[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 107 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
MEDIA FREEDOM IN CHINA
=======================================================================
ROUNDTABLE
before the
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 24, 2002
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Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China
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CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
Senate House
MAX BAUCUS, Montana, Chairman DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska, Co-
CARL LEVIN, Michigan Chairman
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California JIM LEACH, Iowa
BYRON DORGAN, North Dakota DAVID DREIER, California
EVAN BAYH, Indiana FRANK WOLF, Virginia
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JOE PITTS, Pennsylvania
BOB SMITH, New Hampshire SANDER LEVIN, Michigan
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio
TIM HUTCHINSON, Arkansas SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
JIM DAVIS, Florida
EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
PAULA DOBRIANSKY, Department of State
GRANT ALDONAS, Department of Commerce
D. CAMERON FINDLAY, Department of Labor
LORNE CRANER, Department of State
JAMES KELLY, Department of State
Ira Wolf, Staff Director
John Foarde, Deputy Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS
Mann, James, senior writer in residence, Center for Strategic and
International Studies, Washington, DC.......................... 2
He, Qinglian, journalist, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ;
accompanied by Dr. Jay Sailey, interpreter, Silver Spring, MD.. 6
Menon, Kavita, Committee to Protect Journalists, New York, NY.... 8
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements
Mann, James...................................................... 34
Menon, Kavita.................................................... 37
MEDIA FREEDOM IN CHINA
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MONDAY, JUNE 24, 2002
Congressional-Executive
Commission on China,
Washington, DC.
The roundtable was convened, pursuant to notice, at 2:33
p.m., in room SD-215, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Ira Wolf
(Staff Director of the Commission) presiding.
Also present: John Foarde, Deputy Staff Director; Chris
Billing, Director of Communications of the Commission; Matt
Tuchow, Office of Representative Levin; Karin Finkler, Office
of Representative Pitts; Amy Gadsden, U.S. Department of State;
and Holly Vineyard, U.S. Department of Commerce.
Mr. Wolf. Let us get started.
I would like to welcome all of you on behalf of the
Commission chairman, Senator Baucus, and the Commission co-
chairman, Congressman Bereuter, to this seventh staff
roundtable on issues of human rights and the rule of law.
Today we will be discussing restrictions on media freedom
in China. There are several key enablers of human rights in
China, and media freedom is one of those.
We have three distinguished witnesses today--Jim Mann, from
the Center for Strategic and International Studies and former
Beijing Bureau Chief of the Los Angeles Times; He Qinglian, who
is former editor of Shenzhen Legal Daily and author of
``China's Pitfalls''; and Kavita Menon, Asia Program Director
for the Committee to Protect Journalists.
Each of you will have 10 minutes for an opening statement.
We also welcome any formal statement you want to put in the
record. Then the staff will ask some questions, and we hope
there will be discussion among the three of you.
As always, we make a full transcript of today's
proceedings. Any written statements will be posted on our
Website in the next day or two, and it will take about 5 weeks
to post the full transcript of this roundtable.
The roundtable itself will be an important element
contributing to the annual report of the Commission which will
be sent to the President and to the Congress in October.
Before we start, I just want to mention that between now
and the end of the summer we will have three more roundtables.
On July 8, we will have a roundtable on village elections; on
July 26, a roundtable on the criminal justice system in China;
and on August 5, we will have an open forum where any
individual or group is welcome to come and speak for 5 minutes
on any issue related to human rights and rule of law in China.
With that, I would like to start with Jim Mann. Please, go
ahead.
STATEMENT OF JAMES MANN, SENIOR WRITER IN RESIDENCE, CENTER FOR
STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Mann. Good morning, Mr. Wolf. I come here today to
offer some thoughts concerning freedom of press and freedom of
political expression in China, or more precisely, concerning
the lack of such freedom.
I also come to tell you that I worry about the ways in
which other interests, the foreign policy interests of the
United States Government, the commercial interests of
international media corporations, or an unduly narrow focus on
the rule of law may unintentionally contribute to continuing
restrictions on freedom of the press and on intellectual
expression in China.
At the outset, I should tell you that what I have to say
reflects only some general and philosophical observations I
have reached in thinking about China issues over the past 15
years, first as a correspondent in Beijing in the 1980s, and
then in covering American policy toward Asia and writing a
history of Sino-American relations in the 1990s from
Washington.
The two other witnesses here today, He Qinglian and Kavita
Menon, can give you a better sense of the climate in China
right now than I can. I do talk from time to time to colleagues
in Beijing, but what I have to say reflects my own perspective.
For me, the most important fact is that, despite many
changes in China over the past decades, the situation for press
freedom in China today is what it has been. That freedom still
does not exist.
The human right of freedom of expression included in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights is not a right that the
1.3 billion people in China are allowed to enjoy.
Congress assigned to your Commission the task of monitoring
what it called the right to engage in free expression without
fear of any prior restraints.
In China, there is no such freedom. The restraints remain
in place. To State the obvious, the Chinese Communist Party
[CCP] maintains its monopoly on power, and that includes the
power over the principal newspapers and television stations.
The Party's tolerance for what can be published varies from
season to season. During some periods of so-called
liberalization more critical views can be aired, but once the
criticisms get too pointed or too threatening they are
suppressed.
Among the most sensitive subjects are worker strikes, rural
unrest, Falun Gong, allegations of corruption or nepotism by
the country's leaders, direct criticism of the Chinese
Communist Party, Chinese rule in Tibet and Xinjiang, and,
finally, of course, the events of 1989, including the
leadership upheavals, the Tiananmen crackdown, or what the
Chinese often call simply 6/4.
The record is replete with examples of disciplinary action
against those who venture onto these or other sensitive
subjects. Just to take a few examples from the last 3 years,
Chinese authorities forced the publication Southern Weekend to
stop the presses this March and remove a feature about a
scandal in Project Hope, a charity that is under the control of
the Communist Youth League.
A magazine called Today's Celebrities closed last year
after it carried an article that was considered unflattering to
the memory of Deng Xiaoping.
And since you have already held a hearing on the Internet,
I presume you are aware of the case of Huang Qi, who was
imprisoned in March 2000 after his Website aired information
about the events of 1989.
The underlying problem is deep-rooted and fundamental. The
China news media are still viewed by the Party, not as
independent sources of information or as a check or restraint
upon power, but rather as instruments of political and social
control.
In January 2001, Jiang Zemin said that the news media in
China have a duty ``to educate and propagate the spirit of the
Party's Central Committee.''
This view of the press as an arm of the regime is not
merely abstract; it affects daily life, too. To take one recent
and relatively benign example, earlier this month when China's
soccer team lost to Costa Rica at the World Cup, Communist
Party officials instructed the sports editors of major Chinese
newspapers not to criticize the team and not to do anything
that might arouse popular anger at the team and its defeat.
Now, let me turn immediately to the question I know that at
least some of you will ask, which is this: But, really, are
things in China not really getting better these days?
I anticipate this question simply because, for more than
two decades, the notion that things are getting better in China
has been repeatedly used to defuse and to minimize concern in
the United States about restraints on freedom of expression and
other forms of political repression there.
I would argue, as I did in my book, that the notion that
things are getting better is propelled by strong strategic and
commercial interests, interests which may be valid in their own
sphere, but which have little or nothing to do with political
freedom of freedom of expression.
In the late 1970s and in the 1980s, the United States
viewed China as a tacit ally against the Soviet Union. In the
1990s, the United States sought to invest in and trade with
China, and to use commerce as a means of integrating China into
the international community.
I think, if we are talking specifically about freedom of
the press, the idea that things are getting better represents a
determined effort to put the best face on things and is really
a distortion of the truth.
Things have gotten much better in China in some ways, that
is, if we are talking about private freedoms. You can wear what
you want, you can own what you want, and in private, you can
say what you want.
As virtually every American visitor to China quickly finds
out, the cab driver at the airport is free to tell you what he
thinks, maybe even to tell you he believes Jiang Zemin is an
airhead. Things have improved in one other way, too. The
Chinese authorities cannot possibly keep information out of the
country to the extent that they could before.
The influx over the Internet, the airwaves, and travel
across China's borders is far too great for China to be able to
prevent its people from knowing that happens outside.
When the people of Taiwan were able to hold a free election
and force the Kuomintang, or Nationalist Party, to step down
from power in March 2000, the people of China were able to find
out about these events. That is a significant change.
But, still, let us keep it in perspective. It is a change
that has taken place in spite of, not because of, the efforts
of the Chinese leadership, which continues to block Websites,
jam radio frequencies, and monitor access to the Internet.
The larger problem is that these changes have no bearing at
all on freedom of the press or freedom of expression, if by
those words we mean what we usually mean, which is public and
political expression, the freedom to criticize the government
openly, to express in print or over the airwaves those views
which dissent from what the country's leaders are saying. This
right still does not exist in China, and all the talk about
changes should not deflect us away from that fact.
Now, let me turn to the concerns that I mentioned at the
beginning of my statement, ones that I hope you will keep in
mind as you do your work.
First, about an over-emphasis on the rule of law. The rule
of law is an extremely worthwhile objective in China. However,
over the past few years I have heard some Americans speak as
though it were the only or the ultimate objective for political
reforms in China, or as thought it were the sole means of
accomplishing political change. I strongly disagree.
The subject in your roundtable today is freedom of the
press and freedom of expression. Those political freedoms are
at least as important as the rule of law, indeed, in my own
personal view, more so.
Frankly, it is possible to imagine a government that
incorporates the formalities of the rule of law while doing
little or nothing for freedom of expression. In fact, even
worse, it is possible to envision a government that uses the
rule of law to inhibit freedom of expression.
To take one concrete example, Singapore offers the rule of
law in such a way that international companies have perfectly
decent access to its court system for commercial disputes, and
at the same time the same government uses its laws to punish,
or indeed bankrupt, those political opponents who would
challenge the existing order or the ruling party.
I hope you will take care not to emphasize the rule of law
to the exclusion of freedom of expression. I hope you will not
inadvertently encourage China to attempt to follow the
political path of Singapore.
I hope that when you pursue the valuable objective of the
rule of law in China you will make clear that it is not enough
to provide courts, lawyers, and judges exclusively for settling
or arbitrating commercial disputes.
If that were to be the sole result, then I think,
unfortunately, history may judge that the pursuit of the rule
of law in China will have turned out to serve the interests of
American business and legal communities, but not the goal of
advancing the rights and freedom of expression of ordinary
people in China.
Second, concerning the United States Government, I think
United States officials need to be careful about
unintentionally encouraging restrictions on freedom of
expression in China.
What I am referring to, is the tricky question of United
States policy toward popular expressions of anti-Americanism in
China. On a number of occasions over the past few years there
have been outbursts of anti-American sentiment.
We have all seen this, most notably, of course, after the
American missile struck the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in
1999, and after a Chinese pilot shot down the American EP-3
reconnaissance plane last year.
I think the United States Government is certainly right to
complain when there is evidence that the Chinese regime is
encouraging, or even organizing, such anti-American outbursts,
or when the Party newspapers fueled by the regime fuel these
sentiments. There were such indications after the Belgrade
incident.
Otherwise, however, I believe the United States should not
seek suppression of populace Chinese views, including those
that are wrong-headed or crazy.
After the EP-3 incident, I heard some Americans express
satisfaction, or even gratitude, that the Chinese leadership
had reigned in or stopped some of these outbursts.
To me, such attitudes are short-sighted. It harms the cause
of freedom of expression in China and it puts the United States
Government in the position of asking the Chinese regime to
restrict public opinion.
Needless to say, China is full of bright, talented people
and if they are permitted the freedom to criticize the United
States of America, some of them may ask why they are not
permitted the same freedom to criticize their own government
and leaders.
Furthermore, these outbursts of anti-Americanism, so long
as they are genuine, serve the function of allowing us to see
what ordinary Chinese people think.
That, at least, is a step forward from having to listen to
the Chinese Government claim for itself the right to say that
this or that action hurts the feelings of the Chinese people,
an assertion that Chinese leaders make without ever holding the
sort of open elections or other processes that would determine
the feelings of the Chinese people, and without ever permitting
the question of whether the Chinese Government's own actions
may hurt the feelings of the Chinese people.
I go on in my written statement to argue that the interests
of international media corporations also sometimes hurt the
cause of freedom of expression, and maybe I can elaborate on
that later on.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Mann appears in the
appendix.]
Mr. Wolf. We will have plenty of opportunity to talk
further.
Ms. He, we are very pleased that you were able to come
today. We will give you 20 minutes since we will use
consecutive interpretation. So, please, we welcome you and are
looking forward to hearing from you.
STATEMENT OF HE QINGLIAN, JOURNALIST, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY,
PRINCETON, NJ; ACCOMPANIED BY DR. JAY SAILEY, INTERPRETER,
SILVER SPRING, MD
Ms. He. I am very happy to come here today to be able to
talk about control of the media in China. The control of the
media since 1989 has been stronger than that in the previous
period, but there has been a major difference in the way in
which the control has been exercised.
I would like to say in a few words what means have been
employed to control the media. There has been a systematic
control of the media which has existed since the time of Mao
Zedong.
In the time of Mao, there was only one Ministry of
Propaganda, which reached from the central government all the
way to the lower political divisions of the country. But in the
1980s, a Ministry of Information was established and controlled
by the government.
One of the functions of the group was to select and pick
out various articles and items of news from all fields. Certain
categories of materials were especially up for scrutiny, such
as anything to do with the World Trade Organization [WTO] or
questions having to do with human rights.
For example, the United States attack on the Chinese
Embassy in Belgrade was another item. Also, the EP-3 crisis of
last year. In these cases, these items of news, care was taken
to make clear what sort of things should be said about them,
what sort of things should not be said.
There were specific policies not only about the content,
but the headlines and where in the newspaper the item of news
should be placed that would make a much more similar recounting
of the news in all the different Chinese news media.
Also, there were on-the-spot telephone calls made to the
various media sources. For example, if someone in the
leadership was opposed to a particular item of news appearing
in the newspaper, this fact would be made known to the media
people. Also, 2 years ago, intellectuals were forbidden to
publish individual articles or books. This policy was enforced
through telephone calls to the various media outlets.
It was not allowed to make a written record of these phone
conversations, nor was it allowed to have them recorded, nor
was it permitted to know who in the leadership was opposed to
the propagation of these items.
The fear was that such information might be passed on to
international human rights groups and cause embarrassment. When
I was working for the Shenzhen Legal Daily, I often received
such telephone calls and saw such material across my desk.
Another way in which this was brought about was through an
actual censorship process. These people were chosen from the
most reliable elements, in the eyes of the government in the
media.
Each article in each major newspaper had to be read on a
daily basis, and anything that displeased these people had to
be clarified.
A report had to be made of this and sent to the Ministry of
Propaganda. If the censors felt that a particular item of news
was especially unpleasant, then they would notify the newspaper
and censure them.
Then there was a system by the Ministry of Propaganda for a
monthly criticism of the media. Every month, a report was
prepared and sent to all the different media outlets in the
country and it was reported that such-and-such a newspaper made
such-and-such a kind of error in such-and-such item of news and
what the higher-ranking government officials did to resolve
this problem.
When the people from the other media outlets saw this, they
were supposed to realize what the position of the government
was vis-a-vis the media. There was a very good excuse for all
this. It was described as ``harming the good relationship
between the Party and the government.'' We should not,
therefore, broadcast things that make society look bad.
In a free country, the media is expected to criticize the
government. In China, it is exactly the opposite: it is the
government that criticizes the media.
This is part of the system of being a party in power, the
way in which the Party has done things. The way in which the
society is being governed is more and more secretive. Secret
police are sent to follow media people about to see what they
do.
From 1998 onward, I was under surveillance from the
Ministry of Public Security and from January 2000 I realized,
in the apartment next to mine, there were 12 people who kept
constant surveillance over me. Of course, my telephone wire was
tapped. My assistants were also investigated. They entered my
files on my computer.
But, even more significant, is a policy which was set out
by Jiang Zemin in 1999. This was an effort to use non-political
means to deal with political problems.
For example, he did not like our media's criticism of
corruption within the government, but he did not want to use
that as the charge against us, that is, explicitly, that we
were criticizing the government's corruption. So, at least
there should be the use of some other kind of excuse to
criticize us.
For example, at that time I was in charge of several
different divisions within the paper. As you know, many Chinese
media people like to receive bribes. They said, ``You write
this item of news because you have been bribed to do so.'' So,
instead of criticizing us for reporting the news, we are
criticized for taking bribes. But my work unit was unable to
find any corroborative evidence that I ever took bribes. Other
intellectuals were criticized for releasing public secrets, and
harming national security, and plotting to overthrow the
government. Also, a kind of sexual blackmail. By using these
kinds of means, it was possible to destroy a person's good
reputation in China.
Gao Qinrong from Shanxi Province reported an item of
corruption in his province. He was brought on a charge of
corruption and sentenced to 13 years in jail. Shi Binhai in
Beijing reported Chinese economic news to foreign reporters,
but he was charged with economic crimes for doing so. Peng Ming
was criticized for engaging with prostitutes and sexually
blackmailed. So, Chinese intellectuals more and more are saying
that these low, mean ways of dealing with people are what the
government favors over direct charges.
Many people in the West think that, with the advent of the
Internet and the accessibility of things, the media situation
will improve. Actually, the real situation is not like this at
all.
For example, our access to the Internet is all controlled
centrally. The government has invested a vast sum in
controlling access to the Internet. If someone were to issue
some sort of theory or opinion criticizing the government and
put it on the Internet, afterward the government was able to
employ some sort of technique to discover who the person was
who put it on there.
For example, there was a young man in Sichuan who put some
material on the Internet which was supportive of me at night in
Sichuan saying that the Chinese Government should not restrict
scholars like myself from writing articles and disseminating
them. He was arrested and sentenced to 5 years in jail.
His older brother came to Shenzhen to discuss this with me,
but there was nothing I could do about it. The company which
had printed my book was the Today's China Book Company. They
published my well-known works. In this case, the company was
put out of business in the year 2000.
Another company which put out one of my books, the editor
was fired. He was forbidden from ever becoming involved in
media affairs again. More than a dozen different publishing
houses were closed as a result of publishing these sensitive
books.
There is a government project called the ``Golden Shield.''
The Golden Shield is a special kind of development of high-tech
in order to control access to the Internet. The purpose of this
project is to control all access into and out of the Internet.
This system is proposed to be completed by the year 2008. I
think this will make China the greatest police State in the
world.
Thank you.
Mr. Wolf. Thank you very much. I would also like to thank
Dr. Sailey for helping out today. We appreciate it very much.
The final witness is Kavita Menon from the Committee to
Protect Journalists, a group that has done critically important
work throughout the world. We are pleased to have you here
today also, so please go ahead.
STATEMENT OF KAVITA MENON, COMMITTEE TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS,
NEW YORK, NY
Ms. Menon. Thank you. Thank you for inviting the Committee
to Protect Journalists [CPJ] to participate in this roundtable
discussion about media freedom in China.
CPJ has been monitoring press freedom conditions in China
and around the world for more than 20 years. The organization
was founded in 1981 by a group of American journalists who
believed that the strength and influence of the international
media could be used to support journalists who were targeted
because of their work.
CPJ's board of directors, who remain actively involved in
our work, include such leading American journalists as Tom
Brokaw of NBC News, Clarence Page of the Chicago Tribune, and
Terry Anderson, who was held hostage for nearly 7 years in
Lebanon while working as the chief Middle East correspondent
for the Associated Press.
CPJ works primarily by publicizing attacks against the
press and petitioning governments to stop press freedom abuses.
Without a free press, other human rights remain out of reach. A
strong press freedom environment is essential to building a
vibrant civil society that helps ensure healthy social,
political, and economic development.
I am going to be echoing many of the points you have
already heard from my colleagues on the panel, and I apologize
for any repetition. We all seem to agree on the central theme,
that the Chinese Government does not tolerate press freedom.
All media are censored, and journalists who manage to
express critical views risk harassment, dismissal from their
jobs, and even imprisonment, this, despite the fact that
Article 35 of the Chinese Constitution enshrines the right to
freedom of speech and of the press. China has also signed,
though not ratified, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights which guarantees freedom of expression.
The jailing of journalists is among the most effective
tactics employed by repressive regimes to control the media,
and China does this more than any other country in the world.
According to CPJ's research, China currently holds 35
journalists in prison. A journalist, according to CPJ's
definition, is anyone who publishes news or opinion.
These arrests worked to silence critical voices and also
send a warning signal to all journalists who dared to express a
dissenting view or expose an uncomfortable truth.
Despite statements by senior Communist Party leaders--
including Premier Zhu Rongji--calling on the press to expose
official corruption, Chinese journalists have told CPJ that
such reporting is extremely dangerous. Journalists are not
allowed to criticize senior leaders, and reporting about well-
connected officials can cost you your job, and possibly your
freedom. There are no protections for journalists who do
independent investigative reporting.
In November 2001, CPJ honored imprisoned journalist Jiang
Weiping with an International Press Freedom Award. Mr. Jiang
was arrested on December 5, 2000 after publishing a number of
articles for the Hong Kong magazine Frontline that revealed
corruption scandals in northeastern China. He was sentenced to
8 years in prison on charges including revealing State secrets
and endangering national security.
The case of Jiang Weiping has recently become even more
complicated with the arrest, in March, of his wife, Li Yanling.
CPJ fears that Li Yanling was detained because her husband's
case had received significant press attention.
Li Yanling's arrest and Jiang Weiping's prolonged detention
underscore the fact that international media attention alone
cannot prod the Chinese Government toward reform. Such cases
must also be championed by political actors, including the
United States.
The United States has clear commercial and political
interests in promoting greater transparency and the rule of law
in China. Local media there have increasingly played a critical
role in exposing corruption and other abuses of power and
deserve the support of the international community for doing
so.
If Members of the United States Congress speak out when
Chinese journalists are jailed, it may help to secure their
release. It is important to note that the arrests of
journalists not only violate international law, but also are
typically carried out in violation of Chinese laws.
Trials are often secret, and family members, colleagues,
and the press are not allowed to attend. Detainees are often
held for time periods exceeding legal limits specified in
China's criminal procedure law.
Prison visits by family members, which are permitted under
the prison law, are frequently denied to imprisoned
journalists, as is medical treatment.
The criminal procedure law also stipulates that a court
must pronounce judgment within 6 weeks after accepting a case,
however, five journalists who were tried in 2001 are still
awaiting sentencing.
Of the eight new arrests CPJ documented last year, all were
related to online publishing. That means that the new
possibilities for free expression that accompanied the advent
of the Internet come with the old risks of prosecution.
There are an estimated 57 million people now online in
China. With increasing access to the Internet, it has, of
course, become much easier to publish independent views and to
have such articles circulated widely.
Internet chat rooms are lively forums for political debate,
and the sheer speed with which news can travel across the
country and around the world has posed a huge challenge for the
Chinese Communist Party, which remains determined to control
information.
In some cases, the publication of news online has put
pressure on traditional media and the government to acknowledge
major stories. In July 2001, local officials in Nandan, Guangxi
Province, tried to cover up an incident in which a local mine
was flooded and at least 80 workers were killed.
Although hired thugs threatened and harassed journalists
who came to investigate, reporters managed to post exposes on
various online news sites. Nandan residents soon thronged to
local Internet cafes to read online reports of the accident,
and journalists from around the country came to cover the
story.
While government officials had initially said the accounts
of the disaster were fabricated, the central government was
eventually forced to respond to the news reports and send a
team to investigate the situation.
This Spring when massive labor protests erupted in several
major cities, activists managed to defy a central news blackout
on the demonstrations by transmitting news of their activities
via the Internet.
However, precisely because the Internet has the potential
to break the Communist Party's monopoly over domestic news, it
is seen as a special threat. The Chinese Government has
introduced a number of regulations designed to restrict online
content and to expand official monitoring of the Web.
These regulations include requiring Website operators and
Internet service providers to keep detailed records of content
and user identities and to turn these records over to
authorities on demand.
American companies have been eagerly eyeing the vast
Chinese market, but it is not clear how they could comply with
such rules violating basic rights to privacy and free
expression.
Traditional media in China are, in many ways, more diverse
and active today than at any time in the history of the
People's Republic. This is, in part, because publications are
more dependent on advertising revenue than on government
subsidies, and so must be more responsive to the public.
Still, aggressive local reporting is not always welcome,
and CPJ has noticed a growing incidence of violent attacks
against journalists. In 2001, CPJ documented its first case of
a reporter killed for his work in China. The journalist, Feng
Zhaoxia, was an investigative reporter for a provincial
newspaper in Xi'an. He was found in a ditch outside the city
with his throat cut. CPJ believes he was killed for reporting
on local officials' alliances with criminal gangs.
However, the most common threat to local journalists
remains bureaucratic interference. All local media are under
the control of the Chinese Communist Party. In a back-handed
compliment to the growing independence and professionalism
among elements of the country's press, the Chinese Government
has recently undertaken one of the most severe media crackdowns
in recent years, shuttering publications, firing editors and
reporters seen as too independent, and issuing new directives
listing forbidden topics.
One of the victims of this crackdown is Southern Weekend, a
newspaper published in southern Guangdong Province. One of
China's most progressive and adventurous newspapers, Southern
Weekend has long pushed the boundaries of media control in
China by publishing in-depth reports on social problems such as
AIDS, crime, and the trafficking of women.
Last Spring, the paper published an article about a
criminal gang that killed 28 people in a spree of murder and
theft. The author included interviews with gang members and
their families, as well as a broad analysis of problems such as
poverty and other forms of inequality that may have led to a
life of crime.
After the article came out, the Hunan provincial government
notified central authorities that Southern Weekend had
published a negative portrait of China's socialist struggle.
Soon, the deputy editor-in-chief, front page editor, and
another senior editor were demoted. The news section chief and
reporter were fired and banned from ever working in journalism
again.
Pressure on local media has been particularly intense in
the run-up to the 16th Party Congress scheduled for this Fall,
when delegates will choose successors to President Jiang Zemin
and Premier Zhu Rongji.
CPJ is also worried about the erosion of press freedom in
Hong Kong during its fifth year under Chinese rule. Local
journalists and press freedom groups have said that reporters
and editors increasingly practice self-censorship and avoid
topics that could anger Beijing.
CPJ is also monitoring proposed security laws against
subversion and sedition in Hong Kong which could have severe
consequences for freedom of expression in the territory.
In conclusion, China is too large and unwieldy for perfect
control to be possible, but the Communist Party remains
unwilling to cede the battle. Hardliners believe that to
relinquish control over information would be to relinquish
control over power altogether.
Despite its heavy-handed tactics, the Chinese Government
has largely succeeded in evading international censure of its
media policies. If reform is to come, it will be due largely to
the persistence and professionalism of journalists such as
Jiang Weiping, the editors of Southern Weekend, and my co-
panelist, He Qinglian. They need and fully deserve the world's
support and attention.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Menon appears in the
appendix.]
Mr. Wolf. Thank you very much.
Let me start out with the first question. Are there
elements one can identify in Chinese history, culture, and
society that predate the founding of the PRC that lead to
restrictions on media freedom, on freedom of expression, or is
the point in time of the founding of the PRC a threshold? Is
that the critical turning point, or are there elements in
history contributing to the government practices with the
media.
I would be interested in all of you answering, maybe
starting out with Jim.
Mr. Mann. Well, for the full breadth of Chinese history, I
am going to defer to He Qinglian. I will point out that under
the Kuomintang the Nationalists were fabulously skilled at
manipulating and trying to control the press. So, it would be
going overboard to talk about a free and open press in China in
the 1930s and 1940s.
Having said that, the controls were vastly greater after
1949. There is a specific history within the Chinese Communist
Party, specifically Mao Zedong at Yenan, of asserting and
laying out the doctrine for control of all intellectual
endeavors, including the press.
Mr. Wolf. Ms. He.
Ms. He. Yes. This tradition existed during the time of the
Kuomintang but it was never so fully implemented and exercised
as it was under the Communists. For example, one could write
critical things, such as the writer Lu Xan was published in the
Nationalist period. But in the Communist period, to have
published materials directly critical to the government would
lead to execution or being jailed. This happened very
frequently.
There was a short period of relenting in the 1980s under
Deng Xiaoping, but direct criticism of Deng Xiaoping personally
was not permitted. The famous Wei Jingsheng, because he
criticized Deng Xiaoping, was one of the first people charged
with having done damage to the national security.
I talked about an editorial board. This was the case in
Mao's period and Deng's period. But these were people who were
criticized for political crimes in that period.
There are a number of these people: Fang Lizhi, Liu Binyan,
Wang Ruowang. These three people were very well-known. They
were criticized as not going along with the Party in the
political sphere.
After the events of June 4, 1989, in order to preserve an
element of national importance, the government expressed a kind
of sympathy, at least an appearance, toward those who wanted to
express their lack of sympathy with the government.
The policy then was implement by Jiang Zemin to use non-
political crimes to be applied to journalists who were
politically critical. Of all the people who were just mentioned
who were imprisoned and so forth, none of them were
specifically charged with political crimes.
They were all charged with other sorts of offenses.
Mr. Wolf. Did you want to add anything, Ms. Menon?
Ms. Menon. No. My expertise is really not on China's
historical attitude toward the press. I will say briefly that I
think that the Communist Party's control of the media is more
extensive than any other regime's in the world. I do not know
how much of that is traditional.
People always talk about an aversion on the part of some
Asian societies to public criticism. I do think cultures
change, people change, and there are many Chinese journalists
who think that the role--there is even debate, I think, in the
Communist Party itself about, what is the role of the media?
I think it is very interesting to hear and to see even in
previous eras of comparative liberalization, when even very
senior officials talk about the media as the ``voice of the
people.'' A lot of journalists make this point, that the role
of the press is not to be the voice of the Party, but to be the
voice of the people, and what does that mean?
Mr. Wolf. All right. Thank you.
Next is John Foarde, who is the Deputy Staff Director of
the Commission.
Mr. Foarde. First of all, let me thank all three panelists
for joining us this afternoon. It has really been a helpful and
rich conversation so far. Thanks, also, to Jay Sailey for
giving us a hand today.
Jim Mann, let me ask you this. You mentioned in your
testimony our statute and what it says about prior restraint.
Can you give us a better sense of what the Chinese Government
does to restrain free expression before the fact?
We heard quite a lot from you and from the other panelists
about what happens after you publish or say something that is
deemed unacceptable. But what are the mechanisms and who
enforces sort of prior restraint on free expression?
Mr. Mann. I would refer you to what He Qinglian just said,
that there is censorship. The articles are submitted
beforehand. Second, by my interpretation of prior restraint,
which comes less from China than from 8 years covering the
Supreme Court, closing down a magazine so that it does not
publish is a prior restraint, is it not?
So the lesser publications--not the People's Daily but
lesser publications--are closed down when they get too
adventurous. That is, in my mind, a prior restraint.
Mr. Foarde. Let me follow up with another comment that you
made that I thought was really interesting about the danger of
putting too much stress on the rule of law, or perhaps thinking
that making the changes to the legal regime first would end up
helping freedom of expression sort of automatically. I hope I
am not misrepresenting what you said.
How can we get at doing something to promote press freedom
separately from helping to liberalize the legal regime?
Mr. Mann. Two things. First, it is important to have a
definition of the rule of law which is not focused specifically
on commercial disputes or arbitration. That is, if the rule of
law is to include guarantees of the right to freedom of
expression, then I have no complaint with the rule of law.
But without it, if it is focused specifically on getting
American companies a fair deal in the Chinese courts, I think
that is fine for American companies but I think that is
insufficient. That is first of all.
If your general question is, what can we do, my answer
would be that the first value is simply in calling attention to
the truth and not being sort of diverted by the smaller things,
less important things in China that are changing and keeping
the focus on the very important ways in which China is not
changing. The truth-telling function is extremely important. It
was important, for example, in the Helsinki process, and it is
important here.
Mr. Foarde. I have got a few minutes left, so let me pose a
question to He Qinglian. Oh. Please, go ahead.
Ms. He. Let me mention, we were talking about, during the
Kuomintang period, the Nationalist government. There were a
number of scholars and others who criticized the Nationalist
government. These people, when the Communists took over, many
of them were thrown into prison simply because at some point in
their lives they may have said something critical of the
Communists. I have studied this time period and I was very
surprised to see how many of these people were dealt with this
way.
The Chinese Government uses differing tactics based on the
needs of a particular situation. For example, the Constitution
says there is freedom of religious belief, but it does not
really give people the freedom of religious belief. The
Constitution gives people freedom of speech, but in fact they
do not have freedom of speech.
Mr. Foarde. That is very useful. Thank you.
Mr. Wolf. All right. Next is Chris Billing, who is the
Director of Communications for the Commission and himself a
long-time journalist in Beijing.
Mr. Billing. Thank you.
Jim, you are going to suggest that American media companies
who want a piece of the action in China might be complicit in
helping the government there control the free flow of
information. I was wondering if you could expound on that a
little bit.
Mr. Mann. Sure.
Mr. Billing. And others of you, too, if you have comments.
Mr. Mann. I am going to just read a couple paragraphs of
what I wrote, because I did try and think this out. While large
media corporations, of course, often engage in political
expression, they have many other interests, including financial
ones.
As a result, these large media companies may not always
further the cause of freedom of expression for ordinary
individuals. So, in the case of China, we can see large media
companies lining up to enter the China market. These include
huge international concerns like Rupert Murdoch's News
Corporation, AOL Time-Warner, and Disney.
And there are also smaller Asian companies. For example,
the leading newspaper corporations of Taiwan have been quietly
hoping and laying plans for years now to start publishing
copies of their newspapers in China.
In business terms, these companies are doing what other
companies are doing. Really, it is no different and they have
the same right as anyone else to expand their market, or
increase their revenues.
But these companies not only should enjoy the right to
publish or broadcast, but they also have a special obligation
to help foster freedom of expression and do nothing that harms
freedom of expression.
So, what I argued in my statement is that newspapers and
broadcast companies should not agree to censorship or to other
restrictions on content as a condition for entering the China
market.
The computer and other high-tech companies should not
assist the Chinese Government in blocking the Internet, and
that American entertainment companies and movie studies should
not let Chinese authorities use the lure of theme parks or
distribution outlets to determine what movies get made, or what
is made in these movies.
Finally, the executives of media companies need to be
something other than just flatterers for the regime when it is
restricting freedom of expression. What I am saying is, these
companies need to think about their larger missions and not
just the balance sheets.
I think that is an important part of the media scene in
China, that you do have these companies rushing to come in and
there is a serious issue of what restrictions they accept for
themselves. They can play a role in helping freedom of
expression or, to the contrary, could harm the cause.
Ms. He. I would like to add something to that. The control
or restraint on the foreign media in China takes the situation
of controlling access to information of the media rather than
controlling the media itself, so the state carefully
scrutinizes any kind of foreign correspondent or reporter who
goes out to seek news in China.
So anyone who furnishes to these correspondents information
that would be embarrassing to the Chinese Government would
certainly be arrested. These take the form of charges such as
endangering national security or harming the national interest.
Therefore, when Chinese people meet with foreign journalists,
either they will not dare to say anything or they will say
something that is not true.
Ms. Menon. I just wanted to add a brief comment to Jim
Mann's point about the responsibility of media companies in
China.
Around the time that AOL Time-Warner announced its joint
venture with Chinese computer maker Legend, it was not clear
exactly what kind of services that AOL Time-Warner would be
providing, but doing some kind of thing on the Internet. The
Washington Post obtained an internal memo that was circulating
at AOL, kind of posing the different kinds of questions that
the company might face.
The memo really posed that question in very stark terms, I
think, and said, ``What would AOL do if the Chinese Government
demanded names, e-mails, or other records relating to political
dissidents?'' And the company did not have a good answer for
that question, and I think that is the question that all
companies doing business in China need to grapple with.
Mr. Wolf. Thank you.
Next is Amy Gadsden who represents one of our State
Department Commissioners, Assistant Secretary Lorne Craner,
from the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor.
Ms. Gadsden. Thank you to all of the panelists. I have
found this very interesting.
I want to switch a little bit and ask you to talk about the
consumption of news as opposed to the production of news. How
are the Chinese people getting their news in this environment
where the media is controlled? In particular, is there an
increase, in your opinion, in the Chinese turning to other
sources of information on the net and elsewhere?
Mr. Mann. I think I should defer to He Qinglian on that.
Ms. He. I think the source of news for the great majority
of the Chinese people is from government-run sources, such as
the print media or TV. People's understanding of what happens
abroad comes from government-controlled channels.
After the events of September 11, people had a very
confused notion of what happened. This was a result of
brainwashing conducted by the Chinese media. Only a very small
proportion of people were able to get news from the Internet.
But now, with the increasing control over the Internet, the
access to this sort of information is even more restrained. The
Daqing matter which was exposed in the western media received
no attention in the Chinese Government press.
Ms. Gadsden. Thank you.
Mr. Wolf. Next is Holly Vineyard, who works for our
Commissioner Grant Aldonas, who is Under Secretary of Commerce.
Ms. Vineyard. Thank you for joining us today.
Ms. He, you mentioned in your testimony that news in China
on the WTO gets special scrutiny. I am wondering, what sort of
news is not getting reported? Is there any sort of angle that
is added that it might be helpful for us to be aware of?
Ms. He. One of these subjects is criticism of individual
Chinese leaders. Also, matters relating to foreign affairs that
the government does not wish foreigners to know about, for
example, negotiations on China's border with Russia.
When the results of this treaty signed by Jiang Zemin were
made public, a lot of items were left out and the Chinese
people were totally unaware of this, also, the facts about the
affair of September 11, and some of the differing accounts of
matters relating to United States-China affairs, and also
problems which may be confronting China as a result of its
joining the WTO.
These are things that the Chinese Government does not wish
to see placed on the Internet. Also, some of the labor actions
and some of the agricultural unrest in China, and any kind of
popular criticism or dissatisfaction. All of these things fall
within the scope of things that the government wishes to limit
or reduce access to.
In the past, I received a lot of secret documents relating
to these matters and directives from the government. Every
couple of months there were a dozen or more different kinds of
materials that were not to be discussed at all.
One is not permitted to criticize the national economic
policy or to discuss matters relating to Tibet, Taiwan, or
Xinjiang, or about the cultural revolution. There were many
such regulations.
Ms. Vineyard. Thank you.
Have you seen any censorship, any of you, about what has
been going on with China's WTO implementation?
Ms. He. Yes. One of the things that was seized from my
household was an article relating to the implementation of the
World Trade Organization commitments, a thick document of 48
questions relating to things that had to do with the World
Trade Organization. This was a very detailed source of
information.
The government had prepared the document saying that if any
of these 48 different questions should arise, this is how they
should be answered.
Mr. Mann. If I could further clarify, this fits precisely
in this category that I was talking about of permitting views
or the short-sightedness of suppressing views that the United
States may not like.
I was fascinated to hear He Qinglian mention WTO on this
list of things that were monitored very carefully. I think
people in this country might think, well, the Chinese
Government was trying to suppress criticisms of entering the
WTO. It is not the reverse.
They were worried about people complaining that it was a
bad deal for China. That fits precisely in this category of
things that I think we need to allow popular expressions of
opinion on.
Mr. Wolf. Thank you.
Next is Matt Tuchow, who works for Congressman Sander
Levin.
Mr. Tuchow. My question goes back to the mission of this
Commission, which is, in part, to make recommendations on an
annual basis to Congress and to the Executive Branch. I am
curious what you panelists feel the Commission should recommend
in the Fall to Congress and to the Executive Branch.
Mr. Mann has mentioned that sunshine is important, bringing
the truth to light. But how would you do that? What sort of
specific recommendations would you and would others have us
make to the Congress and to the Executive Branch?
Mr. Mann. Well, I feel limited because I am not quite sure
what the range of options are for this Commission and what
kinds of recommendations you have under consideration.
Beyond simply telling the truth, I think the thrust of my
testimony is that, to the extent that you focus on the rule of
law, that it be far broader than simply commercial law. But
beyond that, since I do not know the general range----
Mr. Tuchow. It is pretty flexible.
Ms. He. In the past, the United States has used the issue
of human rights to try to persuade the Chinese Government to
change its activities. At that time, the Chinese Government
represented itself as respecting the views of the Government of
the United States.
Not everyone in the Chinese Government wants to improve the
human rights record in China. China was influenced by the
United States point of view because she had not yet been
admitted to the WTO and had not received the most-favored-
nation [MFN] status either.
Since the entry into the World Trade Organization and the
restriction from most-favored-nation has now been lifted, the
Chinese Government is less concerned about how it is perceived
in other countries.
I think the United States Government should consider some
new sort of policy in this regard because this would be
something that would be influential among the Chinese
intellectual community. Everyone recognizes that with some
input from the United States, the human rights record in China
could be improved.
Why has this record become worse in the last couple of
years? For the reasons I just stated, that there is no longer
such a strong pressure on the Chinese Government. A lot of that
has to do with the fact that this most-favored-nation is no
longer an issue in China.
I do not really know what sort of instruments could be used
to bring the human rights question into more prominence with
the Chinese Government at this point. China has often used a
kind of policy of warnings and bullying with other countries,
for example, threatening to limit trade and using other
stratagems like this.
But some of these policies implemented by the Chinese
Government have been quite successful, really. Small countries,
Finland, for example, has already submitted to some of these
irrational demands on the part of the Chinese Government.
Ms. Menon. We would just hope that the United States
Congress and every other American political leader should be
raising these issues in meetings with Chinese Government
officials, should be speaking out whenever possible, really,
and just to raise these issues consistently, that press freedom
is a fundamental right, and other human rights in China, and
monitoring of those human rights depends on ensuring press
freedom.
So, when there are serious press freedom violations,
especially when a journalist is jailed for his or her work, we
would just hope that Congressional representatives, as well as
members of the Executive Branch, the President, members of the
Administration would raise these cases as priority cases, that
these are cases that America and Americans care about. I think
that is the most important thing.
Mr. Wolf. Thank you.
Next is Karin Finkler, who works for Congressman Joe Pitts.
Ms. Finkler. Thank you. I think most of my questions have
already been asked.
But I would ask, as a followup to the questions that John
and Matt asked, for further specific examples of what Congress
can do. There is a lot of funding for democracy-building and
rule of law programs.
If there is funding that can be given to groups that help
journalists, or train journalists, or things like that, it
would be helpful to know about that so when we are talking with
the members they can recommend ideas to different committees
and the Administration.
Mr. Mann. That is a very fair question. There are a number
of media groups, some working in China. I did not come with a
list today. I think that either I or someone else could come up
with a list. I do not know who is doing the most productive
work.
But the focus of that work certainly needs to be with the
Chinese press, with Chinese journalists. The more who can get
to this country, as many have in one way or another, or get
out, and exposure to the world of the press outside of China,
the better.
Ms. Finkler. I think that the Chinese Government, some
parts of it, have been open to outside assistance on rule of
law programs. I do not know if there are any specific instances
that could be pointed to where the Chinese Government is open
to outside interaction on media issues.
Ms. Menon. I think that there are Chinese journalists
coming for training in different kinds of training programs.
The Chinese Government has been a bit more receptive to that
and that does have an effect.
I think the increasing professionalism of journalists in
China who see themselves as journalists who have a
responsibility to get many different perspectives and to tell a
story in an interesting and challenging way, I think that does
have its effect.
But you can be the best journalist in the world, and if you
are still working under a repressive regime, there is not much
you can do. I mean, a lot of Chinese journalists who are
brought here through the United States International Visitors
Program, a lot of them come to the Committee to Protect
Journalists.
It is always very informative and illuminating to hear what
they have to say. The point is, most Chinese journalists know
much more and think much more critically than they are ever
allowed to express publicly. So, again, until there is
fundamental reform, those kinds of programs are great and they
do have, certainly, a positive effect. But the limits are
there.
Ms. Finkler. Yes. Thank you.
Ms. He. In the last 20 years, there have been a great many
cooperative programs between China and the United States,
particularly cooperative events with the Chinese Government.
But please pay attention to the factor that is reality.
These programs have resulted primarily in simply supplying a
means by which Chinese Government officials can pay for their
journeys to the United States. There has been very little
resulting help to the development of democracy in China.
In this cooperation, there are a lot of Americans who have
recognized a particular problem. Without the support of the
Chinese Government, no program could really be successful.
In cases where the government has very strict control over
these projects, if one is continuing to do research, for
example, from the point of view of the intellectuals in China,
there is too great a disparity between reality and the kind of
things that are researched in these United States-Chinese
Government-sponsored programs.
Mr. Wolf. Thank you.
Just to put the last few questions in context, one purpose
of these roundtables is to hear from the experts on the panels.
But another purpose is to create a broader dialog and to tell
those people who are interested in these issues that we would
like as much input as we can get.
So for the three of you, we would like to hear any further
thoughts you have, for example, on ideas on specific things
that the Commission might be able to recommend, or ideas on
that from anyone else.
Mr. Mann. Can I ask on that, do you plan to have specific
recommendations for specific U.S. Government policy actions?
Mr. Wolf. The mandate of the Commission includes, in our
annual report, recommendations to the Congress and to the
Executive Branch, and recommendations for actions to take. So,
yes.
We are going to start another round and continue this
discussion. I would like some insight into what happened at
Southern Weekend. A year ago, there were very good things to
say about the freedom of reporting in Southern Weekend. Now we
are in a totally different situation.
Why was Southern Weekend allowed to do the kind of
reporting it was doing a year ago, and what happened, what
threshold was passed that we are now in a period of significant
constraint on what they can do?
Again, I am trying to understand this as an indicator of
how the government acts and intervenes and what circumstances
make the government alter its policy.
Ms. Menon. I think He Qinglian knows a lot about this case,
but I can also talk about it after she is finished.
Ms. He. Yes. I am quite familiar with the Southern Weekend
matter. The government has been allowing us to proceed and has
allowed the situation to go on for a number of years.
The former chief editor told me their real purpose was to
bring to people's attention mistakes that the government may
have committed. In 1999, their chief editor, Jiang Xiping, was
dismissed and a number of editors resigned. Qian Gang became
the chief editor.
The government was very dissatisfied with what this
newspaper had been reporting. Last year, as an excuse, they
seized upon two particular articles which were critical. There
was a gang of people who had been committing robberies and
rapes. The head of that group's particular role in this crime
was reported.
But they said that the reason why this group was so
vicious, is because they came from a rural, poverty setting.
And in each case, the families had seven or eight children,
so these families had no way to provide for such a large number
of children. When they went into the cities, they could not
find work so they became robbers and rapists.
So this report said there are a lot of people like this
Zhang Jun who come from such deep rural poverty. The society
that produced someone like that still has not been changed.
Until it is, similar groups will continue to arise.
The government considered this to be a serious crime, this
kind of reporting and said it was a destruction of the efforts
of the Hunan Province over the past 20 years to raise the
standard of living of its people. This was very special, this
particular case. This meant that a number of people had to be
dismissed. A number of reporters were restricted and placed on
probation to see how their attitude might change.
So, Southern Weekend was not officially ceasing its
publication, but it was no longer the kind of paper it used to
be.
Mr. Wolf. Did you want to add something, Jim?
Mr. Mann. Yes. You asked in your question, what was the
line that Southern Weekend crossed. I just wanted to point out
something that you probably already realized. The real problem
is, no one knows what the lines are. The lines change from time
to time, so you can never quite predict what they are going to
be.
Mr. Wolf. Thanks. John Foarde.
Mr. Foarde. Ms. Menon, did you want to step up to that
question as well and say something?
Ms. Menon. Yes.
Mr. Foarde. Please go ahead.
Ms. Menon. I think that that is the important point, that a
lot of journalists have said that it is even more unclear now
what they can or cannot do, and why. I think it is difficult
for international observers to understand. Well, China does not
have press freedom, so how can this enterprising, aggressive,
and independent-seeming newspaper even exist?
One way is that such newspapers seem to exist in pockets,
especially in a place like Guangdong, which is generally a bit
more of a freewheeling atmosphere, and I think there are
different sensibilities among the provincial Communist Party
leaders about what the press should and should not be doing.
There is that factor.
There are also some provincial papers that are able to
publish very aggressive stories about wrongdoing in other
provinces, but not in their own backyards, so they do not make
their own sponsors look bad. So, there is sometimes the
appearance of great freedom in pushing the boundaries, when
really I guess journalists are just exploiting these loopholes.
But there is always this danger lurking that you will
expose the wrong guy, you will write something critical about a
leader who does have very powerful backing. If you misread the
signals, then you are certainly in danger of losing your job,
or at the worst, you could be jailed.
Ms. He. The Southern Weekend frequently reported all sorts
of corruption and crime in various provinces of the country.
The people in these other provinces in the government were very
unhappy about that, including when there were meetings of the
different Governors and Party secretaries of the different
provinces.
For example, in the Guangdong province, both the Governor
and the Party secretary raised this issue: ``Why are you people
at Southern Weekend so much like Americans? You want to get
involved in everything.''
Mr. Wolf. Thanks. Chris Billing.
Mr. Billing. If you read Chinese newspapers they tend to be
very optimistic in the sense that they are always talking
about, industrial production is up, agricultural output is
increasing, nationalities are unified. Meanwhile, Chinese
citizens are dealing with rising crime, corruption, and labor
unrest and those sorts of issues.
My question is, is the propaganda still effective? Do
ordinary citizens still really believe what the government is
saying? This question is for anyone who has any comments.
Ms. He. I think this propaganda is useful to the state. I
have met a number of people who are Chinese who came to the
United States and got doctorate degrees here, including some
Americans who were students of China. They said, ``China is
great.'' I said, ``Where did you get your information from?''
They said, ``The People's Daily says that all the time.''
I said, ``Please pay attention to this. If you take the New
York Times, for example, and compare it to the People's Daily,
you would reach the conclusion, America is terrible because the
New York Times daily criticizes the United States. China must
be a heaven in comparison, because that is what it says in the
People's Daily. Please make some determinations as to which you
think is more reliable.'' They were left speechless.
Mr. Mann. I would add to that. It is sometimes very
counterproductive. China is a rumor culture. Bad news travels
by rumor, as of course there is very little fact-checking on
the rumors, which sometimes are worse than the reality and
sometimes are distorted.
I sometimes tell Chinese friends that in this country, if
things are going well, if everything is going great at the
Department of Housing and Urban Development--a very random
example--you do not read about it in the newspaper. And if you
do not read about things in the newspaper, people assume that
maybe things are going all right.
In China, of course, people read between the lines. Since
all the news is good, people read between the lines and assume
that there are bad things going on that they do not know about.
Ms. He. One more thing. I have a nanny who works in my
home. She talks with me quite often about the United States.
She hates America. She comes from a farm village in Hunan, has
no real understanding of the United States.
I asked her, ``Where do you get your information about the
United States?'' She said, ``That is because everything I read
says that, both from the newspaper and the television. When I
was in primary school and high school, that is what the teacher
always said.'' So do not look down upon the capability of this
kind of propaganda to achieve its purpose.
This is presenting a very distorted view of history and
unreality to cheat or to deceive the general population.
Mr. Wolf. Amy Gadsden.
Ms. Gadsden. Two quick questions. The first, for Ms. Menon
and Mr. Mann, and the second one for Ms. He.
The first question is, Ms. Menon, you mentioned in your
testimony, and I do not know whether you got to say it or not,
that recently the New York Times reported that a woman was
arrested and that there was a directive that had gone out in a
local area where a New York Times journalist had been recently
doing some research, that anyone that talked to foreign
journalists could be arrested or detained.
In your experience, Mr. Mann, and in your work, Ms. Menon,
is that something you are seeing an increase in? I mean, it
seems to me that that was something that was very prevalent in
the 1980s, but then in the 1990s as China opened up there was
an ability where they were able to talk to Western journalists.
But is that still something we should be very mindful of?
And the second question for Ms. He has to do with ownership
structures of newspapers. In this case, I am not talking about
ownership of Renmin Ribao [the People's Daily] or any of the
national papers, but at the local level, at the provincial
level, at the county level.
Is there changing in the nature of ownership of media
outlets, whether it is publishing companies or newspapers, and
does that affect where people are willing to take risks in
order to make a profit?
Mr. Mann. Let me take a crack at the first question. I
think when you talk about China's treatment of foreign
correspondents, that things were getting more relaxed in the
1980s but were tremendously tightened up in the early 1990s.
The security monitoring was the heaviest then and has become
somewhat looser.
My colleagues in Beijing now say that, generally speaking--
and again, things change from season to season--that they are
able to travel and they certainly are able to talk to people in
China, I think, more than in the early 1980s, anyway.
But that article posits the problem, which is that after
they talk to people, some of the people that they talk to, if
they say the wrong things, are subject to retaliation. Again, I
would not want to compare that. I do not think that it is worse
than in 1990 or 1991, but that is still a serious problem.
Ms. Menon. I do think that this harassment of sources is
something we are increasingly worried about, certainly. I am
not sure how many cases of that we have documented. Most of
these cases do not get publicized.
Just finding out about these cases is really difficult, but
I definitely have heard more concern among some foreign
journalists that there would be retaliation against some of
their sources.
I think for a while it seemed like people were very
outspoken, not only in the cabs and in informal conversations,
but even more open to talking to foreign journalists about
pretty controversial subjects and expressing publicly these
kinds of frustrations.
There was the sense that, ``Oh, if you say this to the New
York Times, you would share the New York Times correspondent's
immunity from retaliation'' because there has not been a lot of
harassment of at least the mainstream foreign correspondents.
There was a recent case of a Chinese-born Canadian citizen
who was expelled from China. He was reporting for PBS. But,
generally speaking, foreign correspondents in China have not
faced that kind of harassment. They may be tailed. They are
very often detained, especially if they report without a
permit.
Reporting without a permit is a really frequent reason for
harassing foreign journalists because, of course, it is very
difficult to get a permit to report where the stories are. But,
yes. I guess, to summarize, we are increasingly worried about
harassment of sources.
Mr. Mann. One last thing I would point out. One of the most
serious incidents of the year were the strikes up in northeast
China, and it was very difficult. We really did not get a good
picture because it was very difficult for the foreign press
corps to get access there.
Ms. He. You were asking about the ownership of the media.
All of the newspapers in the country are owned entirely by the
State, not by any private group. The chief editors of these
newspapers are government officials.
To go back to this Southern Weekend, it is not directly run
by the government but it is prepared together with a newspaper
which is run by the city government of Guangzhou. The Southern
Daily newspaper is the owner or the leader of the Southern
Weekend supplement.
All the editors and assistant editors, and so forth are all
part of the organization of the mother paper, which is run by
the city government.
There is a regulation on the part of the government that
deals with the media: No private group is allowed to run a
newspaper.
Mr. Wolf. Thank you. Holly Vineyard.
Ms. Vineyard. Ms. He, thank you for your comment about your
nanny. That brings to mind a comment that was recently relayed
to me by a United States businessmen based in Beijing. He said
that he was concerned that the United States is losing the
hearts and minds of the average Chinese people.
I was wondering if the other panelists might comment on
that observation, how the media restrictions affect the
attitude that the average Chinese person adopts toward the
United States, and despite the fact that all the Chinese
newspapers are owned by the government, if you have noticed if
there are any regions that enjoy greater press freedoms than
others.
Ms. Menon. As far as regions go, certainly Guangdong is
among the most liberal of the regions in China. It is never an
independent press, but it at least has some journalists who are
more critical and more willing to take some risks.
I would have to defer to He Qinglian or Jim Mann on the
first part of your question, because I do not read Chinese. I
do not read the Chinese media. We have a researcher who does
all of that. Also, I have never been to China and talked to
people about their attitudes about the United States or about
their government.
I was listening to everything that Jim Mann said, and He
Qinglian also, about the dangers of this kind of propaganda. I
think He Qinglian especially emphasized that it is very, very
effective. It is surprisingly effective, in some ways.
I think another kind of, I do not know if it is a flip side
to that, but another side to that is, I think if there is a
disconnect between what people know and what they see reported,
locally, at least, there is a general sense of disbelief in
anything that authorities say or do.
I think there does seem to be very deep and widespread
cynicism among the Chinese public these days. I think that, in
that sense, propaganda is not only not effective, but it is
counterproductive in that it feeds this sense that everybody is
lying, nobody is telling the truth.
If you are constantly reading between the lines to see what
is not there, and if rumors are allowed to grow, that is very
unhealthy for any society.
Mr. Mann. The question you asked about losing the hearts
and the minds of the Chinese people is very complicated. In my
experience in China, people in China tend to be very shrewd,
and sometimes very cynical and very critical of anybody and
everything.
So to give you a couple of stories, I can remember once,
again, in the early and mid-1980s, sometimes your ability to
travel in China or to report in China had to go in organized
tours.
I remember once visiting a factory in China where it was an
organized tour of foreign correspondents, and then separately
of Chinese correspondents interviewing the same factory
officials.
By the time the foreign correspondents were brought in and
these people had been questioned by the Chinese press, they
were nearly shattered because the Chinese press privately was
much more critical than we could ever know to be.
Just as a second story. I was writing a book about American
business in China, I was reporting on a joint venture. It took
me about 18 months to get permission to just talk to ordinary
workers on the factory line.
When I did, I began to ask them, first, about the American
company. Well, the American company was exploiting them, it was
hiring them for wages that were less than they were in Detroit.
I thought I got the picture. Then they switched to the Chinese
Government, which was also exploiting. They felt exploited by
everybody.
I am not sure that your business friend in Beijing has the
whole story on losing the hearts and minds of the Chinese
people. People tend to think for themselves. I guess my goal in
seeking an end to restrictions on freedom of expression is so
they can bring that criticism out into the public where it has
some reality testing.
Ms. He. Please note that it is not only the uneducated
people in China who dislike the United States. Many of the
people who express anti-American feelings are college-educated
people. This includes Chinese students in America who have
received higher education.
If there is a little bit of time left, I would like to tell
you one short story. There was an official from Shenzhen who
came to the United States. I met him one day and he said, ``I
just came back from the United States. America is wonderful, it
is just, but the system does not work very well. In China,
nothing works very well, except the system is good.'' He was
not a humorous fellow. I was very surprised. I asked him,
``Please explain.'' He pointed out the matter of President
Bush's daughter being pulled aside for illegal drinking.
``This is all over the U.S. media. Everyone is critical. If
a news system like that were to exist in China, that would not
be reported at all.'' I understood then. I told him, ``I
understand, because our system cannot protect the government
and its officials.''
Nothing is allowed to be broadcast, so no matter what bad
thing an official does, it does not appear in the press. Now,
this was his understanding of the differences between the
systems in the United States and in China.
Thank you.
Mr. Wolf. Thank you. Matt.
Mr. Tuchow. I have two quick questions. The first one, is
whether the panelists believe that this Commission's or our
government's speaking out on behalf of specific detained,
arrested, or imprisoned individuals will be helpful or harmful
to those individuals.
There is in the testimony, I think, an example of an
arrested journalist about whom, there was so much press that
his wife was arrested or detained, and then she refused to
speak to foreigners any more. So, that is my first question.
Then the second one relates to our earlier discussion here
about the effectiveness of propaganda in China. I would like to
ask you what you feel about the role or the benefit of Radio
Free Asia and other groups that the government could support to
provide other media information to people in China.
Ms. Menon. I raised the case of Jiang Weiping, the
imprisoned journalist whose wife was later arrested. The point
I was trying to make, is that press attention, international
media attention alone will not do the trick. There has to be
political back-up and follow-through as well.
I do think that in every case, if you look at the
scattering of political prisoners who have been released over
the past 5 or 10 years, all of those political prisoners have
been the ones with the highest profile. They have been the ones
whose cases have been raised at the highest levels by
government officials. International human rights groups and
journalists have written about them.
It is the people whose cases are championed. Those are the
people who are ultimately released and those are piecemeal
victories. That is not reform, but at least, individual by
individual, it is important, I think, to raise a voice on
behalf of those people and to try to secure their release. I do
think it would be extremely helpful for political leaders to
raise these cases at every opportunity.
Ms. He. In relation to this question, I think citing
specific names over and over again is a kind of double-edged
sword. On the one hand, it places more attention on this
individual and on the government's charges against him, and
makes the government uneasy because the Chinese Government has
always felt it is the government's role here to protect
society.
But, on the other hand, it might have some genuine effect
in protecting the individual concerned. For example, you cannot
treat a well-known journalist whose name has been mentioned
specifically by the government the same way you could an
unknown factory worker.
I think the advantages outweigh the disadvantages of the
U.S. Government raising names of specific persons. At least, it
serves to protect them. They would not die unrecognized in a
jail somewhere. But you have to beware. In order to ameliorate
these people's conditions, there has to be some kind of quid
pro quo for the Chinese.
Mr. Mann. Two things. First, there has been a serious
debate, and there is a serious debate with arguments on both
sides about raising cases of individuals. But it is not the
question you asked, actually.
I mean, the debate is, if you focus on specific
individuals, are you allowing the Chinese Government to turn
those individuals effectively into hostages and bargaining them
away for other things, and are you diverting attention away
from more systemic change?
The question you asked, is whether it helps those
individuals. I think the record of the last 20, 25 years is
that it definitely does. It helps those individuals. It helps
to protect those individuals. So, I would say without
qualification, yes, in answer to your question.
The question is whether, in the process of doing that, are
you diverting away from pushing for a systemic change or
getting into some kind of hostage negotiation.
And on the question of Radio Free Asia, just very, very
briefly, I think it has been extremely valuable in bringing
information to China. It is jammed, but it is concentrating on
the countries that it can reach. It is obviously not just for
China. It is concentrating on bringing information that would
otherwise not be out there and it has been extremely valuable.
Mr. Wolf. Thanks.
If you do not mind, let us go to another series of
questions.
In the years before 1989, there was a measurable
liberalization. Is there a scenario over the next half a dozen
years where you can envision political change that would lead
to a similar liberalization in the freedom of expression and
press freedom?
Mr. Mann. I do not want to venture into sort of soothsaying
about China. I do not know what is going to happen. I do think
that those changes before 1989 were done with a level of
innocence, and in some cases romanticization of the West, that
will not occur again.
Furthermore, the political results of 1989--and people in
this country sometimes forget this--were to lop off a whole
wing of the Party, a whole wing of the leadership which then
either ended up outside of the country, or in some cases in
jail. I do not see that recurring. I can imagine, the
leadership now is once again talking about--talking about--
political reform.
But the problem is, first of all, talking never quite
reckons into account all the vested interests against it. You
think you want political reform as a Chinese leader until you
run into tremendous opposition, or you define political reform
in such a way that it amounts to nothing.
So, occasionally--and this has been true not just before
1989 but also afterward--you do hear people begin to talk about
the importance of allowing the press some kind of restraint,
that it has some oversight function. Then, of course, it does
not quite happen because you cannot separate out the role of
the press from the larger political questions in China.
Mr. Wolf. Thanks. John.
Mr. Foarde. I have a question for Ms. He, who has excused
herself briefly.
Mr. Wolf. All right. Amy.
Ms. Gadsden. While we are waiting, just a quick question
for you, Mr. Mann. The interaction between Chinese journalists
and the international journalists based in China, is that
growing? Is it having an effect in terms of changing the way
Chinese journalists understand their role within the system,
even given the restraints that there are within China?
I think you mentioned Taiwan media organizations that are
interested in gaining a foothold in China, or Hong Kong-based
media organizations that are interested in getting a foothold
in China. Could there possibly be a ``tail wagging the dog''
effect with that in terms of reforming the media?
Mr. Mann. I think it would be presumptuous of me to talk in
detail about interactions between foreign correspondents and
Chinese correspondents.
Now, I will say, over a period of 15 years, there is some
very slow impact from watching Hong Kong and Taiwan media go
into China. When I arrived, there were Hong Kong reporters
there, and then Taiwan reporters began to arrive.
To watch Chinese officials be asked questions in Chinese by
other than a controlled source and be forced to articulate
answers to them, even though the answers may not have been what
those reporters wanted, that was, itself, the beginning of a
process and had some value, within limits.
Mr. Billing. He Qinglian, you mentioned that one charge the
government uses against journalists it does not like is to
accuse them of taking bribes. It seemed to me that, in fact,
bribe taking is quite common among Chinese journalists, in the
sense that companies can buy news and bribes are quite readily
available. I wonder if you can give me a sense if there is a
lot of corruption within the media ranks within China.
Ms. He. Yes. The situation of corruption within the media
is very strong. This is a way in which they can increase their
income. For example, if you write an article that is very
complimentary toward an individual, that is going to result in
a good fee.
The price will vary, whether the article appears on the
first page or the fifth page. This is open. Everyone knows it.
Also, there are individual activities on the part of
journalists. A reporter will praise a particular company or
particular individual. He is often going to get some
compensation for that.
We have a number of reporters on our paper whose income is
quite good. That is why the Chinese Government feels every
Chinese reporter must be on the take. The People's Daily, for
example, a lot of the people who work for it have their own
private automobiles. This would be impossible under their own
salary level. Their parking lot is called ``the place where the
expensive cars are parked.''
Mr. Wolf. Thanks. Holly.
Ms. Vineyard. Ms. Menon, I noted in your testimony that
self-censorship is an increasing problem in Hong Kong. I was
wondering if you could talk more about that for a little bit.
Also, if you could let us know if there has been any formal
censorship of United States media such as we have seen in other
Asian countries.
Ms. Menon. About Hong Kong, I think self-censorship got a
lot of attention recently when Jasper Becker, from the South
China Morning Post, was pretty unceremoniously dismissed from
his post.
He said it was very much a case of self-censorship. The
South China Morning Post, which is one of the most influential
English-language papers in the region, has dramatically changed
over the past few years. It is owned by a Malaysian Chinese
tycoon who has very substantial business interests in Mainland
China.
So, it is not a case of the government in Beijing ordering
the Hong Kong officials to discipline the paper in some way or
fire such-and-such person, it is really the publisher acting in
some ways because of his political bent to change the nature of
the newspaper's coverage.
So, the problem with those kinds of cases is it is very
difficult for any monitoring group or anybody who is interested
in what is happening politically to understand, well, where
does this pressure come from? It is very difficult to document,
for example, why a story does not appear.
Is it because of the publisher's business interests? Is it
because somebody's political bent is contrary to what was being
reported? Are there any overt or subtle pressures being
applied? It is very difficult to measure. So, that is why it is
particularly worrisome.
I mean, we can document press freedom violations when the
government clearly applies pressure, but if publishers in Hong
Kong or if journalists in Hong Kong simply are not writing
about things because they do not feel the freedom to do so,
that is much harder to understand the mechanics of that, and it
is always controversial.
In the Jasper Becker case, as an example, he was the
Beijing Bureau Chief for the South China Morning Post. I guess
the management ended up saying he was not doing a good job. How
can you prove exactly what really happened? It ends up being,
``he said, she said.''
People were alarmed by the case because they felt like the
South China Morning Post was a bellwether for whether there is
press freedom in Hong Kong. And, certainly, that case did have
those kinds of implications, but it is just so complicated that
it is very difficult for anybody to take a clear stand and say,
this is what is happening here, because everything is happening
under the table.
I am sorry. What was the second part of your question?
Ms. Vineyard. Have you seen any overt censorship of United
States media in Hong Kong? Other Asian countries, for instance,
will block certain issues of the Wall Street Journal from time
to time. I am wondering if you have seen anything like that
develop in Hong Kong.
Ms. Menon. I do not think I have noticed any. I mean, I do
not think that we have documented any cases like that in Hong
Kong, no.
Ms. Vineyard. Anyone else?
Mr. Mann. There are cases from time to time in China where
foreign publications or an issue of foreign publications gets
blocked. The Economist had a special section on China 3 or 4
weeks ago, and I noticed that, sure enough, that was restricted
in China. In Hong Kong, I do not know that that has happened at
all. I do not think it has.
Mr. Wolf. All right. Thanks. Matt.
Mr. Tuchow. I have two questions, again. The first one, is
just for Mr. Mann. It is the question you raised, the bigger
question, the one you said I should have asked, which is about
hostage negotiation. Does taking up the case of an individual
deflect or divert from more systemic changes in the system? I
am curious what your answer to that would be.
Then I have a second question, if we have time. That has to
do with another theme that we have been talking about today,
which is, what space for progress on freedom of speech, or
press, or expression in China exists? Is there any way that
this government will see it in its own interests to allow
greater freedoms in this respect?
I say that in the context of remembering what I think was a
pretty highly publicized case of a fireworks factory where some
kids were involved. I believe that there were some local
journalists who were involved in reporting on this.
It was initially denied, and then the central government
agreed that this had occurred. It was as if the journalists had
won the day on this particular issue. I do not know if that
portends a trend or a space for freedom of the press. So, it is
really those two questions.
Mr. Mann. Well, first, on the whole raising the cases of
individuals, I think that the U.S. Government and the
Commission should raise, and can raise, both and not get
restricted to one at the exclusion of the other and that the
record shows that when you raise the cases of individuals, that
helps those individuals. You just should not leave that out,
because obviously you and I feel that the systemic change is of
crucial importance.
The problem comes less from a situation like your
Commission faces than for high levels of the U.S. Government
when you get into some kind of pre-summit, pre-meeting, pre-
something or other situation. That is when this sort of
bargaining takes place.
I think just continuing to raise a case and suggesting that
the United States would really like to see action on a case
often produces some results. I do not know what kind of
bargains. To judge a particular bargain, you would have to see
what it is the United States is being asked to give up in order
to get a particular individual freed.
What was your second question?
Mr. Tuchow. What space exists for freedoms, and in
particular, the example of the fireworks factory?
Mr. Mann. I think there is some space. The example of the
fireworks factory raises a very complicated issue about
investigative reporting. That is, people in this country or
people who visit China come out and say, gee, I saw this great
investigative report.
There are times in which investigative reporting, within
the limits that it is done, can be good investigative
reporting, and yet not only is not against the interests of the
government, but the central government likes it. The central
government, just apart from issues with the United States,
apart from issues internationally.
The central government always has some problems enforcing
or carrying out what it wants with localities, with local
areas. In some cases where there are abuses at the local level,
the central government is quite happy to have investigative
reporting to expose those abuses. So, that provides some degree
of space for local investigative reporting.
The problem comes, what happens when the investigative
reporting starts reaching the national level? We have seen some
scandals. There was a huge smuggling scandal, for example, in
Fujian Province which started out as a local scandal, and the
central government was quite happy to foster the coverage of
it. It then began reaching into Beijing, and things got much
trickier and people got less interested in the investigations.
Mr. Wolf. We have a few minutes left, so if you have any
short, final comments or advice, please go ahead. If anything
comes to you later, feel free to send us a note and we will put
it in the record for the hearing.
Jim.
Mr. Mann. I do not think so. Thank you.
Mr. Wolf. Ms. He, any final comment?
Ms. He. I think if the Chinese Communist Party does not
change its basic principles, it will be very difficult to
change the present situation. This is an influence that the
Chinese Communist Party is exerting on the entire world.
The impression they are trying to convey is that China
cannot do without the Communist Party, but, in fact, this is
true. The reality that we have was manufactured by the
Communist Party. It does not permit any voices of disapproval,
nor any other competitive forces to be allowed to be created.
There are two things you can notice about this. From the
outside, many of these groups that call themselves non-
governmental and claim to be so, but the leaders of these
groups and also the people who work there are all Party members
and Party officials.
For example, organizations within enterprises. Within the
enterprise, they represent the government. Toward the
government, they claim to be at the same time representing the
enterprise. An organization like that could serve no genuine
social good.
As I understand it, the understanding of realities within
China among people overseas are perhaps 5 years behind the
reality within China. Problems that we faced 5 years ago are
only now being recognized among foreign people, particularly
among those who do research on China, because they think of
their own self-interests and they do not want to say anything
that would be considered abnormal.
They do not want to say anything that is particularly
disadvantageous to the Chinese Government. They may not be
able, in the future, then to get a visa. They would not get
financial support for the research within the United States,
even though they may know that what they are saying is not
true.
Mr. Wolf. Well, I guess we are lucky to have you here to
help break through that. Thank you.
Ms. Menon, any final comment?
Ms. Menon. I will just say thank you for actually hosting
this discussion on press freedom and I look forward to seeing
the recommendations that come out of this roundtable.
Mr. Wolf. All right.
Mr. Mann. I guess the last thing I would leave you with is
there are occasional times every decade or two when, for
whatever reason, usually some disagreement within the
leadership, the restrictions on free speech in China go off for
a few days, weeks, whatever.
Once you see that, you see the range of opinion, and people
say and write what they really think. It is vastly different
from all of the palliatives of official programs to bring
journalists here and back. It is that first that we should be
shooting for. The rest, I am afraid, are really within the
limits of the existing structure, and it is a structure that
needs to change.
Mr. Wolf. Well, on behalf of all of our bosses, thank you
very much. This afternoon's session will provide significant
input into the preparation of the Commission's report.
So, thank you all very much.
[Whereupon, at 4:51 p.m. the roundtable was concluded.]
A P P E N D I X
=======================================================================
Prepared Statements
------
Prepared Statement of James Mann\1\
june 24, 2002
To the Commission:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ James Mann is Senior Writer in Residence at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies in Washington. He is the author of
two books about China: Beijing Jeep and About Face: A History of
America's Curious Relationship With China, From Nixon to Clinton.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I come here today to offer some thoughts concerning freedom of
press and freedom of political expression in China--or more precisely,
concerning the lack of such freedom. I also come to tell you I worry
about the ways in which other interests--the foreign-policy interests
of the United States government, the commercial interests of
international media corporations, or an unduly narrow focus on the rule
of law--may unintentionally contribute to the continuing restrictions
on freedom of press and intellectual expression in China.
At the outset, I should tell you that what I have to say reflects
only some general and philosophical observations I have reached in
thinking about China issues over the past 15 years, first as a
correspondent in China during the 1980s and then in covering U.S.
policy toward Asia and writing a history of modern U.S.-China relations
while living in Washington in the 1990s. I do not claim to be closely
familiar with the day-to-day situation in China in 2002. Your two other
witnesses today, He Qinglian and Kavita Menon, can give you a better
sense of the climate in China right now than I can. I do talk from time
to time with foreign correspondents now serving in and covering China,
but what I have to say reflects exclusively my own perspective.
For me, the most important fact is that despite many changes in
over the past decades, the situation for press freedom in China today
is what it has been: That freedom still does not exist. The human right
of freedom of expression included in the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights is not a right that the 1.3 billion people in China are allowed
to enjoy. Congress assigned to your Commission the task of monitoring
what it called ``the right to engage in free expression without fear of
any prior restraints.'' In China, there is no such freedom. The
restraints remain in place.
To state the obvious, the Chinese Communist Party maintains its
monopoly on power, and that includes the power over the principal
newspapers and television stations. The party's tolerance for what can
be published varies from season to season; during some periods of so-
called liberalization, more critical views can be aired. But once the
criticisms get too pointed or too threatening, they are suppressed.
Among the most sensitive subjects are workers' strikes; rural unrest;
Falun Gong; allegations of corruption or nepotism by the country's
leaders; direct criticism of the Chinese Communist Party; Chinese rule
in Tibet and Xinjiang; and, finally, of course, the events of 1989,
including the leadership upheavals, the Tiananmen crackdown or what the
Chinese often call simply ``6-4.''
The record is replete with examples of disciplinary action against
those who venture onto these or other sensitive subjects. Just to take
a few examples from the last 3 years: Chinese authorities forced the
publication Southern Weekend to stop the presses this March and remove
a feature about a scandal in Project Hope, a charity that is under the
control of the Communist Youth League. A magazine called Today's
Celebrities closed last year after it carried an article that was
considered unflattering to the memory of Deng Xiaoping. And since you
have already held a hearing on the Internet, I presume you are aware of
the case of Huang Qi, who was imprisoned in March, 2000, after his web
site aired information about the events of 1989.
The underlying problem is deep-rooted and fundamental. Chinese news
media are still viewed by the party not as independent sources of
information or as a check or restraint upon power, but rather as
instruments of political and social control. In January 2001, Jiang
Zemin said that the news media in China have a duty ``to educate and
propagate the spirit of the Party's Central Committee.''
This view of the press as an arm of the regime is not merely
abstract. It affects daily life, too. To take one recent and relatively
benign example: Early this month, when China's soccer team lost to
Costa Rica at the World Cup, Communist Party officials instructed the
sports editors of major Chinese newspapers not to criticize the team
and not to do anything that might arouse popular anger at the team and
its defeat.
Now, let me turn immediately to the question I know you will ask:
But really, aren't things getting better in China these days?
I anticipate this question simply because for more than two
decades, the notion that things are getting better in China has been
repeatedly used to defuse and to minimize concern in the United States
about restraints on freedom of expression and other forms of political
repression there. I would argue--in fact, I did in my book--that the
notion that ``things are getting better'' is propelled by strong
strategic and commercial interests, interests which may be valid in
their own sphere but which have little or nothing to do with political
freedom. In the late l970s and the 1980s, the United States viewed
China as a tacit ally against the Soviet Union, and in the 1990s the
United States sought to invest in and trade with China and to use
commerce as a means of integrating China into the international
community.
I think if we're talking specifically about freedom of the press,
the idea that things are getting better represents a determined effort
to put the best face on things and is, really, a distortion of the
truth.
Things have gotten much better in China in some ways--that is, if
we are talking about private freedoms. You can wear what you want, you
can own what you want and in private, you can say what you want. As
virtually every American visitor to China quickly finds out, the cab
driver at the airport is free to tell you what he thinks--maybe even
tell you that he believes Jiang Zemin is an airhead.
Things have improved in one other way, too. The Chinese authorities
cannot possibly keep information out of China to the extent that they
could before. The influx over the Internet and airwaves and the travel
across China's borders is far too great for China to be able to prevent
its people from knowing what happens outside. For example, when the
people of Taiwan were able to hold a free election and force the
Kuomintang or Nationalist Party to step down from power in March 2000,
the people of China were able to find out about those events. That's a
significant change. Still, let's keep it in perspective: It is a change
that has taken place in spite of, not because of, the efforts of the
Chinese leadership, which continues to block websites, jam radio
frequencies and monitor access to the Internet.
The larger problem is that these changes have no bearing at all on
freedom of the press or freedom of expression--if by those words, we
mean what we usually mean, which is public and political expression,
the freedom to criticize the government openly, to express in print or
over the airwaves those views which dissent from what the country's
leaders are saying. This right--again, a right recognized in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the U.N. Convention on Civil
and Political Rights--still does not exist in China, and all the talk
about changes should not deflect us away from that fact.
Now, let me turn to the concerns I mentioned at the beginning of my
statement ones that I hope you will keep in mind as you do your work.
First, about an overemphasis on the rule of law: The rule of law is
an extremely worthwhile objective in China. However, over the past few
years I have heard some Americans speak as though it were the only or
ultimate objective for political reforms in China or as though it were
the sole means of accomplishing political change. I strongly disagree.
The subject in your hearing today is freedom of the press and
freedom of expression. Those political freedoms are at least as
important as the rule of law--indeed, in my own view, more so. And
frankly, it is possible to imagine a government that incorporates the
formalities of the rule of law while doing little or nothing for
freedom of expression. In fact, even worse, it is possible to envision
a government that uses the ``rule of law'' to inhibit freedom of
expression. To take one concrete example, Singapore offers the rule of
law in such a way that international companies have perfectly decent
access to its court system for commercial disputes; at the same time,
the same government uses its laws to punish or, indeed, bankrupt those
political opponents who would challenge the existing order or the
ruling party.
I hope you will take care not to emphasize the rule of law to the
exclusion of freedom of expression. I hope you will not inadvertently
encourage China to attempt to follow the political path of Singapore. I
hope that when you pursue the valuable objective of the rule of law in
China, you will make clear that it is not enough to provide courts,
lawyers and judges exclusively for settling or arbitrating commercial
disputes. If that were to be the sole result, then I think
unfortunately history may judge that the pursuit of the rule of law in
China will have turned out to serve the interests of the American
business and legal communities, but not the goal of advancing the
rights and freedom of expression of ordinary people in China.
Second, concerning the U.S. government: I think U.S. officials need
to be careful about unintentionally encouraging restrictions on freedom
of expression in China.
What I'm referring to is the tricky question of U.S. policy toward
popular expressions of anti-Americanism in China. On a number of
occasions over the past few years, there have been outbursts of anti-
American sentiment--most notably, of course, after an American missile
struck the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999 and after a Chinese
pilot shot down the American EP-3 reconnaissance plane last year.
I think the U.S. Government is certainly right to complain when
there is evidence that the Chinese regime is encouraging or even
organizing such anti-American outbursts, or when the party newspapers
controlled by the regime fuel these sentiments. There were such
indications after the Belgrade incident.
Otherwise, however, I believe the United States should not seek
suppression of populist Chinese views, including those that are wrong-
headed or crazy. During and after the EP-3 incident, I heard some
Americans express satisfaction or even gratitude that the Chinese
leadership under Jiang Zemin had ``reined in'' or stopped some of the
outbursts of anti-Americanism on Chinese websites or radio talk shows.
To me, such an attitude is shortsighted. It may help the short-term
foreign-policy interest of restoring harmony between the U.S. and
Chinese governments. But it harms the cause of freedom of expression in
China; it puts the U.S. Government in the position of asking the
Chinese regime to restrict public opinion.
Needless to say, China is full of bright, talented people, and if
they are permitted the freedom to criticize the United States of
America, some of them may ask why they are not permitted the same
freedom to criticize their own government and leaders. Furthermore,
these outbursts of anti-Americanism--so long as they are genuine--serve
the function of allowing us to see what ordinary Chinese people think.
That, at least, is a step forward from having to listen to the Chinese
government claim for itself the right to say that this or that action
``hurts the feelings of the Chinese people''--an assertion that Chinese
leaders make without ever holding the sort of open elections, referenda
or other processes that would demonstrate the feelings of the Chinese
people, and without ever permitting the question of whether the Chinese
government's own actions may hurt the feelings of the Chinese people.
Finally, let me add few words of caution about the tension between
the goal of freedom of expression in China and the interests of media
corporations that seek to operate in China.
This is an old issue, one which has arisen outside of China, too,
but which has special relevance to China today. While large media
corporations of course often engage in political expression, they have
many other interests, including financial ones. As a result, these
large media corporations may not always further the cause of freedom of
expression for ordinary individuals--and in fact, can sometimes harm
that cause.
In the specific case of China, we can see large media companies
lining up to enter the China market. These include huge international
concerns like Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation, AOL-Time Warner and
Disney. They also include smaller Asian companies; for example, the
leading newspaper corporations of Taiwan have been quietly hoping and
laying plans for many years now to start publishing copies of their
newspapers on the Chinese mainland.
In business terms, these companies are doing no more or less than
all the other companies who have been entering the China market or
planning to do so. They have the same right as any other company to
expand their market or to try to increase their revenues.
However, in one respect, these companies are different. They are
media companies, which not only should enjoy the right to publish or
broadcast, but also, I believe, have a special obligation, a special
duty to help foster freedom of expression and to do nothing that harms
freedom of expression.
With respect to China, that obligation carries special meaning. It
means that newspaper and broadcast companies should not agree to
censorship or to other restrictions on content as a condition for
entering the China market. It means that computer and other high-
technology companies should not assist the Chinese government in
blocking the Internet. It means that American entertainment companies
and movie studios should not let Chinese authorities use the lure of
theme parks or distribution outlets to determine what movies get made
or what is in those movies.
And, finally, it means that executives of media companies need to
be something other than mere flatterers and mouthpieces for a regime
that restricts the freedom of expression their companies enjoy
elsewhere. When they seek to enter China, they need to think about
their larger missions, not merely their balance sheets--assuming that,
as I believe, some of them do have some ideals and goals beyond making
money. Those need to espouse the cause of freedom of expression not
just for themselves or their media corporations, but for ordinary
people in China.
And what can the U.S. Government or your own commission do? I
realize there are no easy policy prescriptions that will bring about
freedom of expression in China. But one thing is simple: You can tell
the truth. You can call attention to the continuing restrictions in
China. You can emphasize the major factors about the press and
television in China that have not changed, and not merely the lesser
things that have changed.
More than two decades ago, one of my predecessors, a Canadian
correspondent in China named John Fraser, covered the Democracy Wall
movement of 1979-80, one of those brief interludes when the
restrictions on freedom of speech in that country were essentially
lifted. In a book later on, he wrote something I never forgot: Once you
have seen what the people of China do and say when the all political
restrictions are off, your opinion of the country and its people will
never be the same.
I hope you will do whatever you can to help ensure that some day,
the restrictions on freedom of expression will be lifted in China--not
just for a season and not just at the whim of some Chinese leader, but
in a fashion that endures.
______
Prepared Statement of Kavita Menon
june 24, 2002
Thank you for inviting the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ)
to participate in this roundtable discussion about media freedom in
China. CPJ has been monitoring press freedom conditions in China, and
around the world, for more than 20 years. The organization was founded
in 1981 by a group of American journalists who believed that the
strength and influence of the international media could be used to
support journalists who are targeted because of their work. CPJ's Board
of Directors, who are actively involved in our work, includes such
leading American journalists as Tom Brokaw of NBC News, Clarence Page
of The Chicago Tribune, and Terry Anderson--who was held hostage for
nearly seven years in Lebanon while working as the chief Middle East
correspondent for The Associated Press.
CPJ works primarily by publicizing attacks against the press and
petitioning governments to stop press freedom abuses. Without a free
press, other human rights are likely to remain out of reach. A strong
press freedom environment is essential to building a vibrant civil
society that, in turn, can help ensure healthy social, political, and
economic development.
The Chinese government does not tolerate press freedom. All media
are censored, and journalists who manage to express critical views risk
harassment, dismissal from their jobs, and even imprisonment. This,
despite the fact that Article 35 of the Chinese constitution enshrines
the right to freedom of speech and of the press. China has also signed,
though not ratified, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, which guarantees freedom of expression.
The jailing of journalists is among the most effective tactics
employed by repressive regimes to control the media. And China does
this more than any other country in the world. According to CPJ's
research, China currently holds 35 journalists in prison. A journalist,
according to CPJ's definition, is anyone who publishes news or opinion.
These arrests work to silence critical voices, and also send a
warning signal to all journalists who would dare to express a
dissenting view or expose an uncomfortable truth.
Despite statements by senior Communist Party leaders, including
Premier Zhu Rongji, who have called on the press to expose official
corruption, Chinese journalists have told CPJ that such reporting is
extremely dangerous. Journalists are not allowed to criticize senior
leaders, and reporting about well-connected officials can cost you your
job--and possibly your freedom. There are no protections for
journalists who do independent, investigative reporting.
In November 2001, CPJ honored imprisoned journalist Jiang Weiping
with an International Press Freedom Award. Jiang Weiping was arrested
on December 5, 2000, after publishing a number of articles for the Hong
Kong magazine Frontline (``Qianshao'') that revealed corruption
scandals in northeastern China. He was later sentenced to 8 years in
prison on charges including ``endangering national security'' and
``revealing state secrets''--a charge frequently used to prosecute
journalists and political dissidents.
The case of Jiang Weiping has recently become more complicated with
the arrest in March of his wife, Li Yanling. CPJ fears that Li Yanling
was detained because her husband's case has received significant press
attention. Li herself had avoided contact with foreign journalists and
international organizations, including CPJ, precisely because she did
not want to risk further harm to her family. The couple has a young
daughter, who is currently staying with relatives.
Li Yanling's arrest and Jiang Weiping's prolonged detention
underscore the fact that international media attention alone cannot
prod the Chinese government toward reform. Such cases must also be
championed by political actors, including the United States.
The U.S. has clear commercial and political interests in promoting
greater transparency and the rule of law in China. The local media have
increasingly played a critical role in exposing corruption and other
abuses of power, and deserve the support of the international community
for doing so. If members of the U.S. Congress speak out when Chinese
journalists are jailed, it may help to secure their release.
It is important to note that the arrests of journalists not only
violate international law, but also are typically carried out in
violation of Chinese laws. Trials are often secret, and family members,
colleagues, and the press are not allowed to attend. Detainees are
often held for time periods exceeding legal limits specified in China's
Criminal Procedure Law. Under this law, suspects may only be detained
for 2 months while their case is being investigated. Jiang Weiping was
held for 9 months before facing trial.
Prison visits by family members, which are permitted under the
Prison Law, are frequently denied to imprisoned journalists. In the 18
months since Jiang Weiping has been imprisoned, his wife and daughter
have not been allowed to visit or speak with him. For the first month
of his detention, his family was not even informed of his whereabouts.
Jiang has also been denied medical treatment, also guaranteed under the
Prison Law, despite the fact that he suffers from a severe stomach
disorder.
The Criminal Procedure Law also stipulates that a court must
pronounce judgment within 6 weeks after accepting a case. However, five
journalists who were tried in 2001 are still awaiting sentencing. Huang
Qi, an Internet publisher charged with subversion, was tried in August
2001, but 10 months later no verdict has been announced. Yang Zili,
Zhang Honghai, Xu Wei and Jin Haike, were charged with subversion after
they founded the New Youth Study Group (Xin Qingnian Xuehui), which
distributed online essays about political and social reform. Though the
four were tried in September 2001, they are still awaiting the verdict.
Of the eight new arrests CPJ documented last year, all were related
to online publishing. That means that the new possibilities for free
expression that accompanied the advent of the Internet come with the
old risks of persecution.
There are an estimated 57 million people now online in China. With
increasing access to the Internet, it has become much easier to publish
independent views, and to have such articles circulated widely.
Internet chat rooms are lively forums for political debate. The sheer
speed with which news can travel across the country and around the
world has posed a huge challenge to the Chinese Communist Party, which
remains determined to control information.
In some cases, the publication of news online has put pressure on
traditional media and the government to acknowledge major stories. In
July 2001, local officials in Nandan, Guangxi Province, tried to cover
up an accident in which hundreds of miners were trapped in a flooded
mine. Although hired thugs threatened and harassed journalists who came
to investigate, reporters managed to post exposes on various online
news sites. Nandan residents soon thronged to local Internet cafes to
read online reports of the accident, and journalists from around the
country came to cover the story. While government officials had
initially said accounts of the disaster were ``fabricated,'' the
central government eventually responded to the news reports and sent an
investigative team, which found that at least 81 miners had been
killed. The mine owner and 90 others were arrested for the accident,
and for conspiring with local officials to cover it up.
This spring, when massive labor protests erupted in several major
cities in China, activists managed to defy a central news blackout on
the demonstrations by transmitting news of their activities via the
Internet.
However, precisely because the Internet has the potential to break
the Communist Party's monopoly over domestic news, it is seen as a
special threat. The Chinese government has introduced a number of
regulations designed to restrict online content and to expand official
monitoring of the Web. These regulations include requiring Web site
operators and Internet service providers to keep detailed records of
content and user identities, and to turn these records over to
authorities on demand. U.S. companies have been eagerly eying the vast
Chinese market, but it is not clear how they could comply with such
rules violating basic rights to privacy and free expression.
Some local journalists have noted that while the Internet offers
new venues for discussion, the technology also allows the government to
easily spy on its citizens.
Traditional media in China are in many ways more diverse and active
today than at any time in the history of the People's Republic. This is
in part because publications now are more dependent on advertising
revenue than on government subsidies, and so must be more responsive to
the public.
Still, aggressive local reporting is not always welcome, and CPJ
has noticed a growing incidence of violent attacks against journalists.
In 2001, CPJ documented its first case of a reporter killed for his
work in China. The journalist, Feng Zhaoxia, was an investigative
reporter for a provincial newspaper in Xi'an. He was found in a ditch
outside the city with his throat cut. CPJ believes that he was killed
for reporting on local officials' alliances with criminal gangs.
In January 2002, security officials beat three journalists inside
the local propaganda bureau offices in Ningyang County, Shandong
Province, after they reported on anti-corruption protests by local
villagers. And in March, Beijing-based journalist Yang Wei was
assaulted by staff members of a property management company that he was
investigating. His case actually prompted fellow journalists,
government officials, and members of the public to call for greater
protections for the local media.
During the last few years, Chinese journalists have repeatedly and
openly called for a law to protect their ``right to report.'' But
although violent incidents are occasionally covered in the local media,
few legal recourses exist for journalists who are victims of physical
assault.
The most common threat to local journalists remains bureaucratic
interference. All local media are under the control of the Chinese
Communist Party. In a back-handed compliment to the growing
independence and professionalism among elements of the country's press,
the Chinese government has recently undertaken one of the most severe
media crackdowns in recent years, shuttering publications, firing
editors and reporters seen as too independent, and issuing new
directives listing forbidden topics.
One of the victims of this crackdown is Southern Weekend (Nanfang
Zhoumo), a popular, hard-hitting newspaper published in southern
Guangdong Province. One of China's most progressive and adventurous
newspapers, Southern Weekend has long pushed the boundaries of media
control in China by publishing in-depth reports on social problems such
as AIDS, crime, and the trafficking of women.
Last spring, the paper published an article about a criminal gang
that killed 28 people in a spree of murder and theft. The author
included interviews with gang members and their families, as well as a
broad analysis of problems such as poverty and other forms of
inequality that may have led to a life of crime. After the article came
out, the Hunan provincial government notified central authorities that
Southern Weekend had published a negative portrait of China's socialist
struggle. Soon, the deputy editor-in-chief, front-page editor, and a
senior editor were demoted. The news section chief and reporter were
fired and banned from ever working in journalism again.
Central government authorities had frequently criticized Southern
Weekend in the past, and some observers speculated that the crackdown
was orchestrated by provincial leaders in Guangdong eager to curry
favor with the leadership in Beijing.
Southern Weekend continues to test the limits of official tolerance
but is a considerably more tame publication these days. In March, the
paper planned to run a front-page story on the misuse of funds by
Project Hope, a charity sponsored by a subsidiary of the Communist
Youth League. As the issue was at the printer, the editor succumbed to
pressure from the local propaganda bureau and decided to replace the
story with a less controversial one.
Pressure on local media has been particularly intense in the run-up
to the 16th Party Congress scheduled for this fall, when delegates will
choose successors to President Jiang Zemin and Premier Zhu Rongji.
The Chinese government also continues to closely monitor and
regulate foreign correspondents in the country. In the past year, CPJ
has documented several cases of foreign journalists being harassed,
detained or physically assaulted for their reporting. Sensitive topics
include coverage of the destruction of homes in preparation for the
2008 Olympic Games in Beijing, bombings, and protests by members of the
outlawed Falun Gong spiritual group. In June 2002, Canadian journalist
Jiang Xueqin was detained for 2 days and then deported after filming
labor unrest for the U.S.-based Public Broadcasting Service.
Chinese citizens who speak with foreign correspondents can also
face repercussions. AIDS patients, for instance, have been repeatedly
warned not to talk to the foreign press. In June, a farmer in Hunan
Province who was interviewed by The New York Times about her efforts to
wage a campaign against rural lawlessness was detained and charged with
malicious slander of officials. A local official told The New York
Times that authorities were seeking the arrest of anyone who had spoken
with foreign journalists.
It is also difficult for foreign journalists to obtain permission
to travel to sensitive areas such as Tibet or Xinjiang, where pro-
independence movements are active.
Since the September 11 attacks in New York and Washington, the
Chinese government has publicly equated the independence movement in
Xinjiang with
terrorism--announcing a crackdown on ``terrorist, separatist, and
illegal religious activities'' in the region. Xinjiang's independence
movement is led by ethnic Uighurs, who are mostly Muslim. The policy
appears to have serious consequences for the local media. In January
2002, the Xinjiang Party Secretary gave a speech warning that the media
could be used for ``penetration and sabotage'' by separatist groups.
CPJ is also researching reports that during recent months authorities
in Xinjiang have closed numerous Uighur-language publications, publicly
burned thousands of copies of Uighur-language books, magazines and
journals that they claim support ``separatist activities,'' and
restricted Internet access in the region.
CPJ is also worried about the erosion of press freedom in Hong Kong
during its fifth year under Chinese rule. Local journalists and press
freedom groups have said that reporters and editors increasingly
practice self-censorship and avoid topics that could anger Beijing. CPJ
is also monitoring proposed security laws against subversion and
sedition in Hong Kong, which could have severe consequences for free
expression in the territory.
In conclusion, China is too large and unwieldy for perfect control
to be possible. But the Communist Party remains unwilling to cede the
battle. Hardliners believe that to relinquish control over information
would be to relinquish control of power altogether.
Despite its heavy-handed tactics, the Chinese government has
largely succeeded in evading international censure of its media
policies. If reform is to come, it will be due largely to the
persistence and professionalism of journalists such as Jiang Weiping,
the editors at Southern Weekend, and my co-panelist He Qinglian. They
need and fully deserve the world's support and attention.
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