Type unit	Number of unit
Aviation	4
Chemical	3
Engineer	33
Medical	84
Ordnance	9
Quartermaster	20
Signal	6
Adjutant General	1
Chaplain	3
Finance	0
Military police	40
Military law	0
Psychological operations	0
Military intelligence	2
Maintenance	4
Headquarters ^a	0
Transportation	29
Total	238

 $^{\mathrm{a}}\textsc{These}$ units consist of personnel that would be assigned to augment command organizations in wartime.

Shortfall of Selected Nondivisional Support Units Required in Two Specific U.S. Plans for Responding to Regional Conflicts by <u>Number and Type</u>

Type of unit	Number of units
Medical	96
Engineer	59
Quartermaster	59
Military police	52
Transportation	72
Total	338

Units Dual-Tasked to Two Specific U.S. Plans for Responding to Regional Conflicts by Number and Type

Type of unit	Number of units ^a
Aviation	40
Chemical	32
Engineer	94
Medical	96
Ordnance	32
Quartermaster	94
Signal	25
Adjutant General	20
Chaplain	0
Finance	9
Military police	45
Military law	1
Psychological operations	1
Military intelligence	4
Maintenance	22
Headquarters ^b	4
Transportation	135
Total	654


^aFor certain unit types, the numbers in this table are greater than those shown in table 1. As we reported in 1995, planning factors for nondivisional support requirements used in the Total Army Analysis differ from those used by war-fighting commands in developing regional conflict plans. See Force Structure: Army Support Requirements Process Lacks Valid and Consistent Data (GAO/NSIAD-95-46, Jan. 30, 1995).

^bThese units consist of personnel that would be assigned to augment command organizations in wartime.

Comments From the Department of Defense

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301 3 0 JAN 1995 RESERVE AFFAIRS Mr. Henry L. Hinton, Jr. Assistant Comptroller General National Security and International Affairs Divisions U.S. General Accounting Office Washington, D. C. 20548 Dear Mr. Hinton: This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the General Accounting Office (GAO) draft report, "FORCE STRUCTURE: Army National Guard Divisions Could Augment Wartime Support Capability, " dated January 12, 1995 (GAO Code 701058/OSD Case 9809-A). The DoD partially concurs with the report. Although the DoD agrees with much of the information in the GAO report, there are additional concerns the report fails to address. First, current resourcing priorities for Army National Guard (ARNG) divisions are low when compared with enhanced readiness brigades and early deploying U.S. Army Reserve units. Unaddressed, that condition would inevitably result in degradation in personnel, training, and equipment readiness. Second, despite similarities between divisional and nondivisional support units, doctrinally they are not trained or equipped to perform the same mission. Doctrinally, the forces are designed to fight like they are trained. A dual mission tasking on the ARNG support units, without increased resourcing for training, would not produce the desired payoff in support of Active Army combat forces. Lastly, in an era of diminished resources, "breaking" ARNG divisions by accessing their divisional support units for nondivisional support to the Army in a crisis may seem expedient. However, that alternative must be weighed carefully against the value of these divisions for other missions as outlined in the national military strategy. The DoD concurs with the GAO recommendation and will take appropriate action pending the outcome of Total Army Analysis-2003 (TAA-03), expected in May 1995. The detailed DoD comments on the GAO findings and recommendations are enclosed. Suggested technical changes

to the report have been provided separately to the GAO staff. The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft report. Robert A. Goodbary Major General, USA Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (Readiness, Training & Mobilization Enclosure: As stated



Now on pp. 1-2.

	to future adversarial regimes, plus providing capability to meet domestic crises.
Now on p. 3.	 FINDING B: Army Had Difficulty Providing Support During The Persian Gulf War. The GAO asserted that during the Persian Gulf War-a single regional conflictthe Army deployed virtually all of some types of nondivisional support units and ran out of some other types of units, even though it deployed only a portion of its total active combat force about 8 of 18 divisions. The GAO further asserted that the DoD was able to mitigate the potential adverse impact of shortfalls because (1) U.S. forces had a long lead time to deploy before conducting a counteroffensive against Iraqi forces and the counteroffensive was of short duration; (2) Saudi Arabia and other countries provided extensive host nation support, such as transportation and water; and (3) no second conflict developed at the same time requiring a U.S. response. The GAO concluded that in a two-conflict situation, the Army may face even greater challenges than it encountered during the Gulf war. The GAO noted that as envisioned in the BUR, the Army, with little warning, may need to simultaneously support at least 10 active divisions deployed to two major conflicts in two different regions. (pp. 4-5/GAO Draft Report)
See pp. 7-8.	DOD RESPONSE: Partially concur. It should be recognized that while the Army did encounter some shortfalls in nondivisional support units during the Persian Gulf War, the campaign was successfully brought to conclusion. In addition, the DoD does not agree that, based solely on the Operation Desert Storm experience, it can be concluded that the Army may face greater challenges in a two MRC scenario.
	 FINDING C: The Army Lacks Units to Support Total Combat Force and Specific Regional Conflicts Plans. The GAO concluded that as of November 1994, the Army did not have sufficient nondivisional support units to support its current active combat force. The GAO observed that based on its most recent TAA, the Army decided not to allocate resources to 838 nondivisional units required to support 12 active divisions. The GAO asserted that although the 838 units are a small portion of the total nondivisional support requirement, they represent important capabilities required to support combat operations.
	The GAO analyzed the nondivisional support requirements in two U.S. plans for responding to regional conflicts for 17 types of units that were unresourced in the 1993 analysis.
	Enclosure Page 2 of 5

Now on pp. 3-5.	The GAO noted that those plans were developed by two separate warfighting commands and covered a specific regional conflict. The GAO found that the Army is lacking 238 units (medical, engineer, quartermaster, transportation, and military police units) needed for one of the two plans, found that the shortfall would increase from 206 to 338 units. The GAO also found that 656 of the same nondivisional support units were assigned to both of the regional conflict plansdual-tasked to support combat operations in both conflicts. The GAO noted that like the shortfalls previously mentioned, the largest number of dual- tasked unitsa total of 464 unitsconsisted of medical, engineer, quartermaster, transportation, and military police units. (pp. 5-8/GAO Draft Report) DOD RESPONSE: Nonconcur. The DoD acknowledges that shortfalls exist in the 12 division Army support structure. However, the DoD does not agree with the GAO analysis and conclusions that the Army does not have sufficient support units to adequately support the combat force. The GAO based its analysis on specific unit shortfalls for the current 12 division Army and then implied that the Army could not support the BOI 0 division force and the specific plans for two MRCs. According to the GAO, a total of 656 Army support units are dual-tasked, which the GAO implies would preclude effective U.S. operations in two MRCS. It
	<pre>of shortfall in capabilities. The GAO apparently based its analysis on the Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) supporting specific Commander-in-Chief (CINC) warplans. Both the data and the plans are based on the 1993-1995 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), which assumed a 12 division active component force structure. Therefore, combat support (CS)/combat service support (CSS) dual-taskings shown in the report probably overstate the potential shortages. As the active Army force structure is reduced to 10 divi- sions, planned aggregate active and reserve end-strength will give the Army the flexibility to provide more support units in areas of need. In many cases, the use of host- nation support, contractors, and other resources can also be employed to provide workable alternatives. The Army is currently addressing its force structure requirements (both active and reserve component) through its Total Army Analysis-2003 (TAA-03), projected for completion by May 1995. Until the TAA-03 is complete, it is premature</pre>
	Enclosure Page 3 of 5

7.0	to draw conclusions regarding shortfalls in the Army support structure.
e pp. 7-8.	 Support structure. FINDING D: Army Has the Option of Using National Guard Divisions to Augment Nondivisional Support Capability. The GAO asserted that the eight Army National Guard divisions that the DoD does not envision using during a two-conflict situation contain support capability that the Army could use to fill nondivisional support unit's needs. The GAO noted that at their request, the Army performed a broad analysis comparing the capability in support units in a typical National Guard division with the capability reflected in nondivisional support units. The GAO pointed out that the analysis identified several examples of support units in a National Guard Division that are similar or identical to unresourced nondivisional support units. The GAO analyzed Army data on the personnel and equipment assigned to the eight National Guard divisions and found that those divisions have many of the same skilled personnel
	and equipment needed for nondivisional support units. The GAO cited several examples of some areas where those divisions could provide 100 percent of the unresourced nondivisional personnel and equipment support requirements. The GAO concluded that given the similarities of National Guard divisional support units and the personnel and
	equipment in those units with the types of unresourced nondivisional support units, the Army should consider using the support capability in the eight National Guard divisions to augment its nondivisional support capability. The GAO asserted that the Army has the option of using National Guard divisional support units to (1) fill the requirement for nondivisional support units, (2) provide personnel and equipment to form a new nondivisional support unit, or (3) provide personnel and equipment to augment an existing nondivisional support unit. The GAO noted that the Army, in the past, has not considered using National Guard divisions in that manner because the divisions were planned to be used as follow-on combat forces in the event of a global war. The GAO pointed out that according to Army officials, National Guard divisions are a potential source for meeting nondivisional support requirements, but emphasized that more extensive analysis is required to determine the feasibility and cost-effectiveness of that
	ontion and the impact on the disidual of the state of the
w on pp. 5-7.	option and the impact on the divisions of using them in this manner. (pp. 8-10/GAO Draft Report) DOD RESPONSE: Concur. As discussed in the DoD response to Finding A, the primary mission of the 8 National Guard

divisions is to provide a strategic hedge in a war fighting related mission, extended crisis, or operations other than war. Based upon the final conclusions of the TAA-03, now being performed, the Army may then need to address the additional concerns of resourcing, readiness, and reorganization associated with using Army National Guard support units as the GAO recommends. (See also the DoD response to the GAO recommendation.) * * * * * RECOMMENDATION **<u>RECOMMENDATION</u>**: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of ο the Army, as part of the Army's ongoing TAA, identify the (1) specific nondivisional support requirements that could be met using National Guard divisional support units and the personnel and equipment in those units and (2) work with the National Guard to develop a plan for accessing that support Now on p. 7. (p. 11/GAO Draft Report) capability. DOD RESPONSE: Concur. As discussed in the DoD response to Finding C, the Army is currently analyzing its force structure requirements in the TAA-03. The TAA-03 analysis will include both active and reserve components and will consider unresourced nondivisional support requirements. Completion of the TAA-03 is projected for May 1995. Based on the results of the TAA-03, the Army will then determine whether there is a need to address resourcing, readiness, and reorganization issues using Army National Guard support units; and take appropriate action. Enclosure Page 5 of 5

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