

United States General Accounting Office Briefing Report to the Majority Leader, U.S. Senate

May 1995

PEACE OPERATIONS

Update on the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia



GAO	United States General Accounting Office Washington, D.C. 20548
	National Security and International Affairs Division
	B-261202
	May 8, 1995
	The Honorable Robert Dole Majority Leader United States Senate
	Dear Senator Dole:
	As requested, we are providing you an update on the situation in the former Yugoslavia. ¹ Specifically, you asked us to assess (1) progress in resolving the conflict in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (hereafter referred to as Bosnia) and (2) the United Nation's effectiveness in carrying out Security Council mandates in these countries. On April 3, 1995, we briefed your staff on the results of our work. This report presents the information provided at that briefing.
Background	War began in the former Yugoslavia in June 1991, after two of its republics—Slovenia and Croatia—declared their independence. Serbia, the largest republic of the former Yugoslavia and in control of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA), forcibly tried to prevent the other republics from becoming independent. The JNA assisted the Croatian Serbs and fought against the new Croatian government. After fierce fighting, Serbia and Croatia signed an unconditional cease-fire in November 1991. In February 1992, the U.N. Security Council established the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and mandated it to help (1) supervise the withdrawal of the JNA and demilitarize the areas in Croatia occupied by the Croatian Serbs, (2) return the displaced who fled from their homes in these areas, and (3) monitor human rights in these areas. UNPROFOR in Croatia was authorized primarily under Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter, which allows only peaceful means to carry out mandates.
	In March 1992, the Bosnians voted for independence, and fighting broke out among the new Bosnian government and Bosnian Serbs who were opposed to independence. Bosnian Serbs quickly captured most of the territory.
	In June 1992, the United Nations and the United States recognized Croatia and Bosnia as independent states. The U.N. Security Council then extended UNPROFOR's mission to Bosnia, and over the past 3 years has
	This report follows up on some issues discussed in our 1994 report. Humanitarian Intervention:

¹This report follows up on some issues discussed in our 1994 report, <u>Humanitarian Intervention</u>: Effectiveness of U.N. Operations in Bosnia (GAO/NSIAD-94-13BR, Apr. 13, 1994).

	mandated UNPROFOR to (1) facilitate and protect the delivery of humanitarian aid; (2) use necessary means, including air power from regional organizations, to deter attacks against six safe areas (i.e., areas, such as Sarajevo to be protected against armed attacks and any other hostile actions); and (3) other actions to support an environment leading to peace. Most of UNPROFOR's activities in Bosnia, such as deterring attacks on safe areas, are authorized under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, which allows forceful means to carry out mandates.
Results in Brief	Little progress has been made in resolving the major issues of conflict in Croatia and Bosnia. In Croatia, fundamental differences divide the warring parties. The Croatian Serbs still demand an independent state within Croatia, and the internationally recognized Croatian government demands control of its occupied territory. The Croatian Serbs still maintain an army with heavy weapons and fighter planes and face the Croatian government along confrontation lines. In Bosnia, the Bosnian Serbs control 70 percent of the territory and no territory has been returned to the Bosnian government, as proposed in the international peace plan. ² Moreover, many thousands of Bosnians have been killed since the beginning of the conflict; ³ widespread human rights violations have been committed; and the guilty parties have not answered for their crimes. As of May 1995, fighting continues in Bosnia.
	UNPROFOR has been ineffective in carrying out mandates leading to lasting peace in the former Yugoslavia. In Croatia, UNPROFOR was unable to demilitarize the territory controlled by the Croatian Serbs, return displaced persons to their homes, or prevent the use of Croatian territory for attacks on Bosnia. In Bosnia, UNPROFOR made an assertive stand with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to protect Sarajevo in February 1994. However, UNPROFOR lost credibility as a peacekeeping force when it

²The plan was proposed by the Contact Group, which is composed of the United States, Russia, Germany, France, and England. The plan calls for 51 percent of Bosnia to be controlled by the Bosnian Muslims and Croats and 49 percent controlled by the Bosnian Serbs. The Bosnian government has accepted the plan; the Bosnian Serbs have not.

³Estimates of those killed in Bosnia range from 250,000 (<u>Country Reports on Human Rights Practices</u> <u>for 1994</u>, report submitted to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and the House Committee <u>on International Relations by the Department of State in February 1995</u>) to 167,000 (Bosnian Institute of Public Health). Other experts estimate a lower number.

•	requested little NATO air support after Gorazde was attacked in April 1994,
	and Bosnian Serbs killed civilians, shelled the hospital, and took
	peacekeepers hostage and

• failed to deter attacks on the Bihac area in December 1994, when Bosnian and Croatian Serbs launched air and missile attacks on the area, wounded several U.N. peacekeepers, and killed one.

As a result of UNPROFOR's ineffectiveness, Croatia announced in January 1995 that it would not agree to a renewal of UNPROFOR's mandate. Croatia only recently agreed to a new U.N. mandate that authorizes peacekeepers to monitor Croatia's international borders and internal confrontation lines.

UNPROFOR's limited effectiveness to deter attacks and provide protection stems from an approach to peacekeeping that is dependent on the consent and cooperation of the warring parties. Although UNPROFOR has authority to use force, it tries to negotiate when attacked, and has called sparingly for NATO air support. UNPROFOR has requested NATO close air support five times for limited purposes during attacks on U.N. personnel and safe areas. The effectiveness of this approach has been minimal and the lack of consistent assertive response to aggression has left UNPROFOR little credibility.

In some areas, U.N. actions have been more effective. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), in coordination with UNPROFOR, international humanitarian organizations, and allied operations, has provided food for thousands living in the region over the past several winters. For its part, UNPROFOR monitors the situation on the ground, maintains roads, and escorts convoys to the safe areas. UNPROFOR previously escorted many aid convoys, but U.S. diplomatic initiatives helped bring about a Bosnian federation of Muslims and Croats, which allows convoy deliveries to many parts of Bosnia without protection. UNPROFOR also operates Sarajevo airport and undertakes confidence-building measures, such as joint patrols and monitoring of cease-fires. If UNPROFOR withdraws, UNHCR and some other humanitarian organizations plan to continue providing aid, but believe some activities will be curtailed if not halted.

Agency Comments and Our Analysis We obtained comments on a draft of this report from the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Mission to NATO, the U.N. Secretariat, and UNPROFOR. The Department of State commented that UNPROFOR would be more effective if member states provided more resources for the operation. UNPROFOR commented that it has proposed actions that could improve its performance in safe areas. These include providing more troops for UNPROFOR to deter attacks, better defining safe areas, and demilitarizing all warring parties in and around the safe areas.

Given the U.N.'s approach to peacekeeping—to fully rely on the consent and cooperation of the parties—it is questionable that further resources or a better definition of safe areas would improve UNPROFOR's performance. Moreover, there are many crises in the world that compete for finite peacekeeping resources and UNPROFOR is the largest peacekeeping operation in U.N. history. Member states have thus far paid more than \$3 billion in assessments for UNPROFOR, provided billions more in voluntary contributions, provided 40,000 U.N. troops, and committed NATO air power to the operation. Under current conditions and given UNPROFOR's lack of credible deterrent to attacks, demilitarizing the safe areas does not seem to be practical. We have incorporated other comments in the report, as appropriate.

We had the full cooperation of the U.N. Secretariat, UNPROFOR, and UNHCR and were assisted by the U.S. Departments of State and Defense, the U.S. Missions to the United Nations and NATO, and the U.S. Agency for International Development's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance.

To review the status of peace efforts in the former Yugoslavia, we conducted fieldwork in Bosnia and Croatia. During our visit, we met with senior officials of UNPROFOR and UNHCR and visited several UNPROFOR troop contingents. We also interviewed U.S. officials in both countries, including the U.S. Ambassadors, the Commander of the Joint Task Force Forward, and members of the U.S. Agency for International Development's Disaster Assistance Response Team. We also met with senior officials of both the Croatian and Bosnian governments. On three separate occasions we tried to interview Bosnian and Croatian Serb officials but were unsuccessful. To analyze U.N. operations, we obtained Security Council resolutions and reports and documents from the U.N. Secretariat, UNHCR, and UNPROFOR. We analyzed data from UNHCR's convoy database and reviewed UNHCR situation reports. To analyze air operations in the former Yugoslavia, we analyzed data on air sorties and air strikes. We also discussed air operations and NATO decisions with the U.S. Ambassador to NATO, members of his senior staff, and other national representatives to NATO in Brussels, Belgium. In Naples, Italy, we met with the Commander in Chief, Allied

Scope and Methodology

Forces South and his senior staff and the Commander of the Joint Task Force, Provide Promise.

Further information regarding U.N. activities in the former Yugoslavia and this report is in appendixes I-III. Appendix I lists all U.N. Security Resolutions on the former Yugoslavia, as of April 15, 1995. Appendix II provides information on peacekeeping contingents; appendix III provides selected sources of information used for this report.

We conducted our work from December 1994 to May 1995 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to other appropriate congressional committees; the U.N. Secretariat; the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the Former Yugoslavia; the Permanent Representative to NATO; the Secretaries of State and Defense; and the Administrator, U.S. Agency for International Development. Copies will also be made available to others upon request.

This report was prepared under the direction of Joseph E. Kelley, Director-in-Charge, International Affairs Issues, who can be reached at (202) 512-4128 if you or your staff have any questions. Other major contributors to this report were Tet Miyabara, John E. Tschirhart, and Barry J. Deewse.

Sincerely yours,

Henry & Henton, Jr

Henry L. Hinton, Jr. Assistant Comptroller General

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Abbreviations

CAS	Close air support
CSCE	Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council
JNA	Yugoslav National Army
KSA	Krajina Serb Army
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PVO	Private Vountary Organizations
UNCRO	United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in
	Croatia
UNPREDEP	United Nations Preventive Deployment Force
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNPA	United Nations Protected Area
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force



Figure 1: Factional Control in the Former Yugoslavia


The United States has not recognized this entity.

Little change has taken place in the factional control of Bosnian and Croatian territory since 1993. Croatia remains divided between the government and Croatian Serbs in the former U.N. Protected Areas (UNPA).¹ Croatia recently agreed to a new U.N. operation, the U.N. Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO). However, the Croatian Serbs have not agreed to the terms and remain mobilized.

In Bosnia, Bosnian Serbs still control about 70 percent of the territory and the Bosnian government enclaves of Bihac, Gorazde, Srebrenica, and Sarajevo are still isolated and cut off from Central Bosnia. Bosnian Muslims and Croats agreed to form a federation, following diplomatic initiatives by the United States in March 1994. Although there has not been full cooperation within the federation, it has allowed the relatively unobstructed delivery of humanitarian assistance to Central Bosnia and other locations. (We will discuss the federation later.) In December 1994, the Bosnian government and Bosnian Serbs agreed to a cessation of hostilities but an extension was not agreed to. As of May 1995, conflict in Bihac, increasing violations in Sarajevo, new offensives around Tuzla, and shelling in the other safe areas were taking place.

¹The term UNPA was dropped in the new U.N. mandate for Croatia because it implied a special status for this part of Croatia.

Briefing Section I Background




As of mid-April 1995, 12 U.N. Security Council Resolutions focussed on Croatia. These mandates are authorized primarily under Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter, although the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) received Chapter VII authority to protect itself and ensure its own freedom of movement. The mandates were primarily to implement a U.N. peace plan designed to end the conflict in Croatia. Under this peace plan, UNPROFOR's mandate was to

- verify the withdrawal of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) from Croatia,
- ensure the demilitarization of the UNPAs and protect persons in them from fear of armed attack,
- help ensure respect by the local police for the human rights of UNPA residents, and
- facilitate the safe and secure return of displaced persons to their homes in the UNPAS.

UNPROFOR was also to monitor and verify compliance with the March 29, 1994, cease-fire agreement between the government and Croatian Serb forces.

On March 31, 1995, the U.N. Security Council replaced UNPROFOR with a new mission, UNCRO. Under the mandate, UNCRO forces will be deployed to monitor Croatia's international borders with Bosnia and the former Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro); UNCRO will also monitor the cease-fire within Croatia.



Overall, 20 Security Council Resolutions focus on Bosnia and 11 are authorized under Chapter VII. In November 1991, the U.N. Secretary-General designated UNHCR the lead agency for humanitarian relief in the former Yugoslavia. One of UNHCR's major responsibilities is to manage an extensive logistics and distribution network to move food and other relief supplies to persons affected by the conflict. UNHCR maintains large warehouses and arranges convoys to transport aid to those in need.

As fighting shifted from Croatia to Bosnia in early 1992, the Security Council extended UNPROFOR's mandate to Bosnia. The first task given UNPROFOR in that country was to ensure the security of the Sarajevo airport. UNPROFOR was to help unload humanitarian cargo at the airport and to ensure the safe movement of aid and relief workers. UNPROFOR's humanitarian role in Bosnia was expanded in late summer 1992 when it was mandated to protect UNHCR convoys. UNPROFOR was explicitly authorized to use force in situations where armed people attempted to prevent the U.N. from carrying out its mandates.

In June 1993, UNPROFOR was mandated to deter attacks against six safe areas in Bosnia—Sarajevo, Bihac, Gorazde, Tuzla, Srebrenica, and Zepa. These enclaves were surrounded by Bosnian Serb forces. The safe areas were to be "free from armed attacks" and UNPROFOR was authorized under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter to take necessary measures to ensure this, including the use of air power provided by regional organizations or member states.

GAO	U.N. Operations in the Former Yugoslavia	
(as of April 1995)		
	U.N. Resolutions UNPROFOR cost ^a U.S. assessment ^b (Est. FY 95) ^c Other U.S. costs UNPROFOR staff ^d Fatalities Casualties	70 (38 Chapter VII) \$3.3 billion \$1.1 billion \$ 506 million \$1.4 billion 44,034 155 1,382

^aTotal assessments for UNPROFOR thru March 31, 1995.

^bTotal estimated U.S. assessments fiscal years 1992-1995.

°Estimated U.S. assessment for fiscal year 1995.

 $^{\rm d}$ Includes U.N. troops civilian police and UNPROFOR civilians. This total does not include all U.N. workers, such as UNCR staff.


The U.N.'s mission in the former Yugoslavia is by far the largest in its history, authorized in 70 Security Council resolutions, of which 38 are authorized under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. Thirty-five resolutions apply generally to the former Yugoslavia, 20 focus primarily on Bosnia, 12 focus on Croatia, and 3 apply to Macedonia. The 44,000 staff in UNPROFOR exceeds that of any other U.N. peace operation. UNPROFOR has about 37,000 troops, 4,600 civilians, and 1,500 civilian police and military observers. U.N. member states have been assessed more than \$3.3 billion for UNPROFOR as of March 31, 1995. Separate budget estimates for UNCRO and UNPROFOR were not available at the time of our review.

Total U.S. government costs for operations in the former Yugoslavia are estimated to be \$2.5 billion for fiscal years 1992 through 1995. Assessments for UNPROFOR were about \$1.1 billion and the costs of humanitarian assistance and air operations such as enforcing the no-fly zone over Bosnia were an additional \$1.4 billion. The estimated U.S. assessment for UNPROFOR for fiscal year 1995 is \$506 million.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees' (UNHCR) activities in the former Yugoslavia have also been unparalleled in U.N. history in terms of size, breadth, and hazards encountered. It has spent over \$1.0 billion in the former Yugoslavia. At the end of 1994, about 740 of its staff or about 15 percent were working in this region. At the start of 1995, it was providing food aid for over 2.2 million people in all parts of the former Yugoslavia.

By April 1995, UNPROFOR forces had suffered 1,382 casualties, 155 of them fatal. Over 560 of the casualties were war-related, with mines, shelling, and direct fire each accounting for about one-third of this number. Thirteen UNHCR staff have been killed, including several convoy drivers.

Effectiveness of U.N. Operations




The JNA officially withdrew from Croatia in 1991. But according to the Croatian government, the JNA only partially withdrew. In a December 1994 report, the U.N. Commission of Experts on the former Yugoslavia found that the JNA transferred massive amounts of weapons to Croatian Serbs to help them form an army. Also, many JNA soldiers remained in the former UNPAs and reconstituted themselves as part of the new Croatian Serb army—formally called the Krajina Serb Army (KSA).

Although given mandates to help demilitarize the UNPAs and return displaced persons to them, UNPROFOR was not able to disarm the KSA. The KSA initially placed heavy weapons in UNPROFOR storage depots, but the KSA later broke into these sites and reclaimed their weapons, partially in response to Croatian government initiatives in January 1993. As of May 1995, troop movements by both the KSA and the Croatian government were occurring in the former UNPAS. Because of potential fighting, UNPROFOR has returned very few of the estimated 360,000 to 450,000 refugees and displaced persons. According to the U.N. Secretary-General, present conditions do not permit voluntary return of displaced persons.

In 1994, UNPROFOR in Croatia emphasized monitoring the cease-fire agreement. To accomplish this, it interposed its forces between the KSA and the Croatian government in a 2-kilometerwide, 740-kilometer long buffer zone and established about 300 observation and control posts. However, the number of cease-fire violations steadily increased from 70 on October 1, 1994, to 212 on March 1, 1995. UNPROFOR was especially concerned about the number of serious violations by Croatian Serbs involving the use of heavy weapons. In addition, a growing number of UNPROFOR vehicles were hijacked at gunpoint within the UNPAS.

The Croatian government and the Croatian Serbs reached an economic agreement in December 1994 and it has produced tangible results. The Zagreb-Belgrade highway was opened on December 21, 1994, in two sectors of the former UNPAS, with UNPROFOR forces providing security along part of the route. Traffic quickly rose from under 1,000 vehicles per day in late December to over 5,000 by mid-January 1995. However, progress to implement the agreement slowed after Croatia announced it would no longer accept UNPROFOR's mandate.



The failure to achieve the goals of the original peace plan led the President of Croatia to announce the termination of UNPROFOR's presence in Croatia as of March 31, 1995. According to Croatia's Foreign Ministry, UNPROFOR's presence was a buffer that effectively established a sovereign state in the UNPAS for the Croatian Serbs. Moreover, since sections of the UNPAS are adjacent to the highway along Croatia's Dalmatian coast, Croatian Serbs could close the highway and cut Croatia off from its coast.

Croatia also acted to terminate UNPROFOR's presence because UNPROFOR did not stop violations of Croatia's international borders from the UNPAS. For example, in November 1994, Croatian Serbs launched air, missile, and ground attacks from the UNPAs into Bihac in Bosnia. On March 10 and 11, 1995, Croatian Serbs removed heavy weapons from a storage site in the sector east UNPA, crossed into Serbia with the weapons, and then reentered the UNPA farther north. According to the U.N. Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, this was a violation of Croatia's international borders and was reported to the Security Council. Overall, UNPROFOR has not emphasized control of Croatia's international borders. Most UNPROFOR troops in Croatia are deployed well within Croatia as a buffer between Croatian government and Croatian Serb forces. U.N. reports further show that the UNPROFOR observers are frequently denied access to the international borders and cannot monitor them.

After considerable pressure from U.S. officials, who were concerned that a termination of UNPROFOR would lead to war, the Croatian government agreed to permit U.N. forces in Croatia under a new mandate. On March 31, 1995, the U.N. Security Council approved a new mandate for Croatia and a new mission, UNCRO. UNCRO will monitor Croatia's international borders with Bosnia and the former Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) as well as continue monitoring the internal cease-fire line. The concept of U.N. Protected Areas has been dropped from the new mandate. UNCRO forces will monitor and report on the crossing of military personnel, equipment, supplies, and weapons at 25 border posts. In addition, it will continue to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid through Croatia into Bosnia. Overall force levels for UNCRO will be reduced from the roughly 12,000 troops currently deployed to about 8,750. However, as of early May 1995, neither the Croatian government nor the Croatian Serbs had agreed to specific terms of UNCRO's deployment.



Since April 1992, an estimated 10,000 residents of Sarajevo have been killed and nearly 60,000 wounded. This total includes over 1,500 children killed and nearly 15,000 wounded according to a report by the U.N. Commission of Experts on the former Yugoslavia. Because of attacks on civilians, the U.N. Security Council designated Sarajevo and five other locations safe areas, "free from armed attacks and any other hostile acts."

On February 5, 1994, 68 civilians were killed and 142 wounded by a mortar round fired at the central market in Sarajevo. This followed a similar attack a day earlier in the suburbs of Sarajevo where 10 people were killed and 18 injured. Responding to these attacks, the U.N. Secretary-General asked the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for air strikes to lift the siege of Sarajevo. On February 9, NATO issued an ultimatum to Bosnian Serb forces to withdraw their heavy weapons 20 kilometers from the center of Sarajevo or place them under UNPROFOR control within 10 days, or they would be subject to air strikes. The Security Council broadly supported the ultimatum as a key effort to achieve a negotiated settlement of the conflict.

In the face of NATO's threat, the Bosnian Serbs agreed to withdraw their heavy weapons within 2 days. By the evening of the deadline set by NATO, the United Nations reported that the Bosnian Serbs had substantially complied with the ultimatum. Some heavy weapons had not been withdrawn beyond the 20-kilometer zone, but UNPROFOR planned to monitor them in place. As a result of these actions, no air strikes were carried out.


Following the assertive response by NATO and UNPROFOR, the siege of Sarajevo was lifted, and the United States was able to initiate discussions for a federation of Bosnian Muslims and Croats. A framework for the federation was signed in Washington in March 1994 and constitutional arrangements were agreed to in May 1994. The agreement called for federal units with equal rights and responsibilities, and also envisioned that areas with a majority of Serb residents would ultimately join the federation after peaceful negotiations. Although the federation has not yet resulted in the political reintegration of all communities, humanitarian aid passes relatively unobstructed through territory under federation control.



At the end of March 1994, Bosnian Serb forces launched an infantry and artillery offensive against the Gorazde enclave. The city of Gorazde was subject to intermittent shelling and sniper fire by the Bosnian Serb Army, resulting in a steady stream of casualties and injuries. Attacks became more serious with the Serb offensive of March 28 and 29, which involved artillery, tanks, and infantry. No distinction was made between military and civilian targets. Serb shelling also caused damage to the U.N. refugee center and U.N. equipment. The Bosnian Serb Army steadily invaded the safe area from all sides; numerous villages were destroyed and burned and their inhabitants killed or driven out. The city's hospital was reported to be overcrowded, understaffed, unsanitary, and the frequent target of shelling. Evacuation of urgent medical cases was rarely permitted. During this time period, the local population staged a protest against UNPROFOR's inaction UNHCR communications staff were concerned that reports did not portray the seriousness of the situation.


On April 6, 1994, the Security Council demanded that the Bosnian Serbs cease their attack. Subsequently, UNPROFOR asked NATO for air support to protect several endangered U.N. military observers in Gorazde. In response, NATO aircraft bombed Serb positions on April 10 and 11 and destroyed a tank shelling Gorazde. However, heavy shelling of Gorazde continued. Over the next few days, Bosnian Serbs tested UNPROFOR's will by taking hostages—at one point removing 16 peacekeepers from their posts-targeting the city, wounding several U.N. personnel, and killing two. Further air support was not requested until April 22. On that date, the North Atlantic Council of NATO authorized air strikes against Bosnian Serb targets and issued an ultimatum establishing (1) a 3-kilometer exclusion zone from which Bosnian Serb military forces were to pull back and (2) a 20-kilometer zone from which Bosnian Serb heavy weapons were to be withdrawn. Air strikes did not take place because UNPROFOR reported that Serb forces had withdrawn their heavy weapons from the 20-kilometer zone. However, some Serb soldiers with small arms remained within the 3-kilometer zone after the date of the ultimatum.

During the next few weeks, these forces harassed and obstructed UNPROFOR convoys and humanitarian aid deliveries, detained UNPROFOR forces, and stole UNPROFOR weapons and equipment. U.S. Agency for International Development officials visiting the enclave in July noted that the Serbs still maintained a presence within the 3 kilometer zone, having simply changed their military uniforms for police or civilian attire.



The northwest Bosnian enclave of Bihac was declared a safe area by the Security Council in May 1993. In October 1993 an opposition Bosnian Muslim leader declared Bihac to be autonomous from the Sarajevo government. Fighting broke out between forces loyal to the Bihac leader and the Bosnian government, with the rebel forces finally defeated in August 1994. Government forces then began an offensive against Bosnian Serb forces surrounding Bihac, but were forced back into Bihac in September 1994. In early November 1994, Serbs from within Croatia launched missile and air strikes on the Bihac pocket. Bosnian Serbs and the rebel Muslim forces attacked the Bihac pocket from Croatia. During an attack on November 18, these forces used napalm and cluster bombs, which the Security Council noted was "in clear violation of Bihac's status as a safe area." The air attacks from Croatia led the Security Council to authorize the use of NATO air power on targets in Croatia. Shortly thereafter, NATO aircraft struck Ubdina airfield in Croatia, damaging only the runway at UNPROFOR's request. However, the military advance of the Bosnian Serbs continued, with the assistance of the Croatian Serbs. NATO informed UNPROFOR it was prepared to use wider air strikes upon request, but UNPROFOR did not request them, choosing instead to negotiate a possible cease-fire. During this period, UNPROFOR personnel throughout Bosnia were being taken hostage. On successive days in early December, Bosnian Serb forces detained or held hostage between 316 and 439 UNPROFOR personnel.

By early December the borders of the enclave had been infiltrated everywhere, and the towns surrounding Bihac had fallen to the Bosnian Serb Army. Shelling of the center of Bihac occurred daily and by mid-December, a large part of Bihac lacked water. Access for humanitarian convoys was almost impossible. The UNPROFOR troop contingent in the Bihac pocket lacked food and did not have fuel to fully move around the area. On December 12, 1994, some of the contingent was attacked; five peacekeepers were wounded and one was killed. This contingent had deployed to Bihac in June as a replacement for another contingent and was not fully equipped. According to UNPROFOR'S Deputy Operations Commander, only about one-quarter of the unit had rifles. UNPROFOR had planned to send the remaining weapons and equipment by convoy. But Bosnian Serbs obstructed UNPROFOR convoys and would not allow the equipment to be delivered. On December 16, UNHCR reports characterized the situation in Bihac as a siege, with UNHCR and UNPROFOR officials virtual hostages. The city of Bihac did not fall, however, and in late December 1994, a cease-fire agreement was signed for all of Bosnia. Nonetheless, UNPROFOR and humanitarian aid convoys were still obstructed. According to U.N. reports, fighting continues in Bihac as of May 1995.




The full magnitude of human rights violations in the former Yugoslavia from 1991-94 is unknown because the United Nations and other organizations do not have access to all areas. However, the Chairman, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, testified that "Despite the absence of a smoking gun, like the files left by the Nazis documenting the Holocaust, what has happened in Bosnia is genocide."² He also provided some indication of the magnitude of violations in Bosnia and Croatia—151 mass graves with 5 to 3,000 bodies in each, over 20,000 rape victims, and over 50,000 torture victims. During our work, we saw destroyed hospitals and schools in Bihac and bombed residences and buildings in Sarajevo. We also saw extensive tracts of burned and bombed housing in the protected areas in Croatia. According to victims and U.N. officials, many Croatians living in the former protected areas were killed and others had their homes destroyed.

In November 1994, the United Nations reported that widespread violations of human rights in areas controlled by Bosnian Serb authorities continued. These violations included the displacement, murder, beating, torture, and rape of Bosnian Muslim and Croats in areas such as Banja Luka, Prijedor, and Bijeljina. A Human Rights Watch report documented similar violations in other locations in Northern Bosnia and said that "non-Serbs have been murdered with impunity." Witnesses to the crimes stated that those committing the crimes were often dressed in uniforms belonging to the Bosnian Serb army, military police, or civilian police. In December 1994, the U.N. Commission of Experts on the former Yugoslavia reported on the killing of civilians, mass gravesites, rapes, torture, ethnic cleansing, and prison camps. The Commission concluded that all parties had committed grave breaches of international humanitarian law. But most violations were committed by Serbs against Bosnian Muslims. Croats were the second largest group of victims. Serbs were also victims, but to a much lesser extent than the others. The Commission also said the chain of command in committing the crimes was blurred, but "the absence of preventive action by military commanders and other purposeful omissions ... creates a clear basis for command responsibility."³

In February 1995, the International War Crimes Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia issued its first three indictments naming 22 people for genocide in death camps run by Bosnian Serbs. In April 1995, the Special Prosecutor named Bosnian Serb leaders as suspects in an investigation of war crime.

²*Statement of the Honorable Christopher H. Smith," Chairman, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe," at the Hearing on the UN, NATO, and the Former Yugoslavia, April 6, 1995.

³Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (U.N. Security Council, S/1994/674/Add.2, Vol I, December 28, 1994).




Although unable to bring lasting peace to Bosnia and Croatia, U.N. actions have provided vital humanitarian assistance. Over the past three winters, UNHCR has led efforts by national governments, other U.N. agencies, and nongovernmental humanitarian organizations to deliver vital food aid, particularly in Bosnia. In 1994, about 356,000 metric tons of food, or about 85 percent of their estimated food requirements, were delivered to Bosnians. However, the success rate was not uniform to all parts of the country or at all times of the year. For example, Bihac received only 33 percent of its estimated food requirements in 1994, with no food delivered in November 1994. Bihac has an estimated population of 180,000 to 205,000. The eastern enclaves (Gorazde, Zepa, and Srebrenica), received 65 percent of food requirements; these safe areas have an estimated population of 104,000.

UNPROFOR has an important role in ensuring the delivery of aid, but the overall benefit provided by UNPROFOR varies. In 1994, about 77 percent of the aid convoys in Bosnia were successful. However, on routes where UNPROFOR escorts were needed and provided, such as the safe areas, the success rate was much lower. For example, in 1994, the convoy success rate to Bihac was 44 percent and to the eastern enclaves it was 62 percent. Overall, 59 percent of convoys to the safe areas were successful. Although UNPROFOR escorts do not ensure successful aid deliveries, UNHCR officials said escorts to Bihac, Sarajevo, and the enclaves are essential. Without UNPROFOR escorts, convoy drivers would refuse to deliver aid to safe areas. By contrast, some local UNHCR officials noted that UNPROFOR escorts are considered by Bosnian Serbs to be a provocation.

UNPROFOR contributes to humanitarian aid efforts in other ways. In many parts of Bosnia, UNPROFOR provides engineering assistance, such as opening up new routes, maintaining existing roads in the harsh climate, and repairing bridges. In some cases, UNPROFOR has loaned fuel to UNHCR when there were fuel delivery problems in Bosnia. UNPROFOR also provides information to UNHCR on route conditions and potential fighting. Finally, UNPROFOR operates and provides security at Sarajevo airport. Over 55,000 metric tons of aid were delivered there in 1994, more than twice the amount coming into the city by land routes. According to the chief of UNHCR's Sarajevo office, it would be virtually impossible to provide aid to Sarajevo without UNPROFOR's services.


UNHCR has indicated that despite UNPROFOR's importance to its humanitarian mission, it intends to continue operations in Bosnia if UNPROFOR withdraws. At the same time, it recognizes that the level of fighting and tension could jeopardize or halt the delivery of aid to Sarajevo, Bihac, and the eastern enclaves.



In Bosnia and Croatia, UNPROFOR has undertaken specific measures to build confidence among the parties. It monitored the cease-fire between Bosnian Muslim and Croat forces and participated in local security monitoring when requested by the parties, such as 24-hour patrols in a Croat community in Zenica and joint patrols with local Croat and Bosnian police to deter banditry on roads near Vitez. Throughout the two countries, UNPROFOR also monitors fragile cease-fires and observes movements of forces. UNPROFOR has also fostered discussions among local political leaders, some of which have led to agreements to allow greater freedom of movement for people and goods or to permit improvements to local water, telephone, sewer, gas, and power utilities. Some meetings of local civil and military leaders are chaired by UNPROFOR and allow these officials to discuss matters of mutual concern.

Public transport through the region has improved as UNPROFOR provides security to rail passengers and a new public bus system that is operating in most of the Federation territory. UNPROFOR has also been involved in infrastructure improvements, such as repairing numerous damaged and destroyed bridges, with a focus on routes used by aid convoys or which link the two communities.


Observations on UNPROFOR and U.N. Peacekeeping



According to U.N. Secretary-General reports, UNPROFOR has been guided by the U.N. doctrine of peacekeeping, which relies on all parties' consent and cooperation to implement Security Council resolutions. This approach has limited UNPROFOR's effectiveness. For example, although UNPROFOR has Chapter VII authority to ensure its freedom of movement, all vehicles obtain movement clearance from the warring factions before driving from one area to another. Also, UNPROFOR does not challenge roadblocks that prevent the delivery of aid or even the resupply of its own troops, as in Bihac. Relying on the parties' consent has also hampered deployment. For example, Bosnian Serbs have influenced which troop contingents are stationed along confrontation lines. According to the former U.N. Commander in Bosnia, the Bosnian Serbs clearly stated which national troop contingents were acceptable, and which were not. UNPROFOR'S Bosnia Chief of Operations said these views, as well as the preferences of the other warring parties, must be considered in UNPROFOR deployment and, as a result, the force is not as effectively used as it could be.

According to the Secretary-General, UNPROFOR must also remain strictly neutral in carrying out its mandate. UNPROFOR's interpretation of neutrality has led it to restrict air power in response to attacks on peacekeepers and on safe areas. The UNPROFOR Commander in Bosnia said more assertive action to protect and deter attacks would make UNPROFOR appear to take the side of the party under attack. This has led to relatively ineffectual use of air power. Air support in Gorazde and Bihac was minimal even when civilians living in safe areas were being killed. After attacks on U.N. peacekeepers in Gorazde, Bihac, and Sarajevo, UNPROFOR sparingly called for air support and only against the specific violating weapon.

Finally, UNPROFOR'S staff structure reflects the doctrine of peacekeeping. The staff consists of 37,000 troops. But UNPROFOR also consists of 2,600 local civilian staff, 2,000 international staff such as public affairs and information officers, 800 civilian police, and 700 military observers. These personnel are unarmed, many work throughout Croatia and Bosnia, and many are periodically taken hostage. The Secretary-General cites the vulnerability of these personnel as a reason to act only with the consent of the warring parties. He said UNPROFOR's mandate is peacekeeping; aggressive action would be a fundamental shift from the logic of peacekeeping and would entail unacceptable risks to the mission.



Briefing Section III Observations on UNPROFOR and U.N. Peacekeeping


NATO operates three air missions in Bosnia. In April 1993, NATO began to independently enforce a "no-fly" zone over Bosnian airspace, under U.N. Security Council Resolution 843. In August 1993, NATO agreed to provide close air support (CAS) for UNPROFOR. NATO provides CAS only at U.N. request and targets specific military weapons attacking UNPROFOR personnel. In August 1993, NATO also agreed to support UNPROFOR with air strikes to deter attacks on safe areas. Unlike CAS, air strikes could be used more broadly as a deterrent. Authorization for air strikes is dual-key—requiring both NATO and U.N. approval.⁴

As of March 1995, NATO had conducted over 17,000 sorties related to air strikes or CAS. However, only four air strikes had been formally authorized and five CAS operations requested.⁵ According to NATO officials, the 17,000 sorties did not necessarily respond to formal UNPROFOR requests, but were flown under NATO initiatives. In this regard, NATO has encouraged more assertive use of air power. For example, NATO typically has aircraft patrolling on a regular basis so it can respond quickly to formal U.N. requests. In November 1994, NATO urged a more assertive use of air power to deter attacks on Bihac. After NATO aircraft were targeted by Croatian Serb missiles, NATO began reconnaissance for expanded operations. UNPROFOR, however, requested NATO to cease reconnaissance, temporarily halt the air interdiction over much of Bosnia, and halt further air strikes.

The limited use of air power stems from a difference in mission between the United Nations and NATO. According to NATO and U.N. documents and officials, the U.N. believes that the robust use of air power is inconsistent with ensuring the cooperation of all parties. NATO believes sufficient air power should be used to accomplish the mission of deterring attacks on U.N. personnel and safe areas. Thus NATO has insisted that UNPROFOR provide pilots with several targets of military significance, whereas UNPROFOR insists on symbolic targets to send a political message. NATO has also disagreed with UNPROFOR on policy regarding tactical warning. NATO insists that tactical warnings of air strikes should not be provided because it endangers pilots and compromises the mission. UNPROFOR insists on having contact with all parties and believes that general warnings of air strikes must be given. Based on these different approaches, NATO military officials think air strikes in the former Yugoslavia lack credible deterrent.

⁴Once air strikes are approved, the operational keys are delegated to the Secretary-General's Special Representative for the former Yugoslavia, and the Commander in Chief, NATO's Southern Command.

⁵Air strikes were against Serbian targets near Sarajevo, and against a Croatian Serb airfield that was use to launch against attacks the Bihac pocket in late 1994.




Briefing Section III Observations on UNPROFOR and U.N. Peacekeeping

As with other peacekeeping missions, UNPROFOR's command and control hampers operations.⁶ For example, in 1994, a troop contingent was requested to deploy to Mostar where intense fighting was taking place. According to the troop contingent, it had discretion in carrying out this order and decided not to deploy immediately. The issue was not resolved and the Security Council and the troop contingent's government exchanged letters over the issue. According to the Chief of Operations in the Bosnia Command, the inability to effectively deploy and move troops poses a problem in a war environment. Currently, UNPROFOR informally asks troop contingent commanders their views on redeploying or changing the contingent's operation. The contingent commander will then contact his capital and ask for advice. If the response is positive, the U.N. Commander, Bosnia, will formally order the redeployment.

As of April 1995, 28 nations contributed U.N. troop contingents for the former Yugoslavia; and differences in their readiness posed a problem. Some contingents, for example, arrived without needed equipment, supplies, or maintenance capabilities. According to UNPROFOR officials, one contingent initially arrived without sleeping bags, flak jackets, or winter clothing. Others arrived without vehicles and armored personnel carriers. These troops could not be deployed in Bosnia without transport equipment and had to remain in Croatia while awaiting donated equipment. The troop contingent in Bihac in December 1994, deployed without weapons and basic equipment for each soldier. When Bihac came under siege, U.N. convoys could not deliver the equipment to the contingent.

UNPROFOR's troop strength is less than that authorized by the Security Council. As of April 1995, its actual strength of nearly 39,000 was almost 6,000 short of authorized levels. Most of this shortfall is in logistics and support troops. According to the UNPROFOR Commander, even authorized troop levels are insufficient to carry out UNPROFOR's mandate. However, given the peacekeeping approach underlying U.N. operations in the former Yugoslavia, the U.N. belief that assertive action could compromise its neutrality, and a desire to negotiate a solution, it is an open question how greater troop strength would change UNPROFOR's approach.

⁶For a discussion of weaknesses in command and control, see Peace Operations: Information on U.S. and U.N. Activities (GAO/NSIAD-95-102BR, February 1995); U.N. Peacekeeping: Lessons Learned in Recent Missions (GAO/NSIAD-94-9, Dec. 1993).



Briefing Section III Observations on UNPROFOR and U.N. Peacekeeping

Both UNPROFOR and NATO have begun to plan for a possible withdrawal of UNPROFOR forces from all or parts of the former Yugoslavia. Initial withdrawal plans centered on Bosnia, reflecting intensified fighting and frustration with the lack of progress on a peace agreement. Planning also focussed on a possible UNPROFOR withdrawal from Croatia.

Most planning was based on a contingency of a hostile withdrawal, since UNPROFOR personnel had periodically been taken hostage during air strikes. Moreover, UNPROFOR weapons and equipment would be valuable to all sides, and during withdrawal, the parties might try to seize the equipment. Although not finalized or approved, draft NATO withdrawal plans have been completed. NATO involvement would only occur at the request of the United Nations. Estimates are that NATO would have to provide seven to nine brigades.

But major issues remain undecided. For example, decisions about the command and control of a U.N.-NATO withdrawal above theater level, have not been fully agreed upon. This issue is complicated by the presence of non-NATO forces in UNPROFOR, and humanitarian workers, U.N. military observers, and civilian police throughout Croatia and Bosnia. In addition, various NATO nations have differing views on the mix of NATO-U.N. funding that would finance the withdrawal. The cost and duration of a withdrawal would be strongly influenced by whether its nature is benign or hostile and how much equipment is withdrawn.

The United States has agreed in principle to assist NATO in an UNPROFOR withdrawal, pending congressional consultation.

U.N. Security Council Resolutions in the Former Yugoslavia

Resolution number	Date	Area	Purpose	U.N. Charter	
713	9/25/91 FY Weapons embargo against all former Yugoslavia			VII	
721	11/27/91	FY	Preliminaries to establishing UNPROFOR		
724	12/15/91	FY	Establishes sanctions Committee	VII	
727	1/8/92	С	Deployment of 50 liaison officers	VI	
740	2/7/92	С	Increases in liaison officers	VI	
743	2/21/92	С	Establishes UNPROFOR	VI	
749	4/7/92	С	Authorizes full deployment of UNPROFOR	VI	
752	5/15/92	В	Demands all cease fighting in Bosnia	VI	
753	5/18/92	С	Admits Croatia to the U.N.	VI	
754	5/18/92	FY	Admits Slovenia to the U.N.		
755	5/20/92	В	Admits Bosnia to the U.N.		
757	5/30/92	FY	Imposes sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro		
758	6/8/92	В	Authorizes UNPROFOR deployment to Sarajevo		
760	6/18/92	FY	Exempts humanitarian aid from sanctions		
761	6/29/92	В	Additional UNPROFOR deployment to Sarajevo; mandate to ensure security of airport	VI	
762	6/30/92	С	Additional UNPROFOR mandate in Croatia "pink zones"		
764	7/13/92	В	UNPROFOR reinforcements in Sarajevo		
769	8/7/92	С	Enlarges UNPROFOR mandate in Croatia to perform customs functions		
770	8/13/92	В	Asks member states to facilitate delivery of humanitarian aid in Bosnia		
771	8/13/92	В	Demands unimpeded access for humanitarian organizations		
776	9/14/92	В	Enlarges UNPROFOR mandate to protect humanitarian convoys in Bosnia		
777	9/19/92	FY	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia no longer U.N. member		
779	10/6/92	С	Enlarges UNPROFOR mandate in Croatia — Prevlaka peninsula		
780	10/6/92	FY	Establishes war crimes commission		
781	10/9/92	В	Bosnia no-fly zone		
786	11/10/92	В	Enlarges UNPROFOR mandate to authorize and monitor flights into Bosnia		
787	11/16/92	FY	Restricts transshipments		
795	12/11/92	М	UNPROFOR deployment to Macedonia	VI	
798	12/18/92	В	Condemnation of war crimes	VI	
802	1/25/93	С	Demands cessation of attacks on UNPROFOR and end of cease-fire violations		
307	2/19/93	FY	Demands respect for UNPROFOR's security and extends mandate until 3/3/93	VII	
808	2/22/93	FY	Establishes war crimes tribunal	VI	
815	3/30/93	FY	Extends UNPROFOR mandate until 6/30/93	VII	
816	3/31/93	В	Authorization to enforce no-fly zone	VII	
817	4/7/93	М	Admits Macedonia to the U.N.	VI	
819	4/16/93	В	Designates Srebrenica as safe area	VII	

(continued)

Appendix I U.N. Security Council Resolutions in the Former Yugoslavia

Resolution number	Date	Area	Purpose		
820	4/17/93	FY	Strengthens embargo on Serbia and Montenegro	VII	
821	4/28/93	FY	Excludes Serbia and Montenegro from ECOSOC	VI	
824	5/6/93	В	Designates six safe areas in Bosnia		
827	5/25/93	FY	Establishes International War Crimes Tribunal	VII	
836	6/4/93	В	Enlarges UNPROFOR mandate to deter attacks on safe areas	VII	
838	6/10/93	В	Requests report on deploying monitors on Bosnia's borders	VII	
842	6/18/93	М	Authorizes U.S. to deploy in Macedonia	VI	
843	6/18/93	FY	Requests to examine financial impact of sanctions	VI	
844	6/18/93	FY	Authorizes reinforcement of UNPROFOR	VII	
845	6/18/93	М	Urges Greece and Macedonia reach settlement	VI	
847	6/30/93	FY	Extends UNPROFOR mandate until 9/30/93	VII	
855	8/9/93	FY	Calls for continuation of CSCE missions in Serbia and Montenegro	VI	
857	8/20/93	FY	Candidates for judges of War Crimes Tribunal		
859	8/24/93	В	Calls for cease-fire		
869	9/30/93	FY	Extends UNPROFOR mandate until 10/1/93	VII	
870	10/1/93	FY	Extends UNPROFOR mandate until 10/5/93		
871	10/5/93	FY	Extends UNPROFOR mandate until 3/31/94		
877	10/21/93	FY	Appoints international tribunal prosecutor	VI	
900	3/4/94	В	Appoints Special Coordinator for Sarajevo		
908	3/31/94	FY	Extends UNPROFOR mandate until 9/30/94	VII	
913	4/22/94	FY	Demands immediate release of U.N. personnel		
914	4/27/94	FY	Increases UNPROFOR personnel by 6,550		
936	7/8/94	FY	Appoints prosecutor of international tribunal		
941	9/23/94	В	Condemns Bosnian Serb ethnic cleansing		
942	9/23/94	В	Imposes economic sanctions on Bosnian Serbs		
943	9/29/94	FY	Lifts some sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro		
947	9/30/94	FY	Extends UNPROFOR mandate until 3/31/95		
958	11/19/94	С	Extends air strike authority to Croatia	VII	
959	11/19/94	С	Clarifies safe area regime		
967	12/14/94	FY	Permits Serbs to export diphtheria serum		
970	1/12/95	FY	Continues suspensions of some sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro		
981	3/31/95	С	Establishes UNCRO mission for Croatia		
982	3/31/95	В	Extends UNPROFOR mandate until 11/30/95 but only for Bosnia		
983	3/31/95	М	Establishes UNPREDEP mission for Macedonia	VI	

Legend

B = Bosnia C = Croatia

M = Macedonia FY = Former Yugoslavia Areas

UNPROFOR Troop Deployments and Contributing Countries (as of March 1995)

Country	Croatia	Bosnia	Macedonia	Total
France	843	3,781		4,624
Jordan	3,283	100		3,383
United Kingdom		3,155		3,155
Pakistan		2,983		2,983
Canada	1,218	820		2,038
Netherlands	148	1,482		1,630
Malaysia		1,545		1,545
Turkey		1,469		1,469
Spain		1,372		1,372
Russia	856	472		1,328
Bangladesh		1,238		1,238
Denmark	953	280		1,233
Sweden	128	1,030		1,158
Poland	1,141			1,141
Ukraine	555	460		1,015
Kenya	974			974
Czech Republic	957			957
Nepal	898			898
Belgium	769	100		869
Argentina	862			862
United States	299		540	839
Norway	111	636		747
Slovakia	567			567
Nordic			556	556
Egypt		418		418
New Zealand		249		249
Indonesia	220			220
Finland	43			43
Subtotal	14,825	21,590	1,096	37,511
Hdqs. units				404
Total troop strength				37,915

Appendix III Selected Sources

1. U.N. Headquarters

Documents: Security Council resolutions, Secretary-General Reports, International Conference on Former Yugoslavia

reports, Commission on Human Rights reports

Officials:

Special Assistant to the Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping; Director and military briefers, U.N. Situation Center

2. UNPROFOR

Documents:

Situation reports, U.N. military observer reports Officials: Special Representative of the Secretary-General Force Commanders, UNPROFOR and B-H Command U.N. Special Coordinator for Sarajevo Chief, Civilian Affairs Deputy Chief Inspector, Civilian Police Chief Military Observer Chief of Staff, Logistics Other military and civilian officers at UNPROFOR Headquarters, B-H Command, Sarajevo, Sector North, and troop contingents

3. UNHCR

Documents: Field situation reports, field office responses of UNPROFOR services Officials:

Chief of Mission, Bosnia Head of Office, Sarajevo Field staff in various locations

4. NATO

Officials:

U.S. Ambassador to NATO Deputy Permanent Representatives to NATO of Turkey, United Kingdom, and France Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe Senior and other staff, Allied Forces, Southern Europe

5.	Department of Defense
	1

Officials: Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe Commander, Allied Air Forces Southern Europe Deputy Commander in Charge, United States European Command Commander, Joint Task Force, Provide Promise Commander, Joint Task Force Forward

Documents:

Briefing slides on U.S. and U.N. operations in the former Yugoslavia Reports and studies on peace operations

6. Department of State, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, and Agency for International Development

Documents:

Cables, reports

Officials:

U.S. Ambassador and the Deputy Chief of Mission to Bosnia U.S. Ambassador and the Deputy Chief of Mission to Croatia Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, International Organization Affairs

Director, Office of Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement

7. Statistical Information

Budget data on U.S., UNPROFOR, and UNHCR actions in the former Yugoslavia UNPROFOR casualities and causes Cease-fire violation analyses Chronolonogy of CAS and air strikes Convoy success rates Days Sarajevo airport closed UNPROFOR deployment and troop numbers Monthly food distribution reports Sorties flown related to Deny Flight Sorties flown related to CAS and air strikes

U.N. personnel detained during selected time periods

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