[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 107 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
ETHNIC MINORITIES IN CHINA:
TIBETANS AND UIGHURS
=======================================================================
ROUNDTABLE
before the
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 10, 2002
__________
Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.cecc.gov
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
80-922 WASHINGTON : 2002
_____________________________________________________________________________
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512-1800
Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
Senate
House
MAX BAUCUS, Montana, Chairman DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska, Co-
CARL LEVIN, Michigan Chairman
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California JIM LEACH, Iowa
BYRON DORGAN, North Dakota DAVID DREIER, California
EVAN BAYH, Indiana FRANK WOLF, Virginia
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JOE PITTS, Pennsylvania
BOB SMITH, New Hampshire SANDER LEVIN, Michigan
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio
TIM HUTCHINSON, Arkansas SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
JIM DAVIS, Florida
EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
PAULA DOBRIANSKY, Department of State
GRANT ALDONAS, Department of Commerce
D. CAMERON FINDLAY, Department of Labor
LORNE CRANER, Department of State
JAMES KELLY, Department of State
Ira Wolf, Staff Director
John Foarde, Deputy Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS
Wolf, Ira, Staff Director, Congressional-Executive Commission on
China.......................................................... 1
Tsering, Bhuchung K., director, International Campaign for Tibet. 2
Sperling, Elliot, associate professor of Tibetan Studies, Indiana
University..................................................... 4
Holcombe, Arthur N., president, Tibet Poverty Alleviation Fund... 8
Kamberi, Dolkun, director of Uighur Language Service for Radio
Free Asia...................................................... 20
Rudelson, Justin, executive director, University of Maryland
Institute for Global Chinese Affairs........................... 24
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements
Tsering, Bhuchung K.............................................. 36
Sperling, Elliot................................................. 38
Holcombe, Arthur N............................................... 41
Kamberi, Dolkun.................................................. 46
Rudelson, Justin................................................. 49
ETHNIC MINORITIES IN CHINA:
TIBETANS AND UIGHURS
----------
MONDAY, JUNE 10, 2002
Congressional-Executive
Commission on China,
Washington, DC.
The roundtable was convened, pursuant to notice, at 2:32
p.m., in room SD-215, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Ira Wolf
(staff director of the Commission), presiding.
Also present: John Foarde, deputy staff director; Steve
Marshall and Anne Tsai, Commission staff; Jennifer Goedke,
Office of Representative Kaptur; Matt Tuchow, Office of
Representative Levin; Arlan Fuller, Office of Representative
Brown; Karin Finkler, Office of Representative Pitts; Dave
Dettoni, Office of Representative Wolf; and Holly Vineyard,
Department of Commerce.
STATEMENT OF IRA WOLF, STAFF DIRECTOR, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE
COMMISSION ON CHINA
Mr. Wolf. I would like to welcome everyone to the sixth
staff-led roundtable of the Congressional-Executive Commission
on China. We are holding these roundtables per the instructions
of the Commission chairman, Senator Baucus, and the Commission
do-chairman, Congressman Bereuter, in order to delve more
deeply into specific issues than is normally possible at a full
Commission hearing.
Two issues of great concern to many Members of Congress, to
the Administration, and to the American people are Tibet, and
the treatment of Uighurs in Xinjiang. We have two panels today.
The first will deal with Tibet, the second will deal with
Uighurs.
We are going to follow the usual process for these
roundtables, which means each witness will have 10 minutes for
an oral presentation. Then we will have questions from the
staff members.
We have a court reporter transcribing this roundtable.
Within the next couple of days, the formal written statements
will be posted on our Website at www.cecc.gov, and then, in
about 5 weeks, the full transcript will be posted.
When we complete the Tibet panel we will move to panel two.
For this panel, in addition to myself and John Foarde, who is
the deputy staff director, as well as the staff members of
individual commissioners, Steve Marshall, from the Commission
staff will
participate.
The three panelists today are Bhuchung Tsering, who is
director of the International Campaign for Tibet, Elliot
Sperling, chair of Central Eurasian Studies at Indiana
University; and Arthur Holcombe, who is president of the Tibet
Poverty Alleviation Fund. Mr. Tsering, let us start with you.
STATEMENT OF BHUCHUNG TSERING, DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN
FOR TIBET
Mr. Tsering. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity
to testify before you all here. We believe this Commission and
its staff members play a very important role in trying to
define how the United States will be dealing with China.
I think today we are at a crucial State on the Tibetan
issue, as far as the United States-China relationship is
concerned. That is because in recent months, the Chinese
authorities have taken some steps which on the face of it shows
that the Chinese are sensitive to American concerns about human
rights in Tibet and the political situation, in general.
However, if you base your consideration solely on those
developments, then we might miss the broader political issue
which still remains to be resolved. Despite the fact that there
have been release of political prisoners, the Chinese
authorities have adapted a slightly different policy in that in
addition to the previous policy of suppressing Tibetans in all
their walks of life, today they have come to control the
Tibetan people's way of life. And that is done very subtly
through incorporation of certain aspects of Tibetan life,
including academic and economic fields. So I want to touch
briefly on these topics.
One thing that we can say for certain is that because of
international pressure, because of the pressure that the United
States has been exerting, Chinese authorities have had to take
even those minimum steps that they have taken. But the Chinese
authorities are also using new tactics. For example, the
incentives of access to economic opportunities for government
organizations and individuals, who then would have to become
sympathetic to their perspective on Tibet. They also are
welcoming, in fact, attracting more and more western experts to
Tibet, to China, to various conferences being organized by the
Chinese Government, and to somehow legitimize the Chinese rule
over the Tibetan people, not just in the political aspects, but
in the cultural, literary, and all other aspects of the issue.
I have to say that there are some individuals and
organizations who take opportunity of this Chinese opening, to
interact with the Tibetan people, in fields which are of direct
benefit to the Tibetan people and that, we really encourage.
To go back to the release of some prisoners. You will
recollect that in January the Chinese authorities released
Ngawang Choephel, a Fulbright Scholar and ethnomusicologist, on
medical parole. His case was taken up mostly by the U.S.
Government, as well as by Members of Congress, particularly
from Vermont. Then we had Chadrel Rinpoche being released some
time in February, although we do not know what his present
situation is. Then, Tanag Jigme Zangpo, whose case is also
well-known to people who watch Tibet, was released in March.
At the same time that the Chinese Government was releasing
these political prisoners, they were taking steps, most
noticeably in Eastern Tibet--which is presently in what we
would call Sichuan--and Qinghai provinces. They were cracking
down on Tibetan leaders who were popular among the people for
the work that they were doing with the Tibetans directly; Lamas
like Tenzin Deleg Rinpoche, Gyaye Phuntsog, in present-day
Qinghai, Gen Sonam Phuntsog, from Kardze in Sichuan, and, of
course, Khenpo Jigme Phuntsog, from Larung Gar Buddhist
encampment. And just recently we heard about Jigme Tenzin
Rinpoche from Lhasa, who had been detained on different
charges, but we feel, because he was popular with the people
for starting an orphanage there.
So all these show that the Chinese Government is taking
steps to assuage the international concerns by releasing
popular political prisoners but still slamming down on the most
popular leaders still inside Tibet. The Chinese authorities are
also using developmental opportunities, as I said earlier, to
fulfill their political ambition. Most noticeable is the
railway project that they are undertaking. We believe in the
long term, the railway project will be hard on the Tibetan
people, despite the fact that it has short-term economic
benefits. One Western journalist who visited the construction
area had this to say, ``The trains would allow quick deployment
of troops to put down Tibetan protests like those in the late
1980s against Chinese rule and to guard the frontier with
India, which fought a border war with China in 1962.'' He also
goes on to say that, ``It would be very easy to bring lots of
non-Tibetans to the Tibetan areas, thus affecting the Tibetan
identity there.''
China has also revised its regional autonomy law to say
that all developmental projects--which are supposed to be in
the autonomous region--would be prioritized on the basis of the
interests of Beijing.
This brings us to the question: What is the International
Campaign for Tibet's position on developmental projects in
Tibet? We are not opposed to developmental projects in Tibet--
we believe Tibetans need to be empowered--but at the same time
we are
opposed to those projects which bring in more non-Tibetans to
the Tibetan areas. We are opposed to those projects which take
over Tibetan resources without benefiting the Tibetan people.
We are
opposed to those projects which fulfill the political ends of
the Chinese leadership.
Having said this, what is our recommendation to the
Commission and to everyone here? I have seven recommendations
that I would like to mention. The first is that the Commission
needs to realize that human rights aspect is just one symptom
of the Tibetan problem, which is a broader political problem.
Unless we tackle that broader political problem, there cannot
be a lasting solution. And that broader political problem needs
to be tackled through continued raising of dialog for resolving
the issue between the Dalai Lama and the Chinese leadership.
Second, the Commission should urge the Congress to pass the
Tibet Policy Act, which is a comprehensive legislation before
the Congress. Third, the Commission should ask the
Administration to have a coordinated approach to the Tibet
issue. Maybe there is some sort of coordination at the moment,
but we think it can be improved so that at all fronts the
Chinese Government realizes, whether it is economic, commerce,
or political, it cannot go on without resolving the political
issue of Tibet. Then the Commission also should urge the
Administration to adopt a multilateral approach, not just the
United States, but the international fora, including the United
Nations.
The Commission should also ask the Administration to draw
up guidelines on the developmental projects in Tibet. The
Congress has already done that in the Tibet Policy Act, where
it has incorporated some of those basic principles which are of
concern to the Tibetan people. The Tibetan Government in exile
has come out with guidelines on development projects in Tibet,
where they encourage development in the rural sector,
particularly in the fields of health and education.
We commend the Commission for taking a staff delegation to
Tibet and China recently. We believe that needs to be
complimented by sending a delegation to the Tibetan community
in exile so that the Commission can understand how the
democratic administration in exile functions; what is the
thinking of the leadership, how the Tibetan refugees survive.
We believe this information will be useful to the Commission as
you continue your dialog with the Chinese leadership.
Finally, we would like to endorse the recommendations of
the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, which
was contained in their third annual report released in May of
this year. Their recommendations, as you recall, consisted of
asking the Congress to extend an invitation to the Dalai Lama
to hold a joint meeting, and that the United States should have
a presence in the Tibetan capital, Lhasa, and that the United
States should ask the Chinese Government to grant access to
religious persons in prison in Tibet. We believe with such a
comprehensive approach there is hope for a lasting solution to
the Tibetan issue. Thank you so much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Tsering appears in the
appendix.]
Mr. Wolf. Thank you very much, Bhuchung. Elliot Sperling.
STATEMENT OF ELLIOT SPERLING, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF TIBETAN
STUDIES, INDIANA UNIVERSITY
Mr. Sperling. Thank you. I am going to diverge from the
things that I have written as well, so this will be somewhat
extemporaneous, in part.
I am grateful to the Congressional-Executive Commission on
China for giving me the opportunity to speak to you. I am the
chair of the Department of Central Eurasian Studies at Indiana
University, and have for a long time been engaged in the study
of Tibetan history and Sino-Tibetan relations. I served as a
member of the Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on
Religious Freedom Abroad before it became the Commission on
Religious Freedom.
I am going to talk about the Tibet issue in general, both
historical and contemporary. The historical perspectives that
underlie Chinese policies in Tibet are fairly clear. It is the
position of the People's Republic of China [PRC] that Tibet
became an integral part of China in the 13th century; that
sovereignty over Tibet was claimed by all subsequent dynastic
rulers, and that inasmuch as China has consistently been a
multinational state, the fact that two of the three dynasties
involved in this rule were Mongols and Manchus has no bearing
on the question of Chinese sovereignty. This is the position of
the People's Republic of China.
With the collapse, in 1911, of the last imperial dynasty,
the Qing, these claims were taken up by the Republic of China--
or Nationalist China as it is sometimes called--and in 1949 by
the People's Republic of China, which was able to implement
them fully. In May 1951 after military clashes left Tibet with
no real defense, the Chinese Government was able to conclude an
``agreement on measures for the peaceful liberation of Tibet''
with the government of the Dalai Lama, which constituted an
official acquiescence to Tibet's incorporation into the
People's Republic of China.
This account, the view from the People's Republic of China,
is in some ways emotional and nationalistic in its perception
of Tibet as an integral part of China for centuries. It is used
to introduce almost all Chinese polemics and arguments about
Tibet and its history and it underpins China's assertions about
its place in Tibet. Sometimes there is talk about the benefits
China has brought to Tibet, in Chinese materials, and talk
about other issues, too. But in making the case as to why Tibet
is a part of the People's Republic of China, the argument is
always historical. It is held to derive from the workings of
history.
And here we come to an interesting facet of this whole
issue, something that came up at a conference 2 months ago at
Harvard University. Several of us were addressing the Tibet
issue, and Tibet in the cold war, and it was remarkable to see
the extent to which Marxist-Leninist theory plays into issues
such as Tibet. One tends to think now of China as having gone
beyond Marxist-Leninism, not that it is not ruled by an
authoritarian regime; but nevertheless the Marxist-Leninist
theory has been jettisoned.
There are certain aspects of Chinese policy, such as the
Tibet issue, which really cannot be explained otherwise. If you
turn to questions such as self-determination or whatever, you
still sense the dominance of Marxist-Leninist ideas. That is to
say, the historical narrative which China puts forward, which I
just spoke about, is a Marxist-Leninist view. It represents the
inevitable workings of history. There is no other theoretical
justification for it. So, therefore, we have something which
stays where it is by dint of inertia; this justification, this
Marxist-Leninist justification about the workings of history,
holds that this is inevitable, that the Tibetan and ``Han''--
this is the term which is used for the people who are otherwise
called Chinese--that the Tibetan and ``Han'' people have merged
together by the workings of history. This is the emotional
underlay which we have as a Chinese justification of Tibetan
policy. Thus--and I do not want to be too obtuse about this--
when people talk about bridging the gap between the positions
of the Tibetan exiles and the Chinese Government, they often
forget that in point of fact, China's justification actually
have an important link to their theoretical views in this.
Therefore, when the Tibetan exiles and the Dalai Lama's
government have broached proposals, such as taking all of the
disparate Tibetan areas within the People's Republic of China
and making a larger Tibetan region that would be autonomous,
China has simply rejected this, because as far as China is
concerned, history has already decided the Tibetan issue. That
is to say, the exile government often says there is a
difference in nationality. You are Chinese, we are Tibetan;
therefore, we should have some sort of autonomy. To which China
responds, you already have nationality autonomy. But again,
Tibetan exiles ignore China's Marxist-Leninist notion that
national differences are on the surface and thus that the
Tibetan question has been solved by the socialist integration
of Tibet into China. For China it is the social and economic
differences which require certain allowances for autonomy:
witness Hong Kong. You do not have any national difference
there, the differences are social and economic. Even though we
often forget about the Marxist-Leninist background here--and I
do not want to exaggerate; certainly in so many areas of life
in China Marxist-Leninism has been jettisoned--in some areas,
as if by inertia, you do find this theoretical basis. When
people argue about the Tibet issue, as often as not they forget
that there is this vast theoretical difference in positions,
and therefore when China rejects what the exiles say, it does
so with its own logic, which is often misperceived.
For Tibetans opposed to Chinese rule, the Tibetan issue
also remains a very emotional issue. And it is, at heart, a
nationalist issue as well. And this is something which the
attempt to bridge positions often elides. The fact is, Tibetans
who are dissidents, Tibetans who protest against Chinese rule
inside Tibet and outside Tibet, do so on the basis of
nationalist sentiment. They see their identity as Tibetans as
something which is quite different from an identity as Chinese.
It is a nationalist issue and they are calling for
independence.
Proposals to bridge the gap put forth by the United States
Government, for instance, calling for more autonomy and
cultural freedom in Tibet, are all very good and they are all
very well intentioned, but we have to bear in mind that these
are not the issues being addressed by Tibetans who are
agitating inside Tibet. Almost all of the material that you
pick up that is put out by Tibetan dissidents, uses the term
independence. They are struggling for independence there. It is
quite interesting that you have as the rallying cry from
certain sectors, such as the exile government authorities, that
we have to preserve Tibetan culture. And this has been picked
up in the United States, in House and Senate resolutions, and
also by the Executive Branch. What we must do, they say, is
preserve Tibetan culture, which, of course, is a somewhat
difficult issue, because calls for preserving a culture forget
that what we are dealing with here is something dynamic.
Culture is dynamic, it changes all the time. It cannot be
preserved. The only thing you can call for, really, is the
lifting of restrictions and measures that suppress cultural
expression. It should not be forgotten, too that when people
call for Tibetan cultural preservation that we are often
talking about sort of a folk culture or Tibetan monastic
culture. Tibetan culture today is actually a very complex
thing. You have modern secular writers in Tibet who are part of
the Tibetan picture, too.
The focus of a lot of efforts has also been in bringing
China into negotiations with the Dalai Lama's government in
exile and this has also been mired in misperceptions, I
believe, largely coming from the Tibetan Government in exile.
These were also picked up certainly during the Clinton
Administration. It was and is a very important point for the
United States, that what we should be doing is encouraging
China to negotiate with the Dalai Lama. And the main obstacle
to this--this is how it is often presented--is that China does
not realize that the Dalai Lama has renounced Tibetan
independence, which indeed he has. He has said that in the
past, Tibet was independent, but for the future, Tibet does not
have to be independent. He does not want Tibet to be
independent. He has even said at one point, it would be a
disaster, if Tibet were to be independent. Of course, China
understands what the Dalai Lama is saying. But Chinese policy
has evolved: it is a very clear-cut policy and it is very easy
to see. China has decided that it really does not need the
Dalai Lama.
A number of years ago you had the case of the Panchen Lama.
The Dalai Lama recognized a child as the Panchen Lama, the
second highest ranking hierarch, as he is often termed, within
the Gelugpa sect. And China, of course, rejected this; it was
adamant and angry and chose another child as the Panchen Lama.
In a sense, what this means is that China was essentially
saying that it was going to control the Buddhist establishment.
It was not going to have the Dalai Lama controlling the
Buddhist establishment. More importantly, of course, is the
fact that China's Panchen Lama is going to help find the next
Dalai Lama. China had decided that it did need a Dalai Lama,
but not the Dalai Lama; it could wait until the present Dalai
Lama died. The Dalai Lama is not young, and Chinese policy has
now come down to waiting for the death of the Dalai Lama. This
is something which I have to emphasize because for so many
years, the Tibetan Government in exile, in the face of all
evidence to the contrary, and the United States Administration,
which in many ways relied on information from the Tibetan
Government in exile, acted as if what was needed was to get
negotiations started between the Dalai Lama and the Chinese
Government. The Chinese Government, of course, benefited
because it could simply say, well, we would do it, of course,
if the Dalai Lama were more sincere, and they would then elicit
further statements from the Dalai Lama, which helped to
undermine the case for Tibetan independence. Without seeming
flip, it was a policy that I call the ``Dalai Lama dancing on
one foot'' policy. The Dalai Lama would say ``No, I do not want
Tibetan independence.'' The Chinese Government would say,
``Well, you are not sincere. You have to say that you do not
want Taiwan independence either.'' The Dalai Lama would say,
``Well, I am not for Taiwan independence.'' The Chinese
Government would say, ``Well, you are not sincere.'' It would
seek more and more. It was simply buying time. And like it or
not, it is important for this government, this Administration,
and I think, everybody who cares about Tibet, to understand
what is going on and what Chinese policy is, and to be
guided by the actual facts of the issue, and not by what we
hope they might be. I apologize for taking excess time.
Mr. Wolf. Thank you. This is just supposed to set a
framework. Arthur Holcombe, please.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sperling appears in the
appendix.]
STATEMENT OF ARTHUR N. HOLCOMBE, PRESIDENT, TIBET POVERTY
ALLEVIATION FUND
Mr. Holcombe. Thank you very much. It is also a pleasure
for me to be here. I will also diverge a little bit from my
prepared text. In the context of my previous experience, I was
the resident representative for the UNDP [United Nations
Development Program] in China during the 1990s. Later, starting
in 1998, I established the Tibet Poverty Alleviation Fund. All
of this has meant that I have been involved in development work
in Tibet since about 1992, and so the perspectives that I would
like to share here are looking at it from the standpoint of the
economic and social trends in Tibet and what they mean for the
international donor community.
Around 1992, the Chinese Government introduced major new
financial and residence liberalization measures in Tibet which
resulted in a major influx of Han and Hui Muslim people. These
people migrated primarily into urban areas or along main
routes, and established businesses. However, along with them
came farming populations from Sichuan and elsewhere, who went
into greenhouse farming around the urban areas. This influx
created a new dynamic in Tibet, and greatly stimulated economic
growth. According to the Chinese Government, growth since 1992
has been on the order of about 11.9 percent per annum--some of
the fastest growth in the PRC during this period. In 2000,
Central Government introduced its major Western Provinces
Development Initiative. This was initially explained in terms
of trying to boost economic growth and incomes among local
ethnic populations, and helping them to catch up to the living
standards of people in Eastern Provinces. More recently, it has
become clear that the ``Western Initiative'' has been focused
primarily on the development of gas, oil, other natural
resources to the benefit of China as a whole.
So what we have seen since 1992 is an urban oriented growth
process which has focused on public sector infrastructure
investment, supporting economic reforms and opening up. What I
would like to highlight are some of the distortions that this
urban growth has created as far as the Tibetan population is
concerned.
The first important implication is a very rapidly
increasing income disparity between urban and rural areas.
Because most of the Tibetans are living in the rural areas,
there is also growing income disparity between the Han and
Tibetan populations. The government does give some figures on
this. It states that in 1996, urban family average per capita
income was about $606, whereas, it was only $117 in the rural
areas. Moreover, in the urban areas, average income was growing
at five times that of the rural sector.
Second, it has meant that because Tibet's infrastructure
and investment have been largely urban focused, Tibetans in
rural areas have not been provided opportunities to learn
modern skills useful for employment in Tibet's modern urban
sector. This greatly encouraged the government to continue to
employ skilled migrants to implement urban investment programs.
Third, Tibetan entrepreneurs in urban areas have
experienced great difficulty in competing effectively against
the rapidly growing number of better funded, better managed,
and lower-cost Han enterprises. This competition from migrant
enterprises has included even some of the traditional Tibetan
artisan product sectors of the economy. So, we are seeing a
squeezing out of traditional Tibetan entrepreneur in the urban
areas due to the rapid growth and modernization taking place
there.
Fourth, there is also a growing influx of rural Tibetan
youth, into the urban areas looking for employment
opportunities, but without the skills needed to secure the jobs
that they are looking for. This increasing unemployment is
creating growing social problems, including crime and other
illegal activity.
The formal social and economic policies applicable to
Tibetans in rural areas of Tibet are commendable. They include
elimination of absolute poverty among most disadvantaged
populations; universal access to basic healthcare; in rural
areas, replacement of all 2-year community schools with 6-year
State primary schools, and by 2003, achievement of 6 years of
primary education for all rural primary school aged children;
introduction of vocational skills curricula in primary and
middle schools in rural areas; and by 2005, establishment of a
home in winter village areas for all nomads that do not have
them.
The difficulty is that there is not enough money to
implement these policies in a timely and comprehensive basis
More central government funds are required to upgrade rural
health and educational services and to greatly expand
vocational skills training for unemployed Tibetans both in
rural and urban areas. Unless they do, Tibetans will continue
to be marginalized rather than benefited by the continued
expansion of Tibet's market economy. Similarly, without
priority to increased local vocational skills training, migrant
labor will be required for the construction and operation of
the new railway from Qinghai to Lhasa, and with it, further
exacerbation of ethnic income disparities, and increased
marginalization of Tibetans in traditional economic pursuits.
To help compensate for this lopsided emphasis on investment
in urban areas, the TAR government has been encouraging outside
international bi-lateral and NGO [non-governmental
organization] agencies to get involved. In particular, they
have been encouraging them to assist into the rural sector,
focusing on strengthening basic health and education, but also
clean water supply and to some
extent, vocational skills training. Most of this activity by
outside donors located around main urban areas and in the
Qomolangha Nature Preserve along the Nepalese border. But some
organizations, like the Canadian CIDA [Canadian International
Development Agency] and our own Tibet Poverty Alleviation Fund,
have been encouraged to assist into closed areas of Lhoka and
Nagchu Prefectures.
I would like to relate a comment made to me in April 1998,
by Mr. Guo Jinlong, who is the present Tibet Autonomous Region
Party Secretary. At that time, when we were formulating our
program of assistance in Lhoka and Nagchu Prefectures, he
indicated to us his hope that we would focus on rural
activities that would help to bring Tibetans into the market
economy where they could benefit most from the economic reforms
and modernization taking place. He also indicated that whatever
we could do as an NGO to help benefit the traditional nomad
populations would be very much welcomed. He further indicated
that if we found ways to make progress in helping to bring
nomad populations into the modern sector and benefiting from
the economic reforms taking place, that the government would
try to expand upon our efforts.
I would like to just conclude by saying, that we, as well
as other NGOs, have found it possible to collaborate
effectively with the TAR government, at all levels to improve
basic health and other human services of benefit to Tibetan
communities. While we would like to see a reorientation of the
TAR policies to give relatively more emphasis to rural sector
activities that can help to improve Tibetan working and living
conditions, we believe it is now possible for NGOs to cooperate
successfully and help improve conditions for Tibetans.
We also believe that it is very important for there to be
stepped-up United States Government support to United States
NGOs prioritizing Tibetan human development. This will help to
signal the human development values and priorities that we, as
Americans, believe ought to be given higher priority in Tibet.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Holcombe appears in the
appendix.]
Mr. Wolf. Thank you all very much.
Each of us up here will have 5 minutes for quick questions,
and we encourage discussion and interaction among the three of
you.
Let me start out with a question for Mr. Holcombe regarding
your final comment. What would be the nature of additional
United States Government support and help for NGOs working in
the rural areas in Tibet?
Mr. Holcombe. In the health sector?
Mr. Wolf. Well, in health, or in any sector, economic
development, business development.
Mr. Holcombe. This is a complicated issue. In the education
sector, many rural communities youth still only have 2-year
community primary schools. Thus, for many Tibetan youth in
rural villages, that is all the formal education they ever get.
There is an important need for the government to successfully
implement its policy of introducing 6 years of compulsory
education at the primary level However, we also believe that
U.S. NGOs can help to reform the curriculum to include
vocational content that can help to prepare Tibetans for the
world of work. The NGO I established is working with the TAR
Education Bureau to introduce such reforms in 21 pilot counties
of Tibet.
In addition to that, I believe U.S. NGOs should give
priority to vocational skills training that can equip Tibetans
for jobs that require vocational and technical skills in rural
and urban areas. We were told by the TAR Poverty Alleviation
Office very recently that there is a government decision now
that where Tibetans are qualified for work in the construction
sector, they will be given priority over others. We believe
that U.S. NGOs can help to prepare Tibetans for available
construction sector jobs. One of our new programs will be
working with the Nagchu Poverty Alleviation Office to launch a
construction skills training program for Tibetans who will be
working in 10 rural counties.
In the health sector, there is a broad range of needs.
There is presently a network of township clinics,
backstopped by county level hospitals. These health facilities
are inadequately staffed and equipped U.S. NGOs can help with
training and upgrading the skills of local doctors to improve
the quality of health services they provide. Success in
improving the quality rural health services would also have the
effect of building greater confidence in the rural health
system, and increasing the utilization of available services.
United States NGOs can help expand Tibetan community access
to rural credit for income generating purposes. My NGO is
currently providing small loans to about 1,000 Tibetan
families. We find that after 4 years we have about a 95 percent
pay back on loans. This is a payback rate substantially higher
than the payback in the formal banking system catering more to
the urban commercial sector. We also believe that United States
NGOs can provide valuable technical and financial support to
Tibetan entrepreneurs and enterprises in rural and urban areas.
So there are a range of practical, economic, and social
development initiatives that can and should be promoted by
United States NGOs. I think United States government support to
United States NGOs can expand and enhance the value of United
States NGOs helping to improve working and living conditions
for Tibetans in Tibet. It can also help to project the kinds of
values and priorities that we think are important for Tibet.
Mr. Wolf. Increased support? Do you mean U.S. money to
NGOs?
Mr. Holcombe. Financial support through NGOs.
Mr. Wolf. Good. Bhuchung, please.
Mr. Tsering. In addition to what Mr. Holcombe mentioned,
the greatest problem that is in Tibet today is the economic
marginalization of the Tibetan people. In order to avert that
danger, I think it is imperative that the United States
encourage NGOs to support projects in Tibetan areas which
empower the Tibetan people at all levels. This can be done at
the same time as enabling the Tibetan people to preserve their
traditional handicrafts or other forms of production. Some NGOs
are already doing that in Tibetan areas and therefore, I think
whether it is Commerce or any other department which handles
that aspect of the issue, should be encouraged to take steps to
empower people economically.
Mr. Wolf. Thank you.
Mr. Sperling. I would just like to say that in some of the
literature that has come out, people have pointed to the
economic
disparities and have said, what you have in Tibet is not really
a national division. That is to say where Chinese are doing
better than Tibetans, or Chinese, including Han and/or Hui, are
doing better economically than Tibetans, it is an urban-rural
division, and, therefore, there is no national aspect to it. It
hardly matters though. The effect is the same and certainly the
perception on the part of Tibetans is the same. Mind you, there
are some Tibetans who are doing well or are doing better. But
by and large indeed, you do have this divide. Whether you want
to divide it along the rural-urban line, or along the Tibetan-
Chinese line, there is this perception that Tibetans are not
doing as well as they might be doing, and it has to do with
rule by China.
Mr. Wolf. Thank you. Next is John Foarde.
Mr. Foarde. I thank all three of you for sharing your
expertise with us this afternoon. I am going to reserve my
questions until later, because we have a number of colleagues
here that I am sure want to ask you some questions. And we have
very little time.
Mr. Wolf. Next is Steve Marshall.
Mr. Marshall. I have enjoyed this a lot, hearing three
rather distinctive viewpoints here. It sounds like we have got
basically two sides of this issue to deal with. One is quite
political, insofar as the United States would be concerned, and
is certainly grounded in this idea of nationalism. This is a
very thorny and difficult issue.
The other side is about what the United States can do for
97 percent of Tibetans who are still living in the PRC. Their
needs are much more immediate. They begin right now and their
continuation starts tomorrow. So, I would like to ask two
questions and see if we can get very quick ideas from you on
these two things.
On the political side, to follow up Elliot's idea, when the
Dalai Lama passes away, and if China were able to appoint a
replacement, would that indeed solve the problem for China?
On the development side, the question is: Is it a good idea
for Tibetans, particularly rural Tibetans, to learn the Chinese
language so that they can participate in the job market more
competitively? Whoever would like to reach for the mike first--
--
Mr. Holcombe. I would like to respond to the second
question. The language issue in Tibet is a tremendously
complicated and difficult one. In the rural areas, Tibetan
youth are going to primary school and learning the Tibetan
language. And they are generally being taught by Tibetan
teachers. Those that pass on to the middle school level begin
to get instruction in the Chinese language, and also
instruction of arithmetic and some basic science in the Chinese
language. Most Tibetans do not get beyond the middle school
level. If they do go on to the secondary level, then they are
confronted with a predominantly Chinese curriculum. At this
level Tibetan youth are at a distinct disadvantage in that they
must compete against Han youth for available secondary school
seats, and if
admitted, they must compete against Han youth in Chinese
speaking classes. Frequently, they get placed in slower,
inferior course streams within their classes because of their
language disadvantage.
Tibetan youth who want to get better skill qualifications
and better jobs, or who want to secure government jobs, must
master the Chinese language. So it is a dilemma for both the
government and Tibetans and I do not think there is any easy
answer to it.
Mr. Tsering. To answer the first question, I think it would
be foolish for the Chinese authorities to assume that when the
Dalai Lama is no longer there, the Tibetan issue will have been
solved. In fact, the issue might deteriorate. The only reason
why the Tibetan issue has become so peaceful and non-violent so
far is the Dalai Lama's commitment to non-violence as a way and
means of achieving a Tibetan political solution. Tibetans are
only human beings. And there is already frustration building up
inside Tibet. And when the Dalai Lama is no longer there to
console the Tibetan people, they might as well take other paths
which might increase the tension in the area as a whole. If you
look at the map of Central Asia, tension in Tibet would have
implications in other areas as well.
The second question in terms of learning Chinese language
in rural areas, I think the short answer is, that if this is
done, not at the cost of learning Tibetan, then it is a
political reality today that if Tibetans have to survive, they
have to learn Chinese. Tibetans in exile learn three languages,
so Tibetans should be capable of learning Chinese language, if
they are given equal opportunities.
Mr. Wolf. Thank you. Jennifer Goedke works for
Representative Marcy Kaptur.
Ms. Goedke. My question is going to be regarding,
especially--Mr. Tsering, in your testimony you referred to the
release of prisoners. As a commission, we have been charged
with establishing a list of political prisoners. In your
experience, how helpful are these lists? And how are they best
utilized? Have you found some of these lists to be helpful in
some of the releases you referred to in your testimony, or even
in people that you are working toward releasing now?
Mr. Tsering. Generally, anything that is done by the
outside world, including the United States Government, whether
it is raising the political prisoner issue or the Tibetan issue
as a whole is helpful. Having said that, I think the Chinese
Government unfortunately does not play by the same rules that
the United States tries to play. Therefore, the Chinese look at
their interests. As I mentioned earlier, the Tibetan political
prisoners who were released have been released, not because the
Chinese felt that that was their right, but because they
thought they would win the support of other governments, like
the United States, on this. So I think it is useful to keep
account of the number of prisoners the Chinese Government is
holding. It is useful for letting the Tibetan people know that
the outside world cares about them.
Ms. Goedke. Would anyone else like to speak to that?
Thank you.
Mr. Wolf. Thank you. Next is Karin Finkler, who works for
Congressman Joe Pitts.
Ms. Finkler. Thank you, Dr. Sperling. If you would like to
ahead and finish the statement that you wanted to make before,
that would be helpful. And also if you could address--you
mentioned that the United States needs to, in its policies,
address the real facts about Tibet. If you could clarify that
in terms of specific policies that you would recommend, that
would be helpful.
Mr. Sperling. Well, that last part, of course, is a most
difficult task, what to do in this situation--if I might, let
me get back to the other two questions. I appreciate your
asking me to finish with them. The language issue is
particularly complex. China publishes a tremendous amount of
material in Tibetan. This is quite laudatory. They publish old
classical Tibetan books, they have magazines; they have
newspapers. There is a lot going on in terms of Tibetan
publishing. But--and I always say this--the crux of the matter
is, what is the viability of the Tibetan language day-to-day?
As an academic, as a scholar, of course, I am thrilled to see
all of this material in Tibetan to see texts that I can use.
But until Tibetan is the administrative language, until it is
the day-to-day language of administration and of commerce, it
is endangered. And I say this with trepidation. By the way,
there has been another announcement recently, that cadres in
Tibet should learn the Tibetan language. But the fate of such
sentiments and announcements remains to be seen.
With the economic development that we see, particularly
with the proposed rail link between the Tibetan capital and
Golmud and the influx of tremendous numbers of people from
China proper, the Tibetan language is going to be under serious
pressure.
Now as for the question about the Dalai Lama: the fact of
the matter is--and I really don't even think it is conjecture
at this point--China's policy is to wait for the Dalai Lama to
die. The question was, would this be effective? I do not think
so. But China obviously does. They think this will effectively
put an end to the Tibetan issue. Of course, over the years,
they have tended to personalize the Tibetan issue. They have
often treated the Tibetan issue as if it were simply a question
between the Dalai Lama and the Chinese Government. And the fact
of the matter is that I do not think this is going to end this
issue. It is difficult to say what is going to happen, if
Tibetan nationalism becomes more fragmented, which is a
possibility, unfocused and perhaps unpredictable; I do not
know.
Policy recommendations. This is a very tricky subject. As I
think everybody here knows, the United States does not
recognize Tibet as an independent country. The Dalai Lama does
not advocate that Tibet be an independent country. But just
about all of the dissidents and activists inside Tibet, and I
would say, most of them outside Tibet are advocating Tibetan
independence. It often comes down to the United States not
advocating Tibetan independence which is outside the pale as
far as United States foreign policy is concerned. But what does
one do with a Chinese Government that consistently and harshly
represses dissent on this issue? It is a very tricky and
complex issue.
If we press China to respect human rights, that includes
freedom of expression. It includes the expression of dissenting
political opinions, particularly on the status of Tibet. And if
you have free dissent, public meetings, circulation of
materials, you are going to have increased sentiment and
increased pressure, along these lines. Do you then say, well,
we understand that this is something that China does not want.
And even though advocacy is non-violent, we agree that it
should be suppressed and that people should be locked up for
it. It is a conundrum. I am not giving you an answer--clear-cut
steps, one, two, and three, but at least we should understand
what the situation is. If you press China for respect for human
rights, including freedom of expression, you have to understand
you are also going to be asking them to respect the right of
Tibetans to express themselves on Tibetan independence and that
will have an effect.
I should also add that we often take the view in the United
States that what Tibet needs is cultural preservation and
material development; that if Tibet develops materially, then
that will resolve the issue. But again, you are dealing with a
nationalist question. It is emotional. If you look at the
dynamics in other areas, in Eastern Europe, for instance. The
fact of the matter is, that when an authoritarian government
begins to liberalize, often it is then, as conditions improve
politically and materially, that people turn themselves to
political desires, and political activism.
Mr. Wolf. Next is Matt Tuchow with Congressman Sander
Levin.
Mr. Tuchow. My question is also about policy
recommendations. I want to ask all the panelists, or at least
those who have not spoken to this yet. What specifically do you
recommend that we, the Commission, recommend to Congress and
the Executive Branch, to do about the issues and the problems
that you have identified? That is a broad area and I want to
give you leeway to respond to that. But a more specific
question relating to this would be, if Han immigration is
agreed by all of you to be of singularly strong impact in the
Tibetan areas, what antidote is there for this in terms of law
and policy? But answer either the broad or the specific or
both.
Mr. Holcombe. Because local ethnic populations, including
Tibetans, lack the skills necessary to secure employment in
major construction, transport or mining activities, it would be
necessary to utilize the skills of Han people for the
construction and operation of the large investment projects.
Only with a major commitment to employable skills training for
local ethnic minorities, backed by legislation giving priority
to the employment of local ethnic minority people when they had
the requisite skills, would it be possible to reverse the
present Han migration patterns found in Tibet and other western
regions.
From a practical standpoint, what the United States
Government can do is support U.S. NGOs active in these western
regions, which are concerned about the development and welfare
of ethnic minorities, and are in a position to help provide the
types of training that will enable ethnic minorities to qualify
for employment on major investment and construction projects
that would otherwise require outside migrants. U.S. NGOs can
help to highlight the particular beneficial types of training
initiatives and demonstrate that they can, at the same time,
bring Tibetans and other ethnic minority populations into
mainstream economic life.
Mr. Tsering. Two points. The United States at the political
level should discourage the Chinese Government at every
instance in which they take steps to send Chinese people to
Tibet in different ways. At the economic level, I think maybe
the Commerce Department is the right department who should look
at ways to discourage being involved in projects in Tibetan
areas which contribute to the migration of Chinese. In the
past, there was the instance of the World Bank investment, and
now there is the railroad. There are gas pipelines and other
activities which the corporate world looks to in Tibet.
Mr. Sperling. I would just point out that China views this
economic development, this integration within the great Western
Development scheme, as something that, in addition to being
part of the general development of the western areas of the
PRC, will by drawing Tibet into the Chinese economy, reduce
instability. Those things, which, well-intentioned as they are,
seem to be part of a separate Tibetan economy, would be looked
upon, I think, without great favor. The whole point is to
integrate Tibet into the Chinese economy, and, hence, too, you
are going to have an increasing influx of people from Chinese
interior.
Mr. Wolf. Thank you. Arlan Fuller, who is with Congressman
Sherrod Brown.
Mr. Fuller. The question is actually to the three of you on
the issue of Tibetans in exile, specifically in Nepal.
It seems from what I have been hearing in Nepal with the
Maoist insurgency, that the conditions for refugees have been
increasingly more inhospitable. I was wondering if the three of
you might be able to enlighten us a bit on what the conditions
are right now for refugees in Nepal and India, and so forth.
Mr. Tsering. The situation of Tibetans in Nepal,
particularly the newest comers who escaped from Tibet through
Nepal, was precarious in the past. But it has become more so in
recent times because the Nepalese Government has been cracking
down on Maoist insurgency. And the Chinese Government seems to
be taking advantage of that to pressure the Nepalese to take
action on Tibetans. One indication of this is that last year,
and the year before, there was a great difference in the number
of Tibetans coming out, escaping out through Nepal.
Certainly, the Nepalese Government, because it seems to be
walking a tight political rope, bowed to the pressure of the
Chinese Government so that it deprived the Tibetan people,
newcomers as well as the resident Tibetan refugees, basic
political rights, rights such as the right to assembly, the
right of freedom of speech, etc. Of course we understand the
Nepalese Governments situation, but there are ways that the
Nepalese Government can protect and respect the rights of the
Tibetan people without facing the wrath of the Chinese
Government. That is something which we feel ought to be done.
For your information, The International Campaign for Tibet
has done a report on the Tibetan refugees in Nepal, which is
coming out soon.
Mr. Sperling. I would simply point out that there has been
a lot of--and I phrase this mildly--unpleasantness along the
border between Tibet and Nepal over the years, particularly
with local Nepalese authorities along the border, who have in
some ways abused Tibetan refugees and in some instances sent
them back. So it has always been somewhat difficult before
Tibetans finally managed to get down to Kathmandu.
As far as the Maoist insurgency goes, I think that is
something which is quite frightening to Tibetans in Nepal, but
it is also frightening to Nepalese.
Mr. Holcombe. Nepalese that I have met in Lhasa are very
worried about this situation and see this as an impending
national crisis, one that goes far broader and deeper than just
the Tibetan communities there. It is a very serious situation,
whose outcome is by no means certain.
Mr. Wolf. Thanks. Last is Dave Dettoni, with Congressman
Frank Wolf.
Mr. Dettoni. Thanks, Ira. How many Buddhist monks and nuns
are imprisoned in Tibet? Does anybody know?
Mr. Tsering. Amnesty International came out with a report
this year in which they documented 250 political prisoners.
Most of them are monks and nuns. As for specifics, it is very
difficult to say. At the height, it ranged in the several
thousands, but maybe lately, people see the number of prisoners
have been decreasing.
Mr. Dettoni. Why is it difficult to determine who is in
prison and who is not?
Mr. Tsering. I think, first of all, it is the basic
structure of the system in China. It is a communist system
where the rights of the people are, to say the least, not
respected. So it is difficult to say. And also, the Chinese
judicial system, there is a fine line between who is detained,
who is under observation and who is under investigation. This
puts us in a difficult situation.
Mr. Dettoni. My understanding is that a number of prisoners
were in prison during the reign of Hu Jintao. Are there still
Tibetan political prisoners and Buddhist monks and nuns who
were arrested and put in prison when Hu Jintao was Governor?
Mr. Tsering. I think our investigation shows that there
were, I think, 25 political prisoners who are still in prison.
Mr. Dettoni. So how long have they been in prison?
Mr. Tsering. We are talking about the period from 1989 to
1993.
Mr. Dettoni. These are monks and nuns?
Mr. Tsering. I would not say that they all are monks and
nuns.
Mr. Dettoni. So would it be fair to say that these people
are in prison for practicing their faith?
Mr. Tsering. Sure. They were trying to preserve their basic
religious and cultural identity.
Mr. Dettoni. That is a long time to be in prison.
That being said, about Hu Jintao, and these folks still
being in prison, how do you think Tibet will be treated and
what is your prognosis for Tibet if Hu Jintao climbs the next
step in the ladder of politics in China?
Mr. Tsering. That is a question which many of us are still
trying to tackle. But one thing is for sure. He may not be
better than any of the past leaders, but what he will have is
direct experience of dealing with the Tibetans. And he has this
opportunity. If he wants to do something better for the
Tibetans, he has the opportunity, because he knows the Tibetan
issue better than any of the past central leaders. On the other
hand, if he wants to strike down heavily on the Tibetans, he
can do that because he also knows the Tibetans better, and how
to deal with them.
Mr. Dettoni. This question has come up a couple of times
today and in previous hearings as well. What will be the best
way to help promote human rights and religious freedom in China
and Tibet when Hu Jintao takes office? Given his knowledge of
Tibet, what would be some of the more effective things this
Commission can do to help promote change in Tibet for human
rights and religious freedom?
Mr. Tsering. I think one thing that the United States
Government, including Congress and the Administration, is to
continually put the spotlight on China's attitude in Tibet.
This is important. We at the International Campaign for
Tibet, do not ask the government to isolate China. The
government should engage with China. But at the same time, even
as they engage in trade, or any other aspect of life, they
should not hesitate in raising issues of political freedom,
human rights, issues of religious freedom, as strongly as they
raise issues of bilateral trade. As soon as China realizes that
they cannot avert the issues of human rights, they cannot avert
the issue of religious freedom, then they will be forced to do
something about it.
I want to quote Secretary of State Colin Powell. He dealt
with this issue and he said, ``It is a difficult situation
right now with the Chinese sending more and more Han Chinese to
settle in Tibet, which seems to be a policy that might well
destroy Tibet. I think we have to reenergize our discussions
with the Chinese to let them know that this is another example
of the kind of behavior that will affect our entire
relationship, and to show our interest and solidarity with the
Dalai Lama and the people of Tibet.'' If the Chinese get this
message strongly and consistently, they will be forced to do
something.
Mr. Dettoni. Would it be helpful if top United States trade
negotiators and top U.S. Commerce Department people, USTR or
American businessmen, raise specific cases of prisoners and
religious freedom and human rights with their Chinese
counterparts?
Mr. Tsering. I do not know if it will be helpful in
releasing the prisoners, but it will be helpful in sending that
message to the Chinese Government that they cannot ignore these
aspects of the issues.
Mr. Wolf. OK. Thanks. We are not going to have time to go
for a second round, so if you have some final comments, or
something you want to reiterate, do that over the next few
minutes. Bhuchung.
Mr. Tsering. Some people in the business world tend to
project all Tibetans as being against business dealings with
China and try to make that a big case when we talk about
investment in China, etc. The thing to realize, as I mentioned
earlier, we encourage governments to be dealing with China, but
at the same time we encourage them to talk strongly about the
human rights aspects in Tibet. This is important if at all, the
Chinese are going to change their policy on Tibet. We are
living in what is called a globalized world and if the trade
relationship can somehow be connected with empowering of the
Tibetan people, and the changing of the Tibetan people's human
rights situation, only then can something be effective.
Mr. Wolf. Thank you. Elliot.
Mr. Sperling. I would address two points. One, I would
address the point about raising the issue with China. I would
simply point out that the United States does have a track
record, particularly in the old days before PNTR [Permanent
Normal Trade Relations] was PNTR, when it was MFN [Most-Favored
Nation], of constantly threatening to do things and then
stepping back. I think that has created an environment in which
many of our threats are taken with a grain of salt,
particularly when dealings with companies like Boeing and such
enterprises are put on the block.
The other thing I would point out is with regard to this
comment about Buddhists practicing their faith and being put in
prison for practicing their faith. I think that has to be
nuanced. It is not as if Tibetans simply performing very simple
Buddhist ceremonies and Buddhist practices are going to be
imprisoned. China does allow freedom of religion. But when it
perceives state interest to be at issue, it clamps down. And
that includes allegiance to the Dalai Lama, and not recognizing
the publicly disputed Panchen Lama, whom I mentioned in my
statement. These are basic areas of course, in which you could
say religion is at issue. The other thing that I would point
out to you is that religion in Tibet is not simply religion. It
is a marker of Tibetan nationalism. I have used this term quite
a bit. Much as the Catholicism in Poland differentiated Poles
from Russians who were either Orthodox or Marxist, Tibetan
Buddhism really differentiates Tibetans from Chinese. It is a
marker of Tibetan nationalism. And for many Tibetans who are
not in the clergy, the clergy embodies a degree of Tibetaness.
So there are a lot of factors involved in this beyond simple
religious practice.
Mr. Holcombe. Yes. I will very briefly make three points.
In terms of the question of Hu Jintao, I think we are going to
see a continuity of policy in Tibet. It is not going to vary
because of new leadership in Beijing. We are going to see a
continuing of the present economic reforms, and opening up,
including policies that encourage outside migrants to go to
Tibet to secure employment in the public and private sectors.
My second point is that for some time China has encouraged
overseas Chinese to come back, and invest in China. This has
been mutually beneficial to the investor and to China. The
United States should urge China to allow overseas Tibetans to
return and contribute to the economic and social development of
Tibet. Some have in fact returned, and others should be
encouraged to return in larger numbers to invest in ways that
contribute to the further employment and welfare of Tibetan
people.
My third point is that it is very important that we, as
Americans, find every possible way to project our human
development values in Tibet. Even though it is only in limited
ways that we can do it, it is important nevertheless, to have
organizations working inside Tibet and doing the kinds of
things that are empowering Tibetans to take more control over
their lives, to be more successful and to improve their living
standards.
Mr. Wolf. Thank you all very much. This has been a big help
to all of us. It will be a major contribution to the report
that the commissioners will be presenting in early October. We
thank you, and we will move on to the next panel.
As we move on, the two participants in the second panel are
Dr. Dolkun Kamberi, who is director of the Uighur Language
Service at Radio Free Asia, and Dr. Justin Rudelson, who is the
executive director of the Institute for Global Chinese Affairs
at the University of Maryland. Since you were both here, I do
not have to explain how the process works. Dolkun, would you
start, please?
STATEMENT OF DOLKUN KAMBERI, DIRECTOR OF UIGHUR LANGUAGE
SERVICE FOR RADIO FREE ASIA
Mr. Kamberi. Thank you for inviting me here today to
present on the subject of Uighurs and Uighur identity. I have
divided my research presentation into nine different sections.
That includes: introduction, Uighurs, linguistic identity of
Uighurs, cultural identity of Uighurs, artistic identity of
Uighurs, musical identity of Uighurs, historical identity of
Uighurs, regional identity of Uighurs and conclusion. It is
very difficult for me to draw a complete picture on the subject
within 10 minutes; I will do my best.
The basic meaning of the name Uighur is ``unity.'' But it
may also be translated as ``union,'' ``coalition'' or
``federation.'' The name appeared first in records of the
Orkhun Kok Turk inscriptions and in early Uighur. Later forms
of the name can be found in medieval Uighur, Manichaean, and
Sogdian scripts, and the Arabic script of the Uighur Qarakhanid
and Chaghatay periods. Apart from these Central Asian forms,
the name can be found in different periods and diverse texts in
Chinese, appearing in more than 100 translation forms.
About early Uighur culture and its history, kingdom
Professor Denis Sinor wrote,
The kingdom of Khocho [Idiqut Uighur Kingdom], ruled by the
Turkic Uighurs, was multiracial, multilingual and it permitted
the peaceful coexistence of many religions. It enjoyed a living
standard unparalleled in medieval Central Eurasia. Among the
non-Muslim Turkic peoples, none has reached the degree of
civilization attained by the Uighurs, and they developed a
culture in many respects more sophisticated than that of most
Muslim Turks. In the visual arts, they continued tradition,
non-Turkic in origin, of which they maintained very high
standards. The script they used gained widespread acceptance
both to the east and the west. The Uighurs undoubtedly wrote
one of the brighter chapters of Central Eurasian history.
The German archaeologist, A. Von Le Coq, cut off many wall
paintings, which were shipped back in several hundred cases to
Berlin. The British archaeologist, Aurel Stein, who visited
Bezeklik at the end of 1914, indicated that, in terms of
richness and artistry, no other finds from similar sites in the
Turpan Basin can match those of Bezeklik, which parallel the
rich ancient paintings of the Dunhuang ``Thousand Buddha''
caves. Professor Albert Grunwedel writes in a letter dated
April 2, 1906, ``For years I have been endeavoring to find a
credible thesis for the development of Buddhist art, and
primarily to trace the ancient route by which the art of
imperial Rome, etc., reached the Far East. What I have seen
here goes beyond my wildest dreams. If only I had hands enough
to copy it all. For here in the Kizil are about 300 caves, all
containing frescoes, some of them very old and fine.
Based on history, literature, religion, content, and script
of Uighur linguistic material, I have classified Uighur
language into five different periods: The first is the pre-
historical Uighur language. Before the 6th CE, no written
material in Uighur has been found so far, but language came to
us throughout Uighur oral literature, idiom, idiomatic phrase,
folk story, folk song, folk literature, and ancient mythology
and lands in other language records.
The second period is the ancient Uighur language from the
6th century to the 10th century CE, mostly pre-Islamic
literatures, which had influence from non-Altaic language.
The third period is the medieval Uighur language from the
10th century to the 15th century CE. There is mostly Islamic
literature, which got strong influence from Arabic and Persian
languages.
The fourth period is the contemporary Uighur language
period from the 16th century to the end of the 19th century CE.
Elishir Nawayi's works are the main representative of the era.
The fifth period is the modern Uighur language period from
the end of the 19th century to the present.
Modern Uighur language belongs to the Ural-Altaic language
family, Turkic language group of the eastern branch. Among the
major six Turkic languages, Turkish and Azeri languages are
very close. Kazakh and Kyrgyz languages are closely related,
and Uighur and Uzbek languages are coupled. They can
communicate with each other on simple subjects without learning
the other language. The modern Uighur language has two major
dialects: southern and northern. According to the Chinese 2000
official census, the population of Uighur native speakers is
near 9 million. But independent sources claim the Uighur
population is about 16
million. In the past 10 years, Chinese population in the region
increased almost 32 percent. In 1949, the Uighur population
constituted more than 90 percent and the Han Chinese population
comprised 5 percent of the total population of the Uighur land.
The Chinese population increased about 500 percent from the
original 5 percent of the total population of the Uighur land
in the year 2000.
Among the states of the Central Asian regions currently,
the stateless Uighurs historically formed the leading group of
the region for centuries. They possessed a rich literary art,
strong economy and military, the ability to conduct state
affairs and to help others to solve different problems. They
showed generosity and offered their hospitality across time.
Uighurs and their ancestors built their reign under the rule of
the Hun, 2nd BCE to 2nd CE, the Jurjan, 3rd CE to 5th CE and
the Turk Empires 522 CE to 744 CE. Uighurs also established
their own states throughout history. Their states include the
Uighur Ali, 744 CE to 840 CE, the Idiqut Uighur 840 CE to 1250
CE, the Uighur Qarakhan 10th CE to 13th CE, the Uighur
Chaghatay, 13th to 16th CE, the Yarkant Uighur Khanate 1514 to
1678, the Qumul and Turpan Uighur Baks from the end of the 17th
CE to beginning of the 19th CE, and finally the Yakup Bak, 1820
to 1877, which lasted until Qing's invasion. Uighurs reclaimed
Uighur land as the Republic of Eastern Turkestan in 1933 and
the Eastern Turkestan Republic in 1944 through 1949.
The president of Eastern Turkestan Alihan Ture was called
back by Stalin in 1946 to Russia, and lived in Tashkent until
1976. His successor Ahmatjan Qasim, Eastern Turkestan army
Chief General Isaqbeg, deputy army chief general, Dalilkan
Sugurbayev, a member of Eastern Turkestan Central Government
Abdukerim Abbasov, died in a mysterious plane crash on their
way to Beijing on August 22, 1949. Abduruf Mahsum, the General
Secretary of the State of the Eastern Turkestan Republic, is
still alive in Almaty, Kazakhstan. He is 88 years old. I met
him last year. From 1946 to 1949, Russia and China engaged in
many governmental structure reforms in the Uighur land. During
the reforms, both Russian and Chinese Government
representatives promised again and again to the Uighurs that
the presence of the Chinese army in the Uighur land is to
promote democratization, free elections and high autonomy, to
help build the new Xinjiang, even independence for Uighur in
the future; as Zhang Zhizhong promised at the summit of Chinese
Nationalists, Communist and Uighurs in Urumqi in 1946.
After 1950, several times the Communist revolutionary
moment in China has touched almost every aspect of traditional
culture, especially crucial for Uighur land during the Cultural
Revolution. The revolutionists found that every aspect of
culture in Uighur land was different from that of China. That
included languages, writing systems, the arts, literature,
ideas, values, attitudes, history, religion, customs, music,
dance, songs, the way that people think, even the features of
people, their clothes, house decoration, as well as food and
the like.
After September 11, China increased Chinese military at the
Central Asian borders, and they sent more armed police and non-
uniformed security forces into the big cities of Uighur land to
control Uighur people, intensifying already high tensions.
Recently, Chinese authorities have stepped up the ``Strike
Hard'' campaign against Uighur dissidents. According to an
Amnesty International report, which was released in 1999 and
recently, the Uighur region is the only region of China where
political and religious prisoners have been executed in recent
years. The Chinese Government has also put tremendous pressure
on Central Asian countries such as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and
Uzbekistan, not to support Uighur political activists or harbor
Uighur dissidents. They are pressuring Central Asian
governments and Pakistan to return Uighur dissidents to China
with accusations of terrorism.
The Chinese Government simply labeled Uighurs as terrorists
and tried to condemn two contemporary Eastern Turkestan
republics established during the 1930s and 1940s as the origin
of terrorists. As we know, the concept and terms of
``terrorism'' and
``terrorist'' do not exist in Uighur general knowledge and in
their language throughout history. Modern Uighurs use loaned
words directly borrowed from English terminology for these
notions.
The government-owned Kashgar Uighur publishing house burned
128 copies of ``A Brief History of the Huns,'' and ``Ancient
Uighur Literature,'' which officials view as fermenting
separatism. It also burned 32,000 copies of ``Ancient Uighur
Craftsmanship,'' also regarded as promoting separatist
religious beliefs, according to sources in Kashgar. ``Burning
Uighur books is like burning the Uighur people. Even under the
Chinese constitution, these Uighur books should be protected as
part of the Uighur cultural heritage,'' said one local Uighur.
According to the official Kashgar Daily, the Kashgar Uighur
Publishing House has also censored more than 330 books and
stopped publication of other volumes. Another Uighur
intellectual sadly indicated, ``Burning those Uighur books
recalls images of Hitler and Chairman Mao's campaign during the
Chinese Cultural Revolution.''
It is time for the United States Government to pay more
attention to the seriousness of the political, economic,
cultural, and
religious discrimination and abuses facing the Uighurs and the
Tibetans. Widespread abuses of human rights, unequal wealth
distribution, economic, ideological, cultural exploitation and
joblessness are affecting almost every family of near ten
million Uighurs in China. Saving the Uighur culture is like
saving our own culture. I ask of you, the U.S. Government, to
establish a coordinator in the U.S. State Department on Uighur
issues to help consult the U.S. Government on policymaking
decisions regarding Central Asia and China. The White House
Administration should consider opening a United States
Consulate in Urumqi. The State Department should establish an
immigration quota to help Uighur refugees hiding out in Central
Asia and surrounding countries; also establish an academic
research institution focusing on Silk Road civilization, and
create more educational opportunities in the United States for
Uighur youth. The United States Government should coordinate
with the United Nations and NGOs to promote human rights and
religious freedom for Uighurs. The United States should also
put stronger pressure on China to release Uighur businesswoman,
Rebiya Kadeer, and periodically, send Congressional
delegations, including Uighur dissidents, to Uighur land to
examine the state of human rights and religious freedom in the
Uighur Autonomous Region.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kamberi appears in the
appendix.]
Mr. Wolf. Thank you. Justin.
STATEMENT OF JUSTIN RUDELSON, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, UNIVERSITY OF
MARYLAND INSTITUTE FOR GLOBAL
CHINESE AFFAIRS
Mr. Rudelson. I would like to thank the Commission for
inviting me and thank Anne Tsai, who made it possible for both
of us to be here.
I have been working on Xinjiang issues for the last 20
years. My initial mentor was Louis L'Amour, the western writer,
who loved this area. He, I think, would be very proud that I am
here speaking.
China claims Xinjiang to be the front line in its war
against international terrorism, maintaining that Xinjiang
harbors Uighur Muslim extremists intent on overthrowing Chinese
rule with the support of bin Laden's terrorist network. China
is indeed invoking bin Laden's name to justify its crackdowns
on the Uighurs and Islam that have been going on with a
vengeance in Xinjiang since at least 1990. In Beijing's view,
Xinjiang has a greater potential than all other regions of
China to cause upheaval, something which could bring
instability to Tibet, Hong Kong, and Taiwan.
While Uighur militants have carried out several anti-
government bombings over the past 20 years, Beijing's labeling
the Uighurs as terrorists with connection to the Taliban, al
Qaeda and bin Laden is, frankly, a terrifying appeal to United
States anti-terrorism sympathies. There is evidence of only 13
Uighurs involved with Taliban fighters, and we do not know how
many of these come from the Uighur exile community in Pakistan
that left Xinjiang in the 1930s. To be fair, China is in a no-
win situation. No matter what it does to develop Xinjiang, many
Uighurs will see it as part of China's colonial domination.
They view each discovery of oil as leading to Uighur wealth
being stolen from them. Each new road facilitates Han Chinese
immigration to the region, that will essentially make them a
minority in their own autonomous region.
Beijing uses Western-style affirmative action economic
rewards mixed with political and military crackdowns to
undermine Uighur calls for independence and solve Xinjiang's
problems. As part of China's ``manifest destiny,'' Beijing is
fulfilling its responsibility to modernize Xinjiang, and,
economically, Xinjiang has thrived. In 1991, Central Asian
independence had very little impact on people in Xinjiang,
because most recognized then and now that Xinjiang is
economically a lot better off than Central Asia.
Jiang Zemin's regime has arguably delivered China's most
stable decade in the last 150 years. However, the experimental
nature of Chinese development in Xinjiang opens it to enormous
risks. For example, Beijing is connecting Xinjiang to Central
Asia's new trade, rail, and road links with Kazakhstan and
Tajikistan. But these very openings are splitting the Uighur
Nation apart--and I will talk about this in questions if there
are any questions--and exposing Xinjiang directly to Islamic
militants and drug trafficking from Central Asia. In 1999,
China completed the railway that connects Urumqi to Kashgar to
assist its economic boom. Militant Uighurs are certain to
accelerate violent action against the large number of Han
immigrants who are settling in this traditional Uighur area as
well as against the trains that carry them.
Uighur resistance to Beijing takes many forms. In the oasis
villages, many Uighurs participate in the revival of Islam and
Sufism. Only a very few Uighurs have turned to militancy. And
almost all of these militants are Uighur secular nationalists.
They are seeking independence from China, whose struggle is not
connected with Islam.
As Dr. Kamberi mentioned, in the mid-1990s, Beijing
unleashed a series of police crackdowns called yan da, or
``Strike Hard,'' against what it called ``illegal religious
activities and splittism,'' that equated Islam with subversion.
Two months after the first Shanghai Five meeting in 1996, an
alliance that has given China extreme latitude to crack down on
Xinjiang's Uighurs, China launched ``Strike Hard'' crackdowns
against Uighur ``separatism'' that initiated a tragic cycle of
Uighur anti-government resistance alternating with harsh police
retaliation that continues today. According to Amnesty
International, since 1996, one Uighur has been executed in
Xinjiang an average of every 4 days. Few Western countries have
voiced concern.
By clamping down on all Islamic practices as fundamentalist
or potentially militant, China provides no moderate alternative
for Islamic education. And I see the possibility here for an
alternative use of Islamic education being very positive. This
current policy only produces greater militancy among China's
Muslim population. For example, in 1997, Uighur students in
Yili, the most secular region of Xinjiang, launched a grass-
roots campaign against alcohol. Alcohol addiction is destroying
the Uighur people, much as it has our own Native American
peoples. Uighur students developed their health campaign
against alcohol to encourage liquor stores to diminish their
sales and to get Uighurs to limit consumption. The government
saw the campaign as motivated by fundamentalist Islam. Over
5,000 students protested against government attempts to end the
campaign, and in the ensuing clashes between police and
students an estimated 300 Uighurs were killed.
Besides alcohol, HIV/AIDS has brought the most devastating
threat to Uighur survival as a people. The HIV/AIDS epidemic in
Xinjiang is developing into a significant geopolitical problem
that warrants close attention from the United States. Heroin
started coming into Xinjiang in 1994 from Burma. Within a
drastically short time, Xinjiang has emerged as China's most
seriously affected region and the Uighurs are the most affected
of all of China's peoples. Most of the Uighur HIV sufferers are
intravenous drug users. Most addicts live underground to evade
police detection. In Xinjiang, there are no anti-retroviral
drugs available. The Uighurs face an epidemic chain of
infection, devastation, and disintegration as the number of new
HIV cases grows exponentially each year. Testing is
prohibitively expensive. There are no hospitals in Xinjiang
prepared to treat patients with full-blown AIDS. This
information is collected from the Johns Hopkins University,
which has an HIV station in Urumqi.
Although international teams are working in Xinjiang, the
programs are limited in scope, with a lack of sharing of
information among the various organizations. Such coordination
is crucial to prepare for the rising numbers of Uighur patients
as they develop full-blown AIDS, and as Uighur disaffection and
anger mounts as the AIDS toll climbs. Young Uighurs infected
with HIV/AIDS will feel desperate, enough perhaps to strike out
at Han and government targets as suicide bombers. To deal with
the AIDS nightmare in Xinjiang, China needs to partner with
international organizations to reduce opium production in Burma
and Afghanistan. So far, the entire supply of heroin entering
Xinjiang is from Burma. If China cannot keep Afghan heroin from
entering Xinjiang under the Karzai regime, it will be
catastrophic for the Uighurs.
The HIV/AIDS epidemic in Xinjiang is more of a security
concern than a humanitarian one, warranting immediate attention
from the United States and its allies. The epidemic will
radically affect China's national security and stability.
Xinjiang's HIV/AIDS crisis, when put within the context of the
regional HIV/AIDS epidemic affecting China, Russia, India,
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, and the Central Asian nations,
starkly reveals that Xinjiang and the entire geopolitical
region face a security crisis of the gravest proportions. In
South Africa, where the AIDS trajectory has reached its most
extreme extent, the military currently has an HIV infection
rate of over 90 percent, mainly spread by contact with
prostitutes. As the armed forces are one of the most at-risk
segments of society for HIV, it is predicted that the
militaries of all the countries in this region, including
China's, will be profoundly affected within 5 to 10 years by
HIV infection. I am not just speaking of Uighurs here.
Professor Sperling and others spoke about the Northwest
Development Project. Ethnic Han coming to this region, such as
truck
drivers, unmarried pioneers, soldiers, prostitutes, and
government officials are all high-risk vectors for the spread
of HIV/AIDS. Ethnic Han, although the government might see this
as a Uighur disease in Xinjiang, will also be severely
affected.
Economically, the treatment of opportunistic diseases
associated with HIV/AIDS, such as tuberculosis and sexually-
transmitted diseases, are sure to wipe out most, if not all, of
the monetary gains that Chinese development will bring to
Xinjiang. Moreover, Xinjiang's health system will be too
financially devastated to react to patients with full-blown
AIDS, a situation that is certain to provoke rioting and
militant action against a Chinese Government seen to be
heartlessly unresponsive.
In order to stem such rioting and militancy, the
cooperation in combating terrorism developed between China and
the United States in the wake of the September 11 tragedy must
be extended beyond anti-terrorism to include peacemaking,
regional development, and the struggle against the HIV/AIDS
epidemic. An important step toward this would be for the United
States and its allies to invite China as an observer to G-8
meetings and eventually invite it to join the G-9. I was just
at a meeting with the NATO School in Germany and we discussed
China's joining of NATO in the next 10 years, like Russia. A
Western embrace of China is the only way to develop a long-term
and consistent overall strategy to prevent the further
alienation of the Uighurs and the Turkic Muslim peoples of
Central Asia.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rudelson appears in the
appendix.]
Mr. Wolf. Thanks very much. I will start. One issue that
neither of you really touched on is the practice of religion in
Xinjiang. On the trip that some of us made several weeks ago,
the theme came through repeatedly that nationalism and the
practice of religion must be one in the same. Could you comment
on that and the linkage between the practice of Islam and
splittism as defined by the authorities and what the
implications of that are?
Mr. Rudelson. The fear that the Chinese Government has is
that Islam, essentially, causes Uighurs to be insulated and
withdrawn among themselves and not participate within the
Chinese state. And to a large extent, this is true. The
government in 1985 allowed Uighurs to start practicing Islam to
a very large extent and allowed mosque construction. I did my
anthropological field work in an oasis called Turpan. There
were over 3,000 mosques built in a period of about 5 years. So
the government did not really see Islam as a threat until
Tiananmen in 1989, and started to retract. Just as in Tibet,
where religion is seen as a marker of identity, for many
Uighurs, it is the same, especially Uighurs in the oases. Many
Uighur intellectuals and scholars who moved to Urumqi, to get
more of a secular education, see that secular education is the
most important thing for themselves and for their people,
because it is only by competing with the Han people and
learning the Mandarin language that they can compete on a
national level. So there is friction between intellectuals, for
the most part, who are predominantly secular, and locals, who
see Islam as being part of their heritage. The Chinese
Government is fearful that Islam can become more
fundamentalist. However, just as we in this county have
religious schools, such as Catholic education where both
secular education and religious education are taught at the
same time, this can be developed and should be encouraged to
develop in Xinjiang. But religion is very much a part of who
the Uighurs are. Even those secular Uighurs will say that they
are Muslim, even though they might not practice. I guess it is
akin to Jews, with my own faith. Many Jewish people will say
that they are Jews, even though they do not practice the
religion. But Chinese see Islam and fear its power, and it does
have a power to unify people in ways that China believes can
get out of control.
Mr. Wolf. Dolkun.
Mr. Kamberi. Yes. You already brought out many points about
Islam in the Autonomous Region. It has already become a part of
the Uighurs daily life, and the culture and custom. The people,
actually as Dr. Rudelson pointed out, a lot of intellectuals
are not practicing, but they identify themselves as Islamic as
one of the very important identities of the Uighur people, is
seen as threatening to the Chinese Government.
Mr. Rudelson. The interesting thing though is, it does not
threaten the Chinese Government for the Hui people, or the
Tungans as they are known in Xinjiang. Because the Chinese see
that they are culturally closer to the Han peoples and they
speak Mandarin. They do not speak a Turkic language; their
language at home is not Arabic. So China sees them as being
part of a Han cultural sphere, whereas, the Uighurs are
completely on the outside of that, so that is what China sees
as more of being part of a Central Asia sphere.
Mr. Wolf. Thank you. John.
Mr. Foarde. I wanted to let you pick up, Justin, on your
points about road and rail development in far western Xinjiang
splitting the Uighur nation, and get into that a little more
deeply and tell us what you meant by that, please.
Mr. Rudelson. When I first was in Xinjiang in 1985, I
noticed that there were very significant differences between
the Uighur people. Some would say it is just like the
differences between New York, Los Angeles, and Texas. But there
are strong differences between the Uighur people. So in my own
research, what I found is that through history, while the
Uighurs were part of an area within what is now Xinjiang, they
were often drawn outward across borders, rather than focusing
inward toward one another. So Uighurs in the far east of the
region were more aligned with and worked with China in trade,
than were, say the Uighurs in Kashgar with what is now
Uzbekistan. Most scholars looking at the region, because there
are so many high mountains, thought that the Uighurs focused
inward. And indeed, politically, the Communist Chinese
Government closed off a lot of borders so that the Uighurs were
forced to focus inward. In 1985, China opened this region to
international trade and tourism, and it started focusing
Uighurs outward across the borders again. And so I started
looking at whether this development and international
development would essentially start splitting the Uighurs
apart, allowing the Chinese Government to control them more
effectively because of the difference in the Uighurs and the
fissures that developed between them. This is a complex
situation because while there are things that are drawing them
apart, and drawing their focus across the borders, there are
other things such as HIV/AIDS, and the ``Strike Hard''
initiatives and the clampdown in Islam, that focuses people
together. So it will be a question in the next few years
whether the Uighurs will really solidify, as their name really
means, ``confederacy'' or a ``union,'' or whether the union
will attenuate over certain geographic lines.
Mr. Kamberi. I did not see that. I did not see that the
Uighur in the future would be dividing because of natural
division of the land. Natural division of land, of course
creates different culture and art and, also linguistic dialect
in the region. But right now, I do not see any big difference
between the Southern Uighur and the Northern Uighur. They are
all the same in terms of their cultural identity. And also
their political identity, linguistic identity, and religion
identity, it is the same. I do not see the split coming.
Mr. Foarde. Interesting. Thank you. We spoke a little bit
just a minute ago about levels of religious practice among
Uighurs as Muslims. Are Uighurs allowed to make the Hajj
pilgrimage? And if so, roughly how many go every year, and what
is making those numbers either large or small?
Mr. Kamberi. I do not have specific numbers on how many
each year, but in terms of do they do the Hajj, yes, it is yes.
It used to be more during the 1980s. The procedure has changed.
Travel agents can organize, but recently up to 1997, especially
after recent events, it is only with approval from government
officials. Some of the private sector go to Hajj, only if they
go to Central Asia first. But I do not have specific numbers.
Mr. Rudelson. In the 1980s, it was around 2,000 or 3,000 a
year. Usually people needed almost $6,000 to $12,000 to make
the trip. Because they needed dollars, they sent out young
family members out to the coastal cities, Shanghai, Beijing to
trade money, so they would have the dollars and this would help
the people on the Hajj. A very interesting aspect of the Hajj
is, in the late 1980s--and I think this continued through the
1990s--it was very important for certain local Communist
officials to make the Hajj, because they would come back as a
Hajji. Even though they did not believe in Islam, they would
officiate at certain events and it was more of a pro forma.
This is Uighur tradition as opposed to religion. And that
separation for the Uighur Communist leaders still goes on
today. I think the number of Hajjis has gone down to maybe
fewer than 1,000 today.
Mr. Kamberi. I would add only one thing and that is on the
age. They only allow people over 50 years old and older, right
now to go.
Mr. Wolf. Thank you. Matt.
Mr. Tuchow. I think earlier in your testimony you indicated
that there were only 13 Uighurs who were involved with the
Taliban. I am wondering if the numbers are really so low, why
are the Chinese striking so hard?
Mr. Rudelson. Well, the ``Strike Hard'' campaign started in
1996. So it is sort of unrelated. But the ``Strike Hard''
campaign began when China could strike hard. It knew that there
were incremental bombings, one or two a year. For instance,
there was a bombing in Urumqi on Deng Xiaoping's funeral on the
day and hour of his funeral. It showed that the Uighurs were
not afraid to embarrass China. When it joined the Shanghai
Five, it was allowed to do whatever it needed to do to control
the Uighurs within the Xinjiang region, or Uighur elements, as
well as in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan where Uighurs were,
separatist elements also handled by their governments. So the
idea was that China could strike hard and none of the other
Shanghai Five countries would say anything.
As far as Uighurs in the Taliban, I had been looking for a
good 4 months, trying to find the numbers and came up with 4
Taliban. I then met an Israeli intelligence officer who is also
a professor at Hebrew University, and he said that his count
was 13. The Chinese have said that there are over 1,000 Uighur
Taliban that have now infiltrated the rest of the Muslim
communities throughout China. No one that I have talked to says
that that is possible at all. It has kind of demonized the
Uighur people. It has scared a lot of Uighurs. And I think that
is the reason for striking hard, and also for saying that there
are these contacts with al Qaeda and bin Laden and the Taliban,
just to stifle people into not doing anything.
Mr. Tuchow. Do you know what the numbers are on Uighur
nationals who now are political prisoners, imprisoned for
simply exercising their rights of speech or religion?
Mr. Kamberi. I do not have a number because of the Chinese
Government system. It is not allowed. When they arrest people,
they cover it up and they never allow journalists to go to get
statistics.
Mr. Rudelson. The one we do know about is Rebiya Kadeer,
who, of course, Dolkun mentioned, who is a very famous
activist. A millionaire, a rags to riches story, who met with a
Congressional staff delegation in Urumqi and was arrested 4
years ago, and sentenced to 8 years for passing documents to
her husband who is a dissident journalist living in Oklahoma.
She is now the Mother Teresa or the Dalai Lama figure of the
Uighur people. Because she started organizations for women--the
Thousand Women Movement--helping impoverished women better
themselves, women whose husbands left them, or whatever. When I
was in Urumqi in 1995, I saw anti-heroin posters. She has a 7-
story department store--and had anti-heroin banners outside her
building that she had put up herself. And this was the first
time that I started understanding how profound this HIV problem
was, through her.
Mr. Kamberi. I have not finished my statement on this
issue, actually. I say that we do not have official statistics
from the Chinese side, but we have information from traders who
cross the border to Central Asia who bring information.
Especially at the time in 1995, there was an event that is
unknown to the outside world because of the religious practices
crackdown by the Chinese Government.
Mr. Rudelson. Just to clarify, what happened in 1995, at
least the Chinese explanation, is that so many people were
praying in a mosque during the Kurban festival--the largest
festival when Muslims go to Mecca to make the Hajj--that they
were overflowing into the street, and were praying in the
street and blocking traffic. When the police came to try to
direct traffic, it became chaotic, and there was some
resistance. And when they went to arrest the cleric, it started
violence. That is at least the Chinese official description of
what happened.
Mr. Wolf. Thank you. Dave.
Mr. Dettoni. Thanks for your testimony. In the last panel,
one of the witnesses said that there is religious freedom in
Tibet. I know that from my boss' journeys to Tibet, that there
is a police officer or undercover agent in every seminary or
every temple. So he is not here to answer for himself. And I am
picking a fight with an empty seat. But nonetheless, my
definition of freedom is a bit different. And this is not just
to pick a fight. This leads into a question to you. How are the
mosques in the Uighur areas; are there police officers,
undercover security? How would you describe from your
experiences freedom of religion? Are they being watched? Are
there repercussions for practicing their faith?
Mr. Kamberi. It is hard to define. There is no religious
freedom in China. Of course, there is no religious freedom in
the Autonomous Region. And it is because they only allow
certain people to practice, especially in the government. After
1990, if you work for the government, you are not allowed to
practice religion. Even some kind of cultural form of religious
practice is not allowed.
Mr. Rudelson. In general, Uighur children are allowed to be
trained in basic prayers up to the age of about 6. Then they
are sent to secular schools. Most go for 5 years. Then at age
11 education stops. This is what is causing a lot of the HIV
problems. There is just nothing for a lot of kids to do except
get high on glue or gasoline or shoot heroin.
As far as mosques, as one of my scholar friends says, they
are X-rated. If you are below the age of 18 years you are not
allowed to enter a mosque. When you go in you will see a sign
in Uighur that says if you are under 18 you are not allowed in.
There is one school to train mullahs in all of Xinjiang. All of
the mullahs, at least the ones at the famous mosques, are
trained. And they know how to behave in order to continue as
mullahs under the system.
As far as the power of Islam. In 1990, I was in Turpan
again, and I was at a wedding. There was lots of alcohol at the
wedding, people dancing, men and women together. One individual
got a little bit too drunk and attacked another guest at the
wedding and killed him with a knife. The repercussion was that
the mullah said, whoever had a wedding with alcohol and dancing
in the future, they would refuse to bury that person's father
and mother in a religious way and in a religious cemetery. So
that was the start of really asserting that kind of power. The
government, several weeks later, cracked down and read the
mullah the riot act, that he had to perform religious funerals.
He could not have that kind of power to make that decision.
Most people who are retired, even if they are not
religious, gravitate toward being religious. Being at the
mosque five times a day is, in some ways, a social way of
getting together and being together. For the government, they
are not a threat. The elderly are considered fine, as far as
their practice. So there is, to some degree, religious
practices that are allowed--whether it is completely free, and
there are a lot of strings attached--it is difficult to say.
During that period from 6 to 18 years of age, they are not
allowed to practice Islam at all, and those who do, and do it
secretly can be arrested, and are arrested.
Mr. Dettoni. But are there undercover surveillance officers
in almost all the mosques? Are they being watched?
Mr. Kamberi. Yes. The answer is yes. Religious freedom in
the Uighur Autonomous Region is hindered since the Chinese
Government studied how many mosques have been opened, how many
mosques have been built. And every imam and mosque is governed
by the government, and the imam himself is not well-educated in
the Islamic religion. If you have more knowledge to interpret
it deeply, you are not allowed. In the Chinese newspapers they
say that they have religious freedom, you have open mosques in
each city, people still go and pray. Yes, in terms of that it
is limited practice, just like the Falun Gong.
Mr. Rudelson. There is also a syncretic religion, which is
interesting. There is a lot of Shamanistic practice that goes
along with Islam. The use of fire in purification and
cemeteries, and sometimes at night, you would go out and see
people burning cotton in bottles, sending medicines to heaven,
which kind of surprised me. You will see dead birds hanging in
trees with money, something that is completely antithetical to
Islam, yet practiced there.
As far as the Public Security Bureau [PSB], there are a lot
of informants, people that just see things and use things for
their own strategic benefit within society. So you do not have
to have the Public Security Bureau, people can inform on each
other. Because after the Cultural Revolution, there is a lot of
distrust among people even today.
Mr. Wolf. Thanks. Anne Tsai.
Ms. Tsai. Thank you for your testimony. I was just curious
as to if there is any continuation of local grassroots
activities to address public health issues such as what Rebiya
Kadeer had done, or did that completely get shut down in the
last few years? And also any types of NGO activities outside of
the Red Cross addressing public health issues and other areas
that NGO activity might be helpful in.
Mr. Rudelson. In the public health area--that is what I
have been looking at most extensively recently--Australia is
doing an incredible amount of work in Xinjiang. There are a lot
of Uighurs who emigrated to Australia because it is like
Xinjiang, it has got a lot of desert, it is very far away from
danger, and it is safe and peaceful and beautiful. So
Australian Aid--AUSAid--is very strong there. The Australian
Red Cross is also very strong there. And they are the major
player right now in public health. Johns Hopkins University is
doing some work, but it is very small, prevention trials. Yale
University has a small clinic that treats pregnant Uighur
women. As far as NGO and investment, Xinjiang is the lowest, or
the last, ranked of all of the regions of China in terms of
direct foreign investment.
I am part of a project called the Xinjiang project at Johns
Hopkins-SAIS [School of Advanced International Studies] and one
of our economists found that in fact, China's Northwest
Development Project is just really a slogan, that there really
is not much development going on in Xinjiang at all. And in
fact, she found that Xinjiang is falling apart economically,
that a lot of the state farms are falling apart. And so there
are a lot of Han who might be leaving soon to get back into the
interior of China, which I assume, would make some Uighurs
happy. But it is a difficult situation for them.
The other situation I wanted to bring up is the question of
the military. An Israeli scholar found that, in fact, China's
military is not very strong in Xinjiang. Whenever we look in
this area, the actual military situation is a complete shock to
most of us working in this area. He found that the military
there is composed of the young recruits, the weakest and
smallest numbers of forces. Xinjiang is really seen as a place
to absorb foreign forces. They will let them come across
Xinjiang and then put up a stand in Gansu or Qinghai, or
somewhere else. Xinjiang is not heavily defended so the
``Strike Hard'' campaign is very similar to the Rodney King
days of Los Angeles, where there is a rapid attack force that
comes in and puts something down very hard and scares people
tremendously so that they will not create further problems. And
that is a very different way of seeing this region in terms of
security and stability.
Ms. Tsai. In terms of ``Strike Hard,'' does the Production
and Construction Corps play a large role in that or is that
mostly left to the PSB?
Mr. Rudelson. The Production and Construction Corps are
pretty much getting old. They are producing about one-third of
the gross domestic product coming out of Xinjiang from the
farms. But the farms themselves are having a lot of problems,
very much like the state farms of the former Soviet Union,
Russia today. But their function as a military force is not
that strong at all.
Ms. Tsai. Thank you. Dolkun, do you have anything to add to
that?
Mr. Kamberi. Yes, bing tuan [Xinjiang Production and
Construction Corps] is controlling a lot of things. It might
not seem as strong a military force, as Justin said. But if
there is a war, yes, they have a very strong military because
they have been training secretly. And also they control the
economy of the vast Uighur Autonomous Region. Recently they
wanted to reconstruct the bing tuan as a business corporation,
to try to control the economy of the Uighur Autonomous Region.
And also, I will point out that I do not see the Chinese going
back, as Justin said, because of the failing economy. Recently
we saw that another big project has started, the gas pipeline
project, from Tarim Basin to Shanghai. It is a 4,000 kilometer
pipeline and it is a $40 billion project. And China has decided
to start that project. Many Uighur people see that project as
resource exploitation, because they are not benefiting from it.
The Uighur people are asking questions. Why did they build the
pipeline just around the Tarim Basin, only benefiting the 10
million people there? It would cost less and could have been
built faster, and benefited the Uighurs too, instead of
spending $40 billion to run a long line to Shanghai. So the
Uighurs see that the Chinese Government is always trying to
benefit the Chinese first and not the Uighurs. And this is a
very serious problem right now.
Mr. Wolf. OK. Well, thank you very much. We have pretty
much come to the end. Does anyone have any final quick
comments? Dolkun.
Mr. Kamberi. I would like to suggest, if you can, as I said
because the Central Asia Uighur culture, is a part of the
overall culture and they have a long tradition of culture, we
should preserve it. Preserve the culture. And I would suggest
establishing a research institution. When I look at the
University in that Autonomous Region, in the history
department, there is no teaching of Central Asia history,
Uighur history. And of course we can do something about that,
and establish a department at the research institution.
Mr. Wolf. Thank you. Justin.
Mr. Rudelson. I think the issue of Rebiya Kadeer is very
important. I see her as being a real dynamic force for the
Uighur people. The way she organized her business, her
education establishment in her department store, she sent
several Uighurs to the United States, she helped thousands of
women. Having her let out and having her come here, or stay in
Xinjiang and be able to do good things, would be very important
for the Uighur people.
I think, in general, China really needs Xinjiang. It is a
place for mineral extraction, for wealth, for oil and gas.
China is profoundly in need of mineral wealth and will be
trying to get a lot of mineral wealth from Russia and have it
transfer across Xinjiang to the eastern part of China. So, the
region is important. It is important to emphasize Xinjiang's
development and development of the local people will have an
impact on the Uighurs, not just on the Han that are coming in.
I am extremely worried about the HIV/AIDS situation, which
I think I made clear. I think it will have a tremendously
devastating impact on the region if something is not done
quickly. It must be done without anti-retroviral drugs, these
drug cocktails. It has to focus on boosting the immune system
through traditional Chinese medicine, traditional Uighur
medicine, boosting nutrition of the Uighurs. There is mono-
cropping there so most Uighurs eat bread and tea as their main
staples. All that needs to be changed. And then education,
education, education to change the drug problems.
Mr. Wolf. OK, well thank you very much. This has been very
useful. It is a subject that is all too little addressed in the
United States. I think we all know that this is one of the many
reasons that the problems are so severe, because the outside
world has not paid very much attention. RFA [Radio Free Asia]
is there, there is a handful of scholars in the United States
and in Europe looking at these issues. I hope we can, through
this roundtable today, and through our report in October, at
least help a little bit in sustaining U.S. attention on what is
a very difficult problem.
With that, thank you very much for helping us move a little
bit in that direction as we prepare our report and try to put
some recommendations together. If you want to follow up with
any further thoughts, especially concrete ideas, as to how this
Congressional-Executive Commission, with its recommendations to
the Congress and to the President, may be able to do something
that would help the every day life of Uighurs, feel free to get
in touch with us. Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 4:50 p.m., the hearing was concluded.]
A P P E N D I X
=======================================================================
Prepared Statements
------
Prepared Statement of Bhuchung K. Tsering
june 10, 2002
Thank you for the opportunity to talk about the situation in Tibet
at this roundtable. I would like to focus on some recent developments
in Tibet and to speculate on what they mean in terms of China's
strategy toward Tibet. My hope is that this would be of some use to the
Commission and its staff as you draft your recommendations to the
Congress and the Administration on responding to the changing situation
in Tibet.
Since the Commission has been set up specifically to give
recommendations to the U.S. Government to help improve human rights and
support the development of the rule of law in China, I believe it
should not hesitate in promoting ideas, which even require policy
changes if it believes that is where the solution is.
The United States needs to adopt a holistic approach toward the
Tibetan issue. Attempts to improve the human rights situation needs to
be incorporated with efforts to resolve the broader political problem
in Tibet.
The Chinese authorities have made a subtle change in their policy
on Tibet. In addition to the policy of outright suppression of
Tibetans, they have intensified their control through assimilation and
incorporation of selective aspects of Tibetan life, including in the
academic and economic fields.
China seems to have realized that it is not in its interest to
ignore the international interest in Tibet. Therefore, the Chinese
authorities have chosen to release some Tibetan prisoners who they hope
will help improve their international image. They are also undertaking
economic development projects in Tibetan areas, which on the face of it
are aimed for the welfare of the Tibetans but have the dangerous
possibility of helping to dilute the distinct linguistic, cultural and
religious identity of the Tibetan people.
The Chinese authorities are using the tactic of providing access
and economic incentives to governments, organizations and individuals
to encourage them to be sympathetic to the Chinese perspective. China
has also been attracting Western Tibet experts to visit Tibet and
China, to participate in government-sponsored conferences, etc., all in
an attempt to provide subtle legitimacy to their policy in Tibet. The
silver lining in this development is that there are individuals and
organizations, which are taking advantage of this change in Chinese
attitude to undertake activities, which are of direct benefit to the
Tibetan people.
release of prisoners
To begin with the positive news, in the first 3 months of this year
the Chinese authorities released three internationally known Tibetan
political prisoners.
On January 20, 2002 Ngawang Choephel, a Tibetan ethnomusicologist
who was a Fulbright scholar, was released on medical parole after
serving more than 6 years of his 18-year sentence on trumped up charges
of espionage while documenting Tibetan performing arts tradition in
Tibet.
Ngawang Choephel's case had received the attention of many people
in the United States, particularly the Congressional delegation from
Vermont.
In February 2002, Chadrel Rinpoche, the former abbot of Tashi
Lhunpo Monastery and Head of the Search Committee for the reincarnation
of the 10th Panchen Lama, was released from prison. Although we do not
have exact information about his current whereabouts it is believed
that he is in Shigatse. Chadrel Rinpoche's prison term had been
completed and his release was expected.
On March 31, 2002, Tanak Jigme Sangpo, Tibet's longest serving
political prisoner, was released on medical parole in Lhasa. He had
served 32 years out of his 41-year sentence. The 73-year-old Sangpo is
currently staying in Lhasa with his niece. We have learned that Sangpo
is not getting satisfactory medical treatment.
clampdown on popular tibetan lamas
However, the above development does not seem to indicate that
Chinese policy on Tibet has changed for the better. In recent months
the Chinese authorities took actions to clamp down on certain Tibetans,
individuals who may not be widely known internationally but who have
been making tremendous contribution toward the welfare of the Tibetan
people.
In April 2002 a Tibetan religious teacher, Tenzin Delek Rinpoche
(lay name: Ngawang Tashi), was arrested on suspicion of involvement in
bomb explosions in Karze region of Kham in eastern Tibet (in present-
day Karze Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in Sichuan province). The real
reason for his arrest may have to do with his projects among the
Tibetans, which made him a popular lama.
Tenzin Delek Rinpoche supported local people in the reconstruction
of various smaller monasteries and a nunnery, and he was involved in
activities to provide homes and education for children from poor local
families. The authorities refused him permission to build a school and
an old people's home in one nomadic area. In the late 1990's, however,
he successfully set up a school in Lithang for both Tibetan and Chinese
children, mostly orphans, providing education to at least 130 pupils.
Tenzin Delek Rinpoche is not the first one to suffer because of his
work among the Tibetan people. In July 1999, a Tibetan scholar from
Amdo (Tsolho Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in present-day Qinghai),
Gyaye Phuntsog, was sentenced to 6 years in prison (and reportedly
released on medical parole) for the crime of ``damaging the stability
of the nation.'' Gyaye Phuntsog had founded a school, funded partially
by UNESCO, which caters for some of the region's poorest Tibetan
families and focuses on the study of the Tibetan language.
In October 1999 Gen Sonam Phuntsog, a well-known scholar and
Tibetan language teacher in Kham in eastern Tibet (in present-day Karze
Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in Sichuan province), was arrested in
what appears to be China's concern over his influence in the area and
over his apparent loyalty to the Dalai Lama. At the time of his arrest
he had been teaching more than a hundred monks at Dhargye monastery for
6 years. Sonam Phuntsog was popular among Tibetans because he ran
projects teaching Tibetan children about their religion as well as
Tibetan language. He had also helped in the renovation of some
monasteries in his region in the 1980's.
In September 2001, Khenpo Jigme Phuntsog, abbot of the monastic
complex of Larung Gar in eastern Tibet, was removed from the complex
against his will and is currently being held somewhere in Chengdu.
The monastic community known as Larung Gar near Serthar (in
present-day Karze Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in Sichuan province)
had the largest concentration of monks and nuns anywhere on the Tibetan
Plateau in recent years. In particular, the community attracted several
thousand Chinese devotees.
The latest news is the sentencing of Jigme Tenzin Rinpoche (known
as ``Bangri'' Rinpoche) and his partner Nyima Choedron for charges
including espionage and endangering State security.
They had been running the popular Gyatso Children's Home in Lhasa,
which had about 50 pupils between the age of 3 and 15, most of whom
were orphans. The orphanage had been supported through private
donations. Following their arrest the orphanage was closed down.
The Chinese authorities' action against these popular spiritual
leaders in Tibet can be attributed to the fact that they have been
unable to gain the respect and trust of the Tibetan people.
use of developmental programs to promote political objective
China has also been using developmental activities in order to
promote its overall political objectives in Tibet. Its Western Region
Development Program includes the railway project in Tibet.
The $3.3 billion railway project is said to be China's biggest
investment in Tibet. While the railways may have economic benefit, it
will also strengthen Beijing's political grip. ``The trains would allow
quick deployment of troops to put down Tibetan protests like those in
the late 1980's against Chinese rule and to guard the frontier with
India, which fought a border war with China in 1962,'' according to a
Western journalist who visited the construction area.
Chinese President Jiang Zemin told the New York Times a year back
the railway line was being constructed for political reasons.
Similarly, China has made revisions to its regional national autonomy
law of 1984 to say that the priorities of the central authorities
regarding the control and economic development of ``autonomous'' areas
would be implemented in accordance with a centralized plan. According
to the revised version resource extraction and major infrastructure
construction are to be the main priorities for minority nationality
areas and development will be carried out under the ``unified plans''
of the central authorities and according to ``market demand.''
The Chinese authorities have permitted modest development projects
in Tibetan areas being implemented by some Western NGO's. In many
cases, such projects seem to be benefiting the Tibetan people. The
International Campaign for Tibet's position on development in Tibet is
that all governments, NGO's and individuals undertaking projects in
Tibetan areas should see that their projects directly benefit the
Tibetan people and do not encourage the further dilution of the Tibetan
identity. They should also be carried out in a manner that reflects the
spirit of the priorities outlined in the Tibetan Government-in-Exile's
guidelines. Dharamsala currently encourages developmental projects in
the health and educational sector, particularly in rural areas. Similar
guidelines were incorporated in the Tibetan Policy Act, a comprehensive
legislation that is before the Congress.
recommendations
The human rights violation in Tibet is symptomatic of a bigger
political problem. Unless steps are taken to adequately address the
fundamental issue, mere release of a few prisoners or the
implementation of development projects in Tibetan areas will not
provide any lasting solution. Given this situation, our recommendations
to the Commission are the following:
(1) The Commission should ask the United States government to
consistently and proactively work for encouraging a negotiated
settlement to the Tibetan problem between His Holiness the Dalai Lama
and the Chinese leadership. The Dalai Lama is calling for a genuine
autonomy for Tibet. The U.S. Government should formulate a Tibet policy
based on all Tibetan areas, not just the Tibet Autonomous Region, in
recognition of historical fact, and current demographic reality.
(2) The Commission should recommend that the Congress pass the
Tibetan Policy Act in light of its programmatic and political
significance.
(3) The Commission should ask the Administration to have a
coordinated approach on Tibet, involving all relevant departments,
including Labor, Commerce and State. The Special Coordinator for
Tibetan Issues at the Department of State should be fully relied upon,
and should be involved in any aspects of US-China relations that could
impact Tibet, including issues of economic consequence.
(4) The US government should work multilaterally in developing a
united Tibet policy, including at the U.N. and other regional and
international forums.
(5) The Administration, Commerce in particular, should not promote
any U.S. corporate involvement in projects or investments, such as the
railroad, in Tibetan areas that are contrary to the interests of the
Tibetan peoples. The Administration should consider drawing up
guidelines on this and could look to those formulated by the Congress
in the Tibetan Policy Act as well as by the Tibetan Government-in-Exile
for the Tibetan perspective on economic development.
(6) The staff of the Commission should undertake a trip to the
Tibetan refugee community in India, Nepal and Bhutan, similar to the
trip that they took to Tibet. This will enable the staff to gain
information on the situation of the Tibetans in exile, the working of
the democratic Administration in Dharamsala, the thinking of the
Tibetan leadership in exile, information all of which will be useful as
you continue your dialog with Tibetan and Chinese leaders inside Tibet.
(7) We endorse the recommendations of the U.S. Commission on
International Religious Freedom contained in its third annual report
released in May this year. The Commission recommended that the U.S.
Congress should extend an invitation to the Dalai Lama to address a
Joint Meeting of Congress; that the U.S. Government should endeavor to
establish an official U.S. Government presence in the Tibetan capital,
Lhasa; and that the United States should urge the Chinese government to
provide access to religious persons imprisoned, detained or under house
arrest in Tibet.
______
Prepared Statement of Elliot Sperling
june 10, 2002
I am grateful to the Congressional-Executive Commission on China
for affording me this opportunity to appear before you. Over the course
of many years I have been engaged in the study of Tibet's history and
Tibet's relations with China, both historical and contemporary. I am
presently the chair of the Department of Central Eurasian Studies at
Indiana University and I have served as a member of the Secretary of
State's Advisory Committee on Religious Freedom Abroad (1996-1999).
The historical perceptions that underlie modern Chinese policies
toward Tibet are relatively clear: it is the position of the People's
Republic of China that Tibet became an integral part of China in the
13th century; that this sovereignty over Tibet was claimed by all
subsequent dynastic rulers; and that inasmuch as China has consistently
been a multi-national state, the fact that two of the three dynasties
involved in this rule were established by Mongols and Manchus has no
bearing on the question of Chinese sovereignty. With the collapse in
1911 of the last imperial dynasty, the Qing dynasty of Manchu rulers,
Chinese claims were taken up by the Republic of China and in 1949 by
the PRC, which was able to fully implement them. In May, 1951,
following military clashes that left Tibet with no real defense, the
central government of China concluded an ``Agreement on Measures for
the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet'' with the government of the Dalai
Lama that formalized Tibet's incorporation into the PRC.
This account of Tibet's history, an emotional and nationalistic
perception of Tibet as a centuries-old ``integral part of China,'' is
used to introduce almost all official Chinese polemics and arguments
about Tibet and its history, ancient and modern, and underpins China's
assertions about its place in Tibet. Suffice it to say, outside the
PRC, China's claim to continual sovereignty over Tibet from the 13th
century on are often disputed; and the existence of a de facto
independent Tibetan government under the Dalai Lama prior to 1951 is
often adduced to contradict that claim. Since the establishment of the
PRC the emotional element inherent in China's claim has been
significantly nourished by the ideological imperatives to be found in
the writings of Marx, Lenin, Stalin and Mao. The view derived from
their ideas holds Tibet's integration into China to be part of the
inevitable workings of History, as nations and peoples inexorably move
together. This is, of course, an idea that is now rarely, if ever,
overtly invoked or even seriously considered. It is sustained by
inertia as much as anything else and as such has served to solidify a
dogmatic attitude toward Tibet. None of this is meant to deny that
Tibet also has a marked strategic significance for the PRC. It occupies
a sensitive border area and thus, out of concern for stability
(including stability in other areas of the PRC that are potentially
restive), the Chinese government has clearly felt a need to integrate
it as closely as possible with the rest of the country. To that end
Chinese migration into the area is significant in the development of an
economy-albeit a Chinese-dominated one-that binds Tibet ever closer to
China. Be that as it may, in stating its case China has never based its
claim to sovereignty over Tibet on military or security concerns. It
has based it squarely on the historical argument.
The ideological considerations that I have described have exerted
an influence on the situation that is sometimes poorly perceived,
particularly when proposals for bridging the positions of the Chinese
government and the Tibetan government-in-exile are considered. On
several occasions the latter has put forward propositions for a special
status or condition for Tibetan areas within the PRC on the basis of
the distinctive nationality of Tibetans. These have been rejected for
reasons that can only be understood from an ideological perspective.
For China the great cultural and national differences between Chinese
and Tibetans cannot be a basis for special treatment within the PRC,
since these distinctions are in theory defined as superficial and
ephemeral, unlike the profound differences that China's ideological
theorists recognize between the social and economic systems in the PRC
proper and Hong Kong (or between the systems in the PRC and on Taiwan,
for that matter). Not surprisingly, the PRC rejects such propositions
(including proposals to lump all Tibetans in the PRC into one large,
Tibetan autonomous unit) since they are rooted in national distinctions
rather than in differences in social and economic development.
Moreover, moves to increase Tibetan political autonomy, which would
work against the increasing amalgation of the Tibetans with the other
peoples in the PRC, go against the Marxist sense of History's
direction; they are perceived by China to be ``reactionary'' in a very
basic way. In essence then, the Tibetan question is settled as far as
the PRC is concerned. The perception that the PRC has been
unforthcoming in offering creative solutions to the impasse that has
developed between it and the Dalai Lama's government in exile is
largely rooted in this stance. China is willing to bring in amenable
exile elements but sees no reason to do so other than on its own terms.
But for Tibetans opposed to Chinese rule the Tibet issue remains a
nationalist issue. This fact has been elided, by both the U.S.
Government and the Dalai Lama's government-in-exile. For the U.S.
Government, which has never recognized Tibet's independence, support
for Tibet is largely limited to political, human rights, and cultural
issues, which are not the crux of what Tibetan nationalist agitation is
aiming at. The Dalai Lama, through the Tibetan government-in-exile, has
willingly discarded a policy of seeking independence for Tibet in hopes
of reaching an accommodation with China that would allow Tibet internal
autonomy and preserve Tibetan culture. These approaches are
problematic, but both have been tied to calls for direct negotiations
between the Dalai Lama and the Chinese government. Indeed, over a
period of many years, the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government-in-
exile have focused much energy on seeking to have third parties
(including the U.S.) make clear to China that the Dalai Lama does not
seek Tibet's independence, so that negotiations might commence between
China and the Tibetan government-in-exile. However, China is well aware
of the Dalai Lama's stand; it simply sees no reason to deal with him in
order to resolve the Tibet issue.
As concerns the position of the United States, there has been a
certain myopia inherent in its perception. To wit, hoping that improved
political or material circumstances will alleviate Tibetan discontent
ignores a well-known dynamic. When a highly authoritarian State begins
to liberalize it is then that dissent spills over; we've seen this in
many situations (the lack of understanding of this process is no doubt
why so many Americans were perplexed about Gorbachev's lack of
popularity in the waning days of the USSR). As conditions improved in
Tibet, during the early part of Deng Xioaping's liberalizing break from
the Maoist past, we saw more, not less, discontent, because at heart
the core of the issue in Tibet is one of Tibetan national aspirations,
not material conditions.
The preservation of Tibetan culture as a U.S. foreign policy goal
also presents some problems. Tibetan culture, like any other, is
dynamic. Calling for its ``preservation'' automatically brings forth
the need for it to be defined, and this in turn leads to it being
viewed as a stuffed-and-mounted item fit for a museum. In fact, for
most people calling for the ``preservation'' of Tibetan culture, that
culture is largely equated with clerical and monastic life, or with
what might be termed folk culture. Tibetan culture does not need to be
frozen in time, but Tibetan cultural life needs to be protected from
measures that repress literary and artistic expression. In Tibet today
secular writers and artists-and they do exist-working with modern
forms, are every bit a part of the Tibetan cultural scene.
The focus on bringing China into negotiations with the Dalai Lama's
government-in-exile has also been mired in misperceptions. For its part
the Tibetan government-in-exile has often acted as if the sole obstacle
to talks was China's failure to understand that the Dalai Lama did not
advocate Tibetan independence. To that end, the government-in-exile
would often, as noted above, urge third parties to communicate to China
that the Dalai Lama sincerely sought a solution to the issue that would
leave Tibet within the PRC. However, with the simple goal of buying
time, China would decry the manner in which the Dalai Lama rejected
independence, demanding certain other concessions (e.g., recognition of
China's sovereignty over Taiwan) or displays of greater sincerity,
etc., none of which have been sufficient to meet with Chinese approval.
Though he has tried to comply, the Dalai Lama has, as a result,
actually become a significant actor in a strategy of delegitimizing
support for Tibetan independence. This has not made negotiations
imminent by any means, but it has undermined the position of Tibetan
activists in exile and inside Tibet agitating for Tibetan independence.
What has become clear (even, of late, to members of the government-
in-exile) in all this, is the fact that China's strategy is to look
toward a resolution of the Tibet issue via the death of the Dalai Lama.
Hence the tactic of buying time, which brings us to the ongoing
controversy over the Panchen Lama, the incarnate hierarch generally
considered second to the Dalai Lama within the Dge-lugs-pa sect of
Tibetan Buddhism (the sect of the Dalai Lamas). Chinese moves here have
been quite cynical: they involved the Communist-led government of an
officially atheistic country in the mission to discover the true
reincarnation of the Panchen Lama, who, in turn, would normally
recognize and enthrone the next Dalai Lama. What this clearly implies,
of course, is that the next Dalai Lama will be chosen, groomed and
educated in a manner according with PRC needs and PRC control. The
result has been the recognition in 1995 of one child (now held
incommunicado) by the Dalai Lama and another by the PRC authorities.
The latter lives in Beijing, with all the trappings of a Panchen Lama,
but is not accepted by many, if not most, Tibetans. Nevertheless, all
of this points to a sense, on the part of the Chinese government, that
whatever the inconveniences, China is capable of forging ahead in
Tibetan matters without the cooperation of the Dalai Lama; if the Dalai
Lama wishes to acquiesce and assume the ceremonial place that China is
willing to grant him, well and good. Otherwise it is of little
consequence to Chinese policies that he is not on board.
U.S. policy in pushing for negotiations between the Dalai Lama and
the Chinese government has largely followed the lead of the Tibetan
government-in-exile and seems not to be based on a clear-headed and
independent analysis of the situation. It does not significantly
reflected an understanding of China's decision to write the Dalai Lama
out of the picture. It is time to acknowledge that this indeed is the
step China has taken. Up through the end of the previous
administration, the Office of the Special Coordinator for Tibetan
Affairs proceeded in its work on the assumption that negotiations
between China and the Dalai Lama were feasible if China clearly
understood the Dalai Lama's rejection of Tibetan independence. As
noted, activity over the possibility of negotiations has simply been a
means for letting time pass until the present Dalai Lama is out of the
picture.
At the same time, Tibet remains a focus of attention for several
other reasons as well. As indicated above, the U.S. has oft-stated and
well-justified human rights concerns with regard to Tibet. There is no
doubt that imprisonment for dissenting political expression (most
commonly with regard to Tibetan independence) and State pressure on
religion, where there is a perception of a threat to State interests,
remain serious matters. There is often an overlap between these
concerns, as, for example, when loyalty to the Dalai Lama is at issue.
Most recently Tibetan areas within the PRC have witnessed increasing
restrictions on the activities of certain religious centers and
religious figures (e.g., the 2001 closure and expulsions at Gser-thar).
Over the last 2 years China has embarked on a project designed to
further the economic and social integration of the PRC's western
regions with the rest of the country. This project, the ``Great Western
Development Initiative (Xibu da kaifa . . .),'' has its own
implications for Tibet. It is important to note that while the project
does seek to address the stark imbalance in development that
characterizes the differences between areas such as Tibet and the
wealthy coastal regions in eastern China, it also has the potential for
spurring Chinese migration into Tibet and further Sinicization there.
Given that one of the elements in this enterprise is the construction
of a railway link to Lhasa, the Tibetan capital, this project could
greatly alter the situation in Tibet. And given the nationalism at the
core of Tibetan political activism, this project may well exacerbate
tensions, particularly in Lhasa and other urban areas, where Chinese
residents are an ever-growing majority of the population.
Ultimately U.S. policy must be based on what the actual facts about
Tibet are, not what we might like them to be. These include the fact
that the Tibet issue is at its core a nationalist issue, not one
centered around the improvement of material conditions; and the fact
that Chinese policy is not to seek a compromise with the Dalai Lama,
but to await his death and install a new Chinese-educated Dalai Lama.
China's perception and handling of dissent in Tibet continue to be
characterized by serious human rights violations. Until such time as
China can deal with Tibetan dissent-nationalist, religious, cultural,
etc.-in a manner commensurate with international norms of respect for
human rights, Tibet will be the focus of visible international concerns
and demonstrations.
______
Prepared Statement of Arthur N. Holcombe
june 10, 2002
I am pleased to have this opportunity to speak to you today about
the current situation in Tibet. Tibet remains a contentious issue in
the US, and one can approach the subject from many perspectives. As the
former Resident Representative of the U.N. Development Program in China
during the 1990's and the President of the Tibet Poverty Alleviation
Fund since February 1998, I have been engaged in development work in
Tibet since 1992. This has provided me with certain perspectives which
I would like to share on current economic and social trends there, and
on international assistance being provided to help improve the lives of
average Tibetans.
The Chinese Government reports that GDP in the Tibet autonomous
Region has expanded at an average annual rate of about 11.9 percent
since 1992, and that this is among the fastest growth in any Province
of China during this period. It also reports of progress being made to
develop main transport routes, expand electric power production,
upgrade telecommunications infrastructure and speed up of municipal
construction in major cities and towns. It also highlights the growth
of tourist numbers and earnings, and the expanding output in the
productive sectors, particularly commercial agriculture and minerals.
It also points to the progress in establishing basic health services
and education reaching most the population since 1959.
The Central Government is providing special financial and residence
liberalization incentives to attract outside entrepreneurs and
semiskilled workers to take advantage of economic reforms taking place
in Tibet, and to help force the pace of private sector investment and
growth. At the same time it is providing about 95 percent of Tibet's
capital and recurrent budgets, about the equivalent of $180 million
annually, to help compensate for the widespread local poverty and lack
of local revenue, and to ensure continuing economic and social
advancement. Most recently, the Central Government has been publicizing
its Western Development Campaign, which it indicates should help to
promote local development, welfare and economic stability among local
ethnic populations in Tibet and other Western Provinces, while helping
to develop their gas, oil and other natural resources of overall
national importance. In Tibet, the first big project under this
Campaign is the Qinghai to Lhasa railway link at an estimated cost of
20 billion RMB.
Rapid growth in Tibet has improved living conditions, particularly
for Tibetans and migrant Han and Hui Muslim people living in the urban
areas, and along main transport routes. However, it is important to
understand the distortions created by the present urban oriented market
economy growth taking place in Tibet, and the implications of such
urban orientation for most of the Tibetan population still living in
rural areas and depending on traditional agricultural and livestock
pursuits.
what are some of the distortions?
First, Tibet's rapid employment and income growth has been
primarily in the modern urban sector, and has been driven by a dynamic,
even cut throat, private sector in which Han and Hui Muslim populations
have been dominant. It has included Han farming populations that have
been instrumental in the development of a major peri-urban green house
agriculture that has sprung up around main urban areas. This urban
oriented growth has contributed to rapidly increasing income disparity
between urban and rural areas, and between Han and Tibetan populations,
as most Tibetans still depend for their livelihoods on relatively low
productivity subsistence agriculture and animal husbandry in rural
areas. This is acknowledged by the Government which estimated average
per capita family income in urban areas of Tibet to be the equivalent
of $606 in 1996, in comparison to only $117 in rural areas, and growing
at about 5 times the rate in rural areas.
Second, Government investment since the mid 1980's has given
priority to the development of infrastructure supporting economic
reforms and opening up in urban areas. This has resulted in inadequate
funds being available for rural economic and social infrastructure,
including rural credit, improved basic health services and education
and vocational skills training. Because Tibetans have not been provided
with opportunities to learn modern skills, the Government has found it
expedient to encourage increasing numbers of migrants with the skills
needed for its investment projects. Most rural Tibetan children today
don't advance beyond primary schooling, and rural Tibetan families tend
to underutilize existing basic health services because of their long
distance from villages, their high costs or the low quality of health
care being provided.
Third, the economic reforms and opening up have made it more
difficult for traditional Tibetan urban enterprises to compete with
better funded, more experienced and lower cost Han managed enterprises
in urban areas. There is growing evidence of Han enterprises, which now
constitute about 70 percent of all enterprises in Lhasa Municipality,
squeezing out Tibetan enterprises even in traditional Tibetan product
areas such as Tibetan clothing, furniture, painting, clothing,
restaurants and dry goods and food retailing. In Lhasa today, there are
about 340 officially registered Han enterprises in the ``handicraft''
sector, and only 28 Tibetan enterprises. Moreover, with the opening up
of Tibet to the outside, Nepalese entrepreneurs in Tibet have recently
been able to import high quality traditional jewelry and dominate the
local tourist trade in this area, undermining traditional Tibetan
artisan production.
Fourth, urban construction technologies and practices in Tibet have
advanced to modern earthworks, reinforced concrete and glass designs
and complicated construction machinery that are beyond the traditional
construction experience and practices of existing Tibetan construction
workers. A result is that most transport and urban infrastructure today
is built and maintained by outside, more highly qualified workers.
Fifth, Tibetan youth in rural areas are increasingly being
attracted to the urban areas with their higher paying employment
opportunities and more comfortable living conditions -but without the
skills needed to secure steady, well remunerated work. A consequence is
that they are increasingly getting into crime and other unlawful
activity. To some extent this problem is exacerbated by the lack of
business and vocational skills training facilities in Lhasa and other
urban areas to prepare urban Tibetan and Han youth for available jobs
in the modern sector.
Economic and social policies in Tibet are basically similar to
those set by the Central Chinese Communist Party and Government for all
Provinces of China. Thus, for example, Tibet has social policies that
call for:
elimination of absolute poverty among most disadvantaged
populations in most resource deficient areas;
universal access to basic health care, reinforced by a
Community Medical System health insurance program;
in rural areas, replacement of all 2 year community
primary schools with 6 year State primary schools, and by 2003, achieve
6 years of primary education for all rural primary school aged
children, and 9 years in urban areas;
introduction of vocational skills curricula initially in
1000 pilot primary and middle schools located in 21 counties;
winter village housing in proximity to health clinics and
primary schooling for all Nomads that presently don't have it by 2005.
It is hard to fault these policies, as they focus on improving the
human capacities and living conditions of the Tibetan ethnic population
in Tibet. The basic problem is that with the Central Government
development priority in Tibet being given to investment in urban
infrastructure supporting economic reforms, there hasn't been enough
money available to implement these laudable policies. Our concern is
that the Central and TAR Governments must allocate sufficient funds to
upgrade rural health and education services and to greatly expand
vocational skills training for Tibetans in rural and urban areas.
Unless they do, Tibetans will continue to be hurt rather than be helped
by the continued expansion of Tibet's market economy, and the new
railway to Tibet will only intensify existing migratory trends,
exacerbate ethnic income disparities and further marginalize Tibetans
in traditional economic pursuits.
To in part compensate for the limited investment in rural services,
the Government of the Tibet Autonomous Region has encouraged
international, bilateral and non-governmental organization donors to
support rurally oriented programs of direct benefit to Tibetan
communities. These have been largely in the basic health, education and
water resource development sectors, although some support to household
agriculture and livestock activities and vocational skills training has
also been provided. This assistance has been largely concentrated in
open rural counties around main municipal areas, and in the Qomolangma
Nature Preserve located in Southwest Tibet along the Nepalese border.
There have been some recent exceptions, including with Canadian CIDA
and our Tibet Poverty Alleviation Fund which have been encouraged to
work in closed counties of Nakchu Prefecture. I have attached to my
statement a partial summary of recent external assistance to Tibet,
which shows these overall patterns.
On behalf of TPAF, I had a meeting in April 1998 with Mr. Guo
Jinlong, the present TAR Party Secretary, at the time we were
developing the outlines of our assistance in Lhoka and Nakchu
Prefectures. He urged us to do everything we could to help poor Tibetan
households to participate in the expanding market economy in order to
benefit from the increased income and other benefits it offered. He
also indicated frankly that in Nakchu Prefecture the Government had not
succeeded in getting nomad households to participate more actively in
Tibet's cash economy. He indicated that the TAR Government would be
most interested to support any programs TPAF could develop that helped
to integrate nomads more closely with Nakchu's small, but expanding,
modern sector.
In this spirit, TPAF has given emphasis in its programming to the
provision of small loans to rural Tibetan households for investment in
new income generating activities, to rural and urban employable skills
training, to Tibetan enterprise support and development, and to reform
of rural education to include basic employable skills curricula. These
and other TPAF project activities are generally implemented jointly
with Tibetan staff employed at lower levels of Government. We believe
this helps to strengthen local capacity to continue implementation of
project activities after termination of our assistance. Our projects
are also designed to demonstrate ways Government and other donors can
enhance their support to Tibetan participation in the market economy
and modern sector in the future.
Other US NGO's have also been able to collaborate effectively with
the TAR Government and implement programs that help to improve basic
health and other human services of benefit to Tibetan communities.
While we all would like to see a reorientation of Central Government
and TAR resource allocations to be of greater direct benefit to Tibetan
families and communities, we believe that US NGO's have been able to
help improve working and living conditions for Tibetans in Tibet. We
also believe that stepped up US Government support to US NGO's
prioritizing Tibetan human development helps to signal the values and
social development priorities that we as Americans believe need to be
given higher priority in Tibet.
Thank you.
Major Donor Assistance to Tibet 1999-2002
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Donor organization Sector of activity Observations
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Australia....................... (1) Rural Health (1) Implemented by
Care, Water Australian Red
Supply Cross.
Development
(Shigatse).
(2) Support to IDD
Elimination
Campaign.
(3) HIV/AIDS (3) To commence
Control (Lhasa in 2002.
Municipality).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Belgium......................... (1) Training in Implemented by
essential drugs. Medicins Sans
Frontiers.
(2) R&D in Kashin-
Beck Big Bone
Disease.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Canada.......................... (1) Mixed farming
and Nomadic
Livestock
Development,
Reproductive
Health, and
Environmental
Protection (Lhoka
and Nakchu
Prefectures).
(2) Many small (2) Implemented by
Canada Fund local
projects. governments.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
European Union.................. (1) Irrigated (1) Originally
Agriculture, developed and
Health and approved in mid
Education 1992.
Development
(Panam County,
Shigatse
Prefecture).
(2) Vocational (2) Implemented by
Education the Tibet Poverty
Curriculum Alleviation Fund
Development in during 1999.
Four Rural
Vocational
Training Centers.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Germany......................... (1) Rehabilitation
of small rural
hydropower
Stations (Lhasa,
Lhoka and Lingzhi
Prefectures ).
(2) Vocational
Skills Training
(Lhasa
Municipality and
elsewhere).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Italy........................... Construction of Implemented by
hospital and Italian NGO
primary schools. Associazione per
la Solidarieta
Internazionale in
Asia (ASIA).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Netherlands..................... (1) Pasture (1) Implemented by
Rehabilitation, TPAF.
Village Wells
Development,
Midwife Training,
Urban Skills
Training.
(2) Sustainable (2) Implemented by
Community The Mountain
Development in Institute.
Qomolangma Nature
Preserve.
(3) Water Supply.. (3) Implemented by
ASIA (Italian
NGO).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
New Zealand..................... Poverty Implemented by TAR
Alleviation in and Lhoka
Lhoka Prefecture. Prefecture
Governments.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Norway.......................... Preventive Health Implemented by
Care--Kashin-Beck Medicins Sans
(big bone) Frontiers.
disease.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
United States................... (1) Health and (1) Implemented
Nutrition. TERMA Foundation.
(2) (2) Implemented by
Entrepreneurship The Mountain
Development. Institute.
(3) Improved Eye (3) SEVA.
Care.
(4) Education and (4) Implemented by
Training. Tibet Fund.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
UNDP............................ (1) Integrated (1) Implemented by
Rural Development- national and
QNP area. local government
units.
(2) Improved (2) Financed by
design of Tibetan the Government of
Artisan jewelry Finland
and other Observations.
products.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
UNICEF.......................... (1) Basic Health Implemented by
and Nutrition. national,
regional and
local government
units.
(2) Primary
Education.
(3) Microfinance
for Women.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
United Kingdom.................. Rural Health Care, Implemented by
Education and Save the
Water Supply Children, UK.
(Panam County,
Shigatse Pref.).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
WHO............................. (1) Workshops on Implemented by WHO
health education and TAR Health
and printing of Bureau.
health materials.
(2) Cold chain and
safe injection
project.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ford Foundation (USA)........... (1) Reproductive Implemented by
Health. TPAF.
(2) Vocational Implemented by
Skills TPAF.
Development
(Nakchu
Municipality).
(3) Enterprise Implemented by The
Development. Mountain
Institute.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Future Generations (USA)........ Primary Health Located in
Care, other. Qomolangma Nature
Preserve (South
West Tibet).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Kadoorie Charitable Foundation (1) Microfinance, (1) Implemented by
(Hong Kong). Reproductive TPAF.
Health Training,
Urban and Rural
Skills Dev't.
(2) Child (2) Implemented by
Nutrition. TERMA Foundation.
(3) Small Business (3) Implemented by
Development. The Mountain
Institute.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SEVA (USA)...................... Rural Eye Care.... US Government
Funding.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Swiss Red Cross................. Rural Health Care. Implemented with
and by Shigatse
Prefecture.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Mountain Institute (USA).... (1) Sustainable (1) Netherlands
Community and US Government
Development Funding.
Qomolangma Nature
Preserve (South
West Tibet).
(2) Assistance in (2) Ford
small enterprise Foundation
development. funding and
other.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tibet Poverty Alleviation Fund (1) Small loans to (1) Funded by
(USA). abut 1,000 Kadoorie
families in Charitable
Nakchu and Lhoka Foundations
Prefectures). (KCF).
(2) Development of (2) Funded by Ford
TAR Safe Foundation.
Motherhood
Strategy,
township doctor
and village
midwife training.
(3) Rural and (3) Funded by KCF,
Urban Vocational Dutch Government,
Skills Training. Bridge Fund.
(4) Introduction (4) Funded by
of Vocational anonymous US
Curricula in foundation.
Pilot Primary and
Middle Schools of
21 counties.
(5) Clean water (5) Funded by
supply in 14 Dutch Government.
villages (Nakchu
Prefecture).
(6) Tibetan (6) Funded by KCF,
Artisan Bridge Fund.
Enterprise
Development.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The TERMA Foundation (USA)...... Child Nutrition, US Government
Maternal and Funding and
Child Health, other.
Tibetan Medicine,
TB, and Rickets
Prevention.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tibet Heritage Fund............. Preservation of Implemented with
Old Lhasa City Lhasa Municipal
area. Government
(Terminated by
TAR Government in
2000).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Trace Foundation (USA).......... (1) Technical (1) Implemented by
Training for Tibet Heritage
Restoration and Fund.
Rehabilitation of
Old Lhasa City
area.
(2) Primary
Education
(Nakchu).
(3) Micro-
enterprise
development
(Dingjie County).
(4) Handicraft
Training (Lhoka
Prefecture).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Prepared Statement of Dolkun Kamberi\1\
Thank you for inviting me here to discuss Uyghurs and Uyghur
identity. I have divided my presentation into nine topics: an
introduction, Uyghur people, the linguistic identity of Uyghurs, the
cultural identity of Uyghurs, the artistic identity of Uyghurs, the
musical identity of Uyghurs, the historical Identity of Uyghurs, the
regional Identity of Uyghurs, and a conclusion. It is very difficult
for me to draw a complete picture of the subject in 10 minutes, but I
will do my best to summarize. The full text also will available soon on
the Internet and in print.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Dolkun Kamberi, director of Radio Free Asia's Uyghur service,
earned his M. Phil. and Ph. D. degrees from Columbia University and
completed post-doctoral work at the University of Pennsylvania. His
specialty has been Silk-Road archaeology and civilization. His career
has included work as a university professor, museum curator, and field
archaeologist. He has been published extensively in various languages
on the Silk-Road culture, history, religions, languages, arts and
archaeology. Prior to joining RFA, Dr. Kamberi was a scientific
consultant for the Natural History Museum of Los Angeles County, and a
visiting professor at the University of Pennsylvania. He has taught the
courses: ``History & Archaeology along the Ancient Silk Road,''
``History and Cultural of Central Asian Empires,'' ``Medieval Turkic
Languages and Literature,'' and ``Modern Uyghur and Uzbek Languages.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
summary
Today the land of the Uyghurs consists of the Tarim, Junghar and
Turpan basins, located in the center of Asia. The land has gained great
importance since early times because of its favorable geographic
location on the ancient trade routes between the East and the West,
connecting Greco-Roman civilization with Indian Buddhist culture and
Central and East Asian traditions. Burgeoning trade and cultural
exchanges gave Uyghur-land a cosmopolitan character marked by
linguistic, racial and religious tolerance. Uyghur culture and art has
developed not only on the basis of inheritance and preservation of
traditional culture, but also through cultural exchanges with others in
the East and West.
The name ``Uyghur-land'' denotes a geographical location rather
than a geopolitical entity. It is located in the eastern part of
Central Asia. Uyghur-land comprises about one sixth of China's
territory; it is now the biggest Autonomous Region of China. The Uyghur
region includes a great portion of Central Asia, from the northeast to
the southwest; it borders Mongolia, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Tibet, and India. Uyghur-land is not
only located in a strategic position on a vital communication line in
Central Asia-among three large imperial states China, India, and
Russia-it also has a unique geographic environment, rich natural
resources and special climate. Its arid climate has helped preserve
ancient tombs, mummies, petroglyphs and city sites, Buddhist caves,
innumerable cultural relics, underground antiquities, and treasures.
There are 24 different manuscripts using 17 ancient languages, writings
which were unearthed along with the Tarim and Turpan Basin oasis
cities, well known to scholars. In different periods people called it
``The Western Region'' in Chinese sources, ``Uyghuristan,'' ``East
Turkistan,'' ``Chinese Turkistan,'' or ``Chinese Central Asia'' in the
West. ``Uyghur Ali,'' found in a medieval Uyghur manuscript, means
``The Country of the Uyghur.'' In 1884, the Qing Dynasty Government of
China started calling ``Xinjiang,'' which means ``new territory.''
After 1955 the name ``Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region'' was given to
it by the government of China.
The basic meaning of the name Uyghur is ``unite,'' but it may also
be translated as ``union,'' ``coalition,'' or ``federation.'' The name
appeared first in records of the Orkhun Kok Turk inscriptions and in
early Uyghur. Later forms of the name can be found in medieval Uyghur,
Manichaean, and Sogdian scripts, and the Arabic script of the Uyghur
Qarakhanid and Chaghatay period. Apart from these Central Asian forms,
the name can be found in different periods and diverse texts in
Chinese, appearing in more than 100 translated forms.
The Uyghurs and their forefathers are an ancient group of people
who have inhabited Central Asia since the first millennium B.C. Their
ancestors can be traced in Chinese historical sources to the ``Die,''
``Chi Die,'' ``XiongNu,'' ``Ding Ling,'' and ``Gao Che,'' who lived in
the north of the Heavenly Mountain (Tangri Tagh), and along the Selenga
and Orkhun rivers. That territory later became known as the Uyghur
Empire. The Uyghurs have left historical traces along the ancient Silk
Road, and also in Chinese historiography.
The Uyghurs, earlier than other peoples in Central Asia, started to
settle and build cities. Certain kinds of evidence from both
archaeological excavations and historical records show that Uyghurs
lived a settled urban life, and adopted Buddhist and Manichaean
culture. Facts from Uyghur manuscripts indicate religious and cultural
interaction of medieval Uyghurs with other peoples of neighboring
countries. An important part of Uyghur literature is devoted to the
translation of Buddhist works from non-Turkic languages. That is one
reason why so many borrowed words from different languages appear in
medieval Uyghur language.
About early Uyghur culture and its history, Kingdom Professor Denis
Sinor wrote: ``The kingdom of Khocho [Idiqut Uyghur Kingdom], ruled by
the Turkic Uyghurs, was multiracial, multilingual and [it] permitted
the peaceful coexistence of many religions. It enjoyed a living
standard unparalleled in medieval Central Eurasia. . . . Among the
non-Muslim Turkic peoples, none has reached the degree of civilization
attained by the Uyghurs, and they developed a culture in many respects
more sophisticated than that of most of Muslim Turks. In the visual
arts, they continued a tradition, non-Turkic in origin, of which they
maintained very high standards. The script they used gained widespread
acceptance both to the east and the west. The Uyghurs undoubtedly wrote
one of the brighter chapters of Central Eurasian history.''
German archaeologist A.Von Le Coq removed many wall paintings,
which were shipped in several hundred cases to Berlin. British
archaeologist Aurel Stein, who visited Bezeklik at the end of 1914,
indicated that, in terms of richness and artistry, no other finds from
similar sites in the Turpan Basin could match those of Bezeklik, which
parallel the rich ancient paintings of the Dunhuang Thousand Buddha
Caves. Professor Albert Grunwedel (1856-1935) writes in a letter dated
April 2, 1906: ``For years, I have been endeavoring to find a credible
thesis for the development of Buddhist art, and primarily to trace the
ancient route by which the art of imperial Rome, etc., reached the Far
East. What I have seen here goes beyond my wildest dream. If only I had
hands enough to copy it all, [for] here in the Kizil are about 300
caves, all containing frescoes, some of them very old and fine.''
Historically the Turkic people have commonly used the Uyghur
literary language. The ancient Uyghur language, which was used in the
8th century during the Uyghur Khanate, is the same as the language of
Orkhun-Yenisay inscription, which is called ancient Turki. As we know,
until the 14th century, the ancient Uyghur literary language was
commonly in use among the Turki peoples. Shamsidin Sami the author of
Qamusul'Alam, wrote: ``Uyghur being most advanced in the cultural
development, their language was common literary language among the
Turki peoples. Since the period when Chaghatay Khan was in power, the
Uyghur language, which was called Chaghatay Tili, has been famous.''
Based on history, literature, religion, content, and the scripts of
Uyghur linguistic materials, I have classified the Uyghur language into
five different periods:
(1) Pre-historical Uyghur language, before the 6th CE. No written
material in Uyghur has been found so far, but the language came to us
through Uyghur oral literature, idioms, idiomatic phrases, folk
stories, folk songs, folk literature, and ancient mythology and legends
in other language records.
(2) Ancient Uyghur Language, 6th Century to 10th Century CE. Mostly
pre-Islamic literatures, which were influenced by non-Altaic language.
(3) Medieval Uyghur language, 10th-15th Century CE. Mostly Islamic
literature influenced by Arabic and Persian languages.
(4) Contemporary Uyghur Language, 16th-19th Century CE. Elishir
Nawayi's works represent this era.
(5) Modern Uyghur language, late 19th Century-present.
The modern Uyghur language belongs to the Ural-Altaic language
family, Turkic language group of the eastern branch. Among the major
six Turkic languages, the Turkish and Azari languages are very close,
Kazakh and Kyrgyz languages are closely related, and Uyghur and Uzbek
languages can communicate easily on simple subjects. The modern Uyghur
language has two major dialects: southern and northern.
According to the Chinese 2000 official census, the population of
Uyghur native speakers is near 9 million. But independent sources
claims Uyghur population is about 16 million. In the past 10 years, the
Han Chinese population in the region increased almost 32 percent. In
1949, Uyghurs accounted for more than 90 percent of the population
while the Chinese accounted for only 5 percent of the roughly five
million people in Uyghur-land. The Chinese population had increased 500
percent by the 2000.
The vast majority lives in the Uyghur Autonomous Region under
Chinese rule. There are large Uyghur-speaking communities in the
Central Asian Republics, Turkey, and smaller communities live in
Russia, Mongolia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and also in the West.
According to the Uyghur Autonomous Regional law, the standard Uyghur
language serves as the official language of the Uyghur Autonomous
government since 1955. But while more than 10 million Uyghurs live
throughout a vast region of Central Eurasia, the Uyghur language has
been greatly neglected by the international community. There are no
generally accessible Western publications or education in the Uyghur
languages and literature, except for a few early publications in
Russian, and some German and Swedish. Uyghurs have used more than eight
different writing systems from early medieval times to present. Now
they are using the Arabic script-based, Persian-modified modern Uyghur
writing system.
Among the states of Central Asia, the stateless Uyghurs
historically formed the leading group of the region for centuries. They
possessed a rich literature, strong economy and military, the ability
to conduct State affairs, and to help others solve conflicts. They
showed generosity and offered their hospitality. Uyghurs and their
ancestors built their reign under the rule of the Hun (2nd BCE to 2nd
CE), the Jurjan (3rd CE to 5th CE), and the Turk Empires (522 CE to 744
CE). Uyghurs also established their own states throughout history.
Their states include the Uyghur Ali (744 CE to 840 CE), the Idiqut
Uyghur (840 CE to 1250 CE), the Uyghur Qarakhan (10th CE to 13th CE),
the Uyghur Chaghatay (13th to 16th CE), the Yarkant Uyghur Khanate
(1514-1678), the Qumul and Turpan Uyghur Baks (from the end of 17th CE
to beginning of 19th CE), and the Yakup Bak (1820-1877), which lasted
until Qing's invasion. Uyghurs reclaimed Uyghur-land as the Republic of
Eastern Turkistan in 1933 and the Eastern Turkestan Republic from 1944-
49.
The president of Eastern Turkestan, Alihan Ture, was called back by
Stalin in 1946 to Russia and lived in Tashkent until 1976. His
successor, Ahmatjan Qasim (1914-1949), Eastern Turkestan army chief
general Isaqbeg (1902-1949), deputy army chief general Dalilkan
Sugurbayev (1902-1949), a member of Eastern Turkestan Central
Government Abdukerim Abbasov (1921-1949) died in a mysterious plane
crash on their way to Beijing on 22 Aug. 1949. (Abduruf Mahsum, the
general secretary of the State of the Eastern Turkestan Republic is
still alive in Almaty Kazakhistan). From 1946-1949, Russia and China
engaged in many governmental structure reforms in the Uyghur-land.
During the reforms, both Russian and Chinese government representative
promised again and again to the Uyghurs that the presence of the
Chinese army in Uyghur-land would promote democratization, free
elections, and high autonomy, to help build the new Xinjiang, and
achieve independence for Uyghurs in the future-as Zhang Zhi Zhong
promised at the summit of Chinese Nationalists, Communists, and Uyghurs
in Urumchi in 1946.
After 1950, several times ``the communist revolutionary moment'' in
China has touched almost every aspect of traditional culture,
especially crucial for Uyghur-land during the Cultural Revolution. The
revolutionists found that every aspect of culture in Uyghur-land was
different from that of China. That included languages, writing systems,
the arts, literature, ideas, values, attitudes, history, religion,
customs, music, dance, songs, the way that people thought, even the
features of people-their clothes, house decoration, and food.
The Government twice changed the writing system of the Uyghurs,
Kazaks, and Kirghiz, and punished all levels of educated intellectuals
four times in 50 years for political reasons. Furthermore, the
politicians reorganized and merged the Eastern Turkistan troops into
the Chinese Army units, and made the army units of former Eastern
Turkistan-as well as their generals and high-ranking commanders-
disappear after 1966.
Besides giving serious thought to Uyghur identity, another goal of
this presentation is to attract the attention of United States and
international community to Uyghur issues. Therefore, this presentation
also aims to present the evidence needed to understand Uyghur identity
better. The archaeological excavations and historical records show that
Uyghur-land is the most important repository of Uyghurs and Central
Asian treasures.
Indeed, there are only a few places in the world that can claim the
religious, linguistic, cultural, and artistic diversity at one period
that Uyghur-land can. Shamanism, Buddhism, Manichaeaism, Nestorianism,
and Islam flourished in the Uyghur-land side by side and one after
another along with the tradition of early Uyghur original ethnic cults.
Uyghurs are indigenous people of Central Asia; they have developed a
unique culture and arts that made significant contributions to the
Asian culture. The Uyghur intellectuals have struggled to renew and
keep their cultural identity since 10th Century CE.
After September 11, China increased Chinese military along the
Central Asian borders, and they sent more armed police and non-
uniformed security forces into the big cities of Uyghur-land to control
Uyghur people, intensifying already high tensions. Recently, Chinese
authorities have stepped up its ``Strike Hard'' campaign against Uyghur
dissidents. According to Amnesty International's 1999 and 2002 reports
on human rights abuses, the Uyghur region is only region of China where
political and religious prisoners have been executed in recent years.
Chinese Government has also put tremendous pressure on Central Asian
countries such as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, not to
support Uyghur political activists or harbor Uyghur dissidents. They
are pressuring Central Asian governments and Pakistan to return Uyghur
dissidents to China with accusation of terrorism.
The Chinese government simply labeled Uyghurs as terrorists and
tried to condemn two contemporary Eastern Turkestan republics,
established during the 30s and the 40s, as origins of terrorists. As we
know the terms ``terrorism'' and ``terrorist'' they are non-existent in
Uyghur general knowledge and in their language throughout history.
Modern Uyghur is using words directly borrowed from English terminology
for that notion.
There is recent disturbing news in Urumchi. Xinjiang University
plans to teach major subjects to Uyghur students in Chinese beginning 1
September 2002 and it has burned Uyghur books in Kashgar. Not one
Uyghur dared to comment publicly from the Uyghur-land regarding the
news, but there is a very strong reaction from the exiled Uyghur
community. Eyewitnesses saw the destruction of thousands of books
during May in Kashgar. The government-owned Kashgar Uyghur Publishing
House burned 128 copies of A Brief History of the Huns, and Ancient
Uyghur Literature, which officials view as fomenting separatism. It
also burned 32,320 copies of Ancient Uyghur Craftsmanship, also
regarded as promoting separatist religious beliefs, according to
sources in Kashgar. ``Burning these Uyghur books is like burning the
Uyghur people. Even under the Chinese constitution, these Uyghur books
should protected as part of Uyghur cultural heritage,'' said one local
Uyghur. According to the official Kashgar Daily, the Kashgar Uyghur
Publishing House has also censored more than 330 books and stopped
publication of other volumes. Another Uyghur intellectual sadly
indicated: ``Burning those Uyghur books recalls images of Hitler and
Chairman Mao's campaign during the Chinese Cultural Revolution.''
After carefully examining different aspects of Uyghur identity, I
deeply believe that neglecting Uyghur civilization is neglecting
Central Asian civilization; neglecting Central Asian civilization is
neglecting Asian civilization; and neglecting Asian civilization is
neglecting world civilization. In other words, destroying Uyghur
cultural heritage is destroying the world's cultural heritage.
It is time for the U.S. Government to pay more attention to the
seriousness of the political, economical, cultural, and religious
discrimination and abuses facing the Uyghurs, and the Tibetans. Wide
spread abuses of human rights, unequal treatment, unequal wealth
distribution, economical, ideological, cultural exploitation, and
joblessness are affecting almost every family of near 10 million
Uyghurs in China. Saving the Uyghur culture is like saving our own
culture.
I ask of you, the U.S. Government, to establish a coordinator in
the U.S. State Department on Uyghur issues to help consult the U.S.
Government on policymaking decisions regarding Central Asia and China.
The Administration should consider opening an U.S. consulate in
Urumchi. The State Department should establish an immigration quota to
help Uyghur refugees hiding out in Central Asia and surrounding
countries. And it should also establish an academic research
institution focusing on Silk Road civilization, and create more
educational opportunities in the United States for Uyghur youths. The
U.S. Government should coordinate with the United Nation and NGOs to
promote human rights and religious freedom for Uyghurs. The United
States should also put stronger pressure on China to release Uyghur
businesswoman Rabiya Kadeer. And periodically the United States should
send congressional delegations including Uyghur dissidents to Uyghur-
land to examine the State of human rights and religious freedom in the
Uyghur Autonomous Region. Furthermore, the United States should provide
funds for the Uyghur Non-Governmental Democratic institution.
Thank you for having me here today, and for your attention.
______
Prepared Statement of Justin Rudelson
june 10, 2002
China claims Xinjiang to be the front line of its own war against
international terrorism and maintains that Xinjiang harbors Uyghur
Muslim extremists intent on overthrowing Chinese rule with the backing
of Osama bin Laden's terrorist network. While it is true that that
China is invoking bin Laden's name to justify crackdowns on Islam in
Xinjiang and on the Uyghurs, Beijing's own ``war on terrorism,'' its
crackdown in Xinjiang has been going on with a vengeance since at least
1996, more than 5 years before September 11. This is because Xinjiang
has a greater potential than all other regions of China to cause
upheaval. In Beijing's view, instability in Xinjiang could bring
instability to Tibet, Hong Kong, and Taiwan.
Beijing uses ``affirmative action'' type economic rewards mixed
with political and military crackdowns, believing in a very Western
way, that economic development can undermine Uyghur calls for
independence and solve Xinjiang's problems. As part of China's Manifest
Destiny, Beijing believes it must fulfill its responsibility to
modernize Xinjiang. And economically, Xinjiang has thrived. In 1991,
Central Asian independence had little impact on the Uyghurs because
most Uyghurs recognized then and now that Xinjiang is a lot better off
economically than the countries of Central Asia.
Jiang Zemin's regime has arguably delivered China's most stable
decade in the last 150 years. However, the experimental nature of
Chinese development in Xinjiang opens it to risk. For example, as part
of its development plans, Beijing is connecting Xinjiang to Central
Asia's new trade, rail and road links with Kazakhstan and Tajikistan.
But these very openings are splitting the Uyghur Nation apart and
exposing Xinjiang directly to Islamic militants and the drug trade
emanating from these countries and beyond. In 1999, China completed the
South Xinjiang railway, connecting Urumchi to Kashgar to assist its
economic boom and settling large numbers of Han immigrants in this
traditional Uyghur area. Militant Uyghurs are certain to accelerate
violent action against these Hans and the trains that carry them.
Beijing's labeling the Uyghurs as terrorists and separatists with
connections to the Taliban, al Qaeda and bin Laden is a terrifying
appeal to United States anti-terrorism sympathies. So far, there is
evidence of only 13 Uyghurs involved with Taliban fighters, and we do
not know how many of these were from the Uyghur exile community in
Pakistan. To be fair, China is in a no-win situation. No matter what it
does to develop Xinjiang, many Uyghurs will only see it as a part of
colonialist domination. Each discovery of oil in Xinjiang leads to
Uyghur wealth being stolen. Each new road facilitates Han Chinese
immigration to the region.
Uyghur resistance to Beijing takes many forms. Some Uyghurs look
toward the Central Asian countries and ask why the Uyghurs do not have
their own state. In the oasis villages, many traditional Uyghurs
participate in the revival of Islam and Sufism. In the capital Urumchi,
some Uyghur intellectuals, who are primarily secular and fiercely anti-
Islamic, advocate blowing up all of Xinjiang's mosques because so much
of the Uyghur wealth is being invested in mosques rather than in
secular schools. Only a very few Uyghurs have turned to militancy. And
almost all of these militants are Uyghur secular nationalists, seeking
independence from China, whose struggle has no connection with Islam.
In the mid-1990's, Beijing unleashed campaigns against what it
called ``illegal religious activity'' and ``splittism'' or
``separatism'' that equated Islam with subversion. The security
alliance known as the Shanghai Five, now Shanghai Cooperation
Organization, which began in 1996, gave China extreme latitude to crack
down on Xinjiang's Uyghurs. Two months after the first Shanghai Five
meeting, China unleashed a ruthless police crackdown called ``Strike
Hard'' against Uyghur ``splittism'' that brought on a cycle of anti-
government resistance and harsh reprisals that continue today. Since
1996, one Uyghur has been executed in Xinjiang an average of every 4
days. Few Western countries have voiced concern.
By clamping down on all Islamic practice as fundamentalist or
potentially militant, China provides no moderate alternative and only
produces greater militancy among its Muslim populations. For example,
in 1997, Uyghur students in Ili, the most secular region in all of
Xinjiang, launched a grass-roots campaign against alcohol. Alcohol
addiction is destroying the Uyghur people. Uyghur students developed
the health campaign against alcohol to encourage liquor stores to stop
their sales and to get Uyghurs to end consumption. The government saw
the campaign as motivated by fundamentalist Islam and in the ensuing
clashes between police and students, an estimated 300 Uyghurs were
killed.
Besides alcohol, HIV/AIDS has brought the most devastating threat
to Uyghur survival as a people. The HIV/AIDS epidemic in Xinjiang will
develop into a significant geopolitical problem that warrants close
attention from the US. Heroin started coming into Xinjiang in 1994 from
Burma. Uyghurs initially smoked it but over the past few years began
injecting it, creating a nightmare AIDS crisis. Within a drastically
short time, Xinjiang has emerged as China's most seriously affected
region and the Uyghurs are the most affected of all of China's peoples.
Most of the Uyghur HIV sufferers become infected from intravenous drug
use. The data on HIV prevalence among intravenous drug users is grossly
underreported by as much as 5-10 times, with the rate of infection
increasing by about 30 per cent annually. Drug use in China, as in the
US, is a criminal offense. Clean needle exchanges are unheard of. Data
on drug use is obtained at police-run detoxification centers where drug
users are detained typically for about 2 months. Most addicts live
``underground'' to evade police detection.
In Xinjiang, there are no anti-retroviral drugs available. The
Uyghurs face an epidemic chain of infection, devastation, and
disintegration as the number of new HIV cases grows exponentially each
year. Public health systems are poorly positioned to stem the disease.
There are no hospitals in Xinjiang prepared to treat patients with
full-blown AIDS. Testing is prohibitively expensive.
Although international teams are working in Xinjiang with the
Xinjiang Red Cross, the programs are limited in scope with lack of
coordination or sharing of information among the various organizations.
Such coordination is crucial to prepare for the rising numbers of
Uyghur patients as they develop full-blown AIDS and as Uyghur
disaffection and anger mounts as the AIDS toll climbs. Young Uyghurs
infected with HIV/AIDS will feel desperate, enough perhaps to strike
out at Han and government targets as suicide bombers.
To deal with the AIDS nightmare in Xinjiang, China needs to partner
with international organizations such as NATO, along with international
health agencies to reduce opium production in Burma and Afghanistan. So
far, the entire supply of heroin entering Xinjiang is from Burma. Two
years ago, before the Taliban cracked down on its drug trade,
Afghanistan produced 75-90 percent of the world's opium supply. The
interim government of Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan is too weak to
prevent Afghan peasants from selling opium again. It will be difficult
for China to keep Afghan heroin from entering the Xinjiang market to
meet the huge Uyghur demand. When this happens, it will be
catastrophic.
The HIV/AIDS epidemic in Xinjiang and throughout the greater
Central Asian region is perhaps a more pressing concern as a security
issue than as a humanitarian one, warranting immediate attention from
the US and its allies. Xinjiang's HIV/AIDS situation alone, put within
the context of the regional HIV/AIDS epidemic affecting Russia, India,
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, and the Central Asian nations, starkly
reveals that China and the entire geopolitical region faces a security
issue of the gravest proportions. Note that in South Africa, where the
AIDS trajectory has reached its most extreme extent, the military
currently has an HIV infection rate of over 90 percent mainly spread by
contact with prostitutes. It is predicted that the military of all of
the nations in this region including China's will be profoundly
weakened within 5-10 years by HIV infection in the same way. The HIV/
AIDS epidemic is certain to dramatically affect Xinjiang and its
international neighbors, and will radically affect China's national
security and stability.
The treatment of opportunistic diseases associated with HIV/AIDS
such as Tuberculosis and sexually transmitted diseases are sure to wipe
out most, if all not all, of the economic gains that development will
bring to Xinjiang and the Central Asian region and will be an
impossible burden for the health care budgets of the greater Central
Asian states. Moreover, the under-funded and unreformed health systems
in the region are too weak to react to patients with full-blown AIDS, a
situation that could provoke rioting and militant action against
governments seen to be heartlessly unresponsive.
In order to assist in the fight against HIV/ AIDS in Xinjiang, and
to develop the region economically, two issues that are vital to
stemming militancy and terrorism, China should be invited as an
observer to G-8 meetings and eventually be invited to join the G-9. A
Western embrace of China is the only way to develop a long-term and
consistent overall strategy to prevent the further alienation of the
Turkic Muslim people of the greater Central Asian region including
Xinjiang. China's current approach to the global war on terrorism,
particularly its focus on anti-terrorism in Xinjiang among the Uyghurs,
leads Beijing to appear to be cynically using the September 11 tragedy
to repress its discontented Uyghurs. To change this perception, China
needs to become a partner with the US and Russia in peacemaking,
regional development, and the struggle against the HIV/AIDS epidemic,
not just in anti-terrorism.
-